# Epistemological Problems in Emergency Management:

## Theoretical Dilemmas and Implications

David A. McEntire, Ph.D.

and

Melissa Marshall

Emergency Administration and Planning

Department of Public Administration

University of North Texas

Denton, Tx 76203-0617

In spite of the rapidly growing body of disaster literature, one would
be hard pressed to find frequent mention of the epistemological problems
confronting emergency management theory. Epistemology - or the study of
how and why knowledge is acquired - involves a process of questioning
how scholars generate findings for each other, the students they teach
and the practitioners that rely on their recommendations (see Campbell
and Hunter 2000). Put differently, epistemology uncovers the strengths
and weaknesses of values, assumptions and methods relied upon for theory
development. The term "epistemological problems," therefore, refers to
the challenges facing scholarship, and the dilemmas inherent in the
approaches taken for knowledge acquisition.

The necessity of considering this subject has been reinforced by our
attendance at numerous conferences, including the most recent Higher
Education Workshop at FEMA's Emergency Management Institute. It seems as
if the discipline of emergency management (assuming we are justified in
labeling it as such) is experiencing the same turmoil facing the
profession of emergency management (assuming this status is now
warranted). In both cases, the nature, purposes and boundaries are in
question. In addition, the lack of a coherent theory about the most
appropriate approach to disasters is hindering effective policy
formation and implementation. This being the case, it is woefully
evident that critical reflection is in order. For this reason, we will
attempt to provide one perspective on the dilemmas facing both scholars
and practitioners in the hopes of findings ways to resolve them.
Nevertheless, we recognize that this paper will likely promote further
dialog on the matter, rather than ending the debate about this important
topic.

### Preliminary Remarks

Although emergency management is undoubtedly in an epistemological
conundrum, it might be wise to consider two important points. First, the
current state of theory is not solely or necessarily a problem. The
difficulties we face may in all actuality be a blessing in disguise for
disaster scholarship. New perspectives, and more holistic approaches,
often arise from conflicts within academic concepts or from competition
across theoretical paradigms (see Lapid 1989).

Second, it is important to recognize that emergency management is not
the only area of scholarship struggling with epistemological problems.
For instance, international relations is one of many fields that is
being forced to deal with similar challenges regarding empirical
content, hypothetical explanations and ideological premises (see Lapid
1998, 239). As this field of study emerged after World War II, debate
ensued about which approach (realist or idealist) better explains
political phenomena at the global level (see Angell 1939; Claude 1971;
Niebuhr, 1932; Morganthau 1948). Although the discipline gave priority
to the issue of war versus peace (which was a priority that was never
fully accepted), a new discussion emerged regarding research methodology
(Kaplan 1966). Some scholars accepted a rigorous strategy based on
mathematical models and statistical analysis (Russett 1967; Singer
1969), while others asserted that a "softer science" based on case
studies, history, interpretations and reasoning was also beneficial
(Bull 1966; Young 1969). In spite of (or as a result of) the fact that
this debate also failed to generate consensus, a third debate began in
the field. Scholars initiated a discussion about the very development of
knowledge itself (Lapid 1989; Neufield 1995; Smith, Booth and Zalewski
1996). A good case in point was a study of conflict resolution in the
Middle East. A group of psychologists and other scholars declared that
"Maharishi Technology" has had a positive impact on the reduction of
international conflict (Orme-Johnson et. al. 1988). Their argument was
that transcendental meditation, a form of collective consciousness,
reduces the occurrence of war. When this research was published,
numerous scholars questioned the relevance of this unusual subject
matter while others attacked the methods that produced the researchers
findings (Duval 1988; Schrodt 1990). In response, the scholars countered
that the topic deserves scientific exploration and/or that the
investigative strategy was intellectually sound (Orme-Johnson et. al.
1990). This is only one of many examples of reflexivity that could be
provided from various disciplines to date. Emergency management is
definitely not the only area of study to confront difficult theoretical
challenges.

#### Ten Epistemological Problems

As we see it, there are several major epistemological problems in
emergency management theory. Of the many that could be mentioned here,
we will discuss ten:

1.  What is a disaster?

2.  What is emergency management?

3.  What hazards should we focus on?

4.  Should we continue to give preference to the concept of hazards?

5.  What variables should be explored in academic research?

6.  What actors should be incorporated into academic studies?

7.  What phases should we give priority to?

8.  What disciplines should contribute to emergency management?

9.  What paradigms should guide our field?

10. What is the proper balance for knowledge generation?

The most fundamental epistemological problem in emergency management
deals with the nature of disaster. Quarantelli and others (1998) have
devoted an entire volume to this topic, and have eloquently and
critically reviewed the different perspectives on this matter. Suffice
it to say, views about disasters are diverse and disagreement is
profound. This joint effort has not resulted in the generation of
consensus, and other volume is being developed at this time.
Nevertheless, there has been a definite historical evolution of the
concept (McEntire 2001, 189-190). Views of disaster have shifted from
"acts of God" to "natural hazards" and/or "socially disruptive events"
(Cannon 1994; Fritz 1961). Currently, many scholars assert that
disasters are socially constructed events (Bolin and Stanford 1999). The
argument here is that our values, attitudes and practices result in the
occurrence of disaster. These and other views are similar in that they
each examine the causes and consequences of disaster. Simplifying the
argument considerably, it might be stated that some definitions regard
disasters to be physical phenomena while others see them as social
phenomena.

This discussion about disasters is problematic for a number of reasons.
Natural disasters have more than physical causes and consequences
(Blaikie et. al. 1994; Kreps and Drabek 1996). For instance, the
building of homes on beachfront property undoubtedly raises the
potential for damage in a hurricane. Also, the disruptive impact of a
natural hazard upon human activity can be extremely severe. There are
other types of disasters (e.g., technological or civil) that result
predominantly from human mistakes and behavior. Three Mile Island and
9/11 are a few of the many examples that could be given. Thus, we cannot
simply state that disasters are physical phenomena only. This would
overlook the impact of human decisions, and exclude the influence of the
built environment and modern technology. At the same time, it would be
incorrect to assume that a disaster is only a social phenomenon. Without
a natural hazard agent, we could not have a natural disaster.
Consequently, we must necessarily come to the conclusion that disasters
are both physical and natural phenomena - although some may have more
characteristics on one end of the spectrum than the other.

A second epistemological hurdle hinges on the definition of emergency
management, which is analogous to the conceptual problem of disaster.
The term emergency management has at least two significant defects. The
very name of the field we study is a misnomer. Emergency managers are
not really concerned about emergencies; they are instead interested in
larger events that have community-wide impact (Drabek and Hoetmer 1991).
We should state, of course, that there are some similarities between
emergencies and disasters. For instance, a small house fire may disrupt
the routines of a family like a significant calamity or catastrophe
would. Furthermore, the emergency manager does or should have
involvement in all areas relating to public safety (e.g., he or she may
become involved in a heat wave which typically produces more deaths each
year in the United States than many other disaster events combined).
Nevertheless, disasters are qualitatively distinct from accidents and
emergencies. Consequently, first responders are required for small
incidents, while their efforts are supplemented and superceded by those
of emergency managers in larger disasters. Therefore, first responders
are not emergency managers, although they are certainly important
participants in emergency management. Emergency managers, on the other
hand, are really disaster managers (and are not generally first
responders).

The other problem with the term emergency management is that it is an
oxymoron. It may unintentionally suggest that we can control or always
effectively deal with extreme events. While it is true that we are able
to prevent some disasters or reduce their adverse impacts, we are less
likely to manage our responses to these events in a totally effective
manner (Quarantelli 1997). Nevertheless, our ability to manage disasters
is enhanced through mitigation and preparedness measures such as
improved engineering, planning, training and exercises (Drabek and
Hoetmer 1991). Thus we must recognize both our ability and futility in
dealing with disasters. Managing disasters may be effective or
defective, or will most likely witness a complex combination of the two
extremes.

A third major epistemological problem has plagued scholars is what
hazards we should concentrate on. When emergency management was
initially conceived, it gave preference to civil defense issues, mainly
the nuclear hazard. Since this time, students have shifted attention to
technological and natural hazards (Rubin and Tanali 2001). Now, of
course, emergency management has come full circle by focusing on
terrorism (although modern terrorism is certainly more complex than the
nuclear threat of the Cold War) (Alexander 2002). Obviously, the
drawback of focusing on any particular hazard is that we tend to ignore
the others that will almost certainly affect us. Also by taking an all
hazards approach we are less likely to be surprised by unusual events
such as the World Trade Center collapse or the space shuttle breakup up
over Texas. What is more, lessons from one disaster often transfer
across hazards, and some functions are applicable to all types of
hazards. Regardless, some scholars will argue that we should focus our
efforts on those disasters that are more frequent. This is a logical
argument as we could save resources by concentrating on those events
that are most common. The disadvantage associated with this approach is
that we may also be impacted by low probability, but high consequence
events. For instance, it would be a grave mistake to avoid studies on
bio-terrorism since many thousands, hundreds of thousands or millions
could die if this type of terrorist attack occurred (Fischer 1999). In
contrast, giving preference to unlikely but consequential events would
ignore the high probabilities of floods, tornadoes and earthquakes.
Hence, the inclusion of all types of hazards is needed to avert the
negative results of giving preference to any single hazard or set of
hazards.

The prevalence of discussing hazards instead of vulnerability is another
epistemological problem in emergency management theory (McEntire 2001).
A sizable portion of past literature on disasters has concentrated on
the characteristics of hazards (e.g. magnitude, frequency, duration,
areal extent, speed of onset, spatial dispersion and temporal spacing)
(Burton, Kates and White 1993). Today, scholars also use the concept of
hazard frequently in their research (Mileti 1999). Although no one would
dispute the presence of "triggers" that initiate disaster, scholars
ironically fail to recognize that we are absorbed on that which we have
no control over. Humans cannot stop floods and earthquakes from
occurring. However, people are capable of limiting risk to extreme
events by addressing their vulnerability (McEntire 2001). For example,
land use planning and preparedness measures (i.e., vulnerability
reduction measures) will limit the impact of natural hazards. Thus, it
is our belief that scholarship would be better served by concentrating
on vulnerability (which still has relation to hazards), instead of
focusing on hazards (which do not necessarily capture the concept of
vulnerability).

Accepting this shift from hazards to vulnerability does not limit our
discussion of disaster phenomena. In fact, this reprioritization will
actually increase the number of variables that require academic
investigation. For example, scholars must spend time investigating
structural mitigation, community education, emergency communications,
triage, convergent behavior, the role of insurance, sustainable disaster
recovery, etc. We must come to the conclusion that there is much more to
disasters than natural, technological or civil hazards.

This presents yet another epistemological problem for emergency
management theory: which variables should be given academic priority?
Although structural failure, warning, evacuation and sheltering are
common issues in many disasters, we must not forget that there are other
issues related to emergency management (e.g., special populations,
politics, record keeping, mass fatality management, critical incident
stress, etc.). Accordingly, there may be much intellectual merit in
exploring important or neglected topics. However, we must not look for a
"silver bullet" to solve the disaster problem. Although no one would
deny the fact that effective land use planning could do much to prevent
the frequency and severity of most natural disasters, we should not also
make the mistake of assuming that there are hazard-free areas, and
incorrectly believe that non-structural mitigation will resolve all
technological or civil disasters. These facts reiterate the importance
of holistic approaches to disaster, or at least the need to spell out
the advantages and disadvantages of examining one variable over another.

The organizational boundaries of emergency management also proves to be
an epistemological problem. Emergency management is by its very nature a
multi-organizational activity (McEntire 2002a). It involves individuals
and organizations from the public, private and non-profit sectors.
Actors include public servants and their associated departments at the
local, state and federal levels. Emergency management functions likewise
require the contributions of various businesses, community based
organizations, churches, the Red Cross and emergent groups. But the
activities of these entities may be haphazard or even counter productive
unless they are integrated in a systematic fashion. Therefore, emergency
managers are vital for coordination. But the emergency manager alone
will not be successful unless he or she is surrounded by, and relies
upon, the expertise and resources of others. Hence, this epistemological
problem can be overcome by including all of the actors involved in
disasters, but acknowledging the central role of the emergency manager.

The four phases of emergency management present an additional
epistemological problem. David Neal (1997) has already explored the
complexities of these phases in terms of overlap and fluidity. This lack
of clear boundaries within the timeline of disaster is now widely
accepted, so this subject will not be treated further here. What is
necessary and possibly even disturbing, however, is to see priority
shifts among these phases. Previously, scholars spent a great deal of
attention on preparedness, response and recovery issues (McEntire
2002b). Today, it is recognized that these phases are very reactive.
Mitigation and recovery (as it relates to mitigation) are becoming the
focus of academic research (Burby 1998; Britton 1999; Godschalk et. al.
1999; Geis 2000). It is indisputable that we need more research on
disaster prevention and reduction since we know very little about
mitigation as compared to the other phases (Mileti 1999). Unfortunately,
focusing on proactive measures alone implies that all disasters can be
prevented. The reality is that disasters have always occurred and they
will continue to do so. We simply do not have sufficient knowledge, will
and power to fully prevent them. Nevertheless, as Quarantelli has stated
(1993, 25), "the fact that not everything can be done does not mean that
something cannot be done." Our own view is that scholarship must become
more proactive now and in the future, but preparedness, response and
recovery will always be needed and must not be overlooked.

The location of emergency management in academia, and its relation to
various disciplines also poses epistemological problems (Neal 2000).
Historically, most scholars of emergency management have graduated from
geography and sociology. Indeed, the literature from these fields is
rich and has dramatically shaped emergency management. The former helps
us to understand the causes of extreme environmental events while the
latter enables us to comprehend the patterns of human responses to
disasters. That being said, one of the problems of maintaining emergency
management in these disciplines alone is that they may overlook the
importance of leadership, management skills, intergovernmental relations
and other topics. This is not to deny the value or outstanding record of
contributions by sociologists and geographers, but it is to recognize
that disciplines such as public administration may also play a role in
the production and application of research findings pertaining to the
public sector.

Regardless, emergency management education programs and research
projects could be placed in many disciplines including anthropology,
environmental studies, political science, psychology, engineering,
epidemiology, etc. And each discipline undoubtedly makes important
contributions to emergency management (McEntire 2003). For example,
anthropology helps us to understand the impact of culture on adaptations
to hazards. Environmental studies underscore the need to consider the
dangers of environmental degradation. Political science enables one to
identify the political barriers confronting emergency managers. Research
in psychology reveals how people process risk and cope emotionally with
disaster. Engineering identifies safer ways to construct buildings and
infrastructure. And, epidemiology uncovers the medical component of
disasters, including the cause(s) of injury and treatment of diseases.
Unique contributions may also be achieved in computer science, criminal
justice, law and meteorology. In spite of this intellectual cornucopia,
universities and funding are not always supportive of inter or
multi-disciplinary work. In addition, scholars are hesitant to accept
the concerns and methods of their counterparts in other fields.
Conceptual language or other organizational barriers also hinder
cross-disciplinary knowledge development. It will be necessary to at
least attempt to cooperate if these chasms can be bridged however.

The proliferation of diverse disaster paradigms presents additional
epistemological problems (McEntire 2002b). For a number of decades, the
guiding paradigm has been comprehensive emergency management. It focused
on all hazards, phases and actors pertaining to disasters. However, it
was reactive and ignored the social, cultural, political and economic
issues of disasters. Scholars have therefore explored concepts such as
resistance, resilience and sustainable development. Homeland security
has also come to the forefront of the literature since 9/11. But these
concepts also have their own epistemological problems. Resistance does
not relate well to response issues and may be limited to engineering
(Geis 2000). Resilience, for its part, is somewhat reactive (although
many scholars use it to imply prevention or mitigation), and it
generally captures social, political, economic and cultural issues only
(Buckle, Mars and Smale 2000; Burby et. al. 2000). Sustainable
development/sustainable hazards mitigation helps us to understand the
importance of land use planning, but it has trouble relating to disaster
preparedness and response functions (Burby 1998; Mileti 1999; Berke
1995). Finally, homeland security is limited to the civil hazard of
terrorism and takes a step back from the proactive approaches being
promoted today. Therefore, each of these new paradigms must be
supplemented with the strengths of others in order to avoid the pitfalls
of any singular perspective.

The last epistemological problem to be discussed here is connected with
the process of how academia derives knowledge for emergency managers.
Many scholars assert the supremacy of theory over practical experience.
Certainly, no serious scholar will question the value of academic
concepts and empirical research. But we should be very careful to avoid
an attitude of omniscience. Do we really believe we have all of the
answers and the best solutions? If so, why do we spend time interviewing
and interacting with practitioners? We also need to ensure that our
theories are not limited to the "ivory tower." Can our theoretical
concepts survive and be applied in the real world? Similarly, we must
teach sound theory, but also help students develop skills and abilities
for the careers that await them. Do we not want our students to make
positive contributions when they graduate? Hence, book learning is vital
and necessary for the future generation of emergency managers, but
education must also provide at least some practical application of that
knowledge.

# 

# Discussion and Conclusion

By now it should be apparent that there are serious epistemological
problems facing those who study emergency management. These challenges
range from disagreement about theoretical concepts and faulty
assumptions about the human role in disasters to disputes about the
inclusion of various disciplines and the relative merit of competing
paradigms. It should also be evident from this discussion that common
ground needs to be found to integrate academic findings. The scope and
complexity of emergency management is only now being recognized. Never
before has there been so great a need to see the big picture of
disasters.

For these reasons, it our opinion that many of the epistemological
problems identified in this paper may be overcome by avoiding extreme
perspectives in emergency management theory. In addition, it is our view
that the field can obtain a higher degree of synthesis by focusing on
the concept of vulnerability (McEntire 2002b). Vulnerability is an
integral component in the concept of disaster and the field of emergency
management. It is related to all types of hazards and most disaster
variables. Each actor has a bearing on the extent of human vulnerability
to deadly, destructive and disruptive events. All disciplines also
recognize the impact of vulnerability on the occurrence and severity of
disaster. Finally, scholars and practitioners may find increased unity
by agreeing on vulnerability as the common problem to be addressed
regarding disaster phenomena.

With this in mind, the concept of vulnerability seems to surmount many
of the epistemological problems mentioned here. Consequently, it might
be necessary to change the name of the field we study from emergency
management to disaster vulnerability management (McEntire 2002b). This
implies that we endeavor to reduce liabilities such as risk and
susceptibility. It also implies that we strive to raise capabilities
such as resistance and resilience.

While we acknowledge that our proposed name change is unlikely to be
accepted because of tradition and the widespread recognition of the term
emergency management, we hope this paper has at least caused others to
reconsider their thinking about disasters. At a minimum, we encourage
scholars to continue this discussion so that the epistemological
problems can be taken into account as we strive to improve the practice
of emergency management.

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