# International Bounty Hunters for War Criminals: Privatizing the 

# Enforcement of Justice

[Major Christopher M. Supernor]{.smallcaps}[^1]

**I. INTRODUCTION**

International law is often criticized for lacking any formal means of
enforcement.[^2] International criminal tribunals are not supported by
an international police force. Many of the individuals indicted by the
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) remain
at large,[^3] and the Yugoslavian government has systematically refused
to arrest indicted war criminals.[^4] Even the October 2000 popular
uprising that ousted Slobodan Milosevic from Yugoslavia's presidency has
done little to improve Yugoslavia's level of cooperation with the ICTY.
Mr. Vojislav Kostunica, Yugoslavia's newly elected president, has not
permitted Serbs to be extradited to The Hague.[^5] Mr. Kostunica has
stated that a Yugoslavian national truth commission should address
Yugoslav war crimes.[^6] The departing president of the ICTY, Gabrielle
McDonald, has criticized the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) for
"doing too little to help bring indicted people to justice."[^7]

Without an international police force, who can the international
community rely on to hunt war criminals and bring them to justice? In
the United States, domestic bounty hunters have proven more effective at
ensuring an alleged criminal\'s presence at trial than State law
enforcement has.[^8] Can international bounty hunters prove an efficient
means to bring war criminals to justice?[^9]

Shortly after Ms. Carla del Ponte, the Chief United Nations (UN)
prosecutor at the ICTY, called for "creative ways" to arrest fugitive
war criminals, on April 21, 2000, in Smederevo, Serbia, Mr. Dragan
Nikolic, an indicted war criminal, was handed over to American
Stabilization Force soldiers by bounty hunters.[^10] The bounty hunters
smuggled Mr. Nikolic out of Serbia and handed him over to NATO troops in
Bosnia who transferred him to the ICTY in the Netherlands.[^11] During
an April 28, 2000 court appearance, Mr. Nikolic pleaded not guilty to
eighty separate war crimes charges and requested that the ICTY dismiss
his case on the grounds that his arrest was illegal.[^12] On May 17,
2000, Serbian police arrested eight persons in Serbia who were allegedly
involved in kidnapping Mr. Nikolic.[^13] Serbian police claim that
unspecified "foreign services" paid £31,000 (British pounds) for the
kidnapping.[^14]

This paper discusses the feasibility and practicality of utilizing
international bounty hunters to deliver war criminals to justice. Part I
of this paper provides a brief overview of some of the available sources
of international law that establish war crimes. Part II discusses the
international community's growing interest in prosecuting war criminals
and the inadequacy of relying on extradition treaties, military forces,
and UNSC enforcement sanctions to capture fugitive war criminals. Part
III briefly considers the viability of utilizing an international police
force to capture war criminals. Part IV analyzes the effectiveness of
domestic bounty hunters. Part V discusses the available legal
alternatives for establishing international bounty hunters. Part VI
discusses whether a bounty hunter's forced abduction of an indicted war
criminal violates the UN Charter. Part VII explores the practical
applications of how an international bounty should function.

**II. WAR CRIMES**

International and domestic courts rely on treaties applicable to armed
conflicts and customary international law[^15] when defining war crimes.
A war crime is defined as any violation of international law governing
war.[^16] However, only grave breaches of the law involving the
mistreatment of protected individuals are typically prosecuted.[^17]

The four 1949 Geneva Conventions[^18] protect persons who are not taking
an active part in an armed conflict. Protected persons include the sick
and wounded, prisoners of war and civilians under the control of an
occupying force. Murder, torture, inhuman treatment and willfully
causing great suffering or serious injury to a protected person in the
course of an international armed conflict are grave breaches to the
Geneva Conventions and constitute war crimes.[^19] The Additional
Protocols of 1977 extended these protections to all civilians.[^20]
Common Article 3 to the 1949 Geneva Conventions also provides basic
fundamental protections to all persons during all armed conflicts, both
international and internal. Common Article 3 prohibits murder, torture,
the taking of hostages, outrages upon personal dignity, and the carrying
out of executions without the judgment of a regularly constituted
court.[^21]

The Geneva Conventions focus upon the protection of persons during armed
conflict, while the Hague Conventions[^22] focus on the means and
methods of warfare.[^23] The 1907 Hague Convention concerning the laws
and customs of land warfare prohibits parties to an international armed
conflict from using poisoned weapons, employing arms that are calculated
to cause great suffering, and improperly using a flag of truce.[^24] The
1907 Hague Convention also requires combatants to protect, as far as
possible, buildings of historical or cultural significance, and
hospitals.[^25]

On December 9, 1948, the United Nations general assembly approved a
convention,[^26] which established that genocide, whether committed in
war or peace, is a crime under international law.[^27] The convention
defined genocide as acts committed with the intent to destroy, in whole
or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group.[^28]

The four Geneva Conventions, the Hague Conventions, and the Genocide
Convention have all matured into customary international law.[^29]
Accordingly, all States are legally bound by these conventions
regardless of whether or not a State is a party to any of the
conventions. Individuals who violate any of these conventions during an
armed conflict may be prosecuted as a war criminal.[^30] Additionally,
under customary international law, a commander may be held accountable
for his subordinates\' war crimes if he knew or should have known that
his subordinates were involved in war crimes and he did not take
reasonable measures to prevent the crimes.[^31] Domestic criminal courts
generally rely on the above sources of international law for the
prosecution of a war crime.

The recent international war crimes tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia
and Rwanda were each provided with a statute drafted by the UNSC that
codified the specific war crimes that each court could prosecute.[^32]
The statute for the ICTY provides jurisdiction for grave breaches of the
1949 Geneva Conventions, violations of the law or customs of war,
genocide, and crimes against humanity.[^33] Under the ICTY statute,
crimes against humanity include murder, enslavement, torture, rape, and
the deportation and persecution of any civilian population on racial,
political or religious grounds.[^34] The statute for the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) provides jurisdiction for breaches
of common Article 3 to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, violations of the
1977 Additional Protocol II, and crimes against humanity.[^35] The list
of crimes against humanity for the ICTR and the ICTY are identical.[^36]
However, the statute for the ICTY requires a nexus to the armed conflict
before there can be a crime against humanity while the statute to the
ICTR only requires a crime against humanity to be committed as part of a
widespread or systematic attack against any civilian population.[^37]

On July 17, 1998, at a UN Diplomatic Conference in Rome, 120 States
voted to establish a permanent International Criminal Court (ICC).[^38]
The ICC will come into force when 60 States or more have ratified or
accepted the court's statute.[^39] The ICC statute provides jurisdiction
for the ICC to prosecute genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes,
and the crime of aggression.[^40]

**III. JUSTIFYING THE NEED FOR AN INTERNATIONAL**

**BOUNTY HUNTER**

The international community\'s interest in the prosecution of war
criminals has never been greater. For the first time since World War II,
international prosecutions for war criminals are not just a theoretical
possibility. The international criminal tribunals for the Former
Yugoslavia and Rwanda demonstrate the UNSC's ability and willingness to
create *ad hoc* tribunals for specific armed conflicts. Recent proposals
have discussed the possibility of creating additional *ad hoc* tribunals
to prosecute war crimes that were committed in Kosovo, Sierra Leone, and
Cambodia.[^41] The ICC is evidence of the growing support for a
permanent standing international court to prosecute war crimes. States
have also demonstrated a renewed interest in using their domestic courts
to prosecute war criminals.[^42]

Universal jurisdiction under customary international law gives States
the right to use their domestic courts to prosecute war criminals.[^43]
Customary international law obligates States to search for, prosecute,
or extradite war criminals.[^44] The 1949 Geneva Conventions obligated
States to enact domestic legislation to enable the State to fulfill its
obligation to prosecute war criminals.[^45] After the 1949 Geneva
Conventions, the United States relied on Articles 18 and 21 of the
Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) to fulfill its obligation under
international law to have a domestic forum for the prosecution of war
criminals. Article 18 of the UCMJ permits the United States military to
try by general courts-martial its own military member or any prisoner of
war for violations of the law of war.[^46] Article 21 of the UCMJ
permits the United States military to try any individual at a military
commission for violations of the law of war.[^47] Recently, in 1996, the
United States enacted the War Crimes Act to expand federal court
jurisdiction over war crimes to include the prosecution of violations of
common Article 3 to the 1949 Geneva Conventions provided that a victim
or the offender is a United States citizen.[^48]

In 1999, Spain relied on universal jurisdiction to request the
extradition of General Pinochet from the United Kingdom for alleged
human rights violations committed in Chile.[^49] Although Spain's
extradition request was denied based upon Britain's determination that
the 84-year-old Pinochet was mentally unfit to stand trial, this case
emphasizes the continuing validity of universal jurisdiction.[^50] The
Pinochet case also established the precedent that there is no immunity
for a sitting head of State who commits crimes against humanity.[^51]

The continuing efforts of States to use their domestic courts to
prosecute war criminals and the recent creation of international war
crime tribunals will lead to increasing numbers of indicted war
criminals. However, attempts by domestic or international courts to
prosecute war criminals are often frustrated because there is not an
effective means to obtain custody over alleged war criminals.

States are obligated under the 1949 Geneva Conventions to try
individuals who commit or order grave breaches before their own criminal
courts or to hand over such persons for trial in another State.[^52] The
duty to extradite also exists in Additional Protocol I and the Genocide
Convention.[^53] Additionally, the UN General Assembly has repeatedly
asserted that a State's refusal to cooperate in the arrest, extradition,
trial, and punishment of persons accused of war crimes is contrary to
the UN Charter.[^54] Both the ICTY statute and the ICTR statute require
States to cooperate with the international criminal tribunals by
arresting and extraditing persons accused of war crimes. [^55]

While States are obligated under international law to cooperate with any
efforts to prosecute war criminals, the international community lacks
effective enforcement measures for noncompliance.[^56] The international
community is overly dependent upon each State's willingness to comply
with its obligations under international law. The use of extradition
treaties, military forces, and enforcement sanctions by the United
Nation Security Council have each proven to be an ineffective means of
obtaining custody of an international fugitive.[^57]

If a State is seeking custody of an individual present in another State,
that State may seek extradition of that individual pursuant to an
existing extradition treaty between those two States. However, not every
State chooses to enter into extradition treaties. [^58] Even when there
is an extradition treaty between two States, the treaty may only provide
that extradition is discretionary.[^59] For example, the extradition
treaty between the United States and Mexico does not require either
State to extradite its citizens.[^60] The United States does not
consider its own extradition treaties as creating a *per se* obligation
to extradite. The United States' view is that the State's right to
protect its sovereignty and its right to grant asylum overrides a
State's treaty obligation to extradite.[^61]

Where no treaty exists, a State may seek extradition based upon the
customary international law principles of reciprocity and comity.[^62]
Reciprocity is an exchange of fugitives between States. Under the
principle of reciprocity, a State extradites an individual to a
government requesting extradition in exchange for that government\'s
promise to extradite an individual from their territory.[^63] The
principle of comity is when a State chooses to extradite an individual
as an act of courtesy or good will.[^64]

Extradition requests, whether based upon treaties or customary
international law, are often cumbersome and ineffective. Nations are
often unable or unwilling to arrest and extradite indicted criminals.
The existence of non-cooperative States effectively creates safe havens
for international fugitives.[^65] The best evidence of the failings of
extradition requests is the frequent examples of State abductions and
the tolerance of these abductions by domestic courts. The abduction of
an individual by State agents within the jurisdiction of another State
without its consent violates the sovereignty and territorial integrity
of that State.[^66] Furthermore, a State-sponsored abduction violates
the UN Charter, which prohibits a State from using force against another
State except in self-defense.[^67] Out of frustration, States have
repeatedly resorted to abducting an alleged criminal in violation of
international law as the only available means to obtain custody.[^68]

On May 11, 1960, "Israeli agents abducted Adolf Eichmann, a Nazi war
criminal infamous for his role in Hitler's 'final solution,'" from
Argentina and flew him to Israel.[^69] In February 1963, Argoud, a
leader of a military revolt against President DeGaulle was kidnapped
from Munich, West Germany.[^70] In 1964, Egyptian agents attempted to
kidnap Mordecai Luk, an alleged double agent for Egypt and Israel, by
shipping him in a trunk to Egypt.[^71]

"As a long-standing practice, U.S. law enforcement agents occasionally
engaged in state-sponsored abductions in lieu of extradition as a more
expedient means of arresting fugitive offenders in foreign
jurisdictions."[^72] On June 21, 1989, the United States Department of
Justice expressed its opinion that the President has constitutional
authority to direct the Federal Bureau of Investigation to abduct a
fugitive from a foreign State even if those actions violate
international law.[^73] In 1989, United States military forces abducted
General Manuel Noriega from Panama to face United States drug-dealing
charges.[^74] United States DEA agents offered former Mexican police
officers a \$50,000 reward to abduct Dr. Humberto Alvarez-Machain who
was wanted by United States law enforcement for helping drug lords
torture a DEA agent.[^75] On April 3, 1990, the former Mexican police
officers abducted Dr. Machain and delivered him to the United
States.[^76] On July 15, 1993, in Nigeria, FBI agents abducted Omar
Mohammed Ali Rezaq, a Palestinian who was wanted for killing one
American and injuring another during the hijacking of an Egyptian
airline.[^77]

For the most part, domestic courts have tolerated State-sponsored
abductions by holding that a State's illegal or irregular method in
bringing a defendant to court does not divest the court of its
jurisdiction over the defendant. The United States Supreme Court has
held that a State-sponsored abduction in violation of international law
did not deprive a federal court of criminal jurisdiction over the
abducted individual.[^78] The ICTY has not yet decided whether it will
continue to maintain personal jurisdiction over an abducted
individual.[^79] Despite judicial tolerance of the practice, State
sponsored abductions are not an acceptable solution for obtaining
custody of war criminals. State sponsored abductions violate customary
international law[^80] and undermine world public order by encouraging
the erosion of international law.[^81]

The UNSC could use its enforcement powers to lawfully authorize a
military invasion of a State to forcibly remove an indicted war
criminal.[^82] However, authorizing a large-scale military invasion to
pursue one person seems counter-productive to the UNSC's mission of
maintaining international peace and security since the use of a large
military force to capture a protected fugitive would most likely lead to
an armed conflict. In any event, even if the UNSC authorized a
large-scale military invasion to hunt for a fugitive war criminal, it is
doubtful that such a mission would succeed. [^83] The use of a
large-scale military invasion force is not an efficient enforcement
mechanism to capture war criminals. Military forces are not trained to
hunt for individual fugitives. A single individual is easy to hide, and
a large-scale military invasion might only prompt the fugitive to
relocate to another State.

The UNSC could limit its authorization to the use of small-scale
military forces to capture an indicted war criminal. A small,
clandestine military strike force might be able to successfully capture
a suspected war criminal without provoking an armed conflict since a
small military force could enter a State by stealth as opposed to brute
force. However, it would be extremely difficult for the UNSC to craft
resolutions on an *ad hoc* basis that authorize States to use military
forces to pursue a suspected war criminal but also restrict this grant
of authority to use of only a small-scale strike force.[^84]
Furthermore, any UNSC resolution that called upon all States to
undertake a small-scale military operation to abduct an indicted war
criminal would also provide an advance warning of such an operation to
the fugitive. Accordingly, *ad hoc* resolutions for small-scale military
operations would undermine the element of surprise that would be
essential for the operation\'s success. If the UNSC had its own standing
military force, it could avoid this problem, but at present the UNSC is
ill-equipped to authorize small-scale military operations to abduct
indicted war criminals.

Even when a State's military force is already present in a foreign State
by invitation or pursuant to a UN' mission, military commanders would
still be reluctant to take on the responsibility of hunting war
criminals since the search and apprehension of suspected war criminals
would usually be counter productive to the commander\'s peacekeeping or
peace-enforcement mission. Neutrality is the key to effective
peacekeeping and peace-enforcement. It is hard to be perceived as
neutral when military forces are actively engaged in the pursuit of
alleged war criminals.[^85]

Both the United States and NATO were reluctant to use military forces in
Bosnia to hunt for indicted war criminals in Bosnia.[^86] NATO policy
was to arrest indicted war criminals only if they were encountered in
the course of normal operations.[^87] The Pentagon insisted that the
arrest of suspected war criminals was the responsibility of local law
enforcement or political authorities.[^88] The real reason for the
military's reluctance was that any aggressive effort on their part to
hunt indicted war criminals would jeopardize the negotiated peace.[^89]

The UNSC could employ other enforcement sanctions besides authorizing a
military invasion to compel the extradition of an indicted war criminal.
However, the use of economic and political enforcement sanctions have
proven ineffective at compelling a non-cooperative State to render
custody of an international fugitive. In November 1999, the UNSC imposed
economic sanctions against Afghanistan for harboring Bin Laden after he
was indicted on United States criminal charges for masterminding the
United States 1998 embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania.[^90] The UNSC
ordered all States to freeze Afghanistan government assets and banned
all flights to Afghanistan.[^91] However, to date, the UNSC enforcement
sanctions have not convinced Afghanistan to hand over Bin Laden.[^92]

As the interest in prosecuting war criminals grows so to will the need
for international bounty hunters. Although States are obligated under
international law to cooperate with the prosecution of war criminals,
far too frequently States are unable or unwilling to fulfill their
obligation. The use of extradition treaties, military forces, and
sanctions by the UNSC have often proved to be ineffective tools for
obtaining custody of suspected war criminals. If the international
community is truly interested in prosecuting war crimes, then it needs
to find effective legal alternatives for obtaining custody over
fugitives. Establishing an international police force or authorizing
international bounty hunters could provide the international community
with an effective means to bring war criminals to justice.

**IV. INTERNATIONAL POLICE FORCE AS AN**

**ALTERNATIVE TO BOUNTY HUNTERS**

The UNSC could consider creating a permanent international police force
as opposed to relying on private international bounty hunters. Although
the UN does not have a permanent standing international police force,
the UN frequently creates *ad hoc* international police forces to assist
with particular peace operations. In 1998, approximately 3,000 civilian
police officers were engaged in peace promoting missions throughout the
world.[^93] The capabilities of United Nation civilian police officers
do not go much beyond traditional monitoring, training, or advisory
tasks, however.[^94] United Nation civilian police officers can not
substitute as law enforcement for a failed State.[^95] In a host nation
with a functioning government, UN police officers can not operate
without the cooperation of the host nation's government and law
enforcement officers. The UN sends civilian police officers to rebuild
and reform a host State's police force, not to perform law enforcement.
The *ad hoc* United Nation civilian police forces that have been used in
the past are incapable of capturing indicted war criminals in an
uncooperative State. If the UN wanted an international police force to
apprehend indicted war criminals, it would need to create a permanent
standing police force. Such a force would need to be heavily armed and
be prepared to enter a foreign State with armed force. A permanent
international police force capable of arresting fugitive war criminals
from rogue States might more closely resemble a military force than a
civilian police force.

The creation and management of a permanent international police force
for apprehending war criminals would involve substantially more effort
than the creation of a legal framework to permit the operation of
international bounty hunters. The UN Charter envisioned that the UN
would possess its own standing military force but this has never
occurred.[^96] If, after approximately fifty years, the UN has been
unable to implement its original intent of possessing a standing
military force; it is difficult to envision the creation of a standing
international police force. The cost of maintaining an international
police force would be enormous.[^97] Even if the UN could convince its
member States to fund and man an international police force, it is
questionable whether the UN could effectively manage such a force. Who
would control the day-to-day operations of an international police
force? How many locations throughout the world would an international
police force need to be effective? These issues are beyond the scope of
this article. Even if there were an international police force, the
possibility of having a system of international bounty hunters would
still be viable. Just as domestic bounty hunters thrive in the United
States alongside state law enforcement, they could contribute to the
apprehension of war criminals in the presence of an international police
force.

**V. WHAT MAKES A BOUNTY HUNTER EFFECTIVE?**

Each year in the United States, approximately seven thousand bounty
hunters arrest between 25,000 to 30,000 fugitives.[^98] Bounty hunters
have proven themselves more efficient than law enforcement at ensuring a
defendant\'s presence at trial.[^99] How do domestic bounty hunters
work?

In the United States, in order to be released after arrest, most
defendants hire a bail bondsman to post a bond with the court.[^100] The
State then delivers custody of the defendant to the bail bondsman who
must return the defendant to the court to receive a refund of his
bond.[^101] When the State transfers custody of the defendant to the
bail bondsman, it also transfers powers to search for and arrest the
defendant.[^102] To guarantee a defendant's presence in court, bail
bondsmen hire bounty hunters who are fully vested with the bail
bondsmen's broad powers over the defendant.[^103]

In 1872, the United States Supreme Court held that bounty hunters
possess the same rights of search and arrest as a sheriff over an
escaping prisoner.[^104] Bounty hunters are legally entitled to break
into a suspect\'s home and use whatever force is necessary, including
deadly force, to arrest a fugitive.[^105] Despite these sweeping powers,
domestic bounty hunters are largely unlicensed and unregulated because
they are viewed as private parties to whom constitutional restrictions
do not apply.[^106] Recently, several States have enacted or are
considering enacting laws to regulate domestic bounty hunters.[^107]

A domestic bounty hunter is paid only if he presents the fugitive or his
death certificate to the court.[^108] But financial incentives alone do
not provide bounty hunters the necessary tools to hunt fugitives.
Domestic bounty hunters could not exist without the legal immunity for
the forceful acts necessary to arrest a fugitive. Without this immunity,
domestic bounty hunters would face criminal and civil liability for
their forceful acts in apprehending fugitives.[^109]

Likewise, an efficient system of international bounty hunters could not
exist absent a legal immunity from State domestic laws for the forceful
acts necessary to apprehend an indicted war criminal. A bounty might
encourage someone to provide information concerning the whereabouts of a
war criminal, but in most cases it would not encourage someone to pursue
a war criminal's apprehension. No matter how large the reward, a private
party would be foolish to attempt to arrest a war crimes fugitive when
faced with the risk of criminal convictions for kidnapping and other
offenses under domestic law. The Serbian bounty hunters who kidnapped
Mr. Nikolic were convicted by a Serbian court and sentenced to serve
two-to-six years of imprisonment.[^110] The nine men who captured Mr.
Stevan Todorovic for a bounty were also convicted by a Serbian court in
the town of Uzice and received from one and a half years to eight and a
half years of imprisonment.[^111] An efficient system of international
bounty hunters can not be established without legal immunity for the
forceful acts necessary to apprehend and deliver a war criminal to
trial.

## VI. ESTABLISHING INTERNATIONAL BOUNTY HUNTERS

Generally, sovereign States are free to criminalize conduct that occurs
on their territory. However, in certain specific circumstances, the
international community has chosen to pierce the veil of State
sovereignty in order to immunize an individual from the possibility of
domestic criminal prosecution. For example, representatives to the
principal and subsidiary organs of the UN while exercising their
functions and while traveling to their place of meeting are immune from
arrest, detention, and all kinds of legal process.[^112] Another example
of immunity from domestic law is combatant immunity. During
international armed conflicts, military members are directed to kill,
destroy property, or commit other such acts that would normally be
considered criminal acts. However, if a military member acted in
accordance with the law of war, customary international law provides him
with a blanket of immunity for his pre-capture warlike acts.[^113] How
could worldwide immunity from domestic laws be created for international
bounty hunters?

The United States or any other individual State could not by itself
create worldwide immunity from every State's domestic laws for
international bounty hunters. A group of States could ratify a treaty
that provides international bounty hunters with immunity from domestic
criminal prosecutions. However, while using a treaty to create immunity
for international bounty hunters is theoretically possible, it is
practically nonviable. First, it would be extremely difficult to achieve
a consensus among States on such a novel idea. Second, even if a
consensus could be obtained, any treaty would only bind the signatories
to the treaty. Nonparty States would create safe havens for fugitives
and completely frustrate the efforts of international bounty hunters.
Third, the treaty process takes too long.[^114]

In 1994, the UN chose the treaty process as a means to provide
protection to military members to military forces performing a UN
peacekeeping mission that was authorized under Chapter VI of the UN
Charter.[^115] States that have ratified the Convention on the Safety of
United Nations and Associated Personnel are obligated to criminalize the
murder, kidnapping, or attack upon the person or liberty of any UN or
associated personnel.[^116] After approximately six years, only
thirty-three States have ratified this treaty.[^117] The inability to
achieve a broad international consensus on protecting peacekeepers most
likely contributed to the UNSC's decision to bypass the normal treaty
route when it created the ICTY. The UNSC did not pursue a treaty to
create the ICTY because the treaty process would have taken years, if
not decades, and could have been defeated by opposition from a number of
States.[^118] The best alternative for providing immunity from domestic
laws for international bounty hunters would be an enforcement action by
the UNSC.

Worldwide immunity for international bounty hunters could be created by
a resolution by the UNSC.[^119] Under the UN Charter, the UNSC has
substantial powers to maintain international peace and security. If the
UNSC determines that a threat to international peace exists then it may
use its enforcement authority to eliminate that threat,[^120] even going
so far as to displace domestic law. Article 42 of the UN Charter
authorizes the UNSC to call upon multinational military forces to
restore international peace. Article 41 of the UN Charter permits the
UNSC to impose measures not involving the use of armed force to maintain
international peace. Article 41 further permits the UNSC to enact arms,
air travel, oil embargoes, economic, and financial sanctions.[^121] The
UNSC has also used its Article 41 enforcement authority to attempt to
coerce a non-cooperative State to turn over custody of an international
fugitive. In November 1999, the UNSC imposed economic sanctions against
Afghanistan for harboring Bin Laden who was charged with complicity in
the United States 1998 embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania.[^122] In
this instance, the UNSC determined that a sole criminal fugitive
remaining at large constituted a threat to international peace.
Furthermore, the UNSC has also used its broad enforcement authority
under Article 41 to create the ICTY and ICTR.

In the *Tadic* case, the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY rejected the
defense\'s argument that the UNSC lacked the authority to create an
international criminal tribunal.[^123] The *Tadic* defense argued that
Article 41 only permits the UNSC to impose economic and political
measures.[^124] The Appeals Chamber held that the examples of economic
and political sanctions expressly contained in Article 41 do not exclude
other types of enforcement measures.[^125] Article 41 grants broad
discretion to the UNSC to take any measures not involving the use of
armed force in order to maintain international peace and security.[^126]
Furthermore, the Appeals Chamber declined to review the UNSC\'s
determination that an international criminal tribunal could effectively
meet its objective of restoring the peace.[^127] In conclusion, the UNSC
has very broad discretion in crafting enforcement mechanisms under
Article 41 to promote international peace and security.

Although an international bounty hunter might forcibly abduct an
indicted war criminal with a weapon, the use of an international bounty
hunter should not be considered the use of an "armed force". The "armed
force" contemplated by Article 42 of the UN Charter is the employment of
military forces. The use of international bounty hunters would not
constitute "armed force" under Article 42 because they are not in the
military and they are not State actors. If a State provided substantial
logistical and intelligence assistance to a private bounty hunter, one
could argue that the bounty hunter should be considered the equivalent
of a State actor and the bounty hunter's actions should constitute the
use of an "armed force" under Article 42. Whether the use of an
international bounty hunter would constitute the use of "armed force" as
defined by Article 42 is purely an academic argument. The UNSC can
authorize an enforcement action under either Article 41 or Article 42.
The important issue for this paper is whether the powers of the UNSC are
broad enough to establish international bounty hunters and not whether
the UNSC should cite to Article 41 or Article 42 of the UN Charter when
it establishes such a system.

If the UNSC determined that arresting indicted war criminals would
promote or maintain international peace then the UNSC could implement
enforcement measures to compel their arrest. Prosecuting war criminals
promotes international peace by deterring future war crimes. Punishing
the perpetrators of war crimes also helps eliminate the need for victims
to commit war crimes in revenge. By creating the ICTY and the ICTR, the
UNSC recognized the importance of the prosecution of war criminals for
restoring international peace.[^128] The UNSC could just as easily
determine that the apprehension of indicted war criminals is also
necessary to promote peace since an international criminal tribunal can
not fulfill its intended role in restoring international peace if it is
unable to obtain custody of its indicted war criminals. Accordingly, the
UNSC could use its broad enforcement authority to pass a resolution that
provides international bounty hunters with legal immunity from State
domestic law for the forceful acts necessary to arrest indicted war
criminals. All UNSC resolutions are immediately binding on all members
to the UN; therefore, the UNSC could effectively create a worldwide
immunity from domestic laws for international bounty hunters. [^129]

**VII. WOULD THE FORCEFUL ACTS OF AN INTERNATIONAL BOUNTY HUNTER VIOLATE
THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER?**

Article 2(4) of the UN Charter prohibits a State from using force or
threatening to use force against another State's territory or political
independence. Included in this prohibition is a State's unilateral
decision to kidnap an individual from a foreign State. However, the
abduction of an individual from a foreign State by an international
bounty hunter would not violate Article 2(4) because the international
bounty hunter is a private party. Article 2(4) regulates the conduct of
States not individuals. In any event, even if bounty hunters were
considered to be acting as State agents, the forceful acts committed by
international bounty hunters would still not violate Article 2(4) if
international bounty hunters were acting pursuant to a UNSC resolution.
The UNSC has the authority to authorize uses of force that would
otherwise violate Article 2(4). Articles 41 and 42 of the UN Charter
permit the UNSC to trump the prohibitions of Article 2(4) in the
interests of maintaining international peace. Accordingly, a UNSC
resolution that establishes a legal immunity for international bounty
hunters from domestic laws for the forceful acts necessary to arrest a
war criminal would not violate the U.N. Charter.

**VIII. PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS CONCERNING INTERNATIONAL BOUNTY
HUNTERS**

The UNSC could establish worldwide legal immunity for international
bounty hunters for the forceful acts necessary to arrest indicted war
criminals. However, whose indictments could an international bounty
hunter seek to enforce? Who would be responsible for funding the reward?
Should international bounty hunters be given the absolute right to cross
international borders? Should international bounty hunters be required
to notify local law enforcement before attempting an arrest? Who should
adjudicate criminal and civil claims against bounty hunters for use of
excessive force? Should international bounty hunters be licensed, and if
so, who should be the licensing authority? Where should the
international bounty hunter be required to deliver custody of the
captured fugitive? When should an international bounty hunter be paid?
Can the UNSC realistically expect private parties to capture indicted
war criminals? Each of these issues must be carefully considered by the
UNSC before privatizing the enforcement of justice.

**A. Whose Indictments Could an International**

**Bounty Hunter Seek to Enforce?**

The UNSC must carefully decide which war crime indictments international
bounty hunters could act upon. One legal scholar, Ms. Beverly Izes, has
proposed that the UN formally legitimize State-sponsored abductions of
war criminals by defining an explicit set of circumstances that
prescribe when a State may perpetrate a kidnapping.[^130] Ms. Izes
proposed that the UN create a list of crimes that would justify a
State-sponsored abduction.[^131] Furthermore, before a State attempted
an abduction of a suspected war criminal, there must be a refusal by the
refuge State to extradite the suspect, a refusal to bring the suspect to
trial, or a clear case of where the local trial of a war criminal was a
sham.[^132] This type of proposal would give each State the authority to
issue an indictment that an international bounty hunter could seek to
enforce. However, creating an expansive system that permitted
international bounty hunters to enforce the war crime indictment of any
State or entity would be a grave mistake.

Domestic courts or self-appointed commissions of rogue States could
issue spurious indictments against world leaders for political
purposes.[^133] An expansive authority to issue war crime indictments
could easily lead to the wrongful abductions of heads of State and other
governmental leaders. For these reasons, the authority to issue war
crimes indictments that can be acted upon by international bounty
hunters must be limited to impartial institutions whose sole interest is
the pursuit of justice.

The UNSC could limit the authority to issue an indictment that
international bounty hunters may act upon to the UNSC itself. Because it
would be too burdensome for the UNSC to act upon every potential
indictment, the UNSC should delegate the responsibility to international
criminal tribunals. Probable cause determinations necessary for
indictments are better suited for a judicial body. Initially, it would
be prudent for the UNSC to limit the authority to issue such indictments
to a single international criminal tribunal. The ICTY is an excellent
candidate for such authority.

The ICTY has had difficulty in obtaining indicted individuals, and it
could benefit from the efforts of international bounty hunters.
Furthermore, the ICTY already has a judicial procedure in place for
issuing international arrest warrants. Before issuing an international
arrest warrant, an indicted individual is given the opportunity to
voluntarily come before the court. It is only after an indicted
individual is not arrested that the ICTY issues and transmits an
international arrest warrants to all States.[^134] Accordingly, an
indicted war criminal and States would be provided with a fair
opportunity to transfer custody of the indicted war criminal to the ICTY
before the authority of international bounty hunters were unleashed. If
the use of international bounty hunters with the ICTY proved successful,
the UNSC could expand the authority to use international bounty hunters,
giving it to other international criminal tribunals such as the ICTR or
the ICC.

**B. Who Would be Responsible for Funding the**

**Bounty Hunter's Reward?**

Locating funding for rewards should not be difficult. The UNSC could
simply call upon member States to fund reward money for indicted war
criminals. In 1987, West Germany offered nearly a half-million dollar
reward for the arrest of Josef Schwammberger who was wanted for war
crimes he committed as a Nazi SS captain in charge of two Jewish ghettos
and a work camp.[^135] Germany is offering a reward of 500,000 Deutsche
Marks for information that leading to the arrest of Alois Brunner,
another Nazi war criminal.[^136] The United States Department of State
is offering rewards of up to five million dollars for information that
leads to the capture of any of the fugitive war criminals indicted by
the ICTY.[^137] If the United States is willing to offer money just for
information that leads to the capture of a war criminal then it should
also be willing to offer money for the actual arrest of a war criminal.
States whose citizens were victims of a war crime should also be willing
to fund rewards for capture of the individuals responsible for those
crimes. The UNSC could also solicit funds from private groups interested
in promoting human rights.[^138] Organizations such as Amnesty
International may be willing to spearhead private collection efforts to
raise bounties for war criminals. The more egregious the crimes, the
easier it should be to raise a substantial reward for that criminal's
capture.

C. Should International Bounty Hunters be Given the Absolute Right to
Cross International Borders?

International bounty hunters could not be effective without the freedom
to travel between States. However, the UNSC should not extend an
absolute right to enter foreign States to international bounty hunters
since such a right could be easily abused. Illegal aliens, drug
traffickers, and other international criminals could falsely claim that
they were acting as international bounty hunters when caught entering a
State illegally. International bounty hunters should be expected to
enter States through their own legal and independent means.

After an international bounty hunter has obtained custody of a fugitive
war criminal, the UNSC should provide the international bounty hunter
with the absolute right to cross international borders while en route to
delivering custody of his prisoner. If an international bounty hunter
presents a copy of the indictment and he has custody of the indicted
individual, State officials should be required to let the international
bounty hunter and his prisoner continue to their destination.

D. Should International Bounty Hunters be Required to Notify

Local Law Enforcement Before Attempting an Arrest?

Unlike domestic bounty hunters, international bounty hunters should not
be required to notify local law enforcement. In the United States,
requiring domestic bounty hunters to notify local law enforcement before
attempting an arrest is a reasonable requirement. Local law enforcement
should always be willing and able to assist bounty hunters in bringing a
fugitive to justice. In the international forum, a State might actually
be protecting a war criminal. An indicted war criminal might actually be
running the State and in control of the State's law enforcement.
Accordingly, international bounty hunters should not be required to
notify local enforcement before attempting to arrest a suspected war
criminal.

**E. Who Should Adjudicate Criminal and Civil Claims Against**

**Bounty Hunters for the Use of Excessive Force?**

International bounty hunters will be pursuing individuals who
desperately want to avoid a lengthy prison sentence. Indicted war
criminals who were prominent government officials or senior military
commanders could even be protected by armed bodyguards. Accordingly,
International bounty hunters will often need to use force or threaten
the use of force in order to successfully apprehend an indicted war
criminal.

An international bounty hunter should have the legal right to forcibly
enter an indicted war criminal's home and to use a reasonable amount of
force to arrest that individual. Furthermore, an international bounty
hunter should also be entitled to forcibly enter the home of a third
party when he reasonably believes that an indicted war criminal is
present. International bounty hunters should also be permitted to use
reasonable force against any third parties who attempt to obstruct the
bounty hunter's efforts to apprehend an indicted war criminal. An
international bounty hunter should only be permitted to use deadly force
against an indicted war criminal or a third party in self-defense.
Accordingly, an international bounty hunter could only use deadly force
if he reasonably believed that he was threatened with grievous bodily
harm.

Of course, a prudent bounty hunter will look for any way possible to
capture an indicted war criminal with a minimal amount of force. After
all, a violent confrontation not only threatens the welfare of a
fugitive, it also threatens the welfare of the bounty hunter.
International bounty hunters would also have a financial incentive to
limit their use of force against an indicted war criminal if they could
not collect their reward if the indicted war criminal died during an
attempted arrest. However, the strongest incentive for international
bounty hunters to limit their use of force against both indicted war
criminals and third parties would be the possibility of a criminal or
civil complaint against the bounty hunter for excessive use of force.

Like domestic police officers, the conduct of international bounty
hunters must be reviewable by some judicial body. An international
bounty hunter should have complete criminal and civil immunity from
State domestic law for his use of force during an actual or attempted
arrest of an indicted war criminal since a State that has been harboring
an indicted war criminal can not be trusted to impartially and fairly
adjudicate a criminal or civil complaint against an international bounty
hunter. However, an international bounty hunter's conduct during an
attempted arrest should be reviewed by the same international court who
issued the indictment that the bounty hunter was trying to enforce. This
international court should have sole jurisdiction to adjudicate both
criminal and civil claims against international bounty hunters for use
of excessive force. Furthermore, this international court should use all
or any portion of a bounty hunter's reward to satisfy a criminal fine or
a civil judgment against a bounty hunter.

F. Should International Bounty Hunters be Licensed?

By What Licensing Authority?

Who should be eligible to hunt for war criminals? The UNSC could limit
its grant of legal immunity from domestic law for the forceful acts
necessary to capture a fugitive war criminal to licensed individuals.
Although most jurisdictions within the United States do not require
licenses, the modern trend is to license bounty hunters.[^139] Requiring
a license could insure that all bounty hunters receive some minimal
training. Requiring a license also provides the means to exclude certain
individuals from serving as an international bounty hunter. For example,
ex-convicts could be excluded from acting as international bounty
hunters. The UNSC could ask the UN General Assembly or an international
criminal tribunal to develop the needed criteria to qualify for an
international bounty hunter license and to issue any licenses. Even so,
international bounty hunters should not be licensed.

Requiring all international bounty hunters to obtain a license assumes
that all individuals want to work as a bounty hunter on a recurring
basis. In fact, many individuals who decide to forcefully capture an
indicted war criminal may do so only as the result of a one-time
opportunity rather than a decision to pursue a career as an
international bounty hunter. The best person to apprehend a particular
war criminal might not be the full-time professional bounty hunter but
an acquaintance, friend, business partner, political rival, or estranged
spouse of the war criminal. If licenses were not required, individuals
who have no interest in a career as a professional bounty hunter would
be free to capture fugitive war criminals.

Requiring international bounty hunters to obtain a license before
attempting to apprehend a war criminal would greatly reduce the number
of persons engaged in the hunt. The UNSC or the international community
should not be concerned about the character of the individual who
delivers the custody of a fugitive war criminal, as long as custody is
delivered. The UNSC should be concerned about the possibility of
wrongful arrests of individuals who are unreasonably mistaken for
fugitive war criminals. However, requiring international bounty hunters
to hold licenses does not preclude the possibility of wrongful arrests.
Even highly trained police offices occasionally arrest the wrong
individual. If a bounty hunter wrongfully arrests an individual who is
mistaken for an indicted war criminal then that bounty hunter would be
subject to domestic civil and criminal liability. The possibility of
liability under domestic law should be sufficient by itself to deter
wrongful arrests. Requiring bounty hunters to be licensed would
substantially reduce the number of individuals who could arrest war
criminals while doing little to reduce the risk of wrongful arrests.

Requiring international bounty hunters to obtain licenses might
substantially impede a bounty hunter's efforts to apprehend fugitive war
criminals. It could make it reasonably easy for States to learn the
identities of bounty hunters. A State that opposes the use of
international bounty hunters or one that intentionally harbors a war
criminal could use this information to obstruct a bounty hunter's
efforts. A State could explicitly or surreptitiously deny a bounty
hunter entrance or could keep a fugitive war criminal informed of the
bounty hunter's whereabouts. Of course, a State could not actively
obstruct a particular bounty hunter if the bounty hunter's identity were
unknown.

The potential detriments of requiring licenses for international bounty
hunters outweigh any of the potential benefits. A licensing requirement
for international bounty hunters would greatly reduce the number of
bounty hunters, impose an unnecessary administrative burden, and
potentially offer rogue States a means to obstruct the efforts of bounty
hunters. While a licensing requirement would be an effective means to
ensure that bounty hunters receive some training, it is doubtful that
training would provide any significant benefit by preventing wrongful
arrests since these arrests are already punishable by civil and criminal
domestic law. The best way for the UNSC to avoid wrongful arrests is to
ensure that indictments for war criminals contain sufficient information
to identify a fugitive. Indictments should contain as much identifying
information as possible, such as recent photographs, an accurate
physical description, and a list of any identifying scars or
tattoos.[^140]

**G. Where Should the International Bounty Hunter be Required**

**to Deliver Custody of the Captured Fugitive?**

Ideally, the international bounty hunter should deliver the indicted war
criminal to the court that issued the indictment. In many circumstances
this would involve travel over great distances and through many
different States. It would be more practical if the court could identify
suitable destinations for delivery of the fugitive that were reasonably
close to the anticipated point of capture. What constitutes a suitable
destination for the bounty hunter to transfer custody depends upon the
circumstances of each particular case. Possible delivery locations could
include the embassy of any State that posted reward money for that war
criminal or any location where the military forces of such State were
located. If a State contributed to the reward for the capture of an
indicted war criminal, it would be reasonable to trust that State with
the responsibility of completing delivery of a captured fugitive to the
court. Accordingly, indictments should identify not only the court that
issued the indictment as an acceptable destination for the delivery of
the fugitive but it should also include other reasonable locations as
acceptable destinations.

**H. When Should an International Bounty Hunter be Paid?**

In the United States, domestic bounty hunters are paid upon returning
the defendant or the defendant's death certificate to the court.
Likewise, international bounty hunters should only be paid for the
delivery of an indicted war criminal. Reward money could be released to
the bounty hunter after the court that issued the indictment confirms
the identity of the delivered individual as the person named in the
indictment. International bounty hunters should not be rewarded for
causing an indicted individual's death. Payment of reward money for
causing an indicted individual's death could transform international
bounty hunters into international assassins. It would be far easier to
kill an indicted war criminal than to transport that individual through
a State that has been intentionally harboring him.[^141] Furthermore,
paying international bounty hunters only upon delivery of an indicted
war criminal will help minimize the amount of force that an
international bounty hunter uses to arrest a fugitive since the bounty
hunter would collect nothing if the fugitive dies.

# 

# I. Can the UNSC Realistically Expect Private parties 

# to Capture Indicted War Criminals?

Pursuing a career as an international bounty hunter would require far
more expertise than pursuing one as a domestic bounty hunter. Even with
legal immunity for the forceful acts necessary to arrest a war criminal,
an international bounty hunter would require some knowledge of domestic
law. The professional international bounty hunter might need to become
familiar with a State's privacy laws if he sought government or private
commercial records to help trace a fugitive's whereabouts. A bounty
hunter might need to possess a weapon to coerce the cooperation of an
indicted war criminal. Accordingly, the professional bounty hunter would
also need to be aware of any domestic laws that prohibit or regulate the
possession of firearms or other weapons.

The professional international bounty hunter must also consider the
possibility that a foreign State might use its power to protect an
indicted war criminal. For over twenty-five years, the Syrian government
has openly protected a Nazi war criminal, Alois Brunner, who as the
chief deputy to Adolf Eichmann was responsible for the deaths of more
than 100,000 Jews and some 60,000 others.[^142] In 1987, a privately
sponsored effort to kidnap Brunner from Syria was called off because
Brunner was too closely guarded by Syrian police.[^143]

An indicted war criminal could even be the head of a foreign State. When
an indicted war criminal is controlling a State, the State will probably
disregard the legal immunity granted by the UNSC and criminally
prosecute the bounty hunter for any attempts to arrest the indicted war
criminal. On May 24, 1999, the ICTY indicted the head of Yugoslavia,
President Slobodan Milosevic for war crimes.[^144] Could an
international bounty hunter realistically be expected to abduct a head
of State?

Although varying domestic laws between States make international bounty
hunting a complex business, the substantial rewards offered for indicted
war criminals could reasonably attract a corporate interest. A
corporation with a legal staff and employees with previous military or
police experience could handle the complex issues involved with
international bounty hunting and earn a generous profit.[^145] However,
even a corporation would not pursue all indicted war criminals. A
corporation would realistically assess its chances at success before
expending its resources to pursue any specific war criminal. A
corporation engaged in international bounty hunting might deem it too
high of a risk to pursue a war criminal who was a State leader.

Even if professional bounty hunters shied away from pursuing certain
indicted war criminals, this does not foreclose the possibility of
arrest by an individual who has no interest in pursuing a career as an
international bounty hunter. Arresting an indicted war criminal may not
be a complex matter if the indicted criminal happens to be a neighbor,
relative, spouse, or business partner. Many individuals, out of mere
circumstance, may be in an excellent position to abduct an indicted war
criminal, and might chose to do so if it was lawful and financially
profitable. For example, while a corporate bounty hunter might be unable
to locate and arrest Slobodan Milosevic, a political rival might have
the access and government allies necessary to deliver Milosevic to the
ICTY.

During the summer of 2000, after reading an article about the United
States' five million-dollar bounty for indicted war criminals, five
journalists on vacation in Bosnia spontaneously decided to search for
Radovan Karadzic.[^146] After only a few days of inquiries, they met
with a high-ranking member of the Serb secret police.[^147] The Serb
policeman mistook the journalists for a CIA hit team and offered to
provide them with information on Karadzic's security detail and when and
where Karadzic traveled in exchange for twenty percent of the bounty for
Karadzic's capture and American passports for himself and his
family.[^148] The Serb policeman explained that he had been profiting
from cigarette and liquor smuggling across the Bosnia border but that he
was now "being squeezed" by Karadzic's lieutenants.[^149] He needed to
get Karadzic before Karadzic's men came to get him.[^150] The five
journalists provided all of this information to an American Lieutenant
Colonel at the NATO base in Sarajevo. Although it is unknown when and if
NATO will attempt to act on this prospect for capturing Karadzic,[^151]
this episode illustrates that private bounty hunters can realistically
enlist the help of individuals closely associated with fugitives.

International bounty hunters could also circumvent the power and
authority of an obstructive State by tricking the indicted war criminal
into leaving the State where he or she is protected. If an indicted war
criminal could be lured to a State that would not use its powers to
protect him or her then an arrest could be more easily accomplished. An
indicted war criminal could be lured to a different State by many
different techniques. A Caribbean cruise sweepstakes award or an
invitation to a fictitious job interview could persuade someone to
travel abroad. An international bounty hunter posing as an Internet love
interest could entice an indicted war criminal to a foreign rendezvous.
The possible avenues to entice a fugitive out of a protective State are
only limited by the boundaries of a bounty hunter's imagination.

The abilities of private parties to hunt indicted war criminals should
not be underestimated. The efforts of private citizens at hunting Nazi
war criminals have out-performed the efforts of the world's
governments.[^152] Simon Wiesenthal has been personally responsible for
ferreting out thousands of Nazi war criminals.[^153] Neal Sher, a
director of the Department of Justice's Office of Special
Investigations, the government organization responsible for locating
Nazi war criminals in the United States, has admitted that Simon
Wiesenthal had a better track record at hunting Nazi war criminals than
most governments.[^154]

International bounty hunters would also benefit from the vast expanse of
information available on the Internet. A website devoted to the most
recent sightings of individuals who are indicted by the ICTY already
exists.[^155] Private bounty hunters are already responsible for
capturing two of the war criminals indicted by the ICTY.[^156]
Additionally, States would not be precluded from helping private
international bounty hunters. A State could assist an international
bounty hunter by providing intelligence, equipment, training, and
transportation.

While international bounty hunters may not be able to arrest every
indicted war criminal, the UNSC can reasonably expect international
bounty hunters to capture indicted war criminals given the examples of
domestic bounty hunters, the successful efforts of private parties at
locating Nazi war criminals, and the possibility of State assistance.
Whether motivated by justice, financial gain, or other self-serving
goals, private parties are in an excellent position to contribute
effectively to the apprehension of indicted war criminals if given the
opportunity.

**IX. CONCLUSION**

Increasing the number of available forums to prosecute war criminals
will not serve the interests of justice if the international community
lacks the ability to locate and arrest indicted war criminals. There is
no international police force to hunt and apprehend war criminals.
Extradition treaties, the use of military forces, and UNSC economic
sanctions are often ineffective means for obtaining custody of war
criminals. If the UNSC wishes the ICTY and ICTR to fulfill its intended
role of promoting international peace then the UNSC must find ways to
forcefully bring indicted war criminals to trial.

The UNSC could lawfully authorize a multinational military force to use
all necessary means to apprehend an indicted war criminal. However, the
use of military forces could trigger a widespread-armed conflict.
Furthermore, using military forces, which are engaged in peace-keeping,
to hunt for war criminals would compromise their neutrality and
potentially destabilize a negotiated peace. In many cases, the use of
international bounty hunters to apprehend an indicted war criminal would
be a more effective alternative than the use of military forces.

Private international bounty hunters will obviously not be concerned
about the political ramifications of their actions. Nonetheless, an
international bounty hunter is more likely to capture an indicted war
criminal peacefully than is a military force. An international bounty
hunter can not capture an indicted war criminal by waging a war against
a State's military or police force, but must apprehend an indicted war
criminal by stealth and surprise and with a minimal amount of force.
Further, an international bounty hunter will carefully limit his use of
force against an indicted war criminal because the former will not be
paid if the latter dies. And, an international bounty hunter will
cautiously avoid the use of force against third parties because of
potential civil and criminal liability. The ideal grant of immunity from
State domestic law for international bounty hunters for the forceful
acts necessary to apprehend an indicted war criminal would not be
limitless. A bounty hunter, like a civilian police officer, could still
be held accountable for an excessive or unnecessary use of force.

Authorizing private parties to apprehend indicted war criminals could
provide excellent opportunities for individuals who are personally
acquainted with the war criminal. The best person to capture an indicted
war criminal might be that individual's neighbor, coworker, estranged
spouse, or political rival. These individuals could be capable of
capturing an indicted war criminal with very little force if given a
financial incentive and a lawful authority to act.

The UNSC should pass a resolution that provides international bounty
hunters with immunity from domestic laws for the forceful acts necessary
to arrest an indicted war criminal. The international bounty hunter
should have the same authority to use force as a civilian police officer
pursuing an escaping felon. The UNSC should call upon both States and
private organizations to fund the rewards offered for fugitive war
criminals. To test the effectiveness of international bounty hunters,
the UNSC should permit the ICTY to issue international arrest warrants
that bounty hunters could seek to enforce. These international arrest
warrants should only be issued after States are given a fair opportunity
to surrender custody of the indicted individual to the ICTY. The
international arrest warrants should contain sufficient information to
enable the accurate identification of the indicted individual and
specify all acceptable locations for delivery of the fugitive.
International bounty hunters should have the right to cross
international borders when traveling with the indicted war criminal to a
location designated in the indictment for delivery of the fugitive.
Given the examples of domestic bounty hunters, the successful efforts of
private parties at locating Nazi war criminals, and the possibility of
State assistance, the UNSC can reasonably expect international bounty
hunters to capture indicted war criminals. Even if the establishment of
international bounty hunters does not result in the arrest of every
indicted war criminal, it would still be a significant step in the right
direction.

[^1]: ^\*^ *Major Supernor (B.S., Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute,
    J.D., Florida State University School of Law, LL.M, The Judge
    Advocate General's School, U.S. Army) is a country program manager
    for the Defense Institute of International Legal Studies, Newport
    Naval Station, Rhode Island.*

[^2]: "The weakest link in all of international law is the lack of
    effective enforcement mechanisms." Bartram S. Brown, *Primacy or
    Complementarity: Reconciling the Jurisdiction of National Courts and
    International Criminal Tribunals*, 23 [Yale J. Int'l L.]{.smallcaps}
    383, 408 (Summer 1998). International criminal law is weakened by a
    lack of enforceability[. Farhad Malekian, The Monopolization of
    International Criminal Law]{.smallcaps} 56 (1995). International
    criminal law provides only a mirage of justice since international
    tribunals lack any coercive power to bring an accused before the
    court. Mary Margaret Penrose, *Lest We Fail: The Importance of
    Enforcement in International Criminal Law*, 15 [Am. U. Int\'l L.
    Rev.]{.smallcaps} 321, 364-65 (2000). International criminal law has
    failed and it will continue to fail without a means of enforcement.
    *Id*. at 393.

[^3]: The ICTY indicted 98 individuals. *International Criminal Tribunal
    for the Former Yugoslavia: Key Figures*, *available at*
    http://www.un.org/icty/glance/keyfig-e.htm (last modified Mar. 1,
    2001) (copy on file with the *Air Force Law Review*). Nine of the
    indicted individuals have died and charges have been dropped against
    18 others. *Id.* Proceedings are ongoing for 38 of the indicted
    individuals. *Id.* Twenty-seven of the indicted individuals remain
    at large. The three principal architects of the Bosnian genocide,
    ex-Yugoslavian President Slobodan Milosevic, Dr. Radovan Karadzic,
    and General Ratko Mladic, are among the most notable fugitives in
    Yugoslavia. Radovan Karadzic, an indictee of the ICTY who is charged
    with responsibility for killing up to 6,000 Muslims at Srebrenica in
    1995, lives in a closely guarded stronghold outside Pale in the Serb
    Republic. Brian James, *Out of Sight, But Not Out of Mind; Night &
    Day*, [Mail on Sunday]{.smallcaps} (London), Aug. 10, 1997, at 10.
    Mr. Richard Holbrooke, the United States Ambassador to the United
    Nations, explained that "NATO troops have been reluctant to arrest
    Karadzic, who travels with 20 to 80 bodyguards." David J. Lynch,
    *Bosnian Serb Leader Faces Capture as his Power Fades*, [USA
    Today]{.smallcaps}, Nov. 8, 2000, at 22 A. For several years, the
    residence of another indictee, General Ratko Mladic, the former
    commander of the Bosnian Serbs, "the Butcher of the Balkans", was
    also a matter of public knowledge. James, *supra*, at 10. On Mar.
    25, 2000, Mladic attended a soccer match in Belgrade with an escort
    of bodyguards, the Yugoslavian foreign minister, army chief of
    staff, and the Serbian Prime Minister. *War Criminal Watch,*
    [Coalition for International Justice,]{.smallcaps}
    http://www.wcw.org (last visited Mar. 9, 2001) (copy on file with
    the *Air Force Law Review*). Only recently has General Mladic gone
    into hiding. *After Years in Open, War-Crimes Suspect Drops out of
    Sight*, [Chicago Tribune]{.smallcaps}, Feb. 22, 2001, News, at 20.

[^4]: *Kosovo War Criminals May Go Free*[, Human Rights
    Watch]{.smallcaps},
    http://www.hrw.org/hrw/press/1999/feb/kos0209.htm (Feb. 9, 1999)
    (copy on file with the *Air Force Law Review*); [Yves
    Beigbeder]{.smallcaps}, [Judging War Criminals: The Politics of
    International Justice]{.smallcaps} 201 (1999); Brown, *supra* note
    Error: Reference source not found, at 414. ("Most of the indictees
    still at large are apparently living free in the areas where the
    local authorities have failed to comply with their legal obligation
    to arrest those indicted.").

[^5]: David Buchan, *Downfall of Milosevic*, [The Financial
    Times]{.smallcaps} [(London)]{.smallcaps}, Oct. 7, 2000, World News,
    at 6. Western governments continue to pressure Yugoslavia's new
    government to fully cooperate with the ICTY. On Oct. 25, 2000, the
    United States Congress approved a \$100 million aid package to
    Serbia but conditioned the aid on the new Yugoslav government's
    cooperation on arresting and transferring those indicted by the ICTY
    for war crimes. Steven A. Holmes, *\$100 Million Voted for Serbia,
    But with War-Crimes Strings*, [N.Y. Times]{.smallcaps}, Oct. 26,
    2000, at A13. Recently, Yugoslavia stated its intent to try Slobodan
    Milosevic in Yugoslavia for abuse of power and theft of national
    property rather than turn Milosevic to the ICTY to face war crime
    charges. Alan Sipress, *Yugoslavia Vows Milosevic's Arrest This
    Month,* [Wash. Post]{.smallcaps}, Mar. 7, 2001, at 24.

[^6]: *See* Diane F. Orentlicher, *A Look at . . . War Crimes and
    Punishment*, [Wash. Post]{.smallcaps}, Nov. 26, 2000, Outlook, at
    B3.

[^7]: Terence Neilan, *World Briefing: United Nations: Council
    Criticized on War Crimes*, [N.Y. Times,]{.smallcaps} Nov. 4, 1999,
    at A6. Although States are bound to follow orders from the ICTY, the
    Appeals Chamber of the ICTY has held that the ICTY is not vested
    with any authority to issue sanctions against a recalcitrant State.
    Prosecutor v. Blaskic, No. IT-95-14-AR108 bis, para. 33 (I.C.T.Y.
    Oct. 29, 1997) (judgment on request for review of trial decision of
    July 18, 1997), *available at* www.un.org/icty. The UNSC is the only
    international organ that can enforce the authority of an
    international tribunal. However, the UNSC has not taken any
    affirmative action in response to Yugoslavia's and the Bosnian-Serb
    Republika Srpska's refusal to render its citizens to the ICTY.
    Brown, *supra* note Error: Reference source not found, at 410.

[^8]: *See infra* note Error: Reference source not found and
    accompanying text.

[^9]: This paper focuses on the feasibility of using international
    bounty hunters to apprehend war criminals. International bounty
    hunters could also be used to pursue individuals whose crimes did
    not occur in the context of an armed conflict. International bounty
    hunters could also be tasked with the responsibility to pursue
    individuals wanted for piracy, terrorism, drug trafficking, or
    violations of human rights. For example, international bounty
    hunters might prove useful to capture Osama Bin Laden. *See Infra*
    note Error: Reference source not found and accompanying text.
    However, before advocating such an expansive role for international
    bounty hunters, one must recognize that the use of international
    bounty hunters is an erosion of state sovereignty by the
    international community. Nations jealously guard their rights as a
    sovereign. The author believes that any curtailment of sovereign
    rights to permit the use of international bounty hunters must be
    approached cautiously and in a narrowly defined context. The
    effectiveness of international bounty hunters should first be
    verified before establishing an expansive use of international
    bounty hunters. To test the effectiveness of international bounty
    hunters, the UNSC should permit the ICTY to issue international
    arrest warrants that bounty hunters could seek to enforce. *See
    Infra* pp. 35-37. Only if the use of international bounty hunters
    proves itself in this narrowly defined context should a more
    expansive use of international bounty hunters be explored.

[^10]: Zeljko Cvijanovic & Vesna Peric Zimonjic, *Belgrade Crackdown:
    "Bounty Hunters Strike Inside Serbia to Seize War Crimes Suspects,"*
    [The Independent (London)]{.smallcaps}, May 18, 2000, at 14.

[^11]: *Id.* Two men posing as police officers forced Mr. Nikolic into
    the trunk of a car where he was driven to the border of Bosnia.
    *Id.* After crossing the Drina river by boat, Mr. Nikolic was handed
    over to American soldiers. *Id.*

[^12]: *Id.* Mr. Stevan Todorovic, another indicted war criminal who was
    captured by bounty hunters has also asked the court to dismiss his
    case because of the illegality of his arrest. *See* Maggie O'Kane,
    *Tougher Rules for Arrest of Suspects*, [The Guardian
    (London)]{.smallcaps}, Oct. 20, 2000, Foreign Pages, at 18. On Oct.
    20, 2000, judges at the ICTY ordered NATO to reveal details of Mr.
    Todorovic's apprehension. *Id.* On Nov. 20, 2000, Canada, Denmark,
    Germany, Italy, Netherlands, NATO, Norway, United Kingdom, and the
    United States appealed the decision of the trial chamber.
    *ICTY--Status of Cases as of 11 April 2001*,
    http://www.un.org/itcy/glance/casestatus.htm (Todorovic Case) (copy
    on file with the *Air Force Law Review*). However, before this
    appeal was decided, Todorovic negotiated a plea agreement whereby he
    would plead guilty to count one of his 27 count indictment and he
    would withdraw all pending motions related to the circumstances of
    his arrest. *Id.* The prosecution withdraw the remaining 26 counts
    and will recommend to the court that Todorovic be sentenced to not
    less than five years of imprisonment and not more than 12 years of
    imprisonment. *Id.* Count one of Todorovic's indictment accuses him
    of committing a crime against humanity by persecuting individuals on
    political, racial, and religious grounds. *Id.* NATO and its member
    states may have pressured the prosecution to obtain a plea agreement
    with Todorovic to avoid having to disclose the details of
    Todorovic's capture by bounty hunters.

[^13]: Cvijanovic & Zimonjic, *supra* note Error: Reference source not
    found. On Nov. 24, 2000, a Serbian court in Smederevo sentenced
    seven of these persons to serve between two-to-six years of
    imprisonment for abducting Nikolic. *Seven Charged with Abducting
    War Crimes Go on Trial*, [Agence France Presse]{.smallcaps}, Dec. 5,
    2000, at International News.

[^14]: Cvijanovic & Zimonjic, *supra* note Error: Reference source not
    found. Thirty-one thousand British pounds is about forty-five
    thousand U.S. dollars.

[^15]: Customary international law results when States observe a
    constant practice out of a sense of legal obligation.
    [Restatement]{.smallcaps} ([Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of
    the United States]{.smallcaps}, § 102 (1987). Article 38(1) of the
    Statute of the International Court of Justice defines customary
    international law as the general practice of States accepted as law.
    [Stat. of the Int'l Ct. of J.]{.smallcaps}, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat.
    1031 (entered into force Oct. 24, 1945).

[^16]: "Every violation of the law of war is a war crime." [U.S. Dep't
    of Army, Field Manual]{.smallcaps} [27-10, The Law of Land
    Warfare]{.smallcaps} (1956) para. 499 \[hereinafter AR 27-10\].
    However, some international law scholars contend that technical
    violations of the law of war do not constitute war crimes. *See*
    Yoram Dinstein, *The Universality Principle and War Crimes*, *in* 71
    [International Law Studies, The Law of Armed Conflict: Into the Next
    Millennium]{.smallcaps}, 17, 21 (Michael Schmitt & Leslie Green,
    eds., 1998). Professor Dinstein believes that only serious
    violations of the law of war such as the grave breaches of the
    Geneva Conventions constitute war crimes. *Id*.

[^17]: Harold Wayne Elliott[,]{.smallcaps} The Trial and Punishment of
    War Criminals: Neglected Tools in "New World Order?" 82 (1998)
    (unpublished Doctor of Juridical Science dissertation) (on file with
    the University of Virginia Law Library).

[^18]: There were four Geneva Conventions of 1949: The Geneva Convention
    for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in
    Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S.
    31 \[hereinafter GWS\]; The Geneva Convention for the Amelioration
    of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of the
    Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85
    \[hereinafter GWS at Sea\]; The Geneva Convention Relative to the
    Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75
    U.N.S.T. 135 \[hereinafter GPW\]; The Geneva Convention Relative to
    the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6
    U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.S.T. 287 \[hereinafter GC\].

[^19]: *See* GWS, *supra* note Error: Reference source not found, art.
    49, 50; GWS at Sea, *supra* note Error: Reference source not found,
    art. 50, 51; GPW, *supra* note Error: Reference source not found,
    art. 129-30; GC, *supra* note Error: Reference source not found,
    art. 146[.]{.smallcaps}

[^20]: Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August
    1949, and Relating to the Victims of International Conflicts, Dec.
    12, 1977, 11 U.N.T.S. 3, 16 I.L.M. 1391 \[hereinafter Protocol I\];
    Protocol II Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949,
    and Relating to the Victims of Non-International Conflicts, Dec. 12,
    1977, 11 U.N.T.S. 3, 16 I.L.M. 1442.

[^21]: *See* GWS, *supra* note Error: Reference source not found, art.
    3; GWS at Sea, *supra* note Error: Reference source not found, art.
    3; GPW, *supra* note Error: Reference source not found, art. 3; GC,
    *supra* note Error: Reference source not found, art.
    3[.]{.smallcaps}

[^22]: Of the thirteen 1907 Hague Conventions, the most important for
    land operations is the forth. Hague Convention IV Respecting the
    Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277
    \[hereinafter Hague Convention No. IV\].

[^23]: *See, e.g.,* [Beigbeder]{.smallcaps}, *supra* note Error:
    Reference source not found, at 9.

[^24]: Hague Convention No. IV, *supra* note Error: Reference source not
    found, at art. 23.

[^25]: Hague Convention No. IV, *supra* note Error: Reference source not
    found, at art. 27.

[^26]: Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
    Genocide, Dec. 11, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 \[hereinafter Genocide
    Convention\].

[^27]: [Beigbeder]{.smallcaps}, *supra* note Error: Reference source not
    found, at 12-13; Major Marsha Mills, *War Crimes in the 21st
    Century*, 3 [Hofstra L. & Pol'y Symp.]{.smallcaps} 47, 60-61 (1999).

[^28]: Genocide Convention, *supra* note Error: Reference source not
    found, art. II.

[^29]: *See, e.g.,* Mills, *supra* note Error: Reference source not
    found, at 50.

[^30]: The sources of international law briefly discussed in this
    article are not the only available sources that establish war
    crimes. Other international treaties could also establish individual
    criminal responsibility for wrongful acts committed during an armed
    conflict. *See* Convention on the Prohibition of the Development,
    Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their
    Destruction, Jan. 13, 1993, [S. Treaty Doc. No. 21]{.smallcaps},
    103d Cong. (1993), *reprinted in* 32 [I.L.M.]{.smallcaps} 800 (1993)
    (entered into force Apr. 29, 1997). The Nuremberg Charter
    established criminal liability for waging a war of aggression
    (crimes against peace), for violations of the laws and customs of
    war, and for major inhumane acts committed against a civilian
    population before or during an armed conflict (crimes against
    humanity). Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major
    War Criminals of the European Axis, Annex containing the Charter of
    the International Military Tribunal, art. 6, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat.
    154, 82 U.N.T.S. 279. This article provides the most commonly relied
    upon international law source that establishes war crimes.

[^31]: AR 27-10, *supra* note Error: Reference source not found, para.
    501; Major Michael L. Smidt, *Yamashita, Medina, and Beyond: Command
    Responsibility in Contemporary Military Operations*, 164 [Mil L.
    Rev]{.smallcaps}. 155 (June 2000); Ilias Bantekas, *The Contemporary
    Law of Superior Responsibility*, 93 [Am. J. Int'l L.]{.smallcaps}
    573 (July 1999); William H. Parks, *Command Responsibility for War
    Crimes*, 62 [Mil L. Rev.]{.smallcaps} 1 (1973); Matthew Lippman,
    *Conundrums of Armed Conflict: Criminal Defenses to Violations of
    the Humanitarian Law of War*, 15 [Dick. J. Int\'l L.]{.smallcaps} 1,
    71-79 (Fall 1996) (discussing the command responsibility doctrine
    utilized in the trial of General Yamashita); Trial of General
    Tomoyuki Yamashita (U.S. Milit. Comm\'n, Manila, Oct. 8-Dec. 7,
    1945), [IV Law Rep. Trials War Crim]{.smallcaps}. 1, 4 (U.N. War
    Crimes Comm\'n 1948). Protocol I imposes criminal liability upon a
    superior when he knew or should have known that his subordinates
    were committing war crimes and he failed to take all feasible
    measures within his power to prevent it. Protocol I, *supra* note
    Error: Reference source not found, art 86.

[^32]: Statute of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,
    adopted at New York, May 25, 1993, S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th
    Sess., 3217th mtg., at 1-2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993), *reprinted
    in* 32 I.L.M. 1159 \[hereinafter ICTY Statute\]; Statute of the
    International Tribunal for Rwanda, adopted at New York, Nov. 8,
    1994, S.C. Res. 955, U.N.SCOR, 49^th^ Sess., 3453d mtg., U.N. Doc.
    S/RES/955 (1994), *reprinted in* 33 I.L.M. 1598 \[hereinafter ICTR
    Statute\].

[^33]: [Beigbeder]{.smallcaps}, *supra* note Error: Reference source not
    found, at 152.

[^34]: *Id.*

[^35]: *Id*. at 175. The differences between the statutes for the ICTY
    and ICTR can be accounted for by the differences between the armed
    conflict in Yugoslavia and Rwanda. The conflict in Yugoslavia had
    both an internal and international aspect but the conflict in Rwanda
    was strictly internal. *Id*. at 174-75.

[^36]: *Id*. at 175.

[^37]: *See id*.

[^38]: U.N. Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the
    Establishment of an International Criminal Court, Rome Statute on
    the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, U.N. Doc.
    A/CONF/189/9, *reprinted in* 37 I.L.M. 999 (1998) \[hereinafter ICC
    Statute\].

[^39]: *Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: Ratification
    Status*, http://www.un.org/law/icc/statute/status.htm (last modified
    Feb. 12, 2001). One hundred and twenty-nine nations have signed and
    twenty-five nations have ratified the court's statute. *Id*. On June
    9, 2000, France, a permanent member of the United Nations Security
    Council, ratified the court's statute. *Id.*

[^40]: ICC Statute, *supra* note Error: Reference source not found.
    Although, the ICC will not exercise jurisdiction over the crime of
    aggression until a provision defining this crime is adopted. Under
    articles 5, 12, and 123, this provision could not be adopted until
    seven years after the ICC statute has taken effect. *Id.*

[^41]: Carlotta Gall, *U.N. Mission in Kosovo proposes to Set Up a War
    Crimes Court*, [N.Y. Times]{.smallcaps}, June 23, 2000, at A3.
    United Nations Press Release, SC/6910, *Council Asks
    Secretary-General, Sierra Leone to Negotiate Agreement for Creation
    of Independent Special Court*, Aug. 14, 2000, *available at*
    www.un.org (copy on file with the *Air Force Law Review*); United
    Nations Press Release, SG/SM/7481, *United Nations Legal Counsel
    Completes Formal Discussions with Cambodian Government on
    Establishment of Tribunal to Try Former Khmer Rouge Leaders*, Jul.
    6, 2000, *available at*
    http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2000/20000706.sgsm7481.doc.html,
    (copy on file with the *Air Force Law Review*).

[^42]: *See Infra* notes Error: Reference source not found and Error:
    Reference source not found and accompanying text.

[^43]: [M. Cherif Bassiouni]{.smallcaps}, [International Extradition:
    United States Law and Practice]{.smallcaps} 356-60 (3d ed. 1996).
    Universal jurisdiction under customary international law permits
    States to enact legislation that grants its domestic criminal courts
    jurisdiction to prosecute war criminals. [Beigbeder]{.smallcaps},
    *supra* note Error: Reference source not found, at 133. Universal
    jurisdiction permits a State to prosecute a war criminal
    irrespective of the war criminal\'s nationality or place of the
    commission of the offense, or of any link between the prosecuting
    State and the war criminal. [M. Cherif Bassiouni, Crimes Against
    Humanity in International Criminal Law]{.smallcaps} 511-13 (1992).
    The rationale for universal jurisdiction is that there are certain
    offenses, which by their very nature, affect the interests of all
    States. *Id*. at 512-13.

    United States federal courts have recognized universal jurisdiction
    over war crimes. Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d 571, 583 (6th Cir.
    1985), *cert. denied*, 475 U.S. 1016 (1986). The American Law
    Institute\'s Restatement also states that war crimes are subject to
    universal jurisdiction. [Restatement (Third) of the Foreign
    Relations Law of the United States]{.smallcaps}, § 404 (1987). In
    1996, a Spanish judge ruled that crimes against humanity enjoy
    universal jurisdiction and started a criminal investigation into the
    torture and murder of Spanish citizens in Argentina.
    [Beigbeder]{.smallcaps}, *supra* note Error: Reference source not
    found, at 133. In 1997, a German court utilized the doctrine of
    universal jurisdiction to convict a Bosnian Serb for taking part in
    a massacre of 14 Muslims in Bosnia. *Id*. at 134. However, French
    courts have declined to accept universal jurisdiction in a number of
    cases. *Id*.

[^44]: Mills, *supra* note Error: Reference source not found, at 48 &
    n.6.

[^45]: *See* GWS, *supra* note Error: Reference source not found, art.
    49; GWS at Sea, *supra* note Error: Reference source not found, art.
    50; GPW, *supra* note Error: Reference source not found, art. 129;
    GC, *supra* note Error: Reference source not found, art. 146;
    [Beigbeder]{.smallcaps}, *supra* note Error: Reference source not
    found, at 8.

[^46]: UCMJ art. 18.

[^47]: UCMJ art. 21.

[^48]: War Crimes Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C.A. § 2441(a) (1996).

[^49]: *The Case of General Pinochet: Universal Jurisdiction and the
    Absence of Immunity for Crimes Against Humanity*, [Amnesty
    International On-Line,]{.smallcaps}
    http://www.web.amnesty.org/ai.nsf/index/EUR450211998 (visited Mar.
    9, 2001) (Amnesty International\'s Spanish language 1998 third party
    position paper on General Pinochet\'s extradition case before the
    English House of Lords).

[^50]: *See* Charles Trueheart, *Rights Activists Cheer Pinochet
    Precedent*, [Wash. Post]{.smallcaps}, Jan. 14, 2000, at A22.

[^51]: *Id*.

[^52]: *See* GWS, *supra* note Error: Reference source not found, art.
    49; GWS at Sea, *supra* note Error: Reference source not found, art.
    50; GPW, *supra* note Error: Reference source not found, art. 129;
    GC, *supra* note Error: Reference source not found, art. 146;
    [Beigbeder]{.smallcaps}, *supra* note Error: Reference source not
    found, at 8.

[^53]: Protocol I, *supra* note Error: Reference source not found, art.
    88; Genocide Convention, *supra* note Error: Reference source not
    found, art. VII. Professor Bassiouni has compiled an extensive list
    of international criminal law conventions that establish a duty to
    extradite. [M. Cherif Bassiouni, Crimes Against Humanity in
    International Criminal Law]{.smallcaps} 788-800 (1992).

[^54]: *Principles of International Co-operation in the Detention,
    Arrest, Extradition and Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes
    and Crimes Against Humanity*, G.A. Res. 3074 (XXVIII), 28 U.N. GAOR
    Supp. (No. 30) at 78, U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1973); G.A. Res. 2840 (XXVI)
    26 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 29), at 88, U.N. Doc. A/8429 (1971); G.A.
    Res. 95(I), 1 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 2) at 188, U.N. Doc. A/64/Add. 1
    (1947); *Extradition and Punishment of War Criminals*, G.A. Res. 3,
    1 U.N. G.AOR at 9-10, U.N. Doc. A/OR/1-1/R (1946).

[^55]: ICTY Statute, *supra* note Error: Reference source not found,
    art. 29; ICTR Statute, *supra* note Error: Reference source not
    found, art. 28.

[^56]: The efforts of the ICTY have been severely stagnated by its
    inability to coerce individual states to secure the arrest and
    detention of high-profile defendants. Penrose, *supra* note Error:
    Reference source not found, at 353.

[^57]: *See infra* notes Error: Reference source not found through
    Error: Reference source not found and accompanying text.

[^58]: During the time that there were 185 member States to the United
    Nations, the United States had only entered into approximately 100
    separate extradition treaties. [M. Cherif Bassiouni]{.smallcaps},
    [International Extradition: United States Law and Practice 16-17
    (3]{.smallcaps}d ed. 1996).

[^59]: Most extradition treaties permit one or both States discretion to
    refuse extradition. Brigette Belton Homrig, *Abduction as an
    Alternative to Extradition: A Dangerous Method to Obtain
    Jurisdiction over Criminal Defendants*, 28 [Wake Forest L.
    Rev.]{.smallcaps} 671, 676 (1993).

[^60]: Extradition Treaty Between the United States of America and the
    Mexican States, May 4, 1978, U.S.-Mex., 31 U.S.T. 5059.

[^61]: [Bassiouni]{.smallcaps}, *supra* note Error: Reference source not
    found, at [108]{.smallcaps}. The United States Secretary of State
    may exercise executive discretion to override a duty to extradite
    under treaty obligations. *Id*.

[^62]: *Id.* at [5-7]{.smallcaps}; Argiro Kosmetatos, *U.S.-Mexican
    Extradition Policy: Were the Predictions Right About Alvarez?*, 22
    [Fordham Int\'l L.J]{.smallcaps}. 1064, 1068 (March 1999).

    Suspected war criminals have been extradited despite the absence of
    an extradition treaty. On Dec. 11, 1974, the Supreme Court of
    Bolivia denied France's request to extradite, Klaus Barbie, a Nazi
    war criminal known as the "The Lyons butcher," on the basis that
    there was no extradition treaty between France and Bolivia.
    Jean-Olivier Viout, *The Klaus Barbie Trial and Crimes Against
    Humanity*, 3 [Hofstra L. & Pol'y Symp]{.smallcaps}. 155, 156-57
    (1999). However, as a result of a change in the Bolivian government,
    on Feb. 6, 1986, Barbie was summarily expelled from Bolivia and
    flown to the French territory of Guyana where he was arrested by
    French authorities. *Id*. at 161-62. The French courts disregarded
    Barbie's contention that he should be released because his custody
    was obtained by an illegal extradition. *Id*.

    In March 2000, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright authorized the
    extradition of Pastor Ntakirutima, a Rwandan genocide suspect, to
    the ICTR despite the absence of an extradition treaty with Rwanda.
    *See* Betsy Pisik, *Rwanda Tribunal Victory*, [Wash.
    Times]{.smallcaps}, Mar. 6, 2000, at A12. Although the United States
    does not have an extradition treaty with Rwanda, in 1995, President
    Clinton entered into an executive agreement with the ICTR, which
    promised that the United States would agree to surrender persons in
    its territory that were charged or convicted by the tribunal.
    Agreement on Surrender of Persons Between the Government of the
    United States and the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of
    Persons Responsible for Genocide and other Serious Violations of
    International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda
    and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide and Other Such
    Violations Committed in the Territory of Neighboring States, Jan.
    24, 1995, U.S.-ICTR, 1996 WL 165484; Ntakirutima v. Reno, 184 F.3d
    419, 422 (5th Cir. 1999), *cert. denied*, 120 S. Ct. 977 (2000). To
    implement this executive agreement, in 1996, Congress enacted
    legislation that provided that federal extradition statutes apply to
    the surrender of persons to the ICTR. National Defense Authorization
    Act, Pub. L. 104-106, § 1342, 110 Stat. 486 (1996). The United
    States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit rejected
    Ntakirutima\'s arguments that the Constitution of the United States
    requires that an extradition must occur pursuant to a treaty.
    Ntakirutima, 184 F.3d at 424-27. A majority of the Court held that
    either a federal statute or a treaty may confer the power to
    extradite. *Id*.

[^63]: Kosmetatos, *supra* note Error: Reference source not found, at
    1069 n.26.

[^64]: *Id*. at 1069 n.27.

[^65]: According to estimates of Nazi hunters from the Anti-Defamation
    League and the World Jewish Congress, between as many as 40,000 and
    50,000 Nazis sought refuge in Latin America after World War II.
    [Charles Ashman & Robert J. Wagman, The Nazi Hunters]{.smallcaps}
    303 (1988).

[^66]: [Bassiouni]{.smallcaps}, *supra* note Error: Reference source not
    found, at [219.]{.smallcaps} State abduction violates the domestic
    law where the abduction occurs and international law. I. [A.
    Shearer, Extradition in International Law]{.smallcaps} 72 (1971).

[^67]: [U.N. Charter]{.smallcaps} art. 2, para. 4. The United Nations
    Security Council ordered Isreal to make reparations to Argentia for
    abducting a Nazi war criminal, Eichmann, from Buenos Aires. U.N.
    SCOR, 15th Sess., 868th mtg. at 4, U.N. Doc. S/4349 (1960).

[^68]: Despite the widespread existence of extradition treaties,
    international abduction has "occurred fairly consistently worldwide
    throughout the last 160 years." Jonathan A. Gluck, *The Customary
    International Law of State-Sponsored International Abduction and
    United States Courts*, 44 [Duke L.J.]{.smallcaps} 612, 613 (Dec.
    1994).

[^69]: Homrig, *supra* note Error: Reference source not found, at 698.
    Israel also allegedly considered kidnapping Alois Brunner, another
    Nazi war criminal, from Syria but ruled against it because political
    matters in that part of the world made it impractical to risk the
    negative reaction of another Eichmann-type of raid. [Ashman &
    Wagman]{.smallcaps}, *supra* note Error: Reference source not found,
    at 27.

[^70]: [Bassiouni]{.smallcaps}, *supra* note Error: Reference source not
    found, at [220]{.smallcaps} n.9.

[^71]: *Id.* at [221]{.smallcaps} n.11.

[^72]: Kosmetatos, *supra* note Error: Reference source not found, at
    1064. In recent years, United States authorities have engaged in
    dozens of kidnappings of foreign suspects wanted for drug-related
    offenses. Stephen J. Hedges, et al., *Kidnapping Drug Lords*, [U.S.
    News & World Rep.]{.smallcaps}, May 14, 1990, at 28 ("Kidnapping is
    an attractive law-enforcement tool because it avoids lengthy
    extraditions and official corruption that can shield and even free
    suspects.").

[^73]: Gluck, *supra* note Error: Reference source not found, at 652
    n.218 (citing an internal memorandum from the U.S. Department of
    Justice); Jeanne M. Woods, *Presidential Legislating in the
    Post-Cold War Era: A Critique of the Barr Opinion on
    Extraterritorial Arrests*, 14 [B.U. Int'l L.J]{.smallcaps}. 1 (1996)
    (criticizing the Department of Justice opinion).

[^74]: Homrig, *supra* note Error: Reference source not found, at
    677-78; United States v. Noriega, 746 F. Supp. 1506, 1511 (1990)
    (describing the circumstances surrounding Noriega\'s abduction).

[^75]: Homrig, *supra* note Error: Reference source not found, at 685.

[^76]: Homrig, *supra* note Error: Reference source not found, at 685.

[^77]: Kristin Berdan Weissman, *Extraterritorial Abduction: The
    Endangerment of Future Peace*, 27 [U.C. Davis L. Rev.]{.smallcaps}
    460 (Winter 1994).

[^78]: United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992); Ker v.
    Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886); [Bassiouni]{.smallcaps}, *supra* note
    Error: Reference source not found, at [228]{.smallcaps} (United
    States courts traditionally uphold personal jurisdiction over a
    criminal defendant that was secured by illegal methods, including
    abduction by government agents.).

[^79]: *See* *supra* note Error: Reference source not found, and
    accompanying text.

[^80]: The United States Supreme Court has determined that customary
    international law is binding on the United States when there is no
    controlling treaty, executive or legislative act, or judicial
    decision. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 577 (1900).

[^81]: [Bassiouni]{.smallcaps}, *supra* note Error: Reference source not
    found, at [219]{.smallcaps}.

[^82]: [U.N. Charter]{.smallcaps} art. 42.

[^83]: Between June 1993 and 1994, in Somali, United States military
    forces and other UN military forces were unable despite their best
    efforts to capture General Mohammed Farah Aideed, a Somali warlord.
    Moyiga Nduru*, Aideed's supporters vow to fight on: Death of Somali
    Warlord Could Trigger War*, 715 [Ethnic News Watch]{.smallcaps} 12
    (1996). The United States, with other UN peacekeeping forces, went
    into Somalia in December 1992 for humanitarian reasons. *General
    Aideed Obituary*, [The Economist]{.smallcaps}, Aug. 10, 1996, Arts,
    Books and Sport, at 69. In June 1993, General Aideed's men killed 24
    Pakistanis peacekeepers that were trying to close down a Somali
    radio station. *Id*. This incident prompted the US-led peacekeepers
    to focus their energies on capturing General Aideed. *Id*. In
    October 1993, three US helicopter gunships were brought down as they
    stormed a building in a failed attempt to capture General Aideed.
    *Id*. General Aideed's men were seen on television dragging a dead
    American pilot through the streets of Mogadishu. *Id*. The US
    withdrew its troops from Somalia in 1994, and the rest of the UN
    peacekeepers left in March 1995. Nduru, *supra.* In August 1996,
    General Aideed died of a heart attack that was related to an injury
    sustained following a July 24, 1996 assassination attempt by a rival
    Somali faction. *Id*.

[^84]: If the UNSC could craft such a resolution, it would effectively
    create the equivalent of state-supervised bounty hunters. Like
    bounty hunters, these small-scale military forces would rely on
    stealth and surprise to capture fugitive war criminals.
    Alternatively, the UNSC could adopt this article's recommendation of
    passing a resolution that provides private actors with immunity from
    domestic law for the forceful acts necessary to act as international
    bounty hunters. *See infra* notes Error: Reference source not found
    through Error: Reference source not found and accompanying text. It
    would be much easier for the UNSC to pass a single resolution that
    established a system of private international bounty hunters than it
    would be to craft *ad hoc* resolutions for small-scale military
    operations for each fugitive war criminal. Furthermore, if the UNSC
    established a system of private international bounty hunters, this
    would not preclude States from choosing to assist private bounty
    hunters by providing them with training, equipment, intelligence,
    and transportation.

[^85]: On July 10, 1997, after British troops arrested one suspected war
    criminal and killed another who resisted arrest in the Bosnian town
    of Prijedor, a spate of retaliatory hand-grenade attacks, stabbings,
    and bombings was directed against NATO units. Chris Hedges, *Dutch
    Troops Seize Two War Crimes Suspects, Wounding One*, [N.Y.
    Times]{.smallcaps}, Dec. 19, 1997, at A20.

[^86]: Jamie McIntyre, *Who Will Catch Bosnia War Criminals?*, [CNN
    Interactive World News,]{.smallcaps}
    http://cnn.com/world/9612/19/pentagon.bosnia (Dec. 19, 1996) (copy
    on file with the *Air Force Law Review*).

[^87]: [Beigbeder]{.smallcaps}, *supra* note Error: Reference source not
    found, at 162.

[^88]: Eileen O\'Connor, *Pentagon denies current training for Bosnian
    \'snatch missions\'*, [CNN Interactive World News,]{.smallcaps}
    http://www9.cnn.com/WORLD/9708/13/bosnian.war.criminals/ (Aug. 13,
    1997) (copy on file with the *Air Force Law Review*). Despite the
    Pentagon's rejection of any legal responsibility to arrest war
    criminals indicted by the ICTY, NATO troops have arrested a few of
    the indicted war criminals. NATO's strict stance against actively
    pursuing indicted war criminals may have softened after General
    Wesley Clark replaced General George Joulwan as the overall NATO
    commander. Steven Erlanger, *NATO Action Reflects Shift in Tactics*,
    [N.Y. Times]{.smallcaps}, July 11, 1997, at A5. On July 10, 1997, a
    British military operation led to the arrest of one indicted war
    criminal and the killing of another. *Id*. On Dec. 18, 1997, Dutch
    troops arrested two war crimes suspects. Hedges, *supra* note Error:
    Reference source not found, at A20. On Jan. 22, 1998, United States
    troops arrested war crimes suspect, Goran Jelisic. Mike O'Connor,
    *G.I.'s in Bosnia Make Their First Arrest of a War-Crimes Suspect*,
    [N.Y. Times]{.smallcaps}, Jan. 23, 1998, at A7. NATO troops have
    arrested nineteen of the individuals currently in custody before the
    ICTY. *International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia:
    Key Figures,* http://www.un.org/icty/glance/keyfig-e.htm (last
    modified Mar. 29, 2001) (copy on file with the *Air Force Law
    Review*). Thirteen individuals voluntarily surrendered themselves to
    the ICTY and six others were arrested by domestic law enforcement.
    *Id.* Despite these arrests, NATO troops do not actively hunt war
    criminals, and they are unwilling to make any attempt to capture a
    well guarded or politically connected war criminal such as Slobodan
    Milosevic or Ratko Mladic.

[^89]: *See* [Beigbeder]{.smallcaps}, *supra* note Error: Reference
    source not found, at 162-163.

[^90]: Barbara Crossette, *New Sanctions Incite Attacks by Afghans at
    U.N. Sites,* [N.Y. Times]{.smallcaps}, Nov. 16, 1999, at A6.

[^91]: Brian Blomquist, *Afghans Defy Deadline to Hand over Bin Laden*,
    [N.Y. Times]{.smallcaps}, Nov. 14, 1999, at Metro 5.

[^92]: Afghanistan's Taliban regime has stated that Afghan hospitality
    makes it impossible to turn a house guest over to his enemies, but
    it has assured the United States that Bin Laden is under virtual
    house arrest because of international concerns. Holger Jensen
    Scripps, *Taliban Snubs Hijackers But Won't Hand Over Bin Laden*,
    [Dessert News]{.smallcaps} (Salt Lake City), Jan. 2, 2000,
    Viewpoint, at AA04.

[^93]: Nilas Gunnar Billinger, *Report of the Special Swedish Commission
    on International Police Activities*, *in* [Policing the New World
    Disorder: Peace Operations and Public Security]{.smallcaps} 459, 479
    (Robert B. Oakley, et al.[,]{.smallcaps} eds., 1998). This book is a
    collection of essays that discuss in detail the role of United
    Nations civilian police in recent peace operations such as Cambodia,
    El Salvador, Mozambique, Somalia and Haiti.

[^94]: *Id*. at 39.

[^95]: *Id.*

[^96]: Under Article 43 of the United Nations Charter, each member State
    was required to complete a "special agreement" with the Security
    Council that governed the type and number of military forces that
    the nation was obligating itself to provide to the Security Council
    for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security.
    [U.N. Charter]{.smallcaps} art. 43. However, the Security Council
    has never signed an Article 43 special agreement and does not have
    its own military forces. Andrew S. Miller, *Universal Soldiers: U.N.
    Standing Armies and the Legal Alternatives*, 81 [Geo.
    L.J.]{.smallcaps} 773, 782 (March 1993) (questioning the feasibility
    of creating a standing U.N. military force and recommending that the
    UN avoid being drawn into a major debate over this issue). The UN
    has never had a permanent, standby, or on-call military force acting
    under UN authority and prospects for one in the near future remain
    grim. David J. Scheffer, *Peacekeeping, Peacemaking, &
    Peacebuilding: The Role of the United Nations in Global Conflict:
    Permanent Peacekeeping: The Theoretical & Practical Feasibility of a
    United Nations Force: United Nations Peace Operations and Prospects
    for a Standby Force*, 28 [Cornell Int'l L.J.]{.smallcaps} 649
    (Spring 1995).

[^97]: In 2000, it cost over ninety-five million dollars just to run the
    ICTY for one year. *International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
    Yugoslavia: Key Figures*, http://www.un.org/icty/glance/keyfig-e.htm
    (last modified Mar. 29, 2001) (copy on file with the *Air Force Law
    Review*).

[^98]: Jonathan Drimmer, *When Man Hunts Man: The Rights and Duties of
    Bounty Hunters in the American Criminal Justice System*, 33 [Hous.
    L. Rev]{.smallcaps}. 731, 732-33 (Fall 1996).

[^99]: Bounty hunters return 99.2% of all individuals in the custody of
    bondsman while law enforcement returns 92% of individuals under
    public bail. *Id.* at 738 n.31. Mr. Bob Burton, president of the
    National Institute of Bail Enforcement Agents, claims that of the
    approximately 22,000 annual arrests by bounty hunters only about 15
    of those arrests involve "errors." Kirk D. Richards and Matthew
    Marx, *Proposed Law Would Limit Who Can Be Bounty Hunter*, [Columbus
    Disp.]{.smallcaps}, Oct. 3, 2000, at 1C.

[^100]: Drimmer *supra* note Error: Reference source not found, at 735.
    With the exception of the Philippines, commercial bailsbondman do
    not exist outside of the United States. [F. E. Devine, Commercial
    Bail Bonding: A Comparison of Common Law Alternatives]{.smallcaps}
    15 (1991). Other common law countries have chosen to use methods of
    recognizance, criminal penalties, nonfinancial control of conduct,
    or noncommercial financial security deposit to insure an accused\'s
    presence at trial. *Id*. at 201. The most common type of bail system
    utilized by common law countries is the recognizance system. *Id*.
    Under the recognizance system, the accused or a noncommercial surety
    pledges to pay money to the State if the accused fails to appear at
    court. *Id*. Typically, no money is deposited with the court and a
    debt to the State is only incurred if the accused fails to appear at
    trial. *Id*.

[^101]: Drimmer, *supra* note Error: Reference source not found, at 735.

[^102]: Drimmer, *supra* note Error: Reference source not found, at 736.

[^103]: Drimmer, *supra* note Error: Reference source not found, at
    736*.*

[^104]: Taylor v. Taintor, 83 U.S. 366, 371-72 (1872) (recognizing the
    bounty hunter\'s comprehensive common law right of recapture over a
    bailed defendant).

[^105]: Drimmer, *supra* note Error: Reference source not found, at
    750-53. According, to Thomas Nixon, the chief instructor for the
    National Institute of Bail Enforcement Agents, although bounty
    hunters can legally break into a fugitive's home, most gain access
    simply by knocking at the door. Janet Caggiano, *Skip Tracers; For
    Bounty Hunters, the Work Is 97 Percent Boredom and 3 Percent Fear*,
    [Rich. Times Disp.]{.smallcaps}, Sep. 5, 1999, at G1. Nixon, a
    practicing bounty hunter, usually gains entry by posing as a
    salesman or courier; or he just waits until the fugitive leaves.
    *Id.*

[^106]: Jonathan Drimmer, *When Man Hunts Man: The Rights and Duties of
    Bounty Hunters in the American Criminal Justice System*, 33 [Hous.
    L. Rev]{.smallcaps}. 731, 736 (Fall 1996). The author criticizes the
    lack of regulation of bounty hunters for causing unnecessary
    violence, the destruction of property, and the arrest of innocent
    victims. *Id*. at 737. These concerns, and an infamous 1997 Arizona
    case, prompted several States to enact or consider legislation to
    regulate bounty hunters. The 1997 Arizona case concerns five men who
    broke into a private residence and engaged in a gun battle with one
    of the home's occupants. Adam Cohen, *Murders at Dawn---Bounty
    Hunters Storm the Wrong House in Phoenix,* *Killing Two and Spurring
    the Cry for Safeguards*, 150:11, [Time]{.smallcaps}, Sep. 15, 1997,
    at 91. Two of the five intruders were shot before the intruders
    killed two of the home's occupants. After the fight, the five
    intruders told police that they were bounty hunters who mistakenly
    hit the wrong house while looking for a California fugitive. *Id*.
    The leader of the raid was recently convicted of first degree murder
    and nine other criminal charges. *Sentencing for Bounty Hunter
    Stalled, Hearing on New Trial Set*, [Arizona Republic]{.smallcaps},
    Jan. 30, 1999, Valley and State, at B2. State prosecutors maintained
    that the five intruders broke into the home under the mistaken
    belief that they would find a large amount of drugs and money and
    that their claims of being bounty hunters was merely a cover story.
    *Id*. Regardless of whether the intruders were truly acting as
    bounty hunters or not, their criminal acts spurred legislation
    nationwide that attempted to prevent bounty hunter misconduct.

[^107]: A Nevada law, effective Oct. 1, 1997, requires bounty hunters to
    obtain a license. N[ev. Rev. Stat. Ann.]{.smallcaps} § 697.173(1)
    (LEXIS 2000). To qualify for a bounty hunter license in Nevada, a
    individual must be 21 years of age or older, be a United States
    citizen, have graduated high school, submit a negative drug test,
    undertake a psychological examination, complete required training,
    and pass a written examination. Furthermore, Nevada excludes anyone
    convicted of a felony, a crime of moral turpitude, or a crime
    involving the unlawful use, sale, or possession of a controlled
    substance from holding a bounty hunter\'s license. *Id.* at §
    697.173(2).

    Other representative state statutes also deal with bounty hunters:
    [Ind. Code Ann.]{.smallcaps} § 27-10-3-5 (LEXIS 2000) (to obtain a
    permit bounty hunters must be at least 18 years old, a U.S. citizen,
    a resident of Indiana for six months and have no recent criminal
    convictions); [Ga. Code Ann.]{.smallcaps} § 17-6-57 (LEXIS 2000)
    (must have a firearms license, be a U.S. citizen, 25 years old, and
    notify local sheriff and police chief before engaging in
    surveillance, apprehension, or capture); [N.H. Rev. Stat.
    Ann.]{.smallcaps} § 597:7-b (LEXIS 2000) (requires bounty hunters to
    be trained and certified by the Professional Bail Agents of the
    United States, to register with the secretary of state, and to
    notify local law enforcement before searching for a fugitive); [Utah
    Code Ann.]{.smallcaps} § 53-11-108 (LEXIS 2000) (applicant for
    license must be at least 21 years of age, a citizen or legal
    resident of the U.S., not be convicted of a felony or a crime
    involving violence, fraud, or moral turpitude, have completed a
    training program of not less than 16 hours, have at least 1,000
    hours of experience as a bail recovery agent or law enforcement
    officer); [Tenn. Code Ann.]{.smallcaps} § 40-11-318 (LEXIS 2000)
    (prohibits individuals with felony convictions from serving as
    bounty hunters and requires bounty hunters to notify local law
    enforcement before attempting to take any person into custody);
    [Ark. Stat. Ann.]{.smallcaps} § 16-84-114 (LEXIS 2000) (requires
    bounty hunters to notify local law enforcement before attempting to
    apprehend a fugitive).

    In 1999, West Virginia unsuccessfully attempted to pass legislation
    that would require bounty hunters to be licensed and will likely try
    to pass similar legislation again next year. *Bounty Hunters\'
    Charges Could Spur Law*, [Charleston Gazette]{.smallcaps}, Aug. 7,
    1999, at 3A. Pennsylvania is considering legislation that would
    require bounty hunters to be 21 years of age or older, to be a
    citizen of the United States, to pass a background check for mental
    stability, to undergo 80 hours of training, and to not have a
    conviction for a felony, first or second degree misdemeanor, or any
    crime involving violence or fraud. S. Res. l 931, 183rd Gen. Assem.,
    1999-00 Sess. (Pa. 1999). On Jan. 19, 2000, a bill was introduced in
    Virginia that would regulate bounty hunters. S. Res. 582, Va. 2000
    Sess. (Va. 2000). In 2000, Ohio is considering legislation that
    would require bounty hunters to be licensed and to notify local law
    enforcement before attempting to make an arrest. Kirk D. Richards
    and Matthew Marx, *Proposed Law Would Limit Who Can Be Bounty
    Hunter*, [Columbus Dispatch]{.smallcaps}, Oct. 3, 2000, at 1C.
    Representative William A. Hutchinson, an Arkansas Republican, has
    proposed federal legislation in the United States House of
    Representatives that would require all bounty hunters in the United
    States to notify local law enforcement before attempting to obtain
    custody of a fugitive. Citizen Protection Act of 1998, H.R. 3168,
    105th Cong., 2d Sess.

    In 1999, Alaska strictly prohibited all bounty hunters from
    operating within their State by passing a law that prohibits private
    persons from making any arrest for a crime not committed or
    attempted in their presence. [Alaska stat. §]{.smallcaps} 12.25.025
    (LEXIS 2000). Kentucky, Wisconsin, and Illinois passed laws that
    prohibit companies from posting bonds for profit. *Wanted: Get Out
    of Jail Free---Are Bounty Hunters Needed?*, [Cincinnati
    Enquirer]{.smallcaps}, Apr. 21, 1999, Editorial, at A14;
    [Devine]{.smallcaps}, *supra* note Error: Reference source not
    found, 52-53. Furthermore, Kentucky law requires bounty hunters
    working for an out-of-state bondsmen to obtain a warrant from a
    Kentucky judge before arresting a fugitive in Kentucky. *Id*.

[^108]: Drimmer, *supra* note Error: Reference source not found, at 743.
    Bounty hunters typically earn ten percent of the bond, plus
    expenses. Caggiano, *supra* note Error: Reference source not found,
    at G1.

[^109]: Despite legal immunity, bounty hunters still face criminal
    liability for mistakenly entering the wrong property or for using
    force against the wrong person. In a 1999 incident in DeKalb County,
    Georgia, two bounty hunters kicked in a door at a wrong address and
    terrified a 14 year-old girl who was there alone. Bill Torpy,
    *Playing with a Different Set of Rules; Modernizing Bounty
    Hunting*[, Atlanta Journal]{.smallcaps}, Feb. 28, 1999, Local News,
    at 1E. Both bounty hunters were charged with criminal damage to
    property and one was also charged with misdemeanor battery. *Id*.

    Bounty hunters may also face civil liability for mistakenly entering
    the wrong property or for using force against the wrong person. In a
    1994 incident, bounty hunters wrongfully arrested a woman who was
    mistaken for a fugitive and transported her from Manhattan, New York
    to Tuscaloosa, Alabama. Cohen, *supra* note Error: Reference source
    not found, at 91. A federal jury in New York awarded the wrongfully
    arrested woman \$1.2 million. *Id*.

    A Georgia law holds bounty hunters strictly liable for all damages
    when a bounty hunter enters the wrong property and causes property
    damage or injury. [Ga. Code Ann.]{.smallcaps} § 17-6-58(c) (LEXIS
    2000). Effective July 1, 2000, New Hampshire will require bounty
    hunters to carry liability coverage in the amount of \$300,000.
    [N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann.]{.smallcaps} § 597:7-b (LEXIS 2000).

[^110]: *See supra* note Error: Reference source not found and
    accompanying text.

[^111]: *Nine Convicted in Kidnap of War-Crimes Suspect,*
    [N.Y.]{.smallcaps} Times, Dec. 11, 2000, at A15.

[^112]: Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United
    Nations, Feb. 13, 1946, 1 U.N.T.S. 15, art. IV.

[^113]: Major Geoffrey Corn & Major Michael L. Smidt, *"To Be or Not To
    Be, That is the Question" Contemporary Military Operations and the
    Status of Captured Personnel*, June 1999 [Army Law]{.smallcaps}. 1,
    14. The GPW does not explicitly mention combatant immunity but it is
    inferred from the cumulative effect of the protections within the
    GPW. *Id*. at n.124.

[^114]: For example, the Genocide Convention opened for signature on
    Dec. 11, 1948 but was not ratified by the United States until 40
    years later on Nov. 25, 1988. Genocide Convention, *supra* note
    Error: Reference source not found.

[^115]: Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated
    Personnel, G.A. Res. 49/59, 49 U.N. G.A.O.R. Supp. (No. 49) at 299,
    U.N. Doc. A/49/49 (1994) (hereinafter CSUNAP); *see also* Lieutenant
    Colonel Steven J. Lepper, *The Legal Status of Military Personnel in
    United Nations Peace Operations: One Delegate's Analysis*, 18 [Hous.
    J. Int'l Law]{.smallcaps} 359 (Winter 1996), for an in-depth
    discussion of the drafting process and meaning of the Convention on
    the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel.

[^116]: *See* CSUNAP, *supra* note Error: Reference source not found,
    art. 9.

[^117]: Judith Kumin, *Foreign Aid Workers Need Protection Too*, [Ottawa
    Citizen]{.smallcaps}, Sep. 21, 2000, at A21.

[^118]: [Beigbeder]{.smallcaps}, *supra* note Error: Reference source
    not found, at 150.

[^119]: State members to the United Nations must accept and carry out
    decisions by the Security Council. U.N. Charter art. 25. Security
    Council decisions must have affirmative votes from nine of the
    fifteen members of the Council and not be subject to the veto of any
    of the permanent members. *Id*. art. 27. The permanent members to
    the Security Council are the United States, China, the Russian
    Federation, the United Kingdom and France. *Security Council*,
    *available at* http://www.un.org/Overview/Organs/sc.html#MEMBERS
    (last visited Apr. 17, 2001) (copy on file with the *Air Force Law
    Review*).

[^120]: "The Security Council shall determine the existence of any
    threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and
    shall make recommendations or decide what measures shall be taken in
    accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore
    international peace and security." [U.N. Charter]{.smallcaps} art.
    39.

[^121]: *See* [Beigbeder]{.smallcaps}, *supra* note Error: Reference
    source not found, at 150-51.

[^122]: Crossette, *supra* note Error: Reference source not found. The
    United Nations Security Council ordered all countries to freeze
    Afghanistan government assets and to ban all flights to Afghanistan.
    Blomquist, *supra* note Error: Reference source not found. On Dec.
    19, 2000, the Security Council voted to broaden its sanctions
    against Afghanistan. *UN Council Applies More Pressure on Taliban,*
    [Chicago Tribune]{.smallcaps}, Dec. 20, 2000, News, at 4. However,
    Afghanistan's leaders still refuse to hand over Osama Bin Laden.
    *Id.*

[^123]: Prosecutor v. Tadic**,** Appeal on Jurisdiction, No.
    IT-94-1-AR72, paras. 31-37 (I.C.T.Y. Oct. 2, 1995), *reprinted in*
    35 ILM 32 (1996), *available at* www.un.org/icty (copy on file with
    the *Air Force Law Review*).

[^124]: *Id.* para. 34.

[^125]: *Id*. para. 35.

[^126]: *Id*. paras. 31-37.

[^127]: *Id*. para. 39.

[^128]: Mills, *supra* note Error: Reference source not found, n.6; ICTY
    Statute, *supra* note Error: Reference source not found.

[^129]: [U.N. Charter]{.smallcaps} arts. 25 & 48. Currently, 189 States
    are members of the United Nations. *List of Member States*, *at*
    http://www.un.org/Overview/unmember.html (last visited Apr. 17,
    2001) (copy on file with the *Air Force Law Review*).

[^130]: Beverly Izes, *Drawing Lines in the Sand: When State-Sanctioned
    Abductions of War Criminals Should be Permitted*, 31 [Colum. J.L. &
    Soc. Probs]{.smallcaps}. 1, 10 (Fall 1997). Ms. Izes also stated
    that abducted individuals should be permitted to bring human rights
    actions to an international tribunal for any abduction that failed
    to follow the United Nation's procedural guidelines on
    State-sponsored abductions. *Id.* at 14.

[^131]: *Id.* at 2.

[^132]: *Id.* at 14.

[^133]: On February 29, 1992, after ten months of hearings and
    approximately 3,000 witnesses, a self-appointed commission found
    President George Bush, Vice-President J. Danforth Quayle, Secretary
    of Defense Richard Cheney, and General Norman Schwarzkopf guilty of
    nineteen war crimes committed during the course of the Gulf War.
    [Beigbeder]{.smallcaps}, *supra* note Error: Reference source not
    found, at 137-38. These crimes included crimes against peace,
    indiscriminate bombing, use of prohibited weapons of mass
    destruction, and crimes against humanity. *Id*. Lacking any
    enforcement authority, the commission did not pass any sentence but
    condemned these individuals in the strongest possible terms. *Id*.
    The commission ignored Iraq's unlawful act of aggression against
    Kuwait and that the UNSC had acted within its rights under the UN
    Charter in authorizing the use of military force against Iraq. *Id*.
    at 138. It also ignored Iraq's own war crimes. *Id*. The
    commission's real objective was to influence public opinion against
    the war. *Id*.

[^134]: Indictments for the ICTY are prepared by a prosecutor and
    confirmed by a judge of the Trial Chamber if a *prima facie* case
    has been presented. If an indicted individual is not arrested, a
    public hearing is held before the full Trial Chamber. If the full
    Trial Chamber is satisfied that the indictment was issued upon
    probable cause then the full Trial Chamber will issue and transmit
    an international arrest warrant. *Id.* at 153. *See also* Rule 61,
    Procedure in Case of Failure to Execute a Warrant, Rules of
    Procedure and Evidence, IT/32/Rev. 9, ICT-FY, July 5, 1996. The ICTY
    has issued international arrest warrants against twelve of the
    indicted individuals. *Fact Sheet: International Criminal Tribunal
    for the Former Yugoslavia*,
    http://www.un.org/icty/glance/procfact-e.htm (last modified Mar. 29,
    2001) (copy on file with the *Air Force Law Review*). International
    arrest warrants have not resulted in the apprehension of any
    fugitive war criminals. *Id*.

[^135]: [Ashman & Wagman]{.smallcaps}, *supra* note Error: Reference
    source not found, at 30-32 (Schwammberger was known as the "mass
    murderer of Poland"). On November 17, 1987, people interested in
    collecting the reward led Argentine police to a small village where
    Schwammberger was hiding. *Id*. at 32.

[^136]: *Arrest Order Filed for Nazi Brunner*,
    [Sun-Sentinel]{.smallcaps} (Fort Lauderdale), Sep. 11, 1997,
    Editorial, at 14A.

[^137]: *Diplomatic Security Service: U.S. Department of State*,
    http://www.dssrewards.net/english/warcrimes/torture.html (last
    visited Apr. 17, 2001).

[^138]: The authors of *The Nazi Hunters* state that two wealthy
    American businessmen offered them a "blank check" for anyone who
    could abduct Alois Brunner, a Nazi war criminal hiding in Syria.
    [Ashman & Wagman]{.smallcaps}, *supra* note Error: Reference source
    not found, at 28.

[^139]: *See supra* notes Error: Reference source not found-Error:
    Reference source not found.

[^140]: For example, Janko Janjic, a fugitive war criminal indicted by
    the ICTY, is extensively tattooed. *War Criminal Watch*, [Coalition
    for International Justice,]{.smallcaps} http://www.wcw.org (see
    "sightings" section for the ICTY on this web site) (last visited
    Apr. 17, 2001). One tattoo on his forehead reads "I was dead before
    I was born." *Id.*

[^141]: After Syria denied extradition requests for Alois Brunner, a
    Nazi war criminal, State agents unsuccessfully attempted to execute
    Brunner with mail bombs. *See* [Ashman & Wagman]{.smallcaps},
    *supra* note Error: Reference source not found, at 18. One bomb cost
    Brunner two of his fingers and the second bomb cost him one of his
    eyes. *Id.*

[^142]: [Charles Ashman & Robert J. Wagman, The Nazi
    Hunters]{.smallcaps} 17 (1988). In 1954, France tried Brunner in
    absentia and sentenced him to death. *Id*. at 26. Brunner worked in
    Damascus, Syria as an assistant manager for a trading company that
    represented West German firms under the alias, Dr. George Fischer.
    *Id*. In 1960, Syrian police arrested Dr. Fischer for drug smuggling
    but after Syrian officials learned his true identity, he was
    welcomed to the country and became a security advisor to the Syrian
    government. *Id*. at 26-27. Brunner helped train Syrian police in
    effective interrogation methods and he is believed to be responsible
    for plotting several anti-Israelis incidents throughout the world,
    including the 1961 attempted bombing of the World Jewish Congress in
    Vienna. *Id*. at 27. Syria repeatedly denied West Germany's
    extradition requests for Brunner and even provided Brunner with
    armed, uniformed bodyguards. *Id*. at 27-28. The French, Greek,
    Czech, Austrian, and Israeli authorities all want custody of
    Brunner. James, *supra* note Error: Reference source not found, at
    10. Poland is also considering demanding Brunner's extradition but
    then Syrian President Hafez Assad stated that to his knowledge
    Brunner was not in his country. *Plea Over War Criminal*,
    [Birmingham Post]{.smallcaps}, Jan. 19, 2000, News, at 9. But
    President Hafez Assad's recent death has provided new hope that
    Brunner will finally face extradition. Syria's new President,
    Assad's son, Bashar-al-Assad, is considering extraditing Brunner to
    Germany in exchange for closer diplomatic ties with Western
    countries. Allan Hall and Gabriel Milland, *Last Major War Criminal
    to Go Back to Germany*, [Express]{.smallcaps}, Oct. 31, 2000.

[^143]: [Ashman & Wagman]{.smallcaps}, *supra* note Error: Reference
    source not found, at 30.

[^144]: *Outstanding Public Indictments*,
    http://www.un.org/icty/glance/indictlist-e.htm (last modified Mar.
    29, 2001) (copy on file with the *Air Force Law Review*).

[^145]: A former British military commander is already attempting to
    establish Justice Action, the world's first non-governmental war
    crimes investigation unit. James Clark, *Colonel Bob to Lead Hunt
    for War Criminals,* [London Sunday times]{.smallcaps}, Jan. 28,
    2001, Home News. The group will be staffed by former police officers
    and military investigators. *Id.* Justice Action is seeking funding
    from private individuals and charitable organizations. *Id.* The
    group will not act as an international police force but will attempt
    to put pressure on governments to apprehend and prosecute war
    criminals. *Id.*

[^146]: Scott Anderson, *What I Did on My Summer Vacation*,
    [Esquire]{.smallcaps}, No. 4, Vol. 134, 104.

[^147]: *Id.*

[^148]: *Id.*

[^149]: *Id.*

[^150]: *Id.*

[^151]: *Id.*

[^152]: [Charles Ashman & Robert J. Wagman, The Nazi
    Hunters]{.smallcaps} 280-97.

[^153]: *Id.* at 287.

[^154]: *Id.* at 290.

[^155]: *War Criminal Watch*, [Coalition for International
    Justice,]{.smallcaps} http://www.wce.org (visited Apr. 17, 2001).

[^156]: *See supra* notes Error: Reference source not found and Error:
    Reference source not found, and accompanying text.