# **Chapter 9: International Disaster Management**

# 

### Chapter Outline

1.  Introduction of topics and concepts to be discussed in the chapter.

    a.  International Involvement

    b.  The United Nations System

        i.  The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)

        ii. The United Nations Office for the Coordination of
            Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA)

        iii. The United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)

        iv. The World Food Programme (WFP)

        v.  The World Health Organization

    c.  Non-Governmental Organizations

        i.  The International Red Cross

    d.  United States Agency for International Development (USAID)

    e.  The United States Military

    f.  The International Financial Institutions

        i.  The World Bank

        ii. The International Monetary Fund

2.  Case Studies:

    a.  The Earthquake in Gujarat, India; Response and Rehabilitation

    b.  The January and February 2001 El Salvador Earthquakes

    c.  Hurricane Mitch in Guatemala: Response and Recovery

3.  Additional Sources of Information

4.  Glossary of Terms

5.  Acronyms

6.  Discussion Questions

    a.  General

    b.  The Earthquake in Gujarat, India; Response and Rehabilitation

    c.  The January and February 2001 El Salvador Earthquakes

    d.  Hurricane Mitch in Guatemala: Response and Recovery

7.  Suggested Out of Class Exercises

**Introduction**

The capacity to respond to large disasters achieved by individual
nations can been linked to several factors, including propensity for
disaster, local and regional economic resources, organization of
government, and availability of technological, academic and human
resources. However, it is becoming increasingly common that the response
ability of individual nations is insufficient in the face of large-scale
disaster, and outside assistance must be called upon. The greatest
incidence of natural disasters occurs within developing countries, with
90% of disaster-related injuries and deaths sustained in countries with
per-capita income levels that are below \$760 per year.

Despite the fact that disaster preparedness and mitigation are widely
accepted by international development agencies to be integral components
in the overall development process, it comes as no surprise that
countries ranking lower on development indices have placed disaster
management very low in budgetary priority. These nations' resources tend
to be focused on more socially demanded interests like education and
base infrastructure, or on their military, instead of on projects that
serve a preparatory or mitigative need, such as retrofitting structures
with hazard-resistant construction.

**International Involvement**

A disaster requires the involvement of the international community of
responders when a nation's capability to respond has become overwhelmed.
There are three types of emergencies that normally involve an
international humanitarian response; natural disasters, technological
disasters, and complex humanitarian emergencies (CHEs).

There are several issues that must be addressed when responding to
international disasters. The first, *coordination*, is a vital and
immediate component due to the sheer numbers of responding agencies that
almost always appear. It is not uncommon in larger disasters to see
several hundred local and international NGOs, each with a particular
skill or service to offer. The United Nations has become widely
recognized as the central coordinating body, with specialized UN
agencies handling the more specific needs associated with particular
disaster consequences. In addition to the UN, several organizations and
associations have come up with standards of conduct, such as the Red
Cross 'Code of Conduct'
([http://www.ifrc.org/publicat/conduct/index.asp]{.underline}), the
Sphere Project 'Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster
Response'
([http://www.sphereproject.org/handbook_index.htm]{.underline}) , and
the Oxfam 'Code of Conduct for NGOs'
([http://www.oxfam.org]{.underline}).

The second issue is that of *sovereignty of the state*. State
sovereignty is based upon the recognition of political authority
characterized by territory and autonomy. Accordingly, a foreign nation
or organization cannot intercede in domestic matters without the prior
consent of the ruling government. Examples of such behavior include
Japan's refusal to allow access to international agencies for several
days after the earthquake in Kobe and the actions of the Former Soviet
Union following the nuclear power plant accident in Chernobyl.

The third issue is *equality in relief distribution*, and it applies to
any type of disaster. There often arise situations where, for any number
of cultural or political reasons, certain groups in need of aid are
favored over others. The first example of this discrimination is due to
gender bias, which is most commonly found in societies where gender
roles are strictly defined and women are traditionally tasked with
duties related to the home and children (which tend to be increased in
times of crisis). In these cultures, it is the men who are more likely
to have opportunities to wait in relief lines for supplies, and the
women (as well as children and the elderly) become even more dependent
on them for survival. The second form of inequality in relief is that of
class bias. Though most obvious in social systems explicitly based on
caste identity, there are often underlying ethnic and racial divides
that present similar problems.

A fourth issue is the importance of *capacity building* and *linking
relief with development*. Responding agencies have an obligation to
avoid using a 'Band-Aid' approach in assisting the affected country.
Disasters almost always present a window of opportunity to rebuild old,
ineffective structures and develop policy and practice in a way that
leaves behind a more empowered, resilient community. As these goals
mirror those of most traditional development agencies, linking relief
and development should not be a major deviation from either type of
agencies' missions.

The United Nations System

Through the major UN bodies and its associated programs, the United
Nations has established a presence in most countries throughout the
world, and fostered partnerships with Member State governments. Though
over 70% of UN work is devoted to development activities, there are
several other issues that are central in their mission, including that
of disaster mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery

Upon onset of a disaster, the UN responds immediately and in an ongoing
basis by supplying aid in the form of food, shelter, medical assistance
and logistical support. The UN Emergency Relief Coordinator heads the
international UN response to crises through a committee of several
humanitarian bodies including the UN Children's fund (UNICEF), the UN
Development Programme (UNDP), the World Food Programme (WFP), the UN
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and other associates as deemed
necessary in accordance with the problems specific to the event.

The United Nations also serves to promote prevention and mitigation
activities through their regular development projects. By encouraging
the building of early warning systems and the conducting of monitoring
and forecasting routines, they are working to increase local capacity to
adequately boost local and regional preparedness.

The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)

The UNDP was established in 1965 during the UN Decade of Development to
conduct investigations into private investment in developing countries,
to explore the natural resources of those countries, and to train the
local population in development activities such as mining and
manufacturing. Historically, the UNDP was not considered an agency on
the forefront of the crisis and disaster management scene because, while
they worked on development issues, they did not focus specifically on
emergency response systems, considered to be the focal point of crisis
and disaster management for many years.

The UNDP feels that vulnerability to disasters is strongly linked to a
lack of or weak infrastructure, poor environmental policy, misuse of
land, and rising populations in areas that are prone to repeat
disasters. In many cases, these disasters can literally set a country
back years, if not decades, in terms of development achievement. For
instance, the president of Honduras has declared that the country has
gone back to early 1950's levels of development due to the devastating
effects of Hurricane Mitch. UNDP currently dedicates over 40% of its
resources to emergency relief operations.

The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
(UNOCHA)

The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
(OCHA) was created under the UN Secretary-General's Program for Reform
in 1998, to accommodate the needs of victims of disasters and
emergencies. Their specific role in the broad range of disaster
management tasks is to coordinate assistance provided by the UN system
in emergencies that exceed the capacity and mandate of any individual
agency. The OCHA response to disasters can be categorized under three
main groupings, including the coordination of the international
humanitarian response, the provision of support and policy development
to the humanitarian community, and the advocating of humanitarian issues
to ensure that that the overall direction of relief reflects the general
needs of recovery and peace-building.

The Disaster Response System, established by OCHA, monitors the onset of
natural and technological disasters on a constant basis. This system
includes the training of the assessment teams before disasters strike,
as well as evaluations conducted post-disaster. When a disaster is
identified, the OCHA response is activated, and a situation report is
generated to provide the international response community with detailed
disaster-specific information (which includes damage caused, actions
taken, needs assessed, and current assistance being provided). OCHA may
then, if deemed necessary, deploy a UN Disaster Assessment and
Coordination (UNDAC) team to assist in the coordination of relief
activities and help assess damages and needs.

The United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)

In the situations of disaster or armed conflict where this is the case,
UNICEF is well poised to serve an immediate role as aid-provider to its
specific target groups. This rapid response is important, because young
mothers and children are often the most marginalized groups in terms of
aid received. UNICEF works on a regular basis to ensure that children
have access to education, healthcare, safety, and protected child
rights. In the response and recovery periods of humanitarian
emergencies, it is these roles that are merely expanded to suit the
rapidly extended requirements of victims. In countries where UNICEF has
not yet established a permanent presence, the form of aid is virtually
the same, however the timing and delivery are affected and
reconstruction is not nearly as comprehensive.

UNICEF maintains that humanitarian assistance should include programs
aimed specifically for child victims. Relief projects generally work to
provide a rapidly needed response in the form of immunizations, water
and sanitation, nutrition, education and health. Women are recipients of
this aid as well, because UNICEF considers them to be vital in the care
of children. UNICEF also works through recovery and reconstruction
projects, providing for the basic rights of children. UNICEF is
currently working in 161 countries.

The World Food Programme (WFP)

In rapid onset events such as natural disasters, WFP is activated, as a
major player in the response to the immediate nutritional needs of the
victims. Food is transported to the affected location and delivered to
storage and distribution centers. The distribution is carried out
according to pre-established needs-assessments performed by OCHA and
UNDP. WFP distributes food through contracted NGOs who have vast
experience and technical skills required to plan and implement such
projects of transportation, storage and distribution. The principal
partners in their planning and implementation are the host governments
(who must request the aid of WFP to begin with, unless the situation is
a complex humanitarian emergency where there is no established
government, and the UN Secretary General makes the request). WFP works
closely with all responding UN agencies to coordinate an effective and
broad reaching response, as food requirements are so closely linked to
every other vital need of victims.

The World Health Organization

In the event of a disaster, WHO responds in several ways that address
the health of victims. Most importantly, it provides ongoing monitoring
of diseases traditionally observed within the unsanitary conditions of
disaster aftermath. WHO also provides technical assistance to the
responding agencies and host governments who are establishing disaster
medical capabilities, and serves as constant source of expertise as
needs arise.

Non-Governmental Organizations

The number of non-governmental organizations focusing on international
humanitarian relief has grown exponentially in the past few decades.
These organizations have come to play a vital role in the response and
recovery to disasters, filling gaps left by national and multilateral
organizations. They have significantly improved the ability of
international relief efforts to address the needs of victims with a
diverse range of skills and supplies. Some of the larger NGOs, like the
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), have established an
international presence similar to that of the UN, and have developed
strong local institutional partnerships and a capacity to respond almost
immediately with great effectiveness. These grass-roots level
organizations are so successful in their activities that the major
funding organizations such as USAID, OFDA, and the UN regularly arrange
for relief projects to be implemented by them rather than their own
staff.

The International Red Cross

Today, the IFRC includes 195 member societies, a Secretariat in Geneva,
and over 60 additional delegations dispersed throughout the world. The
IFRC conducts complex relief and recovery operations in the aftermath of
disasters throughout the world. Their four areas of focus include
promoting humanitarian values, disaster response, disaster preparedness,
and health and community-care. Through their work, they seek to 'improve
the lives of vulnerable people by mobilizing the power of humanity," as
stated in their mission. These people include those who are victims of
natural and man-made disasters and post-conflict scenarios.

When a disaster strikes and the local capacity is exceeded, an appeal by
that country's national chapter is made for support to the Federation's
Secretariat. As coordinating body, the Secretariat initiates an
international appeal for support to the International Federation and
many other outside sources, and provides personnel and humanitarian aid
supplies from its own stocks. These supplies, which can be shipped in if
not locally available, pertain to needs in the areas health, logistics
and water specialists, aid personnel, and relief management.

Depending on the complexity of the required response, a Field Assessment
and Coordination Team (FACT) may be deployed to assist the local chapter
in determining the support needs for the event. The teams, deployable to
any location with only 24 hours notice, consist of Red Cross/Red
Crescent disaster managers from throughout the Federation, bringing with
them skills is relief, logistics, health, nutrition, public health,
epidemiology, water and sanitation, finance, administration, and
psychological support.

Finally, the IFRC in heavily engaged in disaster preparedness, and has
identified several strategies towards mitigation they hope to achieve by
2010. These activities, which relate to reducing the impact of disasters
whenever possible, and to working towards better prediction and
prevention methods, are becoming a fundamental component of local Red
Cross / Red Crescent Society programs.

United States Agency for International Development (USAID)

The US agency tasked with providing development aid to other countries,
The United States Agency for International Development (USAID), has also
been tasked with the coordination of the US response to international
disasters. USAID's Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) is
divided into four distinct sub-units: Disaster Response Division (DRD),
Prevention, Mitigation, Preparedness and Planning (PMPP), Operations
Support (OS), and Program Support (PS). DRD handles the US assistance
provided to foreign disasters. PMPP assists foreign nations with
assistance to develop their ability to mitigate and prepare for
disasters. OS division handles the technical and logistical support of
all OFDA projects, and PS division works with the OFDA financial and
accounting systems.

The administrator of USAID holds the title of President's Special
Coordinator for International Disaster Assistance. When a disaster is
declared in a foreign nation by the resident US ambassador (or by the
Department of State (DOS) if one does not exist), the USAID
administrator is appealed to for help. OFDA is authorized to immediately
disburse \$25,000 in emergency aid to the US Embassy to be spent at the
discretion of the ambassador for immediate relief. OFDA also can
immediately send regional advisors with temporary shelter and medical
aid supplies from one of four OFDA stockpiles in Guam, Italy, Honduras,
and the United States.

If the disaster is considerable in size, a Disaster Assistance Response
Team (DART) is deployed to the country to assess the damages, and
recommend the level of assistance that should be made by the US
government. The DART team works quickly to develop a strategy to
coordinate US relief supplies, provide operational support, coordinate
with other donor countries, UN agencies, NGOs and the host government,
and monitor and evaluate projects carried out with US funds. In the
largest of disasters, Response Management Teams (RMTs) may be
established in both Washington, DC and the disaster site, to coordinate
and offer administrative assistance and communication for the several
DART teams that would be deployed.

OFDA recently developed a Technical Assistance Group (TAG) to increase
its capabilities in planning and programming. TAG teams are comprised of
scientists, and specialists in agriculture and food security, emergency
and public health, water and sanitation, geoscience, climate, urban
planning, contingency planning, cartography, etc. TAG teams work with
DARTS and RMTs in response, as well as USAID development missions in
preparation and mitigation for future disasters.

The United States Military

The assistance of the military is normally requested by USAID/OFDA
through the Department of Defense (DOD) Office of Political/Military
Affairs (PM). The US Military is heavily involved in the response to
international disasters through organized operations termed Foreign
Humanitarian Assistance (FHA) or Humanitarian Assistance Operations
(HAO). FHAs are authorized by DOD Office of Political/Military Affairs
(DODPM) at the request of OFDA (the President, as Commander in Chief,
gives final authorization for any support operation). Assistance may be
provided in the form of physical or technical support, such as
logistics, transportation, communications, relief distribution, security
and emergency medicine. In emergencies of natural or man-made origin
that do not involve conflict, the role of the military is to provide
support, rather than leadership, to the national government and the
overall relief community.

The military is known for its self-contained operational abilities,
arriving on-scene with everything they need, so to speak. Usually, they
provide more than adequate personnel and supplies for the mission they
were called to act upon. Once in country, they work under the strict
guidelines of Force Protection (enforced security of all military and
civilian personnel, equipment and facilities associated with their
mission) and Rules of Engagement (ROE - a structured, pre-established
guideline of 'circumstances and limitations under which the military
will initiate or continue combat engagement'.) The ROE dictate military
action in both peace keeping and disaster operations.

The International Financial Institutions

The International Financial Institutions (IFIs) provide loans for
development and provide financial cooperation throughout the world.
These institutions are made up of member states, arranged on a global or
regional basis, which work together to provide financial services to
national governments through direct loans or projects. In the aftermath
of disasters, it is common for nations with low capital reserve to
request increased or additional emergency loans to fund the expensive
task of reconstruction and rehabilitation. Without these IFIs, most
developing nations would have no means with which to recover. The
largest of these, The World Bank, and one of its subsidiaries, the
International Monetary Fund, will be detailed below. Other regional IFIs
with similar functions include the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB)
that works primarily in Central and South America, and the Asian
Development Bank (ADB), based in Manila, Philippines, which works
throughout the Asian continent.

The World Bank

Once a disaster occurs, the World Bank (the Bank) may be called upon for
help. As it is not a relief agency, The Bank will not take on any role
in the initial response. However, immediately upon agreeing to
participate, it begins work on restoring damaged and destroyed
infrastructure and restarting production capabilities. First, a team may
be provided to assist in performing initial impact assessments,
including an estimate of pure financial losses resulting from the
disaster and an estimated cost of reconstruction including raised
mitigation standards. Second, they could restructure the country's
existing loan portfolio with the Bank in order to allow for expanded
recovery projects. Thirdly, projects that have not yet been approved
(but are in the application process) can be redesigned to account for
changes caused by the disaster. And lastly, an Emergency Recovery Loan
(ERL) can be granted, which would specifically address the issues of
recovery and reconstruction.

ERLs are granted for the restoration of affected economic and social
institutions and for the reconstruction of physical assets such as
essential infrastructure. It is important to note that ERLs are not
designed for relief activities. They are most appropriate for disasters
that have great adverse impact on the economy, are infrequent in nature
(as recurrent disasters are accommodated by regular lending schemes),
and create urgent needs. The loan is expected to eventually produce
economic benefits to the borrowing government. The ERLs are usually
implemented within three years, and are flexible to accommodate for the
specific needs of each unique scenario. Construction performed with the
ERL must use disaster-resistant standards and include appropriate
mitigation measures, thus providing an overall preparedness for the
country affected. Once an ERL has been granted, the Bank coordinates
with the IMF, the UNDP, NGOs, and several other international and local
agencies to create a strategy which best utilizes granted funds in
relation to the reconstruction effort as a whole.

The International Monetary Fund

In the event of an international disaster or complex humanitarian
emergency in a member country, the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
utilizes its 'Emergency Assistance Specific Facility' to provide rapid
financial assistance. In these situations, it is not uncommon for a
country to have severely exhausted their monetary reserves. The IMF
goals are to rebuild government capacity and to return stability to the
local economy. In the event of a natural disaster, funding is directed
towards local recovery efforts and for any economic adjustment that may
be needed.

When a country wishes to request emergency assistance, they must submit
a detailed plan for economic reconstruction, and ensure that it will not
create trade restrictions or intensify exchange. If the country already
is already working under an IMF loan, then assistance can come in the
form of a reorganization within existing arrangements. Separate
emergency assistance loans are also offered, which do not involve the
regular criteria under which the countries must normally operate. These
loans, while normally available only up to 25 percent of a country's
pre-established lending quota, have been created in quantities reaching
50 percent of quota. However, this funding is provided only when the
member country is "cooperating with the IMF to find a solution to its
economic problems." These loans are required to be repaid within 5
years.

The three case studies presented in this chapter clearly illustrate the
critical roles each of the above described programs play in a major
international disaster event. The experience in the Gujurat, India
earthquake provides an example of the overwhelming destruction a major
disaster event in a developed country and the wide range of
international organizations that become involved in response and
recovery efforts. Similarly, the case studies of the El Salvador
earthquakes and Hurricane Mitch in Guatemala demonstrate the devastating
impact large natural disasters can have on a developing nation and the
types of international assistance provided to help these nations to
respond effectively and to recover.

> Case 9.1: The Earthquake in Gujarat, India; Response and
> Rehabilitation

### Introduction

In Calcutta, India, as citizens were just starting to celebrate their
country's 52^nd^ Republic Day, high-rise apartment buildings began to
shake at a barely perceptible intensity. Little did anybody in that city
know, they were not experiencing a weak local tremor but the far
reaching effects of the second most deadly earthquake to hit the country
in recorded history taking place more than 1900 kilometers away in the
state of Gujarat. In fact, this quake which struck at 8:46am on the
26^th^ of January in 2001, was felt in both Pakistan and Nepal (GOG,
2001).

This event, the worst earthquake to hit the state of Gujarat in 200
years and the most devastating disaster to hit the country of India in
the past 50, struck an unprepared nation. Devastation in the area was
almost complete. Police and fire brigades, the personnel that
traditionally respond first in these situations, were occupied with
duties related to security and logistics for flag-raising ceremonies and
parades that were to take place throughout the country for that national
holiday (EERI, 2001). Many government personnel were taking advantage of
the long weekend, and were not preparing to suddenly return to work and
crank the engine of government response which was so badly needed.
Fortunately, few children were in school and, as statistics concerning
the destruction of school buildings will later show, the death and
injury for this group may have been lower than possible (GOG, 2001).

As the months progressed, hundreds of aftershocks (more than 500 of
magnitude 3.0 or greater (Vatsa, 2001)) further challenged the
confidence of the people of Gujarat, adding incredible psychological
damage to the overwhelming physical injury already inflicted. The task
of responding to the disaster, and the rebuilding and rehabilitation
that followed, was tackled by hundreds of public and private agencies at
a scale seldom witnessed before. This event is one that has woken India,
and alerted similar countries, to the necessity of proper planning and
education required in the successful handling of large-scale unavoidable
natural disasters. Today, three years later, rehabilitation efforts
there continue, due to the sheer number of affected. Disputes concerning
both the magnitude of the event and the location of the epicenter still
remain, and almost every geological institution maintains it\'s own
interpretation of the event.

This case will discuss the origins and disaster history for the affected
region, and the damage inflicted by the Gujarat earthquake (sometimes
referred to as the Bhuj earthquake because of the epicenter proximity to
that city.) Also examined will be the response that followed by
Institutions including the national government of India and the state
government of Gujarat, the government of the United States, the United
Nations, and the multilateral lending institutions. Three non-profits,
the Red Cross, CARE and Catholic Relief Services, will be discussed in
relation to their assistance, as a sample of the hundreds who responded.
Finally, the performance of these reacting bodies, the lessons learned,
and the implications for future disasters in the region will be
considered.

#### 

#### Origins, geology, disaster history

The State of Gujarat, ranked third in the country for per-capita income,
is considered both wealthy and progressive (Vatsa, 2001). While only
five percent of the country's people reside there (48 million), it
accounts for eleven percent of total national industrial output, ten
percent of private consumption, and handles twenty percent of trade.
Gujarat's location in the west of India, bordering Pakistan, lies within
the Himalayan collision zone where two surface plates (the
Indo-Australian and the Eurasian) are slowly crashing together to form
the world's youngest and tallest mountain chain at a pace of about two
centimeters a year (WB and ADB, 2001). This movement is but one peril in
a land that faces many natural challenges.

Cyclones, floods, drought, and earthquakes characterize Gujarat's
history. In the twenty-five years preceding the quake, over three
thousand people and 350 livestock had been killed and over one million
houses destroyed by almost yearly cyclones. Floods inundate an average
of 300,000 hectares of land, damage an average of 37,000 houses, kill
135 people, and affect 2 million human lives in each average one-year
span (WB and ADB, 2001). The district of Kuchchh, which is the largest
in the state, is surrounded by a peculiar swamp called the 'Rann of
Kuchchh' which floods annually and isolates the region from the rest of
the Gujarat (Vatsa, 2001). Drought is almost a yearly occurrence, with a
particularly long three-year drought which led up to and further
complicated events discussed in this paper (HR, 2001).

In terms of earthquakes, there have been many, with incidents measuring
over 6.0 or greater on the Richter scale occurring in 1819 (8.3), 1903
(6.0), 1940 (6.0) and 1956 (7.0). Though the high vulnerability to these
disasters has been long established as fact, there was no formalized
government management plan to mitigate, prepare, or respond when the
Gujarat quake struck. As a result, they were totally unprepared to
handle the mass casualty events that ensued (EERI, 2001). Ironically,
this earthquake struck surprisingly close in location to the one that
had occurred in 1819 along the same fault line in which many less lives
were lost. A dramatic increase in development in that region with little
or no building code enforcement is blamed for the much higher level of
casualty even with a lower intensity.

#### Scope of the quake

This was the largest earthquake to occur in India since an 8.5 magnitude
event hit the state of Assam in 1950 (USAID, 2001). The Indian
Meteorological Department (IMD) has recorded a Richter magnitude of 6.9
with location being north-east of Bhuj, while the United States
Geological Survey (USGS) maintains that the magnitude was 7.9, and the
epicenter lay north of Bachau in a location 50 kilometers from the IMD
site (Sinha and Shaw, 2001). The depth of the earthquake, also disputed,
was eventually confirmed as approximately 20 kilometers and resulting
aftershocks at an unusually deep 30 kilometers give the impression that
the earthquake may have severed the lithosphere (CIRES, 2001). There was
little surface deformation due to the depth, with no clearly discernible
cracks on the surface such as those seen with more shallow quakes.
However, the liquefaction phenomenon was widespread due to the intensity
(WB and ADB, 2001), and in some cases, rivers that had been dry for more
than a century became activated (CIRES, 2001).

Most of the communication infrastructure was immediately destroyed, and
a good portion of the transportation infrastructure was damaged. The
local government had no immediate means to alert the central government
of their imminent needs. This resulted in the lack of an initial
assessment, and urban search and rescue teams were not sent in time to
be fully effective in their missions. The bulk of the initial rescue
missions were carried out by neighbors helping neighbors, digging with
their bare hands and personal tools. Nobody outside the state could have
guessed the magnitude of damage they would find in the coming days, and
the character of the first response reflected this knowledge gap.
However, when the rescue teams reached the relatively easily-accessible
city of Ahmedabad and observed the damage, they immediately knew they
were going to confront worse conditions in Kuchchh where the epicenter
was located. They moved relief material and volunteers to that region
without pre-assessment (Sinha and Shaw, 2001).

The earthquake caused damage in 7,904 villages in 21 of the state's 25
districts (Sinha and Shaw, 2001). The district of Kuchchh was the
location of the bulk of the damage, and over 400 villages were affected.
The towns which suffered the most significant damage were Bhuj, Bachhau,
Anjar, Rapar and Gandhidham, where virtually 100 percent of the
buildings were damaged (Vatsa, 2001). This district sustained 90 percent
of the deaths and 78 percent of the injuries reported overall, and
contained 257,000 of the houses damaged or destroyed (HR, 2001). In
Ahmedibad, which is 300 kilometers from the epicenter, 179 buildings
were destroyed (GOG, 2001).

In many of the areas that were isolated, there was no food or medical
relief for up to five days, and people began looting what they could in
order to survive (GOG, 2001). In Bachhau, where 30,000 people of 40,000
were cut off from the relief, armed gangs formed and began attacking
survivors for money or food (Times of India, 2001). These problems
ceased almost immediately upon the arrival of assistance, illustrating
the effect a timely response can have on the security of an affected
region.

#### Consequences

The damage resulting from this earthquake is a good indicator of the
extent to which mega-hazards will affect nations financially in the
21^st^ century, as sustained losses repeatedly exceeded one billion
dollars. In fact, in pure asset losses, the World Bank and Asian
Development Bank estimate that India's losses will exceed \$2.1 billion
(a much lower figure than the Government of Gujarat's \$5 billion
estimate), and the cost of reconstruction with improved standard
development techniques will likely exceed \$2.3 billion (WB and ADB,
2001). In lives lost and persons injured, however, this event is
extraordinary. The official government death toll, based upon family
registration of death and most likely severely under-estimated as
result, is 20,005 people (HR, 2001). Of the 166,812 injured, about
20,000 of them had very serious wounds. Almost 16 million people, or
one-in-three in the state of Gujarat, were affected in some way by the
January 26^th^ events (GOI, 2001).

In pure financial losses, the damage to houses and other buildings far
exceeded other factors, accounting for almost 50 percent of damages.
About 400,000 structures collapsed, and an additional 500,000 -- 800,000
were damaged. The root causes of this destruction vary according to the
location of the structure. In the cities, a combination of cheap
building materials, haphazard construction techniques, and a lack of
enforceable building standards, were viewed as most problematic. In
addition, many of the taller buildings had 'soft story' ground floors
(thin support columns to allow for parking) or very heavy roof gardens
(WB and ADB, 2001). In the rural areas, there was a total lack of
appropriate knowledge to guide the non-engineered housing construction,
and a scarcity of safety awareness and training (Sinha and Shaw, 2001).
The loss of many of these houses will have high resultant social costs
such as homelessness, psychological trauma, sickness, and a devastating
personal economic cost to the many families whose homes doubled as their
place of work.

With over 166,000 people injured, the earthquake was truly a
mass-casualty event. No healthcare system could be adequately prepared
for a scenario of this magnitude, and for Gujarat there were many other
factors that confounded the situation. For example, the major hospitals
in Bhuj, Anjar, Bachau and Gandhidham had collapsed, killing the
majority of doctors, nurses, and medical staff on duty (GOG, 2001). In
Kuchchh district alone, 300 primary health care centers and 1,300 child
nutrition centers were lost. Of the hospitals that remained standing,
most were severely damaged and deemed unsafe for work (HR, 2001). Due to
the nearly complete devastation, there were few places that could serve
as hospitals (i.e., 70% of the schools had collapsed. Fortunately, the
persistent drought prevented excessive groundwater contamination,
resulting in no major disease outbreaks from the thousands of corpses
decomposing in the rubble)(Sinha and Shaw, 2001). Gujarat\'s healthcare
system will continue to be sapped from this event for many years to
come, since so many people were seriously injured or handicapped, both
physically and psychologically, and will require rehabilitation to fully
recover (WB and ADB, 2001).

The damage to the state's infrastructure, administration, and
communications was extensive, and has remained a major burden on
resources in the reconstruction phase. The main telecommunications link
with Kuchchh snapped and 147 exchanges were damaged in the initial
tremor, confounded further by 82,000 damaged phone lines (GOI, 2001).
Those lines that were not damaged were useless for days since they were
constantly flooded with calls from concerned relatives. In fact, for the
first two days of the response, the only means of communication were the
local police systems (GOG, 2001). Most power facilities were damaged to
some extent, and 925 villages lost power (GOI, 2001). Drinking water and
irrigation systems were affected in 1,340 villages, with 1100 of those
villages reporting severe damages. Most of the \$50 million in damages
affecting this sector were in the form of pump house collapses and
damages to intake towers and pipelines (WB and ADB, 2001, and Vatsa,
2001). Of 240 damaged reservoir dams that supply the water for these
irrigation and domestic needs, 20 were damaged beyond repair (WB and
ADB, 2001). The roadways and railways seemed to withstand much of the
earthquake's brunt, because it's depth prevented considerable surface
alterations. Regardless, 100 kilometers of roads were severely damaged,
several railroad lines needed repair, and 5 of the 10 piers at Kandla
Port (the major shipping port in the state) were destroyed. The airports
suffered slight damage as well, but all of the major facilities were
repaired within a few days in order to be of use in the relief efforts.
Thankfully, the two major bridges in the state that sustained damage
were quickly repaired, thereby preventing total isolation (GOI, 2001).

The education sector suffered greatly in terms of schools destroyed or
damaged. The final government estimates claim that 9,600 primary
schools, 2,040 secondary schools, and 140 technical institutions will
need to be rebuilt. As mentioned earlier, the fact that this was a
national holiday may have saved thousands of students lives, as schools
were almost empty. In accidents involving collapsing schools, there were
910 elementary, 37 secondary, 3 higher and 21 technical students killed
(WB and ADB, 2001).

Most of the factories in Gujarat, which provide the bulk of local GDP,
escaped damage. However, work was stalled because most of the industrial
labor force who had migrated from other states fled to their homes and
did not return for weeks (The Statesman, 2001). It was the handicraft
industry, and most significantly in Kuchchh, that suffered the most. In
that district, where a primary form of income lies in the small-scale
arts industry, over 3,000 artisans were killed. In Dhamadka village,
almost 70% of the artisan workers were lost. Of those who did survive,
many had their shops destroyed or suffered injuries resulting in
handicaps that prevented them from carrying out their former trade
(Times of India, 2001 and The Statesman, 2001). In total, over 3,000
small scale and cottage industries and 20 medium to large scale
enterprises were affected (WB and ADB, 2001).

The fiscal impact, purely in terms of debt accrued, is estimated to be
as much as \$3 billion attributed mainly to the relief and
reconstruction costs of housing and infrastructure. On the brighter
side, there is speculation that the long-term work required to rebuild
and rehabilitate the region will accelerate growth and offset the loss
of output, estimated at around \$500 million, resulting in a positive
change in total regional income (WB and IDB, 2001).

Since the impact of this event was not initially communicated to the
Government of India, a resulting underestimation of its severity was
conveyed to the world community of responders (GOG, 2001). Much of the
initial response was further hampered by the fact that many of the local
responders (fire, police, health) were either dead, injured, or
attending to family emergencies which diverted their attention away from
the greater relief effort (GOI, 2001). Initial response efforts lasted
two weeks, and there were several cases of trapped victims being located
and extracted alive after as many as 10 days. The scope of
rehabilitation required was close to inconceivable, and nearly a year
after the quake later there were still many anxious people sleeping out
in the open or under plastic sheeting. Those people whose homes were
only damaged slept outside in fear that one of the aftershocks would add
them to the list of dead or injured

#### Participants

This event was "the biggest challenge Gujarat has ever faced" (GOG). By
most accounts, the response by the state government was non-existent,
due primarily to the complete lack of emergency preparedness and
resultant chaos that ensued. The Government of India, on the other hand,
took charge almost immediately and responded well to an event that would
have challenged even the most developed of nations. It is important to
note that while Prime Minister Vajpayee never formally requested
international assistance, he did let it be known that offers of aid were
welcome and would be gladly accepted (HR, 2001).

The Government of Gujarat immediately airlifted a team of five officials
headed by the 'Additional Chief Secretary', which arrived in Bhuj within
six hours of the first tremors. This team, though experienced in the
management of engineering and medical response, was much too small to
handle an event of this magnitude. To increase the rescue staff
available, all government officials were officially called off of
vacation, and an appeal for volunteerism was made to doctors, engineers,
retired government officials, and others with applicable skills. Schools
and colleges were uniformly closed to ensure that students would be
available for the relief and rescue efforts A state control room was
made functional on the first day (claimed to be functional by 9am), and
its effectiveness increased once the communication lines were repaired
on day two when contact with all district headquarters except Bhuj could
be contacted. Ham radio, satellite and cell phone stations were
established for both public and private use. It was not until the third
day, however, that the state government diverted heavy equipment used
for irrigation, roads, and construction to the search and rescue
operations, thereby provided rice and wheat rations to the victims (GOG,
2001).

Due to the aforementioned communication problems, the initial Government
of India response was small and mounted only in Ahmedabad where reports
were able to be dispersed. The Government of India had no formal
disaster management plan that defined the responsibilities of the
separate government agencies (like the US Federal Response Plan does),
so the approach was very centralized. Assets had not been inventoried,
and their mobilization was not as rapid as it could have been (Sinha and
Shaw, 2001). Other than these initial issues, the government response
was one to be commended

The Krishi Control Room was set up to coordinate the central government
response and provide constant communications and updates (GOI, 2001).
The Chief Secretary began holding twice-daily meetings to review the
progress and planning of the relief efforts, and a hotline was set up
between the Prime Minister and the State Governor to facilitate
communication (GOG, 2001). Local Emergency Operation Control Rooms of
varying capability and equipment were set up in tents or structures that
had not collapsed, in the localities that suffered the worst damage.
These centers acted as information nodes, and assisted in the central
government coordination to the sites (Sinha and Shaw, 2001). Two major
locations were established as collection, tracking, and distribution
centers at Gujarat College and at a town hall, for the tremendous flow
in donated goods (GOG, 2001).

Doctors and nurses were sent to each region with appropriate medical
equipment and vehicles (GOG, 2001). Fifteen thousand Gujarat Electricity
Board (GEB) personnel and 30 truckloads of equipment were dispatched to
repair the electrical power in the affected regions (power in Ahmedabad
was restored in minutes, and within two days in Bhuj) (Vatsa, 2001). A
government survey team was created and examined the status of the
buildings that remained to determine their safety (GOG, 2001). Fifteen
thousand Indian military service personnel and significant heavy
equipment were deployed to provide transportation and distribution
support to relief operations, and to repair the airports and bridges
that had been damaged (HR, 2001 and GOG, 2001). The government sent out
a request to businesses that operate cranes, gas cutters and
construction equipment to volunteer their services (GOG, 2001).

When the temperature beginning to fall at night, temporary shelters were
provided as quickly as possible. The water supply, already deficient due
to the drought, was supplemented by tankers in Kuchchh. Various foods
and cooking supplies were distributed, including the allotment of 20
kilograms of wheat and 5 kilograms of rice for each family. For the many
families who lost food ration cards (pre-quake government subsidies),
replacements were given. One month's worth of grass was distributed to
cattle owners in the regions hardest hit. Public Service Announcements
were taped and announced on radio and television instructing people not
to enter damaged buildings which could collapse. Customs and excise
taxes on all goods imported or manufactured for the relief efforts was
waived, and the ban on foreign technology and foreign aid that was in
effect was suspended as well. To show government support and sympathy,
Prime Minister Vajpayee visited the area, and is said to have foregone
regular security and stayed longer than originally planned to convey his
message (GOG, 2001).

The Empowered Group of Central Ministers (EGOM) was created to
coordinate the emergency response, and met for the first time on January
30^th^, 2001. It consists of representatives from the departments of
Home Affairs, Railways, Textiles, Consumer Affairs, Information &
Broadcasting, Defense, Finance, Civil Supplies, Health, Rural
Development, Housing, Agriculture, Communications and Power (GOI, 2001).
Their purpose was to do the following:

1.  Consider the report of the Crisis Management Group and give such
    directions as considered appropriate,

2.  Decide on all action necessary to provide immediate relief to the
    victims,

3.  Consider measures necessary for relief and rehabilitation of the
    affected, and

4.  Consider long-term institutional and organizational measures that
    are necessary for management and mitigation of such natural
    disasters

For the restoration efforts, the Gujarat Earthquake Rehabilitation Fund
was created to raise money. Grants were distributed according to the
extent of financial and physical damage. The Government of Gujarat State
Disaster Management Authority (GSDMA) was created to better enable these
reconstruction efforts, heralding \$1 billion in aid to assist over
300,000 families according to level of village damage, distance from the
epicenter, and the original house value (Vatsa, 2001). A national
Department of Earthquake Relief was also created, as part of the
department of General Administration. Finally, a plea was made to ban
all public celebrations until February 28^th^, and that "those
celebrating marriage and other social programs \[are\] modest and
austere" (GOG, 2001) ^.^

## 

## **The United States Response**

The United States government, one of the largest donors in the relief
effort, provided aid through the Department of Defense (DOD) and the US
Agency for International Development (USAID) Office of Foreign Disaster
Assistance (OFDA). Between the two agencies, the United States
contributed \$13.1 million to the response effort. The Department of
Defense provided airlifts for all of the donated goods, a 2.5-ton truck,
2 forklifts, 2 400-gallon tankers, 10,000 blankets, 1,500 sleeping bags
and 92 50-person tents. A six-person military assessment team consisting
of experts in communications, logistics and technical support, was
provided to advise the government responders. OFDA provided assistance
through donated commodities and through grants via organizations such as
CARE, Catholic Relief Services, and the World Food Program. Three
airlifts by OFDA (valued at \$2,426,463), carried technical equipment,
shelters, blankets, sleeping bags, water and sanitation equipment and
other goods supplied relief to over 450,000 people (USAID 2, 2001). The
programs that OFDA dollars facilitated included water sanitation,
disease surveillance, emergency shelters, relief distribution, medical
support, trauma counseling and food assistance. In addition to these
projects, a USAID Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) comprised of
eleven people was dispatched to conduct emergency needs assessments and
coordinate the distribution of all US Government donated relief supplies
(USAID, 2001). Finally, \$100,000 was given to the Prime Minister's
Gujarat Rehabilitation Relief Fund.

The United States has remained active in the recovery and rehabilitation
of Gujarat. USAID developed the Gujarat Earthquake Recovery Initiative,
which is aimed at families in the poorest communities. An allocation of
\$8.5 million was granted, with funds coming from existing USAID budget
resource to be used by various NGOs and multilateral organizations like
the UN. There are four established areas for which the funds will be
used:

1.  Cash, for work and other NGO programs to help repair roads, wells,
    water systems, homes, work places and other infrastructure needed to
    restart economic activities.

2.  Cash, for work and other NGO programs to clear away debris and
    rubble and repair public facilities such as health clinics and child
    nutrition centers.

3.  Survey support, to assess damaged (but still standing) buildings, to
    determine whether they can be repaired and retrofitted or if they
    need to be demolished and rebuilt, and

4.  Support, to municipalities and local NGOs to develop community
    renewal plans that will help reconstruct devastated communities HR,
    2001).

The United states was just one of many countries that responded,
providing a total of about \$90 million to support the relief and
reconstruction of Gujarat (HR, 2001). Other nations that assisted
include Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg,
Monaco, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Oman, Poland, Russia,
Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Turkey, and the UK (USAID
2, 2001).

#### Non Governmental Organizations

Over 200 NGOs engaged in the response and relief effort in India,
creating a daunting task of cooperation and coordination (The Statesman,
2001). Initially, there was no built-in government mechanism to organize
the relief. In these chaotic circumstances, the organizations worked out
a system of coordination on their own which attempted to create the most
optimal working arrangements for the disaster and increase effectiveness
in responding to the greatest number of those in need. It is reported
that this was the first time coordination efforts such as these had
taken place in India, and they were primarily successful (Sinha and
Shaw, 2001). Three organizations' responses, those of CARE, Catholic
Relief Services, and the Red Cross, are described below.

# 

# CARE

CARE mobilized the morning after the quake struck to perform an initial
assessment of the Kuchchh district. They provided an initial supply of
medical equipment, food, blankets, tarps, tents (10,000 family size) and
water purification tablets. CARE emergency medical teams provided
treatment and trauma counseling to survivors in the hard to reach areas
of Anjar, Bachau, Rapar and Bhuj (HR, 2001). With the help of a USAID
grant, they were able to provide food and survival kits to assist 50,000
people, to encourage them to remain in their home areas rather than
become displaced (USAID 3, 2001).

Their work in India lasted through the end of February, 2001, helping
over 175,000 people in the remote villages where they felt need was the
greatest (HR, 2001). In this time, they helped to build at least 118
community service facilities (schools, health centers, government
offices) and 105 water systems (locally managed for sustainability),
increased access to employment and training for 6000 people, and rebuilt
damaged irrigation systems and watershed management schemes. Overall,
their goal was to increase the general capacity of the earthquake
victims through many self-help initiatives.

# 

# Catholic Relief Services

Catholic Relief Services (CRS), like CARE, was the recipient of a good
portion of the USAID grants. In addition, they committed \$650,000 in
private funds, as well as their Africa-based emergency technical unit
and staff from various locations including Bosnia (HR, 2001). Initial
cash resources were designated for the installation of temporary shelter
and to meet the personal hygiene needs of over 65,000 people in 73
villages. Mental Health units were established to provide trauma
counseling for the injured, their families, and the most vulnerable
groups (women, children, lower-caste members, elderly, and minorities)
(HR, 2001). CRS remained long after the disaster to work on follow-up
projects to increase the likelihood of program success, and to create
village resource maps to maximize the overall target population size
(Interaction, 2001).

# 

# American Red Cross

The American Red Cross (ARC) is one of the most experienced
organizations in responding to international disasters of every type.
They were one of the first organizations on the ground in Gujarat,
working with a team of 11 American experts trained in logistics,
communication, mental health and family tracing. This team supported the
overall International Red Cross team of over 120 people. The ARC
distributed almost \$2 million in supplies to nearly 100,000 victims.
Included in this aid was 13,000 five-gallon buckets, 550 rolls of
plastic sheeting, 15,000 kitchen sets, over 25,000 tarps, over 15,000
blankets, and 5,000 tents. They purchased and distributed emergency
health kits, from the World Health Organization (WHO), which included
medicine, IV fluids, surgical tools and other medical supplies (ARC,
2001).

The ARC pledged to assist the state of Gujarat in the reconstruction as
well. In doing so, they aimed to do the following:

1.  Help rebuild community infrastructure to provide safe, clean water,
    including the repair and installation of water collection, storage
    and sanitation,

2.  Develop a trained network of Indian mental health professionals who
    will provide mental health counseling for this and other disasters,
    and

3.  Provide community health education programs to improve access to
    basic health care and prevent the spread of communicable diseases
    (ARC, 2001).

These efforts all compliment the \$15 million in aid provided by the
International Federation of Red Cross/Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), who
set up a 310 bed high-tech emergency hospital in Bhuj, for example
(Sihna and Shaw, 2001 and WB and ADB, 2001).

# 

# **The United Nations**

The UN agencies responded immediately, having access to all government
information as an established in-country presence. The UNDP was
coordinator, assisting in responses of the World Food Programme (WFP),
the United Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF), Office of the
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), the International Labor
Organization (ILO) and the World Health Organization (WHO). The
accomplishments of each of these agencies is described below.

# 

# UNDP

The UNDP deployed its Disaster Response Team, whose responsibility was
to coordinate the entire emergency response until the UNDP could
formally assume that role (WB and ADB, 2001). In addition, supported by
\$2.75 million from the governments of the US, Britain and Italy, the
UNDP coordinated the UN-body needs assessments, activity identification,
project proposal design and implementation, monitoring and quality
control (Nainan, 2001). UNDP and the UN Volunteers (UNVs) they oversee
worked to address the issue of the houses destroyed in the quake. Using
"roaming teams", they worked with local communities to develop and fund
projects for the distribution of building materials and the construction
of temporary shelters. These teams also monitored the progress of the
project. The UNDP provided \$100,000 for immediate relief through a
project in partnership with two of the leading women's organizations in
Gujarat -- the Self-Employed Women's Association (SEWA) and the NGO
Kutch Mahila Vikas Sangthan, who put together "survival kits" for
families, in addition to helping with the housing issues. In addition,
the UNDP sent 35 UN Volunteers into several regions where no other NGOs
have initiated work or provided assistance. The UNDP established a goal
to have 5000 volunteers working on the recovery effort (UNDP, 2001).

The UNDP served as the UN coordinating body for reconstruction, a long
and arduous task that will, in some ways, continue for years. They began
by working with the central Government of India and the state Government
of Gujarat in implementing plans to provide permanent housing to the
homeless, using construction design that is resistant to the many risks
encountered in that region (WB and ADB, 2001). All of these projects are
merely in addition to those the UNDP already conducts throughout India.

# 

# The World Food Programme

The World Food Programme launched a \$4.14 million project which
provided relief food rations to 300,000 people for four months. Most of
these people received packages of wheat flour and lentils, to help them
survive the months following the earthquake. They specifically targeted
a group of 178,000 children below the age of five and pregnant and
nursing mothers, and provided them with highly-nutritious biscuits and a
'fortified blended food' called Indiamix. A special Joint Logistics
Center was initiated in Bhuj on February 11^th^, with a \$2.3 million
budget, to coordinate the overall relief efforts for the victims and
airlift the relief material from a UH Humanitarian Response Depot
(UNHRD) in Brindisi, Italy to Bhuj (UN India, 2001).

# 

# UNICEF

Just two days after the earthquake struck, UNICEF sent a team of fifteen
members based in Gujarat to distribute 15,000 blankets, one million
chloroquine tablets to purify drinking water, and medical supplies that
could help 30,000 people for three months. In the next 72 hours, they
provided an additional \$600,000 in medical equipment. Over the course
of the next few weeks, during the response phase, UNICEF supplied 83
mobile water tankers, countless medical supplies of every type, 75,000
blankets, measles vaccines to over 400,000 children, water supply
systems, 700 large tents (to act as temporary classrooms and health care
centers), school supplies, vitamin A for one million children, one
million oral re-hydration packets, refrigerators, generators, and
106,000 family survival kits (UNICEF, 2001). UNICEF worked with the
Government of Gujarat to rebuild many of the schools that were damaged
or destroyed, and helped the communities in the state prepare emergency
preparedness plans. In total, UNICEF contributed over \$25 million to
relief and reconstruction.

# 

# Office of the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)

OCHA sent a five-member UN disaster assessment and coordination team on
January 27^th^ to assist the UNDP in the response phase of the disaster
(WB and ADB, 2001). They provided an emergency grant of \$150,000 from
their own resources and from pre-positioned funds from the Governments
of Denmark and Norway, to purchase tents and blankets. Together with
WFP, they organized the three relief flights from the UNHRD in Brindisi,
Italy discussed earlier. Periodically, OCHA issued Situation Reports
during the response phase in order to keep the international community
informed, and to raise support for the affected population (UN India,
2001).

# 

# International Labor Organization (ILO)

ILO\'s activities were aimed at creating short-term work opportunities
in clean-up, at rebuilding the infrastructure and housing, and
'protecting vulnerable groups such as young women and children' (UNDP,
2001). They established programs that addressed aspects of the disaster
recovery relating to their main concern of labor issues. These projects
sought to gather statistics relating to the effect on the job market
from losses in employees and employment, migration flows, and the skills
of the victims. Using what they refer to as 'labor-intensive methods,
they provided immediate employment opportunities to stimulate local
markets and provide people with self-reliance. They concentrated on the
most vulnerable groups, such as women and children, and worked with
other agencies (such as UNICEF) to curb the disaster effects that lead
to child labor, child trafficking, and sexual exploitation (UN India,
2001).

# 

# World Health Organization (WHO)

The World Health Organization sent a team of nine public experts to
Gujarat to perform a rapid health assessment of the region. A disease
surveillance desk was established in main emergency operations center in
Bhuj to monitor the possible outbreak of disease (which often appear in
mass-casualty events) (WB and ADB, 2001). Experts from the Organization
provided technical advice to the state government and health officials
on public health issues. They also provided emergency health materials,
including trauma kits, emergency health kits, and other essential
medical supplies, all within the first days of the disaster. What was
most needed, however, was the rehabilitation of the damaged and
destroyed health care facilities, and they were working with the
experience they had acquired in the same region after the 1999 cyclone
that caused similar destruction (UNDP, 2001).

# 

# International Development Banks

# It is important to mention the international development banks that worked with the Government of India to finance reconstruction loans that are essential to the recovery of the state. Though these institutions played a vital role in establishing the preliminary and final assessments of the damages and reconstruction needs resulting from the quake, they do not perform any duties related specifically to the response. Their involvement in the reconstruction is essential, as they have provided the capitol without which nothing could be rebuilt, and they continue to work with the government of India in maintaining a reconstruction plan that is able to better weather the types of natural disasters that afflict the area on a regular basis (WB and ADB, 2001).

##### Performance of the institutions involved

After the initial day or two of confusion, directly attributed to the
complete breakdown in communication, there was a more organized response
observed. In fact, as one report states, "There was also a perception
that the Government of India's strong intervention in the
post-earthquake situation was to offset the weak performance of the
Government of Gujarat, which was weak and chaotic in the first few
days." The central government was seen as a 'strong and benevolent
force' in this disaster, especially in its break from traditional policy
of allowing aid workers to accompany the aid donated (EERI, 2001). The
handling of damaged infrastructure was effective, with communications
and transportation back to strength in a matter of days.

The government of India drew considerable criticism for its proposed
relocation projects aimed at villages in which damages to housing
exceeded 70 percent. The rationale behind this plan was that temporary
houses could be build in undeveloped areas before the original sites
needed to be cleared of debris (reducing the amount of time required to
get people under a roof), and then, these temporary houses could be
reinforced in order to become permanent (Times of India 2, 2001).
However, only 10 percent of the villages targeted for relocation were
willing to remain in their relocation sites (Times of India 3, 2001).
Another complaint was that the relief efforts were not fair along caste
lines, with minorities and lower-caste members being left out of the
government response (Indian Express, 2001). It has been suggested by
USAID that a monitoring team consisting of international aid providers
to monitor the government relief distribution be established (HR, 2001).
Also, as there were accusations of corruption in the government response
to the Latur earthquake and the Orissa Cyclone just a few years earlier,
it was necessary to guard against similar behavior in this event (The
Statesman, 2001).

The NGOs that responded did so with incredible coordination and in a
professional manner surprising for such a large event. They were
coordinated under the umbrella functions of the UNDP, but at ground
level they seemed to have worked together through strong mutual
cooperation. In a field that is characteristic of bitter turf-wars, this
is a promising fact. Of course there are always unseen issues which can
surface at a later date, though nothing devastating has emerged. One
particular issue to note is that, while the food supply was more than
adequate, with the fulfillment of needs surpassed, the need for shelter
was never satisfied even months after the quake. Literally hundreds of
thousands of people were still living in rudimentary conditions ranging
from plastic-sheeting shelters to sleeping on the street a year after
the quake. In Kuchchh alone, there was a need for over 100,000
additional tents (Times of India 4, 2001). A related issue, and one that
is commonly seen in large-scale international response, is the
occasional lack of contextual consideration of local customs or culture
that appeared. Food was donated that was, in many cases, very different
from the regular tastes of the local population, or even outside of the
allowed diets in accordance with religious beliefs. Many of the food
packages were written in foreign languages, and examples of foods which
were rarely consumed include Brazilian Java coffee, Kellogg's
Cornflakes, Asparagus soup, Danish lunch meat, sardines in sunflower
oil, and African raisins (Hindustan Times, 2001). Clearly, good
intentions alone are not sufficient when planning relief for a large
scale disaster.

##### Lessons learned

This disaster joins a list of many which show both the importance of
pre-disaster mitigation and the point at which no preparedness would be
fully sufficient. It has been said that it is not the earthquake which
kills people, but the buildings. Compare this quake to one in California
of the exact same magnitude, and at a more deadly depth of only 18
kilometers, where only 5 people were killed. This could be attributable
to many factors, but the greatest would have to be the stringent
building codes to which California developers are bound. Unfortunately,
regulations such as these require effective monitoring techniques, which
currently may be unrealistic in India due to a combination of poverty,
under-development, corruption, and a dearth of technical skills.

Developed nations such as the United States who respond to disasters
such as these with money, people and resources, need to put equal
efforts into mitigation and preparedness. The experienced disaster
managers and engineers in wealthier disaster-prone countries have a
responsibility to assist countries that are trying to become more
disaster resistant. The new Indian Disaster Management Authority, which
is still in its earliest stages, is a perfect opportunity, and the US
Government has expressed interest in involving FEMA through a transfer
of skills (HR, 2001).

The NGOs involved in the reconstruction effort and the multilateral
bodies like the United Nations and the World Bank, have an obligation to
insist that their donated or loaned resources be used in only
sustainable development activities. They should take into account a full
risk analysis and incorporate locally available successful technique
before any permanent rebuilding takes place. For instance, the Banni
people, who adapted a new style of traditional housing after the 1819
earthquake and have changed little since, did not suffer the loss of a
single (bhunga) in the Gujarat earthquake (Times of India 5, 2001). This
is not to say that all rebuilt houses should be bhungas, but that
locally available techniques need to be considered. Of course, any
rehabilitation and reconstruction should be performed in a manner blind
to cultural inequalities and should ensure the fair treatment of the
most marginalized groups.

The Indian Institute of Technology department of Civil Engineering and
the National Research Institute for Earth Science and Disaster
Prevention of the Earthquake Disaster Mitigation Research Center have
released a report on the Bhuj earthquake outlining challenges to be
overcome in the rehabilitation of Gujarat. These are broken into four
categories and are detailed as follows:

1.  Recommendations for Future Actions -- A decision support system must
    be developed as a tool to assist in government actions, long term
    mitigation measures are needed, government response needs to be
    decentralized, and relocation efforts must be abandoned

2.  Recommendations Targeting People -- People need to have confidence
    in earthquake resistant technology, they need to participate in the
    recovery and rehabilitation process and be aware of risks, and need
    to be trained in disaster planning

3.  Recommendations Targeting Academics and Professionals -- These
    people have an obligation to transfer existing knowledge in
    mitigation, they need to create a centralized database of pertinent
    information, and they need to create training modules and guidelines

4.  Recommendations Targeting Business and Industrial Communities --
    Industry must play a greater role in the development process, it
    must be involved in the long-term recovery process, and must assist
    in the generation of local small scale industries (Sinha and Shaw,
    2001)

The level of destruction and death that occurred in a matter of minutes,
that could have been avoided with proper regulations, is excusable
considering the history and level of development in India. The
reconstruction should not be given such tolerance. Disasters have always
been seen as a hidden opportunity, and this is no exception. With proper
assistance, planning and monitoring, India can work with the
international community to make itself much less vulnerable to events
that need not be so severe. They cannot do it alone, however, and it is
the developed world that has the capability and responsibility to
assist.

##### References

American Red Cross (ARC). 2001. "India Quake Relief 2001.**"**
<http://www.redcross.org/news/in/0101bhuj/india.html>

CIRES. 2001. **"**26 January 2001 Bhuj Earthquake, Gujarat, India."
August. University of Colorado.
<http://cires.Colorado.edu/~bilham/gujarat2001.html>

EERI. 2001. "EERI Preliminary Government Response Report, Earthquake in
Gujarat, India, Jan26, 2001."
<http://www.eeri.org/earthquakes/reconn/bhuj_india/pgovtrest.html>

Government of Gujarat (GOG), India. 2001. "Earthquake in Gujarat."
Website. \<http://gujaratindia.com/preliminary.html\>

Government of India (GOI). 2001. "The Government of India's Official
Website on the Gujarat Earthquake**"**
<http://gujarat-earthquake.gov.in/>

Hindustan Times. 2001. "No Bread? Let The Quake-Hit Eat Cake." February
9.

Indian Express. 2001. "Relief Discrimination Irks Lodia Villagers."
February 8.

Interaction. 2001. "Earthquake in India." June.
<http://www.interaction.org/india00/index.html>

Nainan, Madhu. 2001. "Quake-Proof Houses Set the Model for Gujarat
Reconstruction." Agence France-Presse. March 13. P.5.

Sinha, Ravi and Shaw, Rajib. 2001. "The Bhuj Earthquake of January 26,
2001: Consequences and Future Challenges." April 26. P.1.

The Statesman (India). 2001. "Gujarat Tragedy: Could Be a Blessing in
Disguise." April 23.
[http://web.lexis-nexis.com](http://web.lexis-nexis.com/)

Times of India. 2001. "Food Riots Hamper Quake Relief Work in Gujarat."
January 30.

Times of India 2. 2001. "Orphans Can Be Adopted, Not Villages." February
14. P.1.

Times of India 3. 2001. "90% Kutch Villagers Reject Relocation, Upset
Rehab Plans." February 21.

Times of India 4. 2001. "Unprepared Government Undermines Relief
Mobilisation." February 4.

Times of India 5. 2001. "Banni's Dwellers were secure in Bhungas as Bhuj
Crumbled." February 21.

Times of India. 2001. "Quake Destroys Kutch's Artistic Tradition."
February 17.

U.S. House of Representatives (HR). 2001."The Earthquake in India: The
American Response**."** March 1. U.S. Government Printing Office.
Washington DC. P.10.

UN India. 2001. "The UN System Response to the Gujarat Earthquake."
August 2. <http://www.un.org.in/dmt/guj/unresguj80201c.htm>

UNDP. 2001. "UN Steps Up Relief Operations in Gujarat." United Nations
Press Release. February 3. P.2.

UNICEF. 2001. "India:Earthquake, Complete Emergency Report."
[http://www.unicefusa.org/alert/emergency/
indiaeq/archive.html](http://www.unicefusa.org/alert/emergency/ indiaeq/archive.html)

USAID 2. 2001. "India - Earthquake, Fact Sheet #14 (FY 2001)." February
8. <http://www.usembassy.state.gov/posts/in1/wwwhguj.html>

USAID 3. 2001. "USAID Awards \$2.2 Million in Contracts for Indian
Earthquake." February 5. USAID Press Office. P.1.

USAID. 2001. Summary of U.S. Government Assistance for the Victims of
the Gujarat Earthquake." February 12. P.1.

Vatsa, Krishna. 2001. "The Bhuj Earthquake, District of Kutch, State of
Gujarat (India) January 26, 2001." 16 March. DRM-World Institute for
Disaster Risk Management. P.6.

World Bank (WB) and Asian Development Bank (ADB). 2001. "Gujarat
Earthquake Recovery Program: Assessment Report." March 14. P.5.

**Image 9.1.1: Isoseismic Map of the Gujarat Earthquake**

![](media/image1.png){width="6.925in"
height="5.683333333333334in"}Source: Geological Survey of India (GSI),
<http://www.gsi.gov.in/isoseis.htm>

Case 9.2: The January and February 2001 El Salvador Earthquakes

# 

# **Introduction**

Throughout El Salvador's history, and most notably in the past quarter
century, the Salvadorans and their infrastructure have endured the wrath
of myriad disasters ranging from the natural to the intentional.
Collectively, these events have drastically hindered that nation's
development, even reversing it in many instances. Since 1980, the
country has survived a civil war (1980s), a refugee crisis, Hurricane
Mitch (October of 1998), and three powerful earthquakes (1986 and
January and February 2001) (Whitbeck, 2001).

The 2001 earthquakes, upon which this case will focus, were devastating
to the already suffering nation. The quakes, which were followed by
landslides, became part of a cascading series of disasters, that
collectively caused tremendous damage and casualties. In total, 1,155
public buildings were damaged, 169,792 houses were damaged and 108,261
houses were destroyed. These events caused the death of over 1,100
people and injuries to over 8,100 (ARC, 2001).

This case will discuss the two earthquakes of 2001, and their affects El
Salvador and its people. An analysis of at the relief response of the
national and international community will be provided. Finally, the case
will examine at the functions and performance of the governmental and
non-governmental organizations and what can be learned from these
disasters by El Salvador and the other organizations in case of future
disasters.

# **Background -- Two Quakes in Two Months**

El Salvador is a seismically-active mountainous country in Central
America known as the "land of Volcanoes" (CIA, N/D). Central America is
subject to wide range of geotectonic failures and is also exposed to
local faultages in all the countries comprising it (see Figure 9.2.5).
To the north in the Atlantic, the North American and Caribbean Plates
are interacting, divided by the Pit of Grand Cayman; to the south in the
Pacific, the Cocos Plate can be found along the lentgth of Central
America, forming the Pit of Mesoamerica. This geological structure
reaches the Cocos ridge at the border between Costa Rica and Panama. The
plate of Nazca is active from Panama through the Galapagos Plate, with
parallel movement to the Block of Panama that also affects Costa Rica
through a transcurrent fault. This tectonic structure generates
important seismic activity and has created major, destructive tremors in
the Central American region. In the last hundred years, El Salvador has
been affected by at least 13 major earthquakes. Among the most
destructive were those of Jucuapa-Chinameca on May 6, 1951; San Salvador
on May 3, 1965 and San Salvador on October 10, 1986 (PAHO, 2001).

At 11:35 on the morning of January 13, 2001, the citizens of El Salvador
were jolted by 40 seconds of violent shaking from an earthquake of 7.6
magnitude. The tremor was epicentered off of the Salvadoran coast about
65 miles southwest of the city of San Miguel, and at a depth of about 37
miles (USGS, 2001). The quake was so powerful, that buildings in Mexico
City, over 1,100 miles away, swayed with the earth's movements. Almost
immediately, the first of over 1000 aftershocks that followed (over 600
in the first two days alone) began to occur, and several of these
sustained moderate magnitudes of between 4.5 and 5.5 (OCHA, 2001).

According to the U.S. Geological Survey, at least 844 people were killed
and 4,723 were injured in this first of two major earthquake events
(USGS, 2001). A majority of those killed, approximately 585, died not as
direct result of the quake but from the effects of over 16,000
landslides that followed (USGS, 2001). The earthquake's movement
triggered these landslides which followed almost immediately, burying a
whole neighborhood in one instance (see Image 9.2.1). The town of Santa
Tecla, located west of San Salvador, was almost completely destroyed by
landslides, with over 250 homes covered by the rubble (WWU, 2001). These
slides also blocked major transportation routes, damaged several large
buildings, and knocked out radio stations and telephone service
(Disaster Relief, 2001). The residential and commercial infrastructure
also sustained considerable damage. Even the nation's production
capabilities suffered approximately two million dollars in damages, as
indicated by the Minister of Agriculture and Cattle.

The quake left homes, hospitals, and roads in shambles. The Pan American
Health Organization (PAHO) and World Health Organization (WHO) reported
that 1,346 hospital beds were lost or disabled due to this damage (OCHA,
2001). They also reported that pharmaceutical stocks were insufficient
at the time of the quake to handle the anticipated growing needs that
would result from injuries sustained, epidemiological control,
sanitation issues, mental health, and potable water issues.

Exactly one month later, at 8:22 in the morning on February 13, 2001,
another earthquake with a magnitude of 6.1 struck El Salvador (CNN,
2001). The epicenter of this earthquake was located 15 miles east of San
Salvador, in San Pedro Nonualco in the department of La Paz. The quake,
which lasted about ten seconds, occurred on a different crustal plate
than the January event, and at a much shallower (6 mile) depth.

In this second, weaker earthquake, damages were again severe, and are
notable despite being overshadowed by the event that occurred one month
earlier. USAID reported that there were 15, 706 houses damaged in the
quake, and 41,302 completely destroyed. The effect on the population was
severe as well, with 315 lives lost and 3,399 injuries sustained.
Seventeen health posts were affected by the earthquake, requiring the
opening of temporary facilities to make up for the lost hospital beds.
Additionally, 111 schools, 73 churches, and 82 public buildings were
damaged. Seventy-one landslides occurred as a result of this second
major quake, blocking several major roadways in a rugged area where
alternative options are seldom available.

During a one month period, more than 1.5 million Salvadorans in a
country populated with six million, were directly affected by two
earthquakes (WWU, 2001). When combined with the January earthquake,
these two quakes constituted a single, devastating event whose response
phases easily overlap. The earthquakes destroyed entire towns and even
resulted in the complete disappearance of some villages (five villages
on the outskirts of San Vicente volcano have vanished (CNN, 2001)).
Ninety percent of the houses in towns like San Cayetana, Guadeloupe,
Verapza and Texistepeque were damaged. San Salvador, the nation's
capital, was left without drinking water for over a week, and the Pan
American Highway, which was heavily damaged, was impassible for weeks in
parts (CNN 2, 2001).

In total, it is estimated that 185,338 houses were damaged, and 149,528
houses were destroyed (WWU, 2001). There were 8,122 injuries and 1,159
deaths as a result of the two events (UNDP, 2001). International
organizations' damage estimates for the events were reported to be more
than \$2.8 billion. The Pan-American Health Organization (PAHO) and the
World Health Organization (WHO) estimate that the rehabilitation of
hospitals and health centers alone will cost \$162 million (UNDP, 2001).
In this sector, 19 hospitals (63%), 75 health units (21%), and 12 health
centers (7%) were damaged. Over 2,600 public schools were damaged or
destroyed, and 75% of the affected region's potable water systems were
rendered unusable, at least temporarily, by damage or complete
destruction (USAID, 2001).

**Response**

This event was catastrophic to the government and people of El Salvador,
and clearly overwhelmed their capacity to respond. The response required
the efforts of not only the local and national response resources, but
the full range of unilateral, multilateral, and non-profit organizations
that respond to such overwhelming events. There were several local and
international partners in the reconstruction effort after the
earthquake. International organizations that participated in this effort
include the Central American Bank for Economic Integration, German
Cooperating Agency, Japan International Cooperation Agency, World Food
program, Pan-American Health Organization, United Nations Children's
Fund, United Nations Development Program, European Union, Inter-American
Development Bank, World Bank as well as several countries from around
the world. These governments, international organizations, civil
society, non-governmental organizations, banks and private companies
provided over \$11.6 million in relief by the end of February (PAHO,
2001). This section will detail the response of the major players
involved.

**Government of El Salvador**

The Government of El Salvador was undoubtedly concerned with the relief
and recovery of its people. President Francisco Flores declared a state
of emergency immediately after the January earthquake occurred. A
meeting of the National Emergency Committee (COEN from its Spanish name,
Comité de Emergencia Nacional), which is the national government agency
that coordinates emergency activities composed of the Ministries of
National Defense, the Interior, Public Safety and Public Works,
Agriculture and Livestock, Foreign Affairs, Education and Health, as
well as relief, scientific, autonomous, and international Agencies, and
private companies, began to meet a day after the earthquake and provided
the first data on the magnitude and severity of its effects on the
population (see sidebar 9.2.1)(Disaster Relief, 2001). This committee
updated their information on a daily basis. These authorities also
established an emergency operations center to focus on the event (though
El Salvador's government was later criticized as having had serious
pre-existing weaknesses in its national disaster management response
capability)(USAID, 2001). In the second earthquake, this facility was
severely damaged and the center needed to be relocated.

People were evacuated from identified zones of greatest danger, and were
relocated into 82 shelters that were established in ten of the most
affected departments (OCHA 2, 2001). In total, 64,606 people were housed
in these emergency shelters (PAHO, 2001). The department of La Libertad
managed the greatest number of registered shelters (18) and people
sheltered (31,397). Police canvassed neighborhoods in danger, and
encouraged residents to leave their homes and go to shelters (CNN 3,
2001). Some residents did not immediately evacuate because they wanted
to protect their belongings or continue the search-and-rescue for
friends and relatives (CNN 4, 2001). To counter any rumours about
earthquakes that were propogating unnecessary fear and causing people to
take unnecessary risks, COEN initiated a public information campaign on
the origins of earthquakes and the activities citizens should be taking
to protect themselves.

Search and rescue efforts were started immediately. Many of these
efforts, as is common in the urban centers of developing and developed
nations, were initiated by neighbors and other non-official residents.
These groups quickly went to work in an attempt to dig out the victims
of the many landslides that not only caused structures to collapse, but
buried them under many tons of debris. In this regard, Santa Tecla,
Santa Ana, the department of La Paz, and Usulutan were the hardest hit
areas in El Salvador (CNN 5, 2001). President Flores announced that the
priority for response and rescue efforts would, as such be given to the
southern part of Santa Tecla and the area of Berlin, which had been most
significantly affected, following in order of need (CNN, 2001).

An epidemiological surveillance system was activated by the country's
health authorities because of fears based upon pre-existing conditions
relating to the nation's public health. Such conditions can easily
spread out of control in the disarray that follows major disasters. The
pricipal pre-existing and new conditions include:

-   A recent dengue epidemic

-   The presence of an epidemic of diarrheal disease by rotavirus

-   The sporadic circulation of Vibrio cholera

-   The presence of malaria endemic areas

-   Previous presence of cases of leptospirosis, and

-   The presence of a cold front that affected the country after the
    disaster.

The high number of fatalities presented the government with a public
health crisis. Mortuary officials were overwhelmed with the number of
cadavers they had to store, identify, and bury. In Santa Tecla, where
the number of dead was notably great, many victims were buried in a long
pit at the municipal cemetery to avoid a subsequent outbreak of disease
(CNN 6, 2001). A temporary morgue had been established in order to allow
family members to identify the dead, but often the health officials were
forced to inter them in mass burials regardless of these measures (CNN
3, 2001). The mass graves were treated with anti-bacterial chemicals in
an effort to prevent the outbreak of an epidemic (CNN 7, 2001). To
directly address the problem with the high number of cadavers, President
Flores requested that the government of Colombia send 3,000 coffins as
part of their aid package (CNN 8, 2001).

To address the consequences suffered by the economic well being of the
nation, the Salvadoran Congress decreed a price freeze that threatened
retailers with jail time for overcharging customers or hoarded goods.
President Flores issued a 90-day emergency measure fixing water and
electricity rates, as well as public transport prices, to address the
same problem (CNN 6, 2001).

On January 13^th^, the government of El Salvador issued a formal appeal
to the international community for the provision of the following
supplies:

-   Emergency lighting equipment

-   Emergency generators

-   Protection equipment for rescue workers

-   Remove debris equipment

-   Tarpaulins and tents

-   Water and water containers

-   Body bags

The Government issued a subsequent appeal on February 13^th^ for aid
from the international community for victims of the second earthquake.
The National Commission for Solidarity was charged with receiving and
distributing the contributions from the international community. The
committee also set up an international bank account into which financial
contributions could be directly deposited.

**The United Nations**

[United Nations General Assembly]{.underline}

On January 26, approximately two weeks after the first earthquake in El
Salvador, occurred, the United Nations' General Assembly urged all
Member States, the United Nations system, the international financial
institutions, and non-governmental organizations to continue responding
generously to El Salvador during their time of crisis (UN, 2001). The
United Nations was focused on maintaining the present political
stability and did not want the earthquake to become an obstacle to the
economic and social development of El Salvador. El Salvador's
representative to the United Nations assured the assembly at that time
that El Salvador had in fact begun the rehabilitation and reconstruction
process. The assembly drafted a resolution at this meeting requesting
that the Secretary-General continue humanitarian assistance through his
office and special agencies of the United Nations. This resolution was
co-sponsored by the following countries:

Argentina

Barbados

Belize

Bolivia

Brazil

Chile

Colombia

Costa Rica

Cuba

Dominican Republic

Ecuador

El Salvador

Grenada

Guatemala

Haita

Honduras

Jamaica

Mexico

Nicaragua

Panama

Paraguay

Peru

Saint Vincent and

the Grenadines

Trinadad and Tobago

Uruguay

Venezuela

Several other countries joined as co-sponsors of the resolution,
including Armenia, Australia, Bhutan, Cambodia, Canada, Cape Verde,
France, Gabon, Italy, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Monaco, Morocco, Netherlands,
Norway, San Marino, Slovenia, Syria, and Yemen.

[United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)]{.underline}

The UNDP responded immediately, on January 13^th^, 2001, by providing
\$50,000 in emergency funds to support logistics, transportation, and
other emergency needs. UNDP also created an online information portal
called "Reconstruir" ('to reconstruct') to consolidate and distribute
the information generated by various actors involved in reconstruction.
It also monitored accountability and closely followed status of several
projects, allowing all agencies involved in the relief and recovery
access to the status of all UN projects throughout the country. The
website marked one of the first times in Latin America that information
technology played a large part in the national reconstruction process
(UNDP, 2001). In general, governmental and non-governmental institutions
cooperated in the process, and were eager to disseminate the results of
their data gathering for the benefit of all other organizations.

In the long term, the UNDP's became involved in rebuilding damaged
infrastructure. In doing so, it worked to ensure that a risk management
approach was taken in this construction. This approach had a mission of
ensuring that the population would not be impacted in the future by
other foreseeable natural threats (UNDP, 2001).

[UN Disaster Management Team and Assessment and Coordination
Team]{.underline}

The United Nations Disaster Management Team (UN-DMT) coordinated the
United Nations system's inter-agency appeal. This appeal, which was made
on January 26^th^, sought the assistance of the international body of
emergency relief and response and recovery for a period of at least six
months. The Appeal called for international assistance in the amount of
\$34,882,935. The areas covered in the Appeal were food, health, water
and sanitation, agriculture, cattle and fishing industries, education,
housing and protection of the most vulnerable. The following chart
details the initial appeal by UN agency:

[UN Agency Amount (In USD)]{.underline}

WFP 9,922,727

FAO 2,430,000

UNICEF 4,158,368

WHO/PAHO 4,700,000

UNFPA 800,000

UNDP 12,721,840

OCHA 150,000

**Total 34,882,935**

Following the February 13^th^ event, UNDMT updated the initial
Inter-Agency appeal. At the time this appeal was made, less than 16% of
the first appeal had been fulfilled, leaving grip prospects about how
much could be expected from a much larger second appeal. Ultimately, the
appeal was adjusted to reflect a need of \$40,377,935.

The United National Disaster Assessment and Coordination (UNDAC) team
was placed on immediate alert when the news of the quake came through.
On January 14^th^, a seven-member UNDAC Team (from Ecuador, Guatemala,
Switzerland and United Kingdom), led by the OCHA Regional Disaster
Response Advisor, was dispatched to assess damages and assisted in
coordinating international humanitarian assistance (Disaster Relief,
2001). They were provided with an initial \$30,000 for the purchase of
emergency supplies.

As the disaster recovery progressed, UNDAC provided daily updates on the
needs of survivors and local emergency officials, conducting dozens of
visits in the affected regions. The team coordinated the international
search and rescue operations that were conducted. The team also provided
support for relief coordination, facilitating the meetings of the UN
Resident Coordinator with UN and NGO relief agencies and donors, and
providing regular field situation reports. Finally, UNDAC provided
assistance to the UNDMT with the preparation of the planned UN
Inter-Agency Appeal for El Salvador.

After the February 13^th^ event, another UNDAC team, this time composed
of four members, was dispatched to perform the same functions as were
performed in the January 13^th^ event.

[World Food Programme (WFP)]{.underline}

World Food Programme (WFP) adopted an emergency package of USD 200,000
on January 14^th^. Two teams of WFP staff from Managua and Lima were
deployed to El Salvador to handle programming, logistics, and public
information needs that would soon arise (Disaster Relief, 2001). Their
first action was to open three food distribution sites: two in the town
of Santa Tecla, and one in Comasagua. Soon after two additional
distribution sites were opened in Usulutan (with CARE) and in San
Salvador (with the city government). Vehicles and communications
equipment were sent from WFP Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua. WFP also
assessed emergency food requirements and the need for a larger
operation.

The WFP, with the assistance of the Salvadorian Red Cross, distributed,
during the first 24 hours after the February 13^th^ earthquake, over
1,000 family food rations for two weeks in the three most affected
communities. WFP logistics teams from Honduras and Guatemala were
deployed to El Salvador to help to carry out the additional activities
over the January 13^th^ efforts. WFP adopted a practice of buying local
food supplies, with a total value of \$537,000 (in addition to other
food purchased external to El Salvador) which went directly into the
local economy.

More than 20 municipalities benefited from the food-ration distribution
program. WFP also participated in a 'food by air' program in the
municipality of Cojutepeque and other areas not accessible by road. A
logistics base was installed in the municipality of Verapaz. From this
trans-shipment point, food and non-food items were directly transported
to small surrounding communities.

[United Nations Children's Fund]{.underline}

United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) responded immediately to the
disaster by initiating the distribution of safe drinking water. UNICEF
provided a pledge of \$500,000 for water, medical, education, and
logistical needs (Disaster Relief, 2001). UNICEF specifically provided
water tanks, water purification tablets, portable latrines, medical
supplies and drugs to fight the spread of disease, educational supplies
and school kits, psychosocial training for volunteers, teachers, and
relief officials, and specialists to assist local authorities in
arranging care for unaccompanied children and organization for family
reunification. UNICEF specifically noted that the money would be used on
preventing diseases and helping restore a sense of normalcy for children
traumatized and left homeless by the earthquake and landslides. Japan
purchased medical supplies for Salvadorans through UNICEF, which were
distributed to the facilities most in need (UNICEF, 2001). The following
details the specific areas where UNICEF worked in the aftermath of the
disaster:

-   Psycho-Social Rehabilitation - UNICEF held a two-day session on
    recreation-based psychological care in Guadalupe, San Vicente,
    Verapaz and Tepetitan, affected greatly by the second earthquake.
    The project (\"Retorno al Alegria\" or "Return to Happiness")
    provided over 1,400 children with drawing sessions, physical
    education and recreation activities. Specialized psychological care
    was also provided. On 19 February, a workshop with communicators
    (adults and 12-13 year old children), the National Secretariat for
    the Family, the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Health and
    youth groups, was held for the elaboration of 12 radio spots on
    psycho-social rehabilitation.

-   Health - A national measles immunization campaign was started on
    January 22^nd^ supported by UNICEF, providing over 450,000 doses.

-   Water - UNICEF assumed the lead in organising the provision of water
    in the three most affected departments (San Vicente, Cuscatlán and
    La Paz). UNICEF established a commission to verify and monitor the
    quality of water being delivered, whose members are UNICEF, the
    Ministry of Health, the National Aqueduct and Sewer Administration
    (ANDA), the Armed Forces, the Red Cross, the Swedish Rescue Mission
    and OXFAM. UNICEF recommended that the water distribution issue be
    divided in four parts: Production, distribution, storage, and
    handling. UNICEF provided hundreds of water tanks, and distributed
    some 50 water reservoirs as well as 13,000 'jerrycans' provided by
    Norway, that were sent in a relief flight from the United Nations
    Humanitarian Response Depot in Brindisi, Italy.

-   Sanitation - UNICEF organized a joint purchase by UNICEF, PAHO/WHO,
    UNDP/OCHA and the El Salvador Red Cross, of 1000 latrines. The
    Ministry of Health identified the communities where these latrines
    were placed.

[Pan American Health Organization (PAHO)/World Health Organization
(WHO)]{.underline}

Pan American Health Organization (PAHO), which is part of the World
Health Organization (WHO), responded immediately, by mobilizing national
and international financial and technical resources (PAHO, 2001). They
gave an initial advance of \$50,000 for the local purchase of medical,
surgical, and other supplies to get the response moving as quickly as
possible. Movement of medical supplies to hospitals also began
immediately after the event was recognized. PAHO sought first to provide
technical cooperation that included disaster relief and assessment of
the vulnerability of structures.

PAHO dispatched its disaster mitigation engineer, who in collaboration
with the national counterparts helped to determine the immediate needs
(including assessing the safety of the hospitals and identifying interim
measures to restore their minimum capacity.) The Government of El
Salvador asked for support of SUMA, the humanitarian Supply Management
system, to assist with the anticipated influx of donations. Two SUMA
specialists assisted the National Emergency Committee and the health
sector.

By January 19^th^, the PAHO team was strengthened with an additional
sixteen experts, including people specialized in structural and
nonstructural assessment of health facilities and water distribution
systems, epidemiologists to monitor cases of diarrhea, dengue,
leptospirosis and other diseases, a food handling specialist, a sanitary
engineer for shelter, latrines and solid waster disposal and specialists
for mental health and health education.

Additional personnel soon arrived from neighboring countries to assist
in re-establishing the hospital network, fixing medical and lab
equipment, storage and distribution of medical and health supplies.
Volunteers from all over the region were mobilized by PAHO through
FUNDESUMA (a Costa Rica based international NGO).

PAHO/WHO issued a \$5.6 million appeal on February 15 for emergency
needs in the health sector, including disease control, rehabilitation of
health infrastructure, food safety, water and sanitation, and vector
control.

[Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)]{.underline}

The Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in Geneva
provided an initial emergency grant for \$50,000. OCHA also assisted by
serving as a channel for contributions towards the disaster relief.
Through OCHA, the Government of Luxembourg pledged \$161,464, the
Governments of Denmark, Italy, and Norway each gave a donation of
\$50,000, and the United Kingdom contributed up to \$50,000 for UNDAC
mission operations (OCHA 2).

**The United States Government's (USG) response**

The United States Government (USG) was one of the largest donors in the
humanitarian and relief mission after the earthquake disasters in El
Salvador. The United States Agency for International Development
(USAID), as well as other U.S. Government agencies, also supported the
longer-term reconstruction efforts in El Salvador. These other agencies
included Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), U.S.
Department of Defense (DOD), the Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster
Assistance (OFDA), the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
(NOAA), U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), U.S. Department of
Agriculture (DOA), and U.S. Geological Survey (USGS).

[United States Agency for International Development (USAID)]{.underline}

On the day of the first earthquake, three USAID OFDA personnel happened
to be in San Salvador at the time of the earthquake. They immediately
began liaising with the El Salvadoran Red Cross, the National Emergency
Commission, and the U.S. Embassy in San Salvador to ascertain the extent
of damage and humanitarian needs and coordinate assistance. On January
13, USAID/OFDA activated its Washington-based Response Management Team
and began preparations to augment its personnel in El Salvador and to
transport relief supplies to affected areas.

Based on USAID/DART assessments and President Flores\' request for
assistance, U.S. Ambassador Rose Likins declared an earthquake disaster
on January 14. In response, USAID/OFDA provided \$25,000 to USAID/San
Salvador for the purchase of tools, hard hats, gloves, goggles,
flashlights, lighting, fuel, and related supplies or equipment that are
required for search and extraction. Concurrently, USAID/OFDA activated
its Washington-based Response Management Team and began preparations to
augment its personnel in El Salvador and to transport relief supplies to
affected areas.

On January 14, 11 additional USAID/OFDA personnel arrived in San
Salvador, bringing to 14 the total number of the USAID/DART. The
USAID/DART conducted damage and needs assessments; coordinated
assistance with the national government, El Salvadoran Red Cross, U.S.
Embassy, USAID/San Salvador, and other donors; and facilitated the

transportation and distribution of USG-provided relief supplies.
USAID/DART personnel arrived with three priorities:

1.  To assist COEN in improving Non-Governmental Organization (NGO)
    coordination;

2.  To assist COEN in establishing a command and control system for
    search and extraction activities; and

3.  To assist COEN in instituting a system by which airlift missions are
    prioritized and tasked.

On January 14, a USAID/OFDA-chartered aircraft arrived in Ilopango
carrying a pre-packaged Ground Operations (GO) kit, containing medical
equipment and supplies to treat 1,000 people for a week; 1,002 hygiene
kits, each with supplies sufficient for a family of five for two weeks;
40 rolls of plastic sheeting (enough to temporarily shelter 400
families); 1,000 five-gallon water jugs; and 1,000 wool blankets. In
addition to the GO kit, the charter aircraft transported 500 water jugs
and 60 rolls of plastic sheeting.

USAID/OFDA funded the provision of three Blackhawk and two Chinook
helicopters provided by the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) in support
of USAID/OFDA assessments, Med-evac of injured persons, and transport of
relief commodities. The helicopters, permanently stationed in Soto Cano,
Honduras, arrived in El Salvador on January 14. DOD also provided a
total of 41 personnel, 23 flight personnel and 19 individuals to
coordinate DOD assistance, conduct structural assessments, provide
medical assistance, and operate radio and camera equipment.

On January 15, USAID/OFDA provided \$25,000 to USAID/San Salvador for
the purchase of tools, hard hats, gloves, goggles, flashlights,
lighting, fuel, and related supplies or equipment that are required for
search and extraction. On January 16, USAID/OFDA provided \$150,000 to
USAID/San Salvador for the local purchase of rice, beans, and water
tanks and jugs for distribution to vulnerable groups in primarily
Usulutan Department. In addition, on January 16, USAID/OFDA provided
\$50,000 to USAID/San Salvador for the local transport of these
commodities from Comalapa airport to Usulutan. At this time, USAID/OFDA
also provided an additional 5,040 hygiene kits and 250 rolls of plastic
sheeting for distribution in Usulutan. On January 17, USAID/OFDA
provided \$40,000 to USAID/San Salvador for the local purchase of 10,000
blankets.

On February 13^th^, when the second earthquake occurred, USAID/OFDA was
still conducting operations from the first event. The embassy released
an immediate allotment of \$25,000 for the local purchase of relief
supplies. USAID/OFDA immediately redirected 300 rolls of plastic
sheeting, originally intended for shelter operations from the January 13
earthquake, for use in response to the new event. Three million dollars
was also made available, for use by U.S. private voluntary organizations
for shelter construction. Additionally, \$530,000 was provided to the
U.S. Embassy/USAID Mission for local procurement of emergency relief
supplies.

After quakes, USAID created the Earthquake Recovery Program (ERP). ERP
was created to address the needs of the rural poor in the areas most
affected by the earthquakes (USAID 2, 2001). ERP had four major
components, which included:

-   Restoration of community infrastructure;

-   Economic reactivation working primarily with micro and small
    businesses and farmers;

-   Disaster mitigation to assist El Salvador to better prepare for
    future disasters; and

-   The restoration of municipal government infrastructure (USAID,
    2001).

Through ERP, the United States provided a budget of approximately \$75
million in FY2001 and \$100 million in FY2002 (USAID 3, 2001).

The 2001 earthquakes were estimated to have affected 43,000
micro-enterprises and 40,000 small farmers (USAID 2, 2001). USAID did
the following, as well as other programs, to promote recovery for these
sectors:

-   **Reconstructed Rural Markets:** USAID worked with the Social
    Investment Fund for Local Development (FISDL) to reconstruct five
    public markets that were severely damaged, benefiting 1,684 vendors
    (USAID 2, 2001).

-   **Initiated the Productive Asset Grants (PAG) Program:** USAID
    launched a \$1 million PAG voucher program, which provided grants to
    micro and small entrepreneurs who lost clients, business equipment
    or realized significant loss or damage as a result of the
    earthquakes (USAID 2, 2001). The vouchers allowed the recipients to
    purchase productive assets which helped them re-start and expand
    their businesses as well as re-generate income. Through this
    program, over 6,000 jobs were protected within micro-enterprises.

-   **Strengthened Rural Micro Finance Institutions (MFI):** USAID
    stabilized and promoted the recovery of the micro-finance sector by
    strengthening the management capacity of MFIs (USAID 2, 2001).

-   **Financed Small Infrastructure Activity (SIA):** USAID initiated a
    quick-response to improve rural productivity by helping communities
    that had been destroyed by the earthquake. They helped reconstruct
    10 childcare centers and approved 13 infrastructure projects that
    would repair or reconstruct bridges, hospitals, schools and water
    systems (USAID 2, 2001).

Other US agencies provided support outside of regular USAID/OFDA
operations, as detailed below:

-   USAID\'s Office of Food for Peace (USAID/FFP) contributed towards
    the WFP Emergency Appeal released after the January 13 earthquake.
    USAID/FFP will provided 1,750 metric tons of **P.L. 480 Title II
    emergency food commodities** valued at \$917,700.

-   WFP conducted a food survey which was accompanied by a USAID/FFP
    representative from Guatemala. It was the first comprehensive food
    survey conducted in response to the earthquakes.

-   Three helicopters (2 Blackhawk and 1 Chinook) from the Department of
    Defense's (DOD) Southern Command responded to priorities established
    by COEN and the Salvadoran Armed Forces from February 14 to 16 at a
    cost of \$116,000. The helicopters were used to move Salvadoran
    military personnel and transport injured victims to the military
    hospital in San Salvador. The Chinook was used to transport a
    Mexican army field hospital.

-   DOD\'s Southern Command delivered a shipment of construction
    equipment, including two five-ton dump trucks, two twenty-ton dump
    trucks, two bulldozers, and one truck.

-   DOD\'s Southern Command deployed a Medical Readiness Training
    (MEDRED) unit consisting of DOD reserve medical personnel training
    for deployment to disasters. The MEDRED operated in the towns of
    Hurualen, Salinas Lel Potrepo, and Normandia, and provided
    5,000-7,000 patients with outpatient care.

-   USGS personnel in the region conducted aerial assessments of damage.

-   The U.S. also provided financial relief by granting eighteen months
    clemency from deportation to Salvadoran citizens who were illegally
    living in the United States, allowing them to continue to work and
    send money home to their earthquake-shattered country. This affected
    over 1,100 Salvadorans who were in Immigration and Naturalization
    Service (INS -- now part of the Department of Homeland Security)
    custody at the time and were awaiting repatriation (CNN 9, 2001).

Several Salvadoran Ministries as well as efforts at the local level
partnered up with USAID. Partners included local governments and
ministries such as Agriculture, Economy, Education, Environment, Foreign
Affairs, Health, and the Vice-Ministry of Housing. Local Funds and
Committees that sustained the earthquake reconstruction effort included
the National Commission for Micro and Small Enterprise, National
Emergency Committee, National Family Secretariat, National Popular
Housing Fund, Social Investment Fund for Local Development, Technical
Investment Fund for Local Development, Technical Secretariat for
External Financing, Foundation for Micro and Small Enterprise
Competitiveness. Salvadoran business leaders also met to discuss what
kind of help they could offer (CNN 3, 2001).

**Other Governments**

Other governments that offered assistance to mobilize relief effort
included the European Union (ECHO), Mexico, Germany, Spain, Taiwan,
Great Britain, Panama, Guatemala, Venezuela, Switzerland, and Japan (CNN
5, 2001). The European Union's humanitarian aid office (ECHO) sent
experts to areas hit most severely by the first earthquake and pledged
\$1.9 million in aid (CNN 3, 2001). Although Guatemala also experienced
some of the affects of the earthquakes, they sent a helicopter over the
southwestern part of Guatemala and part of El Salvador to assess the
damages well as rescue teams.

**Non-profit organizations**

Several non-profit organizations became involved in the response and
reconstruction in El Salvador after the devastating earthquakes. The
non-profit organizations that were recognized as partners to USAID's
effort included:

-   Aid to Artisans

-   AmeriCares

-   American Red Cross

-   CARE

-   Catholic Relief Services

-   Cooperative Housing Foundation

-   Cooperative League of the

-   United States of America

-   Development Alternatives, Inc.

-   Development Technologies System, Inc.

-   DPK Consulting, Inc.

-   Salvation Army World Service Office

-   Enterprise Works Worldwide

-   FINTRAC, Inc.

-   Food for the Poor, Inc.

-   Friends of the Americas

-   Instituto Libertad y Progreso

-   Project Concern International

-   Salvadoran Fund for Reconstruction

-   and Development

-   Research Triangle Institute

-   Samaritan's Purse

-   Save the World

-   Technoserve

-   World Vision

-   Mercy Corps

**El Salvador Red Cross, American Red Cross, and the International
Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies**

The Salvador Red Cross (SRC) headquarters suffered considerable damage
to walls and infrastructure in the initial quake. Despite this setback,
SRC immediately activated its emergency contingency plan, with search
and rescue teams consisting of 200 first responders and relief workers
deploying to the most heavily affected area of Santa Tecla. These
officials were supported by over 1,000 volunteers who took part in the
in search, assistance and relief activities and working in close
coordination with SRC headquarters and with the support of the
International Federation. Another 30 relief workers were deployed to
Comasagua (La Libertad Department). On the first day of the operation,
SRC gave \$100,000 from the Federation's Disaster Relief Emergency Fund
(DREF) to support the immediate emergency response.

The Federation dispatched a Field Assessment and Coordination Team
(FACT) to assist the Regional Delegation and the SRC in the damage and
immediate needs assessment process. In addition, a team already in place
in San Salvador provided immediate logistics, health, water, disaster
preparedness, and relief support to the operation, and the Regional
Delegation kept a Regional Intervention Team (RIT) on standby comprised
of regional specialists in all disciplines of disaster relief.

Through its existing delegation, who were in the region as result of the
response and recovery from Hurricane Mitch, the American Red Cross (ARC)
released immediate financial assistance and pre-positioned relief
supplies (such as blankets, plastic sheets, comfort kits, and water
containers.) The ARC also provided a family linking service, which
helped people obtain news of and find family members, whether in the
U.S. or in a Salvadoran village (Long, 2001). The SRC used a database
developed by the American Red Cross to continue this service. An
important part of this service involved the creation of lists of people
in hospitals and shelters which were used to find those victims whose
family members were searching for them.

The ARC was also an active responder to the earthquakes. ARC staff
members purchased and distributed clean, safe drinking water, more than
63,000 blankets and, 40,000 water buckets. They also supplied latrines
to help meet immediate public health needs. The ARC maintained a
presence in El Salvador long after the earthquakes, partnering with SRC
in emergency prevention and preparedness training and other related
mitigation activities.

National Red Cross Societies in the region immediately offered their
support to the SRC when news of the earthquakes' destruction became
known. All national societies in the region went on standby pending the
preliminary results of the SRC's and Federation's damage and needs
assessments. In addition, the British, Danish, Netherlands, Spanish and
Norwegian Red Cross offered support and assistance.

A team of SRC workers were some of the first to head to the epicenter to
begin relief operations. El Salvador's Ministry of Health requested that
the SRC manage over 130 relief shelters that were set up across the
country in schools, churches and public buildings (Ward, 2001). SRC made
a public appeal for blood donations and kept its blood bank services
running 24 hours a day while the Red Cross ambulance and first aid
serviced hundred of injured people (OCHA 3, 2001). They also teamed-up
with the Salvadoran military in search and rescue efforts (Red Cross,
2001).

To manage the public health crisis, SRC set up mobile community health
brigades that traveled throughout the country to train residents in
prevention and treatment of communicable diseases. Traveling with the
brigade were mental health counselors who worked with adults and
children who lost friends, family members, and homes in the quake (Ward,
2001).

The SRC remained involved in rehabilitation, recovery, and mitigation
activities that continued almost a year after the quakes struck. During
this time, the victims of the quake also suffered the consequences of
both floods and drought, and the SRC assisted as appropriate. Families
were still living in the mass shelters set up in the aftermath of the
earthquake, and the SRC spent considerable time and resources to
resettle them in safe living conditions. They had to constantly work to
prevent the outbreak of disease, and their counseling services were
ongoing due to the stress of displacement. To provide some
sustainability to their work, they helped the local response agencies in
increasing their capacity to respond to similar events that might occur
in the future, and taught the benefits of mitigation.

**Lending institutions -- Inter-American Development Bank**

The Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) announced on February 13 the
approval of a \$20 million emergency loan for El Salvador. Fifteen
million dollars of the loan was used to help finance a program of El
Salvador's Social Investment Fund for Local Development (FISDL), that
helped some 44,000 families achieve basic shelter and a jumpstart to the
rebuilding process (IDB, 2001). These families were given basic housing
kits and the funds required to perform clean-up and debris removal. A
\$3.9 million portion of the loan was used to fund preventive and
control measures needed to stabilize hazardous hillsides in high-risk
areas identified by El Salvador's ministries of the Environment and
Natural Resources and Agriculture and Livestock (IDB, 2001).

In addition to providing this loan, the IDB held a Consultative Group
meeting for the reconstruction of El Salvador on March 7 in Madrid,
Spain. The meeting focused on reconstruction issues related to both
earthquakes.

**Analysis of Participant's Actions**

The response to the two El Salvadorian earthquakes and subsequent
landslides, by a majority of the unilateral, non-profit, and
multilateral organizations, initiated immediately upon notification.
Most of these organizations had institutional knowledge or response in
the area because of the action needed in the aftermath of Hurricane
Mitch. Many of these organizations, in fact, were still in the area due
to that event, and had the benefit of representation on the ground to
help assess damages and needs required to mount an effective response.

The government of El Salvador performed very well considering the drain
on resources it had experienced since Hurricane Mitch. Government
leadership formed a multi-agency and multi-organization committee, the
National Emergency Committee, within 24 hours, to address the earthquake
response. The Salvadoran government recognized their limitations
immediately, and made an international appeal that wasted no time. The
speed with which this appeal was made helped the external organizations
to assess the situation, respond, and help the Salvadorans to recover.
Additionally, the Salvadorian Government adequately delegated
responsibility where they were otherwise unable to manage effectively,
as was the case with turning over all of the shelters and the medical
facilities to the various responding Red Cross agencies.

The search and rescue response required following landslides is more
critical than in most other building collapse catastrophes, because the
victims are often left with less oxygen. The speed with which the
responders, both local and international, recognized and responded to
this need clearly saved lives. Because of the conditions of the mud
burying the victims, rescuers needed to forego the use of most of their
mechanical equipment and dig with their hands. Almost 2,000 volunteers
assisted in this effort (CNN 11, 2001). Unfortunately, despite the best
efforts of the teams of responders and search dogs that descended upon
the country from around the world, most victims who were buried were not
recovered before they perished. A major part of this problem was that
the transportation, both by land and by air, was hindered by the effects
of the quakes.

Responders recognized the problems that would be associated with the
damaged infrastructure, including the ability to assess damages and
reach the most hard-hit victims. Many of the responding agencies, most
significantly the United States Government, addressed these needs by
providing both the versatile transportation needed in the first few days
(such as the helicopters provided by the US Military to perform damage
assessments and deliver supplies), and the equipment needed to repair
the transportation and communications infrastructure (CNN 7, 2001).

The El Salvadorian government took immediate and necessary actions to
prevent the long-existing problems associated with corruption from
effecting the response efforts. In previous disasters, local politicians
and other authorities mismanaged donated funds, often by either taking
it for their own use or by using it for their political benefit. The
national government, in addition to several international organizations,
realized that the scope of relief aid would require that immediate and
effective cash management take place, and programs were set up to do so
within the first days following the disaster. Salvadoran officials
centralized the funds received in order to maintain control of it as
long as possible (CNN 12, 2001). The National Commission for Solidarity
was the government organization established to carry out this task, and
was done so with a high degree of transparency.

The type of aid in this case was revolutionary at the time, in that much
of it was in the form of cash rather than goods. Oftentimes in
disasters, unneeded supplies, such as cold-weather clothes in the
tropics, or food that the locals cannot or will not eat, is received. In
this case, an appeal was made for cash in lieu of goods, other than
specific supplies that were desperately needed and identified
explicitly. In doing this, two goals were met. First, the transfer of
this aid to the local government occurred instantly, through credit or
wire transfers into a local bank account, and freed up the equipment
needed to perform airlifts and other immediate needs. Second, the money
supported the damaged local economy, because it was injected as supplies
like food, construction supplies, and salaries were paid. This helped to
return the El Salvadorian people to independence from aid much sooner
than they otherwise would have been able.

[]{.mark}

Most importantly, disaster mitigation was involved heavily in the
response and recovery efforts. These actions helped to ensure that
future events in El Salvador were less destructive, and helped to
empower the national government of El Salvador to better respond to
these future events. A good example of these activities is a USGS
project that helped to establish a Geographic Information System (GIS)
database as well as two flood monitoring gauges, which will give the El
Salvadorian response officials both early warning capabilities and the
ability to quickly assess damages (USAID 4, 2001). The American Red
Cross performed mitigation and preparedness programs in 30
municipalities, involving 90 schools, in four of the earthquake-affected
departments. These people will now have the capacity to help themselves
much more so than was evident after the 2001 earthquakes. Seventeen
municipalities have since developed disaster mitigation plans and have
continued the process of disaster management training (USAID 4, 2001).

**Conclusion**

When a disaster like an earthquake affects a developing country such as
El Salvador, the ability to absorb such an impact is minimal. In
general, the local infrastructure is not designed to for any other
condition than exists on an average day, and as such this stock fails
immediately upon exposure to extreme pressures like occurred in January
and February of 2001. Additionally, the local response needs are rarely
intact, as more pressing needs such as failing public health and weak
educational institutions, with the little money that exists within
government coffers.

The disasters in El Salvador exemplify the importance of mitigation and
preparedness that often exists in the more developed countries, such as
the United States and those in Europe. The disparity between the number
of victims following similar disaster circumstances, and the unequal
speed with which these different societies recover, are a testament to
the value of such prudent activities. The developing world suffers more
not merely because they are affected by more disasters, but because they
are unprepared for them.

This event taught the people of El Salvador an important lesson
concerning the preparedness and prevention measures for both earthquakes
and landslides -- a lesson whose advice they wisely heeded. This
knowledge was transferred through programs in both the schools and to
the government officials that manage emergencies. Many people had
already experienced exposure to such teaching during the recovery from
Hurricane Mitch, and were beginning to recognize its value. Though El
Salvador clearly has a long way to go before it can be considered
'prepared' for the next disaster, they have been given a solid
foundation upon which this preparedness can be built.

# **References**

# 

# American Red Cross. N/D. "Worldwide Earthquake Relief." ARC Website. <http://www.redcross.org/news/in/0101lsalv/elsalvador.html> 

# Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). "El Salvador." CIA World FactBook. <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook> 

# CNN. 2001. "Death toll in Salvadoran quake now 173." CNN.com. February 14. <http://archives.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/americas/02/14/salvador.quake/index.html> 

# CNN 2. 2001. "El Salvador relief effort running into roadblocks." CNN.com. February 15. <http://archives.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/americas/02/15/salvador.quake/index.html> 

CNN 3. 2001. "Salvadorans fear aftershocks, possible mudslides after
quake." CNN.com. January 15.
<http://archives.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/americas/01/15/quake.02/index.html>

CNN 4. 2001. "Susan Candiotti on the devastating quake in El Salvador."
CNN.com. January 15.
<http://archives.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/americas/01/15/candiotti.debrief/index.html>

CNN 5. 2001. "Central American quake leaves hundreds dead, up to 1,200
missing." CNN.com. January 14.
<http://archives.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/americas/01/14/quake.02/index.html>

CNN 6. 2001. "Musician's death deals a fresh blow to El Salvador quake
survivors." CNN.com. January 17.
<http://archives.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/americas/01/17/quake.01/index.html>

CNN 7. 2001. "El Salvador fears epidemic." CNN.com. January 16.
<http://archives.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/americas/01/16/quake.03/index.html>

CNN 8. 2001. "Rescue, recovery efforts go on after Salvadoran quake."
CNN.com. January 15.
<http://archives.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/americas/01/15/quake/index.html>

CNN 9. 2001. "U.S. grants illegal Salvadorans 18 months of grace."
CNN.com. March 3.
<http://archives.cnn.com/2001/US/03/02/us.el.salvador/index.html>

CNN 10. 2001. "Grim verdict of quake rescue experts." CNN.com. January
15.
<http://archives.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/americas/01/15/quake.rescue/index.html>

CNN 11. 2001. "El Salvador appeals for rescue equipment, disaster aid."
CNN.com. January 15.
<http://archives.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/americas/01/14/quake.03/index.html>

CNN 12. 2001. "Salvadorans from U.S. fly home to help bury earthquake
dead." CNN.com. January 18.
<http://archives.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/americas/01/18/quake.01/index.html>

Disaster Relief. 2001. "Major Quake Jolts Central America."
<http://www.disasterrelief.org/Disasters/010113salvadorquake>

# Inter American Development Bank (IDB). 2001. "IDB Reaffirms Support For El Salvador After Latest Earthquake, Approves \$20 Million Emergency Loan." <http://www.iadb.org/NEWS/Display/PRView.cfm?PR_Num=13/01&Language=english> 

# Long, Cynthia. 2001. "Red Cross Reconnecting Families Separated By Disaster." January 15. <http://www.redcross.org/news/in/0101elsalv/010115b.htm> 

# Pan American Health Organization (PAHO). 2001. "Earthquakes in El Salvador." Epidemiological Bulletin. V.22, No.1. March. 

# Red Cross. 2001. "Red Cross Reels from Second Major Quake." February 14. [http://www.redcross.org/news/in/0101el salv/010214a.html](http://www.redcross.org/news/in/0101el salv/010214a.html) 

# United Nations (UN). 2001. UN Press Release GA/9853. January 26. <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2001/ga9853.doc.htm>

# United Nations Children's Fund. 2001. "As aftershocks rattle El Salvador, UNICEF focuses on helping children cope." January 16. <http://www.unicef.org/newsline/01pr01.htm> 

# United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). 2003. "El Salvador Earthquake Reconstruction Aided by Internet: Website data helped speed planning and reduce costs." Choices: The Human Development Magazine. December. <http://www.undp.org/dpa/choices/2003/december/elsalvador.html>

# United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). 2001. "Situation Report." Relief Web. January 16. <http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/vID/6E678FD0BCA25E7EC12569D70067FD6C>? 

# United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) 2. 2001. "Situation Report." Relief Web. January 17. <http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/vID/9FA93BF3B24BEF81C12569D600690EDF>?

# United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). 3. 2001. "Situation Report." January 15. <http://www.reliefnet.int/w/rwb.nsf/vID/A6BA793B0E48B30A852569D500756D6>?

# United States Agency for International Development (USAID). 2001. "Earthquake Reconstruction: Program Overview." <http://www.usaid.gov/sv/er/index.htm> 

# United States Agency for International Development (USAID) 2. 2001. "Economic Growth and Education: Earthquake Response." <http://www.usaid.gov/sv/ege/egeact7.htm> 

# United States Agency for International Development (USAID) 3. 2001. "El Salvador: Budget. <http://www.usaid.gov/sv/progover/budget.htm> 

# United States Agency for International Development (USAID) 4. 2001. "Earthquake Reconstruction: Accomplishments." <http://www.usaid.gov/sv/er/eraccomp.htm>

# United States Geological Survey (USGS). National Earthquake Information Center (NEIC). <http://neic.usgs.gov/neis/> 

# Ward, Christina. 2001. "Thousands of Homeless Quake Victims Fill Salvadoran Shelters." <http://www.disasterrelief.org/Disasters/010125salvadorquake6/> 

# Western Washington University (WWU). 2001. "El Salvador Earthquake Project." <http://www.ac.wwu.edu/~sattled/salvador.htm>

# Whitbeck, Harris. 2001. "Salvadorans' will be tested by quake." CNN.com. February 14. <http://archives.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/americas/02/14/whitbeck.debrief/index.html> 

# ![](media/image2.jpeg){width="7.25in" height="5.604166666666667in"}**Image 9.2.1: Map of Landslide Damage in the 2001 El Salvador Earthquake**

# 

# Source: United States Department of State/Global Disaster Information Network, <http://www.reliefweb.int/mapc/amer_cac/cnt/els/es_landsl_14jan.html> 

#  

# **Image 9.2.2: Image of Landslide through San Salvador**

# ![](media/image3.jpeg){width="3.095138888888889in" height="5.064583333333333in"}

# 

# Source: Indiana University, <http://www.indiana.edu/~pepp/earthquakes/elsalvador1_13_01.htm> 

# **Image 9.2.3: Location of the January 13, 2001 Earthquake**

# ![](media/image4.jpeg){width="4.654861111111111in" height="4.897222222222222in"}

# Source: USGS, <http://neic.usgs.gov/neis/eq_depot/2001/eq_010113/neic_0113_l.html> 

# **Image 9.2.4: Location of the February 13, 2001 Earthquake**

# 

# ![](media/image5.jpeg){width="4.793055555555555in" height="5.042361111111111in"}

# 

# Source: USGS, <http://neic.usgs.gov/neis/eq_depot/2001/eq_010213/neic_0213_l.html> 

# 

# **Figure 9.2.5: Tectonic Diagram of Central America**

# 

# ![](media/image6.png){width="4.729166666666667in" height="4.375in"}

# 

# Source: CEPREDENAC, [www.cepredenac.org/](http://www.cepredenac.org/) 

# **Sidebar 9.2.1: COEN**

# 

**National Emergency Committee**

The National Emergency Committee (COEN from its Spanish name, Comité de
Emergencia Nacional) in El Salvador typically coordinates emergency
activities. It is composed of the Ministries of:

-   National Defense

-   Interior

-   Public Safety and Public Works

-   Agriculture and Livestock

-   Foreign Affairs

-   Education

-   Health

-   Other local and international agencies, and private companies.

[MORE]{.mark}

#  

## Case 9.3: Hurricane Mitch in Guatemala: Response and Recovery

# **Introduction**

Early in 1998, the people of Guatemala were still soaring on the hopes
of a new beginning and a promising future. Less than two years had
passed since Guatemala City's central plaza had hosted the unprecedented
celebrations heralding the signing of the Peace Accords, a pivotal act
signaling the end of one of Latin America's longest and bloodiest civil
wars (NACLA, 1997).

The nation was in the midst of recovery from the devastating war, and
while much rebuilding remained, the country had come a long way towards
recovery. The enactment of the Peace Accords precipitated a movement
seeking to erase the country's negative status and uplift its
poverty-stricken people. These changes were gradually beginning to
reverse the damage of the past, but Guatemala was never able to achieve
any considerable advances before meeting its next roadblock.

Hurricane Mitch swept across Central America during the last week of
October 1998, bringing with it torrential rain, flooding, and the seeds
of disease and famine. Central America is one-fourth the size of Mexico,
its northern neighbor, and half the size of Colombia, its southern;
however, its geographic importance belies its small size (Letsgo.Com,
N/D). Though many hurricanes pass through this regional corridor, Mitch
(which reached the maximum rating on the Saffir Simpson Hurricane
Scale - Category V (see Sidebar 9.3.2)) was the most deadly to occur in
over two centuries. As it moved, it struck Honduras, Belize, Nicaragua,
Guatemala and El Salvador --- leaving a trail of destruction in each
(BBC, 1999) (See Images 9.3.1, and 9.3.2). In total, about 10,000 people
were killed, thousands disappeared and millions lost their homes, their
land, their crops and for many, their means to work. Infrastructure that
had represented vast investment, much of which survived a fierce war,
was swept away in hours -- so much so that development experts estimate
development has been reversed as far as fifty years or more (BBC, 1998).
Final estimates set collective economic losses from Mitch at more than
\$5 billion, the equivalent of 17% of the region\'s annual gross
domestic product (IDB, 2000). In Guatemala alone, 268 were killed, 121
went missing, and almost 750,000 people suffered personal harm, property
damage, or both.

# **Guatemala: Geography, Risk Factors and Natural Hazards**

**Geography and Natural Hazard Profile:**

Guatemala is situated in Central America, bordered to the west by the
Pacific Ocean, and to the east by the Caribbean Sea, to the north by
Mexico and to the southeast between Honduras and Belize. At 42,042
square miles, it is slightly smaller than Tennessee. The country is
divided into a series of distinct geographic zones, two-thirds of which
are mountainous and volcanic. Guatemala is geologically active, and most
of the country's population resides in a mountainous highland region
that transverses the country from west to east. A population explosion
has compromised the environment as evidenced by deforestation, soil
erosion, loss of biodiversity and pollution. From 1990 to 1995,
deforestation occurred at an annual rate of 2%, and new studies are
expected to find a rise in those rates in the last decade since parts of
the country have become more accessible with the end of the civil war.

The primary mountainous area includes the inactive volcano Tajumulco,
which is the tallest in Central America (13,816 ft/4,211 m). It's range
is flanked on the Pacific side by a string of volcanoes (some active),
such as Tacaná, Acatenango, and Agua. Volcanic eruptions and earthquakes
have plagued Guatemala throughout its history, adding to the trouble
associated with its frequent floods and hurricanes. Sandwiched by
tropical water from the Pacific and Atlantic oceans, Guatemala is
particularly vulnerable to the threat of hurricanes and tropical storms
from both the east and west. Flooding, and the associated mud- and
landslide hazard risk, occur during each May-to-November rainy season,
often killing dozens of people and damaging the transportation
infrastructure (US Embassy, Guatemala, N/D).

**Sociological Risk Factors:**

Despite the signing of the Peace Accords in 1996 and the subsequent
initiation of economic and governmental reforms, Guatemala remained one
of the most violent and underdeveloped nations in Central America.
Poverty is rampant and security virtually nonexistent, notably in the
rural areas and in indigenous communities where close to 70% of the
population are living below the poverty line -- one of the worst rates
in the Americas. Illiteracy, infant mortality and malnutrition rates are
among the highest in the region. These factors combined create a
scenario where life expectancy has fallen to age 65, which places it
among the lowest in Latin America (BBC, N/D).

Guatemala's rural poor are largely dependent on cash crops, leaving them
vulnerable to disasters (BBC, N/D). They also lack many of the basic
life needs, such as safe drinking water and proper waste disposal,
placing them at much higher risk to disease (ECLAC, 1999). These factors
have resulted in Guatemala ranking among the worst in Latin America in
terms of public health standards (CIA, N/D). Income distribution in
Guatemala is the 15^th^ worst in the world, with growth occurring only
for the wealthiest sectors of society while the poor majority enjoy few
opportunities to escape their paltry status (UNDP, N/D). The Central
Intelligence Agency reports that 16% of the population lives on a
stipend of \$1 a day (ARC, N/D).

Guatemala's infrastructure has long been vulnerable to the impacts of
both man and nature. Roads fall victim to flooding and mudslides,
leaving significant portions of the population isolated when natural
disasters occur. Communications often befalls the same fate. These
factors prolong the persistent cycle of poverty, isolation, manipulation
and destruction. The poor face restricted access to land, forcing them
to live in marginal, high-risk areas, such as the banks of rivers and on
steep mountain slopes, leaving them helpless when disasters occur. Their
lack of education and low literacy directly inhibits both their ability
to prepare for and mitigate hazards, and to recover and growth once they
do occur. Each of these risk factors led to the socially precarious
conditions that existed when Hurricane Mitch arrived.

# **Background: Hurricane Mitch**

Hurricanes are large tropical depressions or cyclones with wind speeds
that exceed 74 mph. They are massive low-pressure systems of tropical
origin with rotary winds blowing counterclockwise around a calm central
area called \"the eye.\" These storms occur in well-defined belts in the
Caribbean, on the Atlantic coastline, and on the west coast of Central
America.

Every year, approximately eighty storms form over warm tropical waters
of the Atlantic, Caribbean, and Gulf of Mexico, and several of these
develop into hurricanes (also called typhoons, in the eastern
hemisphere). Worldwide, hurricanes and typhoons claim about 20,000 lives
each year, primarily through storm surges, high winds, heavy rainfall,
flooding, and landslides. The storm surges cause the greatest toll on
human life, accounting for more than 90% of fatalities as a result of
drowning.

Hurricane Mitch was given the dubious distinction of being the
fourth-most powerful Caribbean hurricane of the 20^th^ century, and the
most devastating to hit Central America in 200 years. The storm
originated in the waters off northern South America. After threatening
Jamaica and the Cayman Islands, Mitch turned northwestward, and
increased in intensity to Category V, with peak winds of at least 155
mph. On October 27, it made landfall about 60 miles north of Trujilo,
Honduras, where the initial storm surge was as high as 20 feet. After
pounding the Honduran coast for two days, Mitch began a westward drift
through the mountainous interior of the country, reaching the Guatemalan
border on October 31. In these intervening days, Mitch lost much of its
windspeed, dropping its status to that of a tropical storm. However,
this did not at all signify that Guatemala had escaped its destructive
power.

The Central American mountains that lay in the hurricane's path served
to greatly hinder its movement, resulting in what became its most
destructive force -- torrential rainfall. Due to the storm's slowdown
caused by the rugged territory, Mitch hovered over Guatemala until
November 4^th^, when it moved northward. During this time, rainfall
levels reached as high as two feet per day. In the preceding eight
months, the area had been suffering from a drought, and the parched,
hardened soil could do little to absorb the deluge (IDB 2, 1999). Runoff
gained both volume and momentum, causing both catastrophic flooding and
mudslides across the mountainous area. Total rainfall from the storm was
reported as high as 75 inches in parts of the country -- greater than
what normally falls in an entire year.

# **Hurricane Consequences**

Hurricane Mitch left an indelible imprint on Guatemala as it passed. The
most severe damage was sustained on the southern coast, in the central
and northwest river valleys, and on the Caribbean coast. Ultimately, the
human toll in Guatemala was established as:

-   268 dead

-   Approximately 260 injured

-   121 missing

-   Almost 1 million affected

-   105,055 evacuated

-   \>100,000 homeless

Of the almost one million people affected by the storm, approximately
16% were children under the age of 5, and 5% were pregnant mothers.

Direct and indirect damages were estimated at US\$748 million. The
agricultural sector had the greatest damages (US\$499 million), followed
by transportation (highways, bridges, and railways -US\$90 million) and
housing (US\$35 million) (IDB, 2000). Communications was impaired due to
the persistent flooding, leaving more than 16,000 people isolated for
several days (ECLAC, 1999).

Throughout the country, 311 schools were affected. Twenty-seven were
completely destroyed, while 175 were partially destroyed, 111 were
flooded, and 73 were turned into shelters for the homeless and
displaced. The education infrastructure sustained a total of \$7.851
million in damages.

While no health facilities were completely destroyed, there were damages
sustained at seven health centers, and 48 rural clinics. Together, these
facilities had served over 50,000 people, who generally had no other
options for health care. What was worse than these damages, however, was
the exacerbation of the chronic epidemiological problems the country had
been experiencing before the hurricane struck. Diseases such as
bacterial, parasitic, and viral diarrhea, malaria, respiratory
illnesses, dengue fever, hepatitis, among others, began to increase in
incidence as public health priorities became sidetracked or suspended.
Total damages to the health sector amounted to \$4.8 million.

The transportation and communications infrastructure, as mentioned
earlier, was particularly vulnerable because of its need to cross many
rugged, remote areas. In many places, slopes above and below these
routes failed, causing partial or total collapse of roadways, thus
hindering transportation to affected areas. Damages to transportation
included the total destruction of 37 bridges and damage to 60.
Fifty-seven pedestrian bridges (see Image 9.3.3), often vital to rural
areas for crossing rivers to reach farmland, were damaged. Ninety
roadway sections were damaged or destroyed (though a majority of these
damages were not on primary transportation routes). Almost \$90 million
in direct and indirect damages were sustained by this sector.

The energy sector suffered heavily. Many electrical lines, and
generation facilities, were damaged by either floods and landslides.
Damages to this sector amounted to just over \$10 million.

Mitch caused the most damage in Guatemala, in terms of financial cost,
to the agricultural sector. Between livestock and crops, a total of
\$500 million in direct and indirect losses were sustained. The greatest
losses were felt in the banana industry, which suffered destruction of
almost 30% of its total crop, or 409,000 tons of bananas. Considering
that Guatemala's agricultural sector accounts for one quarter of the
country's GDP and two-thirds of national exports, this event removed, if
only temporarily, a great portion of the country's ability to generate
the income needed to rebuild and recover.

**The Response**

**The Government of Guatemala**

On October 31, hours before hurricane officially crossed into the
country, Guatemala's national government declared a state of emergency
and a mandatory cessation of normal government activities in order to
begin any final preparations and commence response. This decree also
helped to reduce the demand for certain goods that would be needed in
the aftermath of the disaster to come, such as food, gasoline and other
fuels. The decree established sanitary cordons to prevent epidemics,
restricted unnecessary road travel and authorized the obligatory
evacuation of people living in high risk areas.

One day later, when it became clear that Guatemala would indeed fall
within the storm's path, CONRED (Coordinadora Nacional Para la Reduccion
de Desastres) evacuated nearly 6,000 people from the highest-risk areas
-- primarily those living closest to the Atlantic coast. This action is
believed to have resulted in much lower fatality rates, and was lauded
by the international response community. The government carried out
these warnings and evacuations not only quickly, but in partnership with
the private sector.

Several national government ministries, as well as public, civil, and
military organizations, participated in the response and recovery to the
hurricane. Damages to the electrical infrastructure, which was in the
process of privatization, was repaired by both private and public
agencies, and restored to most citizens who had lost it within hours.
Crews were sent out almost immediately to repair the damage sustained by
the transportation network, though many of these repairs required
extensive work to complete. Citizens who had lost their homes were
accommodated in emergency shelters.

The government wasted no time in making an appeal to the international
community for the provision of both monetary and technical assistance.
Government officials were well aware that they were ill-prepared to
handle both the short-term and long-term needs of relief and
reconstruction. An appeal was also made to the international financial
institutions that managed the country's debt, seeking more lenient
interest payment terms and redirection of available funds to be used for
emergency-related needs.

Distribution of food and other aid was carried out by the Social
Investment Fund (FIS) and the National Fund for Peace (FONAPAZ). By
mid-November, FIS was redirecting its funds in order to extend credit to
victims for repairs in rural areas. The Fund set out to repair all
damaged schools within 100 days. FONAPAZ managed the reception of
international aid, which was extensive, and created the systems by which
it was distributed. Their work in these two areas received commendation
by the United Nations because they were so highly efficient and
effective. Their rapid action in each of the affected municipalities
made it possible to establish contact with victims and distribute
materials to enable communities to begin repairing their homes
immediately.

On November 18^th^, the Guatemalan government announced that it was
creating a rehabilitation and reconstruction program, lead by the vice
president, with three basic objectives:

-   Normalizing victims' living conditions

-   Repairing the damage caused by Mitch, and

-   Restoring and developing productive capacity.

Their initial aim was to accomplish the first two objectives within 100
days, but recognized that the third would require much more time. In
reality, these goals proved much more difficult than originally
anticipated, but over 90% of this goal was accomplished on time despite
the limited resources of the government. Highlights of what they
accomplished in just 100 days include:

-   The return of all but 530 of the 54,725 evacuees to their
    communities;

-   4,366 families received housing materials (for floors and roofs);

-   75% of targeted water systems were repaired

-   26 major bridges repaired

-   105 kilometers of primary roads asphalted

-   23 targeted major irrigation systems and 40 minor irrigation systems
    rehabilitated

-   Short-term job creation produced 275,560 workdays provided, under
    food for work programs

**The United Nations**

In 1998, the various agencies of the United Nations had been operating
in Central America for almost fifty years. The UN had taken an active
role in the peace process in Guatemala, and other countries in the
region, and as result enjoyed a stable base and a close relationship
with the various national governments. The UN maintained offices in the
capitals of each of the affected countries, and had been actively
working on projects that addressed the needs of the population most
vulnerable to the effects of Mitch -- namely the rural poor, women, and
children. By the time Mitch arrived the United Nations was primed for a
timely response.

As the hurricane began to advance upon the region, the UN body of
agencies immediately began to respond. Their first action was to
inventory their medical aid, food stocks, and other materials that could
be of use to victims. The resident coordinators and UN disaster
management teams, which existed in Guatemala and each of the other
affected countries, activated their systems for coordinating the
international response that was to follow -- directed by the United
Nations Emergency Relief Coordinator of the Office for the Coordination
of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). In doing so, they took the following
actions:

-   Issued situation reports highlighting unmet emergency requirements,
    in order to mobilize international assistance and to sum up the
    international response;

-   Deployed UN disaster assessment and coordination teams to assist the
    offices of the United Nations Resident Coordinators;

-   Channeled cash contributions for relief and immediate
    rehabilitation;

-   Conducted airlifts from the Office for the Coordination of
    Humanitarian Affairs warehouse in Pisa, Italy, of emergency relief
    items and water supply equipment;

-   With the help of the OCHA office in Geneva, mobilized military
    assistance from the Netherlands (40 rescue boats, 200 military
    personnel), and in the coordinated use of military assets from the
    United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (helicopters).

In the first weeks after the disaster, the United Nations system
channeled over \$12 million in emergency assistance. The availability of
World Food Programme (WFP) food stocks in various locations played a
crucial role in ensuring the immediate delivery of food to the affected
areas. In all of the affected countries, the United Nations country
teams worked to facilitate coordination and accelerate the
implementation of already available donor support.

The Emergency Response Division of UNDP approved over \$1.2 million in
the aftermath of the hurricane to strengthen the capacity of the UNDP
Humanitarian Coordinator to undertake crucial coordination and
information-sharing activities. All the major UN agencies recruited
additional staff or were strengthened with professionals seconded from
other offices or from headquarters. The UN Guatemala disaster management
team disseminated information on the hurricane through the creation of a
Website, which proved to be a valuable source of information on the
activities of the UN and provided links to official governmental and
Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs data on the disaster
and to the work of non-governmental organizations. Together with the UN
disaster assessment and coordination teams, the UN Guatemala country
team served as a clearing house for information on the crisis for the
international community during the many assessment missions that
occurred after the hurricane.

The United Nations Children\'s Fund (UNICEF) approved funds from its
Emergency Programme Fund and undertook assessments of the situation of
women and children. The Pan American Health Organization/World Health
Organization (PAHO/WHO) mobilized more than 60 specialists to bolster
health systems in Guatemala and the other countries affected. The Supply
Management System, introduced to the region by PAHO/WHO was utilized in
monitoring and categorizing the receipt of in-kind contributions. The
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) approved
emergency projects to provide tools, seeds and fertilizers to farmers
affected by the hurricane.

A joint World Food Programme (WFP) and UNICEF telecommunications team
visited Guatemala and found relief operations hampered by a lack of
reliable and efficient communications. Although the existing
telecommunications infrastructure continued to operate within the
capital cities in the region and other urban areas, no reliable means of
communicating existed in the rural affected zones. UNICEF and WFP shared
logistical and technical staff support to install, maintain, and manage
a shared emergency communications network for Guatemala and for all of
Central America.

After meeting with the Ambassador of Guatemala to the United Nations (as
well as those from Honduras, Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Costa Rica) on
November 3^rd^, the Secretary-General sent letters to the Presidents of
the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), and to the
Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund, in which he asked
for their support in easing the debt burden for the most affected
countries and in providing additional soft credits for rebuilding
damaged infrastructure.\
 \
At the request of the Secretary-General, UNDP and OCHA brought together
the United Nations system, the international financial institutions and
the major NGOs in providing emergency relief to the victims of hurricane
Mitch to form an inter-agency task force. At the first meeting of the
task force, co-chaired by UNDP and OCHA and held in New York on November
18^th^, the need for a UN inter-agency transitional appeal was
discussed. The UN Country Teams were tasked with formulating figures
that would raise adequate support for relief needs, immediate
rehabilitation, and longer-term needs. The total amount of resources
requested amounted to \$153 million, of which 80 percent related to
needs in Honduras and Nicaragua, the worst affected countries (the
Guatemala country team requested \$14.25 million, or 9.3% -- see Sidebar
9.3.2.) The appeal was launched during the first week of December 1998
in Geneva.

[]{.mark}

**Inter American Development Bank (IDB)**

The Inter-American Development Bank responded immediately to the crisis
by sending technical missions to the four countries most affected by the
disaster. These missions were to assist IDB country offices in
evaluating the damage, identifying available resources, and preparing
the most urgent counter-measures (IDB 2, 1999).

In the first few months after the hurricane, the IDB concentrated its
assistance on emergency programs covering an array of activities, from
helping prepare national plans for reconstruction and transformation to
support for social programs. Among other projects, the IDB supported the
rehabilitation of high-priority social services, including: water and
sanitation systems, rural roads, bridges, schools, and rural health
clinics (IDB 2, 1999).

The IDB's plans were to not only intervene with emergency aid, but to
also reactivate the economy, generate productive employment, reduce
poverty, and promote the sustainable use of natural resources (IDB 2,
1999). The organization sought to strengthen the democratic system of
government at all levels, encouraging the citizenry to participate in
government in order to improve the mechanisms of prevention and
mitigation of natural disasters.

Some of these participatory activities included regional workshops,
attended by officials from Central America and experts from donor
countries, on social and environmental vulnerability, the reduction of
the risk of natural disasters, and emergency management measures. The
IDB sent several teams to the region to discuss initiatives to improve
the transparency and efficiency in the use of public funds, one of the
major concerns of the donor community (IDB 2, 1999).

**United States Response:**

The United States Agency for International Development Office of Foreign
Disaster Assistance (USAID/OFDA) pre-positioned disaster relief
personnel in Guatemala on October 27^th^. On October 31st, U.S.
Ambassador to Guatemala Donald J. Planty made a formal disaster
declaration for the country. In response, USAID/OFDA provided \$25,000
through the U.S. Embassy to Catholic Relief Services for the local
purchase of food. On November 6^th^, President Clinton ordered \$30
million in equipment and services from the Department of Defense and
\$36 million in food, fuel and other relief to be supplied to Honduras,
Nicaragua, El Salvador and Guatemala.

In the initial weeks of the response, The U.S. Department of Defense
provided six UH-60 and 4 CH-47 helicopters to assist in damage
assessments and the distribution of relief by OFDA. Air Force
civil engineers and medical officers were deployed to the region to
assist in response and immediate reconstruction. The U.S. forces
coordinated their activities with officials of the defense, agriculture
and transportation ministries of the host countries -and tackled many of
the engineering and distribution projects that required specialized
heavy equipment and transportation capabilities often reserved for the
military. In Guatemala, the Air Force constructed a 1,000-person base
camp to house its engineering personnel, who went to work clearing
debris, repairing streets and bridges, and  decontaminating wells (USAF,
1999).  The work was complicated by the constant threat of an estimated
10,000 landmines from Honduras and Nicaragua.

The USAID Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) worked alongside
CONRED in coordinating the national relief effort, and conducted damage
assessments and oversight of USAID/OFDA assistance. USAID/OFDA also
provided \$1 million in funding to Guatemala to support grants with NGOs
for disaster response projects. Funds facilitated activities in the
water/sanitation, emergency shelter, medicine, hygiene, and agriculture
sectors.

Arriving on two separate airlifts, taking place on the 4^th^ and 9^th^
of November, USAID/OFDA delivered 290 rolls of plastic sheeting, 3,000
polyester blankets, 7,350

five-gallon water jugs, and four 3,000-gallon water bladders to
Guatemala, at a total estimated cost of \$182,013, including transport.
OFDA also provided \$50,000 for the rental of local helicopters for
aerial assessments of disaster-affected areas.

A total of five USAID/OFDA Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART)
members operated in Guatemala. The DART teams identified the most
severely affected regions, which including the cities of Isabal, Zacapa,
and Alta Verapaz, and followed up on the needs of displaced victims.

In late November, First Lady Hillary Clinton visited the stricken
region. During this meeting, she called for more financial, rather than
material, help for the victims. By that time, the United States had
committed \$263 million to disaster relief work. Of this total, \$130
million came from the Defense Department along with a deployment of
almost 3,000 troops to the region.

**International Federation of Red Cross / Red Crescent Societies
(IFRC)**

Immediately after the disaster, the National Societies of Central
America mobilized more than 6,000 volunteers who provided basic survival
services \-- rescue, evacuation, first aid, shelter, clothing, food,
water and tracing services \-- to at least 180,000 people. They were
assisted by personnel, cash and goods from sister Societies, including
those of Great Britain, Germany, Spain and the USA, often channeled
through and/or directly coordinated by the IFRC. The four Operating
National Societies also undertook emergency preventive health measures,
including the distribution of 450,000 leaflets explaining precautions
for avoiding malaria, dengue fever and cholera and for protecting water
sources.

In Guatemala, the Red Cross distributed food to the displaced
populations, reaching over 60,000 people. Four World Health Organization
(WHO) Emergency Health Kits, each capable of addressing the needs of
10,000 patients, were provided to the local medical staff. Eight cholera
kits, each capable of protecting 125,000 people, were provided for the
most hard hit regions where local epidemics of the disease were
appearing.

To address the longer term issues of rehabilitation, the Red Cross
addressed the needs of almost 4,000 families identified as highest risk,
which included a total of 23,580 Guatemalan Citizens. Aid was provided
through two sources, Family Parcels and Subsistence Farming. These are
described as:

-   **Family Parcels -** consist of supplementary food (rice, beans,
    corn flour, sugar, oil, cereal and salt) and kitchen sets.
    Distributed to 3,930 families (23,580 persons) in the provinces of
    Guatemala, Alta Verapaz, Izabal, Escuintla, Zacapa, Sacatepequez,
    Suchitepequez and Jalapa.

-   **Subsistence Farming -** seeds (beans, rice, maize and sorghum) and
    tools (spades, hoes and machetes) distributed to 2,000 families
    (12,000 persons) who are totally dependent on the produce they grow
    and who lost all of their crops during the disaster.

# **Conclusion: Problems Encountered, and Lessons Learned**

Despite the immediate international response to this crisis, the flow of
information between all sources was hampered because of mass chaos and
the general unprepared state of the region for a disaster of this
magnitude. A lack of cohesion existed between military organizations and
civilian organizations primarily due to a lack of civilian direction
(Hofstetter, N/D.)

Failures existed in directing money to the affected countries. A prime
example is a figure of \$265 million promised by the European Union
(EU). Two years after Hurricane Mitch hit Central America, not one penny
allocated to rebuild those nations had been spent. Ray Moseley of the
Chicago Tribune said, "The EU is so inefficient that it takes an average
of 4 ½ years to disburse aid money. It has accumulated \$18 billion in
unspent funds that were intended to assist countries around the world to
cope with natural disasters" (Moesely, 2000).

The failures didn't end there. The WFP reported that more than a year
after Mitch hit the region, only 32% of the money pledged to help it
feed 1.1 million people in the five countries has been received. This
funding shortfall, in addition to the slow arrival of non-emergency aid,
bureaucratic inefficiency, political infighting, corruption,
debt-service payments --- not to mention more heavy rain --- severely
hampered the post-hurricane recovery (Time, 1999).

Guatemalan newspaper Prensa Libre accused CONRED and the Guatemala Red
Cross of hoarding badly needed food, water, clothing and generators.
"CONRED spokesman Josue Perez \[said\] the aid was being warehoused
'because it can only be distributed if someone asks for it, otherwise,
it stays in the warehouses as long as necessary.'\" (AFP, 1999).

When a natural disaster occurs, it undermines development and places new
demands on societies that may already be strained. Development
priorities may be shifted, pushing back long-term goals to meet the more
immediate. Years of development efforts and investments are destroyed in
a matter of hours, and the natural environment, especially as it
benefits society, undoubtedly suffers. All of these issues were well
represented in the aftermath of Hurricane Mitch in Guatemala.

However, many of these natural hazard risks can be reduced or eliminated
through proper planning, environment management, and mitigation (IDB 2,
1999). Unplanned human settlement, unchecked urbanization, poor
construction standards, poor infrastructure, severe poverty, and unwise
environmental practices, all contributed to Guatemala's high
vulnerability. Considering the country had recently emerged from a
devastating civil war, many of these problems may have been excusable.
However, having endured a hurricane like Mitch, and accepting both the
responsibility and opportunity to rebuild stronger, and better, the
government faces a moral obligation to do so in their peaceful present.

A wide spectrum of mitigation opportunities were presented and addressed
throughout the region. Estimates state that between 50% and 75% of the
economic losses from Hurricane Mitch resulted from inadequate design and
location of housing, roads, bridges, and industry (IDB 2, 1999). For
instance, flooding, which has accounted for more than two-thirds of
Central American disasters and was a major factor in the consequences of
Mitch, was being addressed by the Flood Hazard Mapping and Local Alert
System in the Small River Valleys Project (SVP) when Mitch hit. This
project, which encouraged local communities, national and international
organizations to focus on flood preparedness, was in the pilot stage and
only fully operational in limited regions in the river valleys of
Honduras in late 1998. The simple community-alert system was proven to
have saved lives, and in recognition of its value, was expanded in the
reconstruction of Mitch into Guatemala and other countries in the
region.

Land use planning is another area where mitigation potential has been
recognized. Many of those that were killed lived in areas that should
never have been developed in the first place. These include
steeply-sloped hillsides that are susceptible to failure, unprotected
coastal zones, at the base of mountains in areas where runoff,
rockslides, and mudslides threaten, and in the floodplain of the many
Central American rivers. Several mitigation projects involved
identifying these areas and designating them as high risk. The matter of
enforcement, probably the cornerstone to land use management, is wholly
dependent upon the will and ability of each national government.

Finally, the value of leadership in recognizing and promoting the
importance of mitigation is key to reducing the vulnerability of the
region's citizens. A coordinated institutional framework, supported by
all internal and external development organizations, must be agreed upon
and followed in order to achieve a coherent and reachable goal.
Resilience is not a set value, but a sliding scale that depends upon the
resources, direction, and dedication of all stakeholders, including the
national government, the citizens, and the non-governmental agencies
tapped to assist. The system must be participatory to ensure acceptance
by the target population, and the value of its products must be trusted
and effective.

The IDB promoted these wise practices by requiring the fulfillment of a
full hazard assessments before any projects were approved for funding
(IDB 2, 1999). Mapping technology introduced by the United States
Geological Survey, and the United Nations, have made these assessments
not only possible, but have proven useful in helping to identify people
who may be vulnerable to disasters other than hurricanes to which the
region is at risk. These all-hazards assessments provide a more
comprehensive understanding of the region's vulnerability and reduce the
chances that future disasters trigger the same levels of devastation.

Recently, CONRED partnered with the U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) for
a course on Incident Command System, with participants coming from the
Municipal and Volunteer Firefighter Corps and disaster managers from
CONRED. The course was designed in the "train-the-trainer" teaching
style in order to allow for these participants to share the lessons they
had learned internally to their agencies (FAVA, N/D). Guatemala is also
showing interest in new technologies that can enhance their ability to
detect long-term hazards. In 2002, for example, government officials
brought together regional and world expertise within the country by
hosing an International Early Warning Conference. The systems discussed
at the conference helped to expose CONRED, which is still in its early
states, to effective warning systems, risk communications methods, and
other mitigation and preparedness techniques that can now be considered.
The regional consultation also helped them to identify shortfalls and
future needs (FAVA, N/D). Finally, the relationships that were formed
will help Guatemala to respond in a more coordinated manner should they
either find their own response systems overwhelmed in the future, or be
requested to assist by an overwhelmed neighbor.

Guatemala still faces many obstacles related to its financial and
historical troubles. However, the national government and CONRED are
slowly improving the efficacy of their disaster management capabilities.
It is obvious to Guatemala, its neighbors, and many of the other
developing countries around that world that have suffered disasters in
recent memory, that the international community will assist, but will
never provide enough to fund every bit of relief and recovery that is
required. These countries recognize the limitations of international
aid, but it is an uphill battle each must fight to assume the
responsibility of decreasing their dependence to better weather future
disasters.

##### 

##### References

Agence France Presse (AFP). 1999. "Nicaraguan Villagers Force US Army
Doctors to Leave." January 7.

American Red Cross. N/D. "Guatemala: Current Projects."
<http://www.redcross.org/services/intl/0,1082,0_49_,00.html>

BBC News. 1999. "Special Report: Hurricane Mitch." March 8.
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/210851.stm>

BBC News. 1998. "Mitch: A Path of Destruction." December 3.
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/202395.stm>

BBC News. N/D. "Country Profile: Guatemala."
<http://usembassy.state.gov/guatemala/wwwhcise.html>

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). N/D. "World Factbook -- Guatemala."
<http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/gt.html>

Economic Commission for Latin American and the Caribbean (ECLAC). 1999.
"Guatemala: Assessment of the Damage Caused by Hurricane Mitch." April
23. <http://www.crid.or.cr/digitalizacion/pdf/eng/doc13974/doc13974.pdf>

Florida International Volunteer Corps (FAVA). N/D. "Communique: Stories
on Guatemala." <http://www.favaca.org/country/Guatemala.html>

Hofstetter, Melinda. N/D. "Battling Storms."
<http://www.google.com/url?sa=U&start=1&q=http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/1526.pdf&e=10313>

Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). 2000. "Central America After
Hurricane Mitch."
<http://www.iadb.org/regions/re2/consultative_group/backgrounder5.htm>

Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). 1999. "IDB Helps Central
America's Recovery from Hirricane Mitch by Approving \$597 Million in
One Year Period." November 1.
<http://www.iadb.org/NEWS/Display/PRPrint.cfm?PR_Num=195_99&Language=English>

Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) 2. 1999. "Reducing Vulnerability
to Natural Hazards: Lessons Learned from Hurricane Mitch."
[http://www.iadb.org/regions/re2/consultative_group/groups/ecology_workshop_1.htm#1c](http://www.iadb.org/regions/re2/consultative_group/groups/ecology_workshop_1.htm%231c)

International Federation of Red Cross / Red Crescent Societies (IFRC).
1999. "Central America: Hurricane Mitch Appeal." February.
<http://wwwnotes.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/6686f45896f15dbc852567ae00530132/cbd0ff0d59444695c12566f000552a0e?OpenDocument>

Letsgo.Com. N/D. "Central America: An Introduction."
<http://www.letsgo.com/CEAM/01-CentralAmerica-4>

Moesely, Ron. 2000. "Bumbling EU Sitting on Millions for Relief."
Chicago Tribune, August 27.

North American Congress on Latin America (NACLA). 1997. The Guatemalan
Peace Accords." NACLA Reports. October 27.
<http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/47/140.html>

Time Magazine. 1999. "World Watch." November 15.

United Nations Development Program (UNDP). N/D. "Human Development
Reports: Statistical Data." <http://hdr.undp.org/statistics/data/>

United States Agency for International Development. 1999.
"USAID/Guatemala Hurricane Mitch Special Objective."

US Air Force (USAF). 1999. "Red Horse Helping Hurricane Mitch Recovery."
January 29. FDCHeMedia, Inc.

US Embassy Guatemala. N/D. "Guatemala -- Consular Information Sheet."
<http://usembassy.state.gov/guatemala/wwwhcise.html>

![](media/image7.wmf){width="6.9375in"
height="4.492361111111111in"}**Image 9.3.1: Hurricane Mitch Timeline**

Source: ECLAC, [http://dyred.sureste.com](http://dyred.sureste.com/).

**Image 9.3.2: Wind Speed Map of Hurricane Mitch**

![](media/image8.png){width="5.996527777777778in"
height="4.908333333333333in"}

Source: Ray Sterner and Steve Babin, Johns Hopkins University Applied
Physics Laboratory, 1998.

**Image 9.3.3: Example of a Guatemala Footbridge**

![](media/image9.png){width="4.232638888888889in" height="5.9375in"}

Source: USAID,
<http://www.google.com/url?sa=U&start=1&q=http://mitchnts1.cr.usgs.gov/publications/USGS_GUATEMALA_FINAL.pdf&e=10313>

**Sidebar 9.3.1: Saffir-Simpson Hurricane Scale**

The Saffir-Simpson Hurricane Scale is a 1-5 rating based on the
hurricane\'s present intensity. This is used to give an estimate of the
potential property damage and flooding expected along the coast from a
hurricane landfall. Wind speed is the determining factor in the scale,
as storm surge values are highly dependent on the slope of the
continental shelf in the landfall region. Note that all winds are using
the U.S. 1-minute average.

**Category One Hurricane:**

> Winds 74-95 mph (64-82 kt or 119-153 km/hr). Storm surge generally 4-5
> ft above normal. No real damage to building structures. Damage
> primarily to unanchored mobile homes, shrubbery, and trees. Some
> damage to poorly constructed signs. Also, some coastal road flooding
> and minor pier damage. Hurricanes Allison of 1995 and Danny of 1997
> were Category One hurricanes at peak intensity.

**Category Two Hurricane:**

> Winds 96-110 mph (83-95 kt or 154-177 km/hr). Storm surge generally
> 6-8 feet above normal. Some roofing material, door, and window damage
> of buildings. Considerable damage to shrubbery and trees with some
> trees blown down. Considerable damage to mobile homes, poorly
> constructed signs, and piers. Coastal and low-lying escape routes
> flood 2-4 hours before arrival of the hurricane center. Small craft in
> unprotected anchorages break moorings. Hurricane Bonnie of 1998 was a
> Category Two hurricane when it hit the North Carolina coast, while
> Hurricane Georges of 1998 was a Category Two Hurricane when it hit the
> Florida Keys and the Mississippi Gulf Coast.

**Category Three Hurricane:**

> Winds 111-130 mph (96-113 kt or 178-209 km/hr). Storm surge generally
> 9-12 ft above normal. Some structural damage to small residences and
> utility buildings with a minor amount of curtainwall failures. Damage
> to shrubbery and trees with foliage blown off trees and large trees
> blown down. Mobile homes and poorly constructed signs are destroyed.
> Low-lying escape routes are cut by rising water 3-5 hours before
> arrival of the center of the hurricane. Flooding near the coast
> destroys smaller structures with larger structures damaged by
> battering from floating debris. Terrain continuously lower than 5 ft
> above mean sea level may be flooded inland 8 miles (13 km) or more.
> Evacuation of low-lying residences with several blocks of the
> shoreline may be required. Hurricanes Roxanne of 1995 and Fran of 1996
> were Category Three hurricanes at landfall on the Yucatan Peninsula of
> Mexico and in North Carolina, respectively.

**Category Four Hurricane:**

> Winds 131-155 mph (114-135 kt or 210-249 km/hr). Storm surge generally
> 13-18 ft above normal. More extensive curtainwall failures with some
> complete roof structure failures on small residences. Shrubs, trees,
> and all signs are blown down. Complete destruction of mobile homes.
> Extensive damage to doors and windows. Low-lying escape routes may be
> cut by rising water 3-5 hours before arrival of the center of the
> hurricane. Major damage to lower floors of structures near the shore.
> Terrain lower than 10 ft above sea level may be flooded requiring
> massive evacuation of residential areas as far inland as 6 miles (10
> km). Hurricane Luis of 1995 was a Category Four hurricane while moving
> over the Leeward Islands. Hurricanes Felix and Opal of 1995 also
> reached Category Four status at peak intensity.

**Category Five Hurricane:**

> Winds greater than 155 mph (135 kt or 249 km/hr). Storm surge
> generally greater than 18 ft above normal. Complete roof failure on
> many residences and industrial buildings. Some complete building
> failures with small utility buildings blown over or away. All shrubs,
> trees, and signs blown down. Complete destruction of mobile homes.
> Severe and extensive window and door damage. Low-lying escape routes
> are cut by rising water 3-5 hours before arrival of the center of the
> hurricane. Major damage to lower floors of all structures located less
> than 15 ft above sea level and within 500 yards of the shoreline.
> Massive evacuation of residential areas on low ground within 5-10
> miles (8-16 km) of the shoreline may be required. Hurricane Mitch of
> 1998 was a Category Five hurricane at peak intensity over the western
> Caribbean. Hurricane Gilbert of 1988 was a Category Five hurricane at
> peak intensity and is one of the strongest Atlantic tropical cyclones
> of record.

**Sidebar 9.3.2: UN Appeal for International Aid**

#### UNITED NATIONS SEEKS \$153 MILLION FOR HURRICANE MITCH VICTIMS IN HONDURAS, NICARAGUA, EL SALVADOR, GUATEMALA, BELIZE 

December 4, 1998

GENEVA / NEW YORK (Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs)
\-- In an effort to cover the continuing humanitarian relief needs and
immediate rehabilitation requirements in five countries of Central
America, following the devastating Hurricane Mitch, the United Nations
today presented donors with a transitional appeal for \$153 million for
six months.

More than 3 million people were directly affected by Hurricane Mitch as
it swept across Honduras, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Guatemala and Belize
early in the last week of October. The disaster resulted in torrential
rains, flooding and landslides. Many lost their lives in the disaster,
and half-a-million people lost their homes. There is now an urgent need
for humanitarian assistance, particularly to the poorest, in the form of
clean water and food, shelter, emergency health services, education as
well as urgently-needed help in agriculture.

A meeting to present the appeal was organized today by the Office for
the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in Geneva, jointly with
the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). It was attended by
representatives of agencies making the appeal. Donors were told that the
transitional appeal was intended to \"tide over\" the next six months,
leading up to finalization of country-specific reconstruction projects.

The \$152,934,914 appealed for is apportioned thus: \$82.93 million for
Honduras; \$38.2 million for Nicaragua; \$16.19 million for El Salvador;
\$14.25 million for Guatemala; \$846,000 for Belize; \$490,000 for
regional activities.

The appeal document is a joint effort undertaken in the field by the
United Nations in-country teams under the coordination of the United
Nations Resident Coordinators and at Headquarters level. The appealing
agencies are the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), UNDP, United
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO),
United Nations Population Fund

**Additional Sources of Information on the Gujarat Earthquake**

CIRES Gujarat Page -
<http://cires.colorado.edu/~bilham/Gujarat2001.html>

Government of India Gujarat Earthquake Page -
<http://cires.colorado.edu/~bilham/Gujarat2001.html>

Wikipedia Gujarat Earthquake Page -
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2001_Gujarat_Earthquake>

BBC News Gujarat Earthquake Page -
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/in_depth/world/2001/south_asia/gujarat_quake/default.stm>

Embassy of India Gujarat Earthquake Page -
<http://www.indianembassy.org/new/earth_quake_2001.htm>

**Additional Sources of Information on the El Salvador Earthquakes**

EERI El Salvador Earthquakes Page -
<http://www.eeri.org/lfe/el_salvador_2001_series.html>

USGS Landslide Information for El Salvador, 2001 -
<http://landslides.usgs.gov/html_files/centrala.html>

USAID Earthquake Reconstruction, El Salvador -
<http://www.usaid.gov/sv/er/>

PBS Special Feature on the El Salvador Earthquakes -
<http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/latin_america/jan-june01/quake_1-15.html>

**Additional Sources of Information on Hurricane Mitch**

Mitch Satellite Photos: <http://www.osei.noaa.gov/mitch.html>

BBC Hurricane Mitch Special Report -
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/210851.stm>

NOAA Hurricane Mitch Page -
<http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/oa/reports/mitch/mitch.html>

Disaster Center Mitch Reports Page -
<http://www.disastercenter.com/hurricmr.htm>

NPR -- Hurricane Mitch Disaster Recovery Lessons -
<http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=4276639>

**Glossary of Terms**

**Acronyms**

ADB -- Asian Development Bank

ANDA -- El Salvador Aqueduct and Sewer Adminstration

ARC -- American Red Cross

CDC -- Centers for Disease Control (US)

CIA -- US Central Intelligence Agency

COEN - Comité de Emergencia Nacional (El Salvador)

CONRED - Coordinadora Nacional Para la Reduccion de Desastres
(Guatemala)

CRS -- Catholic Relief Services

DART -- USAID Disaster Assistance Response Team

DOA -- Department of Agriculture

DOD -- US Department of Defense

DREF -- (SRC) Disaster Relief Emergency Fund

ECHO -- European Commission Humanitarian Office

EERI -- Earthquake Engineering Research Institute

EGOM -- Empowered Group of Ministers (India)

ERP -- (USAID) Earthquake Recovery Program

EU -- European Union

FACT -- (Red Cross) Field Assessment and Coordination Team

FAO -- UN Food and Agriculture Organization

FEMA -- Federal Emergency Management Agency

FFP -- (USAID) Food For Peace

FIS -- Social Investment Fund (Guatemala)

FISDL -- (El Salvador) Social Investment Fund for Local Development

FONOPAZ -- National Fund for Peace (Guatemala)

GDP -- Gross Domestic Product

GEB -- Gujarat (India) Electricity Board

GIS -- Geographic Information System

GO Kit -- Ground Operations Kit

GOG -- Government of Gujarat (India)

GOI -- Government of India

GSDMA -- Gujarat (India) State Disaster Management Authority

HR -- House of Representatives (US)

IDB -- Inter-American Development Bank

IFRC -- International Federation of Red Cross / Red Crescent Societies

ILO -- UN International Labor Organization

IMD -- Indian Meteorological Department

INS -- (US) Immigration and Naturalization Service

MEDRED -- USDOD Medical Readiness Training

MFI -- Micro Finance Institution

NGO -- Non-Governmental Organization

NOAA -- National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration

OCHA -- UN Office of the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

OFDA -- US Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance

PAG -- Productive Asset Grant (USAID)

PAHO -- Pan American Health Organization (UN)

RIT -- (Red Cross) Regional Intervention Team

SEWA -- Self Employed Women's Association (India)

SIA -- Small Infrastructure Activity

SOUTHCOM -- United States Military Southern Command

SRC -- El Salvadorian Red Cross

SVP -- Small River Valleys Project (Central America)

UN -- United Nations

UNDAC -- United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination Team

UNDMT -- United Nations Disaster Management Team

UNDP -- United Nations Development Programme

UNHRD -- United Nations Humanitarian Response Depot

UNICEF -- United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund

UNV -- United Nations Volunteer

USACE -- US Army Corps of Engineers

USAF -- United States Air Force

USAID -- United States Agency for International Development

USG -- United States Government

USGS -- United States Geological Survey

WB -- World Bank

WFP -- World Food Programme

WHO -- World Health Organization

**Discussion Questions**

#### General

1.  Describe the role that the UNDP plays in disaster response.

2.  Explain how the U.S. Government assists countries affected by
    disasters.

3.  Explain how relief and development are linked.

4.  Describe the various types of NGOs, and the roles they play in
    disaster response.

5.  Describe a disaster where an international response was required,
    either from the case study described in the book or from your own
    experience or knowledge, providing at least one national,
    international, and NGO organization that provided assistance and
    what that assistance was.

#### Gujarat Earthquake

1.  Was the Government of India irresponsible in not having established
    an emergency management system prior to the Gujarat earthquake?
    Explain your answer.

2.  Could the Federal Response Plan be adapted for use in India? Why or
    why not?

3.  Why is it important that a nation's leader visit a disaster area,
    such as occurred in India when Prime Minister Vajpayee visited
    Gujarat following the earthquake there?

4.  Did the United States do enough to respond to the Gujarat
    Earthquake?

5.  Why is coordination such a problem when many organizations from
    around the world descend upon the disaster scene?

6.  Do you believe that the UNDP is the right UN agency to coordinate
    disasters? Why or why not?

#### El Salvador Earthquakes

1.  Is anyone to blame for allowing residential neighborhoods to be
    constructed below precarious hillsides? If so, then who, and why?

2.  If a country with limited resources, like El Salvador, was looking
    to build their emergency management capabilities from the ground up,
    what would you suggest be the most important building blocks? (for
    example -- communications, Search and Rescue capabilities, etc.)
    Why?

3.  If the Government of El Salvador did not appeal to the international
    community, do you feel that the multilateral response agencies (like
    the UN) would have had the right to intervene anyways? Why or why
    not?

4.  The United Nations appeals went largely unfunded. Do you feel that
    the international community was being 'stingy' in responding with
    financial resources? Why or why not?

5.  Why do you think that women and children are more vulnerable in
    disasters in developing countries? Is there anything that can reduce
    these vulnerabilities?

#### Hurricane Mitch

1.  In a situation where multiple countries are involved in a disaster,
    how should responding agencies decide where to dedicate resources?

2.  If advance notice of a hazard exists, such as occurred with
    Hurricane Mitch, how much responsibility to pre-position resources
    in the poor countries do you feel lies with the wealthy countries of
    the world?

3.  Should hazard assessments be a requirement for loans from the
    international financial institutions? Who should be responsible for
    these assessments, and who would assure that they were accurate?

4.  Do the poor countries experience more devastating natural disasters,
    or are they simply less prepared for them such that the consequences
    from equally-sized events are greater there? Would a Hurricane like
    Mitch have caused more or less damage in the United States?

**Suggested Out of Class Exercises**

1.  Identify and research the history and mission of a nongovernmental
    relief organization that responds to international disasters (check
    [www.interaction.org](http://www.interaction.org/) for ideas). Find
    out how someone interested in volunteering for this organization
    could become involved. Share your findings with the class.

2.  Choose a developing country and a rich country, other than the
    United States. Investigate their disaster management capabilities.
    Make a chart to illustrate these differences and similarities, and
    share your findings with the class.

3.  Choose a major international disaster that occurred at least 3 years
    ago. Create a case study detailing the disaster, its consequences,
    and the actions of the responding organizations.

4.  Use the internet to find out what disasters occurred in the past
    thirty days, and what countries were affected by each. Try to
    determine whether or not the leaders of those countries appealed for
    international assistance. Share this list with the class.

5.  The 2004 tsunami in Asia was arguably the largest and most
    devastating disaster in modern history. Create a list of all the
    countries that contributed aid, and what percentage of their GDP
    that figure amounts to. Rank the countries in order.