![](media/image1.wmf){width="8.577083333333333in" height="11.1in"}

**THREAT ASSESSMENT IN SCHOOLS:**

**A GUIDE TO MANAGING THREATENING SITUATIONS AND TO CREATING SAFE SCHOOL
CLIMATES**

**UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE**

**AND**

**UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION**

**by**

**Robert A. Fein, Ph.D.**

Director

National Violence Prevention and Study Center

**Bryan Vossekuil**

Director

National Violence Prevention and Study Center

**William S. Pollack, Ph.D.**

> Director, National Violence Prevention and Study Center

Assistant Clinical Professor

> Harvard Medical School / McLean Hospital

**Randy Borum, Psy.D.**

Associate Professor

University of South Florida

**William Modzeleski**

Director

Safe and Drug-Free Schools Program

U. S. Department of Education

**Marisa Reddy, Ph.D.**

Chief Research Psychologist and Research Coordinator

National Threat Assessment Center

U. S. Secret Service

**WASHINGTON, D. C.**

**May 2002**

Disclaimer

The findings, conclusions, and opinions expressed in this document are
those of the authors, and do not necessarily reflect the official
position or policies of the U.S. Department of Education or the U.S.
Department of the Treasury.

Joint message From the Secretary, U.S. Department of Education and from
the Director, U.S. Secret Service:

Since June 1999, the U.S. Department of Education and the U.S. Secret
Service have been working as a team to try to better understand--and
ultimately help prevent--school shootings in America. When we began this
collaboration nearly three years ago, we did not know what information
we might uncover in the course of our joint study on targeted violence
in schools, known as the *Safe School Initiative*. However throughout
our collaboration, our two agencies have focused on one common goal: to
develop accurate and useful information about prior school attacks that
could help prevent some future ones from occurring.

We believe the results of this effort have given schools and communities
real cause for hope. Through the *Safe School Initiative*, staff from
the U.S. Department of Education's Safe and Drug-Free Schools Program
and the U.S. Secret Service's National Threat Assessment Center have
found that some school attacks may be preventable. The companion report
to this document, *The Final Report and Findings of the Safe School
Initiative: Implications for the Prevention of School Attacks in the
United States*, details findings from the *Safe School Initiative* and
includes several key findings relevant to prevention efforts. In
particular, the *Safe School Initiative* findings indicate that
incidents of targeted violence in school were rarely impulsive; that the
students who perpetrated these attacks usually planned out the attack in
advance -- with planning behavior that was oftentimes observable; and
that, prior to most attacks, other children knew that the attack was to
occur. Taken together, these findings suggest that it may be possible to
prevent some future school attacks from occurring -- and that efforts to
identify, assess, and manage students who may have the intent and
capacity to launch an attack may be a promising strategy for prevention.

This document, *Threat Assessment in Schools: A Guide to Managing
Threatening Situations and to Creating Safe School Climates*, takes
these findings one step further by setting forth a process for
identifying, assessing, and managing students who may pose a threat of
targeted violence in schools. This process -- known as threat assessment
-- was first pioneered by the U.S. Secret Service as a mechanism for
investigating threats against the President of the United States and
other protected officials. The Secret Service threat assessment approach
was developed based upon findings from an earlier Secret Service study
on assassinations and attacks of public officials and public figures.

This *Guide* represents a modification of the Secret Service threat
assessment process, based upon findings from the *Safe School
Initiative*. It is intended for use by school personnel, law enforcement
officials, and others with protective responsibilities in our nation's
schools. This *Guide* includes suggestions for developing a threat
assessment team within a school or school district, steps to take when a
threat or other information of concern comes to light, consideration
about when to involve law enforcement personnel, issues of information
sharing, and ideas for creating safe school climates.

![](media/image2.png){width="1.8in" height="0.9013888888888889in"}We
applaud all of you working to keep children safe in school. We hope that
the information in this *Guide*, and the companion *Final Report*,
assist you in your continued efforts to do so.

Roderick Paige Brian L. Stafford

Secretary Director

U.S. Department of Education United States Secret Service

May 2002

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The authors of this *Guide* are grateful to many agencies and
individuals for their assistance in planning and carrying out the *Safe
School Initiative* and for assistance in the development and writing of
this *Guide*. First and foremost, the authors owe a debt of gratitude to
the representatives of the numerous law enforcement and criminal justice
agencies that permitted Secret Service personnel to review investigative
files on the school attacks in their respective communities; provided
other key information and materials about these attacks; and assisted
and supported Secret Service personnel in seeking permission to
interview 10 attackers. Moreover, the authors are grateful to the U.S.
Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs' National Institute of
Justice for providing critical financial support that helped make the
study possible.

This *Guide* would not have been possible without the support and
assistance that the authors received from several key officials and
personnel at the Department of Education and the Secret Service. Absent
the significant contributions of these individuals, the Secret Service's
experience in researching and preventing targeted violence could not
have been translated into a useful guide about threat assessment and
targeted school violence. At the Department of Education, these
individuals are: Secretary of Education Rod Paige, Assistant Secretary
for Office of Secondary and Elementary Education Susan B. Neuman, and
Connie Deshpande. Secret Service officials who provided guidance and
support for this project include: Director Brian Stafford, Special Agent
in Charge George Luczko, Assistant Special Agent in Charge Matt Doherty,
Assistant to the Special Agent in Charge Cindy Rubendall, and Resident
Agent in Charge John Berglund.

The authors extend special thanks to Assistant Director Barbara Riggs,
Office of Protective Research, U.S. Secret Service for her support of
the *Safe School Initiative* and the National Threat Assessment Center.

The *Guide* benefited from the thoughtful comments of a focus group of
education and law enforcement leaders that was organized by the
Department of Education. Participants in the group included: Ahndrea
Blue, James Campain, Marilyn Copeland, Melissa DeRosier, Steve Edwards,
David Friedberg, Jeff Heller, Liz Karnes, James Kelly, Wesley Mitchell,
Lawrence Porte, Frank Sanchez, Jr., Kate Stetzner, Melorra Sochet, Betsy
Thompson, and John Van Dreal.

Finally, the authors acknowledge the contributions of Mary Rowe, Paul
Gebicke, Gwen Holden and several anonymous reviewers from the Department
of Education, whose observations and comments helped to shape the
*Guide*. Special thanks go out to Gwen Holden and Paul Kelly, who helped
edit the *Guide*.

> Robert Fein
>
> Bryan Vossekuil
>
> William Pollack
>
> Randy Borum
>
> William Modzeleski
>
> Marisa Reddy
>
> Washington, D.C.

CONTENTS

Chapter I: Introduction: Threat Assessment and the Prevention of
Targeted School Violence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Chapter II: Creating Climates of School Safety: A Foundation for
Reducing School Violence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Chapter III: Key Findings of the Safe School Initiative's Study of
Targeted School Violence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Chapter IV: Implementing a School Threat Assessment Process . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . 31

Chapter V: Conducting a School Threat Assessment . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . 46

Chapter VI: Managing a Threatening Situation . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . 70

Chapter VII: Action Plans for School Leaders: Creating a Safe and
Connected School Climate and Implementing a Threat Assessment Program .
. . . . . . . . 74

Chapter VIII: Conclusion: Threat Assessment as a Decision-Making Tool .
. . . . . . 83

Appendix: Annotated Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .85

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION: THREAT ASSESSMENT

AND THE PREVENTION OF TARGETED SCHOOL VIOLENCE

The vast majority of the nation's students will complete their schooling
without ever being touched by peer violence. Nevertheless, recent school
attacks carried out by students have shaken the image of schools as
reliably safe and secure environments in which the qualifications of
teachers and the efficacy of the educational curricula are the most
pressing concerns of educators and parents. Televised images of
frightened and injured students fleeing school grounds have imprinted
themselves on the American consciousness. "Columbine," the Littleton,
Colorado high school that on April 20, 1999, was the scene of the most
violent of the school attacks recorded to date in the United States, has
entered contemporary vocabulary as a national symbol of the violence
that claimed the lives of 14 students and a teacher on that day.

Incidents of targeted school violence[^1] occurred in 37 communities
across the country between 1974 and June 2000. Compared to the other
types of violence and crime children face both in and outside of school,
school-based attacks are rare. While the Department of Education reports
that 60 million children attend the nation's 100,000 schools, available
statistics indicate that few of these students will fall prey to serious
violence in school settings.[^2]

However, highly publicized school shootings have created uncertainty
about the safety and security of this country's schools and generated
fear that an attack might occur in any school, in any community.
Increased national attention to the problem of school violence has
prompted educators, law enforcement officials, mental health
professionals, and parents to press for answers to two central
questions: "Could we have known that these attacks were being planned?"
and, if so, "What could we have done to prevent these attacks from
occurring?"

For example, what should happen when a student comes to attention for
saying something or behaving in a manner that causes concern, as in the
following instances?

"The kids are saying that Johnny told his friends not to go to the
cafeteria at noon on Tuesday because something big and bad is going to
happen."

Marty, who has appeared withdrawn and irritable the past few weeks,
handed in a story about a student putting a bomb in an empty school.

Sandy brought bullets to school to show friends.

Rafael, who got pushed around again after gym class, stormed out in
tears, shouting "You're all going to pay!"

Casey, who was suspended last year for bringing a knife to school, left
a "hit list" on his desk.

Terry submitted an essay in which an assassin blew up the school,
attacked the governor, and then killed himself.

Given the enormous concern about targeted school violence, these
reported statements and behaviors cannot be ignored. But how should
school officials and other responsible adults respond?

This publication, *Threat Assessment in Schools: A Guide to Managing
Threatening Situations and to Creating Safe School Climates*, is the
product of an on-going collaboration between the U. S. Secret Service
and the U. S. Department of Education to begin to answer these
questions. Its focus is on the use of the threat assessment process
pioneered by the Secret Service as one component of the Department of
Education's efforts to help schools across the nation reduce school
violence and create safe climates. As developed by the Secret Service,
threat assessment involves efforts to identify, assess, and manage
individuals and groups who may pose threats of targeted violence.

Development of the School Threat Assessment Process

This *Guide* is an outgrowth of the joint Secret Service/Department of
Education Safe School Initiative. This initiative, begun in June 1999,
was undertaken to explore the potential for adapting the threat
assessment investigative process developed by the Secret Service to the
problem of targeted school violence.

The Safe School Initiative, implemented through the Secret Service's
National Threat Assessment Center and the Department of Education's Safe
and Drug-Free Schools Program, combined the Department of Education's
expertise in helping schools facilitate learning through the creation of
safe environments for students, faculty, and staff, and the Secret
Service's experience in studying and preventing targeted violence.

The Safe School Initiative began with a study of the thinking, planning,
and other pre-attack behaviors engaged in by students who carried out
school shootings.[^3] That study examined 37 incidents of targeted
school violence that occurred in the United States from December 1974
through May 2000 when researchers concluded their data collection.

The Safe School Initiative was patterned after the Exceptional Case
Study Project (ECSP), the Secret Service's earlier five-year study of
the thinking and behavior of individuals who carried out or attempted
lethal attacks on public officials or prominent individuals in the
United States since 1949.[^4] The purpose of the ECSP was to generate a
better understanding of attacks against public officials that, in turn,
would inform Secret Service agents' investigations of threats against
the president and other Secret Service protectees, and the development
of strategies to prevent harm to these public officials.

In July 1998, the Secret Service and the Justice Department's National
Institute of Justice released the publication, *Protective Intelligence
and Threat Assessment Investigations: A Guide for State and Local Law
Enforcement Officials,* in an effort to make the Service's threat
assessment protocols available to a wider law enforcement audience. That
publication offers state and local police officials guidance in carrying
out and evaluating the findings of threat assessment investigations.[^5]

The Safe School Initiative study reinforced the findings of the Secret
Service's ECSP study concerning the thinking and behavior of attackers.
In particular, like the ECSP, the Safe School Initiative concluded that
most attackers did not threaten their targets directly, but did engage
in pre-attack behaviors that would have indicated an inclination toward
or the potential for targeted violence had they been identified.
Findings about the pre-attack behaviors of perpetrators of targeted
violence validated the "fact-based" approach of the threat assessment
process. This process relies primarily on an appraisal of *behaviors*,
rather than on *stated threats* or *traits*, as the basis for
determining whether there is cause for concern. These findings argue
favorably for pursuing adaptation of this threat assessment process for
use by school administrators and law enforcement officials in responding
to the problem of targeted school violence.

The *Guide* is intended to provide school administrators and law
enforcement officials guidance in incorporating the threat assessment
process for investigating, evaluating, and managing targeted violence
into strategies to prevent school violence. The purpose of the *Guide*
is to contribute to achieving the broader goal of creating safe and
secure school environments by helping school and law enforcement
officials respond responsibly, prudently, and effectively to threats and
other behaviors that raise concern about potential violence.

Effective threat assessment can only occur in a larger context of school
safety. Cultures and climates of safety, respect, and emotional support
can help diminish the possibility of targeted violence in schools.
Environments in which students, teachers and administrators pay
attention to students' social and emotional needs*--*as well as their
academic needs*--*will have fewer situations that require formal threat
assessments.

In an educational setting where there is a climate of safety, adults and
students respect each other. This climate is defined and fostered by
students having a positive connection to at least one adult in
authority. In such a climate, students develop the capacity to talk and
openly share their concerns without fear of shame and reprisal. They try
to help friends and fellow students who are in distress, bringing
serious concerns to the attention of adults.

Ideally when this climate of safety is created, students experience a
sense of emotional "fit" and of respect. Problems are raised and
addressed before they become serious. As a result, the potential for
school violence diminishes. When a member of the school community shows
personal pain that might lead them to harm themselves or others, someone
is available. Young people can find an adult to trust with this
information, so that it does not remain "secret" until it is too late.

A young man who brought a rifle into school, killing two students, and
wounding several others, told us from his prison cell: "I was really
hurting. I didn't have anybody to talk to. They just didn't care."

Organization of the *Guide*

The remainder of this *Guide* is organized into seven chapters. Chapter
II of the *Guide* discusses characteristics of safe school climates.
Chapter III presents the key findings of the Safe School Initiative and
discusses the implications of these findings for the prevention of
targeted school violence. Chapter IV describes the principles underlying
the threat assessment approach to preventing targeted violence, and
outlines the central elements of a threat assessment process.

Chapters V and VI will be of particular interest to school
administrators, law enforcement officials, and others who wish to pursue
the development of a threat assessment process as a component of a
broader school violence prevention strategy. Chapter V outlines the
approach to identifying students whose behavior may suggest the
potential for targeted school violence, and discusses the steps in
carrying out a threat assessment inquiry or investigation.[^6] Chapter
VI addresses the issue of managing threatening situations.

Chapter VII presents an action plan for creating safe school cultures
and climates and an action plan to help school leaders implement a
threat assessment program. In the final chapter of the *Guide*, Chapter
VIII, the authors reassert the importance of the threat assessment
process as a component of broader school safety and violence prevention
strategies. In addition, the authors offer some concluding observations
on the efficacy of the threat assessment process as a tool that can help
school administrators, law enforcement officials, and others to make
critical decisions about responding to situations involving the threat
of targeted school violence.

Readers will find additional resources to inform the development and
implementation of school threat assessment processes in the appendix
that is included at the end of the *Guide*. The Appendix provides an
annotated list of publications and other resources on threat assessment
and related topics.

CHAPTER II

Creating Climates of School Safety:\
A Foundation for Reducing School Violence

> "What I hate about this school is that I\'m being picked on in the
> halls and just about everywhere else"*--*A 14-year-old student
>
> "School has always been hard for me, literally from the first day I
> started elementary school. People saw me as a ... good target. They
> just started picking on me for no reason...they made fun of me \[and,
> now\] I\'m going through self-esteem issues because of the 11 years I
> was a target."*--*An 18-year-old student.
>
> "They want me to open up, express myself. Quite a funny notion,
> ironic! If someone had helped me do that several years ago, I probably
> would have turned out okay."*--*Comment in a diary by a 17-year-old
> student who attacked others at school, then killed himself.

The threat assessment process described in this *Guide* is presented as
an approach to addressing the problem of targeted school violence.
Incidents of targeted school violence are extreme and, thankfully, rare
events. However, targeted school violence is arguably only the tip of
the iceberg of pain, loneliness, desperation, and despair that many
students in this nation's schools deal with on a daily basis.

Threat assessment should be looked upon as one component in an overall
strategy to reduce school violence. The threat assessment process by
itself is unlikely to have a lasting effect on the problem of targeted
school violence unless that process is implemented in the larger context
of strategies to ensure that schools offer their students safe and
secure learning environments. The principle objective of school
violence-reduction strategies should be to create cultures and climates
of safety, respect, and emotional support within educational
institutions.

Fostering a Culture of Respect

In educational settings that support climates of safety, adults and
students respect each other. A safe school environment offers positive
personal role models in its faculty. It provides a place for open
discussion where diversity and differences are respected; communication
between adults and students is encouraged and supported; and conflict is
managed and mediated constructively.

Cultures and climates of safety support environments in which teachers
and administrators pay attention to students' social and emotional needs
as well as their academic needs. Such environments emphasize "emotional
intelligence," as well as educational or intellectual pursuits.[^7]
Students experience a sense of emotional "fit" and of respect within the
school body, and may be less likely to engage in or be victimized by
harmful behavior.[^8]

A culture of safety creates "shame free zones" in which daily teasing
and bullying is not accepted as a normal part of the adolescent
culture.[^9] School environments characterized by bullying and meanness
can lead to student isolation and fear. At best, school environments
that turn a blind eye to bullying and teasing inhibit the work of
school*--*learning and growth. At the worst, such environments allow
behavior that fosters fear and fury that stunts the healthy development
of the victims of that behavior, and may lead to psychological and
physical violence.

Creating Connections Between Adults and Students

Connection through human relationships is a central component of a
culture of safety and respect. This connection is the critical emotional
glue among students, and between students and adults charged with
meeting students' educational, social, emotional, and safety needs[^10].

In a climate of safety, students have a positive connection to at least
one adult in authority. Each student feels that there is an adult to
whom he or she can turn for support and advice if things get tough, and
with whom that student can share his or her concerns openly and without
fear of shame or reprisal. Schools in which students feel able to talk
to teachers, deans, secretaries, coaches, custodians, counselors,
nurses, school safety officers, bus drivers, principals, and other staff
support communication between students and adults about concerns and
problems.

Schools that emphasize personal contact and connection between school
officials and students will take steps to identify and work with
students who have few perceptible connections to the school. For
example, during staff meetings in a school in a California School
District, the names of students are posted, and school faculty members
are asked to put stars next to the names of those students with whom
they have the closest relationships. Faculty members then focus on
establishing relationships with those students with few stars next to
their names.

Breaking the "Code of Silence"

In many schools there is a pervasive sense among students and some
adults that telling grownups that another student is in pain or may pose
a threat violates an unwritten, but powerful, "code of silence." A code
of silence has the potentially damaging effect of forcing students to
handle their pain and problems on their own, without the benefit of
adult support. These codes also suggest that a student should not bring
any concerns that he or she may have about a peer's behavior to the
attention of responsible adults.

The findings of the Safe School Initiative suggest that silence is far
from golden. In fact, study findings indicate that silence may be
downright dangerous. The study found that most school shooters shared
their potentially lethal plans with other students, but that students
who knew of planned attacks rarely told adults.

In a climate of safety, students are willing to break the code of
silence. Students are more likely to turn to trusted adults for help in
resolving problems. Moreover, students are more willing to share their
concerns about the problem behavior of peers with their teachers and
other adults in positions of authority within the school without feeling
that they are "snitching" or "ratting" on a buddy or friend.

As a result of responsible bystander behavior, serious problems come to
adult attention earlier, before these problems lead to violence.
Problems are raised and addressed before they become serious, and the
potential for school violence arguably is diminished. In an environment
that encourages communication between students and adults, information
does not remain "secret" until it is too late. In fact, it is considered
good citizenship or even heroic to go to a teacher to share the fact
that a fellow student is in trouble and may be contemplating a dangerous
act.

Major Components and Tasks for Creating a Safe/Connected School Climate

The major components and tasks for creating a safe school climate
include:

-   Assessment of the school's emotional climate;

-   Emphasis on the importance of listening in schools;

-   Adoption of a strong, but caring stance against the code of silence;

-   Prevention of, and intervention in, bullying;

-   Involvement of all members of the school community in planning,
    creating, and sustaining a school culture of safety and respect;

-   Development of trusting relationships between each student and at
    least one adult at school; and

-   Creation of mechanisms for developing and sustaining safe school
    climates.

Discussion of these components and tasks may be found in Chapter VII of
this *Guide*.

CHAPTER III

KEY FINDINGS OF THE SAFE SCHOOL INITIATIVE'S

STUDY OF TARGETED SCHOOL VIOLENCE

This chapter summarizes the Safe School Initiative and the findings that
support a threat assessment process to identify, assess, and manage
threatening situations in schools. The Safe School Initiative examined
incidents of targeted school violence from the time of the incident
backward, to identify the attackers' pre-incident behaviors and
communications and to explore whether such information might aid in
preventing future attacks.

The findings of the Safe School Initiative suggest that there are
productive actions that educators, law enforcement officials, and others
can pursue in response to the problem of targeted school violence.
Specifically, Initiative findings suggest that these officials may wish
to consider focusing their efforts to formulate strategies for
preventing these attacks in two principal areas:

-   developing the capacity to pick up on and evaluate available or
    knowable information that might indicate that there is a risk of a
    targeted school attack; and,

-   employing the results of these risk evaluations, or "threat
    assessments," in developing strategies to prevent potential school
    attacks from occurring.

Support for these suggestions is found in the 10 key findings of the
Safe School Initiative study:

-   Incidents of targeted violence at school are rarely sudden,
    impulsive acts.

-   Prior to most incidents, other people knew about the attacker's idea
    and/or plan to attack.

-   Most attackers did not threaten their targets directly prior to
    advancing the attack.

-   There is no accurate or useful "profile" of students who engage in
    targeted school violence.

-   Most attackers engaged in some behavior, prior to the incident, that
    caused concern or indicated a need for help.

-   Most attackers were known to have difficulty coping with significant
    losses or personal failures. Many had considered or attempted
    suicide.

-   Many attackers felt bullied, persecuted, or injured by others prior
    to the attack.

-   Most attackers had access to and had used weapons prior to the
    attack.

-   In many cases, other students were involved in some capacity.

-   Despite prompt law enforcement responses, most shooting incidents
    were stopped by means other than law enforcement intervention.

An overview of these findings, and their implications for the use of
threat assessment protocols to identify, assess, and manage possible
targeted school violence, follows.

Implications of Key Findings for the Use of Threat Assessment Protocols

Key Finding 1

Incidents of targeted violence at school rarely are sudden, impulsive
acts.

Explanation

Students who engaged in school-based attacks typically did not "just
snap" and engage in impulsive or random acts of targeted school
violence. Instead, the attacks examined under the Safe School Initiative
appeared to be the end result of a comprehensible process of thinking
and behavior*--*behavior that typically begins with an idea, progresses
to the development of a plan, moves on to securing the means to carry
out the plan, and culminates in an attack.

[Example:]{.underline} One attacker asked his friends to help him get
ammunition for one of his weapons; sawed off the end of a rifle to make
it easier to conceal beneath his clothes; shopped for a long trench coat
with his mother; and cut the pockets out of the coat so that he could
conceal the weapon within the coat while holding it through one of the
cut-out pockets. This same attacker had a well-known fascination with
weapons and frequently told his friends that he thought about killing
certain students at school.

Implications

The process of thinking and planning that leads up to an attack
potentially may be knowable or discernible from the attacker's behaviors
and communications. To the extent that information about an attacker's
intent and planning is knowable and may be uncovered before an incident,
some attacks may be preventable. However, the Safe School Initiative
found that the time span between the attacker's decision to mount an
attack and the actual incident may be short. Consequently, when
indications that a student may pose a threat to the school community
arise in the form of information about a possible planned attack, school
administrators and law enforcement officials will need to move quickly
to inquire about and intervene in that possible plan.

Key Finding 2

Prior to most incidents, other people knew about the attacker's idea
and/or plan to attack.

Explanation

In most cases, other young persons*--*friends, schoolmates, and/or
siblings*--*knew about the attacker's idea or plan for a possible attack
on the school before that attack occurred. However, this information
rarely made its way to an adult.

[Example:]{.underline} One attacker had planned to shoot students in the
lobby of his school prior to the beginning of classes. He told two
friends exactly what he had planned and asked three other students to
meet him in the mezzanine overlooking the school lobby the morning of
the planned attack, ostensibly so that these students would be out of
harm's way. On most mornings, few students would congregate in the
mezzanine before the school day began. However, on the morning of the
attack, word about what was going to happen spread to such an extent
that, by the time the attacker opened fire in his school lobby, 24
students had gathered in the mezzanine waiting for the attack to begin.
One student who knew about the attacker's plans brought a camera so that
he could take pictures of the event.

Implications

First and foremost, this finding suggests that students can be an
important part of prevention efforts. A friend or schoolmate may be the
first person to hear that a student is thinking about or planning to
harm someone. Nevertheless, for a variety of reasons, those who have
information about a potential incident of targeted school violence may
not alert an adult on their own. Schools can encourage students to
report this information in part by identifying and breaking down
barriers in the school environment that inadvertently may discourage
students from coming forward with this information. Schools also may
benefit from ensuring that they have a fair, thoughtful, and effective
system to respond to whatever information students do bring forward. If
students have concerns about how adults will react to information that
they bring forward, they may be even less inclined to volunteer such
information.

In addition, this finding highlights the importance in a threat
assessment inquiry of attempts to gather all relevant information from
anyone who may have contact with the student. Efforts to gather all
potentially relevant pieces of information, however innocuous they may
appear on their own, from all individuals with whom the student has
contact may help to develop a more comprehensive picture of the
student's ideas, activities, and plans. In the end, investigators likely
will find that different people in the student's life may have different
pieces of the puzzle.

Key Finding 3

Most attackers did not threaten their targets directly prior to
advancing the attack.

Explanation

The Safe School Initiative found that most attackers in fact did not
threaten their target directly and some made no threat at all. Instead,
other behaviors and communications that may prompt concern, such as
hearing that a young person is talking about bringing a gun to school,
are indicators of a possible threat and therefore should prompt the
initiation of efforts to gather information.

Implications

This finding underscores the importance of *not waiting* for a threat
before beginning an inquiry. School administrators, of course, should
respond to all students who make threats because the lack of response
could be taken by the threatener as permission to proceed with carrying
out the threat. In the end, however, it is important to distinguish
between someone who *makes* a threat*--*tells people they intend to harm
someone*--*and someone who *poses* a threat*--*engages in behaviors that
indicate an intent, planning, or preparation for an attack. Those
conducting threat assessment inquiries should focus particular attention
on any information that indicates that a student *poses* a threat,
regardless of whether the student has told a potential target he or she
intends to do them harm.

Key Finding 4

There is no accurate or useful "profile" of students who engage in
targeted school violence.

Explanation

The demographic, personality, school history, and social characteristics
of the attackers varied substantially. Moreover, knowing that an
individual shares characteristics, behaviors, features, or traits with
prior school shooters does not help in determining whether a particular
student is thinking about or planning for a violent act.

[Example]{.underline}: In one case, the dean of students had commended a
student for improving his grades and behavior a few weeks before that
student carried out an attack at his school.

Implications

The use of profiles to determine whether a student is thinking about or
planning a violent attack is not an effective approach to identifying
students who may pose a risk for targeted violence at school or*--*once
a student has been identified*--*for assessing the risk that a
particular student may pose a risk for targeted school violence.
Reliance on profiles to predict future school attacks carries two
substantial risks: (i) the great majority of students who fit any given
profile of a "school shooter" actually will not pose a risk of targeted
violence; and, (ii) using profiles will fail to identify some students
who in fact pose a risk of violence, but share few if any
characteristics with prior attackers.

Rather than trying to determine the "type" of student who may engage in
targeted school violence, an inquiry should focus instead on a student's
*behaviors and communications* to determine if that student appears to
be planning or preparing for an attack. Rather than asking whether a
particular student "looks like" those who have launched school-based
attacks before, it is more productive to ask whether the student is on a
path toward a violent attack, if so how fast the student is moving
toward attack, and where intervention may be possible.

Key Finding 5

Most attackers engaged in some behavior, prior to the incident, that
caused others concern or indicated a need for help.

Explanation

Several key findings point to the fact that young people send
signals*--*both direct and indirect*--*to others regarding their
problems. The boys and young men who engaged in the targeted school
violence examined by the Safe School Initiative were not "invisible"
students. In fact, nearly all of these students engaged in behaviors
that caused concern to at least one person, usually an adult*--*and most
concerned at least three people.

Implications

This finding highlights the range of behaviors in a student's life that
may be noticeable to adults and that could prompt some additional
probing by a caring adult. As was true in some of the incidents covered
in the Safe School Initiative's study, individuals in contact with the
attacker each may have observed something of concern about that
student's behavior, but not of sufficient concern for them to notify
anyone in a position to respond.

Educators and other adults can learn how to pick up on these signals and
make appropriate referrals. By inquiring about any information that may
have prompted some concern, an investigator may be able to develop a
more comprehensive picture of the student's past and current behavior,
and identify any indications that the student is intent on or planning
to attack. However, discretion should be exercised in determining whom
to talk to about the student, so as not to alienate or stigmatize the
student of concern.

Key Finding 6

Most attackers had difficulty coping with significant losses or personal
failures. Many had considered or attempted suicide.

Explanation

Many students, not just those who engaged in school-based attacks,
experience or perceive major losses in their lives. Most students who
face a significant loss, or who have difficulty coping with such a loss,
are not going to be at risk for a school-based attack. However,
information that indicates a student is facing or having trouble dealing
with a significantly difficult situation may indicate a need to refer
the student to appropriate services and resources.

In addition, more than three-quarters of school shooters had a history
of suicidal thoughts, threats, gestures, or attempts. Most of these
students were known to have been severely depressed or desperate at some
point before their attacks.

[Example]{.underline}: One school shooter submitted a series of poems
describing his thoughts of suicide and homicide to his English teacher.
One poem read:

Am I insane

To want to end this pain

To want to end my life

By using a sharp knife

Am I insane

Thinking life is profane

Knowing life is useless

Cause my emotions are a mess

Am I insane

Thinking I've nothing to gain

Considering suicide

Cause love has died

Am I insane

Wanting to spill blood like rain

Sending them all to Hell

From humanity I've fell

The teacher became concerned and recommended that the student receive
help. Help, however, was not offered. After failing to kill himself,
this student killed two adults at school. He hoped to be convicted of
capital murder and executed by the state.

Implications

In cases where there is concern about the possibility that a student may
engage in targeted violence, an inquiry or investigation should include
attention to any indication that a student is having difficulty coping
with major losses or perceived failures, particularly where these losses
or failures appear to have prompted feelings of desperation and
hopelessness. An inquiry or investigation also should anticipate changes
in the life of a troubled student, and consider whether these changes
might increase*--*or decrease*--*the threat that the student poses.

Key Finding 7

Many attackers felt bullied, persecuted, or injured by others prior to
the attack.

Explanation

Bullying was not a factor in every case, and clearly not every child who
is bullied in school will pose a risk for targeted violence in school.
Nevertheless, in a number of the incidents of targeted school violence
studied, attackers described being bullied in terms that suggested that
these experiences approached torment. These attackers told of behaviors
that, if they occurred in the workplace, likely would meet legal
definitions of harassment and/or assault.

[Example]{.underline}: In one situation, most of the attacker's
schoolmates described the attacker as "the kid everyone teased." In
witness statements from that incident, schoolmates described how
virtually every child in the school had at some point thrown the
attacker against a locker; tripped him in the hall; held his head under
water in the pool; or thrown things at him. Several schoolmates had
noted that the attacker acted differently in the days preceding the
attack in that he seemed more annoyed by and less tolerant of the
teasing than usual.

Implications

The prevalence of bullying found by the Safe School Initiative's
examination of targeted school violence and in other recent studies
should strongly support ongoing efforts to reduce bullying in American
schools. Educators can play an important role in ensuring that students
are not bullied in schools and that schools not only do not permit
bullying, but also empower other students to let adults in the school
know if students are being bullied.

Key Finding 8

Most attackers had access to and had used weapons prior to the attack.

Explanation

Almost two-thirds of attackers used a handgun in their attack. Almost
half used a rifle. Most attackers acquired weapons from their home or
the home of a relative. Approximately two-thirds of attackers had a
history of using guns prior to the attack.

Implications

Access to weapons among some students may be common. However, when the
idea of an attack exists, *any* effort to acquire, prepare, or use a
weapon or ammunition, including bomb-making components, may be a
significant move in the attacker's progression from idea to action. Any
inquiry should include investigation of and attention to weapons access
and use and to communications about weapons.

The large proportion of attackers who acquired their guns from home
points to the need for schools and law enforcement officials to
collaborate on policies and procedures for responding when a student is
thought to have a firearm in school. In particular, schools should be
aware of the provisions of the Federal Gun-Free Schools Act, which
generally requires a minimum one-year expulsion of students who bring a
gun to school and that all violations be reported to local law
enforcement officials.

Key Finding 9

In many cases, other students were involved in the attack in some
capacity.

Explanation

The Safe School Initiative found that in over half of the incidents,
others assisted in the planning or execution of the attack by actively
encouraging the attacker to shoot others at school, or even helping to
select targets and train the shooter in how to use a weapon.

[Example]{.underline}: One attacker's original idea had been to bring a
gun to school and let other students see him with it. He wanted to look
tough, so that the students who had been harassing him would leave him
alone. When the attacker shared this idea with two friends, however,
they convinced him that he could not just show up with a gun, but
actually had to *shoot at* people at the school in order to get the
other students to leave him alone. It was after this conversation that
he decided to mount his school attack.

Implications

This finding highlights the importance of considering what prompting or
encouragement a student may receive from others in his life that
influences any intent, planning, or preparations for a potential attack.
Any inquiry or investigation of potential targeted school violence
should include attention to the role that a student's friends or peers
may be playing in that student's thinking about and preparations for an
attack. It is possible that feedback from friends or others may help to
move a student from an unformed thought about attacking to developing
and advancing a plan to carry out the attack.

This finding speaks to the importance of school officials paying
attention to the "settings" and climates of their schools. Peers exert
enormous influence over their friends and schoolmates. And principals,
teachers, counselors, coaches, and other adults at school may make all
the difference in preventing violence. An environment in which it is
clear that violence doesn't solve problems, but only makes them worse
may help prevent tragedy. A climate in which a young person is seen as a
"snitch" or a "rat" for telling an adult about a student in distress
differs from one in which young people know that they can call on adults
to help students who are in pain.

Key Finding 10

Despite prompt law enforcement responses, most attacks were stopped by
means other than law enforcement intervention and most were brief in
duration.

Explanation

Law enforcement authorities responded quickly to almost all calls from
schools about attacks. However, most attacks were resolved within
minutes, without law enforcement intervention.

Implications

The short duration of most incidents of targeted school violence argues
for the importance of developing preventive measures in addition to any
emergency planning for a school or school district. The preventive
measures should include protocols and procedures for responding to and
managing threats and other behaviors of concern.

In summary, the findings of the Safe School Initiative suggest that some
future school attacks may be preventable. The fact that most attackers
engaged in pre-incident planning behavior and shared their intentions
and plans with others, suggests that those conducting threat assessment
inquiries or investigations could uncover these types of information.
The remainder of this *Guide* sets forth how to develop a capacity for
and conduct a threat assessment process.

CHAPTER IV

IMPLEMENTING A SCHOOL THREAT ASSESSMENT PROCESS

The primary purpose of a threat assessment is to prevent targeted
violence. The threat assessment process is centered upon on analysis of
the facts and evidence of behavior in a given situation. The appraisal
of risk in a threat assessment focuses on actions, communications, and
specific circumstances that might suggest that an individual intends to
mount an attack and is engaged in planning or preparing for that event.

In a situation that becomes the focus of a threat assessment inquiry or
investigation, appropriate authorities gather information, evaluate
facts, and make a determination as to whether a given student *poses* a
threat of violence to a target. If an inquiry indicates that there is a
risk of violence in a specific situation, authorities conducting the
threat assessment collaborate with others to develop and implement a
plan to manage or reduce the threat posed by the student in that
situation.

Six principles form the foundation of the threat assessment process.
These principles are:

-   Targeted violence is the end result of an understandable, and
    oftentimes discernible, process of thinking and behavior.

-   Targeted violence stems from an interaction among the individual,
    the situation, the setting, and the target.

-   An investigative, skeptical, inquisitive mindset is critical to
    successful threat assessment.

-   Effective threat assessment is based upon facts, rather than on
    characteristics or "traits."

-   An "integrated systems approach" should guide threat assessment
    inquiries and investigations.

-   The central question in a threat assessment inquiry or investigation
    is whether a student *poses* a threat, not whether the student has
    *made* a threat.

In addition, three elements guide the development and operation of an
effective school threat assessment program. These elements are:

-   authority to conduct an assessment;

-   capacity to conduct inquiries and investigations; and,

-   systems relationships.

These principles and elements are discussed below.

Principles of the Threat Assessment Process

This *Guide* is about the systematic use of threat assessment as a
central component in preventing targeted school violence. The threat
assessment process involves identifying, assessing, and managing
individuals who might pose a risk of violence to an identified or
identifiable target. Implementation of a threat assessment process is
informed by six underlying principles.

Principle 1: Targeted violence is the end result of an understandable,
and oftentimes discernible, process of thinking and behavior.

Findings of the Safe School Initiative indicate that students and former
students who committed targeted attacks at schools almost always thought
about their attacks in advance, and did not just "snap" suddenly. These
findings suggest that students who carry out school attacks may consider
possible targets; talk with others about their ideas and intentions; and
record their thinking in diaries and journals or on a Web site. They may
seek out weapons to use in the attack, and they may practice with these
weapons in preparation for the attack. The actions of these attackers
may be deliberate and occur over days and weeks, months or years.

Principle 2: Targeted violence stems from an interaction among the
person, the situation, the setting, and the target.

Understanding and preventing acts of targeted violence require a focus
on these four component parts and their interaction: the individual, the
situation, the setting, and the target.

-   *The potential attacker*: To determine the risk of targeted
    violence, a threat assessor must gather information about the
    potential attacker. In a threat assessment inquiry or investigation,
    a major question is: How has this student dealt with situations that
    have led him or her to see life as unbearably stressful? Individuals
    who in times of great stress have considered or acted upon ideas of
    suicide or violence toward others, or both, should be considered
    persons of increased concern.

-   *The situation*: Investigators should examine circumstances and
    significant events in the life of the individual, especially recent
    events that have been overwhelmingly stressful. For students who
    engaged in school-based attacks, those events included having been
    bullied and humiliated, especially in public; loss of significant
    relationships; and perceived failures or loss of status. Almost all
    school shooters experienced some major situational stress at some
    point before their attack.[^11]

-   *The setting*: The third factor to consider is the specific setting
    at the time that the student came to authorities' attention as
    possibly posing a threat of targeted school violence. Do fellow
    students, friends, or others say*--*directly or indirectly*--*that
    violence is not a solution to problems? Do these people suggest ways
    to get help and assistance? In a school, are there respectful
    connections among students and adults, networks of trusting
    relationships, that facilitate non-violent problem-solving? Or is
    the idea of violence proposed, supported, accepted, or ignored by
    those who know the potential attacker?

    In many school shootings, other young persons knew about the
    shooter's interest in mounting an attack. In some cases, clear
    warnings were dismissed or ignored. In others, friends and fellow
    students of the shooter encouraged or helped the attacker in his
    pursuit of violence. Messages about the acceptability of violence
    that are communicated directly or subtly to a potential attacker by
    students and/or adults in his or her environment may facilitate, or
    alternatively help to prevent, an attack.

-   *The target*: When assessing the risk of an attack at school,
    investigators and others with protective responsibilities also must
    pay attention to the individual's choice of a potential target. The
    attacker may target a particular individual or group of individuals
    over some perceived injury or loss. In some cases, attackers chose a
    specific target, such as a particular student or teacher. In other
    instances, the target was more general: the school, "jocks," or
    "kids in the cafeteria."

    Principle 3: An investigative, skeptical, inquisitive mindset is
    critical to successful threat assessment.

An investigative mindset is central to successful application of the
threat assessment process. Threat assessment requires thoughtful
probing; viewing information with healthy skepticism; and paying
attention to key points about pre-attack behaviors. Authorities who
carry out threat assessments must strive to be both accurate and fair.

Moreover, threat assessors should question the information in front of
them continuously. Ideally, there should be credible verification of all
essential "facts." Information about a potential attacker's interests,
statements, and actions should be corroborated, wherever possible.

The investigative mindset and perspective also rely on common sense.
Threat assessors working to understand a given situation should step
back periodically from the individual details of an inquiry or
investigation and ask whether information gathered makes sense and
supports any hypothesis developed concerning the risk posed by the
subject of the threat assessment inquiry.

Principle 4: Effective threat assessment is based on facts, rather than
characteristics or "traits."

A major principle of threat assessment is that each investigation stands
on its own. Inferences and conclusions about risk should be guided by an
analysis of facts and behaviors specific to the person of concern and
the given situation. Any student with the motive, intent, and ability
potentially is capable of mounting a targeted attack at school.
Judgments about a student's risk of violence should be based upon
analysis of behaviorally relevant facts, not on "traits" or
"characteristics" of a given individual or of a class of individuals.

In the climate of fear that followed recent attacks, students in high
schools across the country who appeared angry and wore trench coats were
marked as possible school attackers. They were so labeled because of
appearance and demeanor. Blanket characterizations, or student
"profiles," do not provide a reliable basis for making judgments of the
threat posed by a particular student.[^12] Even worse, the use of
profiles can shift attention away from more reliable facts and evidence
about a student's behavior and communications.

Principle 5: An "integrated systems approach" should guide threat
assessment investigations.

In a threat assessment, bits of information might be viewed as pieces of
a puzzle. Each bit may appear inconsequential or only slightly worrisome
by itself. But, when the pieces are put together*--*as oftentimes has
occurred in "after the fact" analyses of school attacks*--*the behaviors
and communications of a student may coalesce into a discernible pattern
that indicates a threat of violence. In many school attacks, information
existed within the school and community that might have alerted
authorities to the risk of attack posed by a particular student.

Relationships with agencies and service systems within the school and
the surrounding community are critical to identifying, assessing, and
managing students who are on a path toward carrying out a school attack.
An integrated systems approach recognizes the necessity of cooperation
and partnerships between schools and systems outside of the school.
These may include law enforcement, social services and mental health
providers, the courts, community agencies, families, worksites,
religious organizations, and others.

Principle 6: The central question of a threat assessment is whether a
student *poses* a threat, not whether the student *made* a threat.

Although some individuals who threaten harm may pose a real threat of
targeted violence, many do not. The Safe School Initiative found that
fewer than 20 percent of school shooters communicated a direct or
conditional threat to their target before the attack. By contrast,
individuals who are found to *pose* threats of violence frequently *do
not make* threats to their targets. The study found that in more than 80
percent of the cases, school shooters did not threaten their targets
directly, but they did communicate their intent and/or plans to others
before the attack.

These findings underscore the importance of making judgments in threat
assessment investigations based upon a student's behaviors and
communications, rather than upon whether or not that student threatened
his or her target. Authorities conducting threat assessment
investigations must distinguish between *making* a threat, e.g., telling
a potential target that he or she may or will be harmed, and *posing* a
threat, e.g., engaging in behavior that indicates furthering a plan or
building capacity for a violent act.

Nevertheless, threats of violence should not be dismissed out of hand.
Students may make threats with a variety of intents and for a wide range
of reasons, e.g., to get attention; to express anger or frustration; to
frighten or coerce their peers; as a part of joking or "playing around;"
or, in some cases, to communicate intent to attack.

Consequently, every threat should receive prompt attention. Although
voicing a threat should not be used as the principle determinant in
making judgments about the likelihood of a school attack, it likewise
would be a mistake to assume that individuals who make threats in every
instance are unlikely to follow through on those communications.

Elements of a School Threat Assessment Process

Authorities involved in carrying out a threat assessment inquiry or
investigation should gather and analyze information about the behavior
and communications of the student of concern. This information, in turn,
will permit these authorities to make reasonable judgments about whether
the student of concern is moving along a path toward an attack on an
identifiable target. Three elements are essential to the development and
operation of an effective school safety threat assessment program.[^13]

1\. Authority to Conduct an Investigation

A teacher comes to the principal's office to report "the kids are saying
that Johnny told his friends not to go to the cafeteria at noon on
Tuesday because something big and bad is going to happen." What did
Johnny mean by that statement? Is Johnny planning to attack the school?
Perhaps Johnny is engaging in idle talk. Perhaps the report of Johnny's
statement is inaccurate. Perhaps Johnny is planning an attack on the
school or has knowledge about other students' plans.

Clearly, this information cannot be ignored. How, then, should the
principal respond to this report? Should the principal call Johnny to
the office and ask him about the report? Should other students be
queried about the report? What if Johnny denies making the statement
that has been reported, while other students assert otherwise?

Schools should have in place clear policies on collecting and reacting
to information on potentially threatening situations and determining
whether this information merits further attention through a threat
assessment inquiry and investigation. Threat assessment inquiry and
investigation should be initiated if there is credible information that
passes a critical threshold of concern.

In creating these policies, school administrators should be aware of and
consult with the school's legal counsel about legal issues related to
the conduct of a threat assessment inquiry or investigation. These legal
issues include the effects of laws pertaining to: (1) access to and
sharing of information, and (2) searches of a student's person or
property. Each of these issues should be discussed with the school's
legal counsel.

Establishing Authority to Conduct an Inquiry or Investigation

A formal policy authorizing school officials to conduct a threat
assessment should cover the following topics:

-   the purpose and scope of the policy;

-   the role of educators and the threat assessment team vis a vis the
    role of law enforcement;

-   the identity of, and delegation of authority to, school officials
    concerning determination that a threat assessment inquiry or
    investigation should be pursued;

-   the definition of the threshold of concern for initiating a threat
    assessment inquiry or investigation, i.e., a description of the
    nature and extent of behavior or communication that would trigger a
    threat assessment inquiry or investigation;

-   the description of the types of information that may be gathered
    during the assessment;

-   the designation of the individuals or group of individuals who would
    be responsible for gathering and analyzing information; and

-   the steps and procedures to be followed from initiation to
    conclusion of the threat assessment inquiry or investigation.

    Information-Sharing in Support of the School Threat Assessment
    Process

Much emphasis in this *Guide* is placed upon the importance of sharing
information about a student who may pose a risk of violence. In most
previous school shootings, there was information available prior to the
incident that suggested that the student was planning an attack at
school.

However, when conducting an inquiry or investigation regarding a
potential threat, the inquirer or investigator will find that different
people in the student's life may have different*--*and possibly
small*--*pieces of the puzzle. It is the responsibility of the threat
assessment team to gather this information from what may be multiple
sources*--*teachers, parents, friends, guidance counselors,
after-s\--chool program staff, part-time employers, and others.

Once information is gathered from the various sources contacted during a
threat assessment inquiry, the threat assessment team may wish to
explore options for storing this information in an accessible format.
The team likewise may wish to consider keeping the information in a
central location.

Legal Considerations in Developing Information-Sharing Policies and
Procedures

Although the need to gather information about a student who may pose a
threat of violence is clear, the ability to share this information
requires some advance consideration. Laws, rules, regulations, and
policies, for example, may place limitations on access to student
records and restrict the use of accessible information in conjunction
with investigations. In formulating information-sharing policies and
procedures, threat assessment teams should consult with their respective
school's*--*or school district's*--*legal counsel to ensure that team
members are well-briefed on existing laws and regulations and their
implications for the development of policies and procedures for
accessing and disclosing student information. In particular, threat
assessment teams should examine provisions of these laws and regulations
to identify opportunities for including threatening situations in
schools as exceptions to constraints on the disclosure of information
contained in education records.

Two principal areas of law*--*federal statutes and state statutes*--*may
affect access to and sharing of information about a particular student.
An overview of the implications of these areas of law for conducting
threat assessment investigations is provided in the following.

Federal Statutes

Under existing federal law, a school's authority to release information
about a student is governed by the Family Educational Rights and Privacy
Act (FERPA).[^14] The intent of FERPA is to protect the privacy of
"education records," a term that is defined as any records that contain
information directly related to a student and that are maintained by the
educational agency or institution or by a person acting for the agency
or institution. Under provisions of FERPA, a school may not disclose
personally identifiable information about a student from any education
records without the prior written consent of the student's parent or, in
the case of students who are 18 or older, the consent of the student.

FERPA does allow for various exceptions to privacy protections covering
access to student records, specifying situations and conditions under
which a school may disclose information from a student's education
records without consent. A detailed analysis of these exceptions is
beyond the scope of this *Guide*. However, there are two exceptions that
are worth noting because of their specific relevance to accessing and
sharing information for threat assessment inquiries:

-   *Health and Safety Emergencies*: FERPA provides that schools *may
    disclose* information from a student's education records in
    situations where there is an immediate need to share that
    information in order to protect the health or safety of the student
    or others.[^15] Under this exception, schools must define the term
    "health or safety emergency" narrowly and are permitted to disclose
    information from education records only to those individuals who
    need the information in order to protect the student and others.

-   *Law Enforcement Unit Records*: FERPA regulations draw a distinction
    between records created by a school law enforcement unit for law
    enforcement purposes, such as the enforcement of a local, state, or
    federal law, and records created by a school law enforcement unit
    for non-law enforcement purposes, such as the enforcement of school
    policies concerning behavior or disciplinary actions. FERPA also
    distinguishes between student information that school law
    enforcement unit officials gathered from education records, and
    student information that unit officials obtained from other sources.
    With respect to disclosure of student information contained in
    school law enforcement unit records, FERPA provides that:

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-   Personally identifiable information about a student may be disclosed
    by school officials if that information is held in a school law
    enforcement unit record that was created to enforce a federal,
    state, or local law.

-   Information in school law enforcement unit records that was not
    obtained from a student's education records may also be disclosed
    without the consent of the student's parents or the student.

It is important to note that FERPA regulations govern the disclosure of
student information from education records and any information about the
student that is based upon information contained in education records.
FERPA regulations do not restrict the authority of school officials to
share other information about a student that *is not* contained in
education records. For example, information such as a school official's
personal observations about or interactions with a student that is not
contained in education records may be disclosed.

State Law and Access to Student Records

State laws governing access to and sharing of information about students
vary from state to state. Moreover, in the wake of highly publicized
school shootings in the 1990s, several states enacted laws that revise
restrictions on disclosure of information contained in student records.
In some states, these amendments, in effect, make it easier to share
this information among schools, law enforcement agencies, and others in
furtherance of protecting the safety of students at school.[^16]

2\. Capacity to Conduct School Threat Assessments

Proactive planning is a critical element in the implementation of a
school threat assessment program. School administrators should consider
creating a multidisciplinary threat assessment team that is based in the
school or the school district. Schools should not wait until a crisis
occurs to establish a threat assessment team. Many schools across the
country already have established teams to respond to a wide range of
situations, from suicides to meeting special education needs. The
expertise and knowledge of any existing teams may be useful in
developing a threat assessment team.

The roles and responsibilities of the team as a whole, and of members of
that team individually, should be clearly defined. The information
gathering and assessment procedures to be used by the team should be
formalized. Team members should be trained together in the threat
assessment process. Multidisciplinary training sessions provide
opportunities for professionals in different systems to build
relationships and to consider how to address issues before a crisis
arises. Training that uses practical exercises *--*"what should we do
if..."*--*can enhance threat assessment and management programs and
processes.

The multidisciplinary threat assessment team's principal responsibility
is to guide the assessment and management of situations of concern. A
senior school administrator should chair the team. Regular members of
the team ideally should include: 1) a respected member of the school
faculty or administration; 2) an investigator, such as a school resource
officer or other police officer assigned to the school; 3) a mental
health professional, such as a forensic psychologist, a clinical
psychologist, or a school psychologist; and 4) other professionals, such
as guidance counselors, teachers, coaches, and others, who may be able
to contribute to the threat assessment process.

In addition, the chair of the threat assessment team may wish to
consider including as an ad hoc member of the team someone who knows the
student of concern in the threat assessment inquiry. This ad hoc
position might be held by an individual from the school community, such
as a teacher, counselor, coach, nurse, other school employee, or someone
from the community who may know or have knowledge of the student, such
as a probation officer, member of the clergy, or a social service
worker.

If the student of concern is being provided services under the
Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act (IDEA), a representative
from the team that developed or manages that student's Individualized
Education Plan (IEP) also should be brought onto the threat assessment
team as an ad hoc member for the inquiry regarding this particular
student.

Skills and Training

Developing the capacity to conduct school threat assessments involves
recruiting, training, and supporting professionals with special skills.
The qualifications, skills, knowledge and experience of the members of
the threat assessment team should include:

-   a questioning, analytical, and skeptical mindset;

-   an ability to relate well to parents, colleagues, other
    professionals, and students;

-   familiarity with childhood and adolescent growth and development,
    the school environment, the need for safe schools, and the
    community;

-   a reputation within the school and the community for fairness and
    trustworthiness;

-   training in the collection and evaluation of information from
    multiple sources;

-   discretion, and an appreciation for the importance of keeping
    information confidential, and of the possible harm that may result
    in the inappropriate release of information; and

-   cognizance of the difference between harming and helping in an
    intervention.

    3\. Integrated Systems Relationships

In order to identify, assess, and manage students who might pose threats
of targeted violence, a threat assessment program must build
relationships among individuals and organizations both within the school
and external to the school. These relationships can help the team
acquire and use information about a given situation, and aid those with
protective responsibilities in developing strategies to prevent targeted
school violence.

Ideally, community systems concerned with education, safety, and child
welfare would have well-established policies and procedures for
cooperation and collaboration. In practice, these systems oftentimes are
large and overburdened and tend to carry out their functions
independently. In a well-functioning threat assessment program,
effective systems relationships are most likely to occur between
individuals, not institutions.

Individuals who build and maintain these relationships across
disciplines and agencies are called "boundary spanners."[^17] They serve
as a formal link or liaison between various systems and meet regularly
with them. Boundary spanners have credibility, respect, and strong
interpersonal skills. In addition, they should understand the needs and
operation of other systems. This understanding helps in integrating
ongoing interagency relationships, in developing written protocols, and
in facilitating the resolution of conflicts.

CHAPTER V

CONDUCTING A SCHOOL THREAT ASSESSMENT

This chapter focuses specifically on carrying out the threat assessment
process. The sections that follow address the issue of identifying
threatening situations; describe the information that should be sought
in a threat assessment; identify potential sources of information; and
set out 11 key questions that may provide members of the threat
assessment team guidance in making judgments about whether a student of
concern poses a threat.

The approach presented is highly detailed but should not be read as
suggesting that most, or even many, threat assessments will require
extensive or elaborate gathering and analysis of information. Threat
assessments may be brief and limited, or extensive and complex. The
facts of a situation, together with information developed about a
student of concern, will determine the scope of the threat assessment
process. Many situations can be understood and resolved after initial
information-gathering and evaluation.

The Threat Assessment Process as a Continuum

In previous chapters of this *Guide*, the terms "threat assessment
inquiry" and "threat assessment investigation" generally have been used
interchangeably. In this chapter, threat assessment inquiries and threat
assessment investigations will be addressed as two complementary parts
of a threat assessment continuum. Under this model of the threat
assessment process, evaluation of a threatening situation proceeds from
a threat assessment [inquiry]{.underline}, carried out by the school
threat assessment team, to a threat assessment
[investigation]{.underline}, carried out by a law enforcement agency, if
the initial inquiry determines that there is a valid threat of targeted
school violence.

There may be several "right ways" to designate responsibility for
conducting a threat assessment. One community or school system may
decide to give primary responsibility to specially trained law
enforcement professionals. Another may keep responsibility for most
threat assessment and management within the school system. Still other
communities develop "blended" systems. School, law enforcement, and
community leaders should consider the principles of threat assessment,
the functions needed for a successful program, and local resources and
relationships before deciding what delineation of responsibilities makes
the most sense.

The threat assessment process is being presented in this manner as a
means of underscoring the proposition that not all situations that
become the focus of school threat assessment inquiries will require
referral to and follow-up threat assessment investigations by law
enforcement officials. For example, some preliminary inquiries by
members of the school threat assessment team will find that information
about a student was false or unfounded, or that the behavior of the
student who is the subject of this inquiry does not present a risk of
targeted violence and can be managed by school administrators and other
officials on an informal basis. The situations examined in these
inquiries do not pose threats to the school, the student body, or the
community, and therefore generally would not be referred to law
enforcement agencies. By contrast, threat assessment inquiries that
conclude that a valid threat of targeted school violence exists will
require referral to law enforcement officials for further investigation.

Central Distinctions Between Threat Assessment Inquiries and
Investigations

The central distinctions between a threat assessment inquiry and a
threat assessment investigation are defined by the management of these
two parts of the threat assessment continuum. The primary objective of
both a threat assessment inquiry and an investigation is to determine
whether a particular student poses a threat of targeted school violence.
Both an inquiry and an investigation ask "Is there information to
suggest that this student is on the path to an attack? What is the risk
of targeted violence?"

A threat assessment inquiry is initiated and controlled by school
authorities (often with law enforcement consultation and participation).
Information is gathered at the school and by persons known to the
school. If information collected suggests that the student of concern is
considering mounting an attack at school, it may be appropriate to refer
the situation to law enforcement for an investigation. Also, if
information gathered in a threat assessment inquiry suggests that it is
likely that a violation of law has occurred, it may be appropriate to
refer the situation to law enforcement.

A threat assessment investigation also asks: "Does this student pose a
threat of targeted violence?" In addition, investigators may ask: "Has
this student violated a law?"

With respect to their management, the threat assessment inquiry and the
threat assessment investigation differ as follows:

-   threat assessment inquiries are initiated, conducted, and controlled
    by the school threat assessment team;

-   threat assessment investigations are initiated, conducted, and
    controlled by law enforcement agencies.

The line between a threat assessment inquiry and a threat assessment
investigation*--*the point along the threat assessment continuum at
which a school threat assessment team decides that a threatening
situation must be referred to a law enforcement agency for
investigation*--*will be determined by the school threat assessment team
in consultation with school administrators and law enforcement
officials. These determinations, in turn, will be made on a case-by-case
basis. Nevertheless, in developing policies and procedures for carrying
out a threat assessment inquiry, the threat assessment program should
establish a general threshold for initiating inquiries and referring
threatening situations to law enforcement agencies.

Identifying Students of Concern

As discussion of the threat assessment process in this *Guide*
indicates, that process is not about the wholesale examination of the
student body to identify students who may be at risk of committing acts
of targeted school violence. Instead, threat assessment is a tool for
responding to threatening situations in which there is concern about a
particular student who has come to the attention of school
administrators or other authorities.

Students who become the focus of threat assessment inquiries and
investigations may come to the attention of authorities in a number of
ways.

Circumstances that Bring a Student to Official Attention

Some students may bring themselves to the attention of authorities by
engaging in communications that cause concern:

-   A student submits a story for an English assignment about a
    character that shoots other students in his school.

-   Two students in a video class make a movie about kids who bring
    bombs to school.

-   A dean receives an e-mail stating, "I'm going to kill everyone in
    this asylum."

-   A seventh-grader, who is known to be feared by his classmates, cocks
    a finger at another boy on the playground and says "you're gonna
    die."

-   The personal Web page of a high-achieving student has links to Web
    pages with information about cyanide.

In each of the situations described above, a student has behaved in a
manner that causes concern to school administrators and other
authorities. Each situation requires some kind of follow-up inquiry or
investigation. In each case, the identity of the student is known or
potentially knowable. In some cases, the student's communication is a
direct threat. In other cases, the communication is ambiguous.

Other students of concern come to the attention of authorities through
second or third parties:

-   A school bus driver tells the principal of a school that a group of
    students has been overheard whispering about bringing a gun to
    school.

-   A ninth-grader reports that he has been threatened by another
    student and warned not to tell anybody about the threat.

-   A student reports overhearing a lunchroom conversation between two
    other students in which one of the students says that he "isn't
    going to take it any more. I'm going to get even for good."

-   A neighbor of a student calls the school to report suspicions that
    the student is experimenting with bomb-making materials.

In still other cases, students come to the attention of authorities
through anonymous communications:

-   A parent anonymously calls a tip line to report concerns about the
    behavior of a student.

-   The school district superintendent's office receives an anonymous
    call stating that a bomb will go off in one of the middle schools at
    1:45 p.m.

-   An anonymous letter signed "Fans of Eric and Dylan Club" arrives at
    a high school. The letter states "Remember Columbine" and warns that
    "Judgment Day" is coming.

Information provided anonymously requires careful evaluation by the
school threat assessment team. Some information may be accurate. Some
information may be partial or incomplete. Some may be false and/or
fabricated with malicious intent.

In situations where a student is not easily identifiable from an
anonymous communication, more sophisticated identification techniques
may be required. These methods and techniques may necessitate
involvement of law enforcement organizations, particularly in situations
where there are anonymous warnings of imminent danger, such as bomb
threats.

Managing Communications about Students of Concern

Policies regarding the handling of communications that raise concerns
about students should address the following topics:

-   Establishing low barriers for reporting for those who may have
    information of concern.[^18]

-   Advising students and adults of the kinds of information that should
    be brought forward: threats; weapon-seeking and weapon-using
    behavior; homicidal and suicidal behaviors; behaviors suggesting
    that a young person is contemplating, or planning, an attack.

-   Ensuring that a thoughtful process is put in place in the school or
    school district to assess information that is brought forward about
    a potential attacker. This process should be perceived as credible
    by students and adults.

-   Recognizing that what is reported may often be different than what
    actually was said or occurred.

-   Establishing and continually reinforcing a policy that it is
    everyone's responsibility to help develop and maintain a respectful,
    safe school environment.

-   Reinforcing positive behaviors by teachers, students, and staff in
    the school.

-   Building linkages to individuals, groups, and organizations that can
    offer support and assistance to students and to the school.
    Sometimes these persons and groups may provide information that can
    help prevent targeted violent attacks.

    Creating a Central Point of Contact

Individuals who have information about students that is cause for
concern should know how to refer this information and to whom. The
threat assessment team should designate a member of the team to serve as
the initial point of contact for information of possible concern. The
availability of this point of contact should be made known
community-wide. An anonymous tip line may be of use if there is a
process in place to carefully evaluate the information that is received
by means of this approach. The threat assessment team member who serves
as initial point of contact will screen information and determine
whether to initiate a threat assessment inquiry or to consult other
members of the team.

Schools should publicize the name of the designated point of contact to
faculty, staff, parents, and students as the person to contact with any
information of potential concern. Students, faculty, staff, and parents
should be instructed and encouraged to bring forward information about
any activity that evokes concern about possible targeted violence.
Information of interest includes threatening statements and writings;
behavior that indicates that an attack is being planned; and attempts to
acquire weapons.

Individuals who provide information concerning a student should receive
follow-up acknowledgments of their communications from the central point
of contact, such as: "We have carefully considered the information you
shared with us" or "We appreciate your bringing this situation to
attention." A follow-up acknowledgment can be made without revealing
confidential or inappropriate information, and it reinforces the
proposition that individuals in the community can play an important role
in alerting school officials and other authorities of suspected
threatening situations.

The Threat Assessment Inquiry

This section describes the process for conducting a threat assessment
inquiry. The information developed during the inquiry will inform the
threat assessment team's analysis of a potentially threatening situation
and provide the basis for deciding whether that situation should be
referred to a law enforcement agency for a threat assessment
investigation.

In the event that a threatening situation is referred to a law
enforcement agency, the information gathered and analyzed by the threat
assessment team during the threat assessment inquiry will be forwarded
to the investigative law enforcement agency. That information will
provide direction to police officials' more in-depth examination of the
behaviors and communications of the student of concern.

When should a threat assessment inquiry be initiated?

When information about a student's behavior and communications passes an
agreed-upon threshold of concern, school officials should initiate a
threat assessment inquiry. Upon receiving information concerning a
potentially threatening situation, the threat assessment team must first
consider: "How much time do we have?" An inquiry should be initiated
immediately (within hours of notification) in any situation of concern.

If information concerning a threatening situation suggests that violence
is imminent*--*for example, a student has acquired a weapon and is on
his way to the school with the intention of shooting another
student*--*that matter of course should be referred immediately to
police.

When information is received concerning a potentially threatening
situation, the safety of the school and the community is the priority
consideration. The threat assessment team therefore should consider how
to handle a student of concern while an inquiry or investigation is
being conducted. In making decisions about how to handle a student
pending the outcome of a threat assessment inquiry or investigation,
care should be exercised to ensure that a student of concern is not
treated inappropriately, since any allegations regarding the behavior or
perceived dangerousness of the student may be unfounded.

What information should be sought in an inquiry?

Once a decision has been made to conduct an inquiry, the threat
assessment team should develop an information plan. A school threat
assessment inquiry should seek information in five areas:

1.  The facts that drew attention to the student, the situation, and
    possibly the targets

The first area of inquiry concerns how the student came to the attention
of school officials. What behaviors and/or communications were reported,
and by whom? What was the situation? Who, if anyone, witnessed the
reported behavior of concern? What was the context for the reported
behavior, i.e., what else was going on at the time of the reported
behavior?

Individuals who report information about possible threatening situations
may have multiple motives. Alleged accounts of behaviors may be
inaccurate and may be subjective interpretations of events. Careful
attention to the facts*--*with corroboration wherever possible*--*will
help determine whether the situation warrants scrutiny.

2.  Information about the student

Three kinds of general information about a student should be gathered:
identifiers, background information, and information about the student's
current life situation and circumstances.

A.  Identifying information:

-   name;

-   physical description;

-   date of birth; and

-   identification numbers.

B.  Background information:

-   residences;

-   family/home situation;

-   academic performance;

-   social networks;

-   history of relationships and conflicts;

-   history of harassing others or of being harassed by others;

-   history of violence toward self and others;

-   history of having been a victim of violence or bullying;

-   known attitudes toward violence;

-   criminal behavior;

-   mental health/substance abuse history;

-   access to and use of weapons; and

-   history of grievances and grudges.

C.  Current life information:

-   present stability of living and home situations;

-   nature and quality of current relationships and personal support;

-   recent losses or losses of status (shame, humiliation, recent
    breakup or loss of significant relationship);

-   current grievances or grudges;

-   perceptions of being treated unfairly;

-   known difficulty coping with a stressful event;

-   any "downward" progression in social, academic, behavioral, or
    psychological functioning;

-   recent hopelessness, desperation, and/or despair, including suicidal
    thoughts, gestures, actions, or attempts; and

-   pending crises or change in circumstances.

Of particular note is whether the student has any trusting relationships
with adults who are emotionally available to him or her, or whether the
student is known to be consistently respectful to any adult. If there is
an adult who is "connected" to the student, that adult may have useful
information about the student's thinking and behavior. In addition, such
an adult may be able to help the student if he or she appears to be on a
path toward mounting a targeted school attack.

3.  Information about "attack-related" behaviors

Examination of the thinking and behaviors of school shooters suggests
that most attacks are preceded by discernible behaviors, as the student
plans or prepares for the attack. These behaviors are referred to as
attack-related behaviors.

Behaviors that should raise concern about potential violence include:

-   ideas or plans about injuring him/herself or attacking a school or
    persons at school;

-   communications or writings that suggest that the student has an
    unusual or worrisome interest in school attacks;

-   comments that express or imply the student is considering mounting
    an attack at school;

-   recent weapon-seeking behavior, especially if weapon-seeking is
    linked to ideas about attack or expressions about interest in
    attack;

-   communications or writings suggesting the student condones or is
    considering violence to redress a grievance or solve a problem; and

-   rehearsals of attacks or ambushes.

4.  Motives

Motives for actual school attacks have included:

-   revenge for a perceived injury or grievance;

-   yearning for attention, recognition, or notoriety;

-   a wish to solve a problem otherwise seen as unbearable; and

-   a desire to die or be killed.

Knowledge of the motives of a student of concern may help the threat
assessment team in evaluating the risk of targeted violence.
Understanding the circumstances that may have prompted a student to
consider attacking others may permit authorities to direct the student
away from violence.

For example, a student who feels he has been treated wrongly and
unfairly by a teacher or an administrator and who is thinking about
"revenge" may be offered or taught non-violent ways to address his
concerns and problems. Mediation; personal support; clarification about
the disciplinary process; education about how to write a letter of
concern to authorities who might intervene in the student's problems; or
other dispute resolution efforts might turn that student away from a
potentially violent course of action. A student who is suicidal and who
wants to get "even" with his bullies before ending his life may be
provided mental health services and support. In addition, school
administrators should intervene on this student's behalf to stop the
bullying.

As stated in previous chapters of this *Guide*, students make threats
and engage in other risky behaviors for a range of reasons. Many
threatening statements and actions do not reflect the student's actual
movement on a path to attack. Adolescents occasionally say and do
"outrageous" things, so a single utterance or action should not be seen
as determinative in a threat assessment.[^19]

5.  Target Selection

Most school shooters identified their targets to friends and fellow
students before advancing the attack. Almost half of school shooters had
more than one target. Threat assessors should consider whether and how a
potential attacker's interest in a target may shift to another target
over time. Information about a student's targets may provide clues to
the student's motives, planning, and attack-related behaviors.
Information about the student's motives also may inform the question of
whether there are additional targets.

What are sources of information for the inquiry?

1.  School Information

A school threat assessment inquiry should begin with what is known about
the student from records, teacher interviews, and other information
easily accessed at the school and from school officials. In utilizing
information from school records in a threat assessment inquiry, the
threat assessment team should follow school policies and relevant laws
regarding information-sharing.[^20]

Answers to the following questions may be drawn from information at
school:

-   Is the student well known to any adult at the school?

-   Has the student come to attention for any behavior of concern? If
    so, what? (e-mail, Web site, posters, papers, rule-breaking,
    violence, harassment, adjustment problems, depression or despair,
    acting-out behavior, etc.)

-   Has the student experienced serious difficulties or been in
    distress?

-   Is there anyone with whom the student shares worries, frustrations,
    and/or sorrows?

-   Is there information that the student has considered ending his or
    her life?

-   Has the student been a victim and/or an initiator of hostile,
    harassing, or bullying behavior directed toward other students,
    teachers, or other staff?

-   Is the student known to have an interest in weapons? If so, has he
    or she made efforts to acquire or use weapons? Does the student live
    in a home in which there are weapons (whether or not the weapons are
    secured)?

6.  Collateral School Interviews

Students and adults who know the student who is the subject of the
threat assessment inquiry should be asked about communications or other
behaviors that may indicate the student of concern's ideas or intent.
The focus of these interviews should be factual:

-   What was said? To whom?

-   What was written? To whom?

-   What was done?

-   When and where did this occur?

-   Who else observed this behavior?

-   Did the student say why he or she acted as they did?

Bystanders, observers, and other people who were there when the student
engaged in threatening behaviors or made threatening statements should
be queried about whether any of these behaviors or statements concerned
or worried them. These individuals should be asked about changes in the
student's attitudes and behaviors. Likewise, they should be asked if
they have become increasingly concerned about the student's behavior or
state of mind.

However, individuals interviewed generally should not be asked to
characterize the student or interpret meanings of communications that
the student may have made. Statements such as "I think he's really
dangerous" or "he said it with a smile, so I knew that he must be
joking" may not be accurate characterizations of the student's intent,
and therefore are unlikely to be useful to the threat assessment team in
carrying out a threat assessment inquiry.

7.  Parent/Guardian Interview

The parents or guardians of the student of concern usually should be
interviewed.

Parents may be protective of their children. They may be frightened
and/or embarrassed about the inquiry and the possibility that their
child may be contemplating a violent act. The threat assessment team
therefore should make it clear to the student's parents, or guardians
that the objective of the threat assessment inquiry is not only to help
prevent targeted school violence and diminish the chance that the
student and possibly others would be harmed, but also to help their
child.

The threat assessment team should seek the help of the student's parents
in understanding the student's actions and interests, recognizing that
parents may or may not know much about their child's thinking and
behavior. Questions for parents should focus on the student's behaviors
and communications, especially those that might be attack-related. The
student's interest in weapons should be explored, as well as his or her
access to weapons at home.

It may be useful for a member of the threat assessment team to visit and
observe the student of concern's home. The threat assessment team should
have policies and procedures in place regarding home visits.

8.  Interviews with the Student of Concern

Interviews with a student of concern oftentimes are critical in a threat
assessment inquiry. School administrators and law enforcement officials
and their respective legal counsels should follow existing policies, or
develop policies regarding interviews with students of concern. Issues
that should be considered include:

-   If and when to notify parents/guardians of an interview;

-   Whether or when to invite parents/guardians to be present during an
    interview;

-   Whether and how to use information from an interview for criminal
    justice proceedings; and

-   Whether and when legal representation should be allowed, offered, or
    provided.

State and local laws differ with respect to requirements regarding these
questions.

In some instances, the threat assessment team may determine that
important information might be obtained through a search of a student's
person or property, or the property of another individual to which the
student has access. The search of a student in any context is a
sensitive and legally complex issue that should be examined thoroughly
by school administrators and their legal counsel and addressed in
policies and procedures governing the conduct of a threat assessment
inquiry.[^21]

The primary purpose of a student interview is to learn about the
student's thinking, motives, and behavior. The tone of the interview
should be professional, neutral, and non-confrontational, rather than
accusatory or judgmental.

Before conducting an interview with a student of concern, the threat
assessment team should be well acquainted with the facts that brought
the student to the attention of school administrators and others. In
addition, prior to conducting the student interview, the threat
assessment team should have reviewed available information concerning
the student's background, interests, and behaviors. Background
information can inform the threat assessment team's approach to and
questioning of the student. This information may help the threat
assessment team determine whether the student poses a threat to
particular targets. In addition, knowledge of background information
concerning the student prior to the interview may help the threat
assessment team judge whether the student is forthcoming and
straightforward. Generally, a student should be asked directly about his
or her intentions. Often, adolescents will respond forthrightly to a
direct question.

A student interview conducted during a threat assessment inquiry can
elicit important information that permits the threat assessment team to
better understand the situation of the student and possible targets.
This understanding, in turn, will help the threat assessment team to
assess the risk of violence that the student may pose in a given
situation. Interviews with a student of concern also can generate leads
for further inquiry.

An interview can also send the message to the student that his or her
behavior has been noticed and has caused concern. Interviews give
students of concern the opportunity to tell their personal stories, to
be heard, and to reassess and redirect their behavior away from
activities that are of concern. The interview may suggest to a student
who has mixed feelings about attacking that there are people who are
interested in his or her welfare, and that there are better, more
effective ways to deal with problems or with specific people.

Although an interview with a student of concern can provide valuable
information, relying too heavily on that interview as a basis for making
judgments about whether that student poses a threat may present
problems. The information offered by the student may be incomplete,
misleading, or inaccurate. It therefore is important to collect
information to corroborate and verify information learned from the
student interview.

9.  Potential Target Interview

Individuals who have been identified as potential targets of the student
of concern also should be interviewed. The threat assessment team should
inform the subject of the interview that the primary purpose of that
interview is to gather information about a possible situation of
concern.

A potential target should be asked about their relationship to the
student of concern and queried about recent interactions with that
student. The interviewer should gather information about grievances and
grudges that the student of concern may hold against a target or against
others.

Interviews with potential targets should be conducted with special
sensitivity. Care must be taken to gather information without unduly
alarming a potential target. If the threat assessment team believes that
there may be a risk of violence to an identified target, that target
should be offered assistance and support.

How should information be organized and analyzed?

-   Information gathered in a threat assessment inquiry should be
    examined for evidence of behavior and conditions that suggest that
    the student of concern is planning and preparing for an attack.
    Analysis of this information should, in the end, answer these
    questions: Is the behavior of the student consistent with movement
    on a pathway toward attack? Do the student's current situation and
    setting incline him or her toward or away from targeted violence?

Evaluation of information gathered from research and interviews
conducted during a threat assessment inquiry should be guided by the
following eleven key questions:

1.  What are the student's motive(s) and goals?

-   What motivated the student to make the statements or take the
    actions that caused him or her to come to attention?

-   Does the situation or circumstance that led to these statements or
    actions still exist?

-   Does the student have a major grievance or grudge? Against whom?

-   What efforts have been made to resolve the problem and what has been
    the result? Does the potential attacker feel that any part of the
    problem is resolved or see any alternatives?

2.  Have there been any communications suggesting ideas or intent to
    attack?

-   What, if anything, has the student communicated to someone else
    (targets, friends, other students, teachers, family, others) or
    written in a diary, journal, or Web site concerning his or her ideas
    and/or intentions?

-   Have friends been alerted or "warned away"?

10. Has the subject shown inappropriate interest in any of the
    following?

-   school attacks or attackers;

-   weapons (including recent acquisition of any relevant weapon);

-   incidents of mass violence (terrorism, workplace violence, mass
    murderers).

11. Has the student engaged in attack-related behaviors? These behaviors
    might include:

-   developing an attack idea or plan;

-   making efforts to acquire or practice with weapons;

-   casing, or checking out, possible sites and areas for attack;

-   rehearsing attacks or ambushes.

12. Does the student have the *capacity* to carry out an act of targeted
    violence?

-   How organized is the student's thinking and behavior?

-   Does the student have the means, e.g., access to a weapon, to carry
    out an attack?

13. Is the student experiencing hopelessness, desperation and/or
    despair?

-   Is there information to suggest that the student is experiencing
    desperation and/or despair?

-   Has the student experienced a recent failure, loss and/or loss of
    status?

-   Is the student known to be having difficulty coping with a stressful
    event?

-   Is the student now, or has the student ever been, suicidal or
    "accident-prone"? Has the student engaged in behavior that suggests
    that he or she has considered ending their life?

14. Does the student have a trusting relationship with at least one
    responsible adult?

-   Does the student have at least one relationship with an adult where
    the student feels that he or she can confide in the adult and
    believes that the adult will listen without judging or jumping to
    conclusions? (Students with trusting relationships with adults may
    be directed away from violence and despair and toward hope.)

-   Is the student emotionally connected to*--*or disconnected
    from*--*other students?

-   Has the student previously come to someone's attention or raised
    concern in a way that suggested he or she needs intervention or
    supportive services?

15. Does the student see violence as an acceptable*--*or desirable*--*or
    the only*--*way to solve problems?

-   Does the setting around the student (friends, fellow students,
    parents, teachers, adults) explicitly or implicitly support or
    endorse violence as a way of resolving problems or disputes?

-   Has the student been "dared" by others to engage in an act of
    violence?

16. Is the student's conversation and "story" consistent with his or her
    actions?

-   Does information from collateral interviews and from the student's
    own behavior confirm or dispute what the student says is going on?

17. Are other people concerned about the student's potential for
    violence?

-   Are those who know the student concerned that he or she might take
    action based on violent ideas or plans?

-   Are those who know the student concerned about a specific target?

-   Have those who know the student witnessed recent changes or
    escalations in mood and behavior?

18. What circumstances might affect the likelihood of an attack?

-   What factors in the student's life and/or environment might increase
    or decrease the likelihood that the student will attempt to mount an
    attack at school?

-   What is the response of other persons who know about the student's
    ideas or plan to mount an attack? (Do those who know about the
    student's ideas actively discourage the student from acting
    violently, encourage the student to attack, deny the possibility of
    violence, passively collude with an attack, etc.?)

Thoughtful consideration of the answers to the above 11 questions will
produce a sound foundation for the threat assessment team's response to
the overarching question in a threat assessment inquiry: Does the
student of concern pose a threat of targeted violence at school? If the
threat assessment team concludes that:

a.  there is enough reliable information to answer the 11 key questions;
    and

b.  the weight of the information is convincing that the student *does
    not pose* a threat of targeted school violence; then

c.  the threat assessment team may conclude the threat assessment
    inquiry.

The threat assessment team may determine that closure of the inquiry is
warranted, but conclude that the student, or previously suggested
targets, need help coping with the behavior or problems that initially
brought the threatening situation to the attention of authorities. In
such situations, the team should work with school administrators and
others to ensure that these individuals receive the assistance and
continued support that they may need.

For example, if the student who was the focus of the threat assessment
inquiry came to the attention of authorities because of behavior or
communications that suggested that he or she was contemplating suicide,
that student should be offered*--*and receive*--*appropriate counseling
or other services. Likewise, if the threat assessment team concludes
that the student was a victim of false allegations, the team may wish to
consider recommending actions to deal with malicious accusers.

Regardless of the outcome of the threat assessment inquiry, the threat
assessment team should document carefully the inquiry and any actions
taken. This documentation should be carried out in compliance with any
applicable school or other relevant policies and/or legal
considerations, and should include a record of the sources of, and
content for, all key information considered in the threat assessment as
well as the date that the information was acquired. In addition to
documenting the facts that provided the basis for the findings in the
threat assessment inquiry, it also is important to document the
reasoning that led the threat assessment team to its decision in that
inquiry.

If the team concludes that

a.  there is insufficient information for the threat assessment team to
    be reasonably certain that the student does not pose a threat; *or*

b.  the student appears to be on a path to attack; then

c.  the team should recommend that the matter be referred to the
    appropriate law enforcement agency for a threat assessment
    investigation.

The Threat Assessment Investigation

As explained earlier in this chapter, the focus of a threat assessment
investigation*--*the information sought and questions asked*--*will be
similar to that of a threat assessment inquiry. However, the scope of
the threat assessment investigation's collection and analysis of
information will be broader than in an inquiry, reaching outside the
school and across systems within the community.

In carrying out a threat assessment investigation, investigators should
explore a student's prior contacts with civil authorities and criminal
and juvenile justice officials. These investigators may re-interview, in
greater depth, individuals contacted during the threat assessment
inquiry, such as a student's family members; fellow students and
friends; neighbors; and employers. Investigators will focus particularly
on attack-related behaviors exhibited by the student, including efforts
to acquire, buy, or gain access to weapons.

Investigators also may request the permission of the student or his
parents to search a student's computer, room, home, car, or workspace.
In some cases, investigators may seek to obtain search warrants.

Investigators should evaluate information gathered during a threat
assessment investigation in accord with the 11 key questions identified
in the above discussion of procedures for conducting a threat assessment
inquiry. Threat assessment investigators may consult with colleagues and
with professionals in other fields and disciplines who possess special
skills and experience in handling situations involving potential
targeted violence. These professionals may include other law enforcement
officers, mental health service providers, social workers, physicians,
and others knowledgeable about stalking, domestic violence, and
workplace violence. The knowledge, experience, and insights of these
professionals may help the threat assessment investigator in evaluating
and organizing information concerning situations that involve the threat
of targeted school violence.

In addition, as investigators proceed with a threat assessment
investigation, they continuously should ask themselves the following
questions:

-   Does the information collected prompt more concern or less concern
    about the possibility that the student is moving on a path toward a
    school attack?

-   What information might prompt less concern?

-   What information might heighten concern?

-   What options exist for intervening in the behavior of or redirecting
    the student away from ideas of or plans for a school attack?

-   Should potential targets be contacted, warned, and/or protected?

As with a threat assessment inquiry, it is critical that investigators
document and keep a record of the information that they gather and
evaluate in carrying out a school threat assessment investigation. A
well-documented record provides baseline information about a student's
thinking and actions at a certain point in time. This information can be
useful if the student comes to authorities' attention again, or if at
some point in the future investigators need to determine whether the
subject has changed patterns of thinking and behavior. Also, should a
threatening situation result in civil or criminal action against a
student or others, a carefully documented investigative file will be an
important asset in demonstrating that a threat assessment investigation
was conducted properly and in compliance with applicable laws, policies,
and procedures.

CHAPTER VI

MANAGING A THREATENING SITUATION

Threat assessment and threat management are integrated and
interdependent functions. Many students who come to the attention of
threat assessment teams may need help and support. Assisting, directing,
and managing these young people and the situations they are in should be
high priorities for threat assessment team members.

When the findings of a threat assessment inquiry or investigation
suggest that a student has the interest, motive, and ability to mount a
school attack, and has started down a path toward attack, the primary
mission is to prevent the attack and protect possible targets.
Accordingly, an individual management/monitoring plan should be
developed for any student who is identified in a threat assessment
inquiry or investigation as posing a threat of targeted school violence.

Key Components and Functions of a Management Strategy

Who should manage the threatening situation, and what the components of
the plan are, will depend on the specific threatening situation. For
example, a student who is under the jurisdiction of the juvenile or
criminal justice system could be supervised or managed by court or
justice system officials. If the student remains in school, school
administrators might work with parents to impose and monitor the
student's compliance with a supervision or management plan.

Successful management of a threatening situation requires substantial
time and effort. Management of these situations comprises three related
functions:

1.  controlling/containing the situation and/or student in a way that
    will prevent the possibility of an attack;

2.  protecting and aiding possible targets; and

3.  providing support and guidance to help the student deal successfully
    with his or her problems.

Considerations in Developing a Management Strategy

Managing Threatening Situations for the Short Term

Managing a student of concern involves short-term and longer-term
considerations. In the short term, after a threat assessment
investigation has concluded that a student poses a risk of targeted
school violence, authorities must move immediately to intervene with
that student to contain the threatening situation and reduce the
potential for violence.

In some cases, subjecting the student to a threat assessment inquiry or
investigation may have the added effect of containing future threatening
behavior. As a result of the inquiry or investigation, the potential
attacker receives help in addressing the problems that may have prompted
his or her action and abandons plans for the attack, believing that an
attack is not feasible or necessary.

In other situations, there must be more overt containment of potential
attackers. Containment and control in these situations may include
supervision and/or confinement of the student of concern and the
protection of possible targets.

Managing Threatening Situations for the Long Term

Once the immediate threat of a situation is believed to be under control
for the short term, the threat assessment team should turn its attention
to longer term safety. The threat assessment team should address two
central questions: What steps should be taken to contain a potential
attacker over the longer-term? What course of action should be pursued
to deter the potential attacker from posing a future threat of violence?

The primary goal in a school threat assessment is to prevent an attack.
The intervention or management strategy selected therefore should be the
one with the greatest potential for long-term *preventive* power.

Threat managers should ask: "What will be the most effective and least
damaging course of action?" When confronted with a problem,
professionals often choose the tools with which they are most familiar:
Police officers arrest; Mental health professionals commit; Workplace
managers fire; Principals suspend or expel. Caution should be used in a
given situation of concern to make sure that the response of authorities
is appropriate to the problem.

The most familiar response may or may not be the best response, the best
course of action for the longer term. For example, school administrators
may feel pressured to "get tough" or "set an example," by suspending or
expelling a student who threatens to bring a weapon to school. However,
suspension or expulsion of a student can create the risk of triggering
either an immediate or a delayed violent response unless such actions
are coupled with containment and support. A student who is expelled may
conclude: "I have lost everything. I have only a short time to act. I
will give them what they deserve." Acting upon those beliefs, the
student may return to school with weapons and attack others. In
addition, a student who is suspended or expelled without alternative
educational placement may be under less supervision than if he or she
were to remain in a school setting.

Those with responsibility to manage a student assessed as posing a
threat of targeted violence should consider options for the long term
management of threatening situations in the context of the primary goal
of prevention. The response with the greatest punitive power may or may
not have the greatest preventive power. Although arresting a student may
be necessary in a particular situation, without careful attention to the
need for confinement, weapons removal, or interpersonal intervention,
that action may be insufficient to prevent an eventual attack at school
or otherwise protect a target. Similarly, referring a student to the
mental health system, without seeing that referral in the context of an
overall monitoring/management plan, may not be sufficient to prevent
targeted violence.

An Integrated Systems Approach to Managing Threatening Situations

The Safe School Initiative found that school attackers' formulation of
ideas about carrying out an attack oftentimes followed failed efforts to
solve problems and reduce emotional pain through nonviolent means.
Helping a student to see that he or she has a future, and directing that
student to effective, non-violent ways to resolve disputes and
conflicts, takes sensitivity, commitment, and an integrated systems
approach to meeting the needs of that student.

An integrated systems approach can enhance the potential effectiveness
of both short- and long-term strategies for managing threatening
situations. Those responsible for managing a situation and student of
concern*--*school officials, law enforcement officers, mental health
professionals, youth service workers, court, probation, or correctional
staff*--*should identify existing resources within the community that
can play roles in managing students who pose threats of targeted school
violence.

Discontinuation of Monitoring

A key focus of the threat assessment process is to connect the student
to services and support systems that provide encouragement and hope, and
reduce the likelihood that the student will engage in future threatening
behavior. The ultimate objective is to enable the student to function
without monitoring by responsible adult authorities.

Monitoring of a student may be discontinued after responsible
authorities have completed the following tasks:

-   Assessing whether (and to what extent) the student has changed
    unacceptable thinking and behavior over time; and

-   Developing and supporting intervention strategies that encourage and
    help the student to change.

    After a determination is made that the subject no longer poses a
    threat of targeted school violence, formal monitoring is ended.
    However, the student still may remain involved with service systems
    within the community that will support his or her continued
    successful functioning.

    CHAPTER VII

    ACTION PLANS FOR SCHOOL LEADERS:\
    CREATING A SAFE AND CONNECTED SCHOOL CLIMATE AND\
    IMPLEMENTING A THREAT ASSESSMENT PROGRAM

Creating a Safe and Connected School Climate

Creating cultures and climates of safety is essential to the prevention
of violence in schools. How can a school, its teachers and
administrators, and its students work toward implementing cultures of
connection and climates of safety?

Major Components and Tasks for Creating a Safe/Connected School Climate

1.  Assess the school\'s emotional climate.

Although no one wants to believe that this country's educational
institutions are anything other than safe and positive environments that
support the learning experience, it is incumbent upon those in positions
of responsibility to take a "step back" and gain perspective on the
emotional climate of their schools. This perspective can be gained by
systematically surveying students, faculty, and other important
"stakeholders," such as parents, administrators, school board members,
and representatives of community groups who interact with the school
about the emotional climate of schools. Anonymous surveys, face-to-face
interviews, focus groups, and psychological measures integrated into a
total assessment package all have been used to varying degrees to gather
key "real time" data. It is essential that school administrators,
parents, and community leaders not assume that they know school climates
as do those individuals*--*especially students*--*who are most directly
affected by the educational experience on a daily basis. Absent a
thorough assessment of climate process, school officials and leaders may
never have the opportunity to find out what they did not know.

The findings of climate surveys can inform efforts to plan ways to
enhance safety and respect within the educational environment. It is
important to give feedback about school climate data to all involved and
affected parties. Sharing climate data establishes a foundation for
building an integrated systems approach that will bring the central
"players" to the table; empower students to make change; and connect the
school to the community and parental support.

2.  Emphasize the importance of listening in schools.

Pupils must listen respectfully to adults and to their peers, and
teachers, administrators, and other adults must listen respectfully to
their students and to each other. Grownups often expect that students
listen to adults in authority. However, all too frequently adults forget
that respectful listening is a "two-way street." A school with a culture
of "two-way listening" will encourage and empower students to have the
courage to break the ingrained code of silence.

Listening also must be expanded beyond academic concerns. Communications
between teachers and students also should include listening to feelings,
especially those of hurt and pain. In addition, it is important to
"listen" to behaviors. Many students, including some who consider
violence an appropriate way to solve problems, have a difficult time
finding the words to articulate the disenfranchisement, hurt, or fear
that they may feel. Not knowing how to express their problems and
feelings may prompt these students to take action. Adults who listen to
behavior and assist students in learning how to articulate their
feelings and experiences provide students with critical skills that can
contribute to preventing and reducing violence.

3.  Take a strong, but caring stance against the code of silence.

Silence leaves hurt unexposed and unacknowledged. Silence may encourage
a young person to move along a path to violence.

4.  Work actively to change the perception that talking to an adult
    about a student contemplating violence is considered "snitching."

A school climate in which students connect to each other and to adults
is one that promotes a safe and secure educational environment. A
student who finds the courage to tell a caring adult about a friend in
pain may save a life.

5.  Find ways to stop bullying.

Bullying is a continuum of abuse, ranging from verbal taunts to physical
threats to dangerous acts.[^22] Bullying is not playful behavior. In
bullying, one student assumes power by word or deed over another in a
mean-spirited and/or harmful manner. In a school with a culture of
safety and connection, both the bully and the student who is the victim
of the bullying are attended to in a respectful manner. Schools with
climates of safety and respect are establishing foundations for
pro-social behavior. These climates teach conflict resolution, peer
mediation, active listening, and other non-violent ways to solve
problems. In a safe school climate, adults do not bully students and do
not bully each other,*--*and they do not turn a blind eye to bullying
behavior when they know that it is going on in the school.

6.  Empower students by involving them in planning, creating, and
    sustaining a school culture of safety and respect.

Creating a safe school climate is a process that should involve all
members of the school community, including teachers, students, parents,
counselors, administrators, health staff, security professionals, and
support personnel. Climates of safety should be collaborative ones.
Helping students to engage in positive, productive activities or work in
their local community can diminish isolation and enhance connection and
safety.

7.  Ensure that every student feels that he or she has a trusting
    relationship with at least one adult at school.

Trusting relationships between adults and students are the products of
quality connection, interaction, and communications. These relationships
evolve and do not develop simply because an adult, such as a homeroom
teacher or a guidance counselor, and a student have been ordered or
assigned to interact with one another. Schools with cultures and
climates of safety monitor students on a regular basis. School
administrators should take steps to ensure that at least one adult at
school knows what is happening with each student.

8.  Create mechanisms for developing and sustaining safe school
    climates.

A mechanism for developing and sustaining safe school climates should
serve as a vehicle for planning and monitoring the climate and culture
of the school. This mechanism may involve administrators, teachers,
counselors, students, school law enforcement and security staff, and
other personnel. Questions to be considered in implementing this
mechanism might include: What should be done to develop and support
climates of safety? To what extent are teachers, administrators, and
other school staff encouraged to focus on students' social/emotional
learning needs? How close is the school to achieving the goal of
ensuring that every student feels that there is an adult to whom he or
she can turn for talk, support, and advice if things get tough?

9.  Be aware of physical environments and their effects on creating
    comfort zones.

Building structure, facility safety plans, lighting, space, and
architecture, among other physical attributes of educational
institutions, all can contribute to whether a school environment feels,
or is in fact, safe or unsafe. In large schools, school administrators
may wish to explore changes in the physical characteristics of the
school that would permit the assignment of teachers and students to
smaller, mutually intersecting and supportive groupings within the
broader educational community.

10. Emphasize an integrated systems model.

People support most what they believe they have had genuine input in
creating. This requires the difficult but necessary task of bringing all
of the stakeholders to the table. Stakeholders include: students,
teachers, administrators, school board members, parents, law enforcement
personnel, after-school and community-based groups, and others.
Stakeholders must struggle with questions such as the definition of
"fairness," "threat," "consequence," and "change" as these concepts fit
into the unique context of each school, school system, and the
surrounding community.

11. All climates of safety ultimately are "local."

Many local factors contribute to the creation of a culture and climate
of safety. These factors include: the leadership*--*"open door" role of
the school principal; "empowered buy-in" of student groups; connections
to the local community and its leaders; and the respectful integration
into the safe school climates process of "safekeepers," such as parents
and law enforcement personnel close to the school.

Schools that have succeeded in creating safe school climates have done
so because of their recognition that such climates of safety actually
"raise the bar" on sound educational expectations, which, in turn, keep
students engaged and learning at high levels. Such schools achieve their
aims by realizing that safe school climates are not created overnight.
Implementation of the safe school climates process requires planning and
dedicated work. Participants in this process need adequate feedback and
evaluative processes to sustain and continually improve educational
environments. To work effectively, safe school climates that create
relationships of respect and connection between adults and students must
be accepted as integral to the mission of threat assessment and
management, and understood from "the top down" as integral to the
success of the learning experience.

Implementing a Threat Assessment Program

Threat assessment policies and programs work best as components of
school violence prevention strategies if these policies and programs are
authorized, developed, and implemented by local officials, and developed
in consultation with representatives of the broader community. The
following course of action should be pursued in establishing a threat
assessment approach in a community or school district.

1.  A principal, superintendent, school board member, or other school
    official initiates a request to develop a process to evaluate and
    respond to threatening situations. The request is forwarded to the
    school board or other responsible oversight entity for policy
    approval.

Threatening situations might include: threats made directly against
students, teachers, or other school officials; threats made indirectly
by telephone, in writing, over the Internet or through interpersonal
contacts; communications or behaviors suggesting a student's intent to
mount an attack at school; and allegations of bomb-making or that a
student possesses a firearm.

19. The school district creates a planning team to develop or further
    refine a process to identify, assess, and manage threatening
    situations.

Members of the team should be drawn from the school district and the
community. Team members should include representatives of law
enforcement and mental health agencies who work with the schools.
Representatives from the school district should include administrators,
teachers, attorneys, school security officials, and school psychologists
and mental health workers.

The team appointed to develop a process to evaluate threatening
situations should determine the status of each of the following:

-   *Information-sharing:* What are the existing policies, procedures,
    and legal parameters in place for access to and sharing of school,
    law enforcement, and mental health records? The team should
    ascertain what information concerning students is available; where
    that information is located; how and under what conditions, that
    information can be accessed; and who can access available
    information.

-   *Existing policies regarding threats and threatening situations:*
    The team should review all existing school disciplinary policies,
    including those related to threats and threatening situations. This
    review should cover definition of threats and threatening situations
    and sanctions for engaging in threatening behavior. The team should
    assess the effectiveness of existing school discipline policies in
    this area.

-   *Existing policies regarding the roles and responsibilities of law
    enforcement*: The team should review policies that cover when police
    are to be contacted by the school; what options are available to
    police officials for intervening in a situation once they are
    contacted; and interaction of the police and local school officials,
    such as principals, in responding to and managing threatening
    situations.

-   *Existing approaches to creating and maintaining safe and respectful
    school climates and cultures:* The team should engage in an
    assessment of the emotional climate of the school. This assessment
    should include a review of policies; rules and regulations; and
    physical aspects of the school that may affect the overall safety
    and security of the educational institution.

20. The planning team should determine what policies, rules,
    regulations, procedures, and/or processes should be revised or
    created. Some schools already may have policies and protocols in
    place to deal with certain kinds of threats and threatening
    behaviors, such as e-mail threats, internet threats, potential
    suicides, and other behaviors that raise concern about potential
    violence. In particular, the planning team's deliberations in this
    area should produce answers to the following questions:

-   What should be the roles and responsibilities of school
    administrators, teachers, security personnel, and other school
    officials in responding to threats and threatening situations? When
    should parents be contacted concerning a threatening situation?
    Which situations should be handled within the school? Which
    situations require notification of, and intervention by, law
    enforcement officials?

-   What should be the roles/responsibilities of law enforcement
    officials in responding to threats and threatening situations in
    schools?

-   Under what conditions will information concerning a student or a
    threatening situation be shared? What types of information will be
    shared? With whom will it be shared?

-   When should students who engage in threatening behavior be referred
    to outside services, such as mental health agencies, for assistance?
    How should referrals to outside agencies be handled?

-   What actions should be taken to develop and support climates of
    safety within the educational institution? What steps could be taken
    by school officials to encourage students to come forward with
    concerns about potentially violent situations? What policies or
    actions would encourage students to bring their problems to the
    attention of adults? How can school officials and other adults work
    with students to resolve problems and remedy underlying conditions?

21. School administrators, teachers, law enforcement officials, parents,
    representatives of other community agencies and organizations, and
    representatives of the student body, where appropriate, review and
    provide feedback on revised and/or new recommended processes for
    threat assessment. These processes should include recommendations
    for implementation, training, and the periodic review, evaluation,
    and updating of the threat assessment program.

22. The school board reviews and acts upon recommended changes and
    additions to the threat assessment program.

23. Upon approval by the school board or other appropriate authorities,
    school officials will implement the threat assessment process.

    CHAPTER VIII

    CONCLUSION: THREAT ASSESSMENT AS A DECISION-MAKING TOOL

Developing a strategy to prevent and respond to potential incidents of
targeted school violence is a challenging and complex task. There is no
single, universal prescription that will be effective in dealing with
every situation or crisis that will confront school administrators, law
enforcement officials, parents, and other individuals and organizations
in the community.

When a student's behavior raises the specter of potential violence,
responsible adults will be forced to make judgments about the risk
associated with that student's actions and how to respond to that
threatening situation. The threat assessment process outlined in this
*Guide* will not eliminate the need to make difficult judgments when the
actions of an individual suggest that the safety and security of a
school is at risk. Instead, the *Guide* is intended to assist officials
in implementing a process that will inform these judgments and increase
the likelihood that actions based upon these judgments will prevent
incidents of targeted violence in schools.

The threat assessment process is rooted in the proposition that each
situation of concern should be viewed and assessed individually and that
targeted violence is the end result of a discernible process. No two
cases involving the potential for targeted school violence are likely to
be similar in all aspects. Application of that process is guided by the
facts of that situation and carried out through the analysis of
information about behaviors and situational references. Instead of
basing judgments of risk on student traits or whether that student made
specific threatening statements, the threat assessment process focuses
upon evaluating that student's behaviors and communications and
determining whether those behaviors and communications suggest that the
student has the intent and capacity to carry out a school attack.

The work of the Secret Service and the Department of Education in
examining the problem of targeted school violence suggests that the
threat assessment process can help to develop and maintain key
relationships between the school and the community. These relationships
are critical elements in creating safe school climates. Schools and
communities that think clearly about threat assessment and management
will develop relationships, processes, and protocols that will
contribute to reducing school violence and to creating safe and secure
learning environments in this nation's schools.

Appendix

Annotated ResourceS

The following section offers suggestions for further reading on specific
topics related to responding to threatening situations in schools and to
creating safe school climates. Each topic area is accompanied by a brief
description of the documents listed within that topic. The list that
follows is not intended to be exhaustive or all-inclusive. Instead, the
list is offered as a starting point for additional reading in selected
areas.

Bullying and the Creation of Respectful Climates

The following resources provide specific information on bullying
behavior and more general information on the experiences of boys and
young men in school and in society. The work by Olweus and related work
by Graham and Juvonen reviews bullying behavior in schools. Olweus
pioneered research on bullying behavior and provides an overview of
decades of research on this topic. "Bullying behavior among U.S. youth"
provides recent data on the prevalence of bullying behavior in America.
The three books by William Pollack and his colleagues describe Pollack's
work talking with boys and young men about their experiences in school
and in the community. *Real boys* and *Real boys' voices* include
findings from Pollack's work on the culture of boyhood in America;
review certain assumptions that parents and other adults may bring to
their interactions with boys and young men; and include suggested
approaches and strategies for improving relationships with boys and
young men. *Real boys workbook* contains specific exercises for parents
and teachers to help enhance their interactions and communications with
boys and young men. Olweus and colleagues' and Pollack and colleagues'
work encourages parents, school leaders, and others to work to create
respectful and safe school climates.

-   Graham, S, & Juvonen, J. (2001). An Attributional Approach to Peer
    Victimization. In Juvonen, J. Graham, S. (eds.), *Peer Harassment in
    School: The Plight of the Vulnerable and Victimized, pp. 49-72*. New
    York: Guilford Press.

-   Olweus, D. (1993). *Bullying at School: What we know and what we can
    do.* New York: Blackwell.

-   lweus, D. (1996, Spring). Bully/Victim Problems at School: Facts and
    Effective Intervention. *Reclaiming Children and Youth,* pp.
    *15-22.*

-   Nansel, T., Overpeck, M., Pilla, R., Ruan, J., Simons-Morton, B., &
    Scheidt, P. (2001). Bullying behavior among U.S. youth. *Journal of
    the American Medical Association, 285,* pp. 2094-2100.

-   Pollack, W. (1998). *Real boys: Rescuing our sons from the myths of
    boyhood.* New York: Henry Holt, Inc.

-   Pollack, W., & Cushman, K. (2001). *Real boys workbook*. New York:
    Villard.

-   Pollack, W., & Shuster, T. (2000). *Real boys' voices*. New York:
    Random House.

Information-Sharing / Legal Issues

These resources provide an overview of the issues impacting the sharing
of information about students in schools. *Sharing information* is a
primer on the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA), the
federal regulation governing protection of educational records and other
student information in schools. It includes the full text of FERPA, as
well as detailed explanations on exceptions to FERPA restrictions.
"Establishing and maintaining interagency information sharing" provides
guidance on developing and implementing appropriate policies to permit
or facilitate sharing of information about juveniles across agencies.
*School violence: Sharing student information* provides further
information on the protections afforded to student information and
reviews recent state legislative initiatives designed to make sharing
information about students easier to accomplish.

-   Medaris, M.L., Campbell, E., & James, B. (1997, June). *Sharing
    information: A guide to the Family Educational Rights and Privacy
    Act and participation in juvenile justice programs*. Washington, DC:
    U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Juvenile Justice and
    Delinquency Prevention and U.S. Department of Education, Family
    Policy Compliance Office.

Please also see the following Web site for updates on FERPA regulations
since the 1997 publication of this document:

http://www.ed.gov/offices/OM/fpco

-   Slayton, J. (2000, March). Establishing and maintaining interagency
    information sharing. *JAIBG Bulletin*. Washington, D.C.: U.S.
    Department of Justice, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency
    Prevention.

-   Thomerson, J. (2001, May). *School violence: Sharing student
    information*. Denver, Colo.: National Conference of State
    Legislatures.

School Violence and Crime

As of the publication date of this *Guide*, the resources included below
represent some of the most recent data and statistics on violence,
crime, and other behavior in American schools as well as in the
community. Since currently there is no one central mechanism for
reporting violence and crime perpetrated and experienced by youth in
American schools, these reports collectively represent a fairly
comprehensive picture of school violence and crime in America.

-   Anderson, M., et. al. (2001). School-associated Violent Deaths in
    the United States, 1994-1999. *Journal of the American Medical
    Association, 286,* pp. 2695-2702 (2001)

-   Kaufman, P., et. al. *Indicators of School Crime and Safety,
    2000*. U. S. Department of Education (NCES 2001-017) and U. S.
    Department of Justice (NCJ-184176): Washington, D. C. (2000).
    Available at:
    nces.ed.gov/pubs2001/quarterly/winter/elementary/e_section4.html

-   National Research Council and Institute of Medicine, Committee on
    Law and Justice and Board on Children, Youth, and Families. (2001).
    *Juvenile Crime, Juvenile Justice*. Panel on Juvenile Crime:
    Prevention, Treatment, and Control. McCord, J., et. al. (Eds.).
    National Academy Press: Washington, D. C.

-   Snyder, H.N., & Sickmund, M. (1999). *Juvenile offenders and
    victims: 1999 National Report*. Washington, D.C.: Office of Juvenile
    Justice & Delinquency Prevention, U.S. Department of Justice.
    Available at: www.ncjrs.gov/html/ojjdp/nationalreport99/index.html.

-   U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education
    Statistics (2002). *Digest of Education Statistics 2000*; Washington
    D.C.: Authors

-   U.S. Department of Education and U.S. Department of Justice (1999).
    *1999 Annual Report on School Safety*. Washington, D.C.: Authors.

Risk Assessment and General Aggression / Violence

"Assessing violence risk among youth" presents an overview of the known
risk factors for general aggression and violence among youth. It
summarizes the current scientific knowledge base on the topic and
includes recommendations for clinicians tasked with assessing the risk
of general aggression and violence (i.e. not targeted violence) in
youth. *Manual for the SAVRY* presents a similar review of risk factors
for general aggression and violence in youth and provides specific
guidance and a structured assessment tool to help guide clinicians'
assessment of risk for general aggression and violence within a
particular individual (youth).

-   Borum, R. (2000). Assessing violence risk among youth. *Journal of
    Clinical Psychology, 56,* pp. 1263-1288.

-   Borum, R., Bartel, P., & Forth, A. (2002). *Manual for the
    Structured Assessment of Violence Risk in Youth (SAVRY)*. Tampa:
    Fla.: University of South Florida.

-   U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. (2001). *Youth
    violence: A report of the Surgeon General.* Rockville, Md.: U.S.
    Department of Health and Human Services, Substance Abuse and Mental
    Health Services Administration, Center for Mental Health Services,
    National Institutes of Health, National Institute of Mental Health.
    Available at: http://www.surgeongeneral.gov/library/youthviolence/

Threat Assessment and Targeted Violence

The following documents represent a sample of information currently
available on various types of targeted violence and on threat assessment
as a strategy to help prevent targeted attacks. "Defining an approach
for evaluating targeted violence" is an academic paper that presents the
general concepts of threat assessment and 10 key questions that
investigators and others can use when gathering information about
someone who may pose a threat of targeted violence. "Assassination in
the United States" is also an academic paper that reviews the
Exceptional Case Study Project and presents the study's findings.
*Protective intelligence & threat assessment investigations* is a guide
for state and local law enforcement officials, and others with
protective responsibilities. It sets forth guidelines for developing a
threat assessment capacity for targeted violence against protected
officials and others in a manner similar to that contained in this
*Guide*. It also includes findings from the Exceptional Case Study
Project. "Threat assessment" provides a brief and straightforward
description of the threat assessment approach. "Evaluating risk for
targeted violence in schools" presents and compares the various
assessment approaches schools currently have available for gauging the
threat that a particular student may pose. The paper reviews profiling,
structured clinical assessment, automated decision-making (e.g., the use
of software or Web-based decision tools), and threat assessment.

-   Defining an approach for evaluating risk of targeted violence.
    *Behavioral Sciences & the Law, 17,* pp. 323-337. Available at
    http://www.secretservice.gov/ntac.htm

-   Fein, R.A., & Vossekuil, B.V. (1999). Assassination in the United
    States: An operational study of recent assassins, attackers, and
    near-lethal approachers. *Journal of Forensic Sciences, 44,* pp.
    321-333. Available at http://www.secretservice.gov/ntac.htm

-   Fein, R.A., & Vossekuil, B. (1998). *Protective intelligence &
    threat assessment investigations: A guide for state and local law
    enforcement officials* (NIJ/OJP/DOJ Publication No. 170612).
    Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice. Available at
    http://www.secretservice.gov/ntac.htm

-   Fein, R.A., Vossekuil, B., & Holden, G.A. (1995, September). Threat
    assessment: An approach to prevent targeted violence. *National
    Institute of Justice: Research in Action,* 1-7. Available at
    http://www.secretservice.gov/ntac.htm

-   Reddy, M., Borum, R., Berglund, J., Vossekuil, B., Fein, R., &
    Modzeleski, W. (2001). Evaluating risk for targeted violence in
    schools: Comparing risk assessment, threat assessment, and other
    approaches. *Psychology in the Schools, 38,* pp. 157-172. Available
    at http://www.secretservice.gov/ntac.htm.

    Web Sites

    United States Department of Education www.ed.gov

    United States Secret Service www.secretservice.gov

    Author Brief Bios

[Robert A. Fein, Ph.D.]{.underline}

Robert Fein is a forensic psychologist who is a director of the National
Violence Prevention and Study Center. Dr. Fein has worked with the U.S.
Secret Service for the last twenty years in the area of threat
assessment. Recently, he has served as Co-Director of the Secret Service
Safe School Initiative. Together with Bryan Vossekuill, Dr. Fein is
author of *Protective Intelligence and Threat Assessment: A Guide for
State and Local Law Enforcement Officials* and of other publications
concerning targeted violence. He holds appointments at Harvard Medical
School and the University of Massachusetts Medical School. Dr. Fein can
be reached at rfein@nvpsc.org.

[Bryan Vossekuil]{.underline}

Bryan Vossekuil is a director of the National Violence Prevention and
Study Center. He retired as a special agent in the U.S. Secret Service,
where he served as executive director of the National Threat Assessment
Center. He also served as co-director of both the Secret Service\'s Safe
School Initiative and Exceptional Case Study Project. He has a special
interest in the assessment and management of threatening persons and
situations and has co-authored a number of publications on threat
assessment. He can be reached at bvossekuil@nvpsc.org.

[William S. Pollack, Ph.D.]{.underline}

Dr. Pollack is Director of the Centers for Men and Young Men at McLean
Hospital. He is Assistant Clinical Professor in the Department of
Psychiatry at Harvard Medical School and is a Director of the National
Violence Prevention and Study Center, as well as founder and Director of
the REAL BOYS(R) Educational Programs. He has served on the U.S.
Presidential Initiative, the National Campaign Against Youth Violence
and is a consultant to the United States Secret Service, including its
collaborative Safe Schools Initiative with the U.S. Department of
Education. The author of three popular books re-framing the roles of
boys in the family: Real Boys, Real Boys\' Voices and the Real Boys
Workbook, his work has also focused on the roles of violence and
depression in American society, the impact of emotional cognition/roles
within organizations\--most especially in creating \"safe climates\" in
schools & the workplace, and male-female relationships. He may be
reached at: wpollack@williampollack.com.

[Randy Borum, Psy.D.]{.underline}

Dr. Randy Borum is Associate Professor in the Department of Mental
Health

Law & Policy at University of South Florida. He is a licensed
psychologist and is Board-Certified (ABPP) and fellowship-trained in
Forensic Psychology. He has served a sworn police officer for municipal
departments in Maryland and Florida, and is currently a consultant to
the U.S. Secret Service National Threat Assessment Center, where he
worked on the Safe School Initiative, and Advisory Board Member for the
FBI\'s Behavioral Science Unit.

[William Modzeleski]{.underline}

Bill Modzeleski currently serves as the Director of the Safe and
Drug-Free Schools Program, at the U.S. Department of Education. Mr.
Modzeleski has over 30 years of experience working on issues related to
the care and well being of youth. He has served in several capacities at
the U.S. Department of Justice and at the local levels. President Bush
recently named Mr. Modzeleski as a Meritorious Executive for his work in
the area of school safety.

[Marisa Reddy, Ph.D.]{.underline}

Marisa Reddy is the chief research psychologist and research coordinator

for the U.S. Secret Service National Threat Assessment Center. Dr. Reddy
oversees all research conducted by the U.S. Secret Service on targeted
violence and threat assessment, and serves as Co-Director of the Safe
School Initiative. Dr. Reddy is co-author of "Evaluating Risk for
Targeted Violence in Schools: Comparing Risk Assessment, Threat
Assessment, and Other Approaches," as well as additional publications on
the prevention of various types of targeted violence. Dr. Reddy can be
reached at ntac@secretservice.gov.

# U.S. Department of Education

Roderick Paige

Secretary

# Office of Elementary and Secondary Education

Susan B. Neuman

Assistant Secretary

# Safe and Drug-Free Schools Program

William Modzeleski

Director

# U.S. Secret Service

Brian L. Stafford

Director

# Office of Protective Research

Barbara S. Riggs

Assistant Director

**National Threat Assessment Center**

George P. Luczko

Special Agent in Charge

May 2002

This report is in the public domain. Authorization to reproduce it in
whole or in part is granted. While permission to reprint this
publication is not necessary, the citation should be: Fein, R.,
Vossekuil, B., Pollack, W., Borum, R., Modzeleski, W., & Reddy, M.
*Threat Assessment in Schools: A Guide to Managing Threatening
Situations and to Creating Safe School Climates.* U.S. Department of
Education, Office of Elementary and Secondary Education, Safe and
Drug-Free Schools Program and U.S. Secret Service, National Threat
Assessment Center, Washington, D.C., 2002.

**To order copies of this report,**

**write to:** ED Pubs, Education Publications Center, U.S. Department of
Education, P.O. Box 1398, Jessup, MD 20794-1398;

or **fax** your request to: (301) 470-1244;

or **email** your request to: <edpubs@inet.ed.gov> or
<ntac@usss.treas.gov>.

or **call** in your request toll-free: 1-877-433-7827 (1-800-4-ED-Pubs).
If 877 service is not yet available in your area, call 1-800-872-5327
(1-800-USA-LEARN). Those who use a telecommunications device for the
deaf (TDD) or a teletypewriter (TTY), should call 1-800-437-0833.

or **order online** at:
<http://www.edpubs.ed.gov/webstore/Content/search.asp>.

This report is also available on the Department of Education's Web site
at: <http://www.ed.gov/about/offices/list/osdfs/resources.html> and the
U.S. Secret Service Web site at:
[www.secretservice.gov/ntac.shtml](http://www.secretservice.gov/ntac.shtml).

On request, this publication is available in alternative formats, such
as Braille, large print, audiotape, or computer diskette. For more
information, please contact the Department of Education's Alternate
Format Center (202) 260-9895 or (202) 205-81113.

[^1]: Targeted violence is defined as any incident of violence where a
    known or knowable attacker selects a particular target prior to
    their violent attack. See Fein, R.A., Vossekuil, B. & Holden, G.
    "Threat Assessment: An Approach to Prevent Targeted Violence*.*"
    *Research in Action.* U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice
    Programs, National Institute of Justice: Washington, D.C.
    (September, 1995), at 1-7. NCJ 155000

[^2]: U.S. Department of Education & U.S. Department of Justice (1999).
    1999 Annual Report on School Safety. Washington, DC: Authors

[^3]: Vossekuil, B., Fein, R., Reddy, M., Borum, R., & Modzeleski, W.
    *The Final Report and Findings of the Safe School Initiative:
    Implications for the Prevention of School Attacks in the United
    States*. U.S. Secret Service and U.S. Department of Education:
    Washington, D. C. (May 2002), at 15. \[hereinafter *The Safe School
    Initiative Final Report*\]. For a fuller discussion of the Safe
    School Initiative, its methodology, and findings, please refer to
    this report.

[^4]: Fein, R. & Vossekuil, B. "Assassination in the United States: An
    Operational Study of Recent Assassins, Attackers, and Near-Lethal
    Approachers." *Journal of Forensic Sciences*, 44 (1999), at 321-333.

[^5]: Fein, R. & Vossekuil, B. *Protective Intelligence and Threat
    Assessment Investigations: A Guide for State and Local Law
    Enforcement Officials*. U. S. Department of Justice, Office of
    Justice Programs, National Institute of Justice: Washington, D. C.
    (July 1998).

[^6]: This *Guide* distinguishes between a threat assessment *inquiry*
    and a threat assessment *investigation*. Threat assessment inquiries
    are initiated, conducted, and controlled by school officials (often
    with input or participation from law enforcement professionals),
    while threat assessment investigations are initiated, conducted, and
    controlled by law enforcement officials. Each school system or
    community should decide where to place the line between an "inquiry"
    and an "investigation." For further discussion, please see Chapter
    V.

[^7]: Goleman, D. *Emotional Intelligence*. New York: Bantam Books,
    (1995).

[^8]: See, for example, Resnick,M.D., Bearman,P.S., Blum, R.W. et. al.,
    (1997) "Protecting Adolescents from Harm," JAMA, 278(10) pp.
    823-832. See also www.allaboutkids.umn.edu.

[^9]: See Pollack, W. *Real Boys: Rescuing Our Sons from the Myths of
    Boyhood*. New York: Henry Holt, Inc., (1998).; Pollack, W., &
    Shuster, T. *Real Boys' Voices*. New York: Random House, (2000).;
    Pollack, W., & Cushman, K. *Real Boys Workbook*. New York: Villard,
    (2001).

[^10]: Pollack, W. *Real Boys.* (1998). See note #9.

[^11]: It should be emphasized again that many young people experience
    losses, failures, humiliations, and other kinds of situational
    stressors, and that few become school shooters.

[^12]: Please refer to Reddy, et. al. (2001), "Evaluating Risk for
    Targeted Violence in Schools: Comparing Risk Assessment, Threat
    Assessment, and Other Approaches," for a discussion of the use and
    limitations of profiling as a tool for assessing the risk of
    targeted school violence. The full citation for the article is
    provided in the **Appendix**, **Annotated Resources**, of this
    *Guide*.

[^13]: See **Chapter VII**, **Action Plans for School Leaders**, for
    further guidance in creating school threat assessment programs.

[^14]: 20 U.S. C. 1232g. See "Information Sharing" in the **Appendix**,
    **Annotated Resources**, of the *Guide* for referral to additional
    sources of information on FERPA.

[^15]: 34 CFR 99.31(a)(10).

[^16]: See "Information Sharing" in the **Appendix**, **Annotated
    Resources**, of the *Guide* for referrals to some of the more recent
    changes to state laws that affect access to and disclosure of
    student information contained in education records.

[^17]: Steadman, H., "Boundary Spanners: A Key Component for the
    Effective Interactions of the Justice and Mental Health Systems."
    Law and Human Behavior. 16 (February, 1992): 75-87.

[^18]: There is a growing body of literature on lowering barriers for
    persons with concerns and on integrated conflict management systems
    that may be of interest to school administrators. See for example
    [Designing Integrated Conflict Management Systems: Guidelines for
    Practitioners and Decision Makers in Organizations]{.underline},
    Society of Professionals in Dispute Resolution, 2001,
    http://www.mediate.com/articles/spidrtrack1.cfm

[^19]: Please note that all comments and behaviors should be understood
    in their context: the words "get him" may have very different
    meanings at a football game when linemen are chasing the quarterback
    than in a hallway after a student has been bullied and tormented.

[^20]: See **Chapter IV** of this *Guide* for a more in-depth discussion
    of the issue of information-sharing.

[^21]: The U.S. Supreme Court has established that Fourth Amendment
    protections against unreasonable search and seizure apply to
    students on school property, but the Court has recognized school
    officials' authority to conduct searches that are reasonable (*New
    Jersey v. T.L.O.*).

[^22]: For more detailed references on bullying, please refer to the
    Appendix.