Before the

**Federal Communications Commission**

**Washington, D.C. 20554**

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| **In the Matter of**             | * | **IB Docket No. 00-202**     |
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| **Policy and Rules Concerning    |   |                              |
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**REPORT AND ORDER**

**Adopted: March 16, 2001 Released: March 20, 2001**

**By the Commission: Commissioner Ness issuing a statement;**

> **Furchtgott-Roth concurring and issuing a statement.**

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

Paragraph

I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND [3](#introduction-and-background)

II\. REGULATORY FORBEARANCE [8](#regulatory-forbearance)

A. Analysis of Statutory Requirements
[8](#analysis-of-statutory-requirements)

1\. Are Tariff Filing Requirements Necessary to Ensure that the Charges,
Practices, Classifications or Regulations for the International
Interexchange Services of Non-dominant Interexchange Carriers Are Just
and Reasonable, and Are Not Unjustly or Unreasonably Discriminatory?
[9](#are-tariff-filing-requirements-necessary-to-ensure-that-the-charges-practices-classifications-or-regulations-for-the-international-interexchange-services-of-non-dominant-interexchange-carriers-are-just-and-reasonable-and-are-not-unjustly-or-unreasonably-discriminatory)

a\. Background [10](#background)

b\. Discussion [10](#discussion)

2\. Are Tariff Filing Requirements for the International Interexchange
Services of Non-dominant Interexchange Carriers Necessary for the
Protection of Consumers?
[13](#are-tariff-filing-requirements-for-the-international-interexchange-services-of-non-dominant-interexchange-carriers-necessary-for-the-protection-of-consumers)

a\. Background [13](#background-1)

b\. Discussion [14](#discussion-1)

3\. Is Forbearance from Applying Section 203 Tariff Filing Requirements
to the International Interexchange Services Offered by Non-Dominant
Interexchange Carriers Consistent with the Public Interest?
[16](#is-forbearance-from-applying-section-203-tariff-filing-requirements-to-the-international-interexchange-services-offered-by-non-dominant-interexchange-carriers-consistent-with-the-public-interest)

a\. Background [16](#background-2)

b\. Discussion [17](#discussion-2)

B. Maintenance and Disclosure of Price and Service Information
[22](#maintenance-and-disclosure-of-price-and-service-information)

1\. Background [22](#background-3)

2\. Discussion [23](#discussion-3)

1\. Background [26](#background-4)

2\. Discussion [27](#discussion-4)

D. Complete Detariffing of International CMRS Services
[27](#d.-complete-detariffing-of-international-cmrs-services)

1\. Background [27](#background-5)

2\. Discussion [28](#discussion-5)

E. Filing of Carrier-to-Carrier Contracts
[31](#filing-of-carrier-to-carrier-contracts)

1\. Background [31](#background-6)

2\. Discussion [32](#discussion-6)

III\. TRansition Issues [36](#iii.-transition-issues)

A. Background [36](#background-7)

B. Discussion [36](#discussion-7)

IV\. ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS [39](#administrative-matters)

A. Final Regulatory Flexibility Certification
[39](#final-regulatory-flexibility-certification)

V. ORDERING CLAUSES [43](#ordering-clauses)

PART 0 -- COMMISSION ORGANIZATION [45](#part-0-commission-organization)

Separate Statement of [56](#separate-statement-of)

Commissioner Susan Ness [56](#commissioner-susan-ness)

**APPENDIX A: List of Parties**

**APPENDIX B: Final Rules**

# INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

1.  On October 18, 2000, the Commission released a Notice of Proposed
    Rulemaking (*NPRM*) initiating a review of its regulation of
    international interexchange services. The Commission initiated this
    proceeding in response to the dramatic changes that have occurred in
    the international interexchange marketplace as a result of the
    Commission's deregulatory and procompetitive policies, the World
    Trade Organization (WTO) Basic Telecom Agreement, increased
    privatization and liberalization of foreign markets, falling
    accounting rates, and greater competition in the U.S. market.[^1]
    Specifically, the Commission made several tentative conclusions
    relating to the detariffing of international interexchange services
    in the *NPRM* pursuant to its power to forbear from applying
    provisions of the Communications Act of 1934 or of the Commission's
    regulations.[^2] In this Report and Order, we examine the
    Commission's proposals raised in the *NPRM* and, after consideration
    of parties' comments, adopt the conclusions discussed herein.

2.  Moreover, as part of the statutory obligation to review its
    regulations in every even-numbered year under Section 11 of the
    Act,[^3] the Commission proposed in the *NPRM* to examine whether
    tariffs are no longer necessary in the public interest "as a result
    of meaningful economic competition between providers of such
    service."[^4] As part of the 2000 biennial regulatory review, the
    Commission reviewed all of its rules relating to international
    telecommunications services to identify those rules that could be
    revised or eliminated. In conjunction with this review, the
    Commission staff also met with interested parties to discuss which
    rules could be modified or eliminated in light of competition in
    international telecommunications services, and which rules should be
    clarified to make it easier for practitioners and other members of
    the public to understand and follow those rules. Based on this
    review, the Commission has identified a number of rules that it
    proposes to amend in this proceeding and in two related
    proceedings.[^5]

3.  As we noted in the *NPRM,* the Commission has made numerous efforts
    to eliminate the tariff requirements in Section 203 of the Act for
    interexchange services. [^6] In the *Domestic Detariffing Order*,
    the Commission took action to detariff completely domestic long
    distance services pursuant to its forbearance authority under
    Section 10 of the Communications Act of 1934.[^7] In April 2000, the
    U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia upheld the
    Commission's authority under the statute to require complete
    detariffing[^8] of domestic interstate, interexchange services.[^9]

4.  Though tariffs have traditionally been used to prevent
    discrimination among consumers, the Commission concluded in the
    domestic proceeding that the decision to forbear from requiring
    tariffs does not depart from the Commission's historic commitment to
    protect consumers against anticompetitive practices.[^10] Indeed,
    the Commission found that tariffs impede carriers' flexibility to
    react to competition and may actually harm consumers because of the
    effect of the "filed-rate" doctrine.[^11] While concluding in the
    domestic proceeding that tariffs were no longer necessary for
    domestic interexchange services, the Commission reaffirmed its
    intent to enforce vigorously the statutory and regulatory safeguards
    against carriers that take unfair advantage of American consumers.
    Moreover, the Commission noted that detariffing would allow
    consumers to avail themselves of all remedies provided by state
    consumer protection and contract laws against abusive carrier
    practices.[^12]

5.  In the domestic detariffing proceeding, the Commission chose not to
    consider whether detariffing international interexchange services
    satisfies the requirements of Section 10. [^13] In the *NPRM*,
    however, the Commission tentatively concluded that competitive
    conditions in the international interexchange marketplace today
    support the complete detariffing of non-dominant carriers' provision
    of international services, with limited exceptions for permissive
    detariffing of such services, in accordance with the criteria in
    Section 10.[^14] The Commission also proposed requirements regarding
    public disclosure and maintenance of information that mirror those
    requirements adopted in conjunction with the detariffing of domestic
    services.[^15]

6.  In this order, we affirm our finding made in the *NPRM* that there
    have been significant changes that have benefited consumers and
    competition in the past several years that support the detariffing
    of international interexchange services. In particular, the
    international interexchange marketplace has experienced increased
    privatization and liberalization, rapidly declining international
    settlement rates, and a greater number of providers of international
    interexchange services.[^16] In 1997, most of the world's most
    advanced economies entered into the WTO Basic Telecom Agreement,
    committing to open their telecommunications markets to foreign
    investment. Since that time, the Commission has worked diligently to
    further competition in the international interexchange marketplace
    by encouraging competition from foreign companies in the U.S. market
    and by reforming and streamlining its rules and policies governing
    the provision of U.S. international services. [^17] As a result of
    these new policies, and in conjunction with market forces, there has
    been a substantial increase in the level of competition in the
    international interexchange marketplace, to the benefit of
    consumers.[^18]

7.  In light of the increasingly competitive state of the international
    interexchange marketplace, we find that the deregulatory actions we
    take in this order to detariff international interexchange services
    will serve to promote further the pro-competitive goals of the 1996
    Act and foster increased competition. We adopt the *NPRM'*s
    tentative conclusions that the statutory requirement that
    non-dominant common carriers file tariffs for their international
    interexchange services is no longer necessary for the majority of
    international services as a result of competition in the market for
    international interexchange services and that complete detariffing
    of these services satisfies the forbearance criteria in Section
    10.[^19] As we noted in the *NPRM*, when referring to the
    non-dominant status of carriers, unless otherwise noted, we intend
    to invoke the reference to dominant classification due to reasons
    *other* than a foreign carrier affiliation.[^20]

8.  In response to the *NPRM*, we received fifteen initial comments and
    five replies, along with several *ex parte* filings.[^21] Although
    most commenters supported the Commission's proposal to detariff as
    set forward in the *NPRM*,[^22] several commenters raised policy
    issues that are discussed in greater detail below. Specifically, in
    addition to our adoption of complete detariffing for non-dominant
    providers of international interexchange services, we adopt and
    discuss further herein the following conclusions and amendments to
    our rules:[^23]

> \(a\) *Limited Exceptions for Permissive Detariffing*: We conclude, as
> proposed in the *NPRM,* that limited exceptions for permissive
> detariffing for international interexchange direct-dial services to
> which end-users obtain access by dialing a carrier's access code; and
> for the first 45 days of service to new customers that contact the
> local exchange carrier (LEC) to choose their primary interexchange
> carrier are in the public interest. In addition, we find that
> permissive detariffing is appropriate for the provision of
> international inbound collect calling services to the U.S. Moreover,
> we are persuaded that carriers providing "on-demand" mobile satellite
> services may be unable to establish contractual relationships with
> customers, and, therefore, permissive detariffing of such services is
> also warranted. [^24]
>
> \(b\) *Public Disclosure Requirement*: We also adopt a public
> disclosure requirement that non-dominant interexchange carriers make
> information available to the public concerning current rates, terms,
> and conditions for all of their international interexchange services,
> in at least one location during regular business hours, and that such
> carriers that have Internet websites post this information on-line.
>
> \(c\) *Maintenance of Price and Service Information*: We require
> non-dominant interexchange carriers to maintain price and service
> information regarding all of their international interexchange service
> offerings. This price and service information should include the
> information provided in the public disclosure requirement, as well as
> supporting documents for the rates, terms, and conditions of the
> offerings, all of which should be provided to the Commission within
> ten business days of receipt of a Commission request. We further
> require that non-dominant interexchange carriers retain price and
> service information for a period of at least two years and six months
> following the date the carrier ceases to provide international
> services on such rates, terms and conditions, in order to afford the
> Commission sufficient time to notify a carrier of the filing of a
> Section 208 complaint.[^25]
>
> \(d\) *Complete Detariffing of Services Provided by U.S. Carriers
> Affiliated with Foreign Carriers Possessing Market Power*: We adopt
> the Commission's tentative conclusion in the *NPRM* that the
> maintenance of information requirement, along with the Commission's
> enforcement powers and other safeguards, will help monitor and prevent
> potential anticompetitive behavior by U.S. carriers on routes on which
> they are affiliated with foreign carriers possessing market power on
> relevant routes. Therefore, we extend our policy of complete
> detariffing to the services provided by all non-dominant U.S.
> carriers,[^26] including those regulated as dominant under 47 C.F.R.
> Section 63.10 for a specific route because of an affiliation with a
> foreign carrier possessing market power.[^27]
>
> \(e\) *Complete Detariffing of International Commercial Mobile Radio
> Services (CMRS)*: We revise the Commission's previous conclusion that
> permissive detariffing of CMRS providers for international services on
> unaffiliated routes is in the public interest. Instead, we determine
> that our forbearance analysis regarding the public interest need for
> complete detariffing of international interexchange services by
> non-dominant carriers is applicable to CMRS providers of international
> interexchange services. We therefore adopt a policy of complete
> detariffing for international interexchange services provided by CMRS
> providers for affiliated and unaffiliated routes.[^28]
>
> \(f\) *Filing of Carrier-to-Carrier Contracts*: We amend Section 43.51
> to clarify that it requires solely the filing of those carrier-to
> carrier contracts: (1) involving international interexchange carriers
> classified as dominant for reasons other than a foreign affiliation
> under Section 63.10 of the Commission's rules, or (2) for services
> between an authorized carrier and a foreign carrier possessing market
> power. Moreover, we eliminate the current requirement in Section
> 43.51(a)(3) that carriers file contracts related to rights granted by
> foreign governments.[^29]

9.  In addition, we determine that a transition period may be necessary
    for non-dominant carriers providing international interexchange
    services to become compliant with the rules and policies we adopt in
    this order. Therefore, we adopt a transition period of nine months
    from the effective date of this order to allow non-dominant carriers
    to cancel their tariffs for international interexchange services.
    During the transition period, we will only permit non-dominant
    carriers to file new or revised tariffs for mass market
    international interexchange services. We will not permit the filing
    of new or revised contract tariffs or other long-term arrangements
    for international interexchange services during the transition
    period. Moreover, we require carriers to be in full compliance with
    the public disclosure and maintenance of information requirements
    with respect to a service at the time the service is detariffed, and
    we require carriers to post information on their websites regarding
    new or revised detariffed offerings within twenty-four hours and
    update public information sites within five days of such offerings
    taking effect. In this regard, we intend to mirror the requirements
    and procedures for complying with the public disclosure rules and
    canceling tariffs followed during the transition period for domestic
    detariffing.[^30]

# REGULATORY FORBEARANCE

## Analysis of Statutory Requirements

10. Section 10(a) of the Communications Act requires the Commission to
    forbear from applying, to a telecommunications carrier or
    telecommunications service, regulations or provisions of the
    Communications Act, if the Commission makes three specific
    determinations.[^31] In determining whether forbearance from
    enforcing a particular provision or regulation is in the public
    interest, the Commission is specifically required to consider
    whether forbearance will promote competitive market conditions,
    including the extent to which forbearance will enhance competition
    among providers of telecommunications services.[^32] We find that
    the Communications Act requires us to forbear from applying Section
    203 of the Act and to adopt a policy of complete detariffing for
    international interexchange services provided by non-dominant
    carriers, with limited exceptions for permissive detariffing.

11. Furthermore, with respect to the scope of application of the
    detariffing policies we adopt in this order, we note that the
    Commission proposed complete detariffing for all international
    interexchange services in the *NPRM*, with a few limited exceptions.
    We clarify that our use of the term "interexchange services" covers
    those telecommunications services provided between telephone
    exchanges, not including exchange access services.[^33] Though the
    Commission primarily concentrated on the effects of detariffing on
    mass market and small business consumers in the domestic proceeding,
    the Commission also intended that its detariffing policies extend to
    contract tariffs and individually-negotiated arrangements to the
    extent these arrangements are considered common carriage.[^34] For
    example, in the domestic proceeding, the Commission stated that the
    public disclosure requirement would promote the public interest by
    making it easier for all consumers, including resellers, to compare
    carriers' service offerings.[^35] When the Commission reinstated the
    public disclosure requirement in 1999, it explained that for the
    public disclosure requirement to be meaningful, it must apply to all
    arrangements, including mass market and individually-negotiated
    service arrangements.[^36] There was evidence presented in the
    domestic proceeding that smaller and medium-sized businesses were
    able to receive better rates by using the individually-negotiated
    contracts of larger businesses, and for this reason, the Commission
    disagreed with the argument that large business-user contracts
    should be exempt from the public disclosure requirements.[^37]
    Because we believe that all customers will benefit from detariffing,
    we, therefore, decline to narrow the types of international
    interexchange services that our detariffing rules cover.[^38]

### Are Tariff Filing Requirements Necessary to Ensure that the Charges, Practices, Classifications or Regulations for the International Interexchange Services of Non-dominant Interexchange Carriers Are Just and Reasonable, and Are Not Unjustly or Unreasonably Discriminatory? 

#### Background

12. In the *NPRM*, the Commission tentatively concluded that competitive
    conditions in the global telecommunications market have improved
    significantly enough in the recent past to reduce the likelihood of
    dramatic price increases or the wide-scale proliferation of
    unfavorable terms and conditions offered to consumers. The
    Commission therefore tentatively concluded that the tariff filing
    requirements contained in Section 203 are not necessary to ensure
    that the charges, practices, classifications or regulations for the
    international interexchange services of non-dominant interexchange
    carriers are just and reasonable, and are not unjustly or
    unreasonably discriminatory.[^39] Pursuant to the first requirement
    for forbearance in Section 10(a), the Commission also tentatively
    determined that, to the extent there are market segments where the
    benefits of increased competition have not reached consumers, the
    filing of tariffs would not address the underlying causes for these
    distortions and would not be necessary to ensure that rates are just
    and reasonable and are not unjustly or unreasonably discriminatory.

#### Discussion

13. As we tentatively concluded in the *NPRM*, we find that the
    competitive state of the international interexchange marketplace no
    longer requires non-dominant carriers to file tariffs to ensure that
    charges, practices, classifications or regulations are just and
    reasonable and are not unjustly or unreasonably discriminatory, as
    required by the first criterion of Section 10(a). [^40] Several
    commenters support the Commission's tentative conclusion that there
    is sufficient competition in the market for international
    interexchange services to justify detariffing, and they further
    claim that the international market is now as competitive as the
    market for domestic service offerings.[^41]

14. The Commission has previously identified two "structural problems"
    in the international services market that contributed to inflated
    consumer calling prices: (1) inflated international accounting
    rates; and (2) the need for additional competition in the U.S.
    market.[^42] As the Commission explained in the *NPRM*, recent
    Commission action, coupled with market forces unleashed by the WTO
    Basic Telecom Agreement, has addressed those structural problems.
    [^43]

15. With respect to the Commission's concern about inflated
    international accounting rates, the Commission has made significant
    progress toward lowering accounting rates through reform of its
    accounting rate and international settlement policies.[^44] As the
    Commission discussed in the *NPRM*, the Commission has pursued a
    two-pronged approach to accounting rate reform by relaxing
    regulations governing accounting rate negotiations on routes where
    there is competition in the foreign market and by adopting
    "benchmark" settlement rates to help reduce rates on routes where
    foreign carriers are not subject to competitive pressures.[^45]
    These accounting rate policies, in conjunction with market forces,
    have led to substantial decreases in settlement rates. The U.S.
    average accounting rate declined from 81¢ at year end 1995 to 38¢ at
    year end 2000, a decrease of 58%.[^46]

16. The Commission has also addressed the need for further competition
    in the U.S. market. The Commission's *Foreign Participation Order,*
    adopted in response in part to the WTO Basic Telecom Agreement,
    established policies that permit entry into the U.S. market by
    foreign carriers. Since the *Foreign Participation Order*'s "open
    entry" policies for WTO Members became effective on February 9,
    1998, the Commission has granted more than 1916 Section 214
    authorizations to provide international telecommunications services.
    In addition, the Commission's accounting rate reform policies have
    encouraged greater competition among U.S. carriers. [^47]

17. Allegiance Telecom argues that the market for international
    interexchange services is not sufficiently competitive to warrant
    detariffing, and that the Commission's reliance on the WTO Basic
    Telecom Agreement is an insufficient basis for concluding that the
    international market is, or will be, competitive enough to eliminate
    tariffs.[^48] We reject this argument. Our evidence shows that,
    generally, competition in the market for international interexchange
    services has increased substantially and that this competition has
    resulted in significant benefits to consumers. As we explained
    above, our accounting rate reform policies, market forces, and
    increased U.S. market entry have led to greater competition in the
    U.S. market and substantial reductions in consumer rates for
    international interexchange services. Since the adoption of these
    policies and the WTO Agreement, the average rate for international
    telephone service in the United States has decreased \$0.23 per
    minute from \$0.74 per minute in 1996 to \$0.51 per minute in
    1999.[^49] Moreover, discount calling plan rates have decreased even
    more dramatically.[^50] Allegiance Telecom offers no specific
    evidence to support its claims that the international market is not
    competitive in general or that the increasing number of providers
    and evidence of lower consumer calling prices and accounting rates
    does not demonstrate an increased level of competition in the
    international marketplace.

18. We also find that, as consumers become more aware of the lower
    priced options for international services and choose appropriate
    plans, non-dominant interexchange carriers will lose their ability
    successfully to charge or impose unreasonable or unjust rates, terms
    and conditions for international services. This is supported by the
    Commission's previous finding that, in general, consumers are highly
    sensitive to prices and are likely to switch carriers to take
    advantage of favorable price promotions.[^51] Moreover, to the
    extent carriers attempt to engage in unjustly or unreasonably
    discriminatory behavior, we have the ability to remedy potential
    violations of the provisions of Sections 201 and 202 of the Act
    through the exercise of our authority to investigate and adjudicate
    complaints and to examine relevant legal and policy issues under
    Section 208 of the Act.[^52]

19. Nevertheless, despite increased competition among U.S. international
    carriers, there are some circumstances under which consumers have
    not benefited from lower rates. First, rates remain high on routes
    on which competition has not taken hold in the foreign market.[^53]
    One key reason is that, on many such routes, excessive settlement
    costs are being passed through to U.S. consumers, even though there
    may be increased competition on the U.S. end. Secondly, rates remain
    excessive for consumers who do not subscribe to carriers' discount
    calling plans or take advantage of competitive dial-around rates.
    Higher prices in these circumstances may be attributable, in part,
    to consumer information problems, including consumers\' difficulty
    in obtaining timely and reliable information about calling plans and
    other competitive alternatives, such as dial-around services. As the
    Commission explained in the *NPRM*, we do not believe that tariffs
    will address the underlying causes of high rates in either of these
    situations. In fact, the public disclosure requirement we adopt
    below will help alleviate the consumer information issue because,
    unlike tariff filings, it will result in the provision of rate and
    service information that is easily understood by or accessible to
    consumers and that permits them to compare and choose suitable
    calling plans.

20. In sum, we conclude that our international rules, policies, and
    enforcement authority, in conjunction with market forces and a more
    educated consumer, will generally ensure that the rates, practices,
    and classifications of non-dominant interexchange carriers for
    international interexchange services will be just and reasonable and
    not unjustly or unreasonably discriminatory. We therefore conclude
    that tariffs for international interexchange services provided by
    non-dominant carriers are no longer necessary to ensure that
    charges, practices, classifications or regulations are just and
    reasonable and are not unjustly or unreasonably discriminatory, as
    required by Section 10(a). In addition, pursuant to Section 11, we
    find that the requirement that non-dominant carriers file tariffs
    pursuant to Section 203 of the Act is no longer necessary in the
    public interest because of meaningful economic competition in the
    international interexchange marketplace.[^54] Accordingly, as we
    discuss further below, we adopt a policy of complete detariffing for
    non-dominant interexchange carriers that will improve market
    efficiency by permitting carriers to respond to the dynamics of the
    marketplace and will further the goals of Sections 201 and 202 of
    the Act.

### Are Tariff Filing Requirements for the International Interexchange Services of Non-dominant Interexchange Carriers Necessary for the Protection of Consumers?

#### Background

21. In the *NPRM*, the Commission tentatively concluded that requiring
    non-dominant interexchange carriers to file tariffs for
    international offerings is not necessary for the protection of
    consumers of international interexchange services in satisfaction of
    the second criterion of Section 10(a).[^55] Instead, the Commission
    stated that tariff filing requirements, though initially required to
    prevent discrimination among consumers, may now actually harm
    consumers by undermining the development of competition and possibly
    leading to higher rates by impeding price reductions and marketing
    innovations.[^56]

22. In particular, the Commission tentatively concluded in the *NPRM*
    that tariffs for international interexchange services might affect
    consumers adversely because of the application of the "filed-rate"
    doctrine.[^57] As the Commission explained, Section 203(c) requires
    carriers to provide service at the rates, terms, and conditions set
    forth in the tariffs on file with the Commission, until the carrier
    files a superseding tariff canceling, or changing the rates, terms,
    and conditions in the tariffed offering.[^58] Regardless of whether
    a carrier has signed an underlying contract with a customer on
    different terms from those contained in the tariff, Section 203(c),
    in most circumstances, requires the carrier to provide the service
    on the terms set forth in the tariff. Therefore, tariffs, even if
    filed on a voluntary or permissive basis, may preclude consumers
    from pursuing remedies under state consumer protection and contract
    laws that are generally available to consumers in unregulated,
    competitive environments. Accordingly, the Commission concluded that
    complete detariffing, *i.e*., prohibiting the filing of tariffs,
    would avoid the uncertainty, confusion, and potential harm to
    consumers associated with the application of the "filed-rate"
    doctrine.[^59]

23. Moreover, the Commission tentatively concluded in the *NPRM* that,
    in a detariffed marketplace, carriers' freedom to respond to price
    and service changes in an unregulated manner would add further
    protection for consumers against rates, terms and conditions that
    violate the Communications Act.[^60] The Commission also tentatively
    concluded that its enforcement authority under Section 208 of the
    Act, in addition to competitive market forces, would ensure the
    protection of consumers in a detariffed marketplace.

#### Discussion

24. We agree with the Commission's tentative conclusion in the *NPRM*
    that the international interexchange tariffs of non-dominant
    providers are unnecessary to protect consumers. Indeed, as the
    Commission discussed in the *NPRM*, the ability of a carrier to
    alter or abrogate a contract unilaterally under the "filed-rate"
    doctrine undermines consumers' legitimate expectations.[^61] Most
    mass market customers would reasonably assume that a carrier would
    not alter service offerings without notifying a customer;
    nevertheless, in the event of a dispute over a rate change, a
    customer would be bound to the rates, terms and conditions of the
    tariff filed with the Commission. Therefore, tariffing requirements
    not only impair market efficiency, as we discuss further below, but
    in some cases could result in harm to consumers through the
    application of the "filed-rate" doctrine.

25. In its comments, Global Telecompetition Consultants, Inc. (GTC)
    construes the Commission's statements, both in the domestic
    proceeding and in the *NPRM,* that complete detariffing will
    eliminate the possible invocation of the "filed-rate" doctrine, as
    "doing away with the filed-rate doctrine."[^62] GTC argues that
    detariffing, whether domestic or international, is not equivalent to
    the abolition of the "filed-rate" doctrine, which is a judicially
    created doctrine that the Commission cannot overturn.[^63]
    Therefore, GTC claims that the Commission exceeded its jurisdiction
    and acted arbitrarily and capriciously in its analysis of how
    complete detariffing would "eliminate the filed-rate doctrine."[^64]

26. We disagree with GTC's argument that, by ordering complete
    detariffing, the Commission has purported to "overturn" a judicial
    doctrine. Rather than "doing away with" the filed-rate doctrine, the
    Commission in the domestic and international proceedings has sought
    to prevent the invocation of the "filed-rate" doctrine through the
    use of its forbearance authority granted in Section 10. Congress
    expressly empowered the Commission to forbear in certain
    circumstances from the statutory provisions of the Act.[^65] The
    Commission's statutory authority in Section 10 to forbear from
    applying Section 203 of the Act and to prohibit the filing of
    tariffs has been upheld by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C.
    Circuit.[^66] Moreover, commenters concur that, in light of the D.C.
    Circuit's ruling, the Commission has the authority to require
    international carriers to cancel their tariffs.[^67] As the
    Commission explained in the domestic proceeding, the "filed-rate"
    doctrine has been applied to the rates, terms, and conditions of
    services specified in tariffs that are "duly filed" with the
    Commission in accordance with Section 203 of the Act.[^68]
    Therefore, in the context of complete detariffing, if the Commission
    prohibits the filing of tariffs under Section 10, there are no
    tariffs "duly filed" with the Commission and carriers have no
    opportunity to invoke the "filed-rate" doctrine. Because we reject
    GTC's interpretation of the Commission's action, we also dismiss
    GTC's argument that we have engaged in arbitrary and capricious
    decisionmaking in proposing to detariff international services.[^69]

27. GTC further claims that the Commission violated the Regulatory
    Flexibility Act by engaging in a perfunctory analysis of complete
    detariffing's effect on the "filed-rate" doctrine and how its
    "elimination of the doctrine" would affect small carriers in the
    *Domestic Detariffing Order*. [^70] As an initial matter, we note
    that GTC does not cite to any specific harms to small carriers from
    either domestic or international detariffing. We also note that the
    Commission tentatively concluded in the Initial Regulatory
    Flexibility Analysis in the *NPRM* that its detariffing proposals
    were the least burdensome on small entities and that eliminating the
    tariff requirement would reduce administrative costs to small
    entities. The Commission sought comment on those tentative
    conclusions.[^71] Though there are similar policy rationales for
    detariffing domestic and international interexchange services, we
    emphasize that we have developed an independent record for
    detariffing international interexchange services in this proceeding
    and have considered fully the impact of the policies we adopt in
    this order on all parties, including small businesses. For example,
    as we discuss below, we conclude that complete detariffing will
    promote flexibility and reduce the regulatory compliance burdens on
    all non-dominant providers of international interexchange services,
    including smaller carriers.[^72] We also note that carriers have
    flexibility in complying with the public disclosure requirement and
    that the costs to carriers of maintaining such sites and posting
    information are moderate.[^73]

28. In conclusion, we determine that complete detariffing will enhance
    competition, as we discuss further below, and protect consumers
    against rates, terms and conditions that violate the Communications
    Act. Complete detariffing will allow carriers the flexibility
    necessary to respond to dynamic price and service changes in the
    marketplace and will best protect consumers from rates, terms, and
    conditions that violate Sections 201 and 202 of the Act. In a
    deregulated environment, the Commission's enforcement authority,
    along with market forces, will serve to safeguard the rights of
    consumers. Accordingly, we find that tariffs are unnecessary for the
    protection of consumers and that our elimination of the tariff
    requirement contained in Section 203 for non-dominant carriers
    providing international interexchange services satisfies the second
    prong of Section 10(a)'s statutory forbearance criteria.[^74]

### Is Forbearance from Applying Section 203 Tariff Filing Requirements to the International Interexchange Services Offered by Non-Dominant Interexchange Carriers Consistent with the Public Interest?

#### Background

29. The Commission tentatively concluded in the *NPRM* that, with
    limited exceptions, prohibiting non-dominant interexchange carriers
    from filing tariffs for the provision of international interexchange
    services under a regime of complete detariffing is consistent with
    the public interest.[^75] As the Commission explained, Section 10(b)
    specifically requires the Commission to consider, in determining
    whether forbearance from enforcing a provision of the Communications
    Act or a regulation is in the public interest, whether forbearance
    will promote competitive market conditions, including the extent to
    which forbearance will enhance competition among providers of
    telecommunications services.[^76] The Commission tentatively
    concluded in the *NPRM* that, as a general matter, complete
    detariffing, as opposed to permissive detariffing, would best
    enhance competition among providers of such services, promote
    competitive market conditions, and achieve other objectives that are
    in the public interest, including eliminating the opportunity to
    invoke the "filed-rate" doctrine and establishing market conditions
    that more closely resemble an unregulated environment. [^77]

30. Nevertheless, the Commission proposed adopting permissive
    detariffing, as it did in the domestic detariffing proceeding, in
    two limited circumstances with respect to: (1) international
    interexchange direct-dial services to which end-users obtain access
    by dialing a carrier access code, *i.e.,* 10-10-XXX, ("dial-around
    1+ services"), and (2) international interexchange services provided
    during the initial forty-five days of service or until there is a
    written contract between the carrier and the customer, in those
    limited circumstances in which a prospective customer contacts the
    LEC to select an interexchange carrier or to initiate a change of
    its primary interexchange carrier ("LEC-implemented new customer
    services").[^78] The Commission's reasoning for these exceptions,
    based upon its conclusions in the domestic proceeding, was that, in
    a detariffed market, carriers and customers must be able to enter
    into legally binding contracts for services, and, regarding these
    two types of services, it may not be possible for carriers providing
    these types of services to give customers notice of the rates, terms
    and conditions of the service prior to the completion of a
    call.[^79]

#### Discussion

31. We agree with the Commission's tentative conclusion in the *NPRM*
    that a deregulatory detariffing policy that does not require nor
    permit non-dominant carriers to file tariffs for international
    interexchange services, *i.e.,* complete or mandatory detariffing,
    will create the most pro-competitive conditions for the
    international interexchange marketplace.[^80] A policy of complete
    detariffing will produce pro-consumer benefits by forcing carriers
    to be more responsive to customer demands and to offer a greater
    variety of innovative price and service packages. The elimination of
    non-dominant carrier tariff filings will also prevent potential
    situations in which carriers seek to avoid contract obligations or
    refuse to negotiate with customers based upon the "filed-rate"
    doctrine and the Commission's tariff filing and review
    processes.[^81]

32. In contrast, allowing carriers to file international service tariffs
    by adopting a permissive or voluntary detariffing policy would
    impede vigorous competition in the market for interexchange services
    by: (1) removing incentives for competitive price discounting; (2)
    reducing or eliminating carriers' ability to rapidly and efficiently
    respond to changes in demand and cost; (3) imposing costs on
    carriers that attempt to make new offerings; and (4) preventing or
    discouraging consumers from seeking or obtaining service
    arrangements specifically tailored to their needs.[^82] Thus, we
    adopt a policy of complete detariffing for international
    interexchange services provided by non-dominant carriers that will
    enable legal relationships between carriers and customers that
    mirror those in other unregulated competitive markets.

33. In the *NPRM*, we stated that complete detariffing would promote
    flexibility and reduce the regulatory compliance burdens on all
    non-dominant providers of international interexchange services,
    including smaller carriers.[^83] We note, however, that two
    commenters disagree with this conclusion and argue that the
    administrative burdens associated with complete detariffing will be
    unacceptable. Specifically, Allegiance Telecom argues that there is
    no basis for the Commission to conclude that complete detariffing
    will promote market efficiency.[^84] Instead, Allegiance Telecom
    asserts that transactional and administrative costs will increase
    with detariffing because carriers will have to engage in individual
    negotiations with customers and renegotiate to implement any
    changes, which will frustrate the ability of non-dominant carriers
    to respond rapidly to the marketplace.[^85] Moreover, Allegiance
    argues that detariffing will not be competitively neutral because
    non-dominant carriers will not be able to avail themselves of the
    efficiencies that tariffs provide, while dominant carriers that must
    file tariffs will have a competitive advantage.[^86] Additionally,
    GTC argues that the administrative and ministerial burden on
    carriers, especially smaller carriers, will be prohibitively
    expensive.[^87]

34. We find unpersuasive the argument that complete detariffing will
    place undue burdens on non-dominant providers of international
    interexchange sevices or create a comparative advantage for dominant
    providers. The Commission has addressed this issue previously in the
    domestic proceeding and determined that complete detariffing will
    not pose more than minimal burdens on carriers, as carriers may
    issue short standard contracts for customers. [^88] In addition,
    several commenters contend that detariffing will actually permit
    carriers to respond more quickly and efficiently to a customer's
    demand for services because a layer of complexity will be
    removed.[^89] We also note that BTNA claims that by removing the
    requirement that carriers with foreign affiliates that possess
    market power file tariffs, the Commission will not be placing such
    carriers at a competitive disadvantage.[^90] Therefore, in order to
    establish a more market-based, deregulatory environment we conclude
    that, with the few exceptions discussed below, it is in the public
    interest to prohibit non-dominant interexchange carriers from filing
    tariffs with respect to international interexchange services.

35. As we discussed in the *NPRM*, in a market environment without
    tariffs, carriers and customers must enter into legal contracts for
    services.[^91] The Commission proposed that, because of the
    difficulty of establishing a contractual relationship between
    carriers and customers, carriers should be permitted to file tariffs
    for their services with respect to: (1) international interexchange
    direct-dial services to which end-users obtain access by dialing a
    carrier access code, *i.e.,* 10-10-XXX, ("dial-around 1+ services"),
    and (2) international interexchange services provided during the
    initial forty-five days of service or until there is a written
    contract between the carrier and the customer, whichever occurs
    first, in those limited circumstances in which a prospective
    customer contacts the LEC to select an interexchange carrier or to
    initiate a change of its interexchange carrier ("LEC-implemented new
    customer services").[^92] We note that several parties have
    expressed support for these exceptions.[^93]

36. Regarding casual calling services in general, the Commission
    previously determined in the domestic proceeding that notice is not
    a problem because most casual calling services already require
    intervention by an interexchange carrier that enables them to
    provide notice to customers prior to the completion of a call.[^94]
    However, with respect to a particular subset of casual calling
    services, dial-around 1+ services, notice remains unlikely. The
    Commission explained in the *NPRM* that most interexchange carriers
    have not implemented universally the technology to allow them to
    distinguish a caller using "dial-around 1+ services" from "direct
    dial 1+ services."[^95] Therefore, the adoption of complete
    detariffing at this time for dial-around 1+ services would not be in
    the public interest until the cost burdens on non-dominant
    interexchange carriers to install the necessary signalling equipment
    to distinguish dial-around 1+ services and to provide recorded
    announcements regarding information about rates, terms, and
    conditions of dial-around 1+ services to customers are reduced; or
    alternative ways to notify customers become more widespread.[^96]

37. We note that Teleglobe also raises the concern that carriers will be
    unable to establish contracts with customers for international
    inbound collect calling services to the U.S.[^97] We find that,
    under the current structure for handling international inbound
    collect calls, it may not be possible for providers of such services
    to provide legal notice of rates, terms, and conditions for the
    service to customers on the U.S. end prior to their accepting
    international inbound collect calls. Currently, it is common
    practice for U.S. providers of international inbound collect calls
    to enter into negotiated arrangements with foreign carriers to
    handle and bill such international inbound collect calls. According
    to Teleglobe, a U.S. carrier generally negotiates with a foreign
    carrier on a route to bill a certain proportion of minutes of
    international inbound collect calls carried to the U.S.[^98] Yet, it
    is possible that the U.S. provider of an international inbound
    collect calling service on a particular route and the U.S. carrier
    that ultimately bills the U.S. customer for the call may not
    correspond. This may be the case because a foreign carrier may
    randomly choose which U.S. carrier will provide the international
    inbound collect call to the U.S., and the foreign carrier, which
    also meters the call, simply allocates billing records in accordance
    with the negotiated proportion of collect call traffic to each U.S.
    carrier at the end of a billing cycle, regardless of which U.S.
    carrier actually provided the service. The U.S. carrier that obtains
    the collect call record as part of its negotiated proportion of
    collect call minutes would then bill the U.S. customer at its
    tariffed rate for providing international inbound collect calls for
    the international route. [^99] Because of the unique circumstances
    associated with the provision of international inbound collect
    calls, we find that permissive or voluntary detariffing is
    appropriate at this time for the provision of international inbound
    collect calls.

38. Additionally, ComSat Mobile Communications argues in its comments
    that the provision of "on-demand" Mobile Satellite Services
    ("on-demand" MSS), that are treated as CMRS services under
    Commission regulations should be subject to permissive
    detariffing.[^100] ComSat explains that, though providers are able
    to issue standard contracts in many cases involving the provision of
    MSS,[^101] providers are unable to do so with respect to the
    provision of "on-demand" MSS because such services are not limited
    to using any particular earth station operator for placing
    mobile-originating calls. Customers of "on-demand" MSS can dial up
    any earth station within view of the satellite being used.[^102] It
    is this "on-demand" capability, according to ComSat, that permits
    customers to choose a different service provider each time a call is
    made, giving customers the flexibility to take advantage of
    different rates and service plans.[^103] In most of these
    circumstances, there are no pre-existing arrangements between
    customers and the earth station operators, though there is a
    centralized accounting authority, or ISP, that ultimately bills the
    customer.[^104] Therefore, ComSat argues that there is generally no
    opportunity for providers of "on-demand" MSS to enter into any
    contractual arrangement with a customer, and tariffs are the only
    legally enforceable mechanism to ensure that a service provider will
    receive payment for its services.[^105] Thus, ComSat requests that
    the Commission refrain from imposing complete detariffing and follow
    the same permissive detariffing model adopted for the provision of
    "dial-around" services for "on-demand" MSS.[^106]

39. We agree that the Commission should not impose its complete
    detariffing regime in instances where entering into contracts with
    individual customers is not possible or where the burdens of
    requiring carriers to provide notice would be unreasonable.[^107]
    Because providers of "on-demand" MSS generally cannot provide notice
    regarding rates and terms to customers prior to use of the service
    because of the unique features of "on-demand" MSS, we find that it
    is appropriate to adopt permissive detariffing for those "on-demand"
    MSS services for which customers have not entered into pre-existing
    ISP service contracts with a particular provider. Therefore, we will
    adopt this further exception to our policy of complete detariffing
    for the non-dominant provision of international interexchange
    services and make the accompanying revisions to our rules.

40. As we tentatively concluded in the *NPRM*, we also find that
    permissive detariffing is in the public interest for the initial
    forty-five days of non-dominant interexchange carriers' provision of
    international interexchange services to new residential and business
    customers, or until a written contract is consummated, whichever is
    earlier. When new customers choose or change an interexchange
    carrier by only contacting their local exchange carrier, the
    interexchange carrier has no direct contact with the customer, and,
    until the local exchange carrier informs the interexchange carrier
    of the new customer, the interexchange carrier may not be able to
    ensure that a contractual relationship is established with that
    customer. Because consumers choose their interexchange carrier for
    both domestic and international services, the conclusions in the
    domestic proceeding regarding LEC-implemented new customer services
    apply equally for both domestic and international interexchange
    services. We adopt our tentative conclusion in the *NPRM* that a
    period of forty-five days is reasonable to assume that an
    interexchange carrier can establish a carrier-customer contract for
    international interexchange services.[^108]

41. In sum, because we find that complete detariffing will enhance
    competition and will be in the public interest as required by the
    third prong of the statutory forbearance criteria in Section
    10,[^109] we adopt a policy of complete detariffing for
    international interexchange services provided by non-dominant
    carriers. Additionally, we conclude that allowing, on a permissive
    basis, non-dominant interexchange carriers to file tariffs for
    dial-around 1+ services and LEC-implemented new customer services
    for a period of forty-five days or until there is a written contract
    between the carrier and customer, whichever is earlier, is in the
    public interest. We also find that permissive detariffing is
    appropriate for the provision of international inbound collect calls
    at this time. Moreover, we adopt a policy of permissive detariffing
    for the non-dominant provision of "on-demand" MSS where a customer
    has not entered into a pre-existing ISP service contract for a
    particular provider. Accordingly, we amend Section 61.19 of the
    Commission's rules to reflect these revisions.[^110]

## Maintenance and Disclosure of Price and Service Information

### 1. Background {#background-3 .unnumbered}

42. The Commission tentatively concluded in the *NPRM* that, although
    customers will receive rate information through the billing process,
    and carriers will likely, as part of their contractual relationship
    with customers, provide notice of rate and other changes in an
    accessible format in order to remain competitive among consumers,
    consumers may continue to have difficulty obtaining complete
    information concerning all of the international interexchange
    service offerings available.[^111] The Commission explained that
    consumers will need information concerning carriers' rates, terms
    and conditions in order to bring complaints to ensure carrier
    compliance with the requirements of the Act and in order for
    consumers to determine the most appropriate rate plans that may meet
    their individual calling patterns.

43. The Commission also acknowledged that tariffs are neither the only,
    nor the best means of disseminating information to consumers about
    international interexchange services. Mass market customers
    infrequently consult tariff filings, and when they do, they find
    them difficult to understand.[^112] Accordingly, the Commission
    proposed extending to non-dominant providers of detariffed
    international interexchange services the public disclosure
    requirements it adopted in the domestic proceeding, including the
    requirement that carriers make rate and service information
    available to the public in at least one location during regular
    business hours and the requirement that carriers maintaining
    Internet websites post this information on-line in a timely and
    easily accessible manner with regular updates.[^113] Moreover, the
    Commission proposed that carriers inform the public that this
    information is available when responding to consumer inquiries or
    complaints and specify the manner in which consumers may obtain the
    information. In addition, the Commission proposed that carriers
    indicate on the title or first page of their cancelled tariffs the
    address of their website and of the public information site where
    the rates, terms, and conditions for their international
    interexchange services can physically be found.[^114]

44. The Commission also tentatively concluded that providers of
    international interexchange services, including certain CMRS
    providers, must maintain price and service information. CMRS
    providers would only be required to maintain price and service
    information for those routes on which the CMRS provider is
    affiliated with a foreign carrier that possesses market power and
    collects settlement payments from U.S. carriers.[^115] The
    Commission reasoned that this maintenance of information requirement
    for non-dominant carriers would enable the Commission to monitor
    compliance with the Act and its rules in a deregulatory
    environment.[^116]

### 2. Discussion {#discussion-3 .unnumbered}

45. We find that the adoption of the public disclosure and maintenance
    of information requirements the Commission proposed in the *NPRM*
    will benefit consumers and further the public interest. Public
    disclosure and maintenance of information about international
    interexchange services will promote carrier compliance with the
    requirements of the Act and permit consumers to have the information
    necessary to make efficient choices regarding their optimal service
    plans.[^117]

46. Nevertheless, several parties to the proceeding opposed the
    Commission's proposal to extend the public disclosure and
    maintenance of information requirements adopted in the domestic
    proceeding to non-dominant providers of international interexchange
    services. These commenters argue that the public disclosure and
    record keeping requirements are burdensome and out-of-place in the
    current deregulatory environment and conflict with the Commission's
    stated goal of treating telecom carriers more like entities in
    other, less-regulated industries.[^118] Instead, they advocate that
    the best approach for the Commission would be to permit carriers to
    develop for themselves appropriate and efficient ways to maintain
    data and to inform customers about services.[^119]

47. We reject the argument that the public disclosure and maintenance of
    information requirements are overly burdensome and contrary to our
    deregulatory goals. The requirements will not impede our continuing
    efforts to establish a deregulated market. At the same time, they
    will permit the Commission to retain the "one positive aspect of
    tariffing," \-- making sure that consumers have the information
    necessary to make informed decisions about their telecommunications
    services \-- without the accompanying negative attributes.[^120] As
    the Commission reasoned in the domestic proceeding, the website
    requirement is not unduly burdensome because, on balance, the growth
    in usage of the Internet has greatly increased the benefits to
    consumers of an on-line information requirement, while the costs to
    carriers of maintaining such sites and posting information are
    moderate.[^121] Moreover, carriers have flexibility in complying
    with the public disclosure requirement. We do not mandate that
    information about rates, terms and conditions be provided in any
    particular format or any particular location. We generally expect
    that competition among carriers will provide carriers the incentives
    to post information online in a more user-friendly format.[^122]
    Nevertheless, carriers must ensure that such information is
    available to the public in at least one location during regular
    business hours, and those carriers that have Internet websites must
    post this information on-line in a timely and easily accessible
    manner with regular updates.[^123]

48. We agree with TMISC that the specific timeframes for filing and
    updating information for detariffed services that the Common Carrier
    Bureau adopted in the *Domestic Transition Order* will assist in
    achieving the consumer benefits of public disclosure and provide
    carriers adminstrative ease in complying with the requirements of
    both domestic and international detariffing.[^124] Therefore, we
    similarly adopt the requirement that carriers, both during and after
    the transition period, update their internet websites within
    twenty-four hours and update public information sites within five
    days of the effective date of a change in the rates, terms, or
    conditions of a detariffed service.[^125] Also, we adopt the
    proposal that carriers inform the public that this information is
    available when responding to consumer inquiries or complaints and
    specify the manner in which consumers may obtain the information. In
    addition, carriers must indicate on the title or first page of their
    cancelled tariffs, the address of their website and of the public
    information site where the rates, terms, and conditions for their
    international interexchange services can be found.[^126]

49. We note that Level 3 opposes the application of the public
    disclosure and contract filing requirements to international private
    line services and dedicated access services, as well as to the voice
    services of large business and carrier end-users.[^127] Level 3
    argues that it is mass market consumer end-users of international
    interexchange voice services, rather than large business or carrier
    end-users, who will benefit from the public disclosure of a
    carrier's service and that it is highly unlikely that mass market
    customers will acquire international private lines.[^128] Both Level
    3 and Ad Hoc argue that business customers who purchase
    international private lines and dedicated access services have
    substantial knowledge of the telecom market and would gain little or
    no benefit from the public availability of a carrier's "generic"
    rates and services.[^129] Therefore, Level 3 requests that the
    Commission rely solely upon the marketplace to address the
    information requirements of sophisticated customers.[^130] Level 3
    also raises concerns that it will be required to disclose online
    proprietary information.[^131]

50. We find that there is no persuasive reason why international
    business customers or other carrier end-users may not also benefit
    from public disclosure even if the information appears "generic." As
    we discussed above, our detariffing policies are intended to apply
    to all interexchange services.[^132] In the domestic proceeding, the
    Commission intended to provide the public disclosure benefits of
    detariffing and a less regulated market to all consumers. The
    Commission possessed evidence in the domestic proceeding that
    businesses, as well as mass market customers, benefit from public
    disclosure by being able to compare service offerings.[^133]
    Availability of service information will help facilitate efficient
    telecommunications decisions for all segments of consumers.[^134]
    Moreover, regarding Level 3's concerns about proprietary
    information, we do not expect carriers to provide more information
    publicly than would normally be contained in a tariff.[^135]
    Therefore, proprietary information that a carrier would not disclose
    in a public tariff need not be disclosed on-line or elsewhere.

51. Ad Hoc raises concerns about the potential anticompetitive harm from
    requiring public disclosure of rate and service information. Ad Hoc
    argues, as it previously did in the domestic detariffing proceeding,
    that public disclosure could increase the ability of carriers to
    engage in parallel pricing or tacit price coordination.[^136]
    However, as the Commission explained in the domestic proceeding and
    in the *NPRM*, the concerns about potential collusive behavior
    resulting from public disclosure, on balance, are outweighed by the
    benefits of public disclosure for numerous reasons.[^137] As the
    Commission set forth in the *Domestic Detariffing Second Order on
    Reconsideration,* there is abundant evidence that disclosure and
    dissemination of service information is beneficial to competition.
    On the other hand, the evidence to the contrary that public
    disclosure is harmful is "sparse and indeterminate."[^138] Moreover,
    in a marketplace with many competitors and low barriers to entry,
    engaging in anticompetitive or collusive behavior is unlikely.
    Furthermore, even if evidence of tacit price coordination existed, a
    public disclosure requirement would not greatly increase the risk of
    harm to competition. As the Commission has recognized, non-dominant
    interexchange carriers will continue to obtain information about
    their competitors' rates and service offerings regardless of whether
    the Commission requires public disclosure.[^139] Therefore the
    absence of a public disclosure requirement would deny consumers the
    benefits of such a requirement without minimizing the possibility
    that collusion could occur. Ad Hoc has not presented any new
    evidence in this proceeding that persuades us to alter this
    conclusion. We conclude, consistent with our findings in the
    domestic proceeding*,* that the best balance is struck in favor of
    consumer concerns and adopt the requirement that information about
    rates, terms, and conditions be made available to the public.[^140]

52. Finally, we adopt the requirement that non-dominant carriers
    maintain price and service information regarding all of their
    international interexchange offerings and be able to submit this
    information within ten business days to the Commission upon request,
    consistent with the requirement that the Commission applied to
    non-dominant providers of domestic, interstate, interexchange
    services.[^141] This maintenance of information requirement will
    assist the Commission in monitoring compliance with the Act and the
    Commission's rules and will help address potential violations that
    may require enforcement action. We anticipate that the information
    maintained will include the information disclosed to the public, in
    addition to supporting information regarding the rates, terms, and
    conditions of the carriers' international interexchange offerings.
    With respect to the type of underlying documentation carriers must
    maintain pursuant to this requirement, we intend for carriers to
    continue to keep the supporting information regarding services that
    is currently required under Part 61 of the Commission's rules for
    carriers submitting tariffs.[^142] Furthermore, we require
    non-dominant interexchange carriers to retain the foregoing
    information for a period of at least two years and six months
    following the date that a carrier ceases to provide services on such
    rates, terms, and conditions, in order to afford the Commission
    enough time to notify a carrier of the filing of a complaint, which
    generally must be commenced within two years from the time the cause
    of action accrues.[^143]

    **C. Application of Proposed Policies to U.S.-Authorized Affiliated
    Carriers Classified as Dominant for Specific International Routes.**

###  {#section .unnumbered}

### 1. Background {#background-4 .unnumbered}

53. The Commission requested comment in the *NPRM* on whether it should
    retain tariffs for U.S. non-dominant facilities-based carriers on
    routes where they have an affiliation with a foreign carrier
    possessing market power. The Commission questioned whether tariffs
    for such routes are required in order to monitor potential price
    squeeze behavior by such U.S. carriers.[^144] Pursuant to the
    Commission's *Benchmarks Order*, there is a rebuttable presumption
    that an authorized carrier has engaged in price squeeze behavior if
    any of the authorized carrier's tariffed collection rates on an
    affiliated route are less than its average variable costs on that
    route, which the Commission defined, for purposes of applying the
    condition, as a carrier's net settlement rate plus any originating
    access charges.[^145]

### 2. Discussion  {#discussion-4 .unnumbered}

54. We find that it is in the public interest to extend our forbearance
    analysis and detariffing policies to include services provided by
    U.S. non-dominant carriers on routes on which they are affiliated
    with foreign carriers that possess market power. The Commission and
    interested parties will have the rate information they need to
    evaluate whether a carrier presumptively has engaged in price
    squeeze behavior on an affiliated route because carriers will be
    required under the rules we adopt in this order to make available to
    the public information about their rates. [^146] In addition, the
    maintenance of information requirement will assist in addressing
    concerns regarding potential anticompetitive pricing strategies by
    U.S. carriers classified as dominant due to their foreign
    affiliations.

55. Accordingly, we conclude that the maintenance and disclosure of
    price and service information, along with the Commission's
    regulatory safeguards for certain affiliated routes,[^147] are
    sufficient alternatives to the monitoring of tariffs for purposes of
    detecting price squeeze and other anticompetitive behavior by
    facilities-based carriers affiliated with foreign carriers that
    possess market power. We therefore find that it would not serve the
    public interest to deny the benefits of a more unregulated
    marketplace to carriers and consumers alike by requiring U.S.
    non-dominant carriers affiliated with a foreign carrier possessing
    market power to file tariffs. In addition, we note that several
    commenters support the Commission's tentative conclusion that
    differential treatment regarding the detariffing of non-dominant
    carriers having affiliations with foreign carriers possessing market
    power is unwarranted.[^148] Therefore, we conclude that it is in the
    public interest that our forbearance analysis and adoption of
    complete detariffing apply to all non-dominant providers of
    international interexchange services, including affiliated
    facilities-based carriers on routes on which their foreign
    affiliates have market power.

## D. Complete Detariffing of International CMRS Services {#d.-complete-detariffing-of-international-cmrs-services .unnumbered}

### 1. Background {#background-5 .unnumbered}

56. The Commission has previously adopted complete detariffing for CMRS
    providers of domestic services pursuant to its authority in Section
    332 of the Act.[^149] Nevertheless, as the Commission explained in
    the *NPRM,* the Commission chose to adopt a policy of permissive
    detariffing for international services to *unaffiliated* points and
    to maintain the statutory tariff requirement for international
    services to *affiliated* points for CMRS providers in its *CMRS
    Forbearance Order*.[^150] In the *CMRS Forbearance Order*, the
    Commission determined that the forbearance criteria of Section
    10(a)(1) and (a)(2) were satisfied and supported detariffing on
    unaffiliated routes;[^151] however, the Commission determined that
    permissive detariffing, rather than complete detariffing, would
    reduce transaction costs and administrative burdens on service
    providers. Therefore, the Commission adopted permissive detariffing
    for unaffiliated routes as consistent with the public interest under
    Section 10(a)(3).[^152]

57. In the *NPRM*, the Commission proposed revisiting the conclusion
    that permissive detariffing of CMRS providers for international
    services on unaffiliated routes is in the public interest. Instead,
    the Commission tentatively concluded that its analysis regarding the
    public interest need for complete detariffing of international
    interexchange services by non-dominant carriers in order to protect
    consumers and further competition applied equally to CMRS providers
    of international services. The Commission also proposed to extend
    the policy of complete detariffing to CMRS providers on affiliated
    routes. The Commission tentatively concluded that any concerns
    regarding price squeeze behavior by CMRS providers could be
    addressed by requiring these carriers to maintain price and service
    information for those routes on which they are affiliated with
    foreign carriers that possess market power.

### 2. Discussion  {#discussion-5 .unnumbered}

58. We determine that complete detariffing of international CMRS
    services, as the Commission has previously found appropriate with
    respect to domestic services provided by CMRS carriers, is warranted
    for all U.S.-international routes whether affiliated or not. We find
    less relevant the Commission's previous concern that complete
    detariffing will increase the transactional and administrative
    burden on carriers by forcing them to contact and negotiate
    individual contracts with customers. Instead, as we discussed above,
    we conclude that complete detariffing will not pose more than
    minimal burdens on carriers, as carriers may issue short standard
    contracts for customers. [^153] This is especially true, given that
    CMRS carriers generally already have contracts with their customers.
    This conclusion warrants our revision of the Commission's prior
    decision to require permissive detariffing of international services
    by CMRS providers. Verizon Wireless supports this view, arguing that
    complying with tariff requirements is actually more burdensome for
    carriers that primarily have contract relationships with customers
    and that generally do not possess the resources necessary to prepare
    and file tariffs routinely.[^154] Moreover, we find that the
    negative consequences for consumers of the "filed-rate" doctrine
    similarly exist for consumers of international CMRS services.[^155]
    In addition, as previously explained, permissive detariffing for
    international interexchange services would not protect consumers
    from application of the filed rate doctrine.[^156] Therefore, we
    determine that it is in the public interest to prohibit CMRS
    providers from filing tariffs with respect to international
    interexchange services.

59. With respect to affiliated routes, the Commission previously
    concluded in the *CMRS Forbearance Order* that it should not
    detariff CMRS providers serving international routes where the CMRS
    carrier is affiliated with a foreign carrier that terminates U.S.
    international traffic.[^157] The Commission's reasoning was based
    upon the need for tariff information to evaluate whether a carrier
    presumptively has engaged in price squeeze behavior on an affiliated
    route. However, as we discussed above with respect to the
    detariffing of non-dominant interexchange carriers that are
    affiliated with foreign carriers with market power, applying the
    requirement for maintenance of price and service information to CMRS
    providers serving affiliated routes will provide the rate
    information necessary to enforce compliance with the
    condition.[^158]

60. Therefore, we adopt our proposal in the *NPRM* to extend the
    requirement that carriers maintain price and service information to
    CMRS providers of international interexchange services for those
    routes on which they are affiliated with foreign carriers that
    possess market power. We clarify our intent in the *NPRM*, however,
    to limit the application of the maintenance of information
    requirement to services provided by a CMRS carrier on those
    affiliated routes where the affiliated foreign carrier has market
    power and collects settlement payments from U.S. carriers. As the
    Commission explained in the *Benchmarks Order*, a price squeeze
    against competing U.S. carriers would only be possible on routes
    where an affiliated foreign carrier controls an essential input for
    providing service, *i.e.,* settlement payments.[^159] We further
    conclude that it is unnecessary to extend to CMRS providers the
    public disclosure requirements discussed in this order. In this
    regard, we recognize that such requirements are currently not
    applicable to the provision of domestic services by CMRS providers.

61. We note that Cingular Wireless LLC argues that there is no need to
    impose a maintenance of information requirement on CMRS providers
    offering service on affiliated routes solely through the resale of
    the international switched services of unaffiliated facilities-based
    carriers.[^160] Cingular states that the information requirement,
    like tariffing, is unwarranted for CMRS providers, given their
    comparatively small share of the U.S. international services
    market.[^161] Moreover, Cingular contends that it is not evident how
    any type of documentation a CMRS provider maintains to "support" the
    rates, terms, and conditions of its resold international services
    could further the Commission\'s objective of preventing and
    detecting a price squeeze on an affiliated route.[^162] Cingular
    also suggests that there are ample alternative mechanisms to monitor
    anticompetitive behavior, including the Section 208 complaint
    process.[^163]

62. Though we disagree that CMRS providers should not be subject to the
    maintenance of price and service information requirement as we
    discussed above,[^164] we agree with Cingular's assertion that the
    maintenance of information requirement is unnecessary for CMRS
    providers offering services solely through the resale of the
    international switched services of unaffiliated facilities-based
    carriers. The Commission has previously determined that the
    competitive concerns associated with switched resale on affiliated
    routes are less significant than those associated with
    facilities-based entry.[^165] Of specific relevance here are the
    Commission's findings in the *Foreign Participation Order* that: (1)
    switched resellers have substantially less incentive to engage in
    predatory price squeezes than facilities-based carriers because of
    their lack of control over facilities; and (2) it is easier to
    detect predatory price squeezes in the switched resale context than
    in the facilities-based context because wholesale rates are known or
    easily identifiable.[^166] Therefore, the maintenance of information
    requirement on affiliated routes where a CMRS carrier provides
    services solely through the resale of switched services of
    unaffiliated providers would be unnecessary to prevent
    anticompetitive behavior and unduly burdensome. We recognize,
    however, that if a carrier currently providing service through the
    resale of an unaffiliated facilities-based provider possesses the
    appropriate authorization, the same carrier may begin to provide
    international service as a facilities-based carrier or through an
    affiliated facilities-based provider without further informing the
    Commission. As always, we expect carriers to comply with applicable
    Commission rules, including the maintenance of information
    requirement, if the nature of their provision of service changes. We
    accordingly make the necessary revisions to rules 20.15 and 42.11 to
    reflect the narrow application of the maintenance of information
    requirement to CMRS providers of international interexchange
    services.

63. In addition, we note that a further minor amendment to our rules is
    necessary. In Section 20.15 of the Commission's rules that addresses
    the tariffing requirements of CMRS providers, the language in
    paragraph (d) states that the Commission's definition of
    "affiliation" is contained in rule 63.18(h)(1)(i), which no longer
    exists.[^167] The Commission's definition of "affiliation" is
    contained in rule 63.09(e). We therefore make a minor amendment to
    revised rule 20.15 in order to reflect the correct definition of
    "affiliation."[^168]

64. In summary, we revise the Commission's previous policy of permissive
    detariffing for the international interexchange services of
    non-dominant CMRS providers for unaffiliated routes and tariffing
    for affiliated routes and, instead, adopt a policy of complete
    detariffing for the international interexchange services of
    non-dominant CMRS providers for both unaffiliated and affiliated
    routes. We also adopt a requirement that a CMRS carrier, which does
    not provide services solely through the resale of the switched
    services of an unaffiliated U.S. facilities-based carrier, maintain
    price and service information for routes on which the CMRS carrier
    is affiliated with a foreign carrier possessing market power and
    collecting settlement payments from U.S. carriers.

## Filing of Carrier-to-Carrier Contracts

### Background

65. In the *NPRM,* the Commission proposed modifying the contract filing
    requirements in Section 43.51 of the Commission's rules. Section
    43.51 requires certain common carriers providing domestic services
    and all common carriers providing international services to file
    with the Commission copies of carrier-to-carrier contracts for
    domestic and international services. [^169] Section 43.51, among
    other things, relates to the filing by a common carrier of
    contracts, agreements, concessions, licenses, authorizations or
    other arrangements to which it is a party.[^170] In that regard,
    Section 43.51 implements Section 211 of the Communications
    Act.[^171] Section 211(a) requires that every carrier file contracts
    with other carriers affecting traffic regulated under the
    Communications Act.[^172] Section 211(b), however, provides that the
    Commission \"shall also have the authority to exempt any carrier
    from submitting copies of such minor contracts as the Commission may
    determine.\"[^173] As the Commission stated in the *NPRM,* it has
    found that Section 211(b) gives the Commission \"the discretion to
    exempt carriers from filing contracts, including those referred to
    in Section 211(a), when we determine that those contracts are of
    minor significance to the regulatory scheme.\"[^174]

66. As the Commission explained in the *NPRM*, the Commission has
    previously found that foreign carriers that lack market power do not
    have the capability to harm competition in the U.S. market. Thus,
    for example, the Commission has determined that the International
    Settlements Policy should not apply to settlement arrangements
    between U.S. carriers and foreign carriers that lack market power.
    Similarly, with regard to the "No Special Concessions" rule, the
    Commission has found that exclusive arrangements between U.S.
    carriers and foreign carriers that lack market power would not
    likely result in harm to competition and consumers in the U.S.
    market.[^175] Accordingly, the Commission concluded in its *ISP
    Reform Order* that it is no longer necessary, pursuant to rule
    43.51, to require the filing of settlement rate arrangements with
    foreign carriers that lack market power in their foreign markets and
    amended the "No Special Concessions" rule to eliminate the
    requirement that U.S. carriers file copies of exclusive arrangements
    with foreign carriers lacking market power.[^176] We also note that
    the Commission previously eliminated the rule 43.51 filing
    requirement for contracts between non-dominant carriers for
    U.S.-domestic services because such carriers, likewise, do not pose
    an anti-competitive threat because of their lack of control over
    bottleneck facilities and the fact that they face numerous
    competitors in the marketplace. [^177]

67. Because the current language in Section 43.51 may not convey the
    Commission's policies clearly, the Commission proposed in the *NPRM*
    to modify Section 43.51 of the Commission's rules to simplify the
    language of the provision and to clarify that the rule only applies
    to U.S. carrier contracts for international common carrier service
    involving: (1) a foreign carrier that has market power in its
    foreign market, or (2) a U.S. carrier that has been classified as
    dominant on any route included in the contract, except for U.S.
    carriers classified as dominant on a particular route due only to a
    foreign carrier affiliation pursuant to Section 63.10.[^178]

### Discussion

68. We adopt the Commission's tentative conclusion in the *NPRM* to
    clarify and modify Section 43.51 of the Commission's rules. The
    primary purpose for requiring the filing of contracts between
    carriers is to assist the Commission in monitoring whether carriers
    are following the Commission\'s rules or are otherwise acting in an
    anti-competitive manner.[^179] With respect to contracts filed
    pursuant to Section 43.51, the Commission has primarily been
    concerned with arrangements involving foreign carriers that possess
    market power on the foreign end of a route because such foreign
    carriers may have the ability to harm competition in the U.S.
    market. Specifically, the Commission is concerned that foreign
    carriers may be able to "whipsaw" U.S. carriers by unilaterally
    setting the prices, terms and conditions under which U.S. carriers
    are able to exchange traffic.[^180] The filing requirements in
    Section 43.51 enable the Commission to enforce the International
    Settlements Policy and maintain regulatory oversight of accounting
    rate agreements to prevent whipsawing.[^181] In addition, the
    Commission is concerned that a foreign carrier with market power
    could adversely affect competition in the U.S. market by entering
    into an exclusive contract with a U.S. carrier. To address this
    concern, the Commission adopted the "No Special Concessions Rule,"
    which prohibits U.S. carriers from agreeing to accept special
    concessions from foreign carriers with market power.[^182] The
    filing requirements in Section 43.51 enable the Commission to
    enforce the "No Special Concessions Rule."

69. The Commission has limited the "No Special Concessions Rule" and the
    ISP to settlement and other arrangements with foreign carriers that
    possess market power. With respect to the ISP, the Commission has
    found that there is no threat of whipsawing from foreign carriers
    that lack market power because U.S. carriers can respond to any
    whipsawing behavior by terminating their traffic with another
    carrier on the route.[^183] With respect to the "No Special
    Concessions Rule," the Commission has found that exclusive contracts
    with a foreign carrier that lacks market power will not harm
    competition in the U.S. because competing foreign carriers should
    have sufficient capacity to accommodate the demands of other U.S.
    carriers.[^184]

70. As discussed above,[^185] the Commission similarly has found that
    carriers that lack market power in their provision of U.S.-domestic
    services will generally be unable to engage in anticompetitive
    behavior in that market because of their lack of control over
    bottleneck facilities and competitive pressures from other carriers.
    On the basis of that finding, the Commission has found that it is
    not necessary to require the filing of copies of contracts between
    non-dominant carriers for U.S.-domestic services. We adopt our
    tentative conclusion in the NPRM that this same analysis applies to
    contracts between non-dominant U.S. carriers involving common
    carrier service between the U.S. and foreign points. No commenter in
    this proceeding has identified any factors unique to the provision
    of international service that make the filing of these contracts
    necessary. Nor has any commenter identified any competitive harms
    that the filing of contracts between carriers that both lack market
    power would help prevent.

71. Section 43.51 as presently drafted does not reflect clearly current
    Commission policies or market realities. Therefore, we amend the
    rule to clarify that only contracts involving carriers with market
    power need to be filed with the Commission. We modify Section 43.51
    to state clearly that the rule applies solely to U.S. carrier
    contracts for international common carrier service involving: (1) a
    foreign carrier that has market power in its foreign market, or (2)
    a U.S. carrier that has been classified as dominant for any service
    on any route included in the contract except for U.S. carriers
    classified as dominant due only to a foreign carrier affiliation. We
    note that, to the extent that a carrier acts in an anti-competitive
    manner or otherwise violates our rules or policies, the Commission
    can obtain contracts and seek remedies against such improper
    activity through the Section 208 complaint process initiated by
    either a competitor or the Commission. [^186] Moreover, the
    Commission maintains authority under Section 211 to require the
    filing of copies of contracts when it is necessary for
    implementation and review of compliance with our rules and
    policies.[^187]

72. In order to implement the requirement that U.S. carriers file
    contracts with foreign carriers that have market power in a foreign
    market, Section 43.51 of the Commission's rules will specify that
    U.S. carriers shall use the Commission's published list of foreign
    carriers that do not qualify for the presumption, set forth in
    section 63.10(a)(3) of the rules, that they lack market power in a
    foreign market.[^188]

73. We reject Level 3's request that the Commission exclude contracts
    with end-user customers for international private lines and for
    dedicated access services from the filing requirement in Section
    43.51 and that the Commission exclude such contracts from the public
    disclosure requirement to the extent public disclosure may be
    applicable.[^189] As we explained above,[^190] those
    carrier-to-carrier contracts that involve U.S. or foreign carriers
    possessing market power pose potential anticompetitive harm to U.S.
    carriers and consumers and, therefore, we continue to require the
    filing of those carrier-to-carrier contracts under Section 43.51. We
    emphasize, however, that the filing requirement, as amended in this
    *Order*, is limited to U.S. carrier contracts for international
    common carrier service involving a foreign carrier that has market
    power in its foreign market or a U.S. carrier that has been
    classified as dominant on any route included in the contract, except
    for U.S. carriers classified as dominant on a particular route due
    only to a foreign carrier affiliation.

74. In addition, the Commission requested comment in the *NPRM* on
    whether to amend Section 43.51(a) to remove the language regarding
    rights granted to a U.S. carrier by a foreign government.[^191]
    Several commenters agree with the Commission's tentative conclusion
    that it is unnecessary to require carriers to file copies of
    agreements with foreign governments. As we noted above, we require
    the filing of copies of contracts in order to determine whether
    carriers with market power are acting in a manner that may adversely
    affect competition in the U.S. market. Generally, we do not have
    that concern with agreements between U.S. carriers and foreign
    governments. To the extent that a foreign government is acting as a
    foreign carrier by directly providing international
    telecommunications services, the contract filing requirements would
    be applicable to carrier-to-carrier contracts involving the foreign
    government. We therefore adopt our proposal to eliminate the
    language in Section 43.51(a) regarding rights granted to U.S.
    carriers by foreign governments and adopt the other changes to
    Section 43.51 to make the rule easier to follow. Furthermore, we
    adopt the proposed amendments to Section 63.21 of the Commission's
    rules, regarding the conditions applicable to international
    authorizations, to reflect these changes.[^192]

75. Some commenters request that the Commission take this opportunity to
    revise Section 43.61 of the Commission's rules, which requires U.S.
    carriers to file reports on international traffic.[^193] In
    particular, SNET and Verizon Wireless argue that the Commission
    should eliminate the requirements of the rule for all non-dominant
    and CMRS carriers, respectively.[^194] As we stated in the *Biennial
    Review 2000 Staff Report*, we recognize that it may be appropriate
    for the Commission to re-examine the current requirements in Section
    43.61 of the Commission's rules.[^195] However, we do not believe
    that this proceeding regarding detariffing of international
    interexchange services is the appropriate forum to consider possible
    revisions to the international traffic reporting rule. Instead, we
    plan to address and take into consideration comments on these and
    other concerns related to the requirements contained in Section
    43.61 in the context of the Commission's current biennial regulatory
    review. If, as a result of the biennial regulatory review, we
    determine that revisions to the Section 43.61 international traffic
    reporting requirements may be warranted, we will commence a
    proceeding. We will incorporate the comments filed here on the
    Section 43.61 requirements into any future proceeding dealing with
    those rules.

# III. TRansition Issues {#iii.-transition-issues .unnumbered}

## Background

76. In the *NPRM*, the Commission requested comment on potential
    transition issues.[^196] In the domestic detariffing proceeding, the
    Commission established a transition period of nine-months for
    non-dominant carriers to detariff their domestic interexchange
    services and delegated those matters related to the transition to
    the Common Carrier Bureau.[^197] However, the nine-month transition
    period was interrupted by the litigation surrounding the domestic
    proceeding. Subsequent to the resolution of the litigation, the
    Common Carrier Bureau sought comment on issues regarding the
    transition to a detariffed marketplace and established January 31,
    2001 as the new domestic detariffing deadline.[^198] The Common
    Carrier Bureau also clarified that, during the transition, carriers
    would be permitted to file new or revised tariffs for mass market
    consumer long distance services, but carriers could not file new or
    revised long distance contract tariff offerings and other long-term
    arrangements.[^199] The Common Carrier Bureau subsequently
    determined in its *Domestic* *Transition Order* that it would extend
    the deadline for the detariffing of domestic mass market consumer
    services to April 30, 2001 in order to permit the Commission to
    consider the merits of establishing a coordinated timetable for the
    detariffing of domestic and international consumer services.[^200]
    Subsequently, the Common Carrier Bureau extended further the
    deadline for the detariffing of domestic mass market consumer
    services to July 31, 2001. The Common Carrier Bureau retained the
    detariffing deadline of January 31, 2001 for large business
    contract-type services because it deemed the likelihood of confusion
    with respect to business customers much less of a concern than the
    potential customer confusion associated with mass market
    detariffing.

## Discussion

77\. Several carriers request that the Commission grant a transition
period of nine months to permit carriers sufficient time in order to
adjust to a completely detariffed regime; to have the maximum
flexibility to cancel tariffs; and to have the option of engaging in
international detariffing after they have completed domestic
detariffing.[^201] We grant carriers\' request for a nine-month
transition period from the effective date of this order for the
detariffing of international interexchange services. Though we believe
that there will be certain efficiencies in detariffing international
interexchange services gained from the domestic experience, we find
merit in carriers' arguments that international detariffing may prove to
be more complex than domestic detariffing because of the large number of
international calling plans that will require contracts with customers
and will need to be posted online. Therefore, we adopt a transition
period of nine-months from the effective date of this order to allow
non-dominant carriers to cancel their tariffs for international
interexchange services and become compliant with the rules we adopt in
this order.[^202] In so doing, we will permit, during the transition
period, non-dominant carriers to file new or revised tariffs for mass
market international interexchange services only. We will not allow the
filing of new or revised contract tariffs or other long-term
arrangements for international interexchange services during the
transition period.

78\. Once a carrier has detariffed its international services, it must
be in compliance with the relevant public information and disclosure
requirements.[^203] We require that carriers post information on their
websites regarding new or revised detariffed offerings within
twenty-four hours and update their public information sites within five
days of such offerings taking effect.[^204] These transition
requirements are the same as those established for the detariffing of
domestic services.

79\. During the transition period, we expect that carriers will
communicate with their customers about the change in status from a
tariffed to detariffed environment. While we believe that consumers will
be protected by state consumer and contract laws after detariffing takes
effect, we encourage carriers to make basic information available in
their communications with their customers to avoid customer confusion.
Useful information would include the price of the calling plan that the
customer currently subscribes to, the duration of the plan, the means of
accepting (or rejecting) the terms of the plan, the notification
procedures the carriers intends to use regarding changes in the plan,
the dispute resolution mechanism, if any, that the carrier or the
customer may invoke, and any other information that the carrier deems
relevant to ensure a smooth transition.

80\. Several commenters also request that the Commission coordinate the
deadlines for domestic and international services in order to minimize
customer confusion and to ensure a smooth transition to a detariffed
regime for domestic and international interexchange services.[^205]
According to Excel, differing deadlines for domestic and international
detariffing pose two potential problems: (1) customer confusion, and (2)
increased implementation costs.[^206] Commenters argue that consumer
uncertainty and confusion will result from having separate deadlines
because such an approach is inconsistent with consumer expectations
about long distance calling plans.[^207] Also, commenters assert that
carriers will have to incur needless costs associated with detariffing
multiple times if domestic and international detariffing are not
simultaneous.[^208] Moreover, parties express concern that international
detariffing will be more difficult than domestic detariffing to
implement in light of the number of countries and specialized nature of
international calling plans.[^209] According to Viatel, carriers will
incur the specific detariffing costs of changing or eliminating existing
tariffs; developing or making changes to existing websites or other
sources of information to comply with the new requirements; producing
mailings and materials to educate customers; implementing a distribution
system for such materials; preparing personnel; and developing standard
contracts.[^210] In addition, Excel claims that, with different
detariffing deadlines, carriers will eventually be forced to raise some
or all retail rates to recover the costs of detariffing, thereby harming
consumers.[^211]

81\. In an *ex parte* filing, AT&T reiterates its desire for the
Commission to delay further the implementation date for the detariffing
of domestic services to allow carriers to detariff domestic and
international services on the same date. AT&T notes, however, that it
will be prepared to detariff domestic and international services on the
same date if the Commission extends the date for detariffing domestic
services to July 31, 2001 and if the Commission has adopted an order on
detariffing for international services by March 2001.[^212] In response
to AT&T's ex parte filing, the Common Carrier Bureau extended the
deadline for the detariffing of domestic mass market consumer services
to July 31, 2001.[^213]

82\. The Commission's domestic detariffing policies have been delayed
substantially since first adopted in 1996. We are committed to ensuring
that consumers experience the benefits of domestic detariffing without
significant further delay unless there are compelling reasons to warrant
another extension of the deadline. The Common Carrier Bureau has already
extended the deadline for domestic detariffing to July 31, 2001 in order
to provide carriers an opportunity to detariff international and
domestic services at the same time. As AT&T notes, the further extension
for detariffing of mass market domestic services granted by the Common
Carrier Bureau will enable at least some carriers to detariff both
domestic and international services at the same time.[^214] We believe
that the additional extension granted by the Common Carrier Bureau
strikes the proper balance between providing an opportunity for carriers
to detariff international and domestic services at the same time and
addressing the Commission's concern that consumers receive the benefits
of detariffing without undue delay. During the interim nine-month
transition period for international detariffing, those carriers that are
able to detariff their international services with their domestic
services tariffs may, but will not be required to do so.

83\. In summary, we find that it is in the public interest to grant a
period of nine months from the effective date of this order for
non-dominant carriers to detariff their international interexchange
services, during which time carriers may continue to file new or revised
mass market tariffs but may not file new or revised contract tariff
offerings and long-term arrangements. We further delegate to the
International Bureau the authority to address any other transition
issues related to international detariffing that may arise when the
rules we adopt in this order become effective.

# ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS

## Final Regulatory Flexibility Certification

84\. The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, as amended (RFA),[^215]
requires that a regulatory flexibility analysis be prepared for
rulemaking proceedings, unless the agency certifies that "the rule will
not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small
entities."[^216] The RFA generally defines the term \"small entity\" as
having the same meaning as the terms \"small business,\" \"small
organization,\" and \"small governmental jurisdiction.\"[^217] In
addition, the term \"small business\" has the same meaning as the term
\"small business concern\" under the Small Business Act.[^218] A small
business concern is one which: (1) is independently owned and operated;
(2) is not dominant in its field of operation; and (3) satisfies any
additional criteria established by the Small Business Administration
(SBA). An Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis (IRFA) was
incorporated in the NPRM.[^219] The Commission sought written public
comment on the proposals in the NPRM, including comment on the IRFA. The
one comment received on the IRFA is discussed below.

85\. There have been dramatic changes in the market for international
interexchange services due to the increase in privatization and
liberalization of foreign markets, the execution of the WTO Basic
Telecom Agreement, the decrease in settlement rates, and the increase in
competition in the U.S. international services market. These changes
have resulted in a substantial increase in the level of competition in
the international interexchange services marketplace. Therefore, we
believe it is no longer necessary to require tariffs for international
interexchange services under Section 203 of the Act, except for carriers
classified as dominant for particular services on particular routes for
reasons other than a foreign carrier affiliation under Section 63.10 of
the rules.[^220] The Commission concludes that detariffing international
interexchange services will serve to promote further the pro-competitive
goals of the 1996 Telecommunications Act and foster increased
competition. The Order requires complete or mandatory detariffing, with
limited exceptions, for the international interexchange services
provided by non-dominant carriers. [^221] The rules and policies
contained in the Order apply to all carriers providing international
common carrier service pursuant to Section 214 of the Act.[^222]

86\. We believe that this Order will reduce carriers' filing costs.
Although eliminating the filing of tariffs with the Commission, the
Order does require that non-dominant interexchange carriers make
information available to the public concerning current rates, terms, and
conditions for all international interexchange services, in at least one
location during regular business hours. Carriers that have Internet
websites also must post this information on-line. The Order also
requires that non-dominant international carriers, with the exception of
most commercial mobile service providers, maintain price and service
information regarding all of their international service offerings. This
price and service information should include the information covered by
the public disclosure requirement as well as supporting documents for
the rates, terms and conditions of the offerings. The Order does not
standardize the maintenance of information and public disclosure
requirements so that carriers may maintain and disclose their rate
information in a manner that is consistent with those business
practices. These public disclosure and maintenance requirements are
nominal because the information is currently maintained by all carriers,
including small entities, in the normal course of business; and
therefore, do not impose a significant economic impact on these small
entities.

87\. In addition, the Order reduces the filing of carrier-to-carrier
contracts contained in Section 43.51. The Order clarifies that Section
43.51 applies solely to U.S. carrier contracts for international common
carrier service involving: (1) a foreign carrier that has market power
in its foreign market, or (2) a U.S. carrier that has been classified as
dominant, for any service, on any route included in the contract**,**
except for U.S. carriers classified as dominant due only to a foreign
carrier affiliation. The Order eliminates the current requirement in
Section 43.51(a)(3) that carriers file contracts related to rights
granted by foreign governments, and stipulates that the Commission may
obtain contracts and seek remedies against improper activity through the
Section 208 complaint process initiated by either a competitor or the
Commission. These modifications to the rules eliminate filing
requirements on small entities and therefore, do not pose a significant
economic impact on such entities.

88\. The Commission has identified instances when tariffs will be
permitted. The Commission\'s rules will permit carriers, including small
entities, to file tariffs for their services with respect to
international interexchange direct-dial services initiated by dialing a
carrier\'s access code; and international interexchange services
provided during the initial forty-five days of service or until there is
a written contract between the carrier and the customer, but in no event
shall the carrier provide service to its customer pursuant to tariff for
more than forty-five days. The Order also adopts permissive detariffing
for those \"on-demand\" mobile satellite services (MSS) services for
which customers have not entered into pre-existing service contracts
designating a particular provider. Finally, the Order also adopts
permissive detariffing for international inbound collect calls. Carriers
that permissively file tariffs under the Commission\'s rules will not be
required to file information in addition to what is currently required.
Therefore, these rules do not increase burdens on small entities, nor do
they create a significant economic impact.

89\. Therefore, we certify that none of the requirements of the Order
will have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small
entities.

90\. Only one commenter, Global Telecompetition Consultants, Inc. (GTC),
addresses the issue of the RFA. GTC argues that the Commission did not
perform the proper analysis in the RFA contained in the
[prior]{.underline} [domestic]{.underline} detariffing proceeding. GTC
raises this issue in this international detariffing proceeding because
the international detariffing NPRM relies on the principles adopted in
the domestic detariffing proceeding.

91\. GTC\'s arguments focus on the \"filed-rate\" doctrine.[^223] GTC
construes the Commission's statements, both in the domestic proceeding
and in the international detariffing NPRM, that complete detariffing
will eliminate the possible invocation of the "filed-rate" doctrine, as
"doing away with" the filed rate doctrine. GTC argues that detariffing,
whether domestic or international, is not equivalent to the abolition of
the "filed-rate\" doctrine, which is a judicially-created doctrine that
the Commission cannot overturn. Thus, GTC claims that the Commission
exceeded its jurisdiction and acted arbitrarily and capriciously in its
analysis of how complete detariffing would eliminate the \"filed-rate\"
doctrine. Further, GTC claims that the Commission violated the RFA by
engaging in a perfunctionary analysis of complete detariffing's effect
on the "filed-rate\" doctrine and how its elimination of the doctrine
would affect small carriers. GTC does not, however, cite to any specific
harms caused small carriers from either domestic or international
detariffing.

92\. We disagree with GTC's argument that, by ordering complete
detariffing, the Commission has purported to "overturn" a judicial
doctrine. Rather than "doing away with" the filed-rate doctrine, the
Commission in the domestic and international proceedings has simply
exercised its forbearance authority granted in Section 10 of the Act.
Congress expressly empowered the Commission to forbear in certain
circumstances from the statutory provisions of the Act.[^224] The
Commission's statutory authority in Section 10 to forbear from applying
Section 203 of the Act and to prohibit the filing of tariffs has been
upheld by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit.[^225]
Moreover, commenters concur that, in light of the D.C. Circuit's ruling,
the Commission has the authority to require international carriers to
cancel their tariffs.[^226] As the Commission explained in the domestic
proceeding, the "filed-rate" doctrine has been applied to the rates,
terms, and conditions of services specified in tariffs that are "duly
filed" with the Commission in accordance with Section 203 of the
Act.[^227] Therefore, in the context of complete detariffing, if the
Commission prohibits the filing of tariffs under Section 10, there are
no tariffs "duly filed" with the Commission and carriers have no
opportunity to invoke the "filed-rate" doctrine. Because we reject GTC's
interpretation of the Commission's action, we also dismiss GTC's
argument that we have engaged in arbitrary and capricious decisionmaking
in proposing to detariff international services.[^228]

93\. We further note that, although there are similar policy rationales
for detariffing domestic and international interexchange services, the
Commission developed an independent record for detariffing international
interexchange services in this proceeding. Thus, the Commission does not
rely on the analysis contained in the domestic detariffing proceeding,
but rather analyzes the full impact of the policies contained in this
Order on all parties including small businesses. As noted above, the
Commission incorporated an IRFA in the NPRM in this proceeding.[^229]
The Commission tentatively concluded in the IRFA that its detariffing
proposals were the least burdensome alternatives on small entities and
that eliminating the tariff requirement would reduce administrative
costs to all entities, including small entities. The Commission sought
comment on those tentative conclusions.[^230] In this Order, we affirm
the tentative conclusions in the NPRM and determine that complete
detariffing will permit all carriers, including small carriers, to have
the flexibility necessary to respond to dynamic price and service
changes in the marketplace and will best protect consumers from the
rates, terms and conditions that violate the Communications Act.[^231]

94\. [**Report to Congress**:]{.underline} The Commission will send a
copy of the Order, including a copy of the Final Regulatory Flexibility
Certification, in a report to Congress pursuant to the Small Business
Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996.[^232] In addition, the
Commission will send a copy of the Order, including a copy of the Final
Regulatory Flexibility Certification, to the Chief Counsel for Advocacy
of the SBA. A copy of the Order and Final Regulatory Flexibility
Certification will also be published in the Federal Register.[^233]

**B.** **Final** **Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 Analysis**

95\. This Order contains either new or modified information collections
subject to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (PRA), Public Law 104-13.
It will be submitted to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) for
review under the emergency processing provisions of the PRA. The
Commission, as part of its continuing effort to reduce paperwork
burdens, invites the general public to comment on the information
collection(s) contained in this Order as required by the PRA. Public and
agency comments on the request for emergency approval of the information
collection requirements are due 14 days after date of publication of
this Order in the Federal Register. Public and agency comments on the
request for regular approval of the information collection requirements
are due 60 days after date of publication of this Order in the Federal
Register. Comments should address: (a) whether the new or modified
collection of information is necessary for the proper performance of the
functions of the Commission, including whether the information shall
have practical utility; (b) the accuracy of the Commission\'s burden
estimates; (c) ways to enhance the quality, utility, and clarity of the
information collected; and (d) ways to minimize the burden of the
collection of information on the respondents, including the use of
automated collection techniques or other forms of information
technology.

96\. All comments regarding the requests for approval of the information
collection, both regular and emergency, should be submitted to Judy
Boley, Federal Communications Commission, Room 1-C804, 445 12^th^
Street, SW, Washington, DC 20554, or via the Internet to
<jboley@fcc.gov>; phone 202-418-0214. In addition, comments on the
emergency request for approval of the information collections should be
submitted to Edward C. Springer, OMB Desk Officer, Room 10236 NEOB, 725
17^th^ Street, NW, Washington, DC 20503 or via the Internet to
edward.springer@omb.eop.gov.

# ORDERING CLAUSES 

97\. Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED, that, pursuant to Sections 1- 4, 10,
11, 201-205, 211, 218, 220, 226, 303(g), 303(r) and 332 of the
Communications Act of 1934, as amended, 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-154, 160, 161,
201-205, 211, 218, 220, 226, 303(g), 303(r) and 332 the REPORT AND ORDER
is hereby ADOPTED.

98\. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, the Commission's Consumer Information
Bureau, Reference Information Center shall send a copy of this REPORT
AND ORDER, including the Final Regulatory Flexibility Certification, to
the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the Small Business Administration.

99\. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, the policies, rules and requirements
established in this decision shall take effect thirty days after
publication in the Federal Register or in accordance with the
requirements of 5 U.S.C. § 801 (a)(3) and 44 U.S.C. § 3507.

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

Magalie Roman Salas Secretary

**APPENDIX A -- LIST OF PARTIES**

Ad Hoc Telecommunications Users Committee

and the New York Clearing House Association, L.L.C. (*Ad Hoc*): *Reply*

Allegiance Telecom, Inc. (*Allegiance Telecom*): *Comments*

AT&T Wireless Services, Inc. (*AT&T Wireless*): *Comments*

BT North America Inc. (*BTNA)*: *Comments*

Cingular Wireless LLC (*Cingular Wireless*): *Comments*

The Competitive Telecommunications Association (*CompTel*): *Comments*

COMSAT Mobile (*ComSat*): *Comments*

Excel Communications, Inc. (*Excel*): *Comments, Ex parte*

General Services Administration (*GSA*): *Comments, Reply*

Global Telecompetition Consultants, Inc. (*GTC*): *Comments*

Level 3 Communications, LLC (*Level 3*): *Comments*

SNET America, Inc. and Southwestern Bell Communications Services, Inc.
(*SNET*): *Reply*

The Telecommunications Management Information Systems Coalition
(*TMISC*): *Comments*

Teleglobe USA Inc. (*Teleglobe*): *Ex parte*

Verizon Wireless (*Verizon Wireless*): *Comments*

Verizon (*Verizon*): *Comments*

Viatel, Inc. (*Viatel*): *Comments, Reply*

WorldCom, AT&T, Concert, Qwest, and Sprint (*Joint Commenters*):
*Comments, Reply, Ex Parte*

**APPENDIX B -- FINAL RULES**

**AMENDMENTS TO THE CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS**

For the reasons discussed in the preamble, the Federal Communications
Commission amends 47 C.F.R parts 0, 20, 42, 43, 61, 63 and 64 as
follows:

# PART 0 -- COMMISSION ORGANIZATION {#part-0-commission-organization .unnumbered}

1.  The authority citation for part 0 continues to read as follows:

Authority: 47 U.S.C. 155.

2.  Section 0.457 is amended by revising paragraph (d)(1)(vi) to read as
    follows:

[§ 0. 457 Records not routinely available for public
inspection.]{.underline}

\*\*\*\*\*

\(d\) \*\*\*

(1) \*\*\*

\(vi\) The rates, terms and conditions in any agreement between a U.S.
carrier and a foreign carrier that govern the settlement of U.S.
international traffic, including the method for allocating return
traffic, if the U.S. international route is exempt from the
international settlements policy under § 43.51(e)(3) of this Chapter.

**\*\*\*\*\***

**PART 20 -- COMMERCIAL MOBILE RADIO SERVICES**

3.  The authority citation for part 20 continues to read as follows:

Authority: 47 U.S.C. 154, 160, 251-254, 303, and 332 unless otherwise
noted.

4.  Section 20.15 is amended by revising paragraphs (c) and (d) to read
    as follows:

[§ 20.15 Requirements under Title II of the Communications
Act.]{.underline}

\*\*\*\*\*

\(c\) Commercial mobile radio service providers shall not file tariffs
for international and interstate service to their customers, interstate
access service, or international and interstate operator service.
Sections 1.771 through 1.773 and part 61 of this chapter are not
applicable to international and interstate services provided by
commercial mobile radio service providers. Commercial mobile radio
service providers shall cancel tariffs for international and interstate
service to their customers, interstate access service, and international
and interstate operator service.

\(d\) Except as specified as in paragraphs (d)(1)-(2), nothing in this
section shall be construed to modify the Commission's rules and policies
on the provision of international service under Part 63 of this Chapter.

\(1\) Notwithstanding the provisions of § 63.21(c) of this Chapter, a
commercial mobile radio service provider [is not]{.underline} required
to comply with § 42.10 of this Chapter.

\(2\) A commercial mobile radio service (CMRS) provider that is
classified as dominant under § 63.10 of this Chapter due to an
affiliation with a foreign carrier [is]{.underline} required to comply
with § 42.11 of this Chapter if the affiliated foreign carrier collects
settlement payments from U.S. carriers for terminating U.S.
international switched traffic at the foreign end of the route. Such a
CMRS provider [is not]{.underline} required to comply with §42.11,
however, if it provides service on the affiliated route
[solely]{.underline} through the resale of an unaffiliated
facilities-based provider\'s international switched services.

\(3\) For purposes of paragraphs (d)(1)-(2) of this section,
*affiliated* and *foreign carrier* are defined in § 63.09 of this
Chapter.

\*\*\*\*\*

**PART 42 -- PRESERVATION OF RECORDS OF COMMUNICATIONS COMMON CARRIERS**

5\. The authority citation for part 42 continues to read as follows:

Authority: Section 4(i), 48 Stat. 1066, as amended, 47 U.S.C. 154(i).
Interprets or applies sections 219 and 220, 48 Stat. 1077-78, 47 U.S.C.
219, 220.

6\. Section 42.10 is amended by revising paragraph (a) to read as
follows:

[§ 42.10 Public availability of information concerning interexchange
services.]{.underline}

\(a\) A nondominant interexchange carrier (IXC) shall make available to
any member of the public, in at least one location, during regular
business hours, information concerning its current rates, terms and
conditions for all of its international and interstate, domestic,
interexchange services. Such information shall be made available in an
easy to understand format and in a timely manner. Following an inquiry
or complaint from the public concerning rates, terms and conditions for
such services, a carrier shall specify that such information is
available and the manner in which the public may obtain the information.

\*\*\*\*\*

[§ 42.11 Retention of information concerning detariffed interexchange
services.]{.underline}

\(a\) A nondominant IXC shall maintain, for submission to the Commission
and to state regulatory commissions upon request, price and service
information regarding all of the carrier's international and interstate,
domestic, interexchange service offerings. A commercial mobile radio
service (CMRS) provider shall maintain such price and service
information only about its international common carrier service
offerings and only for those routes on which the CMRS provider is
classified as dominant under § 63.10 of this Chapter due to an
affiliation with a foreign carrier that collects settlement payments
from U.S. carriers for terminating U.S. international switched traffic
at the foreign end of the route. Such a CMRS provider is not required to
maintain its price and service information, however, on any such
affiliated route if it provides service on that route
[solely]{.underline} through the resale of an unaffiliated
facilities-based provider\'s international switched services. The price
and service information maintained for purposes of this paragraph shall
include documents supporting the rates, terms, and conditions of the
carrier's international and interstate, domestic, interexchange
offerings. The information maintained pursuant to this section shall be
maintained in a manner that allows the carrier to produce such records
within ten business days. For purposes of this paragraph, *affiliated*
and *foreign carrier* are defined in § 63.09 of this Chapter.

\*\*\*\*\*

**PART 43 -- REPORTS OF COMMUNICATION COMMON CARRIERS AND CERTAIN
AFFILIATES**

8\. The authority citation for part 43 continues to read as follows:

Authority: 47 U.S.C. 154; Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub.L.
104-104, sec. 402(b)(2)(B), (c), 110 Stat. 56 (1996) as amended unless
otherwise noted. 47 U.S.C. 211, 219, 220 as amended.

9\. Section 43.51 is revised to read as follows:

[§ 43.51 Contracts and concessions.]{.underline}

\(a\) (1) Any communication common carrier described in paragraph (b) of
this section must file with the Commission, within thirty (30) days of
execution, a copy of each contract, agreement, concession, license,
authorization, operating agreement or other arrangement to which it is a
party and amendments thereto with respect to the following:

\(i\) The exchange of services; and,

\(ii\) The interchange or routing of traffic and matters concerning
rates, accounting rates, division of tolls, or the basis of settlement
of traffic balances, except as provided in paragraph (c) of this
section.

\(2\) If the contract, agreement, concession, license, authorization,
operating agreement or other arrangement and amendments thereto is made
other than in writing, a certified statement covering all details
thereof must be filed by at least one of the parties to the agreement.
Each other party to the agreement which is also subject to these
provisions may, in lieu of also filing a copy of the agreement, file a
certified statement referencing the filed document. The Commission may,
at any time and upon reasonable request, require any communication
common carrier not subject to the provisions of this section to submit
the documents referenced in this section.

\(b\) The following communication common carriers must comply with the
requirements of paragraph (a) of this section:

\(1\) a carrier that is engaged in domestic communications and has not
been classified as non-dominant pursuant to § 61.3 of this Chapter,

\(2\) a carrier, other than a provider of commercial mobile radio
services, that is engaged in foreign communications and enters into a
contract, agreement, concession, license, authorization, operating
agreement or other arrangement and amendments thereto with a foreign
carrier that does not qualify for the presumption, set forth in Note 3
to this section, that it lacks market power on the foreign end of one or
more of the international routes included in the contract, or

\(3\) a carrier that has been classified as dominant for any service on
any of the international routes included in the contract, except for a
carrier classified as dominant on a particular route due only to a
foreign carrier affiliation under § 63.10 of this Chapter.

\(c\) With respect to contracts coming within the scope of paragraph
(a)(1)(ii) of this section between subject telephone carriers and
connecting carriers, except those contracts related to communications
with foreign or overseas points, such documents shall not be filed with
the Commission; but each subject telephone carrier shall maintain a copy
of such contracts to which it is a party in appropriate files at a
central location upon its premises, copies of which shall be readily
accessible to Commission staff and members of the public upon reasonable
request therefor; and upon request by the Commission, a subject
telephone carrier shall promptly forward individual contracts to the
Commission.

\(d\) \*\*\*

\(e\) International settlements policy. (1) Except as provided in
paragraph (e)(3) of this section, if a carrier files an operating or
other agreement with a foreign carrier pursuant to paragraph (a) of this
section to begin providing switched voice, telex, telegraph, or
packet-switched service between the United States and a foreign point
and the terms and conditions of such agreement relating to the exchange
of services, interchange or routing of traffic and matters concerning
rates, accounting rates, division of tolls, the allocation of return
traffic, or the basis of settlement of traffic balances, are not
identical to the equivalent terms and conditions in the operating
agreement of another carrier providing the same or similar service
between the United States and the same foreign point, the carrier must
also file with the International Bureau a modification request under §
64.1001 of this Chapter. Unless a carrier is providing switched voice,
telex, telegraph, or packet-switched service on a route that is exempt
from the international settlements policy, the carrier shall not bargain
for or agree to accept more than its proportionate share of return
traffic.

\(2\) Except as provided in paragraph (e)(3) of this section, if a
carrier files an amendment, pursuant to paragraph (a) of this section,
to an existing operating or other agreement with a foreign carrier to
provide switched voice, telex, telegraph, or packet-switched service
between the United States and a foreign point, and other carriers
provide the same or similar service to the same foreign point, and the
amendment relates to the exchange of services, interchange or routing of
traffic and matters concerning rates, accounting rates, division of
tolls, the allocation of return traffic, or the basis of settlement of
traffic balances, the carrier must also file with the International
Bureau a modification request under § 64.1001 of this Chapter.

\(3\) A carrier that enters into an operating or other agreement with a
foreign carrier for the provision of a common carrier service on an
international route is not subject to the requirements of paragraphs
(e)(1)-(2) of this section if the route appears on the Commission\'s
list of international routes that the Commission has exempted from the
international settlements policy.

Note 1 to § 43.51(e)(3): The Commission\'s list of international routes
exempted from the international settlements policy is available from the
International Bureau\'s World Wide Web site at <http://www.fcc.gov/ib>.
A party that seeks to add a foreign market to the list of markets that
are exempt from the international settlements policy must show that U.S.
carriers are able to terminate at least 50 percent of U.S.-billed
traffic in the foreign market at rates that are at least 25 percent
below the benchmark settlement rate adopted for that country in IB
Docket No. 96-261, Report and Order, 12 FCC Rcd 19,806, 62 FR 45758
(Aug. 29, 1997). A party that seeks to remove a foreign market from the
list of markets that are exempt from the international settlements
policy must show that U.S. carriers are unable to terminate at least 50
percent of U.S.-billed traffic in the foreign market at rates that are
at least 25 percent below the benchmark settlement rate adopted for that
country in IB Docket No. 96-261.

\(f\) Confidential treatment. (1) A carrier providing service on an
international route that is exempt from the international settlements
policy under paragraph (e)(3) of this section, but that is otherwise
required by paragraphs (a) and (b) of this section to file a contract
covering service on that route with the Commission, may request
confidential treatment under § 0.457 of this Chapter for the rates,
terms and conditions that govern the settlement of U.S. international
traffic.

\(2\) Carriers requesting confidential treatment under this paragraph
must include the information specified in § 64.1001(c) of this Chapter.
Such filings shall be made with the Commission, with a copy to the
Chief, International Bureau. The transmittal letter accompanying the
confidential filing shall clearly identify the filing as responsive to §
43.51(f).

Note 1 to § 43.51: For purposes of this section*, affiliated* and
*foreign carrier* are defined in § 63.09 of this Chapter.

Note 2 to § 43.51: To the extent that a foreign government provides
telecommunications services directly through a governmental
organization, body or agency, it shall be treated as a foreign carrier
for the purposes of this section.

Note 3 to § 43.51: Carriers shall rely on the Commission\'s list of
foreign carriers that do not qualify for the presumption that they lack
market power in particular foreign points for purposes of determining
which of their foreign carrier contracts are subject to the contract
filing requirements set forth in this section. The Commission\'s list of
foreign carriers that do not qualify for the presumption that they lack
market power in particular foreign points is available from the
International Bureau\'s World Wide Web site at <http://www.fcc.gov/ib>.
The Commission will include on the list of foreign carriers that do not
qualify for the presumption that they lack market power in particular
foreign points any foreign carrier that has 50 percent or more market
share in the international transport or local access markets of a
foreign point. A party that seeks to remove such a carrier from the
Commission\'s list bears the burden of submitting information to the
Commission sufficient to demonstrate that the foreign carrier lacks 50
percent market share in the international transport and local access
markets on the foreign end of the route or that it nevertheless lacks
sufficient market power on the foreign end of the route to affect
competition adversely in the U.S. market. A party that seeks to add a
carrier to the Commission\'s list bears the burden of submitting
information to the Commission sufficient to demonstrate that the foreign
carrier has 50 percent or more market share in the international
transport or local access markets on the foreign end of the route or
that it nevertheless has sufficient market power to affect competition
adversely in the U.S. market.

**PART 61 -- TARIFFS**

> 10\. The authority citation for part 61 continues to read as follows:

Authority: Sections 1, 4(i), 4(j), 201-205, and 403 of the
Communications Act of 1934, as amended 47 U.S.C. sections 151, 154(i),
154(j), 201-205, and 403 unless otherwise noted.

> 11\. Section 61.3 is amended by revising paragraph (y) to read as
> follows:

[§ 61.3 Definitions.]{.underline}

\*\*\*\*\*

\(y\) Non-dominant carrier. A carrier not found to be dominant. The
nondominant status of providers of international interexchange services
for purposes of this subpart is not affected by a carrier's
classification as dominant under § 63.10 of this Chapter.

\*\*\*\*\*

12\. Section 61.19 is revised to read as follows:

[§ 61.19 Detariffing of international and interstate, domestic
interexchange services.]{.underline}

\(a\) Except as otherwise provided in paragraphs (b) through (e) of this
section, or by Commission order, carriers that are nondominant in the
provision of international and interstate, domestic interexchange
services shall not file tariffs for such services.

\(b\) Carriers that are nondominant in the provision of international
and domestic, interstate, interexchange services are permitted to file
tariffs for dial-around 1+ services. For the purposes of this paragraph,
dial-around 1+ calls are those calls made by accessing the interexchange
carrier through the use of that carrier's carrier access code.

\(c\) Carriers that are nondominant in the provision of international
and domestic, interstate, interexchange services are permitted to file a
tariff for such services applicable to those customers who contact the
local exchange carrier to designate an interexchange carrier or to
initiate a change with respect to their primary interexchange carrier.
Such tariff will enable the interexchange carrier to provide service to
the customer until the interexchange carrier and the customer consummate
a written agreement, but in no event shall the interexchange carrier
provide service to its customer pursuant to such tariff for more than 45
days.

\(d\) Carriers that are nondominant in the provision of international
inbound collect calls to the United States are permitted to file a
tariff for such services.

\(e\) Carriers that are nondominant in the provision of "on-demand"
Mobile Satellite Services are permitted to file a tariff for such
services applicable to those customers that have not entered into
pre-existing service contracts designating a specific provider for such
services.

> 13\. Section 61.28 is revised to read as follows:

[§ 61.28 International dominant carrier tariff filing
requirements.]{.underline}

\(a\) Any carrier classified as dominant for the provision of particular
international communications services on a particular route for any
reason other than a foreign carrier affiliation under § 63.10 of this
Chapter shall file tariffs for those services pursuant to the notice and
cost support requirements for tariff filings of dominant domestic
carriers, as set forth in subpart E of this part.

\(b\) Other than the notice and cost support requirements set forth in
paragraph (a) of this section, all tariff filing requirements applicable
to all carriers classified as dominant for the provision of particular
international communications services on a particular route for any
reason other than a foreign carrier affiliation pursuant to § 63.10 of
this Chapter are set forth in subpart C of this part.

14\. Section 61.74 is amended by removing paragraph (d) and
redesignating paragraphs (e) and (f) as paragraphs (d) and (e).

PART 63 -- EXTENSION OF LINES, NEW LINES AND DISCONTINUANCE, REDUCTION,
OUTAGE AND IMPAIRMENT OF SERVICE BY COMMON CARRIERS; AND GRANTS OF
RECOGNIZED PRIVATE OPERATING AGENCY STATUS

13. 15\. The authority citation for part 63 continues to read as
    follows:

Authority: Section 1, 4(i), 4(j), 10, 11, 201-205, 214, 218, 403 and 651
of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, 47 U.S.C. 151, 154(i),
154(j), 160, 201-205, 214, 218, 403, and 571, unless otherwise noted.

16\. Section 63.10 is amended by removing paragraph (c)(1) and
redesignating paragraphs (c)(2) through (6) as paragraphs (c)(1) through
(5).

17\. Section 63.14 is amended by revising paragraph (c) to read as
follows:

[§ 63.14 Prohibition on agreeing to accept special
concessions.]{.underline}

\*\*\*\*\*

\(c\) This section shall not apply to the rates, terms and conditions in
an agreement between a U.S. carrier and a foreign carrier that govern
the settlement of international traffic, including the method for
allocating return traffic, if the international route is exempt from the
international settlements policy under § 43.51(e)(3) of this Chapter.

\*\*\*\*\*

> 18\. Section 63.17 is amended by revising paragraph (b)(3) to read as
> follows:

[§ 63.17 Special provisions for U.S. international common
carriers.]{.underline}

\*\*\*\*\*

\(b\) \*\*\*

\(3\) Authorized carriers filing tariffs pursuant to §§ 61.19 or 61.28
of this Chapter that route U.S.-billed traffic via switched hubbing
shall tariff their service on a "through" basis between the United
States and the ultimate point of origination or termination;

\*\*\*\*\*

19\. Section 63.21 is amended by revising paragraphs (b) and (c) to read
as follows:

[§ 63.21 Conditions applicable to all international Section 214
authorizations]{.underline}.

\*\*\*\*\*

\(b\) Carriers must file copies of operating agreements entered into
with their foreign correspondents as specified in § 43.51 of this
Chapter and shall otherwise comply with the filing requirements
contained in that section.

\(c\) Carriers regulated as dominant for the provision of a particular
international communications service on a particular route for any
reason other than a foreign carrier affiliation under § 63.10 shall file
tariffs pursuant to Section 203 of the Communications Act, 47 U.S.C.
203, and part 61 of this Chapter. Except as specified in § 20.15(d) of
this Chapter with respect to commercial mobile radio service providers,
carriers regulated as non-dominant, as defined in § 61.3 of this
Chapter, and providing detariffed international services pursuant to §
61.19 of this Chapter must comply with all applicable public disclosure
and maintenance of information requirements in §§ 42.10 and 42.11 of
this Chapter.

\*\*\*\*\*

**PART 64 -- MISCELLANEOUS RULES RELATING TO COMMON CARRIERS**

20. The authority citation for part 64 continues to read as follows:

Authority: 47 U.S.C. 151, 154, 201, 202, 205, 218-220,and 332 unless
otherwise noted.

21. Section 64.1001 is amended by revising paragraph (b) to read as
    follows:

[§ 64.1001 International settlements policy and modification
requests]{.underline}.

\*\*\*\*\*

\(b\) If the international settlement arrangement in the operating
agreement or amendment referred to in § 43.51(e)(1) or (e)(2) of this
Chapter differs from the arrangement in effect in the operating
agreement of another carrier providing service to or from the same
foreign point, the carrier must file a modification request under this
section unless the international route is exempt from the international
settlements policy under § 43.51(e)(3) of this Chapter.

\*\*\*\*\*

# Separate Statement of {#separate-statement-of .unnumbered}

# Commissioner Susan Ness {#commissioner-susan-ness .unnumbered}

Re: 2000 Biennial Regulatory Review; Policy and Rules Concerning the
International, Interexchange Marketplace (IB Docket No. 00-202)

Today's decision to eliminate unnecessary tariff filing requirements
underscores our commitment to deregulate whenever there is competition
and consumers are protected. Carriers providing international services
-- like those providing domestic long distance services \-- will now
establish contractual arrangements with their customers just as
virtually every other business in this country.

I also support our decision to require that carriers make public
information about the rates and terms of their offerings. Competition
has provided consumers with a dizzying array of services and calling
plan options. Consumers often find carriers' marketing and billing
information confusing and difficult to understand.

Public disclosure of rates and terms will increase the availability of
information so that consumers can choose the telecommunications services
that best meet their individual needs. Consumers will have a powerful
tool to shop around and compare rates, thereby leading to more informed
decisions, and fewer unpleasant surprises when the bill arrives.

Consumers today can log onto a website, input their calling patterns,
and receive a comparison of the interstate rates they would pay under
different plans. The public disclosure requirement ensures that consumer
organizations continue to have access to the information necessary to
provide and expand such services to consumers.

Economists generally agree that consumer access to accurate information
is vital for the efficient functioning of competitive markets. I am
pleased that this decision provides for such access. As a result of
today's action, I expect competition in the international services
market to intensify and consumers to reap the benefits.

**CONCURRING STATEMENT OF**

**COMMISSIONER HAROLD FURCHTGOTT-ROTH**

Re: Policy and Rules Concerning the International, Interexchange
Marketplace, 2000 Biennial Regulatory Review, IB Docket No. 00-202 ,
Report and Order (adopted March 16, 2001).

I fully support today's decision to detariff the vast majority of
international telecommunications services. However, as I stated at the
NPRM stage of this proceeding, I fear that today's Order perpetuates
some flawed tariff policies that harm consumers and hinder full and
efficient development of the marketplace.[^234]

As a general matter, I continue to object to the imposition of
ineffective and burdensome rules in the international context based on
the purported need for symmetry with the domestic detariffing item. I
believe the better approach would have been to eliminate these
obligations internationally now and call for comment on changing these
requirements domestically. I am hopeful that the Commission will revisit
all of these obligations as soon as practicable.

Our current international tariffing policies simply do not square with
market realities. First and fundamentally, I do not believe tariffs are
a useful regulatory tool in a competitive marketplace. Indeed, our
permissive detariffing approach to some offerings only serves to block
consumer claims under the filed rate doctrine. Telecommunications
consumers should be entitled to the full panoply of rights that
consumers in other competitive markets enjoy. In this regard,
competitive markets are driven in part by consumer price comparison.
Thus carriers have every incentive to disclose (and indeed advertise)
their rates.[^235] Today's item assumes the opposite -- by creating a
government mandate for disclosure both on the web and in one physical
location in the country.[^236] Similarly today's order imposes an
unnecessary record keeping requirement on international carriers. Under
today's order, carriers must maintain records for all international
service offerings for a period of at least two years and six
months.[^237] The item justifies this obligation based on the need to
have readily available information in the event a complaint is filed
(for example under sections 201 and 202 of the Act). Yet CMRS carriers
are subject to the same complaints, and we have no parallel obligation
on those providers. Carriers are well aware of their potential
liability. If they were to dispose of these records in an irresponsible
fashion, I have no doubt of the Commission's ability to take appropriate
action in a complaint case. Thus there appears to be little need to
create another document retention obligation.

In general today's item is simply too eager to mandate, and too
reluctant to examine the utility of the underlying rules. In a quickly
evolving and competitive marketplace, consumers and carriers will be
better served by a regulator that intervenes only when necessary -- and
focuses its discrete resources on tackling the true problems instead of
creating mandates to solve imaginary ones.

[^1]: *In the Matter of 2000 Biennial Regulatory Review; Policy and
    Rules Concerning the International, Interexchange Marketplace*, IB
    Docket No. 00-202, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 15 FCC Rcd 20008
    (2000) (*NPRM*).

[^2]: The Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §§ 151 *et seq.* The
    Telecommunications Act of 1996 (the 1996 Act) amends the
    Communications Act of 1934. Hereinafter, all citations to the
    Communications Act will be to the relevant section of the United
    States Code unless otherwise noted. The Communications Act of 1934,
    as amended, will be referred to herein as the Communications Act or
    the Act.

[^3]: 47 U.S.C. § 161.

[^4]: 47 U.S.C. § 161(a)(2).

[^5]: *See In the Matter of 2000 Biennial Regulatory Review: Amendment
    of Parts 43 and 63 of the Commission's Rules,* IB Docket No. 00-231,
    15 FCC Rcd 24264 (2000) and *Review of Commission Consideration of
    Applications under the Cable Landing License Act*, IB Docket No.
    00-106, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 15 FCC Rcd 20789 (2000).

[^6]: Section 203 requires every common carrier, except connecting
    carriers, to file with the Commission tariffs for itself and
    connecting carriers for the provision of interstate and foreign wire
    or radio communications. 47 U.S.C. § 203. *See* *In the Matter of
    Policy and Rules Concerning the Interstate, Interexchange
    Marketplace; Implementation of Section 254(g) of the Communications
    Act of 1934, as amended*, CC Docket No. 96-61, Notice of Proposed
    Rulemaking, 11 FCC Rcd 7141 (1996) (*Domestic Detariffing NPRM*);
    Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd 9564 (1996); Second Report and Order,
    11 FCC Rcd 20,730 (1996) (*Domestic Detariffing Order*); *stay
    granted, MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. FCC*, No. 96-1459 (D.C.
    Cir. Feb. 13, 1997); Order on Reconsideration, 12 FCC Rcd 15,014
    (1997) (*Domestic Detariffing Order on Reconsideration*); Second
    Order on Reconsideration and Erratum, 14 FCC Rcd 6004 (1999)
    (*Domestic Detariffing Second Order on Reconsideration*); *stay
    lifted and aff'd*, *MCI WorldCom, Inc., et al. v. FCC*, 209 F.3d 760
    (D.C. Cir. April 28, 2000), Memorandum Report and Order, DA 00-2586
    (CCB, rel. Nov. 17, 2000) (*Domestic Transition Order*).

[^7]: *See* 47 U.S.C. §§ 160, 160(d) (prohibiting the use of
    forbearance, except as provided in Section 251(f), with respect to
    the requirements of Sections 251(c) or 271 until the Commission
    determines that the requirements have been fully implemented).
    Section 10(a) of the Act reads as follows:

    > \[T\]he Commission shall forbear from applying any regulation or
    > any provision of this Act to a telecommunications carrier or
    > telecommunications service, or class of telecommunications
    > carriers or telecommunications services, in any or some of its or
    > their geographic markets, if the Commission determines that --

    enforcement of such regulation or provision is not necessary to
    ensure that the charges, practices, classifications or regulations
    by, for, or in connection with that telecommunications carrier or
    telecommunications service are just and reasonable, and are not
    unjustly or unreasonably discriminatory;

    enforcement of such regulation or provision is not necessary for the
    protection of consumers; and

    forbearance from applying such provision or regulation is consistent
    with the public interest.

    > 47 U.S.C. §160.

[^8]: *NPRM,*15 FCC Rcd at 20021, paras. 19-21. We note that "complete"
    or mandatory detariffing refers to a policy of prohibiting
    nondominant interexchange carriers from filing tariffs pursuant to
    Section 203 of the Act. "Permissive" or voluntary detariffing refers
    to a policy of permitting, but not requiring, nondominant
    interexchange carriers to file tariffs for services.

[^9]: *MCI WorldCom, Inc. et al. v. FCC*, 209 F.3d 760 (D.C. Cir. April
    28, 2000).

[^10]: *Domestic Detariffing Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at 20,733, para. 5.

[^11]: *See infra* note 57.

[^12]: *Domestic Detariffing Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at 20,733, para. 5*.*

[^13]: *Domestic Detariffing NPRM*, 11 FCC Rcd at 7160, para. 33
    (defering to this proceeding the question of whether the Commission
    should consider generally forbearing from requiring tariffs for
    international services provided by a non-dominant carrier, but
    seeking comment on whether to forbear from applying tariffs to the
    international portion of domestic and international bundled service
    offerings); *Domestic Detariffing Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at 20,781-83,
    paras. 94-98 (finding that there is insufficient evidence to
    determine if forbearance is required for the international portion
    of domestic and international bundled service offerings); *Domestic
    Detariffing Order on Reconsideration*, 12 FCC Rcd at 15,043-44,
    paras. 51-52 (affirming decision that there is insufficient evidence
    to make a determination).

[^14]: *NPRM,* 15 FCC Rcd at 20015-20017, paras. 7-12.

[^15]: *NPRM,* 15 FCC Rcd at 20023-20024, paras. 22-26.

[^16]: *NPRM,* 15 FCC Rcd at 20015-20017, paras. 8-12.

[^17]: The results of the WTO basic telecommunications services
    negotiations are incorporated into the General Agreement on Trade in
    Services (GATS) by the Fourth Protocol to the GATS, April 30, 1996,
    36 I.L.M. 366 (1997). These results, as well as the basic
    obligations contained in the GATS, are referred to herein as the
    "WTO Basic Telecom Agreement." *See Rules and Policies on Foreign
    Participation in the U.S. Telecommunications Market*, IB Docket Nos.
    97-142 and 95-22, Report and Order and Order on Reconsideration, 12
    FCC Rcd 23,891 (1997) (*Foreign Participation Order*), Order on
    Reconsideration, FCC 00-339 (rel. September 19, 2000);
    *International Settlement Rates*, IB Docket No. 96-261, Report and
    Order, 12 FCC Rcd 19,806 (1997) (*Benchmarks Order*); Report and
    Order on Reconsideration and Order Lifting Stay, 14 FCC Rcd 9256
    (1999) (*Benchmarks Reconsideration Order*); *aff'd sub nom. Cable &
    Wireless P.L.C. v. FCC*, 166 F.3d 1224 (D.C. Cir. 1999); *1998
    Biennial Regulatory Review, Reform of the International Settlements
    Policy and Associated Filing Requirements*, IB Docket Nos. 98-148
    and 95-22, CC Docket No. 90-337 (Phase II), Report and Order and
    Order on Reconsideration, 14 FCC Rcd 7963 (1999) (*ISP Reform
    Order*).

[^18]: *NPRM,* 15 FCC Rcd at 20012, para. 4. *See infra* Part II.A.1.

[^19]: *See* discussion *infra* Part II.A.

[^20]: As we noted in the *NPRM*, the regulatory safeguards imposed on
    carriers that are regulated as dominant on particular routes because
    of an affiliation or alliance with a foreign carrier with market
    power are set forth in 47 C.F.R. § 63.10 and differ from the
    regulatory safeguards that the Commission has imposed on carriers
    that are dominant for reasons other than a foreign carrier
    affiliation, *eg.* price cap regulation[.]{.mark} *NPRM,* 15 FCC Rcd
    at 20010, para. 2.

[^21]: *See* Appendix A.

[^22]: *See e.g.,* *Ad Hoc Reply* at 1; *AT&T Wireless Comments* at 1
    (for CMRS carriers); *BTNA Comments* at 1; *Cingular Wireless
    Comments* at 1; *CompTel Comments* at 1-2; *ComSat Comments* at 1;
    *Excel* *Comments* at 1; *GSA Comments* at 2; *SNET Reply* at 1;
    *Verizon Wireless* at 1 (for CMRS carriers); *Viatel* *Comments* at
    1; *Joint Comments* at i, 3.

[^23]: *See* Appendix B.

[^24]: *See infra* Part II.A.3.

[^25]: *See infra* Part II.B. We apply the maintenance of information
    requirement to CMRS providers of international interexchange
    services for those routes on which they are affiliated with a
    foreign carrier that has market power. However, we decline to extend
    the public disclosure requirements to those CMRS providers. *See
    infra* Part II.D.

[^26]: *See* discussion *supra,* para. 7.

[^27]: *See infra* Part II.C.

[^28]: *See infra* Part II.D. The Commission has previously detariffed
    the domestic interexchange services of CMRS providers and chose to
    detariff permissively the international services of CMRS providers
    to unaffiliated points. *See Implementation of Sections 3(n) and 332
    of the Communications Act, Regulatory Treatment of Mobile Services*,
    Second Report and Order, 9 FCC Rcd 1411 (1994) (*CMRS Second Report
    and Order*). *See* *Personal Communications Industry Association's
    Broadband Personal Communications Services Alliance's Petition for
    Forbearance for Broadband Personal Communications* Services,
    Memorandum Opinion and Order and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 13
    FCC Rcd 16,857 (1998) (*CMRS Forbearance Order*).

[^29]: *See infra* Part II.E.

[^30]: *See infra* Part III. *See Domestic Transition Order,* DA 00-2586
    (CCB, rel. Nov. 17, 2000).

[^31]: 47 U.S.C. § 160(a). *See supra* note 7.

[^32]: 47 U.S.C. § 160(b).

[^33]: We note that CMRS providers do not use exchanges in the provision
    of wireless services. In any event, the use of the term
    "interexchange" is not necessary to the implementation of these
    rules to detariff all international CMRS.

[^34]: The Section 203 tariffing requirement applies to "every common
    carrier, except connecting carriers." *See* 47 U.S.C. § 203.

[^35]: *Domestic Detariffing Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at 20,776-77, para. 85.

[^36]: *Domestic Detariffing Second Order on Reconsideration*, 14 FCC
    Rcd at 6014-15, note 60.

[^37]: *Id*. *See also* *Domestic Transition Order* at para. 20 ("We
    reiterate the requirement explicitly stated in the \[*Domestic
    Detariffing Second Order on Reconsideration*\] that information on
    [all]{.underline} services must be publicly disclosed, including
    information on services offered through individually negotiated
    contracts.").

[^38]: *Level 3 Comments* at 2. Level 3 specifically requests that the
    Commission modify its proposed rules to ensure that the public
    disclosure and contract filing requirements would be inapplicable to
    international private line services or dedicated access services, as
    well as the voice services of large business and carrier end-users.
    We address this issue in Part II.B.

[^39]: *NPRM,* 15 FCC Rcd at 20017, para. 11.

[^40]: *See* 47 U.S.C. §§ 201-202. Section 201(b) requires that "\[a\]ll
    charges, practices, classifications, and regulations for and in
    connection with such communication services, shall be just and
    reasonable, and any such charge, practice, classification or
    regulation that is unjust or unreasonable is hereby declared to be
    unlawful." 47 U.S.C. § 201(b). Section 202 declares it "unlawful for
    any common carrier to make any unjust or unreasonable discrimination
    in charges, practices, classifications, regulations, facilities, or
    services for or in connection with like communication service . . .
    ." 47 U.S.C. § 202.

[^41]: *Ad Hoc Reply* at 4; BTNA *Comments* at 3; *Cingular Wireless
    Comments* at 3,5; *Joint Comments* at 6.

[^42]: *NPRM,* 15 FCC Rcd at 20015, para. 8. *See Motion of AT&T Corp.
    to be Declared Non-Dominant for International* Services, Order, 11
    FCC Rcd 17,963 (1996) (*AT&T International Non-Dominance Order*).
    *Id.* at 17,994-95, paras. 82-85, and at 18,000, para. 101.

[^43]: *NPRM,* 15 FCC Rcd at 20016, paras. 9-10.

[^44]: The current international accounting rate system was developed as
    part of a regulatory tradition in which international
    telecommunications services were supplied through a bilateral
    correspondent relationship between national monopoly carriers. An
    accounting rate is the price a U.S. facilities-based carrier
    negotiates with a foreign carrier for handling one minute of
    international telephone service. Each carrier's portion of the
    accounting rate is referred to the settlement rate. In almost all
    cases, the settlement rate is equal to one-half of the negotiated
    accounting rate.

[^45]: *NPRM,* 15 FCC Rcd at 20016, para. 9. The *Benchmarks Order*
    requires U.S. carriers to negotiate settlement rates that comply
    with the "benchmark" rates established by the Commission. The
    benchmark rates, and the transition schedule for achieving these
    rates, vary based upon a country's economic classification. In the
    *Benchmarks Order*, the Commission established benchmark settlement
    rates of \$0.15 per minute for upper income countries; \$0.19 for
    upper middle income and lower middle income countries; and \$0.23
    for lower income countries and countries with teledensity \< 1.
    *Benchmarks Order*, 12 FCC Rcd at 19,815-16, para. 19. Since the
    *Benchmarks Order* took effect on January 1, 1998, over 99% of the
    settled minutes for countries in the upper income and upper-middle
    income categories and over 65% of the settled minutes in the lower
    middle income category are in compliance with the benchmark rates.
    *See also Regulation of International Accounting Rates*, CC Docket
    No. 90-337, Phase II, Fourth Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd 20,063
    (1996) (*Flexibility Order*); *ISP Reform Order*, 14 FCC Rcd 7963
    (1999).

[^46]: The U.S. average accounting rate is a figure composed of the
    rates between the United States and all international points where
    each country\'s rate is weighted by its minutes to and from the
    United States.

[^47]: *ISP Reform Order,* 14 FCC Rcd at 7971-73, paras. 23-29.

[^48]: *Allegiance Telecom Comments* at 4.

[^49]: FCC, Section 43.61 International Telecommunications Data, Table
    A1, 1996 and 1999.

[^50]: For example, on the United States to United Kingdom route,
    discount residential rates for the peak period charged by the major
    carriers varied between \$0.30 and \$0.80 per minute in 1996; by
    1999, these rates were as low as \$0.10 per minute. On the United
    States to Japan route, discount rates varied between \$0.45 and
    \$1.30 per minute in 1996; by 1999, these rates were as low as
    \$0.16 per minute. On the United States to India route, discount
    rates varied between \$0.73 and \$1.70 per minute in 1996; by 1999,
    these rates were as low as \$0.55 per minute. Rates are based upon
    publicly available tariffs of AT&T, MCI WorldCom, and Sprint.
    Monthly recurring charges for calling plans for which these rates
    were available remained the same at \$3.00 per month or dropped to
    \$2.00 per month.

[^51]: *See AT&T International Non-dominance Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at
    17,980, para. 46.

[^52]: 47 U.S.C. § 208. *Domestic Detariffing Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at
    20,742-43, para. 21 (ability under Section 208 to investigate and
    adjudicate complaints is sufficient to address illegal carrier
    conduct); *Competitive Carrier Sixth Report and Order,* 99 FCC 2d at
    1029, para. 12 (tariffs "are not essential" to the Commission's
    ability to ensure that carriers' rates comply with the Act because
    the Commission has "other means to ensure our enforcement of the
    mandates of the Act," -- including the Commission's Section 208
    complaint process); *CMRS Second Report and Order* at 1478-79.

[^53]: *AT&T International Non-dominance Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at 17,980,
    para. 46.

[^54]: 47 U.S.C. § 161.

[^55]: *NPRM,* 15 FCC Rcd at 20018-20020, paras. 14-16.

[^56]: *NPRM,* 15 FCC Rcd at 20018, para. 14.

[^57]: Pursuant to the "filed-rate" doctrine, where a filed tariff rate,
    term or condition differs from a rate, term, or condition set in a
    non-tariffed carrier-customer contract, the carrier is required to
    assess the tariff rate, term or condition. *See Armour Packing Co.
    v. United States*, 209 U.S. 56 (1908); *American Broadcasting Cos.,
    Inc. v. FCC*, 643 F.2d 818 (D.C. Cir. 1980); *see also Aero
    Trucking, Inc. v. Regal Tube Co.*, 594 F.2d 619 (7^th^ Cir. 1979);
    *Farley Terminal Co., Inc. v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry.,* 522 F.2d
    1095 (9^th^ Cir.), *cert. denied*, 423 U.S. 996 (1975).
    Consequently, if a carrier unilaterally changes a rate by filing a
    tariff revision, the newly filed rate becomes the applicable rate
    unless the revised rate is found to be unjust, unreasonable, or
    unlawful under the Communications Act. *See* 47 U.S.C. § 201(b);
    *see also Maislin Industries, U.S., Inc. v. Primary Steel, Inc.,*
    497 U.S. 116 (1990).

[^58]: 47 U.S.C. § 203(c).

[^59]: *NPRM,* 15 FCC Rcd at 20019, paras. 15-16.

[^60]: *Id.* at 20019, para. 16 (citing *Domestic Detariffing Order*, 11
    FCC Rcd at 20,750, para. 37).

[^61]: *Id.* at 20019, para. 15.

[^62]: *GTC Comments* at 2.

[^63]: *Id.* at ii, 3-10.

[^64]: *Id.* at 11.

[^65]: *See supra* note 7.

[^66]: *See supra* discussion, para. 3.

[^67]: *CompTel Comments* at 2; *Joint Comments* at 5.

[^68]: *Domestic Detariffing Second Order* *on Reconsideration*, 14 FCC
    Rcd at 6015, para. 17.

[^69]: *GTC Comments* at 11.

[^70]: *GTC Comments* at 15.

[^71]: *NPRM*, 15 FCC Rcd at 20034, paras. 52-55.

[^72]: *See supra*, paras. 33-34.

[^73]: *See supra*, para. 47.

[^74]: 47 U.S.C. § 160(a).

[^75]: *NPRM,* 15 FCC Rcd at 20020, para. 17.

[^76]: 47 U.S.C. § 160(b).

[^77]: *NPRM,* 15 FCC Rcd at 20020, para. 17 (citing *Domestic
    Detariffing Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at 20,773, para. 4, and at 20,760,
    para 52).

[^78]: *Id.* at 20021, para. 20. "Dial-around 1+ services" are
    transactional services for which a consumer can "dial-around" its
    presubscribed long distance carrier by dialing a carrier access
    code, *i.e.,* 10-10-XXX, and access the network of another long
    distance carrier. "LEC-implemented new customer services" describe
    the services provided by a long distance carrier that a customer has
    selected by contacting its local exchange carrier rather than the
    long distance carrier directly. In both circumstances, a long
    distance carrier would likely be unable to contact the customer to
    provide notice of rate and service information prior to the
    completion of the call. *Domestic Detariffing Order on
    Reconsideration*, 12 FCC Rcd 15,014 at 15,026-41, paras. 18-44.

[^79]: *NPRM,* 15 FCC Rcd at 20021-20022, paras. 20-21.

[^80]: *Ad Hoc* *Reply* at 1; *AT&T Wireless* *Comments* at 1; *Cingular
    Wireless* *Comments* at 1; *CompTel* *Comments* at 1-2; *GSA
    Comments* at 3; *Verizon Wireless Comments* at 1; *Viatel Comments*
    at 1; *Joint Comments* at 3; *Joint Reply* at 2.

[^81]: *NPRM,* 15 FCC Rcd at 20020, para. 18. *Domestic Detariffing
    Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at 20,761, para. 54 (noting the accounts of
    commenters claiming that carriers refuse to negotiate requested
    terms and conditions on the grounds that the requested terms and
    conditions are not contained in carriers' tariffs and that the
    Commission would reject any differing terms and conditions). *See
    also GSA Comments* at 3.

[^82]: NPRM, 15 FCC Rcd at 20020, para. 18 (citing *Competitive Carrier
    Sixth Report and Order,* 99 FCC 2d at 1030, para. 13; *Domestic
    Detariffing Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at 20,760-61, para. 53).

[^83]: *NPRM,* 15 FCC Rcd at 20021, para. 19.

[^84]: *Allegiance Telecom Comments* at 5.

[^85]: *Id.*

[^86]: *Id.* at 6.

[^87]: *GTC Comments* at 2.

[^88]: *NPRM,* 15 FCC Rcd at 20026, para. 30 (citing *Domestic
    Detariffing Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at 20,762-65, paras. 56-59). As AT&T
    Wireless notes with respect to CMRS services, detariffing will not
    hamper CMRS providers' ability to establish service arrangements
    with customers, as tariffs are not the only means of establishing
    terms and conditions. *AT&T Wireless Comments* at 2.

[^89]: *Ad Hoc Reply* at 4; *BTNA Comments* at 4; *Joint Reply* at note
    5.

[^90]: *BTNA* *Comments* at 5.

[^91]: *NPRM,* 15 FCC Rcd at 20021, para. 20.

[^92]: *NPRM,* 15 FCC Rcd at 20021-20022, paras. 20-21.

[^93]: *GSA Comments* at 5; *GSA* *Reply* at 5; *Joint Comments* at
    9-10; *SNET Reply* at 3-4.

[^94]: Casual calling services, which include direct dial 1+ services,
    are those services that do not require the calling party to
    establish an account with an interexchange carrier or otherwise
    presubscribe to a service. *Domestic Detariffing Order on
    Reconsideration*, 12 FCC Rcd at 15,032-33, para. 30.

[^95]: *NPRM*, 15 FCC Rcd at 20021, para. 20 (citing *Domestic
    Detariffing Order on Reconsideration*, 12 FCC Rcd at 15,034, para.
    32).

[^96]: *Id.* at 20021, para. 20 (citing *Domestic Detariffing Order on
    Reconsideration,* 12 FCC Rcd at 15,034-35, para. 33). *Joint
    Comments* at 9-10.

[^97]: Letters from Brian Cute, Senior Regulatory Counsel, Teleglobe
    USA, to Magalie Salas, Secretary, FCC (filed Nov. 22, 2000 and Dec.
    4, 2000) (*Teleglobe Ex partes*). *See also* letter from Carol Ann
    Bischoff, Executive Vice President and General Counsel, CompTel, to
    Magalie Salas, Secretary, FCC (filed March 2, 2001) (noting that,
    for some inbound collect international calling services, the
    operator on the foreign end handling the call does not have complete
    information about the rates, terms and conditions to disclose to the
    called party in the United States).

[^98]: *Teleglobe ex parte* (filed Dec. 4, 2000).

[^99]: For example, it is possible that a Bolivian foreign carrier
    randomly selected U.S. carrier "X" to carry an international inbound
    collect call from Bolivia to the U.S. customer, but U.S. carrier "Y"
    received the billing record of that call from the foreign carrier at
    the end of the billing cycle as part of its negotiated proportion of
    minutes of collect call traffic. Therefore, U.S. carrier "Y" would
    then bill the U.S. customer for the collect call pursuant to its FCC
    tariff for international inbound collect calls on the U.S.-Bolivia
    route.

[^100]: *See* discussion of detariffing for other CMRS services *supra*,
    Part II.D.

[^101]: *ComSat Comments* at 2.

[^102]: *Id.* at 2-3.

[^103]: *Id.* at 3.

[^104]: *Id.* The notable exception is when a customer has signed an
    "ISP service contract" with a particular provider. *ComSat Comments*
    at note 5.

[^105]: *Id.* at 3.

[^106]: *ComSat Comments* at 4-5.

[^107]: *Id.* at 1.

[^108]: *NPRM*, 15 FCC Rcd at 20021, para. 21 (citing *Domestic
    Detariffing Order on Reconsideration*, 12 FCC Rcd at 15,037-38,
    para. 39).

[^109]: 47 U.S.C. §§ 160(a), 160(b).

[^110]: *See* Appendix B.

[^111]: *NPRM,* 15 FCC Rcd at 20023, para. 23.

[^112]: *Id.* at 20023, para. 22 (citing *Domestic Detariffing Order*,
    11 FCC Rcd at 20,745-46, para. 25).

[^113]: *Id.* at 20024, para. 25 (citing *Domestic Detariffing Second
    Order on Reconsideration*, 14 FCC Rcd at 6015-16, para. 18).

[^114]: *Id.* at 20024, para. 25 (citing *Domestic Detariffing Order*,
    11 FCC Rcd at 20,776-77, paras. 84-86).

[^115]: *Id.* at 20026, para. 31.

[^116]: *Id.* at 20026, para. 31.

[^117]: *BTNA Comments* at 4; *TMISC Comments* at 4; *GSA Comments* at
    6; *GSA Reply* at 7.

[^118]: *Joint Comments* at note 4; *Joint Reply* at note 2.

[^119]: Joint Comments at note 4. However, we note that the joint
    commenters acknowledge that the maintenance of information
    requirement is an additional mechanism for the Commission to monitor
    compliance with its rules and justifies mandatory detariffing for
    international services on routes where a U.S. carrier is affiliated
    with a foreign carrier with market power. *Joint Comments* at 8;
    *Joint Reply* at note 5.

[^120]: *Domestic Detariffing Second Order on Reconsideration*, 14 FCC
    Rcd at 6016, para. 19.

[^121]: *Id.* at 6015-16, para. 18.

[^122]: *BTNA Comments* at 4-5.

[^123]: *NPRM,* 15 FCC Rcd at 20024, para. 25 (citing *Domestic
    Detariffing Second Recon Order,* 14 FCC Rcd at 6015-16, para. 18).

[^124]: *TMISC Comments* at 7.

[^125]: *Transition Order* at para. 17.

[^126]: *NPRM,* 15 FCC Rcd at 20024, para. 25.

[^127]: *Level 3 Comments* at 3. *See infra* Part II.E. for a discussion
    of the contract filing requirements.

[^128]: *Level 3 Comments* at 4.

[^129]: *Id.* at 5; *Ad Hoc Reply* at 8.

[^130]: *Level 3 Comments* at 5.

[^131]: *Id.*at 7.

[^132]: *See discussion supra* para. 11.

[^133]: *Domestic Detariffing Second Order on Reconsideration*, 14 FCC
    Rcd at 6014-15, note 60.

[^134]: We note that the GSA, the representative of Federal Executive
    Agencies as large customers of telecommunications services, supports
    the public disclosure requirements. *GSA Comments* at 6-7.

[^135]: *Domestic Detariffing Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at 20,776, para. 84.

[^136]: *Domestic Detariffing Order on Reconsideration*, 12 FCC Rcd at
    15,050-54, paras. 66-73; Ad Hoc Reply at 7.

[^137]: *NPRM,* 15 FCC Rcd at 20023, para. 24.

[^138]: *Domestic Detariffing Second Order on Reconsideration*, 14 FCC
    Rcd at 6013-15, para. 16.

[^139]: *Domestic Detariffing Order on Reconsideration*, 12 FCC Rcd at
    15,052, para. 69.

[^140]: *Domestic Detariffing Second Order on Reconsideration*, 14 FCC
    Rcd at 6015-16, para. 18.

[^141]: *NPRM,* 15 FCC Rcd at 20024, para. 26. *Domestic Detariffing
    Order,* 11 FCC Rcd at 20,777-78, para. 87. We note that we do not
    propose to require that carriers make such supporting documentation
    available to the public.

[^142]: *Cingular Wireless Comments* at note 23 (requesting
    clarification on what the Commission intended in the *NPRM* as
    constituting supporting information).

[^143]: *NPRM,* 15 FCC Rcd at 20024, para. 26.

[^144]: NPRM, 15 FCC Rcd at \_\_\_, para. \_\_\_.

[^145]: *Benchmarks Order,* 12 FCC Rcd at 19,908-09, para. 224. In
    addition to the rebuttable presumption, the *Benchmarks Order*
    applied to U.S. carriers' section 214 authorizations a condition
    that required that, before any U.S. carrier may provide
    facilities-based switched or private line service on a route where
    it is affiliated with a foreign carrier with market power, the
    foreign affiliate must offer all U.S. carriers on the route a rate
    for settling traffic that is at or below the relevant benchmark
    rate. In the Commission's 1999 *Benchmarks Reconsideration Order*,
    the Commission narrowed the application of this condition to U.S.
    carriers with foreign carrier affiliates that possess market power.
    *Benchmarks Reconsideration Order*, 14 FCC Rcd 9256 (1999). We note
    that the Commission has proposed to narrow further the condition by
    eliminating it for authorizations to provide facilities-based
    private line services. *In the Matter of 2000 Biennial Regulatory
    Review; Amendment of Parts 43 & 63 of the Commission's Rules*, IB
    Docket No. 00-231, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, FCC 00-407 (rel.
    Nov. 30, 2000).

[^146]: *See supra* Part II.B.

[^147]: 47 C.F.R. § 63.10(c).

[^148]: *BTNA Comments* at 5; *CompTel Comments* at 3;

[^149]: *CMRS Second Report and Order*, 9 FCC Rcd 1411 (1994). 47 U.S.C.
    § 332.

[^150]: *CMRS Forbearance Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 16,884, para. 56.

[^151]: *CMRS Forbearance Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 16,885, paras. 57-58.

[^152]: *Id.* at 16,885-86, para 59.

[^153]: *NPRM,* 15 FCC Rcd at 20026, para. 30. AT&T Wireless states that
    detariffing will not hamper CMRS providers' ability to establish
    service arrangements with customers, as tariffs are not the only
    means of establishing terms and conditions. *AT&T Wireless Comments*
    at 2.

[^154]: *Verizon Wireless Comments* at 3.

[^155]: *See supra* Part II.A.2.

[^156]: *See supra* Part II.A.3.

[^157]: *CMRS Forbearance Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 16,886-87, para. 60.

[^158]: *See supra* Part II.C. In addition, the Commission has
    recognized that carriers will continue to obtain information about
    their competitors' rates and service offerings regardless of whether
    the Commission requires public disclosure. *See supra* para. 51.

[^159]: *Benchmarks Order*, 12 FCC Rcd at 19,896, para. 192.

[^160]: *Cingular Wireless Comments* at 1.

[^161]: *Id.* at 6.

[^162]: *Id.* at 7.

[^163]: *Cingular Wireless Comments* at 8.

[^164]: *See infra* paras. 59, 60.

[^165]: We note that if an authorized carrier provides services on a
    route on which it is affiliated with a foreign carrier possessing
    market power solely through the resale of the switched services of
    unaffiliated providers, the carrier is presumed non-dominant, and
    the Commission does not apply the dominant carrier safeguards in
    rule 63.10 to the carrier's provision of service on that route. 47
    C.F.R. § 63.10(a)(4). *See also* Market Entry and Regulation of
    Foreign-Affiliated Entities, IB Docket No. 95-22, *Report and
    Order*, 11 FCC Rcd 3873 (1995), para. 143 (citing Regulation of
    International Common Carrier Services, *Report and Order*, 7 FCC Rcd
    7331, 7335 (1992)).

[^166]: *Rules and Policies on Foreign Participation in the U.S.
    Telecommunications Market*, IB Docket No. 97-142, Report and Order,
    12 FCC Rcd 23891, 23979-83, *recon. denied in relevant part*, FCC
    00-339 (rel. Sept. 19, 2000) at paras. 68-69.

[^167]: 47 C.F.R. § 63.09(e).

[^168]: *See* Appendix B.

[^169]: Section 43.51 also contains a reporting requirement that applies
    to any U.S. carrier that interconnects an international private line
    to the U.S. public switched network at the carrier\'s switch, 47
    C.F.R. § 43.51(d), and the Commission\'s international settlements
    policy, 47 C.F.R. § 43.51(e).

[^170]: *See* 47 C.F.R. § 43.51(a).

[^171]: 47 U.S.C. § 211.

[^172]: 47 U.S.C. § 211(a).

[^173]: 47 U.S.C. § 211(b).

[^174]: *Amendment of Sections 43.51, 43.52, 43.53, 43.54 and 43.74 of
    the Commission\'s Rules to Eliminate Certain Reporting
    Requirements*, CC Docket No. 85-346, Report and Order, 1 FCC Rcd
    933, 934, para. 10 (1986) (*Reporting Streamlining Order*).

[^175]: The "No Special Concessions" rule prohibits U.S. international
    carriers from agreeing to accept special concessions directly or
    indirectly from any foreign carrier with respect to any U.S.
    international route where the foreign carrier possesses sufficient
    market power on the foreign end of the route to affect competition
    adversely in the U.S. market. 47 C.F.R. § 63.14. The specific types
    of arrangements covered by the "No Special Concessions" rule are set
    forth in 47 C.F.R. § 63.14(b). *See also Foreign Participation
    Order*, 12 FCC Rcd at 23960-62, para. 163 (carriers must file
    contracts under Section 43.51).

[^176]: *ISP Reform Order*, 14 FCC Rcd at 7971-73, paras. 21-29 and at
    7980-81, para. 49. *See also* 47 C.F.R. § 43.51(g).

[^177]: *See Amendment of Sections 43.51, 43.52, 43.53, 43.54 and 43.74
    of the Commission\'s Rules to Eliminate* *Certain Reporting
    Requirements*, CC Docket No. 85-346, Notice of Proposed Rule Making,
    102 FCC 2d 531, para. 4 (\"Due to non-dominant carriers\' lack of
    market power, and the competitive forces which surround them, we
    conclude that any contract between non-dominant carriers can be
    reasonably interpreted as \'minor\' and thus subject to our
    exemption power under Section 211(b).\"). *See also Reporting
    Streamlining Order*, 1 FCC Rcd at 933-34, paras. 2-3.

[^178]: 47 C.F.R. §§ 63.10, 43.51.

[^179]: *See, e.g, Foreign Participation Order*, 12 FCC Rcd at 24007,
    para. 259 (\"\[O\]ur contract filing requirement in Section 43.51 of
    the Commission\'s rules enables us to detect instances where
    carriers enter into arrangements that are inconsistent with our
    rules and policies.\").

[^180]: "Whipsawing" is a practice that occurs when a foreign carrier
    with monopoly power pits competing U.S. carriers against one another
    in settlement rate negotiations, exploiting the fact that U.S.
    carriers unwilling to pay settlement rates demanded by foreign
    carriers would lose business on those routes to higher-bidding U.S.
    competitors, as there are no alternative means of terminating
    international traffic. The Commission has determined that this
    practice can be detrimental to U.S. consumers as it can drive up the
    cost to U.S. carriers of terminating international traffic in
    foreign markets and hence, the prices to U.S. consumers. *ISP Reform
    Order*, 14 FCC Rcd at 79773-74, para. 31.

[^181]: *See 1998 Biennial Regulatory Review: Reform of the
    International Settlements Policy and Associated Filing
    Requirements*, IB Docket Nos. 98-148 and 95-22, CC Docket No. 90-337
    (Phase II), Notice of Proposed Rule Making, 13 FCC Rcd 15,320 at
    15,328-29, para. 21 (*ISP Reform NPRM*).

[^182]: 47 C.F.R. § 63.14

[^183]: *1998 Biennial Regulatory Review, Reform of the International
    Settlements Policy and Associated Filing Requirements*, Report and
    Order, 14 FCC Rcd 7963(1999) (*ISP Reform Order).*

[^184]: *Foreign Participation Order*, 12 FCC Rcd at 23, 958, para. 157.

[^185]: *See* s*upra*, para. 66.

[^186]: 47 U.S.C. § 208. *See Domestic Detariffing Order on
    Reconsideration*, 12 FCC Rcd at 15051, para. 68 (\"\[Commission\]
    can remedy any carrier conduct that violates the requirement that
    carriers make individually-negotiated service arrangements available
    to similarly-situated customers through the section 208 complaint
    process. . .\").

[^187]: *Reporting Streamlining Order*, 1 FCC Rcd at 933, para. 3.

[^188]: The Commission adopted procedures for compiling this list in its
    *ISP Reform Order*, 14 FCC Rcd at 7978 --81, paras. 42-49. The
    Commission adopted this list for purposes of identifying settlement
    arrangements that are not required to comply with the International
    Settlements Policy and the Commission's No Special Concession Rule.

[^189]: *See supra* Part II.B for a discussion of the disclosure and
    maintenance of price and service information.

[^190]: *See* s*upra*, paras. 68-70.

[^191]: *See* 47 C.F.R. § 43.51(a)(3).

[^192]: Revisions to Sections 43.51 and 63.21 of the Commission's rules
    are included in Appendix B.

[^193]: 47 C.F.R. § 43.61.

[^194]: *SNET* Reply at 4-5; Verizon *Wireless Comments* at 4-6.

[^195]: *Federal Communications Commission Biennial Regulatory Review
    2000,* Staff Report, FCC 00-346 (rel. Sept. 19, 2000).

[^196]: *NPRM,* 15 FCC Rcd at 20013, para. 5.

[^197]: *Domestic Detariffing Order on Reconsideration*, 12 FCC Rcd at
    15,044, para. 52.

[^198]: *Public Notice*, DA 00-1028 (2000).

[^199]: *Id.*

[^200]: *Domestic Transition Order* at para. 4.

[^201]: *CompTel Comments* at 2; *Excel Comments* at 2; *Joint Comments*
    at 4, 14.

[^202]: We expect carriers to follow the same procedures to cancel
    tariffs set forth in the public notice issued by the Common Carrier
    Bureau on May 9, 2000. *See* *Public Notice*, DA 00-128 (rel. May 9,
    2000).

[^203]: *Domestic Transition Order* at para. 15.

[^204]: *Id.* at para. 17.

[^205]: *See e.g.,* *Ad Hoc Reply* at 3; *BTNA Comments* at 6; *CompTel
    Comments* at 4; *Excel Comments* at 1; *Viatel Comments* at 2;
    *Joint Comments of WorldCom, AT&T, Concert, Qwest, and Sprint* at 4,
    12.

[^206]: *Excel Comments* at 2.

[^207]: *CompTel Comments* at 4; Viatel *Comments* at 2.

[^208]: *CompTel Comments* at 4; *Joint Comments* at 13.

[^209]: *Joint Comments* at 13.

[^210]: *Viatel Comments* at 3.

[^211]: *Excel Comments* at 3.

[^212]: Letter from Michael F. Del Casino to Magalie Roman Salas,
    Secretary, FCC (filed Feb. 1, 2001) (*AT&T ex parte*).

[^213]: *Public Notice*, DA 01-282 (2001).

[^214]: AT&T *ex parte*.

[^215]: The RFA, *see* 5 U.S.C § 601 *et. seq.,* has been amended by the
    Contract With America Advancement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-121,
    110 Stat. 847 (1966) (CWAAA). Title II of the CWAAA is the Small
    Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996 (SBREFA).

[^216]: 5 U.S.C. § 605(b).

[^217]: 5 U.S.C. § 601(6).

[^218]: 5 U.S.C. § 601(3) (incorporating by reference the definition of
    "small business concern" in the Small Business Act, 15 U.S.C. §
    632). Pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 601(3), the statutory definition of a
    small business applies "unless an agency, after consultation with
    the Office of Advocacy of the Small Business Administration and
    after opportunity for public comment, establishes one or more
    definitions of such term which are appropriate to the activities of
    the agency and publishes such definition(s) in the Federal
    Register."

[^219]: In NPRM, 15 FCC Rcd at 20031-20034, paras, 42-56.

[^220]: Currently, the only entity that would be required to file
    contracts is Comsat.

[^221]: *See supra* Part II A3.

[^222]: We are not certain as to the number of small entities that will
    be affected by the proposals. Agency data indicates there has been a
    steady increase in the number of Section 214 applications filed with
    the Commission. The total number of licensees is difficult to
    determine, because many licenses are jointly held by several
    licensees. Based on agency data, we estimate that there could be 800
    applicants that might be a small entity.

[^223]: Pursuant to the filed-rate doctrine, where a filed tariff rate,
    term or condition differs from a rate, term, or condition set in a
    non-tariffed carrier-customer contract, the carrier is required to
    assess the tariff rate, term or condition. Consequently, if a
    carrier unilaterally changes a rate by filing a tariff revision, the
    newly filed rate becomes the applicable rate unless the revised rate
    is found to be unjust, unreasonable, or unlawful under the
    Communications Act. S*ee supra* n. 57

[^224]: *See supra* note 7.

[^225]: *See supra* discussion, para. 3.

[^226]: *CompTel Comments* at 2; *Joint Comments* at 5.

[^227]: *Domestic Detariffing Second Order* *on Reconsideration*, 14 FCC
    Rcd at 6015, para. 17.

[^228]: *GTC Comments* at 11.

[^229]: *See supra, para*. 84.

[^230]: *NPRM*, 15 FCC Rcd at 20034, paras. 52-55.

[^231]: *See supra*. paras. 28, *see also* 47 U.S.C.§§ 201, 202.

[^232]: *See* 5 U.S.C. § 801(a)(1)(A).

[^233]: *See* 5 U.S.C. § 605(b).

[^234]: [See]{.underline} Concurring Statement of Commissioner Harold W.
    Furchtgott-Roth, *In the Matter of 2000 Biennial Regulatory Review
    Policy and Rules Concerning the International, Interexchange
    Marketplace*, IB Docket No. 00-202, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking,
    FCC 00-367 at 42 (rel. Oct. 18, 2000) (urging complete detariffing
    of international carriers and reexamination of policy of permissive
    detariffing for domestic carriers).

[^235]: A quick examination of international carriers websites reveals
    that carriers prominently advertise rate information even in today's
    tariffed environment.

[^236]: [See]{.underline} ¶ 47. The ineffectiveness of physical location
    requirement is self-evident. The idea that consumers will trek to
    the physical office of a carrier in order to gather rate information
    is bizarre.

[^237]: [See]{.underline} ¶ 52.