**\[SOE LETTERHEAD\]**

July 11, 2005

The Honorable Richard B. Cheney

President of the Senate

Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. President:

We are pleased to submit to Congress the enclosed report concerning
plutonium storage at our Savannah River Site, located near Aiken, South
Carolina. This report was mandated by Congress in Section 3183 of the
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (Public Law 107-1314).
Section 3183 directed that the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board
(Board) conduct a study of the adequacy of facilities at the Savannah
River Site for the storage of plutonium, and that it submit to Congress
and the Secretary of Energy a report on that study. Congress further
mandated in Section 3183 that not later than six months after the
Board's report is submitted to Congress, and every year thereafter, the
Secretary and the Board each submit to Congress, a report on the actions
taken by the Secretary in response to proposals in the report.

The Board submitted its report, "Plutonium Storage at the Department of
Energy's Savannah River Site," both to Congress and the Secretary of
Energy by letters dated December 1, 2003. Our first report on the
actions being taken by the Department of Energy in response to the eight
proposals contained in the report was submitted to Congress by letters
dated June 16, 2004. Our second report is enclosed. Since submission of
our first report, the Department has: (1) made progress on a plan for
disposition of excess plutonium at the Savannah River Site; (2)
completed a revised study of plutonium storage options at the site; (3)
determined that unnecessary combustibles will be removed from the K-Area
Material Storage facility, and (4) decided not to utilize Building 235-F
for extended storage of plutonium or for future stabilization and
packaging operations.

If you need additional information, please contact me or Ms. Jill L.
Sigal, Acting Assistant Secretary for Congressional and
Intergovernmental Affairs, at (202) 586-5450.

Sincerely,

***Samuel W. Bodman***

Enclosure

**\[SOE LETTERHEAD\]**

July 11, 2005

The Honorable J. Dennis Hastert

Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives

Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Speaker:

We are pleased to submit to Congress the enclosed report concerning
plutonium storage at our Savannah River Site, located near Aiken, South
Carolina. This report was mandated by Congress in Section 3183 of the
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (Public Law 107-1314).
Section 3183 directed that the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board
(Board) conduct a study of the adequacy of facilities at the Savannah
River Site for the storage of plutonium, and that it submit to Congress
and the Secretary of Energy a report on that study. Congress further
mandated in Section 3183 that not later than six months after the
Board's report is submitted to Congress, and every year thereafter, the
Secretary and the Board each submit to Congress, a report on the actions
taken by the Secretary in response to proposals in the report.

The Board submitted its report, "Plutonium Storage at the Department of
Energy's Savannah River Site," both to Congress and the Secretary of
Energy by letters dated December 1, 2003. Our first report on the
actions being taken by the Department of Energy in response to the eight
proposals contained in the report was submitted to Congress by letters
dated June 16, 2004. Our second report is enclosed. Since submission of
our first report, the Department has: (1) made progress on a plan for
disposition of excess plutonium at the Savannah River Site; (2)
completed a revised study of plutonium storage options at the site; (3)
determined that unnecessary combustibles will be removed from the K-Area
Material Storage facility, and (4) decided not to utilize Building 235-F
for extended storage of plutonium or for future stabilization and
packaging operations.

If you need additional information, please contact me or Ms. Jill L.
Sigal, Acting Assistant Secretary for Congressional and
Intergovernmental Affairs, at (202) 586-5450.

Sincerely,

***Samuel W. Bodman***

Enclosure

**\[SOE LETTERHEAD\]**

July 11, 2005

The Honorable John Warner

Chairman, Committee on Armed Services

United States Senate

Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

We are pleased to submit to Congress the enclosed report concerning
plutonium storage at our Savannah River Site, located near Aiken, South
Carolina. This report was mandated by Congress in Section 3183 of the
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (Public Law 107-1314).
Section 3183 directed that the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board
(Board) conduct a study of the adequacy of facilities at the Savannah
River Site for the storage of plutonium, and that it submit to Congress
and the Secretary of Energy a report on that study. Congress further
mandated in Section 3183 that not later than six months after the
Board's report is submitted to Congress, and every year thereafter, the
Secretary and the Board each submit to Congress, a report on the actions
taken by the Secretary in response to proposals in the report.

The Board submitted its report, "Plutonium Storage at the Department of
Energy's Savannah River Site," both to Congress and the Secretary of
Energy by letters dated December 1, 2003. Our first report on the
actions being taken by the Department of Energy in response to the eight
proposals contained in the report was submitted to Congress by letters
dated June 16, 2004. Our second report is enclosed. Since submission of
our first report, the Department has: (1) made progress on a plan for
disposition of excess plutonium at the Savannah River Site; (2)
completed a revised study of plutonium storage options at the site; (3)
determined that unnecessary combustibles will be removed from the K-Area
Material Storage facility, and (4) decided not to utilize Building 235-F
for extended storage of plutonium or for future stabilization and
packaging operations.

If you need additional information, please contact me or Ms. Jill L.
Sigal, Acting Assistant Secretary for Congressional and
Intergovernmental Affairs, at (202) 586-5450.

Sincerely,

***Samuel W. Bodman***

Enclosure

cc w/enclosure: The Honorable Carl Levin

Ranking Minority Member

**\[SOE LETTERHEAD\]**

July 11, 2005

The Honorable Duncan L. Hunter

Chairman, Committee on Armed Services

U.S. House of Representatives

Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman:

We are pleased to submit to Congress the enclosed report concerning
plutonium storage at our Savannah River Site, located near Aiken, South
Carolina. This report was mandated by Congress in Section 3183 of the
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (Public Law 107-1314).
Section 3183 directed that the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board
(Board) conduct a study of the adequacy of facilities at the Savannah
River Site for the storage of plutonium, and that it submit to Congress
and the Secretary of Energy a report on that study. Congress further
mandated in Section 3183 that not later than six months after the
Board's report is submitted to Congress, and every year thereafter, the
Secretary and the Board each submit to Congress, a report on the actions
taken by the Secretary in response to proposals in the report.

The Board submitted its report, "Plutonium Storage at the Department of
Energy's Savannah River Site," both to Congress and the Secretary of
Energy by letters dated December 1, 2003. Our first report on the
actions being taken by the Department of Energy in response to the eight
proposals contained in the report was submitted to Congress by letters
dated June 16, 2004. Our second report is enclosed. Since submission of
our first report, the Department has: (1) made progress on a plan for
disposition of excess plutonium at the Savannah River Site; (2)
completed a revised study of plutonium storage options at the site; (3)
determined that unnecessary combustibles will be removed from the K-Area
Material Storage facility, and (4) decided not to utilize Building 235-F
for extended storage of plutonium or for future stabilization and
packaging operations.

If you need additional information, please contact me or Ms. Jill L.
Sigal, Acting Assistant Secretary for Congressional and
Intergovernmental Affairs, at (202) 586-5450.

Sincerely,

***Samuel W. Bodman***

Enclosure

cc w/enclosure: The Honorable Ike Skelton

Ranking Minority Member

**Second Report to Congress**

**On Actions Taken by the Department of Energy**

**In Response to the Proposals in the**

**Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board's**

**December 2003 Report to Congress on**

**Plutonium Storage at the Savannah River Site**

![](media/image1.jpeg){width="2.0506944444444444in"
height="2.0506944444444444in"}

**Department of Energy**

**June 2005**

**Report to Congress on Actions Taken by the Department of Energy in
Response to**

**the Proposals in the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board's
December 2003**

**Report to Congress on Plutonium Storage at the Savannah River Site**

[Introduction]{.underline}

Section 3183 of the Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003
(Public Law 107-

314\) directed that the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (Board)
conduct a study of the adequacy of the K-Area Materials Storage (KAMS)
facility and related support facilities at the Savannah River Site
(SRS), such as Building 235-F, for the storage of defense plutonium and
defense plutonium materials. That statute also required that the Board
submit to Congress and the Secretary of Energy a report on that study,
including any proposals the Board considers appropriate to enhance the
safety, reliability, and functionality of KAMS. Congress further
mandated in Section 3 183 that not later than six months after the
Board's report is submitted to Congress, and every year thereafter, the
Secretary and the Board each submit to Congress a report on the actions
taken by the Secretary in response to the proposals, if any, included in
the report.

The Board submitted its report, "Plutonium Storage at the Department of
Energy's Savannah River Site," both to Congress and the Secretary by
letters dated December 1, 2003. That report presented conclusions of the
Board's study, and identified several proposals for enhancing the
safety, reliability, and functionality of plutonium storage facilities
at SRS.

This report is the second one submitted to Congress by the Secretary of
Energy on the actions being taken by the Department of Energy (DOE) in
response to the proposals contained in the Board's December 2003 report
on plutonium storage at SRS.

[Board's Proposals]{.underline}

The Board's December 2003 report contains eight proposals; two on the
plutonium disposition program, five on the suitability of facilities
(one on KAMS and four on Building 235-F), and one on remote monitoring
and retrieval of material. Those proposals are listed below.

*Plutonium Disposition Program*

-   Expedite the development of a complete, well-considered plan for the
    disposition of all excess plutonium to preclude unnecessary extended
    storage of plutonium at SRS.

-   Conduct a new study of available options for the storage of
    plutonium at SRS.

*Suitability of Facilities*

[KAMS]{.underline}

-   Install fire protection systems and eliminate unnecessary
    combustibles in KAMS.

[Building 235-F]{.underline}

-   Establish an acceptable safety basis for stabilization and packaging
    of plutonium and extended storage of plutonium in the facility.

-   Conduct a systematic evaluation of the safety systems to determine
    needed upgrades.

-   Perform a structural analysis assessing seismic adequacy measured by
    current acceptance criteria. Since the facility has a new extended
    mission, the structural analysis should be based on ground motion
    equivalent to that used in the analysis for a new facility at SRS.

-   Decontaminate unused process cells.

*Remote Monitoring and Retrieval of Material*

-   Develop and implement validated procedures for the handling and
    intrasite shipment of plutonium containers, including damaged
    containers.

[Status of Actions Taken by DOE in Response to the Board's
Proposals]{.underline}

*Plutonium Disposition Program*

**Board Proposal:** Expedite the development of a complete,
well-considered plan for the disposition of all excess plutonium to
preclude unnecessary extended storage of plutonium at SRS.

**DOE Actions:** In order to preclude unnecessary extended storage of
plutonium at SRS, DOE plans to establish a disposition path for all
plutonium at the site. A Critical Decision-0 (CD-0) package for a
plutonium vitrification project at SRS has been prepared, pursuant to
DOE Order 413.3, "Program and Project Management for the Acquisition of
Capital Assets." This Order describes the normal process that DOE uses
for managing capital projects, and an appropriate National Environmental
Policy Act (NEPA) review would be performed as part of the project.

The proposed project would establish the capability in the 105-K
facility to prepare for disposition of the plutonium at SRS that is not
suitable for use in mixed-oxide (MOX) fuel (and, if necessary or
desired, plutonium that is MOXable) by vitrifying it in lanthanide
borosilicate (LaBS) glass. In addition, this project is being sized to
vitrify additional plutonium in the event that further plutonium
consolidation occurs. The small containers of LaBS glass would then be
placed into Defense Waste Processing Facility (DWPF) canisters and
filled with high-level waste glass in a manner that would permit
disposal at the geologic repository planned for construction at Yucca
Mountain. The Department is also working to include LaBS glass in the
license application it is currently developing for Yucca Mountain. The
proposed plutonium vitrification process includes the activities
described below.

[Oxidation:]{.underline} Oxidation receives DOE-STD-3013 containers with
plutonium metal from storage. The plutonium metal is converted to an
oxide in Direct Metal Oxidation Furnaces and the resultant oxide is
packaged in convenience cans. The output from Oxidation is transport
cans of oxide that are sent to Feed Preparation.

[Feed Preparation:]{.underline} Feed Preparation receives 3013
containers of oxide from storage and transport cans of oxide from
Oxidization. The output from Feed Preparation is batching cans with 2 kg
of crushed/screened oxide, with a particle diameter less than 1 mm, that
are sent to Milling/Mixing.

[Milling/Mixing:]{.underline} The Milling/Mixing process step combines
the plutonium feed with LaBS glass frit. Milling/Mixing is accomplished
using an attritor mill to produce the necessary particle size to ensure
dissolution and incorporation of the plutonium into the glass and a
homogenous mixture. The resulting mix is loaded into melter batch cans
and sent to Vitrification. Plutonium oxide feed is received into the
Milling/Mix glovebox from the Feed Preparation glovebox.

[Vitrification:]{.underline} In Vitrification the Plutonium feed/LaBS
frit mixture is vitrified into glass cans using a Cylindrical Induction
Melter (CIM). The CIM is a compact, high temperature (1600°C capability)
melter. A Platinum/Rhodium (Pt/Rh) vessel is used to contain the melt
and a Pt/Rh drain tube is used to discharge the molten glass. The
resultant glass cans are transported to Bagless Transfer.

[Bagless Transfer:]{.underline} The Bagless Transfer allows the glass
can to be removed from the glovebox in a non-contaminated state by
emplacing the glass can in a bagless transfer can. The bagless transfer
system previously utilized in FB-line is expected to be the basis for
the bagless transfer system for the plutonium vitrification effort. The
bagless transfer cans are transported to Magazine/Loading/Storage,
Canister Load/Ship.

[Magazine Loading/Storage, Canister Load/Ship:]{.underline} The Magazine
Loading/Storage, Canister Load/Ship receives bagless transfer cans,
assembles cans into magazines, stores magazines, and assembles
can-in-canister assemblies that are suitable for filling with high-level
waste (HLW) glass in DWPF.

[DWPF Modifications:]{.underline} Specific modifications to DWPF will be
required to allow for receipt and handling of can-in-canister
assemblies. The can-in-canister assemblies differ from typical DWPF
canisters in that they contain significant quantities of special nuclear

material, emit a significant amount of radiation, and weigh
significantly more. Safeguards measures, including the potential use of
a protective force, will be necessary for receipt and movement of the
can-in-canister assemblies. Specific shielding and/or remote operation
measures will be required to handle the canisters. Due to the weight of
the can-in-canister assembly, modifications to existing canister
handling equipment (loading dock, forklift, crane, etc.) will likely be
required.

[Non-Nuclear Material Handling:]{.underline} Non-Nuclear Material
Handling provides for the receipt and storage of non-radioactive
materials and containers used in the process. A storage building outside
of the Security Area will be provided to facilitate off-site vendor
receipts. This building will supply approximately a one month supply of
materials, and will provide the space needs as well as storage level
requirements for the materials.

[Waste Handling/Loading:]{.underline} The Waste Handling/Loading handles
waste generated from this process. This activity removes waste from the
generation point, performs the appropriate measurements, packages waste,
and prepares waste for shipment to the disposal location.

[Balance of Plant:]{.underline} The Balance of Plant makes up the
support functions required by the plutonium vitrification process and
administrative support.

It is believed this plutonium vitrification process is very promising,
and is estimated that if Conceptual Design begins in fiscal year 2006
(congressional approval is required, since the cost of Conceptual Design
is estimated to be greater than \$3 million), the capability can be
operational in time to complete vitrification of all surplus non-pit
plutonium currently at SRS and placement of the vitrified plutonium into
DWPF canisters consistent with the current schedule to complete
operation of DWPF. The Department's fiscal year 2006 budget request to
Congress includes \$10 million to begin Conceptual Design for the
project.

**Board Proposal:** Conduct a new study of available options for the
storage of plutonium at SRS.

**DOE Actions:** In July 2004 the Department completed an update of the
previous study of SRS plutonium storage. Based on the assumptions used
to prepare that study revision, the July 2004 update supported continued
use of KAMS and Building 235-F for plutonium storage, pending
disposition utilizing the vitrification capability described above.
However, subsequent to completion of the study update, Design Basis
Threat (DBT) Guidance was again revised in October 2004. As a result of
that substantial increase in security requirements, and based on the
potential safety issues associated with the use of Building 235-F that
have been identified by the Defense Board and its staff, DOE has now
decided to utilize only Building 105-K for storage of plutonium and for
future stabilization and packaging operations. Building 235-F will be
deinventoried of all plutonium-239 by the end of 2006 in order to avoid
the expenditure of significant funding to bring the facility's security
into compliance with the new DBT Guidance and that

would be required to make the safety upgrades necessary to allow
continued use of the facility. Since the Department has no near-term
plans to ship additional plutonium to SRS and the July 2004 update of
the SRS plutonium storage facility study also included an option to
consolidate the missions of KAMS and Building 235-F by modifying the
Building 105-K facility to include functions that were proposed for
Building 235-F, there is no need at this time to further revise the July
2004 update of the SRS plutonium storage study.

*Suitability of Facilities*

[KAMS]{.underline}

**Board Proposal:** Install fire protection systems and eliminate
unnecessary combustibles in KAMS.

**DOE Actions:** Given the currently planned life of KAMS, the cable
combustible load in the actuator tower above the facility will be
removed at the earliest opportunity, thus eliminating unnecessary
combustibles. Additionally, based on ongoing evaluations incorporating
the recent change in strategy to utilize only Building 105-K for
plutonium storage, stabilization and packaging, a determination will be
made by the end of August 2005 regarding installation of fire detection
and suppression capability in and around KAMS.

[Building 235-F]{.underline}

**Board Proposal:** Establish an acceptable safety basis for
stabilization and packaging of plutonium and extended storage of
plutonium in the facility.

**DOE Actions:** As stated previously, Building 235-F will be
deinventoried by the end of 2006; it will not be used to store
plutonium-239 beyond then nor will it be used for stabilization or
packaging of plutonium. Therefore, all proposals related to Building
235- F in the Board's December 2003 report to Congress on plutonium
storage at SRS are considered closed.

**Board Proposal:** Conduct a systematic evaluation of the safety
systems to determine needed upgrades.

**DOE Actions:** All proposals related to Building 235-F in the Board's
December 2003 report to Congress on plutonium storage at SRS are
considered closed, as stated above.

**Board Proposal:** Perform a structural analysis assessing seismic
adequacy measured by current acceptance criteria. Since the facility has
a new extended mission, the structural analysis should be based on
ground motion equivalent to that used in the analysis for a new facility
at SRS.

**DOE Actions:** All proposals related to Building 235-F in the Board's
December 2003 report to Congress on plutonium storage at SRS are
considered closed, as stated above.

**Board Proposal:** Decontaminate unused process cells.

**DOE Actions:** All proposals related to Building 235-F in the Board's
December 2003 report to Congress on plutonium storage at SRS are
considered closed, as stated above.

(Note that the holdup material in the process cells will be removed or
immobilized as part of the decontamination and decommissioning effort
that will take place following deinventory of Building 235-F.)

*Remote Monitoring and Retrieval of Material*

**Board Proposal:** Develop and implement validated procedures for the
handling and intrasite shipment of plutonium containers, including
damaged containers.

**DOE Actions:** In its June 2004 first annual report to Congress on SRS
plutonium storage, the Board stated that DOE has completed all necessary
actions concerning this proposal and this action is considered closed.