Testimony - Kathy Dent

Supervisor of Elections Sarasota County, Florida

President of the Florida State Association of

Supervisors of Elections

April 16, 2008

for the

U.S. Election Assistance Commission

Commissioners:

I am honored to be invited to address this commission with a focus on an
integral, yet sometimes de-emphasized, segment of the voting process --
ballot design. As a local election official with hands-on involvement in
all aspects of conducting an election, I have been asked to walk through
the ballot design process from start to finish.

Prior to 2000 little attention was given to such factors as usability,
uniformity and voter interface in the design process. Then along came
the 2000 Presidential race with the "infamous" butterfly ballot. The
State of Florida, in a comprehensive election reform package, attempted
to address all of the issues that surfaced in the controversial election
where 537 votes decided the Presidency of the United States. One section
of that legislation created very precise specifications for ballots and
a charge to the Department of State to adopt rules "prescribing a
uniform primary and general election

ballot for each certified voting system." The rules were also to
incorporate:

-   Clear and unambiguous ballot instructions and directions

-   Individual race lay-out

-   Overall ballot lay-out and

-   The graphic depiction of a sample uniform primary and general
    election ballot form for each certified voting system.

This Florida Administrative Code rule became the standard for both the
precinct-count optical scanners and touch screens or DRE's, which became
the only voting systems allowable by law in the state. This rule
provided uniformity and ballot design using Sequoia, ES&S and Premier
voting systems, both optical scan and touch screen.

*The Pre-Design Preparation*

Before any ballot is created, there is a need to be familiar with the
documentation of the specific voting system. Having personally worked
with punch cards, touch screens, and optical scan systems, it is evident
that each system has its limitations and may not provide all of the
desirable flexibility in programming a ballot. Hard coding of many
facets of the system can create the need for software and firmware
upgrades just to make minor changes in ballot design. While these
changes may be an election administrator's priority, it is not always
the greatest priority of the voting equipment vendor.

Evaluating the impact that the spacing, placement of ovals or arrows,
and timing marks is to the tabulation process is essential in ballot
design. Determining how many folds or where to fold a paper ballot can
affect the processing of those paper ballots. Making a decision as to
how many races to place on a page of a touch screen may affect how an
individual voter interacts with the ballot.

Other ballot programming challenges faced are the recording of the audio
units, whether touch screen or AutoMark, in assuring the correct
pronunciation of candidate names is available and that there is no
inflection in voice which might affect a voter's choice; language
requirements and placement and pronunciation on ballots must be
reviewed; and where there is a blended system, realizing there is a
sequential order to programming a ballot -- with the touch screen, for
example, first the absentee ballot, then the DRE screen and finally the
audio portion. Any changes to one can impact the others.

Another pre-design consideration is the selection of the printing
vendor. One cannot just go to "Quickie Printing" around the corner.
Paper quality, availability of approved ballot stock, whether off-set or
laser processing is used, ink density and ink type must be taken into
account. (Florida law requires that marksense or optical scan ballots be
printed on paper of such thickness that the printing cannot be
distinguished from the back and shall meet the specifications of the
voting system that will be used to tabulate the ballots). Sometimes even
vendor-certified printing companies do not automatically meet the
standards necessary to avoid scanning issues. One such vendor-certified
company provided Sarasota with bad timing marks and ink that ran,
resulting in excessive duplication of ballots prior to tabulation.

The final pre-design preparation is certification by the Department of
State of the candidates nominated for placement on the ballot. If the
certification is incorrect or not delivered in a timely fashion, then
ballot preparation is delayed and critical time is lost in the printing
of the ballots.

Occasionally in Primary elections, there is a death, resignation,
withdrawal or removal of a nominee. There is a process for nominating a
replacement. If the new nominee is submitted after certification of the
ballot by the Department of State, the ballot is not changed and the
former nominee's name must appear on the ballot.

*Ballot Design*

After pre-design preparations have been made, then the actual design
begins, always in accordance with all statutes and rules. In Florida,
the title of the election must first be printed across the top of an
optical scan ballot and on the first ballot screen of a touch screen in
all caps bold.

Next, pre-prescribed ballot instructions must be printed directly under
the title on the front side of an optical scan ballot and for the touch
screen at any point before the listing of the candidates or prominently
posted in each voting booth.

Following the instructions, the uniform ballot design rule then dictates
that headings be used to designate races beginning with the President
and Vice-President, then Congressional, State, Legislative, and County.
Under those headings are listed the office titles and candidates.
Nonpartisan offices appear following partisan offices and before
constitutional amendments or other issues.

In Florida, ballot position is based on the number of votes received for
Governor in the last general election. Therefore, if Florida has a
Democratic governor, then democratic candidates are listed first and
vice versa.

Other design requirements include:

-   Headings and office titles must be in all caps bold.

-   Names of candidates must be in upper and lower case.

-   Under each office title must be printed (Vote for One), or where
    more than one vote is permitted, (Vote for no more than the \# to be
    elected).

-   When required, the appropriate abbreviation of a party name or no
    party affiliation must be to the right of the candidate's name, in
    all caps and not in parentheses.

-   No candidate race can appear in more than one column on an optical
    scan ballot or on more than one screen of a touch screen ballot.

-   On two-sided optical scan ballots the words "VOTE BOTH SIDES OF THE
    BALLOT" must appear on the bottom of the front and the bottom of the
    back of the ballot in all caps bold.

-   On touch screen ballots the language choice must appear prior to the
    first ballot screen.

-   Font sizes are based on the number of candidates and races on the
    ballot but no font or ballot image can be smaller than 10 point
    type.

-   If there are more candidates than will fit in one column or on one
    screen, or if the party or candidate name is too long to fit on one
    line in the minimum font size, then approval must be sought from the
    Division of Election prior to printing the ballot.

Upon completion of the ballot design, which is always conducted under
dual or tri-control, the layout design is proofed. Sometimes as many as
eight pairs of eyes review the ballot. Several staff members actually
read letter by letter the language on the ballot. If, for example, we
are conducting an election for a municipality, then the proof is also
sent to the city official to sign off.

The files are then shipped to the printer who supplies proofs of ballots
which are again reviewed by staff before giving the OK to print. When
ballots are received from the printer, the next step is to proof and
test each ballot style. Finally, a public logic and accuracy test is
conducted prior to early voting or the mailing of absentee ballots.

*What Have We Learned*

One would think that all of the steps taken since the 2000 election in
Florida would have resolved all of the issues with ballot design. Yet,
in the 2006 13^th^ Congressional District race, there were 18,000+ under
votes. There were even higher under votes in the Attorney General's race
in other Florida counties. Analysis by David Dill of Stanford
University, Ted Selker of MIT and others have studied the ballot design
and have come to many conclusions:

-   David Dill's report stated: "It seems likely that ballot design
    contributed to higher CD-13 undervote rates in Sarasota, but the
    ballot does not explain all of the high undervotes."

-   The Caltech/MIT Voting Technology Project concluded the obvious:
    "Bold-colored headlines above some races distract people from ones
    without them; races with a small field of candidates can be
    overlooked when next to a race with a large field; and second-
    chance voting can indeed reduce errors."

-   The Voting Technology Project also reported data which indicated
    that test subjects "did not miss the Sarasota CD 13 if they had a
    sample ballot to follow in the voting booth."

It is interesting to note that every registered voter in the CD-13 race
had received a sample ballot prior to the election, and that there was
indeed second-chance voting via a review screen at the end of the ballot
which indicated the selection made, or in the event of an undervote, "No
selection made." Voters then had the opportunity to make changes prior
to casting a vote.

The Elections Assistance Commission, following the November 2006
election, conducted a study resulting in "Effective Designs for the
Administration of Federal Elections." Design for Democracy provided
testimony at the Florida Administrative Code public workshop on November
11, 2007, which required substantial rewording of 1S-2.032, Florida's
Uniform Primary and General Election Ballot rule. To date, this rule has
not been amended.

So, where do we go from here? We know that it is critical that the voter
have optimum opportunity to interact with a ballot that has clarity and
ease of use. Studies such as mentioned above have certainly highlighted
and set standards for the effectiveness of design. But from a local
election administrator's perspective, there are additional areas to be
considered and analyzed:

-   The lack of flexibility in the vendor ballot creation software

-   The length of the ballot

-   The costs involved

-   The usability of printing on the front and back of one page vs. a
    two-page ballot

-   The impact of multi- language on ballot design

-   How ballot certification deadlines affect the process

Again, it is interesting to note that both the butterfly ballot and our
CD-13 ballot were designed because of the length of the ballot.
Ironically, the butterfly ballot was designed to increase the font and
make the long Presidential Race easier to read, and ours in Sarasota
County, to reduce the number of screens the voter had to navigate. In
reality ballot design is not a great challenge until there is an attempt
to balance readability with ballot length.

We thank you \[the EAC\] for the work that has already been done. I
believe that election administrators across the country are now in tune
to the effect that ballot design can have on minimizing voter confusion
in the voting process. Additional change really needs to come from the
top down. I would ask the EAC to assist us during the initial
certification of voting systems in insisting that the design standards
that have been established as best practices are taken into
consideration by the vendor; that the local users have the ability to
format a ballot based on state statute, rule, and variation in ballot
length; that you work with state officials in the development of uniform
rules utilizing professional design experts for each voting system
certified; and that legislators are informed as to the sometimes
unintended consequences delivered to the election administrator. Only
then can we expect to have resolved the ballot design issues.