**THE CHARACTER OF MORAL EXEMPLARS**

White House Conference

On

Character and Community

June 19, 2002

Presented By

Lawrence J. Walker

University of British Columbia

My sense of contemporary moral psychology -- a field of research that
has been my interest for all of my scholarly career -- is that it has
provided rich understandings regarding the development of moral
reasoning, but has been relatively impoverished in terms of its
appreciation of moral personality and character. This rather barren
conception of moral functioning has, not surprisingly, often failed to
provide effective means by which to foster children's moral development.

The basic goal of my recent research is to formulate a more balanced
account of moral functioning that meaningfully integrates moral
cognition with moral character and action -- a research direction that I
will illustrate today through the study of moral exemplarity. It is
important to keep in mind that moral functioning is inherently
multifaceted, involving the dynamic interplay of thought, emotions, and
behavior; and that we trivialize morality if we focus exclusively on one
component. I believe that the study of exemplary moral character has the
potential to encompass the various cognitive, emotional, and behavioral
components of moral functioning, as well as to address the different
domains of moral concern, that is, both our relationships with others
and the personal development of our values, lifestyle, and identity.

What I am pursuing in my own research is a two-pronged approach to
developing such an integrated account of moral functioning: One approach
examines people's ordinary conceptions of moral exemplarity; the other
examines the psychological functioning of actual moral exemplars, people
who have been identified as leading lives of moral virtue, integrity,
and commitment. These different empirical strategies should be mutually
informative, providing convergent evidence regarding aspects of moral
functioning that are significant in everyday life and that should be
incorporated into both our theories of moral development and our
approaches to character education.

Let me begin by describing my research on people's conceptions of moral
excellence (Walker & Pitts, 1998). People's ordinary conceptions of
morality can provide a healthy corrective to the conceptual biases that
sometimes distort our perspectives and they can help to draw attention
to aspects of morality that have been sidelined in our theories. This
research entailed a sequence of three studies in which participants
generated lists of attributes characteristic of a highly moral person,
rated how characteristic these attributes were, and then freely sorted
these attributes into groups -- a process which allowed us, through
various statistical techniques, to derive typologies that reflect
people's implicit understandings.

Analyses identified two dimensions underlying people's understanding of
moral exemplarity: one I labeled a self--other dimension, the other an
external--internal dimension. At one end of the self--other dimension
are traits that emphasize personal agency and commitment, whereas at the
other end are traits that focus more on care for others. Of course, the
range of these moral virtues means that they are sometimes in tension.
For example, strongly held moral values need to be balanced by an
openness to new perspectives and a sensitivity to the circumstances of
others. Similarly, the external--internal dimension reflects the fact
that morality involves an orientation both to shared moral norms and to
the carefully considered principles of one's own conscience. On a
related note, it is important to recognize that many virtues may be
taken to excess and have maladaptive aspects to their expression in some
contexts. For example, self-sacrificial care can be destructive when it
involves self-denigration and over-involvement in others' lives.

Analyses also identified several clusters of attributes in people's
understanding of moral exemplarity that have been inadequately
represented in moral psychology and that now warrant more careful
attention, such as the notion of integrity, for example. There is,
however, one questionable implication from this research that should be
flagged and that is whether there is a single prototype for moral
excellence. This collection may represent an amalgamation of virtues
that would be impossible, indeed incoherent, for any one person to
embody. At present, we have little understanding of how these aspects of
moral character interact in psychological functioning.

In any case, the suggestion pursued here is that moral exemplarity can
be evidenced in quite divergent ways -- think, for example, of moral
heroes such as Martin Luther King Jr. in his pursuit of justice or
Mother Teresa in her selfless care for the disadvantaged or Oskar
Schindler in his brave protection of Jews during the Holocaust. Here the
critical question is: What traits are common across different types of
moral exemplarity and what traits are unique to each? So in this next
project (Walker & Hennig, 2002), we explored conceptions of three types
of moral exemplarity -- just, brave, and caring. As in the previous
project, this entailed a sequence of three studies which in the end
allowed us to identify typologies in people's understanding.

Our analyses revealed rather dissimilar personality profiles for these
different types of moral exemplars. The brave exemplar was associated
with traits of agency and self-sacrifice; the caring exemplar was
associated with traits of nurturance and altruism; whereas the just
exemplar was typified by conscientiousness, stability, and openness.
Yet, many traits were found to be common to all -- what we could
consider suggestive of the core of moral functioning. Among these core
traits were honesty, dependability, and self-control; as well as many
traits of an interpersonal nature that reflect an other-oriented
orientation. Other themes included personal agency, positivity,
emotional stability, and openness. These common features are clearly
foundational for moral functioning and warrant further conceptual and
empirical scrutiny.

The major limitation to the study of conceptions of moral functioning is
that it simply describes people's understandings, not the actual
psychological functioning of real moral exemplars. So in another
research project currently underway, I am examining the personalities,
through extensive interviews and several questionnaire measures, of two
contrasting types of moral exemplars: exceptionally brave versus caring
people. The sample is composed of Canadians who have received national
awards in recognition of either their acts of bravery in risking their
lives to save others or for their extraordinary care to individuals,
groups, or communities, or their support for humanitarian causes. For
example, among the recipients of the award for bravery was a woman who
at considerable danger to herself saved a young girl from a vicious
cougar attack; and among the recipients of the award for care was a
police officer who, in his off-duty time, developed a program to buy and
deliver Christmas gifts for disadvantaged children in remote
communities. These are the types of people who have made a real
difference in the lives of others, who have given selflessly of
themselves in aid of others and their communities.

It is anticipated that the eventual findings of this research project
will yield a more comprehensive understanding of moral functioning that
integrates cognition, personality, and action. Once the field has some
sense of the psychological functioning of moral exemplars, then the
agenda can focus on the formative factors in the development of such
exemplary moral character and on programs to foster it. Certainly, there
are many possibilities to consider as we chart new directions in moral
psychology and character education.

References

Walker, L. J., & Pitts, R. C. (1998). Naturalistic conceptions of moral
maturity. *Developmental Psychology*, *34*, 403-419.

Walker, L. J., & Hennig, K. H. (2002). *Differing conceptions of moral
exemplarity: Just, brave, and caring*. Unpublished manuscript,
University of British Columbia.