White Paper: DRAFT

The Role of the Metropolitan Planning Organization (MPO) In Preparing
for Security Incidents and Transportation System Response

Michael D. Meyer, Ph.D., P.E.

Georgia Institute of Technology

## **Introduction**

The terrorist events of September 11, 2001 provide a good illustration
of the challenges facing states and metropolitan areas in preparing for
and responding to unexpected security incidents or natural disasters.
Given the suddenness of the terrorist incidents and their unexpected
nature, it is not surprising that there was some confusion and lack of
coordination in managing the transportation system in the aftermath. In
some cases, transportation operating agencies did not know what other
local agencies were doing. In others, enforcement agencies were telling
transportation operators to cease service exactly at the time when
service was needed to move people away from the scene. Incompatible
communication systems and no single source of public information caused
confusion in organizational and public response. One lesson from
September 11^th^ is paramount---*effective coordination and
communication among the many different operating agencies in a region
and across the nation is absolutely essential*. Such coordination is
needed to allow enforcement/security/safety responses to occur in an
expeditious manner, while at the same time still permitting the
transportation system to handle the possibly overwhelming public
response to the incident. Complementary to this is the need to make sure
the public has clear and concise information about the situation and
what actions they should take.

Although the immediate organizational response to security incidents and
disasters will be the responsibility of security/public safety agencies,
there is an important role that metropolitan planning organizations
(MPOs) can play in promoting coordinated planning in anticipation of
unexpected events or natural disasters. In addition, the MPO could also
provide a centralized location of information on transportation system
conditions and local/national responses that might be useful in an
emergency. This white paper examines these possible roles and raises
other issues that should be considered by MPO officials.
Disaster/security planning is divided into several components that
reflect the different elements in dealing with such events, e.g.,
prevention, surveillance/monitoring, information dissemination/
communications, incident response, and system recovery. The prospective
role of the MPO in each of these components of an incident/disaster
event response is discussed.

Major Discussion Points

The major discussion points for this paper are:

-   The short timeframe and public safety aspects in responding to
    unforeseen emergency situations require a command and control
    organizational structure for providing immediate and effective
    allocation of emergency response resources. Thus, the planning for,
    and actual response to, emergency situations in a metropolitan area
    is the primary responsibility of the emergency response/public
    safety/operations agencies in the region.

-   Because of the widely varying political and institutional contexts
    for metropolitan planning organizations (MPOs) in the U.S., there is
    no singular model that can best describe the most appropriate role
    for MPOs in security/disaster planning.

-   However, because of its role as a forum for cooperative decision
    making in a metropolitan area, and its responsibility for allocating
    financial resources to improving the performance of the
    transportation system, the MPO does have a role to play in
    security/disaster planning.

-   The role of the MPO will most likely vary by stage of the
    security/disaster incident (e.g., the MPO's role might be very
    different in developing a collaborative strategy to prevent harmful
    effects of events versus in the actual post event investigation
    activities).

Characterizing the Nature of the Threat

The September 11, 2001 terrorist incidents have focused attention on
large scale, area wide responses to sudden terrorist incidents. There is
a wide range of such incidents that could cause varying levels of
disruption to the transportation system. A recent report recommending a
national research and development strategy for improving surface
transportation security presented the list of possible threat scenarios
shown in Figure 1, a list that originated in a U.S. Department of
Transportation vulnerability assessment of the U.S. transportation
system. As shown, the nature of the threats was characterized primarily
as being a physical, biological, chemical or cyber attack. The types of
responses would clearly be different dependent on what type of attack
occurred.

The magnitude and scope of an incident will clearly be an important
determinant for gauging the appropriate public safety/emergency
response. And most studies of sudden disruptions to the transportation
network, either from natural or man-made causes, have concluded that the
redundancies in a metropolitan area's transportation system provides a
rerouting capability that allows the flow of people and vehicles around
disrupted network links. A national research and development study on
surface transportation security observed that "experiences with natural
disasters suggests that even the

Table 1: Scenarios Considered in the U.S. DOT Vulnerability Assessment

+----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+
| Physical Attacks                 |                                   |
+----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+
| -   Car bomb at bridge approach  | -   Attack on passenger vessel in |
|                                  |     port                          |
| -   Series of small explosives   |                                   |
|     on highway bridge            | -   Shooting in rail station      |
|                                  |                                   |
| -   Single small explosive on    | -   Vehicle bomb adjacent to rail |
|     highway bridge               |     station                       |
|                                  |                                   |
| -   Single small explosive in    | -   Bombing of airport transit    |
|     highway tunnel               |     station                       |
|                                  |                                   |
| -   Car bomb in highway tunnel   | -   Bombing of underwater transit |
|                                  |     tunnel                        |
| -   Series of car bombs on       |                                   |
|     adjacent bridges or tunnels  | -   Bus bombing                   |
|                                  |                                   |
| -   Bomb(s) detonated at         | -   Deliberate blocking of        |
|     pipeline compressor stations |     highway-rail grade crossing   |
|                                  |                                   |
| -   Bomb detonated at pipeline   | -   Terrorist bombing of rail     |
|     storage facility             |     tunnel                        |
|                                  |                                   |
| -   Bomb detonated on pipeline   | -   Bomb detonated on train in    |
|     segment                      |     rail station                  |
|                                  |                                   |
| -   Simultaneous attacks on      | -   Vandalism of track structure  |
|     ports                        |     and signal system             |
|                                  |                                   |
| -   Terrorist bombing of         | -   Terrorist bombing of rail     |
|     waterfront pavilion          |     bridge                        |
|                                  |                                   |
| -   Container vessel fire at     | -   Explosives attack on multiple |
|     marine terminal              |     rail bridges                  |
|                                  |                                   |
| -   Ramming of railroad bridge   | -   Explosive in cargo of         |
|     by maritime vessel           |     passenger aircraft            |
+----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+
| Biological Attacks               |                                   |
+----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+
| -   Biological release in        | -   Anthrax release in transit    |
|     multiple subway stations     |     station                       |
|                                  |                                   |
| -   Anthrax release from freight | -   Anthrax release on passenger  |
|     ship                         |     train                         |
+----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+
| Chemical Attacks                 |                                   |
+----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+
| -   Sarin release in multiple    | -   Physical attack on railcar    |
|     subway stations              |     carrying toxics               |
+----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+
| Cyber and C^3^ Attacks           |                                   |
+----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+
| -   Cyber attack on highway      | -   Sabotage of train control     |
|     traffic control system       |     system                        |
|                                  |                                   |
| -   Cyber attack on pipeline     | -   Tampering with rail signals   |
|     control system               |                                   |
|                                  | -   Cyber attack on train control |
| -   Attack on port               |     center                        |
|     power/telecommunications     |                                   |
+----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+

> Source: As reported in National Research Council, *Improving Surface
> Transportation Security, A Research and Development Strategy*,
> Washington D.C: National Academy Press,
>
> 1999; originally in U.S. DOT, *Surface Transportation Vulnerability
> Assessment*, Final Report, Washington D.C. May, 1998.

simultaneous destruction of multiple elements of the system has less
impact on its ability to operate than one might expect. The surface
transportation infrastructure has many redundancies and is quite
resilient."[^1] This may be true. However, as shown by the events of
September 11^th^, a new factor must be incorporated into understanding
the characteristics of the threat and the resulting public response.
With high levels of uncertainty associated with the exact nature of an
incident that happens suddenly and with great visibility to the public,
the transportation system must not only handle the emergency response to
the incident itself, but also the likely mass public response to the
perceived threat. As shown in New York City and Washington D.C., large
numbers of people were trying to escape the immediate areas surrounding
the incidents. After a short time, this escape from immediate danger
became a much larger movement to leave the city itself. The movements of
people away from the incidents often conflicted with the strategies of
public safety/security/emergency management agencies to limit the extent
of the threat (e.g., shut down the subway so that possible perpetrators
could not escape, which at the same time was the major means of
evacuation for tens of thousands of downtown commuters).

Terrorist attacks are sudden and without notice. Without knowing where,
when, or how a terrorist attack is likely to occur, the most effective
response strategy (absent preventing the attack to begin with) is for
State/local/national authorities to develop flexible strategies that can
be adjusted quickly and appropriately to the type of incident that
actually occurs. *This type of strategy requires [management
coordination]{.underline}, [compatible communication
systems]{.underline}, and [real time information feedback]{.underline}
to decision makers that permits near immediate changes in strategy when
required. This approach also requires [mechanisms for disseminating
information to the general public]{.underline} that provides the most
up-to-date guidance on the best transportation options for avoiding
bottlenecks in the transportation system.*

For purposes of this paper, the approach to handling potential
security/disaster incidents is divided into the following six elements
or phases.

> *Prevention*: This has several components, ranging from the actual
> stopping of an attack before it occurs, to providing improved facility
> designs that prevent large scale destruction. Surveillance,
> monitoring, and sensing technologies will likely play an important
> role in the prevention phase of an incident.

## *Response/* Reducing the harmful impact of an attack as it occurs and in the *Mitigation*: immediate aftermath. This entails identifying the most effective 

routing for emergency vehicles as well as for the evacuation of large
numbers of people, as well as providing effective communication systems
among emergency response teams and for general public information.

## *Monitoring*: Recognizing that an incident is underway, characterizing it, and monitoring developments. Clearly, surveillance, monitoring, and sensing technologies would be critical to this phase of incident response, as would public information. 

> *Recovery*: Facilitating rapid reconstruction of services after an
> incident. Depending on the degree of damage to the community and/or
> transportation system, regaining some level of normalcy will require
> bringing the transportation system back to adequate levels of
> operation.
>
> *Investigation*: Determining what happened in an attack, how it
> happened, and who was responsible. This is primarily a security/police
> activity that reconstructs the incident and determines causality and
> responsibility.

*Institutional* Conducting a self-assessment of organizational actions
before,

### *Learning:* during, and after an incident. This element provides a feedback to the prevention element in that by understanding what went wrong or right in response to an incident, steps can be taken to prevent possible new threats.

It is the thesis of this paper that the MPO can undertake actions in
each of these phases of a security/disaster incident that will benefit
the region. Indeed, in many cases, existing hurricane and disaster
evacuation plans are a good starting point and may be sufficient for the
types of incidents anticipated. Before identifying what possible actions
might be taken by MPOs in connection with the security/disaster phases
described above, it is first important to identify the possible roles
for an MPO in transportation system operations.

Characterizing Possible MPO Roles in System Operations and
Security/Disaster Planning

As noted earlier, the role of MPOs in regional planning and
decision-making will vary from one region to another. In some cases,
MPOs have a long history of strongly influencing operations strategies
for the regional transportation system. In others, the MPOs have very
little authority or responsibility beyond that of developing the
transportation plan and transportation improvement program. Recently,
the Federal Highway Administration and many other groups have been
looking closely at institutional strategies for providing
metropolitan-level coordination of transportation system operations. In
particular, the role of the MPO in such coordination has been the topic
of much discussion. As part of this discussion, the Association of
Metropolitan Planning Organizations (AMPO) has developed a technical
paper on the range of roles for MPOs in planning for system
operations.[^2] The roles outlined in this paper are a good point of
departure for the possible roles that MPOs could play in
security/disaster planning, and are thus described below.

> *Traditional* The MPO incorporates system management and operations
> (M&O) *Role:* in its ongoing transportation planning activities. The
> focus would
>
> be on specific M&O projects that arise as part of the transportation
> planning process; but the primary responsibility for operations-type
> projects would rest elsewhere, most likely with the region's
> operations agencies.
>
> *Convener*: The MPO would act as a forum where operations plans could
> be discussed and coordinated with other plans in the region. Regular
> meetings on operations issues would be held, but the MPO would still
> not be responsible for developing a regional operations plan.
>
> *Champion*: The MPO works aggressively to develop a regional consensus
> on operations planning. MPO planners work with operating agencies to
> create programs and projects that improve system performance. The MPO
> takes the lead in developing regional agreements on coordinated
> operations.
>
> *Developer*: The MPO would develop regional operations plans in
> addition to incorporating operations strategies into the
> transportation plan. System-oriented performance measures would be
> used to identify strategic operations gaps in the transportation
> system.
>
> *Operator*: The MPO would be responsible for implementing operations
> strategies that were developed as part of the MPO-led planning
> process.

These five potential roles for MPOs in transportation systems management
and operations show increasing levels of involvement and responsibility.
It is not likely that many MPOs would adopt the last role, that is, act
as the implementer of operations strategies, although such a role has
been adopted by a very limited number of MPOs for very specific
strategies. Given the strong influence of security/public
safety/emergency management agencies in dealing with security/disaster
incidents, it is likely that the most appropriate MPO roles will be
found in the first two or three described above. Indeed, the aftermath
of the September 11^th^ incidents has resulted in the MPOs in New York
and Washington D.C. playing a more active role in security/disaster
planning. In particular, the focus has been on funding better
communications technologies that can be used for a coordinated response
to future incidents.

MPO Roles Relating to Phases of Security/Disaster Incidents

Figure 1 presents a concept of what roles an MPO might be able to adopt
for different phases of a security/disaster incident. As shown, the
major roles for an MPO would primarily be as a convener or champion for
many of the actions that relate to the prevention, response/mitigation,
monitoring and recovery phases. In each case, the MPO would most likely
focus on some aspect of the transportation system that is part of the
larger regional response to security/disaster incidents. Thus, although
Table 2 shows the MPO possibly adopting a developer role for
monitoring/information, this would likely be focused on the such things
as traveler information systems, and not the types of strategies and
actions that would be the primary responsibility of security/public
safety/emergency management agencies. As shown, there is very little
role likely for the MPO in the investigation phase.

Table 2 presents types of actions that an MPO could take in each phase
of a security/disaster incident. The list in Table 2 is not intended to
suggest that MPOs would undertake all of the actions shown. Rather, some
subset of this list could be adopted by the MPO in support of a region's
strategy for dealing with security/disaster incidents. Each of these
actions fits into one or more of the MPO roles shown in Figure 1 and
discussed above.

Given the MPO's strengths in [technical analysis and transportation
planning]{.underline}, the actions that seem most appropriate for the
MPO in the context of security/disaster planning are:

-   Conducting vulnerability analyses on regional transportation
    facilities and services

-   Analyzing transportation network for redundancies in moving large
    numbers of people (e.g., modeling person and vehicle flows with
    major links removed or reversed, accommodating street closures,
    adaptive signal control strategies, impact of traveler information
    systems), and strategies for dealing with "choke" points such as
    tollbooths.

-   Analyzing transportation network for emergency route
    planning/strategic gaps in the network

Figure 1\--Potential MPO Roles in Security/Disaster Incident Phase

+------------------+----------+---------+---------+---------+--------+
|                  | Possible |         |         |         |        |
|                  | MPO Role |         |         |         |        |
+------------------+----------+---------+---------+---------+--------+
| Incident Phase   | Tra      | C       | C       | De      | Op     |
|                  | ditional | onvener | hampion | veloper | erator |
|                  |          |         |         |         |        |
|                  | Role     |         |         |         |        |
+------------------+----------+---------+---------+---------+--------+
| Prevention       |          |         |         |         |        |
+------------------+----------+---------+---------+---------+--------+
| Res              |          |         |         |         |        |
| ponse/Mitigation |          |         |         |         |        |
+------------------+----------+---------+---------+---------+--------+
| Monito           |          |         |         |         |        |
| ring/Information |          |         |         |         |        |
+------------------+----------+---------+---------+---------+--------+
| Recovery         |          |         |         |         |        |
+------------------+----------+---------+---------+---------+--------+
| Investigation    |          |         |         |         |        |
+------------------+----------+---------+---------+---------+--------+
| Institutional    |          |         |         |         |        |
| Learning         |          |         |         |         |        |
+------------------+----------+---------+---------+---------+--------+

  ---------- ------------------------------------------------------------
             Lead MPO Role Possible, Especially For Some Components

             Minor MPO Role Possible

             No Likely MPO Role
  ---------- ------------------------------------------------------------

+------------------+---------------------------------------------------+
| ## S             | # Possible MPO Role                               |
| tage of Incident |                                                   |
+------------------+---------------------------------------------------+
| ##               | -   Funding new strategies/technologies/projects  |
|                  |     that can help prevent events                  |
| ##               |                                                   |
|                  | -   Conducting vulnerability analyses on regional |
| ## Prevention    |     transportation facilities and services        |
|                  |                                                   |
|                  | -   Secure management of data and information on  |
|                  |     transportation system vulnerabilities         |
|                  |                                                   |
|                  | -   Providing forum for security/safety agencies  |
|                  |     to coordinate surveillance and prevention     |
|                  |     strategies                                    |
|                  |                                                   |
|                  | -   Fund and perhaps coordinate regional          |
|                  |     transportation surveillance system that can   |
|                  |     identify potential danger prior to its        |
|                  |     occurring                                     |
|                  |                                                   |
|                  | -   Coordinate drills and exercises among         |
|                  |     transportation providers to practice          |
|                  |     emergency plans                               |
|                  |                                                   |
|                  | -   Coordinate with security officials in         |
|                  |     development of prevention strategies          |
|                  |                                                   |
|                  | -   Hazardous route planning                      |
|                  |                                                   |
|                  | -   Disseminate (and possibly coordinate)         |
|                  |     research on structural integrity in explosion |
|                  |     circumstance and standard designs             |
+------------------+---------------------------------------------------+
| Mitigation       | -   Analyzing transportation network for          |
|                  |     redundancies in moving large numbers of       |
|                  |     people (e.g., modeling person and vehicle     |
|                  |     flows with major links removed or reversed,   |
|                  |     accommodating street closures, adaptive       |
|                  |     signal control strategies, impact of traveler |
|                  |     information systems), strategies for dealing  |
|                  |     with "choke" points such as toll booths)      |
|                  |                                                   |
|                  | -   Analyzing transportation network for          |
|                  |     emergency route planning/strategic gaps in    |
|                  |     network                                       |
|                  |                                                   |
|                  | -   Providing forum for discussions on            |
|                  |     coordinating emergency response               |
|                  |                                                   |
|                  | -   Disseminating best practices in               |
|                  |     incident-specific engineering design and      |
|                  |     emergency response to agencies                |
|                  |                                                   |
|                  | -   Disseminating public information on options   |
|                  |     available for possible response               |
|                  |                                                   |
|                  | -   Funding communications systems and other      |
|                  |     technology to speed response to incident      |
+------------------+---------------------------------------------------+
| Monitoring       | -   Funding surveillance and detection systems    |
|                  |                                                   |
|                  | -   Proposing protocols for non-security/safety   |
|                  |     agency response (e.g. local governments)      |
|                  |                                                   |
|                  | -   Coordinating public information dissemination |
|                  |     strategies                                    |
|                  |                                                   |
|                  | -   Funding communications systems for emergency  |
|                  |     response teams and agencies                   |
+------------------+---------------------------------------------------+
| Recovery         | -   Conducting transportation network analyses to |
|                  |     determine most effective recovery investment  |
|                  |     strategies                                    |
|                  |                                                   |
|                  | -   Acting as a forum for developing appropriate  |
|                  |     recovery strategies                           |
|                  |                                                   |
|                  | -   Funding recovery strategies                   |
|                  |                                                   |
|                  | -   Coordinate stockpiling of strategic           |
|                  |     road/bridge components for rapid              |
|                  |     reconstruction                                |
+------------------+---------------------------------------------------+
| Investigation    | -   Providing any data collected as part of       |
|                  |     surveillance/monitoring that might be useful  |
|                  |     for the investigation                         |
+------------------+---------------------------------------------------+
| Institutional    | -   Acting as forum for regional assessment of    |
| Learning         |     organizational and transportation systems     |
|                  |     response                                      |
|                  |                                                   |
|                  | -   Conducting targeted studies on identified     |
|                  |     deficiencies and recommending corrective      |
|                  |     action                                        |
|                  |                                                   |
|                  | -   Coordinating changes to multi-agency actions  |
|                  |     that will improve future responses            |
|                  |                                                   |
|                  | -   Funding new strategies/technologies/projects  |
|                  |     that will better prepare region for next      |
|                  |     event                                         |
+------------------+---------------------------------------------------+

###  

  ------------------ --------------- ------------------------------------------------
  **Definitions:**   Prevention      Preventing a potential attacker from carrying
                                     out a successful attack

                     Mitigation      Reducing the harmful impact of an attack as it
                                     occurs and in the immediate aftermath

                     Monitoring      Recognizing that an attack is underway,
                                     characterizing it, and monitoring developments

                     Recovery        Facilitating rapid reconstruction of services
                                     after an attack

                     Investigation   Determining what happened in an attack, how it
                                     happened, and who was responsible

                     Institutional   Conducting a self assessment of organizational
                     Learning        actions before, during and after incident
  ------------------ --------------- ------------------------------------------------

Given the MPO's responsibilities for [funding strategies and
projects]{.underline} that will improve the performance of the
transportation system, the actions that seem most appropriate for the
MPO in the context of security/disaster planning are:

-   Funding new strategies/technologies/projects that can help prevent
    events

-   Funding and perhaps coordinating regional transportation
    surveillance system that can identify potential danger prior to its
    occurring

-   Funding communications systems and other technology to speed
    response to incident

-   Funding recovery strategies

Given the MPO's role as a [forum for cooperative
decision-making]{.underline}, the actions that seem most appropriate for
the MPO in the context of security/disaster planning are:

-   Providing a forum for security/safety agencies to coordinate
    surveillance and prevention strategies

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-   Coordinating drills and exercises among transportation providers to
    practice emergency plans

-   Coordinating with security officials in development of prevention
    strategies

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-   Providing forum for discussions on coordinating emergency response

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-   Coordinating public information dissemination strategies

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-   Acting as a forum for developing appropriate recovery strategies

-   Coordinating the stockpiling of strategic road/bridge components for
    rapid reconstruction

-   Coordinating changes to multi-agency actions that will improve
    future responses

One of the more interesting and perhaps critical roles that the MPO can
play is in the [institutional learning]{.underline} phase of a
security/disaster incident. In this phase, the MPO can collect relevant
information on the manner in which the region responded to the incident,
not only the official response in terms of the movement of emergency and
public safety vehicles, but also how the public reacted and the
strategies adopted by travelers in responding to any disruption. With
this data, the MPO and other agencies can analyze the recent incident
response in order to develop improved strategies for handling the next
incident. The MPO is in a unique position to adopt a lead role in this
institutional learning phase of a security/disaster incident.

[Conclusions]{.underline}

This paper has outlined possible roles for MPOs in a regional strategy
for handling security/disaster incidents. The role that is appropriate
for any particular MPO will very much depend on the political and
institutional context for that region, and the expertise and
capabilities of the MPO staff. Given the regional nature of an incident
of the scale and scope of the events of September 11^th^ or of a natural
disaster such as an earthquake, the MPO has potentially an important
role to play. In fact, existing MPO hurricane and disaster evacuation
plans are a good starting point and may be sufficient for the types of
incidents anticipated. Clearly, the security, public safety and
transportation operating agencies have the primary responsibility for
responding to such incidents. However, outside of the immediate urgency
of response when agencies have the opportunity to think about the
requirements for a coordinated response to potential incidents and how
to handle the subsequent demands on the transportation system, the MPO
as a forum for cooperative decision making, as a funder of regional
transportation strategies, and as a region's core capability in
technical analysis of the transportation network has a critical role to
play.

[^1]: National Research Council*, Improving Surface Transportation
    Security, A Research and Development Strategy*, Washington D.C:
    National Academy Press, 1999

[^2]: Association of Metropolitan Planning Organizations, "The MPO Role
    in Management and Operations," Washington D.C. Aug. 28, 2001;
    Presentation made by John Mason, 10^th^ Annual Meeting of the
    Association of Metropolitan Planning Organizations, Atlanta, GA,
    Sept. 19, 2001.