> Please consider my suggestions as starting points for discussion and
> and research.  Please do not dismiss them out of hand because they may
> vary from industry standards.  I am confident that each idea can be
> realized given the will to create a fair voting process.
>
> David Scenga
>
> Lansing, Michigan
>
> 1\. Decide that 100% accuracy is the goal for any proposed system. 
> That is:
>
>    A. No spoiled ballots are possible
>
>    B. No over votes are possible
>
>    C. No changed votes are possible.
>
>    D. Ballot counting is transparent and public.
>
> 2\. Investigate other similar systems for insight.  Note what works
> well and what doesn\'t:
>
>    A. Electronic Banking.  See how many \"spoiled\" dollars there
> are.  See how many dollars wind up in the wrong accounts undetected.
>
>    B. Software product license registrations. See how those Key
> numbers are generated and used.
>
>    C. Lotteries - see how security is constructed to prevent rigged
> drawings.
>
> 3\. Identify the constitutional requirements for secret ballot
> counts.  There are none.   Secrecy applies only to casting ballots. 
> Please discuss this at length.
>
> 4\. Resolve the conflict between secret casting of ballots with voter
> verification in this way:
>
>    A. Use a randomly generated number for each ballot in a voting
> place. 
>
>    B. Put the number on the paper copy of the vote and on an
> electronic spreadsheet of all the votes cast. 
>
>    C. Post the spreadsheet on the Internet and at each polling place
> for the public to inspect immediately after the close of polls.
>
> 5\. This random number ID can be produced using multiple pseudorandom
> algorithms combined with the exclusive OR function as binary numbers,
> using multiple seeds generat! ed by the voter\'s interaction with the
> interface, timed in milliseconds. It can then be converted into
> decimals, alphas or whatever is suitable.   It need not be printed to
> any log file,  just the vote record and the paper vote copy that the
> voter keeps.  Privacy can be maintained by sorting the votes by the
> random ID as the spreadsheet is created.
>
> 6.  The votes are stored as individual records with a column for every
> choice and one column for the random ID number.
>
> 7\. \"No Selection\" must be the default choice for every choice.  See
> any public opinion poll ever produced for a model.
>
> 8\. Post the number of votes cast with each spreadsheet.
>
> 9.  Allow public inspection of the vote spreadsheets.  Yes this is
> redundant, but it is critical.  There is absolutely no reason to keep
> it secret.
>
> 10.  Post for easy and convenient public inspection the source code,
> Operating System files and hardware of the voting equipment. 
>
> 11\. Post the digital signatures of the software and the Operating
> Sysytem files as well, and the hashing algorithm used to produce
> them.  Run the hashing algorithm to match the digital signatures  just
> before the opening of the polls.
>
> 12\. Deny any proprietary rights that would make any part of the
> process less than fully transparent.
>
> 13.  Allow no encryption whatsoever.  It is utterly unnecessary if the
> voters can verify thir own votes.
>
> 14\. Allow no networking other than between the voting machines at the
> voting place.  All totals should be hand delivered to the central
> counting location.  Network access is a necessary ingredient in
> altering vote totals remotely.  This possibility is the most enduring
> and pervasive threat to fair elections, and the greatest threat to
> public confidence.
>
> 15\. Allow public inpections of the voting machine and counting
> machines including their internal hardware immediately before their
> use to see how network cards are used.  The advent of wireless
> networking makes possible undetectable remote access if networking
> cards are activated.
>
> 16\. Require that any system of vote counting be useable without the
> assistance of company technicians.
>
> 17\. Feed each voting machine election parameters before each voting
> day containing each race and candidate, each proposal and choice,
> etc.  The voting machines and counting machines must not need to be
> reprogrammed for any election, count or recount.
>
> 18\. Require that each voter can take from the voting place a complete
> copy of every choice on his ballot.  Require that the voter can match
> via randomly generated ID that entire ballot to a single record (row)
> in the vote spreadsheet which is publicly posted and used for counting
> the votes.
>
> 19\. Assume that every effort will be made at every step by scoundrels
> to find new ways of rigging elections.  Be suspicious of every
> innovation and audit everything possible by multiple private auditing
> firms.  Make information about the auditing firms available to the
> public.  Audit the producers of voting equipment for past occurrences
> of voter fraud and conflicts of interest. 
>
> 20\. Make as much information available to the public by easy and
> convenient means.  Ideally, anything available via a Freedom of
> Information Act Request should be publicly posted without one.