**PUBLIC NOTICE**

**FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION**

**445 12th STREET, SW**

**WASHINGTON, DC 20554**

#######  {#section .unnumbered}

####### DA 01-2076 {#da-01-2076 .unnumbered}

**September 7, 2001**

###### AUCTION NO. 43 MULTI-RADIO SERVICE AUCTION  {#auction-no.-43-multi-radio-service-auction .unnumbered}

##### SCHEDULED FOR JANUARY 10, 2002 {#scheduled-for-january-10-2002 .unnumbered}

**COMMENT SOUGHT**

**ON RESERVE PRICES OR MINIMUM OPENING BIDS AND**

###### OTHER AUCTION PROCEDURAL ISSUES {#other-auction-procedural-issues .unnumbered}

**Report No. AUC-01‑43-A (Auction No. 43)**

By this *Public Notice*, the Wireless Telecommunications Bureau
("Bureau") announces the auction of licenses in multiple radio services
to commence on January 10, 2002 ("Auction No. 43"). Auction No. 43 will
include 4 licenses in the Phase II 220 MHz Service,[^1] 23 licenses for
the 800 MHz Specialized Mobile Radio ("SMR") Service General Category
Frequencies,[^2] and 42 multilateration licenses in the Location and
Monitoring Service ("LMS").[^3] The licenses included in Auction No. 43
either remain unsold from a previous auction or were defaulted on by a
winning bidder in a previous auction. A complete list of licenses
available for Auction No. 43 and their descriptions is included as
Attachment A.

The Balanced Budget Act of 1997 requires the Commission to "ensure that,
in the scheduling of any competitive bidding under this subsection, an
adequate period is allowed . . . before issuance of bidding rules, to
permit notice and comment on proposed auction procedures . . . ."[^4]
Consistent with the provisions of the Balanced Budget Act and to ensure
that potential bidders have adequate time to familiarize themselves with
the specific rules that will govern the day-to-day conduct of an
auction, the Commission directed the Bureau, under its existing
delegated authority,[^5] to seek comment on a variety of
auction-specific procedures prior to the start of each auction.[^6] We
therefore seek comment on the following issues relating to Auction No.
43.

# Auction Structure

## Simultaneous Multiple Round Auction Design 

We propose to award the licenses in a single, simultaneous
multiple-round auction. As described further below, this methodology
offers every license for bid at the same time with successive bidding
rounds in which bidders may place bids. We seek comment on this
proposal.

## Upfront Payments and Initial Maximum Eligibility 

The Bureau has been delegated authority and discretion to determine an
appropriate upfront payment for each license being auctioned, taking
into account such factors as the population in each geographic license
area, and the value of similar spectrum.[^7] As described further below,
the upfront payment is a refundable deposit made by each bidder to
establish eligibility to bid on licenses. Upfront payments related to
the specific spectrum subject to auction protect against frivolous or
insincere bidding and provide the Commission with a source of funds from
which to collect payments owed at the close of the auction.[^8] With
these guidelines in mind for Auction No. 43, we propose to calculate
upfront payments on a license-by-license basis using the following
formulas:[^9]

-   **220 MHz**

> EAG Licenses \$0.01 \* 0.15 MHz \* License Area Population
>
> EA Licenses \$500 per license

-   **800 MHz** \$0.005 \* License Area Population with a

> minimum of \$2,500 per license.

-   **LMS**

> Block A: \$0.0004 \* MHz \* License Area Population with a

minimum of \$500 per license.

> Block B: \$0.0005 \* MHz \* License Area Population with a

minimum of \$500 per license.

> Block C: \$0.0005 \* MHz \* License Area Population with a

minimum of \$500 per license.

Accordingly, we list all licenses, including the related license area
population and proposed upfront payment for each, in Attachment A. We
seek comment on this proposal.

We further propose that the amount of the upfront payment submitted by a
bidder will determine the number of bidding units on which a bidder may
place bids. This limit is a bidder's "maximum initial eligibility." Each
license is assigned a specific number of bidding units equal to the
upfront payment listed in Attachment A, on a bidding unit per dollar
basis. This number does not change as prices rise during the auction. A
bidder's upfront payment is not attributed to specific licenses. Rather,
a bidder may place bids on any combination of licenses as long as the
total number of bidding units associated with those licenses does not
exceed its maximum initial eligibility. Eligibility cannot be increased
during the auction. Thus, in calculating its upfront payment amount, an
applicant must determine the *maximum* number of bidding units it may
wish to bid on (or hold high bids on) in any single round, and submit an
upfront payment covering that number of bidding units. We seek comment
on this proposal.

## Activity Rules 

In order to ensure that the auction closes within a reasonable period of
time, an activity rule requires bidders to bid actively on a percentage
of their maximum bidding eligibility during each round of the auction
rather than waiting until the end to participate. A bidder that does not
satisfy the activity rule will either lose bidding eligibility in the
next round or must use an activity rule waiver (if any remain).

We propose to divide the auction into two stages, each characterized by
an increased activity requirement. The auction will start in Stage One.
We propose that the auction generally will advance to the next stage
(i.e., from Stage One to Stage Two) when the auction activity level, as
measured by the percentage of bidding units receiving new high bids, is
approximately twenty percent or below for three consecutive rounds of
bidding. However, we further propose that the Bureau retain the
discretion to change stages unilaterally by announcement during the
auction. In exercising this discretion, the Bureau will consider a
variety of measures of bidder activity, including, but not limited to,
the auction activity level, the percentage of licenses (as measured in
bidding units) on which there are new bids, the number of new bids, and
the percentage increase in revenue. We seek comment on these proposals.

For Auction No. 43, we propose the following activity requirements:

**Stage One:** In each round of the first stage of the auction, a bidder
desiring to maintain its current eligibility is required to be active on
licenses representing at least 80 percent of its current bidding
eligibility. Failure to maintain the requisite activity level will
result in a reduction in the bidder's bidding eligibility in the next
round of bidding (unless an activity rule waiver is used). During Stage
One, reduced eligibility for the next round will be calculated by
multiplying the current round activity by five-fourths (5/4).

**Stage Two:** In each round of the second stage, a bidder desiring to
maintain its current eligibility is required to be active on 98 percent
of its current bidding eligibility. In this final stage, reduced
eligibility for the next round will be calculated by multiplying the
current round activity by fifty/forty-ninths (50/49).

We seek comment on these proposals. If commenters believe that these
activity rules should be changed, they should explain their reasoning
and comment on the desirability of an alternative approach. Commenters
are advised to support their claims with analyses and suggested
alternative activity rules.

## Activity Rule Waivers and Reducing Eligibility 

Use of an activity rule waiver preserves the bidder's current bidding
eligibility despite the bidder's activity in the current round being
below the required minimum level. An activity rule waiver applies to an
entire round of bidding and not to a particular license. Activity
waivers are principally a mechanism for auction participants to avoid
the loss of auction eligibility in the event that exigent circumstances
prevent them from placing a bid in a particular round.

The FCC auction system assumes that bidders with insufficient activity
would prefer to use an activity rule waiver (if available) rather than
lose bidding eligibility. Therefore, the system will automatically apply
a waiver (known as an "automatic waiver") at the end of any bidding
period where a bidder's activity level is below the minimum required
unless: (1) there are no activity rule waivers available; or (2) the
bidder overrides the automatic application of a waiver by reducing
eligibility, thereby meeting the minimum requirements.

A bidder with insufficient activity may wish to reduce its bidding
eligibility rather than use an activity rule waiver. If so, the bidder
must affirmatively override the automatic waiver mechanism during the
bidding period by using the Reduce Eligibility function in the bidding
system. In this case, the bidder's eligibility is permanently reduced to
bring the bidder into compliance with the activity rules as described
above. Once eligibility has been reduced, a bidder will not be permitted
to regain its lost bidding eligibility.

A bidder may proactively use an activity rule waiver as a means to keep
the auction open without placing a bid. If a bidder submits a proactive
waiver (using the Proactive Waiver function in the bidding system)
during a bidding period in which no bids or withdrawals are submitted,
the auction will remain open and the bidder's eligibility will be
preserved. An automatic waiver invoked in a round in which there are no
new valid bids or withdrawals will not keep the auction open.

We propose that each bidder in Auction No. 43 be provided with three
activity rule waivers that may be used at the bidder's discretion during
the course of the auction as set forth above. We seek comment on this
proposal.

## Information Relating to Auction Delay, Suspension, or Cancellation 

For Auction No. 43, we propose that, by public notice or by announcement
during the auction, the Bureau may delay, suspend, or cancel the auction
in the event of natural disaster, technical obstacle, evidence of an
auction security breach, unlawful bidding activity, administrative or
weather necessity, or for any other reason that affects the fair and
competitive conduct of competitive bidding.[^10] In such cases, the
Bureau, in its sole discretion, may elect to resume the auction starting
from the beginning of the current round, resume the auction starting
from some previous round, or cancel the auction in its entirety. Network
interruption may cause the Bureau to delay or suspend the auction. We
emphasize that exercise of this authority is solely within the
discretion of the Bureau, and its use is not intended to be a substitute
for situations in which bidders may wish to apply their activity rule
waivers. We seek comment on this proposal.

# Bidding Procedures

##  A. Round Structure  {#a.-round-structure .unnumbered}

The Commission will use its Automated Auction System to conduct the
electronic simultaneous multiple round auction format for Auction No.
43. Auction No. 43 will be conducted over the Internet. However, as in
prior auctions, the Bureau's wide area network will be available at the
standard charge, and telephonic bidding will also be available.
Prospective bidders concerned about their access to the Internet may
want to establish a connection to the Bureau's wide area network as a
backup. Full information regarding how to establish such a connection,
and related charges, will be provided in the public notice announcing
details of auction procedures.

In past auctions, we have used the timing of bids to select a high
bidder when multiple bidders submit identical high bids on a license in
a given round. Given that bidders will access the Internet at differing
speeds, we will not use this procedure in Auction No. 43. For Auction
No. 43, we propose to use a random number generator to select a high
bidder from among such bidders.[^11] As with prior auctions, remaining
bidders will be able to submit higher bids in subsequent rounds. The
initial bidding schedule will be announced in a public notice to be
released at least one week before the start of the auction, and will be
included in the registration mailings. The simultaneous multiple round
format will consist of sequential bidding rounds, each followed by the
release of round results. Details regarding the location and format of
round results will be included in the same public notice.

The Bureau has discretion to change the bidding schedule in order to
foster an auction pace that reasonably balances speed with the bidders'
need to study round results and adjust their bidding strategies. The
Bureau may increase or decrease the amount of time for the bidding
rounds and review periods, or the number of rounds per day, depending
upon the bidding activity level and other factors. We seek comment on
this proposal.

## B. Reserve Price or Minimum Opening Bid  {#b.-reserve-price-or-minimum-opening-bid .unnumbered}

The Balanced Budget Act calls upon the Commission to prescribe methods
for establishing a reasonable reserve price or a minimum opening bid
when FCC licenses are subject to auction unless the Commission
determines that a reserve price or minimum bid is not in the public
interest.[^12] Consistent with this mandate, the Commission has directed
the Bureau to seek comment on the use of a minimum opening bid and/or
reserve price prior to the start of each auction.[^13]

Normally, a reserve price is an absolute minimum price below which an
item will not be sold in a given auction. Reserve prices can be either
published or unpublished. A minimum opening bid, on the other hand, is
the minimum bid price set at the beginning of the auction below which
*no bids* are accepted. It is generally used to accelerate the
competitive bidding process. Also, the auctioneer often has the
discretion to lower the minimum opening bid amount later in the auction.
It is also possible for the minimum opening bid and the reserve price to
be the same amount.

In light of the Balanced Budget Act's requirements, the Bureau proposes
to establish minimum opening bids for Auction No. 43. The Bureau
believes a minimum opening bid, which has been utilized in other
auctions, is an effective bidding tool.[^14]

Specifically, for Auction No. 43, the Commission proposes the following
license-by-license formula[^15] for calculating minimum opening bids:

-   **220 MHz**

> EAG Licenses \$0.0125 \* 0.15 MHz \* License Area Population
>
> EA Licenses \$500 per license

-   **800 MHz** \$0.005 \* License Area Population with a

> minimum of \$2,500 per license.

-   **LMS**

> Block A: \$0.0004 \* MHz \* License Area Population with a

minimum of \$500 per license.

> Block B: \$0.0005 \* MHz \* License Area Population with a

minimum of \$500 per license.

> Block C: \$0.0005 \* MHz \* License Area Population with a
>
> minimum of \$500 per license.

The specific minimum opening bid for each license available in Auction
No. 43 is set forth in Attachment A herein. Comment is sought on this
proposal. If commenters believe that these minimum opening bids will
result in substantial numbers of unsold licenses, or are not reasonable
amounts, or should instead operate as reserve prices, they should
explain why this is so, and comment on the desirability of an
alternative approach. Commenters are advised to support their claims
with valuation analyses and suggested reserve prices or minimum opening
bid levels or formulas. In establishing the minimum opening bids, we
particularly seek comment on such factors as the amount of spectrum
being auctioned, levels of incumbency, the availability of technology to
provide service, the size of the geographic service areas, issues of
interference with other spectrum bands and any other relevant factors
that could reasonably have an impact on valuation of the 220 MHz, 800
MHz and LMS spectrum. Alternatively, comment is sought on whether,
consistent with the Balanced Budget Act, the public interest would be
served by having no minimum opening bid or reserve price.

## C. Minimum Acceptable Bids and Bid Increments  {#c.-minimum-acceptable-bids-and-bid-increments .unnumbered}

In each round, eligible bidders will be able to place bids on a given
license in any of nine different amounts.[^16] The Automated Auction
System interface will list the nine acceptable bid amounts for each
license. Once there is a standing high bid on a license, the Automated
Auction System will calculate a minimum acceptable bid for that license
for the following round, as described below. The difference between the
minimum acceptable bid and the standing high bid for each license will
define the *bid increment*. The nine acceptable bid amounts for each
license consist of the minimum acceptable bid (the standing high bid
plus one bid increment) and additional amounts calculated using multiple
bid increments (i.e., the second bid amount equals the standing high bid
plus two times the bid increment, the third bid amount equals the
standing high bid plus three times the bid increment, etc.).

Until a bid has been placed on a license, the minimum acceptable bid for
that license will be equal to its minimum opening bid. The additional
bid amounts for licenses that have not yet received a bid will be
calculated differently, as explained below.

For Auction No. 43, we propose to calculate minimum acceptable bids by
using a smoothing methodology, as we have done in several other
auctions. The smoothing formula calculates minimum acceptable bids by
first calculating a *percentage increment*, not to be confused with the
*bid increment*, for each license based on a weighted average of the
activity received on each license in all previous rounds. This
methodology tailors the percentage increment for each license based on
activity, rather than setting a global increment for all licenses.

In a given round, the calculation of the percentage increment for each
license is made at the end of the previous round. The computation is
based on an activity index, which is calculated as the weighted average
of the activity in that round and the activity index from the prior
round. The activity index at the start of the auction (round 0) will be
set at 0. The current activity index is equal to a weighting factor
times the number of new bids received on the license in the most recent
bidding round plus one minus the weighting factor times the activity
index from the prior round. The activity index is then used to calculate
a percentage increment by multiplying a minimum percentage increment by
one plus the activity index with that result being subject to a maximum
percentage increment. The Commission will initially set the weighting
factor at 0.5, the minimum percentage increment at 0.1 (10%), and the
maximum percentage increment at 0.2 (20%).

######## Equations {#equations .unnumbered}

A~i~ = (C \* B~i~) + ( (1-C) \* A~i-1~)

I~i+1~ = smaller of ( (1 + A~i~) \* N) and M

X ~i+1~ = I~i+1~ \* Y~i~

where,

A~i~ = activity index for the current round (round i)

C = activity weight factor

B~i~ = number of bids in the current round (round i)

A~i-1~ = activity index from previous round (round i-1), A~0~ is 0

I~i+1~ = percentage increment for the next round (round i+1)

N = minimum percentage increment or percentage increment floor

M = maximum percentage increment or percentage increment ceiling

X ~i+1~ = dollar amount associated with the percentage increment

Y~i~ = high bid from the current round

Under the smoothing methodology, once a bid has been received on a
license, the minimum acceptable bid for that license in the following
round will be the high bid from the current round plus the dollar amount
associated with the percentage increment, with the result rounded to the
nearest thousand if it is over \$10,000, to the nearest hundred if it is
under \$10,000 but over \$1,000, or to the nearest ten if it is below
\$1,000.

########  {#section-1 .unnumbered}

######## Examples {#examples .unnumbered}

License 1

C=0.5, N = 0.1, M = 0.2

[Round 1 (2 new bids, high bid = \$1,000,000)]{.underline}

1\. Calculation of percentage increment for round 2 using the smoothing
formula:

A~1~ = (0.5 \* 2) + (0.5 \* 0) = 1

I~2~ = The smaller of ( (1 + 1) \* 0.1) = 0.2 or 0.2 (the maximum
percentage increment)

2\. Calculation of dollar amount associated with the percentage
increment for round 2 (using I~2~ from above):

X~2~ = 0.2 \* \$1,000,000 = \$200,000

3\. Minimum acceptable bid for round 2 = \$1,200,000

[Round 2 (3 new bids, high bid = \$2,000,000)]{.underline}

1\. Calculation of percentage increment for round 3 using the smoothing
formula:

A~2~ = (0.5 \* 3) + (0.5 \* 1) = 2

I~3~ = The smaller of ( (1 + 2) \* 0.1) = 0.3 or 0.2 (the maximum
percentage increment)

2\. Calculation of dollar amount associated with the percentage
increment for round 3 (using I~3~ from above):

X~3~ = 0.2 \* \$2,000,000 = \$400,000

3\. Minimum acceptable bid for round 3 = \$2,400,000

[Round 3 (1 new bid, high bid = \$2,400,000)]{.underline}

1\. Calculation of percentage increment for round 4 using the smoothing
formula:

A~3~ = (0.5 \* 1) + (0.5 \* 2) = 1.5

I~4~ = The smaller of ( (1 + 1.5) \* 0.1) = 0.25 or 0.2 (the maximum
percentage increment)

2\. Calculation of dollar amount associated with the percentage
increment for round 4 (using I~4~ from above):

X~4~ = 0.2 \* \$2,400,000 = \$480,000

3\. Minimum acceptable bid for round 4 = \$2,880,000

As stated above, until a bid has been placed on a license, the minimum
acceptable bid for that license will be equal to its minimum opening
bid. The additional bid amounts are calculated using the difference
between the minimum opening bid times one plus the minimum percentage
increment, rounded as described above, and the minimum opening bid. That
is, I = (minimum opening bid)(1 + N){rounded}- (minimum opening bid).
Therefore, when N equals 0.1, the first additional bid amount will be
approximately ten percent higher than the minimum opening bid; the
second, twenty percent; the third, thirty percent; etc.

In the case of a license for which the standing high bid has been
withdrawn,[^17] the minimum acceptable bid will equal the second highest
bid received for the license. The additional bid amounts are calculated
using the difference between the second highest bid times one plus the
minimum percentage increment, rounded, and the second highest bid.

The Bureau retains the discretion to change the minimum acceptable bids
and bid increments if it determines that circumstances so dictate. The
Bureau will do so by announcement in the Automated Auction System. We
seek comment on these proposals.

##  {#section-2 .unnumbered}

## D. Information Regarding Bid Withdrawal and Bid Removal  {#d.-information-regarding-bid-withdrawal-and-bid-removal .unnumbered}

For Auction No. 43, we propose the following bid removal and bid
withdrawal procedures. Before the close of a bidding period, a bidder
has the option of removing any bid placed in that round. By using the
Remove Selected Bids function in the bidding system, a bidder may
effectively "unsubmit" any bid placed within that round. A bidder
removing a bid placed in the same round is not subject to a withdrawal
payment.

Once a round closes, a bidder may no longer remove a bid. However, in
any subsequent round, a high bidder may withdraw its standing high bids
from previous rounds using the Withdraw function in the bidding system.
A high bidder that withdraws its standing high bid from a previous round
is subject to the bid withdrawal payment provisions of the Commission
rules.[^18] We seek comment on these bid removal and bid withdrawal
procedures.

In the *Part 1 Third Report and Order*, the Commission explained that
allowing bid withdrawals facilitates efficient aggregation of licenses
and the pursuit of efficient backup strategies as information becomes
available during the course of an auction. The Commission noted,
however, that, in some instances, bidders may seek to withdraw bids for
improper reasons. The Bureau, therefore, has discretion, in managing the
auction, to limit the number of withdrawals to prevent any bidding
abuses. The Commission stated that the Bureau should assertively
exercise its discretion, consider limiting the number of rounds in which
bidders may withdraw bids, and prevent bidders from bidding on a
particular market if the Bureau finds that a bidder is abusing the
Commission's bid withdrawal procedures.[^19]

Applying this reasoning, we propose to limit each bidder in Auction No.
43 to withdrawing standing high bids in no more than two rounds during
the course of the auction. To permit a bidder to withdraw bids in more
than two rounds would likely encourage insincere bidding or the use of
withdrawals for anti-competitive purposes. The two rounds in which
withdrawals are utilized will be at the bidder's discretion; withdrawals
otherwise must be in accordance with the Commission's rules. There is no
limit on the number of standing high bids that may be withdrawn in
either of the rounds in which withdrawals are utilized. Withdrawals will
remain subject to the bid withdrawal payment provisions specified in the
Commission's rules. We seek comment on this proposal.

## E. Stopping Rule  {#e.-stopping-rule .unnumbered}

For Auction No. 43, the Bureau proposes to employ a simultaneous
stopping rule approach. The Bureau has discretion "to establish stopping
rules before or during multiple round auctions in order to terminate the
auction within a reasonable time."[^20] A simultaneous stopping rule
means that all licenses remain open until the first round in which no
new acceptable bids, proactive waivers, or withdrawals are received.
After the first such round, bidding closes simultaneously on all
licenses. Thus, unless circumstances dictate otherwise, bidding would
remain open on all licenses until bidding stops on every license.

However, the Bureau proposes to retain the discretion to exercise any of
the following options during Auction No. 43:

1\. Utilize a modified version of the simultaneous stopping rule. The
modified stopping rule would close the auction for all licenses after
the first round in which no bidder submits a proactive waiver,
withdrawal, or a new bid on any license on which it is not the standing
high bidder. Thus, absent any other bidding activity, a bidder placing a
new bid on a license for which it is the standing high bidder would not
keep the auction open under this modified stopping rule. The Bureau
further seeks comment on whether this modified stopping rule should be
used at any time or only in stage two of the auction.

2\. Keep the auction open even if no new acceptable bids or proactive
waivers are submitted and no previous high bids are withdrawn. In this
event, the effect will be the same as if a bidder had submitted a
proactive waiver. The activity rule, therefore, will apply as usual, and
a bidder with insufficient activity will either lose bidding eligibility
or use a remaining activity rule waiver.

3\. Declare that the auction will end after a specified number of
additional rounds ("special stopping rule"). If the Bureau invokes this
special stopping rule, it will accept bids in the specified final
round(s) only for licenses on which the high bid increased in at least
one of the preceding specified number of rounds.

[]{.mark}

The Bureau proposes to exercise these options only in certain
circumstances, such as, for example, where the auction is proceeding
very slowly, there is minimal overall bidding activity, or it appears
likely that the auction will not close within a reasonable period of
time. Before exercising these options, the Bureau is likely to attempt
to increase the pace of the auction by, for example, increasing the
number of bidding rounds per day, and/or increasing the amount of the
minimum bid increments for the limited number of licenses where there is
still a high level of bidding activity. We seek comment on these
proposals.

# Conclusion 

Comments are due on or before September 21, 2001, and reply comments are
due on or before September 28, 2001. An original and four copies of all
pleadings must be filed with the Commission's Secretary, Magalie Roman
Salas, Office of the Secretary, Federal Communications Commission, Room
TW-A325, 445 Twelfth Street, SW, Washington, DC 20554, in accordance
with Section 1.51(c) of the Commission's rules.[^21] In addition, one
copy of each pleading must be delivered to each of the following
locations: (1) the Commission's duplicating contractor, Qualex
International, Portals II, 445 Twelfth Street, SW, Room CY-B402,
Washington, DC 20554; (2) Office of Media Relations, Public Reference
Center, Room CY-A257, 445 Twelfth Street, SW, Washington, DC 20554; (3)
Rana Shuler, Auctions and Industry Analysis Division, Wireless
Telecommunications Bureau, Room 4-A628, 445 Twelfth Street, SW,
Washington, DC 20554. Comments and reply comments will be available for
public inspection during regular business hours in the FCC Public
Reference Room, Room CY-A257, 445 12th Street, SW, Washington, DC 20554.

This proceeding has been designated as a "permit‑but‑disclose"
proceeding in accordance with the Commission's *ex parte* rules.[^22]
Persons making oral *ex parte* presentations are reminded that memoranda
summarizing the presentations must contain summaries of the substance of
the presentations and not merely a listing of the subjects discussed.
More than a one- or two-sentence description of the views and arguments
presented is generally required.[^23] Other rules pertaining to oral and
written *ex parte* presentations in permit-but-disclose proceedings are
set forth in Section 1.1206(b) of the Commission's rules.[^24]

For further information concerning this proceeding, contact the Auctions
and Industry Analysis Division, Wireless Telecommunications Bureau, as
listed below:

For legal questions: Howard Davenport (202) 418-0660 or e-mail
hdavenpo@fcc.gov

For general auction questions: Lyle Ishida (202) 418-0660 or e-mail
lishida@fcc.gov

Barbara Sibert (717) 338-2888 or e-mail bsibert@fcc.gov

**-- FCC --**

[^1]: For the rules associated with the Phase II 220 MHz service
    auction, *see* In the Matter of Amendment of Part 90 of the
    Commission's Rules to Provide for the Use of the 220-222 MHz Band by
    the Private Land Mobile Radio Service, Implementation of Sections
    3(n) and 332 of the Communications Act, Regulatory Treatment of
    Mobile Services, Implementation of Section 309(j) of the
    Communications Act -- Competitive Bidding, PR Docket No. 89-552, RM
    8506, GN Docket No. 93-252, PP Docket No. 93-253, *Third Report and
    Order and Fifth Notice of Proposed Rulemaking,* 12 FCC Rcd 10943,
    11046, ¶ 221 (1997) (*"220 MHz Third Report and Order"*); In the
    Matter of Amendment of Part 90 of the Commission's Rules to Provide
    for the Use of the 220-222 MHz Band by the Private Land Mobile Radio
    Service, Implementation of Sections 3(n) and 332 of the
    Communications Act, Regulatory Treatment of Mobile Services,
    Implementation of Section 309(j) of the Communications Act --
    Competitive Bidding, PR Docket No. 89-552, GN Docket No. 93-252, PP
    Docket No. 93-253, *Memorandum Opinion and Order on
    Reconsideration,* 13 FCC Rcd 11745 (1998) (*"220 MHz Reconsideration
    Order"*).

[^2]: The Commission adopted rules to facilitate implementing a new
    framework for the licensing of 800 MHz SMR systems. *See* Amendment
    of Part 90 of the Commission's Rules to Facilitate Future
    Development of SMR Systems in the 800 MHz Frequency Band,
    Implementation of Sections 3 (n) and 322 of the Communications Act
    -- Regulatory Treatment of Mobile Services, Implementation of
    Section 309(j) of the Communication's Act -- Competitive Bidding, PR
    Docket No. 93-144, *First Report and Order, Eighth Report and Order
    and Second Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking,* 11 FCC Rcd 1463
    (1995) ("*First Report and Order")*. Auction and service rules were
    adopted for the lower 230 channels as well as the procedures for the
    mandatory relocation of incumbents from the upper 200 channels.
    *See* Amendment of Part 90 of the Commission's Rules to Facilitate
    Future Development of SMR Systems in the 800 MHz Frequency Band, PR
    Docket No. 93-144, *Second Report and Order,* 12 FCC Rcd 19079
    (1997) ("*Second Report and Order"*). The Commission clarified
    certain rules regarding the relocation of incumbents from the upper
    200 channels and the auction licensing of the lower 230 channels, in
    addition to amending the channel blocks to be auctioned. *See*
    Amendment of Part 90 of the Commission's Rules to Facilitate Future
    Development of SMR Systems in the 800 MHz Frequency Band, PR Docket
    No. 93-144, *Memorandum Opinion and Order on Reconsideration,* 14
    FCC Rcd 17556 (1999) ("*Reconsideration Order").*

[^3]: The Commission adopted service and competitive bidding rules for
    the Location and Monitoring Service. *See* Amendment of the
    Commission's Rules to Adopt Regulations for Automatic Vehicle
    Monitoring Systems, *Second Report and Order*, 13 FCC Rcd 15182
    (1998) ("*LMS Second Report and Order*").

[^4]: *See* 47 U.S.C. § 309(j) (as amended by Section 3002(a)(E)(i),
    Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. 105-33, 111 Stat. 251 (1997)
    ("Balanced Budget Act")).

[^5]: *See* Amendment of Part 1 of the Commission's Rules ---
    Competitive Bidding Proceeding, WT Docket No. 97-82, *Order,
    Memorandum Opinion and Order, and Notice of Proposed Rule Making*,
    12 FCC Rcd 5686, 5697, ¶ 16 (1997) ("*Part 1 Order*") ("We also
    clarify that pursuant to Section 0.131 of our rules, the Chief,
    Wireless Telecommunications Bureau, has delegated authority to
    implement all of the Commission's rules pertaining to auctions
    procedures.").

[^6]: *See* Amendment of Part 1 of the Commission's Rules ---
    Competitive Bidding Procedures, Allocation of Spectrum Below 5 GHz
    Transferred from Federal Government Use, 4660-4685 MHz, WT Docket
    No. 97-82, ET Docket No. 94-32, *Third Report and Order and Second
    Further Notice of Proposed Rule Making*, 13 FCC Rcd 374, 448, ¶ 124
    (1998) ("*Part 1 Third Report and Order*"). The Commission directed
    the Bureau to seek comment on specific mechanisms related to
    day-to-day auction conduct including, for example, the structure of
    bidding rounds and stages, establishment of minimum opening bids or
    reserve prices, minimum accepted bids, initial maximum eligibility
    for each bidder, activity requirements for each stage of the
    auction, activity rule waivers, criteria for determining reductions
    in eligibility, information regarding bid withdrawal and bid
    removal, stopping rules, and information relating to auction delay,
    suspension or cancellation. *Id.* at ¶ 125.

[^7]: *See Part 1 Order,* 12 FCC Rcd at 5697-98, ¶ 16 (1997); *see also
    Part 1 Third Report and Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 425, ¶ 86.

[^8]: *See* Implementation of Section 309(j) of the Communications Act -
    Competitive Bidding, PP Docket No. 93-253, *Second Report and
    Order*, 9 FCC Rcd 2348, 2378-79, ¶¶ 171-176 (1994).

[^9]: All population figures are from the 4/1/90 U.S. Census, U.S.
    Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census. Results below \$10,000
    are rounded to the nearest hundred; results above \$10,000 are
    rounded to the nearest thousand.

[^10]: *See* 47 C.F.R. § 1.2104(i).

[^11]: To ensure randomness, we will use a National Institute of
    Standards and Technology ("NIST") tested pseudorandom algorithm.

[^12]: *See* 47 U.S.C. § 309(j) (as amended by Budget Act, Section
    3002(a)). The Commission's authority to establish a reserve price or
    minimum opening bid is set forth in 47 C.F.R. § 1.2104(c) and (d).

[^13]: *See* *Part 1 Third Report and Order,* 13 FCC Rcd at 454-455, ¶
    141.

[^14]: *S*e*e*, *e.g.*, Auction of 800 MHz SMR Upper 10 MHz Band,
    Minimum Opening Bids or Reserve Prices, *Order*, 12 FCC Rcd 16354
    (1997); Auction of the Phase II 220 MHz Service Licenses, Auction
    Notice and Filing Requirements for 908 Licenses Consisting of
    Economic Area (EA), Economic Area Grouping (EAG), and Nationwide
    Licenses, Scheduled for September 15, 1998, Minimum Opening Bids and
    Other Procedural Issues, *Public Notice*, 13 FCC Rcd 16445 (1998).

[^15]: All population figures are from the 4/1/90 U.S. Census, U.S.
    Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census. Results below \$10,000
    are rounded to the nearest hundred; results above \$10,000 are
    rounded to the nearest thousand.

[^16]: Bidders must have sufficient eligibility to place a bid on the
    particular license. *See* Section I(B) ("Upfront Payments and
    Initial Maximum Eligibility"), *supra*.

[^17]: *See* Section II(D) "Information Regarding Bid Withdrawal and Bid
    Removal," *infra*.

[^18]: *See* 47 C.F.R. §§ 1.2104(g), 1.2109.

[^19]: *Part 1 Third Report and Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 460, ¶ 150.

[^20]: *See* 47 C.F.R. § 1.2104(e).

[^21]: *See* 47 C.F.R. § 1.51(c). Comments should not be filed using the
    Commission's Electronic Comment Filing System.

[^22]: *See* 47 C.F.R. §§ 1.1200(a), 1.1206.

[^23]: *See* 47 C.F.R. § 1.1206(b).

[^24]: *See* 47 C.F.R. § 1.1206(b).