September 9, 2005

The Honorable Michael Chertoff

Secretary of Homeland Security

Department of Homeland Security

Washington, DC 20528

Dear Secretary Chertoff:

The House Committee on Government Reform has obtained from the
Department of Homeland Security a document describing the "Scope of
Work" of a contract issued by the Federal Emergency Management Agency
for the development of a "Southeastern Louisiana Catastrophic Hurricane
Plan." We are writing to request any plans and other documents that were
developed under this contract.

FEMA's Scope of Work contemplated that a private contractor, Innovative
Emergency Management, Inc. (IEM), would complete the work under the
contract in three stages.[^1] "Stage One" called for a simulation
exercise involving FEMA and the state of Louisiana that would "feature a
catastrophic hurricane striking southeastern Louisiana."[^2] "Stage Two"
called for "development of the full catastrophic hurricane disaster
plan."[^3] And "Stage Three" involved unrelated earthquake planning.

A task order issued under the contract called for IEM to execute "Stage
One" between May 19 and September 30, 2004, at a cost of \$518,284.[^4]
On June 3, 2004, IEM issued a press release announcing that it would
"lead the development of a catastrophic hurricane disaster plan for
Southeast Louisiana and the City of New Orleans under a more than half a
million dollar contract with the U.S. Department of Homeland
Security/Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)."[^5] A second task
order issued on September 23, 2004, required IEM to "complete the
development of the SE Louisiana Catastrophic Hurricane plan." [^6] The
cost of this task order was \$199,969.[^7]

The "Background" section of the Scope of Work stated that "the emergency
management community has long feared the occurrence of a catastrophic
disaster," which the document describes as "an event having
unprecedented levels of damage, casualties, dislocation, and disruption
that would have nationwide consequences and jeopardize national
security."[^8] According to the background discussion, the emergency
management community was concerned that "existing plans, policies,
procedures and resources" would not be adequate to address such a
"mega-disaster."[^9]

According to the Scope of Work, the contact "will assist FEMA, State,
and local government to enhance response planning activities and
operations by focusing on specific catastrophic disasters: those
disasters that by definition will immediately overwhelm the existing
disaster response capabilities of local, State, and Federal
Governments."[^10] With respect to southeastern Louisiana, the specific
"catastrophic disaster" to be addressed was "a slow-moving Category 3,
4, or 5 hurricane that ... crosses New Orleans and Lake
Pontchartrain."[^11] The Scope of Work explained:

> Various hurricane studies suggest that a slow-moving Category 3 or
> almost any Category 4 or 5 hurricane approaching Southeast Louisiana
> from the south could severely damage the heavily populated Southeast
> portion of the state creating a catastrophe with which the State would
> not be able to cope without massive help from neighboring states and
> the Federal Government.[^12]

The Scope of Work further stated: "The Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA) and the Louisiana Office of Emergency Preparedness (LOEP)
believe that the gravity of the situation calls for an extraordinary
level of advance planning to improve government readiness to respond
effectively to such an event."[^13]

The specific disaster scenario contemplated under the contract is
strikingly similar to the actual disaster caused by Hurricane Katrina.
The contract envisioned that "a catastrophic hurricane could result in
significant numbers of deaths and injuries, trap hundreds of thousands
of people in flooded areas, and leave up to one million people
homeless."[^14] The Scope of Work expressly directed the contractor to
plan for the following specific conditions:

> • "Over one million people would evacuate from New Orleans. Evacuees
> would crowd shelters throughout Louisiana and adjacent states."
>
> • "Hurricane surge would block highways and trap 300,000 to 350,000
> persons in flooded areas. Storm surge of over 18 feet would overflow
> flood-protection levees on the Lake Pontchartrain side of New Orleans.
> Storm surge combined with heavy rain could leave much of New Orleans
> under 14 to 17 feet of water. More than 200 square miles of urban
> areas would be flooded."
>
> • "It could take weeks to 'de-water' (drain) New Orleans: Inundated
> pumping stations and damaged pump motors would be inoperable.
> Flood-protection levees would prevent drainage of floodwater.
> Breaching the levees would be a complicated and politically sensitive
> problem: The Corps of Engineers may have to use barges or helicopters
> to haul earthmoving equipment to open several hundred feet of levee."
>
> • "Rescue operations would be difficult because much of the area would
> be reachable only by helicopters and boats."
>
> • "Hospitals would be overcrowded with special-needs patients. Backup
> generators would run out of fuel or fail before patients could be
> moved elsewhere."
>
> • "The New Orleans area would be without electric power, food, potable
> water, medicine, or transportation for an extended time period."

• "Damaged chemical plants and industries could spill hazardous
materials."

• "Standing water and disease could threaten public health."

• "There would be severe economic repercussions for the state and
region."

> • "Outside responders and resources, including the Federal response
> personnel and materials, would have difficulty entering and working in
> the affected area."[^15]

It appears that IEM completed the task order for "Stage One," the
hurricane simulation. An exercise know as "Hurricane Pam," was conducted
by FEMA and IEM in July 2004, bringing together emergency officials from
50 parish, state, federal, and volunteer organizations to simulate the
conditions described above and plan an emergency response.[^16] As a
result of the exercise, officials reportedly developed proposals for
handling debris removal, sheltering, search and rescue, medical care,
and schools.[^17]

It is not clear, however, what plans or draft plans, if any, IEM
prepared to complete "Stage Two," the development of the final
catastrophic hurricane disaster plan. The task order for "Stage Two"
provided that the "period of performance" was September 23, 2004, to
September 30, 2005.[^18]

The basis for the award of the planning work to IEM is also not
indicated in the documents we received. The task orders were issued to
IEM by FEMA under an "Indefinite Delivery Vehicle" (IDV) contract
between IEM and the General Services Administration.[^19] According to
the Federal Procurement Data System, FEMA received only one bid (from
IEM) for the task orders.[^20]

The documents from the Department raise multiple questions about the
contract with IEM and the planning for a catastrophic hurricane in
southeastern Louisiana. To help us understand these issues, we request
that the Department provide the following documents and information:

\(1\) Any documents relating to the "Stage One" simulation exercise,
including documents prepared for exercise planners and participants,
transcripts or minutes of exercise proceedings, participant evaluations,
and after action reports;

\(2\) Any final or draft plans for a catastrophic hurricane in
southeastern Louisiana prepared under "Stage Two" of the contract,
including any final or draft Catastrophic Hurricane Disaster Plan, Basic
Plan Framework, Emergency Support Function Annex, or Support Annex; and

\(3\) An explanation of the procurement procedures used in selecting IEM
for the contract and task orders, as well as a description of IEM's
qualifications and the justification for selecting IEM.

We recognize that Department officials are engaged in ongoing relief
efforts, and we do not want to impair those efforts in any way. For this
reason, we have tailored our request to the discrete set of documents
and information set forth above. To expedite your response to this
request, we have enclosed copies of the Scope of Work, task orders, and
other documents cited in this letter.

> Sincerely,
>
> Rep. Tom Davis Rep. Henry A. Waxman
>
> Chairman Ranking Minority Member

Enclosure

[^1]: Federal Emergency Management Agency, *Combined Catastrophic Plan
    for Southeast Louisiana and the New Madrid Seismic Zone: Scope of
    Work,* p.2.

[^2]: FEMA, *Scope of Work*, *supra* note 1 at p. 7.

[^3]: FEMA, *Scope of Work*, *supra* note 1 at p. 2.

[^4]: Contract Number GS10F0178L, BPA #HSFEHQ-04-A-0288, Task Order 1.

[^5]: Press Release, *IEM Team to Develop Catastrophic Hurricane
    Disaster Plan for New Orleans & Southeast Louisiana* (June 3, 2004)
    (online at
    http://www.ieminc.com/Whats_New/Press_Releases/pressrelease060304_Catastrophic.htm).

[^6]: Contract Number GS10F0178L, BPA #HSFEHQ-04-A-0288, Task Order
    HSFEHQ-04-J-0002.

[^7]: *Id.*

[^8]: FEMA, *Scope of Work*, *s**upra* note 1 at p. 4.

[^9]: *Id.*

[^10]: FEMA, *Scope of Work*, *supra* note 1 at p. 1.

[^11]: FEMA, *Scope of Work*, *supra* note 1 at p. 5.

[^12]: *Id.*

[^13]: *Id.*

[^14]: *Id.*

[^15]: FEMA, *Scope of Work*, *supra* note 1 at p. 6.

[^16]: FEMA, Press Release, *Hurricane Pam Exercise Concludes* (July 23,
    2004).

[^17]: *Id.*

[^18]: Contract Number GS10F0178L, BPA #HSFEHQ-04-A-0288, Task Order
    HSFEHQ-04-J-0002.

[^19]: Federal Procurement Data System, *GSA Schedule GS10F0178L,
    February 15, 2001* (data obtained from FPDS on Sept. 8, 2005).

[^20]: Federal Procurement Data System, *FEMA Awards Referencing* *GSA
    Schedule GS10F0178L* (data obtained from FPDS on Sept. 8, 2005).