**UNITED STATES COURT OF VETERANS APPEALS**

No. 90-1002

[Gerald M. Hohol, Appellant]{.smallcaps},

[v.]{.smallcaps}

[Edward J. Derwinski,]{.smallcaps}

[Secretary Of Veterans Affairs, Appellee.]{.smallcaps}

On Appeal from the Board of Veterans\' Appeals

(Submitted September 25, 1991 Decided February 7, 1992)

*Michael P. Horan* was on the brief, for appellant

*Robert E. Coy,* Acting General Counsel, *Barry M. Tapp*, Assistant
General Counsel, *Pamela L. Wood*, Deputy Assistant General Counsel, and
*Michael P. Butler* were on the brief, for appellee.

Before NEBEKER, *Chief Judge*, and KRAMER and HOLDAWAY, *Associate
Judges*.

NEBEKER, *Chief Judge*: Appellant, Gerald M. Hohol, appeals the May 23,
1990, Board of Veterans\' Appeals (BVA or Board) decision which reduced
his disability rating for post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) from
100% disabling to 70% disabling. We hold the Board\'s finding that the
veteran had sustained material improvement under the ordinary conditions
of life to be clearly erroneous. Furthermore we hold that the Board
committed legal error when it failed to consider appellant\'s case under
38 C.F.R. § 4.16(c) (1990).

**I**

The veteran performed military service from August 1965 through April
1969, which included combat duty in Vietnam. On December 30, 1983, he
underwent an examination for compensation and pension purposes. The
Veterans\' Administration (now the Department of Veterans Affairs) (VA)
doctor reported that appellant was \"markedly tense\" and anxious, that
his sleep pattern was disturbed by nightmares, and that he hallucinated
often. R. at 23. The doctor also found appellant \"alert and fully
oriented\" and his conversation \"to be relevant \[showing\] no
looseness of associations.\" Appellant was diagnosed as suffering from
PTSD. Based on this examination, the VA Regional Office (RO) granted
appellant service connection for PTSD, and rated it as 100% disabling on
February 1, 1984.

Appellant was examined again for compensation and pension purposes on
April 19, 1985. He reported that he had trouble sleeping and suffered
from hallucinations of his time in Vietnam. He also told the examiner
that he had no social life and spent all of his time caring for his two
boys; his speech was relevant and coherent. R. at 38. The examiner found
him to be unemployable and still suffering from PTSD. On May 22, 1985,
an RO decision continued his disability rating at 100%.

On October 12, 1988, he was examined again by VA. Again he reported
sleep disturbance, constant thoughts of the war, and nightmares. He also
reported having trouble with most people, but being tolerant of the ill
and those he was capable of helping. The report described him as
\"cooperative, coherent, relevant, well oriented, competent, tense and
anxious.\" The report also noted that appellant had not worked for eight
years, and was seen weekly at the Mental Health Clinic at the Bay Pines
Facility (Bay Pines Facility). Appellant was again diagnosed as
suffering from PTSD: \"chronic, active, mild to moderate.\" R. at 41-42.
Based on that examination, and without considering medical records from
the Bay Pines Facility, the RO reduced appellant\'s rating from 100%
disabling to 70% disabling. The RO made no mention of any regulation
other than 38 C.F.R. §3.105(e) (1988), but said that medical records
from the Bay Pines Facility were being requested and that appellant
would be reexamined in the future. R. at 43.

On December 14, 1988, appellant received a letter from VA which told him
that VA had \"determined that there has been an improvement in your
post-traumatic stress disorder. This disability is now evaluated 70
percent disabling.\" R. at 68. Appellant submitted a notice of
disagreement on January 18, 1989, and asked VA to obtain all of his
medical records from the Bay Pines Facility. VA sent appellant a
statement of the case specifying the issue as \"increased evaluation for
service connected \[PTSD\]\", citing 38 U.S.C. § 355, 38 C.F.R. § 4.132,
38 C.F.R. § 3.102, and 38 C.F.R. § 3.321 (1989) as the grounds for
denying the veteran an increase. R. at 71-74. A rating decision dated
April 20, 1989, confirmed the 70% rating. R. at 75.

Medical records from the Bay Pines Facility disclosed that appellant
began treatment in October of 1984. Dr. Leo R. Ryan, a clinical
psychologist at the Bay Pines Facility, reported that as of December 27,
1988, appellant\'s \"condition \[remained\] chronic and severe.\" R. at
64. Dr. Ryan also noted that appellant had \"marked sleep disorder and
frequent and intense nightmares which in turn \[produced\] fatigue and
\[augmented\] his chronic major depressive state.\" *Id*. On January 3,
1989, Dr. Ryan wrote that appellant was unemployed and \"it \[appeared\]
unlikely that he will be able to obtain or maintain gainful employment
due to the depth of his psychopathology.\" R. at 66-67.

When these records were reviewed, VA issued a supplemental statement of
the case. R. at 77-79. A rating decision dated June 26, 1989, continued
the 70% rating. R. at 80. On July 13, 1989, appellant appealed to the
BVA. In his appeal form, appellant wrote that he was totally isolated
from the community, visited his doctors once a week, and was totally
unable to obtain or retain employment; he requested that VA obtain
additional outpatient treatment records. R. at 81. On March 31, 1989, VA
issued yet another supplemental statement of the case. R. at 84-86.

Appellant underwent a special neuropsychiatric examination on October
30, 1989. The examiner reported, inter alia, that appellant suffered
from PTSD and was unemployable. R. at 108-109. A subsequent rating
decision dated November 21, 1989, continued the 70% rating. VA issued
another supplemental statement of the case on December 1, 1989.

On May 23, 1990, the Board confirmed the 70% rating. Although the Board
phrased the issue on appeal as entitlement to an increased rating for
PTSD, the Board noted that the veteran\'s appeal stemmed from the
December 1988 rating action which reduced his 100% schedular evaluation
to 70%. Consequently the Board\'s decision focused on the correctness of
the December 1988 rating action. The Board applied 38 C.F.R. §§ 3.343
and 3.344 (1990) and found it clear from the record that

> there has been a material improvement in pertinent aspects of
> \[appellant\'s\] disability picture, at least to an extent that he no
> longer experiences totally incapacitating psychoneurotic symptoms
> bordering on gross repudiation of reality, nor is he demonstrably
> unable to obtain or retain employment, despite his not having worked
> for a period of several years.

R. at 8.

**II**

PTSD is rated under 38 C.F.R. § 4.132, Diagnostic Code 9210 (1990) (DC
9210) which characterizes 100% and 70% disabilities as follows:

100 percent:

> Active psychotic manifestations of such extent, severity, depth,
> persistence or bizarreness as to produce total social and industrial
> inadaptability.

70 percent:

> With lesser symptomology such as to produce severe impairment of
> social and industrial adaptability . . . .

Once rated as totally disabled (100%), a veteran will not have his
rating reduced without a showing of material improvement:

> a\) *General*. Total disability ratings . . . will not be reduced . .
> . without examination showing material improvement in physical or
> mental condition. Examination reports showing material improvement
> must be evaluated in conjunction with all the facts of the record, and
> consideration must be given particularly to whether the veteran
> attained improvement under the ordinary conditions of life, i.e.,
> while working or actively seeking work or whether the symptoms have
> been brought under control by prolonged rest . . . .

38 C.F.R. § 3.343(a). In appellant\'s case, VA failed to show, through
an examination, as required by section 3.343(a), that appellant had
materially improved, based on the record and under the ordinary
conditions of life. The regulation provides that VA must compare the
examination which purports to show that the veteran\'s condition has
materially improved, with the last examination continuing his 100%
rating. The basis for comparison is not the examination on which the
veteran was first awarded total disability. *Karnas v. Derwinski,* 1
Vet.App. 308 (1991).

A comparison of appellant\'s last examination report of October 12, 1988
(1988 exam), which reduced his 100% rating, with the next-to-the-last
examination of April 1, 1985 (1985 exam), which maintained his 100%
rating, shows no indication of material improvement. Although the 1988
exam diagnosed appellant\'s PTSD as \"chronic, active, mild to
moderate\" and the 1985 exam simply diagnosed him as having PTSD, his
symptoms were nearly identical in each examination, with the exception
that appellant\'s hallucinations are not mentioned in the 1988 exam.

Even if this difference between the two examinations should qualify as
\"material improvement,\" and we do not believe it does, such a finding
cannot be supported when considered in conjunction with all the medical
evidence of record as required by 38 C.F.R. § 3.343(a), especially since
outpatient reports from the Bay Pines Facility indicate that
appellant\'s condition remained essentially the same since he first
began treatment there in 1984.

Furthermore, neither the 1985 exam nor the 1988 exam shows improvement
in appellant\'s condition \"while working or actively seeking work\" as
required by 38 C.F.R. § 3.343(a). Section 3.343(a) provides that VA,
when evaluating medical examinations showing material improvement, must
give consideration to whether the veteran attained improvement under the
\"ordinary conditions of life, i.e., while working or actively seeking
work,\" or whether the symptoms improved because of prolonged rest or a
\"regimen which precludes work.\" If the symptoms improved because of
rest, and not under the ordinary conditions of life, as is the case
here, a veteran\'s total disability cannot be reduced until
\"reexamination after a period of employment (3 to 6 months).\" 38
C.F.R. § 3.343(a). No evidence suggests that appellant was working or
seeking work. In fact, both the examinations conducted by the VA and the
outpatient reports indicate that appellant was unemployable.

Not only was the VA careless in applying its regulations, but it failed
to read its medical examinations carefully. For example, in the October
14, 1988, VA examination, the examiner reported:

> \[Appellant\] is cooperative, coherent, relevant, well oriented,
> competent, tense and anxious. His anxiety relates to random thoughts,
> his two sons and their behavior in school and at home. The youngest
> son got involved with alcohol and crack cocaine and was in the Horizon
> Hospital for two to three months and then transferred to a hospital in
> Bradenton and was there about four months. He is off alcohol and drugs
> now, for about the past nine months. He is back in school and seems to
> be doing okay.

R. at 42. The Board, in its May 23, 1990, decision, cited the fact that
*appellant* had been off drugs for nine months in support of its
conclusion that appellant\'s condition had improved. Counsel for the
Secretary was equally inattentive to the record: \"The veteran was off
drugs and alcohol for the last nine months; he was attending school and
seemed to be doing well.\" (Br. of Appellee at 7).

The BVA determined, without evidentiary support, that appellant\'s PTSD
materially improved. This finding is clearly erroneous. In defining
clearly erroneous, the Court has stated:

> The Supreme Court has defined the \"clearly erroneous\" standard as
> follows: \"A finding is \'clearly erroneous\' when although there is
> evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is
> left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
> committed.\"

*Gilbert v. Derwinski,* 1 Vet.App. 49, 52 (1990) (citing *United States
v. United States Gypsum Co*., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948); *Anderson v.
City of Bessemer City*, 470 U.S. 564, 573-74 (1985)). Here, although
there is some evidence to support a finding of slight improvement in
appellant\'s condition if the October 14, 1988, examination alone is
considered, we believe, after considering all the medical evidence of
record, that a mistake has been made; the finding simply is not
plausible in light of all the evidence.

VA\'s erroneous finding is not surprising given that no mention was made
of 38 C.F.R. § 3.343(a) until the May 23, 1989, Board decision which
took notice of the regulation and found material improvement. Neither
the numerous rating decisions nor the various statements of the case,
noted earlier, mentioned the regulation which governs the reduction of
total disability ratings.

We further note the Board\'s failure to apply 38 C.F.R. § 4.16(c), which
controls total disability ratings for compensation based on
unemployability of the individual veteran:

> \[Where\] the only compensable service-connected disability is a
> mental disorder assigned a *70 percent evaluation, and such mental
> disorder precludes a veteran from securing or following a
> substantially gainful occupation . . . the mental disorder shall be
> assigned a 100 percent schedular evaluation under the appropriate
> diagnostic code.*

38 C.F.R. § 4.16 (emphasis added). Since the Board found that
appellant\'s condition warranted a 70% rating and all VA examinations
indicated he was unemployable, the Board erred when it failed to
consider the appellant\'s claim under 38 C.F.R. § 4.16(c). We have
invariably held that the BVA is not free to ignore its own regulations,
even if the appellant fails to raise the issue on appeal. *See, e.g.,
Akles v. Derwinski*, 1 Vet.App. 118 (1991); *Fugere v. Derwinski,* 1
Vet.App. 103 (1990); *Bentley v. Derwinski*, 1 Vet.App. 28 (1990). For
the reasons stated above, we REVERSE the decision of the BVA and REMAND
it with directions to restore the appellant\'s 100% rating retroactive
to the effective date of its reduction.