US Department of the Interior

Bureau of Land Management

State of Colorado Grand Junction District

*This document was re-typed with no graphics from the original report
for easier reading and quicker download time.*

> Accident Report
>
> Battlement Creek Fire
>
> Fatalities & Injury
>
> July 17, 1976

[Contents]{.underline}

[Page]{.underline}

Foreword 3

I. Events Prior to Accident 4

A. Location 4

B. National Fire Situation 5

C. Fire Environment 6

1\. Weather 6

2\. Topography 8

3\. Vegetation and fuels 9

D. Origin and Initial Suppression Effort 11

II\. Fire Behavior and Burning Sequence on July 16-17, 1976 15

A.  General Situation 15

B.  Prior Weather 16

C.  Fire Behavior Appraisal 22

D.  Fire Behavior July 16 22

E.  Burning Sequence July 17 23

F.  Chaparral Model Nomograph 25

G.  Fire Behavior Summary 26

III Suppression Effort and Accident Sequence 28

A.  Accident Sequence 28

B.  Post-Accident Rescue and Medical Action 37

IV\. Investigation 40

V. Organization and Management 42

A. Fire Overhead and Crew Assignments 42

7.16-7/17/76

B. Overhead Qualification and Experience 45

C. Crew Qualification and Experience 49

D. Logistical Support 52

E. Fire Planning and Intelligence 52

F. Aviation Management Activity 53

VI\. Findings 57

A.  Mechanical Factors 57

B.  Physical Factors 57

C.  Human Factors 57

    a.  Crew 58

    b.  Overhead 58

> D. Management Factors 59

VII\. Appendix 61

**[Forward]{.underline}**

This investigation report covers an accident which occurred July 17,
1976, in the Grand Junction District of the Bureau of Land Management
(BLM) in Colorado. Three firefighters were killed and a fourth severely
burned while working on the Battlement Creek fire approximately 40 miles
northeast of Grand Junction, Colorado. All victims were members of a
trained Forest Service (FS) fire crew stationed at Mormon Lake on the
Coconino National Forest near Flagstaff, Arizona.

The victims were:

Anthony A. Czak, 25, Flagstaff, Arizona

Scott L. Nelson, 22, Bloomer, Wisconsin

Stephen H. Furey, 23, Salmon, Idaho.

The fourth victim, although severely burned, is expected to recover
fully. He is John C. Gibson, 27, of Wellsville, New York.

The accident occurred during a burnout operation along a ride above the
fire in a steep drainage. The crew did not recognize the danger they
were in until their planned primary escape route was cut off by a run of
the fire from below them. This report will discuss in depth the multiple
factors which contributed to this unfortunate accident.

Although unrelated to the Mormon Lake crew fatalities, another death
occurred on the Battlement Creek fire when a B-26 air tanker crashed and
burned on July 16, killing the pilot. This accident is reported in a
separate report.

Western Colorado is experiencing an unusually severe fire season caused
partly by unusual fuel conditions and heavy lightning activity during
dry weather. A severe frost on June 14, 1976, killed a high percentage
of the leaves on Gambel's oak, which is now a readily available and dry
fine fuel. The District has also experienced a greater number of fire
starts, which has taxed their fire control capability in the past few
weeks.

Under a national plan to exchange and utilize manpower and equipment,
the Forest Service crew was working on this Bureau of Land Management
fire. There were also people from the Forest Service in supervisory
positions.

The Director of the Bureau of Land Management and Chief of the Forest
Service appointed an interagency investigation team under the
co-chairmanship of Jack Wilson, BLM, Director of the Boise Interagency
Fire Center (BIFC), and Max Peterson, Deputy Chief for Programs and
Legislation of the Forest Service (FS). Other team members were: Clyde
O'Dell, Boise (Idaho) BIFC Fire Weather Meteorologist, National Weather
Service; Ed Heilman, Director of Fire Management, Northern Region,
Forest Service; Robert Mutch, Research Forester (Fire Behavior and
Fuels), Northern Forest Fire Laboratory, Forest Service; James Abbott,
Fire Training and Safety Specialist, Washington Office, Forest Service;
and Harold Baer, Attorney, Solicitor's Office, Department of Interior,
Denver.

Instructions to the team through the co-chairmen were to determine the
conditions and circumstances that led to the fatalities and injury on
the Battlement Creek fire.

I. EVENTS PRIOR TO ACCIDENT

a.  [Location]{.underline}

The fire occurred approximately 40 miles northeast of Grand Junction,
Colorado, in the Battlement Creek drainage, Sections 11, 12, 13, 14 and
23, T7S, R95W. It consumed 880 acres in 3 days: July 15, 16 and 17,
1976. At the time of the accident, 13 crews totaling 270 men and
approximately 20 overhead were assigned to the fire. (See Section I-D
for initial suppression effort by the Grand Valley volunteer Fire
Department on July 11.) The Grand Junction District of the Bureau of
Land Management was responsible for suppression of the fire. Fire
suppression support and capability is newly organized this year around
the Grand Junction Fire Center (BLM) located at Walker Field (the
commercial airport) in Grand Junction. This Center serves all BLM lands
in western Colorado with a complement of crews, helicopters and air
tankers. The Fire Center, under Colorado State Office supervision, has 1
full-time employee, 9 seasonal employees, 2 fire management specialist
assistants (detailed from BIFC), 30 trained firefighters from the San
Luis Valley, Colorado, crews, and one 12-man helitack crew (detailed
from the Forest Service).

b.  [National Fire Situation]{.underline}

On July 15, there were 198 fires reported on the Daily Fire Situation
Report from BIFC. The majority of the fires were in California, Nevada,
and Utah. The only fire requiring interregional support was the Ishawooa
fire on the Shoshone National Forest, which used air tanker No. 56 and
60 Missoula smokejumpers. Utah BLM had a large fire southwest of Salt
Lake City. During this day, the Grand Junction District worked on three
fires, including the Battlement Creek fire.

On July 16, the number of fires increased to 242, but more importantly
extensive dry lightning occurred in California, Nevada, and Utah. The
Battlement Creek fire and the Wickahoney fire in the Boise District of
the BLM (1,590 acres) required mobilization of considerable resources.
Initial attack forces in most areas of California and Utah were heavily
taxed, but were successful in containing most of the fires.

On July 17, as an aftermath of the lightning storms the prior afternoon,
458 fires were reported, and red flag warnings were forecast in central
California. Of the 458 fires, 384 of them were in California. The
Battlement Creek fire was the only one drawing on BIFC support, although
several large restock orders were processed through the fire warehouse
from other areas.

This situation continued through Sunday, July 18, when 452 fires were
reported. Again, 352 of these were in California, with Sequoia and
Yosemite National Parks catching 120 of these fires. There were no major
support actions from BIFC or any other caches outside the fire areas.

In brief summary, the national picture shows a fairly busy initial
attack situation with few large fires materializing, and most of these
not drawing on outside resources to any extent. A large supply of crews,
aircraft of all kinds (except heavy helicopters), overhead, radio
equipment, and fire supplies were available.

[C. Fire Environment]{.underline}

1\. [Weather]{.underline}

The most basic meteorological conclusion that can be drawn from
available meteorological data and extensive interviews with personnel
assigned on the Battlement Creek fire, Saturday, July 17, is that the
accident was not directly weather related; i.e., there were no
thunderstorms in the immediate fire vicinity between 1400 and 1500
m.d.t. that could have produced downdrafts to affect the fire, no
unusual or abnormal winds occurred attributable to accepted
meteorological causes such as fronts, low level jet stream, or locally
induced dust devils, etc.

At the time of the accident, the atmosphere was unstable, normal
up-slope winds were occurring, winds aloft were generally light SW and
ranged from 5-15 m.p.h. from 6,600 feet to 31,000 feet m.s.l.

Observers on the fire at the time of the accident reported high winds at
ground level 25-35 M.P.H. and above. Earlier in the day, the weather was
described as fair; winds were light both on the ridge and on lower
portions of the fire. Some small whirl activity was reported about
1230-1300 m.d.t. which would indicate unstable atmospheric conditions.
Figure 2 illustrates the morning and afternoon soundings for Grand
Junction, Colorado, on Saturday, July 17, 1976. They illustrate typical
summertime conditions of afternoon low-level heating and instability.
Generally observers reported high winds at the time of, or just before,
the accident. These were very likely local fire-induced winds generated
by very intense burning and rapid rate of spread.

A rather severe frost on June 14 (23-27 degrees F. in the 6,200-9,000
foot range) produced extensive damage to Gambel's oak stands in the fire
area. The frost was an important indirect weather-related event which
increased the dry fuel available for combustion by killing leaves in the
oak stands. Relatively warm, dry weather following the frost provided
conditions conducive to drying dead plant tissue.

2\. [Topography]{.underline}

Origin of the fire was 40 airline miles NE of Grand Junction, Colorado,
and 1 ½ miles south of the Colorado River in the Battlement Creek
drainage. Battlement Creek is approximately 8 miles long and flows in a
northwesterly direction to the Colorado River. The fire burned entirely
on the east side of Battlement Creek (fig. 3). The topography varies
from relatively level land along the drainage bottom to rugged mountain
slopes. Elevations on the fire range from 6,200 feet near the origin to
8,400 feet near the site where the men died. The fire burned primarily
on north-facing aspects on Thursday, July 15, and Friday morning, and on
west-facing aspects on Friday afternoon and Saturday. The slopes that
burned on Saturday were fully exposed to prevailing southwesterly air
flow; and they received direct solar heating from 1100 on. Slopes that
burned on Saturday, July 17, ranged from 10 percent above the road to 75
percent in the chute just below the ridgeline. The side drainage that
burned out on Saturday was characterized by two major draws, aligned in
an east-west direction. The head of the north draw was about 3500 feet
northeast of the Battlement Creek road. This draw terminated just below
a saddle on the ridgeline where the Mormon Lake crew was working on
Saturday. The south draw climbs in an easterly direction for 3,200 feet
from the road. Side slopes of these draws were measured at 50-60
percent.

Visibility to the west from the saddle above the north draw was
restricted due to the topography. The slope west of the ridgetop in the
saddle was gradual for about 140 feet and then broke off steeply (fig.
4).

3\. [Vegetation and Fuels]{.underline}

The vegetation of Battlement Creek reflects the arid climate. The
dominant vegetation in the fire area is Gambel's oak\--mountain
mahogany. But vegetational types in the drainage vary according to
elevation and exposure. On north-facing slops, the vegetation begins at
the stream bottoms with a mixture of pinon-juniper and sagebrush. As the
elevation increases, the sagebrush decreases, and a mixed mountain shrub
type gradually replaces pinon-juniper. Grass and sagebrush types are
common on the ridges and drainage bottoms (cured cheatgrass was present
in openings at lower elevations). Aspen and spruce-fir may be found at
lower elevations along draws and moist areas. Some aspen occurred in the
fire area at the head of the south draw; and prostrate Douglas-fir was
found along the high ridge east of the south draw.

The mixed mountain shrub type was the primary plant community
contributing to fire spread on Saturday, July 17. The dominant species
in this community are Gambel's oak, mountain mahogany, serviceberry, and
snowberry. The shrub community was dense and all but impenetrable in
many places. The shrubs contained a large amount of fine dead branches
throughout the canopy (fig. 5). Gambel's oak ranged as high as 10-12
feet or higher; it was 4-6 feet high along the ridgeline above the chute
(north draw). This ridgeline, the site of the accident, also contained
several small openings and game trails (fig 6). A very significant
weather event occurred 1 month prior to the fire which adversely
affected the fuel complex. An extensive frost on June 14 killed more
than 50 percent of the leaves on the Gambel's oak (other shrub species
did not appear to be materially affected). Many of the dead leaves were
sill retained on the plants at the time of the fire (fig. 7). Shedding
oak leaves contributed to a 1-2 inch litter layer beneath the mixed
mountain shrub type. Pinon pine and juniper trees were scattered through
the oak-mahogany type, primarily along the ridge north of the north
draw.

Fuel moisture samples were collected at 1830 on July 20 at 8,800 Feet on
the ridge above the fire area:

> [Sample]{.underline} [Average moisture content (%)]{.underline}

Dead oak leaves (shrub canopy) 11.4

Leaf litter on ground 13.7

Dead oak branches (1/4 inch) 12.4

Green oak leaves 166.5

Living oak stems (1/4 inch) 193.8

The dead oak leaves in the shrub canopy and other fine fuels could have
been at 7-8 percent moisture content, or less, at the time of the fire
run on Saturday, July 17.

The June frost significantly increased the amount of available fuel in
the Battlement Creek area by contributing to the dieback of the oak
leaves. One individual remarked that fire behavior conditions seemed 2-3
weeks early for this time of year.

Chemical analyses of the Gambel's oak leaves were conducted at the
Northern Forest Fire Laboratory in Missoula:

> [Green leaves]{.underline} [Dead leaves in crown]{.underline}

Crude fat (%)[^1] 1.60 0.52

Total ash (%) 3.18 2.50

Low heat of combustion

(B.t.u./lb) ^1^ 7886 7782

Thus, the crude fat content, or amount of volatile waxes, oils, and
resins, was quite low. Much lower than the 8-12 percent reported for
southern California chaparral.

D.  [Origin and Initial Suppression Effort]{.underline}

The action leading up to the time of BLM's initial attack on July 15,
began 4 days earlier, July 12, on private land.

Sunday, July 11, a severe lightning storm struck the Morrisania area
late in the afternoon. Much of the lightning activity occurred in the
vicinity of the Eames orchard. This lightning activity was followed by
what was described as a moderately heavy shower. Records indicated .06
rain fell in the town of Grand Junction, Colorado, approximately 40
miles southwest of the mesa lying in the Colorado River Valley. No fire
was reported at that time.

On July 12, at approximately 1330, a fire was reported in SE ¼, NW ¼
Section 11, T7S, R95W, at Eames orchard (fig. 8). This fire was
controlled by 1700 at ½ acre by the Grand Valley Volunteer Fire
Department. BLM air patrol (783) confirmed the fire was no longer
smoking at 1925.

At 2130, a lightning strike was observed by a local citizen in
approximately the same vicinity which resulted in an immediate fire
start. The Grand Valley Volunteer Fire Department responded to this fire
and returned home at 0300, July 13.

During the daylight hours of Tuesday and Wednesday, July 13-14, a smoke
surveillance was maintained of the area by the captain of the Grand
Valley Fire Department from his place of employment and by other members
of the department at varying times.

On Thursday, July 15, at approximately 1400, smoke was again noted in
the area by the residents of the Eames Orchard, and a call was placed to
the Grand Valley Fire Department. Two men from the Grand Valley
Department responded, arriving at the fire approximately 1430. They
found the fire was again in the same location they had taken action on
twice the previous Monday. The two men were just starting suppression
action when an increase in wind velocity was noted. The fire jumped
about 20-30 feet to the south and southeast into sage and cheatgrass
fuels and spread rapidly. The pumper was considered to be in danger and
the men moved the vehicle and radioed for assistance. The fire was
gaining momentum and velocity; the men decided to remain on the west
side of the fire and wet down that area with the water they had. The
wind velocity kept increasing at this time.

At approximately 1430, the Grand valley Fire Chief went to the north of
the area on a higher mesa some 5 miles distant and had the area in
observation. He reported observing a pattern of fire about 50 yards wide
moving rapidly southeast.

The Grand Valley Fire Captain reported observing a cloud of fire and
smoke erupt from the area at a time of 1500. His location was about 6
miles northeast of the fire.

Additional manpower and equipment were dispatched to the scene by the
Grand Valley Fire Department (time undetermined).

At 1510, July 15, Wayne Fisher, BLM, radioed Grand Junction Fire
Dispatch a location on the fire from his visual observations from some
distance away.

Grand Junction District Fire Management Officer Roy Johnson initiated
BLM action at 1522 while on an aerial observation flight. The initial
order was for a retardant drop and two helitack crews. An additional
retardant drop was ordered almost immediately. At approximately 1600,
the Fire Boss Jack Haslem, a local district employee, was alerted and
two 20-man crews were ordered.

At 1548, BLM air tanker No. 59 was dispatched with an ETA of 15 minutes
and the county fire department had been advised to clear a drop zone.

The Grand Valley crew on the fire reported the first retardant drop at
1600. They had pulled back to the Eames orchard prior to arrival of the
air tanker.

Several local pumper, volunteer, BLM and Forest Service crews continued
to work along parts of the fire the night of July 15. Three air tankers,
two 1,000 gallon B-26's and a 2,000 gallon C-119 worked hot spots until
dark. The pumper-crews patrolled the west side from midnight to 0600
July 16 to prevent the fire from crossing the road to the wet.

From the beginning of suppression effort on July 15, the attack strategy
was designed to prevent western and southern spread of the fire. The
presence of natural gas lines and wells to the west and Project Rulison
to the south influenced this decision. Later, on July 16, the fatal
crash of an air tanker near the fire was also an unusual event.

[Project Rulison]{.underline}

This program was sponsored by Austrol Oil of Houston, Texas, and Los
Alamos Scientific Laboratories under the supervision of the Atomic
Energy Commission. It was conducted to stimulate the natural gas pockets
and facilitate gas collection by underground nuclear explosions.

Remaining at the project site are two above-ground metal holding tanks
which contain some explosive vapors. Also contained in the tanks is a
small amount of material which presents a low-level radiation problem.
The well is closed with plugs at the bottom and also the top of the
shaft. The valves have been closed and chain locked.

Plans are to close the site in the near future by removing the tanks and
cementing the shaft closed.

[Aircraft Accident]{.underline}

On Friday, July 16, 1 day before the crew accident, a B-26 air tanker
crashed on a retardant dropping mission on the Battlement creek fire.
The accident occurred at 0856, approximately 1 mile south of the fire.
The pilot was killed.

The crash diverted the line boss and the Sawtooth interregional crew for
much of the day in controlling a fire at the crash site and removing the
pilot's remains.

Although this accident is not related directly to the crew fatalities
and injuries, it could be an indirect factor affecting overhead attitude
and response.

Although the line boss and one crew were diverted to the crash site July
16, there were, however, no direct actions taken on the Battlement Creek
fire as a result of this aircraft accident.

II\. FIRE BEHAVIOR AND BURNING SEQUENCE ON JULY 16 AND 17, 1976

A.  [General Situation]{.underline}

The large scale synoptic weather pattern over western Colorado and the
Battlement Creek fire area on Saturday, July 17, was one of high
pressure aloft and a very flat surface pressure pattern associated with
a poorly defined thermal low. A large scale pattern of this type is
conducive to generally light wind flow where local effects dominate the
weather picture.

A low pressure area aloft situated off the central California coast
Saturday morning, July 17, (fig. 9) had weakened and moved northeastward
by Sunday morning, July 18, (fig. 10) to the northern Nevada-California
border. This increased free air flow above 12,000 feet from a range of
2-15 m.p.h. at Grand Junction Saturday at 0600 to 13-25 m.p.h. by 1800
(fig 11). Below 12,000 feet, winds decreased from the 5-16 M.P.H. range
to 1-8 M.P.H. during the same time period. Grand Junction is about 40
air miles SW of the fire site, and winds aloft above approximately
8,000-9,000 feet can be expected to be representative of the fire area.
This relatively weak upper air flow permitted local terrain effects to
dominate the wind field in the fire area. The fire burned over an
elevation range of 6,200-8,400 feet m.s.l. on a steep west-facing slope.
The accident occurred at approximately 8,300 feet m.s.l. Terrain effects
produced upslope afternoon winds 10-15 M.P.H., with higher gusts. These
velocity values are based on measured upper winds at Grand Junction and
on untrained observer estimates. No on-site fire weather measurements
were made prior to the accident. Intense burning increased these wind
values for a short period of time and account for higher estimates by
observers. Surface winds recorded at Grand Junction and Rifle on July 16
and 17 are illustrated in the table below.

B. [Prior Weather]{.underline}

The climate of the fire area is classified as arid. Mean annual and
may-September precipitation are illustrated below for several locations
in northwestern Colorado.

  ----------- --------------------- --------------------- ----------------------- --------------------- ------------------------ ----------------------
              [Aspen]{.underline}   [Craig]{.underline}   [Grand                  [Rifle]{.underline}   [Gunnison]{.underline}   [Glenwood
                                                          Junction]{.underline}                                                  Springs]{.underline}

  Mean annual 18.67                 13.42                 8.41                    10.93                 11.0                     18.03
  (inches)                                                                                                                       

  May-Sept.   7.09                  6.04                  4.32                    4.58                  5.36                     6.99
  ----------- --------------------- --------------------- ----------------------- --------------------- ------------------------ ----------------------

The values for the fire area itself are estimated to be 16-20 inches
mean annual and 8-9 inches may through September based on NOAA isohyetal
precipitation analysis maps (1931-60).

Precipitation records for 1976 indicate Grand Junction was somewhat
below normal while Rifle was somewhat above. The fire area lies between
these two stations but much higher and closer to Rifle. Precipitation on
the fire site was most likely very near normal. Monthly distribution of
precipitation for 1976 at stations in the vicinity of the fire is
illustrated below:

  ------------- ----------------------- ------------------------- --------------------- ------------------------- --------------------- --------
                [Grand                                            [Rifle]{.underline}                             [Grand                
                Junction]{.underline}                                                                             Valley]{.underline}   

                [Pcpn]{.underline}      [Departure]{.underline}   [Pcpn]{.underline}    [Departure]{.underline}   [Pcpn]{.underline}    

  January       .13                     -.51                      .52                   -.40                      .26                   

  February      .81                     +.20                      1.81                  +1.05                     1.56                  

  March         .75                     +\\-0                     M                     M                         1.53                  

  April         .38                     -.41                      .89                   -.04                      \-                    

  May           1.49                    +.86                      \-                    \-                        \-                    

  June          .14                     -.41                      \-                    \-                        \-                    

  July-17^th^   .14                     -.18                      \-                    \-                        \-                    

  Season to     3.84                    -.45                      \-                    \-                        \-                    
  Date                                                                                                                                  
  ------------- ----------------------- ------------------------- --------------------- ------------------------- --------------------- --------

Mean maximum temperatures for warm months in northwester Colorado are
illustrated below:

  ----------- ----------------- ----------------- ----------------- ----------------- ----------------- -----------------
              Aspen [7913       Craig [6280       Grand Jct. [4843  Rifle [5319       Gunnison [7694    Glenwood Springs
              ft]{.underline}   ft]{.underline}   ft]{.underline}   ft]{.underline}   ft]{.underline}   [5823
                                                                                                        ft]{.underline}

  May         63.8              68.2              86.0              75.0              67.2              73.2

  June        73.7              77.7              98.0              84.5              77.5              83.3

  July        79.8              85.9              99.0              91.2              83.5              90.0

  August      77.8              83.4              98.0              88.5              80.5              87.0

  September   71.6              75.4              93.0              81.2              75.2              80.4
  ----------- ----------------- ----------------- ----------------- ----------------- ----------------- -----------------

July is the month with the highest average maximum temperature. These
July normals can be seen to be similar to observed maximum temperatures
before and on the day of the fire accident ad illustrated below:

  ----------- ----------- ------------------------ --------------------- ----------------------- ------------------------
                          Grand                    [Rifle]{.underline}   Glenwood                [Gunnison]{.underline}
                          [Junction]{.underline}                         [Springs]{.underline}   

  July 14     Max.        98                       91                    92                      84

              Min.        \--                      \--                   \--                     \--

  July 15     Max.        97                       91                    93                      83

              Min.        60                       49                    51                      42 (.01)

  July 16     Max.        99                       92                    M                       86

              Min.        65                       48                    M                       44 (.04)

  July 17     Max.        97                       95                    M                       \--

              Min.        70                       52                    M                       46
  ----------- ----------- ------------------------ --------------------- ----------------------- ------------------------

Note that Gunnison received light precipitation (.01 and .04 inch) on
July 15 and 16.

Weather was described on the fire Saturday, July 17, as being fair and
hot. This is reasonable in view of the observed temperatures at Grand
Junction and Rifle reaching into the mid and upper 90's.

The freeze of June 14 mentioned earlier was widespread over western
Colorado. The minimums observed were:

  ------------------------------------------ ------------------ -------------------------
                                             Degree             [Elevation]{.underline}
                                             [F.]{.underline}   

  Grand Junction                             34                 4843 ft

  Rifle                                      32                 5319 ft

  Eagle                                      32                 6600 ft

  Gunnison                                   23                 7694 ft

  Montrose                                   36                 5794 ft

  Steamboat Springs                          27                 6695 ft
  ------------------------------------------ ------------------ -------------------------

With the fire elevation well above most of these stations, it is
reasonable and conservative to estimate minimum temperatures in the
23-27 degree Fahrenheit range. Palmer drought values for western
Colorado are in the normal range indicating little stress on vegetation.
The occurrence of the freeze, therefore, becomes more important from the
point of view of altering normal vegetative condition.

Since no direct on-site weather observations were available from the
fire, the next best choice was to go to nearby station. Rifle and Grand
Junction weather is illustrated below:

> [July 16, 1976]{.underline}

  ------- ----------------------- -------------------- ------------------ -------------------- ---------------------- -------------------- ------------------ --------------------
          [Grand                                                                               [Rifle]{.underline}                                            
          Junction]{.underline}                                                                                                                               

  M.d.t   [CldCovr]{.underline}   [Temp]{.underline}   [DP]{.underline}   [Wind]{.underline}   [Cldcvr]{.underline}   [Temp]{.underline}   [DP]{.underline}   [Wind]{.underline}

  0545    Clear                   68                   27                 NE/12                Clear                  51                   38                 NE/4

  0845    1/10                    78                   37                 ESE/11               3/10                   66                   46                 Calm

  1145    2/10                    93                   43                 SE/6                 3/10                   81                   49                 Calm

  1445    3/10                    95                   45                 W/10                 4/10                   91                   55                 N/6

  1745    3/10                    96                   31                 WSW/7                3/10                   81                   60                 Calm

  2045    7/10                    89                   36                 ESE/4                2/10                   71                   56                 N/7

  2345                            \--                                                                                                      \--                
  ------- ----------------------- -------------------- ------------------ -------------------- ---------------------- -------------------- ------------------ --------------------

[July 17, 1976]{.underline}

  ---------------------- ----------------------- -------------------- ------------------ -------------------- ---------------------- -------------------- ------------------ --------------------
                         [Grand                                                                               [Rifle]{.underline}                                            
                         Junction]{.underline}                                                                                                                               

  [M.d.t.]{.underline}   [Cldcvr]{.underline}    [Temp]{.underline}   [DP]{.underline}   [Wind]{.underline}   [Cldcvr]{.underline}   [Temp]{.underline}   [DP]{.underline}   [Wind]{.underline}

  0545                   1/10                    70                   42                 E/7                  Missing                                                        

  0845                   4/10                    75                   45                 ESE/6                4/10                   65                   52                 N/3

  1145                   2/10                    88                   45                 ESE/3                2/10                   84                   42                 S/5

  1445                   4/10                    94                   47                 W/8 Cb ALQDS K SLG   4/10                   93                   55                 NE/4 Cb SE
                                                                                         MTS                                                                                 

  1745                   9/10                    91                   45                 W/7 K and RWU T HVY  10/10                  84                   50                 N/7 Virga ALQDS
                                                                                         cu                                                                                  

  2045                   10/10                   71                   56                 SE/5                 10/10                  74                   52                 SE/8 Cb ALQDS T SW

  2345                   10/10                   64                   59                 WSW/9                10/10                  69                   43                 NW/4
  ---------------------- ----------------------- -------------------- ------------------ -------------------- ---------------------- -------------------- ------------------ --------------------

There were some questions on July 17 between 1400 and 1500 m.d.t. of the
possibility of a thunderstorm near the fire. The remarks from Rifle at
1445 indicate a cumulonimbus cloud to the southeast. This point was very
carefully checked with National Weather Service radar observations at
the same time. Echoes were replotted and the closest echo to the fire as
reported by the Rock Springs radar was about 8 miles north-northeast of
Rifle at 1435 MDT on July 17, 1976. Allowing for extremes in errors in
observation and plotting, it would be very difficult to place a
significant thunderstorm west of Rifle and near the fire at that time.
Based on these observations and most observers on the fire, a
thunderstorm downdraft has been ruled out as a possible contributing
factor. Forecasts issued from Denver for Saturday, July 17, are
illustrated verbatim below. They called for showers and thunderstorms in
western Colorado which did, in fact, occur.

COLORADO ZONES

C001

C005

C010

ISSUED 4AM MDT SAT 7/17/76

FAIR TO PARTLY COULDY WITH WIDELY SCATTERED AFTERNOON AND EVENING
SHOWERS OR THUNDERSTORMS TODAY. MOSTLY CLOUDY AND LITTLE COOLER SUNDAY
WITH SHOWERS OR THUNDERSTORMS SCATTERED. HIGH TODAY 85 TO 95. LOW
TONIGHT 50 TO 65. HIGH SUNDAY 80 TO 90. WIND VARIABLE 5 TO 15 MPH EXCEPT
GUSTY NEAR THUNDERSHWOERS. PROBABILITY OF PRECIP 20 PERCENT TODAY 30
PERCENT TONIGHT 40 PERCENT SUNDAY. \$\$

ZCZC

DEN FP1 171010

FPUS1KDEN171010

ISSUED 4AM SATURDAY

COLORADO

FAIR TO PARTLY CLOUDY AND CONTINUED WARM OVER STATE TODAY WITH WIDELY
SCATTERED AFTERNOON AND EVENING THUNDERSTORMS..SOME HEAVY IN EAST
PORTION TODAY. SHOWERS AND THUNDERSHOWERS INCREASING OVER MOUNTAINS AND
WEST SUNDAY WITH WIDELY SCATTERED THUNDERSTORMS EAST. A LITTLE COOLER
MOUNTAINS..WEST..AND NORTHEAST SUNDAY. HIGH TODAY UPPER 80S TO UPPER 90S
EAST..85 TO 95 WEST WITH 75 TO 85 MOUNTAINS. LOW TONIGHT IN LOWER 60S
EAST..60 TO 66 WEST WITH 40S AND UPPER 30S MOUNTAINS. HIGHS SUNDAY
AROUND 90 EAST..80 TO 90 WEST WITH MOSTLY 70S MOUNTAINS

EAKIN..WSFO DENVER

COLORADO FIRE WEATHER MORNING MAP DISCUSSION

NATIONAL WEATHER SERVICE DENVER CO

845 AM MDT SAT JUL. 17 1976

HIGH PRESSURE RIDGE ALOFT STILL DOMINATES REGION...HOWEVER A CUT OFF LOW
IS DRIFTING EASTWARD OFF THE CENTRAL CALIFORNIA COAST. ABUNDANT MOISTURE
IS SPREAD THROUGHOUT THE WESTERN U.S. AND WILL SLOWLY BE MOVING INTO
COLORADO OVER THE WEEKEND.

SHOWERS AND THUNDERSTORMS WIDELY SCATTERED IN WESTERN HALF OF STATE
TODAY..MORE NUMEROUS SOUTHERN MOUNTAINS. ONLY ISLATED ACTIVITY LIKELY
ALONG EAST SLOPES. TEMPERATURES A LITTLE COOLER WEST TODAY AND OTHERWISE
LITTLE CHANGE. NO SIGNIFICATNT WINDS EXCEPT GUSTY NEAR THUNDERSTORMS.

OUTLOOK FOR SUNDAY...INCREASING SHOWER AND THUNDERSTORM ACTIVITY OVER
MOUNTAINS AND WEST AND COOLER.

SMOKE DISPERSAL GOOD TO VERY GOOD.

LARISON....WSFO DENVER

ZCZC

DEN FPI 171620 AMD

FPUS1KEN171620 AMD

ISSUED 10 AM SATURDAY

COLORADO UPDATED FORECAST

WIDELY SCATTERED SHOWERS AND THUNDERSTORMS MOUNTAINS AND WEST TODAY
INCREASING SUNDAY. CLEAR TO PARTLY COULDY THROUGH SUNDAY EAST WITH
ISOLATED AFTERNOON AND EVENING SHOWERS AND THUNERSTORMS. SLIGHT COOLING
TREND WEST THROUGH SUNDAY. HIGH TODAY AND SUNDAY 80S AND LOW 90S WEST
UPPER 80S AND 90S EAST WITH 60S AND 70S MOUNTAINS. LOW TONIGHT UPPER 50S
AND 60S WITH 40S MOUNTAINS

A thunderstorm occurred at Rifle in the evening of July 17 (2040 m.d.t.)
and .04 inch of precipitation was recorded.

Ten-hour time lag fuel moisture was in the 3-5 percent range for several
stations in the week preceding the accident (fig. 12).

Showers at isolated points temporarily increased fuel moisture to as
much as 11 percent. Generally, however, fuels dried rapidly back to the
3-5 percent range.

C. [Fire Behavior Appraisal]{.underline}

A rather typical weather pattern, steep mountainous terrain, and
frost-induced dieback in Gambel's oak established conditions for high
rates of fire spread in the Battlement Creek drainage during afternoon
hours. For these reasons there might be a tendency to equate the
Battlement Creek fire with a southern California brush fire, but such
was not quite the case. Precipitation amounts were near normal for this
time of year, humidities were not unusually low, and wind velocities
generally fell far short of Santa Ana conditions. Green fuel moistures
for oak leaves and stems were 166 percent and 194 percent, respectively,
well above the 60 percent moisture contents recorded for
drought-stressed chaparral in California. Nevertheless, dead oak leaves
on the ground and in the crowns, abundant fine dead branches in the oak
and mountain mahogany crowns, the dense arrangement of 6- to 12-foot
shrubs, and slopes ranging from 50-75 percent provided all the potential
necessary for a fast-spreading, high intensity fire.

D. [Fire Behavior July 16]{.underline}

The major fire behavior on the day before the tragedy apparently
resulted from a hooking action down toward the road and a subsequent run
uphill in oak brush to the ridgeline. This side drainage lies just north
of the drainage that burned out on Saturday. The run on Friday burned
out a major portion of the drainage (from the road east to the ridgetop)
in about 20 minutes. Fire whirls were associated with this run which
occurred between 1600 and 1700 (fig. 13).

Friday afternoon's fire behavior was impressive. On Saturday it was
considered important to prevent the fire from crossing the road and
catline and getting into the large drainage to the southwest. Also a key
part of the line to hold on Saturday was the 1,800-foot stretch from the
rocky bluff to the helispot.

On Friday a catline was constructed down the ridge of the next side
drainage (A-C, fig. 14). This line was burned out during Friday
afternoon; the burning out operation also proceeded along the road from
the cattle guard (C, fig. 14) north to the bend in the road (D, fig.
14).

E. [Burning Sequence July 17]{.underline}

There were very few smokes visible in the area north of the catline on
Saturday morning---perhaps a few a long the road and on the ridge above
the bend in the road.

The plans for Saturday's day shift were to mop-up along the catline
(A-C) and main road (C-D) and burn out the unburned fuel (A-D). The
Mormon Lake crew was to improve and burn out the line from the rocky
bluff to the helispot (E-G) and move into the black area when unburned
fuels were fired out from below. It is important to account for the
burning out operations on Saturday because these operations materially
contributed to the fire behavior situation.

The Happy Jack crew started burning out from the rocky bluff at 0900.
They proceeded downhill along the edge of the previous day's burnout
north of the catline (arriving at the previous day's burnout north of
the catline (arriving at the road, Point C, at 1200). The same crew
burned out above the bend in the road between 1230 and 1315 (fig. 14).
Meanwhile the Mormon Lake crew at the top of the draw was improving the
line between the rocky bluff (Point E) and the helispot (Point G) and
attempting to burn it out. Line improvement and burning out took place
between 1100 and 1400 along the ridgeline. The burning out on top did
not go well; the fuels did not sustain good fire spread.

Everyone in the Happy Jack burnout squad was back on the road at 1315.
Their burnout fires began burning well about 1300 (fig. 15) and moved up
the south draw first and then worked onto the ridge and into the north
draw. A photograph taken from a Cessna 210 at about 1420 shows the fire
on the spur ridge between the two draws and below the burned island
(fig. 16) Thus, it took over an hour for the fire to burn half way up
the slope. The fire then must have burned into the upper end of the
steep north draw and burned rapidly to the helispot by 1430. A
photograph taken about 1430 from the rocky bluff by Mormon Lake crew
member John Meyers show the fire burning towards the helispot before
burning under the rocky bluff (fig. 17). The Bell 212 helicopter pilots
observed a slightly delayed run around the unburned island and up the
south draw, hooking around the point of the rocky bluff. The fire
probably reached their position about 1435-1440 (fig. 19). Thus, the
fire traveled about 3,600 feet (scaled horizontal distance---from the
base of the north draw uphill and easterly to the ridgetop---C-D to F-G,
fig. 14) in 1 ½ hours.

Although generally light, upslope winds were observed earlier in the
day, reports had winds increasing substantially between 1350 and 1445
(probably gusting to 20-30 m.p.h.). The winds induced by the main fire
whipped up the burnout fires in the saddle between the rocky bluff and
helispot, further threatening the upslope escape route the four squad
members followed. John Meyers reported flame heights 25-30 feet above
the shrubs when the fire came through the saddle. Flames were at a low
angle and elongated.

At 1445, the Bell 206-B helicopter pilot observed from a distance of
about 20 miles a vertical convection column over the Battlement creek
fire with a "nuclear explosion" type cap on the top. He estimated the
convection column height at 16,000 feet m.s.l. (the same height as the
tops of cumulus clouds in the area). The convection column was visible
from the airport at Grand Junction.

The fire burned across the saddle in a couple of places. But it was
essentially contained on the ridgetop by the handline, natural openings,
and earlier retardant drops.

F. [Chaparral Model Nomograph]{.underline}

Site conditions on Saturday afternoon were run using the chaparral fuel
model[^2] of the National Fire-Danger Rating System with nomographs
designed to predict fire spread, intensity, and flame length. Two
different wind speeds (15 and 25 m.p.h.) and three slope percents (40,
60 and 75) were used in calculations Dead fuel moisture was set at 5.5
percent and live fuel moisture at 150 percent. Nomograph results:

  ----------------------------------------- ----------------- ----------------- -----------------
  [Condition]{.underline}                   [1]{.underline}   [2]{.underline}   [3]{.underline}

  Wind speed (m.p.h.)                       15                15                25

  Slope (percent)                           40                60                75

  Effective wind (m.p.h.)                   17                18                29

  Reaction intensity (B.t.u. /sec./ Ft.^2^  12,000            12,000            12,000
  )                                                                             

  Rate of spread (ch./hr.)                  110               125               240

  Flame length (ft.)                        20-30             20-30             30-40

  Fireline intensity (B.t.u./sec./ft.)      5,500             6,000             12,000

  Time to go ½ mile (min.)                  24                21                11

  Time to go ¾ mile (min.)                  36                32                16.5
  ----------------------------------------- ----------------- ----------------- -----------------

Conditions 1, 2, and 3 represent the lower slope, mid-slope, and the
upper portion of steep chute, respectively, Condition 3 also is
characterized by a 25 M.P.H. wind speed to reflect probable peak gusts.
Conditions 1, 2, and 3 show the fire traveling ½ mile in 11-26 minutes.
In reconstructing actual fire spread from photographs and observations,
it appears that the fire traveled the last 1,800 feet to the ridgeline
in about 15 minutes or well within the range of modeled conditions. In
terms of fireline intensity, 100 B.t.u./sec./ft. of fireline is about at
the upper limit for control by hand crews and 500-700 B.t.u./sec./ft.
for direct control of a fire by any forces. Fireline intensities for
cases 1, 2, and 3 were 5,500, 6,000, and 12,000 B.t.u./sec./ft.,
respectively, or absolutely uncontrollable.

C. [Fire Behavior Summary]{.underline}

Steep chutes, 10-20 M.P.H. upslope winds, and dense, flammable Gambel's
oak all combined to place those in the saddle above in an extremely
vulnerable position. The topography below the saddle, as mentioned
earlier, probably denied the crew members good visibility of what was
going on below them. Visibility also was impaired by dense smoke from
the main fire and the squad's burnout fires.

A prophetic report prepared by the Colorado State Forest Service[^3]
described a "fuel type X" that supports high-to-severe wildfire hazards.
These primarily oak brush fuels "are dense, high brush 1 ½ to 10 feet in
height. Small scattered patches of conifer or deciduous tress or
scattered individual trees may also exist but are of minor effect and
occurrence. The fuels are continuous or nearly so. Despite heavy
shading, the ground is seldom damp. Flammability may vary markedly in
the year due to changes in fuel moisture and leaf fall. Fire seldom
kills these species. Many re-sprout after fires with more stems
resulting in more numerous, thin-stemmed fuels than before."

Burning characteristics are described as becoming "extra hazardous
during special times of the year. The critical time of year varies with
the species. For example, oak brush is very difficult to burn when the
leaves are green, *but when it's leaves are brown and still hanging on
the branches, it becomes one of Colorado's most flammable fuels* for 2
to 3 weeks in autumn." The key point here is that these highly flammable
autumn conditions in oak brush existed in the Battlement creek drainage
in *mid-July* due to the June 4 frost!

The report clearly described many of the events observed in the
Battlement Creek Fire:

> "The "X" fuels support medium to high intensity fires, short-range
> spot fires are common, rate of spread is moderate to fast, flare-ups
> brief but common and hot, just-burned area is tenable by humans within
> about ¼ hour, the fire front is impassable. Brush fires seldom burn
> throughout the night and into the next day if suppression action is
> made.
>
> These areas are of state interest due to the associated burning
> characteristics, the difficulty of fire suppression and the resultant
> dangers to life and property during special times. By their very
> nature "X" fuels often create a false sense of security due to their
> lush greenness and sometimes non-flammable periods. Many people find
> it impossible to believe the potential flammability until they witness
> burning in critical periods. Its (oak brush) rate of fire spread has
> been observed and timed to be an incredible 16 acres per minute,
> steady for 3 hours, in Colorado! Fast running mule deer have been
> found dead in oak brush burns---unable to outrun the fire's spread.
> Brush fires are very sensitive to wind direction. Property and lives
> considered safe on a flank can be quickly threatened within minutes by
> a wind shift."

Under the July conditions of frost-induced dieback in Gambel's oak in
Battlement Creek, the oak brush stands must be considered as a most
potent fuel type.

III\. SUPPRESSION EFFORT AND ACCIDENT SEQUENCE

A.  [Accident Sequence]{.underline}

In order to set the stage for full understanding of the events relating
to the three burn fatalities and one serious burn injury of the
afternoon of Saturday, July 17, 1976, it would be helpful to include the
highlights of the previous day, Friday, July 16.

[Strategy and Tactics---Day Shift, Friday, July 16]{.underline} -- The
general plan for the day shift was to hold the fire to the east of the
Battlement Creek road, and to stop the up canyon southerly spread from
reaching gas wells, pipelines and the critical Project Rulison site,
with its potential for gas explosions, radioactivity exposure, etc. To
do this, the fire boss planned ground tankers and hand crews along the
Battlement Creek road and generally northerly along the west flank
toward the point of origin (figs. 3a, 3b). Air tankers were used to
retard spread along this flank. One of these air tankers, B-26 No. 56,
flown by Don Goodman of Missoula, Montana, crashed and burned about 0856
m.d.t. Friday, July 16, killing pilot Goodman. Details of this accident
are covered in a separate report. The line boss and Sawtooth
interregional crew were involved much of the day on this crash and the
resulting fire.

After early morning size-up by the fire boss and line boss, a bulldozer
ordered earlier was assigned to build fireline generally along a spur
ridgetop easterly from a cattle guard at point 7165 on the Battlement
Creek road, near the center of Sec. 23 (fig 3a). This line construction
began about 0900 and was completed about 1600. The fire at this time
(1600) was exhibiting vigorous behavior, including two impressive fire
whirls, in the next draw about ½ mile north, near the section of line
14/23.

The Coconino NF Mormon Lake and Happy Jack hotshot crews had arrived on
the fire about 0630 Friday, and by early afternoon were in place ready
to begin a major burnout of the newly constructed catline, starting at
the base of rocky bluffs to the east, and burning westerly downhill
along the catline toward the Battlement Creek road. Firing began at the
top (Point A, fig. 20) about 1615, and reached the road at the bottom
(Point C, fig. 20) about 2030 as darkness approached. This firing was
generally successful---a strip of 60 feet or more along the catline was
burned, with a few locations exceeding 100 feet. No spotting occurred
outside the line. This fire continued to creep downhill most of Friday
night, burning mostly ground fuels. Some unburned patches of fuel
remained between the catline and the draw just to the north.

[Strategy and Tactics, Night Shift, Friday, July 16]{.underline}

The night shift continued burning out from the bottom of this catline
northerly along the east side of the Battlement Creek road (C-D and
beyond along the road, fig. 20) and by Saturday morning had tied into
the burn of Friday afternoon near section line 14/23. This burnout by
the night shift was spotty and had considerable unburned fuel remaining
Saturday morning.

Also during Friday night shift, other hand crews built handline along a
ridgetop from near point 8850 in Sec. 24 (Point E, fig. 20). The intent
here was to construct and burn out this ridgetop fireline Friday night.
The line construction was completed, but burning out was not attempted
because the crew had no fusees. Even if fusees had been available, night
shift burning at this location would have been difficult and less than
fully effective.

The Mormon Lake and Happy Jack crews were bedded down about 0100 for the
night in fire camp and got 5-6 hours rest under fire camp conditions.

[Strategy and Tactics, Day Shift, Saturday, July 17]{.underline}

Following debriefing of night shift overhead and a morning look at the
fire by the fire boss and the line boss, the strategy for Saturday day
shift was to hold the south flank catline and west flank Battlement
Creek road. The handline (about 40 chains long) built along the ridge in
the Southeast corner during the night from E to G (fig. 21) was to be
widened and burned out, thus tying in the entire perimeter. The crucial
spot on the fire, in terms of potential fire behavior as shown on Friday
afternoon, was the ridgetop from E to G. The Mormon Lake crew was
assigned to this portion of the fire. This crew was specifically chosen
for this tough assignment by the fire boss, based on the crew's
demonstrated capability on the Friday afternoon catline burning out
assignment.

The Happy Jack crew was assigned to the burned out south catline and
Battlement creek road (A-D, fig. 21) with instructions to burn out
inside Friday's black line and also begin mop-up along the outer edge of
the burn.

Other crews were on other portions of the fireline, which by now were in
mop-up stage.

After a general briefing of overhead by the fire boss in fire camp, at
about 0700, the Happy Jack and Mormon Lake crews moved out of fire camp
for the day shift. The Happy Jack crew hiked up the catline to the east
and began firing about 0900 to expand Friday's burnout. This burnout
continued downhill toward the Battlement Creek road, reaching the road
about 1200 (A-B-C, fig. 21). While this was going on, air tankers were
laying a retardant line generally from the upper end of the catline,
along the base of the rock bluffs, and along the ridgetop handline that
would be burned out later in the day.

The Mormon Lake crew arrived at the base heliport along the Battlement
creek road about 0730 and waited until 1030 while the Bell 212
helicopter assigned to the fire was occupied in making three trips to
shuttle a crew from Grand Junction to the fire base heliport. When this
helicopter became available, about 1030, the line boss, sector boss,
Mormon Lake crew boss and a few crewmen made their fire reconnaissance
flight over their assigned area (E-G, fig. 21). While airborne, the line
boss gave the sector boss and crew boss a thorough briefing as to their
landline improvement-burnout assignment, including their planned escape
route into the now cold burn of Friday afternoon. The helicopter ferry
of the remainder of the Mormon Lake crew was completed soon thereafter,
and the entire Mormon Lake crew was at the base of the rock bluff (Point
E, fig. 21) about 1100. Improvement of the handline began toward the
helispots down the ridgeline (from E toward F, fig. 21). One squad boss
with 14 crewmen was assigned to this activity.

The Mormon Lake crew boss had two radios for the day shift---a Coconino
NF set allowing him to talk to each of his two squad bosses, each of
whom also had only a Coconino radio; and a BLM fire net radio which
allowed him to talk to the sector boss, line boss, fire camp, etc. This
radio setup allowed the crew boss to communicate both up and down
organizationally, but did require two separate radios to do so. Best
evidence indicates that all radios functioned normally throughout the
day.

The sector boss started the crew boss and one crewman burning out narrow
fingers of fuel running up into the rock bluff. Another crewman was
stationed on top of the rock bluffs to watch for spots. As this was
going on, the bulk of the crew was improving the handline down the
ridgetop.

At this same time, the Happy Jack crew reached the bottom of the catline
(Point C, fig. 21). While one squad ate lunch, the other squad continued
burning out in the bottom of the draw (C-d, fig. 21), reaching 500 feet
or more inside the fire edge. The Friday evening burnout of the lower
catline and road had generally resulted in a ground fire, with
scorching, but not consumption of the brush canopy. This draw burned
readily, and when firing was completed about 1315, the fire burned
uphill toward the Mormon Lake crew. The Happy Jack crew went on to
another part of the fire. Apparently, neither crew knew of the specific
location or assignment of the other.

When the Mormon Lake line improvement squad had worked about half way
down the ridge to the upper helispot (about midway between E and F, Fig.
21), the sector boss moved the Mormon Lake burnout squad to the base of
the rock bluff to burn out a 60- to 80-foot-wide strip on the west or
fire side of the improved line. The burnout squad consisted of the crew
boss, one squad boss, and three crewmen. The time was now about 1330.

This burnout progressed slowly, with difficult ignition of the sparse
fuels. The crew boss sent one crewman out to the fireline. This crewman
later joined the other crewman on top of the rock bluff, leaving the
crew boss, squad boss, and two crewmen as the burnout squad. The burnout
reached a dense stand of Gambel's oak brush about one/third of the way
from the rock bluff to the upper helispot. The time was now about 1400.
This dense brush burned vigorously, and coupled with the noticeable
increase in smoke from the draw below the burnout operation, inspired
the sector boss (who was located on a rocky point uphill from Point E,
fig. 21) to instruct the crew boss to speed up the line improvement
squad on toward the safety zone (Point G, fig. 21). He also instructed
the crew boss to narrow down and speed up his burnout on down the
ridgeline to join the remainder of the crew in the safety zone when his
burnout was done.

The sector boss also ordered an air tanker load of retardant to
reinforce the fireline. This air tanker was launched at 1410 from Grand
Junction airport, with a lead plane for supervision. The lead plane
ordered a second air tanker en route.

The sector boss advised the crew boss of the impeding arrival of the air
tanker and directed the crew boss to move the line improvement squad
downhill to the safety zone to avoid possible impact hazard from
retardant to be dropped by the air tanker.

Using a crew radio, the crew boss instructed the line improvement squad
boss to move on down the ridge to the safety zone and warned him of the
impending arrival of air tankers. This squad movement occurred without
incident, but the last man had to hurry to avoid the smoke and flames
approaching the ridge-top just south of the lower helispot (Point G,
fig. 21). The squad boss reported to the crew boss when 14 members of
the line improvement squad reached the safety zone. The crew boss
relayed this message to the sector boss. The sector boss assumed this
meant the entire crew was in the safety zone, not just the line
improvement squad. Moments before this message from the crew boss, the
sector boss had observed four men moving out of the smoke near where the
burnout squad had been and join the line improvement squad. The sector
boss assumed these four men were the burnout squad.

Actually, crew boss Czak, with his three-man burnout squad (squad boss
Gibson, crewmen Furey and Nelson), was still uphill on the ridgetop,
separated by 100-200 yards from the line improvement squad in the safety
zone. The time was now about 1425-1430. The burnout squad tried to reach
the safety zone occupied by the line improvement squad but was unable to
do due to the fire front hitting the ridgetop, just south of the lower
helispot (Point g, fig. 21 --see also figure 17 for photograph of fire
at this time). The crew boss then radioed his line improvement squad
boss in the safety zone that he and the burnout squad were "trapped" and
unable to join them in the safety zone. This radio conversation was
calm, without any sign of panic, and the line improvement squad boss
interpreted this only as meaning the burnout squad was temporarily cut
off from the safety zone.

The crew boss also radioed the sector boss that he was unable to get
into the planned safety zone and told the sector boss that he was
proceeding back up the ridgetop fireline toward the rock bluff. The
sector boss was dismayed to learn that the burnout squad was not already
safely with the line improvement squad, as he had thought earlier. The
sector boss told the crew boss that because of heavy smoke obscuring the
sector boss's visibility, he could not advise him on an escape route.
The crew boss and his three-man burnout squad then started rapidly back
uphill southerly along the ridgetop toward the rock bluffs
(approximately from F toward E, fig. 21). The time was now 1430-1435.
The sector boss tried unsuccessfully several times during the next 20 to
30 minutes to contact the crew boss by radio.

Fire-induced winds had now increased, and as the first air tanker from
Grand Junction arrived about this time, it was unable to drop along the
ridgeline (where the burnout squad was), as requested by the sector
boss. Heavy smoke and strong, erratic winds prevented the drop where
requested. A few minutes later, the air tanker made a drop diagonally
across the ridgeline approximately at the base of the rock bluffs. This
had no effect on the burnout squad.

About 1440, the burnout squad was unable to proceed any further uphill
along the ridgeline toward the rock bluffs. Their movement was stopped
(at Point E, fig. 21) by heavy smoke and flames, perhaps from their
wind-fanned burnout hitting against the fireline along which the crew
had been moving.

Upon orders from the crew boss, they removed their canvas cruiser vests,
moistened the vests and their shirts and trousers with water from their
canteens, and laid face down in the mineral soil of the fireline. They
covered their heads and faces with the moistened canvas vests. All had
aluminum cap-style hardhats, Nomex fire-resistant shirts and
non-fire-resistant work trousers. All four men were close enough to
touch each other. The flames and smoke roared overhead. The time was
about 1440-1445.

B.  [Post-Accident Rescue and Medical Action]{.underline}

While the fire was overrunning the four burnout squad members shortly
before 1448 m.d.t. July 15, 1976, crewmen Nelson stood up from his prone
position on the fireline (their attempted refuge point, shouted, "I'm on
fire," and ran downhill into the fire area below the burnout squad
position. His body was later found with his burned watch nearby stopped
at 1448. He was badly burned.

Shortly after Nelson left the burnout squad position, crew boss Czak
stood up, shouted unintelligibly, and ran generally down the ridgeline.
His body was later found approximately 1,100 feet away from the burnout
squad refuge position. He was burned, but much less so than Nelson.

Crewman Furey and squad boss Gibson remained, apparently in a prone
position in the burnout squad location. Both were burned as the fire
swept over them. Furey's work trousers and fire-resistant shirt were
burned entirely off his back except for small fragments. He was in
considerable pain. Gibson advised Furey to remain on the ground, to try
to rest, that help was on the way. Gibson heard a helicopter overhead at
this time.

Sector boss Coleman arrived at the Furey-Gibson location about 1510.
Coleman radioed word of the accident to the fire boss and quickly
checked the immediate area for other burnout squad members. He found no
one else in the immediate area. Using a Coconino crew radio he found at
the scene, Coleman then summoned Kimball, squad boss of the
line-building portion of the Mormon Lake crew, from their refuge in the
burned area below the helispot. Coleman instructed Kimball to bring his
squad from their refuge in the burned area and to come up the ridgeline
to the Furey-Gibson location to help locate the missing men (Czak and
Nelson).

About this time, Furey stopped breathing, so Coleman began
mount-to-mouth resuscitation. While this resuscitation effort was going
on, Safety Officer Bellar and Maps and Records Officer Woody were en
route by helicopter to the helispot just downhill from Coleman's
location. They had first aid equipment with them. Coleman continued
resuscitation efforts on Furey for about 15 minutes until Bellar and
Woody arrived. Bellar, a trained emergency medical technician, checked
Furey's life signs, which indicated no sign of life. Coleman was unable
to detect any signs of life all the time he was administering
resuscitation to Furey. The group decided that any further efforts at
resuscitation on Furey were useless, and turned their efforts to aid
Gibson, who was seated nearby. Gibson was in considerable pain.

Gibson was half-carried, half-walked, downhill to the helispot and
boarded the waiting helicopter. Mormon Lake crewman Armstrong also
boarded the helicopter to assist Gibson. The helicopter was airborne at
1553 and landed at St. Mary's Hospital, Grand Junction, at 1610. Gibson
was admitted to the emergency room and received treatment from Dr. G. R.
Kempers. Upon the recommendation of the staff at St. Mary's Hospital,
Gibson was transferred to the Burn/Trauma Unit at Bernalillo County
Medical Center, Albuquerque, New Mexico, the next day, Sunday, July 18.
He is presently (August 4) recovering at that hospital. His medical
prognosis appears favorable.

While Gibson's evacuation was going on, the Mormon Lake crew and others
were searching for the other two missing burn-out crew members. Nelson's
body was located, and shortly thereafter, Czak's body (fig. 22a, 22b).
The fire boss had earlier requested both a doctor and emergency medical
technician. Dr. J. L. Sisk of Rifle and EMT Steve Miller of St. Mary's
Hospital, Grand Junction, arrived separately by helicopter about 1700.
Czak, Furey, and Nelson were pronounced dead on the scene. Garfield
County Coroner O. L. Sowder of Rifle arrived later by helicopter and
aided in the helicopter transport of the bodies to the Sowder Funeral
Home in Rifle.

Because of the lack of facilities at Rifle, no autopsies were performed.
The bodies were shipped by air to mortuaries in the victims' home towns.
(Czak to Flagstaff, Arizona; Furey to Salmon, Idaho; Nelson to Bloomer,
Wisconsin.) A member of the Mormon Lake crew accompanied the bodies as
escorts to their home towns.

The Garfield County (Colorado) Coroner's Office reports show
asphyxiation as cause of death for Czak, Furey, and Nelson.

All the burn victims wore fire-resistant shirts (GSA Stock No.
8415-11-233-5819), which were apparently in good condition prior to the
fire. All wore work trousers which were not fire-resistant. In addition,
all wore Filson canvas cruiser vests over their fire-resistant shirts.
These vests were removed, moistened by water from canteens and draped
over the men's heads for facial and respiratory protection. All wore
aluminum cap-style hard hats during this time. All laid face down in the
mineral soil of the fireline which had a shallow (13-18 inches)
depression at this point (fig. 23). None had fire shelters.

Fabric samples of work trousers and fire-resistant shirts from the dead
firefighters have been submitted to FS Missoula (Montana) Equipment
Development center for further technical analysis.

IV\. [INVESTIGATION]{.underline}

Grand Junction BLM District Manager Tom Owen was notified of the
accident at approximately 1520, Saturday, July 17. Colorado BLM Safety
Officer Dick Huff and Grand Junction staffman Gus Juarez were
immediately involved with investigative action and follow-up medical
matters and care of the bodies.

The following sequence of events covers the time period from the
accident to the initial investigation:

[July 17]{.underline}

1600 -- (Approx.) Safety Officer Bellar marked location of victims and
collected personal effects.

1615 -- Huff and Juarez talked to Mormon Lake crew member Armstrong at
St. Mary's Hospital in Grand Junction. Armstrong had accompanied injured
squad boss Gibson. Completed CA-16 at that time.

1730 -- Huff and Juarez met remainder of Mormon Lake crew at airport,
began taking statements.

2130 \-- Huff and Juarez took statements from remainder of crew at
airport.

2230 -- District personnel Owen, Juarez, Johnson and Byron Kropf of the
BLM Colorado State Office met with fire overhead Haslem, Coleman, Smith,
Bartlett, Kellogg, Putnam and Woody to review accident and fire plans.

2300 -- District Manager Owen ordered a departmental project overhead
team to relieve present team.

2330 -- Huff and Juarez interviewed survivor at St. Mary's Hospital.
Gibson was sedated in pain. A nurse was present during the 20-minute
interview.

0100 -- Fire overhead team returned to fire camp.

[July 18]{.underline}

Huff collected statements from coroner and doctor. Also coordinated
reports and records requirements with R-3 fiscal management and the
crew's home unit, the Coconino National Forest.

1630 -- Four members of investigation team BIFC arrived at Grand
Junction. The three remaining team members arrived that night and the
next morning.

1800 -- New overhead team relieved team on fire.

1930 -- Team members Wilson, Heilman, Mutch, and O'Dell interviewed
Mormon Lake squad boss Kimball.

[July 19-24]{.underline}

Team members continued field investigation.

[July 24-August 3]{.underline}

Individual team members continued work on assigned portions of report.

[August 4-6]{.underline}

Team met in Denver, Colorado, to complete draft of report.

V. [ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT]{.underline} - Battlement Greek fire

A. [Fire Overhead and Crew Assignments 7/16-7/17/76]{.underline}

> 7/16 DAY SHIFT
>
> Fire Boss Haslem 7/15\*

Time Officer Dillon

0900 \*

Service Chief

> [Engle]{.underline} 0900 \*
>
> Line Boss

Smith P.M. 7/15\*

Plans Chief Bartlett, 0715\*

> -Safety Officer Bellar 0715\*

\- Maps & Records Woody 0715\*

> Sector I Putnam

P.M. 7/15\* Grand Jct.

Eff Crew

> Sector II
>
> Sexton

P.M. 7/15\* Happy Jack Crew Mormon Lake Crew

> 7/16 NIGHT SHIFT
>
> Fire Boss
>
> Haslem

7/15\*

Time Officer Service Chief Line Boss Plans Chief

Dillon Engle Vincent Bartlett

Safety officer

Bellar

Maps & Records

Woody

Sector I Sector II Sector III

Green Sexton Mitchell

Carson Hotshot SRV Crews Blue Jay SRV

Santa Fe #2, 30, 39,70

Panam SRV

> FIRE ORGANIZATION

7/17/76 Day Shift

Fire Boss

Haslem

Scout

Kellogg

Time Officer Service Chief Line boss Plans Chief

Dillon Engle Smith Bartlett

Sector III Sector II Sector I Safety Officer

Sexton Coleman Putnam Bellar

Happy Jack Mormon Lake Sawtooth Maps & Records

Crew \* Crew I.R. Woody

San Luis Crew

Grand Jct.

EFF crew

\* moved to Sector I approximately 1330 after burnout completed.

See figures 24 and 25 following.

B. [Overhead Qualification and Experience]{.underline}

District manager Tom Owen with the advice of Roy Johnson, Fire Control
Officer, initially assigned District employee Joseph Haslem as fire
boss. They also requested two crews and two sector bosses at that time.
Subsequent orders for specific overhead were determined by fire boss
Haslem and transmitted to BIFC by Grand Junction Dispatch Center. BIFC
coordinators followed the normal procedure of requesting overhead by
position from units adjacent to the fire. In this case, requests were
filled by fire control personnel stationed at BIFC and Wyoming BLM at
Lander and Rawlins. In addition, several local Grand Junction District
Personnel were assigned, including Bureau of Land Management and Forest
Service detailers previously assigned at the Grand Junction Fire Center.
A summary of orders placed with BIFC for this fire on July 15 and 16
follows.

Overhead orders received at BIFC 7/15 and 16, 1976 from Grand Junction,
Battlement Creek fire.

7/15 2340 --

BIFC #760970 1 Safety Officer, Wyoming BLM, J. Bellar

2 Sector Bosses, Wyoming BLM, G. Green and M. Woody

> BIFC, T. Sexton, B. Mitchell
>
> 4 Heliport Mgr's,, R-4, R. Patterson, D. Hamrick, Geo. Starr; BIFC, R.
> Everson
>
> 1 Timekeeper, BIFC, Cindy Dillon
>
> 1 Line Boss, BIFC, R. Vincent
>
> 1 Service Chief, BIFC, D. Engle
>
> 1 Plans Chief, Wyoming BLM, B. Bartlett

7/15 2355 --

BIFC #760974 3 Ramp Personnel

2 Helicopter Managers Class 1, R-4

7/16 0800 --

BIFC #760974 1 Logistics Team, BIFC, B. Carr and J. Reginato

1 Supply Officer, BIFC, M. Mitchell

1 Timekeeper, BIFC, L. Johnson

1 Tool Mgr., BIFC, R. Weeks

7/16 2005 \--

BIFC #760996 1 Ass't. Supply Officer, BIFC, Campbell

1 Ass't. Camp Officer, BIFC, D. Call

1 Air Service Mgr., Helicopter (trainee), BIFC, B. Carlton

For several years, the BLM and the Forest Service have used similar but
somewhat different qualification criteria for certifying individuals for
specific fire suppression positions. The differences have been in the
amount and currency of experience and the type of formal training
required. In 1974, the agencies jointly developed a common qualification
system which combined the strong aspects of both systems. The new system
is currently in the process of being adopted and is used by all Forest
Service units. The BLM has begun to implement the system through
designation of two states and the Boise Interagency Fire Center as test
units.

Consequently, personnel on the Battlement Creek fire were rated on two
systems; the old BLM system and the new Interagency Fire Qualification
System. Requirements in the new system are considerably more demanding
in terms of training and experience, and in addition, require a high
level of physical fitness based on aerobic (oxygen) capacity.

The following table contains the fire assignment and the qualification
rating according to the system by which the individuals were rated for
key overhead assignment to the Battlement fire on July 16 and 17.

An individual summary of key overhead showing work experience and
training relevant to the position in which they were assigned on the
Battlement Creek fire follows:

+------------+----------------+--------+--------------+--------------+
| [Name]{.   | [Regular Duty  | [A     | [Battlement  | [Fire        |
| underline} | Statio         | rrival | Fire         | Q            |
|            | n]{.underline} | on     | Assignment   | ualification |
|            |                | Fire]  | 7/15-7/18]   | Card         |
|            |                | {.unde | {.underline} | Rating]      |
|            |                | rline} |              | {.underline} |
+------------+----------------+--------+--------------+--------------+
| Joseph     | Grand Junction | 7/15   | Fire Boss    | Fire Boss I  |
| Haslem     | BLM Colorado   |        |              |              |
+------------+----------------+--------+--------------+--------------+
| Walt Smith | Aerial Fire    | 7/16   | Line Boss    | Division     |
|            | Depot, FS      |        | (day)        | Boss         |
|            | Missoula,      |        |              |              |
|            | Montana        |        |              |              |
+------------+----------------+--------+--------------+--------------+
| William    | Rawlins        | 7/16   | Plans Chief  | Plans Chief  |
| Bartlett   | District, BLM  |        |              | II           |
|            | Wyoming        |        |              |              |
+------------+----------------+--------+--------------+--------------+
| Dave Engle | BIFC-BLM       | 7/16   | Service      | Service      |
|            |                |        | Chief        | Chief II     |
+------------+----------------+--------+--------------+--------------+
| Monford    | Rawlins        | 7/16   | Maps and     | Plans Chief  |
| Woody      | District, BLM  |        | Records      | II           |
|            | Wyoming        |        |              |              |
+------------+----------------+--------+--------------+--------------+
| Jon Bellar | Rawlins        | 7/16   | Safety       | Safety       |
|            | District, BLM  |        | Officer      | Officer      |
|            | Wyoming        |        |              |              |
+------------+----------------+--------+--------------+--------------+
| Jim Sexton | BIFC -- BLM    | 7/16   | Sector Boss  | Sector Boss  |
+------------+----------------+--------+--------------+--------------+
| Leonard    | Grand Junction | 7/16   | Sector Boss  | Sector Boss  |
| Coleman    | BLM Colorado   |        |              |              |
+------------+----------------+--------+--------------+--------------+
| Ted Putnam | Aerial Fire    | 7/16   | Sector Boss  | Crew Boss    |
|            | Depot, FS      |        |              |              |
|            | Missoula,      |        |              |              |
|            | Montana        |        |              |              |
+------------+----------------+--------+--------------+--------------+
| Dan        | Grand Junction | 7/16   | Scout        |              |
| Kellogg    | BLM Colorado   |        |              |              |
+------------+----------------+--------+--------------+--------------+
| Rick       | BIFC -- BLM    | 7/16   | Line Boss    | Line Boss II |
| Vincent    |                |        | (night)      |              |
+------------+----------------+--------+--------------+--------------+
| Cindy      | BIFC --BLM     | 7/16   | Finance      | Time Officer |
| Dillon     |                |        | Chief        |              |
|            |                |        |              |              |
|            |                |        | Time officer |              |
+------------+----------------+--------+--------------+--------------+
| Steve      | BIFC-BLM       | 7/16   | Crew Liaison | Crew Boss    |
| Cornell    |                |        | Officer      |              |
+------------+----------------+--------+--------------+--------------+
| Bill       | BIFC-BLM       | 7/16   | Sector Boss  | Division     |
| Mitchell   |                |        |              | Boss         |
+------------+----------------+--------+--------------+--------------+
| Gale Green | Rawlins        | 7/16   | Sector Boss  | Sector Boss  |
|            | district, BLM  |        |              |              |
|            | Wyoming        |        |              |              |
+------------+----------------+--------+--------------+--------------+
|            |                |        |              | (All except  |
|            |                |        |              | Smith and    |
|            |                |        |              | Putnam rated |
|            |                |        |              | on BLM       |
|            |                |        |              | system)      |
+------------+----------------+--------+--------------+--------------+

**Jack Haslem**, Fire Boss I (rated by BLM system)

Experience: Fire Boss 1-3 fires since 1974

Recent Training: Fire Command 1975

Fire Generalship 1976

**Walt Smith**, Division Boss (rated by Interagency Fire Qualifications
System) Experience: Division Boss - 1 fire

Sector Boss - 3 fires

Work History: Smokejumper and crewman many fires

Recent Training: Sector Boss

Intermediate Fire Behavior

**William Bartlett**, Plans Chief II, rated by BLM System Experience:
Worked in plans function in 1971. Work History: Varied experience as
crew boss on small fires in past three years.

Recent training: Plans and Service functional trainer in 1974.

**Dave Engle**, Service Chief II (rated by BLM System (only person in
Service Section on July 17) Experience: Served as service chief on one
fire in 1975. Also limited experience in other service functions,
especially heliport and air service areas. Work History: Numerous
crewman and crewboss fires. Recent Training: Fire organization and
Management Training in 1975.

**Cindy Dillon**, Time Officer (rated by BLM System (only person in
finance section))

Experience: Timekeeper on 7 fires.

Work History: Limited additional fire experience

Recent Training: Finance Training 1976.

**Leonard Coleman**, Sector Boss (rated by BLM system) Experience: Two
fires in sector boss position. Work History: Numerous small fires as
crewman and crew boss. Recent Training: BLM Fire Academy.

**Ted Putnam**, Crew Boss (rated by Interagency Fire Qualification
System) Experience: First fire in Sector Boss capacity. Numerous fires
as crewman and smokejumper. Recent Training: Sector Boss Training 1975.

**Don Kellogg**: Served as scout or observer for fire boss.-Not rated by
qualification system.

Experience: None on fire team.

Training: None.

C. [Crew Qualification and Experience]{.underline}

Crews assigned to the Battlement Creek fire were organized Forest
Service interregional or hotshot crews, Snake River Valley organized
Mexican-American crews, and a newly formed emergency crew from Grand
Junction. With the exception of the Grand Junction crew, all crews were
well-trained and experienced. Most had been assigned to several fires in
similar conditions this year. This was the seventeenth fire of the first
season of the newly formed Mormon Lake crew, of which five had been
large brush or timber fires.

The Mormon Lake crew boss, squad bosses and crewmen all had completed
training requirements for their positions and had been actively involved
in refresher training sessions.

A summary of the experience and training of this crew follows:

[EMPLOYMENT HISTORY -- MORMON LAKE HOTSHOT CREW]{.underline}

CZAK -- Crew Boss (Czak)

5/73-8/73 Hotshot crew, Flagstaff RD, Coconino NF

5/74-8/74 Hotshot Crew, Blue Ridge RD, Coconino NF Squad Boss

4/75-11/75 Hotshot Crew, Blue Ridge RD, Coconino NF Squad Boss-Crew Boss

3/76-7/76 Hotshot Crew, Mormon Lake RD, Coconino NFCrew Boss

Training S-100, 110, 130, 230, 230, 270

[Total Time 17 Months]{.underline}

FUREY -- Crewman (deceased)

6/73-8/73 Salmon National Forest Pumper Crewman

6/74-8/74 Salmon National Forest Pumper Crewman

5/75-8/75 Salmon National Forest Helitack Crewman

4/76-7/76 Mormon Lake RD, Coconino NF Hotshot Crewman

Training S-100, 110, 130, 190

[Total Time 10 Months]{.underline}

NELSON \-- Crewman (deceased)

5/76-7/76 Hotshot Crew, Mormon Lake RD, Coconino Crewman

Training S-100, 110, 130, 190

[Total Time 2 Months]{.underline}

GIBSON -- Squad Boss (hospitalized)

5/75-12/75 Hotshot Crew, Blue Ridge RD, Coconino

4/76-7/76 Hotshot Crew, Mormon Lake RD, Coconino

Training S-100, 110, 130, 190

[Total Time 10 Months]{.underline}

KIMBALL -- Squad Boss

9/70-12/70 San Bernardino NF Various Dist. Supp. Crews

6/71-12/71 San Bernardino NF Various Dist. Supp. Crews

3/72-8/72 San Bernardino NF Various Dist. Supp. Crews

5/75-10/75 Hotshot crew, Blue Ridge RD, Coconino NF

4/76-7/76 Hotshot Crew, Mormon Lake RD, Coconino NF

Training S-100, 110, 130, 190

[Total Time 22 Months]{.underline}

![](media/image1.wmf)WOFFORD - Crewman

4/72-10/72 Hamilton RD, Bitterroot NF, Montana Project & Fire

4/73-10/73 Darby RD,, Bitterroot NF, Montana Suppression crew

5/75-11/75 Hotshot Crew, Blue Ridge RD, Coconino

4/76-7/76 Hotshot Crew, Mormon lake RD, Coconino

Training S-100, 110, 130, 190

Total Time 21 Months

  --------------- ---------------- ------------------- -------------------
  Kwiatkowski     Crewman          First Season        Maximum 3 months

  Simpson         \`\`             \`\`                \`\`

  Booth           \`\`             \`\`                \`\`

  Strayhand       \`\`             \`\`                \`\`

  Sutton          \`\`             \`\`                \`\`

  Davis           \`\`             \`\`                \`\`

  Ely             \`\`             \`\`                \`\`

  Sullivan        \`\`             \`\`                \`\`

  Meyers          \`\`             \`\`                \`\`

  Training        S-100, 110, 190                      
  --------------- ---------------- ------------------- -------------------

D. [Logistical Support]{.underline}

> Logistical support for the Battlement Creek Fire was provided by the
> Grand Junction fire center at Walker Field. They in turn would draw on
> BIFC for requests beyond local capability. In addition, on July 16 a
> special logistical support office was established in Grand Junction to
> handle direct orders from the fire.
>
> There were no manpower or material shortages during the time of the
> fire. All confirmed requests were filled. A problem did occur in
> ordering procedures and follow-up in fire camp. While this did affect
> some material orders, it did not appear to be a major problem.

E. [Fire Planning and Intelligence]{.underline}

> There was no functioning system of planning and intelligence gathering
> on this fire. One individual served as an observer or scout for the
> fire boss. The plans section operated with a plans chief and one
> individual initially assigned as maps and records officer, but due to
> other demands by the fire boss, served in this role part-time.
>
> The procedure for transmitting information consisted of fire boss
> briefings to line personnel before going on shift. This was always
> verbal with no written instructions or maps provided. Personnel
> briefed varied, but always included the line boss, and usually the
> sector bosses. Written plans were prepared after the briefing as a
> record.
>
> There was no system of information exchange between line personnel
> working different shifts. Transfer of information was accomplished
> verbally by the fire boss.
>
> Helicopters were used by the line boss, sector boss, and crew boss for
> aerial reconnaissance prior to going on shift. Such a flight was taken
> by Smith, Coleman, and Czak on July 17. There were no helicopter
> reconnaissance flights made later during the day, until the rescue
> activities commenced.

F. [Aviation Management Activity]{.underline}

> There were no aircraft shortages during the fire. On the afternoon of
> July 15, aerial tanker (T59), a B-26 was available at Walker Field at
> Grand Junction. This aircraft, and a Bell 206-B Jet Ranger helicopter,
> No. 654W, were the initial attack complement for the Grand Junction
> District. Because of the serious nature of this fire season, a Bell
> 212 helicopter was also at Walker Field. There were other retardant
> aircraft and light helicopters within a 2-hour radius.
>
> At approximately 1615 on July 15, the Bell 212 helicopter was grounded
> for failure of a vital instrument, and replaced by a Bell 205
> helicopter from Boise at 2200. An additional C-119 air tanker from
> Winslow, Arizona (Tanker 138) arrived at approximately 1914. Air
> tanker No. 56, a B-26, from Denver, also arrived July 15.
>
> There were several other smaller ongoing fires beside the Battlement
> Creek fire No. 1173 where aircraft were being used.
>
> By 1000 on July 16, the Bell 212 helicopter was back on the line.
> According to the Grand Junction Fire Center, the following aircraft
> were available and being used on the Battlement Creek fire:

  ------------------------------- ---------------------------------------
  Helicopter 212                  81FC

  Helicopter 205                  440AS

  Helicopter 206B                 654W\*

  Baron Lead Plane                98W

  Tanker, B-26                    T-59\*

  Tanker, B-26                    T-56 (Crashed 7/16)

  Tanker, C-119                   T-138

  Light Twins                     ?

  \*Primary initial attack ships  
  used on the battlement Creek    
  fire.                           
  ------------------------------- ---------------------------------------

> On July 16, most of these aircraft used either their allowed flight
> times or duty hours, resulting in a shortage of pilot hours prior to
> 0800 on July 17.
>
> There was some confusion between the Battlement Creek fire boss and
> the local organization as to availability of the Bell 206B helicopter
> for the fire. The Grand Junction Fire Center view was that the ship
> was assigned to Fire No. 1173 and available for call. The fire boss
> view was that this was the District initial attack ship, and was to be
> used sparingly.
>
> On the day of the incident---July 17---major aircraft use on the
> Battlement Creek fire was as follows:

+-----------------------+-----------------------+-----------------------+
| Helicopter 212        | Helicopter 205        | Jet Ranger 206B       |
+-----------------------+-----------------------+-----------------------+
| > [0858 to            | > [0800 to            | > [1015 to            |
| > 1UO]{.underline}    | > 0830]{.underline}   | > 1138]{.underline}   |
| >                     | >                     | >                     |
| > Ferrying San Luis   | > Took air accident   | > Attached to Fire    |
| > Crews (27 men) - G. | > in­vestigating team  | > No. 1172.           |
| > Jet to Fire         | > to air tanker crash | >                     |
| > Helispot #1.        | > site.               | > [1153 to            |
| >                     | >                     | > 144.5]{.underline}  |
| > [1300 to            | > [08.45]{.underline} | >                     |
| > 1320]{.underline}   | >                     | > Picked up litters   |
| >                     | > Refueled at river.  | > and flew to Heli.   |
| > Grand Junction -    | > [0915 to            | > #2 on Battlement    |
| > Grand Valley.       | > 09A5]{.underline}   | > Cr. Fire.           |
| > Loaded LA\* tank    | >                     | >                     |
| > and dropped water   | > Flew overhead crew  | > [1602 to            |
| > on spots on NW      | > over fire for       | > 1921]{.underline}   |
| > corner of fire.     | > recon­naissance.     |                       |
| >                     | >                     | Evacuation and fire   |
| > [14-30 to           | > [1000 to            | #1173 operation.      |
| > 1515]{.underline}   | > 1100]{.underline}   |                       |
| >                     | >                     |                       |
| > Was over Fire #1173 | > Hauled Mormon Lake  |                       |
| > until ordered to    | > Crew to\' Helispot  |                       |
| > Camp Helispot to    | > #2 and fer­ried Blue |                       |
| > pick up Safety      | > Jay Crew to base    |                       |
| > Officer and         | > heliport.           |                       |
| > Emergency Supplies  | >                     |                       |
| > and go to Heli. #2  | > [1200 to            |                       |
| > on top.             | > 1230]{.underline}   |                       |
| >                     | >                     |                       |
| > [1515 to            | > Returned to G. Jet. |                       |
| > 1918]{.underline}   | > For. Initial        |                       |
| >                     | > attack.             |                       |
| > Working on rescue   | >                     |                       |
| > and fire operation. | > 2415                |                       |
|                       | >                     |                       |
|                       | > Dispatched to Fire  |                       |
|                       | > #1173 - no sign of  |                       |
|                       | > emergency mission)  |                       |
|                       | >                     |                       |
|                       | > [1515 to            |                       |
|                       | > 1922]{.underline}   |                       |
|                       | >                     |                       |
|                       | > Rescue, evacuation  |                       |
|                       | > on Fire #1173.      |                       |
+-----------------------+-----------------------+-----------------------+
| > \* Special          |                       |                       |
| > helicopter tank     |                       |                       |
| > developed by Los    |                       |                       |
| > Angeles County for  |                       |                       |
| > dropping liquids.   |                       |                       |
+-----------------------+-----------------------+-----------------------+

> Aircraft communication over the fire was on FAA frequency 122.9 MHZ.
> There was no overall air management officer, but lead plane 98W
> directed air tanker operations. Coordination was accomplished through
> constant monitoring of 122.9 MHZ and USFS air net in the lead plane,
> air tankers, and large helicopters. The line boss also carried the air
> net. Aircraft were ordered through the Grand Junction Dispatch Office,
> although it has not been possible to establish firmly who determined
> priorities.
>
> Responsibility for fire heliport management was assigned to Mike
> Campbell at 0600 on July 17. He immediately moved the base heliport to
> a new location 2 miles north of the fire camp.
>
> Aircraft facility management at Grand Junction functioned
> satisfactorily under crowded conditions. The area was quite congested,
> especially when large transport aircraft arrived. The ramp operation
> was tightly controlled, and security was present. The retardant plant
> was operated by Jim McKay of USFS.
>
> In brief recapitulation, there was minimal overall aircraft
> coordination or management during this minimal overall aircraft
> coordination or management during this multiple fire complex. Even
> though ample aircraft were readily available, they were not used for
> reconnaissance or intelligence gathering on this fire the day of the
> accident, except for one flight approximately 4 hours before the
> accident. There was no tight and understood aircraft use scheduling.
> Aircraft communications, though successful, were minimal, and priority
> setting for aircraft use was not definite.

VI\. [FINDINGS]{.underline}

A.  [Mechanical Factors]{.underline}

> There were no mechanical failures that contributed to the accident.
>
> On-fire radio communication equipment was adequate.
>
> Adequate air support and line workers were available.
>
> The Mormon Lake Crew was wearing the latest Nomex fire resistant
> shirts.
>
> Fire Shelters were not used. They were not requested or supplied to
> the fire.
>
> Fire shelters might have prevented the fatalities at the refuge site.
> Additional
>
> data to confirm this has been requested from Missoula Equipment
> Development Center.
>
> Policy on issuing and carrying shelters has not been established for
> the BLM in Colorado.

B.  [Physical Factors]{.underline}

> Fire behavior was not usual and was reasonably predictable.
>
> Fire was dominating the local winds at time of accident, not vice
> versa.
>
> Fuel Condition was usual for this area because of a late spring
> freeze.
>
> The Mormon Lake burnout squad and line building squad could not see
> fire buildup below them in the draw.
>
> The fire buildup was observed by many people on the fire including the
> fire boss, line boss, adjacent sector boss, scout and aircraft crews.
> Its potential rate of spread was underestimated by them.
>
> Topography did not prevent crew movement.
>
> A steep draw on a southwest exposure and readily available fuels
> provided the conditions for rapid upslope fire movement.

C. [Human Factors]{.underline}

> [Crew]{.underline}
>
> The Mormon Lake crew was in good condition, well-disciplined, and
> morale was high. They were observed to be a highly productive crew the
> day before.
>
> Crew was specifically selected by fire boss for this assignment
> because of apparent expertise and previous day's performance.
>
> Crew boss and squad bosses were serving in those positions for the
> first year, but had worked together on 17 fires this year.
>
> The crew boss, with the sector boss and line boss, had taken an aerial
> reconnaissance flight prior to beginning burnout
>
> During burnout, crew boss and squad boss were serving as working
> members of the four-man burnout squad. No lookout was posted by the
> squad.
>
> The line-building portion of the crew was ordered to evacuate by the
> crew boss. He asked for and received confirmation that they had
> reached the preplanned safety area.
>
> Burnout squad did try to go to the same preplanned safety area but the
> fire had crossed their planned route.
>
> Burnout squad then attempted to reach their preselected safety area,
> but were blocked by the fire
>
> Better alternate escape routes over the ridge away from the fire were
> available.
>
> Burnout squad remained together, communicated their situation to the
> sector boss, and took survival precautions at direction of crew boss
> with evidence of panic.
>
> The four-man burnout squad remained together when overrun by the fire.
>
> Sometime during or immediately after the fire passed over them, two
> men of the burnout squad left their refuge site and ultimately
> perished.
>
> The remaining two men of the burnout squad stayed in place. The
> survivor stated that he remained prone while the fire passed over.

[Overhead]{.underline}

> New interagency fire suppression qualification standards have been
> established recently.
>
> The new standards have been adopted nationally by the Forest Service
> and are being pilot tested by the BLM in Montana and New Mexico.
>
> Standards applicable to this fire were the existing USDI standards,
> dated April 23, 1973.
>
> Some members of the fire management team did not meet existing USDI
> standards.
>
> Had the new interagency standards been applicable some members would
> not have been qualified for the jobs to which they were assigned.
>
> The following positions were not filled on this fire:
>
> Tractor boss, fire behavior officer, equipment officer, communication
> officer, air attack boss, and others.
>
> Sector boss and line boss relied heavily on Mormon Lake and Happy Jack
> crew boss judgment to complete the crews' assignments.
>
> The fire boss issued a strong and direct order to get out of the area
> just prior to the fire's uphill run to an individual in an adjacent
> area. This order was interpreted by the adjacent sector boss who was
> observing the situation as being directed to the Mormon Lake crew's
> sector boss. Because of this he did not issue a warning to evacuate
> that he was about to give to the Mormon Lake crew's sector boss.
>
> The crew boss was given specific instructions by the sector boss to
> move the line-building squad to the safety area.
>
> The sector boss observed what he thought was the burnout squad moving
> out to the heliport, adjacent to the safety area. He issued no
> specific instructions to move the burnout squad to safety.

D. [Management Factors]{.underline}

> Fire team had not worked together previously and were not a
> pre-organized project fire team.
>
> The interagency nature of the fire management team was not a problem.
>
> The plans and service organization was assembled at fire camp
> approximately 24 hours prior to the accident.
>
> There was an absence of key support positions in the plans and service
> function which resulted in members of team doing other duties which
> detracted from their primary assignment.
>
> A central point of ordering and follow-up at the fire was not
> established.
>
> Work assignments and instructions were verbally communicated to crew
> boss by fire boss, line boss, and sector boss.
>
> Maps and written instructions were not used in briefings or
> distributed.
>
> Mormon Lake crew did not get to line until approximately 1030 due to
> planned helicopter not arriving when anticipated.
>
> Weather intelligence was not formally and regularly gathered on the
> fire. Spot forecasts were not made until Sunday.
>
> Previous day's fire behavior should have alerted the fire organization
> as to the probable fire behavior and served as a background and clue
> to alternate escape routes, suppression action, etc.
>
> There was no aerial reconnaissance by the fire team between 1100 and
> 1500, July 17, 1976.
>
> There was no intelligence requested nor given from aircraft over the
> fire, although aircraft were present most of the time.
>
> The July 17, burnout operations of Happy Jack and Mormon Lake crews
> were not tightly coordinated and controlled in the plans for the day
> or during execution by the line boss and fire boss.
>
> Burnout at bottom of draw moved slowly at first but accelerated up the
> steep slopes and cut off the Mormon lake squad and then overran them.
>
> Various overhead were aware of the position of the burnout squad's
> activity, but the individual crews were not aware of each others
> position or activity.
>
> No formal lookout with communications was posted for the burnout
> squad.
>
> Rescue effort was prompt and professional and effective.
>
> This accident was not caused by any single factor, rather by several
> contributing factors. There is no evidence of individual misconduct.
>
> APPENDIX

[COPY]{.underline}

Memorandum

To: BLM D-BIFC

July 28, 1976

From: Director

Subject: Investigation and Report of Battlement creek Fire Fatalities
and Injuries

You are hereby designated as the Bureau's representative and co-chairman
of a fact-finding team charged with determining the conditions and
circumstances that led to the recent fatalities and injuries on the
Battlement Creek Fire near Grand Valley, Colorado. Concurrently with
your assignment, Mr. R. Max Peterson, U.S. Forest Service, is being
designated as the other co-chairman.

Once the fact-finding team has completed its study and appraisal, both
co-chairmen are to forward duplicate detailed reports of findings and
recommendations to their respective headquarters offices (Director, BLM,
and Chief, U.S. Forest Service) by August 10, 1975. Since release of
these reports will be made solely and jointly by the headquarters
offices, no other releases of your report are authorized at this time.

/s/ George L. Turcott

GEORGE L. TURCOTT

Associate Director

Cc:

Director, Fire Management, USFS

State Director, Colorado

> UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE

FOREST SERVICE

WO

COPY

\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

*REPLY TO:* 6730 Accident Investigation July 30, 1976

*SUBJECT:* Investigation and Report of Battlement Creek Fire

Fatalities and Injuries

*TO:* R. Max Peterson

Deputy Chief

> You are hereby designated as the Agency's representative and
> co-chairman of a fact finding team charged with determining the
> conditions and circumstances that led to the recent fatalities and
> injuries on the Battlement Creek Fire near Grand Valley, Colorado.
> Concurrently with your assignment, Mr. Jack Wilson, Bureau of Land
> Management, is being designated as the other co-chairman.
>
> Once the fact finding team has completed its study and appraisal, both
> co-chairmen are to forward duplicate detailed reports of findings and
> recommendations to their respective headquarters offices (Chief,
> Forest Service, and Director, BLM) by August 10, 1976. Since release
> of these reports will be made solely and jointly by the headquarters
> offices, no other releases of your report are authorized at this time.
>
> /s/ John R. McGuire
>
> JOHN R. McGUIRE
>
> Chief
>
> cc:
>
> Director, Fire Management
>
> Director, BLM

Halsem -- F.B.

Bartlett -- D.C. Maps and Records:

Engle, Dave -- S.C.

BATTLEMENT CREEK FIRE

[Fire #1173]{.underline}

Friday -- July 16, 1976

[Evening Shift:]{.underline}

[Line Boss \-\-- Rick Vincent]{.underline}

[Division A.]{.underline}

[Sector #1]{.underline} 2 Sector Bosses

[Sector Boss Green]{.underline}

Carson Hotshots (Road)

Santa Fe Hotshots

Pan Ams

[Sector Boss Sexton]{.underline}

S R V #70 (Catline)

S R V \# 2

S R V #39

S R V #30 (Bob Clark)

These crews will leave fire camp at 1900 hrs. and will be bussed to the
bottom of Div. I. Tools will consist of ½ shovels and ½ Pulaskis. In
addition each crew will be equipped with 1 chain saw and 1 radio per
crew.

[Division B.]{.underline}

[Sector #1]{.underline}

This crew will leave camp at 1900 and be transported to the T. V.
antenna site area where they will walk into the area immediately east of
the ridgetop. The crew will be equipped with 1 chain saw and one radio.

All overhead will have a radio. Crew members will be reminded of safety
precautions related to working in steep terrain at night, keep men
spaced out, watch for rolling rocks, etc.

BATTLEMENT CREEK FIRE

FIRE #1173

[SATURDAY, JULY 17, 1976]{.underline}

[Dayshift:]{.underline}

Fire Boss............................Jack Haslem

Line Boss...........................Walt Smith

Plans Chief..........................Bill Bartlett

Service Chief........................Dave Engle

Safety Officer.......................Jon Bellar

[Sector #1]{.underline}

Sector Boss...........................Putnam

Sawtooth IR Crew:

> Crew will construct hand line from road and tie in black on northwest
> corner. Bulldozers will be used where possible.
>
> [Sector #2]{.underline}
>
> Sector Boss............................Sexton
>
> Happy Jack Hotshots and Grand Junction E.F.F.
>
> These crews will mop up along Catline and road. Unburned areas will be
> burned out upon command.
>
> [Sector #3]{.underline}
>
> Sector Boss.........................Coleman
>
> Mormon Lake Crew
>
> This crew will be helicoptered to the top and will burn out along line
> in order to strengthen line. Crew will move into black area when
> unburned draw is fired from below.

INDIVIDUAL FIRE REPORT

BRIEF OF EVENTS AND PRESS RELEASE PREPARED BY INVESTIGATION TEAM

PRESS RELEASE

BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT

Grand Junction, July 21, 1976

The following brief is the first reconstruction of the sequence of
events leading to the death of 3 crew men and 1 injury at the 880-acre
Battlement Creek fire. This fire on National Resource land under Bureau
of Land Management (BLM) jurisdiction was 5 miles west of Grand Valley,
Colorado. All 4 men were members of the Mormon lake Hotshots Crew
assigned to the Coconino National Forest, Flagstaff, Arizona.

A 7-man team under the co-chairmanship of jack Wilson, Chief, Boise
Interagency Fire Center, (BLM), and Max Peterson, Deputy Chief, Forest
Service, (FS), has been interviewing personnel who were in the area
prior, during, or following the catastrophe and have also made an
on-site review of the burned area and accident site.

The team is continuing to reconstruct events during the time of the
tragedy and this is their most accurate assessment of the facts at this
time.

BRIEF

On Saturday, July 17, at about 2:45 PM, a 4-man burnout crew from the
Mormon Lake Hotshot Crew, Coconino National Forest, (NF), whose planned
route of escape was suddenly cut off by flames were overrun by the fire
burning rapidly up a steep draw. Three men died at the scene, and one
was evacuated by helicopter and is in fair condition in the Albuquerque
Burn center. The dead men were identified as:

Anthony "Tony" Czak, 25, 643 Campus Heights, Flagstaff, Arizona

Scott L. Nelson, 22, 1505 5^th^ Avenue, Bloomer, Wisconsin

Stephen H. Furey, 23, P.O. Box 1127, Salmon, Idaho.

The accident occurred on the Battlement Creek Fire which started from an
undetermined cause 45 miles east of Grand Junction near Grand Valley,
Colorado. The fire started on private lands and burned on to national
Resource Lands managed by the Bureau of Land Management, (BLM).
Immediately following the accident, an Interagency Investigation team
was convened and has been on the scene reconstructing the events which
follow:

The Battlement Creek Fire was one of several fires in the area, and was
first attacked with aerial retardant from planes based at Grand
Junction. This was supplemented by Garfield County, BLM, and Forest
Service crews and equipment. When these initial efforts failed to
contain the fire, a fire team was assembled made up of BLM and USFS
personnel. The team was headed by Jack Haslem, Grand Junction, Colorado,
an experienced BLM Fire Boss. Additional crews and equipment were
obtained, totaling approximately 300 men, aerial tankers, dozers,
helicopters, and other equipment. One of the crews was the specially
trained 20-man Mormon Lake Hotshots Crew from the Coconino NF at
Flagstaff, Arizona.

The crew worked on the fire on Friday, July 16, burning out the critical
southeast corner of the fire.

On Saturday, July 17, the crew was transported by helicopter to a rocky
ridge to burn out a hand line that had been constructed the night
before. The Crew Boss, Tony Czak, flew the area by helicopter with the
Sector Boss prior to commencing work at approximately 11 a.m. The Crew
Boss assigned fourteen members of the crew under the supervision of
Squad Boss Don Kimball to widen the hand line. He assigned John Gibson,
the other Squad Boss and two crewmen to burn along the hand line to
provide a barrier to the main fire. Two members of the crew were
stationed above the burnout crew on the rocky ridge.

The Crew Boss ordered Kimball and his portion of the crew out of the
area and into a previously burned area while he and the burnout crew
remained to complete the remaining distance of about 200 yards. They
intended to follow Kimball and the balance of the crew as the burnout
was to be completed in a few minutes.

A fast-moving finger of the fire moved up a steep slope, out of their
view, and cut off their planned route of escape. Czak notified both his
Sector Boss and Squad Boss that he was cut off and unable to follow the
balance of his crew. The four men retreated up the ridge along the
burned out line looking for a safe place. When it became apparent to
them that the fire would overrun them, using survival techniques, they
removed their cruiser vests, wet themselves down with water from their
canteens, and laid face down on the ground in a depression along the
fire line.

The heat and smoke was intense as the fire passed over them, and some of
their clothing ignited. Crew Boss Czak and crewmen Nelson and Furey
perished. John Gibson survived. Sector Boss Coleman, Glenwood Springs,
Colorado, arrived approximately ten minutes after the fire passed and
found both Gibson and Furey alive. Steve Furey died at the scene in
spite of first aid, including mouth-to-mouth resuscitation by Coleman.

Immediately upon arrival at the scene, Coleman advised Fire Boss Haslem
that there were injured men and help was needed.

A helicopter with an experienced medical technician and first aid
equipment arrived at the scene within 10 minutes.

John Gibson was promptly removed to St. Mary's Hospital in Grand
Junction, and later, after initial treatment was flown to the burn unit
in Albuquerque.

The investigation will proceed in two directions:

1.  To validate what happened;

2.  To determine what factors caused the accident and what steps the
    agencies might take to prevent a recurrence in the future. It will
    require several more days to complete the fact-finding phase and
    write a report.

FOR THE PRESS:

Terms

Fire Boss -- Overall direction of the fire fighting activities

Line Boss -- Person responsible for all fire line construction

Sector Boss -- responsible to a line Boss for a portion of the line.
Supervises crew bosses.

Crew Boss -- Person in charge of a crew on the fire. (Usually 20 men).
Reports to Sector Boss

Squad Boss -- Person in charge of portion of the crew. Reports to Crew
Boss.

FOLLOWUP ACTION RELATING TO UNUSUAL FUEL CONDITIONS

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE

FOREST SERVICE

WO

\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

*REPLY TO:* 5100 Fire Management Aug 16 1976

*SUBJECT:* Extreme Fire Behavior Conditions

*TO:* Regional Foresters, region 2, 3 and 4

> The enclosed report and memorandum clearly explain an unusual fire
> behavior situation. The importance of this information became evident
> during investigation of the fatalities on the Battlement Creek Fire
> near Grand Junction, Colorado.
>
> Please assure that line officers are aware of this potential problem.
> The information should also be shared with State Foresters in the
> affected areas. All fire teams assigned to fires must be cognizant of
> this unusual situation and not count on normal fire intensities and
> rates of spread.
>
> While this matter relates particularly to frost dieback in Gambel's
> Oak, you should be alert for different conditions caused by other
> unusual events. Only through careful, thorough attention to the local
> situation can future problems be averted.
>
> JOHN R. McGUIRE
>
> Chief
>
> Enclosure
>
> Cc: Regional Foresters, R-1 thru 10

August 6, 1976

[EXTREME FIRE BEHAVIOR CONDITIONS NOW EXIST IN]{.underline}

[FROST-DAMAGED BRUSH FUELS]{.underline}

The purpose of this report is:

> 1\. To alert wildland fire management agencies in Colorado and
> adjacent states regarding the current potential for extreme rates of
> fire spread in brush stands that suffered leaf mortality, due to a
> frost, on June 14, 1976, in Colorado.
>
> 2\. To request that land managers thoroughly brief fire crews and
> overhead teams regarding any local fuel conditions that might
> accelerate rates of spread or increase fire intensities (should
> consider possible drought, insect, and disease effects in addition to
> frost-induced dieback).
>
> 3\. To provide background information on the nature of fire behavior
> conditions in frost-damaged oak stands.

On July 15, Jack Wilson, BLM Director at BIFC, made a helicopter
reconnaissance flight to evaluate frost-killed fuels on the west slope
of Colorado in the Grand Junction are (see attached July 16 memorandum
to the State Director, BLM, Colorado). On June 14, the temperature at
Grand Junction was 32 degrees F., 28 degrees F. at Rifle and probably in
the 24 degree range above 7,000 feet elevation. This frost caused
widespread mortality to the leaves of Gambel's oak. Other species
affected were snowberry, mountain mahogany, aspen, and Douglas-for. As
of late July, 50 percent or more of the Gambel's oak leaves in affected
stands were dead and retained in the shrub crowns. Shed oak leaves
contributed to a 1-2 inches littler layer on the ground.

The day of Wilson's flight, July 15, the stage was already being set to
demonstrate a significant fire behavior episode in frost-damaged
Gambel's oak. The Battlement Creek Fire, 40 miles northeast of Grand
Junction, Colorado, made major runs on the afternoons of July 15, 16 and
17. ON the afternoon of July 17, three members of an Interregional
firefighting crew were overrun and killed by a fire that burned rapidly
in frost-damaged Gambel's oak on a steep, west facing aspect. Slope
percentages in the draw immediately below the crew ranged from 50 to 75
percent.

The single most significant weather event that affected the Battlement
Creek Fire was extensive frost that occurred [one]{.underline}
[month]{.underline} [prior]{.underline} to the fire!

Fuel moisture sample on the Battlement Creek Fire were collected at 1830
on July 20 at 8800 feet on the ridge above the fire area:

  ----------------------------------- -----------------------------------
  [Sample]{.underline}                [Average Moisture Content
                                      (%)]{.underline}

  Dead oak leaves (shrub canopy)      11.4

  Leaf litter on ground               13.7

  Dead oak branches (\< ¼ inch)       12.4

  Green oak leaves                    166.5

  Living oak stems (\< ¼ inch)        193.8
  ----------------------------------- -----------------------------------

The dead oak leaves in the shrub canopy could have been at 7-8 percent
moisture content or less at the time of the fire run on Saturday, July
17.

The June frost significantly increased the amount of available fuel in
the Battlement Creek area by contributing to the dieback of the oak
leaves. One individual remarked that fire behavior conditions seemed 2-3
weeks early for this time of year.

Chemical analyses of the Gambel's oak leaves were conducted at the
Northern Forest Fire Laboratory in Missoula:

  ----------------------- ----------------------- -----------------------
                          [Green                  [Dead Leaves in
                          Leaves]{.underline}     Crown]{.underline}

  Crude fat (%)[^4]       1.60                    .52

  Total Ash               3.18                    2.50

  Low heat of combustion  7886                    7782
  (Btu/lb) ^4^                                    
  ----------------------- ----------------------- -----------------------

^The^ crude fat content, or amount of volatile waxes, oils, and resins,
was quite low in Gambel's oak. Much lower than the 8-12 percent reported
for southern California chaparral. Therefore, the significant fire
behavior fact was the great increase in amount of available fuel in the
Gambel's oak crowns due to frost damage. Fuel chemistry did not play the
important role on the west slope of Colorado that it does in California.

[Chaparral Model Nomograph Results]{.underline}

Site conditions on the Battlement Creek Fire on Saturday afternoon were
run using the chaparral fuel model[^5] of the National Fire-Danger
Rating System with nomographs designed to predict fire spread,
intensity, and flame length. Two different wind speeds (15 and 25
m.p.h.) and 2 slope percents (40 and 75) were used in calculations. Dead
fuel moisture was set at 5.5 percent and live fuel moisture at 150
percent.

Nomograph results:

  -------------------------------------------- ----------------- ----------------- -----------------
  [Condition]{.underline}                      [1]{.underline}   [2]{.underline}   [3]{.underline}

  Wind speed (m.p.h.)                          15                15                25

  Slope (percent)                              40                60                75

  Effective wind (m.p.h.)                      17                18                29

  Reaction intensity (B.t.u. /sec./ Ft.^2^ )   12,000            12,000            12,000

  Rate of spread (ch./hr.)                     110               125               240

  Flame length (ft.)                           20-30             20-30             30-40

  Fireline intensity (B.t.u./sec./ft.)         5,500             6,000             12,000

  Time to go ½ mile (min.)                     24                21                11

  Time to go ¾ mile (min.)                     36                32                16.5
  -------------------------------------------- ----------------- ----------------- -----------------

Conditions 1, 2, and 3 represent the lower slope, mid-slope, and the
upper portion of steep chute, respectively, Condition 3 also is
characterized by a 25 M.P.H. wind speed to reflect probable peak gusts.
Conditions 1, 2, and 3 show the fire traveling ½ mile in 11-26 minutes.
In reconstructing actual fire spread from photographs and observations,
it appears that the fire traveled the last 1,800 feet to the ridgeline
in about 15 minutes or well within the range of modeled conditions. In
terms of fireline intensity, 100 B.t.u./sec./ft. of fireline is about at
the upper limit for control by hand crews and 500-700 B.t.u./sec./ft.
for direct control of a fire by any forces. Fireline intensities for
cases 1, 2, and 3 were 5,500, 6,000, and 12,000 B.t.u./sec./ft.,
respectively, or absolutely uncontrollable.

> [Fire Behavior Summary]{.underline}

A rather typical weather patter, steep mountain terrain, and
frost-induced dieback in Gambel's oak established conditions for high
rates of fire spread in the Battlement Creek drainage during afternoon
hours. For these reasons there might be a tendency to equate the
battlement Creek Fire with a southern California brush fire, but such
was not quite the case. Precipitation amounts were near normal for this
time of year, humidities were not usually low, and wind velocities
generally fell far short of Santa Ana conditions. Green fuel moistures
for oak leaves and stems were 166 percent and 194 percent, respectively,
well above the 60 percent moisture contents recorded for
drought-stressed chaparral in California. Nevertheless, dead oak leaves
on the ground and in the crowns, abundant fine dead branches in the oak
and mountain mahogany crowns, the dense arrangement of 6-12 foot shrubs,
and slopes ranging from 50 to 75 percent provided all the potential
necessary for a fast spreading, high intensity fire.

A prophetic report prepared by the Colorado State Forest Service[^6]
described a "fuel type X" that supports high-to-severe wildfire hazards.
(This report should be required reading for all fire management agencies
in Colorado.) These primarily oak brush fuels "are dense, high brush 1 ½
to 10 feet in height. Small scattered patches of conifer or deciduous
tress or scattered individual trees may also exist but are of minor
effect and occurrence. The fuels are continuous or nearly so. Despite
heavy shading, the ground is seldom damp. Flammability may vary markedly
in the year due to changes in fuel moisture and leaf fall. Fire seldom
kills these species. Many re-sprout after fires with more stems
resulting in more numerous, thin-stemmed fuels than before."

Burning characteristics are described as becoming "extra hazardous
during special times of the year. The critical time of year varies with
the species. For example, oak brush is very difficult to burn when the
leaves are green, *but when its leaves are brown and still hanging on
the branches, it becomes one of Colorado's most flammable fuels* for 2
to 3 weeks in autumn." The key point here is that these highly flammable
autumn conditions in oak brush existed in the Battlement creek drainage
in *mid-July* due to the June 4 frost!

The report clearly described many of the events observed in the
Battlement Creek Fire:

> "The "X" fuels support medium to high intensity fires, short-range
> spot fires are common, rate of spread is moderate to fast, flare-ups
> brief but common and hot, just-burned area is tenable by humans within
> about ¼ hour, the fire front is impassable. Brush fires seldom burn
> throughout the night and into the next day if suppression action is
> made.
>
> These areas are of state interest due to the associated burning
> characteristics, the difficulty of fire suppression and the resultant
> dangers to life and property during special times. By their very
> nature "X" fuels often create a false sense of security due to their
> lush greenness and sometimes non-flammable periods. Many people find
> it impossible to believe the potential flammability until they witness
> burning in critical periods. Its (oak brush) rate of fire spread has
> been observed and timed to be an incredible 16 acres per minute,
> steady for 3 hours, in Colorado! Fast running mule deer have been
> found dead in oak brush burns---unable to outrun the fire's spread.
> Brush fires are very sensitive to wind direction. Property and lives
> considered safe on a flank can be quickly threatened within minutes by
> a wind shift."
>
> So Colorado oak brush need not be compared to California chaparral
> fuel types. Under the July conditions of frost-induced dieback in
> Gambel's oak in Battlement Creek, the oak stands on its own as a most
> potent fuel type!
>
> Robert W. Mutch
>
> Research Forester Intermountain Forest and Range Experiment Station

United States Department of the Interior

BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT

Boise Interagency Fire Center

3905 Vista Avenue

Boise, Idaho 83705

July 16, 1976

Memorandum

To: State Director, Colorado

From: BLM Director-BIFC

Subject: Evaluation of Fuels on the West Slope of Colorado

Subject to your request, I flew to your West Slope Fire Center at Grand
Junction on July 14. There I met Byron Kropf and Doug Gregory of the
Colorado State Office and Roy Johnson of the Grand Junction District. On
July 15, Byron and I flew extensive areas by helicopter after having
determined these were probably the more critical areas based on a fixed
wing flight on July 14.

The imminent problem is caused by the fact that on June 14, 1976, a very
hard killing frost occurred across most of the West Slope of Colorado. A
temperature of 32 degrees was recorded at Grand Junction, and Rifle
recorded 28 degrees. In the area above 7,000 feet, this temperature
probably got down in the 24 degree range. The frost caught particularly
the oak brush at a very vulnerable early leaf and bud stage. Above the
10,000 foot elevation, it appears the aspen was also heavily damaged.
Above 8,500 feet, there is evidence of damage to the snowberry and
mahogany.

The following details are essentially the observations that were made on
the July 15 helicopter flight.

The helicopter flight took us southwest of Grand Junction to an area of
a prior fire, "Granite Creek." We landed at the 8,000 foot level and
examined the oak brush and snowberry stands. It appeared that 25 to 30
percent of the oak brush had been severely affected. On an individual
plant basis, most of the secondary and tertiary branches were dead. The
leaves were desiccated, and 90 percent had fallen to the ground. There
was perhaps a two-inch ground cover in the thicker areas where the
leaves had shed. Perhaps ten percent of the snowberry had been nipped
and their leaves were like parchment. We dug into the oak root system
and even the smaller feeder roots appeared to be alive. The 7,500 foot
elevation seemed to be a critical level. The damaged areas exhibited no
particular pattern in this area but did seem to follow typical drainage
flow channels. Pinon juniper exhibited a fairly solid canopy and was
fairly dry for this time of year.

We then proceeded east of Gateway to the south of Montrose into the
Powderhorn area. Here the frost damage was much more severe. Up to 80
percent of the area appeared affected. In this area generally, the oak
leaves had not fallen from the trees. Time precluded spending much tine
in this area and we did not land, but I expect the individual plant
situation would be similar to the Granite creek fire area except that
there may be some mortality in the primary stalks.

We then flew northward to an area perhaps 35 miles north of the Gunnison
Gorge and proceeded westward into Grand Junction, flying south over
Rifle and over the Bookcliffs area. The area around Rifle appears to be
damaged at about the 50 percent level. I would like to have gotten into
the Douglas Pass area since there appeared to be considerable damage in
that area.

There is a large area between 7,500 feet and 9,500 feet north of the
Gunnison Gorge that is affected but of probably more concern to the
Bureau of Land Management is the apparent damage to the lodgepole pine
in draws feeing into the Gunnison Canyon Reservoir. Damage appears
extensive on both sides of the reservoir and is either a very serious
beetle infestation or a frost desiccation. While I expect this might be
the "gray forest" stage in lodgepole pine, it needs to be field examined
to determine if, in fact, these trees are dying ad if so, then the field
problem is greatly magnified.

Upon returning to Grand Junction, I made some cursory analysis of the
long range situation. Most of the West Slope had a very mild winter. Two
large April storms brought substantial moisture to the area and the
Palmer Drought Index indicates very near to the normal range. Since May
the area has had very limited moisture but this is not too abnormal.
However, computer runs of the AFFIRMS program are showing some
interesting comparisons. Comparative runs of the ignition index (which
is a pretty good one for light fuels) shows readings that are
consistently worse than those that have been recorded in the past. The
same kind of comparisons for energy release indexes were indicating
about the same thing.

From a fire standpoint, the West Slope Fire Center has been responding
to about three times the normal number of fires, and in the 6,000 plus
elevations, they have had difficulty with spotting in fairly sparse
pinon juniper stands. At this time they have not yet had a fire in the
oak brush areas.

The State Office has caused a fair buildup in the initial attack
capability with the view of getting the fires early. The basic strategy
of the initial attack complement has been very effective so far. To date
the initial attack crews have done an excellent job in coping with the
overload fire situation.

[Summary and Conclusions:]{.underline}

1.  The West Slope of Colorado was subjected to an abnormal hard frost
    on June 14, 1976. It caught particularly the oak brush at a very
    vulnerable stage and has affected snowberry and mountain mahogany in
    the higher elevations.

2.  Nature has provided an exceptionally rigorous pruning job to most of
    the affected plans. My cursory estimate on an individual plant basis
    is that, where affected, about 40 percent of the plant is damaged.
    In some areas the leaves have fallen to the ground; in other areas,
    this has not occurred. As long as the fuel is in the air, it is more
    dangerous from the ladder effect, but when it falls to the ground
    there is a dangerous ground cover.

3.  Much of the heavier fuels on BLM lands, pinon juniper in particular,
    are already dry. It is running about a month ahead of normal. The
    "pinon smell," which is an indicator of flashiness, has already been
    noted and, in fact, has been causing spot fires that normally should
    not occur in fairly sparse stands.

4.  The West Slope of the Colorado is facing a very dangerous fire
    situation because of the extra volume of fuel and the drying
    conditions and the possibility for ladder effect, particularly in
    the oak brush areas. My sampling was of necessity very spotty and
    cursory and I could not assess potential wildlife or grazing
    implications but there is a very dangerous fire situation developing
    because of the added fuel load.

5.  Of vital interest and concern to BLM but not a direct responsibility
    is the vast area of bug killed spruce and lodgepole now compounded
    by damage too the aspen and mountain brush encompassed a large area
    bounded roughly by a triangle involving Meeker, Kremmling and Delta
    and including the Gunnison River drainage. This would involve parts
    of the Routt, White River, and Uncompagre National Forests.

6.  From a suppression standpoint, there is in place a reasonably strong
    initial attack force at Grand Junction. It is essentially, however,
    a "loaner" organization made up of USFS smoke jumpers, BIFC
    personnel and aircraft, and Alamosa crew. There should be a regular
    complement to staff and manage this complex operation, particularly
    the air operation. A critical point to remember is that the worst of
    the fire season is yet to come. There is going to be a normal and
    continuing operation for the next few years and this force, in my
    view, is perhaps conservative. They may be faced with added fuel
    loading for several years which might need augmented support.

7.  For this particular season, I would recommend that any fire that
    exceeds 50 acres in oak brush fuels is a potential project fire and
    assistance should be requested for any fires that exceed this
    limitation when containment has not been achieved by initial attack.

Cc:

Mr. Max Peterson

USFS-USDA

Programs and Legislation

Washington, D.D.

WO 440

[^1]: Samples were not frozen. Escape of volatiles might tend to make
    these values low.

[^2]: Fire-Danger Rating System fuel model B was selected because it
    came closest to representing oak brush conditions on the Battlement
    Creek fire.

[^3]: Guidelines and Criteria for Wildfire hazard Areas, September 1974,
    Colorado State Forest Service, Fort Collins, Colorado.

[^4]: Samples were not frozen. Escape of volatiles might tend to make
    these values low.

[^5]: Fire-Danger Rating System fuel model B was selected because it
    came closest to representing oak brush conditions on the Battlement
    Creek fire.

[^6]: Guidelines and Criteria for Wildfire hazard Areas, September 1974,
    Colorado State Forest Service, Fort Collins, Colorado.