# Terrorism and the All-Hazards Model

**William L. Waugh, Jr., PhD, Professor**

**Andrew Young School of Policy Studies**

# Georgia State University

Terrorism is not like natural or even other man-made hazards. But, then
again, a tornado is not like a hurricane and certainly not like an
earthquake. The argument that the all-hazards model cannot accommodate
hazards like terrorism -- especially bioterrorism -- is most often based
upon a fundamental misunderstanding of the model. "All-hazards" does not
literally mean being prepared for any and all hazards that might
manifest themselves in a particular community, state, or nation. What it
does mean is that there are things that commonly occur in many kinds of
disasters, such as the need for emergency warning or mass evacuation,
that can be addressed in a general plan and that that plan can provide
the basis for responding to unexpected events. Emergency plans never, or
virtually never, cover everything that might be required in a disaster.
Indeed, the requirements for evacuation for flood may differ
significantly from those required for evacuation during a hazardous
materials spill. Plans need to be adaptable to circumstances and
emergency managers and other officials, whether they be elected public
officials or corporate officers, also need to be adaptable, innovative,
and, when necessary, improvisational.

The theory is that "all-hazards" plans can provide a basic framework for
responding to a wide variety disasters, but planners typically address
the kinds of disasters that might be expected to occur. Emergency
planning normally begins with the identification of the disasters that
have occurred in a community in the recent past. These are the known
and, generally, the most probable hazards. Planners may then focus on
the disasters that have occurred in the distant past by going through
newspaper archives, history books, and other documents and by
interviewing long-time residents. Other hazards may be added to the list
if it is determined that there may be some probability of them causing
risk to life and/or property or to the environment. New highways and
rail lines mean more potential for hazardous materials accidents, for
example. These are the probable threats. There may be some talk of
possible threats and some of them may be addressed in the plan, as well.
The media, political leaders, influential residents, or influential
participants in the planning process or the larger community may
encourage attention to hazards of very low probability or even of no
discernible possibility. Media attention can make hazards and disasters
seem much worse or more frequent than they really are. That is the
so-called "CNN effect." Personal and family traumas may create champions
for lesser risks. The point is that these less probable or even
improbable hazards may be included in the planning. That's politics and
the planning process is, after all, political as well as technical. It
is also human nature. If the community is lucky, the planners give
greatest attention to the biggest risks. All-hazards planning, then, is
based upon the most likely disasters and the most "popular."

Terrorism is a hazard of uncertain probability for most communities and
organizations. The question is whether terrorism is so different from
other threats that the "all-hazards" approach is inappropriate or
ineffective. Might officials need to issue public warnings, order
evacuations or sheltering-in-place, call out law enforcement and fire
service and EMS personnel, involve hospitals and other medical
resources, or mobilize volunteers? To the extent that terrorist
incidents might even resemble natural or technological disasters, the
response may be very similar. A bridge or building collapse, a fire, an
explosion, a power outage, and even a flood might result from terrorist
actions. Certainly the responses to the World Trade Center towers and
Pentagon attacks were much like responses to fires and structural
failures. While law enforcement officials were concerned with the
preservation of evidence, the emergency responses were much as they
would have been to a "regular" disaster -- an act of God rather than an
act of man. Emergency planning now may include fire and EMS protocols to
minimize disturbance of evidence, but the basic response requirements
remain. Bioterrorist attack may require quarantine, special medical
response, and other extraordinary measures, including dealing with mass
casualties on a scale unlike even the largest natural disasters, but the
basic plan is a beginning place for dealing with such incidents. More
importantly, community response will be guided by the plans in place,
likely an all-hazards plan. That plan should address not only
bioterrorism but flu and other naturally occurring pandemics.

All-hazards planning has the virtue of being cost effective in terms of
time and money. It is cheaper to develop and easier to remember a single
plan even if one has to wade through annexes to provide guidance for
dealing with specific issues. Hazardous materials accidents do require
understanding of the chemicals involved and technical expertise to
minimize damage and protect lives. Structural failures raise other
issues concerning the conduct of emergency response in unstable and
unsafe environs. Floods raise public health issues, as well as hazardous
materials issues.

What the all-hazards approach can contribute to the effort to deal with
terrorism in its many forms is a basic framework for structuring the
emergency response, preparing for the response, and recovering from
attacks, as well as developing appropriate measures to prevent or reduce
the impact of the attacks -- whatever form the attacks may take. It is
also important to remember that the threat of terrorism is less certain
than other threats. Indeed, the threat of earthquakes in California and
the Pacific Northwest is much more certain than the threat of terrorism,
consequently investments in capacity to deal with risks to life and
property should be based upon that priority. Similarly, the threat of
hurricanes is more certain along the Gulf and East coast than the threat
of terrorism. As Hurricane Charley recently demonstrated, the level of
destruction may be even greater than that we have experienced in
terrorist attacks. Building capacity to deal with the most probable
events will increase capacity to deal with less probable events. For
private firms, unless they are a likely target of terrorists or are
located adjacent to such a target, the biggest threat may well be
workplace violence of other sorts. Physical security, from locked doors
and closed circuit television systems to armed guards and employee
identification cards, can address a variety of threats. In short,
precautions to deal with criminal intruders, disgruntled employees,
angry spouses, and enraged clients can also serve as foundation for an
anti-terrorism program and an all-hazards plan can provide the framework
for a response.

Finally, the all-hazards approach encourages a broader perspective.
Attention to the potential to prevent or reduce the impact of hazards is
important. The Department of Homeland Security has been focused on the
prevention of terrorist incidents, even though the department's mission
statement also mentions reducing the impact of incidences that do occur.
Mitigation efforts can reduce the political benefits of terrorist
violence and the psychological impact. Recovery planning can reduce the
social and economic impact, as well. All-hazards planning does encourage
a broader perspective on risks and how to deal with them and a broader
foundation on which to build effective programs to manage hazards and
disasters.

Contact Information: William Waugh at <wwaugh@gsu.edu>.

(revised version of paper presented on the IDS Emergency Management
On-Line Conference, June 28-July 16, 2004)