## U.S. Department of Education

#### Safe and Drug-Free Schools and Communities

Advisory Committee Meeting

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Barnard Auditorium

400 Maryland Avenue, SW

Washington, DC 20202

October 23-24, 2006

> **AGENDA**
>
> **Monday, October 23:**
>
> 8:30 -- 9:00 Breakfast and Registration
>
> 9:00 -- 9:05 Opening Statement and Announcements
>
> 9:05 -- 9:10 Introduction of Panel I: *Association and Organization
> Perspective*
>
> 9:10 -- 10:20 Panelist Presentations
>
> Vera Institute of Justice, Annie Salsich, Sr. Program Associate
>
> National Association of School Safety and Law Enforcement Officers --
> Peter Pochowski, Midwest Director

National Association of Secondary School Principals -- Bill Bond, School
Safety Specialist

New York State Comptroller's Office -- Jerry Barber, Assistant

> Comptroller

10:20 -- 11:00 Questions & Answers: Committee to Panelists

11:00 -- 11:15 Break

11:15 -- 11:20 Introduction of Panel II: *Department of Education: Two
Perspectives*

11:20 -- 12:30 Panelist Presentations

> Office of Inspector General, U.S. Department of Education -- Richard
> Rasa, Director, State and Local Advisory and Assistance Services, and
> Bernard Tadley, Regional Inspector General

Office of Safe and Drug-Free School, U.S. Department of Education --
Paul Kesner, Director, State Grant Program

12:30 \-- 1:10 Questions and Answers

1:10 -- 1:55 Lunch

**Agenda, continued:**

> 1:55 -- 2:00 Introductions of Panel III: *State Education Agency
> Perspective*
>
> 2:00 -- 3:10 Panelists Presentations
>
> New Jersey Department of Education -- Susan Martz, Director of the
> Office of Program Support Services
>
> Texas State Education Agency -- Cory Green, Senior Director of the
> NCLB Program Coordination Division
>
> California Department of Education -- Meredith Rolfe, Administrator of
> the Safe and Healthy Kids Program Office
>
> Colorado Department of Education -- Janelle Krueger, Principal
> Consultant for the Safe and Drug-Free Schools Program
>
> 3:10 -- 3:50 Questions & Answers
>
> 3:50 -- 4:05 Break
>
> 4:05 -- 4:40 Public Comment
>
> 4:40- 5:00 Summary and Closing Remarks
>
> **[Tuesday, October 24:]{.smallcaps}**
>
> 8:00 -- 8:30 Breakfast
>
> 8:30 -- 8:40 Opening Statement
>
> 8:40 -- 10:15 Discussion of Advisory Committee Members
>
> 10:15 -- 10:45 Remarks from Secretary Margaret Spellings (tentative)
>
> 10:45 -- 11:25 Discussion by Members
>
> 11:25 -- 11:30 Closing Comments
>
> 11:30 Adjournment

### Monday, October 23, 2006

*The session convened at 9 a.m.*

David Long, chair, welcomed attendees, and noted that the day's panel
presentations with focus on the 'persistently dangerous schools' \[PDS\]
component of the No Child Left Behind \[NCLB\] Act. He introduced the
first panel.

First Panel: *Association and Organization Perspective*

Annie Salsich, Senior Program Associate, Vera Institute of Justice

Peter Pochowski, Midwest Director, National Association of School Safety
and Law Enforcement Officers -- Peter

Bill Bond, School Safety Specialist, National Association of Secondary
School Principals

Jerry Barber, Assistant Comptroller, New York State Comptroller's Office

*\[Panelists made written submissions; a summary of comments follows\]*

Annie Salsich noted that the PDS initiative had received considerable
attention from the press, but little formal analysis. She noted that
while states had similar approaches, outcomes varied: most states had
not identified any persistently dangerous schools. Many states had set
designation standards that were difficult, if not impossible, to meet.
The phrase 'persistently dangerous school' was politically unpalatable
to education officials; further, the legislation provided no help to
schools so designated. Salsich listed five conditions as characteristic
of unsafe schools: serious violence; bullying, intimidation and
harassment; disorderly common areas; lack of connectedness to the
school; and inconsistent disciplinary practices.

Salsich said most strategies used to monitor school safety were limited
and inconsistent: the key student statement associated with safe schools
was: 'I feel welcome when I am at school.' Salsich urged, first, that
multiple data sources, including school climate surveys, be used to
assess school safety and, second, that a 'watch list' be created to
identify schools that were struggling with safety issues before they
were labeled 'persistently unsafe.'

Bill Bond stated that statistics on acts of overt violence, while a
simple criteria, were not the most accurate. Most students were more
concerned with intimidation and bullying than with fistfights. He noted
that if a student struck another, the likelihood of consequence was
high: this was not true with lesser offenses. He believed likelihood of
consequence was more important that severity of consequence; with
bullying and intimidation, the likelihood of consequence was low. He
believed each state should mandate use of a school climate survey, with
results maintained within the school for administrative guidance, though
not passed up to the state level. School administrators were
'data-driven;' they would act if confronted with school survey results.

Peter Pochowski said the term 'persistently dangerous school' was
stigmatizing and caused an undue hardship for already challenged
principals; the stigma made principals reluctant to gather data: this
legislation asked principals to collect data that could be used against
them in personnel decisions. Pochowski said he believed states had too
much leeway to define standards for persistently dangerous; he
recommended the federal government mandate use of some of the criteria
each state used in its determinations. Pochowski noted serious
under-reporting of school incidents: one school studied had reported 144
incidents, while student records showed 924 -- the number of assaults,
reported at 20, was actually 126. He urged the Department to undertake
more aggressive oversight of reporting; those engaged in reporting might
need additional training.

*Questions and Discussion:*

Fred Ellis noted that 'bullying' was Annie Salsich's second criteria;
had she received any feedback on gang activity. Salsich said gang
activity had not been cited in student interviews; generally, students
focused on daily concerns of feeling scared or uneasy in school. Peter
Pochowski said that while gangs were a problem, he thought them less of
a problem than media reports suggested.

Russell Jones asked if questions about 'trauma' had been asked in the
surveys; he believed trauma was universal and drove much of the behavior
that was of concern in schools. Annie Salsich said the interview
protocol did not involve asking direct questions. Jones said that while
people tended to focus on finite events -- e.g. a school shooting -- it
was essential to examine trauma generally; he believed an effort was
needed to seek information on trauma.

Sheppard Kellam noted that as a public health psychiatrist he had done
numerous field studies. Considerable research showed that children can
be identified as high risk in the first grade. This, he said, needed to
be addressed developmentally: 'problem' students in high school were
typically those who failed to learn to read at a young age or to become
socialized into the role of student. He believed intervention should be
started early, a task made more difficult by the circumstance that
teacher training did not adequately prepare new teachers for classroom
management.

Peter Pochowski said programs having the most success were those dealing
with younger students; people in the DARE program had told him that
targeting middle school students was 'too late.' He noted that his gang
intelligence unit was directing attention at fifth, sixth and seventh
grade students and their parents.

Sheppard Kellam said research emphasized the need to intervene in
kindergarten, first and second grade, the age at which flexibility was
the greatest. Bill Bond said he thought the legislation was political
and directed against high schools; the legislation should become more
proactive. At present, he added, there was no push for principals to use
the data. He believed dangerous schools could likely be predicted from
reading scores. Annie Salsich seconded the call for early intervention:
it was often difficult to work within high schools when there no longer
appeared to be hope for particular students.

Fred Ellis said the legislation recognized that education cannot take
place in an unsafe environment; further, one purpose of the legislation
was to force school districts to gather and to share data on school
safety and to provide options to students who have been harmed. He
endorsed measuring school culture and climate, but suggested this might
prove difficult: could the federal government intercede? He believed
parameters for school safety needed to be established. He took issue
with Bill Bond's suggestion that school safety data be retained within
the school: why should it not be shared? Bill Bond said data on school
climate would motivate principals and staff members to make changes. One
could, he said, create a system that emphasized accountability; however,
he doubted one could have both accountability and improvement. Ellis
commented that many might believe it important to make data available to
parents. Bond replied that parents should be able to see safety data on
request; still, if data was gathered with the intention of passing it
on, he believed the integrity of the data would suffer. Bond noted a
case in point: in 1997, three students had been killed and five wounded
at a school with 486 students; three years later, attendance had risen
to 639. Parents choosing to send their children to that school, he said,
were not reacting to the incidents but to how they students treated by
teachers and staff. Peter Pochowski noted that the school leadership
provided by the principal needed to be the focus of efforts.

Tommie Ledbetter said he was seeking to clarify the problem. Many
comments made during the committee's meeting on the State Grants Program
were being repeated. He noted one panelist's declaration that the
flexibility the law gave to states was a strength; he believed it might
be a weakness. Standards appeared greatly different from state to state:
perhaps this was the first matter to address. Annie Salsich noted that a
school found 'persistently dangerous' by one state's standards may well
not be so found in another; in her investigation, this had been a point
of considerable controversy: some wanted clearer parameters; others
preferred greater flexibility but more central guidance. Ledbetter asked
if giving specific definitions would 'fix' the legislation; Salsich
thought not.

Peter Pochowski said the legislation was good, but needed 'tweaking.' He
had, he said, never met a principal who had falsified records to make
themselves or their schools look good. More likely, he added, principals
did not know what to report: for example, they did not identify
'stealing the milk money' as an identifiable criminal act. Many
principals, he said, were unaware of the gradations within state laws.

Bill Bond said that, in many places, the law was having little impact:
for example, California did not report a single persistently dangerous
school. To the extent the data said anything, it said: 'Stay away from
Pennsylvania.' The phrase 'persistently dangerous school' was, he said,
a 'death sentence' to its enactment. Annie Salsich said she was hesitant
to create structured federal requirements; she agreed with Peter
Pochowski's suggestion that there be federal input into measurement
devices. She believed states wanted guidance on how to be 'intelligently
independent.'

Susan Keys, noting the stigmatizing nature of the legislation, asked if
it was possible to have both change and accountability. She sought the
panelists' advice on how the committee could satisfy the legislative
mandate while being supportive, rather than punitive, of schools.

Bill Bond said the term 'persistently dangerous school' was a major
problem. Individual states, he added, needed flexibility because legal
standards varied from state to state. He noted that the program was
geared to the high school level, even though most agreed that problems
generally traced to the elementary level. The committee needed to
clarify whether it was attempting to offer help or to enforce
accountability.

Annie Salsich recommended, as follows: first, the term 'persistently
dangerous' should be changed; second, schools should be given guidance
on how to identify problems; and third -- 'and critical' -- schools
should be given technical assistance on how to respond to poor school
environments. Finally, she suggested 'flipping' the definition: how did
one identify a safe school?

Russell Jones asked, given what was known about the negative effects of
labeling, what thinking lay behind the phrase 'persistently dangerous.'
Deborah Price said that required looking at the legislative history
behind NCLB to see what the thinking of Congress had been: she said this
portion of the law reflected the desire to allow parents to move
children out of dangerous settings. She noted that NCLB would come up
for reauthorization in 2007; the committee could have significant impact
on various elements of the law.

Seth Norman said the issue of drugs had not been raised: did the panel
see a connection between safety and drugs? Bill Bond said he believed
drugs had little to do with school safety; however, drugs had a negative
effect on school achievement, dropout rates and various other things.
Norman asked if, therefore, funds should be moved from drug prevention
efforts to safety concerns; Bond said no, as drugs had the negative
effects he had noted. Peter Pochowski said drugs led to unsafe
conditions outside schools. He noted that the legislation had been very
popular when passed: the country realized something needed to be done
about school safety. He urged attention to prevention efforts: he had
once attended a school with 2000 students; it had one principal and one
assistant principal. Today, that school had four assistant principals
and ten security guards. He said students today were not receiving
sufficient parental support: 40 percent of his students came from
fatherless homes; often, students were being raised by grandparents, who
might lack the necessary energy.

\* \* \*

Second Panel: *Department of Education: Two Perspectives*

Richard Rasa, Director, State and Local Advisory and Assistance
Services, Office of Inspector General, U.S. Department of Education, and
Bernard Tadley, Regional Inspector General

Paul Kesner, Director, State Grant Program, Office of Safe and Drug-Free
School, U.S. Department of Education

*Summary of Comments:*

Richard Rasa reported on audits of five states to determine compliance
with the Unsafe School Choice Option \[USCO\]; audit reports had been
issued, carrying recommended actions. In four states, he said, incident
reporting was based on disciplinary actions taken; therefore, some
violent acts were not being reported; data being used was generally not
sufficiently reliable to make a PDS determination. He reported that
districts generally could not demonstrate they had offered victims the
opportunity to transfer to another school. Rasa made three
recommendations: first, that states be required to report all criminal
offenses; second, that states verify that data collection was full; and
third, that transfer policies be put in place, with effected students
having the opportunity to transfer within 14 days.

Bernard Tadley noted that some standards made it virtually impossible
for a school to be designated PDS; in one state, a school could
experience four homicides and 19 weapons seizures without being
designated. In a second state, designation criteria were discarded when
it appeared they would identify 36 as PDS. Tadley said it was
'imperative' that statutory changes be made to require school to follow
these basic requirements: all violent incidents must be reported;
reasonable benchmarks must be set; and PDS designations must be made on
the basis of the must current year's data.

Paul Kesner reviewed the Department's support efforts: non-regulatory
guidance; workshops and meetings; data grants, and monitoring and
technical assistance. Kesner recommended, first, that PDS designations
be made on a single year's data; second, that data collection issues be
addressed. Data problems included the aggregating of data by districts,
which made assessment of individual schools difficult, and variations in
definitions used from state to state. He recommended objective data
standards be created that would include such things as: instances of
firearms brought to school; student survey data on fighting on school
grounds; and data on gang presence. Kesner said the term 'persistently
dangerous' was pejorative; that a 'watch list' of schools with safety
concerns should be created; that training be supplied on data
collection; that clear thresholds be established for PDS designation;
and that a clear policy exist for what data sources would be used and
who was responsible for collection and interpretation.

*Questions and Discussion:*

Sheppard Kellam noted there had been no discussion of how the program's
data effort would tie into existing school information systems. Kellam
urged the focus be placed on development issues: children who
persistently shove in kindergarten are those who do not intuitively
understand 'how to be a student.' Data collected on early behavior
should be integrated into existing systems; otherwise, data systems will
be created that can't be effectively used. The focus on development
needed to be extended to schools of education which, Kellam felt, do an
inadequate job of preparing teachers for classroom management.

Paul Kesner noted that 75 to 80 percent of schools identified as PDS
were also school that were failing to make adequate yearly progress; he
thought it surprising the correlation wasn't stronger. Richard Rasa said
his office would endorse data integration: he noted the Department of
Education lacked the internal controls to tie data systems together. He
called attention to two circumstances: first, a recent report on New
York State showed that a large number of school safety incidents were
not being reported; second, a significant number of New York district
superintendents had been unwilling to certify as accurate the data they
were submitting: this occurred even though superintendents had the
option to attach qualifications to their reports.

Fred Ellis said it appeared from Paul Kesner's statement that schools
were doing a poor job of student transfer. Kesner said states needed to
look at their options: transferring the victim or transferring the
perpetrator. Richard Rasa made reference to a 2003 hearing in Denver:
there, a theme emerged that it was important for parents to receive
information and to receive it in a timely way. He noted a case in which
harassment of a female student led eventually to her beating:
apparently, school administrators had been aware of the problem, but it
was not clear the parents had been informed.

Kim Dude said she regarded the legislation as ironic: schools that set
higher accountability standards for their students were more likely to
be designated. Her own work suggested that the more students knew about
fellow students being held accountable, the better they behaved: e.g.
when arrests for DUI went up, drunken driving declined. She felt that
schools which under-reported data were encouraging increased problems;
this she regarded as 'foolish and unproductive.'

Russell Jones commented that basic to the behavioral sciences was the
view that behavior was a function of its consequences: he was curious to
what extent states, schools, teachers and students had 'bought in' to
this program. What incentives were they being offered? Paul Kesner said
a motivator was required; while simply 'doing the right thing' was a
motivation for some, it was not for all. He believed the title
'persistently dangerous school' was a disincentive to school
cooperation. Richard Rasa said schools had few incentives to 'get into
the game and report the right numbers.' At the Denver hearing mentioned
above, he said, the question had been posed: 'who is the customer for
this?' He believed the ultimate customer was the parent of the children
attending a given school; unless parents were adequately informed, they
could not act effectively.

Russell Jones said parent and student involvement could accomplish a
great deal. He noted that after Hurricane Katrina, many focus groups had
been held to discover what people needed; he did not see a similar
effort in this setting. Further, he had heard no discussion of cultural
competence. Deborah Price said that one reason the law had accorded
states the authority to define terms was that this would make it easier
for a given community to identify which issues concerned it most. She
acknowledged that the results of this were mixed, and suggested states
might been the Department to supply baseline definitions.

Belinda Sims noted that the number of schools designated PDS is some
states had declined: what actions had been taken to accomplish this?
Bernard Tadley said that as much of the decline had occurred in
Pennsylvania, a state that had not been audited, he could not adequately
address the question. Richard Rasa said he hoped the decline meant that
improvements had taken place; in some cases, schools had been removed
from the list following appeal, and, he added, data may have been
manipulated or simply disappeared.

Mike Heermann said the committee faced the challenge of determining what
level of improvement was acceptable given available resources: were
there two or three indicators that were reasonably consistent across
state lines that could serve as a starting point? Paul Kesner suggested
the following: first, suspensions or expulsions for physical fighting;
second, number of firearms brought to school and expulsions or
suspensions related to this; third, victims of violent crimes. He added
that many LEAs have a form a student uses to report being victimized;
the form documents that the student and family have been informed of the
transfer option.

Dennis Romero urged the committee to consider information presented from
a development perspective: 'it is easier to work with children than to
fix adults.' Second, he believed parents were 'out of the loop' -- what
could be done to increase their involvement? Third, he believed the
question of trauma was not receiving sufficient attention; in
particular, the stigma that follows from being bullied or singled out.
Romero asked Paul Kesner about data grants the Department made to
states. Kesner said the data grants were to improve data collection at
the state level for all NCLB-related activities; he estimated that 17-18
states had received grants. Romero asked if that grant program
continued; Kesner said it did.

Kim Dude asked whether non-PDS schools had been surveyed to determine
students' perception of their school's safety. Do people in PDS schools,
she asked, actually feel less safe than those in other schools? Paul
Kesner said he was unaware of any comparative studies on this. Seth
Norman asked whether creating standard definitions would be of
assistance; Paul Kesner said it would be help in managing the data.
Bernard Talley said that in the audit work, definitions were not
consistent even between individual schools in the same district.

Susan Keys suggested that school data on fighting within the schools
could be used: if the program required data integrity, then the
committee needed to address the question of how a network of data
sources could be created. She warned against putting 'all our tricks in
one toolbox,' and asked what the feasibility was of developing multiple
sources.

Russell Jones identified two needs: first, an agreed upon glossary of
terms; second, a consistent data core.

Richard Rasa endorsed undertaking school climate surveys and using
multiple data sources: the big question, he said, was 'how do we know
what we have' and 'how does it come to us.' He and Bernard Tadley were
agreed that all violent incident behavior should be in the report; it
would be useful to parents if they could be assured that reporting was
complete.

Tommie Ledbetter seconded the need for workable definitions; phrases
like 'violent incident' were unclear. At his school of 1100 students,
most fighting was between girls -- generally, it related to somebody's
boyfriend. Commonly, the underlying issue was transferred into the
school from an out-of-school setting; did this make the school a
dangerous environment? He thought only 10 percent of in-school fighting
stemmed from an incident that had occurred in school.

David Long noted that comment that behavior was changed more by the
certainty of consequence than the severity of consequence: he asked what
the consequences had been of superintendents' refusal to certify their
reports. Richard Rasa said the example cited came from the New York
State report, which he did not have. He suggested that if a
superintendent refused to sign a report, that should be a 'red flag' and
someone should investigate it.

Sheppard Kellam said the committee's conversation worried him: he did
not think it could get 'from here to there.' He did not see data
gathering as the central concern; rather, the problem was that the
program did not address developmental issues. To be useful, any data
gathered had to be tied into the data system that tracked student
progress through school. If data systems were created in isolation, they
tended to become pejorative, with punishments worse than their positive
consequences. Kellam added that efforts were needed to identify what
criteria were important for establishing acceptable behavior early on.

Russell Jones said the solving the problems required partnering,
bringing in organizations and social workers and others; to extent that
partnering occurred, he added, 'we will move this train along the
track.'

\* \* \*

Third Panel: *State Education Agency Perspective*

Panelists:

Susan Martz, Director of the Office of Program Support Services, New
Jersey Department of Education

Cory Green, Senior Director of the NCLB, Program Coordination Division,
Texas State Education Agency

Meredith Rolfe, Administrator of the Safe and Healthy Kids Program
Office, California Department of Education

Janelle Krueger, Principal Consultant for the Safe and Drug-Free Schools
Program, Colorado Department of Education

*Summary of Comments:*

Susan Martz \[New Jersey\] described implementation of the law in New
Jersey, which, she said, had designated persistently dangerous schools;
had been audited and had received a data grant. In New Jersey, a school
was designated if for three consecutive years it had either 7 or more
category A offenses \[firearms offense, aggravated assault on a student,
weapons assault on a student, or assault on any school staff member\],
or produced a particular score on Category B offenses. She noted that
the number of schools designated had declined, but was not certain of
the reason. She noted that a school could not appeal a designation if it
had been made on the basis of data the school had supplied. She noted
the audit had been very time consuming. Martz recommended that the USCO
provision be repealed: supporting scientific research was lacking;
public labeling was unnecessary and state-to-state variability
undermined assessment. If retained, she urged that all states use
uniform criteria; that PDS be clearly defined; and that dedicated
funding exist for program administration and to provide transportation
to transferred students.

Cory Green \[Texas\] said Texas had defined 'persistently dangerous' as
any school that for three consecutive years had three or more selected
mandatory expulsion incidents per 1,000 students. He reported that in
2005-2006, two Texas schools had been designated; four in 2006-2007. He
noted that Texas, unlike many states, included felony drug and alcohol
offenses in its determination. He noted that the criteria would be
reviewed beginning November 2006. He noted that, in cases of sexual
assault, a district was required to transfer the perpetrator if the
victim did not wish to transfer. He reported that in 2005-2006, 96
students had been transferred for all reasons combined. Green believed
that requiring a school district to do things to which no funding was
attached placed a burden on the district. He said his state needed
strong guidance from the Department on what definitions were preferred
and what requirements were mandatory. He urged the committee to continue
to permit states to be flexible and use their existing data systems.

Meredith Rolfe \[California\] said the 'whole point' of the law was not
to catch schools, but to make them safer; this was why California
allowed a three-year period before determining a school was persistently
dangerous: that period gave schools the opportunity to make needed
improvements. Rolfe identified lessons learned from the experience --
first, 'hard' data wasn't hard; schools with high rates can be safe;
schools with low rates can be dangerous. She noted the view that what
indicated a school was unsafe was not statistics, but the absence of a
good safe school plan. California schools were required to have such a
plan, and update it annually. She believed the term 'persistently
dangerous' was so emotionally laden that it defeated the program's
purpose. She believed that if program funding was eliminated, the number
of 'persistently unsafe' schools would greatly increase.

Janelle Krueger \[Colorado\] addressed the reasons for resistance to
passage of the Unsafe School Choice Option \[USCO\]; the approach
Colorado had taken to addressing implementation; and pertinent
recommendations. Krueger suggested that resistance to the law should not
be confused with being uncaring: educators were 'bending over backwards'
to protect students. Colorado, she noted, was a 'public choice' state:
prior to NCLB, parents could enroll their children outside their
district of residence. She recommended adoption of Colorado's practice
that the perpetrator of an incident -- not the victim -- should suffer
the inconvenience of being transferred. More generally, Krueger
questioned the motives behind the law: the law was about school safety,
but did nothing to promote safety. Many people in Colorado, she said,
objected to the law's approach: they thought they should be shaping
student behavior, not reacting to it. She believed that since criminal
statutes and education law were unique to each state, mandatory
reporting items should also be unique to each state.

*Questions and Discussion:*

Deborah Price asked the state education agency representatives whether,
from their perspective, this aspect of NCLB had made any positive
impact. Susan Martz questioned if benefits were real; she would prefer
to take the time and energy the law's implementation required and direct
them to improving school safety. She noted that various aspects of the
law had already been in place in New Jersey. Corey Green seconded this
comment; Texas had already established many analogous requirements at
the state level. Meredith Rolfe said she did not believe California was
better off because of this law. Janelle Krueger said state law in
Colorado already met the intent of the law; she said the 'persistently
dangerous' label had created considerable anxiety about reporting the
data.

As follow up, Deborah Price asked if other states shared this view.
Susan Martz said the question was difficult to address: she suggested
the law be rewritten so that states that could demonstrate they were
meeting its intent could receive a waiver of its requirements. Meredith
Rolfe said she believed the panel was representative. Janelle Krueger
noted that Colorado received \$700,000 for Safe and Drug-Free Schools;
she urged the committee not to take steps that would create additional
work for the states.

Russell Jones commended the panelists for their efforts; he asked if
they shared insights and resources with other states: were particular
partnerships helpful in moving things forward? Meredith Rolfe outlined
the various partnership arrangements in which her office was engaged.
Cary Greene said Texas was similar: statewide committees brought
together personnel from various programs. Susan Martz said her office
was responsible for a range of services; fortunately, she added, New
Jersey's state legislature had made school safety a priority; meetings
were regularly held with the governor's office, the attorney general's
office and law enforcement.

Howell Wechsler asked panelists what they individually thought of the
alternative approaches Meredith Rolfe had presented. Cory Green said
Texas wanted flexibility within the state. Susan Martz endorsed
identifying schools with high priority concerns and providing resources
to them. Janelle Krueger commented that as Colorado districts had been
allowed to select their survey instrument, participating in an
additional national survey would not 'cause great excitement.' She
thought targeting schools in highest need was a good idea, but asked
where funds would come from and how it would be implemented. Meredith
Rolfe suggested that if Deborah Price's office could identify five key
school safety-related questions, these could be plugged into other
surveys; she did not believe a 20-page survey instrument was required.
Hope Taft said there were limits to what statistics could capture;
describing the world through statistics, she said, 'is like describing
the ocean floor one pebble at a time.'

Meredith Rolfe called attention to data supplied by the San Diego
program coordinator: it showed that as funding for drug education
declined, drug use increased. She added she believed drug use was
without question connected to school safety.

Sheppard Kellam said program operation required an enormous amount of
staff time; further, funds spent on it could not be spent elsewhere,
where he believed they would be put to better use. He did not believe
reliable data on the program's effectiveness existed, though there was
effectiveness data on other programs. The question was not simply: Was
this program helping? The question was: 'Relative to what was it
helping?'

Mike Herrmann commended the panel's work in laying out the problems; he
asked panelists if the process was rightly identifying which schools
should be the focus of concern. Susan Martz said she thought not: she
believed her office could identify New Jersey schools that were more
dangerous; further, she thought that schools which were aggressive about
reporting were likely to be identified.

Russell Jones asked if information existed on the quality of life or
quality of mental health of victims and perpetrators. Janelle Krueger
said the education community did not collect such data; some studies may
have been done on the local level, but no data had trickled up. Susan
Martz said that only in the past two years had her office in New Jersey
collected data on whether student victims were given the option to
transfer and, if so, whether they exercised that option. Russell Jones
asked how the program could be effective if it had no information on the
individuals most affected by school violence. Jones asked Deborah Price
if tracking of victims was part of the legislation. Price said the
pertinent legislative passage consisted of two short paragraphs; the
Department of Education was restricted in this area to giving
non-regulatory guidance.

Drawing discussion to a close, David Long thanked panel members for
their candor and contributions.

\* \* \*

*Public comment:*

David Long, chair, invited public comment.

Linda Mohammed, a parent leader from Baltimore, said she believed
parents and citizens were undervalued in education and were not
communicated with clearly. Her organization was working with local
officials to encourage a greater valuing of parents. Part of the
problem, she said, was that parents and school administrators did not
speak the same language. Noting Sheppard Kellam comments, she said her
group stressed the importance of early intervention; parents of children
in Head Start and kindergarten were eager to engage with their
children's education. She said those dealing with parents should
emphasize honesty in communication; this was important as there was too
often a lack of trust between school officials and parents. She noted
that when she had been a child, teachers had visited her home and talked
with her mother: this had helped to development trust; she was concerned
that such things no longer seemed common. She commended the committee
for its efforts.

Janelle Krueger \[member, Panel 3\] urged the committee to 'stay the
course' with Principles of Effectiveness, which she believed served the
field well. Second, she said the absence of statewide data did not mean
local data did not exist: she believed teachers would consistently state
that the Safe and Drug-Free schools initiative had made things happen.
Third, she expressed concern that substance abuse prevention was
becoming a lower priority: this appeared to follow from the greater
attention given to discipline problems and to school safety whenever a
high profile shooting occurs. Fourth, she noted that the community
advisory committees that had been a part of the effort had been largely
eliminated; while consultation was required, there was no formal
requirement. Finally, she noted that, if schools did not receive
additional funds to address '9/11' concerns, they were inclined to view
Safe and Drug-Free Schools as a source of funds, further reducing
support for the effort.

David Long thanks the panels, committee members and those making public
comments for their contributions; the information presented, he said,
would help frame the following day's discussion.

*The Monday session adjourned at 5 p.m.*

*\* \* \**

*Tuesday, October 24:*

*The session convened at 8:30 a.m.*

David Long opened the meeting, noting that the purpose of the discussion
was to identify recommended changes in the Persistently Dangerous School
\[PDS\] section of the No Child Left Behind \[NCLB\] Act. He urged
members to be candid and creative in their comments. He noted that all
members of the three presenting panels had agreed that the term
'Persistently Dangerous School' was a hurdle to achieving the
legislation's objectives. He urged that, prior to the group's next
conference call, committee members identify the specific name change
they would recommend.

Deborah Price noted that after its meeting on the State Grants program,
the committee had prepared an interim report to the Secretary of
Education; she suggested doing something similar now. NCLB, she added,
would be up for reauthorization in 2008; the Department, in considering
what it would put forward at that time, would benefit from the
committee's input. The committee would continue to work toward
presenting its final report in June.

*Discussion:*

Sheppard Kellam said he thought resources were being directed at the
wrong end of the problem. He advocated use of a new conceptual framework
oriented toward prevention: the focus should be on how children were
adapting to school, rather than on later felonious behavior. Doing this,
he said, would require an information system that was so focused from
the beginning. He urged that a public health assessment be made early on
assessing how classrooms were doing: too many teachers, he believed,
lacked the requisite tools. First-graders, he said, are highly malleable
-- they have not yet experienced sustained failure -- and attention
should be addressed to them.

Deborah Price noted that members of the state panel had said they did
not believe the program helped their efforts: this had not surprised
her, she said, as the states in question had already acted on the issues
involved. However, many other states were floundering. She agreed that
prevention was important; still, what was to be done about students
currently in persistently dangerous schools? While prevention could be
married to the current effort, she said, the current effort could not be
dropped.

Sheppard Kellam said intervention should not occur at a single point,
but involved tracking students over time. It was not an either/or
situation, but it required understanding that the task of education was
the life course of young people and socializing them was the way to
self-esteem.

Susan Keys said the question was how to shift to a prevention agenda
over the long term, yet still remedy situations that exist. She opposed
labeling individual schools; preferably, the system should provide
additional resources and technical assistance to schools that were
identified as struggling. The committee should remain focused on the
goal of creating healthy, safe school environments.

David Long noted that state level presenters had stated that students
had the option to transfer out of a dangerous school prior to NCLB: was
this the case and, if so, should the group recommend that 'choice' be
taken off the table?

Hope Taft said little scientific support for the PDS program had been
presented; this was at odds with other aspects of Title IV, which
emphasize evidence-based programs. This exception might set a bad
example. She welcomed making a positive rather than negative
declaration: designation as a Blue Ribbon school was highly sought;
perhaps guidelines could define what constituted a safe school with
awards to those who succeeded. The current approach, she said, told
schools they were failing without giving them any assistance on how to
improve. Commenting on 'choice,' Taft said that while it was absolutely
correct to provide victims with the option to move to another school,
this did not improve problems at the school in question. She added that
it might be preferable to relocate the person causing the trouble;
otherwise, they might regard their behavior as successful. Deborah Price
commented that if the victim liked their current school, transferring
them might constitute a second injury. She noted that the many districts
with only one high or middle school did not have this option. Taft said
Ohio had a system of alternate schools; districts banded together to
form the critical mass needed: this gave smaller districts more options.

Russell Jones said he believed the research methodology being employed
was fundamentally flawed: the committee did not know whether assessments
were consistent or whether intervention strategies were producing
results. He noted that no discussion had occurred of interventions
directed at the perpetrators; or how students did following a given
incident. Jones said 'the elephant in the room' was that trauma was
universal: numerous studies had shown some level of post-traumatic
stress disorder follows from violent incidents. Further, no attention
had been paid to the fact that many adolescents who behave violently
come from violent families; he believed precursor factors needed to be
considered.

Martha Shirley said that she had been struck by the low base rate for
objectionable behaviors; in Texas, she noted, it was less than one
percent. The state panel had stressed the need for a name change; it had
also stressed the need for flexibility of criteria. Shirley said the
name change was important; further, the spectrum should be broadened to
look at positive behaviors: focusing, for example, on what schools were
doing on test scores and graduation rates. Shirley called attention to
the numbers presented on actual v. reported offenses. She noted there
that definitions appeared to be consistent for sexual offenses and use
of a weapon; however, 'disruptive incidents' was substantially a matter
of the observer's judgment. Given this, she recommended that multiple
informants be used.

Kim Dude said changing the name 'persistently dangerous school' was a
given. She questioned the PDS criteria: the number of people caught, she
said, had little to do with the number breaking a given policy. She did
not see a cause and effect relationship between the number of students
written up and whether a school is dangerous. Additionally, she urged
creation of a tool that would allow students to declare how safe they
felt their school was; a survey containing 10-15 core questions should
achieve this. Teachers should also be surveyed on their own sense of
security.

Fred Ellis said the law's intent was fairly simple: in part, it
addressed the education culture that had historically done a poor job of
data collecting and, particularly, of sharing data with parents. The
school community had had a paternalistic attitude on data sharing; the
legislation would force schools to address this and give parents an
option. Ellis said the legislation had not accomplished its full
purpose: data collection was poor; schools still attempted to sit on the
data that he believed should be transparent. The legislative intent on
data had been a good one. He felt the USCO component had been well
intended; he was not sure it was fulfilling its purpose, in part because
of the small number of schools designated. He believed school culture
and climate were key; that these should be measured by survey, and that
such information would be useful to demonstrating how a school saw
itself and was seen by its community. Ellis added that while he agreed
that prevention was the ultimate goal, not everything could be
prevented. He described a three-legged stool: prevention, deterrence and
enforcement/consequence. What you can't prevent, you deter; what you
can't deter, you address through enforcement. He recommendation that,
first, some standardization of the data elements occur, including a
school climate survey; and, second, that all data be published, both
aggregated and disaggregated. He believed parents were competent to
review the data and act accordingly. Regarding the USCO component, he
believed a student who had been a victim also had the right to stay put.

Michael Pimentel noted that, in his community, victims had the option to
move: doing so was an individual decision.

Mary Ann Solberg seconded Hope Taft's suggestion to emphasize the
positive; the goal, she stated, was to have consistently safe schools.
She noted that the previous day's presentations had indicated that data
was not being collected and that no settled definition existed of what
constituted an unsafe school: for the problem to be dealt with, its
nature and extent must be known. She believed the federal government
needed to have core measurements of school safety. Numerous federal and
state programs existed, but did not achieve synergy, because a poor job
was done of sharing data: data sharing would itself create power. She
was aware this was an unfunded mandate; however, the power such data
could create would attract money and achieve solutions.

Mike Herrmann agreed there were difficulties collecting and sharing
data: he worked with multiple programs; each was asked to collect data
that was similar but not identical; this was time consuming. School, he
said, did not generally welcome surveys; they should be kept to a
minimum. He suggested that as a survey tool became more complicated, it
was prone to prompting local interpretations of the questions, which
tended to make the data soft. He noted that definitions differed, but
added that all states had definitions of what constituted violent crime.
He believed USCO should be focused on the most serious instances; he
favored the idea of recognizing schools for achieving safe school
status.

Tommy Ledbetter said that, as a high school principal, he was aware of
the mix of available programs: some, like Title I, addressed some of the
concerns Sheppard Kellam had raised. He made reference to problems with
funding and accountability for both this and the State Grants Program;
any common problems should be addressed. Funds might be shrinking
because there was insufficient accountability. The state panel
coordinator had each reported that their own staffs were so small they
could not account for the reliability of those reports that came in.
What was the advisability of aggregating the funds, sending them to the
states, and then having district within each state apply for their use:
he believed the individual states knew where the problems were. He
identified funds and accountability as the two biggest problems:
Alabama, he noted, had 100 LEAs; no program coordinator could do 100
site visits in a year. If they were given larger lumps of money with
which to administer programs in areas of known problems there would be a
higher degree of accountability.

Dennis Romero noted the committee's role as a venue in which vitally
important issues could be addressed. He urged that issues of drug and
alcohol abuse not be set aside; he disagreed strongly with the
panelist's statement that drugs and alcohol were not a primary cause of
school violence. He agreed that data should be transparent: he had not
known that he could go to his child's school and obtain data on school
violence. In general, he believed prevention entailed collaboration; a
better mechanism for collaboration was needed: a great deal was not
shared on the programmatic level. Further, he believed agreement was
needed on definitions, on what was meant by all the phrases employed.

Hope Taft called attention, first, to the California survey distributed
the previous day correlating funding reductions with a rise in drug and
alcohol use; second, to a survey that showed a significant correlate
between violence and drug use; and, third, a book from NIAA addressing
the developmental consequences of alcohol use. She recommended that the
committee should encourage all concerned to look 'further upstream' at
those things that precede violent behavior. Second, she urged that the
duration between the time a bill is passed and the date by which things
needed to be in place at the state level be expanded: it appeared that
states had been asked to supply their definitions prior to the issuance
of the appropriate guidelines at the federal level. Deborah Price noted
that state responsibility begins with the passage of a given law.

Russell Jones said the committee 'did not know what we do not know':
clearer definitions were needed if change was to be measured. He
believed the lack of funds could be addressed through partnering: 'many
smart people and initiatives' had yet to be brought into the discussion;
for example, Child Traumatic Network, which had core information about
what changes behavior in traumatized children and adults.

Howell Wechsler \[by speakerphone\] said he was pleased with the
consensus that not 'all our eggs' should be put in the basket of violent
crime data; he believed such data was commonly misreported not only in
schools but also in civil society. He noted that just one of the five
factors characteristic of an unsafe school put forward by Annie Salsich
concerned violence: he thought this an appropriate proportion. He
believed the factors on the list could be measured in surveys such as
were being discussed.

Sheppard Kellam said he believed the discussion was enormously
important. He identified two problems: first, much was known from
research that was not available to the group. He made reference to the
three-legged chair described by Fred Ellis and said that all three legs
were about prevention. The second issue was: what did people feel about
a 30-50 percent reduction in drug use, or a 25-50 percent reduction in
social personality disorder, violence and imprisonment. One needed to
begin with early intervention and build on it over time; this was not an
either/or situation. Further, he believed the many unconnected data
systems needed to be integrated; otherwise they are useless. Finally, he
thought 'branding' schools was a bad practice, based on a bad data
system.

Montean Jackson said considerable data collected on the local level was
not rolled up; guidance was needed from the federal government on what
information should be moved along. Local surveys might well already
exist on school climate and other matters the committee thought
important. She noted that issues from outside the schools may come to
the schools with the consequences that that school was categorized as
persistently dangerous. Further, she said a common language was needed
on what constitutes a safe school and related matters.

Fred Ellis, responding to Sheppard Kellam, said his central point was
that considerable time was spent on prevention programs and character
development; these efforts, however, will not always be successful, in
part because many factors outside a school's control effect student
behavior. Sheppard Kellam responded that the committee was a group that,
starting from diverse perspectives, was in search of a shared vision.
Prevention was a very broad category: one of the largest prevention
programs in the world was the police force, which is in the business of
preventing events; a teacher stepping into the hallway was a prevention
measure. He believed the effort should orient toward prevention; crisis
response was done when prevention failed.

\* \* \*

*Secretary of Education Margaret Spellings:*

Secretary Spellings thanked committee members for their service and
efforts on behalf of school safety. She noted the effort to use the
recent shooting event in Pennsylvania as a 'teaching moment.' As part of
this, President George Bush had convened a summit of educators, law
enforcement officials, community organizations and others on school
safety. Though held on relatively short notice, she believed the summit
had been very worthwhile. Persons at that gathering had identified the
need for a venue in which educational policy issues could be discussed
and vetted; in response, Secretary Spellings had called attention to
this committee and stated her intention to place before it questions
being raised at the summit.

Secretary Spellings identified four issues, as follows:

First: dissemination of information on best practices and information.
At the summit, she said, as individuals spoke of efforts they were
undertaking, others expressed the wish to have heard the information
previously. She noted that 'the constantly changing cast of characters'
in education, law enforcement and elsewhere meant there was a constant
need to refresh others on what was being done. What, she asked, were the
most effective ways to do this?

Second: the issue of data sharing between law enforcement, educators,
social service providers and others. There had been frustration at the
summit with the lack of data sharing. Was this an accurate perception?
At what level does the problem exist? Secretary Spellings added that all
involved needed to be mindful of student privacy issues; she noted some
sentiment that things had become 'tipped' in the direction of privacy
over community safety.

Third: the question of how to ensure that school staff would remain
attentive to warning signs. In part, Secretary Spellings said, this too
followed from the rapid turnover common within schools. She believed
many teachers and other educators did not believe they were armed with
the latest information on how to determine if a problem existed.

Fourth: Secretary Spellings made reference to the previous day's
comments from Linda Mohammed of Baltimore. She affirmed the need to
remain sensitive to the differences between school settings and types of
school, of urban v. rural needs, the needs of families, and of the
uniqueness of individual communities.

Secretary Spellings said she wished the committee to be aware of various
Department of Education actions. The Department was continuing to work
closely with other agencies, including the Secret Service, the
Department of Justice, and the Department of Homeland Security. She
believed that effective collaboration required addressing the question
of what constituted the 'right calibration' of each agency engaged. She
noted the Department's efforts to distribute DVDs and to update crisis
planning guides and get them 'out the door.' The Department was making
broad efforts to make people aware of the resources that existed. She
noted that a 60-minute Web cast on crisis planning would air on November
15, and would be subsequently repeated. Secretary Spellings noted that
following the events in Pennsylvania, the Department experienced a
five-fold increase in the number of calls received on school safety
topics; there was, she added, 'a hunger for information out there.'

*Discussion:*

David Long noted the consensus that the name 'persistently dangerous
school' sent the wrong message, and should be changed. Secretary
Spellings noted that No Child Left Behind \[NCLB\] would be heading into
reauthorization; the President had informed her that he intended to push
reauthorization aggressively: she added that the committee should be
prompt with its recommendations.

Russell Jones thanked Secretary Spellings for the Department's
post-Katrina activities in New Orleans and elsewhere.

Hope Taft said many committee recommendations dovetailed with the issues
the Secretary had voiced. The committee, Taft added, had identified a
need to focus on school culture and climate; the belief that early
identification should be emphasized; and that many of the safety issues
a given school faced came from the community outside. That being the
case, Taft added, schools needed better connections with their
communities.

Secretary Spellings asked how complicated was data sharing? Did the
committee have specific recommendations? Were complaints about data
sharing real or rhetorical?

Hope Taft said the information received by the committee was that
state-level school coordinators and others hoped a common data set could
be developed that all could work with; further, she was aware of federal
efforts to identify a core data set. She expressed the wish that these
two could be 'married' into a single instrument.

Susan Keys noted that several large national data sets are used to
collect information on a regular basis, e.g. CDC, SAMSA. She suggested
these might be amended to carry questions related to school safety and
school climate.

Mike Heermann noted that a year had passed since the school shooting
incident in his state, Tennessee. He thanked the Secretary for the
support received from the Department at that time. On the topic of
information sharing, he suggested that information was often not shared
because those with the information believed that it was not to be
shared; he suggested federal guidance might be helpful.

Dennis Romero reported that the committee had been grappling with the
USCO choice option; among other things, he believed there was need to
focus attention on the trauma experienced by all involved in an
incident, not only on the victim. The committee, he added, was agreed on
the importance of involving parents and the community; regarding
community collaboration, he thought the strategic prevention framework
had been quite successful and might be used to bring together different
community stakeholders.

Robert Flores that the Department of Labor had funds for job training;
the Department of Justice had various funding strategies. He believed
schools rarely considered these as possible sources for support, and
urged they be made aware. He suggested the Secretary might suggest to
other cabinet members that they be receptive to such collaboration.

Sheppard Kellam said a major issue was bringing research into practice.
He identified two questions: first, how can partnerships be made to
work? He believed that to be useful, research needed to be done in the
real world; this required the forming of partnerships with public and
private entities and foundations. He hoped these could create a new
structure of science and practice that was needed to implement research
efforts. Second, what information systems were needed to monitor
progress? Information systems might be easy or inexpensive to invent,
yet the committee's discussion of the 'persistently dangerous school'
designation showed that such systems were of little use if few people
were willing to report the data.

Secretary Spellings asked if Kellam was optimistic that something 'as
hairy' as his first point could be carried out. Kellam said he regarded
it as possible; further, he believed people were looking for 'some kind
of coming together.' Secretary Spellings asked if Kellam could frame for
her which parties needed to be engaged in the conversation about
collaboration. Kellam said he would do so.

Secretary Spellings asked if there were state models that could be
cited. Robert Flores made reference to work on JXML. The effort was
necessary because the courts and police departments now share
considerable data, he said, though there remained issue of privacy and
control. Flores added that he would give pertinent information on the
effort to Deborah Price.

David Long noted the general sentiment that 'persistently dangerous
school' was negative; the committee, he added, thought it would be
preferable to accentuate the positive. Several committee members had
drawn a comparison with the national Blue Ribbon School effort; the
suggestion was that a parallel program might be used to address school
safety.

Susan Keys noted that discussions were proceeding in Connecticut on how
grant recipients could use part of their funding to create the
infrastructure needed to come up with reliable data. Similarly, Hope
Taft cited Ohio's Partnership for Success communities, in which a single
survey has been used to identify those things a community wished to work
on; this, she said, had been helpful in gaining 'buy in' from funders
and others.

*Secretary of Education Spellings departed at this point.*

David Long noted this earlier comment that Secretary Spelling's remarks
might prompt the committee to alter its course; he now believed the
Secretary and the committee were on the same page.

Deborah Price recalled her comment that the committee should submit
another interim report on its discussions at this session. She noted
there was still no clear definition of what it meant for a school to be
safe, healthy and secure. She suggested an additional conference call
might be needed; in preparation for which, a summary could be drafted in
which those points that had arisen in discussion and that had the
general support of the committee would be presented as recommendations.

Hope Taft expressed concern that unless there was a budget marker for
Title IV, the whole safe schools program could disappear. She hoped the
Department would undertake such a marker to keep the program alive.

Sheppard Kellam suggested Deborah Price include in her draft the view
that a separate data system for assessing school hazards should not be
created; rather, existing data records should be integrated with
criteria that would allow the identification to occur. He believed
school records were a very important tool from which to build; he
thought it was possible to build an integrated data model, and that the
success of the safe and drug-free schools effort depended on it.

Michael Pimentel referred to shrinking budgets. In his police
department, shrinking budgets had been addressed by a command group that
met to determine what core values existed. That discussion, he said,
produced the conclusion that the safety of children in school was the
highest priority; in consequence, while cuts were made elsewhere, no
funds were withdrawn from school safety programs. How, he asked, could
the importance of school safety be communicated to elected officials, so
that funds were not taken away from Title IV?

Montean Jackson suggested use should be made of data that has been being
collected on the local level by the National Student Assistance Program,
and others.

Dennis Romero called attention to the need for better methods of
collaboration; as part of that, he urged efforts to help schools make
better use of the various areas of expertise the federal government had
to offer. Further, he felt the committee should not lose track of the
issue of bullying and its impact on student trauma.

Belinda Sims suggested that as the group worked to summarize its
recommendations, it should maintain a broad view; should seek to
integrate issues; and should remain aware that communities and LEAs face
major implementation issues. It was important, she said, to identify
evidence-based programs; at the same time, attention needed to be
directed to implementation and monitoring. Sims asked, given the stigma
associated with 'persistently dangerous schools,' would changing the
name constitute a sufficient step? Perhaps some base-building would be
required at the grassroots level to gain acceptance for whatever new
name the committee might recommend. She thought it was regrettable that
data gathering on school safety had been put under a cloud, as it was
information schools should be utilizing.

\* \* \*

*Close:*

David Long said a conference call would be scheduled for within the next
14 days. He noted that committee members had received a great deal of
information; he urged members, while they were traveling home, to make
notes on what saw as the major points of discussion. Long asked Deborah
Price if the upcoming conference call would provide the basis for the
interim report. Price said it would. In closing, Long expressed his
thanks to committee members for the quality of their questioning of
panelists and for their contributions to the children of the United
States.

*The meeting adjourned at 11:05 a.m.*

*Appendix A:*

*Safe and Drug-Free Schools and Communities Advisory Committee Members
in Attendance*

**David Long (Chairman)**\
Superintendent\
Riverside County Public Schools

**Kim Dude**\
Director of the Wellness Resource Center\
University of Missouri-Columbia

**Frederick E. Ellis**\
Director\
Office of Safety and Security\
Fairfax County Public Schools

**Montean Jackson**\
Safe and Drug Free Schools Coordinator\
Fairbanks North Star Borough School District

**Russell T. Jones**\
Professor of Psychology\
Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University\
Department of Psychology

**Sheppard Kellam**\
Director\
Center for Integration Education\
and Prevention Research in Schools\
American Institutes for Research

**Tommy Ledbetter**\
Principal\
Buckhorn High School

**Seth Norman** (*Monday's meeting only)*\
Judge of the Division IV Criminal Court\
Davidson County Drug Court

**Michael Pimentel**\
Chief\
San Antonio Independent School District Police

**Hope Taft**\
First Lady of the State of Ohio

**Deborah A. Price**\
Assistant Deputy Secretary\
Office of Safe and Drug-Free Schools\
U.S. Department of Education

**J. Robert Flores** (*Tuesday's meeting only)*\
Administrator\
Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention\
US Department of Justice

**Michael Herrmann**

Executive Director

Office of School Health, Safety and Learning Support

Tennessee Department of Education

**Ralph Hingson (***Dr. Mariela Shirley, surrogate for Monday and
Tuesday's meeting)*\
Director\
Division of Epidemiology and Prevention Research Branch\
National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism

**Susan Keys**\
Chief\
Prevention Initiatives and Priority Programs Branch\
Division of Prevention, Traumatic Stress and Special Programs\
Center for Mental Health Services\
Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration\
Health and Human Service

**Dennis Romero**\
Acting Center Director\
Center for Substance Abuse and Prevention\
Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration\
Health and Human Service

**Belinda E. Sims**\
Prevention Research Branch\
Division of Epidemiology, Services and Prevention Research\
National Institute on Drug Abuse\
National Institute of Health

**Mary Ann Solberg**\
Deputy Director\
Executive Office of the President\
Office of National Drug Control Policy

**Howell Wechsler**\
Director of Division of Adolescent and School Health\
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention