FCC 06-47

Released: April 12, 2006

**AUCTION OF ADVANCED WIRELESS SERVICES LICENSES**

**SCHEDULED FOR JUNE 29, 2006**

**Notice and Filing Requirements, Minimum Opening Bids, Upfront Payments
and Other Procedures for Auction No. 66**

**AU Docket No. 06-30**

Report No. AUC-06-66-B (Auction No. 66)

By the Commission: Chairman Martin and Commissioner Tate issuing
separate statements; Commissioners Copps and Adelstein concurring and
issuing separate statements.

Table of Contents

Heading Paragraph \#

I. General Information 1

A. Introduction 1

1\. Background of Proceeding 7

2\. Licenses to be Auctioned 10

B. Rules and Disclaimers 13

1\. Relevant Authority 13

2\. Prohibition of Collusion; Compliance with Antitrust Laws 15

3\. Incumbency Issues 24

4\. Protection of Incumbent Government and Non-Government Operations 28

a\. International Coordination 35

b\. Quiet Zones 36

5\. Due Diligence 37

6\. Use of Integrated Spectrum Auction System 48

7\. Bidder Alerts 49

8\. National Environmental Policy Act Requirements 51

C. Auction Specifics 52

1\. Auction Date 52

2\. Auction Title 56

3\. Bidding Methodology 57

4\. Pre-Auction Dates and Deadlines 58

5\. Requirements for Participation 59

6\. General Contact Information 60

II\. short-form Application (FCC FORM 175) REQUIREMENTS 61

A. Preferences for Small Businesses and Others 65

1\. Size Standards for Bidding Credits 65

2\. Tribal Lands Bidding Credit 68

3\. Installment Payments 69

B. License Selection 70

C. Disclosure of Bidding Arrangements 71

D. Ownership Disclosure Requirements 73

E. Bidding Credit Revenue Disclosures 76

F. Provisions Regarding Former and Current Defaulters 82

G. Other Information 88

H. Minor Modifications to Short-Form Applications (FCC Form 175) 89

I. Maintaining Current Information in Short-Form Applications (FCC Form
175) 94

III\. PRE-AUCTION PROCEDURES 96

A. Auction Seminar ---April 24, 2006 96

B. Short-Form Application (FCC Form 175) --- Due Before 6:00 p.m. ET on
May 10, 2006 99

C. Application Processing and Minor Corrections 102

D. Upfront Payments --- Due June 1, 2006 104

1\. Making Auction Payments by Wire Transfer 105

2\. FCC Form 159 108

3\. Upfront Payments and Bidding Eligibility 109

4\. Applicant's Wire Transfer Information for Purposes of Refunds of
Upfront Payments 122

E. Auction Registration 123

F. Remote Electronic Bidding 127

G. Mock Auction -- June 26, 2006 129

IV\. AUCTION EVENT 130

A. Auction Structure 131

1\. Simultaneous Multiple Round Auction 131

2\. Information Available to Bidders Before and During the Auction 140

3\. Eligibility and Activity Rules 160

4\. Auction Stages 164

5\. Stage Transitions 169

6\. Activity Rule Waivers 171

7\. Auction Stopping Rules 176

8\. Auction Delay, Suspension, or Cancellation 183

B. Bidding Procedures 185

1\. Round Structure 185

2\. Reserve Price and Minimum Opening Bids 187

a\. Reserve Price 190

b\. Minimum Opening Bids 201

3\. Bid Amounts 210

a\. Minimum Acceptable Bid Amounts and Bid Increment Amounts 211

b\. Additional Bid Amounts 218

4\. Provisionally Winning Bids 220

5\. Bid Removal and Bid Withdrawal 230

6\. Round Results 240

7\. Auction Announcements 242

8\. Maintaining the Accuracy of FCC Form 175 Information 243

V. POST-AUCTION PROCEDURES 245

A. Down Payments 245

B. Final Payments 247

C. Long-Form Application (FCC Form 601) 248

D. Ownership Disclosure Information Report (FCC Form 602) 250

E. Tribal Lands Bidding Credit 251

F. Default and Disqualification 257

G. Refund of Remaining Upfront Payment Balance 260

VI\. Contacts

attachment a: licenses to Be Auctioned

Attachment b: List of Parties

ATTACHMENT C: FCC Auction Seminar Registration Form

Attachment D: Electronic and Review of the Short-Form Application (FCC
Form 175)

ATTACHMENT e: Auction-Specific Instructions for FCC Remittance Advice
(FCC Form 159)

ATTACHMENT F: Smoothing Formula Equations

ATTACHMENT G: Summary Listing of Commission and Bureau Documents
Addressing Application of the Anti-Collusion Rule

# General Information

## Introduction

1.  By this Public Notice, the Commission announces the procedures,
    minimum opening bids, and reserve price for the upcoming auction of
    Advanced Wireless Services licenses in the 1710-1755 MHz and
    2110-2155 MHz bands ("AWS-1") scheduled for June 29, 2006 (Auction
    No. 66).[^1] On January 31, 2006, in accordance with Section
    309(j)(3) of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended,[^2] the
    Wireless Telecommunications Bureau ("Bureau") released a public
    notice seeking comment on a reserve price and minimum opening bid
    amounts and the procedures to be used in Auction No. 66.[^3]
    Interested parties submitted 54 comments and 16 reply comments in
    response to the *Auction No. 66 Comment Public Notice* as well as a
    number of *ex parte* or late-filed submissions.[^4]

2.  In the *Auction No. 66 Comment Public Notice*, the Bureau proposed
    to include all 1,122 AWS‑1 licenses in a single auction using the
    Commission's standard simultaneous multiple-round ("SMR") auction
    format.[^5] At the same time, the Bureau sought comment on the
    feasibility and desirability of allocating the AWS‑1 licenses among
    two auctions, run concurrently, with one of the auctions using the
    standard SMR format and the other using the Commission's package
    bidding format ("SMR-PB").[^6] Based on the record and the
    particular circumstances of the auction of AWS-1 licenses, the
    Bureau, as described in more detail below, will include all 1,122
    AWS-1 licenses in a single auction using the Commission's standard
    SMR format, as proposed.[^7] Package bidding will not be used in
    Auction No. 66.

3.  The Bureau also proposed in the *Auction No. 66 Comment Public
    Notice* to withhold certain information on bidder interests, bids,
    and bidder identities that typically has been revealed prior to and
    during past Commission auctions.[^8] The proposal was made in
    response to analysis suggesting that under certain circumstances the
    competitiveness and economic efficiency of an SMR auction may be
    enhanced if such information is withheld until after the close of
    the auction.

4.  As discussed in detail below, taking into account concerns raised in
    the record, we have decided to modify our proposal.[^9] First,
    consistent with a suggested compromise between the proposal and our
    past practice that was the subject of extensive comment in the
    record, we will withhold certain information unless it appears that
    the auction will be sufficiently competitive that any
    anti-competitive behavior addressed by the original proposal would
    be unlikely to be successful.[^10] To gauge the likely level of
    competition in this upcoming auction, we will evaluate the level of
    prospective bidders' bidding eligibility. Specifically, if all the
    bidders' bidding eligibility, measured in bidding units (subject to
    a cap on the amount of any one bidder's eligibility) divided by all
    licenses in the auction, measured in bidding units is equal to or
    greater than three, we believe the auction will be sufficiently
    competitive.  For the purposes of determining the modified
    eligibility ratio, the bidding eligibility of any one bidder may be
    no more than 50 percent of the bidding units of all licenses in the
    auction.  If the modified eligibility ratio is three or greater, the
    likely level of competition should be sufficient to make
    anti-competitive outcomes difficult to sustain.  Second, if the
    modified eligibility ratio is less than three and, therefore,
    certain information is withheld, we will follow the original
    proposal with two changes: (1) we will release each bidder's
    eligibility and upfront payment made prior to the start of the
    auction; and (2) we will release all gross bids for each license
    (including the losing bids) after each round, but not bidder
    identities.  We believe this compromise provides bidders with
    additional information regarding license valuations without
    compromising the proposal's goal of reducing the potential for
    anti-competitive outcomes.

5.  Pursuant to these procedures, license selection information will be
    withheld, at least initially. Therefore, to enable applicants to
    comply with the Commission's anti-collusion rules, each applicant
    with a short-form application to participate in a pending auction
    will receive a letter that lists the applicants in Auction No. 66
    that have applied for licenses in any of the same geographic areas
    as the applicant, once the Bureau has conducted its initial review
    of applications to participate in Auction No. 66.[^11]

6.  Furthermore, the *Auction No. 66 Comment Public Notice* proposed an
    aggregate reserve price of \$1,029,534,343.20 for all AWS‑1 licenses
    in order to implement a Congressional mandate to recover estimated
    relocation costs for government incumbent operators in the lower
    (1710-1755 MHz) AWS‑1 spectrum band.[^12] By law, the Commission
    cannot conclude any auction of statutorily-defined eligible
    frequencies if the total cash proceeds attributable to such spectrum
    are less than 110 percent of the total estimated relocation costs of
    eligible federal entities assigned to the frequencies.[^13]  The
    lower half of the frequencies covered by AWS‑1 licenses, 1710-1755
    MHz, are eligible frequencies.[^14]  Accordingly, the Commission
    will cancel the auction if the winning bids net of applicable
    discounts at the end of bidding that are attributable to such
    spectrum are less than 110 percent of the total estimated relocation
    costs, or \$1,029,534,343.20.[^15] Given that one-half of the
    frequencies authorized for use by each license are CSEA eligible
    frequencies, one-half of each winning bid, net of any applicable
    bidding credit discounts at the end of bidding (e.g., exclusive of
    tribal lands bidding credits), will be counted toward meeting this
    reserve price. Therefore, the winning bids (net of bidding credits)
    in the auction must total at least approximately \$2.06 billion in
    order for the Commission to conclude the auction and award the
    licenses.

### Background of Proceeding 

7.  Growth in demand for mobile wireless services, coupled with the rise
    of the Internet and greater broadband availability, have increased
    the need for additional spectrum and advanced technologies capable
    of providing advanced wireless services, including wireless Internet
    access and other high-speed information and entertainment services.
    Enhancements to current wireless network technologies, as well as
    the development of new technologies, are continuing to improve and
    expand the deployment of wireless broadband.[^16] These new
    technologies are more advanced than analog cellular (first
    generation, or 1G) and digital cellular (second generation or 2G),
    and are often labeled 2.5G, 3G, 4G, and so on.[^17] Mobile telephone
    carriers have recently begun to deploy significantly faster
    broadband technologies on their mobile cellular networks, and many
    have announced plans to launch or expand these technologies further
    in the future.

8.  In order to facilitate the rapid deployment of broadband
    technologies, the Commission has allocated spectrum to meet the
    demand for advanced wireless services. In the *Second Report and
    Order* in ET Docket No. 00-258, the Commission allocated the
    1710-1755, 2110-2150 and 2150-2155 MHz bands for AWS-1 and combined
    these latter two bands into a single 45-megahertz allocation
    (*i.e*., 2110-2155 MHz).[^18] The Commission subsequently adopted
    service rules for AWS in these bands, including application,
    licensing, operating and technical rules.[^19]

9.  Making this spectrum available requires relocating incumbent
    operations, both Federal Government ("Government") and non-Federal
    Government ("non-Government"). Relocation of Government operations
    is subject to CSEA.[^20] For non-Government operations, the
    Commission's *Emerging Technologies* proceeding adopted a relocation
    policy designed to allow early entry for new technology providers
    into reallocated spectrum by allowing providers of new services to
    negotiate financial arrangements for reaccommodation of incumbent
    licensees. [^21] This policy was also designed to allow gradual
    relocation of incumbents during which, as the new entrant deployed
    individual sites throughout its geographic license area over time,
    the new entrant was obligated to relocate incumbent facilities on a
    link-by-link basis (in the case of microwave facilities), based on
    an interference analysis.

### Licenses to be Auctioned 

10. Auction No. 66 will offer 1,122 licenses: 36 Regional Economic Area
    Grouping ("REAG") licenses, 352 Economic Area ("EA") licenses, and
    734 Cellular Market Area ("CMA") licenses.[^22]

11. The following table describes the AWS-1 licenses that will be
    offered in Auction No. 66:

+-------+---------------------+--------------+-----------+-----------+
| **Bl  | **Frequency Bands** | **Total      | **G       | **No. of  |
| ock** |                     | Bandwidth**  | eographic | L         |
|       | **(MHz)**           |              | Area      | icenses** |
|       |                     |              | Type**    |           |
+-------+---------------------+--------------+-----------+-----------+
| A     | 1710-1720 /         | 20 MHz       | CMA       | 734       |
|       | 2110-2120           |              |           |           |
+-------+---------------------+--------------+-----------+-----------+
| B     | 1720-1730 /         | 20 MHz       | EA        | 176       |
|       | 2120-2130           |              |           |           |
+-------+---------------------+--------------+-----------+-----------+
| C     | 1730-1735 /         | 10 MHz       | EA        | 176       |
|       | 2130-2135           |              |           |           |
+-------+---------------------+--------------+-----------+-----------+
| D     | 1735-1740 /         | 10 MHz       | REAG      | 12        |
|       | 2135-2140           |              |           |           |
+-------+---------------------+--------------+-----------+-----------+
| E     | 1740-1745 /         | 10 MHz       | REAG      | 12        |
|       | 2140-2145           |              |           |           |
+-------+---------------------+--------------+-----------+-----------+
| F     | 1745-1755 /         | 20 MHz       | REAG      | 12        |
|       | 2145-2155           |              |           |           |
+-------+---------------------+--------------+-----------+-----------+

12. A complete list of the AWS-1 licenses available in Auction No. 66 is
    also included in Attachment A of this Public Notice.

## Rules and Disclaimers 

### Relevant Authority 

13. Prospective applicants must familiarize themselves thoroughly with
    the Commission's general competitive bidding rules set forth in
    Title 47, Part 1, of the Code of Federal Regulations, including
    recent amendments and clarifications;[^23] rules relating to the
    Advanced Wireless Services and emerging technologies contained in
    Title 47, Parts 27 and 101, of the Code of Federal Regulations; and
    rules relating to applications, practice and procedure contained in
    Title 47, Part 1, of the Code of Federal Regulations. Prospective
    applicants must also be thoroughly familiar with the procedures,
    terms and conditions (collectively, "terms") contained in this
    Public Notice and the Commission's decisions in proceedings
    regarding competitive bidding procedures, application requirements,
    and obligations of Commission licensees.[^24]

14. The terms contained in the Commission's rules, relevant orders, and
    public notices are not negotiable. The Commission may amend or
    supplement the information contained in our public notices at any
    time, and will issue public notices to convey any new or
    supplemental information to applicants. It is the responsibility of
    all applicants to remain current with all Commission rules and with
    all public notices pertaining to this auction. Copies of most
    auctions-related Commission documents, including public notices, can
    be retrieved from the FCC Auctions Internet site at
    [http://wireless.fcc.gov/auctions](http://wireless.fcc.gov/auctions/default.htm?job=auctions_home).
    Additionally, documents are available for public inspection and
    copying between 8:00 a.m. and 4:30 p.m. Eastern Time (ET) Monday
    through Thursday or 8:00 a.m. to 11:30 a.m. ET Fridays at the FCC
    Reference Information Center, 445 12th Street, SW, Room CY-A257,
    Washington, DC 20554. Documents may also be purchased from the
    Commission's duplicating contractor, Best Copy and Printing, Inc.
    ("BCPI"), 445 12th Street, SW, Room CY-B402, Washington, DC 20554,
    800-378-3160 or at
    [http://www.bcpiweb.com](http://www.bcpiweb.com/).[^25]

### Prohibition of Collusion; Compliance with Antitrust Laws

15. To ensure the competitiveness of the auction process, Section
    1.2105(c) of the Commission's rules prohibit applicants competing
    for licenses in any of the same geographic license areas from
    communicating with each other about bids, bidding strategies, or
    settlements unless such applicants have identified each other on
    their short-form applications (FCC Forms 175) as parties with whom
    they have entered into agreements pursuant to Section
    1.2105(a)(2)(viii).[^26] In Auction No. 66, the rule would apply to
    any applicants bidding for the same CMA, EA, or REAG. The rule would
    also apply to applicants bidding for licenses in overlapping CMAs,
    EAs, and REAGs. For example, assume that one applicant applies for
    an REAG and a second applicant applies for an EA covering any area
    within that REAG. The two entities will have applied for licenses
    covering the same geographic areas and would be precluded from
    communicating with each other under the rule. In addition, the rule
    would preclude applicants that apply to bid for all markets from
    communicating with all other applicants. Thus, applicants that have
    applied for the same markets (unless they have identified each other
    on their FCC Form 175 applications as parties with whom they have
    entered into agreements under Section 1.2105(a)(2)(viii)) must
    affirmatively avoid all communications with or disclosures to each
    other that affect or have the potential to affect bids or bidding
    strategy, which may include communications regarding the
    post-auction market structure.[^27] This prohibition begins at the
    short-form application filing deadline and ends at the down payment
    deadline after the auction.[^28] **This prohibition applies to all
    applicants regardless of whether such applicants become qualified
    bidders or actually bid.**[^29] (As described in Section IV.A.2.,
    below, information concerning applicants' license selections may not
    be made public during the auction. If that occurs, the Commission
    will inform each applicant by letter of the identity of each of the
    other applicants that has applied for any of the same geographic
    areas that it has selected in its short form application.[^30])

16. For purposes of this prohibition, Section 1.2105(c)(7)(i) defines
    "applicant" as including all officers and directors of the entity
    submitting a short-form application to participate in the auction,
    all controlling interests of that entity, as well as all holders of
    partnership and other ownership interests and any stock interest
    amounting to 10 percent or more of the entity, or outstanding stock,
    or outstanding voting stock of the entity submitting a short-form
    application.[^31]

17. Applicants for licenses for any of the same geographic license areas
    must not communicate directly or indirectly about bids or bidding
    strategy.[^32] Accordingly, such applicants are encouraged not to
    use the same individual as an authorized bidder. A violation of the
    anti‑collusion rule could occur if an individual acts as the
    authorized bidder for two or more applicants, and conveys
    information concerning the substance of bids or bidding strategies
    between such applicants. Also, if the authorized bidders are
    different individuals employed by the same organization (*e.g.,* law
    firm or engineering firm or consulting firm), a violation similarly
    could occur.[^33] In such a case, at a minimum, applicants should
    certify on their applications that precautionary steps have been
    taken to prevent communication between authorized bidders and that
    applicants and their bidding agents will comply with the
    anti‑collusion rule.[^34] A violation of the anti-collusion rule
    could occur in other contexts, such as an individual serving as an
    officer for two or more applicants.[^35] Moreover, the Commission
    has found a violation of the anti-collusion rule where a bidder used
    the Commission's bidding system to disclose "its bidding strategy in
    a manner that explicitly invited other auction participants to
    cooperate and collaborate in specific markets,"[^36] and has placed
    auction participants on notice that the use of its bidding system
    "to disclose market information to competitors will not be tolerated
    and will subject bidders to sanctions."[^37] Bidders are cautioned
    that the Commission remains vigilant about prohibited communications
    taking place in other situations. For example, the Commission has
    warned that prohibited "communications concerning bids and bidding
    strategies may include communications regarding capital calls or
    requests for additional funds in support of bids or bidding
    strategies to the extent such communications convey information
    concerning the bids and bidding strategies directly or
    indirectly."[^38] Auction participants are hereby placed on notice
    that public disclosure of information relating to bidder interests,
    bids and bidder identities that typically has been revealed prior to
    and during past Commission auctions may violate the anti-collusion
    rule.[^39] Bidders should use caution in their dealings with other
    parties, such as members of the press, financial analysts, or others
    who might become a conduit for the communication of prohibited
    bidding information.

18. The Commission's rules do not prohibit applicants from entering into
    otherwise lawful bidding agreements before filing their short-form
    applications, as long as they disclose the existence of the
    agreement(s) in their short-form application.[^40] If parties agree
    in principle on all material terms prior to the short-form filing
    deadline, each party to the agreement must identify the other party
    or parties to the agreement on its short-form application under
    Section 1.2105(c), even if the agreement has not been reduced to
    writing. If the parties have not agreed in principle by the
    short-form filing deadline, they should not include the names of
    parties to discussions on their applications, and they may not
    continue negotiations, discussions or communications with any other
    applicants after the short-form filing deadline.[^41]

19. By electronically submitting its short-form application, each
    applicant certifies its compliance with Section 1.2105(c). However,
    we caution that merely filing a certifying statement as part of an
    application will not outweigh specific evidence that collusive
    behavior has occurred, nor will it preclude the initiation of an
    investigation when warranted.[^42] The Commission has stated that it
    "intend\[s\] to scrutinize carefully any instances in which bidding
    patterns suggest that collusion may be occurring."[^43] Any
    applicant found to have violated the anti-collusion rule may be
    subject to sanctions.[^44]

20. **Applicants are also reminded that, regardless of compliance with
    the Commission's rules, they remain subject to the antitrust laws,
    which are designed to prevent anticompetitive behavior in the
    marketplace.** [^45] **Compliance with the disclosure requirements
    of the Commission's anti-collusion rule will not insulate a party
    from enforcement of the antitrust laws.**[^46] For instance, a
    violation of the antitrust laws could arise out of actions taking
    place well before any party submits a short form application.[^47]
    The Commission has cited a number of examples of potentially
    anticompetitive actions that would be prohibited under antitrust
    laws: for example, actual or potential competitors may not agree to
    divide territories horizontally in order to minimize competition,
    regardless of whether they split a market in which they both do
    business, or whether they merely reserve one market for one and
    another for the other.[^48] Similarly, the Bureau has long reminded
    potential applicants and others that "\[e\]ven where the applicant
    discloses parties with whom it has reached an agreement on the
    short-form application, thereby permitting discussions with those
    parties, the applicant is nevertheless subject to existing antitrust
    laws."[^49] To the extent the Commission becomes aware of specific
    allegations that may give rise to violations of the federal
    antitrust laws, the Commission may refer such allegations to the
    United States Department of Justice for investigation.[^50] If an
    applicant is found to have violated the antitrust laws or the
    Commission's rules in connection with its participation in the
    competitive bidding process, it may be subject to forfeiture of its
    upfront payment, down payment, or full bid amount and may be
    prohibited from participating in future auctions, among other
    sanctions.[^51]

21. Section 1.65 of the Commission's rules requires an applicant to
    maintain the accuracy and completeness of information furnished in
    its pending application and to notify the Commission within 30 days
    of any substantial change that may be of decisional significance to
    that application.[^52] Thus, Section 1.65 requires an auction
    applicant to notify the Commission of any substantial change to the
    information or certifications included in its pending short-form
    application. Applicants are therefore required by Section 1.65 to
    report to the Commission any communications they have made to or
    received from another applicant after the short-form filing deadline
    that affect or have the potential to affect bids or bidding strategy
    unless such communications are made to or received from parties to
    agreements identified under Section 1.2105(a)(2)(viii). In addition,
    Section 1.2105(c)(6) provides that any applicant that makes or
    receives a communication prohibited by Section 1.2105(c) must report
    such communication to the Commission in writing immediately, and in
    no case later than five business days after the communication
    occurs.[^53]

22. Applicants that are winning bidders will be required to disclose in
    their long-form applications the specific terms, conditions, and
    parties involved in all bidding consortia, joint ventures,
    partnerships, and other arrangements entered into relating to the
    competitive bidding process.[^54]

23. A summary listing of documents issued by the Commission and the
    Bureau addressing the application of the anti-collusion rule may be
    found in Attachment G. These documents are available on the
    Commission's auction anti-collusion web page.[^55]

### Incumbency Issues 

24. The AWS-1 bands are now being used for a variety of Government and
    non-Government services. The 1710-1755 MHz band is currently a
    Government band.[^56] The 2110-2150 MHz band is used by private
    (including state and local governmental public safety services) and
    common carrier fixed microwave services.[^57] The 2150-2155 MHz band
    is currently used by the Broadband Radio Service ("BRS").[^58]

25. *[Relocation of Government Incumbents; Spectrum Relocation
    Fund]{.underline}*. The 1710-1755 MHz spectrum is covered by a
    Congressional mandate that requires that auction proceeds fund the
    estimated relocation costs of incumbent federal entities.[^59]
    Specifically, the CSEA established a Spectrum Relocation Fund
    ("SRF"), to which the cash proceeds attributable to "eligible
    frequencies" in the AWS-1 license auction will be deposited.[^60]

26. CSEA also prohibits the Commission from concluding any auction of
    eligible frequencies if the total cash proceeds attributable to such
    spectrum are less than 110 percent of the estimated relocation costs
    provided to the Commission by the National Telecommunications and
    Information Administration ("NTIA").[^61] NTIA has collected
    estimates of the relocation costs for the "eligible frequencies" in
    the AWS‑1 band. On December 27, 2005, pursuant to CSEA, NTIA
    notified the Commission of the estimated relocation costs and
    timelines for relocation of eligible federal entities assigned to
    frequencies from 1710 to 1755 MHz.[^62] NTIA reported that the total
    estimated relocation costs equal \$935,940,312. More information is
    available at
    <http://www.ntia.doc.gov/osmhome/reports/specrelo/index.htm>.

27. *[Relocation of Non-Government Incumbents]{.underline}*. The
    Commission is in the process of determining how to apply the
    policies adopted in the *Emerging Technologies* proceeding[^63] to
    the relocation of incumbent fixed microwave and BRS licensees in the
    2110-2150 and 2150-2155 MHz bands, respectively. In the *Fifth
    Notice of Proposed Rule Making* ("*AWS Fifth Notice*") in ET Docket
    No. 00-258, the Commission is seeking comment on the specific
    relocation and cost-sharing procedures applicable to BRS operations
    in the 2150-2160/62 MHz band,[^64] which the Commission recently
    decided will be relocated to the newly restructured 2495-2690 MHz
    band. [^65] In the *AWS Fifth Notice*, the Commission is also
    seeking comment on cost-sharing obligations and procedures
    associated with relocation obligations for the 2110-2155 MHz
    band.[^66] In doing so, the *AWS Fifth Notice* also referenced the
    Commission's earlier request in the *AWS-2 Service Rules NPRM* for
    comments on the appropriate procedures for apportioning relocation
    costs among multiple AWS licensees in the 2110-2150 MHz band.[^67]
    The Commission is also currently considering petitions for
    reconsideration that raise issues concerning the conditions under
    which the 2495-2500 MHz band would be available to BRS and the
    suitability of that spectrum for BRS operations.[^68]

### Protection of Incumbent Government and Non-Government Operations

28. AWS licensees must comply with the technical and operational rules
    set forth in 47 C.F.R. §§ 27.50-27.66 and 27.1131-27.1135. The
    latter set of rules describes the procedures AWS licensees must
    follow to protect co-channel and adjacent channel incumbent
    Government and non-Government operations from interference. Such
    operations requiring protection include: Part 101
    fixed-point-to-point facilities in the 2110-2155 MHz band; BRS
    operations in the 2150-2155 MHz band; Broadcast Auxiliary Service
    ("BAS") and Cable Television Radio Service ("CARS") operations in
    the 2025-2110 MHz band; Department of Defense ("DOD") communications
    systems in the 1710-1755 MHz band at 16 protected facilities
    nationwide; non-DOD Federal Government systems operating in the
    1710-1755 MHz and 1755-1761 MHz bands; radiosonde receivers
    operating in the Meteorological Aids Service in the 1675-1700 MHz
    band; and meteorological-satellite earth receivers operating in the
    Meteorological-Satellite Service in the 1675-1710 MHz band. The
    following paragraphs generally describe procedures that AWS
    licensees must follow to protect incumbent Government and
    non-Government operations.

29. *[The 1710-1755 MHz band]{.underline}*. According to NTIA, this
    spectrum is used by the Federal Government for both military and
    non-military operations.[^69] Sixteen DOD facilities in the country
    are classified as "protected facilities," and various types of
    systems operate at these locations. AWS licensees must protect
    systems operating at these facilities from interference until such
    systems are relocated to other spectrum.[^70] These restrictions
    shall apply until such time as the relocation of the Federal systems
    has been completed, and indefinitely in the case of systems at the
    Yuma, Arizona, and Cherry Point, North Carolina, locations.[^71]
    Furthermore, AWS licensees will be required to accept any
    interference received from operations at the 16 facilities. Such
    interference could occur at large distances outside the facilities'
    operating radii due to airborne operations within the radii.

30. The CSEA permits the Commission to grant commercial licenses in
    these bands prior to relocation of federal government operations and
    the termination of a federal entity's authorization.[^72] Until such
    time as the Government licensees have relocated to other spectrum,
    or NTIA de-authorizes an operation pursuant to CSEA, AWS operators
    shall be required to protect non-DOD Government systems operating in
    the 1710-1755 and 1755-1761 MHz bands in accordance with the
    provisions set forth in Section 27.1134(b) of the Commission's
    rules.[^73] Information on the locations of these stations can be
    found at
    <http://www.ntia.doc.gov/osmhome/reports/specrelo/index.htm>. Points
    of contact for the government agencies involved can be found at
    [http://www.ntia.doc.gov/osmhome/reports/specrelo/pdf/1710-1755MHz_points_of_contact.pdf]{.underline}.
    []{.mark}

31. AWS licensees operating fixed stations in the 1710-1755 MHz band, if
    notified that such stations are causing interference to radiosonde
    receivers operating in the Meteorological Aids Service in the
    1675--1700 MHz band or meteorological-satellite earth receivers
    operating in the Meteorological-Satellite Service in the 1675--1710
    MHz band, shall be required to modify the stations\' location and/or
    technical parameters as necessary to eliminate the
    interference.[^74]

32. *[The 2110-2155 MHz Band]{.underline}*. Fixed point-to-point
    microwave systems authorized under Part 101 of the Commission's
    rules will maintain primary status in the 2110-2150 MHz band unless
    and until an AWS or other emerging technology licensee requires use
    of the spectrum.[^75] AWS licensees are required, prior to
    initiating operations from any base or fixed station, to coordinate
    their frequency usage with co-channel and adjacent channel incumbent
    Part 101 fixed-point-to-point microwave licensees operating in the
    2110-2150 MHz band.[^76] Similarly, BRS operations in the
    2150-2160/62 MHz band will be relocated to other spectrum.[^77]
    Until that occurs, AWS licensees, prior to initiating operations
    from any base or fixed station, must coordinate their frequency
    usage with co-channel and adjacent channel incumbent BRS licensees
    operating in the 2150-2160 MHz band.[^78]

33. AWS licensees operating in the 2110-2155 MHz band must protect
    previously licensed BAS and CARS operations in the adjacent
    2025-2110 MHz band. In satisfying this requirement AWS licensees
    must, before constructing and operating any base or fixed station,
    determine the location and licensee of all BAS or CARS stations
    authorized in their area of operation, and coordinate their planned
    stations with those licensees.[^79]

34. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration ("NASA") operates
    the Deep Space Network ("DSN") in the 2110--2120 MHz band at
    Goldstone, California. NASA will continue its operations of high
    power transmitters (nominal EIRP of 105.5 dBW with EIRP up to 119.5
    dBW used under emergency conditions) in this band at this
    location.[^80] AWS licensees must accept any interference received
    from the Goldstone DSN facility in this band.[^81]

#### International Coordination

35. Operations in the 1710-1755 and 2110-2155 MHz bands must not cause
    harmful interference across the borders with Mexico and Canada.
    Until such time as agreements between the United States, Mexico and
    Canada become effective, the same technical restrictions at the
    border that are adopted for operation between geographic service
    areas will apply, to the extent they are not in violation of current
    bilateral agreements and arrangements.[^82] When interim
    arrangements or agreements between the United States, Mexico and
    Canada are final and become effective, licensees in the 1710-1755
    and 2110-2155 MHz bands must comply with these agreements. In
    addition, if these agreements are modified in the future, licensees
    in the 1710-1755 and 2110-2155 MHz bands must comply with these
    modifications.

#### Quiet Zones

36. Advanced Wireless Services licensees must protect the radio quiet
    zones set forth in the Commission's rules.[^83] Licensees are
    cautioned that they must receive the appropriate approvals directly
    from the relevant quiet zone entity prior to operating within the
    areas described in the Commission's rules.[^84]

### Due Diligence 

37. **We caution potential applicants formulating their bidding
    strategies to investigate and consider the extent to which AWS
    frequencies are occupied.** As stated above, operations in the AWS-1
    bands must be protected and/or relocated to available frequencies
    typically in higher bands or to other media. These limitations may
    restrict the ability of AWS geographic area licensees to use certain
    portions of the electromagnetic spectrum or provide service to
    certain areas in their geographic license areas. Bidders should
    become familiar with the status of these operations and relocation
    requirements, and applicable Commission rules, orders and any
    pending proceedings related to the service, in order to make
    reasoned, appropriate decisions about their participation in Auction
    No. 66 and their bidding strategy.

38. Potential bidders are reminded that they are solely responsible for
    investigating and evaluating all technical and marketplace factors
    that may have a bearing on the value of the AWS-1 licenses in this
    auction. **The FCC makes no representations or warranties about the
    use of this spectrum for particular services.** **Applicants should
    be aware that an FCC auction represents an opportunity to become an
    FCC licensee in the Advanced Wireless Services subject to certain
    conditions and regulations.** **An FCC auction does not constitute
    an endorsement by the FCC of any particular service, technology, or
    product, nor does an FCC license constitute a guarantee of business
    success.** Applicants should perform their individual due diligence
    before proceeding as they would with any new business venture.

39. Potential bidders are strongly encouraged to conduct their own
    research prior to the beginning of bidding in Auction No. 66 in
    order to determine the existence of any pending administrative or
    judicial proceedings that might affect their decision regarding
    participation in the auction. Participants in Auction No. 66 are
    strongly encouraged to continue such research throughout the
    auction. In addition, potential bidders should perform technical
    analyses sufficient to assure themselves that, should they prevail
    in competitive bidding for a specific license, they will be able to
    build and operate facilities that will fully comply with the
    Commission\'s technical and legal requirements.

40. Applicants should also be aware that certain pending and future
    proceedings, including applications (including those for
    modification), petitions for rulemaking, requests for special
    temporary authority, waiver requests, petitions to deny, petitions
    for reconsideration, informal oppositions, and applications for
    review, before the Commission may relate to particular applicants or
    incumbent licensees or the licenses available in Auction No. 66. In
    addition, pending and future judicial proceedings may relate to
    particular applicants or incumbent licensees, or the licenses
    available in Auction No. 66. Prospective bidders are responsible for
    assessing the likelihood of the various possible outcomes, and
    considering their potential impact on spectrum licenses available in
    this auction.

41. Applicants should perform due diligence to identify and consider all
    proceedings that may affect the spectrum licenses being auctioned
    and that could have an impact on the availability of spectrum for
    Auction No. 66. In addition, although the Commission may continue to
    act on various pending applications, informal objections, petitions,
    and other requests for Commission relief, some of these matters may
    not be resolved by the time of the auction.

42. **Applicants are solely responsible for identifying associated risks
    and for investigating and evaluating the degree to which such
    matters may affect their ability to bid on, otherwise acquire, or
    make use of licenses available in Auction No. 66.**

43. Applicants may obtain information about non-Federal Government
    incumbent licenses that may have an effect on availability of
    licenses in Auction No. 66 through the Bureau's licensing databases
    on the World Wide Web at <http://wireless.fcc.gov/uls>. Part 101
    fixed point-to-point microwave licenses can be identified by
    searching on the "Microwave Site-Based" service group and limiting
    the search to the frequency range 2110 MHz to 2150 MHz. Applicants
    may query the database online and download a copy of their search
    results if desired. Detailed instructions on using License Search
    (including frequency searches and the GeoSearch capability) and
    downloading query results are available online by selecting the "?"
    button at the upper right-hand corner of the License Search screen
    or by going to the Universal Licensing System ("ULS") support site
    at <http://esupport.fcc.gov/licensing.htm>. Applicants should direct
    questions regarding the ULS search capabilities to the FCC ULS
    Technical Support hotline at (877) 480-3201, option two. The hotline
    is available to assist with questions Monday through Friday, from
    8:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m. ET. In order to provide better service to the
    public, all calls to the hotline are recorded.

44. To further assist potential bidders in determining the scope of the
    new AWS entrants' relocation obligations in the 2150-2155 MHz band,
    the Commission ordered BRS licensees in the 2150-2160/62 MHz band to
    submit information on the locations and operating characteristics of
    BRS systems in that band.[^85]  That information may also be
    found on ULS at <http://wireless.fcc.gov/uls>.  To obtain the
    information, potential bidders should use the ULS Advanced
    Application Search to search for modifications filed in the BR Radio
    Service between November 30, 2005, and December 27, 2005.  Each
    application will need to be viewed to determine if it is a BRS
    Channel 1, 2/ 2A Notification.  Additionally, the Commission has
    sought Office of Management and Budget ("OMB") approval under the
    Paperwork Act of 1995 to collect additional information on the
    locations and operating characteristics of BRS systems in that
    band.[^86] If OMB approves this information collection, the
    Commission intends to give public notice announcing the deadline
    date for BRS licensees to file this additional data on ULS.

45. Information on the locations of non-DOD Government stations can be
    found at
    <http://www.ntia.doc.gov/osmhome/reports/specrelo/index.htm>; points
    of contact for the Government agencies involved can be found at
    [http://www.ntia.doc.gov/osmhome/reports/specrelo/pdf/1710-1755MHz_points_of_contact.pdf]{.underline}.

46. The Commission makes no representations or guarantees regarding the
    accuracy or completeness of information in its databases or any
    third party databases, including, for example, court docketing
    systems. To the extent the Commission's databases may not include
    all information deemed necessary or desirable by an applicant,
    applicants may obtain or verify such information from independent
    sources or assume the risk of any incompleteness or inaccuracy in
    said databases. Furthermore, the Commission makes no representations
    or guarantees regarding the accuracy or completeness of information
    that has been provided by incumbent licensees and incorporated into
    its databases.

47. Potential applicants are strongly encouraged to physically inspect
    any prospective sites located in, or near, the service area for
    which they plan to bid, and also to familiarize themselves with the
    environmental assessment obligations described below in Section
    I.B.8.

### Use of Integrated Spectrum Auction System

48. The Commission will make available a browser-based bidding system to
    allow bidders to participate in Auction No. 66 over the Internet
    using the Commission's Integrated Spectrum Auction System ("ISAS" or
    "FCC Auction System"). The Commission makes no warranty whatsoever
    with respect to the FCC Auction System. In no event shall the
    Commission, or any of its officers, employees or agents, be liable
    for any damages whatsoever (including, but not limited to, loss of
    business profits, business interruption, loss of business
    information, or any other loss) arising out of or relating to the
    existence, furnishing, functioning or use of the FCC Auction System
    that is accessible to bidders in connection with this auction.
    Moreover, no obligation or liability will arise out of the
    Commission's technical, programming or other advice or service
    provided in connection with the FCC Auction System.

### Bidder Alerts

49. As is the case with many business investment opportunities, some
    unscrupulous entrepreneurs may attempt to use Auction No. 66 to
    deceive and defraud unsuspecting investors. Common warning signals
    of fraud include the following:

-   The first contact is a "cold call" from a telemarketer, or is made
    in response to an inquiry prompted by a radio or television
    infomercial.

-   The offering materials used to invest in the venture appear to be
    targeted at IRA funds, for example, by including all documents and
    papers needed for the transfer of funds maintained in IRA accounts.

-   The amount of investment is less than \$25,000.

-   The sales representative makes verbal representations that: (a) the
    Internal Revenue Service ("IRS"), Federal Trade Commission ("FTC"),
    Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC"), FCC, or other government
    agency has approved the investment; (b) the investment is not
    subject to state or federal securities laws; or (c) the investment
    will yield unrealistically high short-term profits. In addition, the
    offering materials often include copies of actual FCC releases, or
    quotes from FCC personnel, giving the appearance of FCC knowledge or
    approval of the solicitation.

50. Information about deceptive telemarketing investment schemes is
    available from the FTC at (202) 326-2222 and from the SEC at (202)
    942-7040. Complaints about specific deceptive telemarketing
    investment schemes should be directed to the FTC, the SEC, or the
    National Fraud Information Center at (800) 876-7060. Consumers who
    have concerns about specific proposals regarding Auction No. 66 may
    also call the FCC Consumer Center at (888) CALL-FCC ((888)
    225-5322).

### National Environmental Policy Act Requirements

51. Licensees must comply with the Commission's rules regarding
    implementation of the National Environmental Policy Act
    ("NEPA").[^87] The construction of a wireless antenna facility is a
    federal action and the licensee must comply with the Commission's
    NEPA rules for each such facility.[^88] The Commission's NEPA rules
    require, among other things, that the licensee consult with expert
    agencies having NEPA responsibilities, including the U.S. Fish and
    Wildlife Service, the State Historic Preservation Office, the Army
    Corps of Engineers and the Federal Emergency Management Agency
    (through the local authority with jurisdiction over floodplains). In
    assessing the effect of facilities construction on historic
    properties, the licensee must follow the provisions of the
    Nationwide Programmatic Agreement Regarding the Section 106 National
    Historic Preservation Act Review Process.[^89] The licensee must
    prepare environmental assessments for facilities that may have a
    significant impact in or on wilderness areas, wildlife preserves,
    threatened or endangered species or designated critical habitats,
    historical or archaeological sites, Indian religious sites,
    floodplains, and surface features. The licensee also must prepare
    environmental assessments for facilities that include high intensity
    white lights in residential neighborhoods or excessive radio
    frequency emission.

## Auction Specifics

### Auction Date

52. Bidding in Auction No. 66 will begin on Thursday, June 29, 2006, as
    announced in the *Auction No. 66 Comment Public Notice*.[^90] The
    initial schedule for bidding will be announced by public notice at
    least one week before the start of the auction.

53. Several commenters addressed the date on which bidding in Auction
    No. 66 will commence. Generally, commenters expressed support for
    commencing the auction on June 29, 2006.[^91] In its support for
    keeping to that start date, T-Mobile noted that the date coincides
    with the schedule outlined by CSEA.[^92] A few commenters, however,
    expressed concern about the start date. For example, MetroPCS and
    Columbia Capital/MC Ventures suggested additional time may be needed
    if the final auction procedures significantly differed from the
    typical auction procedures.[^93] Verizon Wireless offered that the
    Bureau should begin the auction two weeks later than originally
    scheduled, to take into account the Independence Day (July 4^th^)
    holiday.[^94]

54. We do not find sufficient cause to delay the start of Auction No.
    66, and therefore, will commence the competitive bidding as
    scheduled, i.e., on June 29, 2006. We agree with the majority of the
    parties who commented on this issue that it is in the public
    interest to make AWS spectrum available as soon as it is both
    reasonable and consistent with CSEA. As described in detail
    elsewhere in this Public Notice, we have decided to proceed with
    standard, single SMR auction for the AWS-1 licenses. Therefore, the
    concerns raised by some about time needed to prepare for package
    bidding are moot. Moreover, we note that bidders have approximately
    one month to prepare their short-form applications and over two
    months to prepare their bidding strategies before the auction
    commences.

55. Unless otherwise announced, bidding on all licenses will be
    conducted on each business day until bidding has stopped on all
    licenses.

### Auction Title

56. Auction No. 66 -- Advanced Wireless Services (AWS-1)

### Bidding Methodology 

57. As discussed in more detail below, the bidding methodology for
    Auction No. 66 will be simultaneous multiple round bidding.[^95] The
    Commission will conduct this auction over the Internet using the FCC
    Auction System, and telephonic bidding will be available as well.
    Qualified bidders are permitted to bid electronically via the
    Internet or by telephone.[^96] All telephone calls are recorded.

### Pre-Auction Dates and Deadlines

58. Dates and Deadlines

Auction Seminar April 24, 2006

Short-Form Application (FCC Form 175) Filing Window Opens April 24,
2006; 12:00 p.m. ET

Short-Form Application (FCC Form 175) Filing Window Deadline May 10,
2006; 6:00 p.m. ET

Upfront Payments (via wire transfer) June 1, 2006; 6:00 p.m. ET

Mock Auction June 26, 2006

Auction Begins June 29, 2006

### Requirements for Participation

59. Those wishing to participate in the auction must:

-   Submit a short-form application (FCC Form 175) electronically prior
    to 6:00 p.m. Eastern Time (ET), May 10, 2006, following the
    electronic filing procedures set forth in Attachment D to this
    Public Notice.

```{=html}
<!-- -->
```
-   Submit a sufficient upfront payment and an FCC Remittance Advice
    Form (FCC Form 159) before 6:00 p.m. ET, June 1, 2006.

```{=html}
<!-- -->
```
-   Comply with all provisions outlined in this Public Notice and
    applicable Commission rules.

### General Contact Information

60. General Contact Information Table

+-----------------------------------+----------------------------------+
| **GENERAL AUCTION INFORMATION**   | FCC Auctions Hotline             |
+-----------------------------------+----------------------------------+
| General Auction Questions         | \(888\) 225-5322, option two;    |
+-----------------------------------+----------------------------------+
| Seminar Registration              | or (717) 338-2868                |
+-----------------------------------+----------------------------------+
|                                   | Hours of service: 8:00 a.m. --   |
|                                   | 5:30 p.m. ET,                    |
|                                   |                                  |
|                                   | Monday through Friday            |
+-----------------------------------+----------------------------------+
| **AUCTION LEGAL INFORMATION**     | Auctions and Spectrum Access     |
|                                   | Division                         |
+-----------------------------------+----------------------------------+
| Auction Rules, Policies,          | \(202\) 418-0660                 |
| Regulations                       |                                  |
+-----------------------------------+----------------------------------+
| **LICENSING INFORMATION**         | Broadband Division               |
+-----------------------------------+----------------------------------+
| Service Rules, Policies,          | \(202\) 418-0200                 |
| Regulations                       |                                  |
|                                   |                                  |
| Licensing Issues, Engineering     |                                  |
| Issues                            |                                  |
|                                   |                                  |
| Due Diligence, Incumbency Issues  |                                  |
+-----------------------------------+----------------------------------+
| **TECHNICAL SUPPORT**             | FCC Auctions Technical Support   |
|                                   | Hotline                          |
+-----------------------------------+----------------------------------+
| Electronic Filing                 | \(877\) 480-3201, option nine;   |
|                                   | or (202) 414-1250                |
+-----------------------------------+----------------------------------+
| FCC Auction System                | \(202\) 414-1255 (TTY)           |
|                                   |                                  |
|                                   | Hours of service: 8:00 a.m. --   |
|                                   | 6:00 p.m. ET,                    |
|                                   |                                  |
|                                   | Monday through Friday            |
+-----------------------------------+----------------------------------+
| **PAYMENT INFORMATION**           | FCC Auctions Accounting Branch   |
+-----------------------------------+----------------------------------+
| Wire Transfers                    | \(202\) 418-0578                 |
+-----------------------------------+----------------------------------+
| Refunds                           | \(202\) 418-2843 (Fax)           |
+-----------------------------------+----------------------------------+
| **AUCTION BIDDER LINE**           | Will be furnished only to        |
|                                   | qualified bidders                |
+-----------------------------------+----------------------------------+
| **FCC COPY CONTRACTOR**           | Best Copy and Printing, Inc      |
+-----------------------------------+----------------------------------+
| Additional Copies of              | 445 12th Street, SW, Room        |
|                                   | CY-B402                          |
+-----------------------------------+----------------------------------+
| Commission Documents              | Washington, DC 20554             |
|                                   |                                  |
|                                   | \(800\) 378-3160                 |
|                                   |                                  |
|                                   | [http://www.bcpiw                |
|                                   | eb.com](http://www.bcpiweb.com/) |
+-----------------------------------+----------------------------------+
| **PRESS INFORMATION**             | Chelsea Fallon (202) 418-7991    |
+-----------------------------------+----------------------------------+
| **FCC FORMS**                     | \(800\) 418-3676 (outside        |
|                                   | Washington, DC)                  |
|                                   |                                  |
|                                   | \(202\) 418-3676 (in the         |
|                                   | Washington area)                 |
|                                   |                                  |
|                                   | <h                               |
|                                   | ttp://www.fcc.gov/formpage.html> |
+-----------------------------------+----------------------------------+
| **ACCESSIBLE FORMATS**            | Consumer and Governmental        |
|                                   | Affairs Bureau                   |
+-----------------------------------+----------------------------------+
| Braille, large print, electronic  | \(202\) 418-0530 or (202)        |
| files, or                         | 418-0432 (TTY)                   |
+-----------------------------------+----------------------------------+
| audio format for people with      | <fcc504@fcc.gov>                 |
| disabilities                      |                                  |
+-----------------------------------+----------------------------------+
| **FCC INTERNET SITES**            | [http://w                        |
|                                   | ww.fcc.gov](http://www.fcc.gov/) |
|                                   |                                  |
|                                   | <h                               |
|                                   | ttp://wireless.fcc.gov/auctions> |
|                                   |                                  |
|                                   | <http://wireless.fcc.gov/uls>    |
+-----------------------------------+----------------------------------+

#  {#section .unnumbered}

# short-form Application (FCC FORM 175) REQUIREMENTS

61. An application to participate in an FCC auction, referred to as a
    short-form application or FCC Form 175, provides information used in
    determining whether the applicant is legally, technically, and
    financially qualified to participate in Commission auctions for
    licenses or permits.[^97] The short-form application is the first
    part of the Commission's two-phased auction application process. In
    the first phase of this process, parties desiring to participate in
    the auction file streamlined, short-form applications in which they
    certify under penalty of perjury as to their qualifications.[^98]
    Eligibility to participate in bidding is based on the applicants\'
    short-form applications and certifications as well as their upfront
    payments, explained below.[^99] In the second phase of the process,
    winning bidders file a more comprehensive long-form
    application.[^100]

62. Entities seeking licenses available in Auction No. 66 must file a
    short-form application electronically via the FCC Auction System
    before 6:00 p.m. ET on May 10, 2006, following the procedures
    prescribed in Attachment D to this Public Notice. If an applicant
    claims eligibility for a bidding credit, the information provided in
    its FCC Form 175 will be used in determining whether the applicant
    is eligible for the claimed bidding credit. Applicants bear full
    responsibility for submitting accurate, complete and timely
    short-form applications. All applicants must certify on their
    short-form applications under penalty of perjury that they are
    legally, technically, financially and otherwise qualified to hold a
    license.[^101] Applicants should read the instructions set forth in
    Attachment D to this Public Notice carefully and should consult the
    Commission's rules to ensure that, in addition to the materials
    described below, all the information that is required under the
    Commission's rules is included with their short-form applications.

63. An entity may not submit more than one short-form application for a
    single auction. In the event that a party submits multiple
    short-form applications, only one application will be accepted for
    filing.

64. Applicants also should note that submission of a short-form
    application constitutes a representation by the certifying official
    that he or she is an authorized representative of the applicant,
    that he or she has read the form's instructions and certifications,
    and that the contents of the application, its certifications, and
    any attachments are true and correct. Submission of a false
    certification to the Commission may result in penalties, including
    monetary forfeitures, license forfeitures, ineligibility to
    participate in future auctions, and/or criminal prosecution.

## Preferences for Small Businesses and Others 

### Size Standards for Bidding Credits

65. A bidding credit represents the amount by which a bidder's winning
    bid will be discounted. For Auction No. 66, bidding credits will be
    available to small businesses and very small businesses, and
    consortia thereof, as follows:

-   A bidder with attributed average annual gross revenues that exceed
    \$15 million and do not exceed \$40 million for the preceding three
    years ("small business") will receive a 15 percent discount on its
    winning bid.[^102]

-   A bidder with attributed average annual gross revenues that do not
    exceed \$15 million for the preceding three years ("very small
    business") will receive a 25 percent discount on its winning
    bid.[^103]

66. Bidding credits are not cumulative; a qualifying applicant receives
    either the 15 percent or 25 percent bidding credit on its winning
    bid, but not both.

67. Every applicant that claims eligibility for a bidding credit as
    either a small business or a very small business, or a consortium of
    small businesses or very small businesses, will be required to
    provide information regarding revenues attributable to the
    applicant, its affiliates, its controlling interests, and the
    affiliates of its controlling interests on its FCC Form 175
    short-form application to establish that it satisfies the applicable
    eligibility requirement.[^104] Applicants considering claiming
    eligibility as a designated entity in Auction No. 66 should review
    carefully the recently released *CSEA/Part 1 Designated Entity
    FNPRM*. The Commission stated in the *CSEA/Part 1 Designated Entity
    FNPRM* that it intends to complete that proceeding so that any
    resulting rule modifications will apply to Auction No. 66.[^105] In
    the *CSEA/Part 1 Designated Entity FNPRM*, the Commission
    tentatively concluded that it should "restrict the award of
    designated entity benefits to an otherwise qualified designated
    entity where it has a 'material relationship' with a 'large
    in-region incumbent wireless service provider,'" and sought comment
    on how to define the elements of such a restriction.[^106] The
    Commission also sought comment on whether to restrict the award of
    designated entity benefits where an otherwise qualified designated
    entity has a "material relationship" with a large entity that has a
    significant interest in communications services.[^107] The
    Commission further proposed that in the event that any designated
    entity applicants have filed an application to participate in an
    auction prior to the effective date of any designated entity rule
    changes adopted pursuant to the *CSEA/Part 1 Designated Entity
    FNPRM*, such applicants would be required to amend their
    applications on or after the effective date of the rule changes with
    a statement declaring, under penalty of perjury, that the applicant
    is qualified as a designated entity pursuant to section 1.2110 of
    the Commission's rules effective as of the date of the
    statement.[^108] Finally, the Commission noted that under this
    proposal the Bureau will establish any detailed procedures necessary
    for making required amendments and announce such procedures by
    public notice.[^109] Accordingly, applicants considering claiming
    eligibility as a designated entity in Auction No. 66 should monitor
    further proceedings pursuant to the *CSEA/Part 1 Designated Entity
    FNPRM* to assure their ability to comply with any changes to the
    designated entity rules that the Commission may adopt that are
    applicable to applicants in Auction No. 66.

### Tribal Lands Bidding Credit

68. To encourage the growth of wireless services in federally recognized
    tribal lands, the Commission has implemented a tribal lands bidding
    credit. As discussed in greater detail in Section V.E. of this
    Public Notice, the Commission will award pro rata tribal lands
    bidding credits in the event that the sum of all net winning bids at
    the close of bidding, exclusive of tribal lands bidding credits, is
    not sufficient funds both to meet the reserve price and to award all
    eligible applicants full tribal lands bidding credits.[^110]

### Installment Payments

69. Installment payment plans will not be available in Auction No. 66.

## License Selection

70. In Auction No. 66, applicants must select the licenses on which they
    want to bid from the "Eligible Licenses" list. In Auction No. 66,
    FCC Form 175 will include a filtering mechanism that allows an
    applicant to filter the available licenses. The applicant will make
    selections for one or more of the filter criteria and the system
    will produce a list of licenses satisfying the specified criteria.
    The applicant may select all the licenses in the customized list or
    select individual licenses from the list. Applicants also will be
    able to select licenses from one customized list and then create
    additional customized lists to select additional licenses. There
    will be no opportunity to change license selection after the
    short-form filing deadline.[^111] It is critically important that an
    applicant confirm its license selections before submitting its
    short-form application because the FCC Auction System will not
    accept bids on licenses that an applicant has not selected on its
    FCC Form 175.

## Disclosure of Bidding Arrangements

71. Applicants will be required to identify in their short-form
    applications all parties with whom they have entered into any
    agreements, arrangements, or understandings of any kind relating to
    the licenses being auctioned, including any agreements relating to
    post-auction market structure.[^112] Applicants also will be
    required to certify under penalty of perjury in their short-form
    applications that they have not entered and will not enter into any
    explicit or implicit agreements, arrangements or understandings of
    any kind with any parties, other than those identified in the
    application, regarding the amount of their bids, bidding strategies,
    or the particular licenses on which they will or will not bid.[^113]
    If an applicant has had discussions, but has not reached a joint
    bidding agreement by the short-form application filing deadline, it
    would not include the names of parties to the discussions on its
    application and may not continue such discussions with any
    applicants after the deadline.[^114]

72. After the filing of short-form applications, the Commission's rules
    do not prohibit a party holding a non-controlling, attributable
    interest in one applicant from acquiring an ownership interest in or
    entering into a joint bidding arrangement with other applicants
    provided that (i) the attributable interest holder certifies that it
    has not and will not communicate with any party concerning the bids
    or bidding strategies of more than one of the applicants in which it
    holds an attributable interest, or with which it has entered into a
    joint bidding arrangement; and (ii) the arrangements do not result
    in a change in control of any of the applicants.[^115] While the
    anti-collusion rules do not prohibit non-auction related business
    negotiations among auction applicants, applicants are reminded that
    certain discussions or exchanges could touch upon impermissible
    subject matters because they may convey pricing information and
    bidding strategies.[^116] Further, as discussed above, compliance
    with the disclosure requirements of the Commission's anti-collusion
    rule will not insulate a party from enforcement of the antitrust
    laws.[^117]

## Ownership Disclosure Requirements 

73. All applicants must comply with the uniform Part 1 ownership
    disclosure standards and provide information required by Sections
    1.2105 and 1.2112 of the Commission's rules.[^118] Specifically, in
    completing the short-form application, applicants will be required
    to fully disclose information on the real party or
    parties-in-interest and ownership structure of the applicant.

74. Applicants considering claiming eligibility as a designated entity
    in Auction No. 66 should carefully monitor the recently initiated
    rulemaking proceeding concerning the Commission's designated entity
    rules.[^119] In the *CSEA/Part 1 Designated Entity FNPRM*, the
    Commission tentatively concluded that it should "restrict the award
    of designated entity benefits to an otherwise qualified designated
    entity where it has a 'material relationship' with a 'large
    in-region incumbent wireless service provider,'" and sought comment
    on how to define the elements of such a restriction. The Commission
    also sought comment on whether to restrict the award of designated
    entity benefits where an otherwise qualified designated entity has a
    "material relationship" with a large entity that has a significant
    interest in communications services.[^120] The Commission stated
    that it intended any changes adopted in this proceeding to apply to
    AWS licenses to be offered in Auction No. 66.[^121] Depending upon
    the outcome of that proceeding, applicants may be required to
    disclose additional ownership information in order to comply with
    any changes to the designated entity rules that the Commission may
    adopt that are applicable to applicants in Auction No. 66.

75. An applicant's most current ownership information on file with the
    Commission, if in an electronic format compatible with the
    short-form application (FCC Form 175) (such as information submitted
    in an on-line FCC Form 602 or in an FCC Form 175 filed for a
    previous auction using ISAS) will automatically be entered into the
    applicant's short-form application. Applicants are responsible for
    ensuring that the information submitted in their Form 175 for
    Auction No. 66 is complete and accurate. Accordingly, applicants
    should carefully review any information automatically entered to
    confirm that it is complete and accurate as of the deadline for
    filing the short-form application. Applicants can update any
    information that was entered automatically and needs to be changed
    directly in the short-form application.

## Bidding Credit Revenue Disclosures

76. To determine which applicants qualify for bidding credits as small
    businesses or very small businesses, the Commission considers the
    gross revenues of the applicant, its affiliates, its controlling
    interests, and the affiliates of its controlling interests.[^122]
    Therefore, entities applying to bid as small businesses or very
    small businesses (or consortia of small businesses or very small
    businesses) will be required to disclose on their FCC Form 175
    short-form applications the gross revenues of each of the following
    for the preceding three years: (1) the applicant, (2) its
    affiliates, (3) its controlling interests, and (4) the affiliates of
    its controlling interests.[^123] Certification that the average
    annual gross revenues of such entities and individuals for the
    preceding three years do not exceed the applicable limit is not
    sufficient. In order to comply with the Commission's disclosure
    requirements for bidding credit eligibility, an applicant must
    provide separately for itself, its affiliates, its controlling
    interests, and the affiliates of its controlling interests, the
    gross revenues for each of the preceding three years. If the
    applicant is applying as a consortium of small businesses or very
    small businesses, this information must be provided for each
    consortium member.[^124]

77. Applicants considering claiming eligibility as a designated entity
    in Auction No. 66 should review carefully the recently released
    *CSEA/Part 1 Designated Entity FNPRM*. In the *CSEA/Part 1
    Designated Entity FNPRM*, the Commission tentatively concluded that
    it should "restrict the award of designated entity benefits to an
    otherwise qualified designated entity where it has a 'material
    relationship' with a 'large in-region incumbent wireless service
    provider,'" and sought comment on how to define the elements of such
    a restriction.[^125] Depending upon the outcome of that proceeding,
    applicants may be required to disclose additional information
    regarding gross revenues of related parties in order to comply with
    any changes to the designated entity rules that the Commission may
    adopt that are applicable to applicants in Auction No. 66.

78. Controlling interests of an applicant include individuals and
    entities with either *de facto* or *de jure* control of the
    applicant. Typically, ownership of at least 50.1 percent of an
    entity's voting stock evidences *de jure* control. *De facto*
    control is determined on a case-by-case basis.[^126] The following
    are some common indicia of *de facto* control:

-   the entity constitutes or appoints more than 50 percent of the board
    of directors or management committee;

-   the entity has authority to appoint, promote, demote, and fire
    senior executives that control the day-to-day activities of the
    licensee;

-   the entity plays an integral role in management decisions.[^127]

79. Officers and directors of an applicant are also considered to have
    controlling interest in the applicant.[^128] The Commission does not
    impose specific equity requirements on controlling interest holders.
    Once the principals or entities with a controlling interest are
    determined, only the revenues of those principals or entities, the
    affiliates of those principals or entities, and the applicant and
    its affiliates will be counted in determining small business
    eligibility.

80. In recent years the Commission has made modifications to its rules
    governing the attribution of gross revenues for purposes of
    determining small business eligibility. These changes include
    exempting the gross revenues of the affiliates of a rural telephone
    cooperative's officers and directors from attribution to the
    applicant if certain specified conditions are met.[^129] The
    Commission has also clarified that, in calculating an applicant's
    gross revenues under the controlling interest standard, it will not
    attribute the personal net worth, including personal income, of its
    officers and directors to the applicant.[^130]

81. A consortium of small businesses or very small businesses is a
    "conglomerate organization composed of two or more entities, each of
    which individually satisfies the definition of a small business
    \[or\] very small business as those terms are defined in the
    service-specific rules."[^131] Thus, each member of a consortium of
    small or very small businesses that applies to participate in
    Auction No. 66 must individually meet the definition of small
    business or very small business adopted by the Commission for the
    Advanced Wireless Services.[^132] Each consortium member must
    disclose its gross revenues along with those of its affiliates, its
    controlling interests, and the affiliates of its controlling
    interests. Although the gross revenues of the consortium members
    will not be aggregated for purposes of determining the consortium's
    eligibility as a small business or very small business,[^133] this
    information must be provided to ensure that each individual
    consortium member qualifies for any bidding credit awarded to the
    consortium.[^134]

## Provisions Regarding Former and Current Defaulters

82. Each applicant must state under penalty of perjury on its short-form
    application whether or not the applicant, its affiliates, its
    controlling interests, and the affiliates of its controlling
    interests, as defined by Section 1.2110,[^135] have ever been in
    default on any Commission licenses or have ever been delinquent on
    any non-tax debt owed to any Federal agency.[^136] In addition, each
    applicant must certify under penalty of perjury on its short-form
    application that as of the short-form filing deadline, the
    applicant, its affiliates, its controlling interests, and the
    affiliates of its controlling interests, as defined by Section
    1.2110, are not in default on any payment for Commission licenses
    (including down payments) and that they are not delinquent on any
    non-tax debt owed to any Federal agency.[^137] Prospective
    applicants are reminded that submission of a false certification to
    the Commission is a serious matter that may result in severe
    penalties, including monetary forfeitures, license revocations,
    exclusion from participation in future auctions, and/or criminal
    prosecution.

83. "Former defaulters" --- *i.e.*, applicants, including any of their
    affiliates, any of their controlling interests, or any of the
    affiliates of its controlling interests, that in the past have
    defaulted on any Commission licenses or been delinquent on any
    non-tax debt owed to any Federal agency, but that have since
    remedied all such defaults and cured all of their outstanding
    non-tax delinquencies --- are eligible to bid in Auction No. 66,
    provided that they are otherwise qualified. However, as discussed in
    Section III.D.3., *infra*, former defaulters are required to pay
    upfront payments that are fifty percent more than the normal upfront
    payment amounts.[^138]

84. "Current defaulters" --- *i.e.*, applicants, including any of their
    affiliates, any of their controlling interests, or any of the
    affiliates of their controlling interests, that are in default on
    any payment for any Commission licenses (including down payments) or
    are delinquent on any non-tax debt owed to any Federal agency as of
    the filing deadline for applications to participate in this auction
    -- are not eligible to bid in Auction No. 66.[^139]

85. Applicants are encouraged to review the Bureau's previous guidance
    on default and delinquency disclosure requirements in the context of
    the short-form application process.[^140] For example, it has been
    determined that to the extent that Commission rules permit late
    payment of regulatory or application fees accompanied by late fees,
    such debts will become delinquent for purposes of Sections 1.2105(a)
    and 1.2106(a) only after the expiration of a final payment
    deadline.[^141] Therefore, with respect to regulatory or application
    fees, the provisions of Sections 1.2105(a) and 1.2106(a) regarding
    default and delinquency in connection with competitive bidding are
    limited to circumstances in which the relevant party has not
    complied with a final Commission payment deadline.[^142]

86. The Commission considers outstanding debts owed to the United States
    Government, in any amount, to be a serious matter. The Commission
    adopted rules, including a provision referred to as the \"red light
    rule,\" that implement the Commission\'s obligations under the Debt
    Collection Improvement Act of 1996, which governs the collection of
    claims owed to the United States.[^143] Under the red light rule,
    the Commission will not process applications and other requests for
    benefits filed by parties that have outstanding debts owed to the
    Commission. In the same rulemaking order, the Commission explicitly
    declared, however, that the Commission\'s competitive bidding rules
    \"are not affected\" by the red light rule.[^144] As a consequence,
    the Commission\'s adoption of the red light rule does not alter the
    applicability of any of the Commission\'s competitive bidding rules,
    including the provisions and certifications of Sections 1.2105 and
    1.2106, with regard to current and former defaults or delinquencies.
    Applicants are reminded, however, that the Commission's Red Light
    Display System, which provides information regarding debts owed to
    the Commission, may not be determinative of an auction applicant's
    ability to comply with the default and delinquency disclosure
    requirements of section 1.2105.[^145] Thus, while the red light rule
    ultimately may prevent the processing of long-form applications by
    auction winners, an auction applicant's "red light" status is not
    necessarily determinative of its eligibility to participate in this
    auction or of its upfront payment obligation.

87. Prospective applicants in Auction No. 66 should note that any
    long-form applications filed after the close of competitive bidding
    will be reviewed for compliance with the Commission's red light
    rule,[^146] and such review may result in the dismissal of a winning
    bidder\'s long-form application.[^147]

## Other Information 

88. Applicants owned by member of minority groups and/or women, as
    defined in Section 1.2110(c)(3),[^148] may identify themselves in
    filling out their short-form applications regarding this status.
    This applicant status information is collected for statistical
    purposes only and assists the Commission in monitoring the
    participation of "designated entities" in its auctions.[^149]

## Minor Modifications to Short-Form Applications (FCC Form 175)

89. After the deadline for filing short-form applications (FCC
    Forms 175) at **6:00 p.m. ET on May 10, 2006**, applicants are
    permitted to make only minor changes to their applications.
    Applicants are not permitted to make major modifications to their
    applications (*e.g.*, change their license selections, change
    control of the applicant, or claim eligibility for a higher bidding
    credit).[^150] Permissible minor changes include, for example,
    deletion and addition of authorized bidders (to a maximum of three)
    and revision of addresses and telephone numbers of the applicants
    and their contact persons.

90. Any application amendment and related statements of fact must be
    certified by: (1) the applicant, if the applicant is an
    individual, (2) one of the partners if the applicant is a
    partnership, (3) an officer, director, or duly authorized employee,
    if the applicant is a corporation, (4) by a member who is an
    officer, if the applicant is an unincorporated association, (5) the
    trustee if the applicant is an amateur radio service club, or (6) a
    duly elected or appointed official who is authorized to make such
    certifications under the laws of the applicable jurisdiction, if the
    applicant is a governmental entity.[^151]

91. An applicant must make permissible minor changes to its short-form
    application, as such changes are defined by Section 1.2105(b),
    on-line. Applicants must click on the **SUBMIT** button in the FCC
    Auction System for the changes to be submitted and considered by the
    Commission. After the revised application has been submitted, a
    confirmation page will be displayed that states the submission time
    and date, along with a unique file number.

92. In addition, in the event that changes cannot be made immediately in
    ISAS for any reason, an applicant should submit a letter briefly
    summarizing the changes and subsequently update their short-form
    applications in ISAS as soon as possible. Any letter describing
    changes to an applicant's short-form application should be submitted
    by electronic mail to the following address: <auction66@fcc.gov>.
    The electronic mail summarizing the changes must include a subject
    or caption referring to Auction No. 66 and the name of the applicant
    (e.g., "RE: Changes to Auction No. 66 Short-Form Application of ABC
    Corp."). The Bureau requests that parties format any attachments to
    electronic mail as Adobe^®^ Acrobat^®^ (pdf) or Microsoft^®^ Word
    documents. Questions about short-form application (FCC Form 175)
    amendments should be directed to Scott Mackoul of the Auctions and
    Spectrum Access Division at (202) 418-0660.

93. Applicants should [not]{.underline} submit application-specific
    material through the Commission's Electronic Comment Filing System
    (ECFS), which was used for submitting comments regarding Auction No.
    66 procedures.

## Maintaining Current Information in Short-Form Applications (FCC Form 175)

94. Section 1.65 of the Commission\'s rules requires an applicant to
    maintain the accuracy and completeness of information furnished in
    its pending application and to notify the Commission within 30 days
    of any substantial change that may be of decisional significance to
    that application.[^152] Changes that cause a loss of or reduction in
    eligibility for a bidding credit must be reported immediately. If an
    amendment reporting substantial changes is a "major amendment" as
    defined by 47 C.F.R. § 1.2105, the major amendment will not be
    accepted and may result in the dismissal of the short-form
    application.[^153]

95. In the event that the new rules regarding applicants and
    applications become effective after the deadline for filing
    short-form applications (FCC Form 175), applicants may be required
    to submit additional information not required in the initial form.
    In this regard, applicants considering claiming eligibility as a
    designated entity in Auction No. 66 should review carefully the
    recently released *CSEA/Part 1 Designated Entity FNPRM*.[^154] The
    Commission stated in the *CSEA/Part 1 Designated Entity FNPRM* that
    it intends to complete that proceeding in time so that any resulting
    rule modifications will apply to Auction No. 66.[^155] Moreover, the
    Commission proposed that in the event that any designated entity
    applicants have filed an application to participate in an auction
    prior to the effective date of any designated entity rule changes
    adopted pursuant to the *CSEA/Part 1 Designated Entity FNPRM*, such
    applicants would be required to amend their applications on or after
    the effective date of the rule changes with a statement declaring,
    under penalty of perjury, that the applicant is qualified as a
    designated entity pursuant to section 1.2110 of the Commission's
    rules effective as of the date of the statement.[^156] Finally, the
    Commission noted that under this proposal the Bureau will establish
    any detailed procedures necessary for making required amendments and
    announce such procedures by public notice.[^157] Accordingly,
    applicants considering claiming eligibility as a designated entity
    in Auction No. 66 should monitor further proceedings pursuant to the
    *CSEA/Part 1 Designated Entity FNPRM*.

# PRE-AUCTION PROCEDURES

## Auction Seminar ---April 24, 2006

96. On Monday, April 24, 2006, the FCC will sponsor a seminar for
    parties interested in participating in Auction No. 66 at the FCC
    headquarters, located at 445 12^th^ Street, SW, Washington, DC. The
    seminar will provide attendees with information about pre-auction
    procedures, completing FCC Form 175, auction conduct, the FCC
    Auction System, auction rules, and the Advanced Wireless Services
    rules. The seminar will also provide an opportunity for prospective
    bidders to ask questions of FCC staff concerning the auction,
    auction procedures, filing requirements and other matters related to
    this auction.

97. To register, complete the registration form attached hereto as
    Attachment C and submit it by Thursday, April 20, 2006.
    Registrations are accepted on a first-come, first-served basis. The
    seminar is free of charge.

98. For individuals who are unable to attend, an Audio/Video webcast of
    this seminar will be available from the FCC's Auction No. 66 web
    page at
    [http://wireless.fcc.gov/auctions/66/](../../Auction%20#66 (AWS)).
    Select the "Auction Seminar" link. The seminar webcast will be
    archived for future viewing.

## Short-Form Application (FCC Form 175) --- Due Before 6:00 p.m. ET on May 10, 2006

99. In order to be eligible to bid in this auction, applicants must
    first submit an FCC Form 175 application electronically via the FCC
    Auction System.[^158] This application must be received at the
    Commission prior to 6:00 p.m. ET on May 10, 2006. **Late
    applications will not be accepted.** There is no application fee
    required when filing an FCC Form 175. However, to be eligible to
    bid, an applicant must submit an upfront payment.[^159]

100. Applications may generally be filed at any time beginning at noon
     ET on April 24, 2006, until 6:00 p.m. ET on May 10, 2006.
     Applicants are strongly encouraged to file early and are
     responsible for allowing adequate time for filing their
     applications. Applicants may update or amend their applications
     multiple times until the filing deadline on May 10, 2006.

101. Applicants must always click on the SUBMIT button on the Certify &
     Submit screen of the electronic form to successfully submit their
     FCC Form 175's or modifications. Any form that is not submitted
     will not be reviewed by the FCC. Information about accessing,
     completing, and viewing the FCC Form 175 is included in
     Attachment D. FCC Auctions Technical Support is available at (877)
     480-3201, option nine; (202) 414-1250; or (202) 414-1255 (text
     telephone (TTY)); hours of service are Monday through Friday, from
     8:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. ET. In order to provide better service to
     the public, all calls to Technical Support are recorded.

## Application Processing and Minor Corrections

102. After the deadline for filing the FCC Form 175 applications has
     passed, the FCC will process all timely submitted applications to
     determine which are acceptable for filing, and subsequently will
     issue a public notice identifying: (1) those applications accepted
     for filing; (2) those applications rejected; and (3) those
     applications which have minor defects that may be corrected, and
     the deadline for resubmitting corrected applications.

103. As described more fully in the Commission's rules, after the May
     10, 2006, short-form filing deadline, applicants may make only
     minor corrections to their FCC Form 175 applications. Applicants
     will not be permitted to make major modifications to their
     applications (*e.g.*, change their license selections, change
     control of the applicant, or claim eligibility for a higher bidding
     credit).[^160]

## Upfront Payments --- Due June 1, 2006

104. In order to be eligible to bid in the auction, applicants must
     submit an upfront payment accompanied by an FCC Remittance Advice
     Form (FCC Form 159). After completing the FCC Form 175, filers will
     have access to an electronic version of the FCC Form 159 that can
     be printed and sent by facsimile to Mellon Bank in Pittsburgh, PA.
     **All upfront payments must be received in the proper account at
     Mellon Bank before 6:00 p.m. ET on June 1, 2006.**

### Making Auction Payments by Wire Transfer 

105. Wire transfer payments must be received before 6:00 p.m. ET on June
     1, 2006. To avoid untimely payments, applicants should discuss
     arrangements (including bank closing schedules) with their banker
     several days before they plan to make the wire transfer, and allow
     sufficient time for the transfer to be initiated and completed
     before the deadline. Applicants will need the following
     information:

> ABA Routing Number: 043000261
>
> Receiving Bank: Mellon Pittsburgh
>
> 500 Ross St.
>
> Pittsburgh, PA 15262
>
> BENEFICIARY: FCC/Account \# 910-1174
>
> Originating Bank Information (OBI Field): (Skip one space between each
> information item)
>
> "AUCTIONPAY"
>
> APPLICANT FCC REGISTRATION NUMBER (FRN): (same as FCC Form 159, block
> 21)
>
> PAYMENT TYPE CODE: (same as FCC Form 159, block 24A: "A66U")
>
> FCC CODE 1: (same as FCC Form 159, block 28A: "66")
>
> PAYER NAME: (same as FCC Form 159, block 2)
>
> LOCKBOX NO. \# 358405

**NOTE:** The BNF and Lockbox number are specific to the upfront
payments for this auction; do not use BNF or Lockbox numbers from
previous auctions.

106. At least one hour before placing the order for the wire transfer
     (but on the same business day), applicants must send by facsimile a
     completed FCC Form 159 (Revised 2/03) to Mellon Bank at (412)
     209-6045. On the cover sheet of the facsimile, write "Wire Transfer
     --- Auction Payment for Auction No. 66." In order to meet the
     Commission's upfront payment deadline, an applicant's payment must
     be credited to the Commission\'s account before the deadline.[^161]
     **Applicants are responsible for obtaining confirmation from their
     financial institution that Mellon Bank has timely received their
     upfront payment and deposited it in the proper account.**

107. Please note that:

-   All payments must be made in U.S. dollars.

-   All payments must be made by wire transfer.

-   Upfront payments for Auction No. 66 go to a lockbox number different
    from the lockboxes used in previous FCC auctions, and different from
    the lockbox number to be used for post-auction payments.

-   Failure to deliver the upfront payment by the June 1, 2006, deadline
    will result in dismissal of the application and disqualification
    from participation in the auction.

### FCC Form 159

108. A completed FCC Remittance Advice Form (FCC Form 159, Revised 2/03)
     must be faxed to Mellon Bank to accompany each upfront payment.
     Proper completion of FCC Form 159 (Revised 2/03) is critical to
     ensuring correct crediting of upfront payments. Detailed
     instructions for completion of FCC Form 159 are included in
     Attachment E to this Public Notice. An electronic pre-filled
     version of the FCC Form 159 is available after submitting the FCC
     Form 175. Payors using a pre-filled FCC Form 159 are responsible
     for ensuring that all of the information on the form, including
     payment amounts, is accurate. The FCC Form 159 can be completed
     electronically, but must be filed with Mellon Bank via facsimile.

### Upfront Payments and Bidding Eligibility

109. In the *Part 1 Order,* the Commission delegated to the Bureau the
     authority and discretion to determine appropriate upfront
     payment(s) for each auction.[^162] In addition, in the *Part 1*
     *Fifth Report and Order*, the Commission ordered that applicants
     that are former defaulters be required to pay upfront payments 50
     percent greater than non-former defaulters.[^163] For purposes of
     this calculation, the "applicant" includes the applicant itself,
     its affiliates, its controlling interests, and affiliates of its
     controlling interests, as defined by Section 1.2110 of the
     Commission's rules.[^164]

110. In the *Auction No. 66 Comment Public Notice*, we proposed that the
     amount of the upfront payment would determine a bidder's initial
     bidding eligibility, the maximum number of bidding units on which a
     bidder may place bids.[^165] In order to bid on a license,
     otherwise qualified bidders that selected that license on Form 175
     must have a current eligibility level that meets or exceeds the
     number of bidding units assigned to that license. At a minimum,
     therefore, an applicant's total upfront payment must be enough to
     establish eligibility to bid on at least one of the licenses
     selected on its Form 175, or else the applicant will not be
     eligible to participate in the auction. An applicant does not have
     to make an upfront payment to cover all licenses the applicant
     selected on its Form 175, but rather to cover the maximum number of
     bidding units that are associated with licenses on which the bidder
     wishes to place bids and hold provisionally winning bids at any
     given time.[^166]

111. In the *Auction No. 66 Comment Public Notice*, the Bureau proposed
     to calculate upfront payments for Auction No. 66 on a
     license-by-license basis using the following formula:

     \$0.05 \* MHz \* License Area Population.[^167]

     The Bureau set forth the specific upfront payments and bidding
     units for each license in Attachment A of the *Auction No. 66
     Comment Public Notice* and sought comment on this proposal.

112. Commenters presented a number of views on the proposed level of
     upfront payments. Some comments support the proposed upfront
     payments.[^168] Others argue for lowering upfront payments for
     specific licenses, usually either for all CMA licenses (MSAs and
     RSAs) or only for the rural RSA licenses.[^169] Other comments
     propose lowering upfront payments for bidders that qualify as
     designated entities or replacing the upfront payment proposal with
     a straight percentage deposit.[^170]

113. Upfront payments help deter frivolous or insincere bidding. In
     addition, upfront payments provide the Commission with a source of
     funds in the event that the bidder incurs liability during the
     auction. Applicants must make upfront payments sufficient to obtain
     bidding eligibility on the licenses on which they will bid.

114. As discussed below in connection with minimum opening bids, we are
     persuaded by the arguments of numerous commenters that for Auction
     No. 66, the formula to determine upfront payments and minimum
     opening bids should not apply the same figure to a rural population
     unit as it does to an urban population unit.[^171] Commenters
     assert that because of higher buildout costs, upfront payments and
     minimum opening bids for less densely populated areas should be
     calculated at a lower rate than those for higher density
     areas.[^172] More specifically, many commenters contend that
     upfront payments on licenses covering RSAs should be lowered from
     \$0.05 per MHz\*Pop to \$0.01, 0.02, or 0.025 per MHz\*Pop.[^173]

115. We will reduce upfront payments for RSA licenses by forty percent
     (40%) from our initial proposal, *i.e.,* to \$0.03 per MHz\*Pop.
     While some commenters argue for an even greater reduction, we are
     not persuaded that we should lower upfront payments any further.
     With respect to licenses for the more densely populated MSAs, we
     will not reduce the proposed upfront payments. We adopt our initial
     proposal with respect to such licenses and set the upfront payments
     for MSAs using the proposed formula, *i.e.*, \$0.05 per MHz\*Pop.

116. We also will lower the number of bidding units associated with the
     RSA licenses by 40%, in order to maintain the one-to-one
     relationship between bidding units and upfront payment amounts. The
     number of bidding units associated with the MSA licenses will
     remain unchanged since the upfront payment amounts for those
     licenses are unchanged.

117. In order to take into account that rural and urban populations are
     mixed within a single license in the larger geographic licensing
     areas, we will apply the lower upfront payment formula for rural
     areas on a county-by-county basis for all licenses. More
     specifically, we will first break down the larger geographic areas
     into their component counties. The lower upfront payment formula of
     \$0.03 per MHz\*Pop will be applied to the population of those
     counties that are included in an RSA. The formula of \$0.05 per
     MHz\*Pop will be applied to the population of the remaining
     counties. The upfront payment amount for an EA or REAG license will
     be calculated as the sum of upfront payments for the counties in
     the EA or REAG. We will maintain the one-to-one relationship
     between bidding units and upfront payment amounts, so that bidding
     unit amounts will change with the changes in upfront payments.

118. We are not persuaded by comments proposing that we alter our
     upfront payment proposal in other ways. Communications Advisory
     Counsel argues that designated entities should be able to make
     lower upfront payments than other bidders.[^174] In light of the
     purpose of the upfront payments, we do not believe a different
     upfront payment for designated entities is appropriate. As the
     Commission noted in one of its earliest rulemakings regarding
     competitive bidding, "\[t\]he danger of insincere bidding, which
     upfront payments are designed to deter, exists to no less a degree
     with respect to these groups."[^175] Finally, Colts Neck suggests
     that the Commission forego its usual procedure of determining
     upfront payments and bidding eligibility and replace it with a
     requirement that bidders have a certain percentage of their bids on
     deposit with the Commission.[^176] We believe, however, that the
     use of upfront payments in connection with bidding eligibility in
     past auctions has been successful and no radical departure is
     needed.

119. The specific upfront payment amounts and associated bidding units
     for each license available in Auction No. 66 calculated pursuant to
     the procedures described above, as well as the aggregate reserve
     price for all AWS-1 licenses, are set forth in Attachment A.

120. In calculating its upfront payment amount, an applicant should
     determine the **maximum** number of bidding units on which it may
     wish to be active (bid on or hold provisionally winning bids on) in
     any single round, and submit an upfront payment amount covering
     that number of bidding units. In order to make this calculation, an
     applicant should add together the upfront payments for all licenses
     on which it seeks to be active in any given round. **Applicants
     should check their calculations carefully, as there is no provision
     for increasing a bidder's eligibility after the upfront payment
     deadline.**

  --------------- --------------------- ------------------ -----------------
  **Example:                                               
  Upfront                                                  
  Payments and                                             
  Bidding                                                  
  Flexibility**                                            

  **Market        **Market Name**       **Bidding Units**  **Upfront
  Number**                                                 Payment**

  BEA171-B        Anchorage AK          480,000            \$480,000

  BEA172-C        Honolulu HI           539,000            \$539,000

  If a bidder                                              
  wishes to bid                                            
  on both                                                  
  licenses in a                                            
  round, it must                                           
  have selected                                            
  both on its FCC                                          
  Form 175 and                                             
  purchased at                                             
  least 1,019,000                                          
  bidding units                                            
  (480,000 +                                               
  539,000). If a                                           
  bidder only                                              
  wishes to bid                                            
  on one, but not                                          
  both,                                                    
  purchasing                                               
  539,000 bidding                                          
  units would                                              
  meet the                                                 
  requirement for                                          
  either license.                                          
  The bidder                                               
  would be able                                            
  to bid on                                                
  either license,                                          
  **but not both                                           
  at the same                                              
  time**. If the                                           
  bidder                                                   
  purchased only                                           
  480,000 bidding                                          
  units, it would                                          
  have enough                                              
  eligibility for                                          
  the Anchorage,                                           
  AK license but                                           
  not for the                                              
  Honolulu, HI                                             
  license.                                                 
  --------------- --------------------- ------------------ -----------------

121. "Former defaulters" should calculate their upfront payment for all
     licenses by multiplying the number of bidding units on which they
     wish to be active by 1.5.[^177] In order to calculate the number of
     bidding units to assign to former defaulters, the Commission will
     divide the upfront payment received by 1.5 and round the result up
     to the nearest bidding unit. If a "former defaulter" fails to
     submit a sufficient upfront payment to establish eligibility to bid
     on at least one of the licenses applied for on its Form 175, the
     applicant will not be eligible to participate in the auction.

### Applicant's Wire Transfer Information for Purposes of Refunds of Upfront Payments

122. The Commission will use wire transfers for all Auction No. 66
     refunds. To ensure that refunds of upfront payments are processed
     in an expeditious manner, the Commission is requesting that all
     pertinent information listed below be supplied to the FCC.
     Applicants can provide the information electronically during the
     initial short-form filing window after the form has been submitted.
     (Applicants are reminded that information submitted as part of an
     FCC Form 175 will be available to the public; for that reason, wire
     transfer information should [not]{.underline} be included in an FCC
     Form 175.) Wire Transfer Instructions can also be manually sent by
     facsimile to the FCC, Financial Operations Center, Auctions
     Accounting Group, ATTN: Gail Glasser, at (202) 418-2843. All
     refunds will be returned to the payer of record as identified on
     the FCC Form 159 unless the payer submits written authorization
     instructing otherwise. For additional information, please call Gail
     Glasser at (202) 418-0578.

> Name of Bank
>
> ABA Number
>
> Address of Bank
>
> Contact and Phone Number
>
> Account Number to Credit
>
> Name of Account Holder
>
> FCC Registration Number (FRN)
>
> Taxpayer Identification Number (see below)
>
> Correspondent Bank (if applicable)
>
> ABA Number
>
> Account Number

(Applicants should also note that implementation of the Debt Collection
Improvement Act of 1996 requires the FCC to obtain a Taxpayer
Identification Number (TIN) before it can disburse refunds.[^178])
Eligibility for refunds is discussed in Section V.G., below.

## Auction Registration

123. Approximately ten days before the auction, the FCC will issue a
     public notice announcing all qualified bidders for the auction.
     Qualified bidders are those applicants whose FCC Form 175
     applications have been accepted for filing and have timely
     submitted upfront payments sufficient to make them eligible to bid.

124. All qualified bidders are automatically registered for the auction.
     Registration materials will be distributed prior to the auction by
     overnight mail. The mailing will be sent only to the contact person
     at the contact address listed in the FCC Form 175 and will include
     the SecurID® cards that will be required to place bids, the
     Integrated Spectrum Auction System (ISAS) Bidder's Guide, and the
     Auction Bidder Line phone number.

125. Qualified bidders that do not receive this registration mailing
     will not be able to submit bids. Therefore, any qualified bidder
     that has not received this mailing by noon on Thursday, June 22,
     2006, should call (717) 338-2868. Receipt of this registration
     mailing is critical to participating in the auction, and each
     applicant is responsible for ensuring it has received all of the
     registration material.

126. In the event that SecurID® cards are lost or damaged, only a person
     who has been designated as an authorized bidder, the contact
     person, or the certifying official on the applicant's short-form
     application may request replacement registration material.
     Qualified bidders requiring the replacement of these items must
     call Technical Support at (877) 480-3201, option nine; (202)
     414-1250; or (202) 414-1255 (TTY).

## Remote Electronic Bidding 

127. The Commission will conduct this auction over the Internet, and
     telephonic bidding will be available as well. Qualified bidders are
     permitted to bid electronically and telephonically. Each applicant
     should indicate its bidding preference -- electronic or telephonic
     -- on the FCC Form 175. In either case, each authorized bidder must
     have its own SecurID® card, which the FCC will provide at no
     charge. Each applicant with one authorized bidder will be issued
     two SecurID cards, while applicants with two or three authorized
     bidders will be issued three cards. **For security purposes, the
     SecurID**® **cards, the telephonic bidding phone number, and the
     Integrated Spectrum Auction System (ISAS) Bidder's Guide are only
     mailed to the contact person at the contact address listed on the
     FCC Form 175.** Please note that each SecurID® card is tailored to
     a specific auction; therefore, SecurID® cards issued for other
     auctions or obtained from a source other than the FCC will not work
     for Auction No. 66.

128. Please note that the SecurID® cards can be recycled, and we
     encourage bidders to return the cards to the FCC. We will provide
     pre-addressed envelopes that bidders may use to return the cards
     once the auction is over.

## Mock Auction -- June 26, 2006 

129. All qualified bidders will be eligible to participate in a mock
     auction on Monday, June 26, 2006. The mock auction will enable
     applicants to become familiar with the FCC Auction System prior to
     the auction. Participation by all bidders is strongly recommended.
     Details will be announced by public notice.

# AUCTION EVENT

130. The first round of bidding for Auction No. 66 will begin on
     Thursday, June 29, 2006. The initial bidding schedule will be
     announced in a public notice listing the qualified bidders, which
     is to be released approximately 10 days before the start of the
     auction.

## Auction Structure

### Simultaneous Multiple Round Auction

131. In the *Auction No. 66 Comment Public Notice*, we proposed to
     auction all AWS-1 licenses in a single auction using the
     Commission's standard simultaneous multiple-round ("SMR") auction
     format.[^179] As described further below, this type of auction
     offers every license for bid at the same time and consists of
     successive bidding rounds in which eligible bidders may place bids
     on individual licenses. A bidder may bid on, and potentially win,
     any number of licenses. Typically, bidding remains open on all
     licenses until bidding stops on every license, unless a modified
     stopping rule is invoked.

132. We also sought comment on the feasibility and desirability of
     allocating the AWS-1 licenses among two auctions, run concurrently,
     with one of the auctions using the standard SMR format and the
     other using the FCC's package bidding format ("SMR-PB").[^180]
     Under the SMR-PB format, bidders can place bids on groups of
     licenses they wish to win in combination, with the result that they
     win either all of the licenses in a group or none of them, in
     contrast to the license-by-license bidding in the FCC's SMR
     format.[^181] In the SMR-PB auction format, each bidder can have at
     most a single winning bid, so that in order to win any particular
     license combination, the bidder must have placed a package bid on
     that license or specific group of licenses.

133. Based on the record and our belief that a single SMR auction offers
     bidders a simple and effective means of bidding on single or
     multiple licenses without the additional complications that
     participating in two concurrent auctions would involve, we will
     proceed with our proposal to auction all AWS-1 licenses in a single
     auction using the Commission's standard SMR auction format.

134. Nearly all of the parties commenting on the issue of auction format
     support our proposal for one SMR auction for AWS-1. While some
     express concern or opposition to using package bidding generally,
     nearly all commenters oppose the option of running a package
     bidding auction concurrently with an SMR auction. For example,
     Cingular states its support for the concept of package bidding, but
     suggests that it be employed in an auction that is only
     SMR-PB.[^182] Those concerned with the complexity in bidding in two
     auctions at the same time stress difficulty in managing eligibility
     between the two, submitting upfront payments to participate in
     both, and keeping track of bidding among the auctions. The
     complexity level increases further given that the two concurrent
     auctions would have different auction designs.

135. A number of commenters express concern that smaller bidders,
     including rural carriers and new entrants, would be hardest hit by
     the increased complexity of two concurrent auctions and package
     bidding.[^183] Some commenters raise the possibility that an
     auction using a package bidding format, due to the so-called
     "threshold problem," may not assign licenses to the entities that
     value them most highly.[^184] Only two commenters favor allocating
     some AWS-1 licenses to a second auction with package bidding.
     Verizon Wireless suggests that package bidding would allow bidders
     to aggregate licenses more efficiently in order to acquire a
     nationwide footprint.[^185] We agree with those commenters who
     assert that an SMR auction of the AWS-1 licenses, which includes
     several large regional area blocks, will provide opportunities for
     bidders to aggregate licenses in order to obtain nationwide
     coverage.

136. While Verizon Wireless supports package bidding for the E and F
     Block AWS-1 licenses, it advocates that the auctions be run
     sequentially, not concurrently. In particular, Verizon Wireless
     suggests that the Commission run the SMR auction for A to D Blocks
     first using the standard SMR auction, followed shortly by an
     auction for the E and F blocks, allowing for package bidding.
     Comments filed by Paul Milgrom and Gregory Rosston agree in
     principle with sequential auctions, but specifically advocate the
     reverse order -- i.e., run the SMR-PB auction before the standard
     SMR one.[^186]

137. We find the choice of sequential auctions undesirable in these
     circumstances. First, it eliminates flexibility for the bidders, as
     the results from the first auction will stand regardless of how the
     second auction plays out. Second, as discussed earlier, the AWS-1
     licenses are subject to the CSEA aggregate reserve. Determining
     whether this is met is made much more difficult if two sequential
     auctions are held.

138. We conclude that it is operationally feasible and appropriate to
     auction the AWS-1 licenses through a single auction using the
     Commission's standard SMR auction format. Unless otherwise
     announced, bids will be accepted on all licenses in each round of
     the auction until bidding stops on every license. This approach, we
     believe, allows bidders to take advantage of synergies that exist
     among licenses and is administratively efficient.

139. Our decision not to employ an SMR-PB format for some AWS-1 licenses
     does not reflect on future use of package bidding in Commission
     auctions.

### Information Available to Bidders Before and During the Auction

140. **Summary.** In the *Auction No. 66 Comment Public Notice*, we
     proposed to withhold certain information on bidder interests, bids
     and bidder identities that typically has been revealed prior to and
     during past FCC auctions, in the event that a single SMR auction is
     held.[^187] In particular, we proposed not to reveal until the
     close of the auction: (1) bidders' license selections on their
     short form applications and the amount of their upfront
     payments; (2) the amounts of non-provisionally winning bids and the
     identities of bidders placing those bids; and (3) the identities of
     bidders making provisionally winning bids.[^188]

141. The proposal attracted a number of comments, both in support of our
     proposal and opposed to it. We continue to believe, as we noted in
     the *Auction No. 66 Comment Public Notice*, that there are benefits
     as well as potential harms from publicly revealing all information
     during the auction process. Also as stated in the *Auction No. 66
     Comment Public Notice*, we believe that the potential harms from
     anti-competitive behavior facilitated by the release of extensive
     information relating to bidder interests, bids, and bidder
     identities is likely to be greater when the auction is less
     competitive -- that is, when the number of bidders and the level of
     upfront payments are relatively low compared to the number of
     licenses offered. Therefore, in balancing the likely disadvantages
     of making such information available with the potential advantages
     to bidders from being able to formulate more accurate assessments
     of license values, we will make our approach contingent on the
     likely competitiveness of the auction. If we determine that the
     auction is likely to be highly competitive based on the number of
     bidders and upfront payments, and therefore, that the risk of
     successful collusion is low, we will make available bidding
     information that we typically have made available in previous
     Commission auctions. If, on the other hand, it appears that the
     auction may be less competitive, making it easier for bidders to
     signal and enforce cooperative divisions of the market, we will
     limit the information relating to bids and bidder identities in a
     manner that is largely consistent with our proposal in the *Auction
     No. 66 Comment Public Notice*. In this way, unless it appears that
     the costs to providing information are likely to be particularly
     high, we will provide bidders with information that may enhance
     their abilities to participate confidently and effectively in the
     auction.

142. We will estimate the level of competition in the auction by
     calculating a modified eligibility ratio based on upfront payments
     submitted by bidders. Using this estimate, we will determine the
     information procedures that will apply during bidding rounds.[^189]
     Specifically, if a modified eligibility ratio, defined as the total
     number of bidding units of eligibility purchased by bidders, capped
     as discussed below, relative to the total number of bidding units
     for the licenses in the auction, is equal to at least three, the
     auction will proceed under the information procedures typically
     used for past FCC auctions.[^190] For the purposes of calculating
     the modified eligibility ratio, a single bidder's eligibility will
     be capped at 50% of the total bidding units in the auction.[^191]

143. Alternatively, if the level of competition appears insufficient,
     that is if the modified eligibility ratio is less than three, we
     will limit the information that is released prior to and during the
     auction in a way that is substantially consistent with, but not
     identical to, our proposal in the *Auction No. 66 Comment Public
     Notice*. We will make available the total eligibility level for the
     auction as well as bidder-specific eligibility, although we will
     not identify bidders' license selections. After each round of
     bidding, the amounts of each bid placed will be made available, but
     not the identities of the bidders. Under our original proposal, for
     each license only the amounts of the provisionally winning bids and
     the number of bids on the license, not the amounts of
     non-provisionally winning bids, were to have been made available.

144. **Discussion.** As stated in the *Auction No. 66 Comment Public
     Notice*, the Commission has reserved the option to limit the
     availability of information on an auction-by-auction basis, and the
     Bureau retains discretion to limit the information disclosed to
     bidders. With a single early exception, the Commission has elected
     not to limit such information.[^192] Notwithstanding past
     decisions, the Commission believes that the public interest will
     best be served by limiting certain information relating to bidder
     interests, bids, and bidder identities in Auction No. 66, when it
     appears that the competitiveness of the auction is likely to be
     relatively low, as measured by the modified eligibility ratio.

145. This decision to make the availability of information contingent
     upon competitiveness is supported by a number of commenters. The
     notion of using a measure of likely competitiveness to determine
     how much information would be made available was first proposed by
     T-Mobile.[^193] Subsequently, other commenters have voiced support
     for compromise proposals that involve, among other criteria, basing
     the decision on information availability on a similar measure of
     total eligibility.[^194]

146. A number of commenters oppose our proposal to withhold certain
     information for the AWS-1 licenses, challenging the need to
     undertake measures to deter anti-competitive behavior in FCC
     auctions generally, and in particular, they question making changes
     to an established auction process immediately prior to a large
     auction of licenses suitable for high-valued uses.[^195] Some
     commenters note that the FCC has already modified its auction
     design to deter signaling,[^196] and claim that there is little or
     no evidence of coordinated bidding behavior in recent
     auctions.[^197]

147. In response, we note that it is in large part *because* the
     upcoming AWS-1 auction will make available a significant number of
     potentially valuable licenses that we will modify our usual bid and
     bidder information procedures at this time, if it appears that the
     auction may not be sufficiently competitive. With fewer bidders,
     the chances are greater that signaling and retaliatory behavior
     will be successful, with the result that licenses may not be
     assigned to the entities that value them most highly. The AWS-1
     licenses open up a new band to commercial wireless services, and
     represent a sizeable portion of existing spectrum available for
     innovative wireless services. Licensees will have considerable
     flexibility to respond to consumer demand for innovative advanced
     services, and we feel particularly obligated to assure that these
     licenses are assigned to those entities that will put them to their
     highest valued uses.

148. With respect to arguments that the FCC has already eliminated the
     possibility of bid signaling and has no evidence on which to base
     its beliefs that such behavior may occur in Auction No. 66, we note
     that at least two papers mentioned in this proceeding rely on
     signaling consistent with the FCC's current standard SMR auction
     format.[^198] Furthermore, since some types of signaling and
     coordinated bidding are very hard to detect in auction data, making
     it difficult to pursue enforcement actions after such alleged
     activity has occurred, it is important to reduce the potential for
     such collusive bidding behavior to occur in the first place, in
     circumstances in which we believe collusion is most likely to
     occur.

149. At the same time, we recognize that the information that has
     typically been provided during FCC auctions may be of value in
     helping bidders to form more accurate and confident assessments of
     license values, thus allowing them to participate more effectively
     in the auction.[^199] We believe that, under circumstances in which
     collusion is less likely to be successful, the benefits to bidders
     from making information available are likely to outweigh the
     potential harms from facilitating collusive behavior. As a result,
     we will not adopt our proposal to limit information when the
     auction is expected to be competitive as indicated by the modified
     eligibility ratio of three or more -- that is, when coordinated
     bidding activity is unlikely to be sustainable.

150. A number of commenters addressed the various benefits that
     information provides to bidders, especially to bidders with fewer
     resources, including many new entrants and rural carriers.[^200] In
     particular, these commenters suggest that knowing the identities of
     bidders active in particular markets yields useful data on such
     factors as the potential for negotiating roaming agreements;[^201]
     on the likelihood that infrastructure and equipment for certain
     technologies will be available;[^202] and on whether the structure
     of competition in a given market is likely to support the bidder's
     business plan.[^203] Some of the commenters also claim that that
     the uncertainty inherent in opening up a new spectrum band for as
     yet unknown services and technologies makes it all the more useful
     to participants to have such information as may be available,
     including round-by-round information on bids and bidders
     identities.[^204]

151. Some commenters opposing the proposal to withhold information state
     that the advantages gained by knowing bidder identities are
     particularly important to small and mid-sized entities and to new
     entrants and that consequently, they argue, limiting bid and bidder
     information will disadvantage those bidders
     disproportionately.[^205] Specifically, commenters suggest that
     smaller businesses rely more heavily on the need to negotiate
     agreements (on roaming and technological compatibility, for
     example) with neighboring service providers and therefore have a
     greater interest in knowing who adjacent licensees are likely to
     be.[^206] Some point out that niche service providers, and their
     financial backers, are particularly interested in knowing whether
     another entity targeting the same demographic population is likely
     to be competing in a given market.[^207] In addition, commenters
     say that financial backers of smaller firms trust that a bid by a
     market leader reflects a well-researched valuation and are more
     likely to be comfortable investing in a smaller entity if the
     smaller firm's bids are not out of line with those of the large
     entities. Accordingly, they claim, if investors do not have the
     reassurance of knowing how the large bidders are bidding, the
     additional risk will reduce the amount of capital they are willing
     to lend and, consequently, reduce what smaller firms are able to
     bid for and win at auction.[^208]

152. Commenters also suggest that the additional uncertainty about the
     value of licenses introduced by the lack of information on bidder
     identities will increase bidders' fear of the winner's curse,
     leading them to bid below their valuations for the licenses. Some
     assert that those most affected by the uncertainty will scale back
     their bids more than proportionately and that therefore, small
     bidders may fail to win licenses for which they are the highest
     valuing bidder, thereby lowering auction efficiency.[^209]

153. The costs to releasing information as some commenters request,
     however, likely will outweigh the potential advantages of releasing
     the information, if the level of competition in the auction seems
     insufficient to make cooperative divisions of the market difficult
     to signal and sustain.[^210] Accordingly, if the auction is not
     sufficiently competitive as indicated by the modified eligibility
     ratio, we will not provide the information, notwithstanding any
     potential benefits doing so might provide to some bidders.

154. Parties opposing our proposal to limit information point out a
     number of other factors which we also do not regard as sufficient
     to dissuade us from our decision to limit the information that will
     be made available if the modified eligibility ratio is below three
     for Auction No. 66. Some commenters warn that deliberate and
     inadvertent disclosures of information may represent a threat to
     the validity of the auction.[^211] We do not believe that
     significant disclosures are likely to occur, in part because
     revealing bids or bid strategies violates the Commission's
     anti-collusion rules, and in part because bidders will regard it as
     being in their interest to preserve the secrecy of their bidding
     activity.[^212] Furthermore, if an occasional disclosure does
     occur, we do not believe the auction is likely to be affected in a
     way which will compromise its validity. With respect to bidding
     data, much of the data that is generated after a round of a large
     SMR auction is superseded by data for the next round, so that the
     advantage to a bidder from knowing improperly disclosed information
     is likely to disappear within several hours. Milgrom and Rosston,
     commenting in support of our proposal to limit information
     availability, also notes that occasional disclosures, if they were
     to occur, would likely have little impact.[^213]

155. Several commenters suggest that a policy of limiting information
     relating to bidder interests prior to the auction, and limiting
     bidder identities during the auction constitutes a departure from
     the Commission's traditional commitment to a transparent auction
     process.[^214] We disagree. As discussed in the Auction No. 66
     Comment Public Notice, we plan to release all withheld information
     at the close of the auction. Bidders and the public will be able to
     examine all round-by-round bidding activity, and any allegations of
     irregular bidding conduct will be investigated. We note that even
     when bid and bidder information is not withheld, it is our policy
     generally to address any such concerns after the close of an
     auction, when there is greater opportunity for investigation of
     such allegations.[^215]

156. Commenters present various arguments regarding what information
     should be released and when, in the event that the Commission
     limits the information revealed in any way, as will be the case if
     the modified eligibility ratio is less than three. Some argue that
     particular information should be released,[^216] while others argue
     that the Commission should release all information but do so only
     at intervals.[^217] While these proposals may achieve some benefits
     by disclosing information, we are not persuaded any of them would
     be effective in preventing coordinated and retaliatory bidding,
     especially when competition in the auction is relatively weak,
     *e.g.*, the modified eligibility ratio is less than three, and,
     therefore, the risk of collusion is greatest.

157. We note again that even if the limited information procedures are
     in effect, we plan to make available during the auction the amounts
     of all bids placed on each license in each round. Even absent
     bidder identities, this information will give bidders an indication
     of demand for the licenses. Bidders and their investors will be
     able to observe the bids for licenses in the six offered spectrum
     blocks, which will help them assess whether their bids are likely
     to be consistent with the valuations of other bidders. This
     information will reduce uncertainty about license valuations,
     mitigating fear of the winner's curse for bidders and their
     financial backers.

158. **Other Issues.** We do not believe that the information disclosure
     procedures established for this auction will interfere with the
     administration of or compliance with the Commission's
     anti-collusion rule. Section 1.2105(c)(1) of the Commission's rules
     provides that after the short-form application filing deadline, all
     applicants for licenses in any of the same geographic license areas
     are prohibited from disclosing to each other in any manner the
     substance of bids or bidding strategies until after the down
     payment deadline, subject to specified exceptions.[^218] In past
     auctions, each applicant's selection of licenses has been publicly
     available through the Commission's on-line short-form application
     database. In Auction No. 66, however, the Commission may not
     disclose information regarding license selection until after the
     auction closes. As in the past, the Commission will disclose the
     other portions of applicants' short-form applications, through its
     on-line database and certain application-based information through
     public notices.[^219] Thus, even without information regarding
     license selection, applicants would be able to comply with Section
     1.2105(c) by not disclosing bids or bidding strategies to any other
     applicants in the auction. This approach, however, could inhibit
     otherwise lawful communications with applicants for licenses in
     other geographic license areas, which the Commission's rule
     permits.[^220] Consequently, the Bureau will notify separately each
     applicant with short-form applications to participate in a pending
     auction, including but not limited to Auction No. 66, whether
     applicants in Auction No. 66 have applied for licenses in any of
     the same geographic areas as that applicant. After the Bureau
     conducts its initial review of applications to participate in
     Auction No. 66, each applicant with a short-form application to
     participate in a pending auction will receive a letter that lists
     the applicants in Auction No. 66 that have applied for licenses in
     any of the same geographic areas as the applicant. The list will
     identify the Auction No. 66 applicant(s) by name but will not list
     the license selections of the Auction No. 66 applicant(s). As in
     past auctions, additional information regarding applicants in
     Auction No. 66 that is needed to comply with Section 1.2105(c),
     e.g., the identities of controlling interest in the applicant and
     ownership interests greater than ten percent (10%), will be
     available through the publicly accessible on-line short-form
     application database.[^221]

159. Finally, we do not agree with commenters that suggest that SEC
     rules requiring bidders to disclose material financial information
     might require bidders to disclose bidding information during the
     auction.[^222]^ ^ Neither MetroPCS nor U.S. Cellular cites any
     specific SEC requirement that explicitly requires disclosure of
     bidding information and we are aware of none. Until the SEC
     addresses the issue, the Commission will not presume that SEC rules
     require public disclosure of information about bidding while an
     auction is still underway.

### Eligibility and Activity Rules 

160. In the *Auction No. 66 Comment Public Notice*, we proposed that the
     amount of the upfront payment submitted by a bidder would determine
     the initial (maximum) eligibility (as measured in bidding units)
     for each bidder.[^223] One commenter suggested that the Commission
     eliminate the use of bidding units. Colts Neck suggests that the
     Commission define a bidder's eligibility simply as a multiple of
     the amount the bidder places on deposit with the Commission.[^224]
     This proposal ignores the Commission's use of bidding units to
     measure bidder participation in the auction pursuant to the
     Commission's activity rules. The Commission uses activity rules to
     move the auction at an appropriate speed while providing sufficient
     flexibility to permit bidders to pursue a wide range of alternative
     bidding strategies.[^225] We believe the Commission's activity
     rules serve an important purpose and decline to adopt the
     suggestion by Colts Neck Solutions, which would undermine those
     rules.

161. Accordingly, we adopt the proposed use of upfront payments to
     determine initial (maximum) eligibility (as measured in bidding
     units) for Auction No. 66. The amount of the upfront payment
     submitted by a bidder determines initial bidding eligibility, the
     maximum number of bidding units on which a bidder may be active. As
     noted earlier, each license is assigned a specific number of
     bidding units equal to the upfront payment listed in Attachment A
     on a bidding unit per dollar basis. Bidding units for a given
     license do not change as prices rise during the auction. A bidder's
     upfront payment is not attributed to specific licenses. Rather, a
     bidder may place bids on any of the licenses selected on its FCC
     Form 175 as long as the total number of bidding units associated
     with those licenses does not exceed its current eligibility.
     Eligibility cannot be increased during the auction; it can only
     remain the same or decrease. Thus, in calculating its upfront
     payment amount, an applicant must determine the maximum number of
     bidding units it may wish to bid on or hold provisionally winning
     bids on in any single round, and submit an upfront payment amount
     covering that total number of bidding units. **The total upfront
     payment does not affect the total dollar amount a bidder may bid on
     any given license.**

162. In order to ensure that an auction closes within a reasonable
     period of time, an activity rule requires bidders to bid actively
     throughout the auction, rather than wait until late in the auction
     before participating. Bidders are required to be active on a
     specific percentage of their current bidding eligibility during
     each round of the auction.

163. A bidder's activity level in a round is the sum of the bidding
     units associated with licenses on which the bidder is active. A
     bidder is considered active on a license in the current round if it
     is either the provisionally winning bidder at the end of the
     previous bidding round and does not withdraw the provisionally
     winning bid in the current round, or if it submits a bid in the
     current round (*see* "Minimum Acceptable Bid Amounts and Bid
     Increment Amounts" in Section IV.B.3, *below*). The minimum
     required activity is expressed as a percentage of the bidder's
     current eligibility, and increases by stage as the auction
     progresses. Communications Advisory Counsel urges that no minimum
     activity requirements be imposed on designated entities that apply
     to bid on less than one percent (1%) of the licenses available in
     Auction No. 66.[^226] In addition, Communications Advisory Counsel
     urges that a reduced minimum activity requirement should apply to
     all designated entities.[^227] No persuasive reason has been
     presented for applying different activity requirements to bidders
     that are designated entities than to other bidders. The
     Commission's activity rule paces the auction by requiring bidders
     to bid actively. There is no reason to modify this requirement
     based on either the number of licenses for which the bidder has
     applied or the bidder's status as a designated entity. Bidders
     applying for few licenses or that are designated entities suffer no
     disadvantage from complying with the same activity rule as other
     bidders. Because these procedures have proven successful in
     maintaining the pace of previous auctions (as set forth under
     "Auction Stages" in Section IV.A.4 and "Stage Transitions" in
     Section IV.A.5, *below*), we adopt them for Auction No. 66.

### Auction Stages

164. In the *Auction No. 66 Comment Public Notice*, we proposed to
     conduct the auction in two stages and employ an activity rule. We
     further proposed that, in each round of Stage One, a bidder
     desiring to maintain its current bidding eligibility would be
     required to be active on licenses representing at least 80 percent
     of its current bidding eligibility.[^228] Finally, we proposed that
     in each round of Stage Two, a bidder desiring to maintain its
     current bidding eligibility would be required to be active on at
     least 95 percent of its current bidding eligibility. One commenter
     directly addresses our proposal, expressing support.[^229]

165. We adopt our proposals for the activity rules and stages. Below are
     the activity levels for each stage of the auction. The Bureau
     reserves the discretion to further alter the activity percentages
     before and/or during the auction.

166. **Stage One:** During the first stage of the auction, a bidder
     desiring to maintain its current bidding eligibility will be
     required to be active on licenses representing at least 80 percent
     of its current bidding eligibility in each bidding round. Failure
     to maintain the required activity level will result in a reduction
     in the bidder's bidding eligibility in the next round of bidding
     unless an activity rule waiver is used. During Stage One, reduced
     eligibility for the next round will be calculated by multiplying
     the bidder's current round activity (the sum of bidding units of
     the bidder's provisionally winning bids and bids during the current
     round) by five-fourths (5/4).

167. **Stage Two:** During the second stage of the auction, a bidder
     desiring to maintain its current bidding eligibility is required to
     be active on 95 percent of its current bidding eligibility. Failure
     to maintain the required activity level will result in a reduction
     in the bidder's bidding eligibility in the next round of bidding
     unless an activity rule waiver is used. During Stage Two, reduced
     eligibility for the next round will be calculated by multiplying
     the bidder's current round activity (the sum of bidding units of
     the bidder's provisionally winning bids and bids during the current
     round) by twenty-nineteenths (20/19).

CAUTION: Since activity requirements increase in Stage Two, bidders must
carefully check their activity during the first round following a stage
transition to ensure that they are meeting the increased activity
requirement. This is especially critical for bidders that have
provisionally winning bids and do not plan to submit new bids. In past
auctions, some bidders have inadvertently lost bidding eligibility or
used an activity rule waiver because they did not re-verify their
activity status at stage transitions. Bidders may check their activity
against the required activity level by logging into the FCC Auction
System.

168. Because the foregoing procedures have proven successful in
     maintaining the proper pace in previous auctions, we adopt them for
     Auction No. 66.

### Stage Transitions

169. In the *Auction No. 66 Comment Public Notice*, we proposed that the
     auction would generally advance to the next stage (*i.e.*, from
     Stage One to Stage Two) when the auction activity level, as
     measured by the percentage of bidding units receiving new
     provisionally winning bids, is approximately 20 percent or lower
     for three consecutive rounds of bidding.[^230] We further proposed
     that the Bureau would retain the discretion to change stages
     unilaterally by announcement during the auction. This
     determination, we proposed, would be based on a variety of measures
     of bidder activity, including, but not limited to, the auction
     activity level, the percentages of licenses (as measured in bidding
     units) on which there are new bids, the number of new bids, and the
     percentage increase in revenue.[^231] The one commenter addressing
     the proposal directly supports it.[^232]

170. We adopt our proposal. Thus, the auction will start in Stage One
     and will generally advance to Stage Two when, in each of three
     consecutive rounds of bidding, the provisionally winning bids have
     been placed on 20 percent or less of the licenses being auctioned
     (as measured in bidding units).[^233] In addition, the Bureau will
     retain the discretion to regulate the pace of the auction by
     announcement. This determination will be based on a variety of
     measures of bidder activity, including, but not limited to, the
     auction activity level, the percentages of licenses (as measured in
     bidding units) on which there are new bids,[^234] the number of new
     bids, and the percentage increase in revenue. We believe that these
     stage transition rules, having proven successful in prior auctions,
     are appropriate for use in Auction No. 66.

### Activity Rule Waivers

171. In the *Auction No. 66 Comment Public Notice*, we proposed that
     each bidder in the auction be provided with three activity rule
     waivers.[^235] Three commenters address the proposal. T‑Mobile
     supports the proposal.[^236] Communications Advisory Counsel and
     the Blooston Rural AWS Coalition argue that designated entities
     should receive additional waivers, "to have the ability to take a
     'time out'" during the late stages of the auction.[^237] The
     comments requesting additional waivers do not demonstrate why the
     proposed three waivers are insufficient, or why designated entities
     might have a greater need for a "time out" than any other bidder.
     We adopt our proposal that each bidder be provided three activity
     rule waivers. We are satisfied that providing three waivers over
     the course of the auction will give bidders a sufficient number of
     waivers and flexibility, while also safeguarding the integrity of
     the auction.

172. Bidders may use an activity rule waiver in any round during the
     course of the auction. Use of an activity rule waiver preserves the
     bidder's current bidding eligibility despite the bidder's activity
     in the current round being below the required minimum activity
     level. An activity rule waiver applies to an entire round of
     bidding and not to a particular license. Activity rule waivers can
     be either applied proactively by the bidder (a "proactive waiver")
     or applied automatically by the FCC Auction System (an "automatic
     waiver") and are principally a mechanism for auction participants
     to avoid the loss of bidding eligibility in the event that exigent
     circumstances prevent them from placing a bid in a particular
     round.

173. The FCC Auction System assumes that bidders with insufficient
     activity would prefer to apply an activity rule waiver (if
     available) rather than lose bidding eligibility. Therefore, the
     system will automatically apply a waiver at the end of any bidding
     round where a bidder's activity level is below the minimum required
     unless: (1) there are no activity rule waivers available; or (2)
     the bidder overrides the automatic application of a waiver by
     reducing eligibility. If a bidder has no waivers remaining and does
     not satisfy the activity requirement, the FCC Auction System will
     permanently reduce the bidder's eligibility, possibly curtailing or
     eliminating the bidder's ability to place additional bids in the
     auction.

174. A bidder with insufficient activity that wants to reduce its
     bidding eligibility rather than use an activity rule waiver must
     affirmatively override the automatic waiver mechanism during the
     bidding round by using the "reduce eligibility" function in the FCC
     Auction System. In this case, the bidder's eligibility is
     permanently reduced to bring the bidder into compliance with the
     activity rules as described in "Auction Stages" (*see* Section
     IV.A.4 *above*). Once eligibility has been reduced, a bidder will
     not be permitted to regain its lost bidding eligibility even if the
     round has not yet closed.

175. Finally, a bidder may apply an activity rule waiver proactively as
     a means to keep the auction open without placing a bid. If a bidder
     proactively applies an activity waiver (using the "apply waiver"
     function in the FCC Auction System) during a bidding round in which
     no bids or withdrawals are submitted, the auction will remain open
     and the bidder's eligibility will be preserved. However, an
     automatic waiver applied by the FCC Auction System in a round in
     which there are no new bids or withdrawals will not keep the
     auction open. A bidder cannot submit a proactive waiver after
     submitting a bid in a round, and submitting a proactive waiver will
     preclude a bidder from placing any bids in that round. **Note:
     Applying a waiver is irreversible; once a proactive waiver is
     submitted that waiver cannot be unsubmitted, even if the round has
     not yet closed.**

### Auction Stopping Rules

176. For Auction No. 66, the Bureau proposed to employ a simultaneous
     stopping rule approach.[^238] The Bureau also sought comment on a
     modified version of the simultaneous stopping rule. The modified
     version of the stopping rule would close the auction for all
     licenses after the first round in which no bidder applies a waiver,
     places a withdrawal, or submits any new bids on any license on
     which it is not the provisionally winning bidder. Thus, absent any
     other bidding activity, a bidder placing a new bid on a license for
     which it is the provisionally winning bidder would not keep the
     auction open under this modified stopping rule.

177. The Bureau further proposed retaining the discretion to keep the
     auction open even if no new bids or proactive waivers are submitted
     and no provisionally winning bids are withdrawn in a round. In this
     event, the effect will be the same as if a bidder had applied a
     waiver. Thus, the activity rule will apply as usual, and a bidder
     with insufficient activity will either use an activity rule waiver
     (if it has any left) or lose bidding eligibility.

178. In addition, we proposed that the Bureau reserve the right to
     declare that the auction will end after a specified number of
     additional rounds ("special stopping rule"). If the Bureau invokes
     this special stopping rule, it will accept bids in the specified
     final round(s) and the auction will close.

179. We proposed to exercise these options only in circumstances such as
     where the auction is proceeding very slowly, where there is minimal
     overall bidding activity or where it appears likely that the
     auction will not close within a reasonable period of time.[^239] We
     noted that before exercising these options, the Bureau is likely to
     attempt to increase the pace of the auction by, for example,
     increasing the number of bidding rounds per day, and/or increasing
     the amount of the minimum bid increments for the limited number of
     licenses where there is still a high level of bidding activity.

180. In comments filed in response to the *Auction No. 66 Comment Public
     Notice*, Cingular asserts that the Commission should modify its
     simultaneous stopping rule to avoid the possibility that the
     stopping rule might close bidding before the net winning bids meet
     the reserve price.[^240] Cingular suggests that in the event the
     net winning bids do not meet the reserve price at the close of a
     round that would otherwise trigger the stopping rule, the
     Commission should announce that fact and hold the auction open for
     at least one more round.[^241] If subsequently the net winning bids
     do not meet the reserve price at the close of a round that would
     otherwise trigger the stopping rule, the Commission could close
     bidding and, if necessary, cancel the auction pursuant to
     statute.[^242] In a subsequent reply comment, U.S. Cellular
     supports Cingular's suggestion.[^243]

181. We believe that the proposal that the Bureau retain discretion to
     keep the auction open even if no new bids or proactive waivers are
     submitted and no provisionally winning bids are withdrawn in a
     round is sufficient to address the concerns raised in the
     comments.[^244] This differs from Cingular's proposal to the extent
     that the decision to keep bidding open will be within the Bureau's
     discretion. Unlike a fixed rule that the auction will remain open
     "at least one more round," this discretionary approach will not
     unnecessarily encourage bidders to "wait and see" if other bidders
     will raise bids to meet the reserve.[^245]

182. We believe that the proposed stopping rules are appropriate for
     Auction No. 66, because our experience in prior auctions
     demonstrates that these stopping rules balance interests of
     administrative efficiency and maximum bidder participation.
     Therefore we adopt the proposals made in the *Auction No. 66
     Comment Public Notice*. Auction No. 66 will begin under the
     simultaneous stopping rule approach, and the Bureau will retain the
     discretion to employ the other versions of the stopping rule.

### Auction Delay, Suspension, or Cancellation

183. In the *Auction No. 66 Comment Public Notice*, we proposed that, by
     public notice or by announcement during the auction, the Bureau may
     delay, suspend, or cancel the auction in the event of natural
     disaster, technical obstacle, evidence of an auction security
     breach, unlawful bidding activity, administrative or weather
     necessity, or for any other reason that affects the fair conduct of
     competitive bidding.[^246] We received no comment on this issue.

184. Because our approach to notification of delay during an auction has
     proven effective in resolving exigent circumstances in previous
     auctions, we adopt our proposed rules regarding auction delay,
     suspension, or cancellation. By public notice or by announcement
     during the auction, the Bureau may delay, suspend, or cancel the
     auction in the event of natural disaster, technical obstacle,
     evidence of an auction security breach, unlawful bidding activity,
     administrative or weather necessity, or for any other reason that
     affects the fair and competitive conduct of competitive bidding. In
     such cases, the Bureau, in its sole discretion, may elect to resume
     the auction starting from the beginning of the current round,
     resume the auction starting from some previous round, or cancel the
     auction in its entirety. Network interruption may cause the Bureau
     to delay or suspend the auction. We emphasize that exercise of this
     authority is solely within the discretion of the Bureau, and its
     use is not intended to be a substitute for situations in which
     bidders may wish to apply their activity rule waivers.

## Bidding Procedures

### Round Structure

185. The initial schedule of bidding rounds will be announced in the
     public notice listing the qualified bidders, which is released
     approximately 10 days before the start of the auction. Each bidding
     round is followed by the release of round results. Multiple bidding
     rounds may be conducted in a given day. Details regarding round
     results formats and locations will also be included in the
     qualified bidders public notice.

186. The Bureau has discretion to change the bidding schedule in order
     to foster an auction pace that reasonably balances speed with the
     bidders' need to study round results and adjust their bidding
     strategies. The Bureau may increase or decrease the amount of time
     for the bidding rounds and review periods, or the number of rounds
     per day, depending upon the bidding activity level and other
     factors.

### Reserve Price and Minimum Opening Bids

187. Section 309(j) of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, calls
     upon the Commission to prescribe methods by which a reasonable
     reserve price will be required or a minimum opening bid established
     when applications for FCC licenses are subject to auction (*i.e.*,
     because they are mutually exclusive), unless the Commission
     determines that a reserve price or minimum opening bid is not in
     the public interest.[^247] Consistent with this mandate, the
     Commission directed the Bureau to seek comment on the use of a
     minimum opening bid and/or reserve price prior to the start of each
     auction.[^248] Among other factors, the Bureau must consider the
     amount of spectrum being auctioned, levels of incumbency, the
     availability of technology to provide service, the extent of
     interference with other spectrum bands, and any other relevant
     factors that could have an impact on the spectrum being
     auctioned.[^249] The Commission concluded that the Bureau should
     have the discretion to employ either or both of these mechanisms
     for future auctions.[^250]

188. Congress recently required the Commission to revise existing
     regulations regarding reserve prices for auctions involving
     "eligible frequencies" subject to CSEA. CSEA defines "eligible
     frequencies" as including frequencies from 1710-1755 MHz.[^251]
     Thus, each AWS‑1 license authorizes use of frequencies, one-half of
     which are subject to CSEA requirements.[^252] In CSEA, Congress
     directed the Commission to make revisions that would to prescribe
     methods by which the total cash proceeds from any auction of
     licenses authorizing use of eligible frequencies shall equal at
     least 110 percent of the total estimated relocation costs provided
     to the Commission pursuant to CSEA.[^253] Accordingly, the
     Commission recently revised its reserve price rule.[^254]

189. CSEA also imposes other related requirements regarding the proceeds
     from an auction involving eligible frequencies. Pursuant to CSEA,
     the total cash proceeds "attributable to" eligible spectrum must be
     at least 110 percent of the total estimated relocation costs before
     the Commission may conclude the auction.[^255] If this condition is
     not met, CSEA requires that the Commission shall cancel the
     auction.[^256] Finally, in CSEA, Congress also directed that
     "\[c\]ash proceeds attributable to the auction of any eligible
     frequencies . . . shall be deposited in the Spectrum Relocation
     Fund" created by CSEA.[^257]

#### Reserve Price

190. Pursuant to CSEA, on December 27, 2005, NTIA notified the
     Commission of the estimated relocation costs and timelines for
     relocation of eligible federal entities assigned to frequencies
     from 1710 to 1755 MHz.[^258] NTIA reported that the total estimated
     relocation costs equal \$935,940,312. This information can be found
     at
     [[http://www.ntia.doc.gov/osmhome/reports/specrelo/index.htm]{.underline}](http://www.ntia.doc.gov/osmhome/reports/specrelo/index.htm).

191. Accordingly, in the *Auction No. 66 Comment Public Notice*, we
     proposed to establish an aggregate reserve price of
     \$1,029,534,343.20 for all AWS‑1 licenses.[^259] This aggregate
     reserve price is 110 percent of total estimated relocation costs of
     \$935,940,312 and therefore the minimum reserve price required by
     CSEA.

192. For purposes of determining whether a CSEA revenue requirement has
     been met, the Commission has determined that "total cash proceeds"
     means winning bids net of any applicable bidding credit discounts
     at the end of bidding (*e.g.*, exclusive of tribal lands bidding
     credits).[^260] Given that one-half of the frequencies authorized
     for use by each AWS-1 license is subject to CSEA, we proposed in
     the *Auction No. 66 Comment Public Notice*, that one-half of each
     relevant bid for each license would be considered "attributable" to
     "eligible frequencies" for purposes of CSEA. Accordingly, for
     determining whether the reserve price is met in Auction No. 66,
     one-half of each winning bid, net of any applicable bidding credit
     discounts at the end of bidding (*e.g..*, exclusive of tribal lands
     bidding credits) would be counted toward meeting the reserve price.
     Furthermore, consistent with the statute, the same amount would
     determine whether the auction may conclude pursuant to CSEA.

193. A few commenters disagree with our proposal to consider one-half of
     each relevant bid when determining whether the reserve price has
     been met. Verizon Wireless objects that the proposal wrongly
     "assumes that precisely one-half of any AWS-1 bid can be attributed
     to one-half the spectrum."[^261] Verizon Wireless also argues that
     by attributing only half of each relevant bid to meeting the
     reserve, the Commission is improperly "mandat\[ing\] how those
     funds should be apportioned over the 45 MHz of spectrum that will
     be cleared" and "ensur\[ing\] that a minimum of additional funds be
     secured for auctioning other spectrum separate from this band
     \[i.e., the other half of each license."[^262] This, according to
     Verizon Wireless, amounts to the Commission "attempt\[ing\] to
     assess a value \[of\] the spectrum being auctioned."[^263] In reply
     comments, Cingular and T-Mobile second Verizon Wireless's
     arguments.[^264]

194. We are not persuaded by these arguments. CSEA, which refers
     variously to "proceeds from any auction of eligible frequencies,"
     "proceeds attributable to such spectrum," and "proceeds
     attributable to the auction of any eligible frequencies," plainly
     provides that we may attribute a portion of bids for licenses that
     authorize use of both eligible and non-eligible frequencies to the
     amounts used to determine whether CSEA requirements have been met.
     Furthermore, it is reasonable to attribute one-half of relevant
     bids to determine whether the CSEA-required reserve price is met
     given that every AWS-1 license authorizes use of frequencies of
     which one-half are eligible frequencies.[^265] The fact that some
     parties may not value a license authorizing use of one-half of the
     frequencies of an AWS-1 license at precisely one-half the value of
     the corresponding AWS-1 license does not make this proposal
     unreasonable.

195. Attributing one-half of relevant bids to meeting the CSEA-required
     reserve price means that the reserve price only will be met if the
     full amount of relevant bids is double the reserve price. As
     reflected by Verizon Wireless's arguments, this could be viewed as
     effectively establishing a reserve price on the non-CSEA-eligible
     frequencies covered by the AWS-1 licenses. Contrary to Verizon
     Wireless, however, any effective reserve price for
     non-CSEA-eligible spectrum is well within the Commission's
     authority. Moreover, under present circumstances, the amount of the
     effective reserve is appropriate.

196. The Communications Act expressly contemplates that the Commission
     may adopt a reserve price in any competitive bidding for licenses
     and construction permits, not only when CSEA eligible frequencies
     are involved.[^266] The Commission's authority to do so furthers
     the Commission's statutory mandate to "recover\[\] for the public a
     portion of the value of the public spectrum resource."[^267]
     Verizon Wireless alleges that the proposed reserve price attempts
     to set the value of non-CSEA-eligible frequencies, which Verizon
     Wireless contends the Commission should not do. In the present
     circumstances, however, the amount of the effective reserve price
     on non-CSEA-eligible spectrum is determined by the reserve price on
     CSEA eligible spectrum. That amount, in turn, is based on NTIA's
     estimates of relocation costs to reimburse eligible federal
     entities. Thus, the reserve price does not attempt to, and does
     not, set the value of the non-CSEA eligible spectrum, any more than
     it sets the value of the CSEA eligible spectrum.

197. Finally, we believe that effectively requiring that the full amount
     of relevant bids to be twice the estimated relocations costs of
     eligible federal entities is consistent with CSEA. The AWS-1
     licenses were defined prior to the adoption of CSEA and Congress
     knew when it referred to "proceeds attributable" to eligible
     frequencies that the Commission intended to make available licenses
     combining eligible and non-eligible frequencies.

198. We adopt the proposal in the *Auction No. 66 Comment Public
     Notice*. We will apply an aggregate reserve price of
     \$1,029,534,343.20 to all AWS‑1 licenses in Auction No. 66. Given
     that one-half of the frequencies authorized for use by each license
     are CSEA eligible frequencies, one-half of each winning bid, net of
     any applicable bidding credit discounts at the end of bidding
     (*e.g.*, exclusive of tribal lands bidding credits), will be
     counted toward meeting the reserve price.

199. In light of the proposed procedures regarding information available
     to bidders,[^268] we also sought comment in the *Auction No. 66
     Comment Public Notice* on whether the Commission should announce
     before the close of bidding whether the reserve price has been met.
     In comments, Cingular stated that if the Commission proceeds with
     its proposal to limit information regarding provisionally winning
     bids, it should make an announcement when the reserve price has
     been met.[^269]

200. If information on net bids is withheld during the auction as
     described above (i.e., if the modified eligibility ratio is less
     than three), we agree with Cingular that an announcement should be
     made when the reserve price has been met.[^270] Therefore, if
     information regarding net bids is not provided, we will issue an
     announcement in the FCC Auction System stating that the reserve has
     been met immediately following the first round in which that
     occurs. Both the registered bidders and the general public will be
     able to view such announcements through the Commission's website.
     We caution, however, that an announcement that the reserve price
     has been met following a round of the auction does not guarantee
     that the reserve price will continue to be met. Accordingly, after
     making the initial announcement that the reserve has been met, we
     will make a further announcement in the FCC Auction System after
     any round in which the reserve price status changes. As noted in
     the *Auction No. 66 Comment Public Notice*, the amount of net
     winning bids may decline during an auction, if either provisionally
     winning bids are withdrawn or a higher gross but lower net bid
     displaces a prior provisional winner.[^271]

#### Minimum Opening Bids 

201. In addition to proposing an aggregate reserve price, the Bureau
     proposed in the *Auction No. 66 Comment Public Notice* to establish
     minimum opening bids for each license, while retaining discretion
     to lower the minimum opening bids.[^272] Specifically, for Auction
     No. 66, we proposed the following formula for calculating
     license-by-license minimum opening bids:

     \$0.05 \* MHz \* License Area Population.[^273]

     The Bureau sought comment on this proposal and, in the alternative,
     whether, consistent with the Section 309(j), the public interest
     would be served by having no minimum opening bid.[^274]

202. We received a variety of comments on the proposed level of minimum
     opening bids. Some commenters support the Bureau's proposal.[^275]
     A few commenters assert that no minimum opening bids should be
     established, given the use of a reserve price.[^276] Numerous
     commenters believe that the formula to determine upfront payments
     and minimum opening bids should not apply the same figure to a
     rural population as it does to an urban population. They assert
     that because of higher buildout costs, upfront payments and minimum
     opening bids for less densely populated areas should be lower than
     those for more densely populated areas.[^277] More specifically,
     many commenters contend that minimum opening bids for licenses
     covering RSAs should be lowered from \$0.05 per MHz\*Pop to \$0.01,
     0.02, or 0.025 per MHz\*Pop.[^278]

203. In addition, some commenters have argued that prior auction results
     and private market sales indicate that the proposed minimum opening
     bids for sparsely populated areas may exceed the market price of
     the license, potentially resulting in a number of unsold
     licenses.[^279]

204. In Commission auctions, minimum opening bids are intended to serve
     as useful starting points for bidding. Minimum opening bids are not
     intended to be estimates of final auction prices or to reflect all
     differences between license values. Accordingly, differences in
     license characteristics, such as population density, that may
     result in different final prices do not always necessitate
     different minimum opening bids for the licenses.

205. We are persuaded by the record, however, that minimum opening bids
     based on our proposal may be too high for licenses covering low
     density RSAs. We conclude that it is appropriate to reduce minimum
     opening bids for RSAs by forty percent (40%) from our initial
     proposal, *i.e.* to \$0.03 per MHz\*Pop. While some commenters
     argue for an even greater reduction, we are not persuaded that we
     should lower minimum opening bids any further.

206. No equivalent evidence supports a similar reduction in the minimum
     opening bids for licenses covering MSAs. Accordingly, we will adopt
     our initial proposal with respect to such licenses and set the
     minimum opening bids using the proposed formula, *i.e.*, \$0.05 per
     MHz\*Pop.

207. In order to take into account that rural and urban populations are
     covered by a single license in larger geographic area licenses, we
     will apply the lower minimum opening bid formula for rural areas on
     a county-by-county basis for all licenses. More specifically, we
     first will break down the larger geographic areas into their
     component counties.[^280] The lower minimum opening bid formula of
     \$0.03 per MHz\*Pop will be applied to the population of those
     rural counties that are included in an RSA. The formula of \$0.05
     per MHz\*Pop will be applied to the population of the remaining
     counties. The minimum opening bid for an EA or REAG license will be
     calculated as the sum of minimum opening bids for the counties in
     the EA or REAG. Finally, as described above, we have made
     corresponding changes in the upfront payments and bidding units for
     each licenses.[^281]

208. We did not receive any comments addressing our proposal that we
     retain the discretion to reduce minimum opening bid amounts. We
     adopt this proposal. The minimum opening bid amounts we adopt for
     Auction No. 66 are reducible at the discretion of the Bureau. We
     emphasize, however, that such discretion will be exercised, if at
     all, sparingly and early in the auction, *i.e.*, before bidders
     lose all activity waivers. During the course of the auction, the
     Bureau will not entertain requests to reduce the minimum opening
     bid amount on specific licenses.

209. The specific minimum opening bid amounts for each license available
     in Auction No. 66 calculated pursuant to the procedure describe
     above, as well as the aggregate reserve price for all AWS-1
     licenses, are set forth in Attachment A.

### Bid Amounts 

210. In each round, each eligible bidder will be able to place a bid on
     a particular license for which it applied in any of nine different
     amounts.[^282] The FCC Auction System will list the nine bid
     amounts for each license.[^283] The nine bid amounts for each
     license consist of the minimum acceptable bid amount calculated
     using an activity-based formula and additional amounts calculated
     using a bid increment percentage.

#### Minimum Acceptable Bid Amounts and Bid Increment Amounts 

211. In the *Auction No. 66 Comment Public Notice*, we proposed that the
     minimum acceptable bid amount for a license would be equal to its
     minimum opening bid amount until there is a provisionally winning
     bid for the license. After there is a provisionally winning bid for
     a license, the minimum acceptable bid amount for that license would
     be equal to the amount of the provisionally winning bid plus an
     additional amount calculated using an activity-based formula
     described below.[^284] We further proposed to retain the discretion
     to change the minimum acceptable bid amounts and bid increment
     amounts if circumstances so dictated.[^285] T-Mobile supports the
     proposal.[^286] Leap suggests that the Commission should reduce the
     percentage used to determine the minimum acceptable bid as the
     ratio of bidder eligibility to licenses, measured in bidding units,
     declines.[^287] In subsequent reply comments, U.S. Cellular
     supports this suggestion.[^288] In light of the Bureau's discretion
     to change the percentages during the auction, this suggestion can
     be taken into account without modifying the original proposal. The
     Bureau will consider the suggestion as it exercises its discretion
     during the auction.

212. Communications Advisory Counsel argues that the Commission should
     use a smaller percentage to determine acceptable bids for
     designated entities, in order to encourage designated entities to
     remain in the auction.[^289] Pursuant to the proposal, the Bureau
     has discretion to change the percentage in appropriate
     circumstances. It may be appropriate to reduce the percentage to
     encourage bidders to continue bidding on a license in certain
     circumstances. However, we are not persuaded that the percentage
     should be reduced solely for designated entities, or any other
     particular class of bidder. We do not believe it is necessary or
     appropriate to supplement the bidding credits the Commission
     provides to designated entities with customized bidding procedures.

213. As another alternative, Colts Neck argues that the Commission
     should simplify the determination of minimum acceptable bids using
     a simple percentage in place of an activity-based formula.[^290] It
     further argues that the Commission should permit bidders to bid in
     any amount above the minimum.[^291] We decline to adopt these
     alternatives. Determining minimum acceptable bid amounts based in
     part on bidding activity on a license helps pace the auction. We
     cannot be certain in advance of an auction that using a simple
     percentage will approximate results based on activity. Accordingly,
     we believe it is appropriate to use an activity-based formula to
     determine minimum acceptable bids, as well as additional bid
     amounts. Finally, with respect to amounts greater than the minimum
     acceptable bid, providing specified bid amounts both prevents
     bidders from sending signals in their bids and helps bidders avoid
     errors when inputting their bids. The Commission has successfully
     used this procedure to help achieve these purposes.

214. Based on our experience in prior auctions and taking into account
     the comments submitted on this issue, we adopt our original
     proposals for Auction No. 66. The activity-based formula calculates
     minimum acceptable bid amounts by first calculating a percentage
     increment. The percentage increment for each license is a function
     of bidding activity on that license in prior rounds; therefore, a
     license that has received many bids will have a higher percentage
     increment than a license that has received few bids. This allows
     the minimum acceptable bid amounts to be tailored to the activity
     on a license, decreasing the number of rounds it takes for license
     receiving many bids to reach their final prices. Equations and
     examples are shown in Attachment F.

215. The calculation of the percentage increment used to determine the
     minimum acceptable bid amounts for each license for the next round
     is made at the end of each round. The computation is based on an
     activity index, which is a weighted average of the number of bids
     in that round and the activity index from the prior round. The
     current activity index is equal to a weighting factor times the
     number of bidders that submit bids on the license in the most
     recent bidding round plus one minus the weighting factor times the
     activity index from the prior round.[^292] The activity index is
     then used to calculate a percentage increment by multiplying a
     minimum percentage increment by one plus the activity index with
     that result being subject to a maximum percentage increment. We
     proposed to initially set the weighting factor at 0.5, the minimum
     percentage increment at 0.1 (10%), and the maximum percentage
     increment at 0.2 (20%). Hence, at these initial settings, the
     percentage increment will fluctuate between 10% and 20% depending
     upon the number of bids for the license. We will round the result
     using our standard rounding procedures.[^293]

216. In the case of a license for which the provisionally winning bid
     has been withdrawn, the minimum acceptable bid amount will equal
     the second highest bid received for the license.[^294]

217. The minimum acceptable bid amount for a license will be equal to
     its minimum opening bid amount until there is a provisionally
     winning bid for the license. After there is a provisionally winning
     bid for a license, the minimum acceptable bid amount for that
     license will be equal to the amount of the provisionally winning
     bid plus an additional amount. Using the activity-based formula
     described above, the FCC Auction system will calculate a
     **percentage increment** at the end of each round to determine the
     minimum acceptable bid amount for each license for the next round.

#### Additional Bid Amounts 

218. The acceptable bid amounts in addition to the minimum acceptable
     bid amount for each license are calculated using a **bid
     increment** percentage. The first additional acceptable bid amount
     equals the minimum acceptable bid amount times one plus the bid
     increment percentage, rounded --- *e.g.*, if the increment
     percentage is 10 percent, the calculation is (minimum acceptable
     bid amount) \* (1 + 0.10), rounded, or (minimum acceptable bid
     amount) \* 1.10, rounded; the second additional acceptable bid
     amount equals the minimum acceptable bid amount times one plus two
     times the bid increment percentage, rounded, or (minimum acceptable
     bid amount) \* 1.20, rounded; the third additional acceptable bid
     amount equals the minimum acceptable bid amount times one plus
     three times the bid increment percentage, rounded, or (minimum
     acceptable bid amount) \* 1.30, rounded; etc. We will begin the
     auction with a bid increment percentage of 10 percent.

219. The Bureau retains the discretion to change the minimum acceptable
     bid amounts, the parameters of the formula to determine the
     percentage increment, and the bid increment percentage if it
     determines that circumstances so dictate. The Bureau will do so by
     announcement in the FCC Auction System during the auction. The
     Bureau may also use its discretion to adjust the minimum bid
     increment amount without prior notice if circumstances warrant.

### Provisionally Winning Bids 

220. At the end of each bidding round, a "provisionally winning bid"
     will be determined based on the highest bid amount received for
     each license. A provisionally winning bid will remain the
     provisionally winning bid until there is a higher bid on the same
     license at the close of a subsequent round. Provisionally winning
     bids at the end of the auction become the winning bids. Bidders are
     reminded that provisionally winning bids count toward activity for
     purposes of the activity rule.[^295]

221. In the Auction *No. 66 Comment Public Notice*, the Bureau proposed
     to use a random number generator to select a single provisionally
     winning bid in the event of identical high bid amounts being
     submitted on a license in a given round (*i.e.*, tied bids).[^296]
     One commenter addressed our proposed method for breaking
     ties.[^297] Sprint Nextel Corporation asserts that the use of a
     random number generator to break ties among bids amounts to using a
     system of random selection beyond the Commission's statutory
     authority to assign licenses.[^298] We disagree. Using a random
     number generator to break ties among bids submitted as part of a
     system of competitive bidding does not amount to random assignment
     of licenses. The statutory provision cited by Sprint Nextel
     Corporation, which terminates the Commission's prior authority
     pursuant to Section 309(i) of the Communications Act, simply does
     not apply to the Commission's authority to conduct competitive
     bidding pursuant to Section 309(j) of the Communications Act.[^299]
     Moreover, the random number generator only determines the
     provisionally winning bid after a round in which bidders submit tie
     bids. Bidders that lose a tie-break in one round are able to raise
     their bids in subsequent rounds. Consequently, a license only will
     be awarded to a bid that wins a tie-break if other bidders decline
     to raise their bids. This does not amount to a system of random
     selection. We did not receive any comments addressing the merits of
     the proposed method of breaking ties. In light of its successful
     use in prior auctions, we adopt the proposal.

222. A pseudo-random number generator based on the L'Ecuyer algorithms
     will be used to assign a random number to each bid.[^300] The tied
     bid with the highest random number wins the tiebreaker. The
     remaining bidders, as well as the provisionally winning bidder, can
     submit higher bids in subsequent rounds. However, if the auction
     were to end with no other bids being placed, the winning bidder
     would be the one that placed the selected provisionally winning
     bid.

223. During a round, a bidder may submit bids for as many licenses as it
     wishes (providing that it is eligible to bid), withdraw
     provisionally winning bids from previous rounds, remove bids placed
     in the current bidding round, or permanently reduce eligibility.
     Bidders also have the option of submitting and removing multiple
     bids and withdrawing multiple provisionally winning bids (subject
     to the limitation on withdrawal rounds discussed below) during a
     round. If a bidder submits multiple bids for a single license in
     the same round, the system takes the last bid entered as that
     bidder's bid for the round. Bidders should note that the bidding
     units associated with licenses for which the bidder has removed or
     withdrawn its bid do not count towards the bidder's current
     activity.

224. All bidding will take place remotely either through the FCC Auction
     System or by telephonic bidding. There will be no on-site bidding
     during Auction No. 66. Please note that telephonic bid assistants
     are required to use a script when entering bids placed by
     telephone. Telephonic bidders are therefore reminded to allow
     sufficient time to bid by placing their calls well in advance of
     the close of a round. Normally, five to ten minutes are necessary
     to complete a telephonic bid submission.

225. A bidder's ability to bid on specific licenses is determined by two
     factors: (1) the licenses selected on the bidder's FCC Form 175
     and (2) the bidder's eligibility. The bid submission screens will
     allow bidders to submit bids on only those licenses the bidder
     selected on its FCC Form 175.

226. In order to access the bidding function of the FCC Auction System,
     bidders must be logged in during the bidding round using the
     passcode generated by the SecurID® card and a personal
     identification number (PIN) created by the bidder. Bidders are
     strongly encouraged to print a "round summary" for each round after
     they have completed all of their activity for that round.

227. In each round, eligible bidders will be able to place bids on a
     given license in any of nine different amounts.[^301] For each
     license, the FCC Auction System will list the nine acceptable bid
     amounts in a drop-down box. [^302] Bidders use the drop-down box to
     select from among the acceptable bid amounts. The FCC Auction
     System also includes an "upload" function that allows bidders to
     upload text files containing bid information.

228. Until a bid has been placed on a license, the minimum acceptable
     bid amount for that license will be equal to its minimum opening
     bid amount. Once there are bids on a license, minimum acceptable
     bids for a license will be determined as described in Section
     IV.B.3.

229. Finally, bidders are cautioned to select their bid amounts
     carefully because, as explained below, bidders that withdraw a
     provisionally winning bid from a previous round, even if the bid
     was mistakenly or erroneously made, are subject to bid withdrawal
     payments.

### Bid Removal and Bid Withdrawal 

230. In the *Auction No. 66 Comment Public Notice*, the Commission
     proposed bid removal and bid withdrawal procedures.[^303] With
     respect to bid withdrawals, the Commission proposed limiting each
     bidder to withdrawals in no more than two rounds during the course
     of the auction. The round in which withdrawals are used would be at
     each bidder's discretion. T-Mobile expressed support for our
     proposal concerning bid withdrawals.[^304] The Commission adopts
     the proposal.

231. **Procedures.** Before the close of a bidding round, a bidder has
     the option of removing any bids placed in that round. By using the
     "remove bids" function in the FCC Auction System, a bidder may
     effectively "unsubmit" any bid placed within that round. A bidder
     removing a bid placed in the same round is not subject to
     withdrawal payments. Removing a bid will affect a bidder's activity
     for the round in which it is removed, *i.e.*, a bid that is removed
     does not count toward bidding activity. These procedures will
     enhance bidder flexibility during the auction, and therefore we
     adopt them for Auction No. 66.

232. Once a round closes, a bidder may no longer remove a bid. However,
     in later rounds, a bidder may withdraw provisionally winning bids
     from previous rounds using the "withdraw bids" function in the FCC
     Auction System (assuming that the bidder has not already withdrawn
     bids in a previous round). A provisionally winning bidder that
     withdraws its provisionally winning bid from a previous round
     during the auction is subject to the bid withdrawal payments
     specified in 47 C.F.R. § 1.2104(g). **Note: Once a withdrawal is
     submitted during a round, that withdrawal cannot be unsubmitted
     even if the round has not yet ended.**

233. In previous auctions, we have detected bidder conduct that,
     arguably, may have constituted anti-competitive behavior through
     the use of bid withdrawals. While we continue to recognize the
     important role that bid withdrawals may play in an auction, *i.e.*,
     reducing risk associated with efforts to secure various licenses in
     combination, we conclude that, for Auction No. 66, adoption of a
     limit on the use of withdrawals to two rounds per bidder is
     appropriate. By doing so we believe we strike a reasonable
     compromise that will allow bidders to use withdrawals. We base our
     decision on this issue upon our experience with bid withdrawals in
     prior auctions, including PCS D, E and F block and 800 MHz SMR, and
     FM broadcast auctions.

234. We will therefore limit the number of rounds in which bidders may
     place withdrawals to two rounds. These rounds will be at the
     bidder's discretion and there will be no limit on the number of
     bids that may be withdrawn in either of these rounds. Withdrawals
     during the auction will be subject to the bid withdrawal payments
     specified in 47 C.F.R. § 1.2104(g). Bidders should note that abuse
     of the Commission's bid withdrawal procedures could result in the
     denial of the ability to bid on a market.

235. If a provisionally winning bid is withdrawn, the minimum acceptable
     bid amount will equal the amount of the second highest bid received
     for the license, which may be less than, or in the case of tied
     bids, equal to, the amount of the withdrawn bid.[^305] To set the
     additional bid amounts, the second highest bid amount also will be
     used in place of the provisionally winning bid in the formula used
     to calculate bid increment amounts. The Commission will serve as a
     "place holder" provisionally winning bidder on the license until a
     new bid is submitted on that license.

236. **Calculation.** Generally, the Commission imposes payments on
     bidders that withdraw high bids during the course of an
     auction.[^306] If a bidder withdraws its bid and there is no higher
     bid in the same or subsequent auction(s), the bidder that withdrew
     its bid is responsible for the difference between its withdrawn bid
     and the provisionally winning bid in the same or subsequent
     auction(s).[^307] In the case of multiple bid withdrawals on a
     single license, within the same or subsequent auctions(s), the
     payment for each bid withdrawal will be calculated based on the
     sequence of bid withdrawals and the amounts withdrawn. No
     withdrawal payment will be assessed for a withdrawn bid if either
     the subsequent winning bid or any of the intervening subsequent
     withdrawn bids, in either the same or subsequent auctions(s),
     equals or exceeds that withdrawn bid. Thus, a bidder that withdraws
     a bid will not be responsible for any withdrawal payments if there
     is a subsequent higher bid in the same or subsequent
     auction(s).[^308] This policy allows bidders most efficiently to
     allocate their resources as well as to evaluate their bidding
     strategies and business plans during an auction while, at the same
     time, maintaining the integrity of the auction process. The Bureau
     retains the discretion to scrutinize multiple bid withdrawals on a
     single license for evidence of anti-competitive strategic behavior
     and take appropriate action when deemed necessary.

237. Section 1.2104(g)(1) of the rules sets forth the payment
     obligations of a bidder that withdraws a high bid on a license
     during the course of an auction, and provides for the assessment of
     interim bid withdrawal payments.[^309] The Commission recently
     revised Section 1.2104(g)(1) to provide that in advance of each
     auction it shall establish the percentage of the withdrawn bid to
     be assessed as an interim bid withdrawal payment between three
     percent (3%) and twenty percent (20%).[^310] Further, the rule
     provides that the Commission will set the percentage of withdrawn
     bids to be assessed as interim bid withdrawal payments prior to
     each auction. In the *Auction No. 66 Comment Public Notice*, we
     proposed to establish the percentage at ten percent (10%) for the
     AWS-1 auction and sought comment on the proposal.

238. Commenters divided on the proposed interim bid withdrawal
     percentage, with some arguing that it would be too high, others too
     low, and others supporting our proposal.[^311]

239. We adopt our proposal. The Commission will assess an interim
     withdrawal payment equal to ten percent (10%) of the amount of the
     withdrawn bids. The ten percent (10%) interim payment will be
     applied toward any final bid withdrawal payment that will be
     assessed after subsequent auction of the license. Assessing an
     interim bid withdrawal payment ensures that the Commission receives
     a minimal withdrawal payment pending assessment of any final
     withdrawal payment. Section 1.2104(g) provides specific examples
     showing application of the bid withdrawal payment rule.[^312]

### Round Results

240. As described above, the information available after each round will
     vary depending on whether the modified eligibility ratio indicates
     the strong likelihood of a highly competitive auction. If the
     modified eligibility ratio is less than three and information is
     withheld in accordance with the proposed as modified above,
     information about the results of a round will be made public after
     the conclusion of the round.[^313] Specifically, after a round
     closes, the Bureau will compile a report listing each license, its
     current provisionally winning bid amount, the minimum acceptable
     bid amount for the following round, the number of bids placed on
     the license during the round, and whether the license is FCC held.
     The Bureau will post the report so that it is publicly accessible.
     Moreover, after the auction, the Bureau will release complete
     reports of all bids placed during each round of the auction,
     including bidder identities. The Bureau will post those reports so
     that they are publicly accessible.

241. If, however, the modified eligibility ratio indicates the strong
     likelihood of a highly competitive auction (i.e., the modified
     eligibility ratio is three or greater), information will be
     provided in the same fashion typically provided after each round in
     the auction. Bids placed during a round will be made public at the
     conclusion of that round. Specifically, after a round closes, the
     Bureau will compile reports of all bids placed and which bidders
     made them, current provisionally winning bids, new minimum
     acceptable bid amounts, and bidder eligibility status (bidding
     eligibility and activity rule waivers) and will post the reports
     for public access.

### Auction Announcements

242. The Commission will use auction announcements to announce items
     such as schedule changes and stage transitions. All auction
     announcements will be available by clicking a link in the FCC
     Auction System.

### Maintaining the Accuracy of FCC Form 175 Information

243. As noted in Section II.H., after the short-form filing deadline,
     applicants may make only minor changes to their FCC Form 175
     applications, for example, deletion and addition of authorized
     bidders (to a maximum of three). Applicants must click on the
     **SUBMIT** button in the FCC Auction System for the changes to be
     submitted and considered by the Commission. In addition, applicants
     should submit a letter, briefly summarizing the changes, by
     electronic mail to the attention of Margaret Wiener, Chief,
     Auctions and Spectrum Access Division, at the following address:
     <auction66@fcc.gov>. The electronic mail summarizing the changes
     must include a subject or caption referring to Auction No. 66 and
     the name of the applicant. The Bureau requests that parties format
     any attachments to electronic mail as Adobe^®^ Acrobat^®^ (pdf) or
     Microsoft^®^ Word documents.

244. Applicants should [not]{.underline} submit application-specific
     material through ECFS into the record of the proceeding concerning
     Auction No. 66 procedures.

# POST-AUCTION PROCEDURES

## Down Payments 

245. After bidding has ended, the Commission will issue a public notice
     declaring the auction closed and identifying winning bidders, down
     payments and final payments due.

246. Within ten business days after release of the auction closing
     notice, each winning bidder must submit sufficient funds (in
     addition to its upfront payment) to bring its total amount of money
     on deposit with the Commission for Auction No. 66 to 20 percent of
     the net amount of its winning bids (gross bids less any applicable
     small business or very small business bidding credits).[^314]

## Final Payments

247. Each winning bidder will be required to submit the balance of the
     net amount of its winning bids within 10 business days after the
     deadline for submitting down payments.[^315]

## Long-Form Application (FCC Form 601)

248. Within ten business days after release of the auction closing
     notice, winning bidders must electronically submit a properly
     completed long-form application (FCC Form 601) for each license won
     through Auction No. 66. Winning bidders that are small businesses
     or very small businesses must demonstrate their eligibility for a
     small business or very small business bidding credit.[^316] Further
     filing instructions will be provided to auction winners at the
     close of the auction.

249. The recently adopted *CSEA/Part 1 Report and Order* modifies the
     procedure by which a consortium that is a winning bidder in Auction
     No. 66 will apply for a license.[^317] In particular, (a) each
     member or group of members of a winning consortium seeking separate
     licenses will be required to file a separate long-form application
     for its respective license(s) and, in the case of a license to be
     partitioned or disaggregated, the member or group filing the
     applicable long-form application shall provide the parties'
     partitioning or disaggregation agreement in its long-form
     application; (b) two or more consortium members seeking to be
     licensed together shall first form a legal business entity; and (c)
     any such entity must meet the applicable eligibility requirements
     in our rules for small business or entrepreneur status.[^318]
     Applicants applying as consortia should review the *CSEA/Part 1
     Report and Order* in detail and monitor any relevant future
     proceedings to understand how the members of the consortia will
     apply for a license in the event they are winning bidders.

## Ownership Disclosure Information Report (FCC Form 602) 

250. At the time it submits its long-form application (FCC Form 601),
     each winning bidder also must comply with the ownership reporting
     requirements as set forth in 47 C.F.R. §§ 1.913, 1.919, and 1.2112.
     An ownership disclosure record is automatically created in ULS for
     any applicant that submits an FCC Form 175. However, winning
     bidders will be required to review and confirm that it is complete
     and accurate as of the date of filing Form 601. Further
     instructions will be provided to auction winning bidders at the
     close of the auction.

## Tribal Lands Bidding Credit

251. A winning bidder that intends to use its license(s) to deploy
     facilities and provide services to federally recognized tribal
     lands that are unserved by any telecommunications carrier or that
     have a wireline penetration rate equal to or below 85 percent is
     eligible to receive a tribal lands bidding credit as set forth in
     47 C.F.R. §§ 1.2107 and 1.2110(f). A tribal lands bidding credit is
     in addition to, and separate from, any other bidding credit for
     which a winning bidder may qualify.

252. Unlike other bidding credits that are requested prior to the
     auction, a winning bidder applies for the tribal lands bidding
     credit **after** winning the auction when it files its long-form
     application (FCC Form 601). When initially filing the long-form
     application, the winning bidder will be required to advise the
     Commission whether it intends to seek a tribal lands bidding
     credit, for each market won in the auction, by checking the
     designated box(es). After stating its intent to seek a tribal lands
     bidding credit, the applicant will have 180 days from the close of
     the long-form filing window to amend its application to select the
     specific tribal lands to be served and provide the required tribal
     government certifications. Licensees receiving a tribal lands
     bidding credit are subject to performance criteria as set forth in
     47 C.F.R. § 1.2110(f)(3)(vi).[^319]

253. The award of tribal lands bidding credits well after the end of
     bidding could reduce the auction's net winning bids to less than
     the proceeds required by CSEA and therefore require cancellation of
     the auction long after the bidding has ended. In the recently
     adopted *CSEA/Part 1 Report and Order*, the Commission modified its
     tribal lands bidding credit rules to prevent this potential result.
     Pursuant to the new rules, the funds available for tribal lands
     bidding credits will be determined by the amount by which winning
     bids for licenses subject to the reserve price, net of discounts
     the Commission takes into account when reporting net bids in the
     public notice closing the auction, exceed the reserve price.[^320]
     In the event that the funds available are less than the full amount
     for which auction winners seeking tribal lands bidding credits
     might qualify, each applicant eligible for a tribal lands bidding
     credit will receive a pro rata portion of the available funds. The
     ratio of (a) each applicant's pro rata credit to (b) the total
     funds available for tribal lands bidding credits will equal the
     ratio of (a) the applicant's full credit (the tribal lands bidding
     credit for which that applicant would have qualified absent
     limitations resulting from the reserve price) to (b) the aggregate
     maximum amount of tribal lands bidding credits for which all
     applicants might have qualified absent limitations resulting from
     the reserve price. In order to assure that funds are available for
     all applicants seeking tribal lands bidding credits, the Commission
     will calculate the aggregate maximum amount of tribal lands bidding
     credits for which all applicants might have qualified by assuming
     that any applicant seeking a tribal lands bidding credit on its
     long-form application will be eligible for the largest tribal lands
     bidding credit possible for its bid for its license, absent
     limitations resulting from the reserve price. The Commission will
     use this ratio to determine the pro rata credit awarded when the
     Commission grants the license.[^321]

254. The Commission recognized that it may be able to award each
     applicant proving eligibility for a pro rata tribal lands bidding
     credit a larger amount in the event that any other applicant
     ultimately proves to be eligible for less than the largest possible
     tribal lands bidding credit. Funds available for an applicant that
     proves to be eligible for less than the largest possible credit can
     be used to increase pro rata credits for other applicants. However,
     the largest possible pro rata credit for an applicant only can be
     determined after all applications seeking a tribal lands bidding
     credit with respect to licenses covered by a reserve price have
     been finally resolved.[^322] Accordingly, pro rata tribal lands
     bidding credits will be recalculated once all such applications
     have been finally resolved.

255. After all such applications have been finally resolved, the
     Commission will recalculate the amount of pro rata credits using
     the aggregate amount of actual full credits -- i.e., the tribal
     lands bidding credits for which the applicants would have qualified
     absent the limitations resulting from the reserve price -- rather
     than the hypothetical maximum aggregate amount for which all
     applicants might have qualified. In other words, the ratio of (a)
     each applicant's recalculated pro rata credit to (b) the total
     funds available for tribal lands bidding credits will equal the
     ratio of (a) the applicant's full credit (the tribal lands bidding
     credit for which that applicant would have qualified absent
     limitations resulting from the reserve price) to (b) the aggregate
     amount of the actual full credits. In the event that the
     recalculated pro rata credit is larger than the initial pro rata
     credit, the Commission will award the difference. If the second
     calculation produces a different result from the first, it will
     reflect the fact that when the amount of any one applicant's
     portion of the fixed funds available for tribal lands bidding
     credits decreases, the amounts of other applicants' portions should
     increase. An applicant's portion of the fixed funds might decrease,
     for example, if it reaches agreements with tribal governments
     regarding service for less than the full area of tribal land
     covered by the license. Consequently, that applicant may be
     eligible for a credit smaller than the largest credit
     possible.[^323]

256. For additional information on the tribal lands bidding credit,
     including how the amount of the credit is calculated, applicants
     should review the Commission's rule making proceeding regarding
     tribal lands bidding credits and related public notices.[^324]
     Relevant documents can be viewed on the Commission's web site by
     going to
     [http://wireless.fcc.gov/auctions](http://wireless.fcc.gov/auctions/default.htm?job=auctions_home)
     and clicking on the **Tribal Land Credits** link.

## Default and Disqualification

257. Any high bidder that defaults or is disqualified after the close of
     the auction (i.e., fails to remit the required down payment within
     the prescribed period of time, fails to submit a timely long-form
     application, fails to make full payment, or is otherwise
     disqualified) will be subject to the payments described in 47
     C.F.R. § 1.2104(g)(2). The payments include both a deficiency
     payment, equal to the difference between the amount of the bidder's
     bid and the amount of the winning bid the next time a license
     covering the same spectrum is won in an auction, plus an additional
     payment equal to a percentage of the defaulter's bid or of the
     subsequent winning bid, whichever is less. Pursuant to recent
     modifications to the rule governing default payments, the
     percentage of the applicable bid to be assessed as an additional
     payment for defaults in a particular auction will be established in
     advance of the auction. Accordingly, in the *Auction No. 66 Comment
     Public Notice*, we proposed to set the additional default payment
     for the auction of AWS-1 licenses at ten percent (10%) of the
     applicable bid. We sought comment on our proposal.

258. Some commenters supported the proposal as setting an appropriate
     deterrent to default.[^325] Others contend that there is no reason
     to increase the percentage of the additional default payment from
     three percent (3%) as provided under prior rules.[^326] As these
     comments reflect, the primary purpose of setting the additional
     default payment is to deter defaults.[^327] The precise level of
     deterrence provided by any particular percentage is difficult to
     determine. However, continued defaults in past Commission auctions
     indicate that the prior level of three percent (3%) is not
     sufficient.[^328] Moreover, as noted in the *Auction No. 66 Comment
     Public Notice*, the public interest in rapid deployment of new
     advanced wireless services using licenses available for the first
     time in Auction No. 66 would be adversely affected by
     defaults.[^329] We continue to believe our proposal to increase the
     percentage from three percent (3%) to ten percent (10%) is in the
     public interest. We therefore adopt our proposal and set the
     additional default payment for the auction of AWS-1 licenses at ten
     percent (10%) of the applicable bid.

259. Finally, we note that in the event of a default, the Commission may
     re-auction the license or offer it to the next highest bidder (in
     descending order) at its final bid amount.[^330] In addition, if a
     default or disqualification involves gross misconduct,
     misrepresentation, or bad faith by an applicant, the Commission may
     declare the applicant and its principals ineligible to bid in
     future auctions, and may take any other action that it deems
     necessary, including institution of proceedings to revoke any
     existing licenses held by the applicant.[^331]

## Refund of Remaining Upfront Payment Balance 

260. All applicants that submit upfront payments but after the close of
     the auction are not winning bidders for a license in Auction No. 66
     may be entitled to a refund of their remaining upfront payment
     balance after the conclusion of the auction. All refunds will be
     returned to the payer of record, as identified on the FCC Form 159,
     unless the payer submits written authorization instructing
     otherwise.

261. Bidders that drop out of the auction completely may be eligible for
     a refund of their upfront payments before the close of the auction.
     Qualified bidders that have exhausted all of their activity rule
     waivers, have no remaining bidding eligibility, and have not
     withdrawn a provisionally winning bid during the auction must
     submit a written refund request. If the applicant has completed the
     refund instructions electronically, then a written request for the
     refund is not necessary. If not, the request must be in writing and
     include wire transfer instructions, Taxpayer Identification Number
     (TIN) and FCC Registration Number (FRN). Send refund requests to:

> Federal Communications Commission
>
> Financial Operations Center
>
> Auctions Accounting Group
>
> Gail Glasser
>
> 445 12th Street, SW, Room 1-C864
>
> Washington, DC 20554

262. Bidders are encouraged to file their refund information
     electronically using the **Refund Information** icon found on the
     *Auction Application Manager* page or through the **Wire Transfer
     for Refund Purposes** link available in various locations
     throughout the FCC Auction System, but bidders may also send their
     information by facsimile to the Auctions Accounting Group at (202)
     418-2843. Once the information has been approved, a refund will be
     sent to the party identified in the refund information.

NOTE: Refund processing generally takes up to two weeks to complete.
Bidders with questions about refunds should contact Gail Glasser at
(202) 418-0578.

# Contacts

**Media Contact:**

For press inquiries: Chelsea Fallon (202) 418-7991

**Auctions and Spectrum Access Division:**

For legal questions: Scott Mackoul at (202) 418-0660

For general auction questions: Roy Knowles or Lisa Stover at (717)
338-2888

**Broadband Division:**

For legal and technical questions:  David Hu or John Spencer at (202)
418-0200 

For licensing questions:  Beth Fishel at (717) 338-2649

To request materials in accessible formats (Braille, large print,
electronic files, audio format) for people with disabilities, send an
e-mail to <fcc504@fcc.gov> or call the Consumer and Governmental Affairs
Bureau at (202) 418-0530 or (202) 418-0432 (TTY).

Action by the Commission on April 12, 2006.

**\-- FCC \--**

#  {#section-1 .unnumbered}

**Auction No. 66**

**FCC 06-47**

**Attachment A**

#  {#section-2 .unnumbered}

SEE SEPARATE DOCUMENT

# attachment B {#attachment-b .unnumbered}

**Auction No. 66 \-- Advanced Wireless Services (AWS-1) Procedures**

**AU Docket No. 06-30**

**[Initial Comments]{.underline}**

1.  3G Comm, LLC

2.  Advance Communications Technology, Inc.

3.  Alpine Communications, LC

4.  Alltel Corporation ("Alltel")

5.  Bajari, Prof. Patrick and Prof. Jeremy T. Fox (University of
    Michigan/NBER and University of Chicago)

6.  Brusco, Prof. Sandro and Prof. Giuseppe Lopomo (SUNY-Stony Brook and
    Duke University) ("Brusco/Lopomo")

7.  CC Communications

8.  Cameron Communications, LLC

9.  Cascade Communications Company

10. Centennial Communications Corporation ("Centennial")

11. Center on the Study of Auctions, Procurements and Competition Policy
    at Penn State University

12. Cingular Wireless LLC ("Cingular")

13. Chibardun Telephone Cooperative, Inc.

14. Clear Lake Independent Telephone Company

15. Colts Neck Solutions, LLC ("Colts Neck")

16. Columbia Capital LLC and MC Venture Partners ("Columbia/MC")

17. Communications Advisory Counsel ("CAC")

18. Consolidated Telecom

19. Cooper Valley Wireless

20. CTIA - The Wireless Association ("CTIA")

21. Dubois Telephone Exchange, Inc.

22. East Buchanan Telephone Cooperative

23. Emery Telecom

24. Farmers' and Business Mens' Telephone Company

25. Farmers Mutual Telephone Company ("Farmers Mutual")

26. Fidelity Communications Co.

27. Grand Mound Cooperative Telephone Association

28. Interstate Telecommunications Cooperative, Inc.

29. Kennebec Telephone Co., Inc.

30. Leap Wireless International, Inc. ("Leap")

31. Lost Nation-Elwood Telephone Company

32. Marne & Elk Horn Telephone Company

33. MetroPCS Communications, Inc. ("MetroPCS")

34. Miles Co-op Telephone Association

35. Milgrom, Paul and Gregory Rosston, Stanford Institute for Economic
    Policy Research ("Milgrom/Rosston")

36. National Telecommunications Cooperative Association ("NTCA")

37. NTCH, Inc. d/b/a Clear Talk ("NTCH")

38. Nucla-Naturita Telephone Company

39. Premier Communications

40. Reuters America, LLC ("Reuters")

41. RT Communications, Inc.

42. Rural Telecommunications Group, Inc. ("RTG")

43. South Central Utah Telephone

44. Sprint Nextel Corporation ("Sprint Nextel")

45. T-Mobile USA, Inc. ("T-Mobile")

46. UBTA-UBET Communications

47. United States Cellular Corporation ("U.S. Cellular")

48. Van Buren Telephone Co., Inc.

49. Venture Communications Corporation, Inc.

50. Verizon Wireless

51. Webster-Calhoun Cooperative Telephone Association

52. Winnebago Cooperative Telephone Association ("WCTA")

53. Wirefree Partners III, LLC ("Wirefree")

54. Yadkin Valley Telephone Membership Corp.

**[Reply Comments]{.underline}**

1.  Alltel

2.  Blooston Rural AWS Coalition ("Blooston Coalition")

3.  Brusco/Lopomo

4.  Centennial

5.  Cingular

6.  Colts Neck

7.  Federal Trade Commission, Bureau of Economics ("FTC-Economics")

8.  Leap

9.  Madison Dearborn Partners, LLC ("Madison Dearborn") and TA
    Associates, Inc. (jointly "MDP/TA")

10. MetroPCS

11. Milgrom/Rosston

12. NTCA

13. Organization for the Promotion and Advancement of Small
    Telecommunications Companies ("OPASTCO")

14. T-Mobile

15. U.S. Cellular

16. Verizon Wireless

**[*Ex Parte* Submissions and Late-Filed Comments]{.underline}**

1.  Alltel

2.  Colts Neck

3.  Common Cause, Consumer Federation of America, Consumers Union, Free
    Press, Media Access Project, New America Foundation, the National
    Hispanic Media Coalition, and US PIRG, jointly

4.  Cramton, Prof. Peter (University of Maryland, Department of
    Economics)

5.  CTIA

6.  Dobson Communications Corporation

7.  Frontier Communications Corporation

8.  Leap (separately and jointly with Centennial; Cingular; Columbia/MC;
    Cleveland Unlimited, Inc. d/b/a Revol; Dobson; 3G PCS, LLC; U.S.
    Cellular; MetroPCS; and RTG)

9.  Madison Dearborn

10. MetroPCS (separately and jointly with Cingular; Columbia/MC; Edge
    Wireless Licenses, LLC; Leap; Madison Dearborn; RTG; T-Mobile; and
    U.S. Cellular)

11. Minority Media and Telecommunications Council

12. Royal Street Communications, LLC

13. RTG

14. T-Mobile

15. U.S. Cellular

16. United States Department of Justice ("DOJ")

17. Verizon Wireless

**ATTACHMENT C**

**FCC AUCTION NO. 66**

**SEMINAR REGISTRATION FORM**

The FCC will sponsor a one-day seminar for Auction No. 66 applicants.
The seminar is free of charge and will provide information about
pre-auction procedures, service and auction rules, conduct of the
auction, and the FCC Auction System.

Representatives from each company may attend on a reservation basis,
first-come first-served until room capacity is filled. The seminar will
be held:

Monday, April 24, 2006

Federal Communications Commission

445 12th Street, SW

Washington, DC 20554

Registration 10:00 a.m. - 10:30 a.m.

Seminar 10:30 a.m. - 2:00 p.m.

If hotel accommodations are needed

Please contact 888-225-5322 (option #2) for a list of hotels in the
area.

\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*

To register, complete the form below and

return no later than

Thursday, April 20, 2006,

by facsimile to:

FCC Auction 66

Auctions and Spectrum Access Division

1270 Fairfield Road

Gettysburg, PA 17325-7245

Fax: 717-338-2850

Phone: 717-338-2868

Note: The seminar will also be available via webcast and may be viewed
by clicking on the Auction Seminar link on the Auction No. 66 web page,
[http://wireless.fcc.gov/auctions/66/](../../Auction#66 (AWS)). For
further information about accessing FCC webcasts, please visit
<http://www.fcc.gov/realaudio/>.

\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

I/We will attend the Auction No. 66 Seminar, scheduled for Monday, April
24, 2006.

Name of attendee:

Name of attendee:

Company name:

Company address:

Phone: Fax:

**ATTACHMENT D**

**ELECTRONIC FILING AND REVIEW**

**OF THE SHORT-FORM APPLICATION (FCC FORM 175)**

**[PAPERWORK REDUCTION ACT NOTICE]{.underline}**

The Federal Communications Commission uses information collected in FCC
Form 175 in determining whether applicants are legally, technically, and
financially qualified to participate in Commission auctions for licenses
or permits. In addition, if an applicant applies for status as a
particular type of auction participant pursuant to Commission rules, the
Commission uses the information in determining whether the applicant is
eligible for the status requested. The Commission's auctions, including
the collection of information to determine applicants' qualifications to
participate pursuant to Commission rules and requirements, are designed
to limit the competitive bidding to qualified applicants, to deter
possible abuse of the bidding and licensing process, and to enhance the
use of competitive bidding to assign Commission licenses and permits in
furtherance of the public interest.

The Commission estimates that each response to this collection of
information will take on average 1.5 hours. This estimate includes the
time to read the instructions, look through existing records, gather and
maintain required data, and actually complete and review the form or
response.  If you have any comments on this estimate, or on how we can
improve the collection and reduce the burden it causes you, please write
the Federal Communications Commission, AMD-PERM, Washington, DC 20554,
Paperwork Reduction Project (3060-0600).  PLEASE DO NOT SEND COMPLETED
APPLICATION FORMS TO THIS ADDRESS.

The information collected in FCC Form 175 is required to be filed by all
applicants to participate in a Commission auction, pursuant to Section
309(j)(5) of the Communications Act and Section 1.2105 of the
Commission's rules. *See* 47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(5), 47 C.F.R. § 1.2105.
Information collected in a submitted FCC Form 175 will be available for
public inspection.

You are not required to respond to a collection of information sponsored
by the Federal government, and the government may not conduct or sponsor
this collection, unless it displays a current valid OMB control number
with this notice. This collection has been assigned OMB control number
3060-0600.

**THE FOREGOING NOTICE IS REQUIRED BY THE PAPERWORK REDUCTION ACT OF
1995, PUBLIC LAW 104-13, OCTOBER 1, 1995, 44 U.S.C. SECTION 3507.**

**[APPLICATION PREPARATION AND SUBMISSION]{.underline}**

An applicant must submit its short-form application (FCC Form 175)
electronically, via the FCC Auction System. **The FCC Form 175
applications must be submitted and confirmed prior to 6:00 p.m. ET on
Wednesday, May 10, 2006.** Late applications or unconfirmed submissions
of electronic data will not be accepted.

Applicants are reminded that all information required in connection with
applications to participate in spectrum license auctions is necessary to
determine each applicant's qualifications, and as such will be available
for public inspection. Accordingly, an applicant should not include any
unnecessary sensitive information, such as Taxpayer Identification
Numbers or Social Security Numbers, in its short-form application.
Applicants may request that information submitted not be made routinely
available for public inspection following the procedures set forth in 47
C.F.R. § 0.459. Pursuant to Section 0.459(a), such requests must be
included as an attachment to FCC Form 175 and identify the information
to which the request applies. Because the required information bears on
each applicant's qualifications, confidentiality requests will not be
routinely granted.

Applicants may make multiple changes to their FCC Form 175 applications
until the close of the filing window. However, applicants must press the
**SUBMIT** button in the FCC Auction System for the changes to be
submitted and considered by the Commission.

## Software Requirements

Applicants must meet the following minimum software requirements:

-   Web Browser:

```{=html}
<!-- -->
```
-   Microsoft® Internet Explorer 6.0 or higher (recommended). Your
    browser must have either Microsoft VM or Java Plug-In Version
    1.4.2_05 installed.

    or

-   Netscape® Communicator™ 6.0 or higher, with Java Plug-In Version
    1.4.2_05.

> Java Plug-In Version 1.4.2_05 is available for downloading at
> ***<http://java.sun.com/products/archive/j2se/1.4.2_05/index.html>***
> (choose the JRE version).
>
> Other browsers are not supported.

-   PDF Viewer: Adobe Acrobat Reader 5.0 or higher (available at
    [***http://www.adobe.com***](http://www.adobe.com/))

> Currently, the Apple® Mac OS® is not supported.

## Logging On

To submit an FCC Form 175 application electronically via the Internet,
start your web browser and point it to either <http://auctions.fcc.gov/>
(primary location) or <http://auctions2.fcc.gov/> (secondary location).
Once on the *FCC* *Integrated Spectrum Auction System* page, an
applicant may log in to create an FCC Form 175 application using its FCC
Registration Number (FRN) and password.

## Application Filing Instructions

The on-line FCC Form 175 requests information needed to determine
whether an applicant qualifies to participate in competitive bidding for
Commission licenses or construction permits.[^332] Pursuant to Section
1.2105(a), FCC Form 175 must be submitted electronically. Applicants
must submit required information as entries in the data fields of the
electronic FCC Form 175 whenever a data field is available for that
information. Attachments should not be used to provide information that
can be supplied within the data fields of the electronic FCC Form 175.

The screens comprising FCC Form 175 consist of five series, each
requesting five separate types of information: 1) *Applicant
Information*; 2) *License Selection*; 3) *Agreements*; 4) *Ownership*;
and 5) *Certify and Submit*. In addition, *Summary* screens, a sixth
series, appear prior to the *Certify and Submit* screens. The *Summary*
screens provide an overview of an applicant's FCC Form 175 that
facilitates reviewing and revising specific information, as well as an
automated check for certain inconsistencies and omissions in submitted
information.

To simplify filling out FCC Form 175, certain initial information
applicants provide is used to determine what additional information is
needed, and what subsequent screens will appear to collect that
information. For example, a corporate applicant, unlike an individual
applicant, must identify a corporate officer or director responsible for
the application (sometimes called a responsible party). If an applicant
identifies itself as an individual, no additional information is needed
regarding an additional responsible party, and screens requesting
responsible party information will not appear. However, if the applicant
identifies itself as a corporation, subsequent screens in the FCC Form
175 will ask for responsible party information.

Applicants should be able to fill out Form 175 by following the
instructions below. Additional help in filling out FCC Form 175 can be
accessed from the electronic FCC Form 175 in two ways: 1) by clicking on
the **Help** link in the upper right of any screen, which will open
Auction Application Online Filing Help; or 2) by clicking on the text of
any **Common Question** link appearing on the right side of the screen.
The common questions displayed relate to the current screen and vary
from screen to screen. In the event the assistance provided by these
sources is insufficient, filers should use the contact information
provided in the *Procedures Public Notice* to obtain additional
assistance.

### Applicant Information

The *Applicant Information* screens are the first series of screens in
FCC Form 175. In the *Applicant Information* screens, the applicant will
provide basic information including

• the applicant's legal classification, *e.g*., individual, corporation,
etc.

• optional information regarding the applicant's status as a minority-
or woman-owned business or a rural telephone company

• the applicant's name, which will be used as the bidder name during the
auction

• citizenship (for individuals), or jurisdiction of formation for legal
entities

• for applicants classified as legal entities, *e.g*., corporations and
partnerships, the name of and information regarding the entity's
responsible individual

• the name, address, telephone and facsimile number of a contact person
who will communicate with the Commission regarding the applicant's FCC
Form 175

• the names of up to three persons authorized to bid for the applicant
in the auction

• the applicant's preference for electronic or telephonic bidding

• whether the applicant claims eligibility for certain types of bidding
credits and the amount claimed.[^333]

Each screen will specify the information that the applicant must
provide. Please note the following with respect to particular
information requested:

-   Applicants must indicate their legal classification before
    continuing to subsequent screens, because the legal classification
    will determine which subsequent screens will appear.

-   P.O. Boxes may not be used for an applicant's address.

-   To simplify filling out the FCC Form 175, an applicant that has the
    same address as its contact person can click on the **COPY APPLICANT
    ADDRESS** button to automatically fill in the contact person's
    address. P.O. Boxes may not be used for a contact person's address.

-   Applicants must identify at least one authorized bidder. While
    applicants may change their authorized bidders at a later date, in
    Auction No. 66 only those bidders listed on the FCC Form 175 will be
    authorized to place bids for the applicant during the auction.

-   Any qualified bidder may bid either via the Internet or by telephone
    during the auction. Specifying a preference for electronic or
    telephonic bidding assists the Commission in determining the staff
    required for telephonic bidding.

### License Selection

The *License Selection* screens make up the second series of screens in
FCC Form 175. In the *License Selection* screens, the applicant will
identify the items on which the applicant may wish to bid during the
auction. Applicants are not obligated to bid on all licenses selected;
however, applicants will not be able to bid on licenses that they have
not selected on the FCC Form 175.[^334] Be advised that there is no
opportunity to change this list once the short-form filing deadline
passes on May 10, 2006.

To participate in an auction, applicants must select at least one
license. Until the applicant selects a license, the applicant cannot
submit the FCC Form 175. An applicant's license selections cannot be
changed after the initial filing window has closed. Therefore, during
the initial filing window it is important to carefully review license
selections to make sure all the licenses on which the applicant may wish
to bid have been selected.

The License Selection screen contains a listing of all available
licenses in the auction. Applicants can navigate within the License
Selection screen by selecting the individual page links or the
"Previous" and "Next" buttons above and below the list of available
licenses. In addition, applicants can use pre-defined filters to narrow
down the list of licenses for which they wish to select and save.
Specifically, licenses can be selected by either: 1) clicking the check
box next to the license name, then selecting the "Save Selected Items"
button; 2) clicking the "Save all Items" button to save all available
licenses; or by 3) clicking the "Save All Filtered Items" button after
applying a filter. Once the applicant has successfully saved a license,
the word "Saved" will appear next to the license name to confirm that it
has been saved with the application.

[NOTE]{.underline}: Licenses selected on the License Selection screen
will be automatically saved when navigating to another screen within the
Auction Application by using the links and buttons provided on the
screen.

Licenses can be removed by either: 1) clicking the check box (to
uncheck) next to a previously saved license, then selecting the "Remove
Selected Items" button; 2) clicking the "Remove all Items" button to
remove all previously saved licenses; or by 3) clicking the "Remove All
Filtered Items" button after applying a filter. Removed licenses will
not have the word "Saved" next to the license name.

Applicants may view all saved licenses by either clicking the **Edit
Icon** next to "View Saved Items" at the top-right corner of the list,
or by clicking the "CONTINUE" button at the bottom of the page.

Once licenses have been saved, the View/Edit License Selections screen
will be the first screen displayed when navigating to the License
Selection step. This screen lists all licenses the applicant has
selected and saved for the auction. To select a new license or remove a
previously selected license, click the **Edit Icon** next to "Return to
License Selection" at the top-right corner of the list. This will take
you to the original *Select Licenses* screen, as described above.

### Agreements

The *Agreements* screens are the third series of screens in Form 175. In
the *Agreements* screens, applicants will provide information regarding
auction-related agreements subject to disclosure under the Commission's
rules.[^335]

On the first screen, applicants must state whether the applicant has any
agreements that are subject to disclosure under the Commission's rules
by responding yes or no to a question asking whether the applicant has
entered into partnerships, joint ventures, consortia or other agreements
or understandings of any kind relating to the licenses being auctioned,
including any such agreement relating to the post-auction market
structure. If an applicant answers "No," the applicant will continue
with the Ownership series of screens, described below. If the applicant
answers "Yes," the applicant will continue with additional *Agreements*
screens described here.

In the additional *Agreements* screens, applicants must provide an
identifying name for the agreement and must identify the parties, other
than the applicant, to the agreement. The agreement identifier can be a
brief description of the agreement or a simple reference name; however,
each agreement identifier must be unique.

In the event the other party to the agreement is an entity or an
individual, different identifying information is required. For either
entities or individuals, applicants may provide FCC Registration Numbers
("FRNs"), if available. Providing the FRN helps prevent identification
errors resulting from parties having similar names or a single party
using multiple names. Provision of a party's FRN is optional.

Up to three parties to the agreement (not including the applicant) can
be identified on a single screen. Additional parties can be added by
clicking the **ADD MORE PARTIES** button. In the event of an error, the
name of a party and its associated FRN can be deleted from the form by
clicking on the **RESET** button. After identifying all parties to a
particular agreement, click the **FINISH THIS AGREEMENT** button.

The next *Agreements* screen is the *View/Edit Agreements* screen. This
screen lists the agreements and parties to each agreement that already
have been entered. From this screen, you have the following options:

-   Clicking the **Edit** icon or the **Agreements** link to return to
    the initial *Agreements* screen regarding whether or not the
    applicant has any agreements.

-   Modifying agreement identifiers by clicking on them.

-   Clicking the **Delete This Agreement** link to delete an agreement
    and associated parties.

-   Modifying information regarding a particular party to an agreement
    by clicking on the party's name.

-   Clicking the **Remove** icon next to information about a particular
    party to remove the corresponding party.

-   Clicking the **Add Party to This Agreement** link to add a new party
    to an agreement.

-   Clicking the **CREATE NEW AGREEMENT** button to add additional
    agreements.

When you have identified all agreements and the parties to each
agreement, click the **CONTINUE** button.

### Ownership

The *Ownership* screens are the fourth series of screens in the FCC Form
175. In the *Ownership* screens, applicants will provide information
regarding parties with ownership interests in the applicant that must be
disclosed pursuant to Commission rules.[^336] Commission rules also
require the disclosure and description of FCC-regulated businesses that
are owned by the applicant and parties with certain ownership interests
in the applicant.[^337] In addition, if the applicant has claimed
eligibility for bidding credits based on revenues attributable to the
applicant and related parties, the applicant will provide information
regarding revenues in the *Ownership* screens.

#### Information Already on File with the Commission

Some applicants may have previously filed FCC Form 602 disclosing
ownership information in connection with wireless services. To simplify
filling out Form 175, an applicant's most current FCC Form 602 ownership
information on file with the Commission, if in an electronic format
compatible with FCC Form 175, automatically will be entered into this
FCC Form 175. Applicants with ownership information automatically
entered into FCC Form 175 will proceed directly to the *View/Edit
Ownership* screen described below.

Each applicant is responsible for information submitted in its FCC Form
175 being complete and accurate. Applicants should carefully review any
information automatically entered to confirm that it is complete and
accurate as of the deadline for submitting this FCC Form 175. Applicants
can update the information directly in the FCC Form 175. After the
deadline for filing this FCC Form 175, ownership information in a
submitted FCC Form 175 will be considered to be the applicant's most
current ownership information on file with the Commission.

#### Disclosable Interest Holders and FCC-Regulated Businesses 

**• Section 1.2112(a) of the Commission's rules lists the interest
holders in the applicant that must be disclosed in FCC Form 175.**[^338]

**• Section 1.2112(a)(7) lists the FCC-regulated business entities, or
applicants for an FCC license, that must be disclosed in FCC Form
175.**[^339]

For an applicant not claiming eligibility for a bidding credit based on
revenues, the initial *Ownership* screen enables the applicant to: 1)
add information regarding a disclosable interest holder; 2) add
information regarding the FCC-regulated businesses in which the
applicant has an interest; or 3) upload ownership information from a
file prepared by the applicant.

Uploading information from a file prepared by the applicant is an
alternative to individually keying information into the *Ownership*
screens in FCC Form 175. Applicants may upload ownership data in a text
file, which will then be processed and populated into the system as the
applicant's current ownership filing (provided there were no errors).
This feature may benefit those applicants with large amounts of
ownership data that would otherwise have to be entered into the system
manually. It also may benefit those applicants who previously provided
ownership data to the FCC in a similar format for other purposes, such
as in connection with filing FCC Form 602 in relation to wireless
services. Instructions on how to prepare and upload such a file are
provided at
[http://wireless.fcc.gov/auctions/ownership-upload](http://wireless.fcc.gov/auctions/default.htm?job=ownership_upload).
After a successful upload, the *Upload Ownership Disclosure Information
Confirmation* screen will appear. Applicants then may click the
**CONTINUE** button, which loads the *View/Edit Ownership* screen
described below.

Each screen will specify the information that the applicant must
provide. Please note the following with respect to particular
information requested:

-   If an application includes one or more disclosable interest holders
    with an indirect ownership in the applicant,[^340] the application
    must include an attachment regarding the relationship between the
    indirect interest holder(s) and the applicant. The attachment should
    provide an overview of the ownership chain that links the indirect
    owners to the applicant, *e.g.*, indirect owner X owns 50% of
    holding company Y; indirect owner Z owns 50% of holding company Y;
    and holding company Y owns 100% of the applicant.[^341] One
    attachment connecting all indirect owners to the applicant is
    sufficient; a separate attachment for each indirect owner is not
    required. An overview of the ownership connections is sufficient;
    the attachment does not need to duplicate all the detailed
    information already provided in the FCC Form 175.

-   The "Percent of Interest Held in Applicant" should reflect the
    disclosable interest holder's aggregate ownership interest in the
    applicant. In some cases, *e.g.*, circumstances where there is joint
    ownership or indirect ownership resulting in different owners
    sharing the same ownership interests, the sum of all the percentages
    held by disclosable interest holders may exceed 100%. In other
    cases, *e.g.*, directors and officers of an entity seeking
    revenue-based bidding credits,[^342] a disclosable interest holder
    may have a 0% percent of interest held in the applicant.

-   FCC-regulated businesses in which the applicant has an interest can
    be entered from the initial *Add Ownership Disclosure Information*
    screen. FCC-regulated businesses in which a disclosable interest
    holder has an interest can be entered from the *Add FCC Regulated
    Business* screen in the series of screens for entering information
    about a Disclosable Interest Holder.

-   When adding an FCC-regulated business, "Percent of Interest Held"
    refers to the percent of interest held by the applicant or
    disclosable interest holder, as applicable, in the FCC-regulated
    business.

-   To simplify filling out the FCC Form 175, applicants can click on
    the **select business(es) already submitted** link when entering an
    FCC-regulated business previously entered as an FCC-regulated
    business for the applicant or another Disclosable Interest Holder.
    When doing so, be certain to enter the "Percent of Interest Held" in
    the FCC regulated business by the current party, either the
    applicant or the disclosable interest holder, with respect to which
    the FCC-regulated business is being entered.

#### View/Edit Ownership Disclosure Information

The *View/Edit Ownership Disclosure Information* screen summarizes
Ownership information already entered in FCC Form 175, either
automatically from compatible ownership information on file with the
Commission or directly by the applicant, and provides links enabling
existing information to be revised and additional information to be
added.

Existing ownership information is divided into three groups:

-   Disclosable Interest Holders of this Applicant

-   FCC Regulated Businesses of this Applicant

-   Affiliates of this Applicant

To view the detailed information submitted regarding the applicant, a
disclosable interest holder, FCC-regulated business, or an affiliate,
click on the relevant party's name. To delete existing information or
add a new entry in one of the categories, click on the relevant link.
This screen also provides a link enabling applicants to add an
FCC-regulated business directly to an existing disclosable interest
holder, without needing to reenter the disclosable interest holder's
information.

#### Bidding Credit Revenue Information

If the applicant has claimed eligibility for a bidding credit based on
revenues attributable to the applicant and related parties, the first
*Ownership* screen will request relevant information regarding the
applicant's revenues. The subsequent screen will request which of the
two sources of financial information authorized by Section 1.2110 (n)
the applicant used for the revenue information.[^343]

Applicants claiming eligibility for a bidding credit based on revenues
are required to provide revenue information separately and in the
aggregate for the applicant, its affiliates, its controlling interests,
and affiliates of its controlling interests. In addition, if the
applicant is a consortium of small businesses, the information must be
provided with respect to each member comprising the consortium.[^344]
The Commission's definition of an affiliate of the applicant encompasses
both controlling interests of the applicant and affiliates of
controlling interests of the applicant.[^345] Form 175 screens request
information regarding the applicant, disclosable interest holders, and
affiliates of the applicant. Accordingly, information that Commission
rules require be disclosed regarding controlling interests and
affiliates of controlling interests that are not disclosable interest
holders should be disclosed in screens requesting information regarding
affiliates of the applicant.

Following the first two screens, the subsequent screen will be similar
to the initial *Ownership* screen described above, with one addition. In
addition to being able to add disclosable interest holders and
FCC-regulated business, applicants that claim eligibility for bidding
credits based on revenues also will have an option to add information
regarding affiliates, including their revenues, that are not disclosable
interest holders.[^346]

Applicants that claim eligibility based on revenues attributable to the
applicant and related parties will be requested to provide revenue
information for each disclosable interest holder. With respect to
disclosable interest holders that are affiliates or controlling
interests of the applicant, applicants will fill out two screens similar
to the two described above with respect to the applicant, *i.e.*, one
screen requesting the relevant information and a second screen regarding
the source of the revenue information.

However, not all disclosable interest holders that must be listed in
Form 175 pursuant to Section 1.2112(a) are affiliates of the applicant,
controlling interests of the applicant, or affiliates of the applicant's
controlling interests.[^347] Consequently, applicants claiming
eligibility for a bidding credit based on revenues may not need to
provide revenue information for every disclosable interest holder.
Accordingly, applicants may indicate that no revenue information is
required with respect to the relevant disclosable interest holder on the
first screen requesting revenue information for that disclosable
interest holder. To do so, check the box indicating that the disclosable
interest holder is **not** an affiliate or a controlling interest within
the meaning of the Commission's rules and, therefore, no revenue
information for the disclosable interest holder will be provided.

In addition, an applicant may have affiliates that are not disclosable
interest holders. To disclose information regarding such affiliates and
their revenues required pursuant to Commission rule,[^348] applicants
can click on the **ADD AFFILIATE** button on the initial *Ownership*
screen. Applicants also can click on the **Add Affiliate to Applicant**
link on the *View/Edit Ownership Disclosure Information* screen to
disclose information regarding affiliates and their revenues.

Applicants providing information regarding an affiliate must provide the
name of the affiliate and the affiliate's principal business. To
simplify filling out Form 175, applicants can click on the **select
business(es) already submitted** link when entering an affiliate that
previously was entered as an FCC-regulated business for the applicant or
a Disclosable Interest Holder. Applicants will fill out two screens
similar to the two described above with respect to the affiliate,
*i.e.*, one screen requesting the relevant information and a second
screen regarding the source of the revenue information.

Finally, applicants claiming eligibility for bidding credits based on
revenues attributable to the applicant and related parties will be asked
to confirm that they have provided information with respect to all of
the relevant parties, *i.e.*, the applicant; each of the applicant's
officers and directors; each of the applicant's other controlling
interests; each of the applicant's affiliates; and for each affiliate of
the applicant's controlling interests, including its officers and
directors.[^349]

### Summary

The *Summary* screens are the fifth series of screens in FCC Form 175.
The *Summary* screens summarize information applicants have provided in
previous screens, offering an overview of an applicant's FCC Form 175 to
help locate specific information. The *Summary* screens will appear
prior to the *Certify and Submit* screens, in order to permit the
applicant to review all the information entered in previous screens and
to provide an opportunity to check for errors in the information
submitted.

The first *Summary* screen, the *Summary Overview* screen, lists the
first four series of screens in the application and provides a
**VIEW/EDIT** button to access each one. Here is what happens if you
click **VIEW/EDIT** for each series:

-   Clicking **VIEW/EDIT** for Applicant Information produces a *Detail
    for Applicant Information* screen showing what you entered for each
    data entry field. To change any data item, click the **Edit** icon
    for the relevant data field.

-   Clicking **VIEW/EDIT** for License Selection takes you to the
    *View/Edit License Selection* screen discussed above in the License
    Selection section.

-   Clicking **VIEW/EDIT** for Agreements takes you to the *Agreements*
    screen discussed above in the Agreements section.

-   Clicking **VIEW/EDIT** for Ownership takes you to the *View/Edit
    Ownership Disclosure Information* screen discussed above in the
    Ownership section.

Clicking on the **CHECK ERRORS** button initiates an automated check of
the application. If the automated check encounters any errors that must
be corrected before submitting the application, the error(s) will be
listed in an Error box at the top of the screen. To correct one of these
errors, click its corresponding **EDIT** button. In addition, if the
automated check encounters any apparent errors that might render the
application incomplete if the application is submitted with current
information, the apparent error will be listed in a Warning box. To
revise the information related to the apparent error, click its
corresponding **EDIT** button.

Each applicant is solely responsible for providing complete and accurate
information in its FCC Form 175. The automated check is provided to
assist applicants in completing FCC Form 175. However, the automated
check cannot be relied upon to determine whether the information
provided in the FCC Form 175 is complete or accurate. The automated
check may not catch all errors and applicants cannot rely on the
automated check to determine the completeness or the accuracy of
submitted information.

If the automated check does not encounter any errors, a box will appear
displaying the message "**No Errors found - You may continue to Certify
and Submit.**" Applicants may then click the **CONTINUE TO CERTIFY**
button.

### Attaching Additional Information

If an applicant needs to provide additional information not requested
directly in the screens comprising the FCC Form 175, additional
information can be provided in an attachment.

The screen for adding an attachment to FCC Form 175 can be accessed by
clicking on the **Attachments** link in the upper right of any screen.
The *Add Attachment* screen requests information regarding the type of
attachment to be added, the name of the file to be attached, and a brief
description of the attachment. If the attachment is a request for a
waiver of any of the Commission's rules or procedures, the applicant
should identify the "Type" of attachment as a "Waiver" to facilitate
prompt processing. Once the requested information is provided,
applicants can add the attachment to the application by clicking on the
**ADD ATTACHMENT** button.

A list of any attachments already uploaded along with the applicant's
FCC Form 175 appears at the bottom of the screen.

When uploading attachments, applicants may use a variety of file
formats\-- including (but not limited to) Word 2000 or earlier,
WordPerfect 5.x or later, Adobe PDF, and ASCII text\--and must verify
that the files contain all exhibit information. Files may be no larger
than 10 Mb. Graphics files (e.g., .bmp, .tiff, .jpg) and spreadsheets
(e.g., Excel, Lotus) are supported but not recommended. Files must not
be password-protected.

### Certify and Submit

The *Certify and Submit* screens are the sixth and final series of
screens in FCC Form 175. In the *Certify and Submit* screens, applicants
will provide certifications required of all participants in the
Commission's competitive bidding processes.[^350]

The first *Certify and Submit* screen requires each applicant to
indicate whether the applicant, any affiliate, any controlling interest,
and any affiliate of a controlling interest have ever been in default on
any Commission license or have ever been delinquent on any non-tax debt
owed to any Federal agency.[^351] Applicants associated with a relevant
entity that has been in default or delinquent may participate in an
auction, if otherwise qualified. However, such applicants must submit an
upfront payment equal to 50 percent more than otherwise required.[^352]

The second *Certify and Submit* screen lists the certifications required
of all applicants in the Commission's competitive bidding processes and
requests that the applicant's certifying official be identified and sign
the application. Any auction short-form application must be certified
by: (1) the applicant, if the applicant is an individual, (2) one of the
partners if the applicant is a partnership, (3) by an officer, director,
or duly authorized employee, if the applicant is a corporation, (4) by a
member who is an officer, if the applicant is an unincorporated
association, (5) by the trustee if the applicant is an amateur radio
service club, or (6) a duly elected or appointed official who is
authorized to do so under the laws of the applicable jurisdiction, if
the applicant is a governmental entity.[^353]

All applicants must certify on their FCC Form 175 applications under
penalty of perjury that they are legally, technically, financially and
otherwise qualified to hold a license.[^354] Applicants are reminded
that submission of an FCC Form 175 application constitutes a
representation by the certifying official that he or she is an
authorized representative of the applicant, has read the form's
instructions and certifications, and that the contents of the
application, its certifications and any attachments are true and
correct. Submission of a false certification to the Commission may
result in penalties, including monetary forfeitures, license
forfeitures, ineligibility to participate in future auctions, and/or
criminal prosecution.

Once the two *Certify and Submit* screens have been filled out, the
application may be submitted by clicking on the **SUBMIT** button.

After the application has been submitted, a confirmation screen will be
displayed that states the submission time and date, along with a unique
file number. It is recommended that you print a copy of the confirmation
page for your records. You may then view and print a copy of your
submitted application by clicking on Print Preview.

FCC Form 175 applications must be submitted and confirmed prior to 6:00
p.m. ET on Wednesday, May 10, 2006. Late applications or unconfirmed
submissions of electronic data will not be accepted.

### Withdrawing an Application Before the Short-Form Filing Deadline and Updating Existing Applications

#### Withdrawing an Application

If you wish to withdraw a submitted application before the short-form
filing deadline, click on the **Withdraw Application** icon on the
*Auction Application Manager Create or Review Auction Applications* page
and confirm that you want to withdraw your application. If you
subsequently decide to file an application, you will have to re-enter
all previously-submitted data. Applications may not be withdrawn after
the short-form application filing deadline.

#### Updating Existing Applications

Once you have logged into the Auctions Application Manager, the *Create
or Review Auction Applications* page displays any application you have
created or submitted within a filing window. **Note:** This page shows
the application status, the date and time the application was last
updated; and the date and time the application was last submitted. You
may use this page as a reference to confirm the date and time of your
most recent submission of the application.

To review or continue working on an existing application, click its
auction number. This produces the application's *Summary* page and
places you in a view/edit mode. Applicants must go to the *Certify and
Submit* screens and click the **SUBMIT** button to submit any changes
made to their FCC Form 175. After the revised application has been
submitted, a confirmation page will be displayed that states the
submission time and date, along with your unique file number. It is
recommended that you print a copy of the confirmation page for your
records. You may then view and print a copy of your submitted
application by clicking on Print Preview.

After the short-form application filing deadline (6:00 p.m. ET May 10,
2006), applicants may make only minor changes to their applications.
Applicants will not be permitted to make major modifications to their
applications (*e.g*., change their license selections, change the
certifying official, change control of the applicant, or increase its
bidding credit).[^355]

### Upfront Payment Calculator and Form 159 

You may access the **Upfront Payment Calculator and Form 159** from the
*Create or Review Auction Applications* page and from the *Auction
Application Submit Confirmation* page. When you click the **Upfront
Payment Calculator and Form 159** icon or link, a page will be displayed
where you can determine the appropriate upfront payment amount to submit
with the FCC Form 159. From the *Calculate Upfront Payment* page, you
may click the **Form 159** button to obtain the FCC Form 159.

### Refund of Upfront Payment 

On *My Auctions* page, click on the **See Wire Transfer for Refund
Purposes** link to provide your wire transfer instructions for purposes
of refunds of upfront payments. The Commission will use this information
to refund excess funds on deposit upon receipt of a written refund
request.

## Application Review

Once the FCC has completed the short-form application review process,
you can view FCC Form 175 applications electronically by searching for
them in the FCC database. Start your web browser and point it to either
[***http://auctions.fcc.gov/***](http://auctions.fcc.gov/) (primary
location) or
[***http://auctions2.fcc.gov/***](http://auctions2.fcc.gov/) (secondary
location). Click the **Auction Applications** link in the Public Access
area on the *FCC Integrated Spectrum Auction System* page to start your
search.

## Technical Support

For technical assistance with using FCC software, contact the FCC
Technical Support Hotline at (877) 480-3201, option nine; (202)
414-1250; or (202) 414-1255 (TTY). The FCC Technical Support Hotline is
available Monday through Friday from 8 a.m. to 6 p.m. ET. All calls to
the FCC Technical Support Hotline are recorded.

FCC Technical Support can also be contacted electronically by filling
out a help request form at <https://esupport.fcc.gov/request.htm>. On
the Submit Help Request page, select **Integrated Spectrum Auction
System (ISAS)** from the \"FCC System\" drop-down.

**ATTACHMENT E**

**AUCTION-SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS FOR**

**FCC REMITTANCE ADVICE (FCC FORM 159-February 2003 Edition)**

**[Upfront Payments]{.underline}**

The following information supplements the standard instructions for FCC
Form 159 (Revised 2/03), and is provided to help ensure correct
completion of FCC Form 159 for upfront payments for Auction No. 66.
Applicants need to complete FCC Form 159 carefully, because:

-   **Mistakes may affect bidding eligibility; and**

```{=html}
<!-- -->
```
-   **Lack of consistency between information provided in FCC Form 159
    (Revised 2/03), FCC Form 175, long-form application, and
    correspondence about an application may cause processing delays.**

    Therefore appropriate cross-references between the FCC Form 159
    Remittance Advice and the

Short Form Application (FCC Form 175) are described below:

Block

Number Required Information

> 1 LOCKBOX \# - Enter "358405"
>
> 2 Payer Name - Enter the name of the person or company making the
> payment.
>
> If the applicant itself is the payer, this entry would be the same as
> FCC Form 175.

3.  Total Amount Paid - Enter the amount of the upfront payment
    associated with the

> FCC Form 159 (Revised 2/03).

8.  Street Address, City, State, ZIP Code - Enter the street mailing
    address (**not Post Office box number**) where mail should be sent
    to the payer. If the applicant is the payer, these entries would be
    the same as FCC Form 175 from the Applicant Information section.

> 9 Daytime Telephone Number - Enter the telephone number of a person
> knowledgeable about this upfront payment.

10. Country Code - For addresses outside the United States, enter the
    appropriate postal country code (available from the Mailing
    Requirements Department of the U.S. Postal Service).

> 11 Payer FRN - Enter the payer's ten-digit FCC Registration Number
> (FRN) registered in the Commission Registration System (CORES).
>
> 21 Applicant FRN (Complete only if applicant is different than payer.)
> -- Enter the applicant's ten-digit FCC Registration Number (FRN)
> registered in the Commission Registration System (CORES).
>
> 24A Payment Type Code - Enter "A66U"
>
> 25A Quantity - Enter the number "1"
>
> 26A Fee Due - Amount of Upfront Payment
>
> 27A Total Fee - Will be the same amount as 26A.
>
> 28A FCC Code 1 - Enter the number "66" (indicating Auction No. 66).

NOTES:

-   Do not use Remittance Advice (Continuation Sheet), FCC Form 159-C,
    for upfront payments.

-   If applicant is different from the payer, complete blocks 13 through
    21 for the applicant, using the same information shown on FCC
    Form 175. Otherwise leave them blank.

-   Since credit card payments will not be accepted for this auction,
    leave Section E blank.

**[Winning Bidder Requirements, Down Payments and Final
Payments]{.underline}**

Specific information regarding down payments and final payments will be
included in a post-auction public notice announcing the winning bidders.

**ATTACHMENT F**

**SMOOTHING FORMULA EQUATIONS**

A~i~ = (C \* B~i~) + ((1-C) \* A~i-1~)

I~i+1~ = smaller of ((1 + A~i~) \* N) and M

X ~i+1~ = I~i+1~ \* Y~i~

where,

A~i~ = activity index for the current round (round i)

C = activity weight factor

B~i~ = number of bidders submitting bids on the licenses in the current
round (round i)

A~i-1~ = activity index from previous round (round i-1), A~0~ is 0

I~i+1~ = percentage increment for the next round (round i+1)

N = minimum percentage increment or percentage increment floor

M = maximum percentage increment or percentage increment ceiling

X ~i+1~ = dollar amount associated with the percentage increment

Y~i~ = provisionally winning bid amount from the current round

######## Examples {#examples .unnumbered}

License 1

C=0.5, N = 0.1, M = 0.2

[Round 1 (2 bidders submitting bids, provisionally winning bid =
\$1,000,000)]{.underline}

1\. Calculation of percentage increment for round 2 using the smoothing
formula:

A~1~ = (0.5 \* 2) + (0.5 \* 0) = 1

I~2~ = The smaller of ((1 + 1) \* 0.1) = 0.2 or 0.2 (the maximum
percentage increment)

2\. Calculation of dollar amount associated with the percentage
increment for round 2 (using I~2~ from above):

X~2~ = 0.2 \* \$1,000,000 = \$200,000

3\. Minimum acceptable bid amount for round 2 = \$1,200,000

[Round 2 (3 bidders submitting bids, provisionally winning bid =
\$2,000,000)]{.underline}

1\. Calculation of percentage increment for round 3 using the smoothing
formula:

A~2~ = (0.5 \* 3) + (0.5 \* 1) = 2

I~3~ = The smaller of ((1 + 2) \* 0.1) = 0.3 or 0.2 (the maximum
percentage increment)

2\. Calculation of dollar amount associated with the percentage
increment for round 3 (using I~3~ from above):

X~3~ = 0.2 \* \$2,000,000 = \$400,000

3\. Minimum acceptable bid amount for round 3 = \$2,400,000

[Round 3 (1 bidder submitting bids, provisionally winning bid =
\$2,400,000)]{.underline}

1\. Calculation of percentage increment for round 4 using the smoothing
formula:

A~3~ = (0.5 \* 1) + (0.5 \* 2) = 1.5

I~4~ = The smaller of ((1 + 1.5) \* 0.1) = 0.25 or 0.2 (the maximum
percentage increment)

2\. Calculation of dollar amount associated with the percentage
increment for round 4 (using I~4~ from above):

X~4~ = 0.2 \* \$2,400,000 = \$480,000

3\. Minimum acceptable bid amount for round 4 = \$2,880,000

# ATTACHMENT G {#attachment-g .unnumbered}

**SUMMARY LISTING OF DOCUMENTS ADDRESSING**

**APPLICATION OF THE ANTI‑COLLUSION RULE**

**[Commission Decisions]{.underline}**

Implementation of Section 309(j) of the Communications Act --
Competitive Bidding, PP Docket No. 93‑253, *Second Report and Order*, 9
FCC Rcd 2348, 2386‑2388 ¶¶ 221‑226 (1994).

Implementation of Section 309(j) of the Communications Act --
Competitive Bidding, *Fifth Report and Order,* PP Docket No. 93‑253, 9
FCC Rcd 5532, 5570‑5571 ¶¶ 91-92 (1994).

Implementation of Section 309(j) of the Communications Act --
Competitive Bidding, *Fourth Memorandum Opinion and Order*, PP Docket
No. 93‑253, 9 FCC Rcd 6858, 6866‑6869 ¶¶ 47-60 (1994).

Implementation of Section 309(j) of the Communications Act --
Competitive Bidding, *Second Memorandum Opinion and Order*, PP Docket
No. 93‑253, 9 FCC Rcd 7245, 7253‑7255 ¶¶ 48-55 (1994).

Implementation of Section 309(j) of the Communications Act --
Competitive Bidding, *Memorandum Opinion and Order*, PP Docket No.
93‑253, 9 FCC Rcd 7684, 7687‑7689 ¶¶ 8-12 (1994).

Commercial Realty St. Pete, *Notice of Apparent Liability for
Forfeiture,* 10 FCC Rcd 4277 (1995), *Memorandum Opinion and Order,* 11
FCC Rcd 15374 (1996).

Applications of Mercury PCS II, LLC, *Notice of Apparent Liability for
Forfeiture,* 12 FCC Rcd 17970 (1997), *Memorandum Opinion and Order*, 13
FCC Rcd 23755 (1998).

Amendment of Part 1 of the Commission's Rules -- Competitive Bidding
Procedures, WT Docket No. 97‑82, *Third Report and Order and Second
Further Notice of Proposed Rule Making,* 13 FCC Rcd 374, 463‑469 ¶¶
155-166 (1997).

Application of US West Communications, Inc., *Notice of Apparent
Liability for Forfeiture,* 13 FCC Rcd 8286 (1998); Notice of Apparent
Liability for Forfeiture of US West Communications, Inc., *Order*, 14
FCC Rcd 8816 (1999).

Application of Western PCS BTA I Corp., *Notice of Apparent Liability
for Forfeiture,* 13 FCC Rcd 8305 (1998); Notice of Apparent Liability
for Forfeiture of Western PCS BTA 1 Corp., *Memorandum Opinion and
Orde*r, 14 FCC Rcd 21571, 21577-78 ¶ 20 (1999).

Amendment of Part 1 of the Commission's Rules -- Competitive Bidding
Procedures, WT Docket No. 97-82, *Seventh Report and Order*, 16 FCC Rcd
17546 (2001).

[**Wireless Telecommunications Bureau Dec**i**sions**]{.underline}

Amendment of Parts 21 and 74 of the Commission's Rules with Regard to
Filing Procedures in the Multipoint Distribution Service and in the
Instructional Television Fixed Service, MM Docket No. 94-13, *Order,* 11
FCC Rcd 9655 (Wireless Telecom. Bur. 1995).

Applications of GWI PCS, Inc., *Memorandum Opinion and Order,* 12 FCC
Rcd 6441 (Wireless Telecom. Bur. 1997).

Applications of Mercury PCS II, LLC, *Memorandum Opinion and Order on
Reconsideration,* 12 FCC Rcd 18093 (Wireless Telecom. Bur. 1997).

Applications of High Plains Wireless, L.P., *Memorandum Opinion and
Order,* 12 FCC Rcd 19627 (Wireless Telecom. Bur. 1997).

Applications of Mercury PCS II, LLC, *Memorandum Opinion and Order,* 13
FCC Rcd 5756 (Wireless Telecom. Bur. 1997).

###  {#section-3 .unnumbered}

### [Public Notices]{.underline} {#public-notices .unnumbered}

Wireless Telecommunications Bureau Clarifies Spectrum Auction
Anti‑Collusion Rules, *Public Notice,* 11 FCC Rcd 9645 (Wireless
Telecom. Bur. 1995).

FCC Staff Clarifies Application of Anti‑Collusion Rule to Broadband PCS
\"C\" Block Reauction, *Public Notice,* 11 FCC Rcd 7031 (Auc. Div.
1996).

Wireless Telecommunications Bureau Provides Guidance on the
Anti‑Collusion Rule for D, E and F Block Bidders, *Public* *Notice,* 11
FCC Rcd 10134 (Wireless Telecom. Bur. 1996).

Wireless Telecommunications Bureau Responds to Questions About the Local
Multipoint Distribution Service Auction, *Public Notice*, 13 FCC Rcd 341
(Wireless Telecom. Bur. 1998).

### [Letters from the Office of General Counsel, the Wireless Telecommunications Bureau and the Media Bureau]{.underline} {#letters-from-the-office-of-general-counsel-the-wireless-telecommunications-bureau-and-the-media-bureau .unnumbered}

Letter to Gary M. Epstein and James H. Barker from William E. Kennard,
General Counsel, Federal Communications Commission (released October 25,
1994).

Letter to Alan F. Ciamporcero from William E Kennard, General Counsel,
Federal Communications Commission (released October 25, 1996).

Letter to R. Michael Senkowski from Rosalind K. Allen, Acting Chief,
Commercial Radio Division, Wireless Telecommunications Bureau (released
December 1, 1994).

Letter to Leonard J. Kennedy from Rosalind K. Allen, Acting Chief,
Commercial Radio Division, Wireless Telecommunications Bureau (released
December 14, 1994).

Letter to Jonathan D. Blake from Kathleen O'Brien Ham, 10 FCC Rcd 13783
(Auc. Div. 1995).

Letter to Mark Grady from Kathleen O'Brien Ham, 11 FCC Rcd 10895 (Auc.
Div. 1996).

Letter to David L. Nace from Kathleen O'Brien Ham, 11 FCC Rcd 11363
(Auc. Div. 1996).

Letter to Elliott J. Greenwald from Christopher J. Wright, 13 FCC Rcd
7132 (Gen. Counsel 1998).

Letter to Robert Pettit from Margaret W. Wiener, 16 FCC Rcd 10080 (Auc.
Div. 2000).

Letter to Colby M. May from Barbara A. Kreisman and Margaret W. Wiener,
20 FCC Rcd 14648 (Video and Auc. Divs. 2005).

Letter to John Cooper, Aurora Communications, Inc., from Margaret W.
Wiener, 21 FCC Rcd 523 (Auc. Div. 2006).

Letter to Howard A. Kalmenson, Lotus Communications Corp., from Margaret
W. Wiener, 21 FCC Rcd 520 (Auc. Div. 2006).

**[Enforcement Bureau Decisions]{.underline}**

Application of Star Wireless, LLC, *Forfeiture Order*, 19 FCC Rcd 18626
(Enf. Bur. 2004).

Application of Northeast Communications of Wisconsin, Inc., *Forfeiture
Order*, 19 FCC Rcd 18635 (Enf. Bur. 2004).

**[Civil Actions Initiated by U.S. Department of Justice]{.underline}**

*U.S. v. Omnipoint Corp.,* Proposed Final Judgments and Competitive
Impact Statements, Department of Justice, 63 FR 65,228 (November 25,
1998).

"Justice Department Sues Three Firms Over FCC Auction Practices," *Press
Release*, U.S. Department of Justice (November 10, 1998).

Complaint, *U.S.* *v. Omnipoint Corp*., No. 1:98CV02750 (D.D.C. November
10, 1998).

Complaint, *U.S. v.* *Mercury PCS II, L.L.C*., No. 1:98CV02751 (D.D.C.
November 10, 1998).

Complaint, *U.S. v. 21st Century Bidding Corp.*, No*.* 1:98CV02752
(D.D.C. November 10, 1998).

**[How to Obtain Copies of the Anti-Collusion Decisions]{.underline}**

Many of the documents listed in this attachment can be retrieved from
the following Commission web site:
[http://wireless.fcc.gov/auctions/anticollusion](http://wireless.fcc.gov/auctions/default.htm?job=anti_collusion).

The documents may be located by using our search engine (select the link
"search"). Documents retrieved from the web site are available in
various formats including Word, WordPerfect, Acrobat Reader, Excel, and
ASCII Text. To review a document in its entirety, including footnotes,
it is necessary to access the document in WordPerfect, MS Word, or
Acrobat Reader.

Additionally, all of the documents can be ordered in hard copy for a fee
from the Commission's duplicating contractor, Best Copy and Printing,
Inc., 445 12th Street, SW, Room CY-B402, Washington, DC 20554, (800)
378-3160 (telephone) or
[http://www.bcpiweb.com](http://www.bcpiweb.com/).

#  {#section-4 .unnumbered}

[^1]: AWS is the collective term used for new and innovative fixed and
    mobile terrestrial wireless applications using bandwidth that is
    sufficient for the provision of a variety of applications including
    those using voice and data (such as Internet browsing, message
    services, and full-motion video) content. For additional information
    on AWS in general and the AWS-1 bands in particular, *see* Section
    I.A.1. "Background of Proceeding," *infra.*

[^2]: 47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(3)(E)(i)(requirement to seek comment on
    proposed auction procedures); *see also* 47 U.S.C.
    § 309(j)(4)(F)(authorization to prescribe reserve price or minimum
    bid).

[^3]: "Auction of Advanced Wireless Services Licenses Scheduled for June
    29, 2006; Comment Sought on Reserve Prices or Minimum Opening Bids
    and Other Procedures," *Public Notice*, 21 FCC Rcd 794 (2006)
    ("*Auction No. 66 Comment Public Notice*").

[^4]: A listing of parties that filed comments, reply comments and *ex
    parte* or late-filed submissions may be found in Attachment B.
    Parties will be identified in this Public Notice by their
    abbreviated name as indicated in Attachment B.

[^5]: *Auction No. 66 Comment Public Notice* at 1, 4-5. This type of
    auction offers every license for bid at the same time and consists
    of successive bidding rounds in which eligible bidders may place
    bids on individual licenses. A bidder may bid on, and potentially
    win, any number of licenses. Bidding generally remains open on all
    licenses until bidding stops on every license.

[^6]: Under the Commission's package bidding rules, bidders would be
    able to place bids on any groups of licenses they wish to win
    together, with the result that they win either all the licenses in a
    group or none of them.

[^7]: *See* Section IV.A.1. "Simultaneous Multiple Round Auction,"
    *infra.*

[^8]: *Auction No. 66 Comment Public Notice* at 2, 6-7.

[^9]: *See* Section IV.A.2. "Information Available to Bidders Before and
    During the Auction," *infra.*

[^10]: *Id*.

[^11]: The list will identify the Auction No. 66 applicant(s) by name
    but will not list the license selections of the Auction No. 66
    applicant(s). As in past auctions, additional information regarding
    applicants in Auction No. 66 that is needed to comply with section
    1.2105(c), *e.g.*, the identities of controlling interest in the
    applicant and of ownership interests greater than ten percent (10%),
    will be available through the publicly accessible on-line short-form
    application database. *See* *id.*

[^12]: *See* Commercial Spectrum Enhancement Act, Pub. L. No. 108-494,
    118 Stat. 3986, Title II (2004) (codified in various sections of
    Title 47 of the United States Code) ("CSEA"), § 202 (codified at 47
    U.S.C. § 923(g)(2)).

[^13]: *Id*., § 203(b) (Section 203(b) amended Section 309(j) by adding
    at the end a new paragraph (15)).

[^14]: *Id*., § 202.

[^15]: *Auction No. 66 Comment Public Notice* at 2, 14. CSEA, § 203(b).

[^16]: *See* Report, Wireless Broadband Access Task Force, GN Docket No.
    04-163 (Feb. 2005).

[^17]: Although AWS is commonly associated with so-called third
    generation ("3G") applications and has been predicted to build on
    the success of such current-generation commercial wireless services
    as cellular and broadband Personal Communication Services, the
    services ultimately provided by AWS licensees are limited only by
    the Fixed and Mobile designation of the spectrum allocated for AWS
    and the service rules adopted for the bands. The International
    Telecommunication Union (ITU) has defined 3G network technologies as
    those that can offer maximum data transfer speeds of 2 megabits per
    second (Mbps) from a fixed location, 384 kbps at pedestrian speeds,
    and 144 kbps at traveling speeds of 100 kilometers per hour. The
    term "2.5G" is often used to describe the interim technologies that
    carriers have used to migrate from their 2G technologies of CDMA,
    TDMA, GSM, and iDEN to 3G technologies.  *See* Implementation of
    Section 6002(b) of the Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1993, Annual
    Report and Analysis of Competitive Market Conditions with Respect to
    Commercial Mobile Services, WT Docket No. 05-71, *Tenth Report*, 20
    FCC Rcd 15908, 15951 n. 252 (2005) ("*Tenth CMRS Competition
    Report*").

[^18]: *See* Amendment of Part 2 of the Commission's Rules to Allocate
    Spectrum Below 3 GHz for Mobile and Fixed Services to Support the
    Introduction of New Advanced Wireless Services, Including Third
    Generation Wireless Systems, ET Docket No. 00-258, *Second Report
    and Order*, 17 FCC Rcd 23193 (2002) ("*AWS Allocation* *Second
    Report and Order*"). In addition to the spectrum located in the
    1710-1755 and 2110-2155 MHz bands, the Commission has designated
    spectrum in the 1915-1920 MHz, 1995-2000 MHz, 2020-2025 MHz and
    2175-2180 MHz bands for AWS use ("AWS-2"). *See* Amendment of Part 2
    of the Commission's Rules to Allocate Spectrum Below 3 GHz for
    Mobile and Fixed Services to Support the Introduction of New
    Advanced Wireless Services, Including Third Generation Wireless
    Systems, ET Docket No. 00-258, *Sixth Report and Order, Third
    Memorandum Opinion and Order, and Fifth Memorandum Opinion and
    Order*, 19 FCC Rcd 20720 (2004). And the Commission has allocated an
    additional 20 MHz of spectrum at 2155-2175 MHz suitable for AWS uses
    adjacent to the upper 45 megahertz of AWS-1. *See* Amendment of Part
    2 of the Commission\'s Rules to Allocate Spectrum Below 3 GHz for
    Mobile and Fixed Services to Support the Introduction of New
    Advanced Wireless Services, including Third Generation Wireless
    Systems, ET Docket No. 00-258, *Eighth Report and Order, Fifth
    Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and Order*, 20 FCC Rcd 15866 (2005)
    ("*AWS Eighth Report and Order*" and "*AWS Fifth Notice*"). *See
    generally* ET Docket No. 00-258 and ET Docket No. 95-18.

[^19]: *See* Service Rules for Advanced Wireless Services in the 1.7 GHz
    and 2.1 GHz Bands, *Report and Order*, WT Docket No. 02-353, 18 FCC
    Rcd 25162 (2003); *modified by Order on Reconsideration*, 20 FCC Rcd
    14058 (2005) (codified at 47 C.F.R. Part 27, Subpart L) ("*AWS
    Service Rules Order*"). The Commission has also proposed service
    rules for the AWS-2 spectrum. *See* Service Rules for Advanced
    Wireless Services in the 1915-1920 MHz, 1995-2000 MHz, 2020-2025 MHz
    and 2175-2180 MHz Bands, WT Docket No. 04-356, *Notice of Proposed
    Rule Making*, 19 FCC Rcd 19263 (2004) ("*AWS-2 Service Rules
    NPRM*").

[^20]: *See infra* paras. 25-26, 30-31.

[^21]: *See* Redevelopment of Spectrum to Encourage Innovation in the
    Use of New Telecommunications Technologies, ET Docket No. 92-9,
    *First Report and Order and Third Notice of Proposed Rule Making*, 7
    FCC Rcd 6886 (1992); *Second Report and Order*, 8 FCC Rcd 6495
    (1993); *Third Report and Order and Memorandum Opinion and Order*, 8
    FCC Rcd 6589 (1993); *Memorandum Opinion and Order*, 9 FCC Rcd 1943
    (1994); *Second Memorandum Opinion and Order*, 9 FCC Rcd 7797
    (1994); *aff'd Association of Public Safety Communications
    Officials-International, Inc. v. FCC*, 76 F.3d 395 (D.C. Cir. 1996)
    (collectively, "*Emerging Technologies* proceeding"). *See also
    Teledesic, LLC v. FCC*, 275 F.3d 75 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (affirming
    modified relocation scheme for new satellite entrants to the 17.7 --
    19.7 GHz band). *See also* Amendment to the Commission's Rules
    Regarding a Plan for Sharing the Costs of Microwave Relocation, WT
    Docket No. 95-157, *First Report and Order and Further Notice of
    Proposed Rule Making* , 11 FCC Rcd 8825 (1996); *Second Report and
    Order*, 12 FCC Rcd 2705 (1997); *Memorandum Opinion and Order on
    Reconsideration*, 15 FCC Rcd 13999 (2000) (collectively, "*Microwave
    Cost Sharing* proceeding").

[^22]: The CMA licenses consist of both Metropolitan Statistical Area
    ("MSA") and Rural Service Area ("RSA") licenses. MSAs and RSAs were
    originally used to license cellular service. *See* 47 C.F.R. §
    22.909. The Commission refined and used these areas for licensing
    the Lower 700 MHz band. *See* 47 C.F.R. § 27.6(c)(2). For purposes
    of the 1710-1755 and 2110-2155 MHz bands, the Commission stated that
    it will use the same MSAs and RSAs used for licensing the Lower 700
    MHz band. *AWS-1 Service Rules Order,* 18 FCC Rcd at 25176 n.83.
    CMAs cannot be combined to form EAs because several CMAs cross EA
    borders.

[^23]: *See*, *e.g*., Implementation of the Commercial Spectrum
    Enhancement Act and Modernization of the Commission's Competitive
    Bidding Rules and Procedures, WT Docket No. 05-211, *Report and
    Order,* 21 FCC Rcd 891 (2006) ("*CSEA/Part 1 Report and Order*"),
    petitions for reconsideration pending; Amendment of Part 1 of the
    Commission\'s Rules -- Competitive Bidding Procedures, WT Docket No.
    97-82, *Second Order on Reconsideration of the Third Report and
    Order, and Order on Reconsideration of the Fifth Report and Order*,
    18 FCC Rcd 10180 (2003) ("*Order on Reconsideration of the Part 1
    Fifth Report and Order*"). The Commission has recently released a
    Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in the latter proceeding, in
    which it considers whether to modify its general competitive bidding
    rules governing benefits reserved for designated entities (*i.e.*,
    small businesses, rural telephone companies, and businesses owned by
    women and minorities). *See* Implementation of the Commercial
    Spectrum Enhancement Act and Modernization of the Commission's
    Competitive Bidding Rules and Procedures, WT Docket No. 05-211,
    *Further Notice of Proposed Rule Making*, 21 FCC Rcd 1753 (2006)
    ("*CSEA/Part 1 Designated Entity FNPRM*").

[^24]: *See*, *e.g.*, Amendment of Part 1 of the Commission's Rules ---
    Competitive Bidding Procedures, *Second Report and Order,* 9 FCC Rcd
    2348 (1994) (*Competitive Bidding Second Report and Order*);
    Amendment of Part 1 of the Commission's Rules --- Competitive
    Bidding Procedures, *Order on Reconsideration of the Third Report
    and Order*, *Fifth Report and Order*, *and Fourth Further Notice of
    Proposed Rule Making*, 15 FCC Rcd 15293 (2000) (modified by Erratum,
    DA 00-2475 (rel. Nov. 3, 2000)) ("*Part 1 Fifth Report and Order*");
    Amendment of Part 1 of the Commission's Rules --- Competitive
    Bidding Procedures, *Seventh Report and Order*, 16 FCC Rcd 17546
    (2001) ("*Part 1 Seventh Report and Order*") (amending the
    anti-collusion rule, which is codified at 47 C.F.R. §1.2105(c));
    Amendment of Part 1 of the Commission's Rules --- Competitive
    Bidding Procedures, *Eighth Report and Order*, 17 FCC Rcd 2962
    (2002) (amending Section 1.2110 of the Commission's rules); *Second
    Order on Reconsideration of the Fifth Report and Order*, 20 FCC Rcd
    1942 (2005) ("*Second Order on Reconsideration of the Fifth Report
    and Order*") (further amending Section 1.2110 to exempt the gross
    revenues of the affiliates of a rural telephone cooperative's
    officers and directors from attribution to the applicant and
    adopting other modifications to the competitive bidding rules);
    *CSEA/Part 1 Report and Order*.

[^25]: When ordering documents from BCPI, please provide the appropriate
    FCC document number (for example, DA 06-238 for the *Auction No. 66
    Comment Public Notice*, or FCC 06-47 for this Public Notice).

[^26]: 47 C.F.R. § 1.2105(c)(1); 47 C.F.R. § 1.2105(a)(2)(viii). *See
    also* *Part 1 Seventh Report and Order,* 16 FCC Rcd 17546 (2001);
    *Part 1 Fifth Report and Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 15297-98 ¶¶ 7-8.

[^27]: *See*, *e.g.*, "Wireless Telecommunications Bureau Provides
    Guidance on the Anti-Collusion Rule for D, E. and F Block Bidders,"
    *Public Notice*, DA 96-1460 (rel. August 28, 1996).

[^28]: 47 C.F.R. § 1.2105(c)(1).

[^29]: *See, e.g.*, Application of Star Wireless, LLC, *Forfeiture
    Order*, 19 FCC Rcd 18626, 18628 4, n. 19 (2004), application for
    review pending (collusion rule applies to "applicants' regardless of
    whether they are qualified to bid); Letter to Robert Pettit, Counsel
    for Noverr Publishing, Inc., from Margaret W. Wiener, Chief,
    Auctions and Industry Analysis Division, Wireless Telecommunications
    Bureau, 16 FCC Rcd 10080 (2000) (declining to except an applicant's
    controlling interest from coverage by the anti-collusion rule, even
    though the applicant never made an upfront payment for the auction
    and was not listed as a qualified bidder).

[^30]: *See* Section IV.A.2. "Information Available to Bidders Before
    and During the Auction," *infra*, especially ¶ 158.

[^31]: 47 C.F.R. § 1.2105(c)(7)(i).

[^32]: *Part 1 Seventh Report and Order*, 16 FCC Rcd at 17549-50 ¶ 6.

[^33]: *See* Application of Nevada Wireless for a License to Provide 800
    MHz Specialized Mobile Radio Service in the Farmington, NM-CO
    Economic Area (EA-155) Frequency Band A, *Memorandum Opinion and
    Order,* 13 FCC Rcd 11973, 11977 ¶ 11 (1998) ("*Nevada Wireless
    MO&O*").

[^34]: *Id*.

[^35]: *See, e.g*., Letter to Colby M. May, TCCSA, Inc., d/b/a Trinity
    Broadcasting Network, from Barbara A. Kreisman, Chief, Video
    Division, Media Bureau, and Margaret W. Wiener, Chief, Auctions and
    Spectrum Access Division, Wireless Telecommunications Bureau, 20 FCC
    Rcd 14648 (2005) (finding apparent violation of anti-collusion rule
    where applicants with mutually exclusive applications reported
    sharing same individual as an officer and director and reported
    having no bidding agreement).

[^36]: Mercury PCS II, LLC, *Notice of Apparent Liability for
    Forfeiture*, 12 FCC Rcd 17970, 17976 ¶ 12 (1997).

[^37]: Mercury PCS II, LLC, *Memorandum Opinion and Order*, 13 FCC Rcd
    23755, 23760 ¶ 11 (1998).

[^38]: Implementation of Section 309(j) of the Communications Act --
    Competitive Bidding, PP Docket No. 93-253, *Memorandum Opinion and*
    Order, 9 FCC Rcd 7684, 7689 ¶ 12 (1994).

[^39]: *Cf.* Wireless Telecommunications Bureau Responds to Questions
    About the Local Multipoint Distribution Service Auction, *Public
    Notice*, 13 FCC Rcd 341, 347-8 (1998) ("Public statements can give
    rise to collusion concerns. This has occurred in the antitrust
    context, where certain public statements can support other evidence
    which tends to indicate the existence of a conspiracy.").

[^40]: 47 C.F.R. § 1.2105(c)(7)(i).

[^41]: *See* Wireless Telecommunications Bureau Clarifies Spectrum
    Auction Anti-Collusion Rules, *Public Notice*, 11 FCC Rcd 9645
    (1995) ("*Anti-Collusion Public Notice*").

[^42]: *Nevada Wireless MO&O*, 13 FCC Rcd at 11978 ¶ 13.

[^43]: Implementation of Section 309(j) of the Communications Act --
    Competitive Bidding, PP Docket No. 93-253, *Memorandum Opinion and
    Order*, 9 FCC Rcd 7684, 7689 ¶ 12 (1994).

[^44]: *See* 47 C.F.R. §§ 1.2105(c), 1.2107(d), and 1.2109(d).

[^45]: *See* Amendment of Part 1 of the Commission\'s Rules --
    Competitive Bidding Procedures, WT Docket No. 97-82, *Third Further
    Notice of Proposed Rule Making*, 14 FCC Rcd 21558, 21560 ¶ 4 and n.
    4 (1999) *citing* Implementation of Section 309(j) of the
    Communications Act -- Competitive Bidding, PP Docket No. 93-253,
    *Memorandum Opinion and* Order, 9 FCC Rcd 7684, 7689 ¶ 12 (1994)
    ("\[W\]e wish to emphasize that all applicants and their owners
    continue to be subject to existing antitrust laws. Applicants should
    note that conduct that is permissible under the Commission\'s Rules
    may be prohibited by the antitrust laws."); Implementation of
    Section 309(j) of the Communications Act-Competitive Bidding, PP
    Docket No. 93-253, *Fourth Memorandum Opinion & Order*, 9 FCC Rcd
    6858, 6869 n. 134 (1994)("\[A\]pplicants will also be subject to
    existing antitrust laws.").

[^46]: *See Competitive Bidding Second Report and Order*, 9 FCC Rcd at
    2388 ¶ 226. *See also* "Justice Department Sues Three Firms Over FCC
    Auction Practices," *Press Release* 98-536 (DOJ Nov. 10, 1998).

[^47]: The Commission has cited a number of examples of such
    anticompetitive behavior. *See, e.g.,* Implementation of Section
    309(j) of the Communications Act-Competitive Bidding, PP Docket No.
    93-253, *Fourth Memorandum Opinion & Order*, 9 FCC Rcd 6858, 6869 n.
    134 (1994).

[^48]: Implementation of Section 309(j) of the Communications
    Act-Competitive Bidding, PP Docket No. 93-253, *Fourth Memorandum
    Opinion & Order*, 9 FCC Rcd 6858, 6869 n. 134 (1994); *see also*
    *Anti-Collusion Public Notice.*

[^49]: *See* *Anti-Collusion Public Notice*.

[^50]: *See Competitive Bidding Second Report and Order*, 9 FCC Rcd at
    2388 ¶ 226.

[^51]: *See* 47 C.F.R. § 1.2109(d); *see also* *Competitive Bidding
    Second Report and Order*, 9 FCC Rcd at 2388 ¶ 226.

[^52]: 47 C.F.R. § 1.65.

[^53]: 47 C.F.R. § 1.2105(c)(6); *see also* *Part 1 Seventh Report and
    Order*, 16 FCC Rcd at 17555 ¶ 17.

[^54]: 47 C.F.R. § 1.2107(d).

[^55]: [http://wireless.fcc.gov/auctions/anticollusion](http://wireless.fcc.gov/auctions/default.htm?job=anti_collusion)

[^56]: In the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 ("OBRA‑93"),
    Congress directed the Secretary of Commerce to identify at least
    200 megahertz of spectrum below 5 GHz for transfer to non‑Federal
    services. 47 U.S.C. § 923. NTIA identified the band 1710‑1755 MHz
    for transfer, with certain Federal operations to remain protected
    indefinitely. *See* Spectrum Reallocation Final Report, Response to
    Title VI Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, NTIA Special
    Publication 95-32, at App. E and page F-4 (Feb. 1995). Subsequently,
    NTIA concluded that most of the protected Federal operations could
    relocate or modify their operations to allow reallocation of the
    band for AWS. *See* NTIA Report, "An Assessment of the Viability of
    Accommodating Advanced Mobile Wireless (3G) Systems in the 1710-1770
    MHz and 2110-2170 MHz Bands," at 1-2 (July 22, 2002) ("*NTIA AWS
    Assessment*") (available at
    <http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/threeg/va7222002/3Gva072202web.htm>).
    The Commission sought comment on the *NTIA AWS Assessment*. FCC
    Seeks Comment on the National Telecommunications and Information
    Administration's Report, An Assessment of the Viability of
    Accommodating Advanced Mobile Wireless (3G) Systems in the 1710-1770
    MHz and 2110-2170 MHz Bands, ET Docket No. 00-258*, Public Notice*,
    17 FCC Rcd 14390 (2002). The *NTIA AWS Assessment* was incorporated
    into Amendment of Part 2 of the Commission's Rules to Allocate
    Spectrum Below 3 GHz for Mobile and Fixed Services to Support the
    Introduction of New Advanced Wireless Services, Including Third
    Generation Wireless Systems, ET Docket No. 00-258, *Fourth Notice of
    Proposed Rulemaking*, 18 FCC Rcd 13235 (2003).

[^57]: *See* Amendment of Part 2 of the Commission's Rules to Allocate
    Spectrum Below 3 GHz for Mobile and Fixed Services to Support the
    Introduction of New Advanced Wireless Services, Including Third
    Generation Wireless Systems, ET Docket No. 00-258, *Notice of
    Proposed Rule Making*, 16 FCC Rcd 596, 617-18 (2001).

[^58]: *See* *AWS Allocation* *Second Report and Order*, 17 FCC Rcd at
    23208-13 ¶¶ 34-41. The Commission has decided to clear BRS from the
    2150-2155 MHz band as part of a fundamental restructuring of the
    service. *See* Amendment of Parts 1, 21, 73, 74 and 101 of the
    Commission's Rules to Facilitate the Provision of Fixed and Mobile
    Broadband Access, Educational and Other Advanced Services in the
    2150-2162 and 2500-2690 MHz Bands, WT Docket No. 03-66, *Report and
    Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rule Making*, 19 FCC Rcd 14165,
    14177-78 ¶¶ 23-24 (2004) ("*BRS Report and Order*").

[^59]: CSEA, § 202.

[^60]: *Id.,* §§ 201-209. Eligible frequencies comprise four bands
    specified in CSEA (the 216-220 MHz, 1432-1435 MHz, 1710-1755 MHz and
    2385-2390 MHz bands), as well as any other band of frequencies
    reallocated from federal use to non-federal use after January 1,
    2003, and assigned by the Commission through competitive bidding.
    *Id.,* § 202. Bands of frequencies previously identified by the
    National Telecommunications and Information Administration in the
    Spectrum Reallocation Final Report, NTIA Special Publication 95-32
    (1995), are excluded. *Id*.

[^61]: *Id.,* § 203(b). CSEA also requires that, at the same time, NTIA
    submit for approval its estimate of relocation costs and the
    timelines for relocation to the Senate Committees on Appropriations,
    and Commerce, Science, and Transportation, the House of
    Representatives Committees on Appropriations and Energy and
    Commerce, and the Comptroller General. Unless disapproved by these
    committees within 30 days, the estimate "shall be approved."
    *Id*., § 202.

[^62]: *See* Letter from Michael D. Gallagher, Assistant Secretary for
    Communications and Information, United States Department of
    Commerce, to Kevin J. Martin, Chairman, Federal Communications
    Commission, dated December 27, 2005.

[^63]: *See supra* note 20.

[^64]: *See* *generally AWS Fifth Notice*, 20 FCC Rcd 15866.

[^65]: *See BRS Report and Order*, 19 FCC Rcd 14165, 14183-84 ¶¶ 37-38.
    *See also*, Review of the Spectrum Sharing Plan Among
    Non-Geostationary Satellite Orbit Mobile Satellite Service Systems
    in the 1.6/2.4 GHz Bands; Amendment of Part 2 of the Commission's
    Rules to Allocate Spectrum Below 3 GHz for Mobile and Fixed Service
    to Support the Introduction of New Advanced Wireless Services,
    Including Third Generation Wireless Systems, IB Docket No. 02-364,
    ET Docket No. 00-258, *Report and Order, Fourth Report and Order and
    Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking*, 19 FCC Rcd 13386 (2004)
    ("*Big LEO Spectrum Sharing Order*").

[^66]: *See AWS Fifth Notice*, 20 FCC Rcd at 15885-90 ¶¶ 43-52.

[^67]: *Id*. at 15886 ¶ 45, citing *AWS-2 Service Rules NPRM*, 19 FCC
    Rcd 19263, 19282-84 ¶¶ 46-49.

[^68]: *See*, *e.g.*, Petition for Reconsideration filed by Sprint
    Corporation, Nextel Corporation, and Wireless Communications
    Association International, Inc., IB Docket No. 02-364 (arguing that
    2495-2500 MHz is not suitable relocation spectrum because spectrum
    must be shared with other services); Petition for Reconsideration
    filed by Globalstar Corporation, IB Docket No. 02-364 (arguing that
    BRS operations in the 2495-2500 MHz band should be limited to the
    top 35 metropolitan statistical areas).

[^69]: *See* NTIA website at
    <http://www.ntia.doc.gov/osmhome/reports/specrelo/index.htm>.

[^70]: *See* 47 C.F.R. § 27.1134(a). Specifically, AWS licensees must
    protect Government stations within the "radii of operation" of the
    16 facilities. A table indicating the "radius of operation" for each
    of the 16 facilities is included in 47 C.F.R. § 27.1134(a).

[^71]: Operations will continue indefinitely and on a primary basis at
    the Cherry Point and Yuma facilities. 47 C.F.R. § 27.1134(a)(1). In
    addition, airborne and military test range operations as well as
    Precision-Guided-Munitions (PGM) systems will continue to use the
    1710-1720 MHz band on a primary basis, and AWS licensees will be
    required to protect these operations, until the systems are
    relocated to other spectrum, or PGM inventory is exhausted,
    whichever is earlier. 47 C.F.R. § 27.1134(a)(2).

[^72]: 47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(15)(C) (codifying CSEA §203). Upon a finding
    by the NTIA that a Federal entity has achieved comparable capability
    of systems by relocating to a new frequency assignment or by
    utilizing an alternative technology, the NTIA shall terminate the
    entity\'s authorization and notify the Commission that the entity\'s
    relocation has been completed. The NTIA shall also terminate such
    entity\'s authorization if the NTIA determines that the entity has
    unreasonably failed to comply with the timeline for relocation
    submitted by the Director of the Office of Management and Budget
    under Section 118(d)(2)(B). 47 U.S.C. § 923(g)(6).

[^73]: 47 C.F.R. § 27.1134(b).

[^74]: *See* 47 C.F.R. §§ 27.1134(c), 27.1135.

[^75]: Emerging technology services in this band are AWS and the Mobile
    Satellite Service (including auxiliary terrestrial components, or
    "ATC"). *See* 47 C.F.R. §§ 101.69, 101.79(a).

[^76]: *See* 47 C.F.R. §§ 27.1131, 24.237*.*

[^77]: *See BRS Report and Order,* 19 FCC Rcd 14165, 14177-78, 14183-84
    ¶¶ 23-24, 37-38, petitions for reconsideration pending. *See also*
    *AWS Eighth Report and Order*; *Big LEO Spectrum Sharing Order*. A
    five-megahertz portion of the 2110-2155 MHz band is currently used
    for Broadband Radio Service operations in the 2150-2160/62 MHz band.
    The Commission is currently considering relocation procedures that
    AWS-1 licensees will follow when relocating incumbent BRS licensees
    from the 2150-2160/62 MHz portion of the band.

[^78]: *See* 47 C.F.R. § 27.1132. *See also AWS Service Rules Order*, 18
    FCC Rcd 25162, 25206 ¶ 115, petition for reconsideration pending. In
    the event that AWS and BRS licensees cannot reach agreement in
    coordinating their facilities, they may seek the assistance of the
    Commission, and the Commission may then, at its discretion, impose
    requirements on either or both parties. 47 C.F.R. § 27.1132. *See
    also AWS Eighth Report and Order* (seeking comment on interference
    standard for BRS relocation trigger).

[^79]: *See* 47 C.F.R. § 27.1133.

[^80]: See 47 C.F.R. § 27.1134(d).

[^81]: *See* Section 27.50 of the Commission's rules, which states in
    pertinent part: "A licensee operating a base or fixed station
    utilizing a power of more than 1640 watts EIRP must coordinate such
    operations in advance with all Government and non-Government
    satellite entities in the 2025--2110 MHz band." 47 C.F.R. § 27.50.

[^82]: Current agreements and coordination arrangements between the
    United States and Canada or Mexico may be found on the Commission's
    website under <http://www.fcc.gov/ib/sand/agree/welcome.html>.
    Boundary limits using a predicted or measured 47 dBmV/m field
    strength limit for all 2110-2155 MHz transmissions addresses
    co-channel interference. Adjacent channel interference is addressed
    by 43 + 10 log10(P) out-of-band emission limit  for
    all transmissions, originating in both the 1710-1755 and 2110-2155
    MHz bands.

[^83]: *See* 47 C.F.R. § 1.924.

[^84]: *See id.*

[^85]: *See* "Licensees of Broadband Radio Service Channels 1 and/or
    2/2A Must File Site and Technical Data by December 27, 2005,"
    *Public Notice*, 20 FCC Rcd 19273 (2005).

[^86]: *See* Notice of Public Information Collection(s) being Submitted
    for Review to OMB, 71 FR 9127 (Feb. 22, 2006).

[^87]: 47 C.F.R. Ch. 1, Subpart I.

[^88]: 47 C.F.R. §§ 1.1305-1.1319.

[^89]: *See* 47 C.F.R. Part 1, Appendix C.

[^90]: *Auction No. 66 Comment Public Notice* at 1.

[^91]: T-Mobile Comments at 2-3; Alltel Comments at 1; CTIA Comments at
    4; RTG Comments at 9; U.S. Cellular Comments at 4.

[^92]: T-Mobile Reply Comments at 1-3.

[^93]: MetroPCS Comments at 3-6; Columbia/MC Comments at 8-9. MetroPCS
    specifically suggests that the Commission allow a minimum of 60 days
    between the release of the auction procedures and the short-form
    application deadline. MetroPCS Comments at 5. MetroPCS added that
    the additional time would not necessarily require a change in the
    auction start date; rather, the Bureau could reduce the time between
    the short-form filing deadline and the auction start. *Id*. at note
    11.

[^94]: Verizon Wireless Comments at 1.

[^95]: *See* Section IV.A.1. "Simultaneous Multiple Round Auction,"
    *infra.*

[^96]: For additional information regarding ISAS, including sample
    screen shots, visit the "About ISAS" web page at
    [http://wireless.fcc.gov/auctions/about_isas](http://wireless.fcc.gov/auctions/default.htm?job=about_isas).

[^97]: *See* 47 C.F.R. § 1.2105.

[^98]: *See* *id*.; *Competitive Bidding* *Second Report and Order*, 9
    FCC Rcd at 2376 ¶ 163.

[^99]: *See* Section III.D. "Upfront Payments -- Due June 1, 2006,"
    *infra.*

[^100]: *See* 47 C.F.R. § 1.2107.

[^101]: *See* 47 C.F.R. § 1.2105(a)(2)(v).

[^102]: 47 C.F.R. § 1.2110(f)(2)(i).

[^103]: 47 C.F.R. § 1.2110(f)(2)(iii).

[^104]: 47 C.F.R. §§ 1.2105, 1.2110(b)(1)(i). *See* Section II.E.
    "Bidding Credit Revenue Disclosures," *infra*, and Attachment D.

[^105]: *CSEA/Part 1 Designated Entity FNPRM* at ¶ 1.

[^106]: *Id.* at ¶¶ 1, 11.

[^107]: *Id.* at ¶¶ 1, 19.

[^108]: *Id.* at ¶ 21.

[^109]: *Id.* at ¶ 21, n.54.

[^110]: *See* Section V.E. "Tribal Lands Bidding Credit," *infra*.

[^111]: 47 C.F.R. § 1.2105(b)(2).

[^112]: 47 C.F.R. § 1.2105(a)(2)(viii), (c)(1).

[^113]: 47 C.F.R*.* § 1.2105(a)(2)(ix).

[^114]: *See* Section I.B.2 "Prohibition of Collusion; Compliance with
    Antitrust Laws," *supra.*

[^115]: 47 C.F.R. § 1.2105(c)(4)(i), (ii).

[^116]: *See* Section I.B.2 "Prohibition of Collusion; Compliance with
    Antitrust Laws," *supra.*

[^117]: *See id.*

[^118]: 47 C.F.R. § 1.2105 requires the disclosure on the short-form of
    the applicant's ownership information as set forth in 47 C.F.R. §
    1.2112.

[^119]: *CSEA/Part 1 Designated Entity FNPRM* at ¶¶ 1, 11.

[^120]: *Id.* at ¶¶ 1, 19.

[^121]: *Id.* at ¶ 21.

[^122]: § 1.2110(b); *see also Part 1 Fifth Report and Order*, 15 FCC
    Rcd at 15323-27, ¶¶ 59-67.

[^123]: § 1.2110(b).

[^124]: The recently adopted *CSEA/Part 1 Report and Order* will modify
    the procedure by which a consortium that is a winning bidder will
    apply for a license. *See CSEA/Part 1 Report and Order* at ¶¶ 51-52,
    petitions for reconsideration pending. Applicants applying as
    consortia should review the *CSEA/Part 1 Report and Order* to
    understand how the members of the consortia will apply for a license
    in the event they are winning bidders.

[^125]: *CSEA/Part 1 Designated Entity FNPRM* at ¶¶ 1, 11.

[^126]: For further guidance on the issue of *de facto* control, see the
    Commission's affiliation rule at 47 C.F.R. §1.2110(b)(5); *see also
    Intermountain Microwave*, 12 FCC 2d. 559, 560 (1963), and
    Application of Baker Creek Communications, L.P., for Authority to
    Construct and Operate Local Multipoint Distribution Services in
    Multiple Basic Trading Areas, *Memorandum Opinion and Order,* 13 FCC
    Rcd 18709 (1998).

[^127]: *See* 47 C.F.R. § 1.2110(c)(2)(i)(A)-(C).

[^128]: *See* 47 C.F.R. § 1.2110(c)(2)(ii)(F).

[^129]: *Order on Reconsideration of the Part 1 Fifth Report and Order*,
    18 FCC Rcd at 10186-194 ¶¶ 10-18; *Second Order on Reconsideration
    of the Fifth Report and Order*, 20 FCC Rcd at 1945-46 ¶ 9.

[^130]: *Order on Reconsideration of the Part 1 Fifth Report and Order*,
    18 FCC Rcd at 10185-186 ¶¶ 8-9. However, to the extent that the
    officers and directors of the applicant are controlling interest
    holders of other entities, the gross revenues of those entities will
    be attributed to the applicant.

[^131]: 47 C.F.R. §1.2110(c)(6).

[^132]: 47 C.F.R. § 27.1102(b).

[^133]: 47 C.F.R. § 1.2110(b)(3)(i).

[^134]: The recently adopted *CSEA/Part 1 Report and Order* modified the
    procedure by which a consortium that is a winning bidder will apply
    for a license. *See CSEA/Part 1 Report and Order* at ¶¶ 51-52.
    Applicants applying as consortia should review the *CSEA/Part 1
    Report and Order* to understand how the members of the consortia
    will apply for a license in the event they are winning bidders.

[^135]: 47 C.F.R. § 1.2110.

[^136]: 47 C.F.R. § 1.2105(a)(2)(xi); *Part 1 Fifth Report and Order,*
    15 FCC Rcd at 15317 ¶ 42 and n. 142.

[^137]: 47 C.F.R. § 1.2105(a)(2)(x); *Part 1 Fifth Report and Order,* 15
    FCC Rcd at 15317 ¶ 42.

[^138]: 47 C.F.R. § 1.2106(a).

[^139]: 47 C.F.R. § 1.2105(b)(1); 47 C.F.R. § 1.2105(a)(2)(x); *see Part
    1 Fifth Report and Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 15317 ¶ 42 and n.142 ("If
    any one of an applicant's controlling interests or their
    affiliates...is in default on any Commission licenses or is
    delinquent on any non-tax debt owed to any Federal agency at the
    time the applicant files it\[s\] Form 175, the applicant will not be
    able to make the certification required by Section
    1.2105(a)(2)(x)...and will not be eligible to participate in
    Commission auctions.")

[^140]: *See* "WTB Reminds Prospective Broadband PCS Spectrum Auction
    Applicants of Default and Delinquency Disclosure Requirements,"
    *Public Notice*, 19 FCC Rcd 21920 (2004) ("*Auction Default
    Disclosure Public* *Notice*"). This public notice may be found at
    [http://wireless.fcc.gov/auctions/58/](http://wireless.fcc.gov/auctions/default.htm?job=auction_summary&id=58).

[^141]: *See* Letter to Cheryl A. Tritt, Esq., Morrison and Foerster,
    LLP, from Margaret Wiener, Chief, Auctions and Spectrum Access
    Division, Wireless Telecommunications Bureau, 19 FCC Rcd 22907
    (2004) (clarifying the term "debt" or "non-tax debt" as referenced
    in 47 C.F.R. §§ 1.2105(a) and 1.2106(a)). This letter may be found
    at:
    [http://wireless.fcc.gov/auctions/58/](http://wireless.fcc.gov/auctions/default.htm?job=auction_summary&id=58).

[^142]: Even where Commission rules expressly permit late payment,
    subject to payment of an additional late fee, and do not impose a
    final payment deadline, the Commission may in some cases issue a
    demand for payment by a date certain. *See* 47 C.F.R. § 1.1164(a).
    Failure to comply with the terms of a particular demand letter in
    the time period provided may render the subject debt delinquent,
    notwithstanding rules generally permitting late payment.

[^143]: Amendment of Parts 0 and 1 of the Commission\'s Rules;
    Implementation of the Debt Collection Improvement Act of 1996 and
    Adoption of Rules Governing Applications or Requests for Benefits by
    Delinquent Debtors, MD Docket No. 02-339, *Report and Order*, 19 FCC
    Rcd 6540 (2004) (implementing Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321,
    1358 (1996)) ("*Debt Collection Report and Order*").

[^144]: *Debt Collection Report and Order*, 19 FCC Rcd at 6541 n.11.
    Footnote 11 specifically mentions 47 C.F.R. § 1.2105(a)(2)(x) and
    (xi).

[^145]: *See* *Auction Default Disclosure Public Notice*, 19 FCC Rcd at
    21920 (addressing relationship between Commission's Red Light
    Display System and FCC Form 175 default and delinquency disclosure
    requirements for auction applicants).

[^146]: *See Debt Collection Report and Order*, 19 FCC Rcd 6540. *See*
    *also* 47 C.F.R. § 1.1112.

[^147]: Applicants that have their long-form applications dismissed will
    be deemed to have defaulted and will be subject to default payments
    under 47 C.F.R. §§ 1.2104(g) and 1.2109(c).

[^148]: 47 C.F.R. § 1.2110(c)(3).

[^149]: Designated entities are defined as small businesses, businesses
    owned by members of minority groups and/or women, and rural
    telephone companies. 47 C.F.R. § 1.2110(a).

[^150]: *See* 47 C.F.R. § 1.2105(b).

[^151]: *See* 47 C.F.R. § 1.917.

[^152]: 47 C.F.R. § 1.65.

[^153]: *See* 47 C.F.R. § 1.2105(b)(2).

[^154]: *CSEA/Part 1 Designated Entity FNPRM*.

[^155]: *Id.*, ¶ 1.

[^156]: *Id.*, ¶ 21.

[^157]: *Id.*, ¶ 21, n.54.

[^158]: 47 C.F.R. § 12105(a).

[^159]: *See* Section III.D. "Upfront Payments --- Due June 1, 2006,"
    *infra.*

[^160]: 47 C.F.R. § 1.2105(b); *see also* Two Way Radio of Carolina,
    Inc., *Memorandum Opinion and Order*, 14 FCC Rcd 12035 (1999).

[^161]: *See* Letter to Patrick Shannon, Counsel for Lynch 3G
    Communications Corp., from Margaret W. Wiener, Chief, Auctions and
    Industry Analysis Division, Wireless Telecommunications Bureau, 18
    FCC Rcd 11552 (2003).

[^162]: Amendment of Part 1 of the Commission's Rules --- Competitive
    Bidding Proceeding, *Order, Memorandum Opinion and Order and Notice
    of Proposed Rule Making*, 12 FCC Rcd 5686, 5697-98 ¶ 16 (1997)
    ("*Part 1 Order*").

[^163]: *Part 1 Fifth Report and Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 15316-17 ¶¶
    40-42; 47 C.F.R. § 1.2106(a); *see* Section II.F. "Provisions
    Regarding Former and Current Defaulters," *supra.*

[^164]: 47 C.F.R. § 1.2110(c).

[^165]: *Auction No. 66 Comment Public Notice* at 11.

[^166]: Provisionally winning bids are bids that would become final
    winning bids if the auction were to close after the given round.
    *See* Section IV.B.4. "Provisionally Winning Bids," *infra.*

[^167]: An exception to this formula is that proposed upfront payments
    are set at \$20,000 per 10 MHz license and \$40,000 per 20 MHz
    license for the CMA, EA, and REAG licenses covering the Gulf of
    Mexico. All population figures are from the 2000 U.S. Census, U.S.
    Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census. *See* Census 2000
    Summary File 1 (SF1) and July 3, 2001, News Releases covering the
    U.S. Virgin Islands, Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, and
    American Samoa. Results are rounded using our standard rounding
    procedure: results above \$10,000 are rounded to the nearest
    \$1,000; results below \$10,000 but above \$1,000 are rounded to the
    nearest \$100; and results below \$1,000 are rounded to the nearest
    \$10.

[^168]: T-Mobile Comments at 9.

[^169]: *See, e.g.,* Blooston Coalition Reply Comments at 5; NTCA Reply
    Comments at 2; OPASTCO Reply Comments at 3.

[^170]: *See* CAC Comments at 6; Colts Neck Comments at 8-10.

[^171]: *See* Section IV.B.2. "Reserve Price and Minimum Opening Bids,"
    *infra.*

[^172]: *See*, *e.g.*, WCTA Comments at 3.

[^173]: *See* Blooston Coalition Reply Comments at 5 (\$0.01); RTG
    Comments at 6 (\$0.02); Wirefree Comments at 1 (\$0.25).

[^174]: CAC Comments at 6.

[^175]: *Competitive Bidding Second Report and Order*, 9 FCC Rcd at 2380
    ¶ 186*.*

[^176]: Colts Neck Comments at 8-10.

[^177]: 47 C.F.R. § 1.2106(a).

[^178]: 47 C.F.R. §1.1910.

[^179]: *Auction No. 66 Comment Public Notice* at 4.

[^180]: *Id.* at 4-5. We recommended that the two auctions be run
    concurrently, rather than sequentially, in order to permit bidders
    interested in winning licenses in both auctions to coordinate their
    bidding across auctions, and in order to facilitate the application
    of the aggregate reserve price. *Id*. at 5.

[^181]: A bid on a "group" of licenses can include a single license.

[^182]: Cingular Comments at 5.

[^183]: *Id.* at 3-4.

[^184]: The "threshold problem" refers to coordination difficulties
    faced by individual bidders that collectively try to beat a package
    bid by another bidder whose valuation for the package is less than
    the aggregate valuations of the individual bidders.

[^185]: Verizon Wireless Comments at 4.

[^186]: Milgrom/Rosston Comments at 2.

[^187]: In this Public Notice, we adopt our proposal to conduct a single
    SMR auction for Auction No. 66. *See* Section IV.A.1. "Simultaneous
    Multiple Round Auction," *supra.*

[^188]: We intend to release a public notice identifying the names of
    applicants that are qualified to participate in the auction, but
    without indicating applicant's license selections or amounts of
    upfront payments.

[^189]: Prior to the auction, we will withhold information on bidder
    license selections, consistent with our proposal to limit
    information on bidder interests, although we will make available
    each bidder's level of eligibility.

[^190]: The eligibility ratio typically is defined as the sum of bidding
    units for which bidders have purchased bidding eligibility divided
    by the total number of bidding units for licenses in the auction.
    The cap limits the number of bidding units that a single bidder can
    contribute to the numerator of the modified eligibility ratio.

[^191]: For example, a bidder that selects all licenses and submits an
    upfront payment sufficient to bid on all the licenses in the auction
    will be eligible to bid on all the licenses, but because of the 50%
    cap only half the bidding units will count toward calculating the
    modified eligibility ratio. Similarly, a bidder that has made an
    upfront payment covering 80% of the bidding units in the auction
    will also contribute only 50% of the total bidding units to the
    calculation of the modified eligibility ratio.

[^192]: *See Auction No. 66 Comment Public Notice* at 6.

[^193]: *Ex parte* Letter from Thomas J. Sugrue for T-Mobile, March 7,
    2006, at 1; *Ex parte* Letter from Thomas J. Sugrue and Peter
    Cramton for T-Mobile, March 20, 2006, at 1-3. The proposal first
    stated in the earlier letter was modified and expanded in the March
    20 letter; that proposal suggested making information available if
    an adjusted eligibility ratio was at least two.

[^194]: *See, e.g., Ex parte* Letter from Carl Northrop on behalf of
    Cingular, Columbia/MC, Edge Wireless Licenses, LLC, Leap, Madison
    Dearborn, MetroPCS, RTG, T-Mobile, and U.S. Cellular, including
    attachment, dated April 3, 2006 (supporting T-Mobile proposal).

[^195]: *See, e.g.,* Alltel Comments at 1; Leap Comments at 1.

[^196]: T-Mobile Comments, Cramton Decl. at 5; Alltel Reply Comments at
    5; Cingular Reply Comments at 3; Leap Reply Comments at 4.

[^197]: U.S. Cellular Comments at 15; MetroPCS Reply Comments at 10.

[^198]: *See, e.g.,* Reitsma, Paul S.A., Peter Stone, Janos A. Csirik,
    and Michael L. Littman, "Self-enforcing Strategic Demand Reduction,"
    in *Agent Mediated Electronic Commerce IV: Designing Mechanisms and
    Systems*, Lectrue Notes in Artificial Intelligence, PP. 289-306,
    Spring Verlag, 2002; and Bajari, P. and J. Fox, "Complementarities
    and Collusion in an FCC Spectrum Auction," NBER working paper,
    (2005). As noted above, the Commission will continue to scrutinize
    bidding activity for any instances in which bidding patterns suggest
    that collusion may be occurring. *See* Section I.B.2. "Prohibition
    of Collusion; Compliance with Antitrust Laws," *supra*.

[^199]: Our recognition that information may be beneficial to bidders
    does not indicate our acceptance of all of the arguments to that
    effect presented by commenters.

[^200]: *See*, *e*.*g*., Blooston Coalition Reply Comments at 3.

[^201]: *See* Centennial Comments at 6; Leap Comments at 10; RTG
    Comments at 3; OPASTCO Reply Comments at 2-3.

[^202]: *See, e.g.,* Leap Comments at 10-11; T-Mobile Comments at 8;
    U.S. Cellular Comments at 17.

[^203]: *See, e.g.,* MetroPCS Comments at 10; MDP/TA Reply Comments at
    4.

[^204]: *See* Alltel Reply Comments at 6-7; MetroPCS Reply Comments at
    9.

[^205]: *See, e.g.,* MetroPCS Comments at 12; RTG Comments at 4; U.S.
    Cellular Comments at 6-7, 17-19; Comments of Blooston Coalition
    Reply Comments at 3; OPASTCO Reply Comments at 2-3.

[^206]: *See*, *e*.*g*., U.S. Cellular Comments at 18.

[^207]: *See, e.g.,* MetroPCS Comments at 10; MDP/TA Reply Comments at
    4.

[^208]: *See, e.g.,* MetroPCS Comments at 12; Columbia/MC Comments at 7.

[^209]: *Ex parte* Statement of Professor Robert J. Weber submitted on
    behalf of U.S. Cellular, dated March 7, 2006, at 4.

[^210]: With respect to arguments that smaller bidders need more
    information in order to participate in this auction, we note that
    the Commission has taken several steps to assure that they will have
    ample opportunity to compete for AWS-1 spectrum licenses. For
    example, in this Public Notice, we have reduced by 40 percent the
    minimum opening bids and upfront payments for CMA licenses covering
    RSAs. Last fall, the Commission increased the amount of spectrum
    licensed on the basis of CMAs from 10 to 20 megahertz in order to
    provide greater opportunities for smaller providers to obtain access
    to this spectrum at auction. Finally, substantial bidding credits
    are available for small businesses of all types.

[^211]: *See, e.g.*, Colts Neck Comments at 13; T-Mobile Comments at 7
    and Cramton Decl. at 4; Blooston Coalition Reply Comments at 4.

[^212]: *See* Section I.B.2., "Prohibition of Collusion; Compliance with
    Antitrust Laws," *supra.*

[^213]: Milgrom/Rosston Reply Comments at 3.

[^214]: Reuters Comments at 3; Cingular Comments at 7; Leap Reply
    Comments at 2.

[^215]: *See* Baker Creek Communications, L.P., For Authority to
    Construct and Operate Local Multipoint Distribution Services In
    Multiple Basic Trading Areas, DA 98-1921, *Memorandum Opinion and
    Orde*r, 13 FCC Rcd 18709 (1998); Letter from Margaret W. Wiener,
    Deputy Chief, Auctions and Industry Analysis Division, Wireless
    Telecommunications Bureau, to Steven R. Sixberry, Nevada Wireless,
    DA 00-1949 (rel. August 24, 2000).

[^216]: *See e.g.*, NTCH Comments at 4 (release information regarding
    bids on CMA and EA licenses); *Ex parte* Letter from Warren Lavey on
    behalf of U.S. Cellular, including Memorandum from Robert C.
    Marshall to Leslie M. Marx, Chief Economist, both dated March 21,
    2006 (release identities of winning bidders).

[^217]: *See, e.g., Ex parte* Letter from George Y. Wheeler on behalf of
    U.S. Cellular, dated March 17, 2006.

[^218]: 47 C.F.R. § 1.2105(c)(1).

[^219]: Comments premised on such information being unavailable are
    inapposite to the procedure we adopt. *See* Cingular Comments at
    9-10 (asserting applicants would be "forced to avoid contact with
    any entities who might be participating in the auction"); *see also*
    Leap Comments at 10 n.19 (suggesting that questions might be raised
    if short-form application information is not publicly revealed);
    Reuters Comments at 3 (questioning how applicants would know the
    identity of other applicants with which they could not communicate);
    Verizon Wireless Comments at 4-5 (asserting that the Bureau must
    release information regarding the ownership of applicants).

[^220]: As discussed at greater length elsewhere in this Public Notice,
    other laws may prohibit particular communications regarding bids and
    bidding strategies. Nothing in the Commission's rules or procedures
    insulates applicants against liability for violating such laws,
    *e.g.*, applicable anti-trust laws.

[^221]: For purposes of Section 1.2105(c), the term applicant includes
    all controlling interests, all parties with ownership interests
    greater than ten percent (10%) and all officers and directors of the
    applicant. 47 C.F.R. § 1.2105(c)(7).

[^222]: MetroPCS Comments at 13; U.S. Cellular Comments at 22.

[^223]: *Auction 66 Comment Public Notice* at 10-11.

[^224]: Colts Neck Comments at 8-10.

[^225]: *Competitive Bidding Second Report and Order*, 9 FCC Rcd at 2371
    ¶ 134.

[^226]: CAC Comments at 7; *see also* Blooston Coalition Reply Comments
    at 6 (supporting CAC Comments).

[^227]: CAC Comments at 7*.*

[^228]: *Auction No. 66 Comment Public Notice* at 12-13.

[^229]: T-Mobile Comments at 3.

[^230]: The percentage of bidding units receiving new provisionally
    winning bids is reported as the "Stage Transition Percentage" on the
    Results tab of the FCC Auction System.

[^231]: *Auction No. 66 Comment Public Notice* at 12.

[^232]: T-Mobile Comments at 3.

[^233]: The stage of the auction does not affect the auction stopping
    rules; the auction may conclude in Stage One. *See* Section IV.A.7.
    "Auction Stopping Rules," *infra*.

[^234]: When monitoring activity for determining when to change stages,
    we may consider the percentage of bidding units of the licenses
    receiving new provisionally winning bids, excluding any FCC-held
    licenses.

[^235]: *Auction No. 66 Comment Public Notice* at 13.

[^236]: T-Mobile Comments at 3.

[^237]: Blooston Coalition Reply Comments at 6; *see* CAC Comments at 7.

[^238]: *Auction No. 66 Comment Public Notice* at 5-6.

[^239]: *Id*. at 5.

[^240]: Cingular Comments at 11.

[^241]: *Id.*

[^242]: *Id.*

[^243]: U.S. Cellular Comments at 11.

[^244]: *Auction No. 66 Comment Public Notice* at 8.

[^245]: In addition, as noted above, the effect of the Bureau exercising
    its discretion will be that the activity rule will apply as usual
    and a bidder with insufficient activity will either use an activity
    waiver (if it has any left) or lose bidding eligibility. Cingular
    does not address how the activity rule would apply under its
    proposed modified stopping rule.

[^246]: *Id.* at 6.

[^247]: 47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(4)(F).

[^248]: *See* Amendment of Part 1 of the Commission's Rules ---
    Competitive Bidding Procedures, WT Docket No. 97-82, *Third Report
    and Order and Second Further Notice of Proposed Rule Making*, 13 FCC
    Rcd 375, 455-456 ¶ 141 (1997) ("*Part 1 Third Report and Order*").

[^249]: *Id*.

[^250]: *Id*.

[^251]: CSEA, § 202.

[^252]: *See* Section I.A. "Introduction," *supra.*

[^253]: *See* CSEA, § 203(b).

[^254]: *See* *CSEA/Part 1 Report and Order*.

[^255]: *See* CSEA, § 203(b).

[^256]: *Id.*

[^257]: CSEA, § 203(c).

[^258]: *See* CSEA, § 202.

[^259]: *See Auction No. 66 Comment Public Notice* at 14.

[^260]: *See CSEA/Part 1 Declaratory Ruling,* 20 FCC Rcd at 11270-72 ¶¶
    5-12.

[^261]: Verizon Wireless Comments at 8.

[^262]: *Id*. at 7.

[^263]: *Id*. at 8.

[^264]: Cingular Reply Comments at 5-6; T-Mobile Reply Comments at 7-8.

[^265]: CSEA does not alter the Commission's authority to establish
    services that include both eligible and non-eligible frequencies or
    to offer licenses authorizing use of eligible and non-eligible
    frequencies in varying proportions in a single auction. The
    Commission's discretion pursuant to CSEA to attribute bids for such
    licenses between eligible and non-eligible frequencies enables the
    Commission to serve CSEA's objectives of meeting estimated
    relocation costs and clearing eligible frequencies together with
    other public interests in spectrum management applicable to both
    eligible frequencies and non-eligible frequencies.

[^266]: 47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(4)(F).

[^267]: 47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(3)(C).

[^268]: *See* Section IV.A.2. "Information Available to Bidders Before
    and During an Auction," *supra*.

[^269]: Cingular Comments at 10.

[^270]: If information on net bids is revealed during the auction
    (*i*.*e*., modified eligibility ration is three or greater), there
    will be no need to make such an announcement.

[^271]: *Auction No. 66 Comment Public Notice* at n. 37.

[^272]: *Id.* at 15.

[^273]: An exception to this formula is that proposed upfront payments
    are set at \$20,000 per 10 MHz license and \$40,000 per 20 MHz
    license for the CMA, EA, and REAG licenses covering the Gulf of
    Mexico. All population figures are from the 2000 U.S. Census, U.S.
    Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census. *See* Census 2000
    Summary File 1 (SF1) and July 3, 2001, News Releases covering the
    U.S. Virgin Islands, Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, and
    American Samoa. Results are rounded using our standard rounding
    procedure: results above \$10,000 are rounded to the nearest
    \$1,000; results below \$10,000 but above \$1,000 are rounded to the
    nearest \$100; and results below \$1,000 are rounded to the nearest
    \$10.

[^274]: *Auction No. 66 Comment Public Notice* at 15.

[^275]: T-Mobile Comments at 9.

[^276]: Wirefree Comments at 1; U.S. Cellular Reply Comments at 11.

[^277]: *See*, *e.g.*, WCTA Comments at 3.

[^278]: *See* Blooston Coalition Reply Comments at 5 (\$0.01); RTG
    Comments at 6 (\$0.02); MetroPCS Reply Comments at 14-15 (\$0.25).

[^279]: *See* Farmers Mutual Comments at 3; RTG Comments at 6.

[^280]: The changes we make to our proposal for determining minimum
    opening bids does not modify our proposal with respect to licenses
    covering the Gulf of Mexico.

[^281]: *See* Section III.D.3. "Upfront Payments and Bidding
    Eligibility," *supra.*

[^282]: Bidders must have sufficient eligibility to place a bid on the
    particular license. *See* Section III.D.3 "Upfront Payments and
    Bidding Eligibility," *supra.*

[^283]: In the event of duplicate bid amounts due to rounding, the FCC
    Auction System will omit the duplicates and will list fewer than
    nine acceptable bid amounts for the license.

[^284]: *Auction No. 66 Comment Public Notice* at 16.

[^285]: *Id*.

[^286]: T-Mobile Comments at 3.

[^287]: Leap Comments at 11-12.

[^288]: U.S. Cellular Reply Comments at 11.

[^289]: CAC Comments at 7-8.

[^290]: Colts Neck Comments at 3, 11.

[^291]: *Id.*

[^292]: For Round 1 calculations, because there is no prior round
    (*i.e.*, no round 0), the activity index from the prior round is set
    at 0.

[^293]: Results are rounded using our standard rounding procedure:
    results above \$10,000 are rounded to the nearest \$1,000; results
    below \$10,000 but above \$1,000 are rounded to the nearest \$100;
    and results below \$1,000 are rounded to the nearest \$10.

[^294]: *See* Section IV.B.5. "Bid Removal and Bid Withdrawal," *infra*.

[^295]: *See* Section IV.A.3. "Eligibility and Activity Rules," *supra*.

[^296]: *Auction No. 66 Comment Public Notice* at 17.

[^297]: Other commenters made proposals to avoid ties which we address
    separately. *See* Section IV.B.3.a. "Minimum Acceptable Bid Amounts
    and Bid Increment Amounts," *supra*, addressing comments filed by
    Colts Neck.

[^298]: Sprint Nextel Comments at 10; *see* 47 U.S.C. § 309(i)(5)
    (terminating Commission's authority to use random selection pursuant
    to Section 309(i) as of July 1, 1997).

[^299]: *Cf.* 47 U.S.C. §§ 309(i) and 309(j).

[^300]: A description of the L'Ecuyer algorithms can be found in
    L'Ecuyer, P. (1999) "Good Parameters and Implementations for
    Combined Multiple Recursive Random Number Generators" *Operations
    Research* 47 (1), pp.159-164. A longer version of this paper and the
    C code for the algorithms can be found on the author's website at
    <http://www.iro.umontreal.ca/~lecuyer/papers.html>.

[^301]: Bidders must have sufficient eligibility to place a bid on the
    particular license. *See* Section III.D.3. "Upfront Payments and
    Bidding Eligibility," *supra.*

[^302]: In the event of duplicate bid amounts due to rounding, the FCC
    Auction System will omit the duplicates and will list fewer than
    nine acceptable bid amounts for the license.

[^303]: *Auction No. 66 Comment Public Notice* at 18-20.

[^304]: *See* T-Mobile Comments, Cramton Decl. at 6.

[^305]: The Bureau retains the discretion to lower the minimum
    acceptable bid on such licenses in the next round or in later
    rounds.

[^306]: 47 C.F.R. §§ 1.2104(g), 1.2109.

[^307]: The payment will equal the lower of: (1) the difference between
    the net withdrawn bid and the subsequent net winning bid; or (2) the
    difference between the gross withdrawn bid and the subsequent gross
    winning bid. *See* 47 C.F.R. § 1.2104(g)(1).

[^308]: See following paragraph for discussion of interim bid withdrawal
    payments.

[^309]: 47 C.F.R. § 1.2104(g)(1); *see* *Part 1 Fifth Report and Order*,
    15 FCC Rcd at 15302 ¶ 15.

[^310]: *See CSEA/Part 1 Report and Order* at ¶ 30.

[^311]: *See, e.g.,* MetroPCS Comments at 17 ("no compelling reason for
    a change" in the prior level of three percent (3%)); Verizon
    Wireless Comments at 9 ("too low"); and T-Mobile Comments at 17
    (supports interim withdrawal payments of "10 percent of applicable
    bids").

[^312]: 47 C.F.R. § 1.2104(g).

[^313]: The identities of parties that are qualified to bid in Auction
    No. 66 will be available before the auction. Thus, bidders will know
    in advance of this auction the identities of the other parties
    against which they may be bidding in the auction.

[^314]: *See* 47 C.F.R. § 1.2107(b).

[^315]: *See* 47 C.F.R. § 1.2109(a).

[^316]: *See* 47 C.F.R. § 1.2112(b).

[^317]: *See CSEA/Part 1 Report and Order* at ¶¶ 51-52, petitions for
    reconsideration pending.

[^318]: *See id.*

[^319]: *See also* 47 C.F.R. § 1.2110(f)(3)(ii) & (vii).

[^320]: The net bids reported in the Public Notice closing the auction
    reflect discounts based on final information available from the
    applicants at the close of bidding, *e*.*g*., size-based bidding
    credits and, in broadcast auctions, new entrant bidding credits.
    However, the Commission is not able to determine tribal lands
    bidding credits at the close of bidding because the deadline to
    submit the information required for such credits is not until nearly
    six months after the long-form application filing deadline. *See* 47
    C.F.R. §1.2110(f)(3)(ii) (describing required post-auction
    certifications). For purposes of calculating pro-rata tribal lands
    bidding credits, any repayments of tribal lands bidding credit
    amounts pursuant to section 1.2110(f)(3)(C)(viii), as amended, are
    not funds available for granting other pro-rata tribal lands bidding
    credits. *See* 47 C.F.R. § 1.2110(f)(3)(C)(viii), as amended.

[^321]: When making any necessary refunds of already-made license
    payments, the Commission will continue to follow the usual
    Commission procedures, as set forth in the procedures public notice
    for the relevant auction. *See, e.g.,* Entertainment Unlimited, Inc.
    Request for Refund of Late Payment Fees for PCS Licenses Purchased
    in Auction No. 22, *Memorandum Opinion and Order*, 16 FCC Rcd 10030
    (2001).

[^322]: Final resolution of all applications occurs only after any
    review or reconsideration of any such credit has been concluded and
    no opportunity remains for further review or reconsideration. It is
    possible that final resolution of less than all applications seeking
    tribal lands bidding credits may make it apparent that funds
    available for tribal lands bidding credits equal or exceed the full
    amount for which all other applications seeking tribal lands bidding
    credits might qualify. For example, the funds available may have
    been just short of the full amount for which all applicants might
    qualify. If one applicant withdraws its application for a tribal
    lands bidding credit, the funds available subsequently may exceed
    the full amount for which all other applicants might qualify, even
    though it may be some time before all other applications are finally
    resolved. In light of this possibility, the Commission reserved the
    power to award full credits when available information makes it
    clear that funds available exceed the full amount for which all
    applicants might qualify, even though all applications have not yet
    been fully resolved. In such circumstances, the Commission will
    increase the amounts of any previously awarded pro rata credits to
    make them full credits as well.

[^323]: An applicant may be able to obtain the largest tribal lands
    bidding credit possible for a bid for a license even when it is not
    able to provide service to all of the tribal land covered by the
    license. If the tribal land covered by the license is less than 200
    square miles, the largest tribal lands bidding credit possible for a
    bid for that license is not affected by the size of the area that
    ultimately is served. *See* 47 C.F.R. §1.2110(f)(3)(iii). Moreover,
    the largest tribal lands bidding credit possible for a bid for a
    license is also subject to a cap based on the amount of the bid.
    *See* 47 C.F.R. §1.2110(f)(3)(iv).

[^324]: *See generally*, Extending Wireless Telecommunications Services
    to Tribal Lands, *Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed
    Rule Making*, 15 FCC Rcd 11794 (2000), *Second Report and Order and
    Second Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking*, 18 FCC Rcd 4775,
    4778-79 ¶ 10 (2003), *Third Report and Order*, 19 FCC Rcd 17652
    (2004). *See also* "Wireless Telecommunications Bureau Announces
    Enhancements to the Universal Licensing System to Help Winning
    Bidders of FCC Auctions File for Tribal Lands Bidding Credits,"
    *Public Notice*, 16 FCC Rcd 5355 (2001); "Wireless
    Telecommunications Bureau Releases Additional Information Regarding
    the Procedures for Obtaining a Tribal Lands Bidding Credit and List
    of Tribal Lands," *Public Notice*, 15 FCC Rcd 24838 (2000);
    "Wireless Telecommunications Bureau Announces Availability of
    Bidding Credits for Providing Wireless Services to Qualifying Tribal
    Lands: Tribal Lands Bidding Credits to be Available Beginning in
    Auction No. 36 (800 MHz Specialized Mobile Radio (SMR) Lower 80
    Channels) and in Future Auctions," *Public Notice*, 15 FCC Rcd 18351
    (2000).

[^325]: T-Mobile Comments at 9, Verizon Wireless Comments at 9.

[^326]: MetroPCS Comments at 17-18.

[^327]: In addition, the default payment rules create a relationship
    between withdrawal payments and default payments intended to
    encourage bidders to withdraw, and thereby permit other bidders to
    win the license, rather than default. MetroPCS mistakenly argues
    that adopting the proposal and using the same percentage for the
    interim withdrawal payment and the additional default payment will
    leave bidders indifferent to whether they withdraw or default. *Id.*
    at 18. This is incorrect. Commission rules in fact provide that the
    final liability of a defaulting bidder will exceed the liability of
    a bidder that withdraws an equivalent bid by the amount of the
    additional default payment, *i.e.*, the final withdrawal payment
    equals the deficiency portion of the default payment. *See,
    generally,* 47 C.F.R. § 1.2104(g). Thus, the payments alone give
    bidders an incentive to withdraw bids rather than default. In
    addition, defaulters are prohibited from participating in future
    auctions until they cure their default. *See* 47 C.F.R. §
    1.2105(a)(2)(x). Even after curing a default, former defaulters must
    pay an additional upfront payment to participate in Commission
    auctions. *See* 47 C.F.R. § 1.2106(a).

[^328]: *CSEA/Part 1 Report and Order* at ¶ 29.

[^329]: *Auction No. 66 Comment Public Notice* at 21-22.

[^330]: *See* 47 C.F.R. § 1.2109(b) and (c).

[^331]: 47 C.F.R. § 1.2109(d).

[^332]: *See generally*, 47 C.F.R. § 1.2105.

[^333]: *See generally*, 47 C.F.R. § 1.2105(a)(2)(ii)(A).

[^334]: *See generally*, 47 C.F.R. § 1.2105(a)(2)(i).

[^335]: *See generally*, 47 C.F.R. § 1.2105(a)(2) (viii).

[^336]: *See generally*, 47 C.F.R. §§ 1.2105(a)(2)(ii)(B), 1.2110 and
    1.2112.

[^337]: *See* 47 C.F.R. § 1.2112.

[^338]: 47 C.F.R. § 1.2112(a). Section 1.2105 requires the disclosure on
    the short form of applicant ownership information set forth in
    Section 1.2112.

[^339]: 47 C.F.R. § 1.2112(a)(7).

[^340]: S*ee* 47 C.F.R. § 1.2112(a)(6).

[^341]: *Id*.

[^342]: S*ee* 47 C.F.R. § 1.2112(b)(1)(i).

[^343]: 47 C.F.R. § 1.2110(n).

[^344]: *See* 47 C.F.R. § 1.2112(b)(1)(iii).

[^345]: *See* 47 C.F.R. § 1.2110(c)(5).

[^346]: *See* 47 C.F.R. §1.2112(b)(1)(iii).

[^347]: *Compare* 47 C.F.R. 1.2110(c)(2) (definition of controlling
    interests) and (c)(5)(definition of affiliate) *with* 47 C.F.R.
    1.2112(a) (describing disclosable interest holders).

[^348]: *See* 47 C.F.R. § 1.2112(b)(1)(iii).

[^349]: *Id*.

[^350]: *See generally*, 47 C.F.R. § 1.2105(a)(2) (iv)-(vii) and
    (ix)-(xi).

[^351]: *See* 47 C.F.R. § 1.2105(a)(2)(xi).

[^352]: *See* 47 C.F.R. § 1.2106(a).

[^353]: *See* 47 C.F.R. § 1.917.

[^354]: *See* 47 C.F.R. § 1.2105(a)(2)(v).

[^355]: *See* 47 C.F.R. § 1.2105(b).