Space & Missile Defense Report

> July 28, 2008 Monday

Analysis: Navy Deep-Sixes Stealthy DDG 1000 Destroyer Even As China
Wields Hundreds Of Ship-Killer Missiles

**SECTION:** Vol. 9 No. 29

**LENGTH:** 2084 words

By Dave Ahearn

Just as China has deployed hundreds of missiles aimed at the Taiwan

Strait, the U.S. Navy is moving to abandon production of cutting-edge
DDG 1000

destroyers with radar-evading capabilities in favor of buying a few more
old-

style DDG 51 ships that have all the stealth of the wide side of a barn.

While the DDG 1000, all 14,564 long tons of it, will show up on an enemy

radar as nothing more than a fishing boat, the DDG 51 shows up on a
foe\'s radar

as \... a destroyer, bigger than life.

After a decade of development costing billions of dollars, the Navy

suddenly wants to build only the two DDG 1000 superships now on the
verge of

production, and forget plans to build a fleet of seven of the futuristic

destroyers.

Rather, as a make-work for shipbuilding companies, the Navy would buy

fewer than 10 of the old, outmoded DDG 51 Arleigh Burke Class
destroyers, which

were designed in the 1980s. (Then-Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney spoke
at the

commissioning ceremony for the Arleigh Burke, DDG 51.)

The Navy excuse for suddenly abandoning the DDG 1000 shipbuilding
program

is that the ships cost a lot, perhaps more than \$3 billion each for the
first

two, and lesser amounts after that. (The Congressional Budget Office, or
CBO,

says it might be more like \$5 billion for the first two, and lesser
amounts for

later copies of the ship.) For perspective, \$5 billion is less than one
percent

of a single year in defense spending. And a destroyer takes more than a
year to

build.

Reality check: if a ship costs sizeable money, but it performs against a

newly emerging threat, does it make sense to save money by deciding
instead to

acquire a cheaper ship that doesn\'t meet that threat?

Another question that hasn\'t been answered is this: why is the Navy
doing

the work of political officials? The job of military officers, let us be
clear,

is to give their professional assessment of the risks facing the United
States,

and then give their professional assessment as to what equipment \--
ships,

aircraft carriers, submarines, fighter planes, bombers, tanks, cargo
aircraft

and much more \-- is required to meet that threat.

It is the job of elected officials in the White House and Congress to
say

whether they will appropriate the money for those needed military
assets. And

the DDG 1000s are needed.

While it is true that the old DDG 51s have some limited stealth
capacity,

that is nothing compared to the radar-evading powers of DDG 1000s, with
their

inward-sloping hulls, faceted superstructures and backward-sloping bows.

Does the Navy, which year after year cited the clear need for a stealthy

destroyer, now suddenly say the threat environment has eased, that
threats have

disappeared, and stealth is no longer required?

No, the Navy is cutting DDG 1000 not because enemy threats disappeared,

not because the DDG 1000 design is flawed (in fact, it bodes well to
perform

just as expected), but rather because of a desire to avoid spending
money.

Well, here is some advice for the Navy: do your job. Lay out what is

required to defend the nation against the threat. And you have been very
clear,

year after year, that you required a stealthy destroyer to meet the
threat.

If it turns out that it will cost a lot of money, let Congress wrestle

with that. Let members of Congress stand up and say they won\'t provide
for the

common defense, despite the fact that the Constitution of the United
States

charges them with that responsibility. Let Congress say it wants to wage
wars on

the cheap, that it won\'t provide the men and women in uniform, those
who wear

the cloth, with the platform that they need when Congress sends them
into harm\'s

way.

Meanwhile, let the Navy stay in the military area, and state what

militarily is required to project force at sea in the current threat

environment. In fact, the Navy already has done this, repeatedly, and
each time

the sea service said a fleet of DDG 1000 destroyers is needed to prevail
against

likely enemies.

For example, just three years ago, the Navy was adamant that the

futuristic destroyer, then called DD(X), was vitally needed to counter
threats

that even then were clear and growing.

There was no Navy talk of giving up on the future and settling for more

old-tech ships unable to meet the emergent challenge.

Consider, for example, what Vice Adm. Joseph Sestak, deputy chief of

naval operations for warfare requirements and programs, said at the time
about

the indispensability of the next-generation destroyer that he termed a

reasonably priced ship that can operate in littoral, or near-shore,
waters:

\* Without DD(X), \"You won\'t have the vessel you need\...to fight the
fight

in the littoral,\" in gun power, undersea warfare and air warfare,
Sestak said in

an interview. The DD(X) would be superior to existing destroyers in
detecting

and eliminating quiet enemy diesel submarines in near-shore areas, and
the DD(X)

would be able by itself to detect incoming enemy missiles, without aid
from

other ships.

\* The majority of the investment in new technologies for the DD(X)

already has been made. Should that time, money and technology go down
the drain?

And even more funding has been sunk into the advanced, high-technology
ship

design since then.

\* Loss of those technologies would harm other programs expecting to

utilize those innovations, such as the next-generation CVN 21 aircraft
carrier,

the LHA(R) amphibious ship, and the modernization of the old DDG
51Arleigh Burke

Class destroyers and CG 47 Ticonderoga Class cruiser ships now in the
fleet.

\* The DDG 1000 hull form and much of its systems are to form the basis

for the next generation Navy cruiser, CG(X), which is needed to provide

protection against ballistic missile threats.

\* Without the new destroyer, the Navy would lose undersea,
anti-aircraft

and other capabilities improvements over the DDGs.

As for the argument that the DD(X) is prohibitively expensive, Sestak

compared the DD(X) development costs to expenses incurred in developing
other

ships. The DD(X) development outlay then came to just \$7.7 billion,
versus \$11.4

billion to develop the Aegis combat system. And that \$11.4 billion
doesn\'t

include another \$32.5 billion of government cost in the Aegis
development

program.

Want something more recent, and higher-ranking?

Let\'s hear, and heed, the words of Adm. Michael G. Mullen in March last

year. At the time, he was the highest-ranking uniformed leader in the
Navy, the

chief of naval operations. (He since has been promoted, and currently is

chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.)

This is what he had to say about the DDG 1000:

\"This multi-mission surface combatant, tailored for land attack and

littoral dominance, will provide independent forward presence and
deterrence and

operate as an integral part of joint and combined expeditionary
forces,\" Mullen

said. \"DDG 1000 will capitalize on reduced signatures and enhanced
survivability

to maintain persistent presence in the littoral. The program provides
the

baseline for spiral development to support future surface ships. \...

\"With the Advanced Gun System (AGS) and associated Long Range Land
Attack

Projectile (LRLAP), DDG 1000 will provide volume and precision fires in
support

of Joint forces ashore. A Global Positioning System (GPS) guided, 155
millimeter

round, LRLAP will provide all weather fires capability out to 83
nautical miles.

Its Dual Band Radar represents a significant increase in air defense
capability

in the cluttered littoral environment. Investment in Open Architecture
and

reduced manning will provide the Navy life cycle cost savings and
technology

that can be retrofit to legacy ships.\"

Does that sound like the DDG 1000 is an unneeded, unworkable frill that

should be thrown away and forgotten?

Not a bit.

So the question is this: how did such strongly worded, and strongly

thought out, Navy rationales for building the next-generation class of

destroyers become the Navy capitulation and abandonment of a new class
of ships?

How can two ships be the eventual replacement for a fleet of more than
60

Arleigh Burke Class destroyers?

Can the Navy send the old DDG 51 destroyers into the Taiwan Strait if

China makes good on its threat to invade Taiwan? Not unless the Navy
wants to

watch some of the 1,400 Chinese missiles sink American destroyers.

(U.S. forces also would require some super-stealth supersonic aircraft,

the F-22 Raptor, to take out those missile emplacements, and Congress
has

slashed the original buy of 750 Raptors to 381, to 277, and now to 183.
But

that\'s another story of pinch-penny warfighting.)

If Congress wishes to meet its responsibility to support the armed
forces

and provide for the common defense, lawmakers will have to recognize
that

defense spending must rise, even if the war in Iraq ends 16 months after
an

inauguration ceremony in January.

One way for Congress to do that would be to do nothing, and permit the

automatic expiration of the tax cuts enacted in 2001 and 2003 to occur,
as now

provided, in 2010 or 2011. That would add about \$2.6 trillion to
revenues in the

next decade, an amount equivalent to roughly 16 times the entire annual
Pentagon

spending on hardware procurement, including research and development
programs.

Clearly, acquisition costs are going to rise, and the DDG 1000 would be

but a small part of that. The \$300 billion program for the F-35 Joint
Strike

Fighter called Lightning II, and the V-22 Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft,
are set

for full-rate production now or in the next few years. The Navy wants to
shift

from buying one new \$2 billion-plus attack submarine yearly to two
(even as

China is acquiring eight different classes of subs). The Air Force needs
aerial

refueling tanker planes costing perhaps \$100 billion in coming years,
with an

initial batch of 179 aircraft costing maybe \$35 billion. Aircraft
carriers are

to be bought, one every four years, for about \$7 billion to \$8 billion
apiece.

The Army is moving ahead with a \$160 billion Future Combat System of
vehicles,

aircraft and more. And many types of new or refurbished helicopters are
needed

by the armed services.

And all this doesn\'t count billions of dollars in repairing and
replacing

military hardware damaged in the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. It
doesn\'t

include billions more to hire more troops, because there are too few
people in

uniform, and repeated tours of duty in Iraq have left them stressed and
worn.

So out of all this, the Navy can\'t afford to buy some decent destroyers

able to meet the enemy threat? Say that the huge CBO estimate of \$5
billion for

the first two DDG 1000s is right. And say there is not even a slight
reduction

in that price tag for ensuing ships. We\'re still talking five more
ships for \$5

billion each, or \$25 billion over many years, in a Department of
Defense that

goes through \$600 billion each and every year without breaking a sweat.

And let\'s remember the only germane point here: the DDG 1000 is the
right

ship to meet the threat, and the DDG 51 Arleigh Burke Class \-- while
it\'s a

grand old design that has served well in combat including a vicious
attack in

Yemen \-- isn\'t the ship of the future designed to conquer what enemies
will

throw at us as the 21st century unfolds.

Finally, let us examine secondary but very real issue: if the DDG 1000

program is killed, that also may kill the General Dynamics Corp. \[GD\]
shipyard,

Bath Iron Works in Maine. It also will disrupt planned work that
Northrop

Grumman Corp. \[NOC\] unit Ship Systems counted on for future years.

If Bath goes out of business, it will take a huge number of high-paying

jobs out of Maine, a state where unemployment traditionally has been

unpleasantly high.

And if there is no Bath Iron Works, then the Navy can say there is no

competition for shipbuilding work, because only Northrop is left in the
business

in the United States.

Sen. Susan Collins (R-Maine) has asked what will happen then? Will

Pentagon leaders say that competition must be revived by having ships
for the

United States Navy built in foreign yards, instead of by American labor?
Will

American ships be built by French or German workers, she asks?

Or, she continues, could it be that U.S. warships will be built by a

rival power that soon may be at war with the United States, China?

This is not the first time that DDG 1000 foes have attempted to kill the

cutting-edge ship in its crib. Some wanted to block construction of any
of the

advanced destroyers. Now they are making another run at it to kill the
remaining

five in the planned fleet. But Collins, joined by an array of other
lawmakers

and, perhaps, some stalwarts in the Navy, may once again pull victory
out of the

jaws of defeat, and keep the ship from sinking.

**LOAD-DATE:** July 28, 2008

**LANGUAGE:** ENGLISH

**PUBLICATION-TYPE:** Newsletter

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