**Host Security Briefing for Foreign National Guests**

**(To be given to DOC Agency Personnel in the area of the FNG)**

Long-term foreign visits to U.S. national laboratories, government
contractors, and other companies or research laboratories in the private
sector can pose a serious threat to national security.

Given access to U.S. scientific, technical, or other proprietary
information, foreign experts can gain for their home country information
that may erode the U.S. lead in commercially advantageous technologies
and critical military technologies. Often the difference between the
technology used in unclassified research and a classified weapons
program is only the \"application\" of the technology.

Foreign scientists and engineers sometimes offer their services to
research facilities, academic institutions, or defense contractors. This
can be an effort to place a foreign national inside the facility to
collect information on the technology available there. Some prominent
foreign scientists who obtained employment with U.S. companies have
immediately sent acquired information via fax transmissions back to
their former associates in their home country, using their native
language so the U.S. company could not monitor what was being sent.

In some instances, foreign graduate students in the US have been asked
by their government or a national corporation to serve as assistants at
no cost to professors doing research in a targeted field. The student
then has access to the professor\'s research and learns the applications
of the technology.

Some foreign governments routinely task their graduate students in the
United States to acquire information on a variety of economic and
technical subjects. In some instances, the students are contacted and
recruited before they come to the United States to study. Others are
approached after arriving and are recruited or pressured based upon a
sense of loyalty or fear of their home country\'s government or
intelligence service. The security officer of a cleared U.S. defense
contractor reported the company\'s desire to employ the son of a
prominent foreign scientist from a European country. A name check of the
scientist revealed he had previously cooperated with his country\'s
foreign intelligence service.

One allied foreign government has an organized program to send interns
abroad as an alternative to compulsory military service. In return for
exemption from military service, the intern has the specific task of
collecting foreign business and technological information.

The following indicators should trigger security concern:

-   Foreign applicant has a scientific background in a specialty for
    which his country is known or suspected to have a collection
    requirement.

-   The technology the individual wants to conduct research on may have
    classified applications (dual use technology), be on the militarily
    critical technology list, or be export-controlled technology.

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-   Foreign intern (student working on masters or doctorate) offers to
    work under a knowledgeable individual for free, usually for a period
    of 2-3 years. If any foreign national applicant offers services for
    free, the foreign government or a corporation associated with the
    government may well be paying the expenses and expect to gain
    accordingly.

Without sustained security and counterintelligence awareness training
programs, assimilation of foreign personnel into the work environment
usually results in a relaxation of security awareness among U.S.
employees. Security compromise is a frequent result.

**Host Security Briefing for Foreign National Visitors**

**(To be given to Agency Personnel in the area of the FNG)**

The United States encourages technical information exchanges with
scientists from foreign countries, as much can be gained from
international collaboration. Most of these visitors are here as our
guests at our request. Obviously most visitors are not engaged in
intelligence work. They do only what they were invited to do. The
problem is that in such a flood of visitors, it becomes hard to detect
those who do come with ulterior motives. Without appropriate security
precautions, it is possible to lose a great deal of classified,
proprietary, or otherwise sensitive information.

Inappropriate or suspicious activity by foreign visitors to U.S.
commercial or defense installations is a common occurrence. With few
exceptions, security compromises reported from foreign visit incidents
could have been prevented if U.S. personnel had been properly briefed in
advance of the visit as part of the risk management process.

Below are some commonly used tactics by foreign national visitors to
circumvent US security restrictions:

**Hidden Agendas**

Visitors sometimes pursue an agenda different from the stated purpose of
the visit. That is, they arrive to discuss program X but do everything
possible to discuss, observe, or meet with personnel who work with
program Y. They exploit our natural habit of being courteous to
visitors.

**Wandering Visitors**

A foreign visitor separates from the escorted party and strays
\"accidentally\" into other areas of the facility.

**Embarrassing Incidents**

When confronted about attempts to wander from the escorted party or to
elicit information beyond the approved scope of the visit, visitors
sometimes feign indignation and deliberately create an embarrassing
scene. Too often, the host attempts to be conciliatory, giving the
visitors opportunities to fulfill collection objectives.

**Unannounced Changes**

Last minute or unannounced changes to add personnel or substitute
personnel may be an attempt to sneak an intelligence officer or
technical expert (in a technical area that is not supposed to be a
subject of the visit) into the visiting party.

**Exploiting the Foreign Visits System**

The U.S. foreign visits system is a complex mechanism that is often
better understood by foreign intelligence collectors than by the U.S.
organizations that participate in the system. One way to exploit the
system is to make multiple requests to different U.S. agencies. Another
is to take advantage of different procedures depending upon whether the
visit can be described as government sponsored, non-sponsored, or
commercial in nature. For example, if a classified visit is disapproved,
the foreign group may seek to arrange a commercial visit through a
different U.S. Government agency.

**Exploiting Misinterpretations**

U.S. personnel often fail to understand the limitations of government
sponsored and non-sponsored foreign visits. For government-sponsored
visits, the contractor personnel may be under the impression that any
inquiry by the foreign visitor is legitimate. For non-sponsored visits,
the fact that the U.S. Government did not forbid the visit and the
foreign visitors forwarded security clearances may give the U.S.
contractor personnel the mistaken impression that it is okay to discuss
sensitive or classified information.

**Foreign Video Film Crews**

Requests for foreign film crews to make documentary films are
increasing, and a number of these requests have been quite suspect.
Reports from U.S. industry have identified attempts at filming sensitive
equipment and documents, as well as attempts at technical interrogation
of subject-matter experts as part of an "interview".

**Improvised Technical Penetration**

Foreign national visitors may use common, commercially-available
technology to enhance their ability to circumvent U.S. security
controls. Cell phones, Personal Data Assistants (PDAs), digital cameras,
and pen drives can all be used to surreptitiously acquire sensitive or
even classified information. A cell phone camera may be used to
surreptitiously photograph documents or equipment. A pen-drive can
download the contents of a hard-drive into a small, easily concealed
device. Some PDAs combine the features of a cell phone with that of a
small computer. These items are very common and may not be perceived as
posing a threat by U.S. personnel.