![](media/image1.png){width="0.6541666666666667in"
height="0.6604166666666667in"} **PUBLIC NOTICE**

**FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION**

**445 Twelfth St., S.W.**

**WASHINGTON, D.C. 20554**

**News Media Information: (202) 418-0500**

**Fax-On-Demand: (202) 418-2830**

**Internet: http://www.fcc.gov**

**ftp.fcc.gov**

**DA 99-1591**

## August 12, 1999

**AUCTION OF 929 and 931 MHz PAGING SERVICE SPECTRUM**

**Auction Notice and Filing Requirements for 2,499 Paging Upper Band
Licenses Scheduled for February 24, 2000**

### Minimum Opening Bids and Other Procedural Issues

**Report No. AUC-99-26-B (Auction No. 26 )**

**1. INTRODUCTION**

This Public Notice announces the procedures and minimum opening bids for
the upcoming Paging 929 and 931 MHz Upper Bands Auction (\"Upper Bands
Auction\"). On June 7, 1999, the Wireless Telecommunications Bureau
(\"Bureau\") released a Public Notice,[^1] seeking comment on the
establishment of reserve prices or minimum opening bids for the Upper
Bands auction, in accordance with the Balanced Budget Act of 1997.[^2]
In addition, the Bureau sought comment on a number of procedures to be
used in the Upper Bands auction.[^3] The Bureau received four comments
and no replies in response to the *Paging Upper Bands* *Public
Notice*.[^4]

***The Upper Band Licenses to Be Auctioned:*** The licenses available in
this auction consist of 12 channels in the 929 MHz band and 37 channels
in the 931 MHz band. The following tables contain the Block / Frequency
Cross-Reference List for the 929 MHz and 931 MHz bands:

929 MHz Paging Channels

  ------------- -------------------- -- ------------- --------------------
  **Block       **Frequency**           **Block       **Frequency**
  (License                              (License      
  Suffix)**                             Suffix)**     

  A             929.0125                G             929.4625

  B             929.1125                H             929.6375

  C             929.2375                I             929.6875

  D             929.3125                J             929.7875

  E             929.3875                K             929.9125

  F             929.4375                L             929.9625
  ------------- -------------------- -- ------------- --------------------

931 MHz Paging Channels

  ----------- --------------- -- ----------- --------------- -- ----------- ---------------
  **Block     **Frequency**      **Block     **Frequency**      **Block     **Frequency**
  (License                       (License                       (License    
  Suffix)**                      Suffix)**                      Suffix)**   

  AA          931.0125           AN          931.3375           AZ          931.6375

  AB          931.0375           AO          931.3625           BA          931.6625

  AC          931.0625           AP          931.3875           BB          931.6875

  AD          931.0875           AQ          931.4125           BC          931.7125

  AE          931.1125           AR          931.4375           BD          931.7375

  AF          931.1375           AS          931.4625           BE          931.7625

  AG          931.1625           AT          931.4875           BF          931.7875

  AH          931.1875           AU          931.5125           BG          931.8125

  AI          931.2125           AV          931.5375           BH          931.8375

  AJ          931.2375           AW          931.5625           BI          931.8625

  AK          931.2625           AX          931.5875           BJ          931.9625

  AL          931.2875           AY          931.6125           BK          931.9875

  AM          931.3125                                                      
  ----------- --------------- -- ----------- --------------- -- ----------- ---------------

One license will be awarded for each of these spectrum blocks in each of
the 51 geographic areas known as Major Economic Areas ("MEAs"),
resulting in a total of 2,499 Upper Bands paging licenses. These
licenses are listed in Attachment A to this Public Notice. The licenses
designated for the Upper Band auction comprise various portions of the
following areas: (1) the continental United States, (2) the Northern
Mariana Islands, (3) Guam, (4) American Samoa, (5) the United States
Virgin Islands, and (6) Puerto Rico.

***Auction Date:*** The auction will begin on Thursday, February 24,
2000. The initial schedule for bidding will be announced by public
notice at least one week before the start of the auction. Unless
otherwise announced, bidding on all licenses will be conducted on each
business day until bidding has stopped on all licenses.

***Auction Title:*** The 929 and 931 MHz Upper Bands Paging Auction -
Auction No. 26.

***Bidding Methodology:*** Simultaneous multiple round bidding. Bidding
will be permitted only from remote locations, either electronically (by
computer) or telephonically.

***Pre-Auction Deadlines:***

-   Auction Seminar..........................................January 7,
    2000

# Short Form Application (FCC Form 175)............ January 20, 2000; 5:30 p.m. ET 

# Upfront Payments (via wire transfer)..................February 7, 2000; 6:00 p.m. ET

-   Orders for Remote Bidding Software..................February 11,
    2000; 5:30 p.m. ET

-   Mock Auction.............................................February
    22, 2000

    ***Telephone Contacts:***

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-   Auctions Hotline (888) CALL-FCC (888) 225-5322, press

> Option #2 or (717) 338-2888 (direct dial)

(*For Bidder Information Packages, General Auction Information, and
Seminar Registration. Hours of service: 8 a.m. - 5:30 p.m. ET.*)

-   FCC Technical Support Hotline (202) 414-1250 (voice), (202) 414-1255
    (TTY)

> (*For technical assistance with installing or using FCC software.
> Hours of service: 8 a.m. - 6 p.m. ET, Monday - Friday*)

***List of Attachments:***

-   Attachment A...............Summary of Paging 929 and 931 MHz
    Licenses to be Auctioned, Upfront Payments, Minimum Opening Bids

-   Attachment B...............Existing 929 MHz Licensees and 931MHz
    Licensees

-   Attachment C...............Guidelines for Completion of FCC Forms
    175 and 159,

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-   and Exhibits

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-   Attachment D...............Electronic Filing and Review of FCC Form
    175

-   Attachment E...............How to Monitor FCC Auctions Online

-   Attachment F...............Accessing the FCC Network Using Windows
    95/98

-   Attachment G...............FCC Remote Bidding Software Order Form

-   Attachment H...............Summary Listing of Documents from the
    Commission and

the Wireless Telecommunications Bureau Addressing

Application of the Anti-Collusion Rules

-   Attachment I................Auction Seminar Registration Form

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-   Attachment J................Exponential Smoothing Formula and
    Example

***Background:*** In 1997 and 1998, the Commission adopted rules
governing geographic licensing of Common Carrier Paging ("CCP") and
exclusive 929 MHz Private Carrier Paging ("PCP"), and established
procedures for auctioning mutually exclusive applications for these
licenses.[^5] In order to facilitate the geographic licensing program,
the Commission dismissed pending mutually exclusive applications and
applications filed after July 31, 1996.[^6] The Commission provided for
a transition to geographic area licensing for exclusive, non-nationwide
channels in the bands allocated for paging and developed a standard
methodology for providing protection to incumbent licensees from
co-channel interference for the 929-930 MHz and 931-932 MHz paging
bands.[^7] In its *Upper Bands Public Notice* released on June 7, 1999,
the Commission proposed the first in a series of auctions of Paging
service licenses to commence December 7, 1999.[^8]

***Scheduling:*** Due to concerns raised by the commenters to the *Upper
Bands Public Notice* as well as general concerns about the timing of the
Auction No. 26, the Wireless Telecommunications Bureau ("Bureau") has
rescheduled the auction to commence on February 24, 2000.[^9] Parties
responding to the *Upper Bands Public Notice* raised several reasons for
delaying the auction, including anticipated computer software problems
associated with the roll-over into the Year 2000 ("Y2K").[^10] The
Bureau recognizes that preparing their existing businesses for the Y2K
roll-over while preparing for an auction could present formidable
problems for potential bidders. Accordingly, the Bureau is providing
information now about the auction, and allowing for the submission of
Short-Form Applications (FCC Form 175) twenty days after the onset of
Y2K. We believe that this new schedule provides sufficient time for
potential bidders to prepare their computer systems for the auction and
correct any problems that might have been caused by Y2K.

***Incumbent Licensees:*** Incumbent (nongeographic) paging licensees
operating under their existing authorizations are entitled to full
protection from co-channel interference.[^11] Geographic area licensees
are likewise afforded co-channel interference protection from incumbent
licensees.[^12] Adjacent geographic area licensees are obligated to
resolve possible interference concerns of adjacent geographic area
licensees by negotiating a mutually acceptable agreement with the
neighboring geographic licensee. Incumbency issues are further discussed
below.

***Due Diligence:*** Potential bidders are reminded that there are a
number of incumbent licensees already licensed and operating on
frequencies that will be subject to the upcoming auction. Geographic
area licensees in accordance with the Commission's Rules must protect
such incumbents from harmful interference. *See* 47 C.F.R. § 22.503(i).
These limitations may restrict the ability of such geographic area
licensees to use certain portions of the electromagnetic spectrum or
provide service to certain areas in their geographic license areas.

In addition, potential bidders seeking licenses for geographic areas
adjacent to the Canadian and Mexican border should be aware that the use
of some or all of the channels they acquire in the auction could be
restricted as a result of agreements with Canada or Mexico on the use of
929 and 931 MHz spectrum in the border area.[^13]

Potential bidders should also be aware that certain applications
(including those for modification), waiver requests, petitions to deny,
petitions for reconsideration, and applications for review are pending
before the Commission that relate to particular applicants or incumbent
licensees. In addition, certain decisions reached in the paging
proceeding are the subject to judicial appeal and may be the subject of
additional reconsideration or appeal. We note that resolution of these
matters could have an impact on the availability of spectrum for MEA
licensees in the 929 and 931 MHz bands. In addition, while the
Commission will continue to act on pending applications, requests and
petitions, some of these matters may not be resolved by the time of the
auction.

Potential bidders are solely responsible for investigating and
evaluating the degree to which such pending matters may affect spectrum
availability in areas where they seek MEA licenses.

To aid potential bidders, Attachment B to this Public Notice lists
matters pending before the Commission that relate to licenses or
applications for the 929 MHz and 931 MHz service. The Commission makes
no representations or guarantees that the listed matters are the only
pending matters that could affect spectrum availability in the 929 or
931 MHz bands.

Parties may submit additions or corrections to the list, provided such
additions or corrections are filed with the Commission within ten (10)
business days from release of this Public Notice. Such submissions
should be limited to identifying pleadings or papers previously filed
with the Commission. No new pleadings or arguments on the merits will be
accepted as explicitly provided by Commission Rules.[^14]

Corrections and additions must be filed with the Office of the
Secretary, Federal Communications Commission, 445 Twelfth St., SW,
Washington, DC 20554. One copy of each submission should also be
delivered to the Commission\'s duplicating contractor, International
Transcription Service, Inc., (\"ITS\"), 445 Twelfth Street, S.W.,
CY-B402, Washington, D.C. 20554, while an additional courtesy copy
should be sent to Cyndi Thomas, Policy and Rules Branch, Commercial
Wireless Division, Wireless Telecommunications Bureau, Federal
Communications Commission, 445 Twelfth St., SW, Room 4-A164, Washington,
D.C. 20554. Parties filing additions or corrections should include the
internal reference number of this Public Notice (DA 99-1591) on their
submissions. Parties are also reminded that some of the proceedings are
restricted and governed by the Commission\'s *ex parte* rules.
Accordingly, any submission filed pursuant to this Public Notice that is
directed to the merits or outcome of any restricted proceeding must be
served on all parties to that restricted proceeding. *See generally* 47
C.F.R.§§ 1.1200-1.1216.

Copies of the pleadings relating to the 931 MHz band identified in
Attachment B are available for public inspection and copying during
normal reference room hours at: Office of Public Affairs (OPA),
Reference Operations Division, 445 Twelfth Street, S.W., Room CY-C314,
Washington, D.C. 20554. Copies of the pleadings relating to the 929 MHz
band identified in Attachment B are available for public inspection and
copying during normal reference room hours at: Wireless
Telecommunications Bureau (Gettysburg), Public Reference Room, 1270
Fairfield Road, Gettysburg, PA 17325.

In addition, potential bidders may research the Bureau's licensing
databases on the World Wide Web in order to determine which frequencies
are already licensed to incumbent licensees. Because some of our
incumbent paging licensing records have not yet been converted to the
Bureau's new Universal Licensing System (ULS), potential bidders may
have to select other databases to perform research for the frequency(s)
of interest. The research options below will allow potential bidders to
download licensing data, as well as to perform queries online.

[929 MHz band Incumbent Licenses]{.underline}: Licensing records for the
929 MHz band are contained in the Bureau's Land Mobile database (not
ULS) and may be researched on the internet at
[http://www.fcc.gov/wtb]{.underline} by selecting the "Databases" link
at the top of the page. Potential bidders may download a copy of the
licensing database by selecting "Download the Wireless Databases" and
choosing the appropriate files under "Land Mobile Database Files - 47
C.F.R. Parts 74, 90, and 95." Alternatively, potential bidders may query
the Bureau's licensing records online by selecting "Search the Wireless
Databases Online."

[931 MHz band Incumbent Licenses]{.underline}: Licensing records for the
931 MHz band are contained in the Bureau's ULS and may be researched on
the internet at [http://www.fcc.gov/wtb/uls]{.underline} by selecting
the "License Search" button in the left frame. Potential bidders may
query the database online and download a copy of their search results if
desired. The Bureau recommends that potential bidders select the
"Frequency" option under License Search, specify the desired frequency,
and use the "GeoSearch" button at the bottom of the screen to limit
their searches to a particular geographic area. Detailed instructions on
using License Search (including frequency searches and the GeoSearch
capability) and downloading query results are available online by
selecting the "?" button at the bottom right-hand corner of the License
Search screen.

Potential bidders should direct questions regarding the search
capabilities described above to the FCC Technical Support Hotline at
(202) 414-1250 (voice) or (202) 414-1255 (TTY), or via email at
ulscomm@fcc.gov. The hotline is available Monday through Friday, from
8:00 AM to 6:00 PM Eastern Time. In order to provide better service to
the public, *all calls to the hotline are recorded*.

The Commission makes no representations or guarantees regarding the
accuracy or completeness of information that has been provided by
incumbent licensees and incorporated into the database. Potential
bidders are strongly encouraged to physically inspect any sites located
in or near the geographic area for which they plan to bid.

***Participation:*** Those wishing to participate in the auction must:

-   Submit a short form application (FCC Form 175) electronically by
    January 20, 2000.

-   Submit a sufficient upfront payment and a FCC Remittance Advice Form
    (FCC Form 159) by February 7, 2000.

-   Comply with all provisions outlined in this Public Notice.

***Prohibition of Collusion:*** To ensure the competitiveness of the
auction process, the Commission\'s Rules prohibit applicants for the
same geographic license area from communicating with each other during
the auction about bids, bidding strategies, or settlements.[^15] This
prohibition begins with the filing of short-form applications, and ends
on the down payment due date. Bidders competing for the same license(s)
are encouraged not to use the same individual as an authorized bidder. A
violation of the anti‑collusion rule could occur if an individual acts
as the authorized bidder for two or more competing applicants, and
conveys information concerning the substance of bids or bidding
strategies between the bidders he/she is authorized to represent in the
auction. Also, if the authorized bidders are different individuals
employed by the same organization (*e.g.*, law firm or consulting firm),
a violation could similarly occur. At a minimum, in such a case,
applicants should certify on their applications that precautionary steps
have been taken to prevent communication between authorized bidders and
that applicants and their bidding agents will comply with the
anti‑collusion rule.[^16]

The Bureau, however, cautions that merely filing a certifying statement
as part of an application will not outweigh specific evidence that
collusive behavior has occurred nor will it preclude the initiation of
an investigation when warranted.[^17] In the Upper Band auction, for
example, the rule would apply to any applicants bidding for the same
MEA. Therefore, applicants that apply to bid for \"all markets\" would
be precluded from communicating with all other applicants after filing
the FCC Form 175. However, applicants may enter into bidding agreements
*before* filing their FCC Form 175 short-form applications, as long as
they disclose the existence of the agreement(s) in their Form 175
short-form applications.[^18] By signing their FCC Form 175 short form
applications, applicants are certifying their compliance with Section
1.2105(c). In addition, Section 1.65 of the Commission\'s Rules requires
an applicant to *maintain* the accuracy and completeness of information
furnished in its pending application and to notify the Commission within
30 days of any substantial change that may be of decisional significance
to that application.[^19] Thus, Section 1.65 requires an auction
applicant to notify the Commission of any violation of the
anti-collusion rules upon learning of such violation. Bidders are
therefore required to make such notification to the Commission
immediately upon discovery.

***Relevant Authority:*** Prospective bidders must familiarize
themselves thoroughly with the Commission\'s Rules relating to Upper
Band, contained in Title 47, Part 22 and Part 90 of the Code of Federal
Regulations, and those relating to application and auction procedures,
contained in Title 47, Part 1 of the Code of Federal Regulations.

Prospective bidders must also be thoroughly familiar with the
procedures, terms and conditions (collectively, \"Terms\") contained in
the *Second Report and Order* in PP Docket No. 93-253, 9 FCC Rcd 2348
(1994); the *Second Memorandum Opinion and Order* in PP Docket No.
93-253, 9 FCC Rcd 7245 (1994); the *Erratum to the Second Memorandum
Opinion and Order* in PP Docket No. 93-253 (released Oct. 19, 1994);
Revision of Part 22 and Part 90 of the Commission's Rules to Facilitate
Future Development of Paging Systems, WT Docket No. 96-18, *Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking*, 11 FCC Rcd 3108 (1996) ("*Paging Notice*");
Revision of Part 22 and Part 90 of the Commission's Rules to Facilitate
Future Development of Paging Systems, WT Docket No. 96-18, *First Report
and Order*, 11 FCC Rcd 16570 (1996) ("*Paging First Report and Order*");
Revision of Part 22 and Part 90 of the Commission's Rules to Facilitate
Future Development of Paging Systems, WT Docket No. 96-18, *Order on
Reconsideration of First Report and Order*, 11 FCC Rcd 7409 (1996)
("*First Paging Reconsideration*"); Revision of Part 22 and Part 90 of
the Commission's Rules to Facilitate Future Development of Paging
Systems, *Second Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking*, 12 FCC Rcd 2731 (1997) ("*Paging Second Report and
Order*"); Revision of Part 22 and Part 90 of the Commission's Rules to
Facilitate Future Development of Paging Systems, *Memorandum Opinion and
Order on Reconsideration and Third Report and Order*, FCC 99-98 (rel.
May 24, 1999) ("*Paging Reconsideration Order*" and "*Paging Third
Report and Order*").

The terms contained in the Commission\'s Rules, relevant orders, public
notices and bidder information package are not negotiable. The
Commission may amend or supplement the information contained in our
public notices or the bidder information package at any time, and will
issue public notices to convey any new or supplemental information to
bidders. It is the responsibility of all prospective bidders to remain
current with all Commission Rules and with all public notices pertaining
to this auction. Copies of most Commission documents, including public
notices, can be retrieved from the FCC Internet node via anonymous ftp
\@ftp.fcc.gov or the FCC World Wide Web site at
http://www.fcc.gov/wtb/auctions. Additionally, documents may be obtained
for a fee by calling the Commission\'s copy contractor, International
Transcription Service, Inc. (ITS), at (202) 314-3070. When ordering
documents from ITS, please provide the appropriate FCC number (*e.g.*,
FCC 99-98 for *the Paging Third Report and Order*).

***Bidder Alerts:*** All applicants must certify on their FCC Form 175
applications under penalty of perjury that they are legally,
technically, financially and otherwise qualified to hold a license, and
not in default on any payment for Commission licenses (including down
payments) or delinquent on any non-tax debt owed to any Federal agency.
Prospective bidders are reminded that submission of a false
certification to the Commission is a serious matter that may result in
severe penalties, including monetary forfeitures, license revocations,
exclusion from participation in future auctions, and/or criminal
prosecution.

The FCC makes no representations or warranties about the use of this
spectrum for particular services. Applicants should be aware that an FCC
auction represents an opportunity to become an FCC licensee in this
service, subject to certain conditions and regulations. An FCC auction
does not constitute an endorsement by the FCC of any particular
services, technologies or products, nor does an FCC license constitute a
guarantee of business success. Applicants should perform their
individual due diligence before proceeding as they would with any new
business venture.

As is the case with many business investment opportunities, some
unscrupulous entrepreneurs may attempt to use the Upper Bands Auction to
deceive and defraud unsuspecting investors. Common warning signals of
fraud include the following:

-   The first contact is a \"cold call\" from a telemarketer, or is made
    in response to an inquiry prompted by a radio or television
    infomercial.

-   The offering materials used to invest in the venture appear to be
    targeted at IRA funds, for example by including all documents and
    papers needed for the transfer of funds maintained in IRA accounts.

-   The amount of the minimum investment is less than \$25,000.

-   The sales representative makes verbal representations that: (a) the
    Internal Revenue Service (\"IRS\"), Federal Trade Commission
    (\"FTC\"), Securities and Exchange Commission (\"SEC\"), FCC, or
    other government agency has approved the investment; (b) the
    investment is not subject to state or federal securities laws;
    or (c) the investment will yield unrealistically high short-term
    profits. In addition, the offering materials often include copies of
    actual FCC releases, or quotes from FCC personnel, giving the
    appearance of FCC knowledge or approval of the solicitation.

Information about deceptive telemarketing investment schemes is
available from the FTC at (202) 326-2222 and from the SEC at (202)
942-7040. Complaints about specific deceptive telemarketing investment
schemes should be directed to the FTC, the SEC, or the National Fraud
Information Center at (800) 876-7060. Consumers who have concerns about
specific Upper Band proposals may also call the FCC National Call Center
at (888) CALL-FCC ((888) 225-5322).

**2. BIDDER ELIGIBILITY AND SMALL BUSINESS PROVISIONS**

**A. General Eligibility Criteria**

As described above, this auction offers 2,499 licensees in the 929 and
931 MHz bands. In the *Paging Second Report and Order* and *Paging
Reconsideration Order*, the Commission adopted small business provisions
to promote and facilitate the participation of small businesses in the
Upper Bands Auction and in the provision of this and other commercial
mobile radio services. General eligibility to provide Upper Bands
service, subject to any restrictions outlined in the Commission's rules,
is afforded to entities that are not precluded under 47 C.F.R. §§ 22.217
and 22.223.

**(3) Determination of Revenues**

For purposes of determining which entities qualify as very small
businesses or small businesses, the Commission will consider the gross
revenues of the applicant, its controlling interests, and the affiliates
of the applicant and its controlling interests. Therefore, the gross
revenues of all of the above entities must be disclosed *separately and
in the aggregate* as Exhibit C to an applicant\'s FCC Form 175. The
Commission does not impose specific equity requirements on controlling
interests. Once principals or entities with a controlling interest are
determined, only the revenues of those principals or entities will be
counted in determining small business eligibility. The term \"control\"
includes both *de facto* and *de jure* control of the applicant.
Typically, *ownership of at least 50.1 percent of an entity's voting
stock evidences de jure control*. *De facto* control is determined on a
case-by-case basis.[^20] The following are some common indicia of
control:

-   the entity constitutes or appoints more than 50 percent of the board
    of directors or management committee;

-   the entity has authority to appoint, promote, demote, and fire
    senior executives that control the day-to-day activities of the
    licensee; or

-   the entity plays an integral role in management decisions.

**(2) Small or Very Small Business Consortia**

A consortium of small businesses, or very small businesses is a
conglomerate organization formed as a joint venture between or among
mutually independent business firms, each of which *individually*
satisfies the definition of small or very small business in Section
22.223. Thus, each consortium member must disclose its gross revenues
along with those of its affiliates, controlling interests, and
controlling interests\' affiliates. We note that although the gross
revenues of the consortium members will not be aggregated for purposes
of determining eligibility for small or very small business credits,
this information must be provided to ensure that each individual
consortium member qualifies for any bidding credit awarded to the
consortium.

**(3) Application Showing**

Applicants should note that they will be required to file supporting
documentation as Exhibit C to their FCC Form 175 short form applications
to establish that they satisfy the eligibility requirements to qualify
as a small business or very small business (or consortiums of small or
very small businesses) for this auction.[^21] Specifically, for the
Upper Bands Auction, applicants applying to bid as small or very small
businesses (or consortiums of very small, or small businesses) will be
required to file as Exhibit C to their FCC Form 175 short form
applications, all information required under Sections 1.2105(a) and
Section 1.2112(a). In addition, these applicants must disclose,
*separately and in the aggregate*, the gross revenues for the preceding
three years of each of the following: (1) the applicant; (2) the
applicant\'s affiliates; (3) the applicant\'s controlling interests; and
(4) the affiliates of the applicant\'s controlling interests.
Certification that the average gross revenues for the preceding three
years do not exceed the applicable limit is not sufficient. A statement
of the total gross revenues for the preceding three years is also
insufficient. The applicant must provide separately for itself, its
affiliates, and its controlling interests, a schedule of gross revenues
for *each* of the preceding three years, as well as a statement of total
average gross revenues for the three-year period. If the applicant is
applying as a consortium of very small or small businesses, this
information must be provided for each consortium member.

**B. Bidding Credits**

Applicants that qualify under the definitions of small business, and
very small business (or consortia of very small, or small businesses as
are set forth in 47 C.F.R. § 22.223, are eligible for a bidding credit
that represents the amount by which a bidder\'s winning bids are
discounted.[^22] The size of an Upper Bands bidding credit depends on
the average gross revenues for the preceding three years of the bidder
and its controlling interests and affiliates:

-   A bidder with average gross revenues of not more than \$15 million
    for the preceding three years receives a 25 percent discount on its
    winning bids for Upper Bands licenses ("small business");[^23]

-   A bidder with average gross revenues of not more than \$3 million
    for the preceding three years receives a 35 percent discount on its
    winning bids for Upper Bands licenses ("very small business").[^24]

Bidding credits are not cumulative: qualifying applicants receive either
the 25 percent or the 35 percent bidding credit, but not both.

Upper Bands bidders should note that unjust enrichment provisions apply
to winning bidders that use bidding credits and subsequently assign or
transfer control of their licenses to an entity not qualifying for the
same level of bidding credit.[^25] Finally, bidders should also note
that there are no installment payment plans in the Upper Bands Auction.

**3. PRE-AUCTION PROCEDURES**

**A. Short-Form Application (FCC Form 175) \-- Due January 20, 2000**

In order to be eligible to bid in this auction, applicants must first
submit an FCC Form 175 application. This application must be submitted
electronically and received at the Commission by 5:30 p.m. ET on January
20, 2000. Late applications will not be accepted.

There is no application fee required when filing an FCC Form 175.
However, to be eligible to bid, an applicant must submit an upfront
payment. *See* 3.C, *infra*.

**(1) Electronic Filing**

Applicants must file their FCC Form 175 applications
electronically.[^26] Applications may generally be filed at any time
from January 7, 2000 until 5:30 p.m. ET on January 20, 2000. Applicants
are strongly encouraged to file early, and applicants are responsible
for allowing adequate time for filing their applications. Applicants may
update or amend their electronic applications multiple times until the
filing deadline on January 20, 2000.

Applicants must press the \"Submit Form 175\" button on the \"Submit\"
page of the electronic form to successfully submit their FCC Forms 175.
Information about accessing the FCC Form 175 is included in Attachment
D. Technical support is available at (202) 414-1250 (voice) or (202)
414-1255 (text telephone (TTY)); the hours of service are 8 a.m. - 6
p.m. ET, Monday -- Friday.

**(2) Completion of the FCC Form 175**

Applicants should carefully review 47 C.F.R. § 1.105, and must complete
all items on the FCC Form 175. Instructions for completing the FCC Form
175 are in Attachment C of this Public Notice. Applicants are encouraged
to begin preparing the required attachments for FCC Form 175 prior to
submitting the form. Attachments C and D to this Public Notice provide
information on the required attachments and appropriate formats.

**(3) Electronic Review of FCC Form 175**

The FCC Form 175 review software may be used to review and print
applicants\' FCC Form 175 information. Applicants may also view other
applicants\' completed FCC Form 175s after the filing deadline has
passed and the FCC has issued a public notice explaining the status of
the applications. For this reason, it is important that applicants do
not include their Taxpayer Identification Numbers (TINs) on any Exhibits
to their FCC Form 175 applications**.** There is no fee for accessing
this system. *See* Attachment D for details.

**B. Application Processing and Minor Corrections**

After the deadline for filing the FCC Form 175 applications has passed,
the FCC will process all timely submitted applications to determine
which are acceptable for filing, and subsequently will issue a public
notice identifying: (1) those applications accepted for filing
(including FCC account numbers and the licenses for which they applied);
(2) those applications rejected; and (3) those applications which have
minor defects that may be corrected, and the deadline for filing such
corrected applications.

As described more fully in the Commission\'s Rules, after the January
20, 2000, short form filing deadline, applicants may make only minor
corrections to their FCC Form 175 applications. Applicants will not be
permitted to make major modifications to their applications (*e.g.*,
change their license selections, change the certifying official, change
control of the applicant, or change bidding credit eligibility).[^27]

**C. Upfront Payments \-- Due February 7, 2000**

In order to be eligible to bid in the auction, applicants must submit an
upfront payment accompanied by an FCC Remittance Advice Form (FCC Form
159). After completing the FCC Form 175, filers will have access to an
electronic version of the FCC Form 159. All upfront payments must be
received at Mellon Bank in Pittsburgh, PA, by 6:00 p.m. ET on February
7, 2000.

Please note that:

-   All payments must be made in U.S. dollars.

-   All payments must be made by wire transfer.

-   Upfront payments for Auction No. 26 go to a lockbox number different
    from the ones used in previous FCC auctions, and different from the
    lockbox number to be used for post-auction payments.

-   Failure to deliver the upfront payment by the February 7, 2000
    deadline will result in dismissal of the application and
    disqualification from participation in the auction.

**(1) Making Auction Payments by Wire Transfer**

Wire transfer payments must be received by 6:00 p.m. ET on February 7,
2000. To avoid untimely payments, applicants should discuss arrangements
(including bank closing schedules) with their banker several days before
they plan to make the wire transfer, and allow sufficient time for the
transfer to be initiated and completed before the deadline. Applicants
will need the following information:

ABA Routing Number: 043000261

> Receiving Bank: Mellon Pittsburgh

#### BNF: FCC/AC 911-6878

> OBI Field: (Skip one space between each information item)

\"AUCTIONPAY\"

> TAXPAYER IDENTIFICATION NO. (same as FCC Form 159, block 26)
>
> PAYMENT TYPE CODE (enter \"A26U\")
>
> FCC CODE 1 (same as FCC Form 159, block 23A: \"26\")
>
> PAYER NAME (same as FCC Form 159, block 2)

LOCKBOX NO. \# 358400

**NOTE:** The BNF and Lockbox number are specific to the upfront
payments for this auction; do not use BNF or Lockbox numbers from
previous auctions.

Applicants must fax a completed FCC Form 159 to Mellon Bank at (412)
236-5702 at least one hour before placing the order for the wire
transfer (but on the same business day). On the cover sheet of the fax,
write \"Wire Transfer - Auction Payment for Auction Event No. 26.\"
Bidders may confirm receipt of their upfront payment at Mellon Bank by
contacting their sending financial institution.

**(2) FCC Form 159**

A completed FCC Remittance Advice Form (FCC Form 159) must accompany
each upfront payment. Proper completion of FCC Form 159 is critical to
ensuring correct credit of upfront payments. Detailed instructions for
completion of FCC Form 159 are included in Attachment C to this Public
Notice.

**(3) Amount of Upfront Payment**

In the *Part 1 Order, Memorandum Opinion and Order, and Notice of
Proposed Rule Making,* the Commission delegated to the Bureau the
authority and discretion to determine an appropriate upfront payment for
each license being auctioned.[^28] In the *Upper Bands Public Notice*,
the Bureau proposed upfront payments for the Upper Bands Auction.[^29]
Specifically, the Bureau proposed calculating the upfront payment on a
license-by-license basis, using the following formula:

-   \$.0008 \* Pops (the result rounded to the nearest hundred for
    levels below \$10,000 and to the nearest thousand for levels above
    \$10,000) with a minimum of no less than \$2,500 per license.

Metrocall and Morris request the adoption of a different upfront payment
formula.[^30] They claim that upfront payments failing to adequately
account for levels of incumbency are not a rational method of ensuring
the bona fides of bidders, but rather, a penalty against prospective
bidders.[^31] Both Metrocall and Morris conclude that upfront payments
for each license should reflect incumbency levels. Accordingly the
commenters ask that the Commission adopt a formula similar to the 900
MHz SMR Auction, whereby incumbency levels are subtracted from the pops
prior to formulating the payment.[^32]

Although we reject the commenters' request to include incumbency levels
on a license-by-license basis in the upfront payment formula, we
recognize that the proposed formula should be adjusted to reflect
generally high levels of incumbency in the service. Upon re-examination
of the proposed formula, we will modify it as follows:

-   \$.0004 \* Pops (the result rounded to the nearest hundred for
    levels below \$10,000 and to the nearest thousand for levels above
    \$10,000) with a minimum of no less than \$2,500 per license.

The revised formula cuts in half the initial proposal for upfront
payments but retains the \$2,500 minimum level. The upfront payment is a
refundable deposit meant to help ensure sincere bidding and to establish
initial eligibility levels for use with the activity rules discussed in
section 4.A.2. Incorporating incumbency calculations for each of the
2,499 licenses in the auction would be an overly complex and burdensome
process that would not further the purpose of an upfront payment, and as
such, a general reduction in the formula is a more appropriate action.

Please note that upfront payments are not attributed to specific
licenses, but instead will be translated to bidding units to define a
bidder\'s maximum bidding eligibility. For Auction No. 26, the amount of
the upfront payment will be translated into bidding units on a
one-to-one basis, *e.g.*, a \$25,000 upfront payment provides the bidder
with 25,000 bidding units. The total upfront payment defines the maximum
amount of bidding units on which the applicant will be permitted to bid
(including standing high bids) in any single round of bidding. Thus, an
applicant does not have to make an upfront payment to cover all licenses
for which the applicant has selected on FCC Form 175, but rather to
cover the maximum number of bidding units that are associated with
licenses on which the bidder wishes to place bids and hold high bids at
any given time.

In order to be able to place a bid on a license, in addition to having
specified that license on the FCC Form 175, a bidder must have an
eligibility level that meets or exceeds the number of bidding units
assigned to that license. At a minimum, an applicant\'s total upfront
payment must be enough to establish eligibility to bid on at least one
of the licenses applied for on the FCC Form 175, or else the applicant
will not be eligible to participate in the auction.

In calculating its upfront payment amount, an applicant should determine
the [maximum]{.underline} number of bidding units it may wish to bid on
in any single round, and submit an upfront payment covering that number
of bidding units. In order to make this calculation, an applicant should
add together the upfront payments for all licenses on which it seeks to
bid in any given round. Bidders should check their calculations
carefully as there is no provision for increasing a bidder\'s maximum
eligibility after the upfront payment deadline.

NOTE: An applicant may, on its FCC Form 175, apply for every license
being offered, but its actual bidding in any round will be limited by
the bidding units reflected in its upfront payment.

**(4) Applicant\'s Wire Transfer Information for Purposes of Refunds**

To ensure that refunds are processed in an expeditious manner, the
Commission is requesting that all pertinent information as listed below
be supplied to the FCC no later than February 7, 2000. Should the payer
fail to submit the requested information, the refund will be returned to
the original payer. The Commission will use wire transfers for all
Auction No. 26 refunds. Please fax Wire Transfer Instructions to the
FCC, Financial Operations Center, Auctions Accounting Group, ATTN:
Michelle Bennett or Gail Glasser, at (202) 418-2843. For additional
information please call (202) 418-1995.

Name of Bank

#  ABA Number

# Contact and Phone Number

Account Number to Credit

Name of Account Holder

Correspondent Bank (if applicable)

ABA Number

Account Number

(Applicants should also note that implementation of the Debt Collection
Improvement Act of 1996 requires the FCC to obtain a Taxpayer
Identification Number (TIN) before it can disburse refunds.) Eligibility
for refunds is discussed in 5.D., *infra*.

**D. Auction Registration**

Approximately ten days before the auction, the FCC will issue a public
notice announcing all qualified bidders for the auction. Qualified
bidders are those applicants whose FCC Form 175 applications have been
accepted for filing and that have timely submitted upfront payments
sufficient to make them eligible to bid on at least one of the licenses
for which they applied.

All qualified bidders are automatically registered for the auction.
Registration materials will be distributed prior to the auction by two
separate overnight mailings, each containing part of the confidential
identification codes required to place bids. These mailings will be sent
only to the contact person at the applicant address listed in the FCC
Form 175.

Applicants that do not receive both registration mailings will not be
able to submit bids. Therefore, any qualified applicant that has not
received both mailings by noon on Friday, February 18, 2000 should
contact the Auctions Hotline at 1-(888) 225-5322 (option #2) or (717)
338-2888. Receipt of both registration mailings is critical to
participating in the auction and each applicant is responsible for
ensuring it has received all of the registration material.

Qualified bidders should note that lost login codes, passwords or bidder
identification numbers can be replaced only by appearing [in
person]{.underline} at the FCC Auction Headquarters located at 445
12^th^ St., Washington, D.C. 20554. Only an authorized representative or
certifying official, as designated on an applicant\'s FCC Form 175, may
appear in person with two forms of identification (one of which must be
a photo identification) in order to receive replacement codes. Qualified
bidders requiring replacement codes must call technical support prior to
arriving at the FCC to arrange preparation of new codes.

##### E. Remote Electronic Bidding Software

Qualified bidders are allowed to bid electronically or telephonically.
Those choosing to bid electronically must purchase remote electronic
bidding software for \$175.00 by February 11, 2000. (Auction software is
tailored to a specific auction, so software from prior auctions will not
work for Auction No. 26.) A software order form is included in this
public notice. If bidding telephonically, the appropriate phone number
will be supplied in the second Federal Express mailing of confidential
login codes.

**F. Auction Seminar**

On January 7, 2000, the FCC will sponsor a free seminar for the Upper
Bands Auction at the Federal Communications Commission, located at 445
12^th^ Street, S.W. Washington, D.C. The seminar will provide attendees
with information about pre-auction procedures, conduct of the auction,
FCC remote bidding software, and the Paging Upper Band service and
auction rules. The seminar will also provide a unique opportunity for
prospective bidders to ask questions of FCC staff.

To register, complete the registration form included with this Public
Notice and submit it by Wednesday, January 5, 2000. Registrations are
accepted on a first-come, first-served basis.

**G. Mock Auction**

All applicants whose FCC Form 175 and 175-S have been accepted for
filing will be eligible to participate in a mock auction on February 22,
2000. The mock auction will enable applicants to become familiar with
the electronic software prior to the auction. Free demonstration
software will be available for use in the mock auction. Participation by
all bidders is strongly recommended. Details will be announced by public
notice.

4.  **AUCTION EVENT**

The first round of the auction will begin on February 24, 2000. The
initial round schedule will be announced in a Public Notice listing the
qualified bidders, to be released approximately 10 days before the start
of the auction.

**A. Auction Structure**

(**1) Simultaneous Multiple Round Auction**

In the *Upper Bands Public Notice*, we proposed to award the 2,499
licenses in the Upper Bands in a single, simultaneous multiple round
auction.[^33] PCIA requests that the Commission conduct auctions for the
lower band frequencies before it conducts auctions for the 929 MHz and
931 MHz frequencies. [^34] PCIA argues that this sequence of auctions
would reduce the economic hardship on small carriers on the lower bands
that have been subject to the application freeze pending the start of
any auctions.[^35] We note that PCIA made similar requests in WT Docket
No. 96-18 and PR Docket No. 93-253.[^36]

In the *Paging Reconsideration Order*, the Commission directed the
Bureau to resolve this issue after receiving comments pursuant to the
release of the *Upper Bands Public Notice*.[^37] PCIA's claim of general
economic hardship for some licensees fails to reach the level of a
compelling reason for altering our auction sequence at this juncture.
Moreover, although we have corrected the paging information database for
the upper bands, we are still in the process of correcting the lower
bands database.[^38] Auctioning the lower bands first under these
circumstances would seriously delay the paging auctions. By auctioning
the upper bands first, we satisfy our statutory obligation to provide
fast and efficient communications service to the public.

PCIA further requests that if the Upper Bands Auction occurs first, the
Bureau should break the licenses up into smaller regional areas prior to
auction and provide for five auctions instead of one.[^39] We conclude
that it is operationally feasible and appropriate to auction all 2,499
Upper Bands licenses through a single, simultaneous multiple round
auction. Enhancements to the Commission's Automated Auction System
software will allow bidders to easily view and access the licenses in
Auction 26, including license group viewing options and search and sort
capabilities. PCIA has failed to persuade us that the current structure
would be burdensome or harmful to potential bidders. An auction of this
nature provides for an economy of scale, whereas having five separate
auctions could cause significant administrative burdens, to participants
in multiple auctions and unnecessarily protract the auction process.
Unless otherwise announced, bids will be accepted on all licenses in
each round of the auction. This approach, we believe, allows bidders to
take advantage of any synergies that exist among licenses and is most
administratively efficient.

**(2) Maximum Eligibility and Activity Rules**

In the *Upper Bands Public Notice*, we proposed that the amount of the
upfront payment submitted by a bidder would determine the initial
maximum eligibility (as measured in bidding units) for each bidder.[^40]
We received no comments on this issue.

For the Upper Bands Auction we will adopt this proposal. The amount of
the upfront payment submitted by a bidder determines the initial maximum
eligibility (in bidding units) for each bidder. Note again that upfront
payments are not attributed to specific licenses, but instead will be
translated into bidding units to define a bidder\'s initial maximum
eligibility. The total upfront payment defines the maximum number of
bidding units on which the applicant will initially be permitted to bid.
As there is no provision for increasing a bidder\'s maximum eligibility
during the course of an auction (as described under \"Auction Stages\"
as set forth in Part 4.A.(4)), prospective bidders are cautioned to
calculate their upfront payments carefully.

In order to ensure that the auction closes within a reasonable period of
time, an activity rule requires bidders to bid actively throughout the
auction, rather than wait until the end before participating. Bidders
are required to be active on a specific percentage of their maximum
eligibility during each round of the auction.

A bidder is considered active on a license in the current round if it is
either the high bidder at the end of the previous bidding round and does
not withdraw the high bid in the current round, or if it submits an
acceptable bid in the current round (*see* \"Minimum Accepted Bids\" in
Part 4.B.(3), *infra*). A bidder\'s activity level in a round is the sum
of the bidding units associated with licenses on which the bidder is
active. The minimum required activity level is expressed as a percentage
of the bidder\'s maximum bidding eligibility, and increases as the
auction progresses. Because these procedures have proven successful in
maintaining the pace of previous auctions as set forth under \"Auction
Stages\" in Part 4.A.(4) and \"Stage Transitions\" in Part 4.A.(5),
*infra*, we adopt them for the Upper Bands Auction.

**(3) Activity Rule Waivers and Reducing Eligibility**

In the *Upper Bands Public Notice*, we proposed that each bidder in the
auction would be provided five activity rule waivers that may be used in
any round during the course of the auction.[^41] PCIA objects to this
proposal and instead requests that the Commission allocate activity rule
waivers for each stage of the auction (*e.g*., two or three per stage),
with the caveat that any unused waivers could not be carried over to a
subsequent stage.[^42] PCIA claims that this approach would give
applicants sufficient flexibility consistent with the Commission's goals
but would eliminate the use of waivers to keep the auction open for an
inordinate period of time.[^43]

Based upon our experience in previous auctions, we adopt our proposal
that each bidder be provided five activity rule waivers that may be used
in any round during the course of the auction. Use of an activity rule
waiver preserves the bidder\'s current bidding eligibility despite the
bidder\'s activity in the current round being below the required minimum
level. An activity rule waiver applies to an entire round of bidding and
not to a particular license. We are satisfied that our practice of
providing five waivers over the course of the auction provides a
sufficient number of waivers and maximum flexibility to the bidders,
while safeguarding the integrity of the auction system. We have seen no
evidence to support PCIA's claim that the use of waivers under our
guidelines could delay the closing of the auction rather than stimulate
participation.

The FCC auction system assumes that bidders with insufficient activity
would prefer to use an activity rule waiver (if available) rather than
lose bidding eligibility. Therefore, the system will automatically apply
a waiver (known as an \"automatic waiver\") at the end of any round
where a bidder\'s activity level is below the minimum required unless:
(1) there are no activity rule waivers available; or (2) the bidder
overrides the automatic application of a waiver by reducing eligibility,
thereby meeting the minimum requirements.

A bidder with insufficient activity that wants to reduce its bidding
eligibility rather than use an activity rule waiver must affirmatively
override the automatic waiver mechanism during the round by using the
reduce eligibility function in the software. In this case, the bidder\'s
eligibility is permanently reduced to bring the bidder into compliance
with the activity rules as described in \"Auction Stages\" (*see* Part
4.A.(4) discussion below). Once eligibility has been reduced, a bidder
will not be permitted to regain its lost bidding eligibility.

Finally, a bidder may proactively use an activity rule waiver as a means
to keep the auction open without placing a bid. If a bidder submits a
proactive waiver (using the proactive waiver function in the bidding
software) during a round in which no bids are submitted, the auction
will remain open and the bidder\'s eligibility will be preserved. An
automatic waiver invoked in a round in which there are no new valid bids
or withdrawals will not keep the auction open.

(**4) Auction Stages**

In the *Upper Bands Public Notice*, we proposed to conduct the auction
in three stages and employ an activity rule. We further proposed that,
in each round of Stage One, a bidder desiring to maintain its current
eligibility would be required to be active on licenses encompassing at
least 80 percent of its current bidding eligibility. [^44] In each round
of Stage Two, a bidder desiring to maintain its current eligibility
would be required to be active on at least 90 percent of its current
bidding eligibility. Finally, we proposed that a bidder in Stage Three,
in order to maintain eligibility, would be required to be active on 98
percent of its current bidding eligibility. We received no comment on
these proposals.

We conclude that the auction will be composed of three stages, which are
each defined by an increasing activity rule. We will adopt our proposals
for the activity rules. Below are the activity levels for each stage of
the auction. The FCC reserves the discretion to further alter the
activity percentages before and/or during the auction.

**Stage One**: During the first stage of the auction, a bidder desiring
to maintain its current eligibility will be required to be active on
licenses that represent at least 80 percent of its current bidding
eligibility in each bidding round. Failure to maintain the required
activity level will result in a reduction in the bidder\'s bidding
eligibility in the next round of bidding (unless an activity rule waiver
is used). During Stage One, reduced eligibility for the next round will
be calculated by multiplying the sum of bidding units of the bidder's
standing high bids and valid bids during the current round by
five-fourths (5/4).

**Stage Two**: During the second stage of the auction, a bidder desiring
to maintain its current eligibility is required to be active on 90
percent of its current bidding eligibility. Failure to maintain the
required activity level will result in a reduction in the bidder\'s
bidding eligibility in the next round of bidding (unless an activity
rule waiver is used). During Stage Two, reduced eligibility for the next
round will be calculated by multiplying the sum of bidding units of the
bidder's standing high bids and valid bids during the current round by
ten-ninths (10/9).

**Stage Three**: During the third stage of the auction, a bidder
desiring to maintain its current eligibility is required to be active on
98 percent of its current bidding eligibility. Failure to maintain the
required activity level will result in a reduction in the bidder\'s
bidding eligibility in the next round of bidding (unless an activity
rule waiver is used). In this stage, reduced eligibility for the next
round will be calculated by multiplying the sum of bidding units of the
bidder's standing high bids and valid bids during the current round by
fifty-fortyninths (50/49).

**CAUTION:** Since activity requirements increase in each auction stage,
bidders must carefully check their current activity during the bidding
period of the first round following a stage transition. This is
especially critical for bidders that have standing high bids and do not
plan to submit new bids. In past auctions, some bidders have
inadvertently lost bidding eligibility or used an activity rule waiver
because they did not re-verify their activity status at stage
transitions. Bidders may check their activity against the required
minimum activity level by using the bidding software\'s bidding module.

Because the foregoing procedures have proven successful in maintaining
proper pace in previous auctions, we adopt them for the Upper Bands
Auction.

**(5) Stage Transitions**

In the *Upper Bands Public Notice*, we proposed that the auction would
advance to the next stage (*i.e.*, from Stage One to Stage Two, and from
Stage Two to Stage Three) when the auction activity level, as measured
by the percentage of bidding units receiving new high bids, is below 10
percent for three consecutive rounds of bidding in each Stage. However,
we further proposed that the Bureau would retain the discretion to
change stages unilaterally by announcement during the auction. This
determination, we proposed, would be based on a variety of measures of
bidder activity, including, but not limited to, the auction activity
level, the percentages of licenses (as measured in bidding units) on
which there are new bids, the number of new bids, and the percentage
increase in revenue.[^45] We received no comments on this subject.

We adopt our proposal. Thus, the auction will start in Stage One. Under
the FCC\'s general guidelines it will advance to the next stage (*i.e.*,
from Stage One to Stage Two, and from Stage Two to Stage Three) when, in
each of three consecutive rounds of bidding, the high bid has increased
on 10 percent or less of the licenses being auctioned (as measured in
bidding units). However, the Bureau will retain the discretion to
regulate the pace of the auction by announcement. This determination
will be based on a variety of measures of bidder activity, including,
but not limited to, the auction activity level, the percentages of
licenses (as measured in bidding units) on which there are new bids, the
number of new bids, and the percentage increase in revenue. We believe
that these stage transition rules, having proven successful in prior
auctions, are appropriate for use in the Paging Upper Bands Auction.

**(6) Auction Stopping Rules**

In the *Paging* *Reconsideration Order*, the Commission upheld the
hybrid simultaneous/license-by-license stopping rule that had been
adopted for the paging auctions in the *Paging Second Report and Order*,
but retained discretion for the Bureau to use another stopping rule
after seeking further comment on this issue in the pre-auction
process.[^46] For the Upper Bands Auction, the Bureau proposed to employ
a simultaneous stopping rule.[^47] The Bureau concluded that our
proposal to conduct a series of auctions for the upper and lower bands
would eliminate the risk of unnecessarily protracted auctions, and
likewise, the need for a hybrid-stopping rule. We also sought comment on
a modified version of the simultaneous stopping rule. The modified
version of the stopping rule would close the auction for all licenses
after the first round in which no bidder submits a proactive waiver, a
withdrawal, or a new bid on any license on which it is not the standing
high bidder. Thus, absent any other bidding activity, a bidder placing a
new bid on a license for which it is the standing high bidder would not
keep the auction open under this modified stopping rule. The Bureau
further sought comment on whether this modified stopping rule should be
used unilaterally or only in stage three of the auction.

The Bureau also proposed retaining the discretion to keep an auction
open even if no new acceptable bids or proactive waivers are submitted
and no previous high bids are withdrawn. In addition, we proposed that
the Bureau reserve the right to declare that the auction will end after
a specified number of additional rounds (\"special stopping rule\"). If
the Bureau invokes this special stopping rule, it will accept bids in
the final round(s) only for licenses on which the high bid increased in
at least one of the preceding specified number of rounds. We proposed to
exercise this option only in circumstances such as where the auction is
proceeding very slowly, where there is minimal overall bidding activity
or where it appears likely that the auction will not close within a
reasonable period of time.[^48]

All four commenters support the use of the hybrid license by license
stopping rule.[^49] Morris, Metrocall, and PCIA state that the sheer
volume of the auction, coupled with the number of encumbered areas
requires the modified approach.[^50] They claim that there will be
numerous MEAs in which the bidding will be light, and even some
instances where no bids at all are placed in the first round. Other
geographic areas are likely to inspire intense bidding wars. SBT also
urges the use of the hybrid rule because the simultaneous stopping rule
would encourage speculators.[^51]

We adopt our proposals concerning the stopping rule. Adoption of these
rules, we believe, is most appropriate for the Upper Bands Auction
because our experience in prior auctions demonstrates that the
simultaneous stopping rule balanced the interests of administrative
efficiency and maximum bidder participation. The substitutability
between and among licenses in different geographic areas and the
importance of preserving the ability of bidders to pursue backup
strategies support the use of a simultaneous stopping rule. Further, the
Commission also can regulate the pace of the auction by conducting more
bidding rounds per day, employing bid increments that reflect activity
levels as specific markets and accelerating stage changes.

Thus, bidding will remain open on all licenses until bidding stops on
every license. The auction will close for all licenses when one round
passes during which no bidder submits a new acceptable bid on any
license, applies a proactive waiver, or withdraws a previous high bid.
After the first such round, bidding closes simultaneously on all
licenses. In addition, the Bureau retains the discretion to close the
auction for all licenses after the first round in which no bidder
submits a proactive waiver, a withdrawal, or a new bid on any license on
which it is not the standing high bidder. Thus, absent any other bidding
activity, a bidder placing a new bid on a license for which it is the
standing high bidder would not keep the auction open under this stopping
rule procedure. We will notify bidders in advance of implementing any
change to our simultaneous stopping rule.

The Bureau also retains the discretion to keep the auction open even if
no new acceptable bids or proactive waivers are submitted, and no
previous high bids are withdrawn in a round. In this event, the effect
will be the same as if a bidder had submitted a proactive waiver. Thus,
the activity rule will apply as usual, and a bidder with insufficient
activity will either lose bidding eligibility or use an activity rule
waiver (if it has any left).

Further, in its discretion, the Bureau reserves the right to invoke the
"special stopping rule." If the FCC invokes this special stopping rule,
it will accept bids in the final round(s) only for licenses on which the
high bid increased in at least one of the preceding specified number of
rounds. Before exercising this option, the FCC is likely to attempt to
increase the pace of the auction by, for example, moving the auction
into the next stage (where bidders would be required to maintain a
higher level of bidding activity), increasing the number of bidding
rounds per day, and/or adjusting the amount of the minimum bid
increments for the licenses.

**(7) Auction Delay, Suspension, or Cancellation**

In the *Paging Upper Band*s *Public Notice*, we proposed that, by public
notice or by announcement during the auction, the Bureau may delay,
suspend, or cancel the auction in the event of natural disaster,
technical obstacle, evidence of an auction security breach, unlawful
bidding activity, administrative or weather necessity, or for any other
reason that affects the fair and competitive conduct of competitive
bidding.[^52]

Because this approach has proven effective in resolving exigent
circumstances in previous auctions, we will adopt our proposed auction
cancellation rules. By public notice or by announcement during the
auction, the Bureau may delay, suspend or cancel the auction in the
event of natural disaster, technical obstacle, evidence of an auction
security breach, unlawful bidding activity, administrative or weather
necessity, or for any other reason that affects the fair and competitive
conduct of competitive bidding. In such cases, the Bureau, in its sole
discretion, may elect to: resume the auction starting from the beginning
of the current round; resume the auction starting from some previous
round; or cancel the auction in its entirety. Network interruption may
cause the Bureau to delay or suspend the auction. We emphasize that
exercise of this authority is solely within the discretion of the
Bureau, and its use is not intended to be a substitute for situations in
which bidders may wish to apply their activity rule waivers.

**B. Bidding Procedures**

**(1) Round Structure**

The initial bidding schedule will be announced by public notice at least
one week before the start of the auction, and will be included in the
registration mailings. The round structure for each bidding round
contains a single bidding round followed by the release of the round
results. Details regarding round results formats and locations will be
included in the bidder information package.

The FCC has discretion to change the bidding schedule in order to foster
an auction pace that reasonably balances speed with the bidders\' need
to study round results and adjust their bidding strategies. The FCC may
increase or decrease the amount of time for the bidding rounds and
review periods, or the number of rounds per day, depending upon the
bidding activity level and other factors.

**(2) Reserve Price or Minimum Opening Bid**

**a. Background**

The Balanced Budget Act of 1997 calls upon the Commission to prescribe
methods by which a reasonable reserve price will be required or a
minimum opening bid established when FCC licenses are subject to auction
(*i.e.*, because they are mutually exclusive), unless the Commission
determines that a reserve price or minimum opening bid is not in the
public interest.[^53] Consistent with this mandate, the Commission
directed the Wireless Telecommunications Bureau (\"Bureau\") to seek
comment on the use of a minimum opening bid and/or reserve price prior
to the start of each auction.[^54] Among other factors, the Bureau must
consider the amount of spectrum being auctioned, levels of incumbency,
the availability of technology to provide service, the size of the
geographic service areas, the extent of interference with other spectrum
bands, and any other relevant factors that could have an impact on
valuation of the spectrum being auctioned.[^55] The Commission concluded
that the Bureau should have the discretion to employ either or both of
these mechanisms for future auctions.[^56]

In the *Upper Bands Public Notice*, the Bureau proposed to establish
minimum opening bids for the Upper Bands Auction and to retain
discretion to lower the minimum opening bids.[^57] Specifically, for
Auction No. 26, the Commission proposed the following license-by-license
formulas for calculating minimum opening bids, based on the population
(\"pops\") of the BTA:

-   \$.001 \* Pops (the result rounded to the nearest hundred for levels
    below \$10,000 and to the nearest thousand for levels above
    \$10,000) with a minimum of no less than \$2,500 per license.

In the alternative, the Bureau sought comment on whether, consistent
with the Balanced Budget Act, the public interest would be served by
having no minimum opening bid or reserve price.

b.  **Discussion**

All of the commenters support minimum bids instead of reserve pricing,
but request the Commission to take into account incumbency levels in its
calculation formula.[^58] The commenters argue that the current formula
inflates the market prices of the licenses by ignoring the level of
incumbency. Moreover, they claim that this minimum bid could actually be
the only bid issued in many markets.

We will adopt minimum opening bids for the licenses in the Upper Bands
Auction, which are reducible at the discretion of the Bureau. Congress
has enacted a presumption that unless the Commission determines
otherwise, minimum opening bids or reserve prices are in the public
interest.[^59] Based on our experience in using minimum opening bids in
other auctions, we believe that minimum opening bids speed the course of
the auction and ensure that valuable assets are not sold for nominal
prices, without unduly interfering with the efficient assignment of
licenses.[^60]

The commenters' arguments regarding the encumbrance of many of the
paging licenses have convinced us that some proposed minimum opening bid
values could be too high, and thus we will establish minimum opening
bids that are in many cases lower than we first proposed. Accordingly,
we will use the following formula for calculating minimum opening bids:

-   \$.0005 \* Pops (the result rounded to the nearest hundred for
    levels below \$10,000 and to the nearest thousand for levels above
    \$10,000) with a minimum of no less than \$2,500 per license.

We do not accept the commenters' suggested formula setting minimum
opening bids using a license-by-license encumbrance adjustment. We find
that such an approach would be unnecessarily complex and inappropriate.
Because our minimum opening bids serve primarily as a starting point for
bidding, and do not play the role of traditional reserve prices of
maximizing revenue raised in the auction, there is no need to base them
upon complicated formulas involving considerable license-specific
information. Moreover, simple formulas do not disadvantage any
prospective bidders, because we do not expect generally that winning
bids will be equal to the minimum opening values, but rather well above
those opening values.

In addition, we have not previously established minimum opening bid
formulas on license-specific information such as encumbrance. While we
have differentiated among broad groups of licenses in setting minimum
opening bid formulas in some past auctions (e.g., in the first LMDS
auction, where we established three "tiers," for the A and B Block
licenses), here we find there is no need to establish groups with
differing formulas. In particular, we are aware of no significant
difference in the average encumbrance of the 929 and 931 licenses, or
other factors that would suggest treating the 929 and 931 licenses
differently. Finally, we note that license-by-license encumbrance cannot
be determined with certainty, but must be estimated using assumptions
about relevant factors such as the height of towers and power levels
being used by incumbents. Thus, it is not clear that a more complex,
license-by-license approach to encumbrance would necessarily produce
superior information upon which to base minimum opening bids.

We conclude that the adopted formula presented here best meets the
objectives of our authority in establishing reasonable minimum opening
bids. We have noted in the past that the reserve price and minimum
opening bid provision is not a requirement to maximize auction revenue
but rather a protection against assigning licenses at unacceptably low
prices and that we must balance the revenue raising objective against
our other public interest objectives in setting the minimum bid
level.[^61] For the sake of auction integrity and fairness, minimum
opening bids must be set in a manner that is consistent across licenses.

As a final safeguard against unduly high pricing, minimum opening bids
are reducible at the discretion of the Bureau. This will allow the
Bureau flexibility to adjust the minimum opening bids if circumstances
warrant. We emphasize, however, that such discretion will be exercised,
if at all, sparingly and early in the auction, *i.e.*, before bidders
lose all waivers and begin to lose substantial eligibility. During the
course of the auction, the Bureau will not entertain any bidder requests
to reduce the minimum opening bid on specific licenses.

**(3) Minimum Accepted Bids**

In the *Upper Bands Public Notice*, we proposed to use a smoothing
methodology to calculate minimum bid increments.[^62] We further
proposed to retain the discretion to change the minimum bid increment if
circumstances so dictate.[^63] Only PCIA commented on this particular
issue.[^64] PCIA claims that the Bureau's approach will create
unnecessarily large minimum bid increments because the increase would be
based primarily on the number of bids.[^65] The result, PCIA says, would
be that licensees would pay significantly more for authorizations
without due justification.[^66]

We disagree with PCIA's theory and decline to accept it for the Upper
Bands Auction. Instead, we will adopt our proposal for a smoothing
formula. The smoothing methodology is designed to vary the increment for
a given license between a maximum and minimum value based on the bidding
activity on that license. This methodology allows the increments to be
tailored to the activity level of a license, decreasing the time it
takes for active licenses to reach their final value. The formula used
to calculate this increment is included as Attachment J.

We adopt our proposal of initial values for the maximum of 0.2 or 20% of
the license value, and a minimum of 0.1 or 10% of the license value. The
Bureau retains the discretion to change the minimum bid increment if it
determines that circumstances so dictate, such as raising the minimum
increment toward the end of the auction to enable bids to reach their
final values more quickly. The Bureau will do so by announcement in the
Automated Auction System. Under its discretion the Bureau may also
implement an absolute dollar floor for the bid increment to further
facilitate a timely close of the auction. The Bureau may also use its
discretion to adjust the minimum bid increment without prior notice if
circumstances warrant. As an alternative approach, the Bureau may, in
its discretion, adjust the minimum bid increment gradually over a number
of rounds as opposed to single large changes in the minimum bid
increment (*e.g*., by raising the increment floor by one percent every
round over the course of ten rounds). The Bureau also retains the
discretion to use alternate methodologies for the Upper Band Auction if
circumstances warrant.

**(4) High Bids**

Each bid will be date- and time-stamped when it is entered into the FCC
computer system. In the event of tie bids, the Commission will identify
the high bidder on the basis of the order in which the Commission
receives bids. The bidding software allows bidders to make multiple
submissions in a round. As each bid is individually date- and
time-stamped according to when it was submitted, bids submitted by a
bidder earlier in a round will have an earlier date and time stamp than
bids submitted later in a round.

**(5) Bidding**

During a bidding round, a bidder may submit bids for as many licenses as
it wishes, subject to its eligibility, as well as withdraw high bids
from previous bidding rounds, remove bids placed in the same bidding
round, or permanently reduce eligibility. Bidders also have the option
of making multiple submissions and withdrawals in each bidding round. If
a bidder submits multiple bids for a single license in the same round,
the system takes the last bid entered as that bidder\'s bid for the
round, and the date- and time-stamp of that bid reflects the latest time
the bid was submitted.

Please note that all bidding will take place remotely either through the
automated bidding software or by telephonic bidding. (Telephonic bid
assistants are required to use a script when handling bids placed by
telephone. Telephonic bidders are therefore reminded to allow sufficient
time to bid, by placing their calls well in advance of the close of a
round, because four to five minutes are necessary to complete a bid
submission.) There will be no on-site bidding during Auction No. 26.

A bidder\'s ability to bid on specific licenses in the first round of
the auction is determined by two factors: (1) the licenses applied for
on FCC Form 175; and (2) the upfront payment amount deposited. The bid
submission screens will be tailored for each bidder to include only
those licenses for which the bidder applied on its FCC Form 175. A
bidder also has the option to further tailor its bid submission screens
to call up specified groups of licenses.

The bidding software requires each bidder to login to the FCC auction
system during the bidding round using the FCC account number, bidder
identification number, and the confidential security codes provided in
the registration materials. Bidders are strongly encouraged to download
and print bid confirmations [after]{.underline} they submit their bids.

The bid entry screen of the Automated Auction System software for the
Upper Band auction allows bidders to place multiple increment bids which
will let bidders increase high bids from one to nine bid increments. A
single bid increment is defined as the difference between the standing
high bid and the minimum acceptable bid for a license.

To place a bid on a license, the bidder must enter a whole number
between 1 and 9 in the bid increment multiplier (Bid Mult) field. This
value will determine the amount of the bid (Amount Bid) by multiplying
the bid increment multiplier by the bid increment and adding the result
to the high bid amount according to the following formula:

**Amount Bid = High Bid + (Bid Mult \* Bid Increment)**

Thus, bidders may place a bid that exceeds the standing high bid by
between one and nine times the bid increment. For example, to bid the
minimum acceptable bid, which is equal to one bid increment, a bidder
will enter \"1\" in the bid increment multiplier column and press
submit.

For any license on which the FCC is designated as the high bidder
(*i.e.*, a license that has not yet received a bid in the auction or
where the high bid was withdrawn and a new bid has not yet been placed),
bidders will be limited to bidding only the minimum acceptable bid. In
both of these cases no increment exists for the licenses, and bidders
should enter \"1\" in the Bid Mult field. Note that in this case, any
whole number between 1 and 9 entered in the multiplier column will
result in a bid value at the minimum acceptable bid amount. Finally,
bidders are cautioned in entering numbers in the Bid Mult field because,
as explained in the following section, a high bidder that withdraws its
standing high bid from a previous round, even if mistakenly or
erroneously made, is subject to bid withdrawal payments.

**(6) Bid Removal and Bid Withdrawal**

In the *Upper Bands Public Notice*, we proposed bid removal and bid
withdrawal rules.[^67] With respect to bid withdrawals, we proposed
limiting each bidder to withdrawals in no more than two rounds during
the course of the auction. The two rounds in which withdrawals are
utilized, we proposed, would be at the bidder\'s discretion. PCIA
objects to this proposal because the volume of licenses being auctioned
might require bidders to utilize more withdrawals.[^68] We reject PCIA's
request, for the reasons discussed below.

In previous auctions, we have detected bidder conduct that, arguably,
may have constituted strategic bidding through the use of bid
withdrawals. While we continue to recognize the important role that bid
withdrawals play in an auction, *i.e.*, reducing risk associated with
efforts to secure various geographic area licenses in combination, we
conclude that, for the Upper Bands Auction, adoption of a limit on their
use to two rounds is the most appropriate outcome. By doing so we
believe we strike a reasonable compromise that will allow bidders to use
withdrawals. Our decision on this issue is based upon our experience in
prior auctions, particularly the PCS D, E and F block auction, 800 MHz
SMR auction, and is in no way a reflection of our view regarding the
likelihood of any speculation or \"gaming\" in this Upper Bands Auction.

The Bureau will therefore limit the number of rounds in which bidders
may place withdrawals to two rounds. These rounds will be at the
bidder\'s discretion and there will be no limit on the number of bids
that may be withdrawn in either of these rounds. Withdrawals will still
be subject to the bid withdrawal payments specified in 47 C.F.R. §§
1.2104(g), and 1.2109. Bidders should note that abuse of the
Commission\'s bid withdrawal procedures could result in the denial of
the ability to bid on a market. If a high bid is withdrawn, the license
will be offered in the next round at the second highest bid price, which
may be less than, or equal to, in the case of tie bids, the amount of
the withdrawn bid, without any bid increment. The FCC will serve as a
\"place holder\" on the license until a new acceptable bid is submitted
on that license.

**a. Procedures**

Before the close of a bidding round, a bidder has the option of removing
any bids placed in that round. By using the \"remove bid\" function in
the software, a bidder may effectively \"unsubmit\" any bid placed
within that round. A bidder removing a bid placed in the same round is
not subject to withdrawal payments. Removing a bid will affect a
bidder\'s activity for the round in which it is removed. This procedure,
about which we received no comments, will enhance bidder flexibility
during the auction. Therefore, we will adopt these procedures for the
Upper Bands Auction.

Once a round closes, a bidder may no longer remove a bid. However, in
the next round, a bidder may withdraw standing high bids from previous
rounds using the \"withdraw bid\" function (assuming that the bidder has
not exhausted its withdrawal allowance). A high bidder that withdraws
its standing high bid from a previous round is subject to the bid
withdrawal payments specified in 47 C.F.R. §§ 1.2104(g) and 1.2109. The
procedure for withdrawing a bid and receiving a withdrawal confirmation
is essentially the same as the bidding procedure described in \"High
Bids,\" Part 4.B.(4).

**b. Calculation**

Generally, the Commission imposes payments on bidders that withdraw high
bids during the course of an auction.[^69] Specifically, a bidder
("Bidder X") that withdraws a high bid during the course of an auction
is subject to a bid withdrawal payment equal to the difference between
the amount withdrawn and the amount of the subsequent winning bid. If a
high bid is withdrawn on a license that remains unsold at the close of
the auction, Bidder X will be required to make an interim payment equal
to three (3) percent of the net amount of the withdrawn bid.[^70] This
payment amount is deducted from any upfront payments or down payments
that Bidder X has deposited with the Commission. If, in a subsequent
auction, that license receives a valid bid in an amount equal to or
greater than the withdrawn bid amount, then no final bid withdrawal
payment will be assessed, and Bidder X may request a refund of the
interim three (3) percent payment. If, in a subsequent auction, the
selling price for that license is less than Bidder X's withdrawn bid
amount, then Bidder X will be required to make a final bid withdrawal
payment equal to either the difference between Bidder X's net withdrawn
bid and the subsequent net winning bid, or the difference between Bidder
X's gross withdrawn bid and the subsequent gross winning bid, whichever
is less.

**(7) Round Results**

All of the commenters addressing the issue of disclosure support our
proposal to disclose bidder identity, bid amounts, and withdrawal
information during the course of the auction.[^71] The bids placed
during a round will not be published until the conclusion of that
bidding period. After a round closes, the FCC will compile reports of
all bids placed, bids withdrawn, current high bids, new minimum accepted
bids, and bidder eligibility status (bidding eligibility and activity
rule waivers), and post the reports for public access. Reports
reflecting bidders\' identities and bidder identification numbers for
Auction No. 26 will be available before and during the auction. Thus,
bidders will know in advance of this auction the identities of the
bidders against which they are bidding.

**(8) Auction Announcements**

The FCC will use auction announcements to announce items such as
schedule changes and stage transitions. All FCC auction announcements
will be available on the FCC remote electronic bidding system, as well
as the Internet and the FCC Bulletin Board System.

**(9) Other Matters**

As noted in 3.B., after the short-form filing deadline, applicants may
make only minor changes to their FCC Form 175 applications. For example,
permissible minor changes include deletion and addition of authorized
bidders (to a maximum of three) and revision of exhibits. Filers must
make these changes on-line, and submit a letter to Amy Zoslov, Chief,
Auctions and Industry Analysis Division, Wireless Telecommunications
Bureau, Federal Communications Commission, 445 12^th^ Street, S.W.,
Washington, D.C. 20554 (and mail a separate copy to Arthur Lechtman,
Auctions and Industry Analysis Division), briefly summarizing the
changes. Questions about other changes should be directed to Arthur
Lechtman of the FCC Auctions and Industry Analysis Division at (202)
418-0660.

5.  **POST-AUCTION PROCEDURES**

    **A. Down Payments and Withdrawn Bid Payments**

After bidding has ended, the Commission will issue a public notice
declaring the auction closed, identifying the winning bids and bidders
for each license, and listing withdrawn bid payments due.

Within ten business days after release of the auction closing notice,
each winning bidder must submit sufficient funds (in addition to its
upfront payment) to bring its total amount of money on deposit with the
Government to 20 percent of its net winning bids (actual bids less any
applicable bidding credits). *See* 47 C.F.R. § 1.2107(b). In addition,
by the same deadline all bidders must pay any withdrawn bid amounts due
under 47 C.F.R. § 1.2104(g), as discussed in \"Bid Removal and Bid
Withdrawal,\" Part 4.B.(6). (Upfront payments are applied first to
satisfy any withdrawn bid liability, before being applied toward down
payments.)

**B. Long-Form Application**

Within ten business days after release of the auction closing notice,
winning bidders must electronically submit a properly completed
long-form application and required exhibits for each Upper Band license
won through the auction. Winning bidders that are small businesses or
very small businesses must include an exhibit demonstrating their
eligibility for bidding credits. *See* 47 C.F.R. § 1.2112(b). Further
filing instructions will be provided to auction winners at the close of
the auction.

**C. Default and Disqualification**

Any high bidder that defaults or is disqualified after the close of the
auction (*i.e.*, fails to remit the required down payment within the
prescribed period of time, fails to submit a timely long-form
application, fails to make full payment, or is otherwise disqualified)
will be subject to the payments described in 47 C.F.R. § 1.2104(g)(2).
In such event the Commission may re-auction the license or offer it to
the next highest bidders (in descending order) at their final bids.
*See* 47 C.F.R. § 1.2109(b) and (c). In addition, if a default or
disqualification involves gross misconduct, misrepresentation, or bad
faith by an applicant, the Commission may declare the applicant and its
principals ineligible to bid in future auctions, and may take any other
action that it deems necessary, including institution of proceedings to
revoke any existing licenses held by the applicant. *See* 47 C.F.R. §
1.2109(d).

**D. Refund of Remaining Upfront Payment Balance**

All applicants that submitted upfront payments but were not winning
bidders for an Upper Bands license may be entitled to a refund of their
remaining upfront payment balance after the conclusion of the auction.
No refund will be made unless there are excess funds on deposit from
that applicant after any applicable bid withdrawal payments have been
paid.

Bidders that drop out of the auction completely may be eligible for a
refund of their upfront payments before the close of the auction.
However, bidders that reduce their eligibility and remain in the auction
are not eligible for partial refunds of upfront payments until the close
of the auction. Qualified bidders that have exhausted all of their
activity rule waivers, have no remaining bidding eligibility, and have
not withdrawn a high bid during the auction must submit a written refund
request which includes wire transfer instructions, a Taxpayer
Identification Number (\"TIN\"), and a copy of their bidding eligibility
screen print, to:

Federal Communications Commission

Financial Operations Center

Auctions Accounting Group

Shirley Hanberry

445 12th Street, S.W., Room 1-A824

Washington, D.C. 20554

Bidders can also fax their request to the Auctions Accounting Group at
(202) 418-2843. Once the request has been approved, a refund will be
sent to the address provided on the FCC Form 159.

> NOTE: Refund processing generally takes up to two weeks to complete.
> Bidders with questions about refunds should contact Michelle Bennett
> or Gail Glasser at (202) 418-1995.

**Media Contact:** Meribeth McCarrick at (202) 418-0654

**Auctions and Industry Analysis Division:** Lisa Hartigan, Operations
or Arthur Lechtman, Legal Branch at (202) 418-0660; Bob Reagle, Auctions
Analysis at (717)338-2807.

**Commercial Wireless Division:** Cynthia Thomas, Policy and Rules
Branch (202)418--7240; Charlene Lagerwerff, Licensing and Technical
Analysis Branch (202) 418-1385.

**- FCC -**

[^1]: ^?^ *See* \"First Paging Service Spectrum Auction Scheduled for
    December 7, 1999; Comment Sought on Reserve Prices or Minimum
    Opening Bids and Other Auction Procedures,\" *Public Notice*, DA
    99-1103 (rel. June 7, 1999) (\"*Upper Bands Public Notice*\"), 64 FR
    36009 (July 2, 1999).

[^2]: ^?^ Section 3002(a), Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. 105-33,
    111 Stat. 251 (1997) (\"Budget Act\"); 47 U.S.C. §309(j)(4)(F). The
    Commission\'s authority to establish a reserve price or minimum
    opening bid is set forth in 47 C.F.R. § 1.2104 (c) and (d).

[^3]: ^?^ *See Upper Bands Public Notice* at 3.

[^4]: ^?^ Small Business in Telecommunications ("SBT"), Personal
    Communications Industry Association ("PCIA"), Metrocall, Inc.
    ("Metrocall"), and Morris Communications, Inc. ("Morris") filed
    comments on June 30, 1998. No reply comments were filed.

[^5]: ^?^ Revision of Part 22 and Part 90 of the Commission's Rules to
    Facilitate Future Development of Paging Systems, *Second Report and
    Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking*, 12 FCC Rcd 2731
    (1997) ("*Paging Second Report and Order*"); Revision of Part 22 and
    Part 90 of the Commission's Rules to Facilitate Future Development
    of Paging Systems, *Memorandum Opinion and Order on Reconsideration
    and Third Report and Order*, FCC 99-98 (rel. May 24, 1999) ("*Paging
    Reconsideration Order*" and "*Paging Third Report and Order*").

[^6]: ^?^ *Id. See also Upper Bands Public Notice*.

[^7]: ^?^ *See generally Paging Second Report and Order; Paging
    Reconsideration Order; Paging Third Report and Order; Upper Bands
    Public Notice*.

[^8]: ^?^ *Upper Bands Public Notice* at 1.

[^9]: ^?^ SBT Comments at 4, PCIA Comments at 5-7, Metrocall Comments at
    2-7, Morris Comments at 2-7.

[^10]: ^?^ *Id*.

[^11]: ^?^ *Paging Second Report and Order* at ¶ 58 and *Paging
    Reconsideration Order* at ¶ 42-44; 47 C.F.R. § 22.503(I).

[^12]: ^?^ *Paging Reconsideration Order* at ¶ 45.

[^13]: ^?^ *See* December 19, 1995 Letter of Understanding with Mexico
    related to the temporary use of 929-932 MHz channels for paging
    services within 120 kilometers (75 miles) of the common border; *see
    also* *U.S.-Canada Interim Coordination Considerations for the Band
    929-932 MHz, as amended*. SBT specifically requested that the
    Commission warn potential bidders of possible border conflicts.
    *See* SBT Comments at 6-8

[^14]: ^?^ 47 C.F.R. § 1.45(c).

[^15]: ^?^ *Paging Reconsideration Order* at ¶ 97; *see also* 47 C.F.R.
    § 1.2105(c).

[^16]: ^?^ *See* In re Application of Nevada Wireless for a License to
    Provide 800 MHz Specialized Mobile Radio Service in the Farmington,
    NM-CO Economic Area (EA-155) Frequency Band A*, Memorandum Opinion
    and Order*, 13 FCC Rcd 11973, 11977, & 11 (1998) (*\"Nevada
    Wireless\"*).

[^17]: ^?^ *See Nevada Wireless*, 13 FCC Rcd at 11978.

[^18]: ^?^ *See* 47 C.F.R. § 1.2105(c).

[^19]: ^?^ *See* 47 C.F.R. § 1.65.

[^20]: ^?^ For further guidance on the issue of control, see the
    Commission\'s affiliation rule at 47 C.F.R. § 1.2110(b)(4). *See
    also Ellis Thompson Corp.,* 76 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1125, 1127-28
    (1994), in which the Commission identified the following factors
    used to determine control of a business: (1) use of facilities and
    equipment; (2) control of day-to-day operations; (3) control of
    policy decisions; (4) personnel responsibilities; (5) control of
    financial obligations; and (6) receipt of monies and profits;
    *Intermountain Microwave*, 24 Rad. Reg. (P & F) 983 (1963), and
    Application of Baker Creek Communications, LP, For Authority to
    Construct *and Operate Local Multipoint Distribution Services in
    Multiple Basic Trading Areas, Memorandum Opinion and Order*, 13 FCC
    Rcd 18,709 (rel. September 23, 1998).

[^21]: ^?^ *See* 47 C.F.R. §§ 22.217 and 1.2105.

[^22]: ^?^ *See* 47 C.F.R § 22.217.

[^23]: ^?^ *See* 47 C.F.R. § 22.223 (b) (1) (ii).

[^24]: ^?^ *See* 47 C.F.R. § 22.223 (b) (1) (i).

[^25]: ^?^ *Id.*

[^26]: ^?^ All short-form applications must be filed electronically.
    *See* 47 C.F.R. § 1.2105(a).

[^27]: ^?^ *See* 47 C.F.R. § 1.2105. *See also* Two Way Radio of
    Carolina, Inc., *Memorandum, Opinion and Order*, FCC 99-189 (rel.
    July 22, 1999).

[^28]: ^?^ Amendment of Part 1 of the Commission\'s Rules \--
    Competitive Bidding Proceeding, WT Docket No. 97-82, *Order,
    Memorandum Opinion and Order and Notice of Proposed Rule Making*, 12
    FCC Rcd. 5686, 5697-5698, ¶ 16 (1997).

[^29]: ^?^ *See Upper Bands Public* *Notice* at 8.

[^30]: ^?^ Metrocall Comments at 9; Morris Comments at 9.

[^31]: ^?^ Metrocall Comments at 10; Morris Comments at 10.

[^32]: ^?^ Metrocall Comments at 11; Morris Comments at 11.

[^33]: ^?^ *Upper Bands Public Notice* at 1.

[^34]: ^?^ PCIA Comments at 11.

[^35]: ^?^ *Id*.

[^36]: ^?^ *Paging Reconsideration Order* at ¶ 82.

[^37]: ^?^ *Id.*

[^38]: ^?^ *See* "Wireless Telecommunications Bureau Establishes
    Deadline for Lower Band Paging and Radiotelephone Service (Part 22)
    Database Corrections," *Public Notice*, DA 99-1202 (rel. June 22,
    1999).

[^39]: ^?^ PCIA Comments at 12.

[^40]: ^?^ *Upper Bands Public Notice* at 5.

[^41]: ^?^ *Upper Bands Public Notice* at 9.

[^42]: ^?^ PCIA Comments at 17.

[^43]: ^?^ *Id*.

[^44]: ^?^ *Upper Bands Public Notice* at 5.

[^45]: ^?^ *Upper Bands Public Notice* at 10.

[^46]: ^?^ *See* *Reconsideration Order*, FCC 99-98, ¶ 84; *Second
    Report and Order*, 12 FCC Rcd at 2785, ¶ 103. *See also* 47 C.F.R. §
    1.2104(e) (The Bureau has discretion \"to establish stopping rules
    before or during multiple round auctions in order to terminate the
    auction within a reasonable time\").

[^47]: ^?^ *Upper Bands Public Notice* at 11.

[^48]: ^?^ *Id.* at 9.

[^49]: ^?^ SBT Comments at 9; PCIA Comments at 17; Metrocall Comments at
    12-14; Morris Comments at 12-14.

[^50]: ^?^ Metrocall Comments at 13; Morris Comments at 13; PCIA at 18.

[^51]: ^?^ SBT Comments at 9.

[^52]: ^?^ *Upper Bands Public Notice* at 11.

[^53]: ^?^ Budget Act, *see* *supra* note 2.

[^54]: ^?^ *See* Amendment of Part 1 of the Commission\'s Rules \--
    Competitive Bidding Procedures, WT Docket No. 97-82*, Third Report
    and Order and Second Further Notice of Proposed Rule Making*, 13 FCC
    Rcd. at 455-456, & 141 (1998) (\"*Part 1 Third Report and Order*\").

[^55]: ^?^ *Id.*

[^56]: ^?^ *Id*.

[^57]: ^?^ *Upper Bands Public Notice* at 4.

[^58]: ^?^ SBT Comments at 2-4; PCIA Comments at 14; Metrocall Comments
    at 9; Morris Comments at 9.

[^59]: ^?^ Section 3002(F) of the Budget Act directs the Commission to
    \"prescribe methods by which a reasonable reserve price will be
    required, or a minimum bid established, to obtain any license or
    permit being assigned pursuant to the competitive bidding, unless
    the Commission determines that such a reserve price or minimum bid
    is not in the public interest.\"

[^60]: ^?^ 47 U.S.C. 309(j)(3)(C).

[^61]: ^?^ *See* Auction of 800 MHz SMR Upper 10 MHz Band, Minimum
    Opening Bids or Reserve Prices, DA 97‑2147, *Order*, 12 FCC Rcd
    16354, 16358 (1997).

[^62]: ^?^ *Upper Bands Public Notice* at 6.

[^63]: ^?^ *Id.* at 7.

[^64]: ^?^ PCIA Comments at 16.

[^65]: ^?^ *Id*.

[^66]: ^?^ *Id*.

[^67]: ^?^ *See Upper Bands Public Notice* at 8.

[^68]: ^?^ PCIA Comments at 18.

[^69]: ^?^ *See* 47 C.F.R. §§ 1.2104(g), and 1.2109.

[^70]: ^?^ *See* "Phase II 220 MHz Service Auction Closes, Winning
    Bidders in the Auction of 908 Phase II 220 MHz," *Public Notice*, 14
    FCC Rcd 605 (1998).

[^71]: ^?^ PCIA Comments at 15; Morris Comments at 15; Metrocall
    Comments at 15.