**Statement**

**Lawrence William Holland,**

**Command Sergeant Major**

**Senior Enlisted Advisor to the**

**Assistant Secretary Of Defense For**

**Reserve Affairs**

**Before the**

**Commission on National Guard and Reserves**

**Room 2118 Rayburn House Office Building**

**June 15, 2006**

**2:00 P.M.**

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

UNTIL RELEASED BY THE

COMMISSION ON THE

NATIONAL GUARD AND RESERVES

# Command Sergeant Major Lawrence W. Holland

### Senior Enlisted Advisor to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs ![](media/image1.jpeg){width="2.25in" height="2.8125in"}

Command Sergeant Major Lawrence W. Holland is the seventh Senior
Enlisted Advisor assigned to the Office of the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Reserve Affairs. He is responsible for advising the
Assistant Secretary and staff on enlisted affairs of the 1.2 million
military personnel of the Reserve which includes the Army, Navy, Air
Force, Marines, Coast Guard, and the Army and Air National Guard. He
also serves as the Chairman of the Department of Defense Reserve Forces
Senior Enlisted Advisory Council.

Command Sergeant Major Holland was born in New Orleans, Louisiana, on
February 15, 1947. He began his military career in May of 1969 by
joining the Army Reserves. In September of the same year he transferred
to Active Duty and was assigned to HQ, US Army Security Agency-Pacific.
During this time, he completed the Army\'s Basic Leaders Course. After
three years, in October of 1972, CSM Holland joined a reserve
component - 312th MI D (Bde) New Orleans, LA.

Command Sergeant Major Holland has served in numerous leadership
positions from squad leader to Command Sergeant Major and in various
staff positions throughout his career as a proud member of the Corps of
Noncommissioned Officers, living up to the two most basic
responsibilities of an NCO - accomplishment of the mission and the
welfare of his soldiers. His assignments include: SGM positions with the
301st MI Bn, 377th TAACOM. His CSM positions include the 549th MI Bn,
75th USA MAC, HHC, 75th Div (E), 363rd Corps Support Group, 647th Area
Support Group, the 164th Corps Support Group, and Command Sergeant Major
of the 63rd Regional Readiness Command. In 2002 he completed an
eight-month rotation in Uzbekistan in support of Operation Enduring
Freedom.

Command Sergeant Major Holland\'s military education includes a variety
of communications and military intelligence courses. He is a graduate of
the US Army Sergeant Major Course (CSMD-Course). Along with his
thirty-seven years of military service and extensive military education
he also holds two Associates degrees, a Baccalaureate in Commercial
Science, and a Masters in Business Management.

His awards and decorations include the Legion of Merit, Bronze Star,
Outstanding Volunteer Service Medal, Meritorious Service Medal with 3rd
Oak Leaf Cluster, Army Commendation Medal with 2nd Oak Leaf Cluster,
Army Achievement Medal, Army Good Conduct Medal, Army Reserve Component
Medal with 4th Oak Leaf Cluster, National Defense Service Medal with
DSS, GWOT-Expeditionary Medal, GWOT-Service Medal, Armed Forces Reserve
Medal, NCO Professional Development Ribbon number 4, Overseas Ribbon,
and the Army Service Ribbon.

He is married to Kimberly K. Holland who has returned 15JAN04 from
Afghanistan and lives at Ft. Myer, VA. Their son, Dustin McCarty,
resides in Iowa Park, TX.

**[INTRODUCTION]{.underline}**

Chairman Punaro and members of the Commission, thank you for the
invitation to discuss America's Enlisted Reserve Component forces. You
have already heard from Dr. Chu and many others and I will expand some
of the thoughts and ideas proposed. This Commission has several
important tasks at hand, and I will give you my perspective from the
Senior Enlisted Advisors since the enlisted force is 84% of the Total
Reserve Force.

Our Guard and Reserve men and women continue to perform, in a superb
fashion, vital national security functions at home and around the world.
They have been, and continue to be, closely aligned with the states,
cities, towns, and communities in America. Our Reserve Components
continued to transition from primarily a strategic reserve to an
operational reserve; performing missions ranging from high intensity
combat operations, to humanitarian assistance, to rescuing the victims
of hurricanes -- and, in the case of the National Guard, other State
missions, as well. In addition, the Army's Reserve components are
transforming to a lighter more lethal force at the same time. The Air
Reserve components are participating in the transition to the Air Force
"Transformation Flight Plan."

**[PURPOSE OF THE RESERVE COMPONENTS]{.underline}**

The transition to an operational reserve actually began when we
mobilized Reserve Component members for Operations Desert Shield and
Desert Storm. Since then, changes in force management have been made to
reflect this transition toward an operational reserve. The QDR proposes
a Reserve Component that must be even more accessible and more readily
deployable. This will make them even more relevant than ever to the
warfight. However, recruiting, resourcing, retraining, re-equipping, and
resetting the Reserve force remains at the forefront of our efforts.

Predictability is proving to be fundamental to sustaining an operational
reserve. To that end, the Department's policies call for using Reserve
Component members in a predictable, cyclic, or periodic manner. Several
recently-passed statutory changes have helped significantly by removing
barriers and enabling Reserve Component members to volunteer for longer
periods of duty while retaining their status as Reserve component
member.

There have been significant statutory changes in the last two years that
help us recruit, shape and retain viable Guard and Reserve forces. In
the FY 2006 National Defense Authorization Act alone, Congress expanded
eligibility criteria and increased the maximum allowable payments under
many of the bonuses and special pays for Reserve Component members;
authorized a new TRICARE benefit for all Selected Reserve members;
enhanced last years TRICARE Reserve Select program; reduced the 140-day
threshold for full BAH to 30 days; increased the number of Army Reserve
and Army Guard ROTC scholarships; and authorized a new educational
assistance program for activated Guard and Reserve members.

**[STRATEGIC GOALS, PROGRAM OBJECTIVES, AND STRATEGIES]{.underline}**

The recently published USD (P&R) Strategic Plan for 2006 through 2011
(dated April 18) posits certain goals for the Reserve Components.

-   *Integrate the active and reserve military, civilian employees, and
    support contractors into a diverse, cohesive total force and a
    rapidly tailorable joint force structure.*

-   *Promote the transition of the Reserve Components (RC) to an
    "operational reserve", in addition to their traditional role as a
    strategic reserve.*

-   *Enhance quality of life for the total force and support military
    members, their families, and retirees across the full human resource
    life cycle.*

I believe the Commission might look at these goals and the accompanying
plan and framework to ascertain what else should be investigated or
included in its deliberations.

**[RESERVE COMPONENT MISSIONS TODAY]{.underline}**

By far the most demanding operations continue to be Operation Enduring
Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). Reserve Components
currently furnish approximately 20% of the troops in theater. That is
down from 30% just a year ago. The Reserve Components remain an integral
player in Homeland Defense, and in Operation Noble Eagle. They responded
immediately and superbly to the Gulf Coast hurricane disasters, with the
National Guard leading the way, with over 50,000 Guardsmen providing
needed assistance and support. The National Guard will remain a
dual-missioned force performing both State and Federal missions.

The Reserve Components continue to perform a variety of non-traditional
missions in support of the Global War on Terror. One such mission is the
training of the Iraqi and Afghan National armies. The Reserve Components
have provided command and control and advisory support teams in support
of the training that will allow Iraqi and Afghan forces to assume a
greater role in securing their own countries.

In addition, the National Guard will begin supporting Border Customs
until they can hire and train enough agents to better secure our
nation's borders.

**[POLICIES]{.underline}**

Judicious and prudent use of the Reserve Components in support of the
Global War on Terror remains the cornerstone of our policy in that
effort. Our personnel policies state those reservists:

-   Shall be given a minimum of 30 days notice prior to mobilization. We
    try to give at least 90 days notice when possible, so reservists can
    take full advantage of the early eligibility for TRICARE benefits.
    Today, early notifications are now the norm, not the exception---but
    there is still room for improvement and we are working on that.

-   Shall be called to involuntary active duty under the current partial
    mobilization authority for no more than 24 cumulative months.

-   May serve voluntarily for longer periods of time in accordance with
    Service policy.

-   May be released prior to the completion of the period of service for
    which ordered, based on operational requirements.

-   Shall receive equitable treatment, when being considered for
    mobilization---considering the length and nature of previous
    service, family responsibilities, and civilian employment.

-   Are entitled to management of individual expectations, considering
    morale and retention.

-   Shall perform essential and meaningful tasks, and are provided as
    much predictability as possible.

Within this framework, we will continue to manage the Reserve
Components, and assess the impact mobilization and deployments have on
Guard and Reserve members, their families and employers, and adjust our
policies as needed.

**[STRESS ON THE FORCE]{.underline}**

I am sure you have heard much discussion about the stress that the
Global War on Terrorism is placing on the force---both active and
reserve. From my perspective, the dominant question for this Commission
is, "How extensively can we use the Guard and Reserve and still maintain
a viable long-term Reserve force?"

Answering this question involves a number of issues. But first I think
you should quantify how much of the Reserve force we have used as of the
end of March 2006 to support the Global War on Terrorism and the effect
that this rate of utilization is having on the Reserve force.

What I've found is the overwhelming majority of Guard and Reserve
members want to serve, and they want to be part of the victory in this
war on terrorism. That is why they joined the Guard or Reserve and that
is why they serve this nation. I also realize that we must also be
mindful not to over-commit them, and we must use the Reserve force
wisely. We must further be aware of the additional responsibilities that
National Guard members bear to their respective states.

**[Reserve Utilization to Date]{.underline}**

There are two ways to look at rates of mobilization for the Guard and
Reserve. The first is to look at all Reserve Component members who have
served since September 11, 2001---the cumulative approach.

Under the cumulative approach, a total of just under 495,000 Guard and
Reserve members (about 483,000 Selected Reserve members and
approximately 11,000 IRR members) were mobilized between September 11,
2001 and March 31, 2006. That means that about 39 percent of the
1,234,013 members who have served in the Selected Reserve during this
period have been mobilized during the current contingency.

The other way to look at mobilization is in terms of today's Reserve
Component force---those who are currently serving in the Selected
Reserve. Looking at today's Selected Reserve force of 823,270 serving,
as of March 31, 2006, we have mobilized 377,160 of those members, or 46
percent of those currently serving. Of this Selected Reserve force,
72,920 (or 8.9 percent of all members who are currently serving) have
been mobilized more than once. Of the 72,920, a total of 55,073 (6.9
percent of the current force) have been mobilized twice, 12,085 (1.5
percent) have been mobilized three times and 5,762 (0.7 of one percent)
have been mobilized more than three times. No reservist has been
involuntarily mobilized for more than 24 cumulative months, and nearly
all (more than 98 percent) of those remobilized were volunteers. They
have served selflessly and made a great contribution.

As you know, the stress on the force has been high but shows signs of
lessening. In December 2004 there were just over 183,000 reservists
mobilized from all services. As of March 31, that figure stood at
108,513, a drop of 74,500 which equates to about five Army Divisions. We
[are]{.underline} relieving stress on the force.

[Recruiting Results]{.underline}: Fiscal Year 2006 is off to a good
start through the first two quarters, with the DoD Reserve components
achieving 100% of their overall FY 2006 year-to-date (YTD) recruiting
objectives (61,672 accessions against a goal of 61,554) as compared to
achieving only 85 percent of their end of FY 2005 recruiting objectives.
Three of the six DoD Reserve components - the Army National Guard,
Marine Corps Reserve and the Air Force Reserve - achieved, or exceeded,
their YTD recruiting objectives through March. To date, the Army Reserve
is slightly short, by 387 (achieving 97 percent of its YTD recruiting
objective); the Navy Reserve is short by 719 (achieving 85 percent of
its YTD recruiting objective); and, the Air National Guard is short by
734 (achieving 85 percent of its recruiting objective). The remainder of
FY 2006 will continue to be challenging for reserve
recruiting---particularly in the Army Reserve, the Air Guard, and the
Navy Reserve.

Key factors affecting Army Reserve accessions include a shortfall in
Active component to Reserve component transitions, due in part to a
robust Active component reenlistment program, negative feedback from
potential influencers (parents, teachers, etc.) to potential recruits,
and an improving economy with lower unemployment.

The Navy Reserve is in the process of shaping its force and has fully
leveraged the incentive authorities enacted in FY 2006. The Navy Reserve
has maximized the use of re-enlistment bonuses in order to address the
high attrition rate. With the anticipation of heightened recruiting
challenges throughout the remainder of FY 2006, the Reserve components
will continue to address the challenges they have been experiencing with
multiple approaches, including expansion of their recruiting forces and
use of the incentive enhancements provided in this recent authorization
acts that best meet their needs.

Many initiatives have been undertaken to mitigate the challenges. It
should be noted that the Army National Guard has demonstrated
significant improvements in its recruiting program this fiscal year
by: 1) increasing recruiters, 2) working closely with the various states
and territories to rebalance structure as needed to ensure the states
are properly sized to accommodate their strength objectives; and 3)
maximizing use of the incentive authorities given to them in FY 2005 and
FY 2006 by creating new and dynamic incentive programs.

We continue to monitor the quality of our recruits against the
established goals. We see no indicators in the performance of young men
and women being recruited today that concerns us. They remain America's
finest. The changes the Congress enacted in the reserve enlistment and
affiliation bonus in the FY 2006 Authorization Act has help sustain this
success.

[Attrition]{.underline}: Measuring all losses, regardless of reason,
from the Reserve Components, we are pleased to report that enlisted
attrition generally remained [below]{.underline} established ceilings
through first half of fiscal year 2006---also a very positive trend.
Enlisted attrition is on track to remain below the FY 2006 ceiling
established by each Reserve Component. End strength results were better
because of continued low attrition rates in the majority of the
components.

**[Mitigation Strategies]{.underline}**

Of all the strategies to help reduce the stress on the force, the first
and perhaps most important is rebalancing. Its purpose is to adjust the
force to be responsive and produce the capabilities needed in balanced
portfolios across all components. The old force was balanced to respond
to Cold War threats. Rebalancing improves responsiveness and eases
stress on units and individuals by building up capabilities in
high-demand units and skills. This is accomplished by decreasing
capabilities in both the Active and Reserve Components that are in
lesser demand, and increasing them in areas of higher demand, changing
lower priority structure to higher priority structure, and producing a
new Active Component/Reserve Component mix. As outlined in the report
*Rebalancing Forces: Easing the Stress on the Guard and Reserve*,
January 15, 2004, (attached) the rebalancing effort also seeks to
establish a limit on involuntary mobilizations to achieve a reasonable
and sustainable rate. The force structure planning goal aims to limit
the involuntary mobilization of individual Reservists to one year out of
every six.

We continue to pursue continuum of service initiative. The continuum of
service construct varies among services and components but it was
developed to preserve the nature of the "citizen soldier" while making
service more predictable and giving reservists more opportunities to
serve by eliminating barrier. The desired goal is smooth flowing
on-ramps and off-ramps, not impeded by statutory constraints, management
rules, and separate personnel and pay systems.

One of the most significant changes under our continuum of service
construct involved strength accounting. Under the old rules, end
strength and controlled grade accounting and the requirement for
officers to compete for promotion against active duty personnel
suppressed the number of volunteers and limited the length of their
duty. Reservists were reluctant to volunteer for extended periods of
active duty. However, we have implemented the new "operational support"
accounting category (authorized in Sections 415 and 416 of the FY 2005
Authorization Act) which has significantly tempered these barriers and
has provided greater flexibility in Reserve usage and is a significant
supporting element of the continuum of service initiative.

Predictability and reasonable limits on frequency and duration of
mobilization are also key elements of our policies, which are designed
to not only support Reservists, but also sustain the support of
employers and families, and ultimately enable the components to meet
recruitment and retention objectives. The emphasis on volunteerism is
designed to allow service members who want to contribute more to defense
missions to do so.

**[Meeting Future Requirements]{.underline}**

The Army's initiative to create provisional units---drawing upon
underutilized skills to meet current mission requirements---and the DoD
initiative to draw from skill sets in other components and
Services---the joint solution---are near-term strategies being employed
today. We will continue to maximize the use of volunteers when possible.
However, we must balance the use of volunteers from the Selected Reserve
with pending unit deployments and the need for unit cohesion. In this
situation, retiree and Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) members also
provide sources of volunteers.

Compared to Operation Desert Storm when we mobilized 30,000 IRR members,
we have used fewer IRR members to support the Global War on Terrorism.
In the past four years, we have mobilized about 11,000 IRR members. The
further utilization of the IRR remains a viable option for meeting both
near-term and long-term commitments. But we must establish the proper
expectations for our Reserve Component members, their families, their
employers, and the public in general. We have undertaken a program to
establish the expectations of reasonable service requirements for the
21^st^ century based on the frequency and duration of military duty, and
predictability.

For the long term, we will continue to energetically pursue these
transformation initiatives. Rebalancing the force will continue, as will
the conversion of military to civilian positions. The Department's
transformation to a capabilities-based force should help relieve stress
on the force. The overall objective is to have a flexible force, capable
of meeting diverse mission requirements.

**[RESERVE COMPONENT HEALTH BENEFIT ENHANCEMENTS]{.underline}**

The Department has fully implemented the premium-based TRICARE Reserve
Select Tier 1 program for mobilized reservists, which offers TRICARE
Standard and medical treatment facility space-available coverage to
Selected Reserve members and their families. The Department is also on
track to implement the new TRICARE Reserve Select Tier 2 and Tier 3
plans by October 1, 2006, as required by law. Selected Reserve members
who are self-employed, who are eligible unemployment compensation
recipients or who are not eligible for health care under an
employer-sponsored health benefit plan can enroll in TRICARE Reserve
Select Tier 2 plan, under which the member must pay 50 percent of the
premium. Selected Reserve members who do not meet those eligibility
criteria for the TRICARE Reserve Tier 1 or Tier 2 plan can enroll in the
TRICARE Reserve Select Tier 3 plan, under which the member must pay 85
percent premium.

These three new benefits help support retention since the member must
continue service in the Selected Reserve.

**[EQUIPMENT REQUIREMENTS]{.underline}**

The Services are acquiring interoperable equipment to meet joint
training and operational mission requirements as necessary for a
seamlessly integrated Total Force.

The Reserve Components were appropriated \$4.13 billion in FY 2006 for
equipment procurement, as compared to \$2.4 billion on average in past
years.

FY 2006 funding included \$2.13 billion in the President's Budget,
\$1.18 billion in National Guard and Reserve Equipment Appropriations,
\$442 million in Congressional Adds and \$380 million in the Bridge
Supplemental. The President's Equipment Procurement Budget request for
FY 2007 was increased by 67% to \$3.55 billion. The Army has programmed
\$48 billion for its modularity initiative which includes \$19.2 billion
for the Army National Guard (ARNG) and \$3.7 billion for the United
States Army Reserve (USAR) over the FY06-FY11 time frame.

Historically, the Army Reserve Components have been resourced at
approximately 70% of required equipment, 30% of which was legacy
equipment. In the short term, the Army's immediate requirements have
been resolved by cross leveling equipment among deploying units, or
having units utilize equipment remaining in theater as Stay Behind
Equipment.  These actions have an equipment availability and training
impact on the units remaining or returning to their home station.

As a long term goal, the Services have developed strategies that include
development of blended or augment units to share modern equipment with
the Active Components, like the Air Force's Total Force Integration and
the Army's Modularity plan.

The Army has developed a transformation strategy that establishes a
means of providing force elements that are interchangeable, expandable,
and tailored to meet the changing needs of the Combatant Commanders.
This initiative, along with the Global War On Terror requirements,
resulted in the Army's development of a new strategy that guarantees
mobilized units to be equipped at 100% and non-mobilized Army Reserve
and Army Guard units to be equipped with training sets, with identified
ARNG units to meet the Homeland Defense requirements at higher equipping
rates. The strategy uses unit rotation, the Army Force Generation Model
(ARFORGEN).  ARFORGEN consists of progressive and sequential levels of
increasing readiness from reset/train, to a ready force available to
deploy. While the optimal rotation rates of Active Component and Reserve
Component forces will differ (AC=1 deployment in 3 years, RC = 1
deployment in 6 years), the necessary planning, resourcing, and training
validation process is to be synchronized so that the Army can generate
ready forces from both components to achieve a steady state deployment
capability.

**[CONCLUSION]{.underline}**

National Guard and Reserve forces continue to be critical elements in
our National Security Strategy and will continue with their expanded
role as an Operational Reserve in all facets of the Total Force. The
nation continues to call and our Reserve Components continue to proudly
answer that call. But in answering that call, we cannot lose sight of
the need to balance their commitment to country with their commitment to
family and civilian employers. The Enlisted personnel of the Reserve
Components have shown strong leadership by their actions and
performance. Thank you for the opportunity to offer my views and
contribute to your deliberations.