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AAR-100

**Human Factors Newsletter \# 02-09**

**May 4 -- May 17, 2002**

# 

**[CAMI Research Reports]{.underline} - Presentations at the 73rd Annual
Scientific Meeting of The Aerospace Medical Association:**

-   **The Relationship of Flight Strip Marking and Strip Usage
    Preferences** (C. Manning, F. Durso, P. Batsakes, and J.
    Crutchfield; FAA Civil Aerospace Medical Institute, Oklahoma City,
    OK, Texas Tech University, Lubbock, TX, The Boeing Company, Seattle,
    WA). **Purpose:** New air traffic control (ATC) tools will require
    controllers to eliminate their use of paper flight progress strips.
    However, because of strip marking requirements and extensive
    training, controllers\' use of strips is a long-established habit.
    We developed a set of questions about controllers\' strip marking
    preferences to predict those who might have trouble reducing or
    eliminating strip usage. **Methods:** Two hundred ninety-five
    controllers at five en route centers were interviewed about why they
    made certain strip markings. They provided biographical information
    such as age and number of years as Certified Professional
    Controllers (CPC). Their preferences for using flight strips and
    other sources to obtain flight plan information were also obtained.
    These data were matched with observed counts of strip markings made
    during ATC operations. **Results:** Controllers who always said they
    preferred using strips (alone or in combination with other
    information sources) to obtain flight plan information were older
    (X^2^(1)=*t*12.53, p\<.001) and had been CPCs longer
    (X^2^(1)=*t*=8.49, p\<.01) than those who did not always prefer to
    use strips to obtain information. These controllers also made
    significantly more total marks (*t*(291)=4.02, p\<.001) and more
    marks related to incoming and outgoing radar and communications
    (*t*(291)=3.31, p\<.01). Also, those who never said they preferred
    to use strips to obtain information made significantly fewer
    clearance-related marks (*t*(291)=2.30, p\<.03); marked
    significantly fewer issued clearances (*t*(291)=2.20, p\<.03); and
    made significantly fewer marks for incoming and outgoing radar and
    communications (*t*(291)=2.12, p\<.04). **Conclusions:** Controllers
    who said they preferred using strips marked them differently than
    those who said they did not prefer using strips. Strip marking
    preferences were also related to age and experience. This
    information could be useful in identifying controllers who have
    difficulties reducing their usage of flight progress strips.

-   **Joint Safety Analysis Teams: A Cooperative Effort to Improve
    World-Wide Aviation Safety** (R.E. King; FAA Civil Aerospace Medical
    Institute, Oklahoma City, OK). **Introduction**: Manufacturers
    predict the number of commercial airplanes in worldwide service will
    increase to 23,000 by the year 2015. An extrapolation of the data
    suggests nearly one hull-loss accident per week by 2015, even if
    accident rate remains stable. **Method:** Numerous organizations,
    including: DoD, FAA air carriers, aircraft manufacturers, and labor
    unions collaboratively agreed to address problems the data suggest
    are the biggest risks, focusing on those with the highest
    probability of reoccurrence. The identified major challenges include
    Weather, Turbulence, Runway Incursion, Controlled Flight into
    Terrain, Approach and Landing, and Loss of Control (LoC). The
    Commercial Aviation Safety Team (CAST) chartered Joint Safety
    Analysis Teams (JSATs) to analyze representative accidents in these
    areas. Team members aided by a facilitator, identified
    [Events]{.underline}, generated [Standard Problem
    Statements]{.underline} and [Contributing Factors]{.underline}, and
    developed [Intervention Strategies]{.underline}. Interventions were
    then rated (0 to 6) in three areas: Power (in a \"perfect world\"),
    Confidence (considering the real world), and Applicability
    (generalizability). Mathematically combining these ratings yielded
    an Overall Effectiveness (OE) rating. CAST then chartered Joint
    Safety Implementation Teams (JSITs) to assess the feasibility of
    interventions and to facilitate their implementation. The
    interventions with the highest ratings were forwarded to their
    respective JSIT. This presentation will focus on OE ratings from the
    LoC JSAT, which involved a mathematically refined process.
    **Results:** OE ratings from the LoC JSAT ranged from 0 to 4.6. As
    an example, due to it\'s rating of 3.8, Applying Risk Management to
    Maintenance Service Bulletins (intervention strategy #532), ranked
    9th and was consequently operationalized for implementation by its
    JSIT. Typically, design changes garnered the highest OEs, while
    training recommendations tended to earn lower OEs. **Conclusions:**
    CAST/JSAT/JSIT used group process to develop interventions that may
    contribute to a significant reduction in aviation accidents and
    resulting fatalities.

-   **The Effects of Task Load on Controller-to-Controller
    Communications and Situational Awareness** (L.L. Bailey and B.F.
    Willems; Civil Aerospace Medical Institute, Oklahoma City, OK and
    W.J. Hughes Technical Center, Atlantic City, NJ). **Purpose:**
    Recently, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) began a program
    of research to investigate the role that intra-team communication
    plays in helping radar air traffic control teams coordinate their
    individual efforts. Based on the literature of controller and pilot
    communications, it was hypothesized that as task load increased,
    communications would increase in order to maintain situational
    awareness. Furthermore, it was hypothesized that there would be an
    inverse relationship between task load and situational awareness.
    **Methods:** Using a high-fidelity air traffic control (ATC)
    simulator, ten 2-person teams, consisting of certified ATC
    specialists, performed routine ATC tasks within a single factor (low
    and high workload) repeated measure design. Performance was
    videotaped and the frequency of intra-team communications was
    counted. Post scenario perceptions of task load and situational
    awareness were assessed using a version of the NASA Task load Index
    (TLX) and a 4-item scale developed at the William J. Hughes
    Technical Center, respectively. **Results:** Bivariate correlations
    of intra-team communications (c), task load (t) and situational
    awareness (s) were separately analyzed for low and high workload.
    Because the sign of the correlations were established *a priori*, a
    one tailed test of significance was used with p\<.10 as a test of
    significance. Results for the low workload condition were *r*(c,t) =
    -.14 (ns), *r*(c,s) = .38 (ns), and r(t,s) = -.62. Correlations for
    the high workload conditions were *r*(c,t) = .51, *r*(c,s) = .63,
    *r*(t,s) = -.30 (ns). **Conclusions:** Under high workload
    conditions, as perceptions of task load increased, there was a
    corresponding increase in the frequency of intra-team
    communications. The data suggest that the increase in communications
    is used to maintain situational awareness. This conclusion supports
    the *a priori* hypotheses. However, under low workload conditions,
    the data fail to support the hypotheses, with the exception that
    perceptions of situational awareness decreased as task load
    increased.

-   **Pilot Responses to Vacuum Failure in Flight Simulators and
    Aircraft** (D. B. Beringer, J. D. Ball, and K. Roy; FAA Civil
    Aerospace Medical Institute, Oklahoma City, OK, Air Safety
    Foundation, AOPA). **Purpose:** The General Aviation (GA) community
    has indicated an interest in employing a back-up attitude indicator
    in GA aircraft, possibly to the exclusion of the turn coordinator.
    Partial-panel flight has been shown to be challenging and to produce
    elevated workload, and a number of fatal accidents have been
    attributed to it. These studies gathered data on responses of
    instrument-rated GA pilots to simulated vacuum failures, both in
    flight simulators and in aircraft, to evaluate potential
    interventions. **Methods:** Two parallel studies were undertaken,
    one in flight simulators at the Civil Aerospace Medical Institute
    (Piper Malibu and Cessna 172), and one in two aircraft (Air Safety
    Foundation Piper Archer and Beechcraft Bonanza). Sixty
    instrument-rated pilots flew the simulators in 5 different display
    configurations (various combinations of attitude indicator, back-up
    attitude indicator, turn coordinator, and HSI or directional gyro).
    Thirty-six pilots flew the aircraft (24 in the Archer, 12 in the
    Bonanza). Data collected included flight performance, eye movement,
    and cockpit activity. **Results:** Loss of control occurred most
    frequently in the Advanced General Aviation Research Simulator with
    the most impoverished instrumentation condition (75%; partial panel
    and magnetic compass). Addition of other instrumentation decreased
    the frequency of control loss; specifically, adding an HSI and/or
    back-up attitude indicator. The simplex (Cessna simulator, Archer
    aircraft) models appeared more immune to control losses (Bonanza
    data are being collected at this time). Linear correlations with age
    and currency were weak or nonexistent in most cases. **Discussion:**
    It was evident that complex aircraft are more likely to produce
    flight-terminating outcomes in vacuum-failure conditions than are
    simplex aircraft. Recent experience with a vacuum failure appears to
    have a beneficial effect on performance, but simple recency of
    instrument flight does not (nor does total flight experience). There
    was a weak second-order effect for age, with slightly more losses
    associated with the oldest and youngest participants.

-   **Comparisons of Sleep Duration, Subjective Fatigue, and Mood Among
    Four Air Traffic Control Shift Schedule Types** (T.E. Nesthus, K.
    Holcomb, C. Cruz, L. Dobbins, and J.T. Becker; FAA Civil Aerospace
    Medical Institute, Oklahoma City, OK, University of Pittsburgh
    Medical Center, Pittsburgh, PA). **Purpose:** A field study was
    designed to evaluate Air Traffic Control Specialists' (ATCSs) sleep
    duration, wakefulness, subjective fatigue, mood, and computer-based
    test performance during routine operational shift schedules. The
    field study was associated with a Congressional request to
    investigate the effects of shift work and fatigue on ATCSs. This
    presentation compares measures of sleep duration, subjective
    fatigue, and mood among four different shift schedule types,
    including: 2-2-1 (2 evenings, 2 early mornings, 1 midnight); 2-3 (2
    evenings, 3 early mornings); 2-1-2 (2 evenings, 1 midday, 2 early
    mornings); and SS (5 straight early mornings). **Methods:**
    Forty-four ATCS volunteers from two air traffic facilities were
    evaluated in this comparison. Performance testing, wrist activity
    monitoring, and logbook entries were integrated into each
    volunteer\'s workweek and off-time schedules. Sleep duration and
    subjective reports were evaluated relative to each shift schedule
    type for one week plus one day off. **Results:** As expected,
    significant main effects for day, and day-by-shift type interactions
    were found for the following measures: sleep duration, sleep quality
    ratings, pre- and post-shift sleepiness, and pre-shift positive
    affect scores. Sleep duration, sleep ratings, and mood for the first
    day off after the workweek followed trends consistent with recovery
    effects for the more difficult shift-types. **Discussion:** These
    results support previous research showing changes in reported sleep
    duration, sleep quality, mood, and fatigue associated with specific
    shift schedule features such as start times (e.g., early mornings,
    afternoons, midnights) and cumulative effects (e.g., progressive
    work-week fatigue). Of the 4 shift-type schedules evaluated in this
    study, the 2-1-2 generally showed better sleep quality, reduced
    fatigue, and improved mood scores across the week. The 2-2-1 and 2-3
    schedules showed greater sleep duration during the day off which may
    indicate a greater need for sleep (i.e., sleep debt) by the end of
    the week.

-   **A Comparison of the Effects of Clockwise and Counter-Clockwise
    Rapidly Rotating Shift Schedules on Complex Task Performance** (C.
    Cruz, A. Boquet, C. Detwiler, and T. Nesthus; FAA Civil Aerospace
    Medical Institute, Oklahoma City, OK 73125). **Introduction:** Many
    Air Traffic Control Specialists (ATCSs) work a relatively unique
    counter-clockwise, rapidly rotating shift schedule. Although
    arguments against these kinds of schedules are prevalent in the
    literature, few studies have examined rotating shifts such as those
    seen with ATCSs. The present study directly compared clockwise and
    counter-clockwise rapidly rotating shift work schedules on measures
    of complex task performance from the Multiple Task Performance
    Battery (MTPB). **Methods:** Participants (n=28) worked day shifts
    for the first week of the study (0800-1600), followed by two weeks
    of either a clockwise (n=14) or counter-clockwise (n=14) shift work
    schedule. Participants completed three 1.5-hour sessions on the MTPB
    on each shift following the first day of training. Each session
    contained low, medium, and high workload periods, as well as active-
    and passive-task components. **Results:** There were no group
    differences in the passive task composite scores. Instead, a
    shift-by-session interaction, F(8, 19)=2.5, p=.048, indicated that,
    while performance was generally lower on the last session of each
    shift, scores were lower by a much greater margin at the end of the
    midnight shift. Results for the active task composite scores
    indicated a 3-way interaction between week, shift, and rotation
    condition, F(4, 23)=4.7, p=.006. This complex relationship indicated
    that performance was consistently higher in the counter-clockwise
    rotation and was less variable across shifts than in the clockwise
    rotation. **Discussion:** These data do not support the hypothesis
    that a clockwise rotation will result in better outcomes on complex
    task performance. If anything, performance during the
    counter-clockwise condition was the same in the case of passive
    tasks or better and more stable in the case of active tasks. The
    empirical evidence gained from this study suggests that particular
    shifts, such as early morning and midnight shifts, may adversely
    affect sleep and performance more than the direction of shift
    rotation.

-   **An Experimental Analysis of the Effects of Clockwise and
    Counter-Clockwise Shift Rotations on Three Biological Markers** (A.
    Boquet, C. Cruz, C. Detwiler, and T. Nesthus; FAA Civil Aerospace
    Medical Institute, Oklahoma City, OK 73125). **Introduction:** Most
    researchers recommend that shift rotation in a forward or clockwise
    direction will produce less disruption of circadian rhythms than
    those that rotate in a backward or counter-clockwise direction. This
    is based upon extrapolation from quasi-experimental studies of
    shift-workers and research on the effects of jet lag, which indicate
    that westward travel results in less disruption of circadian
    rhythms. This investigation examined the effects of direction of
    rotation on cortisol, melatonin, and temperature in participants
    randomly assigned to either a clockwise or counter-clockwise shift
    rotation. **Methods:** Twenty-eight participants worked a day shift
    (0800-1600) for one week followed by either a clockwise (n=14) or
    counter-clockwise (n=14) shift rotation for two weeks. Participants
    wore a flexible rectal temperature sensor for the three weeks of the
    study and were allowed to remove the probe for 90 minutes each day.
    Saliva samples were collected at the end of the baseline week for
    later assay for melatonin and cortisol, and were time-locked to
    collection times during the two "shift work" weeks. **Results:** No
    group differences were found for cortisol for either of the
    workweeks. The clockwise group, however, had a significantly greater
    increase in melatonin during the midnight shift, compared with the
    counter-clockwise group. Finally, analyses of core body temperature
    revealed greater amplitude for the clockwise group and a delay of
    the acrophase for the counter-clockwise group of 84 minutes during
    both weeks of testing. **Discussion:** While cortisol levels did not
    appear to differ based on direction of shift rotation, there were
    inherent differences with melatonin secretion and core body
    temperature. Precisely why such differences exist remains unclear
    but may be similar to that seen with circadian resynchronization
    during westward travel. Furthermore, it is not clear if these
    differences would persist in individuals exposed to longer periods
    of shift rotations.

-   **The Relationship between Gluccocorticoid Activity and Cognitive
    Performance in the Bakan Vigilance Task** (C. Detwiler, A.
    Boquet, C. Cruz, and T. Nesthus; FAA Civil Aerospace Medical
    Institute, Oklahoma City, OK 73125). **Introduction:** There is a
    growing body of evidence suggesting that chronic exposure to
    increased levels of circulating gluccocorticoids (GC) can impair
    cognitive performance. Specifically, it appears that up-regulation
    of the hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenocortical (HPAC) axis results in
    inhibition of the negative feedback loop through the binding of
    cortisol to GC receptors in key cortical structures. The goal of the
    present study was to test the effects of clockwise and
    counter-clockwise shift rotation and HPAC activity on vigilance.
    **Methods:** Participants in the study worked one week of day shifts
    (0800-1600), followed by two weeks of either a clockwise (n=14) or a
    counter-clockwise (n=14) shift rotation. Saliva samples were
    collected for later assay of cortisol at the end of the baseline
    week and during the two "shift work" weeks. High and low cortisol
    reactors (HCR/LCR) were determined by a median split of their delta
    scores. **Results:** Analyses of the midnight shift yielded
    significantly fewer correct responses on the Bakan Vigilance Task
    for the HCR group compared with the LCR group, F(1,24) = 5.9, p =
    .023. Furthermore, the analysis of the afternoon shift revealed a
    significant shift by reactor group interaction, F(3,22) = 3.6, p =
    .031. Specifically, the HCR group had significantly fewer correct
    responses for the last three measures obtained during the afternoon
    shift, compared with the LRC group. **Discussion:** The results
    support the hypothesis that higher levels of circulating
    gluccocorticoids are associated with decrements in cognitive
    performance. Indeed, those individuals susceptible to greater
    increases in gluccocorticoid activity may be at risk for
    concommitant decreases in cognitive performance.

-   **Relationship of Employee Attitudes and Supervisor-Controller Ratio
    to En Route Operational Error Rates** (D. Broach and C. S. Dollar;
    FAA Civil Aerospace Medical Institute, Oklahoma City, OK).
    **Introduction:** An operational error (OE) results when an Air
    Traffic Control Specialist (ATCS) fails to maintain appropriate
    separation between aircraft, obstacles, etc. Recent research on OEs
    has focused on situational and individual characteristics (Center
    for Naval Analyses Corporation, 1995; Della Rocco, 1999; Rodgers,
    Mogford, Mogford, 1998). In this study, the relationship of
    organizational factors to en route OE rates was investigated, based
    on an adaptation of the Human Factors Analysis and Classification
    System (HFACS; Shappell & Wiegmann, 2000) to air traffic control as
    HFACS-ATC (Scarborough & Pounds, 2001). **Method:** 1997 and 2000
    air route traffic control center (ARTCC) OE rates (errors per
    100,000 operations) were obtained from the National Airspace
    Incident Monitoring System (NAIMS). Organizational factors were
    represented by facility mean scores on scales constructed from 1997
    and 2000 FAA Employee Attitude Survey (EAS) data. Factors included
    employee perceptions of equipment/facilities, performance
    management, overall job satisfaction, and perceptions of other human
    resources management practices. The supervisor-controller ratio
    (SCR) was calculated for each ARTCC by year from agency personnel
    data. SCR and organizational factors facility mean scores were
    regressed on OE rate *(*N=42). **Results:** Two organizational
    factors and SCR accounted for 50% (adjusted *R* 2 = .505, *p* \<
    .001) of the variance in OE rates across ARTCCs for the two years.
    The standardized regression coefficients were -.290 for perceptions
    of equipment/facilities *(*t=-2.07, *p* \< .05), -.302 for
    perceptions of performance management *(*t=-2.28, *p* \< .05), and
    -.395 for SCR *(*t=-3.360, *p* \< .01). **Discussion:** As expected
    from prior research, SCR was a significant predictor of en route OE
    rates. In addition, the results indicated that perceptions of how
    performance was managed and of facilities and equipment were also
    predictors of OE rates. Overall, the results support the inclusion
    of organizational factors as well as individual and situational
    characteristics in the investigation of ATCS operational errors.

-   **Stress, Anxiety, and Well-Being in Air Traffic Controllers** (D.J.
    Schroeder, P. Della Rocco, T. Nesthus, C. Cruz, and D. Thompson;
    William J. Hughes Technical Center, Atlantic City, NJ; FAA Civil
    Aerospace Medical Institute; and OMNI Corporation, Oklahoma City).
    **Introduction:** Scientific evidence has provided limited support
    for the commonly held view that air traffic control is a uniquely
    stressful occupation. Recent surveys indicate that occupational
    stress is evident in most work settings, with more than half of all
    employees (53%) reporting that they are generally \"somewhat\" to
    \"extremely\" stressed on the job. This study reports on the
    relationship between a single item measure of occupational stress
    and selected individual and organizational factors often associated
    with occupational stress. **Methods:** A total of 6,854 ATCSs
    responded to a modified version of the Standard Shift Work Index
    (SSI), including a single item used in a nationwide survey asking
    ATCSs to indicate \"In general, how stressed do you feel at work,\"
    using a 5-point Likert response scale. For purposes of this study,
    we were interested in controller responses to scales assessing
    fatigue, psychological well-being, cognitive and somatic anxiety,
    neuroticism, extraversion, digestive problems, cardiovascular
    problems, general job satisfaction, and circadian types. Analyses
    included ANOVAs correlation coefficients, and multiple regression
    analyses to determine factors associated with self-reported job
    stress. **Results:** Compared with the normative sample where 8% of
    employees reported \"extreme\" stress on their jobs, only 3% of
    controllers selected that category. On the other hand, only 12.8% of
    controllers indicated \"not at all,\" compared with 22% in the
    national sample. Higher levels of self-reported job stress were
    associated with en route controllers, developmentals, and middle age
    (41-45). **Conclusions:** Consistent with previous findings, the
    level of stress and anxiety reported by personnel in the air traffic
    control profession was comparable to that noted in other
    occupations. While the level of cognitive anxiety was lower than
    that reported by Italian controllers, the extent of somatic anxiety
    was comparable for the two groups. The level of minor psychological
    disorders, cardiovascular complaints, and digestive complaints was
    relatively low.

-   **General Aviation Accidents: An Assessment of Risk in Maintenance
    Activities** (S. M. Goldman, E. Fiedler, and R. King; FAA Civil
    Aerospace Medical Institute, Oklahoma City, OK). **Introduction:**
    The FAA's Safer Skies Initiative is designed to identify selected
    interventions for reducing commercial and general aviation (GA)
    fatal accidents. From 1988 to 1997, more than 4,000 fatal GA
    accidents have accounted for nearly 7,500 deaths. To date, efforts
    within the GA community have largely focused on evaluating human
    error associated with the flight crew, giving limited attention to
    the role of human error in maintenance. **Method:** Final reports
    for all maintenance-related accident investigations involving GA
    aircraft between 1988 and 1997 were obtained from the National
    Transportation Safety Board (N = 1,503). Study 1 analyzed the
    frequency of type of maintenance activity, type of aircraft, and
    number of fatalities. Study 2, which flowed from Study 1, analyzed
    reports involving only maintenance installation. **Results:** Study
    1 found that over 7% of all GA accidents occurring between 1988 and
    1997 were attributed to maintenance-related activities. Of these
    1,503 maintenance reports, 300 (19.9%) cited installation as a cause
    or factor in the accident. Additionally, installation was the
    maintenance activity most likely to result in an injury or fatality
    *versus* no injury or fatality (odds = 1.40). Study 2 found that
    *incorrect attachment* (cited in 28.7% of the 300 installation
    reports) was the most frequent type of installation error. However,
    installing the *wrong* *part* (also categorized as an installation
    error) resulted in a greater likelihood of producing an injury or
    fatality *versus* no injury or fatality (odds = 1.88).
    **Conclusion:** Aviation maintenance technicians must perform many
    different maintenance tasks to keep aircraft in an airworthy
    condition. Understanding which maintenance activities pose the
    greatest safety risk is crucial to developing an effective error
    management program. This study found that installation error is not
    only the most often cited cause or factor in GA maintenance-related
    accidents but is also the maintenance activity most likely to result
    in death or injury.

-   **WAIS Correlates of Cogscreen-AE Performance for Older Aviators**
    (M. M. Hawkins, E. R. Fiedler and J. L. Moore; FAA Civil Aerospace
    Medical Institute, Oklahoma City OK and R.E. Mitchell Center for POW
    Studies, Pensacola FL). **Introduction:** The Wechsler Adult
    Intelligence Scale (WAIS) is a well-respected test of intelligence
    often used as part of a neuropsychological test battery.
    CogScreen-AE (CS-AE) is the only neuropsychological test battery
    with comprehensive aviator norms. The original validation of CS-AE
    (Kay, 1995) included information on the relationship of estimated IQ
    scores to CS-AE performance in a population of U.S. aviators (mean
    age 44 years). As part of a CS-AE revalidation, we studied the
    relationship of CS-AE performance to WAIS subtest and Full, Verbal
    and Performance IQ scores for an older group of aviators (mean age
    57 years). **Method:** Participants were 86 male active or former
    military aviators, ages 48 to 69 years at the time of testing.
    Participants completed CS-AE and the full WAIS. Descriptive and
    correlational analyses were completed. **Results:** WAIS Full Scale
    IQ is significantly related to scores on three Speed (r = -.20
    through -.37), six Accuracy (r = .18 through .31), five Thru-put (r
    = .24 through .35), and three Process (r = -.19 through .25) CS-AE
    variables. Verbal IQ is significantly related to scores on two speed
    (r = -.21 and -.38), five accuracy (r = .22 through .37), four
    Thru-put (r = -.19 through .37), and one process (r = .20)
    variable(s). Performance IQ is significantly related to scores on 11
    Speed (r = -.18 through -.36), three Accuracy (r = .20 through .24),
    12 Thru-put (r = .18 through .36), and two Process (r = -.19 and
    .28) variables. Nearly every CS-AE variable correlated with one or
    more of the 11 WAIS subtests. **Discussion:** Current results are
    discussed and contrasted with Kay's earlier findings. Comparing our
    results to Kay\'s, we found that the number of WAIS subtests that
    were significantly correlated to specific CS-AE variables was
    different for the two studies.

-   **Developing Power (Performance and Objective Workload Evaluation
    Research) Measures for En Route Air Traffic Control** (E. M.
    Pfleiderer, C. A. Manning and S. H. Mills; FAA Civil Aerospace
    Medical Institute, SBC Technology Resources, Inc.). **Purpose:**
    Performance and Objective Workload Evaluation Research (POWER)
    measures are being developed to provide a platform for quantifying
    activity and task load in the en route air traffic control (ATC)
    work environment using routinely recorded National Airspace System
    (NAS) data. POWER measures represent an outgrowth of lists of
    variables previously identified by researchers in simulation studies
    and from verbal reports by controllers. The development and use of
    objective indicators of ATC activity and task load are requisite
    tools for establishing baseline measures for evaluating the effects
    of modifications to ATC systems. **Method:** NAS System Analysis
    Recording (SAR) data were collected from the Jacksonville en route
    center between 8:30-10:30 a.m. and between 12:00-2:00 p.m. (local
    time) for each of four consecutive days. POWER measures were
    computed in 30-minute intervals for all active sectors, yielding a
    total of 913 observations for each measure. A Principal Components
    Analysis (PCA) was conducted to evaluate the current set of POWER
    variables and provide guidelines for the addition of new measures or
    the modification of existing ones. **Results:** PCA with Varimax
    rotation converged in six iterations and produced four components
    with eigenvalues \> 1. Cumulatively, the four components accounted
    for approximately 65% of the variability in the data set: Component
    1 (Activity) accounted for 30%, Component 2 (Objective Workload)
    accounted for nearly 13%, Component 3 (D-side Activity) accounted
    for 12%, and Component 4 (Overload) accounted for 10%.
    **Conclusions:** Variables comprising the four extracted components
    provided valuable information about the underlying dimensions of the
    NAS data set. Additions or modifications that might improve the
    ability of POWER to describe ATC activity and task load were
    identified.

-   **A Multidimensional Approach to Test Item Selection in a Practical
    Color Vision Test** (N.J.Milburn, and H.W. Mertens; FAA Civil
    Aerospace Medical Institute). **Purpose:** Previous research
    evaluated the color vision requirements and perceptual factors
    related to interpretation of color-coded weather radar information
    and resulted in an 84-item developmental test. The objective of this
    study was to use Item Response Theory (IRT) methods to select the
    most efficient set of those items without adversely affecting the
    reliability or item domain of the test. **Method:** The participants
    were 335 individuals with normal color vision and 200 with varying
    degrees of red-green types of color vision deficiency. BILOG-3,
    using a specified 3-parameter IRT model, provided indices for
    discrimination, item difficulty, and guessing. The greater the
    discrimination value, the better the item discriminates high
    performers from low performers. Likewise, large difficulty values
    (in the positive direction) indicate more difficult items. Higher
    guessing values indicate a greater probability of guessing the
    correct choice. BILOG-3 also calculates an estimate of each
    individual's ability using the same scale as the item difficulty
    index. Using these indices, a composite scatterplot was constructed.
    With the item discrimination plotted on the Y-axis, and the item
    difficulty/ability estimate on the X-axis, boundary lines were drawn
    for the guessing parameter in addition to the minimum and maximum
    ability estimates for each anomaloscope diagnosis. Once the item's
    content was coded onto the scatterplot, items were evaluated on
    several dimensions to select the most efficient items. **Results:**
    Maintaining the original passing criterion of no more than 1 error,
    high consistency was found between the original 84 items and the
    50-item test (К~(172)~=.95). Correlation between percent correct
    scores was also very high (r~(172)~=.99). The original inter-item
    reliability (α=.96) and item content were unaltered by shortening
    the test. **Conclusions:** The unique, multidimensional approach to
    item selection using the 3-parameter estimates coupled with item
    content and ability range information yielded 50 highly reliable
    items.

-   **Automatic Dependent Surveillance - Broadcast (ADS-B) / Cockpit
    Display of Traffic Information (CDTI): Innovations in Pilot Managed
    Departures (**O. Veronika Prinzo, Ph.D.; FAA Civil Aerospace Medical
    Institute, Oklahoma City, OK). **Introduction:** Avionics devices
    that provide a cockpit display of traffic information (CDTI) enable
    pilots to acquire, verify, and maintain pre-defined spacing
    intervals from other aircraft. It is of interest to the FAA to
    determine how the use of these displays influences pilot/controller
    operational communications. The operational evaluation of the CDTI
    in October 2000 provided an opportunity to examine some of these
    issues. **Method:** Departure profiles (13 without CDTI, 32 with
    CDTI) were established to evaluate the ability of flight crews and
    air traffic controllers to manage long (6 nm) and short (4.5 nm)
    spacing intervals between departing aircraft during 3 day and 2
    night operations. Subject matter experts evaluated 15 hours of
    verbatim transcripts and audiotapes for the presence of
    misidentified aircraft, confusions, uncertainty, and operational
    concerns. Computed for each departure was the time the aircraft was
    under local control, runway ownership time, and the number and
    duration of messages. **Results:** Approximately 4% of the
    departures conducted when CDTI was not used, and 9% when it was,
    involved communication problems. In particular, for pilot messages
    during CDTI departures, aircraft call signs were misstated or
    incorrect. However, when CDTI was not used, controller messages
    included the correct flight identifier but the wrong company name.
    When CDTI was not used, more messages were exchanged during the
    short spacing interval. In contrast, when pilots executed CDTI
    departures, in addition to an overall increased time on frequency,
    more time was spent under local control during the day, and
    departures were completed in less time when assigned the short
    spacing interval. **Conclusions:** Communication problems occurred
    from the call sign procedure that distinguished between aircraft
    being talked to versus talked about. Fortunately these problems were
    detected and corrected mid-stream by the controllers and pilots, and
    statistically, communication efficiency was not impacted. In light
    of the findings and comments from the controllers and pilots,
    alternative call sign procedures will be constructed and evaluated
    for the departure spacing application.

-   **Preliminary Analysis of Human Causal Factors in Runway
    Incursions** (A. Scarborough and J. Pounds; FAA Civil Aerospace
    Medical Institute, Oklahoma City, OK). **Introduction:** Runway
    incursions have steadily increased over the past four years and they
    continue to be one of the Federal Aviation Administration's top
    focal issues. Both technological and human-centered solutions are
    receiving increased attention. To identify strategies for mitigation
    of human factors in runway incursions, a retrospective analysis of
    347 existing operational error narrative reports from runway
    incursions was conducted. **Method:** Air traffic control subject
    matter experts classified critical points (separate points where ATC
    action or inaction negatively influenced the incident) in each
    runway incursion using HFACS-ATC within 14 ATC tasks according to
    whether the critical point was related to ATC decisions, skills, or
    perceptions. **Results:** Of 459 critical points available for
    analysis, 290 (63%) were associated with two tasks: controller-pilot
    communications (*N* = 230) and tower observation (*N* = 60). For the
    230 critical points that involved controller-pilot communications,
    178 were classified as skill-based errors and 52 were decision
    errors. Of the skill-based errors, 84 were attention failures (e.g.,
    the controller failed to catch the pilot's inaccurate read-back of
    the clearance). Of the 60 critical points associated with tower
    observation, 40 were classified as failures of attention (e.g., the
    controller did not notice the aircraft.). **Conclusions:** Although
    preliminary, these results suggest that interventions directed at
    improving controller attention would have the most immediate impact
    on reducing the number of runway incursions. Based on the potential
    benefits from using this human factors approach, CAMI is currently
    working with the FAA Offices of Investigations (AAT-200) and Runway
    Safety (ARI-100) to develop the technique and expand the application
    of the taxonomy to classify a broader set of operational errors and
    runway incursions.

-   **HFACS Analysis of Aviation Accidents: A North American
    Comparison** (D. A. Wiegmann, S. A. Shappell, and J. Fraser;
    University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Savoy, IL, FAA Civil
    Aerospace Medical Institute, Oklahoma City, OK, U.S. Navy Safety
    Center, Norfolk, VA*.).* **Introduction:**

-   Over the past several years, the Human Factors Analysis and
    Classification system (HFACS) has been used to analyze nearly a
    decade of accidents involving the U.S. military, commercial, and
    general aviation aircraft. However, the results of these analyses
    have yet to be compared directly to determined similarities and
    differences in human error tends across these seemingly diverse
    aviation communities. The purpose of the present paper is to provide
    this comparison of North American aviation accidents. **Method:** A
    review of the HFACS data for accidents involving the U.S. Navy,
    Army, Air Force, Scheduled and unscheduled air carriers (FAR Part
    121 and 135), and general aviation aircraft (FAR Part 19) that
    occurred during the 1990's was conducted using previously
    disseminated reports. **Results:** Across all types of operations,
    skill-based errors were the primary human factors cause of these
    accidents, followed by decision errors, violations, and perceptual
    errors. Few latent factors, such as preconditions, unsafe
    supervision, or organizational factors were uniformly identified
    across all categories of aviation operations. However, analyses did
    reveal some differences in the types of pilot errors between the
    different aviation communities. **Discussion:** The present study
    provides the first ever comparison of human error causes of
    accidents across different types of North American aviation
    operations. Although similar error patterns were observed,
    differences in the types of errors committed by these diverse
    aviation communities have direct implications for the development
    and sharing of safety programs that address specific types of human
    error in aviation.

-   **An HFACS Analysis of General Aviation Data 1990-98: Implications
    for Training** (S.A. Shappell and D.A. Wiegmann; FAA Civil Aerospace
    Medical Institute, Oklahoma City, OK and University of Illinois at
    Urbana-Champaign). **Introduction:** A large effort has been
    expended over the last several decades to lower the military and
    commercial aviation accident rates. Unfortunately, until recently, a
    similar effort has not occurred within the general aviation (GA)
    community even though the total number of accidents is considerably
    greater. Therefore, as part of the FAA's effort to better understand
    the causal genesis of GA accidents we previously analyzed nine years
    (1990-98) of fatal GA accidents using the Human Factors Analysis and
    Classification System (HFACS). The findings, though significant,
    reflected only about 20% of the total GA accidents that occurred
    during the time period of the study. Therefore, an analysis of the
    remaining non-fatal GA accidents was conducted to provide a more
    complete picture of the human factors associated with GA accidents.
    **Methods:** Using HFACS, five pilots independently coded the cause
    factors associated with 15,744 GA accidents occurring between
    1990-98. Of these, 12,033 accidents were associated with some form
    of aircrew unsafe act (i.e., decision error, skill-based error,
    perceptual error, and/or violation). Our findings with regard to
    these aircrew-related accidents will be reported here. **Results:**
    With the exception of violations that were more common during fatal
    (35%) than non-fatal (10%) accidents, the pattern of unsafe acts
    committed by aircrew was similar between fatal and non-fatal
    accidents. Furthermore, skill-based errors (primarily technique
    errors) have been associated with nearly 4 out of every 5 accidents
    since 1990, followed by decision (38%) and perceptual errors (less
    than 10%). **Discussion:** These analyses have provided unique
    insight into the genesis of GA accidents. Implications for GA *ab
    initio* and recurrent training will be discussed.

-   

-   **A Comparison of Head-Out Time Between Conventional Cockpit
    Instruments and a Highway-in-the-Sky Display** (Kevin W. Williams,
    Ph.D.; FAA Civil Aerospace Medical Institute, Oklahoma City, OK).
    **Introduction:** While the advantages of Highway-in-the-Sky (HITS)
    displays over conventional aircraft displays for precise navigation
    are well established, there are still questions regarding other
    aspects of HITS displays. One question is whether pilots are more
    prone to focusing their attention on the HITS display at the expense
    of maintaining an out-the-window visual scan. Using the Advanced
    General Aviation Research Simulator (AGARS), a comparison was
    performed between 18 pilots flying a HITS display and 18 pilots
    flying conventional cockpit instruments on the proportion of time
    that was spent looking both inside and outside of the cockpit.
    **Method:** Each pilot flew 6 ten-minute flights. The HITS pathway
    had the form of an extended runway pattern around runway 08 at
    Albuquerque International Airport. Pilots flying the conventional
    displays were given altitude and heading vectors that were similar
    to the HITS pathway. All pilots were instructed to watch for and
    call out traffic in the area during the flight. A video eye-tracking
    system was used to record pilot gaze position. **Result:** Pilots
    flying the HITS display looked outside of the cockpit approximately
    16% of the time, while pilots flying the conventional instruments
    were head-out approximately 40% of the time. A t-test showed these
    differences to be significant, t(17) = 5.83, p \< 0.01.
    **Conclusion:** As more advanced displays become available in
    general aviation cockpits, both pilots and aviation officials need
    to be aware of the potential hazards these displays could impose.
    One of these hazards is that pilots might fixate on displays at the
    expense of scanning for traffic. Training will be necessary to
    increase pilot awareness of potential problems and eliminate the
    initial fascination associated with these displays. Sometimes
    "duller" is better.

-   **A Comparison of the Legibility of Overlapping Symbols in a
    Simulated Air Traffic Control Radar Situation Display in Controllers
    and Non-Controllers** (H. W. Mertens and H. C. Harris. FAA Civil
    Aerospace Medical Institute; Oklahoma City, OK, 73125). **Problem:**
    Air traffic control (ATC) radar situation displays become very
    congested at times of heavy traffic. Symbols for the controller's
    "owned" aircraft are sometimes overwritten and obscured by symbols
    for "non-owned" aircraft. Non-controllers serving as observers would
    facilitate the research to optimize the legibility of the
    controller's "owned" aircraft data blocks by eliminating the
    interference with ATC work schedules, travel expenses, and back-fill
    costs. Responses of highly experienced controllers with
    non-controllers as a function of color, contrast, and overwriting
    conditions in an air traffic control situation display evaluated
    this possibility. **Methods:** Twelve controllers, with 6 to 36
    years of experience, and 12 non-controllers matched for visual
    function, age and IQ, were presented information digitally on the
    display monitor (Sony Model DDM2801C) that is used in new
    workstations at FAA Terminal and En Route radar control facilities.
    Twenty-four conditions involving the combinations of 6 target colors
    (white, red, yellow, cyan, magenta, and green), two target contrasts
    (1:1 or 2:1) and two overwriting conditions (target overwrites or
    non-target overwrites) were presented in each of 12 blocks of 24
    test trials. Non-target symbols were always green. After
    familiarization with the alphanumeric symbols, subjects practiced
    identifying symbols with zero and 50% overlap. The degree of overlap
    in test trials was 75%. **Results and Discussion:** ATCSs generally
    responded faster than non-ATCSs, but their accuracy was lower. An
    efficiency measure, computed to compensate for the speed-accuracy
    tradeoff, i.e. the number of symbols correctly identified per
    minute, showed no significant difference between groups. The
    speed-accuracy tradeoff accounted for the differences between groups
    in accuracy and response time. **Conclusions:** Since the effects of
    color, contrast, and overwriting on legibility are very similar in
    controllers and non-controllers, it is appropriate to utilize
    non-ATCSs in future research to improve the legibility of air
    traffic control displays.

**Aerospace Human Factors Association:** As President of the Aerospace
Human Factors Association, Dr. Scott Shappell/CAMI conducted the recent
business meeting. The following individuals received recognition during
the awards ceremony: Drs. Shappell and Weigmann (U. of Illinois)
received the first annual W.E. Collins award for the best
aviation-related human factors paper published during 2001; Dr. Henry
Mertens/CAMI received the Henry L. Taylor Founders Award for his
contributions to aviation human factors research. Dr. Tom Nesthus/ CAMI
is the new president of the association. (D. Schroeder, CAMI)

**Laboratory Tour:** The William J. Hughes Technical Center's Research,
Development and Human Factors laboratory (RDHFL) hosted 20 eighth grade
students on a field trip from Marlton Middle School. The students had
just completed a unit on computer graphics and virtual reality (VR) in
school and came to a working VR laboratory. The students donned the
laboratory's head-mounted display and 3-D goggles and were able to
\"walk around\" in a virtual air traffic control facility. The students
also were able to play the role of air traffic controllers and
simulation pilots in the RDHFL Distributed Environment for Simulation,
Rapid Engineering, and Experimentation (DESIREE) high-fidelity air
traffic control simulator. RDHFL personnel served as tour guides and
instructors during the field trip, sharing their knowledge and expertise
with the next generation of scientists and engineers. (K. Allendoerfer,
WJHTC/ACB-220)

**Integrated Control Center Evaluation:** On April 29-30, 2002, the
first group of controllers completed nine 50-minute scenarios simulating
New York arrivals as part of the New York Integrated Control Center
Evaluation. One third of the scenarios were under current conditions
(separate facilities), one third under co-located conditions (terminal
and en route in one building), and one third under co-located conditions
and one low altitude en route sector using terminal separation
procedures. Overall the results were highly successful, with complete
runs and great cooperation from the controller participants and Airspace
Redesign Team representatives. Group 2 will run on May 9-10, 2002 and
Group 3 on May 13-14, 2002. ACB-220 will deliver a preliminary briefing
on May 29, 2002 to support the JRC. The researchers have also initiated
scenario development for the Departure Simulation, which is scheduled to
be conducted the weeks of June 17 and 24, 2002. (D. McAnulty,
WJHTC/ACB-220)

**Electronic Flight Bag (EFB):** On April 25, 2002, a contributing
editor for Pilot Journal Quarterly interviewed a researcher from the
Volpe National Transportation Systems Center (VNTSC) regarding EFB
research. The magazine is a publication for pilots of single-engine
piston aircraft, and is sold at national bookstores. Recent articles on
EFBs that have appeared in the press have been on airline and corporate
aircraft; this is the first article directed at Part 91 (private)
operators. The Volpe researcher highlighted some human factors issues
that would be important to private pilots, e.g., training, display
quality, workload, distraction, etc. The journalist\'s expectation is
that the price of EFBs may drop in the near future, so EFBs may become
very popular with the publication's readership. There was discussion
about the benefits of EFBs and some of the cautions that need to be
taken in using them. The EFB feature article will appear in two to three
months. (D. Chandra, VNTSC)

**Amateur-Built Aircraft**: CAMI representatives traveled to FAA
headquarters to meet with AAR-100 and AFS to discuss the amateur-built
aircraft maintenance research project. It was agreed that AAM-510 would
research the human factors involving the cockpit and pilot, while
AAM-520 would focus on the maintenance issues. (E. Fiedler, S. Shappell,
CAMI)

**Air Traffic Control:** The William J. Hughes Technical Center's NAS
Human Factors Group (ACB-220) completed data collection for the New York
Integrated Control Complex arrival flow simulations on May 14, 2002.
Nine controllers from New York TRACON and nine from New York Center
participated. Each controller completed three scenarios under different
conditions in each of three positions (two radar and one handoff
position each in the Center and TRACON sides). In one condition, the
controllers worked under current conditions (separate facilities,
standard procedures). In the second condition, the TRACON and Center
controllers were in a collocated facility so they could observe each
other\'s displays and coordinate face-to-face. In the final condition,
the en route sector handing off traffic to the TRACON used terminal
separation procedures. The simulations were run in the re-configurable
Experiment Rooms 1 and 2 of the Research Development and Human Factors
Laboratory. Data analyses and preparations for a departure flow
simulation in June 2002 are in progress.(T. Truitt, M. McAnulty, WJHTC).

**Aeronautical Decision-Making JSAT:** CAMI continued its role with the
Aeronautical Decision Making (ADM) Joint Safety Analysis Team (JSAT)
meeting May 14 and 15, 2002. The group of government and industry
representatives completed its detailed analyses of 30 general aviation
decision-making accidents using the root cause analysis technique and
the Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS). Results of
this effort will be used to validate earlier findings of CAMI and
University of Illinois scientists who have analyzed all general aviation
accidents from 1990-98 using the HFACS framework. Earlier in the year,
an expert panel of university scholars completed a third effort, the
identification of potential intervention strategies. The June 11-12,
2002 meeting is aimed at bringing all three efforts together so that
focused ADM intervention strategies can be identified. A final report is
planned for later this summer. (S. Shappell, CAMI)

**Knowledge Management:** During the week of April 29^th^**,** FAA
representatives received briefings at the Team Technology Center on what
is being done in Knowledge Management. Gisele Mohler, the Terminal
Business Unit (ATB); Bud Morgan and Perley Eaton, Traffic Flow &
Enterprise Management IPT (AUA-700); Dennis Kolb, Navigation IPT
(AND-700), and Mike Webb, the FAA Vertical Flight Office (AFS-410),
discussed what\'s happening in their particular areas. All of them are
doing some very interesting things in terms of integrating people,
processes, technology, and training to get people the information they
need, when they need it, so they can do their jobs better. In concept,
once you de-mythologize it, knowledge management is basically that
simple. The reason that knowledge management is catching on to some
degree is that some people are starting to see it for what it is -- not
as a program or a management imposed initiative, but a common-sense
means of getting their work done better and more efficiently. Aiding in
this effort are people like Ron Simmons, AAR-100, who was a major
catalyst and resource for several of the initiatives mentioned above, as
well as Bob Turner, AHD, and Giora Hadar, ASU, who also have been
working with various offices to help them get started. Another
encouraging note: Ann Harlan, Director of the William J. Hughes
Technical Center, has established an Office of Knowledge Management as
part of the Center\'s new organization, and recently selected Dennis
Filler to head that office. Incidentally, the April 2002 issue of the
FAA\'s knowledge management newsletter, KnowledgeLink, edited by Giora
Hadar, is now posted. You can also access it through the FAA Knowledge
Sharing site on the VOICE page <http://intranet.faa.gov/voice>. Click on
\"Knowledge Sharing\" in the left column. (G. Lavey, AOA-5)

# ***More information on human factors research can be found at***

***the FAA Human Factors (AAR-100) web site:***
[http://www.hf.faa.gov](http://www.hf.faa.gov/)

######### Mark D. Rodgers

FAA (AAR-100)

![](media/image2.png)

**May 20-22, 2002** -- 11^th^ Annual Phoenix International Aviation
Symposium, The Phoenician Resort, Phoenix, AZ
<http://www.phxskyharbor.com/>

**May 28-30, 2002** -- EBACE2002, Geneva, Switzerland
<http://www.ebace.com/>

**June 13-14, 2002** -- Aviation Conference and Exposition, Oklahoma
City, OK [mailto:skymarket@aol.com](mailto:skymarket@aol.com)

*June 25-27, 2002 -- FAA ARA ISS Workshop/Conference, Clarion Hotel and
Convention Center, Atlantic City, NJ*
[mailto:Meredith.Gibbs@faa.gov](mailto:Meredith.Gibbs@faa.gov)

**August 27-30, 2002** -- Measuring Behavior 2002, 4^th^ International
Conference on Methods and Techniques in Behavioral Research, University
of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The Netherlands

<http://www.noldus.com/events/mb2002/index.html>

**September 16-18, 2002** -- Conference on Aerospace Materials,
Processes and Environmental Technology, Huntsville, AL
<http://ampet.msfc.nasa.gov/>

**September 17-18, 2002** -- FAA R,E&D Advisory Committee, Holiday Inn
Rosslyn Westpark Hotel, Arlington, VA
[mailto:gloria.ctr.dunderman@faa.gov](mailto:gloria.ctr.dunderman@faa.gov)

**September 17-20, 2002** -- International Air Cargo Forum, Hong Kong
<http://tiaca.org/>

**September 30- October 4, 2002** -- Human Factors and Ergonomics
Society 46^th^ Annual Meeting, Baltimore Waterfront Marriott Hotel,
Baltimore, MD <http://www.hfes.org/>

**October 14-16, 2002** -- Third LOSA Week, Dubai, United Arab Emirates
[mailto:dmaurino@icao.int](mailto:dmaurino@icao.int)

**October 23-25, 2002** -- International Conference on Human-Computer
Interaction in Aeronautics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology,
Cambridge, MA <http://www-eurisco.onecert.fr/events/hci-aero2002.html/>

**October 27-31, 2002** -- 21^st^ Digital Avionics Systems Conference,
Hyatt Regency Hotel, Irvine, CA <http://www.dasconline.org/>

**April 7-27, 2003** -- Aviation World's Fair, Newport
News/Williamsburg, VA <http://www.worlds-fair.com/> or
<http://aviation-worlds-fair.com/>

**May 4-9, 2003** -- 74^th^ Annual Scientific Meeting of the Aerospace
Medical Association, Convention Center, San Antonio, TX
<http://www.asma.org/>

**October 13-17, 2003** -- Human Factors and Ergonomics Society 47^th^
Annual Meeting, Adams Mark Denver Hotel, Denver, CO
<http://www.hfes.org/>

**May 2-7, 2004** -- 75^th^ Annual Scientific Meeting of the Aerospace
Medical Association, Egan Convention Center, Anchorage, AK
<http://www.asma.org/>

**September 20-24, 2004** -- Human Factors and Ergonomics Society 48^th^
Annual Meeting, Sheraton New Orleans Hotel, New Orleans, LA
<http://www.hfes.org/>

## Note: Calendar events in Italics are new since the last Newsletter

![](media/image3.png)

Comments or questions regarding this newsletter?

Please contact Bill Berger at (334) 271-2928

or via e-mail at [bill.ctr.berger
\@faa.gov](mailto:bill.ctr.berger@faa.gov)