Before the

**FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION** FCC 94-265

Washington, D.C. 20554

In the Matter of )

)

Amendment of the Commission\'s Rules to ) GEN Docket No. 90-314

Establish New Personal Communications ) RM-7140, RM-7175, RM-7618

Services )

**THIRD MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER**

Adopted: October 19, 1994; Released: October 19, 1994

By the Commission:

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Paragraphs

I. INTRODUCTION AND EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1-9

II\. BACKGROUND 10-16

III\. DISCUSSION 17-91

A. Attribution and Cellular Eligibility 17-34

B. Microwave Relocation Cost Sharing 35-41

C. Service Areas 42-55

D. Technical Issues 56-74

E. PCS Interference to the Broadcast Auxiliary Service 75-82

F.Secondary Allocation for the Mobile-Satellite Service 83-89

G. ONA Implementation for PCS 90-91

IV\. CONCLUSION 92

V. ORDERING CLAUSE 93-94

Appendix A Final Rules

Appendix B List of Parties

**I. INTRODUCTION AND EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

By this order we amend in minor respects our broadband Personal
Communications Services (\"PCS\") regulatory structure to better achieve
the four primary goals of this proceeding: competitive delivery, a
diverse array of services, rapid deployment, and wide-area coverage. We
take this action in response to ten petitions for reconsideration or
clarification of the policies and rules we adopted in a June 1994
[Memorandum Opinion and Order]{.underline} in this proceeding.[^1] We
first summarize the petitions and our disposition of them.

Comcast Corporation (\"Comcast\") and the Cellular Telecommunications
Industry Association (\"CTIA\") ask us to alter rules that determine the
extent to which entities holding substantial ownership interests in
cellular licenses also may hold 30 MHz PCS licenses in overlapping
cellular and PCS service areas. We deny these petitions. Our goals for
PCS reflect a balance of numerous considerations, including
affirmatively promoting competition as well as preventing
anticompetitive behavior in the auction process and the PCS marketplace.
The petitioners offer no persuasive rationale for changing our rules to
reflect a different balance. The record persuades us, however, to modify
those rules in one respect. We will permit entities with attributable,
but non-controlling cellular interests to bid on in-market 30 MHz PCS
licenses, subject to post-auction divestiture of their non-compliant
cellular interest in order to remain in compliance with our cellular/PCS
cross-ownership rules. This modification furthers our policy of
maximizing opportunities for cellular participation in PCS while
safeguarding the PCS market and the auction process against the
potential for anticompetitive conduct.

The Personal Communications Industry Association (\"PCIA\") requests
that we adopt rules requiring PCS licensees to share the cost of
relocating microwave licensees operating in the 1850-1990 MHz PCS bands.
PCIA\'s cost sharing proposal is incomplete, and we believe that its
adoption might hamper potential bidders\' efforts to value spectrum
accurately as well as generate litigation before this Commission to
resolve ambiguous aspects. Further, we believe a more complete record is
necessary for us to fully evaluate the costs and benefits of the
proposal and to consider additional, related aspects. For these reasons
we deny PCIA\'s petition without prejudice. PCIA or other interested
parties may submit a separate petition for rulemaking to address this
subject if they desire to do so.

Point Communications Company (\"Point\") requests that PCS service areas
be based on Department of Commerce BEA Economic Areas\" (\"BEAs\"),
rather than Major Trading Areas (\"MTAs\") and Basic Trading Areas
(\"BTAs\"). Point also requests that entrepreneur block spectrum be
varied from market to market and that we make all PCS licensees subject
to Open Network Architecture (\"ONA\") regulation. We deny these
requests. The record provides no persuasive basis for concluding that
greater public interest benefits will result from switching PCS service
areas from MTAs/BTAs to BEAs. Point\'s claim that varying entrepreneur
block spectrum will benefit small entities by forcing large PCS
providers to develop technologies and equipment for all bands also is
unpersuasive. Adopting Point\'s proposal likely will harm licensees by
making the PCS market unnecessarily complex from technical and
operational standpoints. Finally, whether ONA regulation is appropriate
for the PCS marketplace is outside the scope of this proceeding.

The Puerto Rico Telephone Company (\"PRTC\") requests that we reverse
our decision to establish two separate BTAs in Puerto Rico. The record
does not convince us that Puerto Rico is a single economic unit, as PRTC
claims, and we deny its petition. We note that this decision does not
preclude a party from aggregating the two Puerto Rico BTAs into a single
service area.

The Association of Independent Designated Entities (\"AIDE\") requests
that we clarify PCS licensees\' rights to use of the terms MTA and BTA,
which are subject to copyrights held by Rand McNally. In particular,
AIDE asks that we determine whether the substance of certain
correspondence between AIDE and Rand McNally regarding the use of those
terms, which was entered into the record of this proceeding by AIDE,
comports with our decision to employ the terms to denote PCS service
areas. In effect, AIDE asks us to render an adjudicatory-type advisory
opinion about the meaning of a licensing agreement between Rand McNally
and other commercial interests regarding the use of MTA/BTA terminology.
We decline to address this issue. It is our practice not to render such
opinions, particularly in rulemaking proceedings, and the record
provides no basis for departing from that practice here.

 Spatial Communications, Inc. and ArrayComm, Inc. (jointly
\"SCI/ArrayComm\"), and Omnipoint Corporation (\"Omnipoint\") seek
changes to and clarification of various technical PCS rules.
SCI/ArrayComm\'s understanding that base station transmitter output
power limits apply to each individual antenna comports with our
interpretation, and we grant its petition to that extent. We deny
without prejudice SCI/ArrayComm\'s request to express limits on
transmitted power in terms different from those in our existing rules
because that request is not sufficiently developed to allow
consideration of all its implications. We also deny Omnipoint\'s request
to modify the emission mask for the licensed bands, employing a mask
similar to that used for unlicensed isochronous PCS devices. Adoption of
this mask could result in greatly increased out-of-band emissions levels
in the adjacent frequency blocks to the detriment of the license holder
in those bands. We are, however, amending the rules to specify a new
measurement procedure in the 1 MHz frequency blocks immediately adjacent
to, and outside of, the licensee\'s frequency block. This new procedure
permits the use of a measurement resolution bandwidth of 1 percent, or
greater, of the emission bandwidth of the device under test. We are
adopting Omnipoint\'s request to permit a frame period of 20
milliseconds in the unlicensed isochronous sub-band. However, we are not
adopting their request to require all devices operating in that sub-band
to use a listen before talk monitoring interval of 20 milliseconds.

 A coalition of broadcast interests (hereinafter \"MSTV\")[^2] requests
that we impose special operating requirements on PCS licensees operating
in Block C, in order to protect adjacent channel broadcast auxiliary
service (\"BAS\") receiver sites. This block is reserved for designated
entities. We deny this request because existing rules are adequate to
safeguard such operations.

 Cellsat, Inc. (\"Cellsat\") asks that PCS Blocks F and C (1970-1990
MHz) be allocated domestically for Mobile Satellite Service (\"MSS\") on
a secondary basis, and that the 2160-2180 MHz band be allocated
domestically for MSS on a primary basis, in order to create an
opportunity for hybrid terrestrial-satellite operations on those
frequencies. We deny Cellsat\'s request because our MSS proceeding is a
more appropriate forum to consider these issues. [^3]

**II. BACKGROUND**

On June 9, 1994, in response to 67 petitions for reconsideration of the
[Second Report and Order]{.underline} in this proceeding,[^4] we adopted
the [Broadband PCS Reconsideration]{.underline} decision that allocated
120 MHz for licensed broadband PCS and 20 MHz for unlicensed PCS devices
in the 1850-1990 MHz band and provided service rules for the operation
of this service and equipment.[^5] We revised the allocation plan to
significantly lower equipment costs, lower the cost of relocating
incumbent users, simplify spectrum aggregation, and preserve spectrum
for worldwide MSS operations.[^6] We also adopted a band plan that
provides for three 30 MHz licenses (Blocks A, B, and C) and three 10 MHz
licenses (Blocks D, E, and F), all of which are within the 1850-1990 MHz
band. We provided that the A and B Blocks be licensed within 51 service
areas based on the Major Trading Areas (MTAs) and that the C, D, E, and
F Blocks be licensed within 493 smaller service areas based on the Basic
Trading Areas (BTAs) set forth in the 1992 Rand McNally [Commercial
Atlas & Marketing Guide]{.underline}.[^7]

We reduced the allocation for unlicensed PCS devices to 20 MHz at
1910-1930 MHz, but committed to initiating a proceeding in the near
future to examine allocation of additional spectrum for unlicensed PCS
operations. Within this band, we adopted a 1.25 MHz channelization
scheme for isochronous (voice) devices and eliminated channelization
requirements for asynchronous (data) devices.

Additionally, we continued to permit all eligible entities to acquire
PCS spectrum up to a cap of 40 MHz. We retained our five percent equity
attribution threshold for PCS licenses, so that the same entity may not
own more than five percent of PCS licenses holding more than 40 MHz
within the same area. We also retained our cellular attribution
threshold of 20 percent equity ownership of a cellular licensee and our
service area overlap test of 10 percent of the population of the
relevant PCS market, so that the same entity generally may not own more
than 20 percent of the cellular license and more than 5 percent of PCS
license(s) that would place the entity above the spectrum limit in an
overlapping service area. We relaxed the eligibility rules to permit
entities with attributable interests in cellular companies whose
combined cellular geographic service areas (CGSAs) overlap between 10
and 20 percent of the PCS service area population to submit bids for
more than 10 MHz of PCS spectrum provided that, prior to the auction,
they commit to divest themselves of sufficient cellular interests to
come into compliance with our eligibility rules within 90 days of
license grant.

 We provided that stock, partnership and other financial interests and
relationships will be considered in determining attributable interests
for purposes of our PCS spectrum caps. We raised from a 20 percent to a
40 percent non-controlling interest the threshold for determining
attributable cellular equity ownership for rural telephone companies,
small businesses, and businesses owned by minorities and women, which
collectively are termed \"designated entities\" in our rules
implementing 47 U.S.C. § 309(j). We increased from a 20 percent to a 40
percent non-controlling interest the threshold for determining
attributable cellular equity ownership to allow non-designated entities
to make non-controlling investments in PCS licenses owned and controlled
by minority- and women- owned businesses. We permitted entities with
attributable cellular interests covering 10 or more percent of the
population in a PCS service area to acquire 10 MHz of PCS spectrum
within the PCS service area and, after January 1, 2000, to acquire an
additional 5 MHz for a total of 15 MHz of PCS spectrum in their cellular
service areas. We pledged to examine management contracts and spectrum
leases in the CMRS docket for the purpose of determining whether other
interests in PCS licenses should be limited in order to foster vigorous
competition.

Further, we relaxed construction requirements to provide that (a) 30 MHz
broadband PCS licensees must provide coverage to one-third of their
service area population within five years of initial licensing and
two-thirds within ten years and (b) 10 MHz licensees must provide
coverage to twenty five percent of their service area population within
five years of initial licensing, or submit a showing of equivalent or
substantial service. We increased the maximum power level permitted for
broadband PCS base stations to 1640 watts equivalent isotropically
radiated power (e.i.r.p.), which is equivalent to 1000 watts effective
radiated power (e.r.p.). We retained with minor amendment rules ensuring
compliance with minimum standards for exposure to radio frequency (RF)
energy emitted by PCS devices. We committed to initiate a proceeding in
the near future to allocate additional spectrum for MSS and to work
toward having additional spectrum allocated to MSS at the World Radio
Conference to be held in 1995 (WRC-95).

Previously, we adopted a [Second Report and Order]{.underline} in the
regulatory treatment of mobile services proceeding that concluded,
[inter]{.underline} [alia]{.underline}, that broadband PCS is
presumptively a commercial mobile radio service (CMRS).[^8] In the
emerging technologies proceeding we also adopted rules that subject all
incumbent facilities in the 1850-1990, 2110-2150, and 2160-2200 MHz
bands to mandatory relocation if an emerging technology provider,
[e.g.]{.underline}, a PCS licensee, requires the spectrum.[^9]

Subsequent to adopting the [MO&O]{.underline}, we adopted a [Fifth
Report and Order]{.underline} in the competitive bidding proceeding that
establishes the service specific rules for selecting broadband PCS[^10]
licensees and adopted a [Further Order on Reconsideration]{.underline}
in the instant proceeding that amended our PCS attribution rules to
employ a \"multiplier\" to determine how interests in cellular and
broadband PCS licensees held indirectly through intervening corporate
entities should be attributed.[^11]

**III. DISCUSSION**

A. [Attribution and Cellular Eligibility]{.underline}

In the [Broadband PCS Reconsideration]{.underline}, we retained our five
percent equity attribution threshold for broadband PCS licenses so that
the same entity may not own five or more percent of licenses
constituting more than 40 MHz within the same area. In the [Further
Order on Reconsideration]{.underline}, we implemented a \"multiplier\"
to determine when non-controlling interests in cellular and broadband
PCS licensees held indirectly through intervening corporate entities
should be attributed.[^12] We also retained our cellular attribution
threshold of 20 percent equity ownership of a cellular licensee and our
service area overlap test of 10 percent of the population of the
relevant PCS market, so that an entity wishing to participate fully in
PCS generally may not own more than 20 percent of a cellular license,
and not more than 5 percent of a PCS license(s), that would place the
entity above the spectrum limit in an overlapping service area. However,
we raised the threshold for attributing non-controlling cellular
ownership for rural telephone companies, small businesses, and
businesses owned by women and minorities from a 20 percent to a 40
percent interest .[^13] We relaxed the eligibility rules to permit
entities with attributable interests in cellular companies whose
combined CGSAs overlap between 10 and 20 percent of the PCS service area
population to apply for more than 10 MHz of PCS spectrum provided that,
prior to the auction, they commit to divest themselves of sufficient
cellular interests to come into compliance with our eligibility rules
within 90 days of license grant.[^14]

[Positions of the Parties]{.underline}

The Cellular Telecommunications Industry Association (CTIA) requests
that the cellular-PCS ownership attribution standard be increased from
20 percent to 30-35 percent and that the population overlap standard be
increased from 10 to 40 percent. CTIA claims that these higher limits
would ensure competition without risking inadvertent harm to a nascent
industry,[^15] basing its claim on an antitrust market analysis it
presented with a previous petition for reconsideration.[^16] CTIA also
presents an analysis of the impact of the population overlap standard on
entities with attributable cellular interests in the top fifty BTAs, and
in thirty other BTAs. Using these data as a baseline, the analysis
purports to show how the number of entities barred from holding a 30 MHz
in-market license under the current 10 percent overlap standard
decreases as that percentage is increased to sequentially higher levels
(*i.e.,* 20, 25, 30, 35, 40 percent). According to CTIA, the
beneficiaries of raising the overlap standard would be \"small cellular
carriers\" that are prevented by the current standard from
\"deliver\[ing\] on the promise of the information age to rural and
small town America.[^17]

 Additionally, CTIA requests that the 35 MHz PCS cap be immediately
raised to 40 MHz. If the Commission is not willing to immediately
eliminate the 35 MHz cap, CTIA suggests that the cap be raised to 40 MHz
one year after actual inauguration of services by a new PCS entrant in
the relevant PCS service area.[^18] Finally, CTIA requests that
post-auction divestiture be made available to all cellular providers
regardless of the degree of geographic overlap, instead of limiting
post-auction divesture to cellular providers with a 10-to-20 percent
overlap.[^19]

Comcast Corporation (Comcast) requests that the attribution standard for
purposes of cross-ownership and aggregation of spectrum be increased
from 5 to 20 percent, provided that no more than a five percent voting
interest is held, and the attribution standard be increased to 25
percent in publicly traded corporations, provided that no more than a 15
percent voting interest is held.[^20] Comcast argues that the Commission
has recognized that parties holding more than a five percent equity
interest in a licensee may lack effective control of the licensee, and
cites our decision to allow cellular interests to own up to 20 percent
and designated entities to own up to 40 percent of a cellular provider
without being limited in PCS participation.[^21] Comcast bases its
request on the relaxed attribution standards for entrepreneurial
companies, arguing that the same standard should apply to all PCS
investors and that we should differentiate between mere ownership and
exercise control of a cellular provider or PCS provider.[^22]
Additionally, Comcast requests that all cellular entities be permitted
to bid on PCS spectrum, subject to the condition that any disqualifying
cellular interests be divested within six months of the PCS license
award.[^23] This request is based on the assertion that allowing
divestiture only to auction winners with 20 percent or less overlap is
arbitrary.[^24] Comcast argues that the 90 day divestiture requirement
is unrealistic, given the need to locate buyers, negotiate the
transaction, and obtain this Commission\'s approval.[^25]

Six parties commented on cellular eligibility and ownership attribution
issues.[^26] Three commenters urge us to retain the current rules, and
three support changes to the rules. Commenters urging us to maintain the
current rules assert that no new arguments or facts have been raised to
justify changing the rules, or that the arguments raised by CTIA and
Comcast are insufficient to justify a rule change.[^27] American
Personal Communications (APC) states that current estimates indicate
that it will take up to ten years to clear microwave facilities from the
PCS band. This fact, according to APC, coupled with the fact that
cellular companies currently have technological infrastructure and
marketing in place, places new PCS licensees at an initial competitive
disadvantage.[^28] APC also states that our bright-line attribution
standards provide ease of administration, expedite the licensing
process, and save the costs of disputing ownership structures and
effective control.[^29] APC further argues that relaxing the overlap and
attribution standards could reduce the number of competitors in each
market, to the detriment of consumer welfare.[^30] Finally, APC asserts,
our current rules limit the participation of those entities that have
the greatest potential and incentive to compete less vigorously than
possible, and provide for competition in each market.[^31]

With respect to our rules on post-auction divestiture, commenters
opposing a change point out that we limited post-auction divestiture to
cellular entities having less than 20 percent overlap in order to guard
against cellular operators with large overlap areas obstructing the
licensing of new competitors by abusing the auction process. These
parties argue that there would be no opportunity for competing bidders
to determine whether a cellular provider\'s bid was sincere, or merely
an attempt to increase the final price,[^32] and that the possibility of
such abuses would deter the entry of many potential bidders into the
auction process, to the detriment of both competition and revenues.[^33]
Commenters also note that the 90-day divestiture requirement provides
sufficient time for entities to divest their cellular holdings,
especially as the 90 day period is in addition to the interval between
the conclusion of auctions and the grant of the license. Commenters also
contest the suggestion that it may be difficult to locate buyers, noting
the existence of a ready-made market comprised of unsuccessful PCS
bidders who, these commenters contend, are likely to be interested in
acquiring cellular holdings.[^34]

With respect to the PCS-cellular spectrum cap, commenters who oppose
allowing cellular providers to immediately acquire 40 MHz of spectrum
assert that the \"head start\" we are providing PCS providers is an
attempt to compensate for the head start in clear spectrum,
infrastructure, experience, and marketing enjoyed by cellular
providers.[^35] Further, these parties argue that the delay in allowing
divestiture of 5 MHz blocks is based in part on the need to conduct
further rule making to determine to what extent and in what fashion
partitioning of PCS spectrum blocks is to be permitted.[^36]

Other commenters support the elimination or easing of the restrictions
on cellular participation in PCS. They maintain that reconsideration of
our rules is appropriate because of the adoption of auction rules[^37]
and the experience of the narrowband PCS nationwide auction. These
parties assert that in most markets, cellular carriers will not qualify
for the entrepreneur blocks because of the size of such carriers, and
that this will assure at least two new PCS licensees using the
entrepreneur blocks. They further assert that the fact that the winners
in the narrowband PCS auction were all large companies already involved
in paging, which is one type of narrowband PCS, demonstrates that
companies already providing analogous services will value the spectrum
most highly, and therefore will pay the most for it.[^38] Accordingly,
they contend that revenues to the Treasury will be maximized by the full
participation of cellular incumbents, and the existence of designated
entity and entrepreneurs\' blocks will guarantee competition.[^39]
Further, these parties argue that allowing full participation will serve
Congressional and Commission goals by ensuring efficient use of the
spectrum, maximum recovery by the Treasury of the value of the spectrum,
diversity in licensees (by including cellular incumbents) and rapid
deployment of PCS.[^40] These parties also contend that there is no
evidence that cellular providers will behave in an anticompetitive
fashion, and market analysis indicates that these companies will be
unlikely to dominate the PCS market.[^41] These assertions are the basis
of BellSouth\'s argument that cellular companies should be allowed
unrestricted access to PCS blocks, and McCaw Cellular Communications,
Inc.\'s (McCaw\'s) and Rural Cellular Association\'s (RCA\'s) support of
CTIA\'s petition for setting the population overlap standard at 40
percent and the ownership attribution standard at 30-35 percent.[^42]
RCA further seeks to exempt rural cellular companies entirely from all
limitations, arguing that rural cellular companies will provide quality
mobile service and will not threaten competition because they are mere
passive investors in cellular providers. RCA also argues that the
Congress specifically directed the Commission to ensure licensing
opportunities for rural cellular companies.[^43]

With respect to post-auction divestiture, McCaw argues that all bidders
should be allowed to bid and divest only upon winning. McCaw maintains
that the existing low attribution thresholds create the possibility of
an affiliate of a cellular company interfering with the cellular
company\'s ability to hold a license, without the affected cellular
company\'s knowledge.[^44] BellSouth asserts that entities with large
cellular holdings will not be tempted to abuse the bidding process
because they could win and be forced to pay the full price of the PCS
license.[^45]

McCaw echoes CTIA\'s assertion that the marketplace can best allocate
the additional 5 MHz of spectrum at issue, and therefore urges us to
eliminate the 35 MHz interim spectrum cap for cellular entities.[^46]
BellSouth asserts that the spectrum cap should be the only limit on
cellular participation, and that our CMRS proceeding has established a
45 MHz cap on combined cellular, PCS, and SMR spectrum. It argues that
45 MHz should be the cap for cellular-PCS ownership because that is the
cap adopted in the CMRS proceeding.[^47]

BellSouth further advocates that we use its \"multiplier\" formula to
determine attributable ownership. This formula multiplies spectrum in
megahertz, population overlap, and percentage of ownership to arrive at
its final attribution factor. BellSouth asserts that this formula
produces a more accurate picture of ownership and control, and is
consistent with our use of a multiplier in attributing interests to
indirect owners.[^48] Finally, BellSouth urges us to exempt LECs from
attribution of their cellular spectrum when that spectrum is held by a
separate subsidiary, claiming that it is forbidden by our rules from
having any degree of control over BellSouth Cellular Corporation.
BellSouth asserts that its proposal would permit LECs to provide PCS,
and is fair because LECs have no control over their cellular
subsidiaries.[^49]

CTIA requests reconsideration of our decision to limit the option of
auction participation followed by divestiture of disqualifying holdings
to cellular providers whose population overlap is between 10 and 20
percent.[^50] Comcast makes the same request, and further requests that
we increase the time allowed for divestiture from 90 days to six
months.[^51] Both parties argue that there is no difference whether a
cellular company holds more or less than 20 percent overlap, if it will
divest itself of sufficient overlap in order to meet our requirements.
CTIA specifically states that our concern that a cellular provider with
more than 20 percent overlap might be tempted to interfere with the
auction process is ill-founded, as such a cellular provider could find
itself in the possession of a PCS license and be forced to quickly
divest a large share of its cellular holdings. This argument is echoed
by BellSouth and McCaw.[^52]

Five parties replied on eligibility and attribution issues. APC and
Pacific Bell Mobile Services (PacBell) urge us to maintain our current
cellular eligibility and attribution standards, asserting that the
entrepreneurs\' blocks are insufficient by themselves to promote full
competition in PCS,[^53] that BellSouth\'s comments focus on revenues to
the government without sufficient consideration of other Commission
goals,[^54] and that our current limits on cellular eligibility are
necessary to provide opportunities for full competition in PCS.[^55] In
their replies, CTIA and Comcast essentially reiterate their petitions,
advocating relaxation of the overlap and attribution thresholds,[^56]
asserting that cellular providers do not have a substantial competitive
advantage over other entities in PCS,[^57] and again urging a relaxation
of the standards and timing of post-auction divestiture.[^58] Ameritech
proposes a mechanism whereby cellular providers would be allowed to
divest any amount of interest to an interim independent trustee before
the auction. After the auction, the trustee would dispose of the
interest if the cellular provider won a PCS license, or would otherwise
reconvey the interest to the cellular provider.[^59] Ameritech claims
that this would allow participation by cellular entities in PCS
auctions, while maintaining Commission control over the auction
process.[^60]

[Discussion]{.underline}

Our rules concerning ownership attribution and population overlap
standards have been thoroughly debated and considered in earlier phases
of this proceeding. The arguments presented on the current record for
revising those rules are in most essential respects repetitious, and we
deny Comcast\'s and CTIA\'s petitions in major part on that basis. The
record persuades us to modify our rules, however, to permit entities
with attributable, non-controlling cellular interests to bid on
in-market 30 MHz PCS licenses, on condition that they must divest
prohibited cellular interests within 90 days of PCS license grant. We
discuss these decisions more fully below.

 Our principal goals for PCS include affirmatively promoting competition
and preventing anticompetitive behavior.[^61] The former goal flows from
our explicit mandate under the Communications Act to promote competition
in telecommunications and widely disseminate telecommunications
licenses.[^62] As such, arguments that our rules should be based wholly
on the law of antitrust and corporate control are misplaced. Even if we
agreed with the portrayal of antitrust law by Comcast, CTIA and their
supporters (and we do not), antitrust and corporate control
considerations are not the sole foundation of our rules. Rather, in
accordance with our statutory mandate, those rules reflect a balance of
many public interest considerations, including the need to provide
parties other than existing cellular licensees an opportunity to
participate in PCS. No party offers a persuasive rationale for
rearranging those considerations to reflect a different balance.

 Moreover, the petitioners\' individual requests are flawed. We do not
accept CTIA\'s unconditioned assertion that interests of 30-to-35
percent do not evidence control, which is not a uniformly supported
position. For example, the Financial Accounting Standards Board
(\"FASB\") explicitly states that an ownership interest above 20 percent
presumptively demonstrates control unless evidence to the contrary is
established.[^63] Comcast\'s claim that it is unreasonable to set the
PCS ownership attribution standard at 5 percent when the cellular
attribution is higher ignores the reasoned basis for existing
distinctions.[^64] CTIA\'s request that we increase to 40 MHz the
combined amount of attributable cellular/PCS spectrum an entity may hold
immediately overlooks the fact that it is not possible, even if it were
permitted, to acquire that spectrum combination given existing
allocations and licensing mechanisms.[^65] Arguments that raising the
population overlap standard from 10 to 40 percent will not harm
competition, and will actually increase competition in rural areas, are
not well supported. Although CTIA submitted a study showing that smaller
cellular carriers may benefit from increasing the overlap standard, the
study also shows benefits flowing to very large carriers and covers
fewer than 20% of total BTAs.[^66] Such incomplete data and uneven
results do not justify altering our rules.

 We agree, however, that is is appropriate to modify our cellular
elegibility rule (47 C.F.R. § 24.204) to create additional opportunities
for entities with non-controlling, attributable in-market cellular
interests to participate in PCS auctions, on condition that they divest
prohibited cellular holdings within 90 days of PCS license grant. In the
[Broadband PCS Reconsideration]{.underline}, we limited the \"bid but
divest\" option to entities with in-market cellular interests that
overlap the population of a PCS service by less than 20 percent, on the
theory that entities with larger overlaps may have incentives to delay
the rapid introduction of PCS.[^67] We are persuaded that the rule\'s
exclusive emphasis on the degree of overlap is misplaced because the
anticompetitive incentives the rule is designed to combat in the auction
process are in principal part generated by the amount of the
attributable cellular interest involved, and only secondarily by the
degree of overlap. Indeed, our discussion of that rule at the time it
was adopted explicitly recognized a link between the amount of the
cellular interest involved and the possibility of anticompetitive
abuse.[^68] We now conclude that entities holding controlling interests
have greater incentives to act anticompetitively in the auction process
than entities with non-controlling interests, so we will retain the
existing rule as it applies to attributable controlling interests. We
will supplement Section 24.204, however, to permit non-controlling
interests to participate in the auction process without regard to the
degree of overlap. We define a \"non-controlling\" license interest to
be one in which the holder has less than a 50 percent voting interest
and there is an unaffiliated single holder of a 50 percent or greater
interest.

 Finally, we disagree with parties that claim our rules fail to provide
an adequate post-auction period for winning bidders to divest prohibited
cellular interests in order to comply with our cellular/PCS
cross-ownership rules.[^69] We note that this period is more than just
90 days, because the period between winning the auction and issuance of
license also must be considered. In addition, our rule extends well
beyond the 90 days from grant of license period, discussed
[supra]{.underline}, because parties who are unable to divest within
that time may satisfy the requirement by conveying a prohibited cellular
interest to an independent trustee for an interim period.
[See]{.underline} 47 C.F.R. § 24.204(f)(3)(i). We take this opportunity
to clarify that the trustee must divest that interest within six months
from grant of license.

B. [Microwave Relocation Cost Sharing]{.underline}

In 1992 we established a proceeding, ET Docket No. 92-9, for the purpose
identifying spectrum for emerging technologies such as PCS. In the
[First Report and Order]{.underline} and [Third Report and
Order]{.underline} in that proceeding we established a plan for
relocating incumbent licensees in emerging technology bands to other
frequencies or alternative media.[^70] Pursuant to that plan, PCS
licensees are required to avoid interference to incumbent point-to-point
microwave operations, and to fully compensate such licensees\'
relocation costs.

[Positions of the Parties]{.underline}

 PCIA requests that we mandate participation by PCS licensees in the
1850-1990 MHz band in a plan to share the costs occasioned by relocating
microwave licensees in that band.[^71] Absent mandatory cost sharing,
PCIA argues, the spectrum-clearing efforts of early PCS market entrants
will redound inequitably to the benefit of later entrants. PCIA asserts
that we must establish cost sharing obligations prior to auctions so
bidders can value spectrum accurately. According to PCIA, the three
basic principles of a cost sharing plan should be:

First, a cost sharing obligation should be predicated on a finding that
a PCS licensee\'s operations would have caused interference to a
microwave system\'s link path but for the relocation of that system.

Second, when multiple PCS licensees benefit from relocation, individual
PCS licensees should be required to pay a pro-rata share only of the
documented, direct costs of relocation. These would be limited to the
costs of supplying a microwave licensee with comparable facilities in a
different band, and would not include any premium costs an early PCS
entrant might pay to accelerate a microwave licensee\'s relocation.

Third, a payment obligation should not arise until the time interference
would be caused.

 BellSouth, GTE, MCI, PacBell Mobile and UTAM support the principle of
microwave relocation cost sharing. Although these parties offer mostly
general statements of support, GTE echoes PCIA claim that establishing
cost sharing obligations prior to auctions will enable bidders to value
spectrum more accurately and, for this reason, the issue should be
determined in this proceeding, rather than deferred to a future
rulemaking.[^72] In expressing its support, UTAM contends that PCIA\'s
plan is similar to a proposal by UTAM earlier in this proceeding
concerning relocation efforts in unlicensed PCS bands.[^73]

UTC notes that while there is merit in the idea of establishing a cost
sharing mechanism for microwave relocation in the 1850-1990 PCS band,
the development of such a plan is beyond the scope of a petition for
reconsideration in this proceeding, and is a subject more properly
raised in a separate petition for rule making. UTC states that such a
rulemaking could be instituted without delaying the roll-out of PCS.
Moreover, UTC cautions that the development of a cost-sharing plan must
not be allowed to adversely impact the market-based or individually
negotiated aspects of the Commission\'s microwave transition plan.[^74]

[Discussion]{.underline}

 We share UTC\'s reservations about the current undeveloped state of
PCIA\'s proposal, and for that reason will deny PCIA\'s petition for
reconsideration. We do so without prejudice to its cost sharing
proposal, which PCIA and other interested parties are free to submit in
a separate petition for rulemaking.

 We take this action because while eliminating any \"free rider\" aspect
of microwave relocation through mandatory cost sharing is an attractive
idea in theory, PCIA\'s proposal simply is not sufficiently developed to
warrant adoption at this time. Since the proposal\'s key terms are
ambiguous, adopting it at this time likely would not assist potential
bidders\' efforts to value spectrum accurately. Indeed, such ambiguity
may detract from those efforts. Moreover, such ambiguity increases the
likelihood that this Commission will be called upon to adjudicate
complex disputes that are almost wholly of a commercial nature *(e.g.*,
whether a particular PCS licensee actually \"benefitted\" from a
relocation, and to what extent; the amount of the \"direct\" costs of
that relocation, as opposed to the \"premium\" costs; and the
appropriate basis for measuring each PCS licensee\'s \"pro-rata\" share
of such costs). We find in this record no persuasive argument for
deploying our limited resources in this manner.

 It bears emphasis that relocation costs are expected to be a relatively
small portion of PCS licensees\' total costs. Moreover, in the
[MO&O]{.underline} we significantly reduced microwave relocation cost
burdens by revising the PCS band plan to provide for PCS operations in
the comparatively less heavily loaded 1850-1990 MHz band, rather than in
accordance with the band plan initially adopted in the [Second Report
and Order]{.underline}. Finally, we note that we recently made available
to the public a wealth of information on microwave co-channel and
adjacent channel usage in the 1850-1990 MHz band, thereby increasing the
public\'s ability to value that spectrum accurately prior to auctions.

C. [Service Areas]{.underline}

Point Communications Company (Point), the Association of Independent
Designated Entities (AIDE), and Puerto Rico Telephone Company (PRTC)
request modifications and/or clarifications of the service areas that we
have adopted for PCS.

[Revised Service Areas]{.underline}. Point requests that we use the
Department of Commerce\'s \"BEA Economic Areas\" (BEAs)[^75] to
delineate all PCS licenses, on the ground that designated entities
licensed to serve BTAs cannot compete with large companies licensed to
serve MTAs. According to Point, BEAs provide equal service areas, and
are small enough to create meaningful opportunities for designated
entities, while large enough to attract major spectrum bidders.
Alternatively, if BEAs are not employed, then Point requests that the
Commission subdivide some MTAs, particularly those on the West
Coast.[^76] Finally, Point requests that we vary the spectrum blocks
designated for entrepreneurs from market to market. Point contends that
if designated entities were to have larger corporations on their
frequency blocks in other markets, the companies would ensure that the
smaller ones do not lag in technological or service development.[^77]

In the [PCS Second Report and Order]{.underline}, we based the service
areas for broadband PCS on MTAs and BTAs. We concluded that a
combination of MTA and BTA service areas would promote the rapid
deployment and ubiquitous coverage of PCS and a variety of services and
providers. We also stated our belief that a combination of MTA and BTA
service areas would maximize the benefits of having both large and small
service areas. [^78]

In the [Broadband PCS Reconsideration]{.underline}, we further addressed
the possibility of using BEAs as the PCS service areas. We acknowledged
that identical geographic areas could impose more initial competitive
parity, but stated that such a plan was likely to foreclose cellular
providers and prove too large for many designated entities to finance.
Congress has mandated that we provide areas that promote opportunity for
a wide variety of applicants,[^79] and we determined that the two tier
system provided by the use of MTAs and BTAs best met this mandate.[^80]

MCI Telecommunications Corporation (MCI) and PacBell address Point\'s
petition. Both simply assert that Point\'s proposed BEA plan was
proposed by NTIA in the prior reconsideration, discussed in the
[Broadband PCS Reconsideration]{.underline} and there rejected. Both
commenters state that this issue has been dealt with adequately.[^81]
MCI adds that any reconsideration of service areas would inevitably
delay the auction and licensing and inauguration of PCS.[^82] No replies
addressed this issue.

We have previously addressed Point\'s contentions respecting BEA-defined
service areas in the [PCS Second Report and Order]{.underline} and [PCS
Broadband Reconsideration]{.underline}, and Point has here offered no
new information or argument to justify a change in our decision. Nor can
we accept Point\'s assertion that varying the entrepreneurs\' blocks
from market to market will create blocks where entrepreneurs will occupy
the same frequencies as larger companies in other markets, which will
promote cooperation and assistance to the entrepreneurs from the large
companies.[^83] We specifically changed the frequency allocation to PCS
to minimize the difficulty of switching frequencies within or between
blocks. [^84] Given the level of equipment technology available, we do
not expect that sharing frequency blocks will provide any incentive to
form the frequency block communities envisioned by Point. Rather, we
believe that if a licensee had different blocks in different service
areas, it would generally tend to switch frequencies rather than
establish a relationship with counterpart licensee(s) using the same
frequencies elsewhere. For this reason, we do not believe that varying
the spectrum for the entrepreneurs\' block from market to market will
have a salutary effect, and we decline to make such a change.

[Permitted Use of MTAs/BTAs]{.underline}. AIDE requests that the
Commission expand the rationale upon which we based PCS service areas on
Rand McNally MTA/BTA definitions. AIDE suggests that we explicitly
include Rand McNally\'s written clarification, as set forth in
correspondence with AIDE\'s attorney, that a licensing agreement between
Rand McNally and PCIA was intended to grant broad rights to potential
users and repackagers of Rand McNally\'s MTAs and BTAs. No party
addressed AIDE\'s request for clarification.

On February 10, 1994, PCIA and Rand McNally entered into a License
Agreement.[^85] Under this agreement, Rand McNally grants PCIA and all
other interested parties \"a nonexclusive license to reproduce, create
derivative works from, publicly distribute and publicly display\" the
listing of counties that comprise Rand McNally\'s 487 BTAs and 47 MTAs,
the BTA/MTA Map contained on pages 38-39 of the 1992 version of Rand
McNally\'s [Commercial Atlas & Marketing Guide]{.underline}, and
derivative works created therefrom for the purpose of preparing
documents in connection with PCS and other services, provided that the
appropriate copyright legend is displayed.

On February 25, 1994, AIDE requested clarification from Rand McNally
concerning the scope of the Licensing Agreement. [^86] On March 10,
1994, Rand McNally stated that the License \"Agreement was intended to
grant broad rights to potential users and repackagers\", regardless of
whether \"the use was carried out on a cost-recovery basis or
profit-making basis\". [^87]

We have reviewed the Licensing Agreement between PCIA and Rand McNally
and the Clarification of the Agreement between AIDE and Rand McNally. It
is not our practice in rulemaking proceedings to clarify the meaning of
private commercial contracts and related correspondence, and we have not
been provided any persuasive reason to depart from that practice here.
Our reasons for using the MTA/BTA system, the licensing agreement
between Rand McNally and PCIA, and the related correspondence filed with
AIDE\'s petition are matters of public record. We will let that record
speak for itself, absent a demonstration that clarification is needed to
further the public interest.

[Local Service Areas in Puerto Rico]{.underline}. PRTC requests that the
Commission reinstate the previously adopted unitary Puerto Rico BTA,
arguing that Puerto Rico is in reality a single market. PRTC claims that
the original BTA was appropriately tailored to the natural flow of
commerce, arguing that the mountain range does not cause difficulties in
travel nor separate the island into two areas. PRTC also states that the
island is geographically one of the smaller BTAs. [^88] Finally, PRTC
states that a single BTA would facilitate the provision of lower cost
service to all of Puerto Rico, arguing that the costs to consumers of
constructing and operating a PCS network would be lower if the costs are
shared by end users across the island than if consumers in the new,
smaller BTAs must support an independent system serving the more thinly
populated sectors of the island.[^89]

In the [PCS Second Report and Order]{.underline}, we established Puerto
Rico as a single, BTA-like service area. In a petition for
reconsideration of that decision, Pegasus Communications, Inc.
(Pegasus), requested that we divide the Puerto Rico service area into
two local service areas. Pegasus argued that due to the size and
mountainous terrain of the island, Puerto Rico essentially is split in
half, comprising two commercial centers: San Juan and Mayagüez-Ponce.
Pegasus stated that these mountains make travel to San Juan difficult
for Puerto Ricans located in the southern and western portions of the
island, and therefore they must conduct essentially all commerce in the
port cities of Mayagüez, Aguadilla, or Ponce. Pegasus also stated that
the population of its proposed Mayagüez/Aguadilla-Ponce service area is
more than one million and this area would be larger in population than
several of the existing BTAs. Pegasus provided a list of municipios that
it suggests constitute the Mayagüez/Aguadilla-Ponce service area, and
suggested that the San Juan service area consist of all municipios not
listed for the Mayagüez/Aguadilla-Ponce BTA-like service area.[^90] No
party responded to this petition. Accordingly, we adopted Pegasus\'
suggestion and established two separate service areas in Puerto Rico,
one for Mayagüez/Aguadilla-Ponce and one for San Juan. We stated that
this change recognizes the difficulties created by the mountain range
separating these two areas and that we found this adjustment to be in
the public interest. [^91]

In response to PRTC\'s petition, Pegasus states initially that PRTC had
ample opportunity to address the division of Puerto Rico into two BTAs
in the previous reconsideration of the broadband PCS rules, and in
failing to do so, lost the right to petition here for a reversal of that
decision.[^92] Pegasus also asserts that PRTC presents no facts that
justify its request to consolidate Puerto Rico into a single BTA,[^93]
and presents a number of geographical and economic factors which support
the division of Puerto Rico into two BTAs.[^94] PRTC replies that its
petition is timely and proper at this stage of the proceeding, and would
benefit the public interest.[^95] PRTC also reiterates the facts
presented in its petition, and asserts that they support the need for
Puerto Rico to be a single BTA.[^96] In a late-filed response, Pegasus
seeks to rebut several of PRTC\'s factual assertions. [^97]

We continue to believe that the division of Puerto Rico into two
BTA-like service areas is appropriate for this service. We note that the
1990 census for Puerto Rico is 3,522,037.[^98] The population of the new
Mayagüez/Aguadilla-Ponce service area is 1,048,473 and the population of
the new San Juan service area is 2,473,564. Only 49 of the 493 BTAs have
a population greater than 1,048,473 and only 18 BTAs have a population
greater than 2,473,564.[^99] We find that the population of each of
these service areas is sufficient to support broadband PCS
services.[^100] Additionally, we conclude that the patterns of local
trade make the proposed division economically and geographically
desirable. If PRTC is correct, and Puerto Rico is better served by a
single, island wide BTA, this can be effected by networking the two BTAs
into what amounts to a single structure. The two BTA plan allows for
this, while at the same time allowing the two BTAs to be served
separately if that is the best method. Hence, the current plan offers
more choices, and allows the marketplace to decide which is the better
choice. Nor do PRTC\'s arguments persuade us to reinstate a unitary
local service area for Puerto Rico.[^101] Accordingly, we will maintain
two BTA-like service areas in Puerto Rico for broadband PCS services.

D. [Technical Issues]{.underline}

[Licensed Service, Power Limits]{.underline}. In the [Broadband PCS
Reconsideration]{.underline}, we increased the maximum base station
transmission limit from 100 to 1640 watts equivalent isotropically
radiated power (EIRP) with an antenna height up to 300 meters height
above average terrain (HAAT).[^102] We adopted this amendment in order
to improve PCS licensees\' ability to configure their systems to best
serve the needs of their customers and to compete with other mobile
services such as cellular and wide-area SMR. Spatial Communications,
Inc. and ArrayComm, Inc. (SCI/ArrayComm) make two, related requests.
First, they ask that the rules governing limitations on transmitted
power be redefined in units of power per unit bandwidth, rather than
expressed as limits on individual transmitters (regardless of
bandwidth). [^103] SCI/ArrayComm argues that the current rules define
transmitter power limits in a manner that favors the use of narrowband
over wideband transmissions.

Second, however power limits are defined, SCI/ArrayComm states that by
maintaining a power limit of 100 watts per transmitter the Commission
may have inadvertently discouraged the use of smart antenna technology.
SCI/ArrayComm asserts that applying low transmitter power limits to use
of highly directional antenna technology will preclude larger and more
economic cell sizes by restricting the effective range of \"broadcast\"
control channels that determine the ultimate size of the coverage
area.[^104] SCI/ArrayComm requests the transmitter power limit of 100
watts apply to individual base station transmitters without regard to
the number of such transmitters employed at each base station, the
antenna element or elements to which each transmitter is connected, or
the channels in which each transmitter is allowed to transmit.
SCI/ArrayComm argues that this clarification is needed to ensure that
the power limits do not unfairly disadvantage new technologies, such as
smart antennas.[^105]

Five comments address SCI/ArrayComm\'s request for clarification.[^106]
MCI, Motorola and Northern Telecom support the petition in part.[^107]
As to the definition of power limits, MCI recommends that the
Commission, while maintaining the overall base station power limit of
1640 watts EIRP, give careful consideration to the proposed
bandwidth-based method of defining power suggested by SCI/ArrayComm. MCI
states that the Commission may wish to authorize the use of the
SCI/ArrayComm formula as an alternative method, at the carrier\'s
option. Motorola states that it is still analyzing the ramifications of
adopting a \"watts per hertz\" standard. Northern Telecom states that it
is concerned that, while the SCI/ArrayComm proposal to redefine the
power limits does lead to an acceptable power level, the formulation of
the new limits is unduly complicated and likely to lead to confusion.
Sprint states that SCI/ArrayComm\'s complaint that expressing power
limits in watts per channel favors narrowband channelization is
inconsistent with its previous statement that its technology is
compatible with all modulations.[^108]

 As to the \"per transmitter\" provision, Motorola states that it
believes the current rules can be reasonably interpreted as indicating
that the adopted power limits apply to individual base station
transmitters without regard to the number of co-channel transmitters
employed at each base station, but does not object to clarification of
the rule. Northern Telecom supports clarification that the power limits
apply to individual transmitters. APC asserts that our rules are clear
on power limits and require no clarification.[^109]

With respect to the redefinition issue, SCI/ArrayComm replies that,
contrary to Sprint\'s statement, SCI/ArrayComm\'s concern is not about
competitive advantages, but is intended to maximize flexibility in PCS
system design.[^110] Motorola indicates that, upon further analysis, it
is convinced that the existing rule of 100 watts maximum transmitter
power with a limit of 1640 watts maximum EIRP is adequate to provide
design flexibility and excellent system performance.[^111] Motorola
supports the connection of multiple transmitters to an antenna array,
provided the total EIRP does not exceed 1640 watts as averaged over a
defined time interval so as not to exceed established interference
criteria.[^112] In response to SCI/ArrayComm\'s statement that the
existing rules favor narrowband technologies, Motorola notes that many
factors determine overall system design and performance capability and
that this issue alone will not affect the introduction and use of
wideband PCS technologies. It cites the number of wideband systems
currently under development as evidence that the rules are flexible and
technology-neutral. No reply comments address the \"per transmitter\"
clarification.

[Discussion]{.underline}. As an initial matter, we decline
SCI/ArrayComm\'s request to redefine transmitter limits in power per
hertz or power per unit bandwidth. While SCI/ArrayComm states that the
current power per channel specification favors narrowband over wideband
systems, the existing approach simply leaves to the licensee the
determination how to balance the multiple design considerations in its
system, from transmitter power and configuration to the gain achieved by
receivers, without placing any overall limit on system power so long as
its individual transmitters and field strength data comply with our
rules. As Motorola observes, system design partakes of many
considerations other than the power tradeoffs inherent in narrowband and
wideband systems. [^113] We find that our current definition of power
limitations does not constrain licensees considering such choices; nor
does it significantly favor one technology over another. Moreover,
SCI/ArrayComm has not explained its contention that the rules discourage
highly directional antenna technology in its petition or comments. For
these reasons, we deny SCI/ArrayComm\'s request to redefine the
transmitter power limits. [^114]

As regards power levels per transmitter, antenna or antenna element, it
was always our intent that the 100 watts per channel and 1640 watts EIRP
requirements apply to these individual components and not to the sum of
all components at the entire base station, provided the maximum EIRP
radiated by the base station in any given direction on any given channel
does not exceed 1640 watts. This interpretation is consistent with our
application of similar rules in the cellular service. We believe that
this statement is of itself sufficient interpretation of this provision
of the rules, and no amendment to the rules is needed.

[Licensed Service, Out-of-band Emission Levels]{.underline}. Omnipoint
Corporation (Omnipoint) requests that an emission mask, similar to the
one specified for isochronous unlicensed PCS devices, be adopted for
licensed PCS out-of-band emissions using a resolution bandwidth on the
measurement instrument approximately equal to one percent of the
emission bandwidth of the device under test.[^115] Omnipoint states that
the Commission should specify out-of-band emissions separately from
spurious emissions, arguing that out-of-band emissions are dependent on
the PCS system\'s modulation techniques and modulation rates. Omnipoint
also states that the Commission\'s ability to measure and monitor
out-of-band emissions would be greatly simplified by the use of a
modulation mask. Omnipoint states that a modulation mask, which permits
constant envelope digital modulations to operate in the band, would
ensure that low cost equipment could be deployed in both the licensed
and unlicensed bands. Finally, Omnipoint suggests that the current rule
for emission limits[^116] applies only to spurious emissions.[^117]

Celeritek Incorporated (Celeritek) strongly supports adoption of an
out-of-band emission mask that allows the use of constant envelope
modulation formats. MCI, however, opposes these limits stating that
Omnipoint\'s proposed rule contains a series of definitions that have
the effect of allowing Omnipoint, or another operator using a similar
wideband signal, to cause harmful interference to the users of adjacent
frequency blocks. Accordingly, MCI recommends that the Commission not
adopt these limits prior to a thorough industry review, such as through
a Joint Technical Committee. MCI agrees that the Commission might
authorize Omnipoint to use these limits on a waiver basis, subject to
the submission of evidence that it has obtained the prior written
consent of all potentially affected parties, including those operating,
or requesting authorization to operate, in adjacent frequency bands.
Motorola notes that the [Errata]{.underline} to the [MO&O]{.underline}
[^118] provides additional clarification and flexibility and may already
accommodate Omnipoint\'s concerns by allowing use of alternative
resolution bandwidths for measuring out-of-band emissions. Motorola adds
that the clarification requested by Omnipoint may eliminate any
uncertainties with respect to the proper measurement standards and that
this matter is being addressed in ANSI/IEEE C63-SC7 and the WINTest
group of WINForum.

Reply comments on this portion of the Omnipoint petition were filed by
AT&T Corp. (AT&T), Motorola, and Omnipoint.[^119] Omnipoint states that
it has modified its proposals for the measurement of out-of-band and
spurious emissions in order to directly address MCI\'s concerns with
adjacent channel interference.[^120] It argues that industry can not
wait to have this rule clarified at some later date since no PCS
technology can pass the existing rule within the 5 MHz bands associated
with the 10 MHz licenses. Omnipoint adds that its proposal attempts to
enable all PCS technologies by including a realistic spectrum emissions
mask and a realistic resolution bandwidth measurement.[^121] AT&T agrees
with Omnipoint\'s position, and Motorola\'s comments in support of that
position, regarding the procedures for measuring out‑of‑band emissions
and supports the efforts of WINForum and ANSI/IEEE C63-SC7 in addressing
this matter. Motorola, while supporting the intent of the Omnipoint
proposal in its comments, now expresses concern that it is premature to
adopt specific testing language in the rules. Instead, Motorola supports
continued consultation with industry groups such as TIA, T1, ANSI/IEEE
C63-SC7, and the WINTest group of WINForum before specific testing
requirements are detailed. Motorola and Omnipoint subsequently made
[ex]{.underline} [parte]{.underline} presentations proposing specific
measurement methods for out‑of‑band emissions.[^122] Omnipoint asserts
that the current limits are effectively more severe than the levels
permitted for out-of-band emissions for unlicensed PCS devices.

[Discussion]{.underline} In adopting standards for wideband licensed PCS
systems, the Commission declined to specify a modulation or
channelization scheme within a licensee\'s frequency block. Further, the
Commission attempted to adopt technical standards that did not
intentionally favor one technology over another. We continue to believe
that this flexible approach encourages and facilitates the broadest
range of PCS services and devices by permitting licensees to determine
the most economic and effective methods of using the spectrum. We also
indicated that most parties recognize that PCS is at a nascent stage in
its development and that imposition of a rigid technical framework at
this time could stifle the introduction of important new technology.
[^123] Our concern regarding technical standards was to ensure that PCS
licensees did not cause harmful interference to existing microwave
facilities or to each other.

The Commission specified that all emissions appearing outside of the
licensee\'s frequency block must be attenuated by 43 + 10 log (P) dB
below the transmitter power. [^124] This requirement must be met by
licensees and is not specifically aimed at the design of radio
equipment. We did so because we sought to provide maximum flexibility to
both licensees and equipment manufacturers as to how they might control
emissions outside the licensee\'s frequency block. For example, a
licensee could choose to use equipment that is not designed to meet a
stringent out-of-band emissions mask, yet still ensure compliance with
our emissions limits by leaving a guard band near the edge of the
frequency block..[^125] With regard to Omnipoint\'s assertion that
equipment will be made unnecessarily costly by the current requirement,
we observe that this is not necessarily the case. The equipment can be
designed so that it does not operate right up to the edge of a frequency
block. We believe that any reduction in capacity of the spectrum by
avoiding close proximity to the band edges will be negligible. With
regard to Omnipoint\'s assertion that the unlicensed PCS rules are not
as stringent with regard to spurious emissions, and the implicit
suggestion that emissions standards for out-of-band emissions by
licensed services should be correspondingly eased, we note that
standards for unlicensed PCS are only 3.5 dB less stringent within 1.25
MHz of the band edge, an insignificant difference. We find that our
basic standard of 43 + 10 log(P) dB is necessary and appropriate to
control interference between licensees.[^126] Accordingly, we are
retaining the current emissions standard. To this extent, Omnipoint\'s
petition is denied.

  We are persuaded that further clarification is needed with regard to
the measurement of emissions immediately outside the necessary bandwidth
of the transmitted signal. The current rule states that measurement
instrumentation employing a 1 MHz resolution bandwidth shall be
employed; however, where emissions within the licensee\'s frequency
block influence the levels of the signals measured outside this block in
such a manner to make it appear that these emissions are not in
compliance with the standards, alternative measurement techniques may be
employed. The commenting parties generally agree that the use of a
resolution bandwidth of approximately one percent of the bandwidth of
the device under test is appropriate for measuring emissions immediately
outside of the frequency block. We are specifically noting this as an
appropriate test procedure in the rules. To this extent, Omnipoint\'s
petition is granted. We believe that this action should satisfactorily
resolve much of Omnipoint\'s and the commenters\' concerns. The
Commission\'s staff may provide further guidance on this and other
measurement matters that may arise, consistent with our current
practice.

[Unlicensed Devices]{.underline}. Omnipoint requests that the unlicensed
isochronous[^127] frame period[^128] be changed from 10 milliseconds/X
to 20 milliseconds/X where X is a whole number.[^129] They argue that
this will allow for use of advanced vocoders and promote
interoperability between licensed and unlicensed PCS systems that are
expected to use advanced vocoder technology. Omnipoint states that the
latest generation of vocoders require a 20 millisecond frame period in
order to significantly improve throughput and slot time efficiency.
Omnipoint states more specifically that in these respects, its 8 kbps
codebook excited linear predictive (CELP) type of vocoder meets or
exceeds the performance of 32 kbps adaptive pulse code modulation
(ADPCM) types that have commonly been promoted for unlicensed equipment.
Omnipoint claims their vocoder technology provides a 4:1 improvement
over the 32 kbps vocoder ADPCM technology in throughput efficiency.

[Comments]{.underline}. Motorola opposes Omnipoint\'s request to change
the frame period from 10 milliseconds/X to 20 milliseconds/X and argues
that this change would disadvantage narrow band technologies.[^130]
Motorola contends this disadvantage arises from the relationship between
the current \"listen before talk\" monitoring period of 10 milliseconds
and the current frame period definition of 10 milliseconds/X that were
chosen to accommodate different technologies and promote spectrum
efficiency. Increasing the frame period to 20 milliseconds/X and the
monitoring period to 20 milliseconds would double the time required to
monitor each frequency/time window. Motorola asserts that performance
would be degraded significantly when systems must search a large number
of channels. Battery life of portable units would also be reduced.
Motorola also asserts that the current frame period will support
vocoders that utilize analysis intervals longer than 10 milliseconds.
Motorola provides an example of current technology (GSM) that utilizes a
vocoder analysis interval longer than its frame period interval.

[Replies]{.underline}. Omnipoint replies that extending the frame period
and monitoring period from 10 to 20 milliseconds would result in an
additional delay of only one hundredth of a second when accessing a time
and spectrum window.[^131] They also disagree that extending the frame
period and monitoring period will greatly and adversely affect the time
required to find an open frequency slot or reduce battery life. AT&T
opposes extending the frame period and monitoring period to 20
milliseconds and supports Motorola\'s arguments.[^132] AT&T, however,
presents a compromise approach that it believes addresses the concerns
of all parties. AT&T proposes that we delete the requirement for systems
with 40 or more defined channels to monitor all channels at an access
level of 30 dB above thermal noise power. This would relieve large
systems of the requirement that they perform repetitive listen before
talk monitoring to determine if a clear channel is available, thereby
negating the increased access time and battery life issues for larger
systems.

Extending the maximum frame period of isochronous devices from 10 to 20
milliseconds was addressed in the [Broadband PCS
Reconsideration]{.underline}.[^133] Proponents argued at that time that
this change would permit the widest range of present and future
technologies to operate in the unlicensed band in the most equitable
manner, and so would improve the potential for equipment capable of
operating in both the licensed and unlicensed spectrum. Opponents argued
that lengthening the frame period would necessitate longer channel setup
and access times and decrease battery life in portable units. In making
our decision to retain 10 milliseconds as the maximum frame period, we
stated that a longer frame period could potentially reduce spectrum
efficiency and that we were unconvinced that an increase in the frame
period would improve the likelihood of compatibility with future
technical standards for licensed PCS equipment.

[Discussion]{.underline}. Throughout this proceeding the Commission has
continued to support the concept that regulatory impact on present and
future potential technologies should be minimized wherever possible in
order to provide maximum flexibility for technological innovation. This
is especially true when minor adjustments in technical requirements
would permit additional technological innovation or alternatives without
compromising other implementations. From this perspective, the
compromise proposed by AT&T is flawed because it could potentially lead
to greatly increased interference between systems competing for limited
spectrum. However, analysis by Commission staff of isochronous device
operation under the current unlicensed technical requirements has
developed a compromise regarding the frame period that will provide for
additional technical innovation in the unlicensed spectrum, while not
affecting the operation of systems with a 10 millisecond or shorter
frame period.

This additional flexibility can be achieved by modifying the appropriate
rules to permit devices with frame periods of 20 milliseconds to access
unlicensed spectrum, and also requiring systems with a 20 millisecond
frame period to extend the listen before talk monitoring time to 20
milliseconds. There is little, if any, foreseeable adverse impact on
systems that use a 10 millisecond or shorter frame period from systems
using a 20 millisecond frame period. By continuing to permit systems
with a 10 millisecond or shorter frame period to utilize a monitoring
period of 10 milliseconds, they will be unaffected by this rule change.
This addresses the concerns raised about channel access times and
battery life by continuing to permit system operation consistent with
the current rule requirements. Systems with a frame period of 20
milliseconds may be somewhat disadvantaged relative to systems with a
shorter frame period because they will have longer channel set-up and
access times. The changes in the rules, however, will afford relief to
technologies that, because of choice or design constraints, use a frame
period of 20 milliseconds and permits those technologies access to the
unlicensed spectrum. We are, therefore, revising Sections 15.323(c)(1),
15.323(c)(5) and 15.323(e), that prescribe the channel access
requirements, to accommodate systems that use a frame period of up to 20
milliseconds.

E. [PCS Interference to the Broadcast Auxiliary Service]{.underline}.

The Joint Broadcast Parties request that we clarify that we will, [inter
alia]{.underline}, address the potential for interference to the
Broadcast Auxiliary Service in the 1990-2110 MHz band by high power PCS
base stations in the subjacent 1970-1990 MHz band.[^134] Specifically,
the Joint Broadcast Parties request that we establish a guard band in
the 1970-1990 MHz range, within which only low power mobile units would
be allowed to operate.[^135] In the alternative, the Joint Broadcast
Parties request that we establish a minimum separation distance of two
kilometers between PCS base stations and broadcast auxiliary receive
sites.[^136]

[Comments]{.underline}. Five commenters addressed the Joint Broadcast
Parties\' petition. Commenters argue that the Joint Broadcast Parties\'
analysis of the likelihood of interference is premised upon worst case
conditions, especially in assuming that a PCS base station will be
directly between the broadcast auxiliary transmitter and receiver, that
the PCS station will necessarily be operating at the maximum allowable
power, and that a distance of up to two kilometers represents immediate
proximity.[^137] Further, they state that the suggested guard band would
have the effect of imposing use restrictions on PCS Blocks C and F that
would decrease the value of those blocks, and necessitate design of PCS
handsets more complex and expensive than are necessary under the current
plan. Commenters also claim that the proposed restrictions work against
general design principles, which indicate that the lower power
transmitter should operate on the lower frequency. Commenters also argue
that the proposed guard band would create \"technological islands\" that
would interfere with the interoperability of PCS, to the especial
detriment of designated entities and entrepreneurial licensees.[^138]
Finally, our current rules on interference and out-of-band emissions are
sufficient to protect broadcast auxiliary operations, according to
commenters.[^139]

[Replies]{.underline}. The Joint Broadcast Parties state that those
opposing its initial petition for stricter interference protections make
no serious effort to quantify the actual risk of interference, and
reassert that the BAS needs more protection from potential interference
by PCS.[^140] Motorola Inc. (Motorola) reiterates its opposition to the
establishment of a guard band.[^141]

[Discussion]{.underline}. MSTV\'s concerns arise from two actions in the
[PCS Broadband Reconsideration]{.underline}: the increased maximum
permissible power approved for PCS base stations, and the allocation to
PCS of a portion of spectrum that is internationally designated for MSS.
The increased power limit, MSTV asserts, carries with it an increased
potential for interference to BAS users in the adjacent band, while the
revised allocation plan renews BAS users\' concern that their operations
on the 1990-2110 MHz band not be compromised by subsequent MSS
allocation decisions.

As to the potential for increased interference to BAS users, including
ENG applications, the record does not persuade us that protective action
beyond the measures adopted in the [PCS Broadband
Reconsideration]{.underline} is necessary. There, we amended our rules
to indicate that spurious emission limits apply to all frequencies
outside the block employed by a PCS licensee, and clarified compliance
testing procedures.[^142] We also amended our rules to specify the
resolution bandwidth of measuring instruments. These rules apply both to
the transmitter and the operating system, as installed by the licensee,
and the Commission retains the authority to require additional
attenuation when emissions cause harmful interference to other users of
the RF spectrum. [^143]

To support its argument for measures more extensive than these existing
provisions, MSTV submits an engineering exhibit premised on worst case
assumptions, which provides a wholly insufficient basis from which to
conclude that present interference protection measures are so inadequate
as to require substantial additional safeguards. We are not persuaded
that the worst case scenario MSTV presents should be the appropriate
overall standard for evaluating interference protection. In this case,
in addition to MSTV\'s failure to demonstrate more than the merest
possibility of interference, commenters have identified, and MSTV does
not dispute, significant technical and competitive burdens that would be
imposed on PCS licensees in the 1970-1990 MHz band if use of that band
were constrained as MSTV proposes. MSTV does not dispute that limiting
PCS licensees in that band to mobile use would result in a system
configured at odds with customary engineering practice, and so would
require distinctive handsets that, moreover, would not be compatible for
use with more conventionally configured PCS systems. We view such
targeted constraints on licensee\'s flexibility to use a particular PCS
spectrum block as measures to be considered only in extreme
circumstances, which MSTV has not demonstrated here. We are confident
that the standards already established in this proceeding will serve to
protect the broadcast auxiliary service from possible PCS base station
out-of-band emissions.[^144] We note that, apart from specific
attenuation standards, we have authority under Section 24.238(b) of our
rules to require any PCS base station which causes interference to other
radio services to attenuate its out-of-band emissions substantially. For
these reasons, we deny MSTV\'s petition.

As to the revised allocation plan, and possible allocation actions in
the MSS proceeding, MSTV asks that in future proceedings the Commission
place priority on a spectrum solution for MSS that does not involve
relocation or impairment of BAS operations, and that if relocation is
required, various measures be implemented toward a reasonable transition
period and compensation to broadcasters for relocation costs. These
concerns will be fully considered as part of the Commission\'s impending
review of MSS allocation alternatives, but need not be reviewed in this
further reconsideration context.

F. [Secondary Allocation for MSS]{.underline}

CELSAT, INC. (Celsat) petitions for review on spectrum allocation
issues. Celsat requests that the 1970-1990 MHz band be allocated on a
secondary basis and that the 2160-2180 MHz band be allocated on a
primary basis for domestic Mobile-Satellite Service (MSS) use, arguing
that its technology would allow it to share these bands with both fixed
microwave systems and new terrestrial PCS systems.[^145]

Celsat proposes a domestic MSS or hybrid satellite system that would be
licensed to provide space-based PCS services nationwide as long as it
did not interfere with the operation of any terrestrial PCS system
licensed in either PCS Frequency Blocks F or C.[^146] Celsat states that
its proposal would be spectrum efficient, and that a single handset
could access both terrestrial PCS service in served areas and MSS
service in areas not served by terrestrial PCS.[^147] Celsat states that
participating PCS licensees would attain nationwide coverage upon the
launch of a single MSS satellite and that this coverage would provide
these licensees an immediate competitive advantage over other PCS and
cellular licensees.[^148] It states that these bands are the only
spectrum that is earmarked both domestically and internationally for
both ground and space mobile services and thus are ideal for a hybrid
space/ground PCS system.[^149] Celsat further states that its proposal
would cause no interference if licensees in Blocks C and F use the
1970-1990 MHz band for mobile unit transmission. It therefore requests a
secondary MSS allocation of this band, and urges PCS licensees in this
band to choose the CDMA multiplexing scheme so that MSS and PCS services
can efficiently share the band.[^150] Celsat\'s proposal requires not
only the secondary MSS allocation at 1970-1990 MHz, but also a primary
MSS allocation at 2160-2180 MHz.[^151]

The 1992 World Administrative Radio Conference (WARC-92) adopted the
following allocations for MSS: Region 2 \-- 1970-1980 and 2160-2170 MHz
primary, 1930-1970 and 2120-2160 MHz secondary; Worldwide \-- 1980-2010
and 2170-2200 MHz primary. In the [Second Report and Order]{.underline}
in the instant proceeding, we allocated the 1850-1970 MHz, 2130-2150 MHz
and 2180-2200 MHz bands to terrestrial PCS and reserved the 1970-1990
and 2160-2180 MHz bands for possible MSS use. On reconsideration, we
decided to allocate 1850-1990 MHz for PCS, and to reserve 2110-2150 MHz
and 2160-2180 MHz for emerging technologies, including MSS.

[Comments]{.underline}. Two commenters addressed the issues raised by
Celsat and the Joint Broadcast Parties, generally opposing any change to
our current rules.[^152] As an initial matter, COMSAT Corporation
(Comsat) argues that the petition of Celsat is not within the scope of
this proceeding, because we have indicated that we will address this
issues in an upcoming MSS allocation proceeding.[^153]

With regard to Celsat\'s proposed allocations for MSS, commenters assert
that this proposal would add uncertainty to the quality of PCS services
in this band, to the disadvantage of designated entities and
entrepreneurial licensees,[^154] and would interfere with the ongoing
international negotiations regarding MSS issues.[^155] Commenters state
that the place to consider this issue is the upcoming MSS
proceeding.[^156]

[Replies]{.underline}. American Mobile Satellite Corporation (AMSC)
joins Comsat in urging the Commission to address spectrum issues in an
upcoming MSS proceeding, and urged us to begin this proceeding as soon
as possible.[^157]

[Discussion]{.underline}. We agree with commenters who state that this
proceeding is not the appropriate place to consider the multiple
implications of spectrum allocations for MSS. The Commission is
scheduled to release a Notice of Proposed Rule Making in a separate MSS
proceeding prior to the December 1994 broadband PCS auction, and that
order will consider the issue of authorizing satellite operations in
conjunction with broadband PCS.

G. [ONA Implementation for PCS]{.underline}

 Point asks that the Commission require PCS networks to utilize Open
Network Architecture, asserting this would guarantee competition among
equipment suppliers and reduce the cost of constructing networks. [^158]
MCI in its comments characterizes Point\'s request as a plea for the
Commission to assert authority over equipment manufacturers, and asserts
that the marketplace can best determine the desirability of ONA or other
network architecture schemes. [^159] No reply comments were filed.

 The elements of an Open Network Architecture regulatory system
necessarily reflect the characteristics of the network environment in
which those elements are applied. Apart from Point\'s very general
request and a few sentences of MCI\'s response, the record in this
proceeding is nearly devoid of any discussion of the complex technical
and operational issues involved. Such a record provides a wholly
inadequate basis for assessing the merits of ONA in the wireless
telecommunications marketplace. We will therefore deny Point\'s request,
but this action does not preclude Point or other interested parties from
filing a more specific and well developed ONA proposal in the form of a
petition for rulemaking.

**IV. CONCLUSION**

The adoption of a [Memorandum Opinion and Order]{.underline} in the
Emerging Technology proceeding a month ago advanced our consideration of
transition issues.[^160] Today we have amended our service rules in this
order to better facilitate the introduction of broadband PCS services to
the public. Additionally, we are conducting ongoing consultations with
foreign governments to ensure that international coordination
requirements for this service will be completed as rapidly as possible.
As previously announced, we intend to begin auctioning broadband PCS
licenses on December 5, 1994.[^161]

**V. ORDERING CLAUSES**

ACCORDINGLY, IT IS ORDERED, that the petitions for reconsideration
addressed in this order ARE GRANTED to the extent described above, and
DENIED in all other respects.

 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, that Parts 2, 15, and 24 of the Commission\'s
Rules ARE AMENDED as specified in Appendix A, effective 30 days after
publication in the Federal Register, except that amendments to 47 C.F.R.
Section 24.204 as specified in Appendix A SHALL BE EFFECTIVE immediately
upon publication in the Federal Register.[^162] This action is taken
pursuant to Sections 4(i), 7(a), 302, 303(c), 303(f), 303(g), and 303(r)
of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, 47 U.S.C. Sections
154(i), 157(a), 302, 303(c), 303(f), 303(g), and 303(r).

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

William F. Caton

Acting Secretary

**Appendix A: Final Rules**

Parts 2, 15, and 24 of Chapter I of Title 47 of the Code of Federal
Regulations are amended as follows:

**PART 2 \-- FREQUENCY ALLOCATIONS AND RADIO TREATY MATTERS; GENERAL
RULES AND REGULATIONS**

1\. The authority citation for Part 2 continues to read as follows:

**AUTHORITY: Sec. 4, 302, 303, and 307 of the Communications Act of
1934, as amended, 47 U.S.C. Sections 154, 302, 303 and 307, unless
otherwise noted.**

2\. Subpart B is amended by revising Section 2.106, the Table of
Frequency Allocations, as follows:

a\. In Column (4) of the 1850-1990 MHz band, add US331.

b\. In Column (4) of the 2110-2200 MHz band, delete US331.

c\. In Column (7) of the 1850-1990 MHz band, delete EMERGING
TECHNOLOGIES.

**PART 15 \-- RADIO FREQUENCY DEVICES**

1\. The authority citation continues to read as follows:

**AUTHORITY: Sec. 4, 302, 303, 304, and 307 of the Communications Act of
l934, as amended, 47 U.S.C. Sections 154, 302, 303, 304, and 307.**

2\. Paragraphs 15.323(c)(1) and (5) and 15.323(e) are revised to read as
follows:

**§ 15.323 Specific requirements for isochronous devices operating in
the 1920-1930 MHz sub-band.**

\* \* \* \* \*

\(c\) \* \* \*

\(1\) Immediately prior to initiating transmission, devices must monitor
the combined time and spectrum windows in which they intend to transmit
for a period of at least 10 milliseconds for systems designed to use a
10 millisecond or shorter frame period or at least 20 milliseconds for
systems designed to use a 20 millisecond frame period.

\* \* \* \* \*

\(5\) If access to spectrum is not available as determined by the above,
and a minimum of 40 duplex system access channels are defined for the
system, the time and spectrum windows with the lowest power level below
a monitoring threshold of 50 dB above the thermal noise power determined
for the emission bandwidth may be accessed. A device utilizing the
provisions of this paragraph must have monitored all access channels
defined for its system within the last 10 seconds and must verify,
within the 20 milliseconds (40 milliseconds for devices designed to use
a 20 millisecond frame period) immediately preceding actual channel
access that the detected power of the selected time and spectrum windows
is no higher than the previously detected value. The power measurement
resolution for this comparison must be accurate to within 6 dB. No
device or group of cooperating devices located within 1 meter of each
other shall occupy more than three 1.25 MHz channels during any frame
period. Devices in an operational state that are utilizing the provision
of this section are not required to use the search provision of (b)
above.

\* \* \* \* \*

\(e\) The frame period (a set of consecutive time slots in which the
position of each time slot can be identified by reference to a
synchronizing source) of an intentional radiator operating in these
sub-bands shall be 20 milliseconds or 10 milliseconds /X where X is a
positive whole number. Each device that implements time division for the
purposes of maintaining a duplex connection on a given frequency carrier
shall maintain a frame repetition rate with a frequency stability of at
least 50 parts per millions (ppm). Each device which further divides
access in time in order to support multiple communication links on a
given frequency carrier shall maintain a frame repetition rate with a
frequency stability of at least 10 ppm. The jitter (time-related,
abrupt, spurious variations in the duration of the frame interval)
introduced at the two ends of such a communication link shall not exceed
25 microseconds for any two consecutive transmissions. Transmissions
shall be continuous in every time and spectrum window during the frame
period defined for the device.

**PART 24‑‑PERSONAL COMMUNICATIONS SERVICES**

1\. The authority citation for Part 24 continues to read as follows:

**AUTHORITY: 47 U.S.C. Sections 154, 301, 302, 303, and 332, unless
otherwise noted.**

2\. Section 24.204 is amended by revising text immediately following the
semi-colon in the end of the first sentence of paragraph (f), and by
adding new sentences at the end of that paragraph and of paragraph
(f)(3)(ii) to read as follows:

**§ 24.204 Cellular eligibility.**

\* \* \* \* \*

\(f\) \* \* \* Provided, however, that these divestiture procedures
shall be available only to: parties with controlling or attributable
ownership interests in cellular licenses where the CGSA(s) covers 20
percent or less of the PCS service area population; and parties with
non-controlling attributable interests in cellular licenses, regardless
of the degree to which the CGSA(s) covers the PCS service area
population. For purposes of this paragraph, a \"non-controlling
attributable interest\" is one in which the holder has less than a fifty
(50) percent voting interest and there is an unaffiliated single holder
of a 50 percent or greater voting interest.

\* \* \* \* \*

(3)(i) \* \* \* The trustee must divest the property within six months
from grant of license.

\* \* \* \* \*

3\. Section 24.238 is amended to read as follows:

**§ 24.238 [Emission limits]{.underline}.**

\(a\) On any frequency outside a licensee\'s frequency block, the power
of any emission shall be attenuated below the transmitter power (P) by
at least 43 + 10 log (P) dB.

\(b\) Compliance with these provisions is based on the use of
measurement instrumentation employing a resolution bandwidth of 1 MHz or
greater. However, in the 1 MHz bands immediately outside and adjacent to
the frequency block a resolution bandwidth of at least one percent of
the emission bandwidth of the fundamental emission of the transmitter
may be employed. The emission bandwidth is defined as the width of the
signal between two points, one below the carrier center frequency and
one above the carrier center frequency, outside of which all emissions
are attenuated at least 26 dB below the transmitter power.

\(c\) When measuring the emission limits, the nominal carrier frequency
shall be adjusted as close to the licensee\'s frequency block edges,
both upper and lower, as the design permits.

\(d\) The measurements of emission power can be expressed in peak or
average values, provided they are expressed in the same parameters as
the transmitter power.

\(e\) When an emission outside of the authorized bandwidth causes
harmful interference, the Commission may, at its discretion, require
greater attenuation than specified in this section.

**Appendix B**

**[PARTIES]{.underline}**

**[Petitioners]{.underline}**

1.Association for Maximum Service Television, Inc. and Capital
Cities/ABC, Inc., CBS Inc., Fox, Inc. & Fox Broadcasting Stations, Inc.,
the National Association of Broadcasters, Inc., National Broadcasting
Company, Inc., Public Broadcasting Service, the Radio-Television News
Directors Association, and the Society of Broadcast Engineers
(collectively, \"MSTV\")

2.Association of Independent Designated Entities (AIDE)

3.CELSAT, INC. (Celsat)

4.Cellular Telecommunications Industry Association (CTIA)

5.Comcast Corporation (Comcast)

6.Omnipoint Corporation (Omnipoint)

7.Personal Communications Industry Association (PCIA)

8.Point Communications Company (Point)

9.Puerto Rico Telephone Company (PRTC)

10.Spatial Communications, Inc. and ArrayComm, Inc. (SCI/ArrayComm)

**[Opposing and Commenting Parties]{.underline}**

1.American Personal Communications (APC)

2.BellSouth Corp., BellSouth Telecom. Inc., BellSouth Cellular Corp.
(BellSouth)

3.Celeritek, Incorporated (Celeritek)

4.COMSAT Corporation (Comsat)

5.McCaw Cellular Communications, Inc. (McCaw)

6.MCI Telecommunications Corporation (MCI)

7.Motorola, Inc. (Motorola)

8.Northern Telecom Inc. (Northern Telecom)

9.Pacific Bell Mobile Services (PacBell Mobile)

10.Pegasus Communications, Inc. (Pegasus)

11.Personal Communications Industry Association (PCIA)

12.Rural Cellular Association (RCA)

13.Utilities Telecommunications Council (UTC)

14.Sprint Corporation (Sprint)

**[Replying Parties]{.underline}**

1.American Mobile Satellite Corporation (AMSC)

2.Ameritech

3.APC

4.AT&T

5.CTIA

6.GTE Service Corporation (GTE)

7.Motorola

8.MSTV

9.Omnipoint

10.PacBell Mobile

11.PCIA

12.PRTC

13.UTAM, Inc. (UTAM)

[^1]: [See]{.underline} [Memorandum Opinion and Order]{.underline}, FCC
    94-144, June 13, 1994, *summarized* 59 FR 32820 (June 24, 1994);
    [Erratum]{.underline}, GEN Docket No. 90-314, Mimeo Number 44006
    (released July 22, 1994) (hereafter jointly [Broadband PCS
    Reconsideration]{.underline}). Appendix B lists parties that filed
    petitions for reconsideration, oppositions or comments, and replies.

[^2]: The parties to this petition for reconsideration are: Maximum
    Service Television, Inc., Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., CBS Inc., Fox
    Inc. & Fox Broadcasting Stations, Inc., the National Association of
    Broadcasters, Inc., National Broadcasting Company, Inc., Public
    Broadcasting Service, the Radio-Television News Directors
    Association, and the Society of Broadcast Engineers.

[^3]: [See]{.underline} [Broadband PCS Reconsideration]{.underline},
    [supra]{.underline} n.1 at para. 97.

[^4]: [Second Report and Order]{.underline}, GEN Docket No. 90-314, 8
    FCC Rcd 7700 (1993)(hereafter [PCS Second Report and
    Order]{.underline}).

[^5]: [See]{.underline} [Broadband PCS Reconsideration]{.underline},
    [supra]{.underline} n.1. Previously in this proceeding we adopted:
    [Notice of Inquiry]{.underline}, 5 FCC Rcd 3995 (1990); [Policy
    Statement and Order]{.underline}, 6 FCC Rcd 6601 (1991); [Notice of
    Proposed Rule Making and Tentative Decision]{.underline}, 7 FCC Rcd
    5676 (1992); [Erratum]{.underline}, 7 FCC Rcd 5779 (1992); [Second
    Report and Order]{.underline}, 8 FCC Rcd 7700 (1993).

[^6]: [See]{.underline} [PCS Reconsideration Order]{.underline} at para.
    27.

[^7]: [See]{.underline} [id]{.underline}. at para. 75.

[^8]: PCS providers, however, may offer private PCS service if they
    demonstrate a reasonable basis for overcoming the CMRS presumption.
    Additionally, local exchange carriers (LECs) are required to provide
    reasonable and fair interconnection for all CMRS providers,
    including PCS licensees. [See]{.underline} [Second Report and
    Order]{.underline}, GEN Docket No. 93-252, 9 FCC Rcd 1411
    (1994)(hereafter [CMRS Second Report and Order]{.underline}),
    [petitions for reconsideration pending]{.underline}.

[^9]: [See]{.underline} [Memorandum Opinion and Order]{.underline}, ET
    Docket No. 92-9, 9 FCC Rcd 1943 (1994), [petition for
    reconsideration pending]{.underline}. The emerging technologies
    proceeding, ET Docket No. 92-9, established the transition rules
    that PCS licensees and UTAM, Inc. will employ to gain use of
    spectrum currently being used by point-to-point microwave
    facilities. Previously in ET Docket No. 92-9, we adopted: [First
    Report and Order and Third Notice of Proposed Rule
    Making]{.underline}, 7 FCC Rcd 6886 (1992); [Second Report and
    Order]{.underline}, 8 FCC Rcd 6495 (1993); and [Third Report and
    Order and Memorandum Opinion and Order]{.underline}, 8 FCC Rcd 6589
    (1993), [on reconsideration]{.underline}, 9 FCC Rcd 1943 (1994).

[^10]: [See]{.underline} [Fifth Report and Order]{.underline}, PP Docket
    No. 93-253, FCC 94-178 (Released July 15, 1994).

[^11]: [See]{.underline} [Further Order on Reconsideration]{.underline},
    GEN Docket No. 90-314, FCC 94-195, released July 22, 1994,
    *summarized* 59 FR 39704 (August 4, 1994), [petition for
    reconsideration pending]{.underline}.

[^12]: For example, if Party A owns 10 percent of Company X, which owns
    35 percent of, and controls, Company Y, which owns 25 percent of
    Licensee Z, then Company X\'s attributable interest would be 25
    percent (100% x 25%) and Party A\'s effective interest would be 2.5
    percent (10% x 100% x 25%). However, if Company X owns 35 percent
    of, but does not control, Company Y, then Company X\'s effective
    interest would be 8.75 percent (35% x 25%) and Party A\'s effective
    interest would be 0.875 percent (10% x 35% x 25%).

[^13]: [See]{.underline} [Broadband PCS Reconsideration]{.underline} at
    paras. 102-140.

[^14]: [See]{.underline} [id]{.underline}. at paras. 141-146.

[^15]: [See]{.underline} CTIA Petition at 4.

[^16]: [See]{.underline} S. Besen, W. Burnett, [An Antitrust Analysis of
    the Market for Mobile Telecommunications Services]{.underline},
    Attachment to CTIA Petition for Reconsideration of the [PCS Second
    Report and Order]{.underline}.

[^17]: [See]{.underline} CTIA, [Ex Parte Filing - Docket No.
    90-314]{.underline}, August 2, 1994, at 1-3.

[^18]: [See]{.underline} CTIA Petition at 6.

[^19]: [See]{.underline} [id]{.underline}. at 7.

[^20]: [See]{.underline} Comcast Petition at 2.

[^21]: [See]{.underline} [id]{.underline}. at 3.

[^22]: [See]{.underline} [id]{.underline}. at 4 (citing [Fifth Report
    and Order]{.underline}, PP Docket No. 93-253, FCC 94-178, released
    July 15, 1994, *summarized* 59 FR 37566.

[^23]: [See]{.underline} [id]{.underline}. at 8-9.

[^24]: [See]{.underline} [id]{.underline}. at 8.

[^25]: [See]{.underline} [id]{.underline}. at 9.

[^26]: Commenters on cellular eligibility and ownership attribution
    were: BellSouth Corporation, BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc.,
    BellSouth Cellular Corp. (BellSouth), McCaw Cellular Communications,
    Inc. (McCaw), MCI, Pacific Bell Mobile Services (PacBell), APC, and
    Rural Cellular Association (RCA).

[^27]: [See]{.underline} MCI Comments at 1; PacBell Comments at 4.

[^28]: [See]{.underline} APC Comments at 4-5.

[^29]: [See]{.underline} [id]{.underline}. at 7-8.

[^30]: [See]{.underline} APC Comments at 5.

[^31]: [See]{.underline} PacBell Comments at 4-5.

[^32]: [See]{.underline} MCI Comments at 2; PacBell Comments at 3-4; APC
    Comments at 10.

[^33]: [See]{.underline} APC Comments at 10.

[^34]: [See]{.underline} APC Comments at 11.

[^35]: [See]{.underline} APC Comments at 8; PacBell Comments at 6.

[^36]: [See]{.underline} MCI Comments at 1-2.

[^37]: [See]{.underline} [Fifth Report and Order]{.underline}, PP Docket
    No 93-253, FCC 94-178, *summarized* 59 FR 37566 (July 22, 1994);
    [Order on Reconsideration]{.underline}, PP Docket No. 93-253, FCC
    94-217 (August 15, 1994).

[^38]: [See]{.underline} BellSouth Comments at 6-8.

[^39]: [See]{.underline} [id]{.underline}. at 9-10.

[^40]: [See]{.underline} [id]{.underline}. at 10-17.

[^41]: [See]{.underline} [id]{.underline}. at 17-20.

[^42]: [See]{.underline} [id]{.underline}. at 5-21; RCA Comments at 1-2;
    McCaw Comments at 2-3.

[^43]: [See]{.underline} RCA Comments at 3-5.

[^44]: [See]{.underline} McCaw Comments at 3.

[^45]: [See]{.underline} BellSouth Comments at 28.

[^46]: [See]{.underline} McCaw Comments at 6.

[^47]: [See]{.underline} BellSouth Comments at 22 (citing [Third Report
    and Order]{.underline}, Gen. Docket No.

    93-252, FCC 94-212, adopted August 9, 1994).

[^48]: [See]{.underline} BellSouth Comments at 36-37.

[^49]: [See]{.underline} BellSouth Comments at 38-39.

[^50]: [See]{.underline} CTIA Petition at 7-8.

[^51]: [See]{.underline} Comcast Petition at 7-9.

[^52]: [See]{.underline} CTIA Petition at 8; McCaw Comments at 3;
    BellSouth Comments at 27.

[^53]: [See]{.underline} APC Reply at 3.

[^54]: [See]{.underline} PacBell Reply at 3.

[^55]: [See]{.underline} APC Reply at 4-5; PacBell Reply at 4-7.

[^56]: [See]{.underline} CTIA Reply at 2-3; Comcast Reply at 2-4.

[^57]: [See]{.underline} CTIA Reply at 3-8.

[^58]: [See]{.underline} Comcast Reply at 5-9.

[^59]: [See]{.underline} Ameritech Reply at 1-2.

[^60]: [See]{.underline} [id]{.underline}. at 5.

[^61]: [See]{.underline} [Broadband PCS Reconsideration]{.underline} at
    para. 103.

[^62]: [See]{.underline} 47 U.S.C. § 309.

[^63]: See FASB Accounting Principles Board Opinion No. 18 (1970).

[^64]: As we explained in the [Broadband PCS
    Reconsideration]{.underline}, the attribution standard for cellular
    interests other than designated entities is set at 20 percent to
    account for our policy in the early days of the cellular industry to
    encourage the formation of settlement groups \-- a historic anomaly
    that has no counterpoint in the PCS context. Attributions levels are
    set higher for designated entities in accordance with our statutory
    mandate to promote opportunities in PCS for such entities.
    [See]{.underline} [Broadband PCS Reconsideration]{.underline} at
    paras. 123-132.

[^65]: Cellular spectrum is allocated in blocks of 25 MHz, while PCS
    spectrum is allocated in blocks of 10 and 30 MHz, so no combination
    of cellular and PCS spectrum totals 40 MHz. The opportunity to
    achieve that total will exist when licensees are permitted to
    disaggregate spectrum, a process for which we have not yet adopted
    rules, although we are committed to addressing the legal and
    technical issues that must be resolved in order to adopt such rules.
    See [Broadband PCS Reconsideration]{.underline} at paras. 66-71.

[^66]: For example, CTIA\'s analysis states that in the 18 BTAs that
    comprise the Chicago MTA, increasing the overlap standard to 30%
    creates licensing opportunities for eleven carriers, two of whom are
    Sprint and Southwestern Bell. [See]{.underline} [CTIA Exparte
    Filing]{.underline}, Aug. 2, 1994.

[^67]: [Broadband PCS Reconsideration]{.underline} at paras. 141-146.

[^68]: [See]{.underline} [Broadband PCS Reconsideration
    Order]{.underline} at para. 143.

[^69]: [See]{.underline}, [e.g.]{.underline}, Comcast Petition at 9.

[^70]: [See]{.underline} [First Report and Order and Third Notice of
    Proposed Rulemaking]{.underline}, ET Docket No. 92-9, 7 FCC Rcd 6886
    (1992); [Third Report and Order and Memorandum Opinion and
    Order]{.underline} , ET Docket No. 92-9, 8 FCC Rcd 6589 (1993).

[^71]: [See]{.underline} PCIA Petition at 5-6.

[^72]: [See]{.underline} GTE Reply at 2-3.

[^73]: [See]{.underline} UTAM Reply at 1-3.

[^74]: [See]{.underline} UTC Comments at 7.

[^75]: In its comments to the [Notice of Proposed Rule Making and
    Tentative Decision]{.underline} in this proceeding, the National
    Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) proposed
    that PCS be licensed using the 183 \"economic areas\" defined by the
    Department of Commerce\'s Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). NTIA
    stated that each of these economic areas generally consists of a
    Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) or a similar area that serves as
    a center of economic activity and surrounding counties that are
    economically related to the center.

[^76]: [See]{.underline} Point Petition at 1-4.

[^77]: [See]{.underline} [id]{.underline}. at 5.

[^78]: [PCS Second Report and Order]{.underline}, 8 FCC Rcd at 7729-34
    (paras. 64-78).

[^79]: [See]{.underline} 47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(4)(C).

[^80]: [See]{.underline} [Broadband PCS Reconsideration]{.underline} at
    paras. 77-78.

[^81]: [See]{.underline} MCI Comments at 4; PacBell Comments at 2-3.

[^82]: [See]{.underline} MCI Comments at 4.

[^83]: [See]{.underline} Point Petition at 5.

[^84]: [See]{.underline} [Broadband PCS Reconsideration]{.underline} at
    paras. 33, 35.

[^85]: See AIDE Petition at Attachment B.

[^86]: See letter to Ms. Deborah Lipoff, Rand McNally, from William J.
    Franklin, AIDE Petition Attachment C.

[^87]: See letter from Deborah Lipoff, Rand McNally, to William J.
    Franklin, AIDE Petition Attachment D.

[^88]: PRTC Petition at 3-9.

[^89]: [Id]{.underline}. at 9-11.

[^90]: The primary political divisions of Puerto Rico are termed
    \"municipios.\" [See]{.underline} [1990 Census of Population and
    Housing \[,\] Summary Population and Housing Characteristics \[for\]
    Puerto Rico]{.underline}, 1990 CPH-1-53, Issued November 1991 by the
    Bureau of the Census, at page A-5. In its petition, Pegasus
    translates \"municipios\" to be \"counties.\" We use the term
    \"municipios\" to avoid confusion.

[^91]: [Broadband PCS Reconsideration]{.underline} at para. 79.

[^92]: [See]{.underline} Pegasus Comments at 2-3.

[^93]: [See]{.underline} [id]{.underline}. at 4-5.

[^94]: [See]{.underline} [id]{.underline}. at 6-10.

[^95]: [See]{.underline} PRTC Reply at 3-6.

[^96]: [See]{.underline} [id]{.underline}. at 6-9.

[^97]: [See]{.underline} Pegasus Response to Reply of PRTC. This
    response was late filed, and could have been dismissed for that
    reason, despite Pegasus\' assertion that it reserved the right to
    rebut factual assertions by PRTC. For the sake of completeness of
    the record, however, we consider this response.

[^98]: [See]{.underline} [id]{.underline}. at 1.

[^99]: [See]{.underline} Rand McNally [1992 Commercial Atlas & Marketing
    Guide]{.underline}, \"Population, Income and Sales Data for the 150
    Largest Basic Trading Areas,\" at page 44, Census 4/1/90 column.

[^100]: We note that Puerto Rico is licensed as five MSAs and seven
    Rural Service Areas (RSAs) in the Domestic Public Cellular Radio
    Telecommunications Service.

[^101]: PRTC provides cellular telephone throughout Puerto Rico. Thus
    PRTC, like all in-market cellular operators, is initially limited to
    one 10 MHz BTA license in any geographic area of Puerto Rico. We
    note however that, under the current rules, PRTC can purchase a 10
    MHz license in both BTAs and thus serve the entire island. We do not
    believe that the adopted licensing scheme greatly affects PRTC.
    However, we believe that a single BTA potentially could preclude
    many individuals and companies from competing against PRTC.

[^102]: [Broadband PCS Reconsideration]{.underline} at paras. 172-174.
    Base station antennas may exceed 300 meters with a corresponding
    reduction in power. Mobile/portable stations are limited to 2 watts
    EIRP and must limit power to the minimum necessary for successful
    communications. [See]{.underline} § 24.232 of the Commission\'s
    Rules.

[^103]: SCI/ArrayComm are developers of Spatial Division Multiple Access
    (SDMA) technology, which uses patented algorithms to implement
    \"smart antennas\" that assign specific antenna elements to track
    mobile users and selectively direct RF energy to them.

[^104]: SCI/ArrayComm Petition at 6.

[^105]: For clarity, SCI/ArrayComm adds that it should be acceptable for
    more than one base station transmitter to transmit 100 watts of
    power in the same RF channel at the same time as long as different
    antenna elements are used for each transmitter, [i.e.]{.underline},
    power level as measured at the input to an antenna element.
    SCI/Arraycomm Petition at 6-7.

[^106]: Comments on this issue were filed by MCI, Motorola, Northern
    Telecom, APC and Sprint Corporation (Sprint).

[^107]: [See]{.underline} Motorola Comments at 11; MCI Comments at 5;
    Northern Telecom Comments at 6-7.

[^108]: [See]{.underline} Sprint Comments at 2-3.

[^109]: [See]{.underline} APC Comments at 5.

[^110]: [See]{.underline} SCI/ArrayComm Reply at 2-5.

[^111]: [See]{.underline} Motorola Reply at 4.

[^112]: Motorola does not provide technical details as to how this
    averaging should occur or the time interval that should be employed.

[^113]: For example, the material contained in the SCI/ArrayComm *ex
    parte* filing suggests that changing the regulations to specify
    power limits in terms of watts per hertz could significantly
    increase the transmission range of a PCS base station. This could
    have the further effect of increasing the potential for interference
    to existing microwave users, or possibly reducing interference
    compared to covering the same area with multiple, smaller sized
    cells employing omnidirectional systems. The implications of the
    proposed redefinition for coordination requirements of PCS
    licensees, including the potential for delays in providing service
    to the public, are not sufficiently developed on this record to
    support such a fundamental change as SCI/ArrayComm proposes.

[^114]: We stress that our denial is without prejudice to a subsequent
    petition for rule making, should SCI/ArrayComm or other parties wish
    to pursue these issues on a more fully developed record.

[^115]: Omnipoint Petition at p. 6-8 and Figures 1,2. An out-of-band
    emission is an emission on a frequency or frequencies immediately
    outside the necessary bandwidth which results from the modulation
    process, excluding spurious emissions. [See]{.underline} 47 C.F.R. §
    2.1. [See]{.underline} [also]{.underline} § 15.323(d) of the
    Commission\'s Rules for the isochronous devices\' modulation mask.

[^116]: [See]{.underline} § 24.238 of the Commission\'s Rules.

[^117]: A spurious emission is an emission on a frequency or frequencies
    which are outside the necessary bandwidth and the level of which may
    be reduced without affecting the corresponding transmission of
    information. Spurious emissions include harmonic emissions,
    parasitic emissions, intermodulation products and frequency
    conversion products, but exclude out-of-band emissions. Necessary
    bandwidth is, for a given class of emission, the width of the
    frequency band which is just sufficient to ensure the transmission
    of information at the rate and with the quality required under
    specified conditions. [See]{.underline} 47 C.F.R. § 2.1.

[^118]: [See]{.underline} n.1, *supra*.

[^119]: [See]{.underline} Replies of AT&T at 6, Motorola at 4-5, and
    Omnipoint at 1‑5.

[^120]: In its petition for reconsideration, Omnipoint proposed use of
    the unlicensed PCS isochronous out-of-band emission mask, which
    calls for 30 DB suppression for signals up to 1.25 MHz from the band
    edge, 50 dB suppression between 1.25 MHz and 2.5 MHz from the band
    edge, and 60 dB suppression beyond. In responding to MCI\'s
    concerns, Omnipoint proposed a linear roll-off between 30 dB at the
    band edge and 50 dB at 1.25 MHz beyond the band edge, and between 50
    dB at 1.25 MHz and 60 dB at 2.50 MHz from the band edge.

[^121]: The changes recommended by Omnipoint to the regulations on
    emission limits retain the existing standards as applied to spurious
    emissions. See Omnipoint Reply at 4-5. Omnipoint further described
    its proposed changes in its *ex parte* presentation to the
    Commission on September 30, 1994.

[^122]: [See]{.underline} letters dated September 30, 1994, from Mr.
    David E. Hilliard of Wiley, Rein & Fielding to Mr. Julius Knapp,
    Chief, Authorization and Evaluation Division, OET, and to Mr.
    William F. Caton, Acting Secretary, FCC. In these letters, Motorola
    proposes that out-of-band emissions be measured using a resolution
    bandwidth of approximately one percent of the emission bandwidth of
    the device under test and integrating the energy over a measurement
    bandwidth of 1 MHz. Motorola also requests that, during emission
    measurements, the center of the PCS transmission be displaced from
    the edge of the channel block by an amount equal to its occupied
    bandwidth. Omnipoint submitted an [ex]{.underline}
    [parte]{.underline} filing, dated October 4, 1994, from Mr. Mark J.
    O\'Connor of Piper & Marbury to Mr. William F. Caton, responding to
    Motorola\'s proposals. Omnipoint objects to the complexity of the
    Motorola procedure.

[^123]: [See]{.underline} [PCS Second Report and Order]{.underline}, 8
    FCC Rcd at 7755-56 (paras. 135-137).

[^124]: [See]{.underline} 47 CFR Section 24.238; [see also]{.underline}
    [Broadband PCS Reconsideration]{.underline} at paras. 194-201.

[^125]: Equipment manufacturers would need to locate fundamental
    emissions, based on whatever method of channelization is employed, a
    sufficient distance within a licensee\'s frequency block to ensure
    that only spurious emissions, meeting this limit, appear outside of
    the frequency block.

[^126]: We note that several industry technical and standards groups are
    addressing matters relating to technical standards for PCS both
    domestically and internationally. At such time as these groups agree
    upon standards, we may consider appropriate limits on out-of-band
    emissions also could be considered.

[^127]: Isochronous devices transmit at a regular interval, typified by
    time-division voice systems.

[^128]: Frame period is a set of consecutive time slots in which the
    position of each time slot

    can be identified by reference to a synchronizing source. Currently,
    our rules provide that the

    frame period of an intentional radiator operating in the 1920-1930
    MHz sub-band will be

    10 ms/X where X is a positive whole number. [See]{.underline} §
    15.323(e) of the Commission\'s

    Rules.

[^129]: [See]{.underline} Omnipoint Petition at 3-6.

[^130]: [See]{.underline} Comments of Motorola at 13-15. In an *ex
    parte* filing dated September 30, 1994, Motorola suggested that we
    clarify the rules regarding the random interval waiting period as it
    applies to isochronous transmissions. Specifically, Motorola
    requests that we clarify that any interruption in transmission
    require application of the uniform random distribution waiting
    interval before the same time and spectrum window may be reaccessed.
    We believe this issue can be handled as an interpretation of the
    rules and no change is necessary in the wording of the requirements.

[^131]: [See]{.underline} Reply of Omnipoint at p. 5-8 and Figure 1.

[^132]: [See]{.underline} Reply of AT&T at p. 1-6.

[^133]: [See]{.underline} [Broadband PCS Reconsideration]{.underline} at
    para. 238.

[^134]: [See]{.underline} Joint Broadcast Parties Petition at 5.

[^135]: [See]{.underline} [id]{.underline}., Attachment at 1.

[^136]: The remainder of the Joint Broadcast Parties\' petition
    addresses issues of spectrum allocation and service relocation that
    do not bear on this proceeding. [See]{.underline} [id]{.underline}.,
    Attachment at 1.

[^137]: [See]{.underline} APC Comments, Exhibit 2 at 2-3; Motorola
    Comments at 5-7; Northern Telecom Comments at 5-6.

[^138]: [See]{.underline} APC Comments, Exhibit 2 at 1-2; Northern
    Telecom Comments at 4-5; PCIA Opposition at 2.

[^139]: [See]{.underline} Comsat Comments at 3; Motorola Comments at
    7-8; Northern Telecom Comments at 6.

[^140]: [See]{.underline} Joint Broadcast Parties Reply at 3-5.

[^141]: [See]{.underline} Motorola Reply at 1-3.

[^142]: [PCS Broadband Reconsideration]{.underline} at paras. 197-199.

[^143]: [See]{.underline} [id]{.underline}. at para. 200; Appendix A at
    Sec. 24.238(b).

[^144]: We note that the standard for attenuation of out-of-band
    emissions to which PCS base stations must adhere is currently
    stricter than the standard for microwave licensees in the same band.
    [See]{.underline} 47 C.F.R. § 94.71.

[^145]: [See]{.underline} Celsat Petition at 1-4. Because the MSS system
    would be transmitting to its mobiles in the 2160-2180 MHz band,
    there would be no interference to the PCS mobiles from MSS satellite
    transmissions. Celsat claims that the potential interference from
    MSS mobile transmissions received at PCS base stations would be
    prohibited by not assigning a potentially interfering frequency to a
    mobile user whenever it is within range of a microwave or PCS
    system.

[^146]: PCS Block F is 1890-1895 and 1970-1975 MHz; PCS Block C is
    1895-1910 and 1975-1990 MHz.

[^147]: This ability to use a single handset to access both PCS and MSS
    systems assumes that PCS licensees would employ a handset using a
    CDMA multiplexing scheme compatible with Celsat\'s design.

[^148]: [See]{.underline} Celsat Petition at 6.

[^149]: [See]{.underline} [id]{.underline}. at 2.

[^150]: [See]{.underline} [id]{.underline}. at 5-6.

[^151]: [See]{.underline} [id]{.underline}. at 7.

[^152]: Commenters on Celsat\'s petition were APC and COMSAT Corporation
    (Comsat).

[^153]: [See]{.underline} Comsat Comments at 2.

[^154]: [See]{.underline} APC Comments, Exhibit 2 at 4-5.

[^155]: [See]{.underline} Comsat Comments at 5-6.

[^156]: [See]{.underline} APC Comments, Exhibit 2 at 5; Comsat Comments
    at 8.

[^157]: [See]{.underline} AMSC Reply.

[^158]: [See]{.underline} Point Petition at 5-6.

[^159]: [See]{.underline} MCI Comments at 4-5.

[^160]: [See]{.underline} [Memorandum Opinion and Order]{.underline}, ET
    Docket No. 92-9, 9 FCC Rcd 1943 (1994).

[^161]: [See]{.underline} [Public Notice]{.underline}, Commercial Mobile
    Radio Service Information: Auction Notice and Filing Requirements
    for 99 MTA Licenses Located on the A and B Blocks for Personal
    Communications Service in the 2 GHz Band, Report No. AUC-94-04,
    Auction No. 4, released September 19, 1994.

[^162]: Amendments to Section 24.204 ease existing regulatory
    restrictions on entities with non-controlling, attributable cellular
    interests by providing them an opportunity to participate in
    broadband PCS auctions from which they previously were barred, and
    provides all parties with greater certainty about the post-auction
    divestiture requirements of our cellular/PCS cross-ownership rules.
    These benefits will be compromised unless the Section 24.204
    amendments become effective immediately upon publication in the
    Federal Register, as the deadline for filing applications to
    participate in the initial broadband PCS auction is October 28,
    1994, less than two weeks from the adoption date of the instant
    order. Thus, there is good cause to order the amendments to take
    effect upon Federal Register publication. *See* 5 U.S.C. §§
    553(d)(1), (d)(3).