**Force Structure for High- and Low-Intensity Warfare:**

**The Anglo-American Experience and Lessons for the Future**

**By Dr. Daniel Marston, Royal Military Academy Sandhurst**

**The views expressed in this and other papers associated with the NIC
2020 project**

**are those of individual participants. They are posted for discussion
purposes**

**only and do not represent the views of the US Government.**

**Force Structure for High- and Low-Intensity Warfare:**

**The Anglo-American Experience and Lessons for the Future**

**By Dr. Daniel Marston, Royal Military Academy Sandhurst**

This paper will attempt to address two of the key questions raised by
the NIC in preparation for this conference. First, will the "universe"
of conflict continue to occur below the nuclear threshold and will it
continue to be characterized by a blend of high-end, state-versus-state
and unconventional war (low-intensity conflict)? Or, alternatively will
unconventional, special operations, police work, and a ubiquitous
dependence on intelligence grow into the principle characteristic of
conflict, while "classic" organized state militaries are used mainly as
a support and deterrent force? This paper will also consider the
operational level of conflict to identify emerging new concepts of
operations, such as using unmanned systems, that could have a profound
effect on the nature of war. By 2020, will technology change the way
that low-intensity and unconventional conflict is waged? This paper will
attempt to answer the first and second questions based upon the
experiences and needs of the US and UK militaries.

Predicting future war is incredibly difficult, and many historians and
theorists have been ridiculed for attempting to do so. Having said that,
however, there are general themes from the past and present that will
undoubtedly be relevant in the future. For the purposes of this paper, I
will assume that conflict in the next 15 years will take place below the
nuclear threshold.[^1] The larger and more important question is, what
will war encompass below this threshold?

The future for both the American and British militaries potentially
encompasses three different levels of conflict. The first is
state-versus-state, conventional war (high-intensity)[^2], which is also
the least likely between any of the "first powers"[^3] of the world.[^4]
The second, which is more likely, is a war that may begin as a
high-intensity conflict but, due to overwhelming US/UK military might,
will collapse into an asymmetrical[^5] or low-intensity war.[^6] In this
paper the terms should be understood as: high intensity---conventional
war between two states (WWI, WWII, Arab-Israeli Wars, Gulf War I, etc.);
low intensity---all operations other than conventional war. The third
type of conflict will encompass the support of a friendly state, and
utilize a range of forces, from Special Forces (SOFs) to conventional
troops, against an insurgent force.[^7]

The present conflict in Iraq may or may not be indicative of the type of
scenario that the US and UK will face in the future, and so both states
need militaries that are capable of engaging in either high- or
low-intensity conflict, and of switching back and forth between the two
as circumstances require. Predictions for future war will mean nothing
if our forces are not able to deal with the specialized needs of both
sorts of conflict. General Frank Kitson noted, more than 30 years ago,
when he was looking at the future of war: "all in all the 1970s may turn
out to be as stormy as the 1960s, if not more so, but it is none the
less virtually impossible to plot the path of storms . . . whether in
Europe or overseas, the pattern of conflict is such that it is virtually
impossible to imagine an orthodox \[conventional\] war taking place
without an accompanying campaign of subversion or insurgency, although
the reverse is by no means true."[^8] It is understood that while both
states may create doctrine and train their troops accordingly, there
will still be potential problems. Lessons from the past are important,
but they must be adapted to new situations. A constant assessment
process for both forces must be applied for both high- and low-intensity
warfare. Principles of warfare are important, but it must always be
understood that officers and men will adapt principles to the situations
in which they find themselves.

Future War

Predicting the future is a pastime fraught with danger, and not a new
one. In the 20^th^ century, various military theorists attempted to
gauge what the next wars would encompass and how various weapons systems
might influence events on the battlefield.[^9] All of the militaries
engaged in combat during this period demonstrated the shortcomings of
the various theories, and proved repeatedly that all theories and
doctrines had to adapt to the unpredictable and changeable environment
of the real battlefield. British Military Doctrine 1996 asserts that
"predicting the nature of modern warfare is a notoriously unreliable
process. . . . \[A\] middle \[course\] must be steered between
experience and projections of futuristic weapons. . . . The first safe
assumption is that war will occur where it is little expected and that
warfare will assume at least a partly unforeseen form."[^10]

While the exact scope of future war is difficult to gauge, there are
some signposts from the past that help to indicate the direction that
future conflicts may take. The first is that guerrilla, or insurgent, or
low-intensity war has been with the world as long as conventional or
high-intensity warfare. Since 1945, of all the conflicts in the world,
only 12% can be classified as high-intensity wars (e.g., the
Arab-Israeli and India-Pakistan conflicts).[^11] By 2020, 90% of the
world's population will live in the developing world,[^12] and
developing world nation-states will not have the wealth or capability to
deal with the "first powers" on a level playing field. The overwhelming
military might and pre-emptive strategies employed by the US and its
junior partner, the UK, will make any conventional war scenario very
unlikely. Instead, the conflicts the US and UK are more likely to face
would chiefly be low-intensity means where opponents would be using
whatever capabilities they have at their disposal.[^13]

There is little reason to suppose that conventional, state-versus-state
conflict will take a larger role in future war than it has in the
post-World War II era. The significant high-intensity conflicts of the
past 60 years, chiefly in South Asia and the Middle East, have left the
participants apparently deadlocked. Both India and Pakistan have nuclear
weapons, which now may well keep the struggle over Kashmir from being
either escalated or resolved. (The potential diplomatic intervention of
the US, UK, and other nations \[like maybe Russia\] to discourage any
escalation is also a factor.[^14]) Israel's demonstrated conventional
military capability, coupled with her nuclear weapons, will most likely
deter any Arab state from attempting to launch a conventional campaign
against them. In both of these case studies of formerly conventional
conflicts, the point to remember is that, due to the apparent
limitations of high-intensity conflict, both have devolved into
low-intensity operations[^15]: an insurgency in Kashmir, and the second
Intifada in Israel.[^16]

The one place where a high-intensity war involving the US (and maybe the
UK) is a possibility in the near future is North Korea. Here again,
however, it would be a mistake to focus only on conventional tactics.
These would be required in the first phase, but there would also be a
need to prepare for a second, low-intensity campaign. Since a US/UK
coalition would be dominant in a high-intensity engagement with North
Korea, the likelihood is that the conventional scenario would collapse
into an insurgency. The forces involved would need to be trained
properly for both roles, as well as for the strategic planning necessary
to involve civilian forces in taking responsibility for aspects of a
low-intensity campaign. Given the totalitarian government currently in
place in North Korea and the dire economic conditions experienced by
most of the population, a military force would need the capability to
demonstrate a viable and desirable alternative, and to undertake
nation-building activities.

Aside from the North Korean example, future conflicts between states are
likely to be low intensity. This could occur within sovereign states as
well as between states. The situation in Indian Administered Kashmir
provides an excellent example of this scenario. The Indian government
has consistently accused the Pakistani government of supporting "Muslim
terrorists" in the Indian-occupied sector. The unrest thus promoted
constitutes a low-intensity operation, which keeps the sector unstable
and ill at ease.

The Middle East region provides another example, in which various
governments are under internal pressure of various kinds from Islamic
fundamentalists to sever their ties with western powers. The governments
in the region have been able to maintain power so far, but there is no
guarantee they will be able to continue to do so indefinitely. Consider
Saudi Arabia in such a scenario. The pressure upon the present
government is considerable and is likely to increase. What will the role
of the US and UK be? If the Saudi government is under increasing
pressure, do we deploy troops? If we deploy troops, do we so with SOFs
in a limited and specialized role, as the British did in the Dhofar
Rebellion in Oman, 1970-1975[^17]? Or do we send in major and visible
support, in the form of 100,000 troops? What are the ramifications for a
significant show of US/UK force in support of the existing government,
or against it, for that matter?

The present operation in Iraq is providing some glaring examples of
lessons to be learned for the future. If the US and/or the UK decide to
invade a particular country, either to re-instate a specific ruler or
government or to topple a 'negative' regime, the outcome will be based
upon the military's ability to do two things: support the new system of
government; and wage both high- and low-intensity warfare.

One incentive for beginning an insurgency campaign against the US,
especially, is that at present, the US military does not appear to have
grasped, organizationally, the fundamentals of waging a low-intensity
war, which gives any insurgent group an advantage. As a result, the
current operations in Iraq, which at this stage are chiefly
low-intensity, could potentially be continuing in 2020. Compare this
situation to the British counterinsurgency (COIN) campaign in Northern
Ireland; in 1971, General Kitson stated that "it \[was\] reasonable to
hope that the present Emergency \[would\] be resolved in five
years."[^18] The British Army is still operating in Northern Ireland, 33
years later.

The US and UK are likely to continue to intervene in the affairs of
sovereign states when they feel that their homelands are threatened**.**
The likelihood is not great that this scenario will arise with a state
of comparable size or capability, although this is not guaranteed.[^19]
If the US and UK were to embark on wars against small countries that may
originate as conventional conflicts, e.g., to bring about a regime
change, they may well find the conflicts may end as insurgencies. They
might also intervene in support of a friendly government seeking
military support in dealing with insurgents in its own territory.
Ongoing operations in Iraq may also limit the future use of US and UK
troops. Both countries have been wary of increasing casualty rates due
to the potential for diminished public support at home. The US
government**,** in particular, is concerned with public perception of
'body bags.'[^20]

Counter-insurgency doctrine, correctly incorporated into military
training and deployment, supposes that an insurgency will take many
years to win or at least resolve to the benefit of both parties. Leaders
in the US and UK, both political and military, will thus have to
understand that the campaign in Iraq, or any similar situation, will
involve a long, hard slog. They will then need to decide if the threat
to national interests is worth the potential long-term commitment. There
are no quick victories in insurgencies. However, if what the future
holds for US and UK forces is intervention and participation in these
operations, then they must be properly trained and supported with
adequate doctrine.

Professor Colin McInnes, University of Aberystwyth comments that "\[the
British Army\] approach to change by and large has been evolutionary and
conservative, preferring caution and well proven solutions to the
riskier option of radical change. Doctrine therefore has evolved rather
than being wholly rewritten. . . the Army's structure continues to
emphasise high capability forces for high intensity warfare, even though
that is the Army's least likely operational deployment."[^21] This is a
useful point for the US military to consider in planning for the future.

**Force Structure for the Future**

At present, both US and UK forces have appropriate structures and
doctrines in place for at least one aspect of any potential future
conflict. In the past 100 years, many armies have attempted to gauge the
future of war and adapt accordingly. There are not many examples of
proper adaptation. US and UK forces already have the capacity to develop
proper structures for future high-intensity warfare. Both military
forces, however, need to expand their training to cover both high- and
low-intensity conflict.[^22]

In an expanded training scenario, conventional training should occupy
the principal role. Conventional warfare encapsulates all of the basic
principles and doctrines of waging war, and thus provides a sound
foundation. Low-intensity training uses this foundation, and then
expands into the areas of doctrine and tactics specific to low-intensity
campaigns. The most important aspect of low-intensity conflict is
counter-insurgency (COIN). The principles of COIN are generally
classified as: recognition of the political nature of the insurgency;
establishment of a civil-military command and control structure with
civilian supremacy; importance of intelligence and proper human
intelligence gathering; splitting the insurgents from the population by
propaganda and winning hearts and minds; destroying the insurgents if
the opportunity presents itself; political reforms to prevent
re-occurrence. Trainees learn the basic differences between the two
types of conflict: whereas conventional war envisions the destruction of
the main forces of the enemy and makes military goals paramount, COIN
envisions the military acting in support of a civil authority and seeks
to understand the political, social, and economic (as well as military)
aspects of the campaign.[^23]

Over the course of the past fifteen years, the American and British
forces have benefited from a closer relationship and greater operational
interdependence. Joint training exercises are held regularly all over
the world, and liaison officers work together at planning HQs throughout
the various commands. The British, due to their size, are the obvious
junior partner in the relationship. This part of the paper will consider
both militaries' current capability to operate in combined high- and
low-intensity operations, as well as proposals for the future. Due to my
background, much of the discussion will deal with land-based operations.

The issue raised in the second half of the first question, "Will
unconventional, special operations, police work and a ubiquitous
dependence on intelligence grow into the principle characteristic of
conflict, while 'classic' organized state militaries are used mainly as
a support and deterrent force?" has special relevance for the US defense
establishment. There is a debate in the US defense establishment now as
to whether Special Forces should be expanded to be the force to be used
in COIN, or whether more of the rest of the US Army should be made more
SOF-like. US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld has called for the
expansion of SOFs, apparently taking the view that the more you have,
the more you can deploy. I believe that such a system will leave the
SOFs watered down and their specialized assets lost. An army trained in
COIN, on the other hand, will leave the SOFs free to do what they do
best---act as a strategic, rather than a tactical, asset.

The British approach has been somewhat different. British SOFs,
particularly the SAS, have led the way in developing certain aspects of
COIN, but the vast majority of the current doctrine has been drawn from
lessons learned by the British Army as a whole. The SAS are trained in
COIN and have often been on exercise or attachment to provide training
in COIN to friendly countries. Most of the COIN operations during the
post-WWII period, however, have been carried out by the regular British
Army and Royal Marines, as well as the SAS.

**US Land Forces**[^24]

At present, US land forces operate extremely well in the context of
high-intensity warfare. Current doctrine reflects this excellent record.
The conventional side of the conflict in Iraq was a success, reinforcing
the reasons why most states will not attempt a conventional war against
the US.

In the area of low-intensity operations, US land forces have not been
adequately trained and current doctrine does not reflect the need for
such training. If America intends to pursue terrorists around the world,
including raids into harboring countries, or to intervene in internal
conflicts for humanitarian reasons, she will need to incorporate
low-intensity operations into both training and doctrine. As an American
Colonel, Daniel Bolger, asserted in 1991: "to meet further challenges,
America's Army must turn from the warm and well-deserved glow of the
Persian Gulf victory (1990/1991, high intensity) and embrace, once more,
the real business of regulars, the stinking gray shadow world of 'savage
wars of peace', as Rudyard Kipling called them."[^25]

The American land forces are a highly competent and professional force.
So why, then, do current operations in Iraq indicate that they are
unfamiliar with the parameters of a proper low-intensity operational
plan? It comes down to the fact that the lessons that armies learn from
past victories and defeats may not be the correct lessons. The
post-Vietnam COIN debate within the US Army provides a good example of
this phenomenon. In examining this discussion, it is evident that
lessons and possible solutions lie not only in examinations of British
COIN doctrine, but also with US doctrine and experience that extends
over 60 years. Larry Cable notes that "until the great failure of US
policy in Vietnam . . . American political and military experience had
shown repeatedly that the US government and military were capable of
developing good ideas concerning the nature of insurgency, the
requirements for successfully countering it."[^26] Past history
demonstrates that the needs for the US are not revolutionary but
evolutionary.

**Doctrinal Debate since Vietnam**

Major John Nagl[^27] pointed out, in his important study of the Vietnam
War, that "the US Army has failed to form a consensus on the lessons of
Vietnam and has not accepted the idea that revolutionary war requires a
qualitatively different response from the conventional warfare it knows
so well how to fight."[^28] The US Army and US Marines have continued to
experience difficulties with low-intensity operations, principally
because the higher command has not incorporated the appropriate lessons
of COIN in general and Vietnam in particular.

Attempts to analyze and understand the failings of the US Army in
Vietnam have been divided into two distinct doctrinal camps. The first
attempts to assess the lessons from Vietnam began at the Army War
College in 1974, attempting "not to assume that there's a point-to-point
relationship between the lessons of Vietnam and what we would do the
next time, but toward an open, professionally stimulated and informed
leadership corps, believing that anyone would be delinquent not to
learn."[^29]

This attempt was stymied by General William DePuy, who, in overseeing
the preparation of the 1976 US Army doctrine document, FM 100-5
*Operations*, turned the army away from Vietnam lessons to focus on
large conventional wars. This document contained no mention of COIN.
Following this omission, the Command and General Staff College cut the
topic of COIN from 44 to nine hours of instruction by 1979.[^30]

The 1980s proved to be a defining period for US Army doctrine and
understanding of low-intensity warfare, characterized by the
interpretations of two very different books, one written under the
Army's auspices and the other not. The first book, the 1982 study *On
Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War,* was commissioned by
the Army War College and written by Colonel Harry Summers. The central
thesis of Summers' book was that the US had wasted its resources
fighting a COIN operation in South Vietnam and should instead have taken
the war to the North Vietnamese Army, using a conventional approach.
This theory was widely acclaimed in the US Army in the 1980s as the sole
reason for failure in Vietnam and the rationale for refocusing its
efforts on conventional warfare. Michael Hennessey commented that "many
in the US military \[had\] come to regard the basic concepts of
counterinsurgency doctrine as fatally flawed or directed toward truly
unobtainable goals."[^31]

Not all army officers agreed with these findings. The most important
book stating the other side of the argument was Major Andrew
Krepinevich's *The Army and Vietnam*. Krepinevich's central thesis is
that the US Army fought the wrong war in Vietnam. Proper COIN operations
were never allowed to take hold, pushed aside in an attempt to seek a
major conventional war with the main forces of the North Vietnamese
Army. Krepinevich concluded that "the result \[of US policy in Vietnam\]
has been instead of gaining a better understanding of how to wage
counterinsurgency warfare within the unique social, economic, political,
and military dimensions comprising that form of conflict . . . the Army
has learned little of value."[^32]

The Reagan administration reinforced most of Summers' viewpoints. In
1983, the administration published the 'Weinberger Doctrine', which was
widely construed as an attempt to structure military policy to avoid
future Vietnam scenarios. Robert Komer noted, after the Weinberger
Doctrine was published, "of course insurgencies did not stop occurring.
Moreover, a decade after the fall of Saigon, there has been a modest
revival of US interest in COIN. . . . But we still do not seem to have
profited by many of the operational lessons so expensively learned in
Vietnam. . . . \[T\]hose who do not learn from history are condemned to
repeat it."[^33]

At this juncture, the US Army also began to develop its new Air-Land
Battle[^34] or "Maneuverist Warfare" (MW) doctrine.[^35] While the new
doctrine emphasizes overwhelming firepower to defeat a main enemy, there
are aspects that cross over to COIN doctrine. For example, MW stresses
the need for junior leadership and initiative, which is also a
cornerstone of COIN doctrine. A COIN operation is often described as a
platoon officer's war. This had not been specified in previous US
doctrine as far as my research indicates. Larry Cable's comments appear
to support this; he states that "doctrinal statements developed in the
1980s. . . demonstrate a complete and pervasive ignorance of the
historical realities governing counter-insurgency."[^36]

The end of the Cold War has changed the landscape of conflict. Despite
the possibility of future interventions in small wars around the world,
the US military has made no fundamental changes to its recent doctrine.
Low-intensity conflict has been redefined as "Operations Other Than War"
(OOTW), which incorporates all fighting not classified as high
intensity. As of the mid-1990s, both doctrine and training of the
military were showing gaps. General Maxwell Thurman asserted that "the
military education system does not prepare officers adequately for such
activities \[OOTW\] or equip them with the in-depth knowledge . . . to
be able to co-ordinate the activities of \[a counter\]insurgency
team."[^37] Jennifer Taw and John Peters, examining the implications of
low-intensity conflicts for the US Army in 1995, found shortcomings in
OOTW doctrine and training. They also identified the US military's
emphasis on overwhelming force.[^38] They acknowledge that there have
been attempts in the 1990s to update US Army doctrine[^39], but assert
that there is still much to be done.[^40] Writing in 2002, Nagl confirms
that many of the issues raised in the 1990s have not been addressed, and
describes the consequences: "By failing to learn the lessons of Vietnam,
the US Army continued to prepare itself to fight the wrong war."[^41]
British officers who have served alongside US forces in Iraq echo this
sentiment.[^42]

The US military has the resources to the re-examine and update its
doctrine and training. The US military has the professionalism and
expertise to adopt and apply COIN techniques, and has successfully
utilized COIN strategies in the past.[^43] For fundamental, structural
change to happen, the White House and the Department of Defense will
have to tell the US military to shift its focus. Assuming this is
feasible, the US military can also use a close relationship with their
British counterparts to absorb some of the lessons of COIN that the
British have slowly and painfully learned through 50 years of COIN
operations. There are indications that such a shift in focus is already
happening: in a recent high-level war game in Washington, DC, the US
forces, initially engaged against a conventional enemy, quickly found
themselves in an insurgency. The planners acknowledged the difficulty of
grappling with this situation, and commented that there were valuable
lessons to be learned.[^44]

**British Forces and Experiences:**

Most of this section is based upon conversations with British officers
regarding operations in Iraq, to outline lessons and techniques that
might be useful to the US military in present and future low-intensity
situations. This is not to imply that the British are experts in COIN
and in a position to instruct the US military in the proper use of COIN.
Most of current British COIN doctrine has been formed through years of
painful trial and error.[^45]

As stated earlier, current British doctrine relating to maneuver
(high-intensity) warfare is comprehensive, although lessons from Iraq
have demonstrated some shortcomings in the areas of logistics, and the
superior resources of the US military means that practically, the
British will continue to depend upon the US for support in various
areas. In general, however, all of the forces deployed in Iraq fulfilled
their roles in keeping with the expectations of current doctrine.[^46]

The UK doctrine and training structure considers conventional warfare as
the primary consideration. COIN technique is an important aspect of
warfare that must be mastered, but only after a thorough grounding in
conventional battle doctrine. COIN doctrine in the UK is fairly well
developed, and a process has been established by which lessons of
conflict are evaluated by the Ministry of Defence and incorporated into
doctrine. This process has accelerated in the past 10 years, and the
establishment of the process itself is the result of learning lessons.
While British COIN doctrine dates back as far as the Malayan Emergency
(1948-60),[^47] the British Army has failed periodically to prepare for
operations involving COIN technique; the first years of the Northern
Ireland operation provide an instructive example. Having realized this
error, the British Army took steps not to repeat it, and throughout the
1970s and 1980s, British Army troops were trained both for potential
conventional conflict against the Warsaw Pact states and for deployment
to Northern Ireland. The Army established a training center in Kent
specifically for COIN training.[^48]

The British siege of Basra (March-April 2003) highlights their
particular approach. Over the course of several weeks, the British
surrounded the city. Instead of launching a full-blown conventional
attack, the British undertook small- and large-scale raids in order to
wear down, demoralize, and infiltrate the Iraqi opposition, and gather
intelligence necessary to accurately assess the fighting ability and
location of the Iraqi opposition. The British did not seek a major
battle for fear of massive civilian casualties in a city of 1.5 million
people. Despite some criticism of what was perceived as hesitancy on the
part of the commander, Major General Robin Brims, the British carried on
with their strategy, completing probing raids and gaining human
intelligence. The city was eventually taken in a major raid with the
loss of only two British soldiers.[^49]

The main advantage that the British have over their American
counterparts is that they have learned, as the result of 35 years on
operation in Northern Ireland, that training in low-intensity warfare is
necessary for the whole Army. From my own experience, I can relate that
officer cadets at Royal Military Academy Sandhurst are not only trained
in COIN technique, but also educated in its principles. Classroom
instruction includes eleven case studies dealing with high- and
low-intensity warfare; COIN and insurgency comprise one-third of
these.[^50].

American forces have provided much-needed information and advice on
conducting high-intensity warfare to their British counterparts in the
past. Given that the future of war is likely to include a greater focus
on low-intensity operations, now may be the time for the Americans to
ask the British to return the favor.[^51] While the Americans may seek
knowledge from the British, however, it should never be with the
intention of applying British COIN structure to US military operations.
The US military has its own history and traditions, and the mechanisms
within its structure are significantly different, in mentality as well
as organization. The Americans need to develop and implement their own
system, shored up with advice from the British on lessons learned and
pitfalls to avoid.[^52]

**The Role of Technology in Low-Intensity Warfare?**

Technology will have a role to play in both high- and low-intensity
conflicts of the future. Nevertheless, the drive for more technology or
unmanned weapon systems may have a detrimental effect upon low-intensity
operations. This pertains not only to weapons but also to potential
over-reliance on technology to provide intelligence. To take a
contemporary example: recent targeted missile attacks by the Israeli
Defense Force (IDF) against Hamas have not stopped the campaign of
suicide attacks, and may even be increasing resistance. To make matters
worse, even targeted missiles do go astray and kill innocent people,
particularly children. The propaganda value of this for the terrorist or
insurgent is likely to outweigh the military value. The IDF and Israeli
government need to recognize that reliance on technology alone is not
going to defeat Hamas.

Dr Stephen Biddle's paper analyzing the American operations in
Afghanistan in 2001-2 stresses that, while precision-guided munitions
(PGMs) may have occasionally added value on the battlefield, they were
not part of any revolution in military affairs arising from the war. He
asserts that "as a whole, then, we should be wary of claims that
Afghanistan represents a revolution in warfare. . . . \[A\]nd perhaps
the most important of these lessons is that warfare's future may have
more in common with its past than many in the current debate would have
us believe." [^53] This point is very important when considering issues
of technology and how it could change the battlefield in the future.
Biddle also points out that there has in the recent past been an
overwhelming emphasis in the US military on technology for intelligence
gathering. Operations in Afghanistan provided numerous examples of this,
and highlighted the shortcomings of such an approach, as when US forces
carried out a raid on a wedding party. To avoid similar mistakes,
leading to civilian casualties and hostility, in the future, American
and British forces must cultivate human intelligence in low-intensity
operations. The enemies of the future will be able to understand us
better; many of them will have been educated in the west or otherwise
exposed to western society. We need to cultivate similar access. As Taw
and Peters noted in 1995, the US Army and civil agencies must recognize
that "intelligence gathering is critical in OOTW. . . . \[T\]he
importance of exploiting contacts with other agencies and local
population should be made clear to US soldiers, as should the need for
subtlety in such efforts so as to avoid aggravating local
sensitivities."[^54]

A recent paper by Colonel Richard Iron, deputy Director of (British)
Army Doctrine, on "Decision Superiority"[^55] provides an up-to-date
insight into the limitations of technology against an insurgency such as
the one currently underway in Iraq. In all insurgencies, past and
future, the initiative rests with the insurgents. The military and
police must learn the doctrine and fighting methods of the insurgents in
order to respond appropriately. However, as Colonel Iron has noted,
"knowledge of the way insurgent or terrorist groups work is really
important. But it doesn't come easily or quickly. It comes from
painstaking analysis of enemy patterns. . . . \[A\]dvanced IT certainly
helps to store, retrieve, and analyse data, but it takes humans to
collect the information in the first place. . . . \[W\]e need to work on
\[human and cultural\] intelligence. . . . \[I\]t doesn't come through
satellite imagery. . . . \[I\]t comes from talking to people."[^56]

**Conclusion**

Future wars may well encompass both high- and low-intensity conflict,
but, despite the military superiority of the US and UK, they are likely
to find themselves facing civil disorders, terrorists, and insurgencies
if they choose to intervene in countries, for whatever reason (e.g.,
regime change, WMD, terrorists). The critical decision that the US and
UK will face, in contemplating any future conflict, is whether the gain
from engaging in that conflict is worth the risk of entangling military
personnel in a long-term insurgency campaign. Having made this decision,
the key to US and UK success in future campaigns will be the ability to
operate at two different levels of conflict. Incorporating this
adaptability does not represent a revolution in military affairs, but
rather an evolutionary process. It is a necessary shift, but one that
has a wealth of resources and historical precedent to draw upon in
developing doctrine and training methods. Technology is a useful adjunct
to both present and future wars, but is unlikely to ever reach a level
of sophistication that will render human intelligence gathering
obsolete. Individual human contact and initiative are at the heart of
every aspect of COIN doctrine, and skill in these areas will win the
low-intensity conflicts of the future. The basic strategies of
initiating low-intensity conflict have changed very little throughout
the history of war, despite advances in technology and military
thinking. Effective methods of countering low-intensity campaigns must
take account of the realities of each situation, rather than rely on
rigid doctrines or preconceived ideas.

[^1]: Due to the Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) promised by nuclear
    weapons, it is generally assumed that states will not risk their
    usage.

[^2]: There is some debate regarding definitions of high- and
    low-intensity conflict, and various authors over the years have
    attempted to change or adapt the definitions provided by General
    Frank Kitson in his seminal work, *Low* *Intensity Operations*. The
    debate over the definition of "high intensity" does not center on
    total versus limited, but to what extent the various militaries
    sought the destruction of the opponents' "main" forces.
    Insurgencies, counter-insurgency operations, peacekeeping, and peace
    enforcement are generally lumped together as "low intensity." There
    are of course some wars that are difficult to classify, such as the
    Vietnam War (1965-73). This involved aspects of both high- and
    low-intensity, as the US did not invade the North to destroy the
    main forces of the NVA, which would have conclusively defined it as
    high intensity. My definition of low-intensity warfare tends to
    agree with Kitson's, as do both US and UK doctrine, which classify
    all conflicts short of conventional war as Operations Other than War
    (OOTW). The caveat to this definition is, as Christopher Bellamy
    comments, that "it \[is\] a form of shorthand, to embrace several
    kinds of operations defined not only by their intensity, as such,
    but their political origins and character. To read an interesting
    debate on terminology, see Christopher Bellamy, "Spiral through
    Time: Beyond 'Conflict Intensity'," Strategic & Combat Studies
    Institute, Camberley, UK, 1998, pp. 16-31.

[^3]: Used to designate, collectively, Australia, Canada, China, Japan,
    New Zealand, the USA, and Western Europe.

[^4]: Realistically, war between the UK and France, or the US and Russia
    is unlikely. However, two states such as Vietnam and Laos may begin
    a territorial dispute that could spiral into a high-intensity war.

[^5]: The present US Joint Chiefs of Staff definition of asymmetrical
    warfare is: "attempts to circumvent or undermine an opponent's
    strengths while exploiting his weaknesses using methods that differ
    significantly from the opponent's usual mode of operations." Roger
    Barnett, *Asymmetrical Warfare: Today's Challenge to US Military
    Power*, Brassey's, Washington, DC, 2003, p. 15.

[^6]: The present war in Iraq is an example of this. The initial war
    envisioned the destruction of the Iraqi "main" forces, and was
    successful, but the Iraqis have created a second conflict involving
    low-intensity elements. The Coalition did not focus sufficiently on
    planning for nation building. The DoD's explanation for this was
    that they had been told by Chalabi that they would be greeted with
    roses, but if we plan such engagements in the future, we will need
    to be ready for insurgencies and nation-building. Military troops
    will need to coordinate very closely with civilian agencies in
    rebuilding activities.

[^7]: Such as British operations in Oman (1970-5, see below) or US SOFs
    deployment in the Philippines.

[^8]: General Frank Kitson, *Low Intensity Operations*, London, Faber
    and Faber, 1971, p. 27. Note that this was written at the height of
    the Cold War, well before the establishment of the "New World
    Order."

[^9]: There are many examples of this phenomenon. One is the use of
    tanks in the inter-war period and in the Yom Kippur War. Tanks were
    expected to be a breakthrough weapons system, but each army
    developed different theories about their use. Even the Germans, who
    are often cited as the premier users of mechanized forces,
    encountered problems in deploying tanks effectively and in adapting
    their capabilities to changing strategic situations. The Israelis
    were guilty of over-reliance on tanks and air during the Yom Kippur
    War, having misinterpreted the lessons of the Six-Day War.

[^10]: *British Military Doctrine*, 1997 edition.

[^11]: Brian Holden Reid,"Enduring Patterns in Modern Warfare," *The
    Nature of Future Conflict: Implications for Force Development*,
    Strategic & Combat Studies Institute, Camberley, UK, 1998, p. 28.

[^12]: Jennifer Morrison Taw and Bruce Hoffman, "The Urbanization of
    Insurgency: The Political Challenge to US Army Operations," *Small
    Wars and Insurgencies*, Vol. 6, No. 1 (spring 1995), p. 68.

[^13]: Kitson forecasted the potential for low-intensity operations in
    the 1970s, and Andrew Krepinevich predicted, in his 1986 book *Army
    and Vietnam*, that "low-intensity warfare represents the most likely
    arena of future conflict for the \[US\] Army, and counterinsurgency
    the most demanding contingency." p. 274. Both men were writing
    during the height of the Cold War.

[^14]: Political pressure from both Washington and London after the
    recent terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament was probably
    instrumental in lessening the likelihood of all-out war.

[^15]: Both the Israeli Defence Forces and the Indian Army are
    experiencing difficulty applying proper long-term solutions to
    situations in which they find themselves dealing with low-intensity
    conflict.

[^16]: One potential threat to this apparent state of détente is if the
    insurgencies in either area were to provide the spark to re-ignite a
    larger conflict. This is a difficult scenario to gauge and, leaving
    this possibility aside, it is unlikely that the US/UK would
    intervene in these areas with military force, preferring instead to
    rely on political pressure.

[^17]: The operations of the British in Oman are an important case study
    of a small operation with SAS. The British role in the area was
    significant but has always been kept quiet. To this day, in Oman,
    the role of the SAS is not advertised. For more information on the
    campaign, see Tony Jeapes, *SAS Secret War*; John Akehurst, *We Won
    a War*; Kenneth Perkins, *A Fortunate Soldier;* Ian Beckett and John
    Pimlott, *Armed Forces and Modern Counter-Insurgency*; and Thomas
    Mockaitis, *British Counterinsurgency in the Post Imperial* *Age*.

[^18]: Kitson, *Low Intensity*, p. 24.

[^19]: Russia and China should never be ruled out, as both are likely to
    maintain major conventional and nuclear forces.

[^20]: The recent controversy surrounding photos of US caskets arriving
    on planes from Iraq underscores the political sensitivity of this
    issue in the US. The British, by contrast, have been able to display
    images of dead soldiers' caskets on their own MoD website.

[^21]: Colin McInnes, "The British Army: Adapting to change in the 1990s
    and beyond," *The Nature of Future Conflict: Implications for Force
    Development*, Strategic & Combat Studies Institute, Camberley, UK,
    1998, p. 75.

[^22]: Contrary to common belief, armored infantry and armored
    formations *can* carry out low-intensity operations, even in
    conjunction with high-intensity operations. I recently interviewed
    officers of a British armoured regiment that had served in Operation
    Telic (Gulf War II), who discussed their experiences in carrying out
    both sorts of conflict. Due to the fact that these men are still on
    active duty, I will refer to these interviews without citing
    regiments or names. This will also apply to interviews I have
    carried out with other senior British officers.

[^23]: This has been the chief role of the military as described by
    various COIN theorists, including Robert Thompson, *Defeating*
    *Communist Insurgency*; Frank Kitson, *Low Intensity Operations* and
    *Bunch of Five*; Douglas Blaufarb, *The Counterinsurgency Era*;
    Robert Komer, *Beaucracy at War*; Peter Paret, *French
    Counterinsurgency Warfare from Indo-China to Algeria*; John Nagl,
    *Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam*; and Andrew
    Krepenvich, *Army and Vietnam*.

[^24]: Most of the material for this section focuses on US Army
    doctrine. Due to time constraints, I was not able to consult very
    much material relevant to the USMC. However, I was able to speak
    with Bruce Gudmundsson and Colonel Reginald Ghiden USMC (ret.). Both
    indicated that the USMC has closely followed the US Army in
    regarding conventional war as "real war" and has generally dismissed
    the lessons gathered by the USMC from COIN operations in I Corps in
    South Vietnam. Various conversations since December 2003.

[^25]: Daniel Bolger, "The Ghosts of Omdurman," *Parameters* (Autumn
    1991), pp. 31-32.

[^26]: Larry Cable, "Reinventing the Round Wheel: Insurgency,
    Counter-Insurgency, and Peacekeeping Post Cold War," *Small* *Wars
    and Insurgencies*, Vol. 4, No. 2 (Autumn 1993), p. 228.

[^27]: Major Nagl is currently serving in Iraq and attempting to
    implement COIN techniques in his command area. See Peter Maass'
    "Professor Nagl's War," *The* *New York Times*, January 11, 2004.

[^28]: John Nagl, *Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam:
    Learning to East Soup with a Knife*, Praeger, 2002, p. 205.

[^29]: Nagl, pp. 205-6.

[^30]: Nagl, p. 206.

[^31]: Michael Hennessey, *Strategy in Vietnam: The Marines and
    Revolutionary Warfare in I Corps, 1965-1972*, Praeger, 1997, p. 7.

[^32]: Krepinevich, pp. 274-5.Robert Komer, the former head of the
    attempted COIN strategy in Vietnam, CORDS, published *Bureaucracy at
    War* about this time. His work supports Krepenvich and dismisses
    Summers.

[^33]: Komer, p. 173.

[^34]: The new doctrine was similar to the "Army Concept" that predated
    it. Krepinevich commented that "characteristics of the 'Army
    Concept' are two: a focus on conventional war and a reliance on
    heavy firepower to minimize casualties." Krepinevich, pp. 4-7.

[^35]: This doctrine now defines both the US military and British Army.
    Debates about the validity of the new doctrine are beyond the scope
    of this paper.

[^36]: Cable, p. 253.

[^37]: Jennifer Taw and John Peters, "Operations other Than War:
    Implications for the US Army," *Small Wars and Insurgencies*, Vol.
    6, No. 3, (Winter 1995), p. 400.

[^38]: *Ibid*.

[^39]: The 1993 FM 100-5 *Operations* committed only eight pages to
    OOTW.

[^40]: See Taw and Peters, Vol. 6, pp. 402-4.

[^41]: Nagl, p. 208.

[^42]: Interviews with British officers in Germany and UK, March 2004.

[^43]: See Larry Cable, "Reinventing the Wheel," *Small Wars and
    Insurgencies*, Vol. 4, No. 2; Laurence Greenberg, *The Hukbalahap
    Insurrection*; Napoleon Valeriano and Charles Bohannan,
    *Counterguerrilla* *Operations*; Douglas Blaufarb, *The
    Counterinsurgency Era*, USMC Small Wars Manual (1940); and Michael
    Hennessey, *Strategy in Vietnam*.

[^44]: Conversation with a senior officer, May 2004. He also commented
    that he was not sure the generals would have drawn the same
    conclusion in January 2003, before experiencing the situation in
    Iraq.

[^45]: Northern Ireland from 1970-5 provides an excellent example of
    both insufficient doctrine and painful trial and error.

[^46]: Interviews with British officers, March 2004.

[^47]: *The Conduct* *of* *Anti-terrorist Operations in Malaya*, 1952;
    *Anti-Mau Mau Operations*, 1954; Keeping the Peace, 1957 and 1963;
    *Land* *Operations* "Counter-Revolutionary Operations," 1969 and
    1977; and the current *Army Field Manual* Vol. 1, Combined Arms
    Operations, "Counter Insurgency Operations", 2001. The current text
    devotes nearly 200 pages to insurgency and COIN. It discusses the
    past and ends by articulating the principles of British COIN.

[^48]: Some American troops and officers have been sent to this school
    in recent months before deployment to Iraq. Some of the training
    staff have commented that some of the Americans do not seem to take
    the training seriously. Interviews with British officers, March
    2004.

[^49]: Colonel Richard Iron, "Decision Superiority," 29 April 2004.

[^50]: These case studies present the whole British experience, not just
    success stories. The limitations of British Army operations in
    Ireland, 1919-21, are examined, as well as the foundations they laid
    for future operations. The importance of doctrine is stressed, but
    so is the fact that it will need to be adapted to the particular
    environment in which the officers find themselves.

[^51]: General Jackson, Chief of the British Army, has commented that
    there is "friction" between the US and UK military forces in Iraq
    over differing low-intensity strategies.

[^52]: As an American working closely with the British military, I have
    had a unique opportunity to observe how the two systems compare and
    contrast.

[^53]: Stephen Biddle, "Afghanistan and the Future of Warfare:
    Implications for Army and Defense Policy," Strategic Studies
    Institute, US Army, November 2002, pp. 56-7.

[^54]: Taw and Peters, Vol. 6, p. 401.

[^55]: Paper presented at the Office of Net Assessment Seminar on
    Transformation and Operational Art (US, UK, Israel), April 29, 2004.

[^56]: Colonel Iron, p. 7.