**National Security Space Architect**

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**Space Weather Architecture Study**

**Final Report**

**22 March 1999**

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#### Table of Contents

*Foreword* i

BACKGROUND [1](#background)

STUDY OVERVIEW [2](#study-overview)

SWx Architecture Study Phase I [2](#swx-architecture-study-phase-i)

SWx Architecture Study Phase II [5](#swx-architecture-study-phase-ii)

KEY STUDY FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
[9](#key-study-findings-and-recommendations)

Space Weather Architecture Vector
[9](#space-weather-architecture-vector)

Space Weather Importance Awareness
[11](#space-weather-importance-awareness)

Space Weather Requirements [12](#space-weather-requirements)

Coordinated Space Weather Architecture Acquisition
[13](#coordinated-space-weather-architecture-acquisition)

Space Weather Information Archive
[14](#space-weather-information-archive)

Integrated User Information [15](#integrated-user-information)

Integrated Space Weather Center [16](#integrated-space-weather-center)

Space Weather Research & Development
[17](#space-weather-research-development)

Space Weather and Man-Made Effects Information Coordination
[18](#space-weather-and-man-made-effects-information-coordination)

SPACE WEATHER ARCHITECTURE STUDY CONCLUSION
[19](#space-weather-architecture-study-conclusion)

[APPENDIX A -- Study Stakeholder Organizations]{.underline}
A-[1](#appendix-a-study-stakeholder-organizations)

[APPENDIX B - REFERENCES]{.underline} B-[1](#appendix-b---references)

[APPENDIX C- ACRONYMS]{.underline} C-[1](#appendix-c--acronyms)

Space Weather Architecture\
Final Report

# BACKGROUND

National Security operations and the national economy increasingly rely
on space and ground systems that are susceptible to failure or degraded
performance due to extreme Space Weather (SWx) conditions. SWx refers to
conditions caused by the Sun and the solar wind in the Earth's
magnetosphere, ionosphere, and thermosphere. SWx can adversely affect
satellite operations, communications, space-based and ground-based
radar, navigation, high altitude manned flight, and electrical power
distribution grids. Such conditions can disrupt National Security
operations and cause economic losses in both systems and services.

The SWx Architecture Study Terms of Reference (TOR), dated 4 December
1997, directed the NSSA to lead an integrated SWx architecture study
with Department of Defense (DoD), National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA), National Oceanographic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA), and other agency participation. Accordingly, the
National Security Space Architect (NSSA) formed an Architecture
Development Team (ADT) composed of representatives from major
stakeholders and conducted this architecture study to develop
architecture alternatives which in turn generate findings and
recommendations for a future SWx architecture vector.

The Office of the Federal Coordinator for Meteorological Services and
Supporting Research (OFCM) developed the *National Space Weather Program
(NSWP) Strategic Plan* in 1995 and the NSWP *Implementation Plan* in
1997. These plans provided the vision for future national SWx sensing
and forecasting capabilities and highlighted the need for an
architecture-level study. The OFCM plans recommended an active,
synergistic, interagency SWx architecture to provide timely, accurate,
and reliable space environment observation, specification, and forecast
within the next 10 years. The NSSA study results are consistent with the
NSWP recommendations, reflect a more in-depth review of the 2010+ user
needs, support priorities and consider fiscal resource limitations. This
report documents an overview of the study methodology and results.

# STUDY OVERVIEW

The SWx architecture study was conducted in two phases (Figure 1). Phase
I determined that an architecture study was warranted and gathered the
information necessary to conduct it. Phase II developed and analyzed
architecture alternatives, and generated SWx architecture findings and
recommendations. After study completion, a Transition Team, composed of
stakeholder representatives, will develop a plan to implement the
approved recommendations.

![](media/image3.png)

Figure 1: Space Weather Study Overview

## SWx Architecture Study Phase I

Phase I answered four questions.

1.  Does SWx impact National Security Objectives?

2.  Does the Evolved Baseline provide needed capability?

3.  Will technologies be available to provide projected needed
    capability?

4.  Can Phase II provide viable SWx Architecture Alternatives?

To answer the first question, planners from the Services, the Joint
Staff, and other organizations were consulted and planning documents
reviewed to identify future National Security and civil systems and how
those systems would be used.

![](media/image4.png)

Figure 2: Operational Impacts Joint Warfighting Capability Objectives

Current and future systems were assessed for SWx vulnerabilities and the
expected effects were mapped into impacts on Joint Vision 2010 Joint
Warfighting Capability Objectives (Figure 2). The results clearly showed
that SWx does impact National Security objectives. This assessment was
validated by examining instances of SWx impacts on past and current
systems and supported by quantitative analysis for selected cases.

To answer the second question, the current operational SWx architecture
(current baseline) was identified. By examining current plans, the ADT
developed the expected SWx architecture 2010 baseline, termed the
Evolved Baseline (EB). Starting with Air Force Space Command (AFSPC)
draft Capstone Requirements Document (CRD), other system Operational
Requirements Documents (ORDs) and civil requirements identified by NOAA,
the ADT projected a set of future SWx needs.

The ability of the current baseline to meet future needs was assessed
and shortfalls were identified (Figure 3). The products assessed were
specification, forecast and warning. A specification refers to the
fusion of all available observations into a coherent and realistic
representation of the state of the space environment, at a particular
point in time. A forecast is a prediction of space environment
conditions for a given time period. A warning is a forecast of a
hazardous space weather event that requires some immediate user action.
It became clear that the current baseline fell short of meeting needed
capabilities for the future users.

![](media/image5.png)

Figure 3: Current Baseline Assessment

To answer the third question, the Technology Working Group (TWG)
addressed technology capability. They identified the technologies and
basic research that could lead to an enhanced SWx capability. Relevant
technologies included new and improved sensors, improved models, and
general technologies aimed at lower cost and higher performance
spacecraft, communications, and computing.

The fourth question addressed the potential for improvement through
proceeding with Phase II. The TWG identified that we are on a
"Technology Cusp" where there is the potential that SWx support can move
from a monitoring service to a predictive service. SWx stakeholder
organizations expressed a strong desire for a SWx Architecture to focus
technology and modeling into developing operational capabilities. The
stakeholders, through a Decision Coordination Group (DCG) meeting,
decided that it was possible to develop viable SWx Architecture
Alternatives and they recommended that the study proceed.

## SWx Architecture Study Phase II

In Phase II, the ADT developed architecture alternatives for evaluation
leading to recommendations supporting National Security and other
national needs for the 2010 to 2025 timeframe. The recommendations are
statements of prioritized capabilities to be acquired and include top
level guidance on investments necessary to achieve the needed
capabilities. These recommendations will be used by the Transition Team
post-ADT to develop a plan and implementing directives to guide
research, technology investment, acquisition planning, program
execution, and future operations planning between now and 2010.

Phase II was conducted in two parts. In Phase IIA, the ADT determined
major architecture drivers and chose a trade space used to describe
major architecture variations. The team then constructed a set of
architecture alternatives, which fully explored that trade space and
carefully assessed these alternatives (Figure 4).

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Figure 4: Phase II A Architecture Alternative Development Process

The architectures were developed with the C4ISR Architecture Framework
Version 2 as guidance. Architecture Alternative Working Groups (AAWGs)
accomplished this construction. These groups were composed of NSSA staff
and stakeholder representatives, most of whom had participated in Phase
I. Each AAWG had responsibility to brainstorm architectures that
addressed future needs. These architectures were described at a fairly
high level of abstraction by using tailored versions of the Overview and
Summary Information (AV-1), High Level Operational Graphic (OV-1) and
Operational Node Connectivity Diagram (OV-2), and were evaluated
qualitatively in terms of pros and cons. These partial architectures and
their implied trade axes were integrated and assessed. The result was a
set of key trade axes and thirteen candidate architectures. Each of the
alternative architectures was mapped into the trade space in order to
capture essential architectural elements. The key trade axes were sensor
location (ground -- space), user products needs (observation --
forecast), and SWx processing (distributed -- centralized).

The User Application Tiger Team refined the Phase I set of future
National Security and civil SWx needs. The SWx products needed to
survive, adapt, mitigate, and exploit SWx impacts on user and enemy
systems were captured. The Tiger Team reviewed Launch; Satellite
Operations; Position, Navigation, and Timing (PNT); Intelligence,
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR); Radar; Manned Flight; Space
Control and Ballistic Missile Defense mission areas. The team found that
the military user needs autonomous updating of SWx information into
system operations. In addition, where appropriate, SWx information needs
to be fused with other information, creating tailored decision-ready
products. The military user expects SWx products and expertise to be
easily locatable through a single source.

Industry views were invited via a Request for Information (RFI) in the
Commerce Business Daily. Subsequent meetings and industry briefings
included satellite designers and builders, space insurance, and
electrical power industry representatives. They provided additional
insight into SWx impacts and needs. Finally, issue teams for Man-Made
Effects (MME) and Meteorite/Debris were formed to determine potential
synergism with the SWx architecture.

The MME Team identified synergy between MME impacts, models and
potential sensor suites. The Meteorite/Debris team also identified
synergy but only regarding data archiving.

In Phase IIB, design, analysis, and cost teams composed of government
and industry experts were established. The Design Team fleshed out the
AAWG alternative architecture concepts with sensors, platforms, models,
information processing, communications, staffing, and logistics details
using the C4ISR Architecture Framework System Interface Description
(SV-1). They provided nine architecture "point designs" spanning the
trade space. These "point designs" were assessed by the Analysis Team
using performance (value), robustness (operational risk), and technical
risk. The Cost Team evaluated these "point designs" using standard DoD
and NASA approved costing methodologies.

The performance assessment employed the value methodology used by the
Air Force *2025* study and other major studies to assess architecture
worth. The value model tool captured the future user needs and their
importance to stakeholders as weightings. At the product level, the
expected performance of each architecture was scored. The scores and
weightings were combined to produce an overall value based on user
needs. This work served as the basis of the cost -- benefit evaluation
of the alternative architectures (Figure 5).

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Figure 5: Value Model Evaluation Process

During this phase of the study, a Space Architect Exercise (SAX) was
conducted. The SAX results identified specific SWx characteristics and
architecture capabilities important to the National Security and civil
communities and confirmed the most critical aspects of a National SWx
architecture.

The SAX defined three timeframes for the scenarios (Table 1). Scenario
#1 was identified as the immediate impacts (0 to 12 hours) from a major
solar event. Scenario \# 2 addressed delayed impacts (72 to 144 hours)
and Scenario \# 3 represented the undisturbed solar conditions (after 7
days).

The systems and identified effects are:

+---------+------------------------+------------------+---------------+
| **[Sc   | **                     | **[SWx           | *             |
| enario] | [System]{.underline}** | Phenomeno        | *[Operational |
| {.under |                        | n]{.underline}** | Impact]{      |
| line}** |                        |                  | .underline}** |
+---------+------------------------+------------------+---------------+
| **1**   | **International Space  | **Radiation**    | **Human       |
|         | Station**              |                  | Radiation     |
|         |                        |                  | Exposure**    |
+---------+------------------------+------------------+---------------+
| **1**   | **Fire Support System  | **Ionosphere**   | **Signal      |
|         | HF Comm**              |                  | Fade**        |
+---------+------------------------+------------------+---------------+
| **1**   | **SBIRS High**         | **Radiation**    | **Spacecraft  |
|         |                        |                  | Ch            |
|         |                        |                  | arging/Loss** |
+---------+------------------------+------------------+---------------+
| **2**   | **Navy Radar AEGIS**   | **TEC**          | **Target      |
|         |                        |                  | Position      |
|         | **SPY-1**              |                  | Error**       |
+---------+------------------------+------------------+---------------+
| **2**   | **Space Based          | **Radiation**    | **Masked      |
|         | Microwave Weapon**     |                  | Attack**      |
+---------+------------------------+------------------+---------------+
| **2**   | **Advanced SHF         | **Radiation**    | **Spacecraft  |
|         | MILSATCOM**            |                  | Ch            |
|         |                        |                  | arging/Loss** |
+---------+------------------------+------------------+---------------+
| **2**   | **Single Frequency GPS | **TEC**          | **Inaccurate  |
|         | Receiver**             |                  | Location**    |
+---------+------------------------+------------------+---------------+
| **2**   | **Northeast Power      | **Geomagnetic    | **Power Grid  |
|         | Grid**                 | Storm**          | Failure**     |
+---------+------------------------+------------------+---------------+
| **2**   | **Commercial Space     | **Neutral        | **Flight      |
|         | Plane**                | Density**        | Profile       |
|         |                        |                  | Change**      |
+---------+------------------------+------------------+---------------+
| **2**   | **SBIRS Low**          | **Auroral        | **Target      |
|         |                        | Emissions**      | Acquisition   |
|         |                        |                  | Delay**       |
+---------+------------------------+------------------+---------------+
| **3**   | **Cellular Comm        | *                | **Signal      |
|         | Satellite Network**    | *Scintillation** | Disruption**  |
+---------+------------------------+------------------+---------------+
| **3**   | **Bistatic Radar**     | *                | **Signal      |
|         |                        | *Scintillation** | Disruption**  |
+---------+------------------------+------------------+---------------+

Table 1: SAX Scenario Definition

The SAX information was subsequently employed in the architecture
development effort.

Through iterative re-design and re-analysis (technical and cost), the
ADT formulated key findings and recommendations and distilled the
analytical results into an architecture vector responsive to future
National needs.

Upon approval of the SWx architecture recommendations by the National
Security Space Senior Steering Group (NSS-SSG), ASD (C3I) will lead a
Transition Team to develop a Transition Plan that addresses the
necessary implementation actions.

# KEY STUDY FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

## Space Weather Architecture Vector

To guide future investment, development and acquisition of space and
space-related capabilities, the NSSA recommends:

-   **Increase emphasis on Operational Model development**

-   **Ensure improved Operational Capabilities based on User Needs**

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-   **National Security priorities include Ionospheric and Radiation
    Environment Specifications and Forecasts**

-   **Civil priorities also include Geomagnetic Warnings and Forecasts**

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-   **Evolve to improved Forecast Capabilities, as phenomenology is
    better understood, models mature, and user needs are better
    defined**

Future National Security operations will require improved capability to
accurately locate targets, provide precision navigation, and provide
reliable mobile communications in a more time-constrained environment.
To support these capabilities, immediate emphasis must be given to the
accurate specification and forecasting of ionospheric total electron
content (TEC) and scintillation parameters. It is essential that
ground-based and space-based ionospheric observing systems and
ionospheric models be developed and employed expeditiously. Also,
significant to National Security is the capability to determine rapidly
whether SWx or an adversary is degrading critical satellites. In
addition, it is important to design robust satellites and rapidly
recover damaged satellites. To support these needs, it is necessary to
develop and employ systems and models to provide an essential capability
to specify the radiation environment at satellite altitudes. The desired
capability also includes forecasting of the radiation environment at
satellite altitudes.

Like National Security needs, civil needs also include ionospheric and
radiation specification and forecast. In addition, the civil community
places priority on geomagnetic forecasting through in-situ solar wind
measurements. These capabilities will significantly enhance the civil
community's capability to support the power industry mitigation of
losses from outages, and NASA's ability to protect astronauts from
harmful radiation effects.

These recommendations are based on analysis of architectural
alternatives. Because of the criticality of models to improved SWx
architecture performance, these architectural alternatives have a common
set of forecast and specification models. In addition, a common concept
of operations (CONOPS) and communications systems were defined. Each
alternative was designed to provide maximum benefit-cost ratio at its
projected funding level.

One alternative represents a minimal capability. The sensor emphasis was
on solar flare and Coronal Mass Ejection (CME) imaging and on providing
a dense measurement grid of ionospheric properties and magnetospheric
particles and fields. This alternative provides high quality
specifications in all domains of interest such as ionospheric electron
density, equatorial scintillation and neutral density, and solar event
forecasts.

The second and target level, adds magnetic field and particle sensors
near the L~1~ position to directly sample the solar wind and the CMEs
about one hour prior to their hitting the magnetosphere. The L~1~ sensor
adds confidence to ionospheric electron density, magnetospheric
particles and fields and neutral density specifications, and improves
polar scintillation, magnetospheric particles and fields forecasts.

The next level of development represents a more desired robust
capability adding a second CME imager. It provides a more side-on view
to better characterize evolution and minimize false alarms. It will
improve longer-term forecasts of magnetospheric particles and fields,
Van Allen Belt radiation, ionospheric properties, and neutral density.

Even this alternative is not expected to satisfy all the 2010-2025
needs, particularly forecast needs. Considering the likely technology
and basic research and development necessary for SWx models
implementation, this alternative is the best we can likely achieve
during this timeframe.

These architecture concepts identified and pointed to the investments
which would yield the most timely benefit. Specifically, the desired
goal of achieving the capabilities represented by the most enhanced
alternative must evolve from the minimal capability through the first
level of enhancement as resources allow. To provide these capabilities,
an integrated systems acquisition approach (e.g., sensors, processing
systems, models, and products) focused on user needs is required.

Fiscal constraints demand prioritization of expenditures. The study
identified the need for some increased investments. The highest leverage
near-term investment was found to be validated, reliable SWx operational
models. To achieve these models, a robust focused R&D effort is needed,
including the continuation of science missions to collect data required
by researchers for developing model algorithms. Operational data
collection must provide increased sensor coverage and be archived to
serve as a basis for model validation. This archive should be expanded
to include correlated SWx impacts supporting system acquisition,
simulation and operational planning.

This recommended architecture vector provides a user oriented approach,
consistent with the OFCM plans. It will allow a smooth transition to the
future national SWx infrastructure.

In summary, the ADT found:

-   The Current Baseline supports limited model-development

-   Primary SWx support future user systems needs are: Improved
    Ionospheric TEC & Scintillation and Radiation Environment
    specifications and forecasts

-   Users desire continuously updated impact oriented products

-   Increased investment in and dependence on space systems (military,
    civil, and commercial) justifies some increased SWx investments

## Space Weather Importance Awareness

To guide future investment, development and acquisition of space and
space-related capabilities, the NSSA recommends:

-   **Integrate Space Weather information (system impacts and space
    weather environment data) into User Systems through inclusion in:**

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-   **User Education**

-   **Simulations**

-   **Wargaming and Training**

-   **CONOPS**

-   **Contingency Planning**

-   **System Anomaly Resolution**

-   **Damage Assessment and Reporting**

National Security dependence on space support is increasing dramatically
but the number of National Security satellites is expected to remain
relatively constant with less backup and residual capability. Civil and
commercial dependence on space systems is also increasing. Under these
circumstances, each satellite is more critical and satellite outages
will have greater impacts. The National Security demand for commercial
SATCOM (e.g., hand-held terminals) will increase, creating new
unpredictable vulnerabilities.

The study found limited design information and guidelines for many new
orbits. Furthermore, commercial competitive pressures to cut satellite
development costs lead to reduced testing and away from military
hardening. The developers of user systems must be aware of potential SWx
impacts through user education and SWx inclusion in Simulation Based
Acquisition (SBA).

In the past, space systems have been part of the support (force
enhancement) infrastructure. In the future, terrestrial weapons are
likely to be directly targeted using space, and some weapons may be
space-based. This will drive an increase in coverage, timeliness,
accuracy, and command and control assuredness requirements for space
systems. SWx can significantly impact the ability to achieve needed
levels of capability. For example, ionospheric scintillation can disrupt
access to the Global Positioning System (GPS) and to radar signals with
uncertainty in the ionospheric electron density degrading geolocation
accuracy. Today, outage causes are often not precisely determined,
leading to less effective mitigation, and recovery. This lack of
understanding also impacts user system and SWx model design
improvements.

SWx fidelity in Service wargaming is seriously deficient. In essence,
SWx is ignored. Better simulation of SWx effects in wargaming will
increase SWx awareness in the user community and allow for development
of mitigation and exploitation strategies.

In summary, the ADT found:

-   Operators frequently do not understand SWx impacts. Consequently to
    reduce operational risks, SWx education and training is critical

-   SWx information needs to be integrated into all phases of system
    life cycles

-   Budget and competitive pressures on satellite providers coupled with
    expected increases in demand for improved coverage, timeliness,
    accuracy and assuredness for space-based services, increase the
    potential impact of future SWx perturbations

-   SWx effects have the most impact on communications, PNT, and ISR

## Space Weather Requirements

To guide future investment, development and acquisition of space and
space-related capabilities, the NSSA recommends:

-   **Develop a set of Approved Validated Space Weather Requirements
    focused on User Needs**

-   **Update Requirements as User Needs and Technology evolve**

An effective SWx architecture depends on better understanding and
documentation of user needs to provide compelling justification of what
is needed and at what priority. Needs definition for the SWx study
started with the draft AFSPC SWx CRD and the OFCM NSWP Strategic and
Implementation Plans. Joint Vision 2010 was reviewed and its
implementing systems evaluated for SWx susceptibility. Further
understanding came from review of current architecture requirements and
projected needs for a wide range of users. In addition, the User
Applications Tiger Team systematically reviewed all classes of users
(i.e., National Security, civil, and commercial) and their projected SWx
impacts and product needs.

A SWx SAX captured operators and planners opinions of user needs and
potential user responses. This exercise examined the needs for product
user interface, timeliness, and accuracy in several user system
scenarios with SWx impacts. The results confirmed the need for a clearer
definition of the requirements for the SWx architecture in user impact
terms.

National Security users have a driving need for improved product
confidence, accuracy, resolution, and coverage. Observations and
measurement refresh rates must be increased to improve timeliness.
Enhanced modeling and analysis techniques and rigorous validation will
elevate forecast confidence. Improvement of product timeliness requires
an enhanced capability to receive, process, and display SWx information.

In summary, the ADT found:

-   Current requirements for SWx products are outdated, fragmented and
    incomplete

-   Military and civil SWx requirements are similar but often addressed
    independently

-   Insufficient understanding of user priorities and requirements
    causes significant gaps in current capabilities and has hampered
    efficient acquisition

-   SWx effects need to be translated into user impacts and evaluated
    for potential mitigation techniques

-   Lack of users understanding of space weather impacts on operations
    has impeded development of accurate SWx requirements

-   Requirements must be revised as user needs and technology evolve

## Coordinated Space Weather Architecture Acquisition

To guide future investment, development and acquisition of space and
space-related capabilities, the NSSA recommends:

-   **Identify a cognizant organization in DoD to:**

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-   **Manage the Acquisition of DoD Operational Space Weather
    Architecture and focus DoD Space Weather Research and Development**

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-   **Ensure Validated Models are developed in conjunction with Sensors
    and User Needs**

-   **Ensure effective transitioning of R&D into Operations**

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-   **Coordinate Acquisition and Integration of Space Weather Resources
    across Civil agencies and National Security Interest**

Needs for higher confidence user-friendly products are expected to grow.
Model improvement is essential to increased specification and forecast
confidence and performance.

Currently, the operational models are acquired from multiple
sources---directly from R&D labs and universities, commercially, and
through acquisition organizations. They supply products with differing
or unknown levels of confidence. Sometimes the models have not been
validated before quasi-operational implementation.

Historically SWx sensors were often fielded independent of the
operational models or were not a-priori designed to work with
operational models. A coherent user needs focus will lead to an improved
SWx architecture performance.

The longest lead items for the architectures were found to be the
models. This study identified and traced models to needed sensor inputs.
It appears that efficiencies can be achieved by coordinating development
of models between civil and National Security sectors. Within DoD, a
single acquisition manager for the DoD portions of the SWx architecture
can be achieved. To be most effective, SWx acquisition coordination
needs to be performed at an interagency level.

In summary, the ADT Found:

-   Military, civil, commercial and international cooperation will
    provide opportunities for cost and data sharing

-   Cross-agency coordination is required to achieve improved model
    performance with validated model development prioritized to keep
    pace with sensor development

-   Operational models, sensors and products can benefit from an
    integrated development approach

-   The lack of a controlled process for model development and
    validation has led to inconsistencies in performance and confidence
    of models

## Space Weather Information Archive

To guide future investment, development and acquisition of space and
space-related capabilities, the NSSA recommends:

-   **Consolidate and Expand the Existing Archival System**

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-   **Capture Space Weather Environmental Data and System Impacts**

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-   **The Archival System should be:**

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-   **Centrally Managed**

-   **User Focused**

-   **Incorporate Standard Formats**

-   **Accommodate Multi-level Security**

Spacecraft developers, insurance agencies, HF communicators, third party
vendors, and power companies in the commercial sector responded to the
SWx Architecture Study Request For Information. They provided insights
into the needs for improved archiving.

(a) The commercial satellite builders are interested in historical SWx
    information (e.g., high, low, and average environments) to improve
    future satellite designs.

(b) Industry knows that design lessons are often relearned due to the
    long eleven year solar cycle and personnel turnover. Industry is
    increasing the pressure for reduced satellite development time and
    decreased testing time.

(c) Insurance rates currently do not reflect the SWx robustness of
    satellite systems, but interest was expressed in knowing the
    statistics of SWx events and impacts.

During the definition of user needs, the ADT determined that a
significant number of SWx products must have high confidence. This
requires that the models used to produce products be validated against
the real world (i.e., historical SWx data (climatology) from multiple
solar cycles and global coverage).

The difficulties of collecting validated SWx impacts on operational
systems during Phase I pointed to the need for a centrally managed and
standardized repository to capture impact information. SWx impacts are
often misidentified as other types of anomalies, increasing diagnosis
time and thus the time to mitigate. These needs may be met by a
centralized user-friendly data resource for researchers, SWx model
developers, user system designers, planners and wargamers. It should
capture SWx effects (start time, duration, and intensity), SWx
climatology, and user system impacts.

In summary, the ADT found:

-   SWx effects and their operational impacts are not well
    documented---improved archiving of both would benefit research,
    operations, acquisition, analysis, simulation and wargaming

-   Data that can be used to validate models and products is key to
    producing high confidence products

-   Industry is interested in SWx design guidelines built on SWx
    climatological data

-   SWx impacts and environmental data are essential to understanding
    SWx trends

## Integrated User Information 

To guide future investment, development and acquisition of space and
space-related SWx capabilities, the NSSA recommends:

-   **Provide Space Weather Information:**

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-   **In User Impact Terms**

-   **Routinely Available through Common Dissemination Channels**

-   **Integrated with Other User Information as required**

In conjunction with the User Applications Tiger Team and discussions
with a broad spectrum of users, a SWx SAX was conducted. The SAX
objectives were to capture and assess user insight on the utility of SWx
information to their planning and operations in support of a broad range
of National Security and civil missions and functions.

In the area of products, the SAX results indicated that an expert system
translating SWx information into user impact terms and autonomous SWx
updates for correction of the user systems is needed. Users also
expressed a need for standardized, integrated products and a SWx expert
point of contact to be available to fill special product requests and
analyses. In addition to a requirement for significant improvement in
SWx specification, reliable 4-6 hour and 24-hour forecasts and
advisories are needed to support the mission planning cycle.

Operational systems require high confidence SWx models. For National
Security architectures, this means going through rigorous verification,
validation and accreditation processes.

Increased use of expert systems and tactical decision aids (TDAs) for
mission planners and operators creates a need for SWx information (not
data) to be smoothly integrated with CONOPS, contingency planning and
standard situational awareness displays.

The civil community has the same need for "impact" specification and
forecasts as the National Security community. However, the civil
community relies on a network of value added resellers to provide user
specific products that use SWx assets and data.

In summary, the ADT found:

-   Products currently available to operators and planners are
    inadequate

-   Most users need SWx information provided in terms of impacts and in
    formats that readily integrate into existing or planned systems

-   Users need high confidence in SWx products for operational decisions
    and medium confidence for longer term plans

-   Military users expect tailored space weather products while civil
    policy is to provide access to basic data and rely on third party
    product tailoring

## Integrated Space Weather Center

To guide future investment, development and acquisition of space and
space-related SWx capabilities, the NSSA recommends:

-   **Evolve to an Integrated Space Weather Center capability to
    include:**

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-   **Space Weather Expertise available for User Consultation and
    Support**

-   **A National Security Support Cell to produce Tailored Products**

-   **Back-up capability to provide support in the event of Natural
    Emergencies or Catastrophic Equipment Failures**

One important trade axis explored was distributed --- centralized
processing. Performance and cost were evaluated for architectures at the
extremes. Centralized processing emerged as the better approach. In
addition, the need for coupled computer-intensive models using
consolidated global data drove the need for a highly capable central
processing facility. This facility requires access to all data sources
including SWx climatology and SWx impacts. Some users will require
unprocessed data and their needs can be easily met with this centralized
approach.

There is a high level of cooperation between the military and civil SWx
centers including sharing data, models, and personnel. However, it is
clear there is a potential for cost saving by evolving to an integrated
SWx support capability. Because of the unique needs of some users, a
National Security cell for processing classified data or providing
classified products will be needed. SWx center integration could
compromise robustness, so a back-up center must be considered to reduce
vulnerability to natural disasters and catastrophic equipment failure.

During the SAX, planners and operators also expressed a need for a SWx
expert to be accessible to answer SWx questions and resolve issues.

In summary, the ADT found:

-   The complexity of SWx models and forecasting will likely require a
    full time expert resource available to produce and evaluate products
    and interface with users.

-   Centralized processing provides a single point of contact that is
    best for meeting most user needs

-   An integrated SWx center with civil and joint military staffing
    along with back-up capabilities could improve efficiency and reduce
    costs in developing user products

-   A National Security support cell is needed to focus on tailored
    products and classified support for DoD and Intelligence Community
    users

## Space Weather Research & Development 

To guide future investment, development and acquisition of space and
space-related SWx capabilities, the NSSA recommends:

-   **Provide a Robust SWx Research and Development Program to:**

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-   **Develop and Implement the Improved Models**

-   **Provide options for further growth**

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-   **Continue to Leverage Research and Development Missions**

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-   **Enhance Operational Products until Operational Systems are ready**

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-   **Develop and Implement Standardized Processes to rapidly and
    efficiently Transition R&D into needed Operational Products**

A technology assessment identified, characterized, and documented a
technology foundation for post-2010 SWx capabilities. Three common
threads were revealed.

First, multi-point measurements are vital for a complete picture of the
environment. SWx is currently starved for data essential to global
specification, improved understanding, and better initialization and
validation of forecast models (e.g., measurements from space
Sun-Earth-Line sensors). Today, much of the data on SWx is limited to a
certain geographical area or by resolution. Thus the current SWx
architecture's ability to detect and mitigate SWx impacts is severely
limited.

Second, basic research is an underpinning for better models. This
research should focus on coupling process physics and SWx domain
specific algorithms. High confidence forecasting can only be achieved
with models integrated across the SWx domains (coupling from the Sun to
the magnetosphere and through the ionosphere) that are verified and
validated. The processes of how and when the Sun produces CMEs and the
interaction between the magnetosphere and the ionosphere must be
explored.

Third, new sensors and other supporting technologies are essential, but
are largely driven by other than SWx needs. These supporting
technologies include automated low cost spacecraft, low cost lightweight
sensors, and advanced computing to run the complex SWx models. Promising
sensors like solar flare and CME imagers will move us toward the ability
to predict the impact to the Earth after detection of the event on the
Sun. This lead-time will improve our forecasting ability. GPS
occultation sensors and combined radiation and threat warning sensors
that can be inexpensively deployed on a large number of satellites and
significantly contribute to specification and forecasting of the
magnetosphere and ionosphere. Lightweight payloads and low integration
costs are the drivers for SWx sensors riding on other types of
satellites.

More data and basic research are critical to model development and
improvement. The ADT also validated the current practice of leveraging
R&D missions (e.g., Advanced Composition Experiment (ACE)) to provide
data to forecasters that would otherwise be unavailable. The use of
these data increases forecast and specification confidence.

In summary, the ADT found:

-   SWx is a technically immature discipline and basic research is vital

-   R&D sensors are a valuable data source and greatly benefit
    data-starved operations

-   Flexible SWx architecture could allow easier transition of R&D to
    operations

-   More focus on operational needs could improve R&D pay-offs

-   Some R&D is ready for transition to operations now (e.g.,
    Coronagraph, [C]{.underline}ompact [E]{.underline}nvironmental
    [A]{.underline}nomaly [Se]{.underline}nsor (CEASE), and GPS
    Occultation)

-   R&D investment is key to reducing model development risk

## Space Weather and Man-Made Effects Information Coordination

To guide future investment, development and acquisition of space and
space-related SWx capabilities, the NSSA recommends:

-   **Support the Space Control Protection Mission by providing timely
    Space Weather Information**

-   **Incorporate the Operational Specification and Forecasting of Space
    Environmental Effects of Man-made (Primarily Nuclear) Events as a
    Mission into the Space Weather Architecture**

The ADT studied the relationship between man-made effects (MME) and SWx
effects on the near-earth environment. The spatial and temporal scales
of most man-made effects are smaller than those of naturally occurring
SWx phenomena, while high altitude nuclear explosion energy levels can
be much higher than natural phenomena as well as other MME.

MME and SWx impacts are similar for high-energy photons (e.g., x-rays),
pumped radiation belts, ionospheric disturbances, and aurora
emissions/clutter. SWx sensors can be used to trace MME, but they may
not have the necessary dynamic range.

The Space Control mission requires the characterization of the natural
environment to differentiate between outages caused by SWx or a hostile
force. In many cases it is economical to field combined packages to
provide threat warning, attack assessment, and SWx (e.g., CEASE). The
SWx and MME physics models are similar, and the MME models require SWx
information for initialization. In addition, nuclear detonation sensors
can supply useful data to SWx modelers and forecasters. Thus sharing
data and models between agencies is to be encouraged.

In summary, the ADT found:

-   MME are physically similar to SWx effects, differing in that MME are
    more localized and have different energy levels

-   Nuclear effects are the primary man-made threat to the SWx
    environment

-   Users and models would benefit from spacecraft space environmental
    sensors

-   Nuclear detection missions collect data that could benefit the SWx
    mission area

-   Combining SWx and threat sensors would benefit the space control
    mission area

# SPACE WEATHER ARCHITECTURE STUDY CONCLUSION 

The nine recommendations of the SWx architecture study are intended to
put the United States on a path to a robust, capable SWx specification
and forecasting capability. They offer an integrated, cohesive program
that maximizes resources and eliminates, to the extent possible,
parallel efforts. This will require a high level of cooperation within
the space weather community. In order to implement these
recommendations, further work is needed.

The first task is stakeholders' acceptance of the SWx architecture
Transition Strategy. The transition strategy, developed by NSSA in
coordination with stakeholders, will guide mid-term program transition
planning to achieve the recommended capabilities. The SWx transition
strategy identifies key actions to be performed to transition from the
current SWx support capability to the proposed SWx architecture vector.

The next task is the development of the SWx architecture Transition
Plan. The SWx Transition Team will be composed of key stakeholder and
user representatives led by ASD (C3I). They will build on the
architecture study recommendations to achieve the desired capabilities
within the transition time frames, in a measured, affordable way. The
SWx architecture Transition Plan will add detail (e.g., specific
milestones) to the Transition Strategy

# [APPENDIX A -- Study Stakeholder Organizations]{.underline}

##### OASD (C3I)

##### DDR&E

##### Joint Staff

USSPACECOM

Army Staff

CNO Staff

Air Staff

USMC Staff

AFSPC

NRO

AFMC/SMC

ONR

NRL

AFRL

BMDO

SMDC

AFOSR

DTRA

NAVSPACECOM

NOAA/OAR/SEC/NESDIS

NPOESS IPO

NASA/HQ/GSFC/JPL

USGS

DoE (LANL)

NSF

# 

# [APPENDIX B - REFERENCES]{.underline}

SWx Architecture Study Terms of Reference (TOR) 4 Dec 97

C4ISR Architecture Framework Version 2 18 Dec 97

Request for Information (RFI) on the *Commercial Satellites*

*and Other Systems* in Commerce Business Daily 6 May 98

Military Requirements for Defense Environmental Satellites

(MJCS 154-86) 1 Aug 86

Capstone Requirements Document (CRD) for the Space Environment

Mission Area (Draft) 4 Nov 97

Mission Need Statement (MNS) for Centralized Aerospace Weather

Capability (USAF MNS 003-94) 12 Jun 95

Milestone 0 Acquisition Decision Memorandum for Centralized

Aerospace Weather Capability 20 Oct 95

Environmental Sensing (AFSPC MNS 035-92) 6 Jan 93

National Polar Orbiting Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS)

Integrated Operational Requirements Document (IORD) Dec 95

Defense Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP) Operational

Requirements Document (ORD) 28 Apr 93

Space Weather Analysis and Forecast System

USAF ORD 003-94-I/II/III-C 1 May 97

Solar Radio Burst Locator Requirements (Draft) 14 Mar 97

Technical Requirements Document (TRD) for Solar Electro-Optical

Network (SEON)/Radio Solar Telescope Network (RSTN) Phase II

Upgrade Technical Feasibility Program 26 Oct 92

Improved Solar Optical Observing Network (ISOON)

Requirements (Draft) 14 Mar 97

National Space Weather Program Strategic Plan Aug 95

National Space Weather Program Implementation Plan Jan 97

Joint Vision 2010 Undated

Joint Vision 2010 Implementation Plan Draft 9 Jan 98

Global Engagement: A Vision for the 21^st^ Century Air Force Undated

# [APPENDIX C- ACRONYMS]{.underline}

AAWG Architecture Alternative Working Group

ACE Advanced Composition Experiment

ADT Architecture Development Team

AFSPC Air Force Space Command

ASD (C3I) Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control,
Communications and Intelligence)

BMD Ballistic Missile Defense

BMEWS Ballistic Missile Early Warning System

CEASE Compact Environmental Anomaly Sensor

CME Coronal Mass Ejection

Comm Communications

CONOPS Concept of Operations

CRD Capstone Requirements Document

DCG Decision Coordination Group

DCI Deputy for Central Intelligence

DMSP Defense Meteorological Satellite Program

DoD Department of Defense

EB Evolved Baseline

GIC Ground Induced Current

GPS Global Positioning System

HF High Frequency

IC Intelligence Community

ISR Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance

MILSATCOM Military Satellite Communications

MME Man-made Effects

MMT Micrometeoroids Tiger Team

NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration

NOAA National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration

NSSA National Security Space Architect

NSS-SSG National Security Space Senior Steering Group

NSWP National Space Weather Strategic Plan

OFCM Office of the Federal Coordinator for Meteorological Services and
Supporting Research

ORD Operational Requirements Document

PNT Position-Navigation-Timing

R&D Research and Development

RFI Radio Frequency Interference

SATCOM Satellite Communication

SAX Space Architect Exercise

SBA Simulation Based Acquisition

SBIRS Space-Based Infrared System

SecDef Secretary of Defense

SSG Senior Steering Group

SHF Super High-Frequency

SWx Space Weather

TDA Tactical Decision Aid

TEC Total Electron Count

TMD Theater Missile Defense

TOR Terms of Reference

TWG Technology Working Group

UFO UHF Follow-on