**World Radiocommunication Conference 2003 (WRC-2003)**

**Initial Post-Conference Report**

# July 10, 2003

The International Telecommunication Union's Radiocommunication Sector
(ITU-R) held its 2003 World Radiocommunication Conference (WRC) from
June 9 to July 4, 2003, in Geneva, Switzerland. The Conference broke all
past precedents in terms of the scope of the agenda. There were 48
separate agenda items, a figure that represented roughly a doubling of
the agenda's size from the previous WRC in 2000. In keeping with the
large number of issues to be resolved, some 138 administrations sent a
total of nearly 2,300 delegates to the conference. The U.S. Delegation
contained 170 members, of whom approximately 40 were "senior
advisers"---VIPs from constituent agencies that did not attend the
entire Conference.

All significant U.S. objectives were met. This includes agenda items
with prominent commercial benefits to the U.S. telecommunications
industry, as well as those agenda items that required protection of key
U.S. government systems.

The U.S. Delegation's success in meeting its objectives came despite
strong resistance from other countries and regional groupings that are
U.S. economic rivals or, in some cases, political opponents. As in past
WRC conferences, the U.S. differed sharply on several key issues with
the Europeans---and particularly the French. The U.S. also encountered
disagreements and hard negotiations with some members of the Arab and
Asian groups---notably, Syria and Iran. In all cases, however, the U.S.
was able to negotiate compromises and agreements that furthered and
protected U.S. commercial and governmental interests.

WRC-2003 was chaired by Dr. Veena Rawat of Canada, who was celebrated by
the Conference as the first woman to preside over a WRC. Dr. Rawat
proved to be an excellent administrator and time manager, shepherding
the Conference activities and plenaries to a successful conclusion
within the allotted time frame and without a major breach of consensus.
Ambassador Janice Obuchowski, Head of the U.S. Delegation, served as a
Vice Chairperson and developed an excellent working relationship with
the Chairman. Dr. Rawat responded favorably to the U.S. Delegation's
focus on the agenda items at hand, on their merits, avoiding any linkage
or politicization of the spectrum allocation and regulatory issues.

As foreseen prior to the opening of the Conference, this WRC featured a
maturation of the trend, over recent decades, of countries' working
through regional telecommunications organizations. The U.S. preparatory
process was carried out in close concert with other member nations of
CITEL, the telecommunications arms of the Organization of American
States (OAS). On many of the issues, the U.S. went into the Conference
having developed consolidated proposals with CITEL member nations; these
"Inter-American Proposals" or "IAPs" served the U.S. well in many cases.
Regional cooperation, not only within CITEL, but also with other
regional groups (e.g., the African Telecommunications Union (ATU) and
the Asia-Pacific Telecommunications (APT) group) enabled the U.S.
delegation to match and work with the collective power of the European
bloc, which operates through the CEPT organization.

In addition to its regional alliances, the U.S. Delegation planned and
carried out an extensive outreach effort throughout the month-long
Conference. Individual U.S. Delegation members were assigned to
cultivate ties with other delegations. Each Delegation member was
encouraged to build an informal relationship with his/her assigned
country delegation. This technique maximized the size and strength of
the U.S. Delegation to provide a face-to-face, personal liaison with
every single delegation attending the conference. This was instrumental
in an organization such as the ITU, which employs the UN system of
weighing each country equally, under a one country, one vote system.

In addition, the Delegation as a whole carried out a substantial program
of events to remain connected with key countries and regional blocs. The
U.S. reception, held during the first week of the Conference---and
sponsored by the U.S. private sector---was the only event to include
invitations to every single delegate attending the WRC. The U.S. also
hosted joint receptions, lunches and dinners with key voting allies,
including CITEL, the African Telecommunication Union, the Russian
Delegation and the Asia-Pacific bloc. This outreach effort, carried out
consistently over a one-month period, was perhaps instrumental for the
exchange of views, the alignment of positions and, eventually, the
coordination of plenary actions according to mutual interests that
favored the United States.

This report will now turn to an explication of the results of the major
agenda items. Following that, there will be a brief discussion of the
political aspects of the conference, which were significantly muted
compared with past ITU conferences. Finally, the report will offer an
assessment of the Conference's impact on the industry and on future ITU
conferences.

## Results of Action on Major Agenda Items

The United States Delegation had several objectives going into the
Conference, including the following:

-   Allocation of spectrum in the 5 gigahertz (GHz) range for Mobile
    Service, to support wireless local area network (WLAN) systems
    (e.g., Wi-Fi);

-   Upgrade of allocations in the same spectrum range (5 GHz) for
    Radiolocation, Earth Exploration Satellite Service (EESS) and Space
    Research Service (SRS);

-   A secondary allocation for Aeronautical Mobile Satellite Service
    (AMSS) in the 14-14.5 GHz band to support commercial roll-out of
    broadband services for airline passengers;

-   Agreement on sharing and coordination mechanisms to protect existing
    services in the 1100-1300 megahertz frequency range and to allow the
    upgrade of the U.S. GPS (Global Positioning System) in the
    Radio-Navigation Satellite Service (RNSS);

-   The protection of government Radiolocation systems (i.e., military
    radars) from interference in the 13.75-14 GHz band, shared with
    Fixed Satellite Service (FSS) systems;

-   Resolution of procedural and planning issues involving Broadcast
    Satellite Services, as well as the protection of small-sized BSS
    dishes widely used in the United States; and

-   Resolution of issues to pave the way for use of Earth Stations on
    board Vessels (ESVs) communicating with FSS satellites.

In addition, the U.S. tabled proposals to resolve issues regarding
High-Altitude Platform Stations (HAPS), which are expected to provide a
new medium for transmission from high-altitude transmission stations in
the atmosphere above the Earth. Also, the U.S. came into WRC-2003
opposing any fixed, inflexible or global identification of frequency
bands for public protection and disaster relief, believing that any such
inflexible definition would be unnecessary and potentially at odds with
existing spectrum use in the United States and by the U.S. military's
worldwide operations. Finally, the U.S. Delegation, as it had in
previous WRCs, sought an allocation for feeder links for
non-geostationary satellite systems operating below 1 GHz---the
so-called "Little LEO" low-Earth orbiting satellite systems.

The U.S. substantially met each one of these objectives. The following
is a more detailed discussion of action on each of the key agenda items
mentioned above.

### Agenda Items Primarily of Commercial Importance

1.  [Wireless LAN allocations at 5 GHz (Agenda Item 1.5)]{.underline}
    --- The United States supported the global allocation by WRC of
    spectrum for mobile service in the 5150-5350 MHz and 5470-5725 MHz
    bands. This would result in a total of 455 MHz allocated for
    wireless LANs or, as the ITU classifies such systems, Radio Local
    Area Networks (RLANs). During the process of preparing for WRC, the
    U.S. developed proposals that would allow for such allocations while
    protecting existing services that share these bands. The U.S.
    position was a consensus one, growing out of a resolution---reached
    four months prior to WRC---of competing proposals representing
    government and private-sector concerns over potential interference.
    The U.S. specified technical parameters, including Dynamic Frequency
    Selection (DFS), to protect Radiolocation services (radars) at 5
    GHz.

Going into the Conference, the primary difference between the U.S.
position and others involved whether to allow outdoor use of WLAN
devices operating in the 5250-5350 MHz sub-band. The United States
proposed permitting outdoor use, while the Europeans proposed to ban it.
During the Conference, this issue proved extremely difficult to resolve,
with debate persisting well into the third week. Progress was being
blocked by the stance of a French drafting group chairman who did not
favor the U.S. position in the debate. After a clear stalemate in the
debate, however, an ad hoc group was formed, with an Australian
chairman, to pursue a resolution on the outdoor use issue.

The fact that the United States was already committed to such outdoor
use was a key leverage point in the debate. Given the massive size of
the U.S. market and the fact that deployment of Wi-Fi technology is
inherently difficult to police, many national delegations may have come
to the gradual conclusion that it was expedient from a regulatory
perspective to align with the U.S. position. In addition, Wi-Fi
manufacturers, including European ones, became more convinced of the
benefits of pursuing economies of scale in chip design.

> By early in the fourth week of the conference, a compromise agreement
> emerged that entailed (1) an indoor restriction in the 5150-5250 MHz
> band to protect Mobile Satellite Service (MSS) feeder links; (2) no
> ban on outdoor use in the 5250-5350 MHz band, but text encouraging
> "predominantly" indoor use in the band, and (3) and technical
> constraints (including an optional antenna emission mask) for use in
> the 5460-5725 MHz band. What paved the way for this agreement was a
> softening of Europe's previous hard-line position calling for a ban on
> outdoor use in the 5250-5350 MHz band. During the Conference, the U.S.
> was aware of some degree of flexibility within the European block
> (CEPT) on this issue, and additional flexibility was shown by Korea,
> Australia and New Zealand.
>
> The final result represents a global allocation of 455 MHz of spectrum
> for WLANs, an amount that will provide opportunities for U.S.
> manufacturers to achieve economies of scale and pioneer new markets in
> this globally harmonized spectrum. In addition, there is an
> opportunity, within minimum constraints, for outdoor use of WLAN
> devices in 355 of the 455 MHz allocated at the Conference. This gives
> the United States sufficient flexibility to proceed with its own
> allocations for WLANs, pursuant to the technical parameters developed
> by the government/private-sector approach developed domestically
> earlier this year.

2.  [Extension of space science allocations at 5 GHz (also Agenda Item
    1.5)]{.underline} --- As part of the same agenda item, the U.S.
    sought the following:

-   The addition of primary allocations for EESS (Earth Exploration
    Satellite Service) and SRS (Space Research Service) in the 5460-5570
    MHz band;

-   A primary allocation for SRS at 5350-5460 MHz, providing a
    continuous allocation from 5250-5570 MHz, and

-   Protection of an existing EESS allocation at 5250-5350 MHz from
    mobile services (the RLAN allocations explained in Item No. 1,
    above).

> The primary stakeholder in these objectives was the National
> Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), which substantially
> achieved its aims. The Conference approved an allocation for both EESS
> and SRS at 5460-5570 MHz (the first bullet point, above). In addition,
> the Conference generated a primary allocation for SRS from 5350-5460
> MHz, and it secured protection from mobile service operations through
> two footnotes that prohibit mobile services from causing harmful
> interference to other services in the band.
>
> Taken as a whole, Agenda Item 1.5 represents a victory for the U.S.
> delegation, which was able to secure a commercially important set of
> allocations while simultaneously securing balanced provisions to
> protect vital NASA operations.

3.  [Secondary Allocation for AMSS at 14-14.5 GHz (Agenda Item
    1.11)]{.underline} --- This agenda item was vital for U.S. aerospace
    and communications companies, including Boeing Corp., which has
    developed its Connexion service to provide broadband Internet access
    to airline passengers. The U.S. managed to build broad support for
    this allocation prior to the Conference, including support from its
    fellow members of CITEL in North and South America.

Once the Conference began, however, it became apparent that certain
other administrations, particularly in the Arab Group (and Iran), saw
the commercial importance of this item to the United States as an
invitation to engage in procedural moves designed to hold the issue
"hostage" and link it to other issues. Although the U.S. delegation saw
no regulatory issues with the allocation, several administrations
(France, the UK, Italy and some African countries) expressed concern
about protection of terrestrial fixed wireless services in the band. The
Arab Group and Iran attempted to capitalize on this by tying up the
agenda item in Committee 4 (regulatory issues). The U.S. was successful,
during the first week of the conference, in ensuring that both Committee
4 and Committee 5 (allocations) would act on the proposed allocation.

> The result was that the allocation was approved by the WRC as proposed
> by the U.S., clearing the way for secondary AMSS operations in the
> band. While clearance by Committee 4 was delayed until the last week
> of the Conference, no administration was successful in linking the
> item to other pending issues. Moreover, the U.S. managed to limit the
> regulatory provisions to country-specific footnotes, completely
> avoiding any general restrictions on the allocation. In addition, the
> Conference adopted a footnote that makes clear that secondary AMSS
> earth stations (that is, the equipment installed in the airplanes) can
> communicate with primary FSS satellites. The AMSS allocation became
> effective immediately following the Conference, on July 5, 2003,
> clearing the way for roll-out of this commercial service by Boeing and
> any other companies seeking to enter the market.

4.  [Broadcast Satellite Service Issues (Agenda Item 1.27)]{.underline}
    --- This agenda item involved, in part, discussions between the
    Europeans and the Arab Group concerning issues that were not
    directly contentious for the United States. One issue, however, was
    potentially important to commercial direct broadcast satellite (DBS)
    interests, because of the impact of spectrum sharing discussions on
    protection of U.S. DBS receiver dishes. The United States has some
    20 million receiver dishes that are 45 centimeters in diameter, and
    proposals by some administrations in other regions would have
    protected dishes only to a minimum of 60 centimeters.

> The U.S. Delegation successfully persuaded the Conference to continue
> protecting satellite dishes down to a minimum of 45 centimeters in
> satellite Region 2 (which covers the Americas), thus protecting
> existing U.S. BSS dishes. The United States was able to show that use
> of the smaller dishes has been fully coordinated with other countries
> within Region 2 . Moreover, coordination with satellite dishes in
> other regions has never been necessary.

5.  [Regulatory Provisions and Identification of Bands for HAPS (Agenda
    Item 1.13)]{.underline} --- The major issue in this agenda item was
    whether 2 X 300 MHz of spectrum in the 27 and 34 GHz bands could be
    identified for use in additional countries. Before the Conference,
    those bands were available for High-Altitude Platform Systems (HAPS)
    only through a footnote, and only in several Asian countries.
    Another issue was whether a current freeze on filings for new FSS
    systems would be lifted in the 47 GHz band, which is shared between
    HAPS and FSS on a co-primary basis.

The primary commercial proponent for this agenda item was a U.S.
company, Sky Tower, which had developed, under NASA sponsorship, a
system using an unmanned, solar-powered aircraft for use as a
high-altitude transmission platform for telecommunications. The United
States had contributed Sky Tower studies to the ITU indicating that any
potential interference to FSS and Fixed Service systems caused by the
system could be predicted and mitigated. The U.S. and CITEL backed a
proposal to draft a resolution identifying the bands for HAPS, going
into the Conference.

The proposal encountered stiff resistance from the Europeans, leading
CITEL (with U.S. support) to modify its proposal to make the proposed
resolution apply only to Regions 2 (the Americas) and 3 (Asia), while
exempting Region 1 (Europe and Africa). The Europeans continued to
oppose the proposal, however, arguing that the close geographic
proximity and long border between Regions 1 and 3 would impact
negatively on terrestrial systems in Europe. The geographic separation
between Region 2 land areas and those of the other regions, however,
provided no basis for European opposition to application of HAPS in the
Americas. In the end, the proposal was adopted for Region 2, which
includes the United States. Several countries in Asia (South Korea,
Malaysia, Russia, the Philippines and Kazakhstan, among others),
however, added their names to a footnote allowing HAPS in Region 3.

On the second issue, the freeze on FSS filings in the 47 GHz band was
lifted for Region 2. Finally, two resolutions were amended and
continued, calling for further ITU studies of spectrum bands that could
be identified for HAPS in the future.

6.  [Secondary Allocation for "Little LEOs" (Agenda Item
    1.16)]{.underline} --- During the 1990s, several satellite companies
    pioneered the use of low Earth-orbiting satellites (LEOs) to provide
    Mobile Satellite Services to points anywhere on the globe. The
    Federal Communications Commission then licensed several so-called
    "Little LEOs" for delivery of data services to and from remote sites
    (the "Big LEOs were envisioned as providers of a broader array of
    voice and data services). The Little LEO operators have been
    constrained, however, by lack of an adequate global allocation for
    feeder links (that is, the links providing data between the
    satellites and ground stations). The FCC decided in a rulemaking
    proceeding to allocate spectrum in the 1390-1393 MHz and 1430-1432
    MHz bands---if those bands were allocated globally at WRC.

The downturn in the satellite industry experienced during recent years
had a significant impact upon the U.S. Little LEO providers. In
preparation for this Conference, they were late in supporting and
providing results of all studies needed to prove that the proposed
allocation would not cause interference with existing services. As a
result, the U.S. entered WRC-2003 as essentially the sole proponent of
this allocation. Given that position of relative isolation at the start
of the Conference, the U.S. Delegation achieved a substantial victory at
WRC-2003 on this item.

> The Delegation won a secondary allocation for Little LEO feeder links
> in the bands---an allocation which is, however, subject to significant
> conditions. The allocation will only go into effect when the results
> of further ITU compatibility studies are presented to WRC-2007, or
> another future Conference, and that Conference acts accordingly.
> Whatever technical parameters are applied to MSS systems as a result
> of those studies will be made retroactive to any MSS systems,
> including Little LEOs, that file for use of the bands after July 5,
> 2003.
>
> Although the allocation is conditional, it gives the Little LEO
> industry time to prepare inputs to the ITU studies that will support
> the allocation and provide a pathway for compatible sharing in the
> band. This will set the stage for full implementation of the
> allocation following the next WRC.

### Issues with National Security or Public Safety Implications

7.  [Sharing and Coordination for RNSS Systems (Agenda Item
    1.15)]{.underline} --- This issue involved the existing RNSS systems
    operated by the United States (GPS) and Russia (GLONASS), as well as
    the planned European system, Galileo. It proved to be the most
    contentious of WRC-2003 and was not finally resolved until a
    compromise agreement was endorsed by a plenary session at 11 p.m. on
    the last business day of the Conference.

> The U.S. had been diligently working on resolution of the narrow
> technical questions that were presented on the WRC agenda itself; the
> Delegation believed that most of those issues were near resolution
> going into the Conference. But, given the industrial policy
> implications of the Galileo system for the European Space Agency (ESA)
> and the European Commission, this agenda item became freighted with
> political concerns and posturing on the Europeans' part. It became
> apparent that the issues motivating some of the Europeans' positions
> at the Conference went beyond the discrete questions actually on the
> agenda and implicated broader concerns of viability of Galileo and its
> positioning at the ITU relative to GPS.
>
> The agenda item at this WRC was a follow-up from WRC 2000, during
> which new allocations were made to accommodate additional RNSS
> systems, including Galileo. There were essentially three allocations
> at issue, all of which were of vital concern to the United States
> because of the need to secure sufficient flexibility for the coming
> upgrade of GPS signals.
>
> The issue of RNSS compatibility with Radio Astronomy service in one of
> the bands (5010-5030 MHz) was resolved without any major problem. All
> parties agreed to adopt the technical results in a report of the
> Conference Preparatory Meeting held last year. This met the U.S.
> objective for this band. Similarly, RNSS/radar compatibility studies
> for the 1215-1300 MHz band resulted in full agreement between the
> parties that no power limits needed to be placed on RNSS systems,
> including GPS. That met the U.S. goal of blocking the imposition of
> any power flux density limit in the band.
>
> The lightning rod for disagreement proved to be the 1164-1215 MHz
> band. In this band, the Europeans---in particular, the French
> spokesman for the Europeans---strongly pressed for application of a
> formal coordination procedure, detailed in Article 9 of the Radio
> Regulations. It became apparent that this insistence was rooted in a
> belief that retroactive application of Article 9 coordination would
> provide an advantageous position for the Galileo system, which the
> Europeans insisted had been filed at the ITU before the U.S. filing
> for the GPS upgrade. This would give Galileo precedence under a
> first-come, first-served approach, requiring that GPS accommodate
> Galileo in the coordination process. The U.S., which believed that
> Galileo may actually have filed too early under the rules, vehemently
> opposed any retroactive application of Article 9.
>
> Both sides adhered firmly to their positions throughout the first
> three weeks of the Conference, with CEPT threatening to bring the
> issue to a formal vote with the support of the Arab Group. (This
> support appears to have been garnered in a deal with the Arab Group
> concluded this past spring.)
>
> Final resolution of the issue came with a compromise, in which the
> Europeans agreed to apply Article 9 only prospectively, to RNSS
> systems filed in the band after January 1, 2005. This effectively
> grandfathered both Galileo and GPS, rendering moot any question of
> precedence under the Article 9 procedure. This represented a victory
> by the U.S. Delegation, as it will preserve the ability, under
> informal coordination mechanisms, for the upgrade of GPS, as planned.
> Moreover, the U.S. also succeeded in large part in its pursuit of
> informal coordination threshold criteria designed to ensure that only
> viable systems---not "paper" satellite systems that may never be
> built---are factored into calculations for protecting other services
> in the band. The U.S. success on this agenda item can be attributed to
> firm resolution to defend its interests and principles and to alert
> and effective support by all concerned branches of the U.S.
> government.

8.  [Spectrum Sharing in the 13.75-14 GHz Band (Agenda Item
    1.24]{.underline}) --- In this agenda item, FSS interests around the
    globe sought to relax the restriction on FSS satellite dishes that
    required them to be at least 4.5 meters in diameter to be used in
    this band. Countries supporting change in this agenda item sought
    permission for the FSS dishes to be smaller, thus potentially
    sparking more widespread commercial use. The United States, despite
    its strong satellite industry, opposed any such reduction in the
    satellite dish size because of concerns that it would cause harmful
    interference to Radiolocation (i.e., Navy radar) operations and SRS
    activities (including communications vital to the Space Shuttle and
    International Space Station programs).

> Coming into the Conference, the U.S. adhered to a "Method A"
> option---that is, no change to the dish size. The Europeans and the
> Arab Group supported a "Method B" option, allowing a reduction in
> antenna size coupled with power limits to head off interference. The
> power limit levels favored by Europe and the Arabs were unacceptable
> to the United States. In addition to the technical values in this
> Method B approach, the U.S. also had concerns about where the
> "protection point" would begin, geographically, for Naval radar
> operations in maritime environments.
>
> These issues were resolved through a compromise agreement, in which
> the U.S. agreed to a Method B approach, but with power levels that
> were more strict than those previously suggested by the Europeans or
> industry proponents of reduced dish sizes. Under the agreement, FSS
> dishes in the band can be no smaller than 1.2 meters, and power levels
> cannot exceed a limit of --115 dBW/m2 more than 1% of the time.
> Although the U.S. Delegation did not succeed, against overwhelming
> opposition, in its original "no change" proposal, it did succeed in
> negotiating power limits that will protect U.S. government systems
> operating in the band. Therefore, the compromise met the core U.S.
> objective of protecting these systems from harmful interference by FSS
> operations.

9.  [Earth Stations On Board Vessels (ESVs) (Agenda Item
    1.26)]{.underline} --- The purpose of this item was to provide an
    international framework for the operation of satellite ground
    stations on moving ships. Such ships can be commercial, such as
    cruise ships, or military. This issue was somewhat complicated by
    the fact that the U.S. and other proponents sought permission for
    ESVs to communicate from mobile positions (that is, moving ships) up
    to satellites in the Fixed Satellite Service (which normally
    involves stationary ground stations).

The three major regional groups---CITEL (the Americas), CEPT (Europe)
and APT (Asia-Pacific)---all submitted proposals allowing ESVs to
operate with FSS satellites, while the Arab Group and Iran countered
with proposals to designate ESVs as Maritime Mobile Satellite Service
(MMSS) operations. The final result was along the lines of the
American/European/Asian proposal, in part because of the reluctance to
add an MMSS or MSS allocation in the 5.9-6.4 GHz band. The Conference
did, however, accept a footnote submitted by the Arabs to the effect
that ESV operation would be considered secondary MMSS in the Region 1
countries that subscribe to the footnote.

10. [Public Protection and Disaster Relief Spectrum (Agenda Item
    1.3)]{.underline} --- Going into WRC-2003, several administrations
    wanted the ITU to identify certain bands for countries to use for
    emergency response radio systems employed during disaster relief and
    emergency situations. The goal was to achieve harmonization of these
    bands across national borders and to achieve economies of scale for
    manufacturers. The United States supported efforts to spotlight
    disaster relief but opposed formal identification of bands, under
    Article 5, for such uses. The U.S. position was that formal
    identification was unnecessary, since individual countries had
    already allocated various different bands for these uses. Moreover,
    a formal identification would limit the flexibility of the United
    States and other countries to utilize spectrum for these purposes in
    such a way as to meet local and national interests. Further, band
    identification can be particularly risky for U.S. national security
    interests. These operate worldwide and would have experienced
    harmful interference under some identification scenarios.

> During the Conference, an agreement was reached on a resolution
> providing non-binding guidance to administrations and manufacturers,
> without identifying bands under Article 5. This met the U.S. objective
> of avoiding any formal identification. The U.S. also succeeded in
> suppressing the original resolution on this issue, ensuring there will
> be no further WRC action in future Conferences.

### Resolution 4 and Future Agenda Items

During the final week of WRC-2003, delegates not only worked to hammer
out final compromises on the major issues discussed above, they also
grappled with two issues that came to the fore in the final days.

The first of these issues was a proposal by selected Arab Group
countries (e.g., Syria) and Iran, backed quietly by France and several
developing countries, to fix a time limit on the viability of satellite
orbital slot assignments. The proposal would have set a limit,
originally suggested as being within a range of 20-30 years, for
satellite systems, including ones operating and planning new
generations. In other words, existing commercial systems would have a
window of up to 30 years in which to launch and operate their systems,
through single or multiple generations, before having to relinquish
their rights to that orbital position. The proponents sought to temper
their proposal by exempting some "national" systems and through other
possible loopholes.

The proposal represented a direct threat to the viability of commercial
satellite systems. The U.S. has opposed, on principle, any fixed time
limit that would pull the plug on existing satellite system operations.
Any such limit would pose a threat to the ability of commercial
satellite systems to win and retain investment, imperiling any recovery
of the U.S. satellite industry. When it appeared that the issue was
headed for a floor debate, the U.S. Delegation immediately, rapidly and
effectively mobilized, utilizing the results of its active outreach
program to communicate the seriousness of the threat to the global
satellite industry. The U.S. led the charge in the floor debate against
the proposal and was joined by an overwhelming show of support from
Canada, Australia, Japan, several European states and developing
countries in Africa, Latin American and the Caribbean. The result was a
resounding and firm defeat of the proposal on the floor during the
penultimate night of the Conference.

It appeared clear from the floor statements that multiple
administrations around the world perceived the proposal as antithetical
to the growth of a free market for satellite services. As such, the
proposal would not only threaten the economic viability of the existing
satellite providers around the world, it would also harm their ability
to provide services that are vital to socioeconomic development of
emerging economies.

The Conference also approved a resolution setting an agenda for the next
WRC, which is slated tentatively for 2007. The U.S. Delegation succeeded
in placing all of the items it required on that agenda. Moreover, the
final resolution is important, because it includes fewer than half of
the agenda items that were addressed at WRC-2003. This means a reversal
of the trend of recent WRCs, which had seen a progressive doubling in
the size of the agenda. This result is in keeping with the goals of the
United States---and of the ITU itself---to reduce the cost and scope of
WRCs in the future.

## Political Issues

WRC-2003 was the first major multilateral treaty-level conference in
which the United States participated following the commencement of
Coalition operations in Iraq. The potential certainly existed for
delegations from some administrations opposed to U.S. interests to
politicize the conference in an attempt to block or discredit the United
States. This did not develop, however, as a problem or distraction at
WRC-2003. To an overwhelming extent, delegations confined their
interventions to specific points of discussion related to agenda items,
with the lone exception of a Cuban protest of U.S. broadcasting
operations, made during the opening plenary session.

Delegation members from Iran, Saudi Arabia and Syria made frequent
interventions on the floor during plenary sessions, but they generally
confined them to radiocommunication issues. Moreover, no groundswell of
supported was generate by these interventions. There was no attempted
exploitation of issues relating to Coalition activities, nor were there
politically inspired attacks, on the floor, on other administrations,
such as Israel. Delegations generally observed appropriate decorum and
confined the discussions to the pressing spectrum allocation and
coordination issues before them. This allowed the delegates to achieve
the work of the Conference. Credit for this should go to the delegates
themselves, as well as to Dr. Rawat for her professional and effective
role in chairing the Conference.

## Impact of the Conference for the United States

Because of its role as a technological innovator and market leader, the
United States has perhaps more at stake than any other nation
represented at the periodic WRCs. Its Table of Allocations is more
complex; the number of government and private-sector stakeholders is
more profuse; and the sheer sophistication of spectrum-dependent
activities is higher than any other country in the world. The number of
citizens whose interests it must advance and protect is larger, by far,
than the vast majority of countries represented at WRCs. Yet, the United
States has just a single vote.

The measure of success for the United States at WRC-2003 was the ability
of its delegation to prepare for essentially all of agenda items with
potential to impact upon U.S. commercial and governmental interests. The
United States, like other countries, must approach this task through
careful preparation and coordination with its neighbors and allies---and
indeed, with all countries that share its interests. Success in the WRC
environment calls for firmness in defending U.S. interests and
principles, coupled with technical expertise and diplomatic agility. The
result of WRC-2003 indicates that the U.S. Delegation succeeded in this
effort.