**The Revolution in Military Affairs and the Middle East:**

**If this is a Revolution, then we are the Counterrevolutionists**

Zeev Maoz

Department of Political Science Tel Aviv University

and

Department of Political Science University of Michigan

May 2004

**The views expressed in this and other papers associated with the NIC
2020 project**

**are those of individual participants. They are posted for discussion
purposes**

**only and do not represent the views of the US Government.**

**The Revolution in Military Affairs and the Middle East:**

**If this is a Revolution, then we are the Counterrevolutionists**

Zeev Maoz

Department of Political Science Tel Aviv University

and

Department of Political Science University of Michigan

May 2004

**1. Introduction**

The Middle East was the first region to experience the Revolution in
Military Affairs (RMA) in action. It is also the first region that has
demonstrated some of the shortcomings and limitations of this
revolution. Elements of the RMA---for example, the use of Unmanned
Aerial Vehicles (UAVs)---were deployed in the late 1980s in Israeli
anti-guerrilla warfare in Southern Lebanon. But the first application of
the full array of technologies that are part of the RMA was during the
1991 Gulf War. Five weeks of aerial bombing and missile attacks on Iraqi
targets, followed by a five-day ground campaign, featured most of the
key elements of RMA.

A decade of significant technological innovations later, the United
States unleashed again RMA technologies in Afghanistan and in its war
against Iraq in 2003. Israel has used a number of RMA elements in its
fight against the Palestinians during the Al Aqsa Intifada since
September 2000. Both the increased U.S. presence in the region and the
fact that the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) possesses many of the key
elements of the RMA have forced significant processes of reassessment of
technology, strategy, and operational force design and force deployment
in the main Arab states.

This paper attempts to address the various approaches that the major
Arab states and nonstate actors (in particular the Palestinians and the
Hizballah) have adopted to deal with this emerging reality in the Middle
East. The paper is designed as follows.

-   First, I present the key elements of the RMA. I discuss the way in
    which these elements have been employed in the four principal arenas
    of conflict in the Middle East since 1990: the Gulf War of 1991; the
    guerrilla war in Southern Lebanon, 1990-2000; the AI Aqsa Intifada,
    2000-2004; and the Iraq War of 2003.

-   Second, I examine the implication of these processes on three groups
    of actors in the region.

    -   The first group consists of the \"modernizing\" military forces
        of some states in the region---e.g., Turkey, Egypt, Saudi
        Arabia, and some Gulf states.

    -   The second group concerns \"traditional\" military forces in
        states such as Syria, Iran, and Algeria.

    -   The third group concerns paramilitary forces of prestate actors
        such as the Palestinians and substate actors such as the
        Hizballah.

        -   Finally, in light of this analysis, I discuss various
            scenarios for the evolution of military forces and
            structures in the region.

**2. The RMA in Middle East Conflicts**

The revolution in military affairs consists of an array of technological
innovations in

a number of areas that induce significant changes in the conduct of
military operations.

These changes include: (1) over-the-horizon targeting and fire; (2) the
use of unmanned

vehicles for reconnaissance, targeting, and combat operations; (3) the
use of Precision Guided Munitions (PGMs) in both strategic and tactical
environments; and (4) the use of space and the employment of a \"system
of systems\" for combat-related command and control activity (Cohen,
1996: 40; Owens, 2003), and (5) information warfare (Berkowitz, 2000a).

As noted, Israel employed elements of these technologies in the late
1980s in Lebanon,

especially the use of UAVs for reconnaissance purposes, and throughout
the 1990s in its struggle against the Hizballah in Southern Lebanon. It
used PGMs to assassinate Hizballah leader Abbas Mussawi in February
1992, and employed both air and ground PGM technologies during the two
major bombing campaigns---\"Operation Accountability\" of July 1993, and
\"Operation Grapes of Wrath\" of April 1996. The sophisticated
deployment of PGM and UAVs had little or on effect on the outcome of
this encounter. Israel withdrew from Lebanon with its tail between its
legs (Van Creveld, 2000: 305-306; Maoz, 2005: Chs. 6, 7).

The United States demonstrated the full effect of applied RMA
technologies in Iraq in

three operations---Desert Storm in 1991, Desert Shield in 1998, and the
Iraq War of 2003

(Cordesman, 2003). The first application of RMA technologies in the Gulf
War was also the most impressive one---despite severe criticisms of the
accuracy of the bombing campaign of January 18\--February 24, 1991. The
Iraqi army, by far the largest in the Middle East was both completely
blinded and completely paralyzed during this campaign.

**3. Arab Lessons from the RMA in the Middle East**

There are three types of reactions to the deployment of modern
technologies of warfare in the Middle East. The modernizing armies in
the Arab world attempt to absorb and these capabilities into their
systems. The traditional armies are aware of the advantages of RMA
technologies. Yet, both financial and technological constraints and
limitations on the supply of RMA technologies prevented them from
adopting most of these technologies.

Given these constraints, the strategic efforts of these states is on
finding \"poor man\'s substitutes" for these technologies, mostly by
aspiring to develop or acquire different types of Weapons of Mass
Destruction (WMD). The nonstate actors try to subvert the effects of
these weapons by resorting to guerrilla warfare and terrorism. In these
areas, RMA technologies have had so far little or no effect on the
outcomes of protracted confrontations.

In order to facilitate the discussion of the strategies adopted by
various states and nonstate actors in the Middle East vis-a-vis the
revolution in military affairs, Table 1 below presents a comparison of
the main military indicators of the states discussed in this paper.[^1]

![](media/image1.wmf){width="6.682638888888889in"
height="5.270833333333333in"}

**3.1. Modernizing Armed Forces**

The process of modernizing the armed forces of several key states in the
Middle East

started in the late 1970s and continues to the present. This process
entails increased reliance on arms imports from the West---particularly
the United States---, joint maneuvers with U.S. and other Western
armies, and the training of senior officers in military schools in the
West. This modernization process of Egyptian, Saudi, Turkish, armed
forces and---to a much lesser extent---the armed forces of Kuwait and
the other Gulf states---is driven by three principal incentives.

-   First, U.S. influence in the region and the growing dependence of
    those states on the United States for both equipment and strategic
    support in times of major crisis created opportunities for
    modernization of the armies of the states friendly with the U.S.

-   Second, the development of Israeli capabilities and strategy creates
    both potential threats and a competitive incentive for modernization
    in some Arab armies.

-   Third, internal pressures from the armed forces and the domestic
    political role of the military in these societies put pressure on
    leaders to modernize.

Yet, these incentives for modernization there are constrained and often
balanced by

economic pressures, basic manpower deficiencies, and political
considerations. I discuss

briefly each of the other key states in this group and the trends of
their process of modernization.

Egypt\'s shift to a Western orientation following the 1973 Yom Kippur
War, and

increasingly so since the 1979 Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty, was
accompanied by significant economic and military aid from the United
States. Since the late 1970s, Egypt gradually transformed its principal
source of weapons procurement, shifting to American main weapons
systems, in particular combat aircraft, attack helicopters, and main
battle tanks.

Following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Egyptian and American
units have engaged in joint ground and naval maneuvers. The exposure of
the Egyptian armed forces to Western weapons systems and to Western
doctrine, and the opening of US weapons markets to Egyptian requests
generated a slow but consistent shift of Egyptian military capability to
a Western orientation. Financial constraints have prevented a complete
revamping of the Egyptian military to a strictly Western-type armed
force and have forced the preservation of some significant quantities of
Soviet/Russian-made weapon systems. But the trend of Westemization of
the Egyptian armed forces has continued at a fairly steady pace.

In the Gulf War of 1991, Egypt contributed some 40,000 ground troops to
the war effort. These troops did not participate in actual battle, but
the close contact with the realities of the war impressed Egyptian
commanders. Both the Egyptian general staff and the political elite
understood the importance of the advanced weapons technology in the
modern battlefield and the need to import some of these systems to the
Egyptian armed forces (Kechichian and Nazimek, 1997: 135).

The Egyptian armed forces invested heavily in modernization of main
platforms:

-   The air force was shifted from Soviet MIGs to American F-16s
    (roughly 210 jets) and some Mirage 2000s (18-20). The Egyptian air
    force also has a substantial fleet of Apache and Gazelle attack
    helicopters. These platforms are equipped with Sparrow, Sidewinder,
    and R530D air-to-air missiles and with Maverick and Hellfire
    air-to-ground missiles.

-   The ground forces rely heavily on M1A1 battle tanks that account for
    roughly 22 percent of the entire Egyptian tank force. The anti-tank
    weapons that indicate the level of sophistication of ground PGMs,
    however, are old generation TOW, Milan, Swingfire, and Sagger
    missiles, all wire-guided.

-   Egypt has a well-developed chemical weapons program and there might
    be some biological weapon capabilities, but no nuclear weapons
    potential. Egypt has roughly 100 Scud-B and Scud-C Surface to
    Surface Missiles (SSMs) with a range of up to 500km and a payload of
    up to 1,000kg.

The Egyptian defense effort is moderate, however. Egypt spends only 3.4%
of its GDP on defense. This budget constraint limits the ability of the
armed forces to modernize and forces the Egyptian armed forces to
maintain an arsenal of obsolete weapon systems side-by-side with fairly
modern ones.

In contrast, Saudi Arabia has by far the largest defense budget in the
region in both absolute and relative terms. It spends over \$21 billion
(11 % of its GDP) on defense. This is more than twice Israel\'s and
Turkey\'s defense spending and more than five times that of Iran. The
key question here is, as Cordesman (2003: 78-79) points out, is how the
Saudi defense budget is spent. Cordesman suggests considerable
inefficiencies in defense spending. But at the same time a comparison of
the number and quality of Saudi weapon systems with the magnitude of
spending does not add up.

Since the 1991 Gulf War, Saudi Arabia has increased its defense spending
and its weapon imports programs. For example, only 315 out of Saudi
Arabia\'s estimated 1,015 tanks are MIA1/ A2 advanced tanks. These tanks
are equipped with highly sophisticated guidance and night vision
systems, but they are still only a third of the Saudi armored force.
Saudi Arabia possesses also a high number of Anti-Tank Missile Launchers
(ATMLs), but virtually all of them are obsolete wire-guided missiles.

Clearly, the greatest financial and strategic effort of Saudi Arabia
spending goes to the air force. The Saudi air force\'s top-of-the-line
jet fighters are F-15/C/D Eagles, British Tornados, and F-15S multirole
aircraft. The Saudi armed forces also possess a small but growing fleet
of attack helicopters. Although the size of the Saudi air force is not
as large as that of Egypt, Turkey, Israel, or Syria, it is by far the
more advanced in terms of weapon and support systems compared to all
other states in this study, with the notable exception of Israel.

The Saudi air combat fleet is supported by five AWACS for long range
intelligence, three space satellites, a ground receiving station, and
additional ground-based C4I systems for ground force support (Cordesman,
2003: 235). Saudi jets are equipped by Maverick, Alarm, Sea Eagle, and
Exocet air-to-ground missiles and by Sparrow, Sidewinder, and AMRAAM
air-to-air missiles.

The Saudi armed forces had gained significant combat experience in the
1991 Gulf War, with both air force and armored units playing limited
roles in battle operations. What is most important in terms of the Saudi
efforts of modernization is the close contact with U.S. military forces
in the Gulf. The contact between Saudi and American military officers is
perhaps the closest between any Arab states and the United States. The
U.S. is involved in training and logistical and operational planning of
the Saudi armed forces. Paradoxically, the Iraq War of 2003 has
decreased Saudi dependence on the United States and there is growing
Saudi pressure on the United States to phase out its military bases in
Saudi Arabia \[editor's note: the U.S. has closed its operating bases,
and only training teams are left in the country\].

Since Turkey is a member of NATO, the entire Western weapons market is
available to its armed forces. The relations between Turkey and Israel
since the early 1990s were both motivated and improved by a number of
important weapons deals and upgrade programs. Turkey\'s defense burden
is moderate, accounting for 4.6% of its GDP. The Turkish army places
relatively little emphasis on strategic capabilities such as SSMs and
weapons of mass destruction.

Compared to the overall size of the state and the potential strategic
challenges it may face, the Turkish air force is also of a moderate
size. Yet it is highly sophisticated in terms of its weapons systems.
Its top-of-the-line jets include F-16 C/Ds, and even its less advanced
jets (Mirage 2000 and the F-4E) are relatively advanced compared to the
air forces of some of the potential adversaries. On the other hand, the
Turkish fleet of attack helicopters is relatively small, composed of
only 37 AH-1 Cobras. The Turkish air force has also entered the UAV
market, deploying both reconnaissance UAVs and Israeli Harpy attack
UAVs. The munitions of the Turkish air force include AMRAAM, Sidewinder,
and Sparrow air-to-air missiles, as well as Maverick, Hellfire, and
Israeli Popeye air-to-ground missiles. Turkey is also making use of
Israel\'s Ofeq satellites.

On the other hand, the Turkish ground forces are still equipped with
largely obsolete weapons systems. Turkey's substantial armored force is
equipped with second-line main battle tanks. These include the German
Leopard tanks and the American M60-A1/A3 (currently upgraded by the
Israeli military industry), and the older generation M48 and M47 tanks.
The ATMLs in the Turkish armed forces include MILAN, TOW, and Cobras,
all wire-guided older generation systems.

Common to all three \"modernizing\" armed forces is the fact that they
serve as important

legitimizers, in countries wherein the regimes---although phenomenally
stable---face constant internal threats to their stability (Bill and
Springborg, 2000: 142-143, 175, 191-195; Hinnebusch, 2003:
105-108;Jacoby, 2003). As such they receive a great deal of attention
and considerable funding from the regime. This, however, is qualified by
the fact that two out of the three states have been in poor economic
shape throughout the period. This imposes some constraints on military
acquisitions.

There are two additional factors that slow down the modernization of the
armed forces of Egypt and Turkey. The first factor concerns the
limitations imposed on RMA-related modernization by the kind of human
and technological infrastructure that may support such a process of
large-scale transformation. The second factor concerns the fact that the
United States---the major supplier of RMA technologies---is reluctant to
allow for overly-rapid modernization, because such a process may
heighten the threat perception of other important U.S. allies such as
Israel (in the case of Egypt), and Greece (in the case of Turkey).

The third modernizing state---Saudi Arabia---has re-entered an era of
economic growth during the 1990s and the first three years of the third
millennium. This, as well as its increased threat perception vis-a-vis
Iraq and Iran following the 1991 Gulf War (Cordesman, 2003: 3-32;
Kechichian, 1999), have prompted a great expansion of the Saudi armed
forces. This said, however, it is unclear how the huge amounts of money
have been spent. There is a major discrepancy between the size and
sophistication of Saudi armed forces and the amount of money spent on
defense. The structure of command in the Saudi armed forces and National
Guard is based on family and loyalty to the ruling Saud family
(Cordesman, 2003: 45-51; Bill and Springborg, 2000: 191), which creates
a limited pool of human resources for the officer corps. The manpower of
the armed forces and of the National Guard is of relatively poor quality
in terms of educational and technological competencies, which is also a
factor that limits growth and modernization.

In sum, the modernizing states have been making consistent efforts in
overhauling their armed forces and equip them with modern weapons
systems. These efforts, however, have not been matched by comparable
advances in the quality of manpower and command and control elements.
There is still no significant combat experience to suggest that these
modern weapons system have been adapted properly in terms of doctrine
and combat effectiveness. In fact, it is plausible to suggest that there
are sharp gaps between available technology and the ability to use such
technologies in an efficient and effective manner in battlefield
conditions.

**3.2. Traditional Military Forces**

Following the demise of the Iraqi military in the 2003 Iraq War, Syria
and Iran provide the prime examples of traditional military forces in
the region. As was the case in the modernizing armies, the military in
both Iran and Syria is an important component of the regime\'s tenure
(Cann and Danopoulou, 1997; Talhami, 2001). The domestic
constraints---both social and economic---that are faced by such states
as Egypt and Turkey are also fundamentally similar to the constraints of
the traditional military organizations in Iran and Syria.

More importantly, however, both Iran and Syria face significant military
threats. Iran\'s principal threats come from the U.S. presence in Iraq
and the Persian Gulf, and---to a lesser extent---from Turkey and Israel
(Cordesman, 1999: 24-29; Kam, 2004). United States\' military presence
in the Middle East is also an important challenge to Syria, but more
importantly, Syria is threatened by the overwhelming Israeli military
power.

There is little doubt that these two states may have wanted---under
ideal circumstances---to take full part in the RMA in the Middle East,
at least to the extent that states such as Egypt and Turkey have done in
the last decade. The key problem, however, is the limited access of
these states to RMA technologies, due to their strained relations with
the United States. The major weapons supplier of those states is Russia,
whose RMA capabilities have been both obsolete and limited. Moreover,
repeated pressure from the United States on Russia and Western European
states has limited both the number and the types of systems these
suppliers were willing to provide Syria and Iran. Consequently, these
states have had significant problems in modernizing their armed forces.
As Table 1 suggests, the Iranian and Syrian armed forces are laden with
obsolete weapons systems and have barely entered the modern era in terms
of their major conventional weapons systems (Cordesman, 1999: 141;
Zisser, 2002). Both states rely on traditional force structures; rely
heavily on Soviet military doctrine, and take fairly traditional
approaches to conventional warfare (Eisenstadt and Pollack, 2001).

The Iranian military force had fairly extensive combat experience in the
1980s, but the Syrian armed forces have not been engaged in theater
operations since 1973.[^2] The Iranian air force is based on American
F-14A Tomcats and F4E Phantoms and Russian Mig-29s. All except the
Mig-29s are older-generation jets. These are supported by a helicopter
attack fleet of limited size and reach. These planes are equipped with
Phoenix and Sidewinder air-to-air and Sparrow missiles and with Maverick
and Russian Fajr a-Darya air-to-surface missiles. Iran possesses a very
small fleet of reconnaissance UAVs, but is clearly behind all the
modernizing armies in the Middle East in terms of such aircraft.

The Iranian main battle tanks are the Russian T-72 tanks, of which Iran
possesses roughly 400. These constitute roughly 25% of the armored force
of the Iranian military. Iran possesses an unknown number of anti-tank
weapons (Cordesman, 1999: 114), as well as a number of wire-guided ATMLs
(TOWs, Saggers), all old generation weapons.

Over 50% of Syria's large tank force is in storage and its operational
readiness is questionable at best. Its main battle tanks are the Russian
T-72 (some of them upgraded with relatively modern guidance systems),
but most of them dating from the late 1970s to the early 1990s. Its
Sagger missiles account for most of its ATML arsenal, and, although it
possesses more modern Komet laser-guided missiles, its large ATML
arsenal is getting increasingly obsolete and of questionable operational
readiness.

Syria\'s air force is in dire need of upgrade and improvement. Only
about 30% of its interceptor jets are high-quality Mig-29s and Mig-25s.
The remainder are Mig-21s produced in the 1960s and 1970s. Its attack
helicopter fleet is largely made up of Gazelle and Mi-25 Hinds that were
produced in the 1970s and 1980s. The air-to-air and air-to-ground
missiles on these planes are also old generation missiles.

Syria does not possess any space surveillance capabilities, but it does
use the services of Russian satellites for aerial surveillance.

Both Iran and Syria are aware of the significant qualitative gaps that
have opened up between their conventional capabilities and those of
their principal adversaries over the last fifteen years. While for Iran
a major adversary (Iraq) was removed from the scene in 2003, a more
potent one has become increasingly involved in regional politics (the
United States). Syria found itself increasingly isolated in the Arab
world following the Israeli-Jordanian peace treaty of 1994. Its efforts
to reach a peace treaty with Israel have proved futile thus far.

The principal strategy of both Iran and Syria for dealing with the
growing gap in the balance of capabilities in the region were
concentrated efforts to develop weapons of mass destruction and their
delivery systems. Iran has placed significant emphasis on its nuclear
program and is pursuing it amid significant objections from the IAEA,
the United States, and Israel (Kam, 2004). There are divergent estimates
in the West as to the length of time it would take Iran to reach
operational nuclear capability, but there are repeated indications that
the crossing of the nuclear threshold in terms of enrichment capacity
may come sooner than was originally anticipated.

In addition, Iran has developed a significant SSM force, much of it
based on indigenous

production. Iran\'s Shehab long range SSMs have a range of 1,300km
(Shehab-3) and up

to 2,000km (Shehab-4) and are capable of reaching as far as Israel in
the West and as far as Russia in the north. They can carry a payload of
up to 1,000 kg and may be equipped with nuclear warheads once these
become available. In addition, Iran possesses over 400 Scud-B and C
missiles with a significantly shorter range. Western analysts believe
that Iran is capable of indigenous production of Scud B missiles and
possibly of Scud C missiles as well (Cordesman, 1999: 232-245; Kam,
2004). Iran is also said to have significant chemical potential,
although it is difficult to assess the actual capabilities it possesses
in this area.

Syria does not have a nuclear potential, but it possesses significant
chemical and biological capabilities. It is said to have significant
stockpiles of Sarin, Mustard gas, and VX. Its SSMs are capable of
carrying chemical warheads. Syrian officials have not denied allegations
of possession of chemical capability. Rather, they have justified this
on grounds of the need to deter Israel\'s nuclear weapons. Information
regarding Syria\'s biological capabilities is quite tenuous, but it is
believed that it possesses some quantities of Anthrax and Smallpox
agents. Again, it is alleged that Syria possesses a capacity to launch
biological warheads on its Scud B and C missiles.

The Syrian missile force is formidable. Syria possesses over 45 missile
launchers and over 300 missiles of strategic range (Scud B and C) and
tactical range (SS-21), all capable of carrying chemical and biological
warheads. It is said to engage in indigenous production of these
missiles in cooperation with North Korea (Kam and Shapir, 2003; Zisser,
2003; Shoham, 2000, 2001).

Iran and Syria may have different reasons for developing their WMD
arsenals. They may operate also under a different set of constraints.
Iran\'s search for regional hegemony and status may have fueled the
Shah\'s investment in the nuclear program in the mid 1970s (Kam, 2004).
However, under the Islamic republic, and especially since the Iran-Iraq
and Gulf wars, the threat-related motivations for the development of its
nuclear and SSM capabilities may have taken precedence over the
prestige-related ones (Kam, 2004; Cordesman, 1999: 267-270). Significant
financial constraints---especially in Syria---seem to suggest that the
development of \"the poor man\'s WMDs\" is a substitute for the
possession of nuclear weapons by Israel (Maoz, 2005: ch. 9). Finally,
the cooperative possibilities in the area of WMDs with states such as
North Korea, China, and---to some extent---Russia, appear to be more
realistic than the purchase of high-end RMA technologies from the West.

What is unclear about these systems, however, is their incorporation in
the strategic

doctrines of those states. Although official spokesmen of both Syria and
Iran address these weapons as strategic deterrents, chemical weapons are
ineffective as second strike weapons, especially against a well-defended
population. Biological agents such as smallpox are also largely
ineffective against an inoculated population (Maoz, 2005: Ch. 9). The
destructive capacity of SSMs carrying conventional warheads is also
relatively limited. In the light of significant development of
anti-ballistic missiles in the United States and Israel, these weapons
are also likely to become obsolete. These attributes may suggest a
significant possibility of developing a first-strike conception within
the context of a surprise attack. But there are no clear verbal or
physical indications that this kind of doctrine is in operation.

**3.3. Nonstate Actors**

The successful use of RMA technologies by the United States in Iraq
stands in stark contrast to the ineffectiveness and irrelevance of most
technologies in the cases of low-intensity conflict (LIC) in the region.
The Israeli struggle against the Hizballah in Lebanon, the
Israeli-Palestinian struggle over the nearly four years of the Al Aqsa
Intifada, and the post-invasion guerrilla warfare in Iraq provide
telling evidence of the tactics and logic used by nonstate actors, which
have very few and very limited capabilities against highly capable and
extremely sophisticated armies.

Guerrilla forces in Lebanon (Hizballah and Amal), Palestine (Fatah,
Hamas, Islamic Jihad), and Iraq (Sunni and Shi\'ite insurgents of
various kinds) have adapted well-known guerrilla tactics that had been
developed elsewhere. The use of hit-and-run operations on symbols of the
state and on its logistical and supply lines have been favorite tactics
of all three non-state actors. The relatively cumbersome organization
and static positioning of the security forces of Israel and the United
States provide ample targets for attack. Moreover, in both Palestine and
Iraq, the Israeli military government, the Jewish settlements, and the
American civil administration in Iraq provide convenient targets for
guerrilla operations, both because they are positioned in fixed places
that are difficult to defend, and because they require regular
intercourse between soldiers and local civilians.

But the Lebanese, Palestinian, and Iraqi insurgents have also used
suicide bombings quite extensively and have been willing (especially the
latter two groups) to blur the distinction between combatants and
noncombatants in the target population. This increases the
destructiveness of the attacks and reduces the ability to defend against
insurgents.

The fundamental ideology underlying LIC operations and suicide bombing
is based on the notion that the struggle between nonstate and state
actors is a battle of wills and a contest of resolve and determination,
rather than a duel of capabilities. The technological and quantitative
superiority of the state actors must be outmatched by the ability of
insurgents to inflict casualties that would erode the morale of the
troops and the social support of the home population for the military
ventures of the states. Superior RMA technologies are countered by the
dispersion of the insurgents, the mingling of the insurgents with the
local population, and the sporadic and unpredictable nature of their
attacks. The employment of primitive weapons systems and explosives
makes insurgents relatively difficult to detect and destroy.

Both the Israelis and the coalition forces in Iraq have been very
successful in physical

encounters with groups of insurgents. When targets were available, both
the Israelis and---to a lesser extent---the coalition forces employed
sophisticated PGMs to hit specific targets.

However, when Israel\'s policy of assassinations and American
deployments of air power in Iraq and Afghanistan entailed collateral
damage, these events backfired politically and caused significant public
damage.

On the other hand, it was argued (Pape, 2002) that suicide terrorism (as
well as suicide missions of guerrillas) have been quite effective in
extracting concessions from Western democracies in the past. While the
effects of suicide bombings in Iraq (and to a lesser extent in
Palestine) remain to be seen, clearly they were effective in bringing
about the withdrawal of American and French Marines from Lebanon in
1983, in effecting the Israeli withdrawal from central Lebanon in 1995,
and in exacting heavy casualties from Israel during the Oslo process and
Al Aqsa Intifada and from the coalition forces in Iraq.

The sustained guerrilla war staged by the Hizballah in Lebanon affected
the unilateral Israeli withdrawal from Southern Lebanon in May 2000. The
Palestinian combination of guerrilla and terrorism tactics resulted in
over 900 Israeli fatalities and over 4,000 wounded in a period of less
than four years. The coalition forces have lost over 750 soldiers in
Iraq since the fall of the Saddam Hussein regime (in contrast to only
135 coalition soldiers killed in the war up to the fall of the Hussein
regime). Israeli plans for unilateral withdrawal from, and dismantlement
of settlements in the Gaza Strip and the building of a wall in the West
Bank are clear indication of the failure of Israeli offensive
strategy---both large scale operations such as Defensive Shield (April,
2002) and subsequent operations (e.g., Operation Rainbow of May 2004)
and specific assassination raids using PGMs.

Likewise, the erosion in the American\'s public support of the war in
Iraq and the continued American presence in this country suggest the
limitations of RMA technologies and superior military power in LICs in
which the balance of resolve is clearly tilted against established
democratic states. The struggle of Russia in Chechnya is another such
example.

The threat of acquisition and use of WMDs by guerrilla and terrorist
groups is a growing concern in the West. There is no indication,
however, that the key nonstate actors in the Middle East (with the
possible exception of AI Qaeda) are actively pursuing this route. The
physical contact between the nonstate actors and their state adversaries
in the region is simply too close for using such weapons selectively on
the target population without also causing grave damage to the
insurgent\'s population. Given the proven willingness of the nonstate
insurgent groups to inflict casualties on noncombatants (including from
their own constituency population), the pursuit of WMD terrorism must be
seen as an increasingly realistic prospect.

**4. Conclusion**

Arab states and nonstate actors have responded in a wide variety of ways
to the array

of technological innovations and doctrinal changes that have taken place
in the West over the last two decades. The modernization of some of the
major Arab armies is limited and largely incomplete, but it has taken on
a sustained form. The lessons such states have learned from the various
episodes of high intensity conflict in the region is that quantitative
expansion of military power should be supplanted by qualitative
improvement of the existing military forces. The major effort in these
states went into improvement of weapons systems. Yet, the human,
technological, and logistical infrastructure is still lagging
considerably behind the improved quality of weapons systems and
platforms. Unless a significant social and technological revolution
takes place in such states, it is not clear that the advantages gained
by the qualitative improvement of weapon systems will be fully realized
in combat situations against their key opponents.

Other Arab states sought to find substitutes to the growing
technological gap between themselves and their technologically superior
adversaries. These substitutes include chemical, biological,
and---possibly---nuclear weapons and SSMs of varying ranges and
payloads. As noted, the doctrines that go along with these weapons are
unclear, and this adds a layer of instability to the region because it
is unclear whether such weapons systems are considered to be primarily
for deterrence purposes or for possible offensive ventures.

Nonstate actors have opted for primitive methods of warfare that have
put significant dents in the doctrine and will of state actors and have
rendered many of the technological innovations of the last two decades
to be of limited relevance and effectiveness. To the extent that the
perception of these actors is that these strategies compensate for the
fundamental inferiority in capability, and that the inherent weaknesses
of Western democracies make them vulnerable to such strategies, they may
persist in these efforts.

This paper is not intended to provide ideas for dealing with LIC-related
challenges to the West. Yet it is important to note that unless
doctrinal---rather than technological--- responses are developed to deal
with these challenges, Western democracies will find themselves
increasingly confronted by guerrilla warfare, terrorism, and insurgency
against both their home bases, and---more likely---against their less
significant strategic interests abroad.

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Table1: Balance of Forces in Selected Middle East States^3^

+-----------+----------+------+------+-------+-------+-------+-----+
| Variable  | Egypt    | S    | Tu   | Iran  | Syria | I     |     |
|           |          | audi | rkey |       |       | srael |     |
|           |          |      |      |       |       |       |     |
|           |          | Ar   |      |       |       |       |     |
|           |          | abia |      |       |       |       |     |
+-----------+----------+------+------+-------+-------+-------+-----+
| Defense   |          |      |      |       |       |       |     |
| Exp       |          |      |      |       |       |       |     |
| enditures |          |      |      |       |       |       |     |
+-----------+----------+------+------+-------+-------+-------+-----+
| Total     | 2,750    | 21   | 9    | 4,070 | 1,360 | 9,840 |     |
| Def. Exp. |          | ,330 | ,220 |       |       |       |     |
| (millions |          |      |      |       |       |       |     |
| \$US)     |          |      |      |       |       |       |     |
+-----------+----------+------+------+-------+-------+-------+-----+
| Def.      | 0.034    | 0    | 0    | 0.048 | 0.067 | 0.100 |     |
| Exp/GDP   |          | .115 | .046 |       |       |       |     |
+-----------+----------+------+------+-------+-------+-------+-----+
| WMD       |          |      |      |       |       |       |     |
| Tec       |          |      |      |       |       |       |     |
| hnologies |          |      |      |       |       |       |     |
+-----------+----------+------+------+-------+-------+-------+-----+
| Chemical  | Possible | No   | No   | Pos   | Yes   | Pos   |     |
| Warheads  |          |      |      | sible |       | sible |     |
+-----------+----------+------+------+-------+-------+-------+-----+
| B         | Unknown  | No   | No   | Pos   | Pos   | Pos   |     |
| iological |          |      |      | sible | sible | sible |     |
| Warheads  |          |      |      |       |       |       |     |
+-----------+----------+------+------+-------+-------+-------+-----+
| Nuclear   | No       | No   | No   | No    | No    | -150  |     |
| Warheads  |          |      |      |       |       |       |     |
+-----------+----------+------+------+-------+-------+-------+-----+
| No. of    | -100     | -40  | 77   | -450  | -300  | -100  |     |
| medium    |          |      |      |       |       |       |     |
| and long  |          |      |      |       |       |       |     |
| range SSM |          |      |      |       |       |       |     |
+-----------+----------+------+------+-------+-------+-------+-----+
| Air Power |          |      |      |       |       |       |     |
+-----------+----------+------+------+-------+-------+-------+-----+
| No of     | 518      | 345  | 407  | 342   | 490   | 518   |     |
| Combat    |          |      |      |       |       |       |     |
| Planes    |          |      |      |       |       |       |     |
+-----------+----------+------+------+-------+-------+-------+-----+
| West HQ   | 0.721    | 1    | 1    | 0.000 | 0.000 | 1.977 |     |
| Combat    |          | .005 | .176 |       |       |       |     |
| Pla       |          |      |      |       |       |       |     |
| nes/other |          |      |      |       |       |       |     |
| CP        |          |      |      |       |       |       |     |
+-----------+----------+------+------+-------+-------+-------+-----+
| Attack    | 125      | 27   | 53   | 193   | 105   | 140   |     |
| He        |          |      |      |       |       |       |     |
| licopters |          |      |      |       |       |       |     |
+-----------+----------+------+------+-------+-------+-------+-----+
| UAVs      |          | 100  | N/A  | 60    | -20   | N/A   | -   |
|           |          |      |      |       |       |       | 150 |
+-----------+----------+------+------+-------+-------+-------+-----+
| Intel.    | Pro      | 3    | 14   | None  | 15    | 2     |     |
| S         | curement |      |      |       |       |       |     |
| atellites |          |      |      |       |       |       |     |
+-----------+----------+------+------+-------+-------+-------+-----+
| Armor     |          |      |      |       |       |       |     |
+-----------+----------+------+------+-------+-------+-------+-----+
| Western   | 655      | 315  | 0    | 0     | 0     | 1,400 |     |
| MBTs High |          |      |      |       |       |       |     |
| Quality   |          |      |      |       |       |       |     |
+-----------+----------+------+------+-------+-------+-------+-----+
| Western   | 1,550    | 400  | 4    | 0     | 0     | 2,530 |     |
| MBTs      |          |      | ,255 |       |       |       |     |
| Medium    |          |      |      |       |       |       |     |
| Quality   |          |      |      |       |       |       |     |
+-----------+----------+------+------+-------+-------+-------+-----+
| Russian   | 600      | 0    | 0    | 730   | 2,600 | 0     |     |
| MBTs      |          |      |      |       |       |       |     |
| Hi        |          |      |      |       |       |       |     |
| gh/Medium |          |      |      |       |       |       |     |
| Quality   |          |      |      |       |       |       |     |
+-----------+----------+------+------+-------+-------+-------+-----+
| Total     |          | 3    | 1    | 4,255 | 1,700 | 4,900 | 3,  |
|           |          | ,605 | ,015 |       |       |       | 930 |
+-----------+----------+------+------+-------+-------+-------+-----+
| Western   | 0.222    | 0    | 0    | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.553 |     |
| HQ        |          | .450 | .000 |       |       |       |     |
| MB        |          |      |      |       |       |       |     |
| Ts/Others |          |      |      |       |       |       |     |
+-----------+----------+------+------+-------+-------+-------+-----+
| Wireless  | 0        | 0    | 0    | -50   | -50   | -     |     |
| Anti-Tank |          |      |      |       |       | 2,500 |     |
| Missile   |          |      |      |       |       |       |     |
| Launchers |          |      |      |       |       |       |     |
| (ATMLs)   |          |      |      |       |       |       |     |
+-----------+----------+------+------+-------+-------+-------+-----+
| Wired     | 2,110    | 2    | 943  | -400  | 390   | -     |     |
| ATMLs     |          | ,150 |      |       |       | 1,000 |     |
+-----------+----------+------+------+-------+-------+-------+-----+

3 Source: Kam and Shapir (2003); IISS (2003), Cordesman (2003, 1999).

Use of Israel\'s Ofeq Slntel satellite.

Use of Russian imagery satellites.

[^1]: 1\. Source: Kam and Shapir (2003); IISS (2003), Cordesman (2003,
    1999). Table 1 lists Israeli capabilities\
    as reference. Israel will be discussed in this paper only in terms
    of its attempt to deal with the challenges\
    of guerrillas and terrorism.

[^2]: 2\. In the 1982 Lebanon War, there were only limited armored
    engagements between the Syrian and the Israeli forces. The aerial
    battles, which were fairly extensive, resulted in a total defeat of
    the Syrian air force, and it has not appreciably modernized since
    then.