**Before the**

**Federal Communications Commission**

**Washington, D.C. 20554**

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| In the Matter of                 | *  | ET Docket No. 04-151         |
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| Wireless Operations in the       | ** | WT Docket No. 05-96          |
| 3650-3700 MHz Band               |    |                              |
|                                  | *  | ET Docket No. 02-380         |
| Rules for Wireless Broadband     | *) |                              |
| Services in the 3650-3700 MHz    | ** |                              |
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| Additional Spectrum for          | *) |                              |
| Unlicensed Devices               | ** |                              |
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| Below 900 MHz and in the 3 GHz   | *  |                              |
| Band                             | *) |                              |
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**MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER**

**Adopted: May 22, 2007 Released: June 7, 2007**

**By the Commission**: Commissioner Adelstein issuing a statement.

1.  By this action, we address petitions for reconsideration filed in
    response to the Commission's *Report and Order* in the above
    proceedings relating to the 3650-3700 MHz band (3650 MHz band).[^1]
    In this item, we affirm our previous decisions to create a spectrum
    environment that will encourage multiple entrants and stimulate the
    expansion of broadband service to rural and under served areas. To
    facilitate rapid deployment in the band, we maintain the previously
    adopted, non-exclusive licensing scheme. Additionally, we decline to
    reconsider the requirement that equipment operating in the 3650 MHz
    band incorporate a contention-based protocol, a technology that
    permits multiple licensees to share spectrum by ensuring that all
    licensees receive reasonable opportunities to operate in the
    band.[^2] In response to the record, we do, however, clarify the
    meaning of contention-based protocol and modify our rules to limit
    the operation of equipment using "restricted" contention-based
    protocols to the lower 25 megahertz portion of the 3650 MHz
    band.[^3] We find that this clarification and modification will
    facilitate operation of the widest variety of broadband technologies
    with minimal risk of interference in both the near and long terms.
    They should further reduce the potential for co-channel
    interference, provide additional protections to the multiple users
    in the band under the current licensing regime, and create
    incentives for the rapid development of broadly compatible
    contention technologies. Lastly, we deny requests for
    reconsideration of various technical rules relating to fixed and
    mobile transmission power limits, out-of-band emissions, and the
    coordination of terrestrial operators with satellite licensees.

# background

2.  Historically, the 3650 MHz band was exclusive Federal Government
    spectrum allocated on a primary basis for radiolocation services
    and, later, was also allocated to the non-government radiolocation
    service on a secondary basis.[^4] In 1984, the Commission added a
    primary allocation in the 3650 MHz band for non-government Fixed
    Satellite Service (FSS) space-to-Earth operations, restricted by
    footnote to international inter-continental systems. In 1995, NTIA
    identified the band for transfer to mixed Federal Government and
    non-Federal Government use status, which provided the Commission the
    opportunity to consider additional, more extensive non-Federal
    Government uses of the band. It did so in a 1998 *Notice of Proposed
    Rulemaking and Order*, in which the Commission proposed to allocate
    the 3650 MHz band to the non-government fixed service on a primary
    basis and tentatively concluded not to allocate the band to land
    mobile service.[^5] The Commission also ceased accepting
    applications for new or modified FSS earth stations in the band at
    that time.

3.  In October 2000, the Commission released a *First Report and Order
    and Second Notice of Proposed Rulemaking* that allocated the 3650
    MHz band to fixed and mobile (base station only) terrestrial
    services on a co-primary basis and that grandfathered existing FSS
    earth stations on a primary basis, while allowing new FSS earth
    stations on a secondary basis.[^6] In addition, the Commission
    deleted the government radiolocation allocation, but grandfathered
    three existing government radiolocation sites.[^7] As part of that
    action, the Commission also sought comment on licensing and service
    rules for fixed and mobile services, but ultimately did not directly
    pursue those proposals.[^8]

4.  In April 2004, the Commission released the *Unlicensed 3650 MHz
    Notice* and proposed to allow the operation of unlicensed devices in
    the 3650 MHz band.[^9] In the *Unlicensed 3650 MHz Notice*, the
    Commission tentatively concluded that permitting unlicensed
    operation in the 3650 MHz band would foster the introduction of new
    and advanced services to the American public, especially in rural
    areas, and would result in a more efficient use of spectrum. The
    Commission proposed to allow unlicensed devices to operate in this
    band with higher power limits (up to 24 Watts EIRP) than typically
    allowed for Part 15 devices, and proposed requiring the use of
    smart/cognitive safeguards intended to avoid causing interference to
    licensed satellite services. The Commission also sought comment on
    alternative options for providing licensed or a combination of
    unlicensed and licensed terrestrial services in this band, including
    whether it should split the band to allow separate spectrum for
    unlicensed devices and terrestrial licensed use in different
    segments. In the *Unlicensed 3650 MHz Notice*, the Commission was
    mindful of the need to protect grandfathered FSS radiolocation
    operations in the band.

5.  When it issued the *3650 MHz Order* in March 2005, the Commission
    decided to provide for structured entry into the band by adopting a
    non-exclusive licensing scheme, in lieu of an unlicensed scheme that
    had originally been proposed. In reaching this decision, it
    considered several factors, including the band's encumbrance with
    grandfathered satellite and radiolocation operations, which
    prevented terrestrial use in major population centers along the east
    and west coasts, and the lack of pairing opportunities with other
    spectrum for duplex operations. This, as well as evidence that the
    band was well suited to high-power broadband operations, persuaded
    the Commission that much of the interest in developing the band was
    focused on smaller markets and less densely populated areas.[^10]
    For these reasons, the Commission structured the band's rules to
    provide WISPs and other providers an economical means of quickly
    initiating broadband services, particularly in under-served and
    rural areas.[^11]

6.  Based on the record as well as on certain characteristics of the
    band, the Commission concluded that the 3650 MHz band would be best
    put to use on a non-exclusive shared use basis.[^12] Accordingly,
    the Commission adopted a nationwide, non-exclusive licensing scheme
    for terrestrial operations in the band. It also adopted a number of
    provisions designed to allow cooperative, shared use of the band,
    including a streamlined licensing mechanism and a requirement that
    equipment operating in the band incorporate a contention-based
    protocol to minimize interference.[^13] The Commission concluded
    that this licensing approach struck an appropriate balance,
    providing a regime with low entry costs and minimal regulatory
    delay, while still ensuring more orderly operation than would exist
    under a traditional unlicensed approach in which users must accept
    interference from others in the band and users' locations are
    unknown.[^14]

7.  The Commission also designed the 3650 MHz band rules to provide
    flexibility for a variety of new terrestrial uses in order to
    encourage multiple entrants.[^15] It required that all 3650 MHz
    licensees must cooperate and "make every effort" to avoid harmful
    interference and specifically declined to give interference priority
    to licensees who were the first to deploy in an area.[^16] To
    facilitate the negotiations that would accompany the cooperative use
    of the band by multiple entrants, the Commission required that all
    3650 MHz band licensees register their fixed and base stations in a
    common database.[^17]

8.  As a further means of promoting effective shared use of the
    spectrum, the Commission concluded that contention-based protocols
    were well suited to avoiding interference among the multiple users
    that seek to use the band simultaneously.[^18] While the Commission
    required equipment operating in the band to incorporate a
    contention-based protocol, it did not specify a particular protocol.
    Instead, it left to industry and standards bodies the task of
    developing appropriate protocols for use in the band.[^19] The
    Commission, through the equipment certification process, retained
    the authority to determine whether equipment that operators sought
    to deploy in the band met the requirements it had established for
    contention-based protocols.[^20]

9.  The Commission also adopted a number of provisions to protect
    grandfathered satellite operators, which retained their primary
    status, against interference from the newly authorized operations in
    the band. Specifically, the Commission created exclusion zones with
    a radius of 150 kilometers around approximately 100 grandfathered
    FSS earth stations and prohibited terrestrial operations in the band
    within these exclusion zones, absent agreement with the affected
    satellite operators.[^21] To provide further protection to the
    grandfathered earth stations, the Commission set maximum permissible
    power levels for both mobile and fixed or base stations operating in
    the band and required that mobile units be configured to transmit
    only when they could receive an enabling signal from a licensed base
    station.[^22]

10. As indicated above, eight petitions were filed seeking
    reconsideration of various aspects of the *3650 MHz Order*. The
    Commission received more than 160 oppositions, replies, or comments
    to these petitions.

# Discussion

11. Several of the reconsideration petitions challenge both the
    non-exclusive licensing regime and the requirement that equipment
    operating in the band incorporate a contention-based protocol to
    manage interference in the shared spectrum. As reflected in the
    *3650 MHz Order*, these two issues are closely intertwined. The
    utility of the non-exclusive licensing model the Commission adopted
    is enhanced by the interference protection aspect of the contention
    requirement, and the contention requirement would not have been
    necessary in an exclusively licensed environment. As discussed more
    fully below, we remain convinced that these provisions will operate
    together effectively to ensure the goal of efficient spectrum use by
    multiple licensees in the 3650 MHz band. Accordingly, we are
    retaining the non-exclusive licensing scheme for the band. We
    likewise are retaining the contention-based protocol requirement for
    new fixed, base and mobile equipment, but are clarifying that our
    intent was to adopt a requirement that allows for the certification
    of a variety of devices employing different types of protocols. In
    addition, we are limiting operations of certain contention-based
    protocols -- *i.e*., "restricted" protocols, which are those capable
    of avoiding interference only to other co-frequency devices using
    the same protocol -- to the lower 25 megahertz portion of the 3650
    MHz band. We find that this modification will further reduce the
    potential for co-channel interference, provide additional
    protections to the multiple users in the band under the current
    licensing regime, and create incentives for the rapid development of
    broadly interoperable contention technologies.

12. Additionally, we are denying requests for reconsideration of the
    previously adopted power limits for fixed and mobile transmissions
    in the band, concluding that the limits adopted serve to protect
    against interference both among the band's licensees and with
    satellite earth stations. Finally, we are denying requests to modify
    the out-of-band emission limits in the rules and declining to revise
    our rules regarding coordination with satellite licensees operating
    in the grandfathered FSS exclusion zones.

## Licensing and Use of the Band

13. As noted above, the Commission adopted a nationwide non-exclusive
    licensing scheme for the 3650 MHz band in order to create a spectrum
    environment conducive to the prompt entry by multiple broadband
    providers in under-served markets - and at low entry costs and with
    minimal regulatory delay.[^23] In reaching its conclusion to adopt
    this streamlined licensing approach, the Commission rejected both
    unlicensed and exclusive licensing (both geographic area and
    site-based) approaches for either the whole 3650-3700 MHz band or
    part of the band. In particular, the Commission rejected assertions
    in the record that the interference protection essential to
    exclusive licensing would be necessary to provide spectrum users
    with sufficient incentive to invest in the band. The Commission
    concluded that the non-exclusive licensing model, in conjunction
    with operational and technical safeguards (such as the
    contention-based protocol and registration requirement), obligated
    licensees to cooperate to avoid harmful interference. The Commission
    concluded that the licensing rules it adopted would "ensure open
    access to this spectrum for nominal application fees and allow
    effective and efficient use of this spectrum in response to market
    forces."[^24] This, the Commission reasoned, would encourage "rapid
    deployment of broadband technologies" and advance the "goal of
    bringing broadband services to all Americans, including consumers
    living in less densely populated rural and suburban areas."[^25]

14. Several petitioners ask that we replace non-exclusive licensing with
    an exclusive licensing scheme in all or part of the 3650 MHz band,
    either throughout the U.S. or in urban areas.[^26] Some petitioners
    argue that exclusive licensing should be implemented on a geographic
    area basis, with one licensee selected by auction for each available
    license. While some parties, such as Motorola, seek exclusive
    licensing throughout the country,[^27] others distinguish between
    urban and non-urban areas and offer a mix of licensing
    approaches.[^28] The Wireless Communications Association, which
    advocates the use of exclusive licensing to address concerns about
    the quality of service that will be provided in the band, asks that
    the Commission exclusively license 25 megahertz on an MSA/RSA basis
    and keep the remaining 25 megahertz non-exclusively licensed in
    order to provide easy access by "those willing to accept the risks
    associated with non-exclusive licensing."[^29] These petitioners
    generally do not offer new arguments against the feasibility of the
    non-exclusive licensing scheme, instead reiterating arguments made
    in response to the *Unlicensed 3650 MHz Notice* and addressed by the
    Commission in the *3650 MHz Order*.[^30]

15. To the extent that the petitioners raise issues arguing in favor of
    exclusive licensing that the Commission previously considered and
    decided, we deny those petitions. Based on our review of the record
    and the information provided in the petitions for reconsideration
    and responses, we continue to believe that a non-exclusive licensing
    scheme represents the best fit for the 3650 MHz band.[^31]

16. In various proceedings, the Commission has tried to strike a balance
    between its licensed and unlicensed approaches to assigning spectrum
    rights, determining which approach to use based on all of the
    relevant circumstances.[^32] The unique characteristics of this
    band, including the limitations on use in many major population
    areas near FSS earth stations that characterize the 3650 MHz band,
    continue to suggest that the non-exclusive licensing regime adopted
    in the *3650 MHz Order* best serves the public\
    interest.[^33] As noted in that order, these FSS earth stations
    preclude ubiquitous use of this spectrum throughout the United
    States, particularly in major population centers along much of the
    east and west coasts.[^34] Development of the band is thus
    particularly well suited to smaller markets and less densely
    populated areas where non-exclusive operation is more easily
    accommodated. In addition, the need to protect incumbent users from
    harmful interference requires that terrestrial users in the 3650 MHz
    band operate at lower power levels than are typical of many
    exclusively licensed services. Finally, the record continues to
    indicate that a number of service providers, such as WISPs are
    willing to invest in using the spectrum for the development of
    wireless broadband services in underserved and rural communities on
    a non-exclusively licensed basis.[^35] Accordingly, we continue to
    believe that non-exclusive licensing best balances the competing
    interests in this band.[^36]

17. Because we are not altering the existing non-exclusive licensing
    approach for the band, we need not consider at length the different
    ways petitioners suggested that we apportion the band. We conclude
    that the use of geographic or spectrum-related divisions to the band
    would unnecessarily frustrate potential licensees' abilities to make
    full use of the 3650 MHz band.[^37] Because we believe that adequate
    interference mitigation techniques can be employed in this band, we
    do not accept the argument that the likely difference in congestion
    between urban and rural markets justifies adopting two different
    licensing schemes.[^38]

18. We note that the record generated on reconsideration also reflects a
    broader concern that the particular approach and rules we adopted in
    conjunction with our non-exclusive licensing plan will frustrate
    potential users and limit the practical use of the band. Intel,
    Redline and Alvarion contend that the current rules will cause
    licensees to register, but not build, operations in an attempt to
    prevent other licensees from entering the market -- in effect
    "squatting" in the band.[^39] They also contend that ambiguities in
    the rules -- such as the absence of a specified time period in which
    a licensee must deploy service after registration, the absence of
    criteria defining when a station becomes "unused" and must be
    deleted from the registration database, and the absence of standards
    for cooperation between licensees -- along with the potential for
    delay in evaluating and approving contention-based technologies will
    slow the launch of new services in rural areas.[^40]

19. Several petitioners also assert that our current rules cannot ensure
    sufficient interference protection to provide an adequate quality of
    service to support desired applications, such as voice over IP.[^41]
    They argue that potential operators will be unwilling to invest in
    the band,[^42] resulting in slow service deployment and, ultimately,
    inefficient use of the band.[^43] Intel, Redline and Alvarion
    suggest a different path to the same result. They contend that
    non-exclusive licensing will lead to an insupportable number of
    entrants that will overwhelm the available spectrum, resulting in a
    quality of service too low to provide reliable broadband
    communications.[^44]

20. Some of the parties that oppose exclusive licensing in the 3650 MHz
    band propose other changes we could make to the registration or
    cooperation rules that they contend would provide for more efficient
    use of the band. While most parties reject the petitioners'
    suggestions that we select by auction a single licensee for each of
    several geographic-based area-wide licenses and prefer having
    multiple entrants access the band, some advocate modifications that
    would effectively infuse the non-exclusive licensing scheme with
    some of the rights and protections of a traditional, exclusively
    licensed regime. For example, Covad proposes that licensees who have
    registered their intention to build facilities in a particular area
    should receive certain protections against interference from later
    entrants.[^45] While Covad's plan would not entirely exclude later
    entrants, it would require that they coordinate their operations
    with those of previous entrants. By contrast, Airstream suggests
    setting an application deadline for the band. Licenses for each
    market would be issued only to those operators who met the deadline,
    and operators in each market would decide among themselves on an
    appropriate interference avoidance mechanism.[^46] WCA claims that
    the requirement that both incumbent and new licensees cooperate to
    resolve interference by mutually satisfactory arrangements does not
    give licensees sufficient assurance that their systems will receive
    adequate interference protection.[^47] XO Communications, which
    argues that non-exclusive licensing in the *3650 MHz Order* will
    reduce regulatory barriers, increase the number of market entrants
    and lead to the more efficient use of spectrum, also asks us to
    adopt a Part 90-style frequency coordination regime for the band
    that would permit coordinators to evaluate licensees' needs for
    requested spectrum at specific sites.[^48] It also asks us to adopt
    performance standards for the band to ensure that licensees actually
    provide service in the markets where they have registered
    operations.[^49]

21. In general, all of the arguments for making modifications to our
    licensing rules rest on the assumption that non-exclusive licensing
    will frustrate potential users of the band and its efficient
    use.[^50] We disagree with these projections. While we acknowledge
    that the use of a non-exclusive licensing approach must be
    accompanied with the means to ensure that multiple users can operate
    successfully in the band, we conclude that the Commission adopted
    appropriate and practical mechanisms to ensure such an outcome.[^51]

22. We discuss, at greater length below, the contention-based protocol
    and the record that indicates that contention technology will
    effectively prevent interference.[^52] The band's other rules, in
    particular the cooperation requirement, give us additional
    confidence in the feasibility of the non-exclusive licensing scheme.
    Providers will not be permitted simply to turn up their transmitters
    and overwhelm others in the area; instead, they will be required to
    reach a reasonable accommodation with the other operators nearby. In
    this regard, we do not foresee that the mutual cooperation
    obligation will be as burdensome as some commenters envision.[^53]
    To the contrary, we expect that contention technology will
    facilitate multiple users' sharing of the band. To the extent that
    contention technology does not alone facilitate spectrum sharing,
    the registration database will substantially assist providers in
    locating the source of interference that they may be experiencing
    and facilitate cooperative operating agreement among the parties.

23. We decline to alter the band's cooperation requirement to
    approximate more clearly the rights available in an exclusive
    licensing model. We are not persuaded that the various steps that
    parties suggest in this regard would further the public interest and
    the Commission's goals in this proceeding better than the current
    non-exclusive licensing scheme or that the benefits of these
    proposed changes overweigh the costs. For example, creating the type
    of first-in-time rights that parties suggest would give initial
    market entrants ability to structure their operations in a manner
    that could impede subsequent providers' ability to offer viable
    services and diminish any incentive that such initial market
    entrants might have in negotiating interference avoidance measures
    to accommodate new entrants. Requiring the use of third-party
    frequency coordinators would also add an unnecessary extra layer of
    process that operators would have to satisfy before deploying their
    equipment and initiating service. Given the use of contention
    protocols in the band, we do not see the need to require a separate
    entity to serve as a gate-keeper for the spectrum. Similarly, the
    performance standards and the attendant reporting obligation that XO
    suggests are duplication of the discipline that the market will
    already provide. If an operator is not providing adequate service,
    other operators will be free to deploy their facilities in the
    market and begin their own operations.

24. We disagree that non-exclusive licensing will make the band
    unusable. With respect to Intel's concern about squatting, we agree
    with Cisco that the licensing procedures adopted for the band
    provide no first-in-time right to exclude others from entering a
    market, as would be necessary to make such behavior profitable.[^54]
    To the contrary, the cooperation and contention-based protocol rules
    both require that licensees take various steps to accommodate (or at
    least avoid interfering with) the operations of other licensees in
    their area. Similarly, these requirements should eliminate licensee
    behavior that could overcrowd the band to the detriment of all
    users. They will prevent licensees from consuming the full band and
    crowding out the transmissions of other operators. Licensees that
    must coordinate their operations with other licensees and deploy
    equipment that avoids harmful interference will not be able to
    overwhelm their neighbors.

25. In contrast to an exclusive licensing model in which a licensee may
    exclude others from a particular license area, the non-exclusive
    licensing model adopted in the *3650 MHz Order* requires a potential
    entrant to consider that the presence of other licensees will
    require cooperative use and may, at times, restrict the amount of
    spectrum and/or time that spectrum is available to any particular
    licensee.[^55] That trade-off, however, does not automatically
    render the spectrum unusable.[^56] We note that, while some parties
    claim that the risks associated with the accommodation of multiple
    entrants will deter investment in the band,[^57] the record also
    includes filings by others, including WISPA, and service provider
    Attron Networks, that claim an interest in developing services under
    the non-exclusive licensing approach.[^58]

26. For the foregoing reasons, we decline to reconsider the previously
    adopted non-exclusive licensing scheme and affirm that aspect of the
    *3650 MHz Order*.

## Contention-Based Protocol

27.  Given our decision to maintain a non-exclusive licensing scheme, we
    now address the necessity of preventing co-frequency interference,
    which could arise from multiple entrants' shared use of the band. We
    are not persuaded, as certain petitioners contend, that
    contention-based protocols, as the Commission has defined them**,**
    will widely fail to avoid co-frequency interference among licensees
    sharing the band. As we discuss below, there is much record evidence
    to the contrary. We thus remain convinced that the use of
    contention-based technologies will be an effective mechanism to
    facilitate multiple users in the band, and we retain this
    requirement. Although we are not modifying our decision to require
    the use of contention-based protocols, we are clarifying that the
    requirement allows for the certification of a variety of devices
    using various different types of protocols. We also modify our rules
    to limit the operation of devices using "restricted" protocols, as
    explained below, to the lower 25 megahertz of the band so as to
    provide for additional protections against interference in this band
    and to create further incentives for the rapid development of
    broadly interoperable contention technologies**.** We believe that
    our clarification and our treatment of "restricted" protocols will
    help speed deployment of equipment and the use of this band,
    especially in rural areas.

28. In the *3650 MHz Order*, the Commission explained that
    contention-based protocols, which it required for fixed, base and
    mobile equipment operating in the band, would "allow multiple users
    to share the same spectrum by defining the events that must occur
    when two or more devices attempt to simultaneously access the same
    channel and establishing rules by which each device is provided a
    reasonable opportunity to operate."[^59] The Commission's goal in
    adopting the contention requirement was to speed deployment in the
    3650 MHz band by allowing multiple entrants to provide service. It
    saw the protocol as a means to "ensure efficient and cooperative
    shared use of the spectrum."[^60] The Commission chose not to
    require a specific contention-based protocol, leaving it to industry
    and standards bodies to determine appropriate protocols. The
    Commission cautioned, though, that equipment would not be certified
    for use in the band if it appeared "to be designed to preclude
    others from using this spectrum."[^61] The Commission stated that it
    would monitor use of the spectrum, and would modify the rules if
    there appeared to be significant problems in this regard.[^62]

29. Several parties raise concerns about the contention
    requirement.[^63] In particular, Motorola and the coalition of
    petitioners led by Intel argue that the listen-before-talk (LBT)
    model of contention technology will not be effective either: (1) for
    long-range, higher-power transmissions, as would be necessary to
    serve rural areas, or (2) for avoiding interference among numerous,
    unrelated users, as would be necessary in densely populated, urban
    areas.[^64] They assert that contention technology, such as
    listen-before-talk, is best suited to use with unlicensed Wi-Fi
    devices operating at relatively low power, over short distances and
    under the control of a single entity.[^65] Over longer distances and
    at higher power, the petitioners argue, the increased number of
    potential users renders voluntary operator-to-operator cooperation
    infeasible and the efficacy of contention technologies breaks down,
    generally reducing the throughput possible in the band.[^66] The
    Wi-Max Forum and Motorola argue that the contention requirement will
    delay deployment in the band while equipment manufacturers develop
    the necessary contention technology.[^67] Some petitioners assert
    that, even if the Commission continues to rely on non-exclusive
    licensing in rural areas, the contention protocol requirement should
    be eliminated because the likely number of providers will be small
    enough so that they can cooperate in avoiding interference to each
    other.[^68]

30. On the other hand, Cisco and certain other parties support the
    contention requirement, arguing that it is feasible and imposes only
    a minimal regulatory burden that is adequately justified by the
    increase in spectrum efficiency to which it would lead.[^69] WISPA
    concurs that a contention protocol lowers entry barriers and is a
    cost-effective means of providing interference protection.[^70]
    Parties such as Cisco and Tropos disagree with the petitioners'
    assertions that a contention protocol is not effective for long
    range operations. Thus, Cisco argues that equipment using a
    contention protocol can be used effectively for backhaul in rural
    areas, and Tropos Networks claims that large geographic areas can be
    served by mesh networks employing contention protocols. [^71]

31. Additionally, some petitioners assert that the *3650 MHz Order*
    leaves substantial doubt about precisely what will be necessary to
    satisfy the contention requirement and request that the Commission
    provide clarification. Redline and WCA assert that the criteria
    should be technologically neutral, and that the Commission should
    not require all devices to employ a single protocol; they argue such
    a decision would delay deployment of service in the band and stifle
    new product development.[^72] The petitioners also ask the
    Commission to clarify that Wi-Max technology, which is being
    developed for use in this band world-wide, satisfies the contention
    protocol requirement, even though it does not employ a
    listen-before-talk protocol.[^73] Many commenters agree that the
    contention protocol requirement should allow for more than one type
    of protocol to be recognized for use in the band, and ask the
    Commission to clarify whether Wi-Max technology would satisfy the
    Commission's requirement.[^74]

32. After reviewing the arguments raised by the petitioners and the
    commenters, we conclude that the public interest is best served by
    retaining the requirement that fixed, base and mobile equipment
    operating in the band incorporate a contention-based protocol. Given
    our decision to retain non-exclusive licensing in the 3650 MHz band,
    we continue to believe that equipment incorporating a
    contention-based protocol will provide a cost-effective means to
    enable multiple users to operate on the same frequencies in the band
    without interfering with one another. By retaining the
    contention-based protocol requirement, operators and their customers
    will not have to rely on frequency coordination prior to the
    initiation of service; this will reduce costs and delay. We note
    that most commenters do not dispute the utility of contention
    protocols for interference avoidance but, rather, address whether
    such technology has shortcomings that limit its application in the
    band to short distances or to less congested areas. We are not
    persuaded that the shortcomings that petitioners such as Motorola
    and Intel ascribe to contention protocols will necessarily limit use
    of the band to short range applications. Competing evidence
    indicates that contention technology is suitable for many different
    applications that the *3650 MHz Order* envisioned, including long
    range operations.[^75] Long range transmissions typically would be
    point-to-point using narrow beams. Point-to-point transmissions at
    the power limits adopted for the band will have a lower potential
    for interference and allow providers to use this band for backhaul
    operations, especially in less congested rural areas.[^76] The
    Commission's goal of providing for multiple entrants in the band can
    best be accomplished if users have the flexibility to choose the
    technology most appropriate to meet their needs. Accordingly, we are
    denying those petitions for reconsideration that seek elimination of
    the contention protocol requirement.

33. Further, we clarify that the 3650 MHz rules provide for
    certification of a variety of devices that may use different types
    of protocols or interference avoidance mechanisms that satisfy the
    contention definition that applies to the 3650 MHz band. The
    definition of what constitutes a valid contention protocol for the
    3650 MHz band is broad enough to encompass different types of
    contention protocols and interference avoidance mechanisms, thereby
    promoting innovation and product development. As stated in the
    Order, equipment for use in the 3650 MHz band must incorporate a
    mechanism that allows "multiple users to share the same spectrum ...
    and establish\[es\] rules by which each device is provided a
    reasonable opportunity to operate."[^77] Although the Commission
    stated that it would not certify equipment that appeared "to be
    designed to preclude others from using this spectrum,"[^78] it was
    not the Commission's intent that only one type of contention
    protocol be used by all equipment deployed in the band. The record,
    however, reveals two broad categories of contention-based protocols,
    discussed below, both of which appear to meet our definitional
    requirements for operation in this band. Nonetheless, they may not
    be compatible with each other, and the use of both types could
    result in co-frequency interference and thus frustrate the
    Commission's goal of allowing for multiple entrants in the band

34. Under the Commission's rules, contention-based protocols can be
    broadly categorized as either "unrestricted" or "restricted." Those
    contention protocols that we refer to as unrestricted protocols are
    broadly compatible and function to prevent interference even with
    other, dissimilar contention technologies on the market. A
    listen-before-talk technology such as is used by Wi-Fi devices is a
    prime example of an unrestricted contention-based protocol. If a
    system using Wi-Fi technology hears a competing signal before it
    transmits, it takes steps to avoid interfering, regardless of the
    format of, or interference technology associated with, the other
    signal. It thus allows each device a "reasonable opportunity to
    operate." On the other hand, restricted contention protocols can
    prevent interference only with other devices incorporating the same
    protocol. Wi-Max, with its scheduling protocol, currently stands as
    the main example of a restricted contention technology**.** In its
    present format, Wi-Max technology effectively prevents interference
    among multiple transmitters on a single Wi-Max system. Different
    Wi-Max systems can be coordinated to avoid interfering with each
    other, thus providing each Wi-Max device a "reasonable opportunity
    to operate." However, because it relies on a scheduling protocol and
    does not empirically determine whether other types of transmitters
    are operating on a channel, a Wi-Max system cannot now avoid causing
    interference to with other technologies, such as Wi-Fi, which rely
    on different interference-avoidance strategies. Equipment
    incorporating Wi-Max technology thus runs the risk of interfering
    with, or drowning out, transmissions using other contention
    technologies.

35. Allowing the use of different protocols in the band will serve our
    goal of speeding deployment of service, since operators will be able
    to deploy many different technologies, including those already being
    developed for use in the 3650 MHz band world-wide. Nonetheless, we
    must resolve the potential for conflict between certain types of
    protocols, which could result in interference and/or a denial of
    access to the band for certain users. To resolve this conflict, we
    will certify equipment using a restricted contention protocol --
    *i.e.*, one which can avoid co-frequency interference only with
    other devices incorporating the same type of protocol -- but will
    limit the operation of such equipment to the lower 25 megahertz of
    the 3650 MHz band. Devices incorporating a restricted
    contention-based protocol will only be certified for operation in,
    and may only transmit over, the lower 25 megahertz of the 3650 MHz
    band. This will effectively permit equipment using unrestricted
    protocols to operate in the band since it will be able to operate in
    the upper 25 megahertz of the band without being subjected to
    potential interference from licensees with equipment using
    restricted contention protocol. On the other hand, equipment using
    an unrestricted contention protocol -- *i.e.*, one which can avoid
    co-frequency interference with devices using all types of protocols
    -- will be allowed to operate throughout the 50 megahertz in the
    3650 MHz band since it will be able to detect other transmissions
    throughout the band and thus avoid co-frequency interference
    anywhere in the band. We conclude that this approach will ensure
    efficient use of the spectrum and permit the prompt deployment in
    this country of equipment that is already being used in this
    spectrum in other countries around the globe.[^79] Permitting a
    number of different contention based technologies to operate in the
    band will also provide additional flexibility to licensees to choose
    the best suitable technology for the type of services they plan to
    provide.

36. We will implement this approach through our equipment certification
    process, under which we will examine for compliance with our rules
    all equipment proposed for use in the 3650 MHz band. We will
    condition the certification for equipment using a restricted
    protocol to limit its operation and tuning range to the bottom 25
    megahertz of the band.[^80] The base and fixed stations registration
    database will include the FCC identification number, reflecting the
    equipment certification condition restricting the licensee's
    operating frequency range if the licensee employs equipment using a
    restricted contention-based protocol.[^81] We recognize that
    manufacturers, through software upgrades or other means, may alter
    the emission characteristics of previously deployed devices so that
    they move from the restricted to the unrestricted category. To the
    extent that this occurs, the manufacturer will be responsible for
    complying with the Commission's rules regarding the need for new
    equipment certification before the device will be permitted to tune
    over the full 50 megahertz of the 3650 MHz band.[^82] Further,
    affected licensees must update their base and fixed station
    registrations to reflect this change.

37. By contrast, we will not condition the certification for equipment
    incorporating an unrestricted contention-based protocol, thus
    allowing such equipment it to operate throughout the full 50 MHz of
    the band. By permitting licensees deploying unrestricted contention
    technology to operate throughout the band, we expect to create an
    added incentive for industry groups and manufacturers to speed their
    development and deployment of such technology. In the long term,
    this, should improve the quality of service in the 3650 MHz band,
    furthering the public interest. At the same time, however,
    permitting restricted contention technologies to operate in the
    lower 25 MHz of the band will ensure that a wider range of currently
    available equipment may be immediately deployed in the band.[^83]

38. The record indicates that the industry is already making progress in
    developing additional unrestricted protocols. For example, Airspan
    Networks, Inc., has proposed a "detect and protect" carrier sensing
    mechanism that it claims will be compatible with both Wi-Fi and
    Wi-Max technology (which incorporates IEEE standard 802.16) and will
    offer the spectrum-sharing benefits of contention technology.
    Airspan asserts that its interference-avoidance technology has been
    successfully deployed in dense, urban areas of Japan.[^84]
    Furthermore, under the auspices of the IEEE, industry groups are
    modifying standards for both 802.11 and 802.16 technology to
    facilitate the operation and coexistence in the 3650 MHz band of
    devices built to those standards.[^85] Cisco has asserted that an
    updated 802.11 standard for the 3650 MHz band "is possible as early
    as December 2007."[^86] We are optimistic that, in the relatively
    near term, these and other technical initiatives will yield
    effective contention-based protocols like those that the Commission
    envisioned as necessary to support the non-exclusively licensed
    operation in the 3650 MHz band. Accordingly, we deny the eight
    petitions for reconsideration to the extent that they seek
    elimination of the requirement that equipment in the 3650 MHz band
    incorporate a contention-based protocol.

39.  We note briefly the request by BRN Phoenix that the Commission
    certify its Advanced Antenna System as the (apparently sole)
    contention-based protocol for use in the 3650 MHz band.[^87] Several
    parties strongly oppose BRN's request, correctly arguing that the
    Commission did not intend to choose a single technology as the
    dominant contention protocol for use in the band.[^88] As the above
    discussion makes clear, we expect that a variety of different
    contention technologies will qualify for deployment in the band.
    BRN, like other parties may seek certification for its Advanced
    Antenna System from the Laboratory Division of the Commission's
    Office of Engineering and Technology. We similarly reject BRN's
    attempt to achieve by waiver what it seeks to accomplish by petition
    for reconsideration. It requests waiver of 47 C.F.R. § 90.203(o)(1),
    which requires that parties seeking certification for equipment to
    operate in the 3650 MHz band "describe the methodology used to meet"
    the contention-based protocol requirement.[^89] BRN fails to explain
    how application of the rule to its AAS technology would frustrate
    the underlying purpose of the rule, nor does it identify unique
    circumstances that would make application of the rule inequitable,
    unduly burdensome or contrary to the public interest in this
    case.[^90]

## Emissions Limits

40. In setting the power limits for transmissions in the 3650 MHz band,
    the Commission balanced numerous competing factors to "serve the
    public interest and foster the expeditious introduction of new
    terrestrial services in the 3650 MHz band."[^91] These factors
    included (1) the importance of interference protection for
    grandfathered FSS earth stations and federal government
    radiolocation stations and (2) the need to ensure efficient use of
    the band by avoiding mutual interference among licensed operators.
    To this end, the Commission adopted a peak power density of 25 Watts
    per 25 MHz of bandwidth and no greater than 1 watt per 1 MHz of
    bandwidth for fixed operations and imposed a limit of 1 Watt per 25
    MHz of bandwidth for mobile operations.[^92] Various petitioners
    seek reconsideration of these aspects of the order.

### Fixed and Mobile Power Limits

41.  Redline asks that we reconsider the power limits for fixed
    operations and permit point-to-point devices to employ transmitting
    antennas with directional gain greater than 6 dBi without a
    corresponding reduction in transmitter peak power output.[^93]
    Redline contends that such a change in the rules will extend the
    reach of the point-to-point links that WISPs will rely on in
    bringing broadband service to rural areas. Similarly, several
    petitioners request that we increase the allowable power for mobile
    transmissions in the band to 5 Watts per 25 MHz. They argue that the
    higher power limit is necessary to "allow reliable mobile
    communications over several kilometers" and to facilitate deployment
    of wireless broadband services in rural areas.[^94] Cisco, the
    Satellite Industry Association and Sprint oppose an increase in the
    power limits, arguing that the Commission struck the correct balance
    between signal strength and protecting FSS earth stations.[^95]

42. We decline to increase the power limits for either fixed or mobile
    operations in the 3650 MHz band. In adopting power limits for this
    band, the Commission balanced the potential for inter-service and
    intra-service interference with the need to provide for satisfactory
    service by 3650 MHz devices: it sought to ensure efficient and
    expeditious use of the band by adopting power limits that would
    allow multiple 3650 MHz licensees to operate within reasonable
    proximity of each other without unacceptable interference. At the
    same time, the Commission was concerned that the combination of
    power limits and the size of the earth station exclusion zones that
    it adopted would adequately protect from harmful interference the
    grandfathered FSS operations and Federal Government radiolocation
    stations.[^96] As the Commission noted, the higher the power limit
    -- more particularly the higher the power density expressed in watts
    per megahertz -- the greater the separation distance that is
    necessary to protect the grandfathered satellite earth
    stations.[^97]

43. The parties seeking reconsideration of the power limits do not claim
    that the Commission erred in reaching the balance it struck among
    these various considerations. They do not, for example, argue that
    the rules' power limits will prevent deployment in the band or make
    a viable service impracticable. Rather, they merely ask that we give
    greater weight to considerations of transmission strength (and
    range) than to interference avoidance.[^98] The petitioners have not
    persuaded us that the Commission erred in striking a balance that
    will serve the public interest, and we consequently deny these
    requests for reconsideration.[^99] We therefore conclude that the
    Commission set the 3650 MHz power limits at an appropriate level.
    The levels adopted are adequate to support commercially viable
    services and will allow licensees to operate effectively in the band
    without unacceptably interfering with each other's operations
    (provided they deploy equipment incorporating an appropriate
    contention technology). At the same time, the power limits, combined
    with the size of the protection zones for grandfathered FSS earth
    stations, will prevent terrestrial operations in the band from
    interfering with in-band satellite operations.[^100]

### Advanced Antenna Systems

44. BRN Phoenix asks that we reconsider section 90.1321 of the rules as
    it applies to limit the power output of BRN's advanced antenna
    system ("AAS") to 25 watts per 25 MHz for operations in the 3650 MHz
    band. BRN explains that its AAS technology uses sectorized antennas
    to narrow the beam width of transmissions and thereby reduce the
    probability of interference with FSS earth stations.[^101] It argues
    that reconsideration of the rule's power limit would serve the
    public interest by encouraging technologies that protect earth
    stations from interference.[^102] SIA opposes BRN's request, arguing
    that it would create harmful interference to grandfathered earth
    stations.[^103]

45. We decline BRN's request to reconsider our limit on power output in
    the 3650 MHz band. In the *3650 MHz Order*, the Commission already
    balanced the public interest factors that BRN raises in its
    petition. Specifically, the Commission explicitly considered the
    issues surrounding "deployment of advanced antenna systems,
    including sectorized and adaptive array systems." [^104] It balanced
    the need for "flexibility for licensees to employ a wide variety of
    advanced antennas to meet their needs" with the goal of protecting
    FSS earth stations.[^105] In so doing, it concluded that, "to allow
    flexibility in deployment" of these systems, it would allow such
    antennas to operate with a slightly higher power output.[^106] BRN
    Phoenix identifies no deficiency in the Commission's decision that
    would warrant reconsideration. Accordingly, we deny its petition in
    this regard.

46.  Again duplicating the thrust of its reconsideration petition, BRN
    also asks that we waive the power output rule as it applies to BRN's
    AAS technology,[^107] but it has failed to meet the requirements for
    waiver of a Commission rule. It has established neither (1) that
    underlying purpose of the rule would be ill-served or frustrated by
    application in this case, nor (2) that unusual facts make
    application of the rule unduly burdensome or contrary to the public
    interest.[^108] Accordingly, we deny the requested wavier.

## FSS Satellite Issues

47. As discussed above, the Commission took several steps to minimize
    the extent to which terrestrial operations in the 3650 MHz band
    would affect the operations of satellite operators in both the
    conventional C-band (3700-4200 MHz) and the extended C-band
    (3625-3700 MHz). First, the Commission established protection zones
    with a radius of 150 km around the earth stations of grandfathered
    Fixed Satellite Service operators in the 3650 MHz band.[^109] The
    Commission ruled that licensees in the 3650 MHz band could establish
    Fixed Service operations within the protection zones only with the
    consent of the affected FSS operator.[^110] As we note above, for
    3650 MHz licensees, the Commission established fixed station
    operating power limits of 25 Watts and mobile station operating
    power limits of 1 Watt.[^111] Additionally, the Commission sought to
    avoid out-of-band interference by requiring operators to limit
    emissions into adjacent bands by a minimum attenuation of 43 + 10
    log(P) below the transmit power.[^112]

### Out-of-Band Interference. 

48. The Satellite Industry Association (SIA) seeks reconsideration of
    the *3650 MHz Order*, arguing that the newly authorized terrestrial
    operations in the 3650 MHz band will create interference in the
    adjacent 3700-4200 band that, contrary to the public interest, could
    disrupt C-band satellite operations.[^113] SIA asserts that
    satellite receivers are particularly sensitive to such out-of-band
    emissions as operators move to the more aggressive modulation
    schemes necessary for spectrum-intensive, high-definition services.
    It argues that the potential for harmful interference is exacerbated
    where, as here, the licensing requirements are "minimal in nature,"
    and it asserts that the Commission's discretion to address harmful
    interference once such interference occurs provides insufficient
    protection, particularly where interference sources may be
    unregistered, mobile consumer devices.[^114]

49. In the *3650 MHz Order*, the Commission established a limit of 43+10
    log (p) dB below transmit power as the minimum out-of-band
    attenuation for operations in the 3650 MHz band. SIA argues for the
    significantly more restrictive out-of-band emission limit of
    71.25+10 log (p) dB below transmit power. SIA's petition includes
    two tables on which it relies to demonstrate that the *3650 MHz
    Order*'s signal attenuation requirement is insufficient to prevent
    disruption to C-band earth-station operations.[^115] These tables
    analyze the interrelationship between the arrival angle[^116] of the
    interfering 3650 MHz signal and the distance of the 3650 MHz
    transmitter from the satellite earth station. They purport to show
    that satellite operators will achieve a sufficient
    carrier-to-interference (C/I)[^117] ratio only in rare instances
    under the attenuation limit in the rules.[^118] As we discuss below,
    we find certain flawed assumptions in SIA's analysis that combine to
    significantly overstate the potential problems associated with the
    adopted out-of-band emission limit.

50. First, SIA relies on free-space assumptions for its analysis of
    signal propagation. That is, it assumes that the signal emitted by a
    3650 MHz licensee travels, without impediment, reflection or other
    attenuation, to the antenna of the C-band earth station. This fails
    to account for various factors that, in practice, would
    substantially weaken a terrestrial 3650 MHz signal before it could
    reach an earth station -- factors such as clutter loss and
    reflection off of the earth's surface. When the analysis is adjusted
    to reflect the real-world propagation conditions in which a 3650 MHz
    licensee will operate, the signal loss is significantly greater.
    This adjustment to the attenuation calculation replaces SIA's
    free-space path loss exponent of 2 with a more realistic factor,
    such as a number between 2 and 3.[^119] Indeed, modifying the
    analysis in this one respect yields a carrier-interference margin
    that falls within what SIA describes as an acceptable range[^120] in
    almost all of the scenarios it considers.[^121]

51. Second, SIA claims, without citation of authority or supporting
    analysis, that its members' satellite systems require a
    carrier-interference (C/I) ratio of at least 22 dB for effective
    operation.[^122] We believe this value to be conservative as it
    incorporates a large protection factor which would essentially limit
    the level of an interfering signal to approximately 10 dB below the
    noise floor of a C-band satellite receiver. More specifically, the
    C/I value consists of two factors, the carrier-noise (C/N) value
    which is the operating margin above the noise floor,[^123] and the
    interference-noise (I/N) value which is an additional protection
    level to account for any potential interference that may be
    received. A typical C/N for C-Band earth stations is 12 dB,[^124]
    which, based on a C/I of 22 dB results in a calculated I/N of -10
    dB.[^125] We note that an I/N of -10 dB has an effect of raising the
    noise floor by only 0.4 dB which only reduces the operating margin
    for a C-Band satellite receiver by a negligible amount. Thus, use of
    a more reasonable I/N value further reduces instances where SIA's
    models predict interference due to out-of-band signals.

52. Third, we note that the worst case C/I interference margins in SIA's
    analysis relies in part on scenarios assuming an arrival angle for
    the satellite antenna of only 5 degrees. That is, it assumes that
    the 3650 MHz signal will be amplified by the satellite antenna's
    gain which is very large at or below 5 degrees (*i.e.* it assumes
    that the satellite antenna is almost pointed directly at the 3650
    MHz transmitter). Satellite earth stations will rarely, and only for
    unique locations in the U.S., operate at this low of an angle to the
    earth.[^126] The greater arrival angles that will typically occur
    will further reduce the potential for interference from wireless OOB
    emissions by 3650 MHz stations.

53. Nevertheless, we are sensitive to the concerns that SIA has raised
    about the potential for 3650 MHz operators to interfere with
    satellite signals. We recognize that, in rare instances, a 3650 MHz
    transmitter may be placed (or proposed for construction) near the
    main beam and within a line of sight of a satellite earth station.
    In those cases, which we expect to be exceedingly rare, the
    Commission may require greater suppression of the 3650 MHz
    operator's out-of-band emissions, pursuant to the rules adopted in
    the *3650 MHz Order*.[^127]

54. We therefore decline to reconsider this aspect of the *3650 MHz
    Order*. We conclude that SIA's analysis contains overly conservative
    assumptions about path loss attenuation, the necessary C/I
    protection ratio and the arrival angle of a 3650 MHz signal at a
    satellite earth station. Each of these assumptions contributes to
    the overly pessimistic picture that SIA paints in its Attachment A
    analysis. When these assumptions are adjusted to reflect more
    realistic operational scenarios the attenuation requirement in the
    *3650 MHz Order* adequately protects operations in adjacent bands as
    validated by SIA by its acceptance of the C/I margin levels
    presented in its Attachment B. We note, however, that the Commission
    may require greater suppression of the out-of-band emissions of a
    3650 MHz operator in those rare instances when a 3650 MHz
    transmitter falls near the main beam and in a line of sight of a
    satellite earth station. Our proposed out-of-band emission limits
    will also speed deployment, facilitating the design and construction
    of economic devices for use in the band in a way that SIA's
    substantially more restrictive proposal would not.[^128]

55. Given the adequacy of the protection our signal-attenuation rules
    offer C-band operators, we need not address SIA's arguments relating
    to the mobile units permitted in the band, since the emission limits
    from mobile units are so much lower than for base stations and since
    mobile units can only operate within the range of the base station's
    enabling signal.[^129] Accordingly, we reject SIA's argument and
    affirm the signal attenuation rule the Commission previously
    adopted.

### Power Limits and LNB Saturation 

56. SIA argues that the Commission failed to address evidence in the
    record regarding the potential for emissions from the 3650 MHz
    transmitters to saturate the low noise block converters (LNBs) on
    FSS earth stations operating in the adjacent C-band at 3700-4200
    MHz.[^130] SIA requests that the Commission reconsider the
    permissible power level for fixed and base stations, at least in the
    upper half of the 3650 MHz band (that closest to the C-band) and set
    it at a level below the 25-watt figure that the order adopted.

57. We decline to reconsider the permissible power limits in the 3650
    MHz band as SIA requests. A review of the analysis that SIA provides
    for its argument on LNB saturation reveals that it is based on two
    very conservative assumptions.[^131] The predicted saturation is
    most pronounced when the arrival angle of the satellite antenna is 5
    degrees. At greater arrival angles -- as will exist for the great
    majority of earth stations -- the interference projected by SIA's
    analysis is reduced. We also note that SIA has again assumed free
    space assumptions for its propagation analysis. Employing a path
    loss exponent greater than 2 as we did for the OOB emissions
    estimate significantly reduces the potential interference.

58. Given the smaller separation distances necessary to alleviate LNB
    saturation predicted by a more realistic propagation model, a modest
    coordination effort should allow satellite earth stations to operate
    effectively, despite the presence of nearby operations in the 3650
    MHz band. We expect 3650 MHz licensees and satellite operators to
    undertake such coordination where necessary.[^132] The registration
    requirement for fixed and base station operations in the band will
    facilitate this coordination. As the order describes, in the
    registration process, licensees in the 3650 MHz band will be
    required to provide identification and location information for
    their fixed and base stations, as well as the technical information
    necessary for interference analysis.[^133]

59. Despite the implication of SIA's argument in this proceeding, the
    authorization for terrestrial operations in the 3650 MHz band is
    hardly a new development. In 2000, the Commission allocated the band
    for terrestrial fixed service and base station operations of mobile
    service on a co-primary basis.[^134] Accordingly, satellite
    operators have been on notice for some time of the potential for
    many of the adjacent-band operations about which SIA now complains.
    It appears that, for economic reasons, satellite operators may have
    chosen not to install the appropriate filters in response to the
    Commission's 2000 action. If that is the case, we decline at this
    point to relieve them of the consequences of their business
    decisions.

60. We thus reject SIA's contention that the Commission's authorization
    of operations in the 3650 MHz band improperly places the burden of
    avoiding interference on incumbents.[^135] It is not Commission
    policy to protect incumbent licensees against all emissions from
    adjacent bands; this is particularly true when the emissions are a
    foreseeable result of prior allocation orders. Installation of
    appropriate filters on satellite earth stations can adequately
    address the LNB saturation issue that SIA now raises.[^136]

### Satellite Coordination Requirements

61. Several parties urge reconsideration of the portion of the *3650 MHz
    Order* governing coordination of 3650 MHz fixed station operations
    within the exclusion zones established around grandfathered FSS
    earth stations.[^137] WCA suggests that the requirement that fixed
    station operators negotiate individualized agreements with earth
    station licensees, without a pre-determined interference protection
    framework, imposes significant transaction costs on 3650 MHz
    licensees. It contends that this structure creates a significant
    disincentive for operations within the exclusion zones, "even where
    the interference risk is minimal or non-existent."[^138] To reduce
    these burdens, the petitioners ask that we impose the guidelines of
    the Commission's Part 101 rules (which govern the private use of
    certain microwave radio spectrum) as a framework for the
    coordination, to expedite fixed station entry without creating
    interference risk to the grandfathered FSS earth stations.[^139]

62. SIA opposes application of the Part 101 coordination rules to the
    3650 MHz band, arguing that the architecture of the networks covered
    by Part 101 differs significantly from those that will be operating
    in the 3650 MHz band. Instead, it suggests permitting interested
    parties to develop their own coordination procedures but relying, in
    the meantime, on the operator-to-operator coordination procedures
    envisioned in the *3650 MHz Order*.[^140]

63. We decline to adopt our Part 101 rules as the sole means of
    coordination for those 3650 MHz licensees seeking to operate fixed
    services within the exclusion zones that the Commission established
    around grandfathered FSS earth stations. Our Part 101 rules, *inter
    alia*, "prescribe the manner in which portions of the radio spectrum
    may be made available for private . . . microwave operations that
    require transmitting facilities on land."[^141] In doing so,
    however, they set out specific coordination procedures and
    interference protection criteria for covered fixed microwave
    transmitters.[^142] Rather than impose these specific procedures and
    criteria, we prefer to allow the parties involved to choose for
    themselves the rules governing their particular negotiations. They
    are certainly free to adopt the Part 101 rules; or they may prefer
    to structure their coordination process differently. For example,
    Appendix D of the *3650 MHz Order* laid out a different methodology
    for coordinating the placement of a fixed station within an FSS
    exclusion zone.[^143]

# Ordering clauses

64. Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that, pursuant to the authority contained
    in Sections 4(i), 302, 303(e), 303(f), and 307 of the Communications
    Act of 1934, as amended, 47 USC §§ 154(i), 302, 303(c), 303(f), and
    307, this Order on Reconsideration IS HEREBY ADOPTED.

65. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, pursuant to Sections 4(i), 302, 303(e)
    303(f), 303(g), 303(r) and 405 of the Communications Act of 1934, as
    amended, 47 U.S.C. §§ 154(i), 302, 303(e), 303(f), 303(g) and 405,
    that the petitions for reconsideration, filed by Motorola and
    Redline and seeking clarification regarding the contention-based
    protocol requirement ARE GRANTED to the extent discussed above.

66. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Part 90 of the Commission\'s rules IS
    AMENDED as specified in Appendix A, and such rule amendments shall
    be effective 30 days after publication of the text thereof in the
    Federal Register.

67. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, pursuant to Sections 4(i), 302, 303(e)
    303(f), 303(g), 303(r) and 405 of the Communications Act of 1934, as
    amended, 47 U.S.C. §§ 154(i), 302, 303(e), 303(f), 303(g) and 405,
    that the remainder of the petitions for reconsideration filed by
    Motorola and Redline, as well as the reconsideration petitions of
    BRN Phoenix, the Enterprise Wireless Alliance, the Satellite
    Industry Association, the Wireless Communications Association, the
    Wi-Max Forum, and the joint petition of Intel, Redline and Alvarion
    ARE DENIED.

    FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

    Marlene H. Dortch

    Secretary

**APPENDIX A**

**Final Rule Changes**

For reasons discussed in the preamble, the Federal Communications
Commission amends 47 CFR part 90 to read as follows:

**PART 90 -- PRIVATE LAND MOBILE RADIO SERVICES**

1\. The authority citation for part 90 continues to read as follows:

**Authority:** Sections 4(i), 11, 303(g), 303(r), and 332(c)(7) of the
Communications Act of 1934, as amended, 47 U.S.C. 154(i), 161, 303(g),
303(r), 332(c)(7).

2\. Section 90.7 is amended by revising the definition of
contention-based protocol to read as follows.

**[§ 90.7 Definitions.]{.underline}**

**\* \* \* \* \***

*Contention-based protocol.* A protocol that allows multiple users to
share the same spectrum by defining the events that must occur when two
or more transmitters attempt to simultaneously access the same channel
and establishing rules by which a transmitter provides reasonable
opportunities for other transmitters to operate. Such a protocol may
consist of procedures for initiating new transmissions, procedures for
determining the state of the channel (available or unavailable), and
procedures for managing retransmissions in the event of a busy channel.
Contention-based protocols shall fall into one of two categories:

\(1\) An unrestricted contention-based protocol is one which can avoid
co-frequency interference with devices using all other types of
contention-based protocols.

\(2\) A restricted contention-based protocol is one that does not
qualify as unrestricted.

**\* \* \* \* \***

3\. Section 90.203 is amended by revising paragraph (o) to read as
follows:

**[§ 90.203 Certification required.]{.underline}**

\(o\) Equipment certification for transmitters in the 3650-3700 MHz
band.

1.  Applications for all transmitters must describe the methodology used
    to meet the requirement that each transmitter employ a contention
    based protocol and indicate whether it is capable of avoiding
    co-frequency interference with devices using all other types of
    contention-based protocols (see §§ 90.7, 90.1305 and 90.1321 of this
    part);

2.  Applications for mobile transmitters must identify the base stations
    with which they are designed to communicate and describe how the
    requirement to positively receive and decode an enabling signal is
    incorporated (see § 90.1333 of this part); and

3.  Applications for systems using advanced antenna technology must
    provide the algorithm used to reduce the equivalent isotropically
    radiated power (EIRP) to the maximum allowed in the event of
    overlapping beams (see § 90.1321 of this part).

4.  Applications for fixed transmitters must include a description of
    the installation instructions and guidelines for RF safety exposure
    requirements that will be included with the transmitter. (See §
    90.1335).

4\. Section 90.1319 is amended by revising paragraphs (a), (b), (c), and
adding paragraph (d) to read as follows:

**[§ 90.1319 Policies governing the use of the 3650-3700 MHz
band.]{.underline}**

\(a\) Channels in this band are available on a shared basis only and
will not be assigned for the exclusive use of any licensee

\(b\) Any base, fixed, or mobile station operating in the band must
employ a contention-based protocol.

\(c\) Equipment incorporating an unrestricted contention-based protocol
(i.e*.* one capable of avoiding co-frequency interference with devices
using all other types of contention-based protocols) may operate
throughout the 50 megahertz of this frequency band. Equipment
incorporating a restricted contention-based protocol (i.e. one that does
not qualify as unrestricted) may operate in, and shall only tune over,
the lower 25 megahertz of this frequency band.

\(d\) All applicants and licensees shall cooperate in the selection and
use of frequencies in the 3650-3700 MHz band in order to minimize the
potential for interference and make the most effective use of the
authorized facilities. A database identifying the locations of
registered stations will be available at
\<http://wireless.fcc.gov/uls\>. Licensees should examine this database
before seeking station authorization, and make every effort to ensure
that their fixed and base stations operate at a location, and with
technical parameters, that will minimize the potential to cause and
receive interference. Licensees of stations suffering or causing harmful
interference are expected to cooperate and resolve this problem by
mutually satisfactory arrangements.

**APPENDIX B**

**Parties Filing Petitions for Reconsideration**

**of the Report and Order**

1.  BRN Phoenix, Inc.

2.  Enterprise Wireless Alliance (EWA)

3.  Intel Corporation, Redline Communications, Inc. and Alvarion Inc.
    (joint petition)

4.  Motorola, Inc.

5.  Redline Communications, Inc.

6.  Satellite Industry Association (SIA)

7.  Wireless Communications Association International, Inc (WCA)

8.  Wi-Max Forum.

    **Timely Filed Oppositions, Comments and Replies**

+--------------------------------+-------------------------------------+
| 1.  Alband, Linda              | 2.  AirStream Data, LLC             |
+--------------------------------+-------------------------------------+
| 3.  American Petroleum         | 4.  Anderson, Ithaka                |
|     Institute (API)            |                                     |
+--------------------------------+-------------------------------------+
| 5.  Ansik, Mihal               | 6.  April, Jay                      |
+--------------------------------+-------------------------------------+
| 7.  Armstrong, Marilee         | 8.  Aronoff, Paul                   |
+--------------------------------+-------------------------------------+
| 9.  Austin Free-Net            | 10. Baier, Randal                   |
+--------------------------------+-------------------------------------+
| 11. BG Wireless, Inc.          | 12. Bilderback, Jim                 |
+--------------------------------+-------------------------------------+
| 13. Boone, Douglas R.          | 14. Borus, Audrey A.                |
+--------------------------------+-------------------------------------+
| 15. BPS Networks               | 16. BRN Phoenix, Inc.               |
+--------------------------------+-------------------------------------+
| 17. Bspeedy Wireless Inc.      | 18. Burns, William                  |
+--------------------------------+-------------------------------------+
| 19. Bushard, Mike Jr.          | 20. Butler, Peter                   |
+--------------------------------+-------------------------------------+
| 21. Cape, Melissa              | 22. Carter, Steve                   |
+--------------------------------+-------------------------------------+
| 23. Carullo, Scott A.          | 24. Chicago Media Action            |
+--------------------------------+-------------------------------------+
| 25. Chounet, Linda and Paul    | 26. Cisco Systems, Inc.             |
+--------------------------------+-------------------------------------+
| 27. Coastal Sierra, Inc.       | 28. Coberly, Allan                  |
+--------------------------------+-------------------------------------+
| 29. Coelho, Marco C.           | 30. Coffey, Greg                    |
+--------------------------------+-------------------------------------+
| 31. Connolly, Michael          | 32. Conrad, Ryan                    |
+--------------------------------+-------------------------------------+
| 33. Cronin, Kevin              | 34. Crossman, Kimo                  |
+--------------------------------+-------------------------------------+
| 35. Davis, Morgan              | 36. Direct Wireless Web             |
+--------------------------------+-------------------------------------+
| 37. Dougherty, Martin          | 38. Drew, Christopher A.            |
+--------------------------------+-------------------------------------+
| 39. Dunphy, Joseph F.          | 40. Ellsworth, Mike                 |
+--------------------------------+-------------------------------------+
| 41. Enterprise Wireless        | 42. Erskine, Michael                |
|     Alliance                   |                                     |
+--------------------------------+-------------------------------------+
| 43. Fisler, Nancy              | 44. Foster, Tim                     |
+--------------------------------+-------------------------------------+
| 45. Fox Networks & Home Box    | 46. Friedman, Nicole                |
|     Office, Inc.               |                                     |
+--------------------------------+-------------------------------------+
| 47. Friedman, Paula            | 48. Frosty Hollow Ecological        |
|                                |     Restoration                     |
+--------------------------------+-------------------------------------+
| 49. Garland, Jeff              | 50. Gerry, Lyn                      |
+--------------------------------+-------------------------------------+
| 51. Giguere, P.                | 52. Glass, Brett                    |
+--------------------------------+-------------------------------------+
| 53. Glynn, David               | 54. Gustafsson, Eje                 |
+--------------------------------+-------------------------------------+
| 55. Halsted, Chad N.           | 56. Harkness, Roger                 |
+--------------------------------+-------------------------------------+
| 57. Harnish, Richard           | 58. Hart, Deborah Forest            |
+--------------------------------+-------------------------------------+
| 59. Havens, Brent A.           | 60. Hayes, David                    |
+--------------------------------+-------------------------------------+
| 61. Henry, Roger               | 62. Herber, Steven J.               |
+--------------------------------+-------------------------------------+
| 63. Institute for Local        | 64. Irmiger, Don                    |
|     Self-Reliance              |                                     |
+--------------------------------+-------------------------------------+
| 65. Johnson, Deborah           | 66. Johnson, Robert                 |
+--------------------------------+-------------------------------------+
| 67. Jones, Tom                 | 68. Kaminga, John Paul              |
+--------------------------------+-------------------------------------+
| 69. Kaye, Clair                | 70. Kazemi, Haudy                   |
+--------------------------------+-------------------------------------+
| 71. Kerns, Timothy             | 72. Kirsher, William                |
+--------------------------------+-------------------------------------+
| 73. Kleiman, Steven L.         | 74. Knox, Rich                      |
+--------------------------------+-------------------------------------+
| 75. Koenigsdorf, Brian         | 76. Koskenmaki, Mark                |
+--------------------------------+-------------------------------------+
| 77. Krusemeyer, Gloria         | 78. Kunze, Rick                     |
+--------------------------------+-------------------------------------+
| 79. Lacy, Edward               | 80. Lamb, Michael                   |
+--------------------------------+-------------------------------------+
| 81. Larsen, Matt               | 82. Last Mile Wireless              |
+--------------------------------+-------------------------------------+
| 83. Laura, Joe                 | 84. Levy, Don                       |
+--------------------------------+-------------------------------------+
| 85. Lienhart, Debbie           | 86. Lister, Hillary J.              |
+--------------------------------+-------------------------------------+
| 87. Magnuson, Brian            | 88. Manro, Don                      |
+--------------------------------+-------------------------------------+
| 89. Maranda, Michael           | 90. Marie, Theresa                  |
+--------------------------------+-------------------------------------+
| 91. Martin, Mark               | 92. Massey, David Dyar              |
+--------------------------------+-------------------------------------+
| 93. McGuire, James             | 94. McKinion, James M.              |
+--------------------------------+-------------------------------------+
| 95. McMillion Curtis           | 96. Media Access Project            |
+--------------------------------+-------------------------------------+
| 97. Meinrath, Sascha D.        | 98. Meyer, Kenneth W.               |
+--------------------------------+-------------------------------------+
| 99. Michiana Wireless          | 100. Miller, Noah                   |
+--------------------------------+-------------------------------------+
| 101. Moran, Peter              | 102. Motorola Inc.                  |
+--------------------------------+-------------------------------------+
| 103. Murphy, Karen             | 104. Murphy, Kevin                  |
+--------------------------------+-------------------------------------+
| 105. Neuliep, Michael          | 106. NextWeb, Inc.                  |
+--------------------------------+-------------------------------------+
| 107. Nicholas, Garth           | 108. PART-15.ORG                    |
+--------------------------------+-------------------------------------+
| 109. Penland, Kerry            | 110. Pittman, Charles               |
+--------------------------------+-------------------------------------+
| 111. Ponschock, Lon            | 112. Pool, Herman                   |
+--------------------------------+-------------------------------------+
| 113. Potthoff, Rick            | 114. Quarles, Wendy                 |
+--------------------------------+-------------------------------------+
| 115. RapidDSL & Wireless, Inc  | 116. Reed, Scott B.                 |
+--------------------------------+-------------------------------------+
| 117. Reiter, Tobias H.         | 118. Riddle, Dan                    |
+--------------------------------+-------------------------------------+
| 119. Ridge Runner Internet     | 120. Roadstar Internet              |
|      Services Inc.             |                                     |
+--------------------------------+-------------------------------------+
| 121. Ronan, Stephen B.         | 122. Rothgery, Robert F.            |
+--------------------------------+-------------------------------------+
| 123. Russell, Brian            | 124. Rzeszutek, Konrad              |
+--------------------------------+-------------------------------------+
| 125. Saddlemire, Craig         | 126. Satellite Indus. Ass'n         |
+--------------------------------+-------------------------------------+
| 127. Schaefer, John            | 128. Schwieters, Nancy              |
+--------------------------------+-------------------------------------+
| 129. Sherwood, Jay             | 130. Shevokas, Amanda               |
+--------------------------------+-------------------------------------+
| 131. SmarterBroadband          | 132. Sprint Corporation             |
+--------------------------------+-------------------------------------+
| 133. Sussman, RJ               | 134. Szczepanczyk, Mitchell         |
+--------------------------------+-------------------------------------+
| 135. TDS Telecommunications    | 136. Technology For All             |
|      Corp.                     |                                     |
+--------------------------------+-------------------------------------+
| 137. Thomas, Kent              | 138. Timmerman, Rudolf H.           |
+--------------------------------+-------------------------------------+
| 139. Towers, Matt              | 140. Tropos Networks                |
+--------------------------------+-------------------------------------+
| 141. UpHi.net, LLC             | 142. Valeri, Andy                   |
+--------------------------------+-------------------------------------+
| 143. Veloxinet, Inc.           | 144. Verizon                        |
+--------------------------------+-------------------------------------+
| 145. Wade, Karen               | 146. Wallace, Randy                 |
+--------------------------------+-------------------------------------+
| 147. Wallace, Ron              | 148. Warrier, Unni                  |
+--------------------------------+-------------------------------------+
| 149. Weaver, Rosie             | 150. Webster, Brian                 |
+--------------------------------+-------------------------------------+
| 151. Wenger, John              | 152. WiMax Forum                    |
+--------------------------------+-------------------------------------+
| 153. Win.Net Internet          | 154. Wireless Communications Ass'n  |
|                                |      Int'l, Inc.                    |
+--------------------------------+-------------------------------------+
| 155. Wireless Internet Service | 156. WirelessVT Solutions Inc       |
|      Providers Ass'n (WISPA)   |                                     |
+--------------------------------+-------------------------------------+
| 157. Wolfe, Timothy E          | 158. Worley, Robin                  |
+--------------------------------+-------------------------------------+
| 159. XO Communications, Inc.   |                                     |
+--------------------------------+-------------------------------------+

**STATEMENT OF**

**COMMISSIONER JONATHAN S. ADELSTEIN**

*Re: Wireless Operations in the 3650-3700 MHz Band (ET Docket No.
04-151); Rules for Wireless Broadband Services in the 3650-3700 MHz Band
(WT Docket No. 05-96); Additional Spectrum for Unlicensed Devices Below
900 MHz and in the 3 GHz Band*

*(ET Docket No. 02-380); Memorandum Opinion and Order*

A little over two years ago, I was very pleased to support the
Commission's innovative decision to make the spectrum in the 3650-3700
MHz (3650 MHz) band available on a licensed, but non-exclusive, basis.
In many respects, this was a bold statement. We wanted to take advantage
of the success of the WiFi movement and take it to another level. We
wanted to find the right balance between a licensing model for
traditional, area-wide mobile systems and a model for unlicensed,
consumer-based services. Our licensing regime for the 3650 MHz band will
serve as a wireless highway between small towns and the big city -- it
will facilitate the delivery of broadband to all corners of the country
by serving a different user group, one that often is driven by more
localized, community based needs.

Since our initial decision, I have talked often about the public
interest benefits of the new licensing rules for the 3650 MHz band. I
have spoken with many supporters of our decision, and with those who
believe the band would be better used on an exclusive basis. But I
remain convinced the hybrid licensing approach that we first adopted for
the 3650 MHz band is the correct one, and I enthusiastically support our
reconsideration order today.

During my time at the Commission, I have pushed for flexible licensing
approaches that make it easier for community-based providers to get
access to wireless broadband opportunities, and the rules we affirm for
the 3650 MHz band should help make wireless broadband services available
to a large number of new users. Today, we uphold our earlier decision to
put in place a regime that doesn't rely on first in time and provides
equal access to all. I have heard from representatives of the Community
Wireless Network movement about our 3650 MHz licensing rules, and they
are thrilled with the hybrid approach and the positive impact it will
have on their efforts to deploy broadband networks in underserved
communities around the country.

So, once again, I wholeheartedly support our 3650 MHz licensing
decision. Of course, only time will tell if this unique approach will
result in increased use of this spectrum band. But I think that given
the success of unlicensed wireless networks, we are on the right track,
and our creative spectrum management approach is well justified.

[^1]: *See* Wireless Operations in the 3650-3700 MHz Band, ET Docket No.
    04-151, Report & Order, 20 FCC Rcd 6502 (2005) ("*3650 MHz Order*").
    The parties petitioning for reconsideration were: BRN Phoenix; the
    Enterprise Wireless Alliance (EWA); Intel Corporation, Redline
    Communications and Alvarion (jointly); Motorola; Redline
    Communications; the Satellite Industry Association (SIA); the
    Wireless Communications Association (WCA); and the Wi-Max Forum.

[^2]: *See* *infra* n.Error: Reference source not found.

[^3]: As discussed further below, "restricted" protocols are those
    capable of avoiding interference only to other devices using the
    same protocol.

[^4]: *See* Amendment of the Commission's Rules With Regard to the
    3650-3700 MHz Government Transfer Band, ET Docket Nos. 04-151,
    02-380 and 98-237, *Notice of Proposed Rulemaking*, 19 FCC Rcd 7545
    (2004) (*Unlicensed 3650 MHz Notice*) (describing history of 3650
    MHz band).

[^5]: Amendment of the Commission's Rules with Regard to the 3650-3700
    MHz Government Transfer Band, ET Docket No. 98-237, *Notice of
    Proposed Rule Making and Order*, 14 FCC Rcd 1295 (1998) (*3650 MHz
    Allocation Notice* and *FSS Allocation Freeze Order*).

[^6]: Amendment of the Commission's Rules With Regard to the 3650-3700
    MHz Government Transfer Band; The 4.9 GHz Band Transferred from
    Federal Government Use, *First Report and Order and Second Notice of
    Proposed Rule Making*, ET Docket No. 98-237, WT Docket No. 00-32, 15
    FCC Rcd 20,488 (2000) (*3650 MHz Allocation Order* and *3650 MHz
    Service Rules Notice*, respectively).

[^7]: *3650 MHz Allocation Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 20,503, ¶ 34-39. The
    Commission also deleted the unused government aeronautical
    radio-navigation service (ground-based) allocation in the band*.
    Id.*

[^8]: To some extent, certain proposals in the *3650 MHz Service Rules
    Notice* was superseded by events. For example, although the
    Commission sought comment on the feasibility of pairing the 3650 MHz
    band with the 4940-4990 MHz (4.9 GHz) band for mobile services, the
    4.9 GHz band subsequently became unavailable for commercial services
    when the Commission designated the band for exclusive public safety
    use.

[^9]: *Unlicensed 3650 MHz Notice*, 19 FCC Rcd 7545.

[^10]: *See 3650 MHz Order*, 20 FCC Rcd at 6513, ¶ 30.

[^11]: The Commission also noted that this approach promoted the
    objective of Section 706 of the Communications Act of 1996 by
    furthering the deployment of advanced telecommunications services to
    all Americans. *See* *3650 MHz Order*, 20 FCC Rcd at 6503, ¶ 2.

[^12]: *3650 MHz Order*, 20 FCC Rcd at 6511, ¶ 25.

[^13]: The Commission defined the contention-based protocol as follows:

    > A protocol that allows multiple users to share the same spectrum
    > by defining the events that must occur when two or more
    > transmitters attempt to simultaneously access the same channel and
    > establishing rules by which a transmitter provides reasonable
    > opportunities for other transmitters to operate. Such a protocol
    > may consist of procedures for initiating new transmissions,
    > procedures for determining the state of the channel (available or
    > unavailable), and procedures for managing retransmissions in the
    > event of a busy channel.

    *3650 MHz* Order, 20 FCC Rcd at 6523, ¶ 58.

[^14]: *3650 MHz Order*, 20 FCC Rcd at 6511-12, ¶ 27. For example,
    licensed Fixed Service (FS) operations (which have primary status)
    will be entitled to interference protection vis-à-vis new FSS earth
    stations (which will have secondary status), whereas unlicensed FS
    operations would not.

[^15]: *3650 MHz Order*, 20 FCC Rcd at 6508, ¶ 15.

[^16]: *3650 MHz Order*, 20 FCC Rcd at 6512-13, ¶¶ 29-31. The Commission
    defined the duty of cooperation that it created for the band's
    licensees as follows:

    > All applicants and licensees shall cooperate in the selection and
    > use of frequencies in the 3650-3700 MHz band in order to minimize
    > the potential for interference and make the most effective use of
    > the authorized facilities. A database identifying the locations of
    > registered stations will be available at
    > \<http://wireless.fcc.gov/uls\>. Licensees should examine this
    > database before seeking station authorization, and make every
    > effort to ensure that their fixed and base stations operate at a
    > location, and with technical parameters, that will minimize the
    > potential to cause and receive interference. Licensees of stations
    > suffering or causing harmful interference are expected to
    > cooperate and resolve this problem by mutually satisfactory
    > arrangements.

    47 C.F.R. § 90.1319(c).

[^17]: *3650 MHz Order*, 20 FCC Rcd at 6513-14, ¶ 31.

[^18]: Examples of contention-based protocols described in the order
    include channel monitoring used by private land mobile radios under
    Part 90 and Carrier Sense Multiple Access with Collision Avoidance
    (CSMA/CA) used by Wi-Fi devices. *See* *3650 MHz Order*, 20 FCC Rcd
    at 6522-23, ¶ 57.

[^19]: *3650 MHz Order*, 20 FCC Rcd at 6523, ¶ 58.

[^20]: *3650 MHz Order*, 20 FCC Rcd at 6523, ¶ 58.

[^21]: *3650 MHz Order*, 20 FCC Rcd at 6525-26, ¶¶ 63-64.

[^22]: *3650 MHz Order*, 20 FCC Rcd at 6520-21, ¶¶ 50-52.

[^23]: *3650 MHz Order,* 20 FCC Rcd at 6508, ¶ 16.

[^24]: *3650 MHz Order*, 20 FCC Rcd at 6511, ¶ 27.

[^25]: *3650 MHz Order*, 20 FCC Rcd at 6511, ¶ 27.

[^26]: *See* Motorola Petition at 2; Intel Petition at 18-19; WCA
    Petition at 12.

[^27]: *See* Motorola Petition at 2 (arguing that we should divide the
    band into two 25-MHz blocks and license them exclusively throughout
    the country); TDS Telecommunications comments at 7 (auction by
    individual MSA/RSA will permit smaller entities to meaningfully
    participate).

[^28]: *See* Intel Petition at 18-19 (seeking exclusive licensing in
    urban areas -- specifically the top 50 Metropolitan Statistical
    Areas -- and supporting a continuation of the non-exclusive scheme
    that the Commission previously adopted in the remaining geographic
    areas); Verizon comments at 5 (advocating exclusive licenses for the
    entire band in high-density areas, with only 25 megahertz being
    exclusively licensed elsewhere).

[^29]: WCA Petition at 12.

[^30]: *See, e.g.*, Intel Petition at 21-22 ("Companies are more willing
    to risk capital investments where they can better control spectrum
    access and thus create optimum \[quality of service\] for their
    subscribers."); WCA Opposition at 12-14 (discussing merits of
    exclusive access to spectrum). *3650 MHz Order*, 20 FCC Rcd at
    6511-13, ¶¶ 25-30.

[^31]: *See generally* WISPA comments at 1 (non-exclusive licensing in
    band "will foster an environment of continued service and
    competition" where it has not previously existed); Wi-Max Forum
    comments at 4 (non-exclusive licensing will bring "broadband
    availability, services and options for residential, business, and
    civic entities" to rural areas).

[^32]: *See, e.g.*, In the Matter of Unlicensed Operation in the TV
    Broadcast Bands, Additional Spectrum for Unlicenced Devices below
    900 MHz and in the 3 GHz Band, *First Report and Order and Further
    Notice of Proposed Rule Making*, ET Docket Nos. 04-186, 02-380, 21
    FCC Rcd 12266, 12277 ¶ 27 (2006).

[^33]: *3650 MHz Order*, 20 FCC Rcd at 6511, ¶ 30. *See also* Cisco
    Opposition at 3-4 ("Exclusion zones to protect satellite earth
    stations or federal government installations will make it impossible
    to use this band for general distribution of broadband capacity to
    subscribers in" many major metropolitan areas). Comparison of the
    map of FSS exclusion zones, Appendix F to the *3650 MHz Order*, and
    a list of the top 50 MSAs (available at
    <http://www.fcc.gov/oet/info/maps/areas/names/cmanames.txt>)
    indicates that terrestrial operations in the band would be
    prohibited in at least the following cities, absent an agreement
    with affected satellite providers: New York; Los Angeles;
    Philadelphia; San Francisco; Washington, DC; Dallas-Fort Worth;
    Miami; Pittsburgh; Baltimore; San Diego; Denver; Seattle; Tampa-St.
    Petersburg; San Jose; Portland, Oregon; Hartford, Connecticut;
    Sacramento; Bridgeport, Connecticut; Albany; Nashville; Greensboro,
    North Carolina; New Haven; and Honolulu.

[^34]: *3650 MHz Order*, 20 FCC Rcd at 6511, ¶ 25.

[^35]: *See, e.g.,* WISPA comments at 1; Voorhees ex parte presentation
    dated August 30, 2005 at 1.

[^36]: *See* *3650 MHz Order*, 20 FCC Rcd at 6511, ¶ 30 (stating that
    "\[t\]he record indicates that this band is well suited for high
    power broadband operations using contention-based technologies that
    facilitate sharing and that, provided entry barriers are low,
    parties are prepared to use these technologies to operate in the
    band on a non-exclusive basis"); *id.* at 6511-12 ¶ 27.

[^37]: *See* Cisco opposition at 5 (stating that splitting spectrum
    among metropolitan and non-metropolitan areas is "rarely a good
    idea" for large fixed stations and legacy services, and that such an
    approach would be even less beneficial for a new service such as
    those anticipated for the 3650 MHz band); Part 15.org opposition at
    10 (claiming that splitting the 50 MHz available in the band could
    result in "technically unusable" spectrum).

[^38]: *Cf.* Intel Petition at 18-24.

[^39]: Intel Petition at 8-9.

[^40]: Intel Petition at 10-11.

[^41]: WCA Petition at 2. *See also* Wi-Max Forum Petition at 8-9;
    Motorola Petition at 5 (claiming that these issues would make it
    very difficult to deploy any services that require a specific
    quality of service).

[^42]: *See* EWA Petition at 5 ("it is unlikely that EWA members or
    other prospective users will invest in the Band without a reasonable
    level of confidence that their systems will not experience
    destructive interference"). *See also* Motorola Petition at 5; TDS
    Telecommunications comments at 3.

[^43]: *See, e.g.*, Motorola Petition at 6 (stating that the
    Commission's approach "will not allow rapid deployment at 3650 MHz
    nor offer the most efficient use of the spectrum, particularly in
    dense urban areas").

[^44]: Intel Petition at iii, 12-14. Intel likens this situation to a
    "tragedy of the commons," in which the significant interference
    collectively caused by all the users renders the band virtually
    useless. *See id.* at iii. *See also* TDS Telecommunications
    comments at 5 (with no limitation on the number of licensees, the
    spectral noise floor will gradually but significantly rise to levels
    that will render productive uses of the band impossible).

[^45]: *See* Covad ex parte presentation dated August 22, 2006 at 4-9.
    In order to prevent squatting, Covad also suggests that licensees be
    required to complete construction and begin service within 90 days
    of registering operations in a particular market. *Id.* at 5-6. *See
    also* Enterprise Wireless Alliance Petition at 8 (suggesting that
    industry be charged with developing consensus management plan for
    band, including possibly a prior coordination regime); API comments
    at 6; XO Communications Opposition at 10 ("XO specifically opposes
    any regulations that would impose on incumbent users the obligation
    to modify their operations to accommodate new entrants.").

[^46]: *See* AirStream comments at 5-6. If licensees could not agree
    among themselves on an interference protection scheme, the
    Commission would mediate the process. *Id.* *Accord* American
    Petroleum Institute comments at 6 (suggesting development by
    industry consensus of coordination procedures, channelization plan
    and or technical standards for the band).

[^47]: WCA Petition at 11-12.

[^48]: Under our Part 90 rules, most applications for new and modified
    private land mobile radio licenses must be filed through a frequency
    coordinator. Frequency coordinators are private organizations that
    have been certified by the Commission to recommend the most
    appropriate frequencies for applicants in designated radio services.
    See 47 C.F.R. §§ 90.7, 90.175.

[^49]: XO Communications Opposition at 3 and 11-14.

[^50]: As discussed above, the results described in the parties'
    petitions include over-crowding and unacceptably low quality of
    service -- or that the prospect of such an interference environment
    will discourage investment in the band altogether.

[^51]: *See also* MAP at 5-6 (arguing that the rules resolve potential
    network administration issues and will make high quality of service
    possible in the band).

[^52]: *See infra* ¶¶ 27-39.

[^53]: *See, e.g.,* WCA Petition at 11-12; Covad *ex parte* presentation
    dated August 11, 2006 at 5-7; AirStream comments at 5-6.

[^54]: Cisco Opposition to Petitions for Reconsideration at 7.

[^55]: *Compare* Verizon comments at 4 (attributing commercial wireless
    licensees' successful deployment of service to their exclusive
    rights to the use of their spectrum and contending that "\[t\]hese
    'exclusive use' licenses facilitate the deployment of high quality
    wireless services, without the risk of harmful interference, and
    create the incentives for companies to invest substantial sums of
    money in the construction of wireless networks") *with* Cisco
    opposition at 8-9 (claiming that because the likely use of the 3650
    MHz band will be for opportunistic narrow-beam backhaul applications
    specifically designed around pre-existing users, the existing rules
    are appropriate for the band).

[^56]: *See, e.g.,* Cisco opposition at 10 ("Any band, whether licensed
    or unlicensed, can eventually become so full that additional entry
    is unattractive, but the Commission would be borrowing troubles from
    the future if it were to forego the benefits of nationwide
    non-exclusive licensing today based on the uncertain prospect of
    congestion in some future decade."); MAP at 4 (concluding that the
    rules strike a proper balance of interference risks versus the
    benefits of new service deployments). *See also* WCA Petition at 12
    (asking for exclusive licensing but endorsing retention of
    non-exclusive licensing for a portion of the spectrum for easy
    access by "those willing to accept the risks associated with
    non-exclusive licensing").

[^57]: *See, e.g.,* Verizon comments at 4.

[^58]: WISPA comments at 1; Attron Networks comments. *See also*
    Voorhees ex parte presentation dated August 30, 2005. In further
    support of a non-exclusive licensing approach, Part 15.org notes
    that other, unlicensed, bands have an established history of
    supporting sufficient quality of service to work over large
    distances and support broadband technologies. Part15.org comments at
    9. MAP also notes that dozens of commercial vendors offer equipment
    for existing unlicensed spectrum and that municipalities and other
    service providers have made extensive use of more congested
    unlicensed bands. MAP comments at 5-7.

[^59]: *3650 MHz Order*, 20 FCC Rcd at 6508, ¶ 16. *See also* note
    *Error: Reference source not foundError: Reference source not found
    supra above* (Commission definition of contention-based protocol).

[^60]: *3650 MHz Order*, 20 FCC Rcd at 6508, ¶ 16.

[^61]: *3650 MHz Order*, 20 FCC Rcd at 6523, ¶ 58.

[^62]: *3650 MHz Order*, 20 FCC Rcd at 6523, ¶ 58.

[^63]: *See* Motorola Petition at 4-5; Intel Petition at 11-12; Wi-Max
    Forum Petition at 10.

[^64]: *See* Motorola Petition at 4-5 (discussing problems with
    contention technologies over greater distances); Intel, Redline &
    Alvarion Petition at 12-13 (arguing that contention technologies
    perform poorly over longer distances and when numerous, unrelated
    users are involved).

[^65]: Intel Petition at 11-12. By way of background, a Wi-Fi station
    seeking to transmit must first sense the radio channel it intends to
    use to determine if another station is transmitting on it. If the
    channel is free, the transmission may proceed. If the channel is
    busy, the Wi-Fi protocol (which is based on IEEE standard 802.11 and
    is formally known as Carrier Sense Multiple Access with Collision
    Avoidance) imposes a random wait time before again sensing the
    channel; it repeats this process until it senses a free channel and
    allows the station to transmit. *See generally* [Bob O'Hara & Al
    Petrick, IEEE 802.11™ Handbook]{.smallcaps} 22-23 (2005). Since
    Wi-Fi actually determines whether the spectrum is in use before
    transmitting, it can effectively avoid interfering with the
    transmissions of all potential competing operators, regardless of
    the type of contention technology that they incorporate.

[^66]: Intel Petition at 14. *See also* Motorola Petition at 4 ("Where
    the transmitting device intends to transmit over a long distance,
    not only is there greater probability that multiple users also will
    be attempting to access the spectrum at the same time, but there
    also is reduced throughput because more users must remain silent for
    longer periods of time to avoid interference.").

[^67]: Wi-Max Forum Petition at 10 (if there is a U.S. specific
    contention protocol, users cannot rely on off-the-shelf technology);
    Motorola Petition at 5-6(referring to solving problems of the hidden
    node problem and longer distances) .

[^68]: *See, e.g.*, Intel Petition at 18-19; WCA Opposition at 8.

[^69]: Cisco comments at 10-11. XO Communications argues that the
    Commission should maintain its requirement for contention
    technologies over the long term, but, to facilitate prompt
    deployment, also allow operation of equipment without contention
    capability, subject to a frequency coordination requirement. XO
    Communications comments at 8-9.

[^70]: WISPA comments at 1.

[^71]: Cisco Opposition at 11; Tropos Networks Opposition at 7-8.

[^72]: Redline Petition at 2-3; WCA Opposition at 12-16. *See also*
    Motorola Petition at 6.

[^73]: Wi-Max technology, which is based on IEEE standard 802.16, avoids
    interference by synchronizing the timing of potentially competing
    transmissions so that the various transmitters are assigned to
    discrete time slots. Although the transmitters operate on the same
    frequency, their transmissions do not overlap in time and therefore
    do not interfere with each other. The technology could be used in a
    variety of frequency bands allocated for fixed service, including
    the 3400-3700 MHz band which is allocated internationally for fixed
    service, and the 2500-2690 MHz band in the U.S.

[^74]: *See* XO Communications comments at 6-8 (supporting clarification
    that both listen-before-talk and Wi-Max protocols satisfy the
    requirement); Part 15.Org comments at 7; WISPA comments at 2
    (definition may eliminate Wi-Max). *Cf.* Cisco comments at 10-11
    (definition is technologically neutral).

[^75]: *See* Tropos Networks Opposition at 7 ("contention based
    unlicensed devices are capable of providing quality broadband over
    substantial distances"); WISPA comments at 1 (contention technology
    "provide\[s\] few barriers to entry" while offering "protection to
    existing investments"); Cisco Opposition at 10-11. Tropos Networks
    asserted that contention technology allows "large scale Wi-Fi
    deployment with high throughput" across "large geographic areas" and
    offers "fixed and mobile broadband connectivity with a user
    experience indistinguishable from wired networks." Tropos Opposition
    at 1-2.

[^76]: See paragraphs 41-46 below for discussion of power limits for the
    3650 MHz band.

[^77]: *3650 MHz Order*, 20 FCC Rcd at 6508, ¶ 16.

[^78]: *3650 MHz Order*, 20 FCC Rcd at 6523, ¶ 58.

[^79]: *See, e.g.*, Motorola Petition at 2. For example, spectrum in the
    3.5 GHz range is already in use for fixed, and in some cases mobile,
    operations in Germany, Ireland, Spain, Austria, France, Chile and
    Argentina.

[^80]: We modify Commission rule 90.1319 to incorporate this limitation
    on the tuning range of equipment incorporating restricted contention
    protocols.

[^81]: The *3650 MHz Order* delegated to the Commission's Wireless
    Telecommunications Bureau the authority to adopt "requirements
    regarding the reporting of registration and licensing information,
    pertaining to the 3650 MHz Wireless Broadband Services, in the
    Universal Licensing System database." *3650 MHz Order*, 20 FCC Rcd
    at 6536, ¶ 103. The appearance of this information in the public
    registration database will allow other operators to determine the
    types of equipment operating in a particular market.

[^82]: Section 2.1043 of the Commission\'s rules describes the
    certification requirements for modified equipment. Section 2.1043(a)
    sets out the conditions under which a new grant of certification is
    required, and Section 2.1043(b) sets out three categories of
    permissive changes that may be made without the application for and
    grant of a new certification. *See* 47 C.F.R. § 2.1043.

[^83]: *Cf.* Wi-Max Forum Petition at 10; Motorola Petition at 5-6.

[^84]: *See* Airspan ex parte presentation dated July 6, 2006 at 5 n.9
    (Airspan's "carrier-sense technique is currently being used in
    Wi-Max-based equipment supplied by Airspan to an operator in Japan
    for Tokyo-wide network deployment"); *id.* at 5 ("\[C\]riticisms of
    'listen and protect' systems raised by certain parties are
    inapposite to the carrier sensing technique Airspan proposes . . .
    .").

[^85]: *See* Nextwave ex parte presentation dated January 24, 2007 at 4
    ("Both Wi-Fi and Wi-Max are being modified to meet the FCC's
    requirements for the 3.65GHz band."); *id.* at 4-10 (providing
    details of modifications to 802.16h standards that will allow Wi-Max
    systems to co-exist with each other and with systems using different
    technologies, such as Wi-Fi, including Dynamic Channel Selection,
    Adaptive Extended Quiet Periods and Listen Before Talk).

[^86]: Cisco ex parte presentation dated August 21, 2006 at 3.
    Describing the capabilities of the standard under development, Cisco
    states:

    > The future . . . protocol will define procedures for initiating
    > transmissions, determining the state of the channel (available or
    > unavailable), and managing retransmissions in the event of a busy
    > channel. Dynamic Frequency Selection will allow transmitters to
    > assess if channels are in use by others, and to change frequency
    > and bandwidth. Transmission Power Control based on \[equivalent
    > isotropically radiated power\] will allow transmitters to change
    > power.

    *Id.*

[^87]: *See* BRN Petition at 1-2.

[^88]: *See, e.g.,* WCA Opposition at 12-16; Motorola Opposition at 3-6.

[^89]: *See* BRN Phoenix Petition at 11.

[^90]: *Cf.* 47 C.F.R. § 1.925(b)(3).

[^91]: *3650 MHz Order*, 20 FCC Rcd at 6519, ¶ 47.

[^92]: *3650 MHz Order*, 20 FCC Rcd at 6520-21, ¶¶ 50, 52. *See also* 47
    C.F.R. § 90.1321 (codifying power limits).

[^93]: Redline Petition at 3-4 (citing 47 C.F.R § 15.247(b)(4)(ii),
    which permits a similar exemption to power limits in unlicensed
    services). *See also* Wi-Max Forum Reply at 2.

[^94]: Wi-Max Reply at 2. *See also* Intel, Redline & Alvarion Petition
    at 20 (increase in mobile power "will provide more meaningful
    coverage in rural areas, while allowing for expeditious, low cost
    access to the 3650 MHz band for rural WISPs"); XO Communications
    comments at 14-15 (supporting power increase for fixed or mobile
    stations to 5 watts/25 MHz; opposing any increase in permissible
    power for point-to-point operations).

[^95]: *See* Cisco comments at 12-13; SIA comments at ii-iii, 12; Sprint
    comments at 3. Cisco also notes that higher power limits could lead
    to larger nodes, with more subscribers per node and could eventually
    lead to congestion in the band. *Id.* at 12.

[^96]: *3650 MHz Order*, 20 FCC Rcd at 6519, ¶ 47.

[^97]: *See* *3650 MHz Order*, FCC Rcd at 6520, ¶ 50.

[^98]: *Cf.* SIA comments at 12 (opposing any increase in power limits
    and noting that an increase in the size of the FSS protection zones
    would be necessary if the Commission should adopt higher power
    limits for the band).

[^99]: *Mobile Relay Associates v. FCC*, 457 F.3d 1, 8 (D.C. Cir. 2006)
    (court will "uphold the Commission if it makes a 'technical
    judgment' that is supported 'with even a modicum of reasoned
    analysis,' 'absent highly persuasive evidence to the contrary'")
    (citing *Hispanic Info. & Telecomm. Network v. FCC*, 865 F.2d 1289,
    1297-98 (D.C.Cir.1989)); *EarthLink, Inc. v. FCC*, 462 F.3d 1, 9
    (D.C. Cir. 2006) (according FCC "an extra measure of deference"
    where "decision involves a high level of technical expertise in an
    area of rapid technological and competitive change") (internal
    quotation omitted).

[^100]: *Cf.* SIA Opposition at 11-12 (arguing that increase in fixed
    and mobile power levels would "increase the power level of any
    interference directed at an earth station" and would "enable the
    operation of mobile units farther away from their base stations, and
    thus closer to earth stations, resulting in significantly reduced
    attenuation (path loss) of potential interference").

[^101]: BRN Phoenix Petition at 10.

[^102]: BRN Phoenix Petition at 10.

[^103]: SIA Opposition at 11.

[^104]: *3650 MHz Order*, 20 FCC Rcd at 6522, ¶ 54.

[^105]: *Id.*

[^106]: *Id.* Specifically, the Commission permitted systems using
    sectorized antennas "to operate with an aggregate transmit output
    power transmitted simultaneously on all beams of up to 8 dB above
    the limit for an individual beam." *Id.*

[^107]: *See* BRN Phoenix Petition at 10.

[^108]: *See* 47 C.F.R § 1.925(b)(3).

[^109]: *3650 MHz Order*, 20 FCC Rcd at 6526, ¶¶ 64, 65.

[^110]: *3650 MHz Order*, 20 FCC Rcd at 6527, ¶ 66.

[^111]: *3650 MHz Order*, 20 FCC Rcd at 6520-21, ¶¶ 50, 52.

[^112]: *3650 MHz Order*, 20 FCC Rcd at 6530, ¶ 75. *See also* 47 C.F.R.
    § 90.1323 (codifying emissions limit).

[^113]: SIA petition at 5-9.

[^114]: SIA Petition at 10-13. *See also* Fox/HBO Comments at 2-3.

[^115]: SIA Petition, attachments A & B.

[^116]: The arrival angle that SIA refers to is the angle, measured at
    the earth station receiver, between the 3650 MHz signal and the
    directional axis of the earth station receiver. *See* SIA Petition
    at 9.

[^117]: The carrier-interference ratio indicates the strength of the
    desired satellite signal above the ambient radio-frequency
    interference measured at an earth station's receiver.

[^118]: Specifically, SIA's table shows an adequate C/I ratio for an
    arrival angle of 30 degrees if the 3650 MHz transmitter is at least
    1000 meters away, and for an arrival angle of 45 degrees only if the
    3650 MHz transmitter is at least 600 meters away. According to SIA's
    calculations, a sufficient C/I ratio will never be achieved if the
    transmitter is 1000 meters away and the arrival angle of the 3650
    MHz signal is 15 degrees or less.

[^119]: *See* [Theodore S. Rappaport, Wireless Communications Principles
    & Practice]{.smallcaps} 138-39, & Tab. 4.2 (2d ed. 2002) (proper
    path loss exponent for exterior environments is between 2.7 and 5);
    [Propagation of Radio Waves]{.smallcaps} 191-192 (Les Barclay, ed.,
    2d ed. 2003).

[^120]: The acceptable range for C/I margin under the different
    conditions of separation distance and satellite arrival angle is
    shown in Attachment B to SIA's petition for reconsideration. It's
    C/I margin calculations there still indicate the potential
    interference in certain cases involving satellite arrival angles
    between 5 and 15 degrees, and distances from 50 to 200 m.

[^121]: Adopting a path loss exponent of 3 yields what SIA views as an
    adequate C/I ratio for distances (between the 3650 MHz transmitter
    and the satellite earth station) greater than 200 meters, assuming
    an arrival angle of 5 degrees; for distances greater than 100
    meters, assuming an arrival angle of 15 degrees; and for distances
    greater than 50 meters, assuming an arrival angle of 30 degrees or
    greater. Adopting a slightly higher path loss exponent further
    reduces the number of instances in which the C/I ratio would fall
    below SIA's preferred figure of 22 dB.

[^122]: *See* SIA Petition at 8; SIA Reply at 3.

[^123]: The C/N value consists of a minimum carrier level above the
    noise floor that a receiver needs to operate plus some additional
    margin to account for fading and other effects.

[^124]: *See* [Timothy Pratt, et al., Satellite
    Communications]{.smallcaps} 114, Tabs. 4.4a, 4.4b (2d ed., 2003).
    *See also* [F.H Sanders, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Analysis of
    Electromagnetic Compatibility Between Radar Stations and 4 GHz Fixed
    Satellite Earth Stations]{.smallcaps}**,** NTIA Rpt No. 94-313 at
    34, Tab. 4 (for Digital Television Receive Only Systems, the minimum
    operating margin is 7.5 dB and the protection ratio, provided by the
    ITU-R, is 12 dB). *See also id.* at 34 ("Manufacturers of 4-GHz
    earth station have indicated that digital systems are more
    susceptible to interference than analog stations.").

[^125]: In other words: (C/I) = (C/N) -- ( I/N).

[^126]: *See* PanAmSat Look Angle Calculator (visited Apr. 4, 2007)
    <http://www.panamsat.com/global_network/calc_look_angle.asp>
    (calculator for C-band operating elevation angles in the U.S.).

[^127]: *See* 47 C.F.R. § 90.1323(b).

[^128]: *See* Verizon comments at 6.

[^129]: *See* SIA Petition at 10-12.

[^130]: SIA Petition at 13-14. *See also* Fox/HBO Comments at 3. As SIA
    explains:

    > LNBs are "basically amplification devices used in FSS earth
    > stations, and are designed to operate within a specific power
    > range much like any other amplifier. If these devices are forced
    > to operate near the level of saturation, the result could be
    > distortion of the received signal in the form of phase noise,
    > which is quite detrimental to high order modulation schemes such
    > as those used for HDTV distribution. Saturation also triggers
    > amplifier suppression effects in which the emissions from WISP
    > devices could actually overcome weaker satellite transmissions.

    SIA Petition at 13.

[^131]: *See* SIA Petition, attachment C.

[^132]: We note that 3650 MHz licensees can search the IBFS
    (<http://svartifoss2.fcc.gov/myibfs/welcome.do>) to determine if
    there are any known earth stations with which they should be
    concerned.

[^133]: *See* *3650 MHz Order*, 20 FCC Rcd 6513, ¶ 32 & n. 57.

[^134]: Amendment of the Commission's Rules With Regard to the 3650-3700
    MHz Government Transfer Band, ET Docket No. 98-237, MR-9411, WT
    Docket No. 00-32, *First Report &Order and Second Notice of Proposed
    Rulemaking*, 15 FCC Rcd 20488, 20495-96, ¶¶ 13, 16 (2000).

[^135]: *See* SIA Reply at 6-7.

[^136]: SIA suggests that, in permitting mobile operations in the 3650
    MHz band, the Commission changed course without providing a reasoned
    explanation. *See* SIA Reply at 8. In making this argument, SIA
    refers to language from an earlier action in this proceeding in
    which the Commission declined to permit mobile operations in the
    band, allocating it instead only for fixed and base station
    operations. *See Amendment of the Commission's Rules with Regard to
    the 3650-3700 MHz Government Transfer Band*, ET Dkt No. 98-237,
    RM-9411, WT Dkt No. 00-32, First Report and Order and Second Notice
    of Proposed Rule Making, 15 FCC Rcd, 20488, 20496, ¶ 16 (2000) (2000
    Order & NPRM) ("Given the challenging spectrum sharing environment
    involving the relatively weaker satellite receive signals, we remain
    concerned about mobile station (*i.e.* roving handset) operations in
    the 3650-3700 MHz band."). It is hardly true, however, that the
    Commission simply changed course without considering the effects of
    permitting mobile operations in the band. Rather, it required that
    mobile transmitters receive a base station's enabling signal and
    imposed a peak power limit, both in an attempt to "provide a
    reasonable balance between interference protection goals and
    fostering the most flexible use of mobile stations" in the band.
    *3650 MHz Order*, 20 FCC Rcd at 6520-21, ¶¶ 51, 52.

[^137]: *See, e.g.,* WCA Petition at 23; Wi-Max Forum Petition at 11-12.
    Airstream comments at 7; Verizon comments at 6.

[^138]: WCA Petition at 23.

[^139]: WCA Petition at 22-24; Wi-Max Forum Petition at 11-12. *See
    also* Airstream comments at 7 (without Part 101 procedures, earth
    station operators have "no incentive to negotiate in good faith" and
    can "stonewall provision of service" in exclusion zones); Verizon
    comments at 6; NextWeb comments at 9.

[^140]: SIA comments at 13-14.

[^141]: 47 C.F.R. § 101.1(b).

[^142]: *See* 47 C.F.R. §§ 101.103, 101.105.

[^143]: *See* *3650 MHz Order*, Appendix D, 20 FCC Rcd at 6554-61. We
    note that, as originally published, the formulas in Appendix D had
    two minor errors, which we correct here. First, in Equation 6, we
    replace Gd with θx, where θx is the off axis angle. With that
    change, Equation 6 becomes:
    ![](media/image1.wmf){width="1.7222222222222223in" height="0.25in"}.
    Second, in Equation 7, we reverse the sign of the factor on the
    right side of the equation, so it reads as follows:
    ![](media/image2.wmf){width="1.6111111111111112in"
    height="0.5555555555555556in"}.

    Note that θx (once computed) can have a value greater than 48
    degrees. In those cases (i.e., θx \> 48 degrees), set θx to 48
    degrees in Equation 6 and solve.