Before the

**FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION** FCC 94-144

Washington, D.C. 20554

In the Matter of )

)

Amendment of the Commission\'s Rules to ) GEN Docket No. 90-314

Establish New Personal Communications ) RM-7140, RM-7175, RM-7618

Services )

**MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER**

Adopted: June 9, 1994; Released: June 13, 1994

By the Commission: Commissioners Quello, Barrett, Ness, and Chong
issuing separate statements.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Paragraphs

I. INTRODUCTION AND EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1- 16

II\. BACKGROUND 17- 23

III\. SPECTRUM ISSUES AND SERVICE AREAS 24- 97

A. Allocation, Block Plan and Service Areas 24- 87

1\. Block Positioning 28- 40

2\. Block Size 41- 62

3\. Aggregation and Disaggregation 63- 71

4\. Service Areas 72- 79

5\. Geographic Partitioning 80- 83

6\. Unlicensed Devices 84- 87

B. Private Use 88- 90

C. Mobile Satellite Service Issues 91- 97

IV\. OWNERSHIP RULES AND CELLULAR ELIGIBILITY 98- 146

A. Eligibility of Cellular Licensees for PCS Licenses 102-104

B. Attribution Rules 105-122

C. Attribution Rules for Certain Designated Entities 123-132

D. Population Standard 133-140

E. Post-Auction Divestiture 141-146

V. CONSTRUCTION REQUIREMENTS 147-158

VI\. TECHNICAL STANDARDS 159-202

A. Roaming and Interoperability Standards 159-165

B. PCS Power Limits 166-174

C. Protection of Fixed Microwave Operations 175-193

D. PCS-to-PCS Interference Standards 194-201

E. Enhanced 911 Standards 202

VII\. UNLICENSED PCS 203-244

A. Spectrum Allocation 203-208

B. Coordination 209-223

C. Spectrum Etiquette 224-244

VIII.RADIO FREQUENCY EXPOSURE LIMITS 245-249

IX\. CONCLUSION 250

X. PROCEDURAL INFORMATION 251-252

Appendix A Final Rules

Appendix B List of Parties

Appendix C Final Flexibility Statement

Appendix D Broadband PCS Band Plan

Appendix E Calculating PCS Signals at Microwave Receivers

Appendix F Permissible Ownership of PCS Licenses by the

Owners of Same-Area Cellular Systems

**I. INTRODUCTION AND EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

By this action, we amend certain aspects of our rules governing
broadband personal communications services (PCS). We take this action in
response to 67 petitions for reconsideration or clarification of the
rules and policies adopted in the [Second Report and Order]{.underline}
in this proceeding.[^1]

PCS encompasses a broad range of new radio communications services that
will free individuals from the limitations of the wireline public
switched telephone network and will enable individuals to communicate
when they are away from their home or office telephones. Broadband PCS
devices are likely to be portable and have their own unique telephone
numbers. A basic feature of PCS is expected to be the ability to
communicate person-to-person, rather than station-to-station.

We take this action to foster rapid creation of a competitive market to
deliver these new mobile digital voice and data services to the American
public. Personal communications needs are changing rapidly as our
society becomes more mobile and people demand rapid communications no
matter where they are or what time it is. A competitive market is the
best way to introduce broadband PCS to help meet these demands. We
expect that PCS will provide a variety of mobile services competitive
with existing cellular, paging and other land mobile services as well as
new services offering communications capabilities not currently
available. These services will be provided on an entire family of new
communications devices that will include small, lightweight
multi-function portable phones, portable facsimile and other imaging
devices, new types of multi-channel cordless phones, and advanced paging
devices with two-way data capabilities. We expect that these new
services and devices will affect the future development and
configuration of all telecommunications networks by significantly
improving their flexibility and increasing the number of functions they
can perform.

We are amending the broadband PCS spectrum allocation and regulatory
structure to better achieve what have been and continue to be our four
primary goals in this proceeding: competitive delivery, a diverse array
of services, rapid deployment, and wide-area coverage.[^2] Furthermore,
our PCS rules as modified will partner with our competitive bidding
procedures to meet Congressional objectives that include promoting
economic growth and competition, enhancing widespread access to
telecommunications service offerings, and ensuring that PCS licenses are
disseminated to a wide variety of applicants.[^3]

The actions we take are designed to enable PCS providers to compete
effectively with each other and with other wireless providers so that
the American public can enjoy the greatest benefit from the delivery of
these new services. To promote competitive delivery, we have modified
the band plan to ensure there is an opportunity for a sufficient number
of competitors to offer PCS services. Further, providers will have the
flexibility to determine the amount of spectrum needed for their
particular service or services. However, we have also set limits on the
total amount of spectrum that can be acquired by new entrants and by
incumbent cellular providers. This ensures that there will be a
significant number of competitors in each area.

We have purposely adopted a broad definition of PCS to encourage a
variety of firms with their own visions of PCS to bid for various
combinations of licenses and to provide a diverse array of new services.
Firms will compete not only on price, but also on quality and the types
of new products and services they offer. We have allocated spectrum both
in different sized blocks and in different sized service areas because
we want to encourage businesses to be able to acquire the spectrum and
service areas that best suit their business plans. This additional
flexibility will result in a greater diversity of products and services
for consumers.

Rapid deployment is important so that consumers do not have to wait for
the benefits of the new services. To ensure rapid deployment, we have
allocated two different sized spectrum blocks, which can be aggregated
to form other block sizes. We have also altered the allocation of some
of the PCS spectrum to reduce the cost of moving microwave incumbents
that must be relocated. Both of these decisions will allow more rapid
introduction of service because of the reduced costs of microwave
relocation.

The revised band plan also will reduce the cost of service and equipment
to consumers. In addition, we have increased the power level available
for PCS service. Together with our decisions to license some BTAs and 10
MHz blocks, these changes will make PCS service more viable in rural
areas, help ensure wide-area coverage and increase access for all
Americans.

Many of the actions we take today are directed toward ensuring that a
wide variety of applicants have an opportunity to acquire PCS licenses.
In addition to providing for different spectrum blocks and geographic
areas, we are modifying our ownership rules to encourage participation
in PCS by rural telephone companies, small businesses and businesses
owned by minorities and women.

The most significant of the changes that we adopt today involves
modification of the band plan that was adopted in the [Second Report and
Order]{.underline}. In that [Order]{.underline}, we allocated 120 MHz of
spectrum to PCS, some of which was in the lower portion of the 2 GHz
band allocated for emerging technologies and some of which was in the
upper portion of that band. Under our revised plan, all of the 120 MHz
of spectrum allocated to PCS is located in the lower band. The previous
band plan would have required those who wished to operate in both the
upper and lower bands to utilize more expensive dual mode handsets
capable of operating on both bands. Providing PCS licenses in only the
1850-1990 MHz band will lower costs to consumers by permitting use of a
single-band handset. Reducing the costs of equipment to consumers should
also increase consumer demand and strengthen the economic viability of
the PCS providers. Placing all the licensed and unlicensed spectrum in a
single contiguous band also will decrease the cost of handsets that can
operate in both licensed and unlicensed blocks. In addition, these
changes will preserve spectrum in the upper band that is allocated
internationally for the emerging Mobile Satellite Services (MSS)
industry to provide worldwide service. Taken together, these changes
will increase the competitiveness of PCS service providers in urban,
suburban, and rural areas which should lower prices and stimulate
demand, thereby increasing investment and economic growth. Lower prices
will also enhance consumer access to PCS services.

Having all blocks in a single contiguous band also will increase the
value of the 10 MHz blocks. These blocks would have been less desirable
in the upper band because upper band equipment is expected to be
available from manufacturers twelve or more months after lower band
equipment. In addition, the upper band contains a higher concentration
of microwave facilities that would have had to share spectrum with
broadband PCS licensees or be relocated from the broadband PCS spectrum
to avoid interference. Our action avoids the expense and potential delay
associated with relocating the numerous microwave links currently
operating in the upper band. The change we have made to the band plan
also makes it more feasible to aggregate a 10 MHz block with a 30 MHz
block for a total of 40 MHz. Taken together, these factors will reduce
the time and the cost of PCS providers offering their services to the
American public. The overall allocation of 120 MHz for broadband PCS
remains unchanged.

In the [Second Report and Order]{.underline}, we divided 120 MHz of
spectrum into seven blocks: two 30 MHz blocks, one 20 MHz block, and
four 10 MHz blocks. In this [Order]{.underline}, we are amending our
band plan to provide six blocks: three 30 MHz blocks and three 10 MHz
blocks. We changed the 20 MHz block to a 30 MHz block and eliminated one
10 MHz block primarily because we were persuaded that a single 20 MHz
block would not provide enough spectrum to support a viable competitor
to the 30 MHz PCS MTA licensees, or to the two existing cellular
licensees currently serving most areas. As a primary goal of our
proceeding was to promote competitive delivery of PCS services, we
believe that it is essential to make available an additional 30 MHz
block. We anticipate that the three 10 MHz blocks will be used in a
variety of ways that may include \"niche services\" and other functions,
or as an enhancement for PCS or cellular providers that choose to
purchase a 10 MHz block to complement a 30 MHz or 25 MHz block,
respectively. Thus, our revised band plan provides for an additional
competitor to cellular service and to the other PCS providers, while
also providing three 10 MHz blocks for multiple uses.

In addition to modifying our band plan, we also make significant
amendments to the rules relating to participation in PCS by holders of
cellular interests. In the [Second Report and Order]{.underline}, we
recognized that unfettered participation in PCS by cellular operators
could lessen the potential competition that could develop between PCS
and cellular systems. At the same time, we recognized that cellular
licensees could foster rapid development of PCS for a variety of
reasons, including their expertise with commercial mobile radio
services. Promoting competition and providing for rapid deployment of
PCS are both among the objectives that Congress instructed us to promote
in Section 309(j) of the Communications Act, as amended by the
Reconciliation Act. We have balanced those competing interests by
allowing entities with a 20 or more percent investment interest in a
cellular license to acquire a 10 MHz PCS license in the same area. We
adhere to that decision. However, we have decided that as of January 1,
2000, we will afford cellular operators the same overall 40 MHz spectrum
cap as other PCS operators, and allow them to acquire an additional 5
MHz for a total of 15 MHz of PCS spectrum in the same service areas as
their cellular interests.

In Section 309(j), Congress also directed us to promote economic
opportunity by disseminating licenses to a wide variety of applicants,
including small businesses, rural telephone companies, and businesses
owned by members of minority groups and women (\"designated entities\").
We are modifying our PCS cellular eligibility rules to promote that goal
as well. Specifically, we are relaxing our cellular ownership
attribution rules to allow designated entities with up to a 40 percent
non-controlling interest in a cellular license to obtain a PCS license
in the same area. One effect of this change will be to allow some rural
telephone companies with non-controlling cellular interests, to provide
PCS service in areas that might otherwise not be served in a timely
manner.

We also are relaxing our cellular attribution rules to allow any entity
with up to a 40 percent non-controlling ownership interest in a cellular
license covering 10 percent or more of the population in a PCS service
area to also attain a non-controlling, investment interest in a PCS
license held by a business owned by minorities or women. While there is
some risk that relaxing the cellular eligibility rule will limit the
vigor of competition in some markets, we think that risk is sufficiently
limited where the party holding interests in two licenses holds a
minority interest in the cellular license and the PCS license is
controlled by another entity. We have concluded that we should take that
risk in order to advance the goal of promoting economic opportunity for
these groups.

Our cellular eligibility rules balance the goals that Congress has
established \-- promoting competition, ensuring rapid deployment of PCS,
and providing economic opportunity for designated entities. We have
decided that limited participation by cellular providers will serve the
public interest by promoting rapid deployment of PCS, participation by
designated entities, and overall competition.

We have made a number of minor modifications to our rules. With these
changes, we intend to proceed expeditiously toward licensing providers
of broadband personal communications services. The following is a
summary of all of the specific actions we take today to promote the
goals outlined above:

> a\. Adopting a band plan that provides for three 30 MHz licenses
> (Blocks A, B, and C) and three 10 MHz licenses (Blocks D, E, and F),
> all of which are within the 1850-1990 MHz band;
>
> b\. Providing that the A and B Blocks be licensed within 51 service
> areas based on the Major Trading Areas (MTAs) and that the C, D, E,
> and F Blocks be licensed within 493 smaller service areas based on the
> Basic Trading Areas (BTAs) set forth in the Rand McNally [Commercial
> Atlas & Marketing Guide]{.underline} (123rd ed. 1992);[^4]
>
> c\. Maintaining the allocation of spectrum at 1910-1930 MHz for
> unlicensed PCS devices, and committing to initiate a proceeding in the
> near future to examine allocation of additional spectrum for
> unlicensed PCS operations. Within this band, we have adopted a 1.25
> MHz channelization scheme for isochronous (voice) devices and
> eliminated channelization requirements for asynchronous (data)
> devices;
>
> d\. Continuing to permit all eligible entities to acquire spectrum up
> to a cap of 40 MHz;
>
> e\. Retaining our five percent equity attribution threshold for PCS
> licenses so that the same entity may not own more than five percent of
> PCS licenses constituting more than 40 MHz within the same area;
>
> f\. Retaining our cellular attribution threshold of 20 percent equity
> ownership of a cellular licensee and our service area overlap test of
> 10 percent of the population of the relevant PCS market, so that the
> same entity generally may not own more than 20 percent of the cellular
> license and more than 5 percent of PCS license(s) that would place the
> entity above the spectrum limit in an overlapping service area;
>
> g\. Relaxing the eligibility rules to permit entities with
> attributable interests in cellular companies whose combined cellular
> geographic service areas overlap between 10 and 20 percent of the PCS
> service area population to submit bids for more than 10 MHz of PCS
> spectrum provided that, prior to the auction, they commit to divest
> themselves of sufficient cellular interests to come into compliance
> with our eligibility rules within 90 days of license grant;
>
> h\. Providing that voting stock, general partnership interests,
> interlocking directorates and certain other controlling interests and
> relationships will be considered in determining attributable interests
> under our spectrum caps;
>
> i\. Raising from a 20 percent to a 40 percent non-controlling interest
> the threshold for determining attributable cellular equity ownership
> for rural telephone companies, small businesses and businesses owned
> by minorities and women which are collectively termed \"designated
> entities\" under 47 U.S.C. 309(j);
>
> j\. Increasing from a 20 percent to a 40 percent non-controlling
> interest the threshold for determining attributable cellular equity
> ownership to allow non-designated entities to make non-controlling
> investments in PCS licenses owned and controlled by minority- and
> women- owned businesses;
>
> k\. Permitting entities with attributable cellular interests covering
> 10 or more percent of the population in a PCS service area to acquire
> 10 MHz of PCS spectrum within the PCS service area and, after January
> 1, 2000, to acquire an additional 5 MHz for a total of 15 MHz of PCS
> spectrum in their cellular service areas;
>
> l\. Relaxing construction requirements to provide that (a) 30 MHz
> broadband PCS licensees must provide coverage to one-third of their
> service area population within five years of initial licensing and
> two-thirds within ten years and (b) 10 MHz licensees must provide
> coverage to twenty five percent of their service area population
> within five years of initial licensing or, submit a showing of
> equivalent or substantial service;
>
> m\. Increasing the maximum power level permitted for broadband PCS
> base stations to 1640 watts equivalent isotropically radiated power
> (e.i.r.p.), which is equivalent to 1000 watts effective radiated power
> (e.r.p.);
>
> n\. Retaining with minor amendment rules ensuring compliance with
> minimum standards for exposure to radio frequency (RF) energy emitted
> by PCS devices;
>
> o\. Committing to initiate a proceeding in the near future to allocate
> additional spectrum for mobile satellite services (MSS) and to work
> toward having additional spectrum allocated to MSS at the World Radio
> Conference to be held in 1995 (WRC-95); and
>
> p\. Pledging to examine management contracts and spectrum leases in
> the CMRS docket for the purpose of determining whether other interests
> in PCS licenses should be limited in order to foster vigorous
> competition.

**II. BACKGROUND**

The Commission began its investigation of broadband PCS in 1989.[^5]
Since then the Commission has addressed broadband PCS in this docket by
issuing a [Notice of Inquiry]{.underline}, holding an [En]{.underline}
[Banc]{.underline} meeting, and adopting a [Policy Statement and
Order]{.underline}, a [Notice of Proposed Rule Making and Tentative
Decision]{.underline}, and a [Second Report and Order]{.underline};[^6]
and held a Public Forum on broadband PCS.[^7] We have also allocated 220
MHz of spectrum between 1850 and 2200 MHz for emerging technologies that
include PCS;[^8] provided for band sharing or negotiated relocation of
microwave facilities occupying 2 GHz PCS spectrum;[^9] provided spectrum
to accommodate the existing 2 GHz facilities that relocated;[^10] and
adopted technical, licensing and auction rules for narrowband PCS.[^11]
We also considered 50 pioneer\'s preference requests related to
broadband PCS.[^12] Finally, the Commission made recommendations and
participated in an international allocation conference at which
decisions were made that recognize and permit use of 2 GHz spectrum for
PCS.[^13] Numerous telecommunications companies and associations have
actively participated in our PCS proceedings, and over 100 companies
have applied for and received more than 220 experimental licenses to
develop and test PCS services and technologies.

On August 10, 1993, the President signed the Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1993 (Reconciliation Act),[^14] which amended
Sections 3(n), 309(j) and 332 of the Communications Act of 1934, as
amended (Communications Act).[^15] Section 309(j) for the first time
authorized the Commission to select licensees by competitive bidding and
establishes objectives for the bidding process, including rapid
deployment of new technologies, promotion of economic opportunity,
competition and public access, wide dissemination of licenses, and
efficient use of the spectrum. The Reconciliation Act also amended
Sections 3(n) and 332 to provide that PCS is a mobile service and to
establish a new framework for regulatory treatment of mobile services.

On September 23, 1993, shortly after the Reconciliation Act was enacted,
the Commission adopted the [Second Report and Order]{.underline}
establishing regulations and policies for broadband PCS that are under
review here. In the [Second Report and Order]{.underline}, the
Commission enumerated goals of competitive delivery, diversity of
services, speed of deployment, and wide-area service. The Commission
took a number of actions to help meet these goals.

Specifically, the Commission:

> a\. Defined PCS as \"radio communications that encompass mobile and
> ancillary fixed communication that provide services to individuals and
> businesses and can be integrated with a variety of competing
> networks\";[^16]
>
> b\. Allocated spectrum at 2 GHz for PCS, including 120 MHz of spectrum
> for licensed broadband PCS and 40 MHz for unlicensed PCS devices;
>
> c\. Provided for two 30 MHz licenses and one 20 MHz license in the
> \"lower\" band of the emerging technologies spectrum, and four 10 MHz
> licenses in the \"upper\" band, in each geographic area;
>
> d\. Provided that the two 30 MHz licenses would be authorized within
> 51 service areas based on the Rand McNally Major Trading Areas (MTAs)
> and that the 20 MHz and 10 MHz licenses would be authorized within 492
> service areas based on the Rand McNally Basic Trading Areas
> (BTAs);[^17]
>
> e\. Established eligibility requirements that limit entities with
> certain cellular interests to 10 MHz of PCS spectrum where there is
> significant overlap between a PCS service area and the cellular
> service area ([i.e.]{.underline}, 10 percent or more of the PCS
> service area population);
>
> f\. Limited broadband PCS licensees to 40 MHz of spectrum, and
> established certain licensing and renewal mechanisms;
>
> g\. Established a maximum power level of 100 watts e.i.r.p. for PCS
> base stations, and adopted technical specifications to avoid harmful
> interference to other operations while leaving maximum technical
> flexibility to permit development of new technologies;
>
> h\. Adopted rules to minimize radio frequency (RF) exposure risk; and
>
> i\. Noted an intent to continue participating in international efforts
> to provide standards and consistent spectrum allocations for
> international deployment of worldwide terrestrial mobile and global
> satellite services.

In related proceedings, the Commission provided a transition plan to
govern PCS licensees sharing their authorized spectrum with existing 2
GHz fixed microwave facilities or relocating those facilities to other
spectrum;[^18] determined that broadband PCS presumptively will be
classified as a commercial mobile radio service under Section 332 of the
Communications Act as amended by the Reconciliation Act;[^19] and found
that broadband PCS is within the Commission\'s competitive bidding
authority, when it adopted generic competitive bidding rules and
procedures.[^20] With regard to competitive bidding for broadband PCS
licenses, the Commission proposed to set aside two blocks of spectrum
\-- the 20 MHz block (Block C) and a 10 MHz block (Block D) \-- that
would be reserved for bidding purposes to \"designated entities\",
(small businesses, rural telephone companies and businesses owned by
members of minority groups and women), and proposed other measures to
ensure economic opportunity for designated entities.[^21] These
proposals remain pending. The proposed set-aside and other outstanding
issues concerning broadband PCS auctions will be decided in a
forthcoming Order (in PP Docket No. 93-253) addressing competitive
bidding rules.

In response to the [Second Report and Order]{.underline}, 67 parties
filed petitions requesting reconsideration or clarification. Of the 67
petitions, 58 primarily address issues relating to licensed PCS services
and 9 primarily address issues relating to unlicensed PCS operations.
The petitioners collectively request reconsideration of the spectrum
allocation and frequency block plan, eligibility and attribution
matters, construction requirements, technical standards, microwave
interference criteria, power limits, radio frequency (RF) hazard
requirements, and matters related to unlicensed PCS devices. The
Commission received comments addressing the petitions for
reconsideration from 44 parties and replies from 54 parties.

On March 17, 1994, the Commission established an intra-agency task force
to coordinate the reconsideration of PCS policies and rules. On April 11
and 12, 1994, the task force conducted a series of public panel
discussions on PCS issues. The panelists included potential PCS service
providers, technical experts, members of the financial community,
economists and representatives of designated entities. The presentations
of the panelists and transcripts of the panel discussions were placed in
the record of this proceeding, and 30 interested parties filed
statements in the record responding to the panel discussions.

**III. SPECTRUM ISSUES** **AND SERVICE AREAS**

A. [Allocation, Block Plan and Service Areas]{.underline}.

In the [Second Report and Order]{.underline}, the Commission allocated
120 MHz for licensed PCS and 40 MHz for unlicensed PCS from the 220 MHz
of emerging technologies spectrum.[^22] Specifically, (lower band)
1850-1890 MHz and 1930-1970 MHz, and the (upper band) 2130-2150 MHz and
2180-2200 MHz, were allocated for licensed PCS; and the 1890-1930 MHz
band was allocated for unlicensed PCS devices. In addition, 60 MHz
remained in reserve for future allocations to emerging technologies such
as MSS or other applications. The frequency plan for licensed PCS
included two 30 MHz frequency blocks, one 20 MHz block, and four 10 MHz
blocks. Service areas were defined based on Rand McNally\'s \"Major
Trading Areas\" (MTAs) and \"Basic Trading Areas\" (BTAs).[^23] The two
30 MHz blocks were in the lower band and licensed on an MTA basis; the
20 MHz block also was in the lower band, but licensed on a BTA basis;
and the four 10 MHz blocks were in the upper band and licensed on a BTA
basis.[^24]

Twenty-eight parties argue for reconsideration of various aspects of the
allocation and frequency block plan adopted in the [Second Report and
Order]{.underline}.[^25] In general, the petitioners address: 1)
alternatives for the PCS frequency block plan, including the number of
PCS providers, PCS service areas, and issues relating to the aggregation
or subdivision of PCS spectrum; 2) whether spectrum should be designated
for private PCS use; and 3) the impact of the PCS allocation on the
international allocations for mobile satellite service (MSS).

We are revising the band plan to move the 10 MHz blocks from the upper
band to the lower band, increase the size of the 20 MHz block to 30 MHz,
and reduce the number of 10 MHz blocks from four to three. The revised
band plan is depicted in Appendix D, \"Broadband PCS Band Plan,\" and
detailed in the following table.

  -------------------- ----------------------- -------------------- --------------------------
  [Frequency           [Amount of              [Geographic          [Frequency
  Block]{.underline}   Spectrum]{.underline}   Scope]{.underline}   Range]{.underline}

  A                    30 MHz                  MTA                  1850-1865/1930-1945 MHz

  B                    30 MHz                  MTA                  1870-1885/1950-1965 MHz

  C                    30 MHz                  BTA                  1895-1910/1975-1990 MHz

  D                    10 MHz                  BTA                  1865-1870/1945-1950 MHz

  E                    10 MHz                  BTA                  1885-1890/1965-1970 MHz

  F                    10 MHz                  BTA                  1890-1895/1970-1975 MHz

  Unlicensed           20 MHz                  Nationwide           1910-1930 MHz
  -------------------- ----------------------- -------------------- --------------------------

This plan provides for three large blocks and three small ones. This
will allow potential licensees to aggregate varying amounts of spectrum
in different geographic areas depending on their individual business
plans. The three large 30 MHz blocks ensure that these licensees have
sufficient spectrum to begin service rapidly. The three small 10 MHz
licenses will allow the provision of services that might not require a
full 30 MHz, or for aggregation with a 30 MHz PCS license or an existing
cellular license. As noted above, moving the 10 MHz blocks from the
upper band to the lower band provides a number of important
procompetitive benefits: consumer equipment costs will be significantly
lower, costs of relocating incumbent fixed microwave links will be
significantly reduced for new PCS entrants, the ability to aggregate
spectrum will be increased, and valuable spectrum will be preserved that
can be used to provide mobile satellite service on a worldwide basis.
This revised plan reduces the amount of spectrum for unlicensed devices,
but will increase the ability of new consumer equipment to work on both
a licensed and unlicensed basis, increasing the utility of the devices
for consumers. The improvement in this band plan will increase
competition, lower equipment costs and provide other benefits. As a
result, consumers will receive lower-cost and higher-quality
service.[^26]

1\. [Block Positioning]{.underline}

NYNEX proposes that the number of licenses and size of the frequency
blocks be maintained, but that the 20 MHz block be switched to the upper
band and that two of the 10 MHz blocks be switched to the lower band and
located between the two 30 MHz blocks.[^27] NYNEX states that this would
facilitate aggregation of up to 40 MHz in the lower band because both 30
MHz MTA blocks would be adjacent to a 10 MHz BTA block. It states that
this arrangement of the frequency blocks would be especially helpful to
cellular licensees who are limited to 10 MHz in-market, but can
aggregate up to 40 MHz out-of-market. NYNEX states that this approach
would allow a cellular carrier to purchase licenses only in the lower
PCS band so that its customers would not need handsets that operate in
both the upper and lower bands. NYNEX states that, while it is possible
to design equipment that can work in both the lower and upper PCS bands
and the cellular bands, such \"interoperable\" handsets would result in
increased equipment cost, size, weight, and power consumption.[^28]

INS proposes two 30 MHz and two 10 MHz blocks in the lower band and one
30 MHz and one 10 MHz block in the upper band. It states that this plan
would increase the opportunity for designated entities to aggregate 40
MHz because the current frequency plan encourages designated entities to
bid on three different blocks (one 20 MHz and two 10 MHz blocks). INS
agrees with NYNEX that use of spectrum in both bands would result in
higher per unit capital costs and indicates that this is of particular
importance to small businesses.

Bell Atlantic states that six 20 MHz blocks would eliminate the need for
costly and inefficient aggregation of licenses between the lower and
upper frequency bands. CTIA states that the plan adopted in the [Second
Report and Order]{.underline} will force licensees in the lower band to
aggregate with the 10 MHz frequency blocks in the upper band if their
systems require more than 20 or 30 MHz and contends that this approach
requires complex and expensive equipment capable of operating in both
bands.[^29]

MSS providers argue that the location of the PCS allocations located in
the upper band spectrum nullifies the International Agreement on Global
MSS allocations. They propose combining all 120 MHz of licensed PCS in a
single block below 2 GHz.[^30]

Motorola discussed a plan to move all of the PCS spectrum to the lower
band in [ex parte]{.underline} presentations. They note that their plan
gives the Commission the flexibility to allocate three 30 MHz and three
10 MHz licenses in the lower band. Motorola argues that bidders would be
able to aggregate licenses without the need for dual band equipment.

A number of parties filed comments and [ex parte]{.underline}
presentations which also discuss the benefits of placing all of the
licensed PCS spectrum in a contiguous band. These benefits include lower
equipment costs and lower microwave relocation costs. In addition, some
stress the increased ability of a provider to have spectrum in the same
band in different service areas to provide competitive service.[^31]
Other parties discuss the desirability of having 10 and 30 MHz blocks in
the same band as the 30 MHz blocks to facilitate aggregation.[^32]

[Decision]{.underline}. We initially authorized 10 MHz blocks in the
upper PCS band. Many parties, however, argue that the upper band blocks
would be of little value in the near term because equipment would not be
developed for this spectrum for a year or more.[^33] In addition,
handsets that can bridge the upper and lower bands are predicted to cost
about 25 percent more and to be bulkier than handsets operating only on
the lower frequencies.[^34] In addition, dual mode handsets would be
heavier and have shorter battery life. Several parties argued that dual
band handsets were essential to the success of upper band service
because PCS operators would be likely to aggregate upper and lower band
spectrum and consumers would want to be able to receive service on both
bands, both to permit roaming across geographic areas and to facilitate
changing service providers.[^35] These parties contended that the higher
costs, delay, and other limitations associated with the upper band
presented serious impediments to achieving our goals of fostering a
competitive market, rapid deployment, opportunities for designated
entities, and fostering a wide diversity of services. Upon
reconsideration, we conclude that MSS and PCS services can both be
accommodated by using only lower band spectrum for licensed and
unlicensed PCS services.

Moving licensed PCS from the upper band to the lower band provides a
number of procompetitive benefits. First, the cost of interoperability
between licensed and unlicensed PCS will be reduced. As noted above,
equipment costs to consumers are predicted to be reduced by 25 percent.
Moreover, under the revised plan, manufacturers will concentrate on a
single band with uniform frequency spacing, which should result in
greater economies of scale in manufacturing that reduce consumer
equipment prices. This additional cost for interoperability between
bands was not evident to us when we made our earlier decision. Increased
interoperability has the additional benefit of reducing lock-in costs
for consumers, giving them greater ability to switch providers, and
thereby resulting in a more competitive market. Because of the less
expensive handsets and the ability to combine adjacent blocks,
aggregation is much more desirable. This will benefit all new providers,
including designated entities, because they will be able to reduce costs
and compete more effectively. Furthermore, there appear to be a number
of different potential uses for the 10 MHz blocks: innovative niche
services that are unlikely to be provided initially on the 30 MHz
blocks, aggregation with the 30 MHz blocks, aggregation with other 10
MHz blocks, service extensions for incumbent cellular providers, and
opportunities for designated entities to provide service with lower
capital cost. Moving the 10 MHz blocks from the upper band to the lower
band will enhance the value of some, if not all, of these uses and allow
licensees to decide the most valuable use for the spectrum.

Second, the cost and time required to relocate incumbent fixed microwave
links should be significantly less in the lower band because the number
of microwave links in the upper band is higher than the number in the
lower band.[^36] While the bandwidth used by the upper band microwave
incumbents is much less, making it easier to find some clear spectrum
immediately, the ultimate requirement to clear the spectrum would result
in significantly higher costs for PCS licensees.

Third, equipment should be available for the lower band at an earlier
date. Manufacturers have spent significant time and resources developing
lower band equipment but the record indicates that they have not done
much work on developing equipment for the upper band. As a result, some
parties assert that the availability of upper band equipment trails the
availability of lower band equipment by about one year.[^37] Time to
market is a critical factor in the rollout of PCS services that will
compete against existing cellular and enhanced specialized mobile radio
(ESMR) entities. Thus, earlier equipment availability is a significant
factor in developing a competitive PCS service.

Fourth, many cellular companies have expressed a desire to operate PCS
systems both outside and inside their current cellular service
areas.[^38] By moving the PCS spectrum to the lower band, PCS and
cellular providers will have the ability to provide service over a large
geographic area even though they desire (or are required) to have
different amounts of PCS spectrum in different areas. This capability
could lower costs to the benefit of consumers because cellular companies
will be able to compete using PCS spectrum inside and outside of their
service areas.

Finally, as we discuss [infra]{.underline}, moving all the PCS spectrum
to the lower band will better meet the needs of the emerging MSS
industry. We also believe that this action will increase the value of
the unlicensed spectrum because interoperability with licensed PCS will
increase.

Accordingly, we find that moving all of the PCS spectrum to the lower
band will increase competition, reduce both consumer equipment and
system costs, and increase equipment functionality. This new band plan
has significant industry support, as evidenced by numerous recent
filings submitted in the record by a variety of interests supporting
Motorola\'s proposal to move all of the PCS spectrum to the lower
band.[^39]

2\. [Block Size]{.underline}

In developing our original plan, we concluded that 10 MHz blocks could
support viable and competitive PCS services through the use of advanced
digital techniques, such as Code Division Multiple Access (CDMA) and
Time Division Multiple Access (TDMA), and microcellular technology. We
also stated that some types of PCS operations would require more than 10
MHz of spectrum. In addition, we recognized that initially PCS is
required to share spectrum with fixed microwave operations and therefore
the full amount of spectrum will not be available initially in many
locations. We concluded that 20 and 30 MHz frequency blocks were needed
to support the rapid development and implementation of the fullest range
of PCS services. We also permitted most licensees to aggregate up to 40
MHz of broadband PCS spectrum in each service area, except that cellular
licensees were limited to 10 MHz where their cellular geographic service
area (CGSA) overlapped with the PCS service area. For these reasons, we
concluded that the combination of 10, 20, and 30 MHz licenses would
allow users to acquire the amount of spectrum appropriate for their
applications.

In its petition, Time Warner requests that we allocate 40 MHz per PCS
license. Time Warner argues that 40 MHz blocks are needed to share the
PCS frequencies with fixed users and that allowing aggregation does not
adequately remedy the problems caused by licensing blocks smaller than
40 MHz. Time Warner states that under current PCS rules, the only way
for a licensee to aggregate 40 MHz is to aggregate across the lower and
upper bands, which would necessitate the use of subscriber equipment
that is larger and more expensive.[^40] Alternatively, INS proposes that
we divide the PCS spectrum into three 30 MHz and three 10 MHz blocks,
arguing that this facilitates aggregation of spectrum without crossing
between the bands and will enable designated entities to obtain a 30 MHz
block in the lower band.[^41]

Several parties express support for alternative plans based on blocks of
equal size.[^42] Bell Atlantic, BellSouth, Florida Cellular, Point, and
TDS urge that we allocate six 20 MHz blocks (four 20 MHz blocks in the
lower band and two 20 MHz blocks in the upper band).[^43] Bell Atlantic
states that the net efficiency and capacity gain in moving from four 10
MHz to four 20 MHz blocks greatly outweighs the slight efficiency loss
from reducing the two 30 MHz allocations to 20 MHz. Florida Cellular
states that equal-sized blocks would provide a \"more equitable playing
field\" for small businesses. Other commenters, especially smaller
companies and associations representing the interests of smaller groups,
support the principle that competition will be increased if we allocate
blocks of equal size.[^44]

Point submits that a 20 MHz block is more than enough spectrum to create
a viable PCS service, arguing that digital technology permits a provider
with 20 MHz to serve the entire population in all but the very largest
markets. It argues that in a marketplace comprised of two cellular
carriers, one wide-area specialized mobile radio (SMR) carrier, and from
two to six viable PCS carriers, no single carrier could expect to
achieve more than a 30 percent market share. Point concludes that a 20
MHz block is more than sufficient to serve 30 percent of the total
population even in the largest markets.[^45]

CTIA and Nextel propose four 20 MHz blocks in the lower band and four 10
MHz blocks in the upper band. CTIA and Nextel argue that digital
technology offers unprecedented customer capacity and that the record
does not identify any PCS service requiring as much as a 30 MHz block.
Nextel states that 10 and 20 MHz blocks are sufficient to permit
engineering around unrelocated microwave systems while encouraging the
use of spectrally-efficient technologies.[^46] Additionally, CTIA states
that 30 MHz blocks make coordination with microwave incumbents more
difficult than the 20 MHz blocks because incumbent microwave users
generally have 20 MHz channels.

PacBell urges that we reduce the number of blocks (and PCS licensees).
In particular, PacBell argues that, given two established cellular
providers and one SMR competitor, a maximum of three new PCS providers
would be viable even in the largest metropolitan areas.[^47]

AMT/DSST, in joint comments, submit that the adopted frequency plan
should not be altered. AMT/DSST argue that the petitioners reflect no
consensus on the appropriate direction to be taken by the Commission on
reconsideration. They state that the 10 MHz licenses will facilitate the
provision of specialized or \"niche\" applications and that such
specialized applications and services will not be offered by PCS
providers operating on the larger blocks and expecting to compete with
incumbent cellular providers. AMT/DSST also state that the two 30 MHz
blocks will foster the rapid introduction of PCS services with system
capacities comparable to cellular system capacities. In the view of
AMT/DSST, the current plan represents a \"reasoned balancing of the
regulatory, policy and technical considerations that have received a
full airing in this Docket.\"[^48]

GCI states that, while it would have preferred fewer blocks, each with a
greater amount of spectrum, the current frequency plan should not be
revised. It states that the diversity of arguments for different block
sizes demonstrates that a diversity of services may result from the
allocation of spectrum blocks of varying size. Further, GCI believes
that cellular providers will combine 10 MHz of PCS spectrum with their
existing allocation of 25 MHz. GCI therefore believes it important to
provide PCS licensees with 30 MHz so that new entrants can compete with
cellular providers.[^49]

A number of responding parties argue strongly that the current plan
should not be amended to eliminate 30 MHz blocks in favor of smaller
blocks. For example, APC states that the 30 MHz blocks are necessary to
permit licensees to share spectrum with microwave users, to enable PCS
to compete with the wired local loop, and to facilitate the provision of
high-speed data broadband and information services. APC believes that
entities favoring smaller spectrum blocks hope to place PCS providers at
a competitive disadvantage to cellular and wide-area SMR
operations.[^50] PCS Action similarly argues that large spectrum blocks
and geographic areas will enable independent PCS operators to be
competitive sooner with the existing mobile communications
providers.[^51] US West believes that 30 MHz is necessary to support new
entrants.[^52] MCI submits that smaller blocks would increase the costs
and delays associated with the development of a broadband wide area PCS
system. MCI believes that smaller blocks would be inefficient and would
require new entrants to resort to the secondary market to obtain the
spectrum necessary to compete with other mobile communications
providers.[^53]

Bell Atlantic, CTIA, Nextel, and Sprint oppose Time Warner\'s proposal
for 40 MHz blocks, arguing that such a large amount of spectrum would
permit too much concentration of control and discourage participation by
designated entities, who will tend to be smaller than other PCS
providers.[^54]

At the PCS Public Forum held on April 11 and 12, 1994, and in comments
filed in response to those discussions, many of the parties supported 30
MHz blocks. For example, Mark Roberts of Alex Brown & Co. stated that
PCS entrants will need large blocks of spectrum to be able to compete
efficiently and to operate with a cost structure similar to that of
cellular providers that already have 25 MHz. He further argued that
license sizes of less than 30 MHz would be likely to lock in premium
returns for the cellular industry.[^55] Paul Rissman of Alliance Capital
stated that the financial community would be interested in PCS only if
large spectrum blocks are created.[^56] Daniel Kelley of Hatfield &
Associates stated that, given the spectrum clearing problems, 30 MHz
would be about the minimum amount of spectrum needed for a PCS provider
to compete with incumbent cellular providers.[^57] Other participants at
the public meeting, including George Murray, Dr. Charles Jackson, and
Dr. Jerry Hausman, expressed the view that 20 MHz blocks would be
sufficient for the provision of PCS service and that by allocating 20
MHz blocks the Commission could facilitate aggregation to 40 MHz if some
providers felt that was necessary.[^58]

[Decision]{.underline}. In the [Second Report and Order]{.underline}, we
allocated two 30 MHz blocks, one 20 MHz block and four 10 MHz blocks.
Our intent was to encourage participation of as many viable new PCS
entrants as possible while maintaining sufficient spectrum to ensure the
viability of both MSS and unlicensed devices. Based on the reasoning
presented below, and on information provided by the petitioners and
other responding parties, including presentations made by industry
experts at our panel discussions, we find that our goals will be better
served by two modifications to the band plan: (a) an increase in the
size of the 20 MHz block to 30 MHz; and (b) a reduction in the number of
10 MHz blocks from four to three. Overall, the total amount of spectrum
allocated for licensed PCS remains unchanged.[^59]

One of our goals in this proceeding is to stimulate competition in the
wireless and wireline industries, thus reducing costs and improving
quality for consumers. In so doing, we must balance two objectives.
First, we want to maximize the number of opportunities for new viable
competitors to emerge. We also want to allow market forces to guide how
many competitors survive. We have endeavored to provide as many
opportunities as possible to aggregate blocks into viable service
offerings to ensure that several strong competitors emerge to provide
service. Our desire to maximize competition must be tempered, however,
because 1) spectrum is limited and 2) for new entrants to be viable we
must provide sufficient spectrum to begin service quickly with
reasonable upfront capital costs. We believe that the combination of
microwave incumbents occupying part of this spectrum and economies of
scale lead to the conclusion that the a set of three 30 MHz blocks will
support the rapid introduction of competitive PCS services whereas 20
MHz blocks could lead to PCS service start-up delays or a reduction in
the number of viable competitors.

We believe that our new band plan is superior to uniform 20 MHz blocks,
as advocated by Bell Atlantic, BellSouth, Florida Cellular, Point and
TDS.[^60] The combination of three 30 MHz blocks and three 10 MHz blocks
allows the aggregation of a variety of license sizes that could not
occur with uniform 20 MHz blocks.[^61] As a result, we find that the
allocation of six 20 MHz blocks would not provide as many benefits as
either the allocation adopted in the [Second Report and
Order]{.underline} on the modified plan we adopt in this order and it
might lead to fewer new service providers with sufficient spectrum to
provide service quickly. We also reject the plan of twelve 10 MHz blocks
proposed by Murray, because such an arrangement might seriously delay
the implementation of PCS, since the process of aggregating so many
spectrum blocks could be time consuming and costly.[^62] It also could
dramatically increase complexity and transaction costs at and after the
auction. Finally, we believe that dividing the spectrum into 40 MHz
blocks as requested by Time Warner would be inefficient for many
applications and would foreclose innovative niche services.

The record indicates significant concern that a 20 MHz block may not
provide sufficient spectrum to enable a PCS provider to compete
effectively with other PCS licensees operating on 30 MHz spectrum blocks
or with other commercial mobile radio service providers. Some parties
argue that 20 MHz will provide sufficient capacity in the long run.[^63]
However, APC argues that with only 20 MHz, there could be a
significantly larger portion of each service area where the licensee has
no usable spectrum due to the presence of microwave incumbents.[^64] The
presence of fixed microwave links requires that, on the average, a
licensee with 20 MHz initially will have to relocate more microwave
links than a 30 MHz license before PCS service can begin, which could
significantly delay the commencement of service and increase the upfront
cost of initiating service. In addition, APC states that the ability of
a microwave incumbent to delay or extract a premium for relocating its
link because its microwave path fully blocks service diminishes
significantly with a 30 MHz spectrum block.[^65] While incumbent
microwave links are 20 MHz wide, we feel that the advantages of being
able to work around specific links with a 30 MHz block outweigh the
additional transaction costs which result from not matching the
incumbent fixed microwave assignments identically.

Other parties support the notion that a 30 MHz block will help new PCS
entrants compete more effectively with existing wireless and wireline
providers.[^66] We also believe that limiting one licensee to 20 MHz
could be a disadvantage for future competition. The ability to provide a
complete package of mobile voice and data services could become a
significant competitive advantage in the future. Such a package of
wireless services, however, may require more than 20 MHz of
spectrum.[^67] Other services may require less spectrum and are better
suited to the 10 MHz blocks.

Due in large part to these concerns, the investment community has stated
that financing would be much more difficult to obtain for the licensees
on the 20 MHz block than on the other blocks.[^68] These handicaps are
of particular concern to us because the 20 MHz block was proposed to be
reserved for designated entities.[^69] The competitive handicaps of a 20
MHz block relative to 30 MHz blocks would not have served our goal of
providing a viable competitive opportunity for designated entities.

Increasing the third license from a 20 MHz block to a 30 MHz block
appears to eliminate any competitive disadvantages stemming from the
band plan. The A, B and C blocks each will have a roughly equivalent
portion of its service area completely blocked by incumbent microwave
users in any geographic area. As a result, the costs and delay due to
incumbent relocation should be similar on each of the blocks. This
change should also reduce the difficulty faced by the C block licensee
in obtaining financing. We conclude, therefore, that three equal sized
30 MHz blocks will facilitate competition and the rapid development and
implementation of the fullest range of PCS services and ensure that PCS
is more fully competitive with other mobile radio services. Accordingly,
we are changing the single 20 MHz license to a 30 MHz license.

Time Warner petitioned us to allocate 40 MHz blocks in order to promote
rapid introduction of service and to enhance the ability a wide range of
services in competition with existing wireless and wireline
providers.[^70] While we believe that some new entrants may need to
acquire 40 MHz to fully realize their business plans, requiring all
applicants to purchase 40 MHz in all areas would not serve our goal of
giving potential licensees the ability to determine the amount of
spectrum they need for particular services, nor would it maximize
competition. Companies that desire to provide service using 40 MHz can
do so through aggregation at the auction or afterwards. Providing a
combination of 30 MHz and 10 licenses MHz provides the benefits of 40
MHz licenses, without restricting the options of firms nor affecting
competition.

Consistent with our decision to formulate a flexible definition of PCS,
we allocated four 10 MHz blocks in the [Second Report and
Order]{.underline} that could serve a variety of needs.[^71] We continue
to believe that 10 MHz blocks, both on their own and in combination with
the 30 MHz blocks or with each other, are useful to support a variety of
PCS services. Throughout this proceeding, several parties have indicated
that 10 MHz blocks would be suitable for providing services ranging from
specialized or \"niche\" applications to services comparable to those
now provided by cellular systems.[^72] In addition, the 10 MHz blocks
will be beneficial both for cellular licensees, who have limited
eligibility for PCS participation in region, and possibly also for
augmenting SMR. Finally, commenters discussed the desire to aggregate
the 10 MHz blocks with the larger blocks in order to increase capacity
for PCS services in heavy demand areas.[^73]

For these reasons, we believe the public interest is best served by
continuing the allocation of licenses on 10 MHz channel blocks in
addition to the 30 MHz licenses. We must limit the number of 10 MHz
blocks to three for any given area, however. We are constrained because
we also want to reserve spectrum for other uses such as MSS and
unlicensed PCS. Allowing the flexibility to aggregate spectrum blocks of
different size will help ensure that efficient providers succeed. We
believe that 120 MHz will provide sufficient spectrum to promote
competition rapidly and that flexibility in the provision of service
will provide incentives for efficient use of the spectrum.

In sum, we believe that a band plan that provides for three 30 MHz
licenses and three 10 MHz licenses, all in the lower band, compared to
our earlier plan, will better ensure that PCS services are available
promptly and competitively to the American public.

3\. [Aggregation and Disaggregation]{.underline}

A number of petitioners request clarification of, or changes to, our
policies regarding the aggregation or subdivision of PCS spectrum and
PCS service areas. In the [Second Report and Order]{.underline}, we
limited any party\'s ability to aggregate PCs spectrum to an
attributable interest in 40 MHz.[^74] Companies that were deemed to hold
attributable interests in cellular license(s) covering 10 percent or
more of the population in a PCS service area were limited to holding a
single 10 MHz PCS license in that area.[^75] We did not address the
issue of whether we would allow disaggregation of spectrum.

Comcast requests clarification that the 40 MHz aggregation limit applies
only to PCS spectrum.[^76] PNSC submits that certain PCS licensees
should be permitted to aggregate more spectrum than that allowed under
the current plan. It recommends that BTA licensees in areas with
populations between 200,000 and 999,999 be permitted to aggregate up to
60 MHz and that cellular carriers serving markets with populations of
one million or less be permitted to aggregate up to 20 MHz. PNSC further
urges that no limit be set on aggregation of spectrum in areas with
populations less than 200,000. PNSC questions the viability of seven PCS
licensees and states that rural BTA licensees should be permitted to
aggregate more spectrum because they are at a competitive disadvantage
[vis-a-vis]{.underline} MTA licensees.[^77] It contends that if we do
not raise the aggregation limit, we should adopt a channeling plan that
provides for three 30 MHz MTA licenses, with one set-aside for
designated entities, and three 10 MHz BTA licenses, with one set-aside
for designated entities.

PCS Action and Time Warner request that PCS licensees be permitted to
aggregate up to 40 MHz of spectrum in the lower band through leasing,
joint ventures, consortia, or other means.[^78] They contend that this
would eliminate the need for licensees to use more expensive equipment
capable of operating in both the upper and lower bands. CTIA does not
object to the overall 40 MHz limit on PCS ownership. However, it
requests that cellular licensees be subject to the 40 MHz limit and that
they be allowed to acquire up to 15 MHz of PCS spectrum. Thus, CTIA
argues that, in addition to the right to bid on a 10 MHz channel,
cellular operators should be permitted to acquire an additional 5 MHz
either through bidding and subsequent divestiture or after the
auction.[^79] BellSouth and Point suggest a uniform 45 MHz aggregation
limit that would apply to the total spectrum used by an entity for all
the mobile communications services it provides in a given area,
including, cellular, SMR, wide-area SMR and PCS.[^80] BellSouth argues
that the current approach limits cellular providers to an additional 10
MHz of PCS or a total of 35 MHz of spectrum while enhanced SMRs can
acquire up to 40 MHz of PCS spectrum or a total of 59 MHz of
spectrum.[^81]

[Decision]{.underline}. We believe that the 40 MHz limit for PCS
spectrum is appropriate. No new information has been presented to
indicate that each licensee in a market would require more than 40 MHz
to provide broadband PCS service. Although at least one party argued
that this limit should be amended to allow greater aggregation in rural
areas, we do not believe that greater aggregation is needed.[^82] In
particular, the demand in rural areas is expected to be sufficiently low
that there should be no need for more than 40 MHz by any one provider.
If demand in rural areas is not sufficient to meet than 40 MHz of
spectrum to one entity, it would be preferable to have additional
competitors serve these customers rather than to license more than 40
MHz of spectrum to one entity.

One of our goals in this proceeding is to promote competitive delivery
of wireless services. As a result, we feel that not only is an overall
cap on PCS spectrum important to prohibit excessive spectrum
aggregation, but that a comparable separate limit should be placed on
cellular providers since they already hold 25 MHz of clear spectrum and
already have a large number of existing wireless customers. To ensure
competitive parity, cellular carriers will be subject to an overall
spectrum cap of 35 MHz for their combined PCS and cellular spectrum. We
are persuaded by the argument, raised by a number of parties, that
because of cellular\'s \"headstart\" in the wireless telephone market,
existing infrastructure and large base of customers, cellular carriers
might be able to dominate the wireless market if they receive more than
10 MHz of PCS spectrum.[^83] We also recognize that new entrants face a
possibly lengthy process to relocate existing microwave users so they
can use all of their spectrum. Cellular carriers already have 25 MHz of
clear spectrum in operation whereas new entrants may have to relocate
microwave users to gain access to that much spectrum, even if they
acquire 40 MHz at the auction. In addition, we are concerned that
additional spectrum acquired by cellular entities may reduce the amount
of spectrum available to new entrants and increase the costs to new
entrants. To promote the ability of new entrants to acquire spectrum and
rapidly begin service as strong competitors to in-region cellular
carriers, we have decided to continue to permit cellular carriers to
acquire and hold only a single 10 MHz license in any PCS service area
where they are considered in-region. ([See]{.underline} Cellular
Eligibility section [infra]{.underline}). However, because we realize
that as competitive PCS offerings are implemented, the market advantages
enjoyed by cellular carriers should decrease, we will allow cellular
carriers to acquire an additional 5 MHz after January 1, 2000. This will
allow cellular carriers to acquire the same total amount of spectrum (40
MHz) as other entities. Limiting in-region cellular carriers to 10 MHz
of PCS spectrum for five years will not disadvantage them relative to
the new entrants who must contend with microwave relocation over their
entire spectrum block(s) and do not necessarily have an established
customer base or comparable infrastructure advantages.[^84]

We reject the contention BellSouth and Point that the aggregation limit
be raised to 45 MHz to permit cellular entities to acquire an additional
20 MHz. If we were to allow such aggregation to 45 MHz through the
disaggregation of 30 MHz blocks, the number of full service competitors
could be reduced to the detriment of realizing the goals we have set
forth for PCS. If we were to allow aggregation to 45 MHz through the
aggregation of 10 MHz blocks, there would not be enough blocks to assure
both full cellular participation and the participation of other parties
who desire 10 MHz licenses. We conclude that 40 MHz remains an
appropriate limit on PCS spectrum because it protects the competitive
structure, provides sufficient spectrum for efficient provision of
wireless services, and encourages a wide diversity of firms to
participate in the industry. Furthermore, we are seeking comment in
another proceeding as to whether and how our aggregation limit may be
applied uniformly to all mobile communications providers. We find that
extending the PCS spectrum aggregation limit to include other mobile
services, such as SMR and wide-area SMR services, is beyond the scope of
this proceeding. We therefore intend to address issues relating to
spectrum aggregation across other commercial mobile radio services in a
separate proceeding.[^85]

Although, as stated above, we believe spectrum disaggregation should be
permitted, we are concerned that initially, there may be anticompetitive
incentives to disaggregate spectrum. Two or three entities might
purchase a viable 30 MHz license and disaggregate it to reduce the
number of new entrants. Thus, we will permit disaggregation of spectrum
by any licensee only after it meets the five year construction
requirement. The five year point will allow the PCS market to take
shape. Entities desiring to use small amounts of spectrum before the
prohibition on disaggregation ends can either purchase the 10 MHz blocks
of spectrum if they wish to provide service using less than 30 MHz or
enter into joint ventures or resale arrangements to facilitate their
access to spectrum. We expect to conduct a further proceeding to specify
the rules for spectrum disaggregation, which will also explore the
possibility of permitting disaggregation for other commercial mobile
radio services.

We agree with the suggestions of the petitioners and responding parties
that PCS entities should eventually be permitted to disaggregate
spectrum. We feel that, in the future, disaggregation will complement
the three 30 MHz and three 10 MHz channel plan by allowing subdivision
of spectrum blocks where service providers find that economic or other
conditions warrant it. Allowing spectrum disaggregation, even if it is
prohibited until the first construction benchmark, will provide
appropriate incentives for service providers to conserve their use of
spectrum and to invest in spectrum conserving technologies. Because PCS
licensees have paid for the use of the spectrum and have the ability to
sell it in the future, they should be especially sensitive to the value
of the resource they are using and will be motivated to ensure that it
is used in the most valuable way.

In determining the appropriate placement of the 10 MHz blocks within the
lower band, we seek to promote the development of an efficient market
structure and to ensure that no subset of license has any inherent
competitive disadvantage due to placement of licenses in the band plan.
In particular, we must consider the benefits of aggregating the 30 MHz
blocks with the 10 MHz blocks compared to the benefits of aggregating
the 10 MHz blocks themselves. Interspersing the 10 MHz blocks between
each 30 MHz block facilitates aggregation to 40 MHz by allowing
combination of each contiguous 30 MHz and 10 MHz license pair. This also
facilitates relocations of the existing fixed microwave operations by
matching fixed microwave channels with PCS channels. This will keep to a
minimum the number of parties responsible for each relocation which will
reduce relocation negotiation, timing and costs. On the other hand,
keeping all 10 MHz licenses contiguous would allow more efficient
aggregation of these licenses as a substitute strategy for obtaining one
of the three 30 MHz block. We conclude that interspersing the 10 MHz
licenses between the 30 MHz licenses to permit efficient aggregation up
to 40 MHz should the market favor that outcome is the best approach.
Recognizing that aggregation of the 10 MHz licenses may be attractive to
some parties, however, we are also making two of the 10 MHz licenses
contiguous so as to permit this aggregation to 20 MHz, should some
parties favor 20 MHz over 30 MHz. ([See]{.underline} Cellular
Eligibility [infra]{.underline}.)

4\. [Service Areas]{.underline}

In the [Second Report and Order]{.underline}, we specified that the two
30 MHz blocks would be licensed on an MTA basis. We also specified that
the 20 MHz block and four 10 MHz blocks would be licensed on a BTA
basis.[^86] We adopted this plan to promote the rapid deployment and
ubiquitous coverage of PCS and felt that these areas would follow the
natural flow of commerce.[^87]

A number of petitioners request changes in the service areas designated
for PCS blocks. Pegasus, for example, requests that the Commission adopt
a Mayaguez/Aguadilla-Ponce BTA separate from the San Juan BTA. Pegasus
argues that Puerto Rico should comprise two BTAs because the two areas
are split geographically by mountains.[^88] In addition, DWMP points out
that some rural BTAs are larger than a small MTA and that it would be
unreasonable to ask a rural PCS provider to meet the construction
requirements in these sparsely-populated areas. DWMP requests that we
specify smaller service areas.[^89] Other parties, such as Killen and
NTCA, favor use of the MSA/RSA service areas that are used for cellular
licenses.[^90] Point Communications states that either BTAs or the
cellular MSA/RSA service areas should be used for PCS, arguing that all
PCS should be licensed on the same service area basis.[^91] CTIA and
Nextel suggest that all licensing be based on BTA service areas.[^92]
Nextel believes that MTA service areas will result in poor build-out and
lack of service in rural locations.[^93] BellSouth submits that the six
20 MHz blocks it suggested should be licensed on a BTA basis.[^94]
BellSouth argues that MTAs are inappropriate because they would result
in a lack of parity among competitors, and uniform initial spectrum
blocks and service areas would encourage competition and give effect to
market forces.

At the PCS Public Forum held on April 11 and 12, 1994, Dr. C. J. Waylon
of GTE submitted that MTA coverage offers large geographic service areas
that would enhance competition with existing cellular service
providers.[^95] Mark Roberts of Alex Brown and Co. also voiced support
for the larger MTA service areas.[^96] However, some parties, such as
George Murray, felt that all blocks should be licensed on a BTA basis to
provide an opportunity for small entrants to compete on an equal footing
with other PCS providers.[^97]

[Decision]{.underline}. We have decided to retain the geographic license
areas definitions for PCS licenses, adopted in our [Second Report and
Order]{.underline}. We reject the arguments that all licenses should
have the same geographic scope, as in NTIA\'s proposal to use the
Department of Commerce Economic Areas.[^98] We also reject a re-drawing
of the boundaries along cellular MSA/RSA lines as proposed by Killen,
NTCA, and Point.[^99]

We reject the use of cellular MSA/RSA boundaries for a number of
reasons. The ten year history of the cellular industry provides evidence
generally that these service areas have been too small for the efficient
provision of regional or nationwide mobile service. The large
transaction costs to aggregate MSAs and RSAs that have been incurred
over the past ten years in the cellular industry have frequently been
directed towards geographic aggregation to provide wider service areas
for consumers and to lower costs of providing service. Rather than
forcing replication of this costly and time-consuming process, we are
beginning with larger service areas, which we expect to minimize the
need for costly post-auction transactions. We also hope to spur market
competition from new PCS providers by starting with larger initial
geographic service areas to alleviate the cellular headstart
advantage.[^100] We realize that the MTA and BTA license boundaries do
not coincide with existing cellular license boundaries, but feel that
the costs imposed by these different license boundaries will be
outweighed by the benefits of larger initial service areas. We are
cognizant of problems created by overlaps between the PCS and cellular
service areas, and provide some relief from these problems.
([See]{.underline} Cellular Eligibility, [infra]{.underline}.)

We also are rejecting the suggestion that all licenses should have the
same geographic scope whether MTAs (as proposed by PCS Action), BTAs (as
proposed by BellSouth, CTIA, and Nextel) or Department of Commerce
Economic Areas (proposed by NTIA). While identical geographic areas may
impose more initial competitive parity, we do not believe that this will
maximize competitiveness and participation in the provision of PCS
services. Licensing all blocks on an MTA basis might increase
competitiveness with cellular, but it would limit the ability of
cellular companies and designated entities to participate in the
provision of PCS. Cellular companies could be restricted because of
overlaps with MTAs that might not occur with BTAs. Designated entities
are likely to be better able to finance the construction of PCS across a
BTA than an MTA. Thus, by licensing some blocks on a BTA basis, we
comply with Congress\' directive that we prescribe area designations
that promote economic opportunity for a wide variety of applicants,
including small businesses, rural telephone companies, and business
owned by members of minority groups and women.[^101]

We therefore continue to feel that a combination of MTA and BTA licenses
will give licensees the opportunity to select and combine service areas
and promote broad participation in the provision of PCS services by
firms of various sizes. Licensing two of the 30 MHz blocks on an MTA
basis will permit these licensees to operate in large service areas
which will facilitate interoperability and roaming across wide
geographic areas. Licensing the third 30 MHz block on a BTA basis will
not preclude such efficiencies because of the ability to aggregate
licenses geographically. In addition, in much the same way as the
variety of spectrum block sizes allows various strategies, the variety
of geographic sizes will allow firms to determine the optimal geographic
strategy they wish to pursue. This will also help us to meet the
statutory objectives of disseminating licenses to a wide variety of
licensees.[^102] In addition, allocating four of the six licenses on a
BTA basis addresses the concern that rural buildout would not occur with
MTA licenses.

Finally, we concur with Pegasus\' suggestion with regard to the Puerto
Rico service area and will provide two separate BTA service areas in
Puerto Rico, one for Mayaguez/Aguadilla-Ponce and the other for San
Juan. This action recognizes the difficulties created by the mountain
range separating these two areas. No parties opposed this request and we
find this adjustment to be in the public interest.[^103]

5\. [Geographic Partitioning]{.underline}

In its petition, McCaw asks us to permit applicants to subdivide PCS
blocks and service areas.[^104] McCaw states that this would allow
parties to bid jointly for PCS BTA and MTA licenses, and then subdivide
the PCS operating authority on either a geographic or spectrum basis. It
states that this approach would diminish the disadvantages created by
using MTAs and BTAs rather than the significantly smaller cellular MSA
and RSA service areas. This would allow cellular entities to offer PCS
services in areas where they do not provide cellular service and yet
would not qualify for licensing in the entire PCS service area.

Several parties responding to the petitions favor allowing partitioning
of PCS service areas. For example, AIDE, CTIA and McCaw state that
geographic and spectrum partitioning will promote efficient use of the
spectrum and will encourage service in rural areas.[^105] AMT submits
that partitioning will offer flexibility to PCS providers.[^106] GTE
states that partitioning will expedite the introduction of new services,
promote participation in PCS, and allow PCS to serve niche
markets.[^107] Finally, CUC recommends that the Commission allow
partitioning only within a specified time after licensing to ensure
universal deployment of PCS and prevent licensees from warehousing
spectrum that they do not intend to utilize.[^108]

Other responding parties oppose allowing geographic partitioning. For
example, GCI and MCI argue that interested parties should form consortia
to provide uniform service across areas instead of dividing the
allotments.[^109] GCI, MCI and Nextel argue that allowing geographic
partitioning would inject additional variables into the initial auction
process and complicate the development of an orderly post-auction
market.[^110] MCI contends that to avoid manipulation and evasion of the
construction requirements, voluntary partitioning should be limited to
geographic sizes no smaller than a BTA with no less than 10 MHz of
spectrum, pending examination of the feasibility of smaller partitions
in a separate rule making.[^111]

[Decision]{.underline}. We agree with the parties that oppose permitting
geographic partitioning at this time. We find that there is a
significant risk that partitioning can be used to circumvent
construction requirements. While there may be efficiency enhancing
geographic partitions, much of the benefit can be obtained through other
arrangements that do not raise the same concerns about circumvention of
our construction rules.[^112] On balance, we conclude that we should not
adopt a policy allowing general geographic partitioning, but recognize
that the balance may be different for particular groups of service
providers, such as rural telephone companies or to create PCS ownership
opportunities for companies owned by minorities or women. Therefore, we
will consider the issue of geographic partitioning for rural telephone
companies and other designated entities in our forthcoming Order, to
adopt specific competitive bidding rules for broadband PCS in PP Docket
No. 93-253.[^113] There we will address other designated entity
preferences and will rely on the record in both proceedings in making
our final determinations on this matter. Also, we will address whether
we should recover the unserved PCS areas at the end of the ten-year
construction period, in a later proceeding after we have had an
opportunity to assess the scope of system build-outs.

6\. [Unlicensed Devices]{.underline}

In developing a band plan for PCS, we have had to weigh the spectrum
requirements of licensed PCS with the amount of spectrum allocated for
unlicensed PCS. For reasons described above, the new band plan moves all
of licensed PCS to the lower band. As a result of this change, we have
had to reduce the amount of spectrum available for the operation of
unlicensed PCS devices from 40 to 20 MHz. This is the amount of spectrum
we originally proposed for unlicensed devices. Despite having less
spectrum available for unlicensed PCS devices in the near term, we
believe the new band plan will have an overall positive effect for
consumers in terms of the diversity and utility of unlicensed devices
available on the market, as well as the rapid deployment of competitive
licensed PCS Services.

One reason we reach this conclusion is that even without this change it
is unlikely that the 20 MHz reallocated to licensed from unlicensed
would have been used in the near term for unlicensed. The spectrum at
1890 to 1910 MHz was regarded as less desirable than the 20 MHz retained
for unlicensed PCS at 1910-1930 MHz because it contains significantly
more microwave incumbents.[^114] Our expectation was that unlicensed
devices first would operate on the 1910-1930 MHz spectrum because the
cost of clearing this spectrum is significantly less. Licensed PCS
providers, by contrast, provide ample evidence in the record that they
are ready to begin the relocation of microwave incumbents in the lower
band and provide service in the near term and can use the spectrum from
1890-1910 MHz rapidly. Thus, consumers are more likely to obtain
immediate benefits if we allocate this spectrum to licensed PCS rather
than for unlicensed PCS devices.

Another benefit of the new band plan is that the licensed and unlicensed
PCS spectrum will be located in close proximity on the lower band.
Consumers will have more choices for equipment that operates on both
unlicensed and licensed PCS bands, and will not have to buy
higher-priced equipment that operates on both the lower and upper PCS
bands to have available the full array of service options with a single
piece of equipment. Finally, we intend that the initial 20 MHz
allocation for unlicensed PCS devices meet the near term spectrum
requirements for unlicensed devices.[^115] To consider the long-term
spectrum requirements of unlicensed PCS devices, we intend to issue a
Notice of Proposed Rule Making in the near future to identify additional
spectrum for unlicensed PCS devices.

For the reasons set forth above, therefore, we conclude that consumers
and manufacturers of equipment intended for use on the unlicensed band
will benefit from the new band plan. This does not diminish our concern
that there be sufficient spectrum allocated for unlicensed PCS devices
to accommodate expected demand, and therefore as noted above, we are
committed to instituting a further rule making for this purpose to meet
the long term requirements for unlicensed PCS devices, including those
potential unlicensed uses that may not be accommodated readily in the
initial 20 MHz allocation.

B. [Private Use]{.underline}

In their petitions, UTC and APCO request that we set aside a portion of
the licensed PCS spectrum for private PCS operations such as public
safety or internal company use.[^116] UTC argues that essential public
services and private industries require advanced mobile/portable
communications capabilities that cannot be provided by commercial PCS.
Further, UTC states that the current rules preclude the development of
such private systems. UTC also states that for private users: 1) 10 MHz
channels are too large for a single licensee\'s requirements; 2) the
construction requirements are impractical and inappropriate;

3\) the service areas do not correspond to the service territories of
private entities; and

4\) competitive bidding is inappropriate for public safety and private
systems.[^117] APCO agrees, and argues that public safety agencies need
spectrum for new life-saving communications technologies that will not,
and cannot, be provided by carrier-based services such as PCS. APCO
states that Congress repeatedly has mandated that radio services that
are necessary for the safety of life and property deserve special
consideration in the allocation of spectrum.[^118]

Several parties, including APC, MCI, Sprint, PCIA and TDS, oppose
allocation of PCS spectrum for the private use of utilities and
public-safety organizations.[^119] These parties argue that private
organizations will have full access to unlicensed PCS and that PCS
licensees will have incentives to structure systems for the internal use
of private organizations. Sprint states that reducing the amount of
spectrum available for commercial PCS licenses would compromise the
competitiveness and viability of PCS. Sprint also notes that providing
emerging technology spectrum for private use would not provide auction
revenue for the government. On the other hand, API and ITA support a
separate spectrum allocation for \"private PCS\" systems, arguing that
many private communications operations cannot be transferred to public
systems due to service reliability concerns.[^120]

[Decision]{.underline}. We agree with the parties who argue that both
commercial PCS service and unlicensed PCS devices will be able to meet
many of the communications requirements of private entities. The PCS
licensees will be permitted to tailor specific service applications to
the particular needs of individual organizational customers. Any such
service applications, of course, must be consistent with policies we
have established for the regulation of commercial mobile radio services
under Title II of the Communications Act.[^121] Such applications could
include the use of dedicated capacity. Where such arrangements might not
be satisfactory, entities desiring spectrum solely for internal private
use could, of course, bid for licensed PCS spectrum individually or as a
group intending to share the licensed facilities.[^122] Companies that
value private use of the spectrum highly could win a license at auction;
otherwise they could contract with a licensee to provide the services
they need, or procure such services from resellers. Moreover, as many
commenters argue, we believe that setting aside spectrum for private
interests would not help us achieve the goals set forth for PCS, and at
the same time, could detrimentally affect competitive service provision
and the efficient allocation of scarce spectrum resources. Also, the
extent to which additional spectrum is required for private and public
safety use is being considered in a separate proceeding that addresses
allocation of spectrum below 5 GHz transferred from Federal government
use.[^123] Accordingly, we will deny UTC\'s and APCO\'s requests that we
set aside a portion of the spectrum allocated to PCS exclusively for
private PCS operations.

C. [Mobile Satellite Services (MSS) Issues]{.underline}

AMSC, Comsat, and TRW argue for preservation of the 2180-2200 MHz band
for future allocation to MSS.[^124] The petitioners oppose allocation of
spectrum to PCS that has been allocated internationally to MSS,
contending that such allocation is inconsistent with the United States\'
support for these allocations at WARC-92 and impedes the introduction of
global MSS. In their comments, AMSC claims that since sharing between
MSS and the Broadcast Auxiliary Service in the 1990-2010 MHz band may be
possible, the MSS paired frequencies at 2180-2200 MHz should not be
allocated to PCS.[^125] Comsat and TRW argue that the
[Notice]{.underline} did not propose to consider allocation to PCS of
the 2180-2200 MHz band and that parties were therefore denied the
opportunity to comment fully on this issue.[^126] TRW argues that we
should reallocate the entire 1970-2010 MHz and 2160-2200 MHz bands to
MSS to match the international allocations. To preserve at least the
worldwide MSS allocations, TRW suggests that the four 10 MHz PCS blocks
in the 2130-2150 MHz and 2180-2200 MHz bands be relocated to the
2110-2150 MHz band.[^127] Motorola also filed a petition stating that,
while it supports allocation of sufficient spectrum for terrestrial PCS,
the Commission should initiate a separate proceeding to identify and
allocate additional spectrum outside the PCS bands for MSS.[^128]

Most responding parties oppose the petitioners\' requests that
additional spectrum be reserved for MSS. MCI, Sprint, UTC, API and Bell
Atlantic oppose reallocating any of the PCS spectrum to MSS. API and UTC
state that while MSS can offer a wide range of valuable services, an
adequate spectrum reserve for the development of MSS has been
established and no more should be allocated.[^129] MCI states that, to
the extent the Commission believes there may be a future need for
additional MSS spectrum, the Commission should initiate a separate
proceeding to identify and allocate other bands for MSS.[^130] UTC
argues that the over 100 MHz allocated for MSS is more than
sufficient.[^131] It contends that the petitioners\' real concern
appears to be that there should be sufficient spectrum to accommodate
all potential MSS applicants rather than that the overall allocation to
MSS is insufficient to meet expected demand. Sprint and Bell Atlantic
support the allocation of 120 MHz for broadband PCS and oppose
reallocating any of that spectrum to MSS. Sprint states that to do so
would compromise the competitiveness and ultimate viability of
PCS.[^132]

In reply comments, TRW, AMSC, Comsat, and LQSS support reallocation of
the 2180-2200 MHz band from PCS to MSS. Comsat and LQSS agree with TRW
that we could substitute other spectrum for PCS to replace the 1980-2200
MHz band.[^133] AMSC opposes expansion of the PCS proceeding to include
the possible allocation of the 1990-2010 MHz band to MSS. It argues that
the current allocation of this band to broadcast auxiliary operations is
necessary, that these frequencies are already congested and that there
currently is no evidence that sharing between broadcast auxiliary
operations and MSS would be feasible.[^134]

[Decision]{.underline}. We recognize the potential value of MSS as a
service provider to rural areas that may not be economically served by
PCS. We have thus given the petitions of MSS interests, including the
various alternatives they suggest, careful consideration. Having been
instrumental in obtaining the international MSS allocations at WARC-92,
we would not wish unnecessarily to reduce our flexibility to implement
those allocations in the U.S. On the other hand, we must also recognize
the large potential value of PCS which is a matter of record in this
proceeding.[^135] It should be noted that these MSS bands are also
allocated internationally to fixed and mobile services. PCS, as we have
broadly defined it, fits within the international definition of fixed
and mobile services and is thus consistent with international agreements
on the use of this spectrum. Because spectrum is a limited resource, we
find that to satisfy our goal of allocating sufficient spectrum for a
competitive PCS service, we must allocate to PCS a portion of the
spectrum internationally designated for MSS. We believe the new plan we
are adopting today strikes an appropriate balance between these two
services and will provide maximum benefits to U.S. consumers.

We disagree with the assertion of Comsat and TRW that we provided
insufficient notice and opportunity for comment on the possibility that
we might allocate a portion of the internationally designated MSS
spectrum to PCS. The PCS [Notice]{.underline} sought comment on a wide
range of allocation options for licensed PCS ranging from three to five
spectrum blocks of from 20 to 40 MHz each.[^136] Several of the possible
combinations of block size and number of blocks would require the use of
spectrum in the bands designated internationally for MSS, and at least
one option ([i.e.]{.underline}, five blocks of 40 MHz each) would
require virtually all of that spectrum.[^137] We specifically called
attention to the fact that some of these options would necessarily
require the use of spectrum in other emerging technologies bands, and we
did not exclude emerging technologies bands that had been designated
internationally for worldwide or Region II MSS.[^138] Thus, contrary to
petitioners\' contentions, we believe that parties were given adequate
notice of the possibility that our final PCS allocation could include
some or even all of the internationally allocated MSS spectrum in these
bands.

Under the new band plan, the entire allocation to broadband PCS is
located in the 1850-1990 MHz band. The 2180-2200 MHz band, which was
allocated to PCS in the [Second Report and Order]{.underline} has been
returned to reserve status for future allocation potentially to MSS, as
requested by the MSS interests. Our new band plan, however, removes an
equal amount of spectrum from potential consideration for MSS in the
band 1970-1990 MHz band, 10 MHz of which can be used for Region II MSS
service. We believe that our new band plan accommodates the future
potential of MSS more fully than our original plan and therefore
addresses the concerns of a majority of the MSS industry.[^139]

By shifting the PCS allocation out of the 2180-2200 MHz band we have
preserved the option of allocating some or all of that spectrum to MSS
in the future. This preserves 50 MHz of the 60 MHz allocated worldwide
and thus fits more closely with our international agreements. Twenty MHz
of this worldwide MSS spectrum is paired with spectrum inside the
current broadcast auxiliary band. In the future, this spectrum could
potentially be reallocated for MSS use on a shared basis, if feasible,
or exclusively, if suitable replacement spectrum could be found for
broadcast auxiliary service. It is our intent to initiate a proceeding
to investigate these additional allocation possibilities in the near
future, with the purpose of accommodating MSS operations within the
remaining internationally designated bands, while at the same time
maintaining sufficient spectrum for broadcast auxiliary use. We also
intend to pursue additional international allocations for MSS at

WRC-95.[^140]

**IV. OWNERSHIP RULES AND CELLULAR ELIGIBILITY**

In the [Second Report and Order]{.underline}, the Commission recognized
that permitting cellular licensees to participate in PCS could foster
rapid development of PCS by taking advantage of cellular providers\'
expertise, economies of scope between PCS and cellular service, and
existing infrastructures.[^141] The Commission also recognized that new
entrants would foster competition and expressed concern about potential
anticompetitive conduct by parties with cellular and PCS interests in
the same geographic area.[^142] To balance these competing interests, we
permitted cellular licensees to obtain PCS licenses outside of their
cellular service areas, but restricted them each to one 10 MHz PCS
license within their respective cellular service areas.

For the purposes of its PCS rules, the Commission defined an
attributable cellular interest as ownership of 20 or more percent of a
cellular license.[^143] If an entity has attributable cellular interests
in a license or licenses individually or jointly covering 10 or more
percent of the population in a PCS service area, then that entity would
be restricted to one 10 MHz PCS license in that area. If an entity holds
interests of less than 20 percent in a cellular license, these interests
are not considered attributable and the population covered by that
cellular license area is not counted towards the 10 percent population
threshold. If an entity holds attributable cellular interests,
[i.e.]{.underline}, interests of 20 percent or more, in licenses that
individually or jointly cover less than 10 percent of the population in
a PCS service area, that entity may hold licenses for up to 40 MHz of
PCS spectrum in that PCS service area. Entities that have attributable
interests that put them over the 10 percent population overlap threshold
in a PCS service area are deemed \"in market\" cellular entities and as
such may only hold 10 MHz of PCS spectrum in that PCS service
area.[^144]

The 20 percent attribution rule applies on a cumulative basis to all
parties with ownership interests in cellular operations. Thus, for
example, if four participants in a PCS venture each have an ownership
interest of 5 percent in the same cellular licensee serving more than 10
percent of the population of a BTA, the PCS venture in which they all
have an interest is deemed to have a 20 percent cellular ownership
interest and is restricted to one 10 MHz frequency block in that
BTA.[^145] However, if the four parties to a PCS application each own 5
percent interests in four different cellular licensees, each of which
serves 10 or more percent of the BTA, together they are not restricted
to one 10 MHz block because they do not exceed the 20 percent
attribution threshold as to any single cellular license. Therefore, in
the latter instance, the parties are permitted to purchase a full 40 MHz
PCS spectrum block.

Twenty-four parties petitioned for reconsideration of various aspects of
the cellular eligibility rules and the general attribution standard used
for invoking our PCS ownership limits.[^146] The petitioners address: 1)
eligibility of cellular licensees; 2) the 20 percent attribution
standard; 3) the 10 percent population standard; 4) post-auction
compliance by cellular licensees with the ownership restrictions; 5)
exemptions from the eligibility restrictions for certain cellular
providers; and 6) the interests that should be deemed attributable for
purposes of calculating ownership and control of a PCS or cellular
license.

A. [Eligibility of Cellular Licensees for PCS Licenses]{.underline}

Six parties advocate eliminating all eligibility restrictions on
cellular providers.[^147] Fourteen parties agree with the concept that
there should be some restrictions on cellular participation in
PCS.[^148] These latter parties\' positions range from agreeing with the
standards of the [Second Report and Order]{.underline} to arguing for
different measures of both coverage and ownership to favoring different
standards entirely, but these parties all accept the idea that there
should be limitations on cellular entities holding PCS licenses.[^149]

We have decided to retain restrictions on cellular participation in PCS.
In making this decision, we are aware of the benefits that the cellular
industry has to offer PCS, as TDS and McCaw note,[^150] including
capital, economies of scope, and experience and expertise in the
provision of mobile communications services. For this reason, we will
continue to allow cellular participation in PCS. In addition, we will
make some changes in the specific standards of the [Second Report and
Order]{.underline}, but we remain convinced that restrictions on
in-market cellular providers are necessary to achieve our goal of
maximizing the number of new viable and vigorous competitors. In
reaching this conclusion we do not assume that in-market cellular
providers will engage in illegal anticompetitive behavior. We agree with
the assertion of Dan Kelley of Hatfield Associates that our goal in
crafting these rules should not be to prevent anticompetitive behavior
which may or may not materialize, but rather, to promote
competition.[^151] Bell Atlantic\'s assertion that we should not
restrict cellular participants because we have no basis for assuming
that cellular providers will behave anticompetitively in the PCS market,
does not address our goal of promoting vigorous new competition.[^152]
Similarly, McCaw\'s arguments that existing cellular providers have
minimal market penetration do not respond to our desire to provide
consumers with as many competitive choices as possible.[^153] We
conclude that the public interest would be best served by maximizing the
number of viable new entrants in a given market.

Finally, while some petitioners, such as Radiofone, point out that SMR
and MSS providers are not subject to the same eligibility restrictions
as cellular providers,[^154] only U.S. West affirmatively requests that
the eligibility restrictions of the [Second Report and
Order]{.underline} be extended to wide-area SMR services.[^155] US West
claims that wide-area SMR is competitive with PCS and cellular services
and asserts that the competitive concerns that apply to cellular systems
also apply to wide-area SMR operations. AIDE and Time Warner agree with
U.S. West that cellular eligibility limitations should also apply to
wide-area SMR providers, because wide-area SMRs are expected to compete
with cellular and PCS.[^156] Nextel, however, opposes the application of
cellular eligibility restrictions to wide-area SMR systems.[^157] It
states that extending the eligibility restrictions to wide-area SMR
systems is beyond the scope of this proceeding and that wide-area SMR
operation is too new and too small to have the capability of behaving
anticompetitively. We agree with Nextel that imposing eligibility
restrictions is beyond the scope of this proceeding. We are, therefore,
addressing in another proceeding[^158] the eligibility of wide-area SMRs
and other commercial radio services to participate in PCS.

B. [Attribution Rules]{.underline}

In the [Notice of Proposed Rule Making]{.underline} in this proceeding,
we noted our expectation that PCS and cellular licensees serving the
same area will compete on price and quality of service. We therefore
stated that competitive benefits might be reduced if cellular licensees
are permitted to acquire PCS licenses within their service areas and
proposed an outright prohibition on cross-ownership of PCS licenses by
entities with cellular interests, except that ownership interests of
less than one percent (or less than five percent for publicly traded
companies) would not be considered.[^159] In the [Second Report and
Order]{.underline}, we found this approach too restrictive. Although we
still sought to avoid the potential for undue market power by entities
with significant existing market share, we balanced that goal against
recognition of the expertise that cellular licensees would bring to PCS
markets.[^160] We also noted that many entities possess non-controlling
interests in cellular licensees exceeding 5 percent but, due to the
non-controlling nature of their equity interests, create little
potential for anti-competitive behavior.[^161]

We therefore adopted a simple, bright-line 20 percent cross-ownership
attribution standard, pursuant to which entities with 20 percent or
greater ownership of a cellular operator were limited to one 10 MHz BTA
license for broadband PCS in the same region as their attributable
cellular interests.[^162] We did not distinguish between different types
of ownership such as voting and non-voting stock and general and limited
partnership interests. We noted, however, that while a clear 20 percent
ownership threshold may be more administratively efficient, a concern
remained that some parties with cellular ownership interests will use
our rules as an opportunity to control local cellular licensees while
retaining less than 20 percent ownership. Since such occurrences would
undermine our intent to limit cellular ownership in PCS, we said that we
would review carefully this decision, and we explicitly put parties on
notice that we would reconsider this limit if our intent to ensure
competition between cellular and PCS would be undermined under the
ownership rules adopted in the [Second Report and
Order]{.underline}.[^163]

With respect to ownership interests in multiple PCS licensees in a
single market, we adopted a 5 percent attribution threshold for purposes
of the 40 MHz PCS spectrum limit and for purposes of determining
cellular ownership in a PCS licensee. We stated that PCS ownership
interests of 5 percent or more will be attributed to the holder of the
interest.[^164] In adopting this standard, we cited similar market-based
concerns, noting our desire to \"ensure that \[no entity\] is able to
exert undue market power through partial ownership in multiple PCS
licensees in a single service area.\"[^165] The 5 percent threshold is
consistent with the ownership thresholds we apply to cellular and
broadcast licensees.[^166] We did not find any potential advantages
possessed by any existing PCS licensees inasmuch as there are no such
licensees. Similarly, we did not discuss the need to accommodate
settlements among PCS licensees resulting in non-controlling interests
of between 5 and 20 percent because there are no such settlements in the
PCS context. We therefore adopted this 5 percent limit for application
to PCS multiple ownership, whereas it appeared too restrictive in the
cellular-PCS cross-ownership context given the realities of existing
historical cellular settlements.[^167]

Twelve parties petitioned for reconsideration of the cellular ownership
attribution standard.[^168] The petitioners recommend the following
alternatives: 1) raising the 20 percent level of permissible ownership
in cellular licensees; 2) attribution based on control rather than
ownership; 3) applying an affiliation standard like that in our
telco-cable cross-ownership rules; 4) applying an attribution standard
based on the rules used to enforce our alien ownership restrictions
under Section 310 of the Communications Act; and 5) applying the same
attribution rules to PCS as those we apply to broadcast interests.

[Decision]{.underline}. We continue to believe that the PCS and cellular
ownership attribution decisions we adopted in the [Second Report and
Order]{.underline}, with certain modifications, are appropriate and
strike a reasonable balance between promoting vigorous competition and
the advantages of allowing experienced mobile communications operators
such as cellular licensees to participate as PCS licensees. We disagree
with those parties, such as Bell Atlantic and GCI, that suggest the same
20 percent attribution limits should apply to cellular/PCS
cross-ownership and to PCS multiple ownership.[^169] Generally, we would
prefer to use the 5 percent standard for all cross-ownership situations,
to maximize competition. We are adopting an attribution threshold of 5
percent for multiple PCS ownership purposes to prevent any party from
exerting market power through substantial partial ownership in multiple
PCS licensees in the same service area.[^170] We see no countervailing
reason to risk reducing competition by raising this 5 percent limit for
PCS multiple ownership limits. Moreover, the 5 percent threshold is
consistent with ownership thresholds we apply to cellular and
broadcasting.

Such a strict rule for PCS/cellular cross-ownership, however, would not
recognize the history of cellular licensing. The 20 percent ownership
attribution standard for cellular operators was adopted, in part,
because settlements during the initial phase of cellular licensing
resulted in partial and often non-controlling interests in those
licensees.[^171] In light of this history, we believe it would be unfair
and unduly restrictive to place the same 5 percent limit on cellular/PCS
cross-ownership. For this reason, we decided to allow a 20 percent
cellular ownership interest. Further, we believe that given the nature
of these settlement agreements, permitting this level of ownership will
not decrease the incentives for competition. Therefore we will not
require divestiture to a lower level of ownership. The 20 percent
standard permits many entities with partial, non-controlling cellular
interests to participate in PCS. In adopting the 20 percent standard, we
recognized that participation by cellular operators in PCS would offer
benefits that include promoting early development of PCS by taking
advantage of cellular providers\' expertise and permitting attainment of
economies of scope between PCS and cellular service and existing
infrastructure.[^172] We therefore are making an exception to our usual
treatment of cross-ownership for purposes of cellular-PCS
cross-ownership.

We disagree with those entities such as CTIA that argue for a higher
cellular ownership attribution threshold such as 35 percent.[^173] PCS
Action states that if our PCS attribution standard were raised to
CTIA\'s proposed 35 percent, a consortium of NYNEX, Bell Atlantic and
Bell South, each holding 33 percent of the consortium, could hold all
the 30 MHz MTA licenses in the areas covered by the three parties\'
CGSAs. According to PCS Action, this would amount to cellular control of
PCS services in the entire East Coast and South. PCS Action concludes by
advocating retention of the current standard.[^174] We believe that 20
percent is the proper standard. A higher attribution threshold
([i.e.]{.underline}, above 20 percent) for all incumbent cellular
entities would tend to suppress competition, because the licensee would
have economic incentives not to compete vigorously against competitors
in which it holds a substantial equity interest. We conclude that these
standards, with exceptions discussed below related to certain designated
entities, remain appropriate, and accordingly we affirm them.

A number of parties, including Alliance, Bell Atlantic, Columbia, NYNEX,
Pacific Telecom and PMN, request that we amend the attribution standard
to base it on case-by-case determinations of control rather than the 20
percent attribution standard.[^175] Alliance and others contend that 20
percent is too restrictive and unnecessarily limits participation in PCS
by entities that have only passive interests in cellular systems.[^176]
Bell Atlantic and NYNEX also advocate examining only legal
control.[^177] Bell Atlantic argues that this standard should apply to
both cellular/PCS and PCS/PCS ownership. NYNEX argues that a standard
based upon control would ensure that cellular carriers and local
exchange carriers are able to provide needed capital and expertise to
PCS. CCIMR advocates applying broadcast ownership attribution standards,
arguing that these rules distinguish between ownership and control and
are as easy to administer as the 20 percent attribution standard.[^178]

Our goals here include ensuring that the holder of the PCS license has
strong incentives to compete against the cellular licensees in the same
geographic market.[^179] A PCS licensee that has a large equity stake
(i.e., more than 20 percent) in a cellular license in the same area has
less incentive to compete vigorously against its own equity interest in
a cellular provider, even though it may not exercise legal control over
the cellular licensee. We believe that our attribution rules provide the
right balance between maximizing competition and allowing cellular
entities to bring their expertise to PCS.[^180] We therefore will not
adopt a rule that would require us to find that a party had a
\"controlling interest\" in a cellular licensee before it would be
prohibited from investing in a PCS licensee in the same area. Such a
rule could substantially delay the licensing of PCS and would not serve
our goal of promoting vigorous competition between PCS and cellular
licensees in the same area. We believe the bright-line rules we are
adopting will result in a faster, less burdensome licensing process.

We also reject the suggestion by Time Warner that we prohibit all
\"affiliations\" between cellular and PCS licensees in the same market,
along the lines of our telco-cable cross-ownership rules.[^181] These
rules, which are even more restrictive than our broadcast attribution
rules, would not provide the flexibility to recognize the history of
settlement agreements in cellular licensing and would not allow us to
draw on the experience and expertise provided by cellular providers who
have low equity stakes. They also might have the effect of restricting
contracts between PCS licensees and companies financing their equipment
and the build-out of their PCS systems, which could seriously impair
rapid investment in and deployment of PCS systems.

Comcast recommends that we adopt the attributable ownership standard
used to apply the alien ownership restrictions of Section 310(b) of the
Communications Act, along with policies found in the broadcast
rules.[^182] Comcast notes that these alien ownership provisions
recognize both voting and non-voting stock in determining percentage of
ownership. Comcast also suggests that we adopt the \"multiplier\"
policies of our broadcast ownership rules.[^183] Comcast claims that the
use of these standards together, because they are clear and
well-defined, would help a potential PCS investor decide whether to
invest in PCS.

We disagree that the alien ownership rules provide a clearer guide than
our present attribution standards. Because the alien ownership
restrictions set forth in section 310(b) of the Communications Act were
created specifically to avoid an undue concentration of foreign
influence in the direction of entities involved in communications, the
attribution thresholds defined in that section are more complicated than
the 5 percent/20 percent bright- line thresholds which we have adopted
here. Further, unlike our rules in the broadcast context, we will not
allow use of a \"multiplier\" in the case of multi-tiered entities; the
interest of the subsidiary is attributed in full to the parent. We
agree, however, that both voting and non-voting stock should be included
in determining percentage of ownership of PCS and cellular entities.

In determining attributable interests for the purposes of both the 20
percent cellular/PCS cross-ownership rule and the 5 percent PCS/PCS
multiple ownership rule, we agree with some of the parties that some
clarifications and modifications to our attribution rules are warranted.
Our attribution rules must be simple for applicants to understand
because they are essential to enforcement of our PCS spectrum cap and
our PCS/cellular cross-ownership rules. In the [Second Report and
Order]{.underline}, we stated that we would consider all equity
ownership, including voting and non-voting stock and limited partnership
interests, in calculating the percentages of attributable ownership
interest in a PCS or cellular licensee. We explained that we would count
these interests even if they did not confer on the holder meaningful
participation, because the public interest would best be served by a
\"bright-line\" test. We continue to believe that our ownership rules
should be clear and easy to administer, and, to that end, we will
provide further clarification about which of our ownership rules from
the broadcast regime will be applied to PCS. We decline to adopt the
full panoply of attribution rules that we apply in the broadcast and in
the telco/cable contexts because we

believe that the restrictions we are adopting will be sufficient to
prevent undue influence and preserve competition.

We clarify that, for purposes of these ownership rules, controlling
interests [per se]{.underline} are attributable. As in other contexts,
\"control\" means not only majority equity ownership, but includes any
general partnership interest, or any means of actual working control
over the operation of the licensee, in whatever manner exercised. We
will rely on existing case law for making control determinations where
such issues arise.[^184]

We also clarify that PCS equity investments of 5 percent or more, and
cellular equity investments of 20 percent or more, also are
attributable.[^185] These equity interests are attributable because they
support our goals of developing a competitive PCS service and reducing
the incentive for any entity to retard the capability of the new PCS
licensee to compete with the cellular or any other PCS licensee in which
the entity has an attributable interest. Specifically, the following
equity investments will be counted: voting stock, non-voting stock, and
limited partnership interests.[^186] The percentage of ownership
interest in a limited partnership will be based on the partner\'s
economic interest in the partnership. Therefore, the Commission will
assess the percentage of the partner\'s capital contribution as well as
the percentage of profits and losses allocated to the partner. As noted
above, general partnership interests are deemed attributable regardless
of equity percentage because of the control conferred on general
partners by the nature of their interest. The following investments are
[not]{.underline} attributable for multiple or cross-ownership purposes:
debt interests, including loans secured by the equipment used in the
licensed system, and equity interests below the 20 percent and 5 percent
thresholds. These interests are of less consequence to or independent of
the entity\'s performance and therefore provide little incentive to
delay or dilute the participation of the new PCS license in the market.
In addition, consistent with other multiple- and cross-ownership
attribution standard, convertible debt instruments or options with
rights of conversion to equity interests shall not be attributed unless
and until conversion is effected.

We also clarify that the interests of a cellular or PCS licensee, or
entity in control of a licensee, are attributed to the officers and
directors of that entity. We remain concerned about the ability of such
individuals to exert influence over companies in which they have
significant managerial responsibility. Therefore, if an officer of a
company wishes to invest in a PCS market, he or she may only do so if
this company itself could make the same investment in compliance with
our rules.

We also will not allow an exemption for minority investors in companies
controlled by a single majority shareholder. Although these rules are
used in the broadcast area to exempt from attribution entities not
believed to be able to exercise control over a licensee, in the context
of PCS we believe that not allowing use of a \"multiplier\" serves our
goal of maximizing competition. These rules will help ensure against
undue influence, short of control, by minority stockholders and distant
stockholders in parent or intermediate corporations.

Through an ongoing proceeding concerning multiple ownership of
commercial mobile radio service (CMRS) licensees, we will address
whether we should change our rules to restrict or attribute resale,
management agreements or other ownership arrangements that could confer
possible anticompetitive incentives on parties with multiple CMRS
interests.[^187] This proceeding will examine whether and to what extent
such arrangements could be used to exert control over more spectrum than
is permitted under our PCS spectrum cap (40 MHz) or the proposed CMRS
spectrum cap.[^188]

C. [Attribution Rules for Certain Designated Entities]{.underline}

Several petitioners request that we exempt from the cellular eligibility
restrictions certain classes of cellular owners, such as rural telephone
companies or other designated entities. INS, TDS, Intelco and OPASTCO
all request us to exempt rural telephone companies from the cellular
eligibility restrictions. INS, for example, argues that most rural
telephone companies are merely passive investors in cellular licensees,
incapable of exercising market power. It argues that PCS could be
introduced in rural areas more rapidly through consortia of rural
telephone companies.[^189] OPASTCO argues that Congress directed the
Commission to ensure that opportunities exist for rural telephone
companies, among others, to participate in spectrum-based services and
that the current cellular eligibility rules exclude meaningful
participation in PCS for many rural telephone companies.[^190]
Similarly, Intelco contends that rural telephone companies should not be
prohibited from bringing PCS to less populated areas simply because they
previously invested in cellular licenses serving such areas.[^191] USTA
argues that all cellular eligibility limits should be eliminated on the
grounds that such limits will restrict the full participation of small
and mid-sized cellular providers, who are more likely to bring full PCS
service to under-served areas.[^192]

Most commenting parties generally favor exemptions for rural telephone
companies and consortia led by designated entities. For example, CUC
argues that rural telephone companies are most likely to deploy PCS in
rural and remote areas and therefore should be encouraged to do
so.[^193] RCA contends that the cellular interests of rural telephone
companies cannot exercise market power.[^194] NRTA states that the
Congress intended to ensure that new technologies are available to the
residents of less populated areas, and that applying the cellular
eligibility restrictions to rural telephone companies that hold
significant but non-controlling interests in cellular licenses is
incompatible with the intent of Congress.[^195]

[Decision]{.underline}. We agree with INS, OPASTCO, TDS and Intelco that
relaxing the cellular eligibility restrictions is appropriate for
designated entities.[^196] We recognize that many designated entities
are merely passive investors in cellular operators and, because of their
size, are unlikely to influence pricing decisions. In addition, we seek
to address Congress\' goal of encouraging the participation of
designated entities in the auction process and in the provision of
spectrum-based services. We believe that designated entities which have
some interests in cellular operations may be especially effective PCS
competitors because of their cellular experience. This will help ensure
that service is brought quickly to underserved areas and that designated
entities become viable competitors. In particular, we believe that rural
telephone companies and some small cellular companies, due to their
existing infrastructure, are uniquely positioned rapidly to introduce
PCS services into their service areas or adjacent areas. However, we are
not exempting designated entities entirely from the cellular eligibility
rules, because such an exemption could foreclose from competition from a
new PCS entrant. To the extent that designated entities are involved in
the control of cellular services, we remain concerned that there is
potential for some of these parties to compete less vigorously in the
nascent PCS industry. In balancing these interests, we conclude that
increasing the cellular attribution threshold for designated entities
from 20 percent to 40 percent, if non-controlling, would be appropriate
and would further the Congressional mandate noted above. Accordingly, we
will permit a designated entity to hold a non-controlling equity
interest of up to 40 percent in a cellular licensee without being
subject to the cellular PCS eligibility restrictions.

AIDE and Comcast support exempting from the PCS eligibility restrictions
those cellular entities with minority interests in consortia controlled
by designated entities. AIDE states that such an exemption would serve
the Congressional intent that designated entities have opportunities to
participate in PCS.[^197] Murray supports the recommendation of the
FCC\'s Small Business Advisory Committee that only parties that form
alliances with designated entities be exempt from eligibility
restrictions.[^198] Cablevision, on the other hand, opposes an exemption
for cellular parties that participate with designated entities in PCS.
Cablevision argues that the potential for the cellular provider to
exercise undue influence over the PCS licensee is too great to be
ignored given the superior knowledge and experience of the cellular
provider.[^199]

We have decided to increase the cellular attribution threshold from 20
percent to 40 percent for any entity proposing to invest in businesses
controlled by members of minority groups and/or women. An entity may
hold up to a 40 percent interest in cellular licensees before its
cellular interests will be deemed attributable, but must limit its
participation in a PCS licensee controlled by women or minority group
members to a non-controlling interest. We believe that this action will
encourage entities with attributable cellular interests to make
non-controlling investments in businesses owned by minorities and/or
women, furthering Congress\' objective of ensuring the participation of
these entities in the competitive bidding process by encouraging an
alternative source of financing. The record indicates that the main
challenge that minorities and women face when seeking to participate in
telecommunications licensing is ready access to capital.[^200]
Investments by cellular providers in these designated entities should
increase the entities chances for success in the auctions and later in
service competition by providing access to capital and valuable industry
experience.

We are not, as requested by Comcast and AIDE, granting a blanket
exemption to in-region cellular parties with 40 percent or greater
equity or control to participate in consortia that include designated
entities. Such an exemption would allow a cellular entity to control a
cellular license and create the potential for the entity to influence
the PCS licensee to compete less vigorously. As Cablevision observes,
the potential for a cellular entity to exercise undue influence over the
PCS licensee, especially absent limits on the control exercised by the
cellular carrier over the designated entity and its own cellular
license, is too great, given the superior knowledge and experience of
cellular providers.[^201] Therefore, we have relaxed the cellular
attribution standard to permit entities that hold up to 40 percent
non-controlling equity in cellular licensees in the same service area to
make non-controlling investments in PCS licensees controlled by woman-
or minority-owned businesses. Because their investment will be
non-controlling in both the PCS and cellular license, the threat to
competition is diminished. We believe that this relaxed standard
encourages availability of capital to PCS businesses owned by women and
minorities, yet guards against the dominance of these designated
entities by entities which also control a cellular license in the same
service area.

Comcast requests that the Commission exempt non-wireline cellular
carriers from the cellular eligibility rules. Comcast asserts that we
have focused too narrowly on wireless competition in devising the
cellular eligibility rules. Comcast argues that PCS is a competitor to
the wireline \"local loop\" service of local exchange carriers (LECs)
and that one 10 MHz block is not adequate to provide service that is
competitive to the wireline local loop. Comcast argues that non-wireline
cellular providers have not posed competitive problems, and therefore
should be allowed full participation in PCS.

Bell Atlantic opposes Comcast\'s request that we exempt non-wireline
cellular providers from the PCS eligibility restrictions. Bell Atlantic
argues that Comcast is merely trying to improve its competitive position
by this request.[^202] PMN agrees that non-wireline cellular carriers
should not be entitled to special treatment.[^203]

We deny Comcast\'s request that we exempt non-wireline cellular carriers
from the PCS attribution rules. Comcast\'s arguments, which we
considered in the [Second Report and Order]{.underline}, could impair
successful achievement of our goal of creating the maximum number of new
competitors.

We believe that these important modifications will increase the efficacy
of our cellular eligibility rules by guarding against the improper
exercise of market power by cellular providers through controlling
interests in PCS systems overlapping their cellular coverage areas. We
believe that these changes will better address our concerns regarding
reduced competition without unnecessarily restricting the ability of
cellular providers to participate in PCS, and will provide further
incentives for investment in and participation by designated entities in
PCS.

D. [Population Standard]{.underline}

When we adopted regulations restricting the eligibility of certain
cellular licensees to hold PCS licenses within their cellular service
areas, we noted assertions that cellular operators might have unfair
competitive advantages over PCS licensees.[^204] On the other hand, we
also noted the valuable contributions that the expertise of cellular
providers could provide to the PCS industry. Finally, we noted that,
because of different geographic licensing boundaries for cellular and
PCS, there was a potential for excluding cellular providers from PCS
markets even though the degree of overlap was minimal. We decided that
such an exclusion was neither fair nor desirable for maximizing
competition. In resolving these conflicting interests, the Commission
adopted the 20 percent ownership attribution rule to define cellular
ownership for purposes of the PCS rules. For entities at or exceeding 20
percent ownership, we applied a 10 percent population coverage overlap
test to determine whether the cellular licensee would be restricted to a
single 10 MHz PCS license.[^205]

Florida Cellular, PNSC and CTIA request higher population coverage
overlap thresholds. Florida Cellular states that the coverage threshold
should be raised to 20 percent so that cellular carriers can compete
with PCS carriers in providing mobile services.[^206] PNSC requests a 20
to 30 percent threshold, claiming that a 10 percent threshold is unduly
harsh and unjustified.[^207] CTIA argues for a 40 percent overlap
threshold and provides a market analysis based on the merger guidelines
of the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission to support
its claim that this degree of coverage overlap will not result in
anticompetitive conduct.[^208] Radiofone also objects to the 10 percent
population threshold.[^209]

Cablevision responds that the petitioners requesting a revision of the
cellular eligibility rules raise no new facts or arguments and that
their petitions therefore should be denied. Cablevision states that the
Commission\'s finding that broadband PCS and cellular will compete
justifies maintaining the cellular eligibility rules adopted in the
[Second Report and Order]{.underline}.[^210] AIDE agrees, arguing that
cellular providers are unlikely to be aggressive in introducing PCS
services in their service area.[^211] Similarly, CIS argues that any
relaxation of the current rules would allow Regional Bell Operating
Companies (RBOCs) and large LECs with cellular holdings to dominate the
PCS market to the exclusion of smaller operators.[^212] PCS Action also
opposes the requests for changes to the current cellular eligibility
threshold, arguing that the current standards appropriately limit
cellular participation in PCS.[^213] Finally, Time Warner finds that our
cellular eligibility rules strike an appropriate balance between
preventing anti-competitive behavior and allowing cellular providers to
participate in PCS.[^214]

[Decision.]{.underline} We have decided to retain the 10 percent
population overlap threshold adopted in the [Second Report and
Order]{.underline}. Our goal is to provide for entry into the PCS market
for the maximum number of viable competitors. We remain concerned about
the potential for cellular operators to exercise market power and to
reduce the number of viable competitors in the PCS market. We believe
that the 10 percent population overlap figure is justified and should
foster robust competition and prevent competitive abuse. Balancing the
potential benefits of the participation in PCS of cellular providers and
the potential harms of reduced competition, we are convinced that the 10
percent coverage threshold is appropriate. With this limit we have
ensured the opportunity for the emergence of the maximum number of
competitors that the market will support for 90 percent of the
population. Increasing this limit beyond 10 percent would create greater
risk that consumers would be denied the benefit of vigorously competing
service providers. We also believe that this threshold is an important
means of encouraging new entrants in each area, thereby enhancing
competition. On balance, we conclude that the 10 percent population
coverage threshold promotes competition among licensees serving a
significant percentage of the population, while providing some
recognition of the overlaps that will result from the different
licensing areas for PCS and cellular. In addition, as discussed below,
we will allow divestiture for those entities with CGSA/PCS service area
population overlaps between 10 and 20 percent. In reaffirming our 10
percent threshold, we reject proposals to adopt a national population
measure or to use a multiplier formula.

Concord, GCI and MCI argue that coverage of the national population is a
better measure of market dominance than coverage of population within a
PCS service area. Concord states that the 10 percent overlap standard
will preclude many small and mid-size local exchange carriers with
partial interests in cellular carriers from participating in PCS. It
recommends an eligibility threshold of 1 percent coverage of the
national population to ensure that large cellular providers are not able
to dominate the market. Concord argues that this standard would allow
small and mid-size LECs to participate in PCS.[^215] GCI and MCI
advocate barring the largest cellular providers from bidding on at least
one of the 30 MHz blocks of PCS spectrum. MCI claims that consumer
welfare will be served best by barring any cellular provider with more
than 10 percent coverage of the nation\'s population from at least one
of the 30 MHz blocks.[^216] GCI agrees, claiming that the bidding power
of the largest cellular providers will allow cellular providers either
to capture the nationwide PCS market or at least to prevent any other
licensee from doing so.[^217] NYNEX specifically opposes the petitions
by MCI and GCI, and asserts that all limitations on cellular
participation should be eliminated.[^218] PacBell argues against the
national population standard proposed by GTE and Sprint, and asserts
that the 10 percent rule is clear on its face.[^219]

We do not believe that a national population test would achieve our goal
of providing the maximum number of new competitors in each market. PCS
is being licensed on a local and regional, not national basis. A
cellular entity who operates in one city but has no presence in another
city would be a new competitor in the latter city. We seek to encourage
that entity\'s PCS participation in the second city, because of the
likelihood that the experience and economics it brings from its cellular
business will stimulate PCS development in the market and promote
vigorous competition to other PCS licensees.

Two petitioners, GTE and Sprint, recommend a formula for determining
eligibility. They suggest multiplying the percentage overlap of the
population in the PCS and cellular service areas by the percentage
ownership in the cellular provider, to arrive at an \"effective POP\"
figure. Under this formula, an entity owning 25 percent of a cellular
provider that covered 20 percent of the population of the PCS service
area would have a 5 percent effective POP figure. GTE suggests that a
effective population overlap of 20 percent would be an appropriate
eligibility threshold,[^220] and Sprint advocates a 20 to 30 percent
figure.[^221] These petitioners argue that this approach would allow
companies to bid for MTA licenses in service areas where they hold only
insulated, minority interests in cellular providers in the service area.
They also contend that this approach would enhance the opportunities of
independent rural and suburban telephone companies to participate in
PCS.

We do not believe that this \"effective POP\" attribution rule would
achieve our goal of maximizing the number of new competitors. Under this
rule, an entity could have a majority equity interest in cellular
licenses covering 40 percent of the population in that service area and
remain eligible for 40 MHz of PCS spectrum. This would result in fewer
competitive choices for 40 percent of the consumers in that market. This
would not achieve our goal of maximizing competitive choices for as many
consumers as possible.

E. [Post-Auction Divestiture]{.underline}

In the [Second Report and Order]{.underline} we limited PCS
participation by in-market cellular licensees to one 10 MHz PCS license.
In its petition for reconsideration, McCaw requests that cellular
carriers be permitted to bid for PCS licenses, and to bring their
ownership into compliance with the restrictions if they obtain a PCS
license for more than one 10 MHz block.[^222] This suggestion was
supported in replies by Ameritech, Bell Atlantic, Cablevision, Comcast,
CTIA, GTE, Sprint, TDS and US West.[^223]

[Decision]{.underline}. We concur with these parties that it would be
reasonable to permit incumbent cellular operators, in certain defined
circumstances, to divest their cellular interests in order to become PCS
licensees. These operators could become eligible for 40 MHz of PCS
spectrum by either reducing population overlap or ownership levels to
below the standards discussed above. Either could be accomplished before
the auction, but that would involve selling the cellular interests on an
assumption that the operator would be the successful bidder for a 30 MHz
license.

We also agree with other commenters, including APC, PCS Action and Time
Warner,[^224] that allowing unlimited divestiture of the cellular
interest after the auction raises concerns that abuses could occur
during or after the bidding process.[^225] If afforded an unlimited
opportunity to divest, cellular operators with significant areas of
overlap could have incentives to use the bidding process to forestall
licensing of new competitors in the market, because the cellular
operator would be in control of both a cellular system and one of the
three or four possible 30 MHz broadband PCS licenses. There are
instances, however, in which such abuses are unlikely to occur. A
cellular operator with less than 20 percent population coverage in the
PCS service areas would have little incentive to risk incurring
penalties for abusing the bidding process when PCS offers greater
potential to serve the entire MTA or BTA. These cellular operators have
more to gain by broadening their customer base by offering competitive
PCS services in place of their overlapping cellular interests in excess
of 10 percent than they do by abusing the bidding process to forestall
competition. Operators with population overlaps in excess of 20 percent
have increasingly greater incentives not to start competitive PCS
businesses.

We conclude that it is appropriate to allow cellular operators to divest
themselves of attributable cellular interests that do not comply with
the cellular/PCS cross ownership restriction after winning more than 10
MHz of PCS spectrum in the PCS auctions, provided that the divestiture
occurs within the short time frame we set forth below. However, because
a cellular operator with significant overlaps may have incentives to
delay the rapid introduction of PCS service, we will permit cellular
divestiture only for cellular operators that serve less than 20 percent
of the PCS service area. If the overlap consists of several cellular
licenses, the incumbent may sell some of the licenses and keep others if
the result is in compliance with the attribution and population overlap
thresholds. This will help achieve our goals of rapid introduction of
PCS service and competitive delivery because those entities with
cellular operations near a PCS service area may be able to combine the
operation into a single efficient operation that would benefit
consumers.

We have decided to allow the post-auction partial sale of attributable
cellular interests so that entities may come into compliance with the
cellular eligibility rules. Procedurally, we will require that a PCS
applicant that meets the criteria for post-auction divestiture submit
with the PCS license application (short-form) a statement that, if
successful in obtaining more than 10 MHz of spectrum, it will come into
complete compliance with the cellular/PCS cross-ownership restriction
within 90 days of the PCS license grant.[^226] If more than 10 MHz is
obtained, the long-form application for PCS licensing must be
accompanied by a signed statement from the applicant that the cellular
property causing the applicant to be in excess of the 10 percent
population overlap, or enough equity to bring the entity into compliance
with our attribution threshold, will be divested within 90 days of the
PCS license grant to bring ownership interest below the permitted
attributable ownership limits. If the PCS applicant is otherwise
qualified, the PCS application will be granted subject to a condition
that the PCS licensee come into compliance with the PCS/cellular
cross-ownership rule within 90 days of grant.

As a condition of its PCS license, within 90 days of PCS license grant
the PCS licensee must certify to the Commission that the applicant and
all parties to the application have come into compliance with our
PCS-cellular cross-ownership rules. If the PCS licensee fails to submit
this certification within 90 days, we will invoke the condition on the
PCS license, cancelling it immediately and retaining all monies
tendered. In addition, we may investigate whether the certifications on
divestiture are evidence of misrepresentations that call into question
the party\'s qualification to hold its cellular license. The PCS
licensee may divest the prohibited interest to an interim independent
trustee if a buyer has not been secured in the required time frame as
long as the applicant has no interest in or control of the trustee, and
the trustee may dispose of the license as it sees fit.

**V. CONSTRUCTION REQUIREMENTS**

In the [Second Report and Order]{.underline}, we stated our expectations
that broadband PCS would be a highly competitive industry and that
licensees would have the incentive to construct facilities to meet the
demand for service in their licensed areas. We concluded that specific
channel loading requirements are unnecessary; however, we required
licensees to meet specified construction benchmarks to ensure efficient
spectrum utilization and service to the public. Specifically, we
required licensees to offer service to one-third of the population in
their service area within five years of licensing, two-thirds of the
population in their service area within seven years, and 90 percent of
the population within ten years. We stated that failure to meet these
requirements would result in forfeiture of the license and the licensee
would be ineligible to regain it.[^227]

[Petitioners\' Requests]{.underline}. Several petitioners request
reconsideration of the construction requirements and submit a variety of
alternatives. In its petition, PacBell supports the five-year and
seven-year service area requirements but requests that we eliminate the
ten-year, 90 percent population coverage requirement, arguing that the
90 percent coverage requirement is too stringent in view of the PCS
power limits. PacBell also argues that a PCS licensee should not have to
forfeit its license if it does not meet the construction
requirements.[^228] PCIA also opposes the 90 percent population coverage
requirement and similarly argues that licensees should not have to
forfeit their license if they fail to meet the construction
requirements.[^229] Mebtel and RCA also oppose the requirements, arguing
that the requirements will adversely affect designated entities.[^230]
Mebtel recommends that designated entities be allowed ten years to
provide service to one-third of the population of their service area and
fifteen years to provide service to two-thirds of that population.[^231]

Some parties, including Alliance and Columbia, recommend that areas
unserved for five years be re-licensed to a second party in a manner
similar to relicensing of cellular unserved areas.[^232] RCA recommends
a similar approach, but with a seven-year period before
re-licensing.[^233] Columbia argues that the use of the \"cellular
fill-in\" model would allow the market to determine the development of
PCS. Alliance and Columbia both argue that the fill-in approach would be
more equitable to the licensee and more administratively efficient than
the current population coverage requirements.[^234] Columbia also
contends that standards for ascertaining the service area of a PCS
system are vague and therefore the Commission\'s license forfeiture
policy will be unenforceable.[^235]

PNSC recommends excluding all BTA blocks from the construction
requirements, and Southwestern Bell recommends excluding the 10 MHz BTA
blocks.[^236] PNSC recommends a construction requirement for BTA
licensees of 20 percent population coverage in five years, 30 percent in
seven, and 50 percent in ten years. Southwestern Bell argues that 10 MHz
licensees will not be able to provide the same scope of services or
realize the same economies of scale as licensees of larger spectrum
blocks and recommends that non-aggregated 10 MHz licensees be required
to meet only a 25 percent population coverage requirement within ten
years.

Other parties propose other modifications to the population coverage
requirements. Sprint recommends permitting cellular PCS providers to
count existing cellular population coverage toward the PCS
requirements.[^237] BellSouth recommends eliminating the population
coverage requirements entirely and simply requiring a licensee to build
a system within a five-year period.[^238] Motorola argues that the
current construction schedule, together with the stringent penalty of
forfeiture, will limit the development of pedestrian and in-building PCS
because licensees will face many economic hurdles and pedestrian PCS
would cost more to implement. Motorola requests that we adopt a flexible
plan that permits licensees to specify a construction plan with which
they must comply to accommodate different system configurations and
different coverage situations. Motorola argues that, at a minimum, the
license forfeiture policy should be tempered by providing an opportunity
for the licensee to demonstrate that its service is satisfactory,
regardless of the overall population coverage attained.[^239]

[Responses]{.underline}. A number of parties expressed support for the
existing construction requirements. For example, GCI and NYNEX recommend
that the Commission maintain its construction requirements to ensure
delivery of PCS services as quickly as possible.[^240] NYNEX contends
that PCS applicants can adjust their bids in the auction process to
reflect the difficulties of meeting construction requirements in each
market. Northern Telecom also expresses support for the Commission\'s
construction requirements, but proposes that the definition of
population served include rural residents where they work or shop, and
that the Commission develop guidelines for waivers of the construction
requirements.[^241] On the other hand, CUC opposes overall relaxation of
the construction requirements, arguing that relaxation would delay PCS
implementation. It does support adoption of a waiver standard and
relaxing the construction requirements in rural areas. CUC further
argues that the Commission should not relax its construction
requirements if the licensee has the option of partitioning its service
area.[^242] AIDE argues that if we allow markets to be partitioned, each
partitioned market should be subject to independent construction
requirements.[^243] PacBell opposes Sprint\'s suggestion that cellular
carriers be permitted to include their existing coverage in meeting PCS
coverage requirements.[^244]

MCI asserts that some relaxation of the construction requirements is
necessary if base and mobile power limits are not substantially
increased.[^245] US West opposes the 90 percent construction
requirement, asserting that 90 percent coverage will increase the cost
of PCS fourfold compared to a 67 percent population coverage
requirement. It states that a stringent construction requirement is not
necessary to prevent warehousing of spectrum because the spectrum will
be purchased at auction. As part of its filing, US West submits an
analysis of nine large western BTAs that indicates that increasing
population coverage from 67 to 75 percent results in only a moderate
increase in the geographic area that must be served. On the other hand,
increasing population from 75 to 90 percent results in a very large
increase in the geographic area that must be covered.[^246]

[Decision]{.underline}. We believe that PCS will be a highly competitive
service and that licensees will have incentives to construct facilities
to meet the service demands in their licensed service areas. Further, we
believe that our use of competitive bidding for PCS licensing and the
restrictions on the amount of spectrum that a licensee may control in a
geographic area will limit the likelihood that spectrum will be
warehoused. Nevertheless, we continue to believe that minimum
construction requirements are necessary to ensure that PCS service is
made available to as many communities as possible and that the spectrum
is used effectively. We note that the Reconciliation Act amendments
require the Commission to impose performance requirements.[^247] While
we agree with GCI, NYNEX, and others that construction requirements are
needed to ensure service in a timely fashion, we also agree that
relaxation of the requirements is desirable to ensure an economical
deployment of the service to promote opportunities for PCS \"niche\"
services, and to facilitate a competitive market.[^248]

Accordingly, we are amending the construction requirements as follows.
All 30 MHz broadband PCS licensees will be required to construct
facilities that provide coverage to one-third of the population of their
service area within five years of initial license grant and to
two-thirds of the population of their service area within ten years. We
will require the 10 MHz licensees to meet a single construction
requirement of providing coverage to one-fourth of the population of
their service area within five years; or alternatively, they may submit
an acceptable showing to the Commission demonstrating that they are
providing substantial service. We recognize that these requirements are
less than the requirement for narrowband PCS licensees, but we believe
this difference is appropriate given the higher expected construction
costs involved for broadband PCS.[^249] Moreover, since licensees must
purchase their licenses, they will have added economic incentives to
construct their systems as rapidly as possible and introduce service to
a significant percentage of the population. In this regard, we also
believe that these relaxed construction requirements may increase the
viability and value of some broadband licenses, especially those in less
densely populated service areas. Finally, since most areas are already
served by cellular and SMR providers, we believe it unnecessary to
require PCS licensees to provide identical or similar services to areas
where it is uneconomic to do so. With regard to the 10 MHz licensees, we
believe that the reduced construction requirement will make these
licenses more attractive to applicants intending to provide residential,
cutting-edge niche services or services to business and educational
campuses where the population may be small except during business or
school hours.

At the five-year benchmark we will require all licensees, and again at
the 10-year benchmark for 30 MHz licensees, to file a map and other
supporting documentation showing compliance with the construction
requirements. Licensees failing to meet the population coverage
requirements described above will be subject to the license forfeiture
penalties adopted in the [Second Report and Order]{.underline}.[^250] We
recognize that even with these requirements, factors such as incumbent
microwave operation or sparse population density in some instances could
make compliance difficult. In instances where the circumstances are
unique and the public interest would be served, the Commission will
consider waiving the requirements on a case-by-case basis.[^251] These
revised construction requirements will ensure efficient spectrum
utilization and promote significant nationwide coverage without imposing
substantial cost penalties on licensees that serve less densely
populated areas. In this regard, we believe that these changes generally
address the concerns of those parties that suggested lowering the
construction requirements for designated entities or for BTA service
areas.[^252]

We also recognize the desirability of encouraging more than one provider
to serve a diverse geographic area, and note that resale of a
licensee\'s geographic area to other entities, subject to the
licensee\'s control, is not prohibited by our rules. Accordingly, we
recognize that licensees may resell spectrum, and believe that this will
facilitate the deployment of PCS. Whether or not the licensee enters
into resale arrangements, it will be responsible for insuring that the
coverage requirement and all the other requirements of our rules are
met. The reseller will not be a separate licensee, but rather, will
operate subject to the control of the licensee. We believe that resale
will encourage service provision, particularly to rural areas, and allow
smaller, predominantly rural companies to participate in PCS. We intend
to examine in another proceeding whether resale arrangements confer
attributable interests on the reseller. [See]{.underline} Section IV,
[supra]{.underline}.

In summary, our relaxed construction requirements will foster provision
of PCS services and will promote diversity in their provision.
Permitting licensees to resell service subareas, subject to the
licensee\'s control, will permit smaller, rural companies to provide PCS
without participating in the competitive bidding process. Finally, we
intend to monitor closely the development of PCS in rural and other
under-served areas and, if necessary, will readdress these construction
requirements to ensure that our goals for wide area service are met.

**VI. TECHNICAL STANDARDS**

A. [Roaming and Interoperability Standards]{.underline}

In the [Second Report and Order]{.underline}, the Commission provided
maximum flexibility in technical standards to allow PCS to develop in
the most rapid, economically feasible and diverse manner. Specific
technical standards were prescribed only to the extent necessary to
avoid harmful interference. The Commission recognized that several
industry technical and standards groups were addressing matters related
to PCS technical standards. It encouraged those groups to consider ways
of ensuring that PCS users, service providers, and equipment
manufacturers could incorporate roaming, interoperability and other
important features in the most efficient and least costly manner, noting
that PCS will be more useful to the extent that users are not limited by
geography or by their ability to use their equipment with different
systems.

[Petitioners\' Requests]{.underline}. NCS, Motorola, and TIA request
that we reconsider our decision not to adopt PCS interoperability
requirements.[^253] NCS requests that we adopt standards to ensure
interoperability and nationwide roaming. It argues that such standards
are needed for national security and emergency preparedness
purposes.[^254] Motorola and TIA recommend that we require all equipment
used by licensed PCS operators to meet interoperability standards
developed by a standards body accredited by the American National
Standards Institute (ANSI).[^255] Motorola argues that interoperability
standards will promote international acceptance of U.S. PCS technology
and encourage competition between PCS licensees, since consumers could
use the same equipment regardless of the licensee to which they
subscribe. TIA states that technical standards are needed to ensure that
PCS services are provided at the most competitive prices.[^256]

[Responses]{.underline}. Most responding parties oppose the
petitioners\' requests that we adopt PCS technical standards. For
example, APC, GTE and Northern Telecom express concern that the
development of ANSI-approved technical standards would delay the
implementation of PCS.[^257] MCI and Nextel argue that mandatory
standards would inhibit technical advances that would enable licensees
to deliver a broad range of services to the public.[^258]

[Decision]{.underline}. We continue to believe that a flexible approach,
applying only those standards necessary to prevent interference, is
appropriate. As indicated in the [Second Report and Order]{.underline},
this will allow PCS to develop in the most rapid, economically feasible
and diverse manner.[^259] We agree with NCS and others that
interoperability for PCS is an important and beneficial goal. We
believe, however, that acceptable interoperability is likely to emerge
between PCS licenses in a timely manner without our intervention. Our
decisions to provide for large regional MTA licenses, to move all PCS
licenses to the lower band, and to permit further aggregation of
spectrum blocks across geographic regions all foster wide-area roaming
and interoperability. In addition, competitive bidding for PCS licenses
will facilitate the development of regional or nationwide systems.

We also are aware that the industry is now working aggressively to
complete several voluntary interoperability standards for PCS in a
timely manner. We strongly support these efforts and continue to
encourage the industry\'s work in this area. The availability of
interoperability standards will deliver important benefits to consumers
and help achieve our objectives of universality, competitive delivery of
PCS, that includes the ability of consumers to switch between PCS
systems at low cost, and competitive markets for PCS equipment.

Interoperability, not only nationwide on one block but also between PCS
spectrum blocks, should be in the business interest of all PCS
providers. Such broad interoperability will increase the economies of
scale in manufacturing PCS equipment such as handsets, will made
consumers more likely to subscribe to PCS because they can easily move
from carrier to carrier without having to purchase new handsets, and
will make it easier for PCS licensees to aggregate blocks of PCS
spectrum up to 40 MHz and to create wide-area or national PCS systems.
For these reasons, we believe that it is in the public interest for the
industry eventually to achieve compatible interoperability standards for
all PCS spectrum blocks. Nevertheless, we understand that the industry
is not yet ready to arrive at any standard. In addition, we do not want
to discourage innovation in designing PCS services. Therefore, at this
time we are not mandating that the industry arrive at a single
interoperability standard across all PCS spectrum blocks.

We intend to monitor the industry\'s progress in developing and
implementing PCS technical standards.[^260] In particular, we hope, that
some of the standards proposed for PCS will be adopted or near
completion at the time of the broadband PCS auction. If we find that the
development of PCS technology is not proceeding in a manner that will
accommodate roaming and interoperability, we may revisit this issue and
consider what actions the Commission may take to facilitate the more
rapid development of appropriate standards. Finally, to facilitate
international acceptance of U.S. PCS technology, we will be receptive to
requests seeking our endorsement of completed ANSI standards, provided
that such endorsement does not limit the flexibility of PCS licensees to
select standards and technologies best suited to their needs.

B. [PCS Power Limits]{.underline}

In the [Second Report and Order]{.underline}, the Commission established
a maximum e.i.r.p. of 100 watts and a maximum antenna height above
average terrain (HAAT) of 300 meters for PCS base stations.[^261] The
Commission recognized that most PCS experimental systems operated at a
maximum power of 10 watts e.i.r.p., but adopted a limit of 100 watts
e.i.r.p. for base stations to permit additional flexibility in the
design of PCS systems. It also specified a maximum power limit of 2
watts e.i.r.p. for mobile units.

[Petitioners\' Requests]{.underline}. Eleven parties filed petitions for
reconsideration requesting increases in the PCS power limits. APC,
Ameritech, MCI, Motorola, Northern Telecom, PacBell, PacTel, PCIA,
Sprint, Time Warner and US West argue that higher-powered PCS base
stations should be permitted. The majority of these petitioners request
that the power limit of a PCS base station be increased to 1640 watts
e.i.r.p.[^262] These parties state that permitting higher power will
allow PCS providers to use large cells and deploy advanced technologies,
take advantage of high gain antenna technology, more effectively compete
with cellular, and better cover rural areas. Time Warner and PacBell
recommend that no limit be placed on power and argue that the 100 watt
limit will not allow economic deployment of PCS.[^263]

In requesting an increase in the power limit, PacBell and Northern
Telecom indicate that most base stations would actually operate using
low power transmitters coupled with high gain, directional antenna
systems that boost the radiated signal levels.[^264] Ameritech, MCI,
Sprint, US West and others also support the use of high-gain antenna
technology. They submit that the same antennas are also used to receive
signals from subscriber units, amplifying the level of the received
signal. Thus, a low power transmitter using a high gain antenna at the
base station permits the system to remain \"balanced,\" allowing low
power subscriber units to communicate with the base station over the
larger coverage area provided by the higher radiated base station
power.[^265] The petitioners, for example APC, Northern Telecom, and
PacBell, argue that human exposure to radio frequency energy (RF) can be
controlled through the design of the base station and the requirements
of the current regulation of biohazards can be met independent of the
overall transmitter power limit set by the Commission.[^266]

In their petitions, MCI and PCIA also request that we increase the
maximum power limit for certain types of mobile and portable units from
2 to 20 watts e.i.r.p.[^267] They argue that this would permit the use
of higher power for PCS vehicular-mounted units and special types of
non-handheld equipment such as pay telephones installed at special
events, emergency restoration telephone systems, and telephones
installed in areas where landline facilities are not available or
justifiable due to intermittent use.[^268]

[Responses]{.underline}. The majority of the responding parties support
the petitioners\' requests that the power limit be raised.[^269] These
parties state that operation at higher power levels would decrease the
number of base stations required for coverage, especially in sparsely
populated areas. They further submit that the larger coverage area
provided by higher power operation will also facilitate compliance with
the construction requirements, thereby lowering operating costs.

On the other hand, AT&T indicates that the European Telecommunications
Standards Institute (ETSI) recently rejected a similar proposal for
increased power for the \"DCS 1800\" standard,[^270] and limited base
station transmitter output power to 40 watts and mobile transmitter
power to 1 watt. AT&T argues that an increase in base station power
limits is unnecessary without a corresponding increase in handset power
limits, which leads to more expensive handsets that are heavier, have a
shorter battery life, and interfere with other electronics.[^271] Apple
and Rolm request that we limit the e.i.r.p. of all transmitters
operating on channels adjacent to the unlicensed band to no more than
2 watts to limit interference to unlicensed devices.[^272] Nextel states
that higher power limits would only encourage PCS providers to duplicate
cellular service rather than develop new services.[^273] TDS, UTC and
others argue that any increase in the power limit should not result in
increased interference from PCS systems to other radio services.[^274]
API opposes increasing the power level of subscriber units absent strict
coordination requirements.[^275]

[Decision]{.underline}. We believe that increasing the maximum base
station power limit to 1640 watts e.i.r.p. will improve PCS licensees\'
ability to configure their systems to best serve the needs of their
customers and to compete with other mobile services such as cellular and
wide-area SMR. Higher power will allow individual PCS base stations to
serve larger geographic areas more effectively. We believe that the
ability to serve larger geographic areas will also promote our goal of
service to less populated areas. The flexibility to use higher power
will provide PCS system operators greater flexibility in determining
system architecture, [i.e.]{.underline}, the number of base stations
deployed to serve a given area, based on service demands rather than
adequate coverage considerations. This change will also facilitate the
use of new technologies, such as high-gain, directional antennas, as
well as potential improvements to the design of subscriber products. We
do not agree with Apple and Rolm that PCS operations on channels
adjacent to the unlicensed spectrum should be limited to two watts. We
see no reason to restrict licensed PCS operations to afford additional
protection to unlicensed devices. Such a limit would be detrimental to
licensed PCS services and unfairly disadvantage blocks A and C that are
adjacent to the unlicensed spectrum. In addition, we note that
unlicensed operations will be relatively short range and therefore can
be designed to resist adjacent channel interference. Accordingly, we are
amending the rules to allow PCS base stations to operate with up to 1640
watts e.i.r.p. We are also amending PCS power/HAAT coordination distance
requirements to reflect this increased maximum power level.

While we believe that the power limit for base stations should be
increased to 1640 watts e.i.r.p., this increase in power should not be
used in such a manner that the resulting PCS system becomes unbalanced
so that mobile units are unable to communicate with the base station. To
ensure balanced base-to-mobile and mobile-to-base communications, we are
also limiting the transmitter output power of the base station to
100 watts. By limiting the transmitter output power as well as e.i.r.p.,
we intend to promote the use of the high gain, directional antennas to
achieve the larger coverage areas sought by the petitioners.

We disagree with those parties requesting higher power for certain
mobile and portable units. A lower power output limit minimizes exposure
to radio frequency energy, [see]{.underline} [infra]{.underline} Section
VIII. Further, we agree with API that increasing the power output limit
for subscriber units would necessitate unreasonably stringent and
unenforceable coordination requirements. Unless the location of such
higher power mobile units could be strictly controlled, interference
could result to fixed microwave operations and/or to other PCS systems
in adjacent service areas. For these reasons, we are not increasing the
maximum power limit for mobile and portable PCS transmitters as
requested by MCI and PCIA.

C. [Protection of Fixed Microwave Operations]{.underline}

In the [Second Report and Order]{.underline}, the Commission stated that
a principal concern in the authorization of PCS in the 2 GHz band is
that existing fixed microwave operations be protected.[^276] It adopted
the following approach for providing such protection: 1) required PCS
licensees to provide the same level of protection to microwave
operations that they currently provide under Part 94 of our Rules and
through the use of EIA/TIA Bulletin TSB10-E criteria and
methodology;[^277] 2) specified antenna height and power limits for PCS;
3) adopted requirements for PCS licensees to coordinate with fixed
microwave operators; and, 4) provided methods for calculating
interference from PCS to incumbent microwave operations.[^278]

Specifically, in the [Second Report and Order]{.underline}, we adopted
carrier-to-interference criteria for protection of short and medium
length microwave links of 25 km (about 15 miles) or less. For path
lengths longer than 25 km, where reliability is more dependent on the
relative noise threshold and faded signal level, we limited the level of
an interfering signal to that which would cause a 1 decibel (dB)
degradation in the signal-to-noise ratio for analog systems or which
would cause an increase in bit-error-rate (BER) from 10^-6^ to 10^-5^
for digital systems. Finally, we endorsed procedures for calculating
interference to microwave operations.[^279]

[Petitioners\' Requests]{.underline}. Ten parties request
reconsideration of issues relating to protection of microwave
operations.[^280] Several parties request reconsideration of our
decision to use Bulletin TSB10-E. These parties request that the
Commission adopt newly developed industry standards for protection of
fixed microwave stations from PCS. Specifically, Alcatel, APC, API,
Ameritech, Motorola, TIA and PCIA recommend using EIA/TIA Bulletin
TSB10-F when it is completed, instead of the procedures in Appendix D of
the [Second Report and Order]{.underline}.[^281] TIA argues that
Bulletin TSB10-F, when adopted, will likely be the benchmark industry
standard for determining PCS-microwave interference. API supports using
TSB10-F as the only method, and states that allowing a number of
calculation methods is unwise and will create needless uncertainty.
Alcatel, Motorola, PCIA, and TIA also request that we clarify the rules
to indicate that other appropriate interference procedures developed by
the industry may be used.[^282] A number of the petitioners also suggest
specific changes to the procedures in Appendix D of the [Second Report
and Order]{.underline}.

Motorola, TIA, and PCIA object to the use of the Longley-Rice
propagation model that was stipulated for interference calculations at
Appendix D of the [Second Report and Order]{.underline}.[^283] TIA
states that there are technical problems with the use of \"urban
correction factors\" with the Longley-Rice model, as adopted by the
Commission. Instead, they recommend that an appropriate model accepted
by industry be used. For example, Motorola and PCIA argue that the
propagation model in TSB10-F represents the efforts of all affected
groups and should be adopted.[^284]

Bell Atlantic suggests that we adopt rules to eliminate \"excess
margin\" in microwave systems.[^285] It argues that such excess fade
margin is not needed for reliable microwave communications and reduces
the amount of available spectrum to PCS operators. Bell Atlantic also
recommends that we require microwave licensees to upgrade their systems
when the change will reduce interference and when the PCS operator is
willing to pay for the upgrade.

UTC asserts that the current PCS rules are contradictory. It notes that
the rules provide for blanket licensing of all transmitters in a service
area and at the same time require an engineering analysis before filing
an application for a new or modified facility. UTC suggests that Section
24.11 be clarified to state that despite receiving a blanket license,
licensees will need separate applications and authorizations for each
station to assure that the proposed facility will not cause interference
to existing microwave stations. UTC also recommends that we adopt
coordination procedures based on Part 21 of our Rules and that all
coordination requests be in writing.[^286] API recommends that we
require formal coordination by a third party.[^287]

API requests that we specify sanctions for PCS licensees that cause
interference to incumbent fixed microwave operations. Specifically, API
recommends that we require PCS entities to cease operation upon
notification of interference by a microwave licensee, establish a scale
of significant fines and/or forfeitures to deter violations, and make
available expedited procedures to ensure that complaints are resolved
quickly.[^288] Blooston argues that the PCS rules fail to protect common
carrier microwave operations in the adjacent 1990-2110 MHz band and
should therefore be reworked to extend this protection.[^289]

[Responses]{.underline}. The responding parties generally support the
use of EIA/TIA Bulletin TSB10-F and recommend that we adopt this
standard when it is completed.[^290] TDS states that although Appendix D
may initially be used, improvements involving propagation modeling and
urban correction factors need to be addressed. UTC supports giving equal
consideration to either the interference standard found in Appendix D or
a standard developed by a recognized authority. AAR states that it
supports TIA\'s proposal that we adopt an industry consensus with
Bulletin 10-F, provided that fixed microwave licensees are provided the
same level of protection as under the current standard, Bulletin 10-E.
PacBell states that we should adopt the Okumura-Hata propagation model,
arguing that this model provides more realistic estimates. PCIA concurs
that the Longley-Rice model should not be the only propagation model
permitted if the industry can agree on the use of other models.

Some parties support UTC and API\'s recommendation that we adopt prior
coordination procedures, arguing that this would insure that all
potential issues of interference are resolved prior to licensing and
deployment.[^291] MCI opposes API\'s proposal for a formal third-party
coordination requirement, arguing that such a requirement would create
delays in implementing PCS.[^292]

Several commenters support Bell Atlantic\'s proposal to require
microwave licensees to upgrade their system when it is shown that an
upgrade will reduce interference and the PCS operator is willing to pay
for the upgrade. API disagrees with those parties that argue that
interference protection margins used for microwave systems are
excessive. Alcatel does not oppose elimination of \"excess margins,\"
but asserts that neither the Commission nor an industry standards group
should define what constitutes an excess margin. It states that instead,
these objectives should be determined by individual users through
interaction with appropriate frequency coordinators and potentially
affected users.[^293]

UTC supports API\'s proposal for penalties to deter creation of
objectionable interference to microwave users. It argues that such
penalties would cause PCS proponents to use caution and would therefore
help to avoid interference situations. MCI opposes API\'s request for
sanctions on PCS licensees causing interference. It argues that API\'s
proposal would give microwave licensees undue power to shut down PCS
operations merely by notifying the licensee that it has detected
objectionable interference.

[Decision]{.underline}. In the [Second Report and Order]{.underline}, we
stated that with certain modifications, the level of protection provided
under Part 94 of our rules and through application of TSB10-E criteria
and methodology is appropriate and will provide adequate protection to
microwave users from PCS operations. We also stated that we would accept
the new TSB10-F procedures, when adopted by EIA/TIA, for use in
demonstrating compliance with our technical standards for PCS to fixed
microwave interference.[^294] Although many parties request that
operators be required to use TSB10-F exclusively instead of that set out
at Appendix D of the [Second Report and Order]{.underline}, we cannot
adopt this standard as the only acceptable method for determining
interference to microwave operations from PCS operations until we have
had a chance to evaluate its merits and provide it to the public for
comment. Therefore, we will maintain the procedures adopted in the
[Second Report and Order]{.underline} with some modifications.[^295]

We concur that a prior coordination procedure is necessary to ensure
that potential issues of interference are resolved before deployment of
PCS systems.[^296] We believe that the Part 21 coordination requirements
are appropriate for coordination of PCS and microwave facilities. These
coordination procedures are generally familiar to the parties involved
and are sufficient to address potential interference problems.
Accordingly, we will amend the PCS rules to include coordination
procedures similar to those contained in Part 21. We note that
coordination under Part 21 does not require written notification. We
find no reason to require that the PCS-to-microwave coordination be
treated differently.

We agree with Bell Atlantic that permitting PCS entities to pay for and
upgrade incumbent microwave operation, such as providing better antennas
or filters that would prevent interference, would facilitate the
implementation of PCS. Specifically it would provide more choices and
opportunity for sharing between the two services. However, we believe
that mandating such upgrades of the incumbents\' facilities would be
difficult to regulate. Therefore, we will allow for such upgrades when
all parties agree but will not mandate them.

We share Bell Atlantic\'s concern that excess fade margins in incumbent
systems will inhibit the ability of PCS entities and microwave
operations to share spectrum. However, we also recognize that microwave
systems vary in size, complexity and degree of reliability needed.
Therefore, we see no way of adopting general rules mandating an
acceptable fade margin that would apply fairly in all cases. Accordingly
we will not set limits on the amount of allowable fade margin in a
microwave system. We suggest, however, that incumbent licensees limit
the fade margin in their systems to only that necessary for reliable
service so as to help facilitate the implementation of PCS.

Regarding Blooston\'s assertion that Section 24.233 does not provide
protection to common carrier point-to-point microwave radio service
(PPMRS) operations in the 2110-2130 MHz and 2160-2180 MHz bands, we note
that our Rules contain out-of-band radiation limits that must be met by
PCS entities. We also note that under our revised allocation PCS is only
allocated spectrum in the 1850-1990 MHz band, so there is 120 MHz of
separation between PCS and PPMRS operations.

With regard to Blooston\'s request that we require PCS licensees to
protect common carrier microwave operations in the adjacent 1990-2110
MHz band, we note that the current PCS rules provide for strict
out-of-band emission limits.[^297] We believe that these limits are
sufficient to protect microwave operations in adjacent bands and,
therefore, will not adopt any additional coordination or protection
requirements for PCS operations.

We disagree with UTC that PCS licensees should be required to submit
separate applications and obtain separate authorizations for each
transmitter in their system. The information that would be submitted on
these applications is unnecessary to the Commission, and its filing
would be overly burdensome for PCS licensees. We believe that UTC\'s
concerns are adequately addressed through our requirements for
coordination.

Finally, we deny API\'s request for a rule automatically imposing
penalties on PCS operations that interfere with fixed microwave users.
We believe that such penalties are unnecessary and inappropriate. As we
stated in the [Second Report and Order]{.underline}, a principal concern
in the authorization of PCS in the 2 GHz band is that existing fixed
microwave operations be protected.[^298] If interference were to occur,
we would expect the PCS licensee to take appropriate action to resolve
that interference. In cases where the PCS licensee did not take
appropriate action, we believe our current remedies, either forfeitures
or revocation of licenses, are sufficient.

D. [PCS-to-PCS Interference Standards]{.underline}

In the [Second Report and Order]{.underline}, the Commission established
a limit for spurious emissions appearing outside of the spectrum
allocated to PCS.[^299] No limit was specified for spurious emissions
appearing within the PCS spectrum. The Commission also adopted minimal
standards for PCS transmitter frequency stability, stating only that the
stability must be sufficient to ensure that the fundamental emission
remains within the authorized frequency block.[^300]

[Petitioners\' Requests]{.underline}. Motorola and PCIA request
reconsideration of several aspects of the PCS-to-PCS interference
standards. First, in order to reduce the potential for interference
between adjacent PCS channel blocks, Motorola and PCIA request that the
same limit be applied to all spurious emissions appearing outside a
licensee\'s channel block, regardless of whether the emissions appear
inside or outside of the bands allocated to PCS. Second, Motorola and
PCIA ask that we specify the resolution bandwidth of the instrumentation
used to measure spurious emissions.[^301] Third, Motorola requests
clarification as to whether the limit on spurious emissions contained in
Section 24.234(a) applies only for type acceptance of the transmitter or
to the system as installed.[^302] Finally, Motorola asks that we clarify
how a manufacturer must show compliance with the frequency stability
requirement.

[Responses]{.underline}. APC, Ericsson, and Northern Telecom support the
requests for extension of the spurious emission limit to frequencies
within the PCS spectrum. Ericsson and Northern Telecom also support the
requests to specify the measurement bandwidth for spurious
emissions.[^303] Apple, Ericsson, and Rolm recommend that even tighter
limits be imposed on spurious emissions appearing in the unlicensed PCS
bands from licensed PCS transmitters. They state that such limits are
needed to reduce potential interference to unlicensed devices.[^304]

[Decision]{.underline}. We concur that limits on spurious emissions
outside of the frequency block employed by a PCS licensee are needed to
reduce the potential for harmful interference to other PCS operations as
well as other radio services operating on spectrum outside of the PCS
bands. Accordingly, we are amending the rules to indicate that the
spurious emissions limits apply to emissions appearing on all
frequencies outside of the frequency block employed by a licensee. We
are also clarifying that, when testing to show compliance with the
spurious emission limits, the fundamental emission from the transmitter
must be located as close the edge of the adjacent band as the
transmitter is designed to operate. This will ensure that the emission
limits are met under all normal operating conditions.

We do not agree that the limits for spurious emissions should be further
restricted when those emissions fall within the frequency bands
allocated for unlicensed PCS devices. Apple, Ericsson and Rolm have not
provided information indicating that additional attenuation, beyond that
already provided under the rules, is necessary to prevent harmful
interference.

We agree that the standards for measuring spurious emissions need to be
clarified. The measured levels of spurious emissions are dependent, to
an extent, on the bandwidth of the measuring instrument. Specifying a
minimum resolution bandwidth will eliminate confusion within the rules
and provide repeatable measurement results. However, we disagree with
PCIA\'s proposed bandwidth of 1.0 percent of the emission bandwidth.
Limits are placed on spurious emissions in order to reduce the potential
for causing harmful interference. Ideally, the resolution bandwidth of
the measuring instrument should be adjusted as close as possible to the
bandwidth of the receiver for which interference protection is being
provided.[^305] Near the frequency bands employed for PCS, typical
receiver bandwidths can range from tens of kilohertz to several
megahertz. Since the resolution bandwidth on most measuring instruments
does not go above 1 MHz, this is typically the bandwidth employed by the
Commission when measuring spurious emissions above 1000 MHz.[^306] We
believe that the use of a resolution bandwidth of 1 MHz is also
appropriate for PCS equipment and are amending the rules to add this
specification.

In response to Motorola\'s question regarding on the applicability of
the spurious emissions regulations, these limits apply to both the
transmitter, as tested during type acceptance, and the operating system,
as installed by the licensee. We recognize that the level of the
spurious emissions can be affected by the type of antenna employed by a
licensee. It is for this reason, among others, that the Commission also
may require a licensee to provide additional attenuation to spurious
emissions, even beyond those limits stated in the regulations, when
these emissions cause harmful interference to other users of the RF
spectrum. We are further clarifying the rules to note that additional
attenuation can be required under such circumstances.

The measurement procedures for testing frequency stability are already
specified in the regulations.[^307] As the frequency stability standard
requires only that the fundamental emission stay within the authorized
frequency block, the transmitter must be tested with the fundamental
emission located as close to the edge of the authorized frequency block
as the transmitter is designed to operate in order to demonstrate
compliance under all normal operating conditions.

E. [Enhanced 911 Standards]{.underline}

In its petition for reconsideration, Texas Emergency requests that we
mandate a single enhanced 911 (E-911) standard. It requests that a
uniform standard be adopted for all wireless technologies and that PCS
licensees be required to provide accurate location information about 911
callers from the outset of service. The term \"enhanced 911\" generally
refers to a 911 emergency system that, among other features,
automatically provides 911 operators with a caller\'s exact location
without the caller having to provide his or her location.[^308] No
responding parties opposed this request, although several did raise
concerns about imposing such requirements. In the [Second Report and
Order]{.underline}, we indicated that we would address matters relating
to enhanced 911 (E‑911) capability in PCS, cellular, and other mobile
services in a future rule making proceeding.[^309] We note that the
development of an E-911 standard will necessitate consideration of
issues affecting matters beyond PCS and therefore is more appropriately
addressed in a separate proceeding. We expect to begin this proceeding
shortly and will address Texas Emergency\'s request at that time.

**VII. UNLICENSED PCS**

A. [Spectrum Allocation]{.underline}

In the [Second Report and Order]{.underline}, the Commission allocated
40 MHz of spectrum for unlicensed PCS devices. The 1900-1920 MHz band
was designated for asynchronous (primarily data) devices, and the
1890-1910 MHz and 1920-1930 MHz band was designated for isochronous
(primarily voice) devices. The Commission concluded that this 40 MHz of
spectrum would be sufficient to meet the demands of both nomadic and
non-nomadic data and voice applications. Further, it noted that this
band plan provides both asynchronous and isochronous operations an equal
share of the 1910-1930 MHz band, which has fewer incumbent fixed
microwave facilities that must be relocated before full use of the band
can be made for unlicensed PCS.

[Petitioners\' Requests]{.underline}. On September 13, 1993, Apple
submitted an \"Emergency Petition\" addressing the spectrum allocated
for unlicensed data PCS devices.[^310] Apple argues that since data PCS
operations primarily will be nomadic in nature \-- that is, the devices
will be mobile in nature and their location cannot be controlled or
predicted. Such operations should be allocated the more lightly loaded
1910 to 1930 MHz portion of the spectrum set aside for unlicensed
devices. Apple contends that, unlike nomadic data devices, unlicensed
voice devices ordinarily will operate through a base station and can be
coordinated with existing microwave operations. Due to the greater
number of microwave operations that must be moved, Apple states that the
current allocation significantly increases the time and cost of
implementing nomadic data PCS.[^311] Apple further argues that
allocation of 1890 to 1910 MHz to isochronous voice operations would
serve the interests of many voice technologies because of the
desirability of contiguous spectrum. Separate petitions supporting
Apple\'s position also were filed by Lace and SpectraLink.

[Responses]{.underline}. Several responding parties oppose the
petitioners\' requests and support the current allocation scheme for
unlicensed voice and data operations. For example, APC, AT&T, HP,
Motorola, Northern Telecom and PacBell support the current plan and
point out that providing data and voice with equal amounts of the
lightly encumbered spectrum is fair and balanced. They argue that the
Apple plan would unfairly penalize isochronous voice interests by
allocating to them all of the heavily used microwave spectrum.[^312]
UTAM states that it is neutral on this issue, but points out that
Apple\'s proposed allocation scheme will increase the cost of clearing
the isochronous (voice) band and decrease the cost of clearing the
asynchronous (data) band.[^313]

BSA, Compaq, Ericsson, Metricom, Microsoft, Rolm and SpectraLink support
the petitioners\' proposed changes to the unlicensed allocation. BSA and
Compaq argue that the Commission\'s band plan imposes initial costs for
clearing the bands for data PCS that are significantly higher than those
for Apple\'s plan. They point out that the manufacturers of devices that
may be coordinated with existing facilities can more readily bear the
higher costs of band clearing such costs can be absorbed incrementally
using the cash flows generated by early deployment.[^314] Ericsson, Rolm
and SpectraLink argue that the long-term spectral efficiency advantages
of 20 MHz of contiguous spectrum for voice operations outweigh the
short-term band clearing problems.[^315]

[Decision]{.underline}. As noted above, we have amended the allocation
and frequency plan for licensed PCS. Under this reallocation the amount
of spectrum provided for unlicensed PCS devices is reduced from 40 to 20
MHz. Specifically, the 20 MHz of unlicensed PCS spectrum at 1890-1910
MHz is being reallocated to licensed PCS operations. Our decision to
reallocate this spectrum preserves the 1910-1930 MHz band for unlicensed
devices. We note that this band is the most lightly loaded portion of
the PCS spectrum and is the spectrum where most unlicensed equipment was
expected to operate initially. Further, since unlicensed operations are
restricted to very low power, they should be able to share or \"reuse\"
the available spectrum very efficiently. Accordingly, we believe that
this reduction will not have a major effect in the near term on devices
that will be able to operate on the unlicensed PCS bands. As noted
above, in the near future we will initiate a proceeding to consider
allocation of additional spectrum to meet long term spectrum
requirements for unlicensed PCS devices.

Taking into account this reduction in the total amount of spectrum
available for unlicensed operations, we find that the interests of all
concerned parties would be best served by retaining the plan to provide
10 MHz at 1910-1920 MHz for asynchronous or data devices, and 10 MHz at
1920-1930 MHz for isochronous or voice devices. We believe that this
approach is balanced and treats both voice and data proponents fairly
and equitably. We also believe that this approach will encourage the
clearing of all existing microwave users from the entire 1910-1930 MHz
band, thereby permitting the rapid introduction of nomadic voice and
data devices. Accordingly, we are amending our spectrum plan for
unlicensed devices, as indicated above.

B. [Coordination]{.underline}

In the [Second Report and Order]{.underline}, the Commission designated
UTAM as the coordinating body to manage the transition of spectrum from
fixed microwave to unlicensed PCS. The Commission conditioned this
designation on UTAM\'s submission and our acceptance of: 1) a funding
plan that is equitable to all prospective manufacturers of unlicensed
devices, and 2) a plan for band clearing that will permit the
implementation of nomadic devices, in particular, nomadic data PCS
devices, as promptly as possible.[^316] We stated that UTAM would be
responsible for administering the transition, including negotiating
costs of relocation, ensuring that comparable facilities are provided,
and resolving disputes of interference to fixed microwave from
unlicensed PCS operations. Further, we required that any unlicensed PCS
device or system be coordinated through UTAM before being initially
deployed or subsequently relocated. We required that all applicants for
FCC equipment authorization of unlicensed PCS devices, be participants
in UTAM.

[Petitioners\' Requests]{.underline}. In its petition, Apple maintains
that UTAM does not adequately represent the interests of the unlicensed
data community.[^317] It contends that unless we intervene with
additional guidance, UTAM is unlikely to adopt and implement a
band-clearing plan that will ensure the earliest possible deployment of
nomadic data devices. Apple requests that we remove the specific
references to UTAM in the rules and that we state that we will designate
another entity if UTAM fails to submit an acceptable funding and
band-clearing plan.

Apple also requests that we provide for conditional technical approvals
of unlicensed nomadic equipment ([i.e.]{.underline}, equipment that
cannot be coordinated) in advance of complete clearing of the
spectrum.[^318] It further requests that the labeling requirements for
unlicensed equipment be eliminated once the spectrum has been cleared
and coordination is no longer needed.[^319] UTC, in its petition,
maintains that the definition of \"coordinatable PCS device\" is too
vague.[^320] UTC also requests that the equipment labels be more
specific to let users know that unlicensed devices cannot be relocated
without coordination, and that a toll-free number be placed on the label
so that users can contact UTAM.

In its petition, UTAM asks that we clarify whether the burden of
determining whether a device is coordinatable lies with itself or with
the Commission.[^321] UTAM notes that the rules currently appear to make
UTAM responsible for such determinations.[^322] It states that the
responsibility for determining whether a device is coordinatable should
be determined through the Commission\'s equipment authorization program.
UTAM further requests that the rule requiring that it verify the
location of coordinatable PCS devices be interpreted to allow such
verifications to be made through any method that adequately identifies
the location of a device, including the reports of licensed
installers.[^323] Ericsson, in its petition, requests that we clarify
the types of showings that will be necessary to demonstrate compliance
with the requirement to either prevent activation of equipment or to
disable its use upon relocation without prior coordination with
UTAM.[^324]

AT&T, in its petition, maintains that the current requirement that the
existing Part 15 test procedures be used where applicable, and
supplemented by good engineering practice, does not provide sufficient
guidance for industry.[^325] AT&T requests that the Commission allow the
ANSI C63 Committee to develop standard criteria for testing and
measuring unlicensed devices.

[Responses]{.underline}. AAR, Microsoft and Rolm support Apple\'s
position regarding UTAM\'s role as the coordinator for unlicensed
devices.[^326] For example, Rolm believes we should establish measures
to provide additional assurances that the interests of all nomadic
device proponents, both voice and data, will be protected. Several other
parties, including Motorola and Northern Telecom, support our
designation of UTAM as the coordinator for unlicensed operations.[^327]
These parties point out that various UTAM members have an interest in
marketing data and voice products. They also note that UTAM\'s
membership is open to all and that UTAM has actively solicited
participation from the data industry.

UTC opposes UTAM\'s request that the requirements regarding verification
of the location of coordinatable devices be construed broadly to permit
any method of verification, including the reports of licensed
installers.[^328] UTC argues that only technological means included in
the design of the equipment can provide adequate insurance against
unauthorized deployment or relocation. Apple also opposes UTAM\'s
request, arguing that its efforts to broaden the range of allowable
disabling techniques appear to be at odds with the Commission\'s intent
to ensure against interference to incumbents.[^329] AAR supports UTC\'s
request for more specific labeling.[^330] AAR also maintains that UTAM
should be held responsible for verifying the installation or relocation
of coordinatable devices at the coordinated locations.

Ericsson argues that AT&T\'s claims regarding problems associated with
the testing of unlicensed PCS devices are exaggerated.[^331] Northern
Telecom also opposes AT&T\'s request, stating that the current rules are
adequate to allow products to be developed and deployed and that
awaiting the development of new test procedures would significantly
delay implementation.[^332]

[Decision]{.underline}. We continue to believe that our basic approach
for regulation of unlicensed PCS devices is appropriate. Based on the
record, we continue to find that UTAM is the most suitable entity to act
as the coordinator for unlicensed PCS devices. We concur with those
parties that indicate that UTAM is making good faith efforts to be open
and to include the participation of all interested parties, including
representatives of the data community. We do not believe that additional
guidance or requirements are needed for UTAM at this time. With regard
to Apple\'s specific request that we eliminate UTAM\'s designation in
the rules, we see no merit in such an approach at this time. We will
have ample opportunity to review our decision to designate UTAM as the
coordinator for unlicensed devices during our review of its funding and
band-clearing plans. If UTAM is found unacceptable as a result of our
review process, we can amend our rules at that time to designate another
entity.

With regard to Apple\'s request that we grant conditional equipment
approvals for nomadic devices, it is our intention to consider such
approvals at an appropriate future time. When spectrum is available, or
soon will be available, for the operation of nomadic devices, we will
issue a Public Notice announcing that we will begin accepting and
processing applications for certification of nomadic devices. If we
accept such applications before the spectrum is fully cleared for use by
nomadic devices, the applications will be processed, but the actual
grants withheld until an announcement is made that coordination is no
longer required. At that time, the grants, if justified, will be
immediately issued. We believe that this approach addresses Apple\'s
principal concerns that manufacturers be able to quickly introduce new
nomadic equipment.

We agree with UTC that the labels for coordinatable unlicensed PCS
equipment should also indicate that any relocation of the device must
also be coordinated through, and approved by, UTAM and should include a
toll-free number to assist users in contacting UTAM. This additional
information will not impose additional burden on equipment manufacturers
and will improve compliance with the coordination requirements for
unlicensed PCS devices. We do not agree with UTC that a more rigorous
definition of a \"coordinatable PCS device\" is needed. We continue to
believe that the current definition is adequate to protect existing
microwave operations from interference. The current definition also
provides equipment manufacturers flexibility in designing their
equipment to avoid such interference.

We understand UTAM\'s position that the determination of whether and to
what degree an unlicensed PCS device is coordinatable may place UTAM in
a position of potential conflict of interest with its own members.
Nevertheless, UTAM, as the coordinator for unlicensed device use, is
responsible for ensuring that such devices do not cause interference to
existing microwave operations. Accordingly, we believe it is entirely
reasonable and prudent to require that UTAM make a finding with regard
to the degree to which an unlicensed device can be coordinated and
deployed. It is our intent that UTAM make such determinations in concert
with the requirements of Section 15.307(b) of the rules.[^333] In this
regard, we also agree with UTAM that a broad interpretation of the rules
for preventing interference by unlicensed devices, such as the
requirement for verification that an unlicensed device is being used at
an authorized location, is appropriate. This will afford UTAM latitude
to develop its own policies and interpretations for the wide range of
unlicensed devices that are expected to be developed. We therefore will
allow UTAM broad flexibility in establishing the means it uses to
fulfill its responsibility for ensuring that unlicensed devices to not
interfere with existing microwave operations. Such means could include,
where appropriate, the use of authorized installers to ensure that
unlicensed devices do not cause interference.

Further, as part of our equipment authorization process, we will review
closely the technical aspects of each unlicensed device. This review
will include all technical matters related to the device\'s ability to
be coordinated, as well as, other measures that may be imposed by UTAM
on the operation of the device. This review will provide oversight to
ensure that such measures developed by UTAM are sufficient to protect
existing microwave from harmful interference.

We agree with Ericsson that some modification of the rules is
appropriate to clarify the showings necessary to demonstrate compliance
with the activation and disabling requirements of Section 15.307.
Accordingly, we are amending the rules to indicate that each application
for certification must contain an explanation of all measures for
ensuring that the device cannot be activated until installation at its
authorized location as verified by UTAM and for automatically disabling
the device in the event that it is relocated outside the coordinated
geographic area. Such showings shall include all procedural safeguards,
such as the mandatory use of licensed technicians to install and
relocate the equipment, and a complete description of all technical
features controlling activation and disabling of the device. We believe
that these showings, in addition with the findings required by UTAM,
will be adequate to demonstrate that a device is coordinatable and can
be used in a manner that will not cause interference.

We agree with Ericsson and Northern Telecom that the current test and
measurement procedures are adequate and will allow authorization of
equipment to commence without delay. We note that the ANSI C63 Committee
has already begun work, in cooperation with WINForum, to develop
specific procedures for unlicensed PCS equipment. We will address
specific test and measurement procedures developed by recognized
national standards bodies, such as ANSI C63, at such times as they are
completed.

C. [Spectrum Etiquette]{.underline}

In the [Second Report and Order]{.underline}, the Commission adopted
technical operating requirements for unlicensed PCS devices. These
requirements were based largely on a spectrum \"etiquette\" developed on
a consensus basis by an association of manufacturers and other
interested parties known as the WINForum. The Commission made some minor
modifications to the WINForum etiquette to take into account the
allocation of additional spectrum for unlicensed PCS, to improve
spectrum efficiency and to address specific comments and concerns. In
particular, it divided the 40 MHz of spectrum for unlicensed devices
into two equal 20 MHz allocations; one for isochronous transmissions at
1890-1900 MHz and 1920-1930 MHz and one for asynchronous transmissions
at 1900‑1920 MHz. The Commission adopted WINForum\'s 1.25 MHz
channelization for the 1920-1930 MHz band, but provided for up to 5 MHz
channels in the 1890-1900 MHz band. The asynchronous spectrum at
1900-1920 MHz was divided into two 10 MHz channels. Separate technical
requirements were specified for each transmission method.[^334]

[Petitioner\'s Requests]{.underline}. Several parties request
modifications to the technical rules governing unlicensed operations.
These parties request changes to the channelization plans for the
isochronous and asynchronous bands and raise a variety of other
technical concerns regarding the unlicensed spectrum etiquette.

Motorola requests that we adopt the 1.25 MHz channelization plan for all
isochronous spectrum.[^335] Motorola asserts that 1.25 MHz channels will
help to avoid interference between systems and ensure that no one system
or technology monopolizes the spectrum at a given location. Ericsson,
Rockwell and Lace request that we impose no channelization on the
isochronous spectrum and instead develop a spectrum occupancy
limit.[^336] They argue that the existing channelization plan
disadvantages wideband technologies. Ericsson and Rockwell suggest that
we limit the spectrum occupancy for isochronous devices to no more than
50 percent of the available spectrum in each portion of the isochronous
band. Lace suggests, as an alternative, limiting channel bandwidths to
2.5 MHz in the isochronous spectrum. Apple requests that we adopt
uniform, flexible rules for channelization of all the isochronous
spectrum, so as to be fair to all technologies, and requests that the 10
MHz channelization of the asynchronous spectrum be eliminated.[^337] It
argues that this change would facilitate use of wideband signals and
enable operation in the middle of the asynchronous spectrum to avoid
adjacent channel interference.

AT&T, Northern Telecom, and WINForum state that the WINForum
recommendations regarding the power limits were based on measurements of
mean (average) power, rather than the peak power specified in the
rules.[^338] These parties argue that use of peak power measurements
unfairly penalizes certain digital modulation techniques. They request
that we base the power limit on mean power and impose a limit of 10 dB
on the peak‑to‑average power ratio. PCIA and Rockwell request that the
maximum 10 millisecond frame period for isochronous systems be increased
from 10 to 20 milliseconds.[^339]

Apple, Ericsson, Metricom, Rockwell, SpectraLink and WINForum request
changes in the method by which devices are required to search for unused
channels on which to operate.[^340] This requirement specifies that
searches for time/spectrum windows must begin at a particular band edge
and search across the band until an unoccupied window is located.[^341]
Apple, Metricom and SpectraLink request that this requirement be
deleted. Apple and SpectraLink argue that it increases the potential for
adjacent channel interference between unlicensed devices and precludes
the use of guard bands at the band edges. Ericsson and Rockwell request
that the channel search rule be modified to permit spectrum searches to
begin within a range of frequencies inside the band edge. They state
that this revision will improve interoperability with the licensed
service equipment. WINForum suggests that we remove the channel search
rule for the isochronous spectrum. WINForum states that by mandating the
same search algorithm for all unlicensed devices, the rule will increase
the probability of two devices attempting to seize the open channel.
Further, WINForum asserts that requiring all open channel searches to
start at the same channel precludes the use of high efficiency
multi-cell frequency reuse architectures because groups of channels can
be allocated to specific cells. AT&T, Apple and Ericsson request that we
modify the requirement for [+]{.underline}3 dB accuracy and impose a
[+]{.underline}6 dB tolerance or one-sided 3 dB tolerance in measuring
the power to determine whether a channel is occupied.[^342] Motorola
suggests we delete the requirement and simply prohibit devices from
operating on a channel if the receive power of signals from other
transmitters is a specific level above the noise floor.[^343] They state
that eliminating the accuracy requirement would provide equipment
manufacturers additional freedom in system design without increasing
interference.

AT&T, Ericsson and Motorola request changes in the etiquette with regard
to acknowledgements of transmissions in an isochronous system in order
to prevent monopolization of the spectrum.[^344] The rules currently
require that an acknowledgement from a system participant must be
received by the initiating transmitter within one second or the
transmission must cease.[^345] AT&T suggests that we require a
transmitter to repeat the channel access criteria whenever transmission
temporarily ceases. Ericsson proposes requiring an acknowledgement every
10 seconds, and Motorola recommends every 30 seconds. AT&T, Northern
Telecom, SpectraLink and Motorola also ask that we permit control and
signaling information to be transmitted for 30 seconds without
acknowledgement.[^346] They argue that polling of a group of devices
requires more than the one second currently allowed and that battery
life considerations for portable devices warrant a longer time for these
transmissions.

AT&T, Ericsson, Motorola, Northern Telecom and WINForum request that we
amend the rules to specify use of the WINForum etiquette provisions for
duplex operation.[^347] The WINForum etiquette only requires one
transmitter on a paired channel to search for an unused channel before
initiating operation, while the current rules require both transmitters
to perform a search.[^348] These petitioners indicate that, because
these devices will use fixed pairings, only one transmitter should be
required to perform the search.

Northern Telecom requests that we adopt the WINForum provision for
multicarrier shared antennas.[^349] The rules currently require that an
unlicensed device monitor the time and spectrum windows its transmission
is intended to occupy.[^350] Northern Telecom indicates that when
multiple systems share the same antenna, transmissions on adjacent
channels may be precluded under the monitoring technique specified in
the rules. It states that this occurs because systems sharing the same
antenna will detect spurious emissions of other systems that are
transmitting and thus not use the adjacent channels. Northern states
that the WINForum etiquette accommodates use of multiple systems sharing
the same antenna by allowing the listen-before-talk operation to be
performed in the intended receive time and spectrum window, rather than
the transmit time and spectrum window. Northern Telecom contends that
the WINForum approach would be equally effective in preventing
interference as that specified in the current rules.

Ericsson and Northern Telecom state that the frequency stability
requirement for variations in temperature should be modified.[^351] They
argue that the requirement should be relaxed to [+]{.underline}10 ppm at
stabilized temperature extremes from +10^o^ C to +40^o^ C. Northern
Telecom also requests that the voltage component of the frequency
stability requirement be relaxed to [+]{.underline}10 percent of the
primary voltage supply. Ericsson and WINForum request that we relax the
limit for spurious emissions on first adjacent channels by 10 dB.[^352]
They argue that the current 40 dB attenuation requirement for these
emissions is more stringent than is needed to control interference and
increases equipment costs.[^353]

Metricom proposes in their petition that we conform the etiquette with
the spread spectrum provisions currently in Part 15 for equipment
operating in the ISM bands.[^354] In their May 25, 1994 [ex]{.underline}
[parte]{.underline} filing, their proposal was modified to request only
a power increase to one watt, a requirement for automatic power control,
and permission to use a 200 kHz bandwidth.[^355] Metricom argues that
this would promote a more competitive and cost effective data PCS
service.

[Responses to Petitions]{.underline}. In their response, WINForum and
Northern Telecom support Motorola\'s request that we specify 1.25 MHz
channelization for all the isochronous spectrum.[^356] On the other
hand, Omnipoint and Rolm support the elimination of all channelization
of the isochronous spectrum.[^357] They state that the 1.25 MHz
channelization will impede certain wideband technologies. Ericsson
opposes changes to the peak power measurement requirement, and claims
that permitting a 10 dB peak‑to‑average ratio will cause increased
interference between unlicensed devices.[^358] Motorola, Northern
Telecom and SpectraLink oppose lengthening the frame period.[^359] They
contend that such a change would necessitate longer call setup time.

Rolm supports deletion of the channel search requirements.[^360]
Omnipoint supports the modification of these rules to allow spectrum
searches to begin on a range of frequencies as requested by Ericsson and
Rockwell.[^361] Ericsson, SpectraLink, and Omnipoint oppose Northern
Telecom\'s request to reinstate the WINForum provision that allows
monitoring of receive channels for multicarrier shared antennas.[^362]
They claim that this provision undercuts the purpose of the
listen-before-talk provisions of the etiquette, and therefore will
degrade the ability of systems to share the spectrum. Motorola opposes
relaxation of the requirement for attenuation of emissions on first
adjacent channels.[^363] It argues that because of measurement
differences, the current 40 dB attenuation requirement for first
adjacent channels is close to the WINForum proposal for this standard.

[Decisions]{.underline}. Our initial decision provided spectrum for both
wideband and narrowband isochronous applications. We are now, however,
reducing the spectrum available for isochronous devices from 20 MHz to
10 MHz. With this reduction, it is important that the remaining spectrum
be used as efficiently as possible. In this regard, we agree with
Motorola, Northern Telecom and others that a 1.25 MHz channelization
plan will foster more efficient spectrum utilization. As indicated by
those parties, such a plan will more readily prevent a single user or
system from monopolizing the spectrum at a given location. We find that
a plan that provides wider channels or no channelization at all could
result in inefficient use of the spectrum and preclude other parties
from using the spectrum. Further, we do not believe a spectrum occupancy
limit, as suggested by some parties, would be practical or enforceable.
We believe that a 1.25 MHz channel plan will simplify equipment design
and permit better management of spectrum use. Accordingly, we are
adopting such a channelization plan for the 10 MHz of isochronous
spectrum. If in the future we are presented with information that shows
that wider channels can be accommodated without compromising spectrum
efficiency or monopolizing the spectrum ([i.e.]{.underline}, through use
of reduced power levels for wideband systems, or establishing a spectrum
efficiency standard, [etc.]{.underline}), we may revisit this matter.

With regard to the asynchronous band, we note that channelization is not
as critical for such transmissions, since asynchronous transmissions
will be of very short duration and not occupy the spectrum continuously.
Accordingly, we are eliminating the channelization requirements for the
asynchronous spectrum.

We do not agree with WINForum and others that the power specification
should be based on mean rather than peak power. Given that a wide
variety of modulation methods will be permitted, measurement of mean
power could become complex and subject to differing interpretations.
This could lead to equipment design uncertainties and potential delays
and complications in equipment authorization. We find that measurement
of peak power is straightforward and will not unduly penalize any
technology. We therefore are not altering the method specified in the
rules for measuring the output power of unlicensed PCS devices. With
regard to PCIA, Rockwell and Omnipoint\'s request to increase the frame
period, we believe that a longer frame period could potentially reduce
spectrum efficiency. We are also unconvinced that an increase in the
frame period would improve the likelihood of compatibility with future
technical standards for licensed PCS equipment. Therefore, we are not
modifying the rules in this regard.

With regard to the channel search requirements, we are amending the
rules to permit a device to begin its search for an unused channel at
any point within a range of frequencies from a band edge, as requested
by the several petitioners. This will permit manufacturers greater
flexibility to use guard bands, if needed, while retaining most of the
spectrum efficiency advantages gained by orderly selection of channels.
We disagree with WINForum and others that the channel search rule
significantly increases the potential for two devices attempting to
seize the same channel at the same instant in time. Nor do we believe
this requirement impedes the use of coordinated multi-cell systems. We
also agree with the petitioners that the existing requirement for
accuracy in monitoring signal levels should be deleted. We find that the
existing monitoring threshold requirements are sufficient to ensure that
unlicensed devices do not interfere with one another.

We agree with the petitioners that a requirement for periodic
acknowledgement of transmissions is necessary to ensure that a device
does not monopolize the spectrum. Therefore, we are modifying the
etiquette to require an transmitter to receive an acknowledgement of
transmissions from a system participant every 30 seconds and to cease
transmission if such acknowledgement is not received. We also will
permit control and signaling information to be transmitted for 30
seconds without acknowledgement, as requested by several parties.

With regard to duplex operation, we are persuaded that some changes are
appropriate. While we recognize that performing the listen-before-talk
operation at only one transmitter location may increase the potential
for interference, we believe that this increase is low and is outweighed
by the benefits of simpler, more cost effective equipment design.
Therefore, we are incorporating WINForum\'s provisions for paired duplex
channel operation into the rules. We are also persuaded that an
exception to the listen-before-talk provisions is appropriate for
systems that employ multicarrier shared antennas. Northern Telecom\'s
proposal to monitor the receive channel rather than the transmit channel
should not significantly increase the risk of causing interference to
other unlicensed PCS spectrum users and we are amending the rules to
allow this approach.

We agree with Ericsson and Northern Telecom that the frequency stability
requirements for unlicensed PCS devices should be relaxed. We believe
that unlicensed PCS devices will generally operate under the same the
range of temperature and voltage conditions specified for other Part 15
devices.[^364] Accordingly, we are requiring that the operating
frequency of unlicensed PCS devices be maintained within
[+]{.underline}10 ppm over a temperature range of -20^o^ C to +50^o^ C
at normal supply voltage and for variation in the primary voltage of
[+]{.underline}15 percent at 20^o^ C. While we note that the stability
requirement [+]{.underline}10 ppm is more strict than for other Part 15
devices, we believe this is necessary to ensure the proper function of
the etiquette. We are also relaxing from 40 dB to 30 dB the limit for
suppression of spurious emissions in the first adjacent channels as
requested by Ericsson and WINForum. This will reduce equipment costs
while still providing adequate interference protection between
unlicensed PCS systems.

We note that Metricom\'s request to conform the etiquette to match the
Part 15 standards for spread spectrum devices was not addressed by other
commenters in the proceeding. Further, we observe that Metricom\'s
clarification of its petition was made well after the comment periods
had closed and so other parties had little opportunity to respond. We
find that Metricom\'s proposal is inconsistent with the sharing and
spectrum efficiency goals that underlie the unlicensed PCS etiquette
described by WINForum. We find that WINForum considered factors such as
power levels, bandwidth and dynamic power reduction and arrived at
appropriate recommendations. Their proposal runs counter to precepts
which form the basis of the spectrum etiquette that received broad
industry support. Accordingly, we are rejecting Metricom\'s request.

Many of the petitioners and responding parties suggest edits in the
etiquette language to improve clarity and understanding of the etiquette
concepts. Examples of these changes include: clarifying that the period
of time to be monitored is the time period immediately prior to
initiating a transmission; specifying the starting time for calculating
compliance with the monitoring period before reaccessing the same
channel for isochronous equipment; and, clarifying that the range of the
monitoring period for asynchronous devices must be doubled progressively
for each unsuccessful channel access. To the extent that clarifications
of various provisions of the etiquette were deemed necessary, they have
been incorporated in the amended rules.

**VIII. RADIO FREQUENCY EXPOSURE LIMITS**

In the [Second Report and Order]{.underline}, the Commission required
PCS licensees and equipment to comply with the standards set forth in
ANSI/IEEE C95.1-1992, \"Safety Levels with Respect to Human Exposure to
Radio Frequency Electromagnetic Fields, 3 kHz to 300 GHz\" (ANSI/IEEE
guidelines).[^365] The Commission stated that for purposes of
determining compliance with these standards, all handheld PCS equipment
will be considered to operate in an \"uncontrolled\" environment. It
also noted that the exclusions for low power devices contained in the
ANSI/IEEE guidelines only apply to transmitters operating at 1500 MHz
and below. Therefore, the Commission indicated that, pending an
interpretation from the IEEE, PCS equipment must demonstrate compliance
with the ANSI/IEEE guidelines for maximum specific absorption rates
(SAR).[^366]

[Petitioners\' Requests]{.underline}. In its petition, PCIA requests
that we clarify the rules governing RF exposure from PCS equipment. It
notes that the text of the [Second Report and Order]{.underline}
indicates that handheld PCS devices must comply with the standards for
uncontrolled environments, while Section 24.52 of the rules provides
that all PCS equipment (which would include base stations as well as
handheld units) will be considered to operate in an uncontrolled
environment. PCIA submits that the rules should allow use of the less
stringent \"controlled\" environment standards for base stations where
appropriate.

[Responses]{.underline}. APC agrees with PCIA that the rules should
allow use of the standards for controlled environments for base
stations. MCI also supports this request and states that the request to
increase the base station power limit would not result in additional
risk of harmful exposure to RF radiation. Northern Telecom, in reply
comments, submits that, as an interim measure, manufacturers should be
allowed to the extrapolate the ANSI/IEEE formula up to the 2 GHz band to
determine whether their equipment meets the exclusions for low power
devices. It states that due to a lack of testing facilities, a
requirement for SAR testing would delay PCS implementation.

[Decision]{.underline}. We agree with PCIA that the guidelines for RF
exposure from PCS base stations should apply according to the type of
environment in which the exposure takes place. We also concur with PCIA
and others that there is no need to employ the uncontrolled exposure
limits in those areas in the vicinity of a PCS base station where there
is restricted access by the general public and exposure to the RF field
is unlikely. Accordingly, we are amending the rules to include both the
uncontrolled and controlled limits for PCS base stations. The
definitions of \"controlled\" and \"uncontrolled\" environments
specified in ANSI/IEEE C95.1-1992 will govern which limits will
apply.[^367]

As noted above, we requested a formal interpretation from the IEEE as to
whether the formula for determining the threshold level for the
exclusion from the RF exposure standards can be extrapolated to the 2
GHz range. The IEEE radiated power exclusion applies when a 2.5 cm
separation distance is maintained between the body and the radiating
structure. In its response to our request, IEEE stated that, while it
cannot predict whether such an extension of the standard would be
incorporated into the next revision of C95.1, extrapolation of the
current formula to frequencies up to 2.2 GHz would be
conservative.[^368] We therefore are amending the rules to apply the
ANSI/IEEE radiated power exclusions for low power devices to PCS
devices. In implementing this change, however, we find that it is
appropriate to provide an additional margin to ensure that devices
approved for operation under the exclusion will comply with any changes
to the RF exposure guidelines that may be adopted in the future.
Accordingly, we will exclude PCS devices that operate with output power
of 100 milliwatts or less from the SAR testing requirements. PCS devices
operating at higher powers must be subjected to SAR testing to determine
compliance with the RF exposure guidelines.[^369]

**IX. CONCLUSION**

We are amending our rules as described above to ensure that the American
public benefits from new mobile digital voice and data services. We
believe that our rules, as amended, will foster rapid development of a
competitive market that will provide consumers with access to a diverse
array of high-quality, low-cost PCS services and products on a wide-area
basis. With adoption of these amendments, our rules are finalized and we
now intend to proceed expeditiously to license broadband PCS services
through the competitive bidding process.

**X. PROCEDURAL INFORMATION**

[Regulatory Flexibility Analysis]{.underline}. The analysis required by
the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, 5 U.S.C. Section 608, is
contained in Appendix C.

[Ordering Clause]{.underline}. Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED, That Parts 2,
15, and 24 of the Commission\'s Rules ARE AMENDED as specified in
Appendix A, effective 30 days after publication in the Federal Register;
except that amendments to Sections 15.311 and 24.204(f)(1), (2), (3)(i),
(3)(ii) are effective 90 days after publication in the Federal Register.
This action is taken pursuant to Sections 4(i), 7(a), 302, 303(c),
303(f), 303(g), and 303(r) of the Communications Act of 1934, as
amended, 47 U.S.C. Sections 154(i), 157(a), 302, 303(c), 303(f), 303(g),
and 303(r). Furthermore, IT IS ORDERED, That the petitions for
reconsideration ARE GRANTED, to the extent described above and DENIED in
all other respects.

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

William F. Caton

Acting Secretary

**Appendix A: Final Rules**

Parts 2, 15 and 24 of Chapter I of Title 47 of the Code of Federal
Regulations are amended as follows:

**PART 2 \-- FREQUENCY ALLOCATIONS AND RADIO TREATY MATTERS; GENERAL
RULES AND REGULATIONS**

1\. The authority citation for Part 2 is revised to read as follows:

**AUTHORITY: Sec. 4, 302, 303, and 307 of the Communications Act of
1934, as amended, 47 U.S.C. Sections 154, 302, 303 and 307, unless
otherwise noted.**

2\. Section 2.106, the Table of Frequency Allocations, is amended as
follows:

a\. In the 1850-1990 MHz band: remove NG153 from column 5; and in column
6 replace PERSONAL COMMUNICATIONS SERVICES (99) with PERSONAL
COMMUNICATIONS SERVICES (24). In the 2110-2150 and 2160-2200 MHz bands:
remove US331 from column 5; and in column 6 remove PERSONAL
COMMUNICATIONS SERVICES (99).

**\' 2.106 Table of Frequency Allocations**

\* \* \* \* \* \* \*

[International table]{.underline} \|\| [United States table]{.underline}
\| [FCC use designators]{.underline}

Region 1-allocation \| Region 2-allocation \| Region 3-allocation \|\|
[Government \| Non-Government]{.underline} \| \| Special-use MHz \| MHz
\| MHz \|\| Allocation MHz \| Allocation MHz \| Rule part(s) \|
frequencies \| \| \|\| \| \| \|

[(1) \| (2) \| (3) \|\| (4) \| (5) \| (6) \| (7)]{.underline}

\|\| \| \| \|

\* \* \* \* \* \|\| 1850-1990 \| 1850-1990 \| \|

\|\| \| FIXED. \| PERSONAL COMMUNICATIONS \| EMERGING

\|\| \| MOBILE. \| SERVICES (24). \| TECHNOLOGIES

\|\| \| \| PRIVATE OPERATIONAL-FIXED \|

\|\| \| \| MICROWAVE (94). \|

\|\| \| \| RADIO FREQUENCY DEVICES \| \|\| \| \| (15). \|

\|\| \| \| \|

\|\| \| \| \|

\|\| \| \| \|

\|\| \| \| \|

\|\| \| \| \|

\|\| \| \| \|

\|\| \| \| \|

\|\| \| \| \|

\|\| \| \| \|

\|\| \| \| \|

\|\| \| \| \|

\|\| \| US331 \| \|

\|\| [\| \| \|]{.underline}

\* \* \* \* \* \* \*

\* \* \* \* \* \* \*

[International table]{.underline} \|\| [United States table]{.underline}
\| [FCC use designators]{.underline}

Region 1-allocation \| Region 2-allocation \| Region 3-allocation \|\|
[Government \| Non-Government]{.underline} \| \| Special-use MHz \| MHz
\| MHz \|\| Allocation MHz \| Allocation MHz \| Rule part(s) \|
frequencies \| \| \|\| \| \| \|

[(1) \| (2) \| (3) \|\| (4) \| (5) \| (6) \| (7)]{.underline}

\|\| \| \| \| \* \* \* \* \* \|\| 2110-2200 \| 2110-2150 \| \|

\|\| \| FIXED. \| DOMESTIC PUBLIC FIXED (21).\| EMERGING

\|\| \| MOBILE. \| PRIVATE OPERATIONAL-FIXED \| TECHNOLOGIES

\|\| \| \| MICROWAVE (94). \|

\|\| \| \| PUBLIC MOBILE (22). \|

\|\| \| \| \|

\|\| \| \| \|

\|\| \| \| \|

\|\| \| \| \|

\|\| \| US111 US252 \| \|

\|\| \| NG23 NG153 \| \|

\|\| \| [\| \|]{.underline}

\|\| \| \| \|

\|\| \| 2150-2160 \| \|

\|\| \| FIXED. \| MULTIPOINT DISTRIBUTION \|

\|\| \| \| (21). \|

\|\| \| \| PRIVATE OPERATIONAL-FIXED \|

\|\| \| NG23 \| MICROWAVE (94). \|

\|\| \| [\| \|]{.underline}

\|\| \| \| \|

\|\| \| 2160-2200 \| \|

\|\| \| FIXED. \| DOMESTIC PUBLIC FIXED \| EMERGING

\|\| \| MOBILE. \| (21). \| TECHNOLOGIES

\|\| \| \| \|

\|\| \| \| \|

\|\| \| \| PRIVATE OPERATIONAL-FIXED \|

\|\| \| \| MICROWAVE (94). \|

\|\| \| \| PUBLIC MOBILE (22). \|

\|\| \| \| \|

\|\| \| \| \|

\|\| \| \| \|

\|\| \| \| \|

\|\| \| \| \|

\|\| US111 US252 US331 \| NG23 NG153 \| \|

\|\| [\| \| \|]{.underline}

\* \* \* \* \* \* \*

b\. The text of footnote US331 in the United States footnotes and
footnote NG153 in the Non-Government footnotes is revised to read as
follows:

UNITED STATES (US) FOOTNOTES

\* \* \* \* \*

US331 In the frequency band 1850-1990 MHz, the only fixed PCS services
permitted are ancillary services used in support of mobile personal
communications services.

\* \* \* \* \*

NON-GOVERNMENT (NG) FOOTNOTES

\* \* \* \* \*

NG153 The 2110-2150 MHz and 2160-2200 MHz bands are reserved for future
emerging technologies on a co-primary basis with the fixed and mobile
services. Allocations to specific services will be made in future
proceedings.

\* \* \* \* \*

**PART 15 \-- RADIO FREQUENCY DEVICES**

1\. The authority citation for Part 15 continues to read as follows:

**AUTHORITY: Sec. 4, 302, 303, 304, and 307 of the Communications Act of
l934, as amended, 47 U.S.C. Sections 154, 302, 303, 304, and 307.**

2\. Section 15.301 is revised to read as follows:

**\' 15.301 Scope**.

This subpart sets out the regulations for unlicensed personal
communications services (PCS) devices operating in the 1910-1930 MHz
frequency band.

3\. Sections 15.303(g) and (j) are revised to read as follows:

**\' 15.303 Definitions.**

\* \* \* \* \*

\(g\) *Personal Communications Services (PCS) Devices \[Unlicensed\].*
Intentional radiators operating in the frequency band 1910-1930 MHz that
provide a wide array of mobile and ancillary fixed communication
services to individuals and businesses.

\* \* \* \* \*

\(j\) *Thermal noise power.* The noise power in watts defined by the
formula N=kTB where N is the noise power in watts, k is Boltzmann\'s
constant, T is the absolute temperature in degrees Kelvin (e.g., 295^o^
K) and B is the emission bandwidth of the device in hertz.

\* \* \* \* \*

4\. Section 15.307 is amended by revising the introductory portion of
paragraph (a), paragraph (d), and paragraph(e) as follows:

**\' 15.307 Coordination with fixed microwave service**.

\(a\) UTAM, Inc., is designated to coordinate and manage the transition
of the 1910-1930 MHz band from Private Operational-Fixed Microwave
Service (OFS) operating under Part 94 of this Chapter to unlicensed PCS
operations, conditioned upon submittal to and acceptance by the
Commission of:

\* \* \* \* \*

\(d\) A coordinatable PCS device is required to incorporate means that
ensure that it cannot be activated until its location has been
coordinated by UTAM, Inc. The application for certification shall
contain an explanation of all measures taken to prevent unauthorized
operation. This explanation shall include all procedural safeguards,
such as the mandatory use of licensed technicians to install the
equipment, and a complete description of all technical features
controlling activation of the device.

\(e\) A coordinatable PCS device shall incorporate an automatic
mechanism for disabling operation in the event it is moved outside the
geographic area where its operation has been coordinated by UTAM, Inc.
The application for certification shall contain a full description of
the safeguards against unauthorized relocation and must satisfy the
Commission that the safeguards cannot be easily defeated.

\* \* \* \* \*

5\. Section 15.311 is revised to read as follows:

**\' 15.311 Labelling requirements.**

In addition to the labelling requirements of Section 15.19(a)(3), all
devices authorized under this subpart must bear a prominently located
label with the following statement:

> Installation of this equipment is subject to notification and
> coordination with UTAM, Inc. Any relocation of this equipment must be
> coordinated through, and approved by UTAM. UTAM may be contacted at
> \[insert UTAM\'s toll-free number\].

6\. Paragraphs (a) and (i) of Section 15.319 are revised to read as
follows:

**\' 15.319 General technical requirements.**

\(a\) The 1910-1920 MHz sub-band is limited to use by asynchronous
devices under the requirements of Section 15.323. The 1920-1930 MHz
sub-band is limited to use by isochronous devices under the requirements
of Section 15.321.

\* \* \* \* \*

\(i\) The device must comply with IEEE C95.1-1991 (ANSI/IEEE
C95.1-1992), \"Safety Levels with Respect to Human Exposure to Radio
Frequency Electromagnetic Fields, 3 kHz to 300 GHz.\" Measurement
methods are specified in IEEE C95.3-1991, \"Recommended Practice for the
Measurement of Potentially Hazardous Electromagnetic Fields - RF and
Microwave.\" Copies of these standards are available form the IEEE
Standards Board, 445 Hoes Lane, P.O. Box 1331, Piscataway, NJ
08855-1331, telephone 1-800-678-4333. All equipment shall be considered
to operate in an \"uncontrolled\" environment. The application for
certification must contain a statement confirming compliance with IEEE
C95.1-1991. Technical information showing the basis for this statement
must be submitted to the Commission upon request. PCS hand-held devices
whose radiated power is 100 milliwatts or less are excluded from SAR
testing requirements as long as a 2.5 cm separation is maintained
between the radiating structure and the body of the user. The ANSI/IEEE
standard uses the term \"radiated power\" as meaning the input power to
the antenna.

7\. Section 15.323 is redesignated as Section 15.321. In the new Section
15.321, paragraph (g) is removed, and the section heading and paragraphs
(a), (b), (c)(1), (c)(4), (c)(6), (d), and (e) are revised to read as
follows:

**\' 15.321 Specific requirements for asynchronous devices operating in
the 1910-1920 MHz sub-band.**

\(a\) Operation shall be contained within the 1910-1920 MHz sub-band.
The emission bandwidth of any intentional radiator operating in this
sub-band shall be no less than 500 kHz.

\(b\) All systems of less than 2.5 MHz emission bandwidth shall start
searching for an available spectrum window within 3 MHz of the sub-band
edge at either 1910 or 1920 MHz, while systems of more than 2.5 MHz
emission bandwidth will first occupy the center half of the sub-band.
Devices with an emission bandwidth of less than 1.0 MHz may not occupy
the center half of the sub-band if other spectrum is available.

\(c\) \* \* \*

\(1\) Immediately prior to initiating a transmission, devices must
monitor the spectrum window they intend to use for at least 50
microseconds.

\* \* \* \* \*

\(4\) After completion of a transmission, an individual device or
cooperating group of devices must cease transmission and wait a
deference time randomly chosen from a uniform random distribution
ranging from 50 to 750 microseconds, after which time an attempt to
access the band again may be initiated. For each occasion that an access
attempt fails after the initial inter-burst interval, the range of the
deference time chosen shall double until an upper limit of 12
milliseconds is reached. The deference time remains at the upper limit
of 12 milliseconds until an access attempt is successful. The deference
time is re-initialized after each successful access attempt.

\* \* \* \* \*

\(6\) The monitoring system shall use the same antenna used for
transmission, or an antenna that yields equivalent reception at that
location.

\* \* \* \* \*

\(d\) Emissions shall be attenuated below a reference power of 112
milliwatts as follows: 30 dB between the channel edges and 1.25 MHz
above or below the channel; 50 dB between 1.25 and 2.5 MHz above or
below the channel; and 60 dB at 2.5 MHz or greater above or below the
channel. Compliance with the emissions limits is based on the use of
measurement instrumentation employing a peak detector function with an
instrument resolution bandwidth approximately equal to 1.0 percent of
the emission bandwidth of the device under measurement.

\(e\) The frequency stability of the carrier frequency of intentional
radiators operating in this sub-band shall be 10 ppm over 10
milliseconds or the interval between channel access monitoring,
whichever is shorter. The frequency stability shall be maintained over a
temperature variation of -20^o^ to +50^o^ Celsius at normal supply
voltage, and over a variation in the primary supply voltage of 85
percent to 115 percent of the rated supply voltage at a temperature of
20 degrees Celsius. For equipment that is capable of operating only from
a battery, the frequency stability tests shall be performed using a new
battery without any further requirement to vary supply voltage.

\*\*\*\*\*

8\. Section 15.321 is redesignated as Section 15.323. In the new Section
15.323, the section heading and paragraphs (a), (b), (c)(1), (c)(4),
(c)(6), (c)(8), (d), and (f) are revised and new paragraphs (c)(10),
(c)(11), and (c)(12) are added to read as follows:

**\' 15.323 Specific requirements for isochronous devices operating in
the 1920-1930 MHz sub-band.**

\(a\) Operation shall be contained within one of eight 1.25 MHz channels
starting with 1920-1921.25 MHz and ending with 1928.75-1930 MHz. Further
sub-division of a 1.25 MHz channel is permitted with a reduced power
level, as specified in Section 15.319(c), but in no event shall the
emission bandwidth be less than 50 kHz.

\(b\) Intentional radiators with an intended emission bandwidth less
than 625 kHz shall start searching for an available time and spectrum
window within 3 MHz of the sub-band edge at 1920 MHz and search upward
from that point. Devices with an intended emission bandwidth greater
than 625 kHz shall start searching for an available time and spectrum
window within

3 MHz of the sub-band edge at 1930 MHz and search downward from that
point.

\(c\) \* \* \*

\(1\) Immediately prior to initiating transmission, devices must monitor
the combined time and spectrum windows in which they intend to transmit
to determine if the access criteria are met.

\* \* \* \* \*

\(4\) Once access to specific combined time and spectrum windows is
obtained an acknowledgement from a system participant must be received
by the initiating transmitter within one second or transmission must
cease. Periodic acknowledgements must be received at least every 30
seconds or transmission must cease. Channels used exclusively for
control and signalling information may transmit continuously for 30
seconds without receiving an acknowledgement, at which time the access
criteria must be repeated.

\* \* \* \* \*

\(6\) If the selected combined time and spectrum windows are
unavailable, the device may either monitor and select different windows
or seek to use the same windows after waiting an amount of time,
randomly chosen from a uniform random distribution between 10 and 150
milliseconds, commencing when the channel becomes available.

\* \* \* \* \*

\(8\) The monitoring system shall use the same antenna used for
transmission, or an antenna that yields equivalent reception at that
location.

\* \* \* \* \*

\(10\) An initiating device may attempt to establish a duplex connection
by monitoring both its intended transmit and receive time and spectrum
windows. If both the intended transmit and receive time and spectrum
windows meet the access criteria, then the initiating device can
initiate a transmission in the intended transmit time and spectrum
window. If the power detected by the responding device can be decoded as
a duplex connection signal from the initiating device, then the
responding device may immediately begin transmitting on the receive time
and spectrum window monitored by the initiating device.

\(11\) An initiating device that is prevented from monitoring during its
intended transmit window due to monitoring system blocking from the
transmissions of a co-located (within one meter) transmitter of the same
system, may monitor the portions of the time and spectrum windows in
which they intend to receive over a period of at least 10 milliseconds.
The monitored time and spectrum window must total at least 50 percent of
the 10 millisecond frame interval and the monitored spectrum must be
within the 1.25 MHz frequency channel(s) already occupied by that device
or co-located co-operating devices. If the access criteria is met for
the intended receive time and spectrum window under the above
conditions, then transmission in the intended transmit window by the
initiating device may commence.

\(12\) The provisions of (c)(10) or (c)(11) of this section shall not be
used to extend the range of spectrum occupied over space or time for the
purpose of denying fair access to spectrum to other devices.

\(d\) Emissions shall be attenuated below a reference power of 112
milliwatts as follows: 30 dB between the channel edges and 1.25 MHz
above or below the channel; 50 dB between 1.25 and 2.5 MHz above or
below the channel; and 60 dB at 2.5 MHz or greater above or below the
channel. Systems that further sub-divide a 1.25 MHz channel into X
sub-channels must comply with the following emission mask: In the bands
between 1B and 2B measured from the center of the emission bandwidth the
total power emitted by the device shall be at least 40 dB below the
transmit power permitted for that device; in the bands between B and 3B
measured from the center of the emission bandwidth the total power
emitted by an intentional radiator shall be at least 50 dB below the
transmit power permitted for that radiator; in the bands between 3B and
the 1.25 MHz channel edge the total power emitted by an intentional
radiator in the measurement bandwidth shall be at least 60 dB below the
transmit power permitted for that radiator. \"B\" is defined as the
emission bandwidth of the device in hertz. Compliance with the emission
limits is based on the use of measurement instrumentation employing a
peak detector function with an instrument resolution bandwidth
approximately equal to 1.0 percent of the emission bandwidth of the
device under measurement.

\* \* \* \* \*

\(f\) The frequency stability of the carrier frequency of the
intentional radiator shall be maintained within [+]{.underline}10 ppm
over 1 hour or the interval between channel access monitoring, whichever
is shorter. The frequency stability shall be maintained over a
temperature variation of -20^o^ to +50^o^ degrees C at normal supply
voltage, and over a variation in the primary supply voltage of 85
percent to 115 percent of the rated supply voltage at a temperature of
20^o^ C. For equipment that is capable only of operating from a battery,
the frequency stability tests shall be performed using a new battery
without any further requirement to vary supply voltage.

**PART 24‑‑PERSONAL COMMUNICATIONS SERVICES**

1\. The authority citation for Part 24 continues to read as follows:

**AUTHORITY: Secs. 4, 301, 302, 303, and 332, 48 Stat. 1066, 1082, as
amended; 47 U.S.C. Sections 154, 301, 302, 303, and 332, unless
otherwise noted.**

2\. In Section 24.1, paragraph (b) is revised to read as follows:

**\' 24.1 Basis and purpose.**

\* \* \* \* \*

\(b\) Purpose. This part states the conditions under which portions of
the radio spectrum are made available and licensed for PCS.

\* \* \* \* \*

3\. Section 24.3 is revised to read as follows:

**\' 24.3 Permissible communications.**

PCS licensees may provide any mobile communications service on their
assigned spectrum. Fixed services may be provided only if ancillary to
mobile operations. Broadcasting as defined in the Communications Act is
prohibited.

4\. Section 24.10 is revised to read as follows:

**\' 24.10 Scope.**

This subpart contains some of the procedures and requirements for filing
applications for licenses in the personal communications services. One
also should consult Subparts F and G of this part. Other Commission rule
parts of importance that may be referred to with respect to licensing
and operation of radio services governed under this part include 47
C.F.R. Parts 0, 1, 2, 5, 15, 17 and 20.

5\. Section 24.11 is revised to read as follows:

**\' 24.11 Initial authorization.**

\(a\) An applicant must file an application for an initial authorization
in each market and frequency block desired.

\(b\) Blanket licenses are granted for each market and frequency block.
Applications for individual sites are not required and will not be
accepted.

6\. Section 24.52 is revised to read as follows:

**\' 24.52 RF hazards.**

\(a\) Licensees and manufacturers are required to ensure that their
facilities and equipment comply with IEEE C95.1‑1991 (ANSI/IEEE
C95.1-1992), \"Safety Levels with Respect to Human Exposure to Radio
Frequency Electromagnetic Fields, 3 kHz to 300 GHz.\" Measurement
methods are specified in IEEE C95.3-1991, \"Recommended Practice for the
Measurement of Potentially Hazardous Electromagnetic Fields - RF and
Microwave.\" Copies of these standards are available from IEEE Standards
Board, 445 Hoes Lane, P.O. Box 1331, Piscataway, NJ 08855-1331.
Telephone: 1-800-678-4333. The limits for both \"controlled\" and
\"uncontrolled\" environments, as defined by IEEE C95.1-1991, will apply
to all PCS base and mobile stations, as appropriate. The application for
equipment authorization must contain a statement confirming compliance
with IEEE C95.1-1991. Technical information showing the basis for this
statement must be submitted to the Commission upon request.

\(b\) PCS hand-held devices whose maximum radiated power is 100
milliwatts or less are not required to be evaluated for compliance with
ANSI/IEEE SAR (specific absorption rate) requirements, as long as a 2.5
cm separation distance is maintained between the radiating structure and
the body of the user. (The ANSI/IEEE standard uses the term \"radiated
power,\" meaning input power to the antenna.)

\(c\) For further information on the Commission\'s environmental rules
see Section 1.1301 through Section 1.1319.

7\. Subpart E is revised in its entirety to read as follows:

**Subpart E\--Broadband PCS**

Sec.

24.200 Scope.

24.202 Service areas.

24.203 Construction requirements.

24.204 Cellular eligibility.

24.229 Frequencies

24.232 Power and antenna height limits.

24.235 Frequency stability.

24.236 Field strength limits.

24.237 Interference protection.

24.238 Emission limits.

**Subpart E\--Broadband PCS**

**\' 24.200 Scope.**

This subpart sets out the regulations governing the licensing and
operations of personal communications services authorized in the
1850‑1910 and 1930-1990 MHz bands.

**\' 24.202 Service areas.**

Broadband PCS service areas are Major Trading Areas (MTAs) and Basic
Trading Areas (BTAs) as defined below. MTAs and BTAs are based on the
Rand McNally [1992 Commercial Atlas & Marketing Guide]{.underline},
123rd Edition, at pages 38-39 (\"BTA/MTA Map\"). Rand McNally organizes
the 50 states and the District of Columbia into 47 MTAs and 487 BTAs.
The BTA/MTA Map is available for public inspection as the Office of
Engineering and Technology\'s Technical Information Center, Room 7317,
2025 M Street, N.W., Washington, D.C.

\(a\) The MTA service areas are based on the Rand McNally [1992
Commercial Atlas & Marketing Guide]{.underline}, 123rd Edition, at pages
38-39, with the following exceptions and additions:

\(1\) Alaska is separated from the Seattle MTA and is licensed
separately.

\(2\) Guam and the Northern Mariana Islands are licensed as a single
MTA-like area.

\(3\) Puerto Rico and the United States Virgin Islands are licensed as a
single MTA-like area. (4) American Samoa is licensed as a single
MTA-like area.

\(b\) The BTA service areas are based on the Rand McNally [1992
Commercial Atlas & Marketing Guide]{.underline}, 123rd Edition, at pages
38-39, with the following additions licensed separately as BTA-like
areas: American Samoa; Guam; Northern Mariana Islands;
Mayaguez/Aguadilla-Ponce, Puerto Rico; San Juan, Puerto Rico; and the
United States Virgin Islands. The Mayaguez/Aguadilla-Ponce BTA consists
of the following municipalities: Adjuntas, Aguada, Aguadilla, Anasco,
Arroyo, Cabo Rojo, Coamo, Guanica, Guayama, Guayanilla, Hormigueros,
Isabela, Jayuya, Juana Diaz, Lajas, Las Marias, Mayaguez, Maricao,
Maunabo, Moca, Patillas, Penuelas, Ponce, Quebradillas, Rincon, Sabana
Grande, Salinas, San Germain, Santa Isabel, Villalba, and Yauco. The San
Juan BTA consists of all other municipalities in Puerto Rico.

**\' 24.203 Construction requirements.**

\(a\) Licensees of 30 MHz blocks must serve with a signal level
sufficient to provide adequate service to at least one‑third of the
population in their licensed area within five years of being licensed
and two‑thirds of the population in their licensed area within 10 years
of being licensed. Licensees may choose to define population using the
1990 census or the 2000 census. Failure by any licensee to meet these
requirements will result in forfeiture or non-renewal of the license and
the licensee will be ineligible to regain it.

\(b\) Licensees of 10 MHz blocks must serve with a signal level
sufficient to provide adequate service to at least one-quarter of the
population in their licensed area within five years of being licensed,
or make a showing of substantial service in their licensed area within
five years of being licensed. Population is defined as the 1990
population census. Licensees may elect to use the 2000 population census
to determine the five-year construction requirement. Failure by any
licensee to meet these requirements will result in forfeiture of the
license and the licensee will be ineligible to regain it.

\(c\) Licensees must file maps and other supporting documents showing
compliance with the respective construction requirements within the
appropriate five- and ten-year benchmarks of the date of their initial
licenses.

**\' 24.204 Cellular eligibility.**

\(a\) [10 MHz Limitation]{.underline}. Until January 1, 2000, no
license(s) for broadband PCS in excess of 10 MHz shall be granted to any
party (including all parties under common control) if the grant of such
license(s) will result in significant overlap of the PCS licensed
service area(s) (MTAs or BTAs) and the cellular geographic service
area(s) (CGSA) of licensee(s) in the Domestic Public Cellular Radio
Telecommunications Service directly or indirectly owned, operated, or
controlled by the same party.

\(b\) [15 MHz Limitation]{.underline}. After January 1, 2000, no
license(s) for broadband PCS in excess of 15 MHz shall be granted to any
party (including all parties under common control) if the grant of such
license(s) will result in significant overlap of the PCS licensed
service area(s) (MTAs or BTAs) and the cellular geographic service
area(s) (CGSA) of licensee(s) in the Domestic Public Cellular Radio
Telecommunications Service directly or indirectly owned, operated, or
controlled by the same party.

\(c\) [Significant Overlap]{.underline}. For purposes of Subsections (a)
and (b) of this section, significant overlap of a PCS licensed service
area and CGSA(s) occurs when ten or more percent of the population of
the PCS service area, as determined by the 1990 census figures for the
counties contained therein, is within the CGSA(s).

\(d\) [Ownership Attribution]{.underline}.

\(1\) For purposes of paragraphs (a) and (b) of this section,
\"control\" means majority voting equity ownership, any general
partnership interest, or any means of actual working control (including
negative control) over the operation of the licensee, in whatever manner
exercised.

\(2\) For purposes of applying paragraphs (a) and (b) of this section,
and for purposes of Section 24.229(c) (40 MHz limit in same geographic
area), ownership and other interests in broadband PCS licensees or
applicants and cellular licensees will be attributed to their holders
pursuant to the following criteria:

\(i\) Partnership and other ownership interests and any stock interest
amounting to 5 percent or more of the equity, or outstanding stock, or
outstanding voting stock of a broadband PCS licensee or applicant will
be attributable.

\(ii\) Partnership and other ownership interests and any stock interest
amounting to 20 percent or more of the equity, or outstanding stock, or
outstanding voting stock of a cellular licensee will be attributable,
except that ownership will not be attributed unless the partnership and
other ownership interests and any stock interest amount to 40 percent or
more of the equity, or outstanding stock, or outstanding voting stock of
a cellular licensee if the ownership interest is held by a small
business, a rural telephone company, or a business owned by minorities
and/or women, as these terms are defined in Section 1.2110 of this
chapter, or if the ownership interest is held by an entity with a
non-controlling equity interest in a broadband PCS licensee or applicant
that is a business owned by minorities and/or women.

\(iii\) Stock interests held in trust shall be attributed to any person
who holds or shares the power to vote such stock, to any person who has
the sole power to sell such stock, and, in the case of stock held in
trust, to any person who has the right to revoke the trust at will or to
replace the trustee at will. If the trustee has a familial, personal or
extra‑trust business relationship to the grantor or the beneficiary, the
grantor or beneficiary, as appropriate, will be attributed with the
stock interests held in trust.

\(iv\) Non‑voting stock shall be attributed as an interest in the
issuing entity if in excess of the amounts set forth above.

\(v\) Debt and instruments such as warrants, convertible debentures,
options or other interests (except non-voting stock) with rights of
conversion to voting interests shall not be attributed unless and until
conversion is effected, except that this provision does not apply in
determining whether an entity is a small business, a rural telephone
company, or a business owned by minorities and/or women, as these terms
are defined in Section 1.2110 of this chapter or other provisions of the
Commission\'s Rules.

\(vi\) Limited partnership interests shall be attributed to limited
partners and shall be calculated according to both the percentage of
equity paid in and the percentage of distribution of profits and losses.

\(vii\) Officers and directors of a broadband PCS licensee or applicant
or a cellular licensee shall be considered to have an attributable
interest in the entity with which they are so associated. The officers
and directors of an entity that controls a PCS licensee or applicant or
a cellular licensee shall be considered to have an attributable interest
in the broadband PCS licensee or applicant or a cellular licensee.

\(e\) \[Reserved\]

\(f\) [Cellular Divestiture]{.underline}. Parties holding controlling or
attributable ownership interests in cellular licensees may be a party to
a broadband PCS application ([i.e.]{.underline}, have a controlling or
attributable interest in a broadband PCS applicant), and such PCS
applicant will be eligible for more than one 10 MHz broadband PCS
license and/or 30 MHz broadband PCS license(s) pursuant to the
divestiture procedures set forth in paragraphs (1) through (3) of this
section; Provided, however, that these divestiture procedures shall be
available only for parties with controlling or attributable ownership
interests in cellular licensees where the CGSA(s) covers 20 percent or
less of the PCS service area population.

\(1\) The broadband PCS applicant shall certify on its short-form
auction application, filed in accordance with Section 24.305, that it
and all parties to the application will come into compliance with the
limitations on common ownership of cellular and broadband PCS interests
set forth in this section.

\(2\) If such an applicant is a successful bidder, it must submit with
its long-form application ([see]{.underline} Section 24.307) a signed
statement describing its efforts to date and future plans to come into
compliance with the limitations on common ownership of cellular and
broadband PCS interests set forth in this section.

\(3\) If such an applicant is otherwise qualified, its application will
be granted subject to a condition that the licensee shall come into
compliance with the limitations on common ownership of cellular and
broadband PCS interests set forth in this section within ninety (90)
days of final grant.

\(i\) Parties holding controlling interests in cellular licensees that
conflict with the attribution threshold or service overlap limitations
set forth above will be considered to have come into compliance if they
have submitted to the Commission an application for assignment of
license or transfer of control of the cellular licensee
([see]{.underline} Section 22.39 of this chapter) by which, if granted,
such parties no longer would have an attributable interest in the
cellular license. If no such assignment or transfer application is
tendered to the Commission within ninety (90) days of final grant, the
Commission may consider the short-form certification and the long-form
divestiture statement to be material, bad faith misrepresentations and
will invoke the condition on the PCS license, cancelling it
automatically, retain all monies paid to the Commission, and, based on
the facts presented, take any other action it may deem appropriate.
Divestiture may be to an interim trustee if a buyer has not been secured
in the required time frame, as long as the applicant has no interest in
or control of the trustee, and the trustee may dispose of the license as
it sees fit.

\(ii\) Where parties to broadband PCS applications hold
less-than-controlling (but still attributable) interests in cellular
licensee(s), they shall submit, within ninety days of final grant, a
certification that the applicant and all parties to the application have
come into compliance with the limitations on common ownership of
cellular and broadband PCS interests set forth in this section.

NOTE 1: For purposes of the cellular ownership attribution limit, all
ownership interests in cellular operations that serve 10 or more percent
of the population of the PCS service area should be included in
determining the extent of a PCS applicant\'s cellular ownership.

NOTE 2: When a party owns an attributable interest in more than one
cellular system that overlaps a PCS service area, the total population
in the overlap area will apply on a cumulative basis.

EXAMPLE 1: Company A holds a 15 percent non-controlling ownership
interest in Cellular Licensee X and a 15 percent non-controlling
ownership interest in Cellular Licensee Y. Cellular Licensee X covers 30
percent of the population of the PCS service area and Cellular Licensee
Y covers 10 percent of the population of the PCS service area. A
broadband PCS applicant in which Company A holds an attributable
ownership interest will be eligible for a broadband PCS license or
licenses for more than 10 MHz because Company A does not hold
attributable ownership interests in cellular operations which together
include ten or more percent of the population of the PCS service area.

EXAMPLE 2: Cellular Company A owns a 45 percent non-controlling interest
in cellular license 1, and a 22 percent non-controlling interest in both
cellular licenses 2 and 3. Cellular license 1 includes 15 percent of the
pops in BTA 1. Cellular license 2 covers 7 percent of the pops in BTA 2
and 5 percent of the pops in BTA 3. Cellular license 3 covers 7 percent
of the pops in BTA 3. Together Cellular licenses 1, 2 and 3 cover 9
percent of the pops in MTA 1.

If Cellular Company A is not a designated entity, it can purchase 40 MHz
of spectrum in BTA 2 or in MTA 1. It can acquire only 10 MHz in BTA 1 or
BTA 3 because it is considered to have ownership interests in 15 percent
of the pops in BTA 1 and 12 percent of the pops in BTA 3.

If Cellular Company A wants to acquire 40 MHz of spectrum in BTA 3 it
can either agree to divest either cellular license 2 or 3, or it can
invest as a non-controlling investor in a PCS license that is held and
controlled by a business owned by minorities and/or women.

If Cellular Company A wants to acquire 40 MHz of spectrum in BTA 1 it
can agree to divest its interests in cellular license 1. It cannot
invest as a non-controlling investor in a business owned by minorities
and/or women because its 45 percent ownership of license 1 will be
attributed, since it is greater than the 40 percent threshold.

If Cellular Company A is a designated entity, it can acquire 40 MHz of
PCS spectrum in every area except BTA 1, where it is considered to have
an ownership interest in 25 MHz of spectrum already because it is over
the 40 percent threshold.

EXAMPLE 3: Cellular Company A owns a 45 percent non-controlling interest
in cellular license 1 that covers 5 percent of the pops in BTA 1.
Cellular Company A also owns a 21 percent non-controlling interest in
cellular license 2 that covers 9 percent of the pops in BTA 1. If
Cellular Company A is not a designated entity, then it can buy only 10
MHz of spectrum, because it is considered to have an ownership interest
of 14 percent of the pops in BTA 1. If it wants to buy 30 MHz it would
have to certify before the auction that it will divest either cellular
license 1 or 2.

If Cellular Company A is a designated entity, then it would be
considered to have an ownership interest in only 5 percent of the pops
in BTA 1 and would thus be eligible to buy up to 40 MHz in BTA 1.

EXAMPLE 4: Company A holds a 10 percent interest in Cellular Licensee 1.
Company B holds a 10 percent interest in Cellular Licensee 1. Cellular
Licensee 1 covers more than 10 percent of the population of the PCS
service area. Neither Company A nor Company B is a designated entity. A
PCS entity with interests held by Company A and Company B is ineligible
for a 30 MHz PCS license because the attributable ownership in cellular
license 1 is 20 percent.

EXAMPLE 5: Same as Example 4 except that Company A and Company B are
designated entities. The PCS entity is eligible for a 30 MHz PCS license
because the attributable cellular ownership is less than 40 percent.

**\' 24.229 Frequencies.**

The frequencies available in the Broadband PCS service are listed in
this section in accordance with the frequency allocations table of
Section 2.106.

\(a\) The following frequency blocks are available for assignment on an
MTA basis:

Block A: 1850‑1865 MHz paired with 1930‑1945 MHz; and

Block B: 1870‑1885 MHz paired with 1950‑1965 MHz.

\(b\) The following frequency blocks are available for assignment on a
BTA basis:

Block C: 1895-1910 MHz paired with 1975-1990 MHz;

Block D: 1865-1870 MHz paired with 1945-1950 MHz;

Block E: 1885-1890 MHz paired with 1965-1970 MHz; and

Block F: 1890-1895 MHz paired with 1970-1975 MHz.

\(c\) PCS licensees shall not have an ownership interest in frequency
blocks that total more than 40 MHz and serve the same geographic area.
For the purpose of this section, PCS licensees are entities having an
ownership interest of 5 or more percent or other attributable ownership
interest, as defined in Section 24.204(d), in a PCS license.

EXAMPLE 1: Company A, which is a rural telephone company with no
cellular interests, buys a 7 percent stake in a 30 MHz BTA that
constitutes 8 percent of the population in MTA 1, which encompasses
BTA 1. It is then offered an opportunity to buy 8 percent of the equity
in a 30 MHz license in MTA 1. It cannot accept this offer because it
would be over the 5 percent threshold on two overlapping PCS licenses.
Its status as a rural telephone company has no impact on the 5 percent
threshold for PCS licensees.

EXAMPLE 2: Company A has two investors, Company B and Company C. Company
B owns 15 percent of Company A. Company C, a rural telephone company,
owns 25 percent of Company A. Company B and Company C do not have any
interests in each other.

Company B has 100 percent ownership of cellular license 1 that covers 20
percent of the pops in BTA 1 and 6 percent of the pops in MTA 1. Company
C owns 25 percent of cellular license 2 that covers 20 percent of the
pops in BTA 2 and 6 percent of the pops in MTA 1. Company A has no
separate cellular interests. MTA 1 encompasses both BTA 1 and BTA 2.

Company A cannot purchase 30 MHz of spectrum in BTA 1. Such a purchase
would put Company B over the aggregation limit of 40 MHz in BTA 1
because it would have over 5 percent ownership of the PCS license in
addition to its cellular license.

Company A can, however, purchase 30 MHz in BTA 2 or MTA 1 because
Company C is a rural telephone company, and thus Company C\'s interest
in cellular license 2 falls below the 40 percent threshold and is not
counted against the spectrum cap. If Company C were not a rural
telephone company, then Company A could not acquire 30 MHz in BTA 2 or
MTA 1 because its partners in those licenses would be over the spectrum
cap.

Company B can also buy 30 MHz in BTA 2 or MTA 1 as long as Company A
does not also buy 30 MHz in BTA 2 or MTA 1 because Company B and Company
C have no joint ownership.

Company C can also buy 30 MHz in BTA 1 or 2 or MTA 1 as long as Company
A does not also buy in the region where Company C buys. If Company A
were to buy a 30 MHz MTA 1 license, then Company B and C would be
prohibited from acquiring either of the BTAs because they would be over
the 5 percent threshold for PCS spectrum in the same region.

\(d\) After January 1, 2000, licensees that have met the 5-year
construction requirement may assign portions of licensed PCS spectrum.
In no case may an assignee aggregate more than 40 MHz of PCS/cellular
spectrum.

**\' 24.232 Power and antenna height limits.**

\(a\) Base stations are limited to 1640 watts peak equivalent
isotropically radiated power (e.i.r.p.) with an antenna height up to 300
meters HAAT. See Section 24.53 for HAAT calculation method. Base station
antenna heights may exceed 300 meters with a corresponding reduction in
power; see Table 1 of this section. In no case may the peak output power
of a base station transmitter exceed 100 watts. The service area
boundary limit and microwave protection criteria specified in Section
24.236 and Section 24.237 apply.

Table 1. Reduced Power for Base Station Antenna Heights Over 300 Meters

HAAT in meters Maximum e.i.r.p.

(watts)

[\<]{.underline} 300 1,640

[\<]{.underline} 500 1,070

[\<]{.underline} 1,000 490

[\<]{.underline} 1,500 270

[\<]{.underline} 2,000 160

\(b\) Mobile/portable stations are limited to 2 watts e.i.r.p. peak
power and the equipment must employ means to limit the power to the
minimum necessary for successful communications.

\(c\) Peak transmit power must be measured over any interval of
continuous transmission using instrumentation calibrated in terms of an
rms‑equivalent voltage. The measurement results shall be properly
adjusted for any instrument limitations, such as detector response
times, limited resolution bandwidth capability when compared to the
emission bandwidth, sensitivity, [etc.]{.underline}, so as to obtain a
true peak measurement for the emission in question over the full
bandwidth of the channel.

**\' 24.235 Frequency stability.**

The frequency stability shall be sufficient to ensure that the
fundamental emission stays within the authorized frequency block.

**\' 24.236 Field strength limits.**

The predicted or measured median field strength at any location on the
border of the PCS service area shall not exceed 47 dBuV/m unless the
parties agree to a higher field strength.

**\' 24.237 Interference protection.**

\(a\) All licensees are required to coordinate their frequency usage
with co-channel or adjacent channel incumbent fixed microwave licensees
in the 1850-1990 MHz band. Coordination must occur before initiating
operations from any base station. Problems that arise during the
coordination process are to be resolved by the parties to the
coordination. Licensees are required to coordinate with all users
possibly affected, as determined by Appendix E of the Memorandum Opinion
and Order, GEN Docket No. 90-314, FCC 94-144; TIA Telecommunications
Systems Bulletin 10-F, \"Interference Criteria for Microwave Systems,\"
May 1994, (TSB10-F); or an alternative method agreed to by the parties.

\(b\) The results of the coordination process need be reported to the
Commission only if the parties fail to agree. Because broadband PCS
licensees are required to protect fixed microwave licensees in the
1850-1990 MHz band, the Commission will be involved in the coordination
process only upon complaint of interference from a fixed microwave
licensee. In such a case, the Commission will resolve the issues.

\(c\) In all other respects, coordination procedures are to follow the
requirements of Section 21.100(d) of this chapter to the extent that
these requirements are not inconsistent with those specified in this
part.

\(d\) The licensee must perform an engineering analysis to assure that
the proposed facilities will not cause interference to existing OFS
stations within the coordination distance specified in Table 2 of a
magnitude greater than that specified in the criteria set forth in
paragraphs (e) and (f) of this section, unless there is prior agreement
with the affected OFS licensee. Interference calculations shall be based
on the sum of the power received at the terminals of each microwave
receiver from all of the applicant\'s current and proposed PCS
operations.

Table 2: Coordination Distances In Kilometers

PCS Base Station Antenna HAAT in Meters

e.i.r.p.

\(W\) 5 10 20 50 100 150 200 250 300 500 1000 1500 2000

\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\--

0.1 90 93 99 110 122 131 139 146 152 173 210 239 263

0.5 96 100 105 116 128 137 145 152 158 179 216 245 269

1 99 103 108 119 131 140 148 155 161 182 219 248 272

2 120 122 126 133 142 148 154 159 164 184 222 250 274

5 154 157 161 168 177 183 189 194 198 213 241 263 282

10 180 183 187 194 203 210 215 220 225 240 268 291 310

20 206 209 213 221 229 236 242 247 251 267 296 318 337

50 241 244 248 255 264 271 277 282 287 302 331 354 374

100 267 270 274 282 291 297 303 308 313 329 358 382 401

200 293 296 300 308 317 324 330 335 340 356 386 409

500 328 331 335 343 352 359 365 370 375 391 421

1000 354 357 361 369 378 385 391 397 402 418

1200 361 364 368 376 385 392 398 404 409

1640 372 375 379 388 397 404 410 416 421

NOTE: If actual value does not match table values, round to the closest
higher value on this table. See Section 24.53 for HAAT calculation
method.

\(e\) For microwave paths of 25 kilometers or less, interference
determinations shall be based on the C/I criteria set forth in TIA
Telecommunications Systems Bulletin 10‑F, \"Interference Criteria for
Microwave Systems,\" May 1994, (TSB10‑F).

\(f\) For microwave paths longer than 25 kilometers, the interference
protection criterion shall be such that the interfering signal will not
produce more than 1.0 dB degradation of the practical threshold of the
microwave receiver for analog systems, or such that the interfering
signal will not cause an increase in the bit error rate (BER) from 10E‑6
to 10E‑5 for digital systems.

\(g\) The development of the C/I ratios and interference criteria
specified in paragraphs (e) and (f) of the section and the methods
employed to compute the interfering power at the microwave receivers
shall follow generally acceptable good engineering practices. The
procedures described for computing interfering signal levels in Appendix
E of the Memorandum Opinion and Order, GEN Docket No. 90‑314, FCC 94‑144
shall be applied. Alternatively, procedures for determining interfering
signal levels and other criteria as may be developed by the Electronics
Industries Association (EIA), the Institute of Electrical and
Electronics Engineers, Inc. (IEEE), the American National Standards
Institute (ANSI) or any other recognized authority will be acceptable to
the Commission.

**\' 24.238 Emission limits.**

\(a\) On any frequency outside a licensee\'s frequency block, the power
of any emission shall be attenuated below the transmitter power (P) by
at least 43 plus 10 log~10~ (P) decibels or 80 decibels, whichever is
the lesser attenuation.

NOTE: The measurements of emission power can be expressed in peak or
average values, provided they are expressed in the same parameters as
the transmitter power.

\(b\) When an emission outside of the authorized bandwidth causes
harmful interference, the Commission may, at its discretion, require
greater attenuation than specified in this section.

**Appendix B: List of Parties**

I. [Petitioners]{.underline}

1\. Advanced Cordless Technologies (ACT)

2\. Alcatel Network System, Inc. (Alcatel)

3\. Alliance of Rural Area Telephone and Cellular Service Providers
(Alliance)

4\. American Personal Communications (APC)

5\. American Petroleum Institute (API)

6\. American Telephone and Telegraph (AT&T)

7\. Ameritech

8\. AMSC Subsidiary Corporation (AMSC)

9\. Anchorage Telephone Utility

10\. Apple Computer, Inc. Emergency Petition of September 13, 1993

11\. Apple Petition for Reconsideration and Clarification of December
22, 1993

12\. Association of Public-Safety Communications Officials (APCO)

13\. Bell Atlantic Personal Communications, Inc. (Bell Atlantic)

14\. BellSouth Corporation

15\. Blooston, Mordorfsky, Jackson & Dickens (Blooston)

16\. Chickasaw Telephone Co., Cincinnati Bell Telephone Co., Illinois
Consolidated Telephone Co., Milling Telephone Co., and Roseville
Telephone Co. (CCIMR)

17\. Columbia Cellular Corp. (Columbia)

18\. Comcast Corp.

19\. COMSAT Corp. (Comsat)

20\. Concord Telephone Co. (Concord)

21\. Cellular Telecommunications Industry Association (CTIA)

22\. Duncan, Weinberg, Miller & Pembroke, P. C. (DWMP)

23\. Ericsson Corporation

24\. Florida Cellular RSA Limited Partnership (Florida Cellular)

25\. General Communications, Inc. (GCI)

26\. GTE Service Corporation (GTE)

27\. Iowa Network Services, Inc. (INS)

28\. Killen & Associates, Inc.

29\. LACE, Inc. (Lace)

30\. McCaw Cellular Communications, Inc. (McCaw)

31\. MCI Telecommunications Corp. (MCI)

32\. Mebtel, Inc.

33\. Metricom, Inc.

34\. Motorola Inc.

35\. Murray, George E. (Murray)

36\. National Communications System, Manager of the (NCS)

37\. National Telephone Cooperative Association (NTCA)

38\. Nextel Communications, Incorporated (Nextel; formerly Fleet Call)

39\. Northern Telecom Inc.

40\. NYNEX Corporation

41\. Organization for the Protection and Advancement of Small Telephone
Companies (OPASTCO)

42\. Pacific Bell and Nevada Bell (PacBell)

43\. Pacific Telecom Cellular, Inc. (Pacific Telecom)

44\. PacTel Corp.

45\. PCS Action, Incorporated

46\. Pegasus Communications, Inc. (Pegasus)

47\. Personal Network Services Corp. (PNSC)

48\. PMN, Incorporated

49\. Point Communications Company (Point)

50\. Radiofone, Incorporated

51\. Rockwell International, Inc. (Rockwell)

52\. Rural Cellular Association (RCA)

53\. Southwestern Bell Corporation

54\. SpectraLink Corporation

55\. Sprint Corporation

56\. State of Texas - Office of the Attorney General Petition

57\. Telecommunications Industry Association - Fixed Point-to-Point
Communication Section of the Network Equipment Division (TIA-NED)

58\. Telecommunications Industry Association - Mobile and Personal
Communications Division (TIA-Mobile)

59\. Telephone and Data Systems, Inc. (TDS)

60\. Personal Communications Industry Association (PCIA; formerly
Telocator)

61\. Time Warner Telecommunications (Time Warner)

62\. TRW, Incorporated

63\. U.S. Intelco Networks, Inc. (Intelco)

64\. US West, Incorporated

65\. Unlicensed PCS Ad Hoc Committee for 2 GHz Microwave Transition and
Management

(UTAM)

66\. Utilities Telecommunications Council (UTC)

67\. Wireless Information Networks Forum (WINForum)

II\. [Opposing and Commenting Parties]{.underline}

1\. Advanced MobileComm Technologies, Inc. and Digital Spread Spectrum
Technologies, Inc. (AMT/DSST)

2\. Alcatel

3\. APC

4\. API

5\. Apple

6\. Association of American Railroads (AAR)

7\. Association of Independent Designated Entities (AIDE)

8\. APCO

9\. Bell Atlantic

10\. Cablevision Systems Corporation (Cablevision)

11\. Cellular Information Systems, Incorporated (CIS)

12\. Cellular Telecommunications Industry Association (CTIA)

13\. Citizens Utilities Company (CUC)

14\. Ericsson

15\. TIA-Fixed

16\. General Communication, Incorporated (GCI)

17\. GTE

18\. Hill & Welch

19\. Interdigital Communications Corporation (Interdigital)

20\. KSI, Incorporated

21\. Massachusetts Emergency Telecommunications Board (Mass-Emergency)

22\. McCaw

23\. MCI

24\. Motorola

25\. Murray

26\. National Emergency Number Association (NENA)

27\. Nextel

28\. Northern Telecom

29\. NYNEX

30\. Omnipoint Corporation, Incorporated (Omnipoint)

31\. PacBell

32\. PCS Action

33\. PMN

34\. Qualcomm Incorporated

35\. Rand McNally & Company (Rand McNally)

36\. ROLM Company (Rolm)

37\. SpectraLink

38\. Sprint

39\. TDS

40\. PCIA

41\. United States Telephone Association (USTA)

42\. UTAM

43\. UTC

44\. WINForum

III\. [Replying Parties]{.underline}

1\. Alcatel

2\. Alliance

3\. APC

4\. API

5\. AT&T

6\. American Wireless Communication Corporation (AWCC)

7\. Ameritech

8\. AMSC

9\. Apple

10\. AIDE

11\. Association of Maximum Service Television, Incorporated (AMSTV)

12\. Association of Public-Safety Communications
Officials-International, Incorporated (APCO)

13\. Bell Atlantic

14\. CTIA

15\. Comcast

16\. Comsat

17\. Encompass

18\. Ericsson

19\. Federal Communications Bar Association (FCBA)

20\. GCI

21\. GTE

22\. Hill & Welch

23\. Industrial Telecommunications Association, Inc. (ITA)

24\. Loral Qualcomm Satellite Services, Incorporated (LQSS)

25\. McCaw

26\. MCI

27\. Metricom

28\. Motorola

29\. National Emergency Number Association (NENA)

30\. National Rural Telecom Association (NRTA)

31\. NCS

32\. Nextel

33\. Northern Telecom

34\. NYNEX

35\. PacBell

36\. Pacific Telecom

37\. PCS Action

38\. PMN

39\. Radiofone

40\. Rand McNally

41\. Rolm

42\. RCA

43\. Southwestern Bell

44\. Sprint

45\. PCIA

46\. TIA-Fixed

47\. Time Warner

48\. Texas Advisory Commission on State Emergency Communications (Texas
Emergency)

49\. TRW

50\. UTAM

51\. UTC

52\. Intelco

53\. US West

54\. WINForum

IV\. [Opposing and Commenting Parties on Apple Emergency
Petition]{.underline}

1\. Alcatel

2\. APC

3\. API

4\. Apple

5\. AT&T

6\. Business Software Alliance (BSA)

7\. Compaq Computer Corporation (Compaq)

8\. Comsearch

9\. Cox Enterprises, Inc. (Cox)

10\. Hewlett-Packard Company (HP)

11\. MCI

12\. Metricom

13\. Microsoft Corporation

14\. Northern Telecom

15\. Spectralink

16\. UTAM

17\. UTC

V. [Replying Parties on Apple Emergency Petition]{.underline}

1\. Alcatel

2\. Apple

3\. AT&T

4\. BSA

5\. Ericsson

6\. HP

7\. Motorola

8\. Northern Telecom

9\. PacBell

10\. Rolm

11\. UTAM

**Appendix C: Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis**

Pursuant to 5 U.S.C. Section 603, an initial Regulatory Flexibility
Analysis was incorporated in the [Notice of Proposed Rule Making and
Tentative Decision]{.underline} in combined ET Docket No. 92-100 and GEN
Docket No. 90-314. Written comments on the proposals in the [Notice of
Proposed Rule Making]{.underline}, including the Regulatory Flexibility
Analysis, were requested. A Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis was
incorporated in the [Second Report and Order]{.underline} in GEN Docket
No. 90-314.

A. [Need for and Objective of Rules]{.underline}: Our objective is to
provide spectrum allocations, licensing and authorization rules, and
technical standards for broadband PCS at 2 GHz. Authorizing this new
service will make available a broad range of new services and
technologies to both business users and consumers. The revised PCS rules
will provide licensees and developers of unlicensed equipment the
flexibility to introduce a wide variety of new and innovative
telecommunications services and equipment.

B. [Issues Raised by the Public in Response to the Initial and Final
Analyses]{.underline}: A number of parties supported regulations that
would facilitate participation in PCS by small businesses. Specifically,
these parties argue that small frequency blocks, small service areas,
and special consideration for small businesses in the licensing of PCS
would facilitate small businesses participation in providing PCS
services. The FCC empaneled a Small Business Advisory Committee (SBAC)
that also assessed the policy implications of this proceeding for small
businesses and filed a report with the Commission on September 15, 1993.
The SBAC concluded that small frequency blocks with multiple licensees
in each service area and a frequency block designated for qualified
small, female, and minority businesses would assist entrepreneurial
entry in PCS. The SBAC also suggested that the Commission consider other
mechanisms to foster entry opportunities and capital formation for such
groups. These issues and associated filings have been considered and
addressed in the [Second Report and Order]{.underline} and this
[Memorandum Opinion and Order]{.underline}, except issues related to
licensee selection procedures. Licensing issues are the subject of a
separate proceeding (PP Docket No. 93-253) that will establish rules to
implement competitive bidding in broadband PCS. A Report and Order in
that proceeding will be issued in the near future.

C. [Any Significant Alternative Minimizing Impact on Small Entities and
Consistent with Stated Objectives]{.underline}: We have reduced burdens
wherever possible. The regulatory burdens we have retained are necessary
to ensure that the public receives the benefits of broadband PCS in a
prompt and efficient manner. We will continue to examine alternatives in
the future with the objectives of eliminating unnecessary regulations
and minimizing any significant impact on small entities.

**Appendix E: A Procedure for Calculating PCS Signal Levels at Microwave
Receivers**

The new Rules adopted in Part 24 stipulate that estimates of
interference to fixed microwave operations from a PCS operation will be
based on the sum of signals received at a microwave receiver from the
PCS operation. This appendix describes a procedure for computing this
PCS level.

In general, the procedure involves four steps:

1\. Determine the geographical coordinates of all microwave receivers
operating on co-channel and adjacent frequencies within the coordination
distance of each base station and the characteristics of each receiver,
[i.e.]{.underline}, adjacent channel susceptibility, antenna gain,
pattern and height, and line and other losses.

2\. Determine an equivalent isotropically radiated power (e.i.r.p.) for
each base station and equivalent e.i.r.p. values for the mobiles and
portables associated with each base station. Determine the values of
pertinent correction and weighting factors based on building heights and
density and distribution of portables. Close-in situations, prominent
hills, and extra tall buildings require special treatment.

3\. Based on PCS e.i.r.p. values, correction and weighting factors, and
microwave receiving system characteristics determined above, calculate
the total interference power at the input of each microwave receiver,
using the Longley-Rice propagation model.

4\. Based on the interference power level computed in step 3, determine
interference to each microwave receiver using criteria described in Part
24 and EIA/TIA Bulletin 10-F.

The interference from each base station and the mobiles and portables
associated with it is calculated as follows:

P~rbi~ = 10Log(p~tbi~) - L~bi~ - UC~i~ + G~mwi~ - C~i~ - BP~i~

P~rmi~ = 10Log(n~mi~ x p~tmi~) - L~mi~ - UC~i~ + G~mwi~ - C~i~

P~rpsi~ = 10Log(n~psi~ x p~tpsi~) - L~psi~ - UC~i~ + G~mwi~ - C~i~

P~rpbi~ = 10Log(n~pbi~ x p~tpbi~) - L~pbi~ - UC~i~ - (BP~i~ - BH~i~) +
G~mwi~ - C~i~

P~rpri~ = 10Log(n~pri~ x p~tpri~) - L~pri~ - (UC~i~ - BH~i~) + G~mwi~ -
C~i~

where:

P refers to Power in dBm

p refers to power in milliwatts

P~rbi~ = Power at MW receiver from ith base station in dBm

p~tbi~ = e.i.r.p. transmitted from ith base station in milliwatts, which
equals average power per channel x number of channels x antenna gain
with respect to an isotropic antenna - line loss

L~bi~ = Path loss between MW and base station site in dB

UC~i~ = Urban correction factor in dB

G~mwi~ = Gain of MW antenna in pertinent direction (dBi)

C~i~ = Channel discrimination of MW system in dB

P~rmi~ = Power at MW receiver from mobiles associated with ith base
station

p~tmi~ = e.i.r.p. transmitted from mobiles associated with ith base
station

n~mi~ = Number of mobiles associated with ith base station

L~mi~ = Path loss between MW and mobile transmitters in dB

P~rpsi~ = Power at MW receiver from outdoor portables (s for sidewalk)

p~tpsi~ = e.i.r.p. transmitted from outdoor portables associated with
ith base station

n~psi~ = Number of outdoor portables associated with ith base station

L~psi~ = Path loss between MW and outdoor portables in dB

P~rpbi~ = Power at MW receiver from indoor portables (b for building)

p~tpbi~ = e.i.r.p. transmitted from indoor portables associated with ith
base station

n~pbi~ = number of indoor portables associated with ith base station

L~pbi~ = Path loss in dB between MW and base station site (using average
building height divided by 2 as effective antenna height)

P~rpri~ = Power at MW receiver from rooftop portables (r for rooftop)

p~tpri~ = e.i.r.p. transmitted from rooftop portables associated with
ith base station

n~pri~ = Number of rooftop portables associated with ith base station

L~pri~ = Path loss in dB between MW and base station site (using average
building height as effective antenna height)

BP~i~ = Building penetration loss at street level in dB

BH~i~ = Height gain for portables in buildings dB = 2.5 x (nf-1), where
nf is number of floors

Note: where C~i~ varies from channel-to-channel, which often is the
case, the summation process is more complex, requiring summation at a
channel level first.

Finally, the total PCS interference power at a given microwave receiver
from all the base stations in a given frequency band is found by summing
the contributions from the individual stations. Likewise, the total
interference power at a given microwave receiver from all mobiles and
portables operating in a given frequency band is found by summing the
contributions from the mobiles and portables associated with each cell.

p~rb~ =  p~rbi~ milliwatts

i

p~rm~ =  (p~rmi~ + p~rpsi~ + p~rpbi~ + p~rpri~) milliwatts

i

P = 10 Log(p) dBm

[Base Stations]{.underline}. Interference from each base station to each
microwave should normally be considered independently. A group of base
stations having more or less (within [+]{.underline} 50 percent) the
same height above average terrain, the same e.i.r.p., basically the same
path to a microwave receiving site, and subtending an angle to that
receiving site of less than 5 degrees, may be treated as a group, using
the total power of the group and the average antenna height of the group
to calculate path loss, L.

[Mobile Stations]{.underline}. The e.i.r.p. from mobile transmitters is
weighted according to the number of base station channels expected to be
devoted to mobile operation at any given time. The antenna height of
mobiles used in calculating path loss, L, is assumed to be 2 meters.

[Portable Stations]{.underline}. The e.i.r.p. from the portable units
associated with each base station is weighted according to the estimated
portion of portables associated with that cell expected to be operated
inside buildings at any given time and the portion which could be
expected to be operating from elevated locations, such as balconies or
building rooftops. For example, in the case of service intended for
business use in an urban area, one might expect that perhaps 85 percent
of the portables in use at any given time would be operating from within
buildings and perhaps 5 percent might be operating from rooftops or
balconies. The remaining 10 percent would be outside at street level.

Calculation of an equivalent e.i.r.p. for cells in suburban areas will
involve different weighting criteria.

[Urban Correction Factor]{.underline}. The urban correction factor (UC)
depends on the height and density of buildings surrounding a base
station. For the core area of large cities, it is assumed to be 35 dB.
For medium size cities and fringe areas of large cities (4- to 6-story
buildings with scattered taller buildings and lower buildings and open
spaces) it is assumed to be 25 dB; for small cities and towns, 15 dB,
and for suburban residential areas (one- and two-story, single family
houses with scattered multiple-story apartment buildings, shopping
centers and open areas), 10 dB.

The unadjusted urban correction factor, UC, should not be applied to
base station antenna heights that are greater than 50 percent of the
average building height for a cell.

[Building Height and Building Penetration Factors]{.underline}. The
building height correction, BH, is a function of the average building
height within the nominal coverage area of the base station. It is used
in conjunction with the building penetration loss, BP, to adjust the
expected interference contribution from that portion of the portables
transmitting from within buildings. The adjustment is given by:

BP = 20 dB in urban areas

BP = 10 dB in suburban areas

BH = 2.5 x (nf-1) dB

where nf is the average height (number of floors) of the buildings in
the area.

(Note that this formula implies a net gain when the average building
height is greater than 8 floors). All buildings more than twice the
average height should be considered individually. The contribution to BH
from that portion of portables in the building above the average
building height should be increased by a factor of 20Log(h) dB, where h
is the height of the portables above the average building height in
meters.

[Channel Discrimination Factor]{.underline}. A factor based on the
interference selectivity of the microwave receiver.

[Propagation Model]{.underline}. The PCS to microwave path loss, L, is
calculated using the Longley-Rice propagation model, Version 1.2.2., in
the point-to-point mode. The Longley-Rice \[1\] model was derived from
NBS Technical Note 101 \[2\], and updated in 1982 by Hufford \[3\].
Version 1.2.2 incorporated modifications described in a letter by
Hufford \[4\] in 1985. Terrain elevations used as input to the model
should be from the U.S. Geological Survey 3-second digitized terrain
database.

[Special Situations]{.underline}. If a cell size is large compared to
the distance between the cell and a microwave receiving site so that it
subtends an angle greater than 5 degrees, the cell should be subdivided
and calculations should be based on the expected distribution of mobiles
and portables within each subdivision.

If terrain elevations within a cell differ by more than a factor of
two-to-one, the cell should be subdivided and microwave interference
calculations should be based on the average terrain elevation for each
subdivision.

If a co-channel PCS base station lies within the main beam of a
microwave antenna (5 degrees), there is no intervening terrain
obstructions, and the power at the microwave receiver from that base
station, assuming free space propagation, would be 3 dB or less below
the interference threshold, interference will be assumed to exist unless
the PCS licensee can demonstrate otherwise by specific path loss
calculations based on terrain and building losses.

If any part of a cell or cell subdivision lies within the main beam of a
co-channel microwave antenna, there is no intervening terrain
obstructions, and the accumulative power of 5 percent or less of the
mobiles, assuming free space propagation would be 3 dB or less below the
interference threshold, interference will be assumed to exist unless the
PCS licensee can demonstrate otherwise by specific path loss
calculations based on terrain and building losses.

If a building within a cell or cell subdivision lies within the main
beam of a co-channel microwave antenna, there is no intervening terrain
obstructions, and the cumulative power of 5 percent or fewer of the
portables, assuming free space propagation, would be 3 dB or less below
the interference threshold, interference will be assumed to exist unless
the PCS licensee can demonstrate otherwise by specific path loss
calculations based on terrain and building losses.

References:

1\. Longley, A.G. and Rice, P.L., \"Prediction of Tropospheric Radio
Transmission Loss Over Irregular Terrain, A Computer Method‑1968\", ESSA
Technical Report ERL 79‑ITS 67, Institute for Telecommunications
Sciences, July 1968.

2\. Rice, P.L., Longley, A.G., Norton, K.A., Barsis, A.P.,
\"Transmission Loss Predictions for Tropospheric Communications
Circuits,\" NBS Technical Note 101 (Revised), Volumes I and II, U.S.
Department of Commerce, 1967.

3\. Hufford, G.A., Longley, A.G. and Kissick, W.A., \"A Guide to the use
of the ITS Irregular Terrain Model in the Area Prediction Mode\", NTIA
Report 82‑100, U.S. Department of Commerce, April 1982. Also, Circular
letter, dated January 30, 1985, from G.A. Hufford, identifying
modifications to the computer program.

4\. Hufford, G.A., Memorandum to Users of the ITS Irregular Terrain
Model, Institute for Telecommunications Sciences, U.S. Department of
Commerce, January 30, 1985.

[^1]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} [Second Report and Order]{.underline}, GEN
    Docket No. 90-314, 8 FCC Rcd 7700 (1993) ([Second Report and
    Order]{.underline}). This includes a petition filed by Apple on
    September 13, 1993, which was separately put on notice and comment
    separately received. [Id]{.underline}. at & 92.

[^2]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} [Second Report and Order]{.underline} at &
    5.

[^3]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} 47 U.S.C. 309(j), as amended by Section
    6002(a) of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L.
    No. 103-66, 107 Stat. 312 (1993).

[^4]: ^?^ Our current rules provide 492 service areas based upon BTAs.
    In response to a request we are dividing the Puerto Rico service
    area into two areas, [infra]{.underline}.

[^5]: ^?^ Petitions for Rule Making requesting establishment of PCS were
    filed by Cellular 21, Inc., in September 1989, RM-7140; and PCN
    America, Inc. (PCN America), in November 1989, RM-7175.
    Subsequently, in February 1991, Apple, RM-7618, proposed that 40 MHz
    from the 1850-1990 MHz band be allocated for unlicensed high-speed
    local-area data communications services connecting personal
    computers.

[^6]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} [Notice of Inquiry]{.underline}, GEN Docket
    No. 90-314, 5 FCC Rcd 3995 (1990); [Policy Statement and
    Order]{.underline}, 6 FCC Rcd 6601 (1991); [Notice of Proposed Rule
    Making and Tentative Decision]{.underline}, 7 FCC Rcd 5676 (1992);
    [Erratum]{.underline}, 7 FCC Rcd 5779 (1992); and [Second Report and
    Order]{.underline}.

[^7]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} FCC, Transcripts of PCS Public Forum, April
    11-12, 1994 (Transcripts of the PCS Public Forum). The transcripts
    are available for public viewing at both the FCC Reference Center
    and the Library, 1919 M Street, N.W., Washington, DC. The
    transcripts also may be purchased from the Commission\'s duplication
    contractor.

[^8]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} [First Report and Order and Third Notice of
    Proposed Rule Making]{.underline}, ET Docket No. 92-9, 7 FCC Rcd
    6886 (1992).

[^9]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} [First Report and Order and Third Notice of
    Proposed Rule Making]{.underline}, ET Docket No. 92-9, 7 FCC Rcd
    6886 (1992); [Second Report and Order]{.underline}, 8 FCC Rcd 6495
    (1993); [Third Report and Order and Memorandum Opinion and
    Order]{.underline}, 8 FCC Rcd 6589 (1993); [Memorandum Opinion and
    Order]{.underline}, 9 FCC Rcd 1943 (1994), petition for further
    recon. pending.

[^10]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} [Second Report and Order]{.underline}, ET
    Docket No. 92-9, 8 FCC Rcd 6495 (1993).

[^11]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} [First Report and Order]{.underline}, GEN
    Docket No. 90-314 and ET Docket No. 92-100, 8 FCC Rcd 7162 (1993)
    (initial narrowband rules); [Memorandum Opinion and
    Order]{.underline}, 9 FCC Rcd 1309 (1994) (adopting certain
    narrowband PCS rule amendments on reconsideration); [Third Report
    and Order]{.underline}, PP Docket No. 93-253, FCC 93-98, released
    May 10, 1994 (design of narrowband auctions).

[^12]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} [Third Report and Order]{.underline}, 9 FCC
    Rcd 1337 (1994), recon. pending, [appeal]{.underline}
    [pending]{.underline} [sub]{.underline} [nom]{.underline}. [Pacific
    Bell v. FCC]{.underline}, No. 94-1148 (D.C. Cir., filed March 1,
    1994). We intend to address shortly the petitions for
    reconsideration of our pioneer\'s preference decisions.

[^13]: ^?^ A worldwide allocation for PCS was discussed at the 1992
    International Telecommunication Union (ITU) World Administrative
    Radio Conference (WARC-92) in Torremolinos, Spain. The conference
    decided to maintain primary fixed and mobile allocations at 2 GHz in
    Region II (which includes the United States), and to make additional
    primary mobile-satellite service allocations in the 1930-2010 and
    2120-2200 MHz bands. It added a footnote stating that future public
    land mobile telecommunications systems, similar in concept to PCS,
    are expected to use the 1885-2025 MHz and 2110-2200 MHz bands on a
    worldwide basis. [See]{.underline} [Report]{.underline}, GEN Docket
    No. 89-554, 6 FCC Rcd 3900 (1991); ITU, [Final Acts of the World
    Administrative Radio Conference for Dealing with Frequency
    Allocations in Certain Parts of the Spectrum]{.underline}
    (Malaga-Torremolinos, 1992).

[^14]: ^?^ Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No.
    103-66, Title VI,

    \'\' 6002(b)(2)(A), (B), 107 Stat. 312, 392 (1993).

[^15]: ^?^ 47 U.S.C. \'\' 3(n), 309, 332.

[^16]: ^?^ [Second Report and Order]{.underline}, ET Docket No. 92-9, 7
    FCC Rcd 6886 (1992) at App. A, \' 99.5.

[^17]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} Rand McNally, Inc., [1992 Commercial Atlas
    & Marketing Guide]{.underline} 38-39 (1992).

[^18]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} [First Report and Order and Third Notice of
    Proposed Rule Making]{.underline}, ET Docket No. 92-9, 7 FCC Rcd
    7997 (1992).

[^19]: ^?^ [Second Report and Order]{.underline}, GN Docket No. 93-252,
    9 FCC Rcd 1411, 1423 (1994) ([CMRS Second Report and
    Order]{.underline}), recon. pending.

[^20]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} [Second Report and Order]{.underline}, PP
    Docket No. 93-253, FCC 94-61, released April 20, 1994. (competitive
    bidding rules).

[^21]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} [Notice of Proposed Rule
    Making]{.underline}, PP Docket No. 93-253, 8 FCC Rcd 7635, 7655
    (1993); [Second Report and Order]{.underline} at n.61.

[^22]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} \"PCS Band Plan\" chart attached as
    Appendix D.

[^23]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} Rand McNally, Inc., [1992 Commercial Atlas
    & Marketing Guide]{.underline} 38-39 (1992) (\"BTA/MTA Map\"). Rand
    McNally organizes the 50 states and the District of Columbia into 47
    MTAs and 487 BTAs. The BTA/MTA Map is available for public
    inspection at the Office of Engineering and Technology\'s Technical
    Information Center, Room 7317, 2025 M Street, N.W., Washington, D.C.
    20554. For PCS licensing purposes, the Commission adopted service
    areas that separated Alaska from the Seattle MTA and added five
    insular areas: Puerto Rico, U.S. Virgin Islands, Guam, Northern
    Mariana Islands, and American Samoa. In our rules, the insular areas
    are treated as five BTA service areas and three MTA service areas.
    [See]{.underline} Section 24.102 of the Commission\'s Rules.
    Additionally, a listing of counties, parishes, and census divisions
    that constitute each BTA and MTA is available for inspection at the
    Technical Information Center. This is a listing of Rand McNally\'s
    47 MTAs and 487 BTAs, and therefore, the census divisions of Alaska
    are listed within the Seattle MTA and the insular areas are not
    listed.

[^24]: ^?^ Some parties opposed the use of the Rand McNally MTAs and
    BTAs for PCS service areas. AIDE Comments at 10-15; FCBA Replies at
    1-6; GTE Comments at 13-14; Hill & Welch Comments at 4-8; Killen
    Petition at 1-3; NTCA Petition at 2-3; PacBell Comments at 6-8;
    Point Petition at 3; UTC Petition at 3, 6; and PCIA Petition at
    16-18. The principal objection was the use of proprietary and
    copyrighted material to define service areas for PCS. On February
    15, 1994, a blanket licensing agreement was reached between PCIA, on
    behalf of PCS entities, and Rand McNally. This agreement permits all
    interested persons to use Rand McNally\'s copyrighted material for
    purposes of PCS licensing, building, marketing and operating. As a
    result of this agreement, PCIA asked to delete from its Petition for
    Reconsideration all issues related to the use of Rand McNally\'s
    MTA/BTA service areas and the objections of the other parties appear
    to have been resolved by this agreement. We therefore consider the
    copyright issues related to using MTA/BTA service areas to be
    resolved.

[^25]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} Alliance Reply at 2-4; APCO Petition at 6;
    Bell Atlantic Petition at 3; BellSouth Petition at iii; Columbia
    Petition at 1-3; Comcast Petition at 15-16; Comsat Petition at
    15-22; CTIA Petition at iii; DWMP Petition at 3; Florida Cellular
    Petition at 4; Killen Petition at 1-3; Murray Petition at 4-8; INS
    Petition at 6; McCaw Petition at 7; NTCA Petition at 2-3; Nextel
    Petition at 5; NYNEX Petition at 3, 6-11; PacBell Petition at 2; PCS
    Action Petition at 3, 9-10; Pegasus Petition at 1-2; PNSC Petition
    at 5; Point Petition at 1-2; RCA Petition at 2, 7-8; TDS Petition at
    2; Time Warner Petition at 2-7; TRW Petition at 2; Intelco Petition
    at 3-6; and UTC Petition at 2-6.

[^26]: ^?^ In the [Second Report and Order]{.underline}, the Commission
    declined to allocate additional support spectrum to connect PCS cell
    sites. We found that fixed service spectrum already allocated in
    other bands is adequate to support such PCS backhaul operations. The
    Commission also noted that some of these support operations can be
    provided through facilities that do not require use of radio
    spectrum, such as fiber optic cable. APC, in its comments to the
    petitions for reconsideration, requests that we allocate at least a
    portion of the 38 GHz band specifically for PCS backhaul operation.
    [See]{.underline} APC Comment at 23-24. We continue to believe that
    the spectrum already allocated for fixed microwave services is
    adequate to support PCS operations and will not allocate additional
    spectrum at this time. We do recognize, however, that it is
    important that PCS operations have access to adequate support
    spectrum. Accordingly, we will henceforth examine more closely
    requests for use of the 38 GHz band to ensure that such requests are
    justified and that the spectrum is used efficiently.

[^27]: ^?^ Appendix B lists parties that filed petitions for
    reconsideration, oppositions or comments, and replies. Abbreviations
    for parties used throughout this [Memorandum Opinion and
    Order]{.underline} are indicated in this appendix.

[^28]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} NYNEX Petition at 3.

[^29]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} CTIA Petition at iii, 3-5.

[^30]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} MSS Industry Spectrum Coalition Briefing
    for PCS Task Force at 1-5 (April 14, 1994).

[^31]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} [e.g.]{.underline}, MCI Comments at 5.

[^32]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} NYNEX Comments at 2.

[^33]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} [e.g.]{.underline}, NYNEX Petition at 3.

[^34]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} Transcripts of the PCS Public Forum at
    247-249 (April 12, 1994); Letter from Motorola to the FCC at 2 (May
    25, 1994); Letter from Concord to the FCC at 1 (May 31, 1994);
    Letter from Northern Telecom to the FCC at 1 (June 1, 1994).

[^35]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} Murray Petition at 7-8; PCS Action Petition
    at 2.

[^36]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} Transcripts of the PCS Public Forum at 145
    (April 12, 1994).

[^37]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} Letter from PCS Action to the FCC (March
    23, 1994).

[^38]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} [e.g.]{.underline}, NYNEX Petition at 3.

[^39]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} Letter from Motorola to the FCC (May 25,
    1994); Letter from MCI to the FCC (May 26, 1994); Letter from
    Northern Telecom to the FCC (June 1, 1994); Letter from MSS Spectrum
    Coalition to the FCC (May 27, 1994); Letter from U.S. West to the
    FCC (June 1, 1994); Letter from OPATSCO to the FCC (June 2, 1994);
    Letter from CTIA to the FCC (May 27, 1994); Letter from Concord to
    the FCC (May 31, 1994); Letter from Pacific Telesis to the FCC (May
    27, 1994); Letter from APC to the FCC (June 2, 1994).

[^40]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} Time Warner Petition at 2.

[^41]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} INS Petition at 6.

[^42]: ^?^ In his petition, Murray requested allocation of all broadband
    PCS spectrum in 10 MHz blocks and licensed in BTA license areas. In
    his comments, however, Murray indicates that although he still
    favors 10 MHz licenses, a move toward uniformity (in channel blocks
    of 20 MHz) would be a improvement over the plan adopted.

[^43]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} Bell Atlantic Petition at 3; BellSouth
    Petition at 17; Florida Cellular Petition at 4; Point Petition at 2;
    TDS Petition at 2.

[^44]: ^?^See Murray Petition at 4-8.

[^45]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} Point Petition at 2.

[^46]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} Nextel Petition at 5-8.

[^47]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} PacBell Petition at 2.

[^48]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} AMT/DSST Comments at 2-8.

[^49]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} GCI Comments at 3-5.

[^50]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} APC Comments at 13.

[^51]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} PCS Action Comments at 3-9.

[^52]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} US West Petition at 9-12.

[^53]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} MCI Comments at 2-3, 5.

[^54]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} Bell Atlantic Comments at 4-5; CTIA
    Comments at 12; Nextel Comments at 10-12; Sprint Comments at 4.

[^55]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} Transcripts of the PCS Public Forum at 439
    (April 11, 1994).

[^56]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} Transcripts of the PCS Public Forum at
    441-449 (April 11, 1994).

[^57]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} Transcripts of the PCS Public Forum at
    251-252 (April 11, 1994).

[^58]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} PCS Public Forum transcript at 111 (April
    12, 1994) (Murray), 28 (April 12, 1994) (Jackson), and 353 (April
    11, 1994) (Hausman).

[^59]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} \"PCS Band Plan\" attached as Appendix D.

[^60]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} Bell Atlantic Petition at 3; BellSouth
    Petition at 17; Florida Cellular Petition at 4; Point Petition at 2;
    TDS Petition at 2.

[^61]: ^?^ We also believe that fewer new viable PCS competitors might
    emerge under the six blocks of 20 MHz plan, given a spectrum
    aggregation limit of 40 MHz and the head start of cellular
    incumbents.

[^62]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} Murray Petition at 4-8.

[^63]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} Point Petition at 2; Nextel Petition at
    5-8.

[^64]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} APC Comments at 11.

[^65]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} APC Comments at 10.

[^66]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} PCS Action Comments at 4; INS Petition at
    6; Letter from PacBell to the FCC (April 28, 1994).

[^67]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} PCS Action Comments at 4.

[^68]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} Transcripts of the PCS Public Forum at
    439-449 (April 11, 1994).

[^69]: ^?^ In the [Notice of Proposed Rule Making]{.underline} in the
    competitive bidding proceeding, PP Docket No. 93-253, 8 FCC Rcd 7635
    (1993) (competitive bidding), the Commission indicated that it would
    consider setting aside Blocks C and D for small businesses, rural
    telephone companies, and businesses owned by minorities or women.
    Reconciliation Act \' 6002(a), 107 Stat. at 389. [See]{.underline}
    H.R. Rep. No. 103-213, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. at 482-484 (1993)
    (Conference Report); H.R. Rep. No. 103-111, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. at
    255 (1993).

[^70]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} Time Warner Petition at 2.

[^71]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} [Second Report and Order]{.underline} at &
    24.

[^72]: ^?^ AMT/DSST states that specialized services can meet unserved
    demand for PCS and that 10 MHz will be sufficient for some
    applications. [See]{.underline} AMT/DSST Comments at 4.
    [See]{.underline} [also]{.underline} CTIA Comments at 10; Murray
    Comments at 3-4; and Nextel Reply at 4; Transcripts of the PCS
    Public Forum at 43 (April 11, 1994).

[^73]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} PCS Action Reply at 2; Time Warner Reply at
    2-4.

[^74]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} [Second Report and Order]{.underline} at &
    61.

[^75]: ^?^ [Id]{.underline}. at & 106.

[^76]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} Comcast Petition at 15.

[^77]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} PNSC Petition at 5-8.

[^78]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} PCS Action Petition at 39; Time Warner
    Petition at 8.

[^79]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} CTIA Petition at iii.

[^80]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} BellSouth Petition at 15-17; Point Petition
    at 3.

[^81]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} BellSouth Petition at 15-17.

[^82]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} PNSC Petition at 8.

[^83]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} Letter from PCS Action to the FCC (May 27,
    1994). Many other parties, including one company with existing
    cellular holdings, expressed concern that allowing in-region
    cellular carriers to acquire additional spectrum would lead to a
    market dominated by cellular carriers. [See]{.underline} Letter from
    US West to the FCC (June 1, 1994); Letter from MCI to the FCC (May
    26, 1994); Letter from Time Warner to the FCC (May 27, 1994).

[^84]: ^?^ Because we are prohibiting spectrum disaggregation until the
    year 2000, cellular entities will have an opportunity to acquire 5
    MHz of additional spectrum at that time.

[^85]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} [Further Notice of Proposed Rule
    Making]{.underline}, GN Docket No. 93-252, FCC 94-100, released May
    20, 1994.

[^86]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} [Second Report and Order]{.underline} at &
    76.

[^87]: ^?^ [Id]{.underline}. at & 73.

[^88]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} Pegasus Petition at 1-2.

[^89]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} DWMP Petition at 3.

[^90]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} Killen Petition at 1-3, NCTA Petition at
    1-8. There are 306 Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) and 428
    Rural Service Areas (RSAs). [See]{.underline} 47 C.F.R. \'22.2.

[^91]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} Point Petition at 2-4.

[^92]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} CTIA Petition at 9-10, Nextel Petition at
    11-13.

[^93]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} Nextel Petition at 12.

[^94]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} BellSouth Petition at 17.

[^95]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} Transcripts of the PCS Public Forum at
    82-83 (April 11, 1994).

[^96]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} Transcripts of the PCS Public Forum at 439
    (April 11, 1994).

[^97]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} Murray Petition at 4-8.

[^98]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} Letter from NTIA to the FCC at 2 (May 31,
    1994).

[^99]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} Killen Petition at 1-3; NTCA Petition at
    1-8; Point Petition at 2-4.

[^100]: ^?^ CTIA states that as of year-end 1993, cellular companies
    served more than 16 million subscribers and had invested nearly \$14
    billion in building their systems. Letter from CTIA to the FCC
    (April 29, 1994).

[^101]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} 47 U.S.C. \' 309 (j)(4)(C).

[^102]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} 47 U.S.C. \' 309(j)(3)(B).
    [See]{.underline} [also]{.underline} Alliance Petition at 2-3;
    Columbia Petition at 2-3; NTCA Petition at 3; RCA Petition at 2, 7;
    Intelco Petition at 7.

[^103]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} Pegasus Petition at 10.

[^104]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} McCaw Comments at 2-24.

[^105]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} AIDE Comments at 5; CTIA Comments at 16;
    McCaw Comments at 2-24.

[^106]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} AMT Comments at 2-3.

[^107]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} GTE Comments at 9-10.

[^108]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} CUC Comments at 12.

[^109]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} GCI Comments at 15-16; MCI comments at
    3-5.

[^110]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} GCI Comments at 15-16; MCI comments at
    3-5; Nextel Comments at 13-14.

[^111]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} MCI Comments at 3-5.

[^112]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} GCI Comments at 15-16; MCI Comments at
    3-5; Nextel Comments at 13-14.

[^113]: ^?^ We recognize that we stated in an earlier order that the
    issue of geographic partitioning by rural telephone companies would
    be addressed in this order, but we now believe that this issue
    should be addressed with other issues regarding designated entities.
    [See]{.underline} [Second Report and Order]{.underline} in PP Docket
    No. 93-253 at & 243.

[^114]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} Transcripts of the PCS Public Forum at
    11-12 (April 12, 1994):

[^115]: ^?^ We agree that both unlicensed asynchronous and isochronous
    devices may need additional spectrum in the near future.
    [See]{.underline} Transcripts of the PCS Public Forum at 10 (April
    12, 1994).

[^116]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} UTC Petition at 2-4; APCO Petition at 4-6.

[^117]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} UTC Petition at 2-4.

[^118]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} APCO Petition at 4-6.

[^119]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} APC Comments at 3; MCI Comments at 6;
    Sprint Comments at 5-6; PCIA Reply at 2; TDS Comments at 13.

[^120]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} API Comments at 8-9; ITA Comments at 4-5.

[^121]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} [CMRS Second Report and
    Order]{.underline}, 9 FCC Rcd at 1439 n.130:

    > The terms and conditions for different classes of customers may,
    > of course, vary. Whether such differences are lawful would be a
    > question of whether there is unreasonable discrimination under
    > Section 202(a) of the \[Communications\] Act. In the case of
    > individualized or customized service offerings made by CMRS
    > providers to individual customers, it is our intent to classify
    > and regulate such offerings as CMRS, regardless of whether such
    > offerings would be treated as common carriage under existing case
    > law, if the service falls within the definition of CMRS.

[^122]: ^?^ We also note that, while broadband PCS is presumptively
    classified as a Commercial Mobile Radio Service (CMRS), parties
    acquiring licenses may request Private Mobile Radio Service (PMRS)
    classification if they meet our requirements. [See]{.underline}
    [CMRS Second Report and Order]{.underline} at & 39.

[^123]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} [Notice of Inquiry]{.underline}, ET Docket
    No. 94-32, 9 FCC Rcd 2175 (1994). This proceeding addresses,
    [inter]{.underline} [alia]{.underline}, a Petition for Rule Making
    filed by the Coalition of Private Users of Emerging Multimedia
    Technologies (COPE) for the development of an \"Advanced Private
    Communications Service,\" using 75 of the 200 MHz to be transferred
    to our jurisdiction from Federal government spectrum in compliance
    with the terms of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993.

[^124]: ^?^ The 1992 World Administrative Radio Conference of the
    International Telecommunications Union (WARC-92) allocated 80 MHz of
    spectrum to MSS in the bands 1970-2010 MHz and 2160-2200 MHz while
    retaining the existing fixed and mobile allocations in those bands.
    Petitions from MSS interests seek removal of the PCS allocation from
    the 2180-2200 MHz band to preserve the option of allocating that
    band domestically to MSS. In 20 MHz (the 1970-1980 MHz and 2160-2170
    MHz bands) of this spectrum, MSS is limited to Region II (generally
    countries in the Western Hemisphere); in the remaining 60 MHz
    (1980-2010 MHz and 2170-2200 MHz), the MSS allocation is worldwide.
    In the [Second Report and Order]{.underline}, the Commission
    allocated 20 MHz (2180-2200 MHz) of this spectrum to PCS and
    retained the existing U.S. allocations in the remaining 60 MHz (the
    bands 1970-1990 MHz and 2160-2180 MHz were held in reserve for
    future emerging technologies, and the existing broadcast auxiliary
    allocation was maintained in the 1990-2010 MHz band). The WARC-92
    allocation pairs 2180-2200 MHz for transmission from the satellite
    (downlink) with 1990-2010 MHz for transmission from subscribers
    (uplink).

[^125]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} AMSC Petition at 2-3, 6.

[^126]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} Comsat Petition at 2-3, 15-22; TRW
    Petition at 1-2.

[^127]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} TRW Petition at 2-6.

[^128]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} Motorola Petition at 3.

[^129]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} API Comments at 8-9; UTC Comments at 6-7.

[^130]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} MCI Comments at 6.

[^131]: ^?^ UTC observes that 63 MHz of spectrum is allocated
    domestically for MSS at 1544-1559/1645.5-1660.5 MHz and
    1610-1626.5/2483.5-2500 MHz and that 40 MHz can be used for MSS at
    1970-1990/2160-2180 MHz. [See]{.underline} UTC Comments at 6-7.

[^132]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} Sprint Comments at 5-6; Bell Atlantic
    Comments at 8-10.

[^133]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} Comsat Reply at 4-6; LQSS Reply at 1-4;
    TRW Reply at 2-5.

[^134]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} AMSTV Reply at 1-5.

[^135]: ^?^ PCIA, The Yankee Group, EMCI, and BIS Strategic Decisions
    all presented demand studies at the PCS Public Forum on April 11,
    1994 that showed significant demand for PCS services. In addition,
    also at the PCS Public Forum, Dr. Jerry Hausman pointed to stock
    market valuations for SMR companies to support his assertion that
    there will be significant demand for wireless services in the
    future.

[^136]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} [Notice of Proposed Rule Making and
    Tentative Decision]{.underline}, GEN Docket No. 90-314, ET Docket
    No. 92-100, 7 FCC Rcd 5676, 5692 (1992).

[^137]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} [Second Report and Order]{.underline} at
    && 34, 36.

[^138]: ^?^ [Id]{.underline}. at & 40.

[^139]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} Letter from Motorola to the FCC (May 25,
    1994); Letter from MSS Spectrum Coalition to the FCC (May 27, 1994).

[^140]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} [Preparation for International
    Telecommunication Union World Radio Communication
    Conferences]{.underline}, IC Docket No. 94-31, FCC 94-96, released
    May 5, 1994.

[^141]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} [Second Report and Order]{.underline} at &
    106.

[^142]: ^?^ [Id.]{.underline} at && 101, 105.

[^143]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} [Second Report and Order]{.underline} at
    && 107-108.

[^144]: ^?^ [Id.]{.underline} at && 104-110.

[^145]: ^?^ [Id.]{.underline}at & 107 and n.93.

[^146]: ^?^ Petitioners addressing eligibility and attribution issues
    include: Alliance, APC, Bell Atlantic, CCIMR, Columbia, Comcast,
    Concord, CTIA, Florida Cellular, GCI, GTE, INS, MCI, McCaw, NYNEX,
    OPASTCO, Pacific Telecom, PMN, PNSC, Radiofone, Sprint, Time Warner,
    TDS, Intelco and US West.

[^147]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} Bell Atlantic Petition at 4; McCaw
    Petition at 3; NYNEX Comments at 5-6; Radiofone Petition at 12-15;
    TDS Petition at 3; USTA Comments at 5.

[^148]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} AIDE Comments at 18; Cablevision Comments
    at 6-8; CIS Comments at 1; Concord Petition at 2; CTIA Petition at
    14; Florida Cellular Petition at 5; GCI Petition at 5-8; GTE
    Petition at 2-5; MCI Petition at 1; PCS Action Comments at 13-15;
    PNSC Petition at 9-10; Sprint Petition at 9-10; Time Warner Reply at
    6-8; U.S. West Petition at 16, 26.

[^149]: ^?^ [Id.]{.underline}

[^150]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} TDS Petition at 3; McCaw Petition at 3.

[^151]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} Transcripts of the PCS Public Forum at
    389, (April 11, 1994).

[^152]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} Bell Atlantic Petition at 4; [see
    also]{.underline} [Second Report and Order]{.underline} at && 5,
    108.

[^153]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} McCaw Petition at 3.

[^154]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} Radiofone Petition at 12-15.

[^155]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} U.S. West Petition at 16.

[^156]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} AIDE Comments at 18; Time Warner Reply at
    6-8.

[^157]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} Nextel Reply at 8-9.

[^158]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} [Further Notice of Proposed Rule
    Making]{.underline}, GN Docket No. 93-252, FCC 94-100, released May
    20, 1994.

[^159]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} [Notice of Proposed Rule
    Making]{.underline}, GEN Docket No. 90-314, 7 FCC Rcd. 5676, 5703
    n.46 (citing 47 C.F.R. \' 22.921(b)).

[^160]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} [Second Report and Order]{.underline} at &
    108.

[^161]: ^?^ [Id.]{.underline} at & 107.

[^162]: ^?^ [Id.]{.underline} at && 107, 108; Section 24.204 of the
    Commission\'s Rules.

[^163]: ^?^ [Id]{.underline}. at && 109-110.

[^164]: ^?^ [Id.]{.underline} at n.62, n.92.

[^165]: ^?^ [Id.]{.underline} at & 61.

[^166]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} 47 C.F.R. \'\' 22.902(b)(5), 73.3555, note
    (2).

[^167]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} [Second Report and Order]{.underline} at &
    107.

[^168]: ^?^ Petitioners include: Alliance, Bell Atlantic, Columbia,
    NYNEX, Pacific Telecom, PMN, CCIMR, Comcast, CTIA, GCI, PCS Action
    and Time Warner.

[^169]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} Bell Atlantic Petition at 4; GCI Comments
    at 9-11.

[^170]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} [Second Report and Order]{.underline} at &
    29.

[^171]: ^?^ [Id.]{.underline} at & 107.

[^172]: ^?^ [Id.]{.underline} at & 104.

[^173]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} CTIA Petition at iv.

[^174]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} PCS Action Comments at 16-17.

[^175]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} Alliance Petition at 7-8; Bell Atlantic
    Petition at 4-5; Columbia Petition at 6-7; NYNEX Petition at 4-5,
    13-15; Pacific Telecom Petition at 5.

[^176]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} Alliance Petition at 7; Columbia Petition
    at 6-7; CTIA Petition at 20; NYNEX Petition at 13-15; Pacific
    Telecom Petition at 5.

[^177]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} Bell Atlantic Petition at 5; NYNEX
    Petition at 4-5, 13-15.

[^178]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} CCIMR Petition at 11.

[^179]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} [Policy Statement and Order]{.underline},
    GEN Docket 90-314, 6 FCC Rcd 6601 (1991), [Notice of Proposed Rule
    Making and Tentative Decision]{.underline}, GEN Docket 90-314, 7 FCC
    Rcd 5676, 5690, 5704 (1992).

[^180]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} [Second Report and Order]{.underline} at &
    108.

[^181]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} 47 C.F.R. \' 63.54.

[^182]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} Comcast Petition at 3, 12-15.

[^183]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} 47 C.F.R. \' 73.3555, note (2). [See
    also]{.underline} Comcast Petition at 3, 12-15.

[^184]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} [e.g.]{.underline}, [Intermountain
    Microwave]{.underline}, 24 RR 983 (1963); [Cellular Control
    Notice]{.underline}, 1 FCC Rcd 3 (1986); [News International,
    PLC]{.underline}, 97 FCC 2d 349 (1984); [Loraine Journal v.
    FCC]{.underline}, 351 F.2d 824, 828 (D.C. Cir. 1965), [cert.
    denied]{.underline}, 383 U.S. 967 (1966).

[^185]: ^?^ Attribution for cellular purposes also means overlap of the
    CGSA with at least 10 percent of the population of the PCS market
    (BTA or MTA).

[^186]: ^?^ Thus, in a stock company, PCS and cellular interests of 5 or
    20 percent, respectively, of the total outstanding stock as well as
    interests of 5 or 20 percent, respectively, of the outstanding
    voting stock will be attributable.

[^187]: ^?^ We will issue a notice requesting comment on these issues as
    part of our current proceeding regarding CMRS, in GN Docket No.
    93-252.

[^188]: ^?^ [Id.]{.underline}

[^189]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} INS Petition at 12. [See also]{.underline}
    TDS Petition at 3-6.

[^190]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} OPASTCO Petition at 1-8.

[^191]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} Intelco Petition at 4-8.

[^192]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} USTA Comments at 5.

[^193]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} CUC Comments at 3.

[^194]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} RCA Reply at 1-2.

[^195]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} NRTA Reply at 1-5.

[^196]: ^?^ The Commission will provide further guidance as to what
    constitutes a small business, rural telephone company and a business
    owned by a member of a minority group or a woman

    for purposes of 47 U.S.C. \' 309(j)in a forthcoming order in PP
    Docket No. 93-253.

[^197]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} AIDE Comments at 7-9; [see
    also]{.underline} Comcast Petition at 18-19.

[^198]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} Murray Comments at 7-8.

[^199]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} Cablevision Comments at 5.

[^200]: ^?^ [See]{.underline}, [e.g.]{.underline}, [Report of the FCC
    Small Business Advisory Committee to the Federal Communications
    Commission Regarding GEN Docket 90-314]{.underline}, 8 FCC Rcd
    7826-28 (1993); [Second Report and Order,]{.underline} PP Docket No.
    93-253, FCC 94-61, released April 20, 1994.

[^201]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} Cablevision Comments at 5.

[^202]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} Bell Atlantic Comments at 4.

[^203]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} PMN Comments at 7.

[^204]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} [Second Report and Order]{.underline} at
    && 101, 105, 108.

[^205]: ^?^ [Id.]{.underline} at && 104, 108.

[^206]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} Florida Cellular Petition at 5.

[^207]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} PNSC Petition at 9-10.

[^208]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} CTIA Petition at 20.

[^209]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} Radiofone Petition at 12-15.

[^210]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} Cablevision Comments at 6-7.

[^211]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} AIDE Comments at 18-20.

[^212]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} CIS Comments at 4-5.

[^213]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} PCS Action Comments at 13-15.

[^214]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} Time Warner Reply at 6.

[^215]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} Concord Petition at 2.

[^216]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} MCI Petition at 1-5.

[^217]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} GCI Petition at 5-8.

[^218]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} NYNEX Comments at 5-6.

[^219]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} PacBell Comments at 9-10.

[^220]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} GTE Petition at 2-5.

[^221]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} Sprint Petition at 9-10.

[^222]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} McCaw Petition at 5-6.

[^223]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} Ameritech Reply at 1-2; Bell Atlantic
    Reply at 8-9; Cablevision Comments at 7-8; Comcast Petition at
    16-17; CTIA Comments at 14; GTE Comments at 8-9; Sprint Reply at

    4-7; TDS Comments at 10; US West Reply at 1-2.

[^224]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} APC Reply at 10-11; PCS Action Comments at
    15-16; Time Warner Reply at

    6-8.

[^225]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} Letter from APC to the FCC at 2 (May 31,
    1994); Letter from PCS Action to the FCC at 2 (May 27, 1994).

[^226]: ^?^ The Commission shortly will adopt competitive bidding rules
    applicable to broadband PCS. [See]{.underline} [Second Report and
    Order]{.underline}, PP Docket No. 93-253, FCC 94-61, released April
    20, 1994.

[^227]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} [Second Report and Order]{.underline} at
    && 132-134.

[^228]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} PacBell Petition at 5. [See]{.underline}
    [also]{.underline} UTC Petition at 6.

[^229]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} PCIA Petition at 6.

[^230]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} Mebtel Petition at 3; RCA Petition at 1-2.

[^231]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} Mebtel Petition at 3.

[^232]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} Alliance Petition at 6; Columbia Petition
    at 5; Intelco Petition at 4-7; PCIA Petition at 6.

[^233]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} RCA Petition at 6-7.

[^234]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} Alliance Petition at 6; Columbia Petition
    at 5.

[^235]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} Columbia Petition at 5.

[^236]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} PNSC Petition at 10; Southwestern Bell
    Petition at 2-7.

[^237]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} Sprint Petition at 14.

[^238]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} BellSouth Petition at iii.

[^239]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} Motorola Petition at 5-6.

[^240]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} GCI Comments at 13; NYNEX Comments at 8-9.

[^241]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} Northern Telecom Reply at 6-9.

[^242]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} CUC Comments at 7.

[^243]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} AIDE Comments at 5.

[^244]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} PacBell Comments at 8.

[^245]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} MCI Comments at 17.

[^246]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} US West Reply at 7-9.

[^247]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} 47 U.S.C. \' 309(i)(4)(B), as amended by
    the Reconciliation Act.

[^248]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} GCI Comments at 13; NYNEX Comments at 8-9.

[^249]: ^?^ The construction requirements for narrowband PCS are set
    forth in [Memorandum Opinion and Order]{.underline}, GEN Docket No.
    90-314 and ET Docket No. 92-100, 9 FCC Rcd 1309, 1313-1314, && 27-34
    (1994), [recon]{.underline}. [pending]{.underline}.

[^250]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} [Second Report and Order]{.underline} at
    && 133-134.

[^251]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} [WAIT Radio v. FCC]{.underline}, 418 F.2d
    1153 (D.C. Cir. 1969).

[^252]: ^?^ We will also allow the licensee to use, if they choose to do
    so, the 2000 census to determine the 10-year construction
    requirement, rather than the 1990 census specified in the [Second
    Report and Order]{.underline}. This change ensures that licensees
    will not be required to meet benchmarks based on obsolete data.

[^253]: ^?^ Texas Emergency also requests that we adopt a uniform
    standard for enhanced emergency 911 services. These matters are
    addressed in Section VI.E.

[^254]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} NCS Petition at 2.

[^255]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} Motorola Petition at 3.

[^256]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} TIA Petition at 3.

[^257]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} APC Comments at 15-17; GTE Comments at
    13-14; Northern Telecom Comments at 6-9.

[^258]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} MCI Comments at 21-22; Nextel Comments at
    15-16.

[^259]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} [Second Report and Order]{.underline} at
    && 135-138.

[^260]: ^?^ We will be conducting a comprehensive review of the CMRS
    market on an annual basis. [See]{.underline} [CMRS Second Report and
    Order]{.underline}. In that context we may review PCS
    interoperability and standardization issues.

[^261]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} Section 24.231 of the Commission\'s Rules.
    Antenna heights up to 2000 meters are permitted with a corresponding
    reduction in power.

[^262]: ^?^ Many of the petitioners request the power be increased to
    1000 watts e.r.p., which is equivalent to 1640 watts e.i.r.p. By
    comparison, the cellular rules permit the power of a base station to
    be up to 500 watts e.r.p. [See]{.underline} 47 C.F.R. \' 22.904.
    Equivalent isotropically radiated power is the product of the power
    supplied to the antenna and the antenna gain in a given direction
    relative to an isotropic antenna. Effective radiated power is the
    product of the power supplied to the antenna and its gain relative
    to a half-wave dipole in a given direction. [See]{.underline} 47
    C.F.R. \' 2.1.

[^263]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} Time Warner Petition at 13; PacBell
    Petition at 13.

[^264]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} PacBell Petition at 3; Northern Telecom
    Petition at 5.

[^265]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} Ameritech Petition at 2; MCI Petition at
    2; Sprint Petition at 15; US West Petition at 12-13.

[^266]: ^?^ Increasing the separation between individuals and the
    antenna, using high gain antennas at the base station, and other
    techniques can be used to meet limits on human RF exposure.
    [See]{.underline} APC Petition at 6-7; Northern Telecom Petition at
    5; PacBell Petition at 4.

[^267]: ^?^ A power of 20 watts e.i.r.p. is equivalent to 12 watts
    e.r.p.

[^268]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} MCI Petition at 7-8; PCIA Petition at 8.

[^269]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} APC Comments at 20-21; Bell Atlantic
    Comments at 14; CUC Comments at 12; GCI Comments at 2-3; MCI
    Comments at 18-19; Murray Comments at 6; Northern Telecom Comments
    at 3-6; Omnipoint Comments at 4, 13; and PacBell Comments at 1-3.

[^270]: ^?^ DCS 1800, which operates in the 1800 MHz region of the
    spectrum, is an extension of the pan-European digital cellular
    standard, \"Global System for Mobile Communications\" (GSM).

[^271]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} AT&T Reply at 6.

[^272]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} Apple Comments at 4-5; Rolm Reply at 2.

[^273]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} Nextel Comments at 15.

[^274]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} [e.g.]{.underline}, TDS Supplemental
    Comments at 1-2; UTC Comments at 14-16.

[^275]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} API Comments at 4.

[^276]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} [Second Report and Order]{.underline} at &
    141.

[^277]: ^?^ [Cf]{.underline}. 47 C.F.R. \' 94.63. We also stated that,
    as under Part 94 of our rules, other acceptable industry-developed
    interference procedures, such as those developed by the EIA, the
    Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) and the
    ANSI, may be used in performing interference analyses.
    [See]{.underline} Section 24.237(d) of the Commission\'s Rules.

[^278]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} [Second Report and Order]{.underline} at &
    141-145, 163-174.

[^279]: ^?^ The procedure for calculating the level of PCS signals at
    microwave receivers requires that the PCS licensee compute the sum
    of the transmitters\' powers from proposed PCS base stations and all
    portable and mobiles associated with the base stations at each
    microwave receiver within the coordination distance of the base
    stations. [See]{.underline} [Second Report and Order]{.underline},
    Appendix D.

[^280]: ^?^ The parties requesting reconsideration of these matters
    include: Alcatel, APC, API, Ameritech, Bell Atlantic, Blooston,
    Motorola, TIA, PCIA and UTC.

[^281]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} Alcatel Petition at 4-5; APC Petition at
    8; API Petition at 6; Ameritech Petition at 2-3; Motorola Petition
    at 6-7; TIA Petition at 6-11; PCIA Petition 7, 10-12.

[^282]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} Alcatel Petition at 5-6; APC Petition at
    11; TIA Petition at 10-11.

[^283]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} [Second Report and Order]{.underline} at
    Appendix D.

[^284]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} Motorola Petition at 7; TIA Petition at
    11; PCIA Petition at 12.

[^285]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} Bell Atlantic Petition at 22. Microwave
    systems are typically designed with additional power or signal
    strength, called margin, to provide for attenuation of the signal
    due to changes in propagation or weather conditions that may occur.

[^286]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} UTC Petition at 16-17. These procedures
    are set forth at 47 C.F.R. \' 22.100.

[^287]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} API Petition at 7.

[^288]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} API Petition at 8.

[^289]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} Blooston Petition at 2.

[^290]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} Alcatel Comments at 2-4; APC Comments at
    22; API Comments at 3; AAR Comments at 3-4; TIA-NED Comments at 2-6;
    MCI Comments at 19-20; TDS Supplemental Comments at 3; PacBell
    Comments at 3-4; PCIA Comments at 9.

[^291]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} AAR Comments at 4; Alcatel Comments at 3;
    API Comments at 3-4.

[^292]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} API Petition at 2-4.

[^293]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} Alcatel Reply at 3-4.

[^294]: ^?^ TSB10-F was adopted on May 31, 1994; TIA Telecommunications
    Systems Bulletin Number 10-F, [Interference Criteria for Microwave
    Systems]{.underline}, May 1994, (TSB10-F). On June 1, 1994, TIA
    submitted a Supplement to Petition for Reconsideration to report
    that TSB10-F is now a standard adopted by an ANSI-accepted body.

[^295]: ^?^ While we continue to believe the procedures adopted in the
    [Second Report and Order]{.underline} are accurate and reliable,
    parties may use other methods such as TSB10-F as alternative
    methods. As indicated in the [Second Report and Order]{.underline},
    if both the PCS entity and the incumbent microwave entity agree to
    an alternative criteria for interference protection, then that
    criterion may be used. [See]{.underline} [Second Report and
    Order]{.underline} at n.118. We continue to believe that this
    flexibility is desirable, in light of the varied technologies that
    may be used for PCS.

[^296]: ^?^ We note that we recently adopted Part 21 coordination
    procedures in the Emerging Technologies proceeding for 2 GHz
    microwave facilities that will be relocated to higher bands.
    [See]{.underline} [Second Report and Order]{.underline}, ET Docket
    No. 92-9, at & 60.

[^297]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} Section 24.234 of the Commission\'s Rules.

[^298]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} [Second Report and Order]{.underline} at &
    141.

[^299]: ^?^ Spurious emission is defined as an emission on a frequency
    or frequencies which are outside the necessary bandwidth and the
    level of which may be reduced without affecting the corresponding
    transmission of information. Spurious emissions include harmonic
    emissions, parasitic emissions, intermodulation products and
    frequency conversion products, but exclude out-of-band emissions.
    [See]{.underline} 47 C.F.R. \' 2.1. [See also]{.underline} Section
    24.234 of the Commission\'s Rules.

[^300]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} Section 24.235 of the Commission\'s Rules.

[^301]: ^?^ PCIA recommends a bandwidth of 1.0 percent of the emission
    bandwidth. [See]{.underline} PCIA Petition at 3-4; Motorola Petition
    at 10.

[^302]: ^?^ PCIA also points out that Section 24.234(a) should be
    corrected to indicate that the symbol \"P\" refers to \"watts.\"
    [See]{.underline} PCIA Petition at 4.

[^303]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} APC Comments at 23; Ericsson Reply at 2-4;
    Northern Telecom Comments at 10-11.

[^304]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} Apple Comments at 4-5; Ericsson Reply at
    3.

[^305]: ^?^ Measurements with a narrower resolution bandwidth would
    result in lower values for the measured spurious emissions and
    increase the potential for harmful interference.

[^306]: ^?^ There are a few exceptions to this criteria for some of the
    narrowband licensed services, such as the cellular service.
    [See]{.underline} 47 C.F.R. \' 22.907(j).

[^307]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} 47 C.F.R. \' 2.995.

[^308]: ^?^ In the existing 911 system, automatic location
    identification is easily accomplished because the location is known
    of each telephone in the wired telephone network. Location
    information is not so easily determined in a wireless network
    because the caller can be located anywhere in the network\'s service
    area. In such networks, however, a caller\'s location can be
    approximated by determining which of the network\'s radio
    transmitters is communicating with the caller. In the existing
    cellular system such approximations typically could be accurate only
    to within a few square miles.

[^309]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} [Second Report and Order]{.underline} at &
    139.

[^310]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} Apple Petition, [passim]{.underline}.
    Apple\'s petition was filed three days before the sunshine cut-off
    date for the filing of [ex]{.underline} [parte]{.underline}
    presentations comments in this proceeding. To allow full comment and
    consideration of the issues raised by Apple, on October 22, 1993,
    the Commission requested public comment on Apple\'s petition. In its
    petition, Apple requested that the more lightly encumbered 1910-1930
    MHz band be allocated for the exclusive use of nomadic data PCS
    devices and certain nomadic voice devices, including consumer
    cordless telephones. Apple also requested that an additional 20 MHz
    of spectrum be allocated adjacent to the 1910-1930 MHz band for the
    use of devices that can be coordinated. It further requested that
    two or more additional 10 MHz bands in the 1850-1990 MHz band be
    reserved for at least five years to accommodate retuned microwave
    incumbents from the licensed and unlicensed PCS bands. In subsequent
    comments, Apple stated that certain of its initial concerns were
    rendered moot by the Commission\'s decision in the [Second Report
    and Order]{.underline}, and its only remaining concern was that the
    1910 to 1930 MHz band be allocated for data or asynchronous devices.

[^311]: ^?^ [Id]{.underline}. Apple also suggests that due to the
    potential for adjacent channel interference, nomadic devices may be
    required to observe 4 MHz guard bands. It states that this will
    effectively limit the 10 MHz of easily cleared spectrum available
    under the Commission\'s plan to 2 MHz. Apple states that under its
    plan unlicensed data PCS devices would be given the entire lightly
    loaded 20 MHz, and therefore would have up to 12 MHz of usable
    spectrum by employing two 4 MHz guard bands.

[^312]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} APC Comments at 5-7; AT&T Reply at 4; HP
    Comments at 3; Motorola Reply at 3; Northern Telecom Comments at
    3-4; PacBell Reply at 2.

[^313]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} UTAM Comments at 10-11.

[^314]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} BSA Comments at 5-9; Compaq Comments at 5.

[^315]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} Ericsson Reply at 3-4; Rolm Reply at 1;
    SpectraLink Comments at 3-4.

[^316]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} [Second Report and Order]{.underline} at &
    88.

[^317]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} Apple Petition at 3.

[^318]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} Apple Petition at 3.

[^319]: ^?^ Section 15.311 of the rules requires that unlicensed PCS
    devices, in addition to the general Part 15 labeling requirements,
    include a prominently located label with the statement that
    installation of the equipment is subject to notification and
    coordination with UTAM. [See]{.underline} Section 15.311 of the
    Commission\'s Rules.

[^320]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} UTC Petition at 12. Section 15.303(b)
    states that a coordinatable PCS device is a PCS device whose
    geographical area of operation is sufficiently controlled either by
    necessity of operation with a fixed infrastructure or by disabling
    mechanisms to allow adequate coordination of its location relative
    to incumbent fixed microwave facilities. [See]{.underline} Section
    15.303(b) of the Commission\'s Rules.

[^321]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} UTAM Petition at 3-4.

[^322]: ^?^ [Cf.]{.underline} Section 15.307(c) of the Commission\'s
    Rules: \"An application for certification of a PCS device that is
    deemed by UTAM, Inc., to be noncoordinatable will not be accepted
    until the Commission announces that a need for coordination no
    longer exists.\"

[^323]: ^?^ Section 15.307(d) requires that a coordinatable PCS device
    include measures to assure that it cannot be activated until its
    installation at an authorized location is verified by UTAM.
    [See]{.underline} Section 15.307(d) of the Commission\'s Rules.

[^324]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} Ericsson Petition at 15. [See]{.underline}
    Section 15.307(d),(e) of the Commission\'s Rules.

[^325]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} AT&T Petition at 2.

[^326]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} AAR Petition at 7; Microsoft Comments at
    1; Rolm Reply at 2.

[^327]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} Motorola Reply at 2; Northern Telecom
    Comments at 17.

[^328]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} UTC Comments at 10.

[^329]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} Apple Comments at 6.

[^330]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} AAR Comments at 7-8.

[^331]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} Ericsson Comments at 13.

[^332]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} Northern Telecom Comments at 16.

[^333]: ^?^ Section 15.307(b) requires UTAM to submit an affidavit with
    each equipment application, certifying that the applicant is a
    participating member of UTAM. [See]{.underline} Section 15.307(b) of
    the Commission\'s Rules.

[^334]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} Sections 15.321, 15.323 of the
    Commission\'s Rules.

[^335]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} Motorola Petition at 11.

[^336]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} Ericsson Petition, Appendix I at 5;
    Rockwell Petition at 3; Lace Petition at 3.

[^337]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} Apple Petition at 7.

[^338]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} AT&T Petition, Attachment B at 6; Northern
    Telecom Petition at 23; WINForum Petition at 6. The rules currently
    specify that the peak transmit power of unlicensed PCS devices shall
    not exceed 100 microwatts multiplied by the square-root of the
    emission bandwidth in hertz. [See]{.underline} Section 15.319(c)of
    the Commission\'s Rules.

[^339]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} PCIA Petition at 19, Rockwell Petition at
    5. [See]{.underline} Section 15.321(e) of the Commission\'s Rules.

[^340]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} Apple Petition at 5; Ericsson Petition at
    2; Metricom Petition at 3, 5; Rockwell Petition at 7; SpectraLink
    Petition at 9.

[^341]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} Sections 15.321(b), 15.323(b) of the
    Commission\'s Rules.

[^342]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} AT&T Petition, Attachment B at 14 and 18;
    Apple Petition at 7; Ericsson Petition at 12.

[^343]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} Sections 15.321(c)(6),(8) of the
    Commission\'s Rules.

[^344]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} AT&T Petition, Attachment B at 11;
    Ericsson Petition at 14; Motorola Petition at 14.

[^345]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} Section 15.319(c)(4) of the Commission\'s
    Rules.

[^346]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} AT&T Petition, Attachment B at 12;
    Northern Telecom Petition at 24; Motorola Petition at 14;
    SpectraLink Petition at 8.

[^347]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} AT&T Petition, Attachment B at 14;
    Ericsson Petition at 1; Motorola Petition at 15; Northern Telecom
    Petition at 25.

[^348]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} Sections 15.321(c), 15.323(c) of the
    Commission\'s Rules.

[^349]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} Northern Telecom Petition at 24.

[^350]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} Sections 15.321(c), 15.323(c) of the
    Commission\'s Rules.

[^351]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} Ericsson Petition at 3; Northern Telecom
    Petition at 26. The rules require that the frequency stability of
    the carrier frequency of unlicensed PCS devices be maintained within
    10 parts-per-million (ppm) over a temperature variation of -30^o^ C
    to +50^o^ C, and power supply voltage variations of 15 percent.
    [See]{.underline} Sections 15.321(f), 15.323(f) of the Commission\'s
    Rules.

[^352]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} Ericsson Petition at 8; WINForum Petition
    at 5.

[^353]: ^?^ The rules currently require that emissions between the
    channel edges and 1.25 MHz above or below the channel be attenuated
    40 dB below the reference power level of 112 milliwatts.
    [See]{.underline} Sections 15.321(d) and 15.323(d) of the
    Commission\'s Rules.

[^354]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} Metricom Petition at 3, Section 15.247 of
    the Commission\'s Rules.

[^355]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} Metricom [Ex]{.underline}
    [parte]{.underline} presentation (May 25, 1994).

[^356]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} WINForum Comments at 3; Northern Telecom
    Comments at 12.

[^357]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} Omnipoint Comments at 7; Rolm Comments at
    1.

[^358]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} Ericsson Comments at 8.

[^359]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} Motorola Reply at 7; Northern Telecom
    Comments at 14; SpectraLink Comments at 2.

[^360]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} Rolm Comments at 2.

[^361]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} Omnipoint Comments at 9.

[^362]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} Ericsson Comments at 12; SpectraLink
    Comments at 3; Omnipoint Comments at 11.

[^363]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} Motorola Reply at 4.

[^364]: ^?^ The Part 15 rules require that the operating frequency of
    certain unlicensed devices be maintained within 0.01 percent (or
    100 ppm) of the device\'s operating frequency over a temperature
    range of ‑20^o^ C to +50^o^ C at normal supply voltage, and for
    variation in the primary voltage of 15 percent at a temperature of
    +20^o^ C. [See]{.underline} [e.g.]{.underline}, Sections 15.231,
    15.233 of the Commission\'s Rules.

[^365]: ^?^ The Commission stated that these standards will apply to PCS
    operations pending completion of its complete review of standards
    for RF exposure. [See]{.underline} [Notice of Proposed Rule
    Making]{.underline}, ET Docket No. 93-62, 8 FCC Rcd 2849 (1993). The
    Commission further indicated that any RF exposure standards adopted
    in the instant proceeding that do not conform with the final rules
    adopted later in ET Docket No. 93-62 will be modified as
    appropriate.

[^366]: ^?^ The Commission also indicated that it had requested a formal
    interpretation from the IEEE as to whether the formula for
    determining the power threshold for the exclusion from the standards
    can be extrapolated up to 2200 MHz. [See]{.underline} Letter from
    Thomas P. Stanley to Andrew G. Salem, IEEE Standards Board (June 2,
    1993). This provision exempts a device from the SAR testing
    requirements, if the device operates with power output below a
    certain threshold level. Extrapolating the formula for this
    threshold up to 2200 MHz would allow PCS transmitters to operate
    with about 330 milliwatts of power.

[^367]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} ANSI/IEEE C95.1-1992, Section 2
    (Definitions and Glossary of Terms).

[^368]: ^?^ [See]{.underline} Letter to Thomas P. Stanley from Eleanor
    R. Adair, Co-Chairman, SC-4, Standards Coordinating Committee 28,
    IEEE (October 11, 1993).

[^369]: ^?^ The methodology for SAR testing is described in numerous
    technical publications. [See]{.underline} [e.g.]{.underline}, IEEE
    Recommended Practice for the Measurement of Potentially Hazardous
    Electromagnetic Fields - RF and Microwave, IEEE C95.3-1991, at \'\'
    4.6, 4.7 and Appendix C. [See also]{.underline} reference list in
    same publication. Copies of this document can be purchased from the
    IEEE, at telephone number (800) 678-IEEE. A copy may also be
    inspected at the FCC\'s Office of Engineering and Technology,
    Spectrum Engineering Division, (202) 653-8169.