EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT INSTITUTE Instructor Guide

July, 1998

**THE POLITICAL AND POLICY**

**BASIS OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT**

**Prepared by**

**Richard T. Sylves**

**Department of Political Science**

**University of Delaware**

**Newark DE 19716**

*The views and opinions expressed herein are those of the course
developer and do not necessarily reflect the views and opinions of the
Federal Emergency Management Agency.*

FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY

**CONTENTS**

[Session Session Title Page]{.underline}

Preface 5

Rationale 8

Session 1: Course Orientation 9

Session 2. The American Political System and Disasters 19

Session 3: American Hazards and Disaster Agents 30

Session 4: The Fundamentals of Emergency Management 41

Session 5: Executive Political Issues and Disasters 51

Session 6: Legislative Political Issues and Disasters 63

Session 7: Disaster Laws 76

Session 8: Disaster Budgeting 90

Session 9: The Federal Organization and Policy 105

Session 10: State Political and Organizational Issues 124

Session 11: Local Political and Organizational Issues 138

Session 12: Intergovernmental Relations 154

Session 13: Exam One 169

Session 14: The Public, Interest Groups, and Disasters 173

Session 15: Non-Profit Organizations 186

Session 16: The American Fire Community 203

Session 17: The Media 211

Session 18: Natural Disasters: Earthquakes 223

Session 19: Natural Disasters: Hurricanes 234

Session 20: Natural Disasters: Floods 244

Session 21: Natural Disasters: Tornadoes and Severe Storms 258

Session 22: Exam Two 266

Session 23: Technological Disasters: Nuclear Power 269

Session 24: Technological Disasters: Structural Collapse and Failure 283

Session 25: Wildfire Disasters 295

Session 26: Hazardous Materials Emergency Management 302

Session 27: Big City Emergency Management 318

Session 28: Professionalization of All Hazards Emergency Management 332

Session 29: International Disasters: The Internationalization of
American

> Emergency Management 348

Session 30: Course Conclusions 364

Session 31: Exam Three 375

Appendix A: Politics and Disasters: Opening Day Survey 377

Appendix B: All Type Disaster Declarations: APPROVALS and TURNDOWNS

> by Presidential Administration 1953 - 1994 382

Appendix C: White House Organization 383

Appendix D: Congressional Committees and FEMA 384

Appendix E: Anderson Policy Chapter Synopses 390

Appendix F: Key Word List of Disaster, Hazard, and

> Emergency Management Terms 413

Appendix G: Foreign Disaster Assistance Case Study 437

Appendix H: Bibliography of Helpful Sources 494

**PREFACE**

The Instructor Guide (IG) entitled *The Political and Policy Basis of
Emergency Management* is a resource for professors who are planning a
course for college or university students. The recommended topics and
reading assignments are appropriate for juniors or seniors who are
majoring or minoring in emergency management, a related field (political
science or public administration), or who are enrolled in an emergency
management certificate program. This course may be offered within an
emergency management, political science, public administration, or
related department. It may also serve as a vehicle for pre-professional
or professional development for those interested in emergency management
generally.

This course considers the political and policy environment in which
emergency management is practiced. Rather than concentrate on general
aspects of human behavior or sociological theory, as might be found in
the IG, *The Social Dimensions of Disaster*, by Thomas Drabek, Ph.D.
(1996), this course is based squarely within the realm of
government---most particularly, American government. This IG would be of
help to professors who are planning a course to be offered within a
political science department for undergraduate students majoring in one
of the social sciences. It would also serve professors and students
working in the field of public administration or public policy. The
theoretical and methodological emphases are consistent with courses
typically offered within Departments of Political Science and/or Public
Administration.

An extensive bibliography is contained in the appendices of this IG. It
parallels (although it is not identical to) the bibliography contained
in *Disaster Management in the U.S. and Canada: The Politics,
Policymaking, Administration and Analysis of Emergency Management* by
Richard T. Sylves and William L. Waugh, Jr. in 1996.

This IG was developed within the context of the Higher Education Project
of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the purpose of which
is to encourage and support the spread of emergency management-related
education in colleges and universities across the United States. It is
hoped that in the future more and more emergency managers in government,
as well as in business, industry, and voluntary organizations, will come
to their jobs having successfully completed one or more courses
encompassing disaster, hazard, and emergency management topics. Better
yet would be the proliferation of majors, minors, and certificate
programs in emergency management that would be open to the next
generation.

Approximately twenty courses have been identified for potential future
development---so as to comprise a core set of instructional materials
for an emergency management curriculum. Expectations are that these
courses will be developed over the period 1996 to 2000 at the rate of
four or five a year.

Course titles are:

**Aim and Scope of Emergency Management**

**Business and Industry Crisis Management**

**Citizen and Community Disaster Preparedness**

**Disaster Response Operations and Management**

**Earthquake Hazard Management and Operations**

**Economics of Hazards and Disasters**

**Emergency Management for the Fire Community**

**Emergency Management Skills and Principles**

**Ethics in Disaster and Emergency Management**

**Hazardous Materials Management**

**Living in a Hazardous Environment**

**Political and Policy Basis of Emergency Management**

**Principles and Processes of Disaster Preparedness and Planning**

**Principles and Processes of Disaster Relief and Recovery**

**Principles and Processes of Hazard Mitigation**

**Public Administration and Emergency Management**

**Research Methods and Emergency Management**

**Social Dimensions of Disaster**

**Sociology of Disaster**

**Technology and Emergency Management**

**Terrorism and Emergency Management**

As they become available these courses will be accessible electronically
via the Internet. To check on course availability and (if available) to
review or download a copy, use the following universal resource location
(URL):

http://www.fema.gov/EMI/edu/higher.htm

For additional information regarding the FEMA Higher Education Project,
contact:

> **B. Wayne Blanchard, PhD. CEM**
>
> **Education Program Manager**
>
> **Emergency Management Institute**
>
> **National Emergency Training Center**
>
> **Federal Emergency Management Agency**
>
> **16825 S. Seton Ave., Building N**
>
> **Emmitsburg, MD 21727**
>
> **(301) 447-1262/FAX (301) 447-1589**
>
> **email: wayne.blanchard@fema.gov**

**Learning Resource Center (LRC)**

**Emergency Management Institute**

**Emmitsburg, Maryland**

The LRC provides current information and resources in the fire, EMS and
emergency management fields. With its collection of more than 50,000
books, reports, journals, and audiovisual materials, the LRC routinely
answers simple requests, e.g., for an organization's telephone number
and address. In response to more complex inquiries on specific subjects,
the LRC will do literature searches, compile bibliographies, and
(depending on length and copyright restrictions) provide documentation
in the form of reports and articles. Only FEMA personnel and NETC
students may borrow materials from the LRC. However, via Interlibrary
Loan through local area libraries, the public can borrow material from
the LRC's collection of books, research reports and journal articles.
Audiovisuals, entire journals, and general reference materials are
non-circulating. In addition, the LRC's catalog is now available for
searching on the Internet at:

> http://www.lrc.fema.gov

For further information, or to request a literature search on a topic,
please contact the LRC at (800) 638-1821 or (301) 447-1030. You can also
e-mail to the LRC at:

> netclrc@fema.gov

**Rationale**

As Americans, we have the privilege of living in a representative
democracy. Our form of government affords individuals certain
"inalienable" rights and our Government is accountable to the people.
When disasters and emergencies occur in the United States, our
Government responds. It is a basic tenet of political legitimacy that
democratic governments must respond to public needs. Elected
representatives, in particular, take it upon themselves to set forth and
mobilize governmental programs, policies, and resources on behalf of
disaster victims.

The Presidential Declaration process justifiably affords the President
considerable latitude in responding to any Governor's request for a
Federal declaration of a major disaster or emergency, regardless of the
nature of the incident. Governors themselves have powers to proclaim
State disasters and emergencies, and many mayors, city managers, and
county executives have the authority to declare local emergencies. This
executive authority is "political" in the most positive sense of the
term and reflects the responsibilities that these officials assume as
public servants.

Similarly, National, State, and local legislators are both
"statespeople" and "delegates." As statesmen and stateswomen, they are
expected to act in a manner which protects and serves the Nation as a
whole. They must consider the National impact of disasters and
emergencies and do their best to equitably promote and re-establish
damaged or vulnerable National interests and resources. Legislators, as
delegates, represent specific sub-areas of the Nation: States,
Congressional districts, State Senate or State representative districts,
municipal wards or councilmanic districts. They have a special
obligation to protect, serve, and advance the interests of their
constituents, especially in the aftermath of disaster.

The politics, policies, and laws of American disaster management are
fascinating and important, but neither well understood nor broadly
investigated. This course, *The Political and Policy Basis of Emergency
Management,* addresses in a fundamental way the political dynamics of
American disaster management. It relates elemental concepts of the
political system to the special challenges posed by disasters and
emergencies. It aims to provide students with the tools to better
understand, interpret, and analyze governmental decisionmaking before,
during and after disasters.

**Session No. 1**

**Course:** The Political and Policy Basis of Emergency Management

**Session:** Course Orientation **Time:** 1 Hour

**Objectives:**

> Some might ask:

-   Why the politics of disaster?

-   What do politics have to do with emergency management?

-   Are there concepts of representative democracy underpinning how the
    American Government (at all levels) fashions disaster policy?

-   How do disasters produce political impacts?

-   What role do elected leaders play in all phases of emergency
    management?

> Related questions might include:

-   Why do government officials care about disaster?

-   How do governments prepare for and respond to disaster?

-   How is disaster policy the same (or different from) housing policy?

-   How is it different from transportation policy or environmental
    policy?

-   Are there academic studies of the politics of disaster?

-   What did they prove?

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-   How do governments decide on matters of disaster mitigation and
    recovery?

-   Who decides how these activities and obligations will be paid for?

-   How do the President and the Congress contribute to disaster
    policymaking and implementation?

-   How about Governors and State legislatures or municipal executives
    and local legislatures?

-   Why do American governmental leaders care about disasters that occur
    outside the United States?

> A central objective of this course is to develop answers to these
> questions through lectures, question and answer periods, class
> discussion, and student presentations.

**Purpose**

> The purpose of this course is two-fold: to introduce concepts and
> basic descriptive information about the political system within the
> context of disaster policy and to demonstrate how political factors
> play a role in all phases of emergency management---regardless of the
> type or nature of the disaster event.
>
> To achieve these goals the course provides practical information drawn
> from disaster policy studies and case studies. This information is
> (wherever possible) reviewed for findings that can be generalized,
> that is, for lessons that are applicable to future disasters and
> emergencies.
>
> The course begins by defining what disasters actually are, how they
> pose a "problem," (in particular a "public problem"), and how the
> political system addresses the problem. Students are introduced to the
> "policy process" and are provided policy analytical tools that they
> can use to examine cases and incidents. Early portions of the course
> will also refresh the students' knowledge of the American governmental
> system, political history, Federalism, and intergovernmental
> relations. Also reviewed are collective aggregate interests, public
> opinion, interest groups, political parties, voter choice, the
> Presidency, instruments of political leadership, Congress and the
> legislative process, and executive functions.
>
> The course serves the dual purpose of contributing to the professional
> evolution of the field of emergency management and complementing
> academic programs by serving as a worthwhile course in political
> science, public policy, and public affairs departments and in degree
> or certificate programs. The course also may serve as a launching
> point for instructor-devised advanced courses that are aimed at
> pursuing, in more detail and with more rigor, some of the subjects
> addressed in this guide. The course may also help those who would like
> to integrate spatial political data with the geographic information
> system analysis of disaster data.
>
> Another course purpose is to promote educational and professional
> development. The instructor-student interchange is a two-way street
> and the ideas conveyed through the course are intended to elicit
> constructive criticism and the creation of knowledge. NO part of this
> course endorses or promotes a political ideology (liberal,
> conservative, or otherwise) and NO part of this guide advances
> political or partisan causes, although such topics may enter into
> class discussions spontaneously or subject to instructor guidance. The
> course also avoids being judgmental regarding the behavior of any
> specific political figure(s).

**Scope**

> Students might ask themselves:

-   Why disaster policy?

-   What is emergency management?

-   What's important about disaster policy?

-   What is a "disaster"?

-   Can I get a job if I know this stuff? Doing what?

-   Why do government leaders care about disaster?

-   Which levels of government prepare for and respond to disaster?

-   Can governments avert disasters or make them less destructive?

-   Who pays for disaster response and recovery?

-   Why should the Nation care about a disaster that only affects a tiny
    fraction of the land area of the country?

-   Are major disasters increasing or decreasing in frequency?

-   How is the international community organizing to address disasters?

> "Lotsa" questions!
>
> This instructor guide offers some tools, avenues, readings, charts,
> ideas, and methods that the instructor may use to help the class
> explore and answer these questions. Two fundamental points may be
> made.
>
> First, **since 1989 the United States has experienced a sizable
> increase in the number and expense of its natural disasters**.
> Hurricane Andrew in 1992 and the Northridge California earthquake of
> 1994 were the Nation's most expensive disasters to date. Add to that
> the EXXON Valdez oil spill in 1989, the Murrah Federal Office Building
> bombing in Oklahoma City in April, 1995, the New York Twin Towers
> disaster two years before that, the great Midwestern floods of 1993,
> and a host of other calamities---and public attention is achieved. As
> recently as September 1996, a category 3 hurricane, named Fran,
> battered the North Carolina coast and produced massive inland flooding
> across Virginia, West Virginia, and Maryland, producing an estimated
> \$1 billion or more in losses.
>
> Second, **since the end of the half-century long Cold War between the
> United States and the Soviet Union, many governments, treaty
> organizations (previously based on defense), and the United Nations
> have come to attach more importance to the humanitarian role of the
> international community in addressing people's needs in the aftermath
> of a disaster**. Sometimes disasters stem from nation-to-nation wars,
> civil wars, or "domestic strife." Bosnia, Somalia, Rwanda, Angola,
> Liberia, and other countries have suffered, or are suffering, forms of
> disaster attendant to war. However, most disasters stem from the
> forces of nature. Sadly, Bangladesh seems to suffer recurring flood
> and cyclone disasters which kill tens of thousands of people.
>
> Consider earthquakes. The "Series Earthquake," which took place at the
> start of a World Series baseball game in San Francisco in 1989, killed
> about 65 people; not long after, a quake of comparable magnitude in
> Soviet Armenia killed 25,000 people. The last truly catastrophic
> earthquake in China killed over 200,000 people. Japan's Kobe
> earthquake in 1995 killed over 5000 people and demonstrated that even
> developed, affluent countries suffer major disasters and often need
> outside help. The domestic and international proliferation of
> catastrophes has given emergency management and disaster policy higher
> profiles on the world stage.
>
> Beyond this, disasters are immensely newsworthy and are seemingly
> ideal objects of television news coverage. Disasters pose political
> and administrative challenges for governmental leaders. The media and
> politics intertwine many aspects of disaster management.
>
> Disasters and emergencies involve many questions:

-   Why and how did the disaster or emergency occur?

-   Were government officials adequately prepared?

-   Was the public satisfactorily forewarned?

-   How did authorities respond before, during, and after the disaster
    event?

-   Could loss of life and property have been better averted?

-   Whose fault is it, legally, if various forms of disaster loss and
    damage could have been averted beforehand, but were not?

-   Is it possible to prevent a recurrence?

-   Is it possible to mitigate (reduce or alleviate) the scale of loss
    in the next comparable disaster?

-   Who pays for restoration and repair after a disaster?

-   How are Federal, State, and local governments organized to address
    and prevent disasters and emergencies?

-   What laws are directed to disaster preparedness and recovery?

-   What are the political ramifications of disasters?

-   Which agencies handle disasters **inside the United States?** Which
    agencies address disasters **outside the United States?**

-   What special interest groups are involved in disaster policymaking
    and emergency management?

-   How is the private sector impacted by disasters?

-   Should governmental disaster activity address chiefly losses
    sustained by individuals, or by private industry and its workforce,
    or by other State and local governments?

> Many of these questions may not seem to be of an academic nature, but
> they very much are. There is an emerging body of scholarship on
> disasters and emergency management. In this very class, there may be
> people who will embark on careers as emergency managers. The entire
> profession of emergency management is growing because it is very much
> needed. People want to know how organizations, both public and
> private, function under the stress that disasters and emergencies
> pose. Insurance companies want to help minimize their claims payments
> by helping and encouraging their policyholders (i.e., private
> corporations, homeowners, and municipal and special district
> governments) to minimize disaster risks. Many new Federal, State, and
> local laws require corporations, utilities, and homeowners to take
> specific precautions against disaster threats. Liability and
> negligence law and cases (as well as huge Court settlements) have made
> public and private authorities aware of the need to prepare for and
> avert (if possible) disasters and emergencies.
>
> More than this, disasters and major emergencies require a governmental
> response. A few essentials of post-disaster aid are: public warning,
> search and rescue, evacuation, sheltering, in-kind or cash relief
> assistance, emergency public works restoration, disaster loans for
> reconstruction of private facilities or home repair, unemployment
> assistance, medical aid, and extraordinary interorganizational
> cooperation.
>
> This course will draw heavily on "highly readable" case studies. One
> or two case studies will be probed in most class sessions. Instructors
> should avoid lecturing on each case and instead pose leading questions
> to elicit student views and observations. There is a general core of
> conceptual information in this course, but it will be re-enforced
> through the analysis of case studies. Also, instructors should
> consider assigning students oral reports on selected case study
> readings or should ask some of them to lead discussions on those
> readings.

**References**

> Below are the books that have been selected as required reading for
> the course. Those who employ this Instructor Guide should feel free to
> update the books and make substitutions in the required reading books
> as the field evolves and as books come into and go out of print.

-   Anderson, James E., ***Public Policymaking: An Introduction***, 3rd
    ed. (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1997). (paperback)

-   Schneider, Saundra K., ***Flirting with Disaster: Public Management
    in Crisis Situations*** (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1995).
    (paperback)

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-   Sylves, Richard T. and William L. Waugh Jr. ***Disaster Management
    in the U.S. and Canada*** (Springfield, Ill.: Charles C. Thomas
    Publishers, 1996). (paperback and hard cover)

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-   Waugh, William L., Jr. and Ronald John Hy (eds.) ***Handbook of
    Emergency Management*** (Westport, CT: The Greenwood Press, 1991).
    (hardcover)

**Books on Reserve**

> If possible, the following items should be placed on reserve at the
> college or university library (for campus-based courses) or in other
> reserve reading facilities. This will save students the cost of
> purchasing books and materials that will be used only intermittently
> or which may be unavailable for purchase (i.e., out of print).

-   Auf der Heide, Erik, ***Disaster Response: Principles of Preparation
    and Coordination*** (St. Louis: C.V. Mosby, 1989).

-   Charles, Michael T. and John Choon K. Kim (eds.) ***Crisis
    Management: A Casebook*** (Springfield, Ill.: Charles C. Thomas
    Publishers, 1988).

-   Comfort, Louise K. (ed.) ***Managing Disaster: Strategies and Policy
    Perspectives*** (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1988).

-   Drabek, Thomas and Gerard J. Hoetmer (eds.) ***Emergency Management:
    Principles and Practice for Local Government* (**Washington, D.C.:
    International City Management Assoc., 1991).

-   Petak, William J. (ed.) "Emergency Management: A Challenge for
    Public Administration," ***Public Administration Review**,* Volume
    45 Special Issue (January 1985).

-   Sylves, Richard T. and William L. Waugh Jr. (eds.) ***Cities and
    Disaster: North American Studies in Emergency Management***.
    (Springfield, Ill.: Charles C. Thomas Publishers, 1990).

-   U.S. Senate, Bipartisan Task Force on Funding Disaster Relief, John
    Glenn (Chairman), Christopher S. Bond (Co-Chairman), "Federal
    Disaster Assistance: Report of the Senate Task Force on Funding
    Disaster Relief," 104th Cong., 1st Sess., ***Document No. 104-4***
    (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1995).

**Requirements**

> There will be two tests, a final (third) exam, a 10- to 15-page
> research paper, and several quizzes in this course. Each test,
> including the final exam, focuses on work covered since the previous
> test. No single test or exam is comprehensive for the entire course.
>
> Each student will also be expected to make a verbal presentation
> regarding a disaster case reading assignment. The instructor will
> match each student with each case assignment to be presented, on the
> basis of what was indicated in the first day class survey. (See
> Appendix A)

**% OF RELEVANT COVERS**

**[GRADE]{.underline} [ITEM]{.underline} [DATE]{.underline}
[ASSIGNMENTS]{.underline}**

**20% EXAM 1 tba**

**20% EXAM 2 tba**

**20% EXAM 3 tba**

**10% STUDENT tba CASE**

> **PRESENTATIONS ASSIGNMENTS**

**10% PARTICIPATION**

> **& ATTENDANCE**

**20% RESEARCH PAPER tba**

**100% TOTAL**

**tba= to be announced**

**Remarks and**

**Instructor Policies**

*Research Paper*

> To clarify some of the above and to be more explicit about the grading
> policy, note that one research paper is required in the course. Please
> make it a point to meet with the instructor to discuss the topic
> before the fourth session.
>
> Students must get their topics worked out with the instructor so that
> their papers are researched, organized, written, edited, proofread,
> and submitted on or before the date they are due. Students should be
> encouraged to show the instructor draft copies, outlines, and notes,
> *et cetera*, before they turn in their paper. Tell them that only the
> finished paper is graded and that advice on preliminary work may help
> them do a better paper.

*Take-Home*

*Essay Option*

> The instructor may wish to afford the students the option of doing the
> essay portion of each test on a take-home, essay basis if they wish.
> Here's how it works:
>
> The instructor will give each student a different take-home essay
> question a week before each test. On the testing date, the students
> will turn in their typed (double spaced) take-home essays, documented
> and complete. This means that the sources will be endnoted or
> footnoted, with quotes and superscripted numbers in the text. Then it
> will count the 25-35 points that the essay portion of the test
> represents, and the students will only need to complete the
> short-answer (non-essay) portion of the test. If they choose not to do
> the take-home essay or if they think they cannot get it done on time,
> then they will merely answer the essay portion of the test. If the
> policy succeeds on the first test, the instructor should consider
> making it policy for all the tests, including the last exam.
>
> Students usually appreciate this option. Doing a take-home essay will
> free up their time during the in-class test, so that they have more
> time to concentrate on the short-answer portion of the test.

*Student Presentations*

> The instructor should ask the students to make one 15-minute, in-class
> case presentation. The survey they completed the first day should help
> the instructor make case assignments. The point of this is to give
> them a chance to present the major points of a particular disaster
> case study. They should be free to use overhead transparencies, the
> blackboard, charts, figures, handouts, and 10 minutes of videotape (if
> the instructor was able to schedule the VCR and monitor in advance).
> Students should be encouraged to ask the class and the instructor
> questions.

**Supplemental**

**Considerations**

*Missing a Test*

> If a student misses the first or second test, the instructor should
> prepare a make-up test composed of questions different from those on
> the original, missed test. Advise the students that the make-up test
> is always more difficult than the original missed test.
>
> If a student misses the final exam this policy must be fashioned in
> accordance with the instructor's rules and the institution's policies.

*Attendance and*

*Participation Policy*

> It would be great if students attended all classes, but there may be
> good reasons why they may miss one or more sessions. Class
> participation is 10% of the grade, but this is based on what the
> students do when they attend class; it is not a reward for merely
> being there.
>
> The instructor needs to reward and acknowledge class participation.
> The better prepared the students are for each session, the more
> interesting the course is likely to be for both the instructor and the
> students. Participation credit amounts to 10% of course grade.

**Session No. 2**

**Course**: The Political and Policy Basis of Emergency Management

**Session**: The American Political System and Disaster **Time**: 2
Hours

**Objectives:**

> At the conclusion of this lesson, students should be able to:
>
> 2.1 Explain what a representative democracy is and how it generally
> operates.
>
> 2.2 Define a Federal system and a unitary system, and be able to
> explain the difference between the two.
>
> 2.3 Be able to explain how the separation of powers works through
> checks and balances.
>
> 2.4 Explain a few general points about the process of Presidential
> elections, terms of office, and Presidential succession.
>
> 2.5 Describe the general features of the Senate and House of
> Representatives.
>
> 2.6 Comment on the role of the American courts, particularly the U.S.
> Supreme Court.
>
> 2.7 Explain how the concept of bureaucracy relates to executive power.
>
> 2.8 Summarize how the two major American political parties work.
>
> 2.9 Review the role of interest groups in policymaking.
>
> 2.10 Explain the core elements and concerns of the public policy
> process.

**Scope**

> This session introduces the contemporary American political system. It
> also sets the basis for public policy study.

**References**

> Assigned student reading:

-   Schneider, Saundra K., ***Flirting with Disaster: Public Management
    in Crisis Situations*** (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1995). \[See
    "The Varied Success of Governmental Response to Natural Disasters,"
    Ch. 1, pp. 3-8. See also "Natural Disasters as Public Policy
    Issues," Ch. 2, pp. 9-27.\]

> Students with little or no familiarity with the study of public policy
> would be helped by reading:

-   Anderson, James E., "The Study of Public Policy," ***Public
    Policymaking: An Introduction***, 3rd ed. (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin
    Company, 1997): Ch. 1, pp. 1-46. \[See Appendix E, "Anderson Policy
    Chapter Synopsis", p. 1.\]

> For background read:

-   "What Went Wrong," ***Newsweek*** (September 7, 1992):23.

**Requirements**

> The instructor should refer to diagrams of Appendix C and D that are
> available for use as overheads or handouts and which illustrate the
> general structure of the American political system and the policy
> cycle.
>
> The *Newsweek* article is intended to spur class discussion on the
> political attributes of disaster---in this case, the Hurricane Andrew
> disaster.

**Remarks**

> It is important to ask students how they think a representative
> democracy actually works. Students with little or no course work in
> American government or political science will have a tendency to
> answer questions they do not understand with remarks like, "Well
> that's just politics." Be sure to ask them for an elaboration if they
> provide such responses. You can explain "representation" in terms of
> constituency service, special interests, National interests (i.e.
> taxpayers---their total electorate) and "bureaucratic interference"
> (through which elected officials intercede in governmental
> administration on behalf of some individual or interest).

*Objective 2.1*

> DEMOCRACY is a system of government in which the ultimate political
> authority is vested in the people. Democracy may be direct, as
> practiced in ancient Athens or in New England town meetings, or
> indirect and REPRESENTATIVE. In the modern pluralistic (where many
> groups, institutions, and interests share power) democratic State,
> power typically is exercised by groups or institutions in a complex
> system of interactions that involves compromising and bargaining in
> the decision-making process. Democracy starts with the assumption of
> popular sovereignty that vests ultimate power in the people.
> Decisionmaking in a democracy is based on majority rule with minority
> rights protected. Effective guarantees of the freedoms of speech,
> press, religion, assembly and petition, and equality before the law
> are indispensable to a democratic system of government. Politics,
> parties, and politicians are the catalytic agents that make democracy
> workable. American democracy, like its British counterpart, is an
> evolutionary and organic system that has pragmatically overcome
> obstacles, crises, and disasters \[Plano and Greenberg, 1985, pp.
> 8-10.\]

*Objective 2.2*

> Be sure to mention that, in UNITARY systems of government, as in Great
> Britain and France, the National Government embodies the complete
> sovereignty of the State. Lesser governments and regional authorities,
> such as counties, towns, municipalities, owe their origin, legitimacy,
> and continuation to the National Government. The National Government
> is free to reorganize, abolish, or create lesser governments. In
> FEDERAL systems, sovereignty is shared among National and lesser
> governments. Certain powers reside exclusively in certain levels of
> government and certain powers are shared concurrently. In the American
> Federal system, the United States Constitution accords the States,
> under the 10th Amendment, certain reserved powers not controlled by
> the National Government. Under a Federal system, the National
> Government is NOT free to abolish State governments, but it may
> redefine Federal-State relations if the redefinition is
> constitutional.

*Objective 2.3*

> One complicating factor involves the SEPARATION OF POWERS between the
> three major branches of government: the executive, legislative, and
> judicial branches. James Madison, writing in the *The Federalist
> Papers,* endorsed Montesquieu's claim that legislative and executive
> powers should not be entrusted to the same body of government or
> person. In *The Federalist* No. 51 (on checks and balances), he
> writes,
>
> "But what is government itself, but the greatest of all reflections on
> human nature? If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If
> angels were to govern men, neither external or internal controls on
> government would be necessary. In framing a government which is to be
> administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you
> must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the
> next place oblige it to control itself.... The constant aim is to
> divide and arrange the several offices in such a manner as that each
> may be a check on the other." \[Madison, 1778.\]
>
> Consequently, United States Government entrusts power and authority to
> the U.S. Congress (the Nation's chief legislative body) that is not
> entrusted to the President (the Nation's Chief Executive Officer). So
> the United States has three major branches of government: the
> executive, the legislative, and the judicial branches. In emergency
> management, the executive and legislative branches play the most
> important roles. Each of the three branches possesses a variety of
> independent powers, and each has CHECKS AND BALANCES which can be
> exercised over the others.
>
> The United States has a preoccupation with formalism because each
> branch is concerned that the other branches will surmount or encroach
> on its powers. The United States National Governmental structure
> reflects an effort to prevent tyranny, not to promote policy
> development.
>
> In talking about the separation of powers, students need to know more
> about key institutions involved in the policy process.

THE PRESIDENCY

> Ask the students to name their favorite President and to explain their
> selections. They may need to be reminded about the length of a
> Presidential term, the 4-year electoral cycle, Presidential limits of
> two terms, and how the ELECTORAL COLLEGE determines the outcome of the
> popular vote. Remember that, to be elected President, it is necessary
> to win a majority of votes in the Electoral College, not necessarily a
> majority of the general popular vote. Any single State's electoral
> vote is the sum of its House and Senate seats in Congress. Electors
> are appointed by each State's respective Governor and they almost
> always cast their vote for the candidate who won a majority of votes
> in their State. The Electoral College convenes and votes in the
> December following each Presidential election.
>
> They should know a little about Presidential succession (i.e.,
> President, Vice President, Speaker of the House, President Pro Tempore
> of the Senate, and Secretary of State, etc.) They should appreciate,
> in general terms, what Presidential veto power involves. A
> Presidential veto empowers the President to return a bill unsigned to
> the Congress, thus invalidating it. The Congress can override a
> Presidential veto by casting a 2/3rds roll-call vote of those present
> and voting in each House.
>
> A few very general points about Presidential interest in disasters
> should be offered, with the promise of more details in future classes.
> Review Presidential powers and constraints. Remind students that this
> is also covered in more detail during Session 5.

THE CONGRESS

> It might help if the instructor reviewed the general features of the
> full House of Representatives and Senate, their respective committee
> and subcommittee structures, the Congressional use of joint
> committees, the seniority system of committee appointment and
> membership ranking, policy analysis units, and committee staff. The
> instructor should also review the role of Congress in budgetary
> policy, its investigative powers, its legislative enactment power, its
> campaign finance duties, and how it is an arena of major
> coalition-building among interest groups. More legislative matters
> also emerge in Session 6.

-   The House of Representatives is the lower House of the bicameral
    (two House) Congress in which representation is based upon
    population.

-   The House was intended by the Founding Fathers to be the popular
    chamber of Congress, and it was made larger and more responsive to
    the public will than the Senate, which was intended to represent the
    States and to function as the more deliberative body.

-   In the House, each State is guaranteed at least one representative.
    Since 1910, the House has had a permanent membership of 435.

-   The ratio of population to representatives has been steadily
    increasing until it is now over 500,000 per representative.

-   The Constitution vests certain powers in the House, including: (1)
    the impeachment power; (2) the initiation of revenue (spending)
    bills; (3) the election of a President (if no candidate obtains a
    majority in the Electoral College); (4) the determination of its own
    rules and procedure; and (5) the discipline of its members.

-   Each representative serves a two-year term of office and the entire
    House stands for election in each even-numbered year.

-   The Senate is the upper House of the Congress and is based on the
    principle of State equality.

-   The Constitution specifies that no State may be deprived of its
    equal representation in the Senate without its consent.

-   The Senate is comprised of one hundred members from fifty States.

-   The Vice President is the presiding officer of the Senate. In the
    absence of a presiding officer, a President Pro Tempore elected from
    the membership assumes that role.

-   Each State is represented by two senators and each senator is
    elected to serve a six-year term of office such that about one-third
    of the Senate stands for election every two years, again, like the
    House, in even-numbered years.

-   Most tax bills originate in the Senate, and the Senate has the power
    to ratify treaties, to review and confirm Presidential appointees to
    certain positions in the executive branch, and to filibuster (a
    parliamentary device through which a minority of senators seeks to
    frustrate the will of the majority by literally talking a bill to
    death).

*Objective 2.6*

THE COURTS

> The United States has an elaborate Federal Court system, but **the
> U.S. Supreme Court in particular is considered a Court of last resort
> at the National level**. The Supreme Court, like most courts, is not
> easily moved by political forces, elected executives and lawmakers,
> and election returns, etc. It resolves conflicts under the U.S.
> Constitution and in accord with a body of laws through its exercise of
> judicial review of legislative enactments. The Supreme Court has the
> power to declare a law "null and void." The determination of the
> Court's agenda of cases each year is a key indicator of the policy
> issues which its judges believe deserve an interpretation or ruling.
>
> In a way, the Court has made policy in decisions regarding the
> legality of abortion, school desegregation, capital punishment,
> Federal-State relations, and in many other areas.

*Objective 2.7*

THE BUREAUCRACY

> Bureaucracy, although a form of organization, is often a label applied
> to the full executive branch of government. Public bureaucracies spend
> money in the implementation of public policies. They are hierarchical
> organizations that are highly specialized, and they operate with very
> formal rules. The modern bureaucracy is becoming highly automated, or
> technocratic, in how it functions.
>
> The National Government's bureaus and agencies often serve to expand
> or supplement State and local activities. This leads to the area of
> intergovernmental relations. (See Sessions 9, 10, and 11.) Also,
> government agencies often rely upon outside the consulting firms of
> the private sector to help them get work done (i.e., Baker
> Engineering, Booz, Allen & Hamilton, TRW, etc.)

*Objective 2.8*

POLITICAL PARTIES

> The United States has two-party system in which two "MASS" political
> parties (i.e., Democratic Party and Republican Party) confront each
> other in local, State, and National elections. Some States (e.g.,
> California) forbid all but their largest municipalities to engage in
> partisan elections and insist, instead, on non-partisan elections of
> local officials.
>
> Minor parties, which include Perotians (Ross Perot supporters),
> Socialists, Libertarians, and others, seldom succeed in winning
> elections, but sometimes affect candidate competition. The major
> parties only become genuinely National at Presidential election time,
> and respective State party chapters often vary widely from one
> another. The American electoral system is highly decentralized. When
> it comes to coalition-building inside the Congress, political parties
> are usually very weak. However, the major parties often serve as
> important vehicles for moving issues to the National policy agenda.
>
> The Republican and Democratic Parties are "MASS" parties, rather than
> "CADRE" parties (more single interest and ideologically motivated than
> mass parties). Each seeks to accommodate a broad enough spectrum of
> interests to ensure electoral majorities. Consequently, it is
> difficult to generalize about each party's view on disaster policy or
> emergency management.
>
> Since the 1970s the Republican Party has become more conservative and
> the Democratic Party somewhat more liberal. Generally speaking, the
> Republican Party philosophy of the 1990s has emphasized individual
> initiative, personal freedoms, confidence in the private sector to do
> a better job than the public sector, and the need for smaller
> government. It emphasizes lower taxes, family values, a balanced
> Federal budget, opposition to the growth of government regulation, and
> strong National defense.
>
> The Democratic Party philosophy is less focused, but generally favors
> protecting the rights of ethnic and racial groups, opposes
> discrimination in its many forms, has higher confidence that the ills
> of society may be better addressed by government than the private
> sector, and advances the rights and interests of workers, women, the
> elderly, children and the disabled. It seeks to impose a higher tax
> burden on upper income groups, favors expanded and efficient delivery
> of governmental services, endorses responsible governmental regulation
> appropriately enforced, accepts a balanced Federal budget with
> limitations, and counters alleged, excessive National defense
> spending, especially when domestic social programs are suffering
> budget cuts.
>
> It is fair to say that during the critical response phase of disaster,
> political party leaders and elected government officials ordinarily
> behave in a highly bi-partisan cooperative manner. However, during
> mitigation, preparedness and recovery phases, partisan differences are
> more likely to emerge. For example, Republicans may be expected to
> oppose broad expansion of local governmental land-use regulation aimed
> at disaster mitigation, especially if they perceive the expansion as
> an invasion of private property rights. Correspondingly, Democrats may
> be expected to oppose any changes in local preparedness planning which
> appear to be in conflict with the interests of local municipal labor
> unions, as might happen if arrangements for over-time pay and required
> work hours are thought unsatisfactory.

*Objective 2.9*

INTEREST GROUPS

> As more demands are made on government, more governmental programs
> proliferate. Interest groups often make the initial demands and then
> come to have a stake in the future of those programs. Interest groups
> force policymakers to address grievances. Many interest groups are
> "public interest" or "citizen" interest groups, e.g., Ralph Nader
> Organizations, the Union of Concerned Scientists, and Common Cause,
> *et cetera*. There are also single issue interest groups which are
> influential, e.g., the National Rifle Association, Greenpeace, and
> anti-abortion or pro-choice groups, *et cetera*. These interest groups
> become involved in many areas of the policy process.
>
> Some interest groups represent other levels of government, e.g., the
> National Governor's Association, the National Emergency Management
> Association, and the National Coordinating Council on Emergency
> Management, *et cetera*. Others may be unions or professional
> organizations representing their members, many of whom may be public
> employees, e.g., the International Association of Fire Chiefs, the
> American Medical Association, and the Police Benevolent Association,
> *et cetera*.

*Objective 2.10*

Fundamental questions in the study of the policy process are:

-   How are policy decisions made?

-   How is advice delivered to policymakers about how to make policy
    decisions?

-   What questions were asked by policymakers as they prepared to make
    policy decisions?

-   How was the giving of advice managed?

-   Who had the final say in approving the policy decision(s)?

> The study of the American public policy process is made difficult
> because, as a democracy, the American system of government is in a
> continuous state of development because there is great ambiguity and
> because Americans are always refashioning both the ends and the means
> of public policy.

**Supplemental**

**Considerations**

> At this early stage of the course, it is important that the instructor
> fathom each student's familiarity with the structure of American
> government. If terms like "separation of powers," "checks and
> balances," "judicial review," "advise and consent," "House Speaker,"
> and "majority leader," *et cetera* are unfamiliar terms for students,
> then a deeper review of the fundamentals of the Anderson volume will
> be needed. The *Newsweek* article may be used as a point of disaster
> reference and the Wamsley and Schroder article is well-suited for
> deeper discussion of the fundamental concepts within a disaster
> context. The following questions are all points worthy of class
> discussion:

-   How does one gain access to the formal structure of government?

-   Who gains access?

-   Do some groups or interests have advantages over others when it
    comes to access?

-   How do decisions get made?

-   What bargains are struck or compromises fashioned?

-   What do decisions look like once they are made? They may be laws,
    budget decisions, executive orders, administrative rules and
    regulations, Court decrees or decisions, legislative resolutions,
    and case decisions by bureau officials, *et cetera*.

-   What are some of the general conditions under which policy decisions
    are made?

> To help make this relevant to emergency management, it should be noted
> that the Federal Emergency Management Agency is an executive branch
> agency headed by a Director appointed by the President, from whom he
> takes direction. The executive branch develops policy positions and
> budget proposals for the coming year. As an executive branch agency,
> FEMA is responsible to the President and must carry out his decisions.
> From an administrative standpoint, past experience has shown,
> according to the National Academy of Public Administration and the
> U.S. General Accounting Office, that
>
> "FEMA needs a Director who is trusted by the president to assume a
> lead role in disasters. \...someone who possesse\[s\] the legal,
> political, and managerial clout to compel other agencies to respond to
> the emergency." \[Sylves, 1996, p. 30\].
>
> FEMA is also responsible to the Congress which provides its statutory
> authority and its budget. Each year FEMA representatives are called
> before a broad range of House and Senate Authorization and
> Appropriation Committees to defend various parts of the Agency's
> budget. FEMA receives two kinds of funding: (1) regular appropriations
> and (2) emergency supplemental appropriations following disasters.
> FEMA officials appear before Congressional Oversight Committees or
> testify in various Committee hearings pertaining to proposed
> legislation.

**Endnotes**

-   Madison, James, *The Federalist* No. 51 (on the separation of
    powers) (1778).

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-   Plano, Jack C. and Milton Greenberg, *The American Political
    Dictionary*, 7th ed. (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1985):

> 8-10.

-   Sylves, Richard T., "The Politics and Budgeting of Federal Emergency
    Management," *Disaster Management in the U.S. and Canada* Richard T.
    Sylves and William L. Waugh Jr. (eds.) (Springfield, Ill.:
    Charles C. Thomas Publishers, 1996):29-30.

**Session No. 3**

**Course**: The Political and Policy Basis of Emergency Management

**Session**: American Hazards and Disaster Agents **Time**: 2 Hours

**Objectives:**

> At the conclusion of the session, students will be able to:
>
> 3.1 Explain what disasters and emergencies are in official terms.
>
> 3.2 Demonstrate knowledge of the types of natural disasters, the types
> of technological disasters, and the varieties of conflict disorders.
>
> 3.3 Summarize the different types of costs that disasters and
> emergencies impose on individuals, the Nation, and society.
>
> 3.4 List some of the environmental and social reasons for the
> increasing cost and frequency of emergencies and disasters.
>
> 3.5 List policy questions which disasters pose for Federal, State, and
> local officials, in general terms.
>
> 3.6 List the criteria of disaster risk and vulnerability, based on the
> types of disaster incidents the United States has experienced.

**Scope**

> This session is a general survey of what disasters and emergencies are
> and why they often embody various forms of political activity. It also
> points up the role of local, State, and Federal officials in
> responding to, and recovering from, disasters. This will be one of the
> first sessions that will introduce the matter of public and private
> insurance, and this will be from the perspective of hazard risk and
> disaster vulnerability.

**References**

Assigned student reading:

-   Sylves, Richard T., "The Politics and Budgeting of Federal Emergency
    Management," ***Disaster Management in the U.S. and Canada***,
    Richard T. Sylves and William L. Waugh, Jr., (eds.) (Springfield,
    Ill.: Charles C. Thomas Publishers, 1996): Ch. 2 pp. 26-45.

-   Waugh, William L., Jr. and Ronald John Hy, "Introduction to
    Emergency Management," ***Handbook of Emergency Management***,
    William L. Waugh, Jr. and Ronald John Hy (eds.) (Westport, Conn.:
    The Greenwood Press, 1991): Ch. 1.

> Optional:

-   Auf der Heide, Erik, ***Disaster Response: Principles of Preparation
    and Coordination*** (St. Louis: C.V. Mosby, 1989): Ch. 2.

> The instructor should review:

-   Petak, William J., "Emergency Management: A Challenge for Public
    Administration," ***Public Administration Review***, Vol. 45 Special
    Issue (January 1985):3-7.

**Requirements**

> This session may offer a good opportunity for a guest speaker who
> works in State or local emergency management. That individual (or the
> instructor) should outline the general types of duties and
> responsibilities assumed by emergency managers.

**Remarks**

*Objective 3.1*

Here some useful disaster terms:

-   **Emergency**: An unexpected event which places life and/or property
    in danger and requires an immediate response through the use of
    routine community resources and procedures. Examples would be a
    multi-automobile wreck, especially when involving injury or death,
    or a fire caused by a lightning strike which spreads to other
    buildings.

-   **Mass Emergency**: An unexpected or undesirable event which
    requires the resources of most of the municipal departments and
    limited assistance from outside agencies.

-   **Disaster**: An event in which a community undergoes severe danger
    and incurs, or is threatened with, such losses to persons and/or
    property that the resources available within the community are
    exceeded. In disasters, resources from beyond the local
    jurisdiction, that is, the State or Federal level, are required to
    meet the disaster demands. An example would be Hurricane Opal of
    October 5, 1995, which made landfall in the Florida panhandle and
    damaged several communities. The storm moved inland and then turned
    east, bringing extensive rains and high winds to communities in
    Georgia, Alabama, and North Carolina. By October 6, 1995, damage
    estimates were at \$1.8 billion, 2 million people were without
    power, and (over the four States) 11 people were confirmed dead.

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-   **Catastrophe**: An event in which a society incurs, or is
    threatened with, such losses to persons and/or property that the
    entire society is affected and extraordinary resources and skills
    are required, some of which must come from other nations. An example
    would be the 1985 earthquakes in Mexico City and other Mexican
    cities. Thousands of people died (estimates vary markedly) and tens
    of thousands were injured. At least 100,000 building units were
    damaged; reconstruction costs exceeded five billion dollars, with
    some estimates running as high as \$10 billion. Over sixty donor
    nations contributed to the recovery through programs coordinated by
    the League of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies.

> These are very useful academic definitions. However, they are NOT
> precisely the definitions employed in Federal disaster policy, most
> particularly with respect to types of Presidential Disaster
> Declarations. These are the fundamental definitions that American
> policymakers employ.

-   **MAJOR DISASTER**: Any natural catastrophe (including any
    hurricane, tornado, storm, high water, wind-driven water, tidal
    wave, tsunami, earthquake, volcanic eruption, landslide, mudslide,
    snowstorm, or drought), or (regardless of the cause) any fire,
    flood, or explosion in any part of the United States which, in the
    determination of the President, causes damage of sufficient severity
    and magnitude to warrant major disaster assistance under the
    Stafford Act in order to supplement the efforts and the available
    resources of the States, local governments, and disaster relief
    organizations in alleviating the damage, loss, hardship, or
    suffering caused thereby.

-   **EMERGENCY**: Any occasion or instance for which, in the
    determination of the President, Federal assistance is needed to
    supplement State and local efforts and capabilities to save lives
    and to protect property and public health and safety, or to lessen
    or avert the threat of a catastrophe in any part of the United
    States.

> There is usually a \$5 million Federal spending cap on emergencies.
> Incidents which require more than \$5 million in Federal assistance
> ordinarily require a request for MAJOR DISASTER. EMERGENCY ACTIONS
> involve emergency work that is essential to save lives and protect
> property and the public health and safety. It is performed under
> Section 306 of the Disaster Relief Act of 1974 \[U.S. Senate, 1995.\].

*Objective 3.2*

> The following list of hazards captures most, but not all, types of
> possible disasters. Listed below are typical hazards encountered in
> the United States:

-   avalanches

-   bomb threats

-   structural building failures

-   civil disorder or disturbances (strikes, riots)

-   dam failures

-   droughts

-   environmental disasters (pollution calamities)

-   epidemics

-   explosions

-   fires (urban or rural)

-   floods (flash and slow-rising)

-   hailstorms

-   hazardous materials in business and industry

-   hazardous materials in transportation accidents

-   hurricanes

-   ice and snow storms

-   landslides and mudslides

-   mass casualty incidents (stadium disasters)

-   nuclear power plant accidents

-   terrorism

-   tornadoes and wind storms

-   transportation accidents

-   weapon storage facilities (chemical agents and explosives)

> The United States experiences a very large range of natural,
> technological, and conflict-based disasters. Examining the hazards
> that face the country, either Nationally or locally, is an essential
> component of any emergency management program.

*Objective 3.3*

> Also notable is that disasters and emergencies pose numerous kinds of
> costs on the individual, the society, and the Nation. Monetary or
> economic damages are an explicit part of disasters and emergencies,
> but the social and economic costs of disaster may also be severe. From
> a social perspective, the loss of human life and the human suffering
> resulting from loss of life, home, and security, *et cetera*, has the
> potential to be greater than economic loss. Moreover, environmental
> costs, in terms of the loss of land and ecosystems, are also part of
> the metric of disaster loss, for (more accurately) they are
> irreversibly changed and can never truly be restored to their previous
> state. In recent years, as the number and magnitude of disasters and
> emergencies have increased, these forms of disaster cost have risen as
> well.

*Objective 3.4*

> Disasters, and their cost, have increased because of factors that
> challenge scientific investigation and prediction. A few of these are
> natural cycles, meteorological anomalies, plate tectonics associated
> with seismic and volcanic activity, the El Nino Pacific currents, and
> even the alleged impact of "global warming" on climate change and the
> rise in sea level.
>
> Compounding these natural factors are social factors.
>
> 1\. **Increasing Population Density**: The population of the United
> States, like that of the entire world, increases every day. More
> people live in major metropolitan areas and, thus, are vulnerable to
> disaster events.
>
> 2\. **Increased Settlement in High-Risk Areas**: More people reside in
> coastal areas which are prone to hurricanes and in earthquake-prone
> areas because of the favorable climate and the availability of work.
>
> 3\. **Increased Technological Risks**: The large-scale use of
> hazardous chemicals in the production processes and the fact that
> airplanes carry larger numbers of passengers are only two of the
> dozens of high-risk technologies that did not exist in prior
> centuries.
>
> Likewise, development in flood plains, the destruction of wetlands,
> the over-farming of land, deforestation owing to development, and the
> paving of roads and parking lots, *et cetera*, have all served to
> increase the run-off with heavy rainfall. In addition, the heavy
> engineering of flood-control works sometimes lulls communities into a
> false sense of security and encourages inappropriate risk-taking.
> Ever-expanding sewer systems raise the probability that sewage plants
> will be inundated by flood water and that they will back-up, thus,
> flooding basements and low-lying areas.
>
> The 1990s have witnessed more human-caused disasters as well.
> Terrorist bombings, such as that of New York's World Trade Center in
> February 1993, killed six and injured hundreds. In April 1995,
> Oklahoma City's Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building was devastated by a
> terrorist bomb which killed 167 and injured 460. These disasters,
> along with natural disasters, demand more and better response
> capabilities, resources, and mitigation.

*Objective 3.5*

> Common problems posed by disasters are many, and they often pose
> political and policy questions for elected officials. The following
> are a few examples:
>
> 1\. Where does liability reside? Were damaged structures more
> vulnerable than they should have been? Were land-use and development
> activities properly conducted?
>
> 2\. Where is the greatest need and how should each government mobilize
> to address that need? Should damage assessment precede the issuance of
> State or Federal Disaster Declarations or should the assessment be
> made after-the-fact? If governments respond too slowly and
> methodically, they are accused of "foot-dragging" and incompetence. If
> governments respond too swiftly, without following established
> procedure, they are accused of waste, political favoritism, and bias.
>
> 3\. When is the disaster over? Localities, businesses, and individuals
> receiving disaster aid, or which are eligible to apply for disaster
> aid, never really want the help to end. Many would prefer to receive
> generous government help years after the disaster incident. If
> government keeps the books open on a disaster too long, abuse and
> over-spending of taxpayer monies become more likely and problems of
> fairness ensue. If government closes the books on a disaster too soon,
> deserving disaster victims may be denied the help they need because of
> application problems for which they may not be responsible. Political
> representatives may complain and, in seeking satisfaction for the
> aggrieved constituent, may criticize or punish the agency in some way.

*Objective 3.6*

> Before considering the criteria for disaster risk and vulnerability,
> certain important terms must be understood. Below are a few more
> essential terms shared by disaster sociologists and emergency
> managers:

-   **Hazard**: A condition with the potential for harm to the community
    or environment. Many use the terms "hazard" and "disaster agent"
    interchangeably. Hence, they refer to "the hurricane hazard" or even
    more broadly to "natural hazards"---which includes hurricanes,
    tornadoes, earthquakes and other natural phenomena that have the
    potential for harm. The hazard is the potential; the disaster is the
    actual event.

Americans tend to speak of the following three types of hazards:

> 1\. **Natural Hazards**: Naturally caused events such as hurricanes,
> tornadoes, earthquakes, floods, volcanoes, and forest fires.
>
> 2\. **Technological Hazards**: Typically human-caused hazards such as
> nuclear power plant accidents, industrial plant explosions, aircraft
> crashes, dam breaks, mine cave-ins, pipeline explosions, and hazardous
> material accidents.
>
> 3\. **Conflict Hazards**: War, acts of terrorism, civil unrest, riots,
> and revolutions.
>
> Increasingly common in the emergency management profession are terms
> like the following:

-   **Hazard Analysis**: The systematic identification and analysis of
    all hazards that could occur in a community.

-   **Hazard Risk**: The probability of experiencing disaster damage.

-   **Hazard Probability**: The estimated likelihood that a hazard will
    occur in a particular area.

-   **Hazard Vulnerability**: The susceptibility of life, property, or
    the environment to damage if a hazard occurs.

-   **Risk Analysis**: Assesses the probability of damage or injury and
    actual damage or injury that might occur in light of the hazard and
    vulnerability analysis.

-   **Vulnerability Analysis**: Identifies what is susceptible to
    damage. It should provide information regarding the area or extent
    of vulnerability. Among the range of concerns in vulnerable zones
    are: population, including numbers and categories of people expected
    to be within the zone; private and public property that may be
    damaged, including essential support systems and transportation
    corridors; and the environment that may be affected, including the
    impact on sensitive natural areas and endangered species.

> The instructor may want to ask the students to list the questions they
> think
>
> should be asked in conducting vulnerability analyses. Pose the
> following four questions:
>
> 1\. What can go wrong?
>
> 2\. What is the likelihood?
>
> 3\. What would be the consequences?
>
> 4\. What should be done about it now?
>
> Then look at the following factors:

-   Likelihood or probability of occurrence or frequency

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-   Level of intensity

-   Economic impact, population risk, and ecological risk

-   Psychological impact upon members of the organization

-   Geographical areas of coverage, extent of damage, and scope

-   Duration

-   Speed of onset

-   Controllability

-   Protective actions

-   Sources of assistance

-   Likelihood of a cascading effect that causes other hazards

> Then decide:

-   Which hazards should be prepared for?

-   What should be the scope of the crisis or disaster plans?

-   What should be the rationale for including or excluding a hazard?

**Supplemental**

**Considerations**

> The "natural" disaster and "technological" disaster are neither neat
> nor mutually exclusive categories. Technological disasters are usually
> inferred to be human-caused (e.g., oil spills, hazardous materials
> accidents, certain structural failures, civil disorders, and
> terrorism, etc.) However, natural disasters (e.g., earthquakes,
> hurricanes, tornadoes, floods, severe storms, and droughts, etc.) are
> sometimes made worse due to human activity. Some of the causes are
> arson-caused forest fires, snow-induced structural collapse
> attributable to inferior roof design, housing developments between a
> dune line and the ocean, and poor agricultural techniques which can
> exacerbate drought or flood conditions, *et cetera*.
>
> Students should understand that natural disasters and technological
> (i.e., man-made) disasters are sometimes useful designations, but that
> human behavior can sometimes create conditions which convert
> relatively harmless natural events into disasters. Disaster risk and
> vulnerability are useful concepts to help make this connection.
>
> The following points may enliven class discussion of various types of
> disasters experienced in the United States.

-   There are about 10,000 reported avalanche incidents annually.

-   There are over 80,000 dams in the United States, and more than
    20,000 have been rated as hazardous, with 10,000 of these rated as
    "high-hazard."

-   The 1994 Northridge earthquake resulted in 57 deaths and \$20
    billion in damages. Every American State is at risk from
    earthquakes, with the risk running from minor, through moderate, to
    severe. Earthquakes pose a significant risk in 39 States.

-   On the average there are about 6,000 deaths, 30,000 injuries, and
    about \$8 billion in damages annually in the United States caused by
    structural fires.

-   Every State is at risk from flooding, including some 21,000
    communities that face a significant flood risk. The 1993 Midwest
    floods resulted in \$15-20 billion in losses. Annual flood damage is
    on the order of \$4 billion.

-   In 1992, Hurricane Andrew resulted in \$30 billion in damages in
    Florida and Louisiana. More than 50 million Americans live near
    hurricane-prone coastlines.

-   The estimated annual loss from subsidence incidents exceeds \$125
    million annually. (A subsidence is a vertical displacement or
    downward movement of a generally level ground surface.)

-   Every State is at risk from tornadoes. In February of each year,
    when tornado dangers begin to increase, the center of maximum
    frequency lies over the central Gulf States. Then, during March,
    this center moves eastward to the southern Atlantic States, where
    tornado frequency reaches a peak in April. During May, the center of
    maximum frequency moves to the southern Plains States and, in June,
    northward to the northern Plains, the Great Lakes area, and as far
    north as western New York State.

-   The Mount St. Helens volcano, in 1980, resulted in 60 deaths and
    \$1.5 billion in damages. The Nation's most active volcano areas are
    in Hawaii and Alaska.

-   Every State is at risk from wildfires, although California and the
    Northwest are especially vulnerable. More than 9,000 homes have been
    consumed by wildfires in the last decade. The record year for
    wildfire damage was 1996 when some 84,200 fires burned an estimated
    5 million acres. The previous record was 1994 when 79,000 wildfires
    were reported.

> For younger students unfamiliar with INSURANCE issues, it is important
> to explain what HOMEOWNER'S INSURANCE is, what it generally covers and
> does not cover, and how such insurance relates to disaster. For
> example, banks usually require their mortgage holders to purchase and
> maintain homeowner's insurance as a condition of mortgage approval.
> Homeowner's insurance usually covers the physical structure of the
> home, but it may not reflect full replacement cost unless provision is
> made in the policy. Some, but not all, of the contents of the home may
> also be covered. However, private homeowner's insurance does not cover
> flood loss or earthquake damage. Earthquake insurance is usually
> purchased separately and National Flood Insurance is available to
> residents of communities which qualify for that program. Various types
> of natural forces or homeowner negligence may be exempted from private
> homeowner insurance coverage. Also, the policyholder must continue to
> pay premiums on the policy, or risk the chance that the policy may be
> void at the time a claim is sought.
>
> A common political dilemma that disaster managers and policymakers
> face involves the question of extending Federal financial assistance
> to homeowners who refuse to adequately insure their property against
> disaster threats, despite warnings or despite previous experience with
> the same disaster agent. Extending Federal assistance to those who had
> the means and opportunity to insure their property, but did not, may
> be perceived as encouraging high-risk, under-insured behavior. Yet,
> refusing to extend Federal disaster aid to those individuals or
> families in the aftermath of a disaster is politically risky and,
> perhaps, administratively heartless; officials would be accused of
> punishing the victims of the disaster.
>
> It is important in all sessions, particularly this one, that an
> atmosphere be created in which students can discuss political issues
> frankly, but not dismissively. They need to appreciate the fact that,
> in a representative democracy, political officials, in either an
> executive or a legislative post, are essential participants in
> emergency management work---irrespective of the level of government in
> which they work.
>
> Selected students might be asked to imagine the kinds of needs they
> would have after a disaster and what kind of help they might expect
> from their Government. The instructor might ask whether students or
> their families have experienced disasters or emergencies and what kind
> of help was sought.
>
> **Endnotes**

-   U.S. Senate, Bipartisan Task Force on Funding Disaster Relief, John
    Glenn (Chairman), Christopher S. Bond (Co-Chairman), "Federal
    Disaster Assistance: Report of the Senate Task Force on Funding
    Disaster Relief," 104th Cong., 1st Sess., Document No. 104-4
    (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1995).

**Session No. 4**

**Course**: The Political and Policy Basis of Emergency Management

**Session**: The Fundamentals of Emergency Management **Time**: 2 Hours

**Objectives:**

At the conclusion of this session, students will be able to:

> 4.1 Define emergency management as a term, an occupation, and a field
> of professional and academic study.
>
> 4.2 Explain the four phases of emergency management.
>
> 4.3 Demonstrate a knowledge of the major determinants that impact
> management policies and programs.
>
> 4.4 Explain the importance of multi-agency and multi-jurisdiction
> coordination to emergency management.
>
> 4.5 List the functional demands that emergency managers need to take
> into consideration in crafting effective emergency management policies
> and programs.
>
> 4.6 Explain the political aspects that emergency managers should be
> aware of in their interaction with elected public officials of any
> level.
>
> 4.7 Demonstrate a knowledge of necessary emergency management
> prescriptions.

**Scope**

> The overview of emergency management as an occupation and as field of
> study is central here. Mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery
> phases are introduced and defined. Intra-organizational and
> inter-organizational aspects of emergency management work are
> reviewed. Stakeholder communities are examined. The linkages of
> emergency management organizations to elected government officials is
> discussed, as is the relationship of emergency managers to political
> executives and legislators.

**References**

Assigned student reading:

-   Hy, Ronald John and William L. Waugh, Jr., "The Function of
    Emergency Management," William L. Waugh and Ronald John Hy (eds.)
    ***Handbook of Emergency Management*** (Westport, Conn.: The
    Greenwood Press, 1991): Ch. 2, pp. 11-26.

-   Schneider, Saundra K., "The Governmental Response System,"
    ***Flirting with Disaster: Public Management in Crisis Situations***
    (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1995): Ch. 3, pp. 28-39.

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-   U.S. Senate, Bipartisan Task Force on Funding Disaster Relief, John
    Glenn (Chairman), Christopher S. Bond (Co-Chairman), "Federal
    Disaster Assistance: Report of the Senate Task Force on Funding
    Disaster Relief," 104th Cong., 1st Sess., ***Document No. 104-4***
    (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1995). \[See
    Section 1. Federal Disaster Assistance Programs and Financial Data,
    pp. 1-16.\]

**Requirements**

> The instructor should prepare photocopies of key terms listed in the
> supplementary considerations portion of this session. The Hy and Waugh
> reading assignment and the Bipartisan Task Force Report reading (pp.
> 1-16) provide a very good overview of the political and administrative
> landscape of emergency management. This material should be reviewed
> and discussed carefully with the understanding that future lessons
> will pursue the subject in more detail.

**Remarks**

> This session sets forth the foundations of American emergency
> management. Students need, through lecture and discussion, to relate
> to the managerial and political environment in which emergency
> managers work.

*Objective 4.1*

> EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT is the discipline and profession of applying
> science, technology, planning, and management to the extreme events
> that can injure or kill large numbers of people, do extensive property
> damage, and disrupt community life. The OCCUPATION OF EMERGENCY
> MANAGEMENT is the process of developing and implementing policies and
> programs to avoid and to cope with risks to people and property from
> natural and man-made hazards \[Drabek, 1996\].
>
> **Emergency Management**: The process by which the uncertainties that
> exist in potentially hazardous circumstances can be minimized and
> public safety maximized. The goal is to limit the costs of emergencies
> or disasters through the implementation of a series of strategies that
> reflect the full life-cycle of a disaster, i.e., preparedness,
> response, recovery, and mitigation. \[Drabek, 1996\].
>
> **Emergency Management**: Organized analysis, planning,
> decisionmaking, and the assignment of available resources to mitigate
> (i.e., lessen the effect of or prevent), prepare for, respond to, and
> recover from the effects of all hazards. The goal of emergency
> management is to save lives, prevent injuries, and protect property
> and the environment if an emergency occurs. \[FEMA, 1995, pp. I-6.\]
>
> **Emergency Manager**: The person who has the day-to-day
> responsibility for emergency management programs and activities. The
> role is one of coordinating all aspects of a jurisdiction's
> mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery capabilities. It
> should be noted that, across the United States, the local emergency
> management position has different titles. In some areas, it might be
> civil defense coordinator or director, civil preparedness coordinator
> or director, disaster services director, or emergency services
> director.
>
> **Emergency Support Services**: The departments of local government
> that have the capability of responding to emergencies 24-hours-a-day,
> typically include law enforcement, fire, rescue, and public works.
> They may also be referred to as emergency response personnel or
> emergency operating forces.

*Objective 4.2*

The four phases of emergency management encompass:

1.  **MITIGATION:** Deciding what to do where a risk to the health,
    safety and welfare of a society has been determined to exist; and
    implementing a risk reduction program. It involves minimizing the
    potential adverse effects of hazard agents. It may also be any
    cost-effective measure that will reduce the potential for damage to
    a facility from a disaster event.

> 2\. **PREPAREDNESS:** Developing a response plan and training first
> responders to save lives and reduce disaster damage, including the
> identification of critical resources and the development of necessary
> agreements among responding agencies, both within the jurisdiction and
> with other jurisdictions.
>
> 3\. **RESPONSE**: Providing emergency aid and assistance, reducing the
> probability of secondary damage, and minimizing problems for recovery
> operations.

4.  **RECOVERY**: Providing immediate support during the early recovery
    period necessary to return vital life support systems to minimum
    operational levels, and continuing to provide support until the
    community returns to normal.

> \[Petak, 1985, p. 3\]
>
> The United States has an ongoing system intended to guide the
> governmental response to all natural disasters. Under the American
> system, the process works from the bottom up. It begins at the local
> level and follows a series of pre-specified steps up through the State
> and, ultimately, to the National Government. Local, State, and
> National governments are supposed to share their emergency management
> responsibilities. The higher levels of government are not intended to
> supersede or replace the activities of the lower levels. All three
> levels of government are supposed to develop coordinated, integrated
> emergency management procedures, and they should all participate in
> the process of implementing disaster-relief policies.
>
> Many other countries (e.g., Great Britain, Sweden, France, and Japan)
> also rely on local governments in emergencies and disasters, but
> primary authority for disaster management in those countries flows
> through a "top down" approach under which the local governmental
> authority is often routinely superseded or replaced by National
> government authorities or organizations.

*Objective 4.3*

> There are many functional demands that emergency managers need to
> consider in crafting effective emergency management policies and
> programs and in responding to potential disasters. Among key
> functional demands that emergency managers need to understand are
> issue salience, fragmented government responsibility, and technical
> expertise. How these demands and considerations are met has profound
> implications.
>
> ISSUE SALIENCE is a perennial political problem of emergency
> management. Disasters are by their very nature high-risk, low
> probability events. Their infrequency makes it difficult to justify
> pre-disaster expenditures of public money in view of seemingly more
> pressing, on-going public needs and issues. In the aftermath of a
> major disaster, emergency managers, for a time, enjoy a high political
> profile and may be able to influence the public and their political
> representatives to undertake certain essential emergency preparedness
> or disaster mitigation efforts and projects.
>
> FRAGMENTED GOVERNMENT RESPONSIBILITY is another political challenge
> for disaster managers in implementing emergency management programs.
> The United States is a highly decentralized, Federal system of
> government which, under the U.S. Constitution, affords the National
> Government a range of authority, with some powers reserved for the
> States under the 10th Amendment. Similarly, local governments,
> although legally vestiges of their respective State governments, in
> some States, are afforded certain powers under HOME RULE provisions
> approved by their States, by their State Constitution, or through
> ENABLING STATUTES. This fragmentation of policymaking vertically
> between National, State and local governments is further complicated
> by horizontal fragmentation among a multitude of competing agencies
> with overlapping jurisdictional prerogatives. Effective decisionmaking
> and program coordination is difficult in this instance. This
> underlines the need for multi-agency and multi-jurisdictional
> coordination concerning emergency and disaster issues. (See Session
> 28.)
>
> Lack of TECHNICAL EXPERTISE is another major impediment to effective
> emergency management policies and programs for emergency managers.
> Technical expertise to identify and assess hazards adequately, to
> predict the occurrence of disasters, and to provide the requisite
> technical information for the design and implementation of effective
> programs is crucial to effective emergency management. Moreover, even
> when possible hazards have been identified, it is unclear just how
> much risk is involved. In by-gone eras, emergency management required
> little technical knowledge or expertise when compared with many other
> occupational specialties. Today, emergency managers need to master a
> specialized body of knowledge, often involving multiple disciplines.
> Accounting and budgeting skills are important. Public relations
> expertise and political savvy are necessary. Computing ability, in
> terms of information management, decision support, and geographic
> information systems, *et cetera*, is becoming more a part of routine
> emergency management work. A working knowledge of disaster-related
> laws and programs is vital.

*Objective 4.4*

> Overall, emergency management exists within a complex political,
> economic, and social environment. In part, this explains why emergency
> management has so long lacked a coherent, coordinated policy
> framework. Designing and implementing comprehensive emergency
> management procedures is easier said than done, principally because of
> the obstacles to effective action created by problems stemming from
> political salience, fragmented government responsibility, and a lack
> of technical expertise. In addition, it is only since about 1950 that
> Federal and State authorities have cooperated in the development of
> sound emergency management procedures and have begun to furnish local
> governments with sufficient resources to design, implement, and
> maintain effective emergency management programs. Vertical
> fragmentation results when Federal, State, and local authorities fail
> to coordinate their emergency management responsibilities, when they
> act independent of one another, when they duplicate their efforts or
> work at cross-purposes, or when one level of government fails to carry
> out its obligations.
>
> Because disasters are usually geographically localized, county and
> municipal authorities most often assume primary responsibility for
> emergency management. However, the policy-making, administrative, and
> fiscal capacities of many local governments is often questionable.
> They are often reluctant, unwilling, or unable to design, implement,
> and support effective programs.
>
> As noted earlier, horizontal fragmentation often stems from the
> multiplicity of State and local jurisdictions impacted by a disaster
> or emergency. Mutual assistance agreements may alleviate some of the
> jurisdictional confusion, but emergency responses regularly create
> unanticipated intra- and inter-jurisdictional conflicts that interfere
> with emergency management. Vertical and horizontal fragmentation is
> something with which emergency managers must learn to deal. Such
> fragmentation will not disappear even though "shared governance" holds
> some potential for achieving effective emergency management. Vertical
> and horizontal fragmentation often contributes to the problems of
> sufficient technical expertise, adequate fiscal resources, and unclear
> legislative mandates.
>
> In this manner, the problem of MULTI-AGENCY AND MULTI-JURISDICTIONAL
> COORDINATION challenges emergency managers. Disasters and emergencies
> often change the division of labor and resources in an organization.
> They compel a sharing of tasks and resources between organizations.
> They involve the crossing of jurisdictional boundaries, both in terms
> of geography and responsibility. They require the completion of
> non-routine tasks under abnormal circumstances. They damage, make
> unavailable, or overwhelm normal emergency response tools and
> facilities. Finally, they necessitate new organizational arrangements
> to meet the problems posed.
>
> Emergency management is also challenged by a fundamental public
> distrust of governmental planning efforts, strong resistance to
> land-use and construction regulation, and a tendency, especially at
> State and local levels, to focus only on recent disasters. Levels of
> risk are also difficult to measure, and cause and effect relationships
> are elusive as well. Sadly, it is often politically easier for
> government officials to wait for emergencies to happen and then deal
> with them, than it is for them to attempt to prepare for and mitigate
> their effects. Relief assistance is politically popular and desired,
> while mitigation and preparedness efforts are usually not politically
> popular.
>
> In large measure, the Federal system of the division of powers accords
> State governments, and the localities within them, the lead role in
> responding to most types of hazards and disasters. A facilitating role
> has been assumed by the Federal Government through the Federal
> Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), leaving it up to State and local
> governments to actually develop emergency management procedures.
> America has a highly decentralized and elaborate array of emergency
> management procedures with local emergency management at its base.
> There are some qualifiers. For some types---such as civil defense and
> nuclear accidents---the Federal role in policymaking and
> administration is dominant. Lack of clarity in law, regulations, and
> historical practice, along with differences in perceptions and
> interpretations of risk, have long complicated the job of emergency
> management.

*Objective 4.5*

> DIMENSIONS OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
>
> Decentralization is not necessarily all bad. In fact,
> decentralization, with sound coordination, is an essential component
> of successful emergency management. In addition, because most
> emergency management procedures are implemented by local governments
> to meet local needs, it is not reasonable to assume that common "all
> hazard" sets of procedures are applicable to all localities regardless
> of geography or other factors. The literature that exists on emergency
> management points out the primary dimensions and factors essential to
> successful emergency management. The extent to which one dimension is
> stressed over another depends upon the needs of the locality and the
> types of vulnerabilities the locality faces.
>
> The first dimension of emergency management stressed in the relevant
> literature is the need for strong cooperation and coordination among
> and within local, State, and Federal governments. Experience has
> demonstrated that local government is usually the first responder, and
> its agencies are the primary responders to the emergency, although the
> Federal Government may furnish most of the resources and much
> technical expertise. All citizens expect their local governments to
> prevent, respond to, and manage emergencies. But, without inter- and
> intra-governmental cooperation and coordination, local governmental
> officials cannot implement emergency management as well as they might.
>
> The second dimension found in the literature is the need for strong
> cooperation and coordination among the public, nonprofit, and private
> sectors. Since emergency management is normally conducted in a very
> fluid and often chaotic environment, the government, particularly the
> local government, faces difficulties in meeting its obligations while
> at the same time interacting with other governmental jurisdictions and
> private or nonprofit organizations. For instance, construction
> companies implement building codes and chemical companies help
> detoxify hazardous products. Charitable organizations often service
> human needs that governments cannot. Help from the private and
> non-profit sectors often augments successful emergency management,
> sometimes meeting needs or filling gaps that the government is unable
> to fully address.
>
> The third dimension recognizes the need to consider the type of
> disaster. This dimension may be the most complex. Later sessions will
> analyze different categories of disaster and address a host of both
> natural and man-made disasters in detail.

*Objective 4.6*

POLITICAL FACTORS

> Disasters also possess several significant political components that
> emergency managers should be well aware of in their interaction with
> public officials. In effect, natural disasters and emergencies provide
> excellent windows of opportunity for public officials. They often use
> such circumstances to demonstrate their leadership capabilities and
> willingness to tackle difficult problems. Their actions will almost
> always receive media publicity and instant public notice. Moreover, it
> is extremely difficult to oppose or criticize an official who steps in
> and gives the appearance of taking charge in order to help disaster
> victims.
>
> Natural disasters also produce conditions that allow political leaders
> to show their concern for citizens' needs and demands. Disaster
> victims often encounter problems that they have never before
> experienced and which they may be unprepared or unequipped to handle
> on their own. Public officials are in a position to highlight the
> needs and channel the resources to help those who are in distress.
> Disasters give them a perfect opportunity to demonstrate their
> responsiveness to the needs of the people. Political leaders who
> successfully address disaster-related problems are rewarded while
> those who are unwilling or unable to act can suffer negative political
> repercussions.

*Objective 4.7*

EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT PRESCRIPTIONS

> In light of the many factors involved, the literature suggests that
> the formulation of emergency management follow several prescriptions:
>
> 1\. Since it is a continuous process, emergency management should not
> be formulated on the basis of a single emergency, but on several. At
> the same time, it should allow for the constant incorporation of new
> findings.
>
> 2\. It should attempt to reduce uncertainty in crises by anticipating
> problems and projecting possible solutions. Thus, the appropriateness
> of response is more important than the speed of response.
>
> 3\. It needs to be based on what will probably happen; procedures need
> to address what people are likely to do in emergencies and not be
> based on myths or common pre-conceptions about human behavior.
>
> 4\. It must be educational in that involved persons must be aware that
> such emergency procedures exist, and they must understand and follow
> them. Consequently, emergency management needs to be "sold"
> effectively to communities in order to be taken seriously.
>
> 5\. Finally, it needs to be practiced because the absence of exercises
> and practice will largely negate even the best plans.

**Supplemental**

**Considerations**

> In review of the Bipartisan Task Force Report (pp. 1-16), the
> instructor must emphasize that power and responsibility in the
> American polity are dispersed by design. An over-all lack of
> organization and the absence of a "National goal" remain obstacles
> which the Report says need to be resolved. The spending percentages of
> the Federal Disaster Relief Funding are illuminating: recovery (73%),
> mitigation (22%), and combined preparedness and response (5%). These
> figures highlight the need to promote more mitigation, preparedness,
> and response. The Report discloses that 54% of funding, in the period
> measured, has gone to grants for disaster victims and communities, as
> well as to the payment of the operating expenses of the Federal
> disaster response programs.
>
> Despite the remarkable upturn in Federal disaster spending, Federal
> efforts are supposed to SUPPLEMENT the efforts of others. Most
> disasters do not involve the Federal Government. Local and State
> governments shoulder the primary responsibility for managing
> emergencies. The Federal role has increased since mid-century. Federal
> agencies, particularly FEMA, stimulate and guide emergency planning
> efforts, furnish substantial response and recovery funding, coordinate
> response efforts after (and sometimes before) a Governor secures help
> from the President, and fund many disaster mitigation endeavors.

**Endnotes**

-   Drabek, Thomas, Ph.D., *Social Dimensions of Disaster*: *Instructor
    Guide*, (Emmitsburg, Md: Federal Emergency Management Agency, 1996).

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-   *Introduction to Emergency Management: Student Manual*, (Emmitsburg,
    Md.: Federal Emergency Management Agency, September 1995):I-6.

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-   Petak, William J., "Emergency Management: A Challenge to Public
    Administration," *Public Administration Review,* Vol. 45, Special
    Issue (January 1985):3.

**Session No. 5**

**Course**: The Political and Policy Basis of Emergency Management

**Session**: Executive Political Issues and Disaster **Time**: 2 Hours

**Objectives:**

At the conclusion of this session, students should be able to:

> 5.1 Explain the significance of the issuance of Presidential
> Declarations.
>
> 5.2 Explain the general processes and methods by which Presidential
> Declarations of major disasters or emergencies are requested and
> reviewed.
>
> 5.3 Explain how "emergencies" and "marginal disasters" may invite
> politically subjective determinations in a President's decisions
> regarding Declarations.
>
> 5.4 Discuss how the lack of objective criteria for determining
> Presidential Declarations has impacted Governor requests.
>
> 5.5 Demonstrate an understanding of electoral and media factors that
> are involved in the executive branch operations.
>
> 5.6 Understand the general features of the White House organization.
>
> 5.7 Explain the significance of the executive branch and FEMA
> relations.
>
> 5.8 Demonstrate an understanding of the unique relationship that
> exists between President Clinton and the current FEMA Director, Mr.
> James Lee Witt with respect to representation in President Clinton's
> Cabinet.

**Scope**

> This session examines the emergency powers and responsibilities of
> Presidents and Governors. These stem from the U.S. Constitution for
> Presidents and from State Constitutions for respective Governors. It
> highlights the expanding role of both the President and the executive
> branch in major disasters and emergency management.
>
> The organization of the White House is depicted in order to
> demonstrate how the White House staff and advisors aid the President
> in meeting demands imposed by disasters or emergencies.
> Disaster-relevant, Cabinet-level agencies (many of which included in
> the Federal Response Plan to be studied later) and the FEMA Director's
> special representation in the Cabinet are also incorporated into this
> session.

**References**

Assigned student reading:

-   Schneider, Saundra K., "Human Behavior and Governmental Activity in
    Disasters: Two Sets of Norms," ***Flirting with Disaster: Public
    Management in Crisis Situations*** (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe,
    1995): Ch. 4, pp. 40-54.

-   Sylves, Richard T., "The Politics and Budgeting of Federal Disaster
    Management," ***Disaster Management in the U.S. and Canada***,
    Richard T. Sylves and William L. Waugh, Jr. (eds) (Springfield,
    Ill.: Charles C. Thomas Publishers, 1996):26-45.

> For those new to the study of public policy see:

-   Anderson, James E., "The Policy-Makers and Their Environment,"
    ***Public Policymaking: An Introduction***, 3rd ed. (Boston:
    Houghton-Mifflin Company, 1997): Ch. 2, pp. 47-90. \[See Appendix E
    for a synopsis.\]

**Requirements**

> Be sure to consult Appendix B for tables of information regarding the
> issuance record of Presidential Disaster Declarations. Review the
> records of each Presidential Administration. Be sure to note that the
> Presidential Disaster Declaration process pre-dates the formation of
> FEMA in 1979. Also remind students that new disaster laws, over the
> years, have changed both the conditions and resources distributed in
> Presidential Declaration decisionmaking.
>
> Appendix C should also be consulted for a chart depicting the
> organization of the White House. Appendix C and information in this
> session provide a description of the principal offices and staff posts
> in the White House relevant to disaster policy and emergency
> management.

**Remarks**

> American chief executives, despite what many people believe, cannot
> often exercise direct power, but must share power with others.
> Presidents and Governors work as chief executives. They usually play a
> larger role in policy development than they do in the implementation
> of policy.

PRESIDENTIAL SOURCES OF POWER

EMERGENCY POWERS

> These powers refer to the actions that the President may exercise on
> extraordinary occasions, such as in the case of a rebellion, an
> epidemic, a labor strike, or a disaster. Although no specific
> emergency powers were included in the Constitution, the President's
> Oath of Office requires him to "preserve, protect, and defend" the
> Constitution, as well as to uphold its provisions. Presidents may
> claim, in times of crisis, that the Constitution permits them to
> exercise powers usually granted to the legislative or judicial
> branches of government---fusing all governmental power in the
> executive branch for the duration of the crisis.
>
> The principal authorization of emergency powers for the President
> resides in Article II, Section 3 of the Constitution which States in
> part that "he shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed,"
> and Section 2 which grants him power as the Commander in Chief of the
> armed forces. President Lincoln justified the actions he took after
> the outbreak of the Civil War by claiming that the emergency made it
> necessary for him to exercise legislative powers until he could call
> Congress back into session. President Franklin Roosevelt threatened
> that, unless Congress repealed a certain provision in a wartime
> economic measure, he would treat the law as if it had been repealed
> for the duration of the emergency---in effect, threatening Congress
> with the loss of its legislative powers.
>
> Overall, emergencies have helped to develop the use of these otherwise
> dormant powers as well as the novel application of ordinary powers.
> Although the National Emergency Powers Act of 1976 sought to limit
> past emergency powers that had been granted to the President via
> precedent, Presidents still exercise vast emergency powers. Presidents
> retain the power to do what they want under the rubric of emergency
> powers until they are checked by one of the other branches of
> government. Checks and balances go a long way toward discouraging the
> President from abusing the use of the Presidential emergency. (The
> Supreme Court may declare certain emergency actions unconstitutional).

OTHER DIRECT SOURCES

> 1\. Presidential personnel appointment powers of key departmental
> officials include Schedule C appointments or the impaneling of special
> commissions and task force units. Schedule C appointments fall outside
> the Federal Civil Service methods of recruitment and selection. Senior
> politically-appointed Federal executives need the help of loyal staff
> and Schedule C posts are often filled by workers who understand that
> they are on a temporary assignment and that they themselves may owe
> their appointment to their political service or to some special
> expertise they possess. The President's appointed executives assume
> responsibility for both public management and the promotion of their
> appointing President's policy initiatives.
>
> 2\. The role in the formulation of the executive budget, and the
> preparation of the President's budget request for the next fiscal
> year.
>
> 3\. The President's ability to screen agency legislative proposals and
> to review and assess the proposed regulations of Federal executive
> agencies.
>
> 4\. The President has significant powers to reorganize executive
> branch agencies, subject to possible overrulings by a majority vote of
> either the House of Representatives or the Senate.
>
> 5\. The President has some control over the information which
> executive agencies under his direction supply to the Congress. This is
> especially the case in the area of National security, National
> defense, intelligence matters, and other areas involving restricted
> data.

INDIRECT SOURCES

> 1\. The strength of the United States as a political and economic
> force in the world.
>
> 2\. The President's own leadership style and personality.
>
> 3\. The President's ability to seize initiatives and to exercise
> emergency powers in crises.
>
> 4\. The legitimacy of the institution of the Presidency in persuading
> others to take some course of action.
>
> 5\. The President can veto bills passed by the Congress.

*Objective 5.1*

Presidential Declarations of Major Disaster

or Emergency

> A PRESIDENTIAL DECLARATION of a major disaster or emergency has far
> reaching consequences because it opens the door to Federal assistance.
> The Declaration specifies one or more political jurisdictions; it
> delineates exactly who is eligible for relief in the first place. The
> Presidential Declaration also contains an initial Statement about the
> kinds of assistance that will be provided. This is extremely important
> because it determines whether disaster victims will receive direct
> cash grants, housing supplements, and emergency medical care, etc. It
> also specifies whether or not State and local governments themselves
> are eligible to receive Federal disaster assistance to replace or
> repair public facilities and infrastructure and certain non-profit
> facilities.
>
> The Presidential Declaration is also vitally important to those
> directly affected by the disaster or emergency. It confers on them an
> "official" victim status needed to qualify for Federal aid. To the
> general public, especially those not directly affected by the
> disaster, the President's declaration is a significant piece of
> information as well. At a rather basic level, it signifies that a
> major event has occurred, requiring the attention and resources of the
> Federal Government. In this manner, the content of the Presidential
> Declaration structures popular perceptions about the nature and scope
> of the disaster.

*Objective 5.2*

Declaration Process

> Under customary procedure, the President must be asked by a Governor
> to declare a major disaster or emergency. However, the Stafford Act of
> 1988, and preceding laws, empower the President to declare a major
> disaster or emergency before a Governor asks for one or in the absence
> of a Governor's request altogether. The term "White House package"
> conveys some useful information about the process and about the
> information the President may choose to consider before deciding
> whether to "approve" or "turndown" a Governor's request for a
> Declaration.
>
> "WHITE HOUSE PACKAGE" refers to the documents prepared for the
> President's action on a Governor's request for a major disaster or
>
> emergency Declaration. The package includes the Governor's request and
> contains a memorandum from the FEMA Director to the President which
> summarizes significant aspects of the event; presents statistics
> relative to damage and losses; outlines the contributions made by
> Federal, State, local, and private agencies; highlights unmet needs
> for which the Governor seeks Federal assistance; and presents a
> recommended course of action for the President. Based on the
> recommendation, the package also contains appropriate letters and
> announcements related to the action to be taken (either a declaration
> or a turndown).
>
> "TURNDOWN" refers to the action authorized by the President and signed
> by the FEMA Director which denies a Governor's request for a major
> disaster or emergency Declaration.
>
> History demonstrates that since the first Presidential Disaster
> Declaration was issued in 1953, until 1954, about 1 in every 3
> Governor requests have been turned down by the President. The record,
> since 1988, following the adoption of the Stafford Act, demonstrates
> that Governors have about a 1 in 4 chance that their request will be
> denied. In other words, since 1988, the odds that a Governor's request
> will be approved by the President have risen. Certainly, the broader
> authority to judge what is or is not a disaster under the Stafford Act
> has provided Presidents, since 1988, with more latitude to approve
> unusual or "marginal" events as disasters or emergencies. This may be
> one reason for the higher Governor-request success rate since 1988.

*Objective 5.3*

Criteria and Declarations

> In examining the issue of Presidential Declarations, it is important
> to recognize that the Federal Government has never developed or
> employed a set of objective criteria by which to approve or deny
> Gubernatorial requests for Presidential Declarations of major
> disasters or emergencies. Governors, assisted by their State emergency
> managers, petition the President for Declarations through FEMA
> Regional Offices to FEMA Headquarters, with the close involvement of
> the FEMA Director. Each Governor knows that he or she must prove to
> FEMA and the President that the disaster or emergency, of whatever
> nature, is beyond the State's ability to adequately respond---such
> that Federal assistance is needed. However, it is difficult, if not
> impossible, for FEMA officials to ascertain that an event warrants a
> Presidential Declaration unless Preliminary Damage Assessments (PDAs)
> are first conducted and analyzed or unless the media coverage of the
> event makes it obvious that a major disaster has occurred. Moreover,
> it is difficult to judge whether State and local areas can recover on
> their own if the disaster damage has not yet been assessed.
>
> Furthermore, since the enactment of the Disaster Relief Act of 1970,
> the definition of disaster has been expanded to include not only major
> disasters, but also emergencies. In 1988, new categories of emergency
> were approved in law. Today the term "emergency" is used to define any
> event determined by the President to require Federal assistance as
> stipulated by the Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Amendments
> of 1988. As noted previously, emergencies are usually of less
> magnitude and scope than major disasters and Federal aid is capped at
> \$5 million. Emergency designations, more than major disaster
> designations, are likely to stretch the rule that States must lack the
> capacity to recover on their own to qualify for a Presidential
> Declaration. In times when State and local budgets are tight or in
> deficit, and an incident occurs, the emergency designation offers a
> flexible category for help. FEMA records disclose that snowstorms,
> windstorms, minor flooding, and drought are the most common types of
> emergency declarations. Emergencies also allow politically subjective
> determinations to come into play.
>
> Another important area in which politically subjective determinations
> play a role is with respect to marginal disasters. They are those
> events that are far less than catastrophic, that are not matters of
> National security, and that are near or within the recovery capacity
> of the State or States in which they occur. This researcher claims,
> from his analysis of 42 years of Presidential Disaster Declarations,
> that there have been hundreds of marginal disasters, some were granted
> a Presidential Declaration and some were denied approval. Specific
> case examples indicate that there are definite losers in the
> competition for Presidential Declarations. For example, in 1980,
> Florida experienced flooding after a dam failure and was denied a
> Declaration. In the same year, Oklahoma asked twice within a two-week
> period for a Declaration to cover devastation from severe storms and
> flooding, but was denied both times.
>
> The record of approvals and turndowns raises questions about how the
> Gubernatorial requests for Presidential Declarations are considered,
> particularly for marginal disaster denials. Since there were no
> objective criteria governing approvals and turndowns, only the
> President who received the request knows the reasoning in each case.
> FEMA, for example, does not keep records of fatalities in disaster
> incidents. Consequently, it is not possible to ascertain from
> governmental records whether or not fatalities played a role in the
> President's decision. The FEMA Director may make recommendations to
> the President that a request be turned down because it does not fit
> within the Stafford Act's general criteria of eligibility, yet the
> ultimate decision resides with the President.
>
> This invites political subjectivity into Presidential decisionmaking.
> Governors also play the game by seeking Presidential Declarations for
> drought, crop failures, minor wildfires, small floods, beach erosion,
> and a wide range of other calamities that cannot be considered
> catastrophes, major disasters, or emergencies under the "beyond the
> capability of the State and local government to adequately respond."
> Appendix D shows that, for all the Gubernatorial requests for
> Presidential Declarations (including major disasters, emergencies, and
> fire suppressions), about 66.2% are approved and 33.8% are turned
> down. This covers the entire time span of Presidential Declarations
> from January 1, 1953, to August 18, 1994. Those records of approvals
> and turndowns contain many possible candidates for marginal Disaster
> Declarations. Examining 1980 again, Missouri received \$137,182 in
> Federal aid under Declaration #620 for severe storm and tornado
> damage. Maine was also granted \$385,610 in Emergency Declaration
> #3082 for local fishing interests that suffered the effects of red
> tide-induced toxic algae in their fishing grounds. \[Sylves, 1996, p.
> 33.\]

*Objective 5.4*

Politics and Declarations

> According to FEMA Director James Lee Witt, each event or incident is
> evaluated individually on its own merits. The criteria set forth in
> the Stafford Act for evaluation are:
>
> 1\. The severity and magnitude of the incident;

2.  The impact of the event; and

> 3\. Whether the incident is beyond the capabilities of the State and
> affected local governments.
>
> Overall, the process and criteria are purposely subjective to allow
> the President some discretion to address a wide range of events and
> circumstances. FEMA Director Witt states that there are no definitive
> objective evaluators that could be used in the Declaration process,
> although he recommends that FEMA endeavor to establish some. Without
> such objective criteria, Governors and their State disaster officials
> have little to guide them in estimating whether to go ahead with a
> request for a Presidential Declaration of major disaster or emergency.
> They have little basis for concluding in advance whether their
> petition for a Presidential Declaration will be approved or denied.
> However, as long as a Governor or other State officials know that the
> State can afford to shoulder the 25% share of the 75/25% Federal aid
> formula contained in a Presidential Disaster Declaration, they have an
> incentive to request a Federal Declaration. State officials logically
> minimize their own capacity to address a disaster in petitioning for
> Federal help by "crying poor."

*Objective 5.5*

Media Coverage and Electoral Issues

> Over the past 20 or more years, **Presidents have taken a greater
> interest in disasters, particularly major ones**. President Carter
> issued a Presidential Disaster Declaration while flying over
> Washington State's Mt. St. Helens volcanic eruption; President Reagan
> was photographed shoveling sand into a gunnysack on the banks of a
> flooding Mississippi River; President Bush was filmed commiserating
> with the victims of the Loma Prieta earthquake in a heavily damaged
> San Francisco neighborhood; and, the television showed President
> Clinton at shelters and inspecting freeway damage in the days after
> the Northridge earthquake. Today, Americans expect their President to
> both dispatch Federal disaster help and personally visit damaged
> areas. It is now customary for most of the President's Cabinet,
> especially officials heading disaster-relevant departments, to visit
> major disaster sites.
>
> Such visits have both political and administrative consequences. The
> Bush Administration's awkward handling of the Hurricane Andrew
> disaster in southern Florida, despite the benefit of a Presidential
> visit to the devastated areas, was alleged to have nearly cost the
> President Florida's electoral votes in the 1992 election. California,
> another State that has had a disproportionately large number of
> disasters and emergencies over the years, has 54 electoral votes (more
> than any other State), one fifth the total needed to win the
> Presidency. These factors do not go unnoticed in the White House. How
> Presidents manage disasters, and how responsive to the needs of
> victims they are perceived to be, has far-ranging political and
> electoral consequences. This underlines the importance of the role of
> the FEMA Director, i.e., how well the Director manages the Agency's
> response to disaster is of great political importance to the President
> and his staff. \[Sylves, 1996, p. 27.\]
>
> The Clinton Administration, like others before it, appreciates the
> role the news media have in covering disasters. Both President Clinton
> and the current FEMA Director, James Lee Witt, have emphasized
> post-disaster public relations, in part because they believe the
> President's public image is at stake in disaster circumstances. The
> public requires reassurance that Federal leaders are doing all they
> can to help disaster victims. How the FEMA Director and his staff
> manage the Federal response, and how they portray this effort to the
> Media, shapes public opinion of both the Presidency and the Agency.
> Major disasters customarily pull the Nation together, encourage a
> centralization of authority, and often improve the President's
> approval ratings in public opinion polls. For example, after the
> Northridge earthquake, President Clinton, usually accompanied by FEMA
> Director Witt, visited the damaged areas where he met with victims,
> emergency responders, and State and local officials. Such activity
> promotes public awareness of the disaster across the State, the
> Nation, and the world. It underscores the legitimacy of the
> Government's response and it may convey a greater sense of urgency to
> responders and to those considering the offer of help.

*Objective 5.6*

White House Organization

> The White House staff consists of key aides the President sees
> daily---the chief of staff, Congressional liaison people, the press
> secretary, the National security advisor, and a few other political
> and administrative assistants. Actually there are about 600 people who
> work on the White House staff whom the President rarely sees, but who
> provide a wide range of services. Appendix C provides a detailed chart
> of the principal offices of the White House.
>
> Most Presidents rely heavily on their staffs for information, policy
> options, and analysis. Different Presidents have different relations
> with, and means of organizing, their staffs. President Carter was a
> "detail man" who poured endlessly over memoranda and facts. President
> Reagan was the consummate "delegator" who entrusted tremendous
> responsibilities to his staff. President Bush fell somewhere between
> the extremes of President Carter and President Reagan and was
> considerably more accessible than President Reagan. President Clinton,
> like President Carter, is a detail man, but someone who has also run
> an open White House with fluid staffing \[Lineberry, Edwards, and
> Wattenberg, 1995, pp. 312-313.\]
>
> In any disaster or emergency, many of these offices are likely to
> engage in facilitating the President's work. Clearly, within the
> political offices, all units of the Communications Office would be
> tasked, especially the Press Secretary. The offices of
> Intergovernmental Affairs and Public Liaison would also be heavily
> involved.
>
> Also helping the President, within the policy offices domain, are the
> Domestic Policy Council and the Office of Cabinet Affairs which would
> most likely take on emergency or disaster management duties. The
> Office of Support Services would probably call on the Office of
> Scheduling and Advance if the President were to make arrangements to
> visit the disaster area. The Secret Service, and military and medical
> offices may also play roles. Remember that various White House offices
> and officials come and go with the passage of time and the change of
> Presidents.

*Objective 5.7*

FEMA Leadership and White House Organization

> In the past, the White House staff and other Administration officials
> have stepped in to fill post-disaster power vacuums. For example,
> President Bush assigned John Sununu, his White House Chief of Staff,
> the job of leading the Federal Government's response to the Loma
> Prieta earthquake (in part because FEMA only had an acting Director at
> the time). Some three years later, President Bush asked Transportation
> Secretary Andrew Card to lead the Federal response to Hurricane
> Andrew. President Bush also left the FEMA Directorship vacant for
> months, suggesting that he did not trust FEMA Directors to handle
> executive branch leadership in these circumstances. However, rotating
> Federal disaster leadership among inexperienced disaster management
> White House staffers and cabinet secretaries---absent a strong FEMA
> Director---may produce inefficient and parochial outcomes.

*Objective 5.8*

*(and 5.7 continued)*

Leadership After Disasters

> In 1993, the National Academy of Public Administration (NAPA) and the
> U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) published reports in which they
> explicitly maintained that FEMA needs a Director who is trusted by the
> President to assume a leading Federal role in disasters. They strongly
> endorsed appointing someone who possessed the legal, political, and
> managerial clout to compel other Federal agencies to respond to
> disasters and emergencies. This problem seems to have been addressed
> in the Clinton Administration due to the unique relationship between
> the President and current FEMA Director, James Lee Witt. Thus far,
> President Clinton seems to trust his former Arkansas emergency
> management Director and current FEMA Director with central Federal
> emergency management responsibility.
>
> President Clinton has added the FEMA Director as a participant in his
> Administration's weekly Cabinet meetings. This has helped communicate
> to Cabinet officials that the President values emergency management
> and has facilitated the FEMA Director's ability to coordinate
> government-wide support for disaster activities. This is crucial
> because, FEMA, relative to many bigger and more politically powerful
> Federal departments and agencies must lead through its ability to
> maintain Presidential confidence and through its capacity to supervise
> and mediate the coordination of a host of Federal, State and local
> organizations.

**Supplemental**

**Considerations**

> It is not important that students memorize the history of Presidential
> Disaster Declarations. However, some general historical knowledge
> about American disaster policy from the 1950s to the present would be
> a good goal. Students must also be convinced that the relationship of
> any President with the FEMA Director is a key factor in Federal
> emergency management. Clearly, Directors with close bonds to the
> President are better able to coordinate with the leaders of other
> agencies in disaster circumstances and are more likely to be respected
> by lawmakers in the Congress.

**Endnotes**

-   Lineberry, Robert L., George C. Edwards III, and Martin P.
    Wattenberg, *Government in America: People, Politics and Policy,
    Brief Version*, 2nd ed. (New York: Harper-Collins, 1995):312-313.

**Session No. 6**

**Course**: The Political and Policy Basis of Emergency Management

**Session**: Legislative Political Issues and Disaster **Time**: 2 Hours

**Objectives:**

By the conclusion of this session, students should be able to:

> 6.1 Demonstrate an understanding of the Congressional committee system
> by outlining the general types of committees.
>
> 6.2 Discuss how FEMA and disaster policy and funding are at a
> disadvantage relative to other agencies and issues in the
> appropriations process.
>
> 6.3 Explain how FEMA and disaster policy and funding have been
> splintered in the authorization process, and list three House and
> Senate Committees with jurisdiction over disaster policy and funding.
>
> 6.4 List factors associated with the decision-making process of the
> individuals and collective committees that make up Congress.
>
> 6.5 Present an example of how these factors interact with one another
> in the decisions of individual legislators.
>
> 6.6 Demonstrate an understanding of how Congress has played a
> substantial role in fragmenting FEMA, and disaster policy in general,
> through the appointee confirmation process and the creation of
> "stovepipes."
>
> 6.7 Discuss and explain the significance of special interests in
> decisionmaking and be able to furnish the names of at least three
> groups which lobby in the field of emergency management and disaster
> policy.
>
> 6.8 Explain the important role that the insurance industry has as a
> special interest that often lobbies Congress.

**Scope**

> The U.S. Congress represents the central landscape of this session.
> The Congressional committee system and its relevance to disaster
> policy and emergency management lawmaking are taken up with reference
> to a few committees with cardinal jurisdiction in this field. The
> legislative and political issues of disasters encompass customary
> party affiliation vs. constituency interests. This session also
> explains how Congress has helped systematically to fragment FEMA, and
> disaster management in general. This is seen in the appointee
> confirmation process and the creation of legislative "stovepipes." In
> addition, the importance of interest groups and their efforts in
> lobbying on behalf of disaster-related issues is examined briefly.

**References**

Assigned student reading:

-   Wamsley, Gary L. and Aaron D. Schroeder "Escalating in a Quagmire:
    Changing Dynamics of the Emergency Management Policy System,"
    ***Public Administration Review***, Vol. 56, No. 3 (May/June
    1996):235-244.

-   U.S. Senate, Bipartisan Task Force on Funding Disaster Relief, John
    Glenn (Chairman), Christopher S. Bond (Co-Chairman), "Federal
    Disaster Assistance: Report of the Senate Task Force on Funding
    Disaster Relief," 104th Cong., 1st Sess., ***Document 104-4***
    (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1995). \[See pp.
    18-39 on the insurance industry.\]

> Students new to the study of public policy would gain from reading the
> Anderson assignment below. A synopsis of this chapter appears in
> Appendix E.

-   Anderson, James E., "Policy Formation: Problems, Agendas, and
    Formulation," ***Public Policymaking: An Introduction**,* 3rd ed.
    (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin Company, 1997): Ch. 3, pp. 91-132.

> Instructor may wish to skim through:

-   U.S. Congress and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (Yvonne B.
    Burke; Frank C. Carlucci; Charles L. Dempsey; Thomas M. Downs;
    Andrew J. Goodpaster; Stan M. McKinney; Phillip A Odeen; Elmer B.
    Staats; and Lee M. Thomas) ***Coping with Catastrophe: Building an
    Emergency Management System to Meet People's Needs in Natural and
    Manmade Disasters**,"* (Washington, DC: National Academy of Public
    Administration (NAPA), February 1993):75.

**Requirements**

> This session imposes some special demands on the instructor. First,
> the students need some fundamental review of how the legislative
> process works in Congress. Within the legislative process is the
> Congressional committee system, itself rather complex and elaborate.
> Next, the students need some appreciation regarding how external
> forces and interests impact Congress. These forces include the
> President, Federal agencies, general and special interests,
> constituents, and States and localities, to name a few. Finally, the
> relevance of all of this to emergency management needs to be
> explained.

**Remarks**

*Objective 6.1*

> Within the legislative branch of the Federal Government, disaster and
> emergency management issues and laws are decided within the intricate
> framework of the Congressional committee system. This system is a
> highly elaborate one in which jurisdictional areas of policy and
> programs are divided among a number of different committees. Many FEMA
> programs fall under the jurisdiction of several Congressional
> Committees. Those bodies include the Budget Committee, Appropriations
> Committee, and Authorizing Committees.

BUDGET COMMITTEES

> The SENATE BUDGET COMMITTEE and the HOUSE BUDGET COMMITTEE were
> created in 1974 and are responsible for monitoring the progress of all
> spending and taxing bills that move through the Congress. Their chief
> purpose is to help Congress keep track of how various spending and
> taxing measures are cumulatively affecting the next fiscal year's
> expected budget deficit or surplus. Their work involves SCOREKEEPING
> in that they help both authorizing and appropriating bodies keep score
> with regard to the budgetary impacts of the measures they are
> considering. They also keep track of how tax measures being considered
> (such as tax cuts or increases) will affect the final budget. FEMA,
> like most Federal agencies, becomes involved tangentially with House
> or Senate Budget Committees when substantive legislation is at issue,
> and it has budgetary implications. In "Session 8: Disasters and
> Budgeting," the budgetary process in Congress, with respect to
> disaster and emergency management, will be examined in greater detail.

*Objective 6.2*

APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEES

> Although some Appropriations Committee power has been usurped by the
> House and Senate Budget Committees, Appropriations Committees maintain
> tremendous control over the details of government spending. The full
> House and Senate Appropriations Committees are relatively large. They
> are divided into Subcommittees in order to achieve a better division
> of labor. FEMA's main Appropriations Subcommittees are the SENATE and
> HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS SUBCOMMITTEES ON THE VETERAN'S ADMINISTRATION, ON
> HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, AND ON INDEPENDENT AGENCIES. One major
> disadvantage for FEMA, and disaster funding in general, is that often
> other agencies (such as the Department of Housing and Urban
> Development, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and
> the Environmental Protection Agency) cause the full appropriation
> measure, of which FEMA's annual budget is a part, to be delayed and
> mired in political debate over policies and programs unrelated to
> disasters and emergencies.
>
> FEMA is often detrimentally affected by these disputes since members
> of these Subcommittees have, for the most part, sought appointment to
> them to promote purposes other than disaster funding. Some members
> attach political importance to advancing veterans programs while
> others want to champion inner city economic interests and governmental
> housing programs. This point is crucial to note because disaster and
> emergency issues and funding must compete with other interests for
> legislative attention. Overall, Appropriations Subcommittees and their
> members are free to conduct hearings, investigations, and other
> activities within the jurisdiction of their committees' authority.
>
> Remember, other Federal agencies besides FEMA have disaster-related
> programs, such as the Department of Commerce's Economic Development
> Administration which provides disaster recovery grants and the Army
> Corps of Engineers which helps communities clear debris and build
> flood control facilities, etc. Consequently, other Subcommittees of
> the Appropriations Subcommittee further are responsible for reviewing,
> changing, cutting, and enhancing, *et cetera,* disaster-related
> spending legislation.
>
> Moreover, there are revenue or tax committees in Congress. The HOUSE
> WAYS AND MEANS COMMITTEE and the SENATE FINANCE COMMITTEE have
> jurisdiction over more Federal spending than the Appropriations
> Committees because they handle all Federal tax measures, all Federal
> trust funds, and most off-budget spending. For example, FEMA's
> National Flood Insurance Program and the U.S. Department of
> Agriculture's Crop Insurance Program, both operated as insurance trust
> funds, are under the jurisdiction of these two Committees.

*Objective 6.3*

AUTHORIZING COMMITTEES

> Authorizing Committees of the Congress are responsible for the review
> of proposed legislation, substantive bill drafting, and determining
> the financing scheme for existing and proposed governmental programs.
> They fundamentally impart legal authority in the legislation they
> craft and help enact. Overall, the more SENIORITY (i.e., consecutive
> years and terms in office) lawmakers have, the greater choice they
> have in selecting their committee assignments. Most seek appointments
> to committees with jurisdiction over policies and programs in which
> they have a strong political interest. For example, legislators from
> agricultural districts or States often seek appointments to House or
> Senate Agricultural Committees. Once appointed to an Authorization
> Committee, a lawmaker has an incentive to promote, support, and
> perfect the policies and programs within that Committee's
> jurisdiction. Lawmakers with long-term service on such committees
> often become highly knowledgeable experts in the subject matter of the
> policies and programs they oversee. Authorizing Committees often seek
> the expansion of programs under their jurisdiction, but they may also
> propose cutbacks and the reorganization or termination of policies and
> programs.
>
> Appendix D presents a detailed list summarizing the House and Senate
> Authorizing Committees with major jurisdiction over FEMA operations
> and programs. As the appendix clearly indicates, the House and Senate
> jurisdiction over FEMA and its programs is highly dispersed over
> twelve Authorizing Committees in each chamber. Moreover, as mentioned
> in the case of the Appropriations Committee work, non-FEMA
> disaster-related agencies and programs may be presided over by
> committees besides these. This splintering of authorization and the
> problems to which it leads will be discussed later in the session.

*Objective 6.4*

> LEGISLATORS AND THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS
>
> Overall, a wide range of factors are involved in the decision-making
> process of lawmakers and the collective committees that make up
> Congress. These factors significantly affect the issues that those
> individuals and committees choose to address and the way that they
> choose to address them.
>
> The role of VALUES in legislative decisionmaking has become a central
> area of research. Many have come to recognize that political elections
> are often based on a clash of candidate values. Five categories of
> values which sometimes guide decisionmakers are: organizational
> values, professional values, personal values, policy values, and
> ideological values. Organizational values can be thought of here as
> committee values; they involve the promotion of organizational and
> committee interests in the decisionmaking process. Professional values
> infer that the norms of one's profession instill values that have an
> impact on decisionmaking (e.g., lawyers may tend to take a legal
> perspective on issues). Personal values may involve personal
> ambitions, reputation, and self-interest. Policy values can entail
> acting on the basis of perceived public interest or acting in accord
> with beliefs about what is proper, ethical, or morally correct.
> Finally, ideological values signify rationalizing and legitimizing
> actions on the basis of a political ideology or belief system.
>
> POLITICAL PARTY AFFILIATION remains a strong factor, but one that
> vacillates in its influence of the decision-making process. Party
> membership is interwoven with leadership influence, policy values, and
> ideological values. The Republican and Democratic Parties are mass
> membership parties that seek to appeal to an extremely broad range of
> political interests and ideologies. Party members do not always vote
> as a cohesive bloc. Moreover, more people vote split tickets than vote
> along straight party lines. Political party affiliation, however, is
> still a good predictor of how most legislators will vote or act
> towards an issue. Parties are sometimes associated with specific
> policy positions. Many issues are so complex that they do not lend
> themselves to left vs. right, or liberal vs. conservative party
> positioning.
>
> When party interests conflict with CONSTITUENCY INTERESTS, legislators
> usually vote in favor of their constituency interests. A legislator's
> constituency is made up of the voters and key interests that elected
> him or her to office. Legislators are delegates sometimes, and
> trustees other times. As DELEGATES, they decide matters in accord with
> the views of the majority of their constituents or with a vital block
> of back-home interests. As delegates they attempt to anticipate the
> feelings and sentiments of their constituents. When legislators behave
> as TRUSTEES, they consider interests beyond their constituencies: they
> may think about National, environmental, humanitarian, global, or
> political minority interests.
>
> Within the context of disaster politics, a lawmaker behaves as a
> representative of constituency interests when he or she presses
> Congress and Federal disaster agencies for special categories of
> post-disaster aid or when that legislator attempts to influence agency
> decisionmaking on behalf of a constituent affected by the disaster. A
> lawmaker behaves as a trustee when he or she considers broad National
> interests, such as how much Federal disaster spending adds to the
> Federal deficit and National debt, and proposes ways to economize on
> this form of Federal expenditure.
>
> Other factors that significantly affect legislators in the
> decision-making process are public opinion, deference, and decision
> rules. PUBLIC OPINION usually has an impact on policy decisionmaking
> when decisions involve broad direction. However, most members of the
> general public have very limited knowledge of what policymakers are
> considering. DEFERENCE to the judgment of others occurs when
> decisionmakers obey the wishes of their appointed superiors or when
> legislators vote in accord with the views of top representatives or
> senators who head key committees or subcommittees. DECISION RULES
> refers to instances when new decisions are based on precedents in
> decisionmaking that have occurred before. It also applies to committee
> decisionmaking.

*Objective 6.5*

> These factors regularly interact with each other in the realm of
> disaster policy decisions of legislators. For example, consider a
> hypothetical Republican Congresswoman from Florida. Assume she is
> infused with the values of self-sufficiency, an ideology of "the less
> government the better," and privativism. These values would seem to
> point her toward voting in favor of reduced funding for disaster
> relief initiatives and toward more discretion for States in running
> disaster-related programs. As a Republican, she may also be
> distrustful of FEMA since it was founded by a Democratic
> administration (President Carter) and because Democratic President
> Clinton has strongly associated himself with the work of the Agency.
> The Florida Republican Congresswoman has to balance those views
> against her constituency interests. Since she is from a State that has
> suffered many disasters in the past, her constituency interests may
> outweigh other factors. Moreover, if she has any ambitions to move to
> higher National political office, she will have to consider public
> opinion in the stand she chooses to take. Finally, she may choose to
> defer to the views of the committee with jurisdiction over the matter
> or she may base her decision on past precedents. Competing sets of
> values create cross-pressures for legislators.

*Objective 6.6*

FRAGMENTATION OF FEMA AND DISASTER POLICY

> While factors reviewed above clearly have an impact on decisionmaking
> concerning disaster policy, they are not the only factors worth
> considering. In 1993, the National Academy of Public Administration
> (NAPA) contended that Congress had played a substantial role in
> splintering and fragmenting FEMA, and disaster policy in general, into
> programmatic "stovepipes." In effect, NAPA claimed that Congress' use
> of the confirmation of the appointment process and its general
> oversight of substantive matters (both conducted through Congressional
> Committees), had created for FEMA a "Mission Impossible."

APPOINTEE CONFIRMATION PROCESS

> In the early 1990's, NAPA alleged that FEMA had a disproportionately
> large number of politically appointed managerial positions. This
> sparked some conflicts between the President and the Congress.
> Democratic and Republican Presidential administrations of previous
> decades tended to increase the number of FEMA political appointees.
> More Presidential political appointments to executive branch positions
> holds two sets of benefits for a President. Appointed officials are
> more loyal to the President and his political agenda than are merit
> non-appointed officials. More political appointments also affords a
> President more patronage jobs to dispense as a reward to loyal and
> capable campaign workers and political supporters.
>
> Political appointments requiring Senate confirmation accord the
> Congress some benefits. Senators, especially those in leadership
> positions on the Confirmation Committees, may influence the
> President's decision regarding who is nominated and may exact
> agreements and promises from nominees in the course of confirmation
> hearings. Sometimes nominees fail to win Senate confirmation because
> they have been unresponsive or have provoked a powerful legislator or
> group of legislators. In some respects, the President and Congress
> compete for the loyalty of those whom they appoint to powerful
> managerial positions.
>
> In 1993, NAPA and the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) researchers
> alleged that FEMA had too many political appointees for its size (30+
> employees out of an approximate total of 2,600). All ten FEMA Regional
> Directors are, by law, politically appointed. Owing to the assortment
> of organizations used to form FEMA in 1979, another eight FEMA
> appointees also require Senate confirmation. Five separate Senate
> Committees, each with different interests, must act to confirm one or
> more of these appointees. NAPA and GAO allege that many of these
> appointees owe their allegiance less to the FEMA Director and more to
> certain lawmakers on certain Senate Committees and to influential FEMA
> clientele groups. Compounding this problem were caustic media reports
> that FEMA has been a political dumping ground for spoils system
> appointees who are unqualified to meet their obligations.

CONGRESS AND THE CREATION OF STOVEPIPES

> Congress contributes to this disaster policy fragmentation in part
> through the oversight exercised by a multitude of committees and
> subcommittees. This splintering makes a comprehensive overview of
> disaster policy impossible and contributes to the fragmentation within
> FEMA via programmatic authorizations tied to specific kinds of
> disasters. It also renders relations with Congress needlessly
> time-consuming, complex, and contentious. Although many authorizing
> committees have jurisdiction over some aspect of emergency management,
> there is no single committee in either the House or the Senate which
> has comprehensive oversight responsibility for all of FEMA or disaster
> policy and management. In fact, one FEMA document States that "about
> two-thirds of the House and Senate Committees get involved" in
> supervising FEMA and its programs.
>
> Within these Committees there are many Subcommittees, each of which
> has its own jurisdiction over some aspect of FEMA and disaster policy.
> Subcommittees sometimes conflict with their respective full Committees
> over matters of jurisdiction. This fragmentation or splintering is so
> pervasive that no one has an overall perspective about where
> individual programs fit within the broad framework of Federal
> emergency management. In a 1992 report on internal controls, FEMA
> formally recognized the problem of fragmented jurisdiction when the
> Director commented:
>
> "FEMA's programs are authorized and directed by a myriad of enabling
> legislation, appropriation acts, executive orders, and National
> Security Directives. In addition, Congressional oversight and
> jurisdiction involves some 16 Congressional committees and 23
> subcommittees. As a result, FEMA's mission is continually altered and
> shaped in a piecemeal fashion by diverse events, the influence of
> various constituencies, and differing Congressional interests. For
> FEMA's management, appropriate integration of these various
> authorities into a cohesive mission is difficult at best, especially
> given the fragmentation and dynamics of legislative policy." \[U.S.
> Congress and FEMA, February, 1993, p.75.\]
>
> A description of the appropriations system for FEMA serves as an
> example of this fragmentation. Even though FEMA's appropriations are
> handled by one Subcommittee in each House of Congress, Congressional
> coordination in supervising FEMA and in promoting its cardinal
> mission, is lacking. FEMA, as mentioned previously, is placed in the
> same appropriations bill with housing, environmental protection, space
> exploration, and veterans affairs programs, most of which tend to get
> a greater share of each Subcommittee's attention. Second, different
> Appropriations Subcommittees have jurisdiction over the Small Business
> and Agricultural Loan programs available to disaster victims. Third,
> emergency management programs are authorized for varying time periods,
> ranging from permanent to annual authorizations. Each authorization is
> handled separately with little consideration for other emergency
> management programs, as a result, the programmatic "stovepipes" are
> perpetuated. Finally, due to concerns about FEMA's performance,
> committees have taken on the role of micro-managers, making
> reprogramming (i.e., flexibility with funds) difficult, while
> committees include specific directives for funding individual
> projects.

*Objective 6.7*

THE ROLE OF SPECIAL INTERESTS IN DISASTER POLICY

> The appointment confirmation process and the creation of "stovepipes"
> are further influenced by the unique role of special interest groups
> and their efforts. Overall, special interests employ lobbying efforts
> to influence the decisions of the government through a variety of
> means, including communications with public officials. In recent
> times, there has been a proliferation of interest groups and lobbyists
> throughout the United States, and Congress is one of the primary
> arenas in which they promote their clients and causes.
>
> Special interest groups and the lobbyists they employ are an integral
> part in lawmaking, providing stakeholder opinions and issuing
> expertise. As evidence of their involvement and influence, lobbyists
> are often thought of as the "Third House" of Congress. In effect,
> along with the House and the Senate, special interests play a truly
> significant role in decisionmaking. Nowadays, special interests and
> lobbying have become more professional and sophisticated. Special
> interests engage in coalition-building, grassroots mobilization,
> information distribution through the Media, public relations, and even
> polling \[Rosenthal, 1993, pp. 1-14\].
>
> Congress is no stranger to the charms and pressures of influential
> interest groups, even in the domain of disaster policy and emergency
> management. At the lower end of the spectrum of influence are
> voluntary organizations that often engage in disaster relief, such as
> the American Red Cross and the United Way. More prominent interests
> are groups such as the National Governor's Association, which lobbies
> for increased funding of disasters and a lowering of the State portion
> of matching funds, and the U.S. Conference of Mayors, which is
> especially concerned with the creation and extent of Federally-imposed
> land-use regulations. While both of these interest groups lobby on a
> wide range of issues, Federal disaster policy has also led to the
> creation of single-issue, special interest groups. The International
> Association of Fire Chiefs is an example of a single-interest
> professional group which lobbies on behalf of its members.

*Objective 6.8*

> The most influential special interest group with respect to disaster
> policy, however, is by far the American insurance industry. In the
> United States, the insurance industry plays an important role by
> spreading out the risk of disasters through the policies they sell.
> This reduces the financial impact of disasters on insured disaster
> victims and, in turn, on the U.S. Government. As a result of this
> crucial role and the significant financial and political power that
> the insurance industry possesses in the United States, it is
> integrally involved in the legislative process.
>
> In general, it should be noted that the type of available insurance
> coverage varies throughout the United States, depending in part on the
> risk of particular natural hazards. Although the insurance industry as
> a whole has been able to absorb the losses that have resulted from
> recent catastrophic events such as Hurricane Andrew, the frequency and
> severity of such events in certain areas have led to bankruptcy for a
> few individual insurance firms. In effect, the sensitivity of
> insurance to catastrophic events has caused financial and insurance
> availability problems in certain areas of the United States,
> especially California and Florida. As a result, the insurance industry
> has threatened to refuse insurance to certain areas unless Congress
> takes steps to make mitigation measures and land-use regulations more
> effective.

**Supplemental**

**Considerations**

> When it comes to legislatures, ACCESS is important. People who are
> celebrities, political or otherwise, often find it easy to gain access
> to lawmakers. These charismatic personalities have ready access to the
> Media which they can use to draw attention to their concerns.
>
> Another best access gainer is the governmental administrator.
> High-ranking governmental officials gain access through the power of
> their expertise and through their knowledge of key technical details.
> This can include State or local administrators as well as National
> Government officials. FEMA Director James Lee Witt has achieved this
> status. His expertise and experience, his skillful presentation to the
> Media, and his access to the President all afford him considerable
> ability to move his Agency's concerns forward on the policy agenda.
>
> Administrative agencies can help create imputed interest groups, which
> are groups made up of people who benefit (often indirectly) as a
> result of a governmental program. If the U.S. Department of Education
> forced the creation of and funded a computer lab in every American
> public school, to benefit school children, you can bet that all the
> employees hired to operate these labs would join together to insure
> that the program of computer labs in schools was continued and
> promoted into the future as governmental policy. State disaster agency
> officials represent an imputed interest group in the sense that they
> and their work benefit directly and indirectly from the Federal
> Government grants to their agencies and to Federal efforts to promote
> private sector disaster mitigation by using State-level disaster
> management expertise and help.
>
> Another access gainer is the President and the White House staff. The
> President may call press conferences, make public speeches, issue
> reports often through his or her staff, veto legislation, and appoint
> or dismiss political appointees of his or her administration, all with
> an aim to influencing Congress.
>
> Congressional people and their staffs have the potential to influence
> other lawmakers when they call press conferences, hold newsworthy
> public hearings, bargain with the President (at leadership levels),
> represent home districts and/or States in very public ways, or use
> personal or committee staffs to press something forward onto the
> policy agenda.
>
> Interest groups, as discussed above, enjoy access in varying degrees
> and are of special help if an issue has low public visibility.

**Endnotes**

-   Rosenthal, Alan, ***The Third House*** (Washington DC: Congressional
    Quarterly Inc., 1993):1-14.

**Session No. 7**

**Course**: The Political and Policy Basis of Emergency Management

**Session**: Disaster Laws **Time**: 2 Hours

**Objectives:**

At the conclusion of this session, students should be able to:

> 7.1 Demonstrate an understanding of the early motivations and
> characteristics of disaster relief efforts and assistance.
>
> 7.2 Review the central features of the Civil Defense Act of 1950 and
> discuss its significance.
>
> 7.3 Review the central features of the Disaster Relief Act of 1950 and
> discuss its precedent-setting nature.
>
> 7.4 Explain the general trends of shifting to individual assistance
> programs and non-structural control efforts and their political
> implications.
>
> 7.5 Review the central features of the Disaster Relief Act of 1974 and
> discuss the need for, and implications of, a multi-hazard approach to
> emergency management.
>
> 7.6 Review the central features of the Stafford Act of 1988 and
> discuss the debate that has ensued from the definition of what
> constitutes an "emergency."
>
> 7.7 Review the components of the Disaster Relief Act of 1950 that
> continue to provide a foundation for the Stafford Act's authority.
>
> 7.8 Demonstrate an understanding of the greater trends in general
> public policy of which disaster law is a part.
>
> 7.9 Describe the shifts which have been taking place in disaster
> policy and the reasons behind them.

**Scope**

> Building from the previous session regarding the U.S. Congress, this
> session describes some of the major laws regarding management of
> disasters and emergencies. It does so by providing a historical
> perspective on disaster laws and the Government's involvement in
> disaster management through them. Overall, it connotes the statutory
> evolution of government authority and responsibility in preparing for
> disaster, and in response and recovery to disasters which have
> occurred. It also provides an examination of disaster policy as a
> function of greater political and policymaking trends.

**References**

Assigned student reading:

-   Schneider, Saundra K., "Natural Disasters as Public Policy Issues,:
    ***Flirting with Disaster: Public Management in Crisis Situations***
    (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1995):18-26.

-   U.S. Senate, Bipartisan Task Force on Funding Disaster Relief, John
    Glenn (Chairman), Christopher S. Bond (Co-Chairman), "Federal
    Disaster Assistance: Report of the Senate Task Force on Funding
    Disaster Relief," 104th Cong., 1st Sess., ***Document No. 104-4***
    (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1995). \[See
    Appendix I. "Evolution of Federal Disaster Assistance Policies and
    Programs," pp. 93-143 and Appendix II, "Profiles of Major Disaster
    Assistance Programs," pp. 145-160. \]

> For students new to the study of public policy, it would help them if
> they reviewed the Anderson assignment below. A synopsis of this
> chapter appears in Appendix E.

-   Anderson, James E., "Policy Adoption," ***Public Policymaking: An
    Introduction**,* 3rd ed. (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin Company, 1997):

> Ch. 4, pp. 133-176.

**Requirements**

> Preparing this lesson is a challenge because it embodies substantial
> descriptive information. It is best to list key terms and concepts on
> the chalkboard, drawing from those that have been capitalized
> throughout the session. Many portions of the Remarks section may be
> reproduced as handouts for the class. In addition, the instructor may
> want to focus on some specific law or act that has not been touched on
> in this session or choose to examine a specific law in greater detail.

**Remarks**

> Currently, the Government of the United States provides a wide range
> of services and benefits so that public institutions, private
> companies and individuals can better cope with emergency and disaster
> events. A STANDARD SET OF POLICIES has been developed, over time, that
> enables the Government to deal with all types of disasters, regardless
> of where or when they occur. An analysis of disaster policy through
> the evolution of disaster laws clearly indicates that the level and
> scope of governmental activity in this policy area has changed
> significantly over the years.

*Objective 7.1*

EARLY DISASTER RELIEF EFFORTS AND ASSISTANCE

> Even before the United States became an independent Nation, public
> institutions were providing assistance to victims of natural
> disasters. For example, local officials helped Boston residents
> affected by a major earthquake in 1755. Overall, disaster relief was
> historically considered to be a local responsibility. In the event of
> a disaster, city and county officials were the ones expected to step
> in and help those in need. In addition, local government actions were
> often supplemented by the efforts of private relief agencies such as
> religious organizations and the American Red Cross. In general,
> however, there was no expectation that higher levels of government
> would become involved in disaster relief events.
>
> State governments could be called in to help if local resources were
> inadequate, but State-level organizations were, for the most part,
> ill-equipped, unprepared, and unwilling to intervene. They lacked the
> resources, expertise, and inclination to aid local efforts. The
> Federal Government played a role similar to that of the States---a
> very limited one. The Federal Government could be asked to step in
> when events exceeded local, private, and State capacities. The U.S.
> Congress then established the legal basis for Federal intervention in
> 1803 when it granted special allowances to the victims of a natural
> disaster in Portsmouth, New York.
>
> After setting this precedent, the Federal Government provided aid to
> victims of 128 disasters from 1803 to 1947. What is noteworthy, is
> that in each case, specific legislation was passed to deal with each
> event. During this time, Federal disasters were characterized by a
> lack of coordination and certainty.
>
> "There were no general policies or guidelines to shape governmental
> intervention, and it was never clear whether the Federal Government
> would intervene at all. Basically it responded to each disaster on a
> piece-meal, case-by-case basis. Furthermore, Federal intervention was
> often politically motivated as elected officials pushed through relief
> proposals in order to alleviate specific disaster-related conditions
> in their own States and Congressional districts." \[Schneider, 1995,
>
> p\. 19.\]
>
> Aside from being motivated by CONSTITUENCY INTERESTS, governmental
> disaster activities were also characterized at this time as REACTIVE,
> with institutions providing relief only after disasters. In the 1920s
> and 1930s, however, some preventive measures were passed such as flood
> control structural mitigation. In effect, however, these early efforts
> were approved for political reasons, to create jobs and supply an
> influx of revenue in the areas where levees and flood walls needed to
> be constructed and maintained. Moreover, highlighting structural
> solutions to disasters did not seek to prepare citizens and
> communities in the event of a disaster. This method of policymaking
> continued apace into the New Deal program of President Franklin D.
> Roosevelt from 1933 to 1941.
>
> In 1950, however, Congress enacted legislation to deal with both
> military-related and natural disaster events through the passage of
> the Civil Defense Act of 1950 and the Disaster Relief Act of 1950.

*Objective 7.2*

CIVIL DEFENSE ACT OF 1950

> Although Federal civil defense programs had existed since 1916, civil
> defense against nuclear attack did not emerge as an issue until the
> Soviet Union detonated its first atomic bomb in 1949. In response to
> the start of the Cold War and the impending threat of a nuclear attack
> on the United States, Congress passed the Federal Civil Defense Act of
> 1950. At its inception, the act sought to respond to public and media
> fears concerning the possibility of nuclear threat. For example, the
> 1957 Gaither Report declared that the American public was vulnerable
> to, and ill-prepared for, a Soviet ICBM nuclear attack. The civil
> defense programs set up under the act were initially designed to
> concentrate on plans to protect the population and Government services
> from nuclear attack and subsequent radioactive fallout.
>
> In keeping with these goals the program focused on EVACUATION
> PLANNING, SHELTERING, EMERGENCY WARNING OPERATIONS (such as the
> Emergency Broadcast System), and EVACUATION PLANS. As the Cold War and
> the arms race escalated, the construction of "fallout and bomb"
> shelters became an important part of this policy, reaching their peak
> during the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962.
>
> Moreover, a related program evolving from executive orders was
> "CONTINUITY OF GOVERNMENT," a secretive and often disputed program
> which attempts to safely evacuate and protect a select group of the
> Nation's leadership during nuclear threat. This was seen as essential
> to assure the public and the Nation that legitimate Government would
> be maintained even in the event of a nuclear attack.
>
> The Civil Defense Act had two major effects on disaster policy. The
> law acknowledged for the first time that MAN-MADE HAZARDS had reached
> a stage in which they could be just as destructive, if not more so,
> than natural hazards. This concept was later expanded to include other
> man-made disasters such as oil spills and radioactive waste. More
> importantly, from a political perspective, civil defense against
> nuclear attack came to overshadow other traditional domains of
> disaster policy. Its mission, funding, and general operations
> dominated the administrative agencies dealing with disaster-related
> issues for several decades. For example, by 1957, civil defense monies
> were the primary source of Federal funds to subnational governments
> engaged in upgrading disaster and civil preparedness.

*Objective 7.3*

DISASTER RELIEF ACT OF 1950

> Congress passed the first permanent statutes for Federal disaster
> assistance in 1947 and 1950. The 1947 legislation provided surplus
> property and personnel as needed and its 1950 counterpart gave the
> President authority to determine what type of aid was required. These
> measures changed the nature of disaster relief in the United States.
> The Disaster Relief Act of 1950:
>
> 1\. Clearly Stated for the first time that Federal resources could and
> should be used to supplement the efforts of others in the event of a
> disaster;
>
> 2\. Made Federal disaster assistance more accessible since it no
> longer required specific legislation, but simply a Presidential
> decision; and
>
> 3\. Specified a standard process by which localities and States could
> request assistance.
>
> It should be noted that the Disaster Relief Act of 1950 was not
> intended or initially recognized as PRECEDENT-SETTING. It was
> originally passed as another limited response to a particular disaster
> event, flooding in the Midwest, that was not intended to go beyond
> earlier disaster legislation efforts. Previous measures that
> identified responsibilities of various Federal agencies in disaster
> circumstances began to proliferate. Only later did Congressional
> leaders begin to see the act as precedent-setting and as an early,
> general, National-level disaster policy model.
>
> It set precedents by establishing a Federal policy for providing
> emergency relief, by laying out National Governmental responsibility
> in disasters, and transforming the intergovernmental context of
> disasters. In effect, it set up a framework for government disaster
> assistance that continues today.

*Objective 7.4*

> The main provisions of the 1950 Disaster Relief Act have continued to
> have a significant influence on all legislation in the disaster policy
> and funding area. Congress built on the 1950 Act by passing a number
> of laws, through the 1970s, which expanded the scope of the Federal
> Government responsibility with respect to disasters. In general, aid
> grew from being entirely GOVERNMENT-TO-GOVERNMENT to being
> government-to-government and INDIVIDUAL ASSISTANCE as well.
> Legislation incorporated new groups (such as farmers living in rural
> areas) and new forms of relief (such as temporary housing,
> unemployment insurance, and small business loans). From a political
> standpoint, it is important to note that this shift in aid was done in
> a way that effectively doled out pieces of political power to a number
> of governmental agencies and departments, rather than consolidating
> that power in one unit. For example, when individual small business
> loans were enacted as an assistance program in 1953, the U.S. Small
> Business Administration (SBA) was put in charge of administering the
> program. Subsequent legislation expanded the SBA's responsibilities in
> the area of disaster loan assistance to the point that the SBA's
> disaster loans are currently the primary form of Federal business
> assistance for non-farm, private sector, disaster losses.
>
> Moreover, the basic Governmental approach to disasters shifted away
> from an exclusive "STRUCTURAL" CONTROL emphasis to one which included
> a variety of "NON-STRUCTURAL" CONTROLS. Instead of merely initiating
> projects designed to build physical barriers, emphasis was placed on
> keeping people out of hazard-prone, high-risk areas through zoning
> laws, building codes, and land-use regulations. Thus, public policies
> forced the people and the lower levels of government to assume
> responsibility for where and how they lived. Such lifestyle-changing
> policies, however, often created disputes between levels of government
> and between the government and the public. At one end of the spectrum
> is a growing sentiment among Federal, and some State, officials that
> their governments should not have to "BAIL OUT" communities that do
> not pro-actively protect themselves from known hazards through the use
> of zoning laws, building codes, and land-use restrictions. At the
> other end are resentful local officials and citizens who see such
> measures as unnecessarily burdensome. They argue that these measures
> invade their personal freedom and are financially costly to them.
> Local officials fear Federal encroachment into areas they perceive as
> their traditional jurisdiction.

*Objective 7.5*

DISASTER RELIEF ACT OF 1974

> This evolutionary change in Governmental disaster policy continued
> into the 1970s and many of these changes were consolidated in the
> Disaster Relief Act of 1974 and the amendments soon after. The 1974
> act was precedent-setting in its own right. Here are a few of its
> features. The DFA:
>
> 1\. Instituted the Individual and Family Grant (IFG) program which
> provided 75 percent of the funding for State-administered programs
> providing cash help for furniture, clothes, and essential needs.
>
> 2\. Institutionalized efforts to mitigate against, rather than simply
> respond to disaster events;
>
> 3\. Mandated local, State, and Federal agencies to develop strategies
> aimed at preventing disasters in the future; and
>
> 4\. Stressed a multi-hazard approach to disasters, in which
> governmental efforts would be capable of handling all kinds of
> hazards, rather than being designed for particular disasters.
>
> In establishing a new wave of Federal policy, the Federal Government
> sought to focus on INDIVIDUAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS, MITIGATION EFFORTS,
> and MULTI-HAZARD APPROACHES. Although various laws provided temporary
> housing aid and other forms of individual assistance, the Individual
> and Family Grant program bridged the gap between public and individual
> assistance.
>
> Mitigation efforts, were also institutionalized for the first time in
> the 1974 statute under the assumption that mitigation was a primary
> foundation for emergency management and would decrease costs and
> demands in subsequent disasters.
>
> Finally, multi-hazard approaches to emergency management were
> emphasized in the testimony of government officials. They insisted
> that there was a great need to plan for disasters of all types. This
> multi-hazard or ALL-HAZARDS APPROACH to emergency management
> implicitly alleged that disaster policy up to 1974 was fragmented and
> pre-occupied with confronting individual disasters or types of
> disasters. This was most readily apparent in the division between
> civil defense programs and domestic emergency programs. Civil Defense
> programs seemed distinct from other emergency management programs and
> were viewed as part of the "National security structure." By
> emphasizing a multi-hazard or all-hazards approach, the Disaster
> Relief Act of 1974 inaugurated a trend toward the diminution of civil
> defense issues, funding, and concerns in the realm of domestic
> emergency management.

*Objective 7.6*

> ROBERT T. STAFFORD DISASTER RELIEF AND EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE ACT, P.L.
> 93-288 AS AMENDED
>
> The principal Federal authority for providing disaster relief today
> resides in the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency
> Assistance Act. Congress continued past disaster policy trends by
> enacting the Stafford Act as part of an effort to clarify
> inconsistencies in disaster laws of the past.

The law begins, "The Congress hereby finds and declares that,

> 1\. Because disasters often cause loss of life, human suffering, loss
> of income, and property loss and damage; and
>
> 2\. Because disasters often disrupt the normal functioning of
> governments and communities, and adversely affect individuals and
> families with great severity; special measures designed to assist the
> efforts of the affected States in expediting the rendering of aid,
> assistance, and emergency services, and the reconstruction and
> rehabilitation of devastated areas, are necessary.
>
> It is the intent of the Congress, by this Act, to provide an orderly
> and continuing means of assistance by the Federal Government to State
> and local governments in carrying out their responsibilities to
> alleviate the suffering and damage which result from such disasters
> by:
>
> 1\. Revising and broadening the scope of existing disaster relief
> programs.
>
> 2\. Encouraging the development of comprehensive disaster preparedness
> and assistance plans, programs, capabilities, and organizations by the
> States and by local governments;
>
> 3\. Achieving greater coordination and responsiveness of disaster
> preparedness and relief programs;
>
> 4\. Encouraging individuals, States, and local governments to protect
> themselves by obtaining insurance coverage to supplement or replace
> governmental assistance;
>
> 5\. Encouraging hazard mitigation measures to reduce losses from
> disasters, including development of land-use and construction
> regulations; and
>
> 6\. Providing Federal assistance programs for both public and private
> losses sustained in disasters.
>
> \[U.S. Congress, March, 1994, 42 U.S.C.\]
>
> The major provisions of the Stafford Act were:
>
> 1\. A refinement of the definition of an "emergency";
>
> 2\. An expansion of the responsibilities and obligations of public
> institutions during emergencies;
>
> 3\. Further emphasis on the importance of mitigation and preparedness
> activities;
>
> 4\. The establishment of a process to guide when and how the
> government would become involved in disaster circumstances; and
>
> 5\. A delineation on how response efforts would move from the local
> government, to the State, and up to the National level of Government.
>
> Overall, the Stafford Act authorizes the President to issue major
> disaster or emergency declarations, sets broad eligibility criteria,
> and specifies the type of assistance the President may authorize. The
> definition of "emergency" has been a politically charged issue.
> EMERGENCY refers to
>
> "...any occasion or instance for which, in the determination of the
> President, Federal assistance is needed to supplement State and local
> efforts and capabilities to save lives and protect property and public
> health and safety, or to lessen or avert the threat of catastrophe in
> any part of the United States." \[U.S. Congress, March 1994, 42
> U.S.C.\]
>
> This refinement of emergency clearly affords the President a great
> deal of political subjectivity in determining what is or is not an
> emergency. This point and its implications were examined previously in
> Session 5, "Executive Political Issues and Disasters." In effect, this
> subjectivity often leaves Governors guessing about whether they
> qualify for aid and whether they should seek a Presidential
> Declaration of emergency or not.

*Objective 7.7*

> It is also important to note that the Stafford Act is merely an
> expansion of the first permanent authority conferred in the Disaster
> Relief Act of 1950 (P.L. 81-875). That law provides disaster
> assistance on a continuing basis without the need for Congressional
> action. Several components of that 1950 measure continue to serve as a
> foundation for the Stafford Act's authority including the following:
>
> 1\. The President is given complete authority to determine that a
> major disaster (or emergency since 1974) has occurred and that Federal
> aid is warranted;
>
> 2\. The Governor of the affected State must request Federal assistance
> and provide assurances that State and local resources are committed;
>
> 3\. Federal assistance supplements, but does not supplant State or
> local resources;
>
> 4\. The President is authorized to direct all Federal agencies to
> provided needed assistance; and
>
> 5\. The role of the voluntary sector and the need to coordinate
> Federal efforts with those of relief organizations are recognized.
>
> Since the passage of the Stafford Act, there have been no major
> legislative or statutory revisions in governmental policy, but there
> have been elaborations and additions. In the late 1980s, the Federal
> Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) began working on a new set of
> guidelines and directives in response to criticism. The Federal
> Response Plan of 1992 was the outcome. It represents a cooperative
> agreement between 26 Federal agencies and the American Red Cross. In
> effect, the Federal Response Plan specifies the National Government's
> roles and responsibilities in responding to a disaster or emergency.
> The Federal Response Plan:
>
> 1\. Serves as a blueprint to coordinate and mobilize resources in
> disasters and emergencies;
>
> 2\. Provides greater detail concerning the roles and activities of
> different Federal agencies during large-scale natural disasters;
>
> 3\. Groups together the different types of emergency assistance
> available to public organization and private citizens and identifies a
> lead agency for each of these types of assistance; and
>
> 4\. Specifies a process in which the resources of the Federal
> Government can be deployed more quickly and efficiently.

*Objective 7.8*

> DISASTER LAWS AND POLICY AS A FUNCTION OF GREATER TRENDS
>
> In examining disaster laws and policy one needs to understand that
> they reflect greater overall trends in politics and policymaking in
> the United States. Although disasters and emergencies represent unique
> events, the Government's involvement in them is similar to the way it
> has approached many other policy issues. This is true with respect to
> the nature of events as well as the governmental actions that have
> been designed to deal with them.
>
> One could easily make the case that the Government's increased
> involvement in disasters is nothing more than a manifestation of a
> larger trend towards GREATER PUBLIC SECTOR RESPONSIBILITIES. The
> United States has undergone a tremendous growth in terms of the size
> and
>
> the scope of the Government. For example, in 1992 public expenditures
> were approximately \$2.5 trillion, while in 1942 they had been only
> about \$47 billion. In addition to spending more money, the Government
> has also chosen to address more issues and problems while allocating
> more money to them.
>
> Another similarity that disaster policy has with other public
> activities is the trend toward GREATER INVOLVEMENT BY THE NATIONAL
> GOVERNMENT relative to the State and local governments. As mentioned
> previously, the Federal Government began to play a more active role in
> disaster policy during the 1930s. It enacted legislation in 1950 which
> established a basic framework for disaster policy under which the
> Federal Government was allowed to direct and coordinate efforts in the
> event of severe disasters. That role of the Federal Government was
> expanded through the 1970s and, in 1979, FEMA was established to
> consolidate and coordinate those actions. The creation of this new
> administrative unit was a clear sign that the issue of disasters had
> become a permanent addition to the Federal Government's policy agenda.
>
> The history of Governmental involvement in disasters also reveals the
> REACTIVE NATURE OF POLICY-MAKING in this policy domain. Major
> disasters have often served as stimulants of change and reform in
> disaster policy. Although this was evident in the early history of
> disaster policy when aid was tied to specific legislation and done in
> a piece-meal fashion, it continues today. Policy expansion and
> clarification often continues to take place after severe disasters.
> This makes sense when disasters are viewed from the perspective of
> crises. Major disasters call for an immediate public sector response
> since the public wants something done immediately. In the same manner,
> however, these events do not sustain long-term public or Governmental
> interest and involvement. Once action has been taken or normalcy
> returns, the public and the Government tend to move on to other
> matters.
>
> Finally, the basic Governmental approach to disaster policy is
> EVOLUTIONARY. At first the Government was strictly reactive with
> respect to its policies; it took action after a disaster occurred and
> the extent of its action was limited and arbitrary. Current policies
> place more emphasis on pro-activeness, often through mitigation and
> preparedness measures. This change has occurred over the course of
> many years. Similar to other public policy areas, the Government finds
> it difficult to shift its focus in disaster-relief activities.
>
> Nevertheless, an ever-present INCREMENTAL decisionmaking also
> continues. Past policies become entrenched and they provide the
> foundation for future Governmental activity. Incrementalism is a
> pervasive, limiting force in Governmental disaster-relief
> policymaking. Moreover, public sentiment may deter public officials
> from pursuing alternative policies---those that stress more preventive
> strategies. People may not want the Government to enact stronger and
> more effective building codes and zoning laws if they believed they
> will be costly or likely to inhibit lifestyles, as might occur when
> the Government prohibits development in hazard-prone areas.

*Objective 7.9*

> There has been a shift at all levels in how the Government approaches
> the issue of disasters. This is because policymakers and policy
> implementers have come to agree that it is more cost-effective to
> prevent a disaster than to deal with its consequences. Although
> mitigation and preparedness programs cost money and time, they may be
> very cost-effective. For example, the establishment of stricter
> building codes and regulations in disaster-prone areas has saved
> millions of dollars in property losses while warning and evacuation
> procedures have served to prevent the loss of human life. Another
> reason for the shift in the Governmental approach to disaster policy
> is the result of changes in the definition what a disaster is.
> Man-made events such as oil spills (e.g., the Exxon Valdez spill),
> toxic-waste dangers (e.g., Love Canal), and chemical plant releases
> (e.g., the Union Carbide plant in Bhopal, India) reveal that humans
> are now capable of causing calamities comparable to natural disasters.
> As a result, modern relief efforts have to anticipate these new
> disasters as well as the traditional ones and this has placed new
> demands on those charged with the responsibility for dealing with
> disasters.

**Supplemental**

**Considerations**

> Although this session does not list all of the laws concerning
> disaster management in the United States, it does list the important
> points of some of the major Federal laws. Other measures are reviewed
> in subsequent sessions. For example, the National Flood Insurance
> Program laws and programs are reviewed in Session 20, the National
> Earthquake Hazard Reduction Program and Law is examined in Session 18,
> and the Fire Prevention law is covered in Session 16.
>
> The instructor may also want to focus on some specific law or proposed
> piece of legislation in greater detail. Appendices II and III of
> "Federal Disaster Assistance" by the Bipartisan Task Force On Funding
> Disaster Relief provides an overview of more disaster laws.

**Endnotes**

-   U.S. Congress, Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency
    Assistance Act of May 22, 1974 (Pub. L. 93-288, Title I, Sect. 101,
    May 22, 1974, 88 Stat. 143) as amended by Act of November 23, 1988
    (Pub. L. 100-707, Title I, Sect. 103(a), Nov. 23, 1988, 102
    Stat. 4689) as amended by Act of Dec. 3, 1993, (Pub. L. 103-181,
    Sect. 1, Dec. 3, 1993, 107 Stat. 2054.) 42 U.S.C., Ch.68 -- Disaster
    Relief, Sects. 5121-5402C, reprinted March 1994.

**Session No. 8**

**Course**: The Political and Policy Basis of Emergency Management

**Session**: Disaster Budgeting **Time**: 2 Hours

**Objectives:**

At the conclusion of this session, students should be able to:

> 8.1 Describe in general terms the authorization process used by the
> U.S. Congress.
>
> 8.2 Describe in general terms the appropriations process used by the
> Congress.
>
> 8.3 Outline political aspects of the budgetary process with respect to
> disaster funding.
>
> 8.4 Recall the sources of FEMA's budget authority.
>
> 8.5 Discuss the increasing significance of emergency supplemental
> appropriation laws in recent times.
>
> 8.6 Recount some of the criticisms and supporting statements that have
> been made regarding emergency supplementals.
>
> 8.7 Discuss briefly the pros and cons of the current supplemental
> appropriations procedure.

**Scope**

> The Congressional budgetary process through which the Federal
> Government makes disaster funding available, is explored. The
> political and policy dimensions of budgeting are noted. Sources of
> disaster budgeting authority are examined to provide a fundamental
> understanding of the disaster budgeting process. The political aspects
> of that process are reviewed, especially in light of the tremendous
> escalation in disaster costs in the 1990s. FEMA's role in the disaster
> funding process is noted. Finally, the politics of supplemental
> appropriations are considered, listing the criticisms and the
> supporting arguments of this widely debated and controversial topic.

**References**

Assigned student reading:

-   Sylves, Richard T., "The Politics and Budgeting of Federal Emergency
    Management," ***Disaster Management in the U.S. and Canada***, 2nd
    ed., Richard T. Sylves and William L. Waugh, Jr. (eds.)
    (Springfield, Ill.: Charles C. Thomas Publishers, 1996):41-48.

-   U.S. Senate, Bipartisan Task Force on Funding Disaster Relief, John
    Glenn (Chairman), Christopher S. Bond (Co-Chairman), "Federal
    Disaster Assistance: Report of the Senate Task Force on Funding
    Disaster Relief," 104th Cong., 1st Sess., ***Document No. 104-4***
    (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1995). \[Section
    5, "Budgeting for Federal Disaster Assistance," pp. 75-92, 99-142,
    and Appendix IV, "Financial Information on Federal Disaster Programs
    in Current Dollars," pp. 183-190.\]

> For students who need a more general foundation on the budgeting side
> of public policy, see the following Anderson chapter. Note that a
> synopsis of this chapter appears in Appendix E.

-   Anderson, James E., "Budgeting and Public Policy," ***Public
    Policymaking: An Introduction***, 3rd ed. (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin
    Company, 1997): Ch. 5, pp. 177-212.

**Requirements**

> Preparing this lesson is a challenge because it embodies substantial
> descriptive information and, at the same time, reviews a rather
> elaborate budgeting process---itself rife with complexity. It also
> places the topic of disaster within that process and attempts to
> examine it from a political perspective. The instructor may want to
> list on the board steps in the budgeting process and the groups that
> are involved in it. This may help students better visualize budgetary
> dynamics and the process.

**Remarks**

> The budgetary process that takes place in the United States is complex
> and takes into account a variety of political officials, among them
> members of the Congressional Committees previously examined in Session
> 6, "Legislative Political Issues and Disasters." In addition to the
> authorization, budget, and appropriations Committees of the House and
> Senate, the President and the Executive Office also play a significant
> role in the budgetary process.

*Objective 8.1*

CONGRESSIONAL AUTHORIZATION

> The Federal Government (but not most State governments) has a two step
> process of funding public policies. First, substantive legislation has
> to be passed that establishes a program or policy and **authorizes the
> expenditure of money in its support**. Second, **money actually has to
> be made available for the policy or program through the adoption of
> appropriations legislation**. The general rule is that no
> appropriation can be made without the enactment of an authorization
> law that justifies it. Authorization committees (about 13 major ones
> in the House and 13 in the Senate) review the President's budget
> request submitted each January and from this and their own independent
> actions devise, alter, kill, or push forward to eventual enactment
> bills that authorize Government policy and programs.
>
> For example, the House and Senate Armed Services Committees, both
> authorization-type committees, will help fashion the Defense
> Authorization Act of fiscal year (FY) 1999 that empowers the Defense
> Department Act to undertake certain activities, e.g., funding further
> development and purchase of B-2 Stealth Bombers, the phase-out of Star
> Wars technologies, more tank acquisitions, development of the next
> generation of Sea Wolf attack submarines, as well as military pay
> levels and more. The numbers in the Defense Authorization are only
> spending ceilings. The Pentagon does not usually expect to receive all
> of the money authorized for spending. This is because the
> Appropriations Committee members (House and Senate), acting as
> guardians of the U.S. Treasury and aware of Governmental revenue
> limitations, have to find economies in Federal spending. Consequently,
> the Defense Subcommittees of the House and Senate Appropriations
> Committees will pare down the proposed (and authorized) defense budget
> as they fashion the Defense Appropriations Act of FY 1999. The Senate
> debate on the FY 1999 Defense Authorization law normally takes place
> in the spring, so it can be enacted before October 1 (the start of
> Federal fiscal year) when the Defense Department will need a new
> budget.
>
> The Budget Committees of the House and Senate also play an important
> part in the budgetary process. In the absence of a tough budget
> resolution (like the ones President Clinton and Congress managed to
> approve in 1994 and 1997), the Budget Committees collect spending and
> taxing information from relevant Congressional Committees and
> Subcommittees during the period that Congress fashions the budget. The
> Budget Committees engage in SCOREKEEPING (record keeping) on how much
> is being committed, in total, to spending and how much is being
> collected in taxes under Congressional legislation in process. Their
> chief obligation is to keep track of the size of the projected deficit
> given what the spending and taxing committees are doing. The Budget
> Committees help to formulate both a spring budget resolution and the
> final reconciliation bill that must be passed in September just before
> the final appropriation bills are passed.

*Objective 8.2*

CONGRESSIONAL APPROPRIATIONS

> Appropriations laws create budget authority (permission to obligate,
> spend, or loan Federal revenue) for executive branch departments and
> agencies. Obligations involve a commitment or promise of the Federal
> Government to pay money at some future point for goods or services or
> as cash transfers. Outlays are the actual expenditures of Federal
> money and are the culmination of obligations.
>
> The Federal budget is comprised of 13 major appropriation laws and
> various tax and revenue laws. There are some differences between House
> and Senate Appropriations Committees. Each committee is divided into
> subcommittees which roughly parallel the jurisdictions of each
> respective body's Authorization Committees. The subcommittees review
> proposed budgets for departments, agencies, or programs within their
> jurisdiction. The norm is that the House Appropriations Subcommittees
> usually scrutinize budget details more closely than their Senate
> Appropriations Subcommittee counterparts. The House Spending
> Subcommittees are guardians of the Treasury and suspicious that
> executive branch agencies and the President are asking for more
> funding than is actually needed. Senate Appropriations full Committee
> and its Subcommittees operate more as appeals bodies in the sense that
> they often restore some or most of the budget request money the House
> Appropriations Committee has cut.
>
> Presidents also play a role in the appropriations process through what
> they propose for funding in the President's annual budget request to
> the Congress, through what representatives of the President say and do
> in the course of testifying before House and Senate Appropriations
> bodies, and through the President's exercise of veto power, which may
> be applied to appropriations bills he receives for signature. On
> January 1, 1997, the President, and each future President, were
> accorded "line-item" veto power. This allows the President to veto
> specific line-items of appropriations measures without having to veto
> the entire piece of legislation. (A July 1997 Supreme Court ruling
> determined that the "line item" veto was constitutionally approved,
> but is possibly subject to Court challenge on other grounds. President
> Clinton has used the line item veto in his approval of the Balanced
> Budget Act of 1997.)

*Objective 8.3*

POLITICAL ASPECTS OF THE BUDGETARY PROCESS

> In analyzing the budgetary process of the Federal Government the most
> important thing to keep in mind is that the formulation of the Federal
> budget is a political process. Budgets are not simply financial
> statements, they are political statements that have a tremendous
> impact on public policy. Overall, the Federal budget not only funds
> Government programs, but sets FISCAL POLICY for the Nation. Fiscal
> policy involves the discretionary use of the government's taxing and
> spending powers to stimulate or restrain the economy. Within the
> confines of the Federal budget, different issues, policies, programs,
> and concerns compete with one another for limited funds. This conflict
> over money represents political conflicts over different policies.
>
> Recent efforts to increase control over Federal outlays in the
> budgeting process (as part of an overall effort to decrease the
> Federal deficit and National debt) have intensified these political
> conflicts. Since these different issues, policies, and concerns, are
> located within different programs under the jurisdiction of different
> Federal agencies, there is a substantial amount of political conflict
> that takes place among agencies as well. It is important to note that
> political conflict and competition over funding even takes place
> across different branches or sectors within an agency. This is
> particularly the case today since agencies have less and less say
> about how much money they will receive, but much to say about how the
> money they receive will be spent.
>
> Disaster funding clearly displays these political aspects of the
> budgetary process. As previously noted, disaster funding is at a
> disadvantage in both the Congressional authorization and
> appropriations process because it must compete with funding interests
> such as housing, veterans' affairs, and the space program.
> Historically, all of these issues have had a much higher degree of
> political visibility and interest to the legislators who decide on
> funding matters. In addition, the interest groups which have formed
> around these other issues (consisting of those who have benefited from
> the programs created) are substantially more influential than
> disaster-related interest groups.
>
> The politics of the budgetary process also becomes apparent when
> examining the competition that has sprung up among different agencies.
> Inside the Authorization Committees holding jurisdiction over
> disaster-related issues, FEMA must compete with some powerful
> agencies: namely the Department of Housing and Urban Development
> (HUD), the Veteran's Administration, the Environmental Protection
> Agency, and to a lesser degree the National Aeronautics and Space
> Administration (NASA). It is also important to recognize that there
> are a number of agencies with jurisdiction over some aspects of
> disaster relief which compete among themselves for disaster relief
> funds. For example, although FEMA receives the largest share of
> funding for various disaster relief efforts, it must compete with
> other agencies which provide disaster-relief aid, such as the U.S.
> Department of Agriculture (USDA) which provides emergency food stamps
> and emergency aid to farm businesses, and the Small Business
> Administration (SBA) which provides disaster loans.
>
> Internal conflicts within FEMA have revealed the political aspects of
> disaster funding as well. In the past, the most highly charged
> political issue involving funding within the Agency, was the friction
> which existed between FEMA's domestic emergency management staff and
> its National security and nuclear attack, civil defense staff. These
> staffs competed with one another for funds and personnel for many
> years. In 1992, reportedly, about 38% of FEMA's total staff and about
> 27% of its budget were dedicated to National security emergencies.
> However, FEMA has undergone internal reorganization under the Clinton
> Administration, and, in 1994, Congress passed and the President signed
> a measure which repealed the old Civil Defense Act. This has
> effectively terminated the last remaining vestige of the traditional
> civil defense program work within the Agency. FEMA does retain
> authority for the "Continuity of Government" program. Yet, the
> political competition for funds between domestic emergency and civil
> defense is basically at an end.
>
> In a broader sense, the political issues concerning disaster-related
> funding have taken center stage as disaster costs have escalated. Many
> individual and family assistance programs administered by FEMA (and
> the States) and other agencies are ENTITLEMENT programs in the sense
> that the Government cannot accurately predict how many people will
> suffer disaster losses in the next fiscal year. Nevertheless, when the
> President declares that a major disaster has taken place, financial
> assistance is made available to those who are eligible. The amount
> Congress budgets for the President's Disaster Relief Fund, however, is
> often inadequate to meet all the accumulated claims of applicants in a
> fiscal year. Consequently, special emergency appropriations need to be
> made available during the fiscal year to compensate qualified
> applicants. In this sense disaster funding has been considered
> "UNCONTROLLABLE" and has been provided on an "OPEN-ENDED" basis.
> "Open-ended" means that the emergency appropriation does not have a
> deadline for its expenditure, it can be spent now, later in the fiscal
> year, or in any future year. Since emergency appropriations have
> (until 1995) been funded by Federal borrowing, these budget outlays
> have added to the Federal deficit and the National debt; they have
> been subject to increasing Congressional scrutiny (a subject returned
> to later in the session).

*Objective 8.4*

DISASTER BUDGET AUTHORITY AND PROCESS

> FEMA is responsible to the Congress and receives its budget from that
> body. This means that each year FEMA representatives are called before
> a broad range of House and Senate Authorization and Appropriation
> Committees to defend various components of the Agency's budget
> request.
>
> Agencies that provide disaster relief, as well as those that are
> engaged in other disaster-related activities, normally receive
> appropriations through legislation enacted into law before the start
> of the Federal fiscal year. However, the funding which FEMA receives
> is of two kinds: (1) regular appropriations and (2) emergency
> supplemental appropriations, following disasters.
>
> REGULAR APPROPRIATIONS may provide sufficient funds for FEMA to pay
> for small disasters which frequently occur during a fiscal year.
> However, these sums are often far less than what is needed after a
> mega-disaster. Historically, when a mega-disaster has occurred, the
> President requests supplemental funds and the Congress complies with
> the request. SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATIONS acts (supplementals) provide
> funds for a fiscal year already in progress and typically address
> needs that Congress did not anticipate and that cannot wait until the
> next regular appropriation. They have, therefore, become the natural
> mechanism to provide funding for great disasters, since their timing
> and severity are highly unpredictable. FEMA is funded, in a sense, by
> a dual-method.
>
> When compared with other Federal departments and independent agencies,
> FEMA's regular budget authority appears microscopic. Note, that
> "appropriations" is Congressional language for approved spending and
> BUDGET AUTHORITY. This is how Governmental agency officials speak of
> the appropriations lawfully conferred for their use. Budget authority
> can be obligated (contractually promised) and may be dispensed through
> a variety of methods, each ultimately yielding a BUDGET OUTLAY
> (expenditure).
>
> The fiscal year (FY) 1994 appropriated budget for FEMA was \$786
> million and another \$292 million was earmarked for disaster relief.
> For FY 1995 FEMA secured about \$822 million in budget authority and
> another \$320 million for disaster relief. Its FY 1996 request is for
> \$817 million, again with \$320 million extra to fund the President's
> Disaster Relief Fund. Overall, FEMA's annual budget does not stand out
> in a Federal budget of more than \$1.5 trillion.
>
> FEMA's regular annual appropriations, however, seldom cover all the
> costs of the Federal disaster relief it is responsible for paying in a
> single fiscal year. This is particularly the case in recent times
> because the United States has experienced a sizable increase in the
> number and severity (in cost) of its natural disasters. As Table 8.1
> listed below indicates, since 1989, there have been roughly 300
> disasters large enough to warrant a Presidential Disaster Declaration.
> Moreover, the costs of these disasters clearly outstrip the modest
> funds that FEMA has set aside for disaster relief efforts.
>
> In effect, disasters which used to cost millions of dollars and
> affected only a few thousand victims now commonly cost many billions
> of dollars and affect hundreds of thousands of victims. For example,
> as a result of the Northridge earthquake of 1994 in the Los Angeles,
> California, area some 670,000 individuals and families registered for
> disaster assistance.
>
> In 1994, the Federal cost of disaster relief was \$4.4 billion. In
> that year, there were 16,272 locally declared disasters. Of this
> total, 299 became State-declared emergencies, and 37
> Federally-declared. Generally, 2-3% of local disasters that require
> significant assistance by a State are declared emergencies by the
> Governor. In fiscal year 1995, there were 28 Presidentially declared
> disasters, the Federal cost of which was over \$3 billion. The trend
> continues. During just the first six months of 1996, 43 major Disaster
> Declarations were issued (compared to a year like 1978, when there
> were "just" 9 declarations).

**TABLE 8.1**

**FEMA'S OBLIGATIONS FOR**

**MAJOR DISASTERS AND EMERGENCIES**

**DECLARED IN FISCAL YEARS 1990 -- 1994**

Year Number of Disasters Amount

and Emergencies (In \$Millions,

1995 Constant)

1990 35 \$ 927.6

1991 39 301.8

1992 48 1,394.5

1993 58 1,073.7

1994 37 2,153.8

1996 72 N/A

> \[U.S. GAO, 1996.\]
>
> Major recent disasters have been:

-   Hurricane Hugo in 1989

-   Hurricane Andrew in 1992, which resulted in \$30 billion in damages

-   Hurricane Iniki in 1992

-   The Los Angeles Riots of April and May 1992, which resulted in the
    deaths of 58 people and billions of dollars in damage following the
    acquittal of police officers tried for the beating of a black
    motorist

-   The Midwest floods in 1993

-   The Northridge earthquake in 1994, which resulted in \$30 billion in
    losses

-   The Oklahoma City bombing in 1995

-   The Pennsylvania blizzard and flooding in January 1996

-   Hurricane Marilyn in 1996, which hit the Virgin Islands

-   Hurricane Opal in 1996, which struck Florida and the Gulf Coast,
    leaving half of Alabama a Presidentially-declared disaster area

*Objective 8.5*

> In the wake of major disasters, supplemental appropriations have been
> used to bridge the gap between FEMA's inadequate disaster relief funds
> (obtained through regular appropriations) and the massive obligations
> which the agency assumes. Emergency supplemental funding is shared
> with a variety of other Federal agencies, each of whom has pipelines
> to the President's Disaster Relief Fund or other repositories of
> emergency budget authority. A recent U.S. Senate Task Force report
> concerning Federal disaster spending, however, discloses that FEMA
> received the bulk of all disaster supplemental appropriation monies
> made available since 1979.
>
> "FEMA has received the lion's share of recent supplemental funding for
> disasters, and specifically of designated emergency funds, which are
> exempt from the budget caps under the 1990 Budget Enforcement Act.
> From fiscal years 1992 through 1994, FEMA received almost half (48
> percent) of the emergency supplemental dollars disaster assistance."
> \[U.S. Senate, 1995, p. 80.\]
>
> After a Presidential Disaster Declaration has been issued several
> types of Federal disaster assistance become available. Under disaster
> or emergency circumstances, States receive from FEMA a match-supported
> subsidy (75/25) to provide supplemental assistance to individuals and
> families adversely affected. This is defined as INDIVIDUAL ASSISTANCE.
> While some forms of individual assistance such as temporary housing
> are managed exclusively by FEMA, others such as loans to businesses
> and farm loans are managed by the Small Business Administration (SBA)
> and the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) respectively. FEMA also
> provides PUBLIC ASSISTANCE to State and local governments or certain
> private, not-for-profit organizations, on a 75/25 percent cost-sharing
> basis, to help restore public services and to provide infrastructure
> support. (Note that the President has the authority in law to increase
> the Federal share of the match beyond 75 percent, and up to 100
> percent, when he determines this to be necessary.) The agency is also
> is empowered to fund the Hazard Mitigation Assistance Program. This
> helps State and local governments and other eligible parties to lessen
> or avert the threat of future disasters through funding projects aimed
> at reducing or eliminating future disaster vulnerability.

*Objective 8.6*

POLITICS OF SUPPLEMENTAL APPROPRIATIONS

> The enactment of supplemental appropriations to provide funds for
> natural disaster assistance has become an increasingly volatile topic
> of political debate. The recent surge in disasters and their cost
> since 1989 has coincided with new budget rules enacted in the Budget
> Enforcement Act of 1990, which excludes appropriations designated as
> emergency requirements (such as supplementals) from the strict budget
> disciplines that apply to other spending sources. Since that act took
> effect, almost all of the disaster assistance that has taken place has
> been funded and designated as emergency requirements. These large and
> nearly annual supplementals for disaster assistance have drawn
> substantial criticism from some members of Congress. The members of
> Congress argue that:

1.  The current budget procedures for emergency spending increase the
    budget deficit by providing assistance that is too generous.
    Assistance might not be as generous if disaster-relief had to
    compete with other spending priorities;

> 2\. Frequent, large emergency supplementals for disaster assistance
> make Congress look fiscally irresponsible in a period of budget
> stringency;
>
> 3\. Emergency supplementals for disaster assistance provide vehicles
> for non-emergency provisions that would not be passed otherwise to be
> enacted into law.
>
> In response, proponents of the current system of supplementals point
> out how supplementals have long been a part of the evolution of
> disaster assistance policy. They offer counter-arguments such as:
>
> 1\. Funds for natural disasters and other emergencies will undoubtedly
> be needed from time to time in amounts that are impossible to predict
> and budget for. They allege that requiring Congress to cut other
> programs to account for envisioned, but unpredicted, disasters would
> be unjust; this would simply transfer hardship from disaster victims
> to others;
>
> 2\. Current disaster-relief procedures work well in many respects.
> Congress has generally passed disaster legislation in a timely manner.
> Moreover, some members of Congress want to take a share of the credit
> while others want to constrain the actions of the executive branch;
>
> 3\. Some members of Congress feel that the current safety valve
> provided by supplementals is necessary to hold the budget agreements
> together. Having to fit highly variable needs such as disaster
> assistance under very tight and stringent budget caps would cause
> great difficulties for appropriators. Indeed, without the safety valve
> of supplementals the budget agreement might not have been made in the
> first place.

*Objective 8.7*

> These criticisms and supporting arguments indicate that the emergency
> supplemental appropriations procedure has a positive side and a
> negative side. On the positive side, the procedure allows the Federal
> Government the flexibility to provide, relatively rapidly, huge
> amounts of spending authority in times of crisis, disaster, or
> emergency. Since disasters are inherently unpredictable and often
> severe in their consequences, no American would want their
> Government's ability to furnish emergency funding encumbered. On the
> negative side, because political leaders reason that disasters are
> unpredictable, they routinely under-fund the President's Disaster
> Relief Fund in order to hold down Federal spending. Allotments are
> often unreasonably small because the President and Congressional
> leaders conclude that they can always pass an emergency supplemental
> appropriation, if necessary, so why should they tie up too much
> regular spending authority in the Disaster Relief Fund?
>
> Until recently budget authority provided in emergency supplemental
> appropriations had no time limit. The budget authority remained
> available until fully expended. Consequently, unused budget authority
> remained available far into the future, or until the next
> mega-disaster swallowed it up. This spending authority has provided a
> tempting contingency fund that the President can use to pay for
> smaller, more routine disasters.

**Supplemental**

**Considerations**

> Deficit "hawks" in the Congress have been critical of Federal disaster
> budgeting because emergency supplemental appropriations are becoming
> increasingly more common and because they add directly to the Federal
> deficit at a time when nearly all other forms of Federal spending
> (with the possible exception of entitlements like Social Security and
> Medicare) are being severely constrained in the interest of deficit
> control. The Bipartisan Task Force Report, on pages 84-92, examines
> several options being considered to alleviate this problem. It is not
> necessary that students know the details of these options, for it is
> more important that they understand why and how the problem of Federal
> disaster budgeting emerged over time. Students interested in financial
> information regarding Federal disaster programs should review pages
> 183-190 of the Bipartisan Task Force Report.
>
> Budget authority to spend money on Presidentially-declared disasters
> depends on the regular infusion of supplemental appropriations
> approved after catastrophic disasters. It provides a reservoir of
> spending authority the President (with the help of FEMA) makes
> available to agencies providing disaster assistance. However, for many
> years, supplemental appropriations have been funded by borrowed money.
> The U.S. Treasury has had to sell bonds in order to collect the money
> needed to fund these supplementals.
>
> Each time the Nation experiences a mega-disaster, such as Hurricane
> Andrew or the Northridge earthquake, a supplemental appropriation is
> enacted into law. In packaging requests to meet expected costs,
> Federal officials "tend to ask for everything they need up front"
> rather than be found wanting at some later point. Consequently, costs
> for mega-disasters are routinely over-estimated. It is clear from the
> pattern of Presidential disaster fund spending that huge supplemental
> appropriations often contain "excess budget authority." This "excess"
> furnishes the President the authority to fund lesser disasters that do
> not require supplemental appropriations. In other words, unspent
> budget authority can be used to pay for disasters beyond that of the
> original supplemental. To appreciate why supplementals are so
> essential it is important to understand the pressures of regular
> appropriations spending.
>
> Regular annual appropriations for FEMA and other executive branch
> agencies tend to be kept as low as possible in the interest of Federal
> deficit control and spending rules. Therefore, the Federal Government
> has grossly inadequate "rainy day" regular appropriation resources
> through which to pay for disaster costs. Such a fund might preclude
> the need to enact massive supplemental appropriations in the aftermath
> of Presidentially-declared disasters. Added pressure to hold down
> regular appropriation disaster budgets stems in part from the annual
> cap applied each year to total domestic discretionary spending.
>
> Under the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990, the Office of Management and
> Budget (OMB) tightly polices all spending in the domestic
> discretionary category (as it does for the other two
> categories---defense discretionary and international discretionary
> spending). The OMB is particularly sensitive to all over-budget
> spending. Surges in Federal disaster spending from regular, annual,
> domestic, discretionary accounts sets off alarms at the OMB if that
> spending threatens to exceed allotted funding. Over-spending in
> regular accounts may breach the domestic discretionary spending cap.
> This is supposed to compel the OMB to make mandatory cuts in baseline
> spending for all non-exempt accounts in the domestic, discretionary
> category, something the OMB officials fear and abhor. This is one
> reason why FEMA and other Federal disaster-relevant agencies tend to
> routinely under-estimate the cost of "smaller disasters" which must be
> paid for from regular appropriations (received by the agency as
> "budget authority"). In other words, regularly appropriated funds for
> disaster relief can quickly be exhausted by Federal spending on
> "garden variety" disasters.
>
> By contrast, supplemental appropriations carry some spending
> advantages over regular appropriations accounts. As "off-budget"
> spending, supplementals do not "officially" count against either the
> Federal debt ceiling or against domestic discretionary spending.
> Supplementals to the President's Disaster Relief Fund usually come as
> "no year" appropriations, meaning that the money is available until
> spent and not subject to lapse with the end of the Federal fiscal
> year. An exception to the "no year" custom is the great Midwest flood
> of 1993, under which the supplemental carried a five year limit.
> Deficit "hawks" in Congress have pushed with varying degrees of
> success to limit both total amounts and spending intervals of disaster
> supplementals. This notwithstanding, mega-disasters which produce new
> supplementals furnish new infusions of less-encumbered spending
> authority. Unspent "no year" appropriations in the Disaster Relief
> Fund, owing to over-estimation of the costs of mega-disasters, may
> help Federal agencies (FEMA and others) pay for smaller disasters that
> win Presidential Declarations.
>
> The "bottom line" is that, until, recently the OMB has had little
> incentive to police Disaster Relief Fund spending because it rested on
> supplemental appropriations that did not threaten the domestic
> discretionary spending cap and did not add "officially" to the
> National debt. Because this fund contained "excess" spending authority
> carried over as unspent money from previous mega-disasters, and was
> available beyond the end of the fiscal year, there was considerable
> pressure to tap these monies to pay for smaller disasters. This helped
> prevent "Federal cash squeezes" for smaller disasters that did not
> warrant massive supplemental appropriations.
>
> The very high cost of the Northridge earthquake (combined with an
> underestimated original emergency supplemental) helped eliminate the
> "excess" spending authority carried over from unspent money from
> previous mega-disasters. For this and reasons of deficit reduction,
> Congress has begun using OFFSETS of current year budget authority to
> pay for disaster supplemental appropriations. This practice took hold
> in the spring and summer of 1995, a period in which Congress passed an
> emergency supplemental loaded with massive spending rescissions, only
> to have it vetoed by President Clinton. These spending recessions were
> the cancellation of previously approved budget authority which was
> done, in part, as offsets to pay for more post-disaster costs. After
> negotiations the Congress sent the President a revised measure and the
> President signed it into law in mid-summer of 1995.

**Endnotes**

-   General Accounting Office, *Disaster Assistance: Improvements Needed
    in Determining Eligibility for Public Assistance* (Washington, DC:
    The Office, May 1996).

**Session No. 9**

**Course**: The Political and Policy Basis of Emergency Management

**Session**: The Federal Organization and Policy **Time**: 2 Hours

**Objectives:**

> By the conclusion of this session, students should be able to:
>
> 9.1 Explain the evolution of Federal emergency management in the
> United States highlighting the creation of FEMA.
>
> 9.2 Explain how the initial functions that were transferred to FEMA
> and the original objectives placed on the agency led to the origin and
> creation of a number of political issues that continue today.
>
> 9.3 List the specific missions of FEMA and describe the significance
> and political implications of FEMA's current policy of emphasizing
> mitigation measures.
>
> 9.4 Describe the organizational structure of FEMA and explain how the
> current Directorship has attempted to overcome the problems of
> political appointees.
>
> 9.5 Describe the significance of FEMA's coordinating role with respect
> to different levels of government and Federal agencies.
>
> 9.6 Define and summarize the essentials of the Federal Response Plan.

**Scope**

> This session canvasses the mission and organization of the U.S.
> Federal Emergency Management Agency. It describes the evolution of
> FEMA and the political issues which were present at the outset of the
> Agency's creation. It outlines the essentials of the Federal Response
> Plan and so introduces other Federal agencies involved in disaster
> work. This session serves to tie the laws, the Executive Office, and
> the Congress (as reviewed in the previous sessions) to an emergency
> management context. The session also delves again into Federal
> relations with State and local governments and organizations.

**References**

Assigned student reading:

-   Sylves, Richard T., "Redesigning and Administering Federal Emergency
    Management," ***Disaster Management in the U.S. and Canada***,
    Richard T. Sylves and William L. Waugh, Jr. (eds.) (Springfield,
    Ill.: Charles C. Thomas Publishers, 1996): Ch. I,

> pp. 5-25.

-   U.S. Senate, Bipartisan Task Force on Funding Disaster Relief, John
    Glenn (Chairman), Christopher S. Bond (Co-Chairman), "Federal
    Disaster Assistance: Report of the Senate Task Force on Funding
    Disaster Relief," 104th Cong., 1st Sess., ***Document No. 104-4***
    (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1995). \[Section
    3, "Effectiveness of Existing Federal Disaster Assistance Programs,"
    pp. 51-67 and Appendix 1, "Evolution of Federal Disaster Assistance
    Policies and Programs," (Genesis of FEMA), pp. 93-98.\]

**Requirements**

> The instructor will want to focus on the FEMA organization and
> missions as related in the remarks. The instructor may want students
> to examine Table 1-1 "FEMA Director Managerial Relations" located on
> page 9 in the Sylves and Waugh text. It provides a broad overview of
> FEMA relations with a host of actors. Since FEMA is an instrument of
> policy implementation, the "Implementation Policy" section of the
> Anderson chapter synopsis in Appendix E should help set a foundation
> and should be of particular help to those new to the study of public
> policy.

**Remarks**

> The U.S. FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY was created in 1979 to
> provide a single point of accountability for all Federal activities
> related to disaster mitigation and emergency preparedness, response,
> and recovery. Analysis reveals that the original objectives,
> organizational make-up, and missions of FEMA are imbued with a variety
> of significant political factors.

*Objective 9.1*

EVOLUTION OF FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

> For better or worse, Federal emergency management has been for many
> years involved with or interwoven with civil defense. This linkage was
> finally terminated in 1994 after a gradual separation of domestic
> emergency management from civil defense against nuclear attack. This
> separation began to take place in the 1960s. The U.S. Department of
> Defense was the institutional home of several Federal emergency
> management offices before FEMA's establishment. The Department of
> Defense (DOD) continues to play a limited role in domestic emergencies
> and disasters. The DOD also provides significant logistical support in
> response to foreign disasters. Owing to the magnitude of Hurricane
> Andrew's destructiveness and the positive publicity the United States
> military received for its early deployment to that disaster, some
> lawmakers proposed assigning to an office of the DOD primary emergency
> management responsibility---and simultaneously terminating FEMA. Those
> proposals were considered and rejected.
>
> Session 7, "The Politics of Disaster Laws," detailed the evolution of
> the major laws that constitute emergency management policy in the
> United States. That analysis revealed that, after the passage of the
> Disaster Relief Act of 1974, a comprehensive set of public disaster
> assistance programs was in place by the late 1970s. The administration
> and management of these laws and policies, however, was another matter
> entirely. Several programs and policies became problematic with
> administrative responsibilities divided among numerous departments and
> agencies. Disaster policy fragmentation at the National level
> generated many complaints and criticisms. The lack of leadership and
> coordination was further complicated because responsibility for
> disaster relief at the Federal level seemed to bounce from one agency
> to another. For example, disaster assistance and relief activities
> moved from the Housing and Home Finance Administration in 1951, to the
> Federal Civil Defense Administration in 1953, to the Office of Civil
> Defense and Mobilization in 1958 to the Office of Emergency Planning
> (later renamed the Office of Emergency Preparedness) in 1961. Finally
> in 1973, disaster relief was divided amongst three agencies, the
> Federal Disaster Assistance Administration, the Defense Civil
> Preparedness Agency, and the Federal Preparedness Agency.
>
> In August of 1977, President Carter asked the reorganization staff at
> the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to make a comprehensive
> review of the matter. The reorganization team concluded that:
>
> "\...the present Federal structure for preparing for, responding to,
> and recovering from the effects of major emergencies is in disarray.
> The study group identified many serious deficiencies: low visibility
> for emergency planning; duplication of programs and contracts at the
> State and local level; confusion over jurisdiction and
> responsibilities; lack of accountability below the Presidential level
> for policymaking and needed management improvements" \[U.S. Congress,
> February 1979\]
>
> FEMA was established in response to these findings and
> recommendations. Federal disaster assistance programs were to be
> unified and refashioned through Reorganization Plan No. 3. The plan
> gave FEMA primary responsibility for:
>
> 1\. Mobilizing Federal resources;
>
> 2\. Coordinating Federal efforts with those of State and local
> governments; and
>
> 3\. Managing the efforts of the public and private sectors in disaster
> responses.

*Objective 9.2*

> Executive Order 12148 (1979), issued by President Carter following the
> Congressional acceptance of Reorganization Plan No. 3, delegated most
> of the authority granted to the President under the Disaster Relief
> Act of 1974 to the Director of FEMA. The following functions were
> transferred to FEMA: CIVIL DEFENSE, certain elements of NATIONAL
> EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS FIRE PREVENTION and ASSISTANCE, DISASTER
> RELIEF, FLOOD INSURANCE, EMERGENCY BROADCAST and WARNING, EARTHQUAKE
> HAZARDS REDUCTION and DAM SAFETY. Some functions, however, were not
> transferred to FEMA, most notably the DISASTER LOAN PROGRAMS operated
> by the Small Business Administration (SBA) and the U.S. Department of
> Agriculture's (USDA) Farmers Home Administration.
>
> The four principal objectives that were identified by President Carter
> in a message accompanying Reorganization Plan No. 3 were the:
>
> 1\. Establishment of a SINGLE ENTITY (FEMA), headed by an official
> directly responsible to the President, that would serve as the sole
> Federal agency responsible for anticipating, preparing for, and
> responding to major civil emergencies;
>
> 2\. Development of an effective CIVIL DEFENSE system, integrated into
> the programs and operations of non-Federal entities, to improve
> communications, evacuations, warnings, evacuations, and public
> education efforts to prepare citizens for a possible nuclear attack as
> well as for natural and accidental disasters (an ALL HAZARDS
> approach);
>
> 3\. Reliance of Federal agencies to undertake emergency management
> responsibilities as extensions of their regular missions and on FEMA
> to coordinate these resources;
>
> 4\. Inclusion of Federal HAZARD MITIGATION activities, linked with
> State and local activities, for decisionmaking about preparedness and
> response functions.
>
> Examination of the initial functions transferred to FEMA and the
> original objectives placed on the agency reveals the origin of a
> number of political issues and debates that continue today. First, the
> establishment of FEMA did not fully consolidate all disaster and
> emergency functions and programs residing at the Federal level. As
> mentioned above, certain functions, such as the disaster loan programs
> of the SBA and the USDA, were not transferred to FEMA. Consequently,
> some competition between Federal agencies with disaster and emergency
> jurisdiction continues to this day.
>
> Another political issue involved the transfer of CIVIL DEFENSE
> activities to FEMA and how important civil defense would be within
> FEMA. If civil defense were to be under the umbrella of the new FEMA,
> President Carter had to assure those involved in National security
> aspects of civil defense (particularly nuclear attack) that their role
> and resources would not be diminished. To a degree, this nuclear
> attack, civil defense incorporation rekindled divisions between civil
> defense (nuclear attack preparedness) and domestic emergency
> management operations and personnel---a source of friction since the
> 1950s.
>
> Moreover, building the new FEMA with some offices geared to do
> National security work and others tailored to address home-based
> disasters and emergencies, each often working in isolation from the
> other, did little to advance an ALL-HAZARD APPROACH to emergency
> management. State and Federal officials, through bodies like the
> National Governor's Association, were at the time emphasizing the need
> to plan for disasters generically, rather than as separate incident
> types or as unique events.
>
> The formation of FEMA also spotlighted the significance of HAZARD
> MITIGATION and PREPAREDNESS and gave impetus to a PROACTIVE, rather
> than a REACTIVE, approach to emergency management. Instead of merely
> doing disaster recovery work, emphasis was placed on keeping people
> out of hazard-prone, high-risk areas through instruments such as
> zoning laws, building codes, and land-use regulations. In effect, FEMA
> was challenged to encourage or induce local officials and individuals
> to adopt mitigative policies. Mitigation work opened up a perennial,
> highly political issue between FEMA and local officials, developers,
> and citizens. While Federal officials and FEMA attempt to get
> communities to proactively protect themselves through hazard
> mitigation activities, local officials, developers, and citizens often
> try to circumvent measures they consider restrictive and financially
> burdensome.

*Objective 9.3*

> FEMA MISSIONS
>
> The following Executive Orders (E.O.) and laws provide both the
> statutory foundation for FEMA and are largely responsible for its
> organization and structure.

-   E.O. 12148, Federal Emergency Management

-   E.O. 12656, Assignment of Emergency Preparedness Responsibilities

-   E.O. 12919, National Defense Industrial Resources Preparedness

-   National Security Act of 1947

-   Defense Production Act of 1950, as amended

-   Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, as
    amended

-   Presidential Decision Directive-39 (On American terrorism policy)

> FEMA is a rather small independent agency with a full-time workforce
> of about 2,600, but with a capability to mobilize personnel from a
> disaster reserve force in times of emergency. FEMA promotes disaster
> mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery activities through
> its work with State and local emergency managers. The Agency also
> advances comprehensive, all-hazards emergency management activities.
>
> FEMA is headed by a Director appointed by the President and the Agency
> reports directly to that Office. At this writing, FEMA's Director is
> James Lee Witt. He sits on the Cabinet and enjoys easy access to
> President Clinton. As a result of his many years working in State and
> local emergency management, Mr. Witt was well aware of the Agency's
> strengths and weaknesses before he was appointed as Director. He
> testified at his Senate confirmation hearings on April 6, 1993, that
> it was his aim to renew and reinvent FEMA. His first step in renewing
> FEMA was to give it a clearer mission Statement:
>
> "The mission of the Federal Emergency Management Agency is to provide
> the leadership and support to reduce the loss of life and property and
> protect our institutions from all types of hazards through a
> comprehensive, risk-based, all-hazards emergency management program of
> mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery." \[Gore, September
> 1993, p. 25.\]
>
> FEMA's specific MISSION GOALS are to:
>
> 1\. Create an emergency management partnership with other Federal
> agencies, State and local governments, voluntary organizations, and
> the private sector to better serve customers;
>
> 2\. Establish, in concert with FEMA's partners, a National emergency
> management system that is comprehensive, risk-based, and all-hazards
> in approach;
>
> 3\. Make hazard mitigation the foundation of the National emergency
> management system;
>
> 4\. Provide a rapid and effective response to, and recovery from,
> disaster; and
>
> 5\. Strengthen State and local emergency management.
>
> As a consequence of its legislated mission, FEMA is tasked with
> responding to any accidental, natural, or conflict-induced hazard or
> threat which causes or may cause substantial injury or harm to the
> population or substantial damage to, or loss of, property. In effect,
> it embodies an ALL-HAZARDS APPROACH to emergency management.
>
> By early 1995, Mr. Witt's vision for FEMA was to strive for a
> "Partnership for a Safer Future for America." That partnership was to
> include the universe of FEMA stakeholders. The vision called for an
> informed public dedicated to protecting their families, homes,
> workplaces, communities, and livelihoods from the impacts of
> disasters. Builders and developers would construct hazard-resistant
> structures located out of harm's way. Governments and private
> organizations would set forth plans, compile necessary resources, and
> rigorously train and exercise for disaster responses. Communities
> would prepare and plan for recovery and reconstruction BEFORE disaster
> strikes.
>
> Central to Mr. Witt's vision was an increased emphasis placed on
> MITIGATION ACTIVITIES. FEMA had housed a collection of modest
> mitigation programs prior to Mr. Witt's regime, but he had made
> mitigation the foundation of emergency management and the primary goal
> of the Agency. The reasoning was that mitigation activities and
> strategies may substantially reduce the impact of disasters and, in
> some cases, prevent disasters altogether. FEMA now allocates up to 15
> percent of all disaster assistance funds in a declared disaster to
> State and local long-term mitigation efforts. FEMA officials have gone
> on record as saying:
>
> "Mitigation must become a recognized National priority. Although
> mitigation makes good sense, often it is not a priority for
> communities. Establishing mitigation as a primary foundation for
> emergency management will decrease demands for response to disasters.
> Buildings, homes, and infrastructure that are built better, withstand
> hazards better. This means less destruction, less loss of life, less
> personal and economic hardship. This also means a reduction in outlays
> for disaster assistance by Federal, State, and local governments for
> rebuilding communities and businesses." \[Gore, September 1993.\]
>
> Regardless of the Statement, there is irrefutable evidence that the
> costs of disasters since 1989 have risen dramatically. Moreover, "the
> jury is still out" on whether mitigation will decrease demands for
> Federal response to disasters.
>
> Through highlighting mitigation efforts and securing more program
> resources, FEMA can substantially enhance its capacity and presence in
> intergovernmental relations on a continuous basis, rather than merely
> after a disaster. Whether such invigorated FEMA mitigation efforts
> will produce adequate State and local responses, however, is a highly
> charged political issue. Local officials sometimes rationalize that
> they have little to gain from mitigation efforts if, in the event of a
> disaster, the State and Federal Governments will pay for a the lion's
> share of their local disaster losses. Moreover, mitigation efforts
> have to compete with the far more alluring concerns of economic growth
> and development on the local level. With local officials, developers,
> and citizens often viewing mitigation efforts as restrictions on
> personal freedom and as financially costly, mitigation efforts are
> bound to remain a politically-charged issue.

*Objective 9.4*

FEMA ORGANIZATION

> For the most part, FEMA is organized functionally on the four phases
> of emergency management: mitigation, preparedness, response and
> recovery. Specifically, FEMA comprises five Directorates: MITIGATION;
> PREPAREDNESS, TRAINING AND EXERCISES; RESPONSE AND RECOVERY;
> OPERATIONS SUPPORT; and INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY SERVICES. It also
> includes the U.S. Fire Administration and the Federal Insurance
> Administration.
>
> FEMA is geographically divided into ten standard Federal Regions and
> each Regional Office of FEMA is directed by a politically appointed
> Regional Director. FEMA's jurisdiction covers all 50 States and the
> District of Columbia. Other jurisdictions eligible to request
> Presidential Declarations of major disaster and emergency are: the
> trust territories of American Samoa, Guam, and the Virgin Islands;
> and, the commonwealths of Northern Mariana Islands and Puerto Rico.
> Under a Compact of Free Association (1995), the Federated States of
> Micronesia and the Republic of the Marshall Islands now function as
> independent Nations and may no longer apply for Presidential Disaster
> Declarations, as they were allowed to do (and did) from 1953 to 1995.
> Also noteworthy is the 1994 decision of the Republic of Palau, which
> also won Presidential Disaster Declarations in the past. It agreed, in
> exchange for a \$15 million grant from the United States, to end its
> eligibility to request Presidential Disaster Declarations. \[Kite,
> July 31, 1997.\]
>
> State officials count on the FEMA Regional Office in their area to
> support on-going Federal-State emergency management projects, and FEMA
> regional personnel are made available to help in damage assessment
> after a disaster. Ordinarily, States and localities are expected to
> perform a pre-assessment of damage before the State asks FEMA's
> Regional Director to undertake with them a PRELIMINARY DAMAGE
> ASSESSMENT (PDA). PDAs are comprised of Federal, State, and local
> officials with a designated Federal leader. Once all parties come to
> an agreement on the PDA, it is submitted to the FEMA regional office.
>
> Thus, the Regional Offices play a crucial role in Federal and State
> emergency management relations. In addition to engaging in routine
> operations, FEMA Regional Directors, upon receipt of a Governor's
> request and upon completion of a damage assessment, prepare a REGIONAL
> SUMMARY AND, REGIONAL ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATION. The regional
> summary contains only factual information while the regional analysis
> and recommendation contains opinions and recommendations for the
> President.
>
> FEMA also operates the National Emergency Training Center (NETC),
> which is composed of the National Fire Academy and the Emergency
> Management Institute. The former deals directly and specifically with
> fire-fighting professionals, including hazardous materials training.
> The latter serves other emergency personnel through developing,
> monitoring, and delivering training in all categories of emergency and
> disaster threats to communities, including radiological emergency
> training.
>
> A political issue which continues to hamper FEMA's organizational
> structure and effectiveness is that of political appointees. As
> mentioned in Session 7, "Legislative Political Issues and Disasters,"
> the National Academy of Public Administration (NAPA) and the U.S.
> General Accounting Office (GAO) have alleged that FEMA has too many
> political appointees (over 30) for its size. The ten FEMA Regional
> Directors and eight other top FEMA officials are politically
> appointed. However, only FEMA's Director, Associate Director,
> Directorate heads, Federal Insurance Administration Director, and Fire
> Service Academy leader require Senate confirmation of their
> appointments. Five separate Senate committees, each with different
> program interests, must act to confirm most of these appointees. The
> result is that these appointees may not necessarily owe their
> allegiance to the Director of FEMA, but instead to certain lawmakers,
> Senate committees, and influential clientele groups of FEMA.
> Compounding the problem has been the caustic media reports that FEMA
> has been a political dumping ground for "spoils system" political
> appointees who are unqualified for the duties of their positions---a
> claim made before 1993. \[Schneider, 1995, p. 163.\]
>
> Director Mr. Witt has insisted on promoting "technical and managerial
> selection criteria for political appointments," broader on-the-job
> training for politically-appointed FEMA regional directors, and
> improved career development options for both political and career FEMA
> employees. As a result, better qualified people have been appointed to
> direct FEMA's regional offices and some positions, previously filled
> with political appointees, have been filled by senior FEMA career
> employees. Until the overall number of FEMA's political appointees is
> reduced by Congress, however, this issue can never be fully resolved.

*Objective 9.5*

FEMA'S COORDINATING ROLE

> An examination of FEMA's missions and organization reveal that a
> significant amount of coordination is required for effective emergency
> management. FEMA'S COORDINATING ROLE refers to its relations with
> different levels of government and various agencies in conducting
> emergency management. FEMA's primary purpose is to provide assistance
> to State and local governments in saving lives and protecting property
> and public health and safety for all types of emergencies. It also,
> however, directs or coordinates the Federal Agency disaster response.
>
> Currently, FEMA provides funding, guidance, and training to State and
> local emergency management organizations through its regional
> structure. Its central relationship with States and localities is
> primarily through the medium of PERFORMANCE PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENTS
> (PPA) AND COOPERATIVE AGREEMENTS (CA) with State Offices of Emergency
> Management. The PPA and CA provide a means to pass funds through to
> State Offices of Emergency Management and from them funds go to local
> Offices of Emergency Management. PPAs and CAs are analogous to
> contracts. The PPA is a partnership document of both FEMA and the
> States regarding goals and objectives. States use the partnership to
> develop their own objectives and, in turn, many of these objectives
> may come to shape FEMA's own goals and objectives. For example, PPA
> and CAs can emphasize mitigation efforts. State and FEMA officials
> come to mutual agreement regarding expected State level outcomes given
> FEMA funding support.
>
> FEMA's success or failure in meeting its duties rests largely and
> directly on its ability to coordinate and harmonize the
> disaster-related work of other Federal agencies. Although FEMA
> possesses the authority, funding, and limited assets to enable it to
> do some work independently, it must depend on other Federal
> departments and agencies to provide additional resources to ensure a
> complete Federal response. In the event of a Presidentially-declared
> disaster, a MISSION ASSIGNMENT may be issued to a Federal agency by
> the FEMA Director, Associate Director, or Regional Director.
>
> A MISSION ASSIGNMENT is a work order given to a particular agency that
> directs completion by that agency of a specified task and cites
> funding, other managerial controls, and guidance. In effect, these
> assignments represent FEMA's role in coordinating a complete Federal
> response to a disaster. This term is also significant because it
> denotes how other Federal agencies, besides FEMA, engage in disaster
> recovery work through drawing from the President's Disaster Relief
> Fund.
>
> As both the PPAs, CAs, and MISSION ASSIGNMENTS indicate, a web of
> well-maintained political and administrative relations with customers,
> State and local emergency managers, and Federal agency partners is
> essential to the attainment of FEMA's goals and objectives. An
> excellent example of this is FEMA's governmental and interagency
> coordination work through the Federal Response Plan.

*Objective 9.6*

Federal Response Plan

> The FEDERAL RESPONSE PLAN (FRP) demonstrates much about the political
> and administrative environment of American disaster management. It
> manifests the framework for planning and conducting interagency
> response, recovery, and mitigation activities in
> Presidentially-declared disasters. The FRP's purpose is to integrate
> the capabilities of Federal departments and agencies for a coordinated
> Federal response to disasters, so as to provide emergency assistance
> to save lives, and protect property, public health, and safety for all
> types of emergencies.
>
> Hurricane Hugo in 1989 revealed the need for such a comprehensive
> Federal response program. Criticism of disaster relief efforts in
> response to Hurricane Hugo gave impetus to the creation of the Federal
> Response Plan of 1992, which is now the basis of Federal mobilization
> aimed at helping States and localities respond to all types of
> disasters. The Federal Response Plan of 1992 represented a cooperative
> agreement between 26 Federal agencies and the American Red Cross. The
> Federal Response Plan:
>
> 1\. Serves as a blueprint to coordinate and mobilize resources in
> disaster and emergency circumstances;
>
> 2\. Provides greater detail concerning the roles and activities of
> different Federal agencies during large-scale natural disasters;
>
> 3\. Groups together the different types of emergency assistance
> available to public organization and private citizens and identifies a
> lead agency for each of these types of assistance;
>
> 4\. Specifies a process in which the resources of the Federal
> Government can be deployed more quickly and efficiently.
>
> The Federal Response Plan takes effect when States and local
> governments are overwhelmed by a disaster and the State Governor
> requests, and the President determines, that "an emergency exists for
> which the primary responsibility for response rests with the United
> States."
>
> In presumed disaster or emergency circumstances, the Governor of the
> affected State must determine whether the magnitude of devastation
> warrants the request of a Presidential Disaster Declaration. The
> President, advised by FEMA, must be convinced by evidence that the
> event warrants Federal assistance. This help supplements the efforts
> and available resources of the affected State(s), local governments,
> and disaster relief organizations in alleviating the damage, loss,
> hardship, or suffering. The Federal Response Plan establishes the
> basis by which Federal resources will be organized and employed to
> support affected State and local jurisdictions.
>
> Currently, the FRP includes 28 departments and agencies, and the
> American Red Cross, each of which are assigned primary and support
> roles to provide Federal resources to augment the efforts of local and
> State governments in responding to a disaster or emergency. The FRP
> incorporates the Incident Command System (ICS) approach to organizing
> the Federal interagency response teams. The FRP can be viewed as an
> action plan to support this organizational structure.
>
> The FRP also is linked to other major Federal emergency plans to
> ensure a consistent and coordinated response to any event which
> necessitates Federal disaster or emergency assistance. A single
> Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO) is assigned to direct Federal
> response to the disaster. The FCO is appointed by the President and
> reports to the President through the Director of FEMA.
>
> The FEMA Regional Office dispatches an Emergency Response Team (ERT)
> and establishes a Federal Disaster Office.
>
> The FRP is organized into 12 Emergency Support Functions with a lead
> agency responsible for each:

+------------------------------------+---------------------------------+
| 1\.                                |                                 |
| Transportation\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-   |                                 |
| \-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\- |                                 |
| \-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\--DOT |                                 |
+------------------------------------+---------------------------------+
|                                    |                                 |
+------------------------------------+---------------------------------+
| 2\.                                |                                 |
| Communications\-\-\-\-\-\-         |                                 |
| \-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\- |                                 |
| \-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\--NCS |                                 |
+------------------------------------+---------------------------------+
|                                    |                                 |
+------------------------------------+---------------------------------+
| 3\. Public Works and               |                                 |
| Engineering\-\-\-\-\-\-            |                                 |
| \-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\--DOD |                                 |
+------------------------------------+---------------------------------+
| 4\.                                |                                 |
| Fire-fighting\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\ |                                 |
| -\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\ |                                 |
| -\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\--USDA |                                 |
|                                    |                                 |
| 5\. Information and                |                                 |
| Planning\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\  |                                 |
| -\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\--FEMA |                                 |
|                                    |                                 |
| 6\. Mass                           |                                 |
| Care\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-     |                                 |
| \-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\- |                                 |
| \-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\--ARC |                                 |
|                                    |                                 |
| 7\. Resource                       |                                 |
| Support\-\-\-\-                    |                                 |
| \-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\- |                                 |
| \-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\--GSA |                                 |
|                                    |                                 |
| 8\. Health and Medical             |                                 |
| Services\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-           |                                 |
| \-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\--HHS |                                 |
|                                    |                                 |
| 9\. Urban Search and               |                                 |
| Rescue\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-       |                                 |
| \-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\--DOD |                                 |
|                                    |                                 |
| 10\. Hazardous                     |                                 |
| Materia                            |                                 |
| ls\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\- |                                 |
| \-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\--EPA |                                 |
|                                    |                                 |
| 11\.                               |                                 |
| Food\-\                            |                                 |
| -\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\ |                                 |
| -\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\ |                                 |
| -\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\--USDA |                                 |
|                                    |                                 |
| 12\.                               |                                 |
| En                                 |                                 |
| ergy\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\- |                                 |
| \-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\- |                                 |
| \-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\--DOE |                                 |
+------------------------------------+---------------------------------+

Supporting functions include:

-   Financial Management

-   Public Information

-   Congressional Relations

> The Emergency Support Functions in the Federal Response Plan describe
> essential resources which the departments and agencies can provide to
> augment local and State emergency response. These resources are
> provided under the statutory authority of or by mission assignment
> from FEMA.
>
> To facilitate obtaining resources through an Emergency Support
> Function, FEMA coordinates with the primary agency to validate the
> requirement and to provide the needed resource. Support agencies may
> also provide resources under the mission assignment. FEMA may also
> assign a mission to any agency to provide a unique or specialized
> resource.
>
> When is the Response Plan implemented?
>
> 1\. In anticipation of a significant event (e.g., hurricane) judged
> likely to result in a need for Federal assistance,
>
> 2\. In response to an actual event (e.g., earthquake) which requires
> Federal disaster or emergency assistance,
>
> 3\. In response to a request by a Governor to the President for
> Federal assistance to the State and/or
>
> 4\. As the result of a major disaster or emergency declaration by the
> President.

What types of assistance can be provided?

> 1\. Immediate response for life-saving and life-protecting needs,
>
> 2\. Help in recovering from the disaster,
>
> 3\. Assistance in restoration, repair, or replacement of critical
> public services and facilities,
>
> 4\. Assistance to support disaster operations, and
>
> 5\. Mitigation assistance to lessen the effects of a future disaster.

What resources can be provided?

1.  Emergency Response and Support Teams.

2.  Specialized Teams for:

-   rapid assessment

-   emergency communication

-   medical assistance and support

-   urban search and rescue

-   emergency power restoration

-   incident management

-   community relations

3.  Communications capabilities and equipment.

4.  Facilities to support disaster operations.

5.  Management and coordination expertise.

6.  Supplies, including:

-   food

-   bulk and bottles water, and ice

-   tents, cots, blankets, and sleeping bags

-   diapers and bathroom supplies

-   tarps and plastic sheeting

-   portable radios, flashlights and tools

7.  Equipment, such as:

-   mobile kitchens

-   water purification units

-   portable toilets and showers

-   emergency generators

**Supplemental**

**Considerations**

> Students should be reminded that the published works regarding Federal
> emergency management need to be understood in terms of timing and
> author bias. Some evaluations of Federal emergency management and FEMA
> in particular, were published before modern reforms were made, so
> students need to be reminded of this. Moreover, some evaluations of
> the same matters may manifest various author biases. For example, the
> Schneider book, although generally well-written and informative,
> begins with an admission by the author that her property was damaged
> by a tornado and that she was not completely happy with the
> after-disaster help she received. This may account for some of her
> criticisms of Federal emergency management.
>
> It is also important that the instructor make to the students clear
> that management structures, just like law and policy, are not static.
> Agencies are almost constantly under reorganization owing to internal
> reforms, Presidentially supervised reorganizations, changes mandated
> in law or by budgetary requirements, intergovernmental changes,
> regional changes, or to demands of the job (i.e., new types of
> disasters, new international obligations, and personnel turnover,
> etc.).
>
> After a Presidential Disaster Declaration has been issued several
> types of Federal disaster assistance become available. Under disaster
> or emergency circumstances, States receive from FEMA a match supported
> subsidy (75/25%) to provide supplemental assistance to individuals and
> families adversely affected. This is defined as Individual Assistance.
> Some forms of Individual Assistance are managed exclusively by FEMA.
> Others, such as loans to businesses, are managed by the Small Business
> Administration, and farm loans are managed by the U.S. Department of
> Agriculture.
>
> INDIVIDUAL ASSISTANCE

-   Temporary Housing

-   Grants

-   Small Business and Farm Loans

-   Disaster Unemployment and Job Placement Assistance

-   Social Security, Veterans, and Tax Assistance

-   Crisis Counseling

The types of aid customarily available are:

-   Rental payments for temporary housing for those whose homes are
    unlivable. Assistance is available for up to 18 months depending on
    the need. (A FEMA-funded and administered-program.)

-   Grants for making minor repairs to primary residences that are
    habitable or to make them habitable (A FEMA-funded
    and-administered).

-   Grants ranging from several thousand dollars to a maximum of
    \$12,900 to help meet serious disaster-related needs not covered by
    insurance or other Federal, State, or charitable aid programs.
    (FEMA-funded at 75 percent of the total eligible costs and
    State-administered.)

-   Low-interest loans at 4-8 percent to cover uninsured private and
    business property losses. Loans are available up to \$200,000 for
    primary residence; \$40,000 for personal property, including renter
    losses; and \$1.5 million for businesses. (Funded and administered
    by the U.S. Small Business Administration (SBA).)

-   Loans up to \$1.5 million for small businesses that have suffered
    disaster-related cash flow problems and need funds for working
    capital to recover from the disaster's adverse economic impact. This
    loan, in combination with a property loss loan, cannot exceed \$1.5
    million. (Funded and administered by the SBA.)

-   Loans up to \$500,000 for farmers, ranchers, and aquaculture
    operators to cover production and property losses, excluding primary
    residence. (Funded and administered by the Farmers Home
    Administration, the U.S. Department of Agriculture.)

-   Income tax assistance for filing casualty losses. (Administered by
    the U.S. Internal Revenue Service.)

-   Advisory assistance for legal, veterans' benefits, and social
    security matters.

> FEMA also provides PUBLIC ASSISTANCE to State and local governments or
> certain private, not-for-profit organizations, on a 75/25% cost
> sharing basis, to help restore public services and to provide
> infrastructure support.

PUBLIC ASSISTANCE

1.  Debris clearance.

2.  Repair, restoration or replacement of:

-   water control facilities

-   roads, streets, bridges

-   public buildings and equipment

-   public utilities

-   communications systems

-   recreational facilities, equipment, and parks

> 3\. Direct costs of local government disaster response.

Types of Public Assistance include:

-   Costs associated with debris clearance;

-   The repair, restoration or replacement of water control facilities
    (e.g., dams, levees, drainage channels, shore protection devices,
    and pumping stations);

-   The repair of non-Federally supported roads, highways, and bridges;

-   The repair or restoration of public buildings and equipment (e.g.,
    fire stations and fire-fighting equipment);

-   The repair or restoration of public utilities (e.g., electric, gas,
    or water utilities); and

-   The repair or restoration of parks, and recreational facilities and
    equipment (e.g., playground equipment, swimming pools, boat docks
    and piers, bath houses, tennis courts, picnic tables, golf courses,
    and some tree and landscape features).

> FEMA also is empowered to fund the Hazard Mitigation Assistance
> program. A State is allowed to receive a sum equal to 15% of its
> Federally-declared disaster public assistance costs. This helps State,
> local, and other eligible parties lessen or avert the threat of future
> disasters through funding projects aimed at reducing or eliminating
> future disaster vulnerability.

**Endnotes**

-   Gore, Al, "Federal Emergency Management Agency -- Accompanying
    Report of the National Performance Review (NPR)" Series: "From Red
    Tape to Results: Creating a Government That Works Better and Costs
    Less" (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, Office of
    the Vice President, September 1993):25.

-   Kite, Roy, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Emergency Management
    Institute, telephone interview on July 31, 1997.

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-   Schneider, Saundra K., "Considering Recommendations for Change,"
    *Flirting with Disaster: Public Management in Crisis Situations*
    (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1995):163.

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-   U.S. Congress, U.S. Senate, and Committee on Governmental Affairs
    (Edmund Muskie) "Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1978, Establishing a
    New Independent Agency, The Federal Emergency Management Agency,"
    Series: "Course Material" (Battle Creek, Mich.: Defense Civil
    Preparedness Agency, Staff College, February 1979).

**Session No. 10**

**Course**: The Political and Policy Basis of Emergency Management

**Session**: State Political and Organizational Issues **Time**: 1 Hour

**Objectives:**

By the conclusion of this session, students should be able to:

> 10.1 Explain the purpose and general forms of organization of State
> emergency management agencies.
>
> 10.2 Explain the role of Governors in emergency management and
> disaster policy.
>
> 10.3 Explain the general role of State legislatures in emergency
> management.
>
> 10.4 Outline the general issues and politics of State emergency
> management.
>
> 10.5 Review the major duties and responsibilities that State emergency
> management agencies assume with respect to local emergency management
> agencies (e.g., county and municipal, etc.).

**Scope**

> This session walks students through the world of Governors, State
> lawmakers, and State emergency management officials. It explains the
> central, pivotal role of Governors in emergency management. It reveals
> that Governors, as executives, possess emergency powers applicable to
> disasters or emergencies within their respective States. They have at
> their disposal State emergency management agencies, other State
> agencies, and their State's National Guard (along with reserve and
> active duty forces made available by the President). State emergency
> management is often integrally involved with State legislative
> activities. Moreover, State emergency management is a linchpin and
> overseer for local emergency management. Political issues permeate the
> realm of State emergency management in both positive and negative
> ways.

**References**

Assigned student reading:

-   Durham, Tom and Lacy E. Suiter "Roles of State and Local
    Government," ***Emergency Management: Principles and Practice for
    Local Government***, Thomas E. Drabek and Gerard J. Hoetmer, (eds.)
    (Washington, DC: The International City Management Association,
    1991): Ch. 5, pp. 101-111.

-   U.S. Senate, Bipartisan Task Force on Funding Disaster Relief, John
    Glenn (Chairman), Christopher S. Bond (Co-Chairman), "Federal
    Disaster Assistance: Report of the Senate Task Force on Funding
    Disaster Relief," 104th Cong., 1st Sess., ***Document No. 104-4***
    (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1995). \[See
    Section 2, NonFederal Disaster Assistance (States), pp. 38-44 and
    (National Guard) pp. 44-45.\]

-   Waugh, William L., Jr. and Richard T. Sylves, "Intergovernmental
    Relations of Emergency Management," ***Disaster Management in the
    U.S. and Canada***, Richard T. Sylves and William L. Waugh, Jr.
    (eds.) (Springfield, Ill.: Charles C. Thomas Publishers, 1996): Ch.
    III, pp. 46-68.

-   Winslow, Frances E., "Intergovernmental Challenges and California's
    Approach to Emergency Management," ***Disaster Management in the
    U.S. and Canada***, Richard T. Sylves and William L. Waugh, Jr.,
    (eds.) (Springfield, Ill.: Charles C. Thomas Publishers, 1996): Ch.
    V, pp. 101-125.

**Requirements**

> The Durham and Suiter article provides a very helpful State emergency
> management organization chart in Figure 5-2 on page 108. The
> instructor might consider using it as a transparency for in-class
> instructional use. Page 109 of the same article contains a very
> instructive list of State emergency management agency functions.
>
> Winslow's article is very State-specific (California), but it
> represents an important organizational initiative undertaken by one of
> the country's most disaster-prone States. Ask students to identify
> general points in that work rather than minor details.

**Remarks**

> While everyone is aware that the United States has fifty State
> governments, many are unaware that other jurisdictions are assumed to
> have State status for official purposes. The District of Columbia,
> Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, Guam, American Samoa, and the
> Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, all engage in emergency
> management and are eligible to apply for Federal disaster relief under
> conditions which apply to States. Until 1995, the Republic of Palau,
> the Federated States of Micronesia, and the Republic of the Marshall
> Glands were also eligible to apply for (and did in fact receive)
> Presidential Declarations of major disasters or emergencies. (See
> Objective 9.4 in Session 9.)

*Objective 10.1*

> Each of the 50 States, and each American trust or commonwealth
> territory, has a State emergency management organization. Table 10.1
> below lists the names of all 50 State emergency management
> organizations as they were in 1996.
>
> In some States, emergency management is conducted by an independent
> agency reporting directly to the Governor's office. In other States,
> the agency or organization may be located in the Military Department,
> the Adjutant General's Office, the Department of Public Safety, or in
> some other office. Some emergency management offices are located
> within the management structure of the Governor's staff offices.
>
> **TABLE 10.1**

**STATE EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCIES**

**[State]{.underline} [Emergency Management Agency]{.underline}**

Alabama Emergency Management Agency

Alaska Division of Emergency Services

Arizona Division of Emergency Management

Arkansas Office of Emergency Services

California Office of Emergency Services

Colorado Division of Local Government

Connecticut Office of Emergency Management

Delaware Emergency Management Agency

Florida Division of Emergency Management

Georgia Emergency Management Agency

Hawaii State Civil Defense

Idaho Bureau of Disaster Services

Illinois Emergency Management Agency

Indiana Emergency Management Agency

Iowa Division of Emergency Management

Kansas Division of Emergency Management

Kentucky Disaster and Emergency Services

Louisiana Office of Emergency Preparedness

Maine Emergency Management Agency

Maryland Emergency Management Agency

Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency

Michigan Division of Emergency Management

Minnesota Division of Emergency Management

Mississippi Emergency Management Agency

Missouri State Emergency Management Agency

Montana Disaster & Emergency Services

Nebraska State Civil Defense Agency

Nevada Division of Emergency Management

New Hampshire Governor's Office/Emergency Management

New Jersey Office of Emergency Management

New Mexico Division of Emergency Management

New York State Emergency Management Office

North Carolina Division of Emergency Management

North Dakota Division of Emergency Management

Ohio Emergency Management Agency

Oklahoma Department/Civil Emergency Management

Oregon State Police

Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency

Rhode Island Emergency Management Agency

South Carolina Emergency Preparedness Division

South Dakota Division of Emergency Management

Tennessee Emergency Management Agency

Texas Division of Emergency Management

Utah Comprehensive Emergency Management

Vermont Division of Emergency Management

Virginia Department of Emergency Services

Washington State Emergency Management Agency

West Virginia Office of Emergency Services

Wisconsin Division of Emergency Government

Wyoming Emergency Management Agency

> \[NEMA February, 1996.\]
>
> From a political vantage point, how a State emergency management
> agency is organized and where it sits within the bureaucratic
> hierarchy of State organization, is significant. Many studies of State
> organization have concluded that "stand-alone" agencies, independent
> of broad holding company-type departments, usually have more political
> clout and a stronger professional identity. Another important
> indicator of agency political power is the support of, and access to,
> the Governor. Clearly, State agencies with close organizational links
> to the Office of the Governor usually have a greater capacity to help
> marshal and coordinate State emergency and disaster assistance. Their
> proximity to the Governor, a critical seat of State political and
> managerial power, affords a high organizational profile.
>
> In general, State emergency agencies, like their local counterparts,
> are expected to be organized effectively, and should possess
> well-maintained emergency plans, facilities, and equipment. To become
> and remain eligible for Federal financial assistance, each State must
> manage a State emergency management program that complements and
> promotes local emergency management.

*Objective 10.2*

Emergency Roles of Governors

> Governors, as executives, possess emergency powers applicable to
> disasters or emergencies within their respective States. They have at
> their disposal State emergency management agencies, other State agency
> assistance, and their State's National Guard (along with reserve and
> active duty forces made available by the President, if needed).
>
> A recent survey conducted by the National Emergency Management
> Association (NEMA) \[NEMA, February 1996\] revealed that in virtually
> all States "the Governor is the responsible authority for issuing a
> State Disaster Declaration or initiating a State response." In most
> States, a declaration of emergency or disaster by the Governor is
> sufficient to trigger State expenditures for disaster relief and
> emergency assistance. In many States, this declaration activates the
> State emergency response plan.
>
> The NEMA survey claimed,
>
> "The Governor's pivotal role during disasters has an impact on the
> location and direction of the State emergency management function. A
> 1995 policy paper issued by the National Governors' Association,
> recommends that the individual responsible for the State's emergency
> management program have direct access to the Governor. \[NGA, 1995, p.
> 12\]" \[NEMA, February 1996\]
>
> A review of the structure and location of State emergency management
> agencies revealed that in 44 States the Director of Emergency
> Management is appointed by the Governor. Although placement of the
> agency varies by State, the Emergency Management Director reports to
> the Governor in 19 States, the Adjutant General in 19 States, and the
> Secretary for Public Safety in six States.
>
> In most States, the Governor and the State Emergency Management
> Director rarely work face-to-face. Usually someone on the Governor's
> staff acts as a go-between. However, that staffer often has many
> responsibilities besides emergency management. This sometimes makes it
> difficult for State Emergency Management Directors to influence or
> advise their Governors on matters of policy affecting disaster
> management.

General Powers of Governors

> The authority which a Governor has is defined by the State
> Constitution, and State Constitutions vary considerably both in
> substance, specificity, and length. A Governor, or Acting Governor, is
> the Chief Executive of the State.
>
> 1\. Most Governors have considerable powers of appointment, both in
> appointments to executive agencies and to judicial positions.
>
> 2\. Some, but not all, Governors have powers of executive
> reorganization.
>
> 3\. Many Governors can veto entire bills passed by the State
> legislature, or they can use an "item veto" to invalidate only those
> provisions of bills which they do not want enacted into law. A few
> Governors possess amendatory veto powers which enable them, in certain
> circumstances, to re-write passages in legislation before signing them
> into law.
>
> 4\. Most Governors prepare executive budgets which are submitted to
> the State legislature for review and approval.
>
> 5\. Most Governors are restricted to two successive terms of office.
>
> In the case of appointive powers, it is highly probable that Governors
> who appoint their State Emergency Management Directors are likely to
> work more closely with them before, during, and after disasters. If
> Emergency Management Directors are appointed by others (State Adjutant
> General, the State legislature), they may not have a good working
> relationship with the Governor and they may not feel accountable to
> the Governor.
>
> Powers of reorganization and veto powers are relevant to emergency
> management in the sense that these are instruments which Governors may
> use to emphasize or de-emphasize State emergency management. Veto
> powers, especially over budget legislation, may be used by Governors
> to influence the flow and amount of resources a State dedicates to
> emergency management activity. When Governors prepare executive
> budgets, they are indicating programs and purposes they want to assign
> priority. This too has a major impact on State emergency management.
> Decisions that a Governor makes about State emergency management often
> involve political factors (e.g., jurisdictions and areas to be
> provided disaster mitigation projects for public works areas to
> receive State funds for infrastructure replacement, and
> urban-suburban-rural distinctions in apportioning emergency management
> training and education resources, etc.).
>
> If Governors do not face State term limits, they may come to amass
> tremendous political power. Whenever Governors face a term limit and
> are in their final term of office, they tend to lose a degree of
> political power. This is sometimes consequential in State emergency
> management. Strong Governors are able to fend off State legislative
> interference and may be able to more easily assume temporary emergency
> powers. Weak Governors may discover that their political rivals are
> trying to wrest emergency managerial control from them.

Governors and Declarations

> Governors also play a key role in the Presidential Declaration
> process. When a disaster strikes, local authorities and individuals
> request help from private relief organizations and from the State
> government. If assistance is beyond their capability, the Governor
> requests a Presidential Declaration of Major Disaster or Emergency.
> The Governor submits an official request to the President through the
> FEMA Regional Director asking for Federal assistance under the
> Stafford Act.
>
> Usually a Governor will first consult with the State Office of
> Emergency Management. Then, if the State personnel were not involved
> in the local damage assessment, the Governor will initiate a
> State-level damage assessment. Or, if it appears that the problem is
> beyond the State and local response capacity, the Governor can ask
> FEMA to join State and local personnel in conducting a Preliminary
> Damage Assessment.
>
> If warranted, the Governor will then issue a State Declaration of
> Disaster, typically through an executive order or proclamation. The
> order usually describes the nature of the emergency, where it
> occurred, and the authority under which the Governor makes the
> declaration.
>
> If the Governor decides that the disaster is overwhelming the State
> response capability, then he or she may request a Presidential
> Declaration of Major Disaster or Emergency.

*Objective 10.3*

> State legislatures are also participants in emergency management,
> although their roles are seldom examined or understood.
>
> First and foremost, State legislatures propose, enact, and amend State
> laws which intrinsically involve matters of emergency management.
> State lawmakers empower State administrative agencies to undertake
> emergency management functions and to implement emergency
> management-related programs. As elected political representatives,
> State lawmakers have every incentive to meet the needs of their
> constituents and the needs of the interests which helped them win
> their office. State legislators may hold State emergency managers
> accountable for their actions. Legislative hearings are often a means
> by which State lawmakers investigate administrative activity,
> supervise and oversee agency operation, seek information on agency
> budget requests, conduct audit functions of State programs, and
> publicize mismanagement or highlight the need for reform. Political
> issues permeate many of these proceedings and much State legislative
> activity.
>
> Second, State legislatures provide the funding for State programs. A
> recent NEMA Report reveals that legislatures in 24 States directly
> appropriate funds for specific incidents after each major disaster
> occurs. This is an important responsibility often entailing
> considerable political negotiation regarding how much money will be
> made available and where the funds will come from to pay for the
> disaster. Eighteen States possess separate disaster funds (although
> they are not trust funds) and these monies are appropriated as needed
> to keep an adequate supply of money available at all times (i.e., this
> is generally referred to as a State's "RAINY DAY" fund). Only Alaska,
> California, and Florida (at this writing), have DISASTER TRUST FUNDS
> in which revenues from specified sources (i.e., a tax on insurance
> policies or a certain percentage of tax receipts specified in statute)
> are deposited and used as needed for specified purposes. Some 12
> States have more than one fund from which money may be drawn depending
> upon the type of disaster or emergency that has occurred. Seventeen
> States use other funding mechanisms for generating State funds for
> State programs or the non-Federal share of Federal programs. Some
> States use more than one mechanism, so that the total number of States
> summed from each category of mechanism exceeds 50.
>
> What is important in all this is that State legislatures are decisive
> in determining how prepared a State is for an emergency or a disaster,
> including how well prepared the State is to pay for disasters and
> emergencies. Since State legislators represent districts, rather than
> the entire State, they may sometimes see their areas of representation
> as either victims of disaster or as benefactors or donors to other
> areas of the State impacted by disaster. In the former instance, a
> legislator has every incentive to maximize State (and Federal) aid.
> The people they directly represent must be helped. In the latter
> instance, a legislators are pre-disposed to offer State aid (because
> they expect similar help when it is their constituents who are
> victims), but may do so on a cautionary basis. Needs have to be proven
> and justified, otherwise State resources may be redistributed unfairly
> or too excessively to the constituents of other legislators. Every
> disaster redistributes resources in some form or another, and the
> outcome of this redistribution is of great political importance
> (everyone wants to gain at someone else's expense, no one wants to be
> denied aid that they believe they rightly deserve). \[NCSL, July
> 1997.\]

*Objective 10.4*

> When it comes to State-level emergency management, the chief
> responsibilities of State governments are:

-   Enacting emergency management legislation, codes, regulations.

-   Enforcing National laws (such as Title III of the Superfund
    Amendments and Reauthorization Act, dealing with preparing for and
    responding to hazardous materials incidents).

-   Applying public administration skills to State-wide planning.

-   Developing and maintaining programs that address all four phases of
    the disaster life-cycle.

-   Assisting local governments in the development and maintenance of
    their emergency management responsibilities.

-   Assisting local governments in disaster response.

> Each respective State emergency management organization is responsible
> for developing and maintaining a State Disaster Operations Plan and a
> State Emergency Operations Center (EOC), from which civil government
> officials (State, Federal, municipal, and county) exercise centralized
> direction and control in an emergency. The EOC serves as a resource
> center and coordination point for additional field assistance.
> Officials who work through an EOC provide executive directives and
> liaison services to State and Federal authorities.
>
> The State Disaster Operations Plan is an all-hazards document
> specifying actions to be taken in the event of natural or
> technological disasters, civil strife, or war. It identifies
> authorities, relationships, and what actions to be taken by whom,
> when, and where, based on pre-determined assumptions, objectives, and
> existing capabilities.
>
> Note that, under the Stafford Act, State governments (along with local
> government and eligible private, non-profit organizations) may submit
> a project application or request for direct Federal assistance under
> the PUBLIC ASSISTANCE PROGRAM. Considerable controversy often emerges
> over which organization or project is eligible to receive Federal
> "public assistance" money. Political executives at the local level
> often apply pressure through the President, through members of
> Congress (especially through member's of the State's Congressional
> delegation), or through appeals to Federal administrative officials,
> all aimed at expediting public assistance funding in local disaster
> recovery.
>
> Also, State and local governments assume major responsibilities for
> DAMAGE ASSESSMENT after disasters and emergencies. This is the process
> of determining the magnitude of damage and loss to individuals,
> businesses, the public sector, and the community resulting from
> disasters or emergencies. PRELIMINARY DAMAGE ASSESSMENT refers to the
> initial damage assessment performed by Federal, State, and local
> representatives in disasters. PDAs help government officials determine
> the magnitude of loss and whether the need for Federal disaster aid is
> justified.
>
> As indicated above, Governors play a key role in the DECLARATION
> PROCESS. When a disaster strikes, local authorities and individuals
> request help from private relief organizations and the State
> government. If assistance is beyond State capability, the Governor
> requests a PRESIDENTIAL DECLARATION OF MAJOR DISASTER or EMERGENCY.
> The Governor submits an official REQUEST to the President through the
> FEMA Regional Director asking for Federal assistance under the
> Stafford Act. Sometimes a Governor's request is denied owing to an
> authorized Presidential action which then is signed by the FEMA
> Director. This is officially referred to as a TURNDOWN.
>
> The Bipartisan Task Force Report (pages 38-45) notes that within
> States, standing authority exists for the Governor to take appropriate
> actions to ensure that a preparedness plan has been developed and that
> assistance is provided to stricken communities or areas. Many States
> have gone beyond those general statutory provisions governing
> emergency or disaster management to enact laws which include
> interstate mutual aid compacts and use of the National Guard, *et
> cetera*.
>
> The Report reviews "State Expenditures." It recounts that each State
> receives Federal assistance under the Stafford Act of 1988 and must
> provide a 25 percent match for Federal disaster aid directed to the
> State, its localities, or to individuals. However, since 1985, 15
> major disasters had all or part of the matching requirement waived by
> the President. The match for individual assistance cannot be waived.
> The instructor must remind students that little published information
> has been compiled documenting how States and localities pay their
> share of emergency management costs. \[An exception is NEMA, February
> 1996.\]
>
> The Bipartisan Task Force Report highlights the role of the National
> Guard in response to disaster. Governors frequently activate portions
> of their respective State National Guards to help out in natural
> disasters. For example, from October 1, 1992, to September 30, 1993,
> National Guard units were mobilized to handle 148 natural disasters.
>
> The Waugh and Sylves assignment outlines many important aspects of
> State emergency management and also stands as a critique of State
> emergency management. There is a creative tension between State
> emergency managers and their Federal and local colleagues. State
> emergency managers carry a special obligation to help build and
> cultivate local emergency management. A symbiotic and cooperative
> relationship between State and local emergency managers is needed both
> before and after disasters. This chapter also examines, among other
> things, the matter of Federal-State cost-sharing and proposals for
> reform, such as State disaster funds and deductibles to be paid by the
> States to secure Federal post-disaster assistance.
>
> Another dimension of Federal-State emergency management involves the
>
> DISASTER PREPAREDNESS IMPROVEMENT GRANT PROGRAM. Under Section 201 of
> the Stafford Act, the program provides annual matching awards to
> States in amounts not to exceed \$50,000. These awards help States
> improve or update their disaster assistance plans and capabilities.
> Political officials at the State level must decide whether or not they
> want to apply for these awards and whether they are willing to pay the
> State match.
>
> Each State maintains an EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTER from which civil
> government officials (State, Federal, municipal, and county) exercise
> centralized direction and control in an emergency. The EOC serves as a
> resource center and coordination point for additional field
> assistance. It facilitates executive direction and liaison with State
> and Federal officials, and considers and mandates protective actions.
> Each State employs an EMERGENCY OPERATIONS PLAN that is an all-hazards
> document specifying actions to be taken in the event of natural or
> technological disasters, or nuclear attack. It identifies authorities,
> relationships, and what actions to be taken by whom, when, and where
> based on pre-determined assumptions, objectives, and existing
> capabilities.
>
> FEMA/STATE AGREEMENTS are formal legal documents between FEMA and each
> respective State. Each contains the understandings, commitments, and
> binding conditions for assistance applicable as the result of the
> major disaster or emergency declared by the President. Each is signed
> by the FEMA Regional Director, or designee, and the Governor of the
> respective State. The GOVERNOR'S AUTHORIZED REPRESENTATIVE is the
> person empowered by the Governor in the FEMA/State Assistance
> Agreement to execute, on behalf of the State, all necessary documents
> for disaster assistance and to evaluate and transmit requests by local
> governments, eligible private non-profit facilities, and State
> agencies for assistance to the FEMA Regional Director following a
> major disaster or emergency declaration.
>
> States are integrally involved in hazard identification, hazard
> mitigation, and hazard analysis. States receive a variety of pre- and
> post-disaster grants from FEMA aimed at HAZARD MITIGATION ASSISTANCE
> and support of the STATE HAZARD MITIGATION PLAN.
>
> Under disaster or emergency circumstances, States receive from FEMA a
> match-supported subsidy to provide supplemental assistance to
> individuals and families adversely affected. This is defined as
> INDIVIDUAL ASSISTANCE. Some forms of individual assistance are managed
> exclusively by FEMA. Recall that under PUBLIC ASSISTANCE mentioned
> above, supplementary Federal assistance is provided to State and local
> governments or certain private, non-profit organizations, other than
> assistance for the direct benefit of individuals and families.
>
> After a disaster or emergency the Governor appoints a STATE
> COORDINATING OFFICER who acts in cooperation with the FEDERAL
> COORDINATING OFFICER to administer disaster recovery efforts. States
> also use a STATE EMERGENCY PLAN, which outlines the State-level
> response to emergencies and disasters and sets forth actions to be
> taken by State and local governments, including those for implementing
> Federal disaster assistance.

**Supplemental**

**Considerations**

> A scholarly, timely, 50-State, comparative study of emergency
> management thus far remains unwritten. The challenge for the students
> is to consider what the States are doing in this field. The political
> importance of emergency management in any single State has much to do
> with how that State's emergency management agencies are organized,
> led, staffed, empowered, and funded. The challenge for the instructor
> is to encourage students to learn more about emergency management in
> their own State and in other States as well, in fact, when very little
> published information is available on the subject.
>
> Relatedly, it is vital that the instructor emphasize that a State's
> disaster history explains much about its current State emergency
> management. Also, the ability of State emergency managers to qualify
> for, and secure, Federal program support and funding is another
> important factor. Finally, relationships between State emergency
> managers and their local counterparts are both administrative and
> political. These relationships help promote in a cooperative way,
> efforts to gain, keep and expand necessary authority and budget
> resources.
>
> State emergency management offices used to get most of their funding
> from FEMA. Today they are expected to pay more of their share. More
> States have come to recognize the benefits of using State resources to
> promote emergency management as disasters (and their associated costs)
> have become more prevalent. Moreover, the end of the Cold War and the
> abolition of civil defense programs has led to a dramatic reduction in
> "National security"-backed Federal funding of even dual-use State and
> local activities (civil defense and emergency management). Add to this
> the gargantuan efforts of the Federal Government to balance its
> budget, and the fact becomes obvious that States and localities need
> to cover more of the costs of routine emergency management activities
> at their respective levels.
>
> The funding that FEMA provides to the States, and through them to
> local jurisdictions, is in jeopardy. In recent times, several States
> have considered alternative funding arrangements, that are less
> dependent on FEMA for their emergency management operations. Alaska,
> California, and Florida now have disaster trust funds, as mentioned
> earlier.
>
> In the mid-1990s, FEMA began to fashion Performance Partnership
> Agreements (PPA) and Cooperative Agreements (CA) with the States.
> These agreements customarily required that at least two-thirds of the
> money that FEMA provided under the PPAs and CAs had to be passed on by
> the State to their respective local political jurisdictions. Under the
> current policy, PPAs and CAs no longer require this. Consequently,
> today, some States have decided to keep all of the funding to
> themselves or have pared the pass-through amounts to less than
> two-thirds. This has, in some cases, created tension and conflict
> between State emergency management offices and local emergency
> management offices, particularly because many local emergency
> management offices are abjectly dependent on the pass-through Federal
> funds.

**Endnotes**

-   *Emergency Management: A Legislator's Guide,* National Conference of
    State Legislatures, July 1997. \[Contact Ms. Cheryl Runyon, NCSL,
    1560 Broadway, Suite 700, Denver, Colorado (303) 830-2200 or
    telephone the NCSL Marketing Department at (303) 830-2054 for a copy
    of the *Guide*---item #4347---\$20.00 plus \$6.00 shipping.\]

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-   National Governors' Association, HR-30 Emergency Management (1995),
    Section 30.2, p. 12. In "NEMA/CSG Report on State Emergency
    Management Funding and Structures," (Lexington, Ky.: The Council of
    State Governments, February, 1996).

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-   National Emergency Management Association, "NEMA/CSG Report on State
    Emergency Management Funding and Structures," (Lexington, Ky.: The
    Council of State Governments, February, 1996). \[See Appendix, Table
    8.\]

**Session No. 11**

**Course**: The Political and Policy Basis of Emergency Management

**Session**: Local Political and Organizational Issues **Time**: 2 Hours

**Objectives:**

By the conclusion of this session, students should be able to:

> 11.1 Outline emergency management authority and responsibilities
> shouldered by local governments.
>
> 11.2 Explain the emergency management-related political and legal
> obligations of mayors, city managers, county executives, and other
> executive officials.
>
> 11.3 Review the fundamentals of the occupational and professional
> interaction of the fire service, the police, the emergency medical,
> and other local-level emergency responder organizations.
>
> 11.4 Explain the problems of the low political salience of emergency
> management at the local level, particularly with respect to the
> politics of disaster mitigation.
>
> 11.5 Describe the origin, roles, and politics of local emergency
> planning committees.

**Scope**

> Here, the local context of emergency management is considered. Elected
> officials at the local level include mayors, county executives, and
> city or county commissioners. They shoulder the obligation of
> political responsiveness in disaster or emergency circumstances.
> Appointed officials, like city managers, also have important political
> and managerial duties in the disaster management realm. There are many
> important professionals active in the response phase of emergency
> management and who work at the county or local level. Firefighters,
> police, and emergency medical service workers are especially
> important, although there may be rivalries among them. The local
> citizenry must not be overlooked. The general public and private
> community interests have a substantial say in matters of local
> emergency management. However, the local political importance of
> emergency management varies considerably over time. Local emergency
> planning committees, comprised of representatives of the general
> public and stakeholder groups, also engage in the political world of
> disaster management.

**References**

Assigned student reading:

-   Auf der Heide, Eric, ***Disaster Response: Principles of Preparation
    and Coordination*** (St. Louis: C.V. Mosby, 1989): Chs. 3-4.

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-   Lindell, Michael K., David J. Whitney, Christina J. Futch, and
    Catherine S. Clause, "The Local Emergency Planning Committee: A
    Better Way to Coordinate Disaster Planning," ***Disaster Management
    in the U.S. and Canada***, Richard T. Sylves and William L. Waugh,
    Jr. (eds.) (Springfield, Ill.: Charles C. Thomas Publishers, 1996):
    Ch. X, pp. 234-49.

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-   Waugh, William L., Jr. and Richard T. Sylves, "Intergovernmental
    Relations of Emergency Management," ***Disaster Management in the
    U.S. and Canada***, Richard T. Sylves and William L. Waugh, Jr.
    (eds.) (Springfield, Ill.: Charles C. Thomas Publishers, 1996): Ch.
    III, pp. 46-68.

> Although it is assigned again as the sole reading Session 27, "Big
> City Emergency Management" the instructor should decide whether or not
> it would be helpful to ask the class to read:

-   Sylves, Richard T. and Thomas J. Pavlak, "Managing Major Emergencies
    in 'Gotham City,' ***Disaster Management in the U.S. and Canada***,
    Richard T. Sylves and William L. Waugh, Jr. (eds.) (Springfield,
    Ill.: Charles C. Thomas Publishers 1996): Ch. XII, pp. 270-93.

**Requirements**

> The field of local government is richly diverse and complex. This
> session portrays some of the fundamentals of local government politics
> and management, but with respect to emergency management specifically.
> The general organization of local government can be explained from
> material in the Supplemental Considerations portions of this lesson.
>
> It is unavoidable that some of the readings assigned for this session
> overlap those of the previous session, which was on State emergency
> management. However, this redundancy complements the students'
> knowledge of the key concepts and ideas surrounding local government
> and the politics of disaster.
>
> A local public safety official would make a terrific guest speaker for
> this session.

**Remarks**

*Objective 11.1*

> In the United States, local government is the heart of emergency
> management. Local governments assume primary responsibility for public
> safety, and so are the front-line public institutions which conduct
> the initial emergency response to a disaster or disaster threat. Local
> executives, elected (mayors) or appointed (city managers), usually are
> the lead authorities in charge of helping their jurisdiction confront
> the problem (unless another official is assigned that duty under law
> or ordinance). How local officials cope with and prepare for
> emergencies and disasters demonstrates their managerial competence and
> leadership ability, traits essential to winning and maintaining
> political office.
>
> A LOCAL GOVERNMENT is any county, city, village, town, district, or
> other political sub-division of any State, Indian tribe, authorized
> tribal organization, or Alaskan Native village or organization,
> including any rural community, unincorporated town or village, or any
> other public entity of a State or State political subdivision.
>
> Local governments are responsible for developing and maintaining an
> Emergency Operations Plan. They plan, and when necessary, manage
> disaster evacuations. Localities are also responsible for providing
> emergency warnings and emergency communications. Many local
> governments, manifesting sound emergency management, maintain a local
> Emergency Operations Center.
>
> Local governments often possess substantial authority over land-use
> within their jurisdictions. This authority has a substantial impact on
> development and disaster mitigation activities. These are some common
> land-use powers.
>
> BUILDING CODES are regulations adopted by a local governing body
> setting forth standards for construction, addition, modification, and
> repair of buildings and other structures for the purpose of protecting
> health, safety, and the general welfare of the public. Local
> governments may impose sanctions for violations of their codes and
> ordinances.
>
> STANDARDS represent codes, specifications, or rules required for the
> construction of facilities.
>
> SUBDIVISION REGULATIONS are ordinances or regulations governing the
> subdivision of land with respect to such things as adequacy and
> suitability of building sites, utilities, and public facilities.
>
> ZONING powers and zoning ordinances represent a form of police power
> that divides an area into districts and, within each district,
> regulates the use of land and buildings, the height and bulk of
> buildings or other structures, and the density of the population.
>
> The political relevance of these powers is immense. Local officials
> entrusted with authority over these land-use instruments have the
> power to affect the economic growth of their jurisdictions (promoting
> new businesses, more jobs, and expanded local tax base, etc.).
> Correspondingly, these decisions involve judgments of disaster and
> hazard risk. Strong building codes may save lives and reduce property
> damage in the event of severe storms, strong winds, heavy snows, and
> flooding. Subdivision and zoning embodies responsibility for ensuring
> that new homes, offices, and industries are not sited in highly
> disaster-vulnerable areas. Moreover, the nature of development and the
> mix and proximity of structures may have important consequences when
> emergencies and disasters do occur. Land use carries many
> opportunities to promote disaster mitigation, but often the political
> expedience of promoting economic growth at the expense of disaster
> mitigation is too tempting for authorities. Moreover, development
> interests often have significant political influence, particularly
> through the medium of campaign contributions to those seeking to win
> or maintain political office.
>
> Beyond land use, local governments build, maintain, and improve
> infrastructure that is essential to communities (i.e., bridges, roads,
> and water, sewer, and power systems, etc.). Often within their borders
> are dams, levees, river gauge monitoring systems, and flood control
> works, etc. How these facilities and technologies are managed often
> has a profound impact on how well prepared a community is for a
> disaster threat.
>
> Local governments often manage sanitation, vector control, the
> collection and disposal of toxic and pathogenic materials, and the
> regulation of underground storage tank operations, *et cetera*. These
> duties embody political issues as well as emergency management
> concerns.
>
> Local governments often impose insurance regulations that are aimed at
> promoting public safety. Even matters as mundane as requiring smoke
> detectors and sprinkler systems represent local disaster mitigation
> activity.
>
> Local Governmental Structure and EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
>
> Local Emergency Management offices, like State offices, are organized
> in a variety of ways:

-   As an independent agency or office reporting directly to the chief
    executive,

-   Under an intermediary, within a Fire or Police Department, and

-   Buried deep within a local public agency responsible for a variety
    of programs.

> Emergency Management staffing varies widely including:

-   Part-time, unpaid volunteers,

-   Full-time volunteers, through part-time ill-paid positions,

-   Full-time one person shops that are either poorly paid or well paid,
    and

-   To well staffed full-time organizations.

> The form of the municipal government structure is relevant in
> emergency management. Under a STRONG-MAYOR form of local government,
> the mayor usually has extensive powers to appoint and dismiss top
> municipal officials without the need to first gain the city council's
> permission. The mayor also has many budgetary powers in this system.
> It puts few restrictions on the number of terms a mayor may also
> service in office. Such a system provides the opportunity for mayors
> to assume considerable command and control powers, especially under
> the circumstances of an emergency or disaster. Nevertheless, partisan
> conflict may be pronounced in the strong-mayor system.
>
> Under the WEAK-MAYOR form of local government, the mayor has many
> restrictions imposed on his or her work by the city council or other
> municipal authorities. The mayor may not be able to appoint many city
> department Directors, may not be able to dismiss these Directors, and
> may have only limited influence in the preparation and execution of
> the budget. There may be restrictions on the mayor's ability to be
> reelected to the office, and sometimes the mayor is limited to a
> single term, and sometimes---two terms. Some domains of the city
> administration may function independent of mayoral control (i.e.,
> authorities or special district governments, e.g., parking
> authorities, transit authorities, and independent public school
> systems, etc.). Various local offices may be directly elected (e.g.,
> the Comptroller, the Public Safety Director, and the Chief of Police,
> etc) who are otherwise mayorally appointed under the strong-mayor
> system. Sometimes the weak-mayor form of government fragments the
> executive authority and may muddle or fracture coherent local
> emergency management. Local legislative bodies---city or county
> councils---retain primary political authority under many weak-mayor
> systems.
>
> Under the CITY MANAGER or manager-council form of local government,
> the city manager is appointed by the city council. City managers are
> not elected to office, but may hold much of the official power
> possessed by elected mayors. They are full-time professional
> administrators who work at the pleasure of the city council and who
> may be fired, sanctioned, or rewarded by the city council. They are
> accountable to the city council. They have limited powers of
> appointment, but they exercise considerable influence in creating
> budgets and in implementing programs. If there is a mayor at all in
> the city manager system, that person has purely ceremonial powers. The
> city manager and the mayor are two separate offices; the same person
> cannot occupy both posts at the same time. Partisanship is minimized
> in the city manager system and city managers are usually public
> administrators of the highest calibre. City managers are quite likely
> to understand and appreciate the importance of emergency management.
>
> Under the COMMISSION form of local government, each elected city
> council member heads a separate city department. One councilor heads
> the Police Department, another the Fire Department, another the Public
> Works Department, another Human Services Department, another Parks and
> Recreation Department, and so on. Each council person has extensive
> appointment powers within his or her department, but each one must
> compromise on matters of budgeting and general city administration
> with the other council people. There is no formal mayor, or the mayor
> has only symbolic authority. There is no professional city manager in
> this form of local government. There are few commission-type local
> governments left in the United States, and many of those which remain
> are likely to shift to another form, which many have already done. A
> key problem with this form of government is that by combining the
> executive and legislative authority into the same job, department
> directors then have an incentive to provide a primary service to the
> local city district which elected them to office. Power is highly
> fragmented under this form of government and this does not bode well
> for the local agency coordination needed in emergency circumstances.
>
> The Waugh and Sylves article examines the intergovernmental emergency
> management and discerns that "money" and "politics" are critical
> factors. Disasters carry political costs and benefits for affected
> communities. Local governments are essential constituencies of
> National emergency management. Local emergency management
> organizations are represented by the National Coordinating Council on
> Emergency Management (NCCEM), 111 Park Place, Falls Church, VA 22046;
> telephone (703) 538-1795; fax (703) 241-5603; Internet:
>
> NCCEM@aol.com

*Objective 11.2*

> Executive officials at the local level include mayors, city managers,
> county executives, and city and county councilors and commissioners.
> They are expected to demonstrate political responsiveness in disasters
> and emergencies.
>
> When a major disaster strikes a community, often it quickly becomes
> obvious whether or not outside help will be needed. If it appears that
> outside assistance will be needed, a DAMAGE ASSESSMENT is necessary.
> Sometimes the damage is so significant that outside help is needed to
> conduct the damage assessment itself. If local authorities conclude
> that their jurisdiction is overwhelmed, they are empowered to declare
> an emergency and request State assistance.
>
> In most jurisdictions, the locally elected governmental official
> declares an emergency through an orderly process defined by statute,
> ordinance, or some form of enabling legislation. The declaration
> usually describes the nature of the emergency, the areas affected, and
> the authority that the official invokes in making the declaration.
> Generally, guidelines will specify varying levels of activation and
> emergency according to the severity and extent of the disaster or
> emergency. Exact procedures vary from one place to another. When local
> governments experience disasters their municipal (i.e., city or
> county) authorities are expected, if possible, to conduct a damage
> assessment (as mentioned above), deploy as many local resources as
> possible, and to ask for help from surrounding jurisdictions and from
> the State.
>
> Among duties assumed by locally-elected or locally-appointed
> executives are:

-   Mobilizing resources and transferring and directing emergency
    personnel for emergency management purposes,

-   Requiring and directing evacuation of all or part of the population
    within a disaster area,

-   Prescribing routes, modes of transportation, and destinations in
    connection with an evacuation, and prohibiting certain conduct
    within the disaster area,

-   Commandeering or using private property,

-   Suspending local statutes as necessary, and

-   Authorizing emergency expenditures.

*Objective 11.3*

> There are many important professionals active in the response phase of
> emergency management, and who work at the county or local level.
> Firefighters, the police, and emergency medical service workers are
> especially important, although there may be rivalries between these
> services owing to their competition over jurisdictions and budget
> resources.
>
> In any disaster it is important that response agency people have a
> clear understanding of their roles so they can effectively coordinate
> their efforts, use resources efficiently, and help disaster victims.
> No single agency can manage a disaster effectively. In the American
> system, the response effort requires the resources and expertise of
> law enforcement, the fire service, emergency medical personnel, public
> health and public works people, and many others.
>
> Public information following a disaster is also critical. It is
> essential that local officials disseminate clear and accurate public
> information to a diverse population in a timely manner. The
> information must be in language and form that all of the people in a
> community understand. In other words, in areas or communities with
> non-English-speaking populations, public information needs to be
> disseminated in the languages that are spoken in those communities.
> Another important, but often misunderstood role of local governments
> in disasters involves RUMOR CONTROL. It is imperative that facts about
> the disaster or emergency be made public and correspondingly, that
> rumors, hearsay, and misinformation circulating amongst the public to
> be repudiated by local officials.

*Objective 11.4*

> People expect much of their governments during emergencies and
> disasters. They need the reassurance that their local government is
> doing everything possible to help disaster victims. However, local
> citizens often hold a different view during normal times. In normal
> times disasters hold LOW POLITICAL SALIENCE, both in the minds of
> local residents and in the minds of their elected representatives.
>
> Disasters are by their very nature high-risk, low probability events.
> Their infrequency makes it difficult to justify the expenditure of
> public money in view of seemingly more pressing, on-going public needs
> and issues. A corollary problem of issue salience within the realm of
> disaster policy is the traditional American opposition toward, or
> resistance to, National planning and regulation (especially fears of
> Federal zoning).
>
> Despite the best efforts of governments and voluntary organizations at
> all levels, it is indisputable that, in a major disaster, governments
> and voluntary organizations cannot be immediately everywhere at once,
> helping everyone who needs help. It may take many hours or even days
> for disaster services to begin to reach all of those who need
> assistance. Thus, it is incumbent upon the Government to inform its
> citizens of this state of affairs lest they be left with a false sense
> of security and fail to take those actions which would help them to
> cope with a disaster.
>
> In addition, studies show that communities whose citizens have joined
> in awareness and preparedness programs are more "disaster resilient,"
> which helps to minimize the confusion and expedite response during a
> disaster. Family preparedness programs are cost-effective means of
> educating the public about what to expect in the aftermath of a
> disaster. Working together, the public and private sectors have taken
> steps to encourage people to take actions now which would increase
> their ability to cope, (or even survive,) in a later time of disaster.
> Among the basic approaches to citizen disaster preparedness are the
> following:
>
> 1\. Providing self-help disaster publications to citizens,
>
> 2\. Providing tools, such as public service announcements and videos
> for disaster preparedness personnel to use in their communities, and
>
> 3\. Providing training courses aimed at special audiences in order to
> help get the disaster preparedness message out.
>
> FEMA's Emergency Management Institute teaches a course which seeks to
> help local governments help their citizens to organize in their
> neighborhoods would be better so that, in a time of disaster, they are
> able to help themselves. The Community Emergency Response Team Course
> shows local government officials how to organize neighborhoods and how
> to provide them with rudimentary training in such subjects as:

-   Individual and Family Disaster Preparedness

-   Neighborhood Disaster Organization and Logistics

-   Fire Suppression

-   Disaster First-Aid

-   Light Search and Rescue

-   Damage Assessment

-   Disaster Stress Counseling

> As the frequency and magnitude of emergencies and disasters continue
> to increase, the local emergency management may become more
> politically salient to the local public. Public education programs,
> like the Community Emergency Response Team Course, may help to combat
> local political reluctance to undertake better emergency management.

*Objective 11.5*

> Local emergency planning committees (LEPCs), comprised of
> representatives of the general public and stakeholder groups, also
> engage in the political world of disaster management. They owe their
> origin to the Superfund Authorization and Re-authorization Act of
> 1986. This law was a reaction to the Bhopal, India, chemical release
> disaster in which some 3000 people living near a chemical facility
> were killed by the release of a toxic chemical. The
> Community-Right-To-Know feature of the Act requires that firms that
> handle hazardous chemicals communicate information to local agencies
> and the public regarding the nature, quantity, and dangers posed by
> the chemicals stored at their facilities. LEPCs help to solicit and
> monitor this information and they work with local public and private
> organizations to advance community awareness and preparation. LEPCs
> are a grassroots, democratic manifestation of disaster policy in that
> the members of the general public are directly involved in LEPC
> membership and work.
>
> LEPCs help to frame emergency preparedness issues for local
> authorities and the general public. They exercise a form of vigilance
> on behalf of the interests they serve and represent. However, LEPC
> members often rankle local corporate interests when they constantly
> demand corporate information. Many LEPCs are woefully under-funded and
> under-staffed. Some of these, accept support from the interests they
> are ostensibly in place to oversee, thus posing a possible conflict of
> interest. Moreover, there are frequently problems of succession on
> LEPCs. Many people who win appointment to LEPCs are reluctant to
> surrender their posts. In addition, because LEPC members are unpaid,
> many tend to become distracted and lose interest over time.
>
> LEPCs run the gamut from small ineffective bodies that meet
> irregularly in a pro-forma, more-or-less social gathering with no
> agenda or minutes, to highly effective, well-organized and
> well-staffed bodies that have regular meetings, agendas, minutes, and
> action plans, *et cetera*.
>
> Local emergency managers often exhibit ambivalence toward LEPCs
> well-on the one hand, LEPCs help to highlight the importance of
> disaster preparedness and the need to maintain a public vigilance of
> high-risk industrial facilities---things emergency managers welcome.
> On the other hand, LEPC members are rarely experts in emergency
> management, although many tend to believe they are. Some LEPC members
> are perceived as "gadflies" by local emergency managers in that they
> are often intrusive, uninformed about technical issues, and tend to
> behave as if they had operational, rather than merely advisory,
> authority. Some LEPC members see their service as a pathway to
> political office.
>
> The Lindell, et al., article contains some relatively complex material
> because it is written for an organizational psychology audience.
> Nonetheless, it does a fine job of outlining problems and successes of
> local emergency planning committee work. Advise students to read it
> carefully, but not to worry too much about grasping the methodological
> features of the article.

**Supplemental**

**Considerations**

Local Government and Disaster Plans

> There are many more elements of local disaster planning than those
> which appear below. However, the following list provides a general
> idea of the work that local officials must undertake in order to
> devise and maintain sound disaster plans for their jurisdictions:

-   Review Existing plans.

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-   Existing laws relating to emergencies.

-   Neighboring jurisdiction plans.

-   Higher political authority plans (State or regional).

-   Any previous exercise critiques and evaluations.

-   After-action comments from any previous local disasters.

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-   Define Potential Problems.

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-   Conduct a Hazards Analysis as a Plan Component.

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-   Conduct a Vulnerability Analysis by Hazard.

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-   Conduct a Resource Inventory as a Plan Component.

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-   Brief Superiors and get their support.

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-   Gain Political Support from Elected (Top) Officials:

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-   Public and Policy Statements and Guidance.

-   Personal Involvement.

> Successful leadership in a disaster is dependent on knowing one's role
> in the response effort and carrying out the duties of that role.
> Conflicts may arise when people overstep their boundaries or fail in
> carrying out their designated responsibilities. When this happens, it
> is (more often than not) a function of the inadequate coordination,
> training, and exercising of the disaster plan.
>
> People want to know what to do in crisis circumstances; they want to
> know that someone is in control and taking care of things. That effort
> starts with the team development of a disaster plan and continues into
> the next phase---coordination of duties across the community in accord
> with the adaptable plan.
>
> Local officials must engage a broad array of organizations, people,
> and interests in doing disaster planning work. In a sense, local
> emergency authorities need to engage in political coalition-building
> and consciousness-raising to do their work. The list below reflects
> the variety of players:

-   Local Government.

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-   Chief Executive Officers

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-   Political Leaders

-   Coroner

-   Engineering

-   Finance Department

-   Administration Department

-   Fire Department

-   Human Resources Department

-   Legal Department

-   Police Department

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-   Public Health

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-   Public Information Officer

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-   Public Works Department

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-   Transportation Department

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-   Next Higher Government.

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-   Neighboring Governments.

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-   Any lower jurisdictions.

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-   Special district governments

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-   Neighborhood organizations

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-   Military Installations.

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-   Utilities.

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-   Transportation Authorities.

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-   Airports

-   Train Stations and Yards

-   Waterways

-   Bus Companies

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-   Schools & Day Care Facilities.

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-   Health Care Institutions.

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-   Hospitals

-   Nursing Homes

-   Retirement Homes

-   Human Resources Department

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-   Funeral Home Operators.

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-   Business and Industry.

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-   Voluntary Organizations.

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-   Social Service Department Relief

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-   The Media.

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-   Churches.

Disaster Training and Exercises

> There are many reasons why local authorities need to engage in
> disaster training and exercises. Below is a list of benefits
> associated with training and exercises which:

1.  Help both officials and responders learn the features of:

-   the local disaster plan

-   the essentials of disaster policy

-   the procedures that will go into effect in disaster or emergency
    circumstances

2.  Reveal weaknesses in:

-   Plans

-   Policies

-   Procedures

-   Decisionmaking

-   Information-sharing

-   Communications

-   Laws and Regulations

-   Facilities and Equipment

3.  Disclose resource gaps in:

-   Manpower

-   Equipment

4.  Improve coordination.

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5.  Foster:

-   Cooperation

-   Teamwork

-   Trust

6.  Clarify:

-   roles

-   responsibilities

7.  Improve:

-   Individual performance

-   Confidence

8.  Build:

-   Public Awareness

-   Support

9.  Help convince skeptics of the need for:

-   Emergency Planning

-   Training

-   Practice Exercises

10. Promote:

-   Group Interaction

-   Individual Interaction

> This is so that players will already know each other before a disaster
> response.
>
> 11\. Improve operational readiness.
>
> It is vitally important to emphasize that local governments are
> central organizations in a disaster damage assessment. They are key in
> every phase of emergency management. If local government public
> facilities are impacted by disasters or emergencies, local officials
> may prove that their jurisdiction is eligible for PUBLIC ASSISTANCE
> and MITIGATION PROJECT ASSISTANCE. Counties often initiate the process
> of requesting State and Federal disaster or emergency assistance.
> Local governments also shoulder substantial burdens in providing
> EMERGENCY WARNING and RISK COMMUNICATION. Local governments often
> maintain an EMERGENCY OPERATIONS CENTER. \[See the Supplemental
> Considerations section of Session No. 9 above.\] Local governments
> plan, manage, and practice EVACUATIONS and supervise SHELTERING
> operations. A shelter is a facility to house, feed, and care for
> persons evacuated from a risk area for periods of one or more days in
> the risk areas, the primary shelter and the reception centers are
> usually located in the same facility. RECEPTION CENTERS are set up to
> register evacuees and to assess their needs. Some evacuees may be
> referred to shelters. Those who stay elsewhere provide addresses where
> they can be contacted.
>
> Session 20, which pertains to flood disasters, demonstrates the local
> government's critical role in the NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM.
>
> Local authorities, aided by their State and sometimes their Federal
> counterparts, usually set up a COMMAND POST during a disaster
> response. It serves as a centralized base of operations near the site
> of an incident and is located at a safe distance from an accident
> site, where the on-scene coordinator, responders, and technical
> representatives can make response decisions, deploy manpower and
> equipment, maintain a liaison with the media, and handle
> communications.

**Session No. 12**

**Course**: The Political and Policy Basis of Emergency Management

**Session**: Intergovernmental Relations **Time**: 1 Hour

**Objectives:**

By the conclusion of this session, students should be able to:

> 12.1 Define the term "intergovernmental relations."
>
> 12.2 Explain the essence of multi-agency coordination.
>
> 12.3 Explain how interstate compacts are fashioned and how they work
> in the domain of disaster policy.
>
> 12.4 Explain and provide an example of a memorandum of understanding
> and a mutual aid agreement.
>
> 12.5 Review the Performance Partnership Agreement program of FEMA.

**Scope**

> Intergovernmental relations, although touched upon previously, is
> given center stage in this session. There are a range of political and
> managerial transactions between and among governments of all levels in
> disaster management. Intergovernmental relations are part of
> government-to-government mutual aid arrangements, agency-to-agency
> memorandums of understanding, interstate compacts, and pre-disaster
> Federal-State agreements. Multi-organizational coordination and
> budgetary interdependence of emergency management are also examined.

**References**

Assigned student reading:

-   Hy, Ronald John and William L. Waugh, Jr. "The Utility of
    All-Hazards Programs," ***Handbook of Emergency Management***,
    William L. Waugh, Jr. and Ronald John Hy (eds.) (Westport, Conn.:
    The Greenwood Press, 1991): Ch. 16.

> Re-read, especially "burden shifting" section of:

-   Wamsley, Gary L. and Aaron D. Schroeder, "Escalating in a Quagmire:
    Changing Dynamics of the Emergency Management Policy System,"
    ***Public Administration Review***, Vol. 56, No. 3 (May/June 1996):
    235-244.

> For students who are new to the study of public policy, it would be
> helpful to read the following Anderson chapter. (See Appendix E for a
> synopsis.)

-   Anderson, James E., "Policy Implementation," ***Public Policymaking:
    An Introduction***, 3rd ed. (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin Company,
    1997): Ch. 6, pp. 213-270.

**Requirements**

> Although discussed in previous sessions, some further review of policy
> implementation is needed in this session because disaster policy
> implementation in the United States fundamentally involves
> intergovernmental relations.

**Remarks**

*Objective 12.1*

> INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, is a term which describes the interaction
> of Federal, State, and local officials. This includes general purpose
> governments as well as special district governments. General purpose
> governments are cities, counties, towns, or other municipal
> jurisdictions which collect broad-based taxes to pay for a wide
> variety of public services. Special district governments, usually
> "hived off" from cities or counties, customarily operate to provide
> one or two specialized services funded from an earmarked (dedicated)
> single tax, or sometimes user fees. In modern usage, the term also
> encompasses the interaction of these bodies with groups and
> organizations---the non-profit and private sectors.
>
> Many policy areas and programs in the United States are implemented
> through intergovernmental relations (i.e., environmental, disaster,
> housing, social welfare, and unemployment policies, business
> regulations, etc.). For example, Federal, State, and local
> representatives, during which disasters are clearly beyond the
> recovery capabilities of State and local governments, produce
> PRELIMINARY DAMAGE ASSESSMENTS of those disaster losses. This
> information is then shared and passed between officials at each level
> of government. Disputes sometimes arise over the matter of what is
> "clearly beyond" recovery capability. Considerable political and
> administrative negotiations may result.
>
> A longstanding suspicion about the nature of intergovernmental
> interchange after a disaster is that a "beggar-thy-neighbor" syndrome
> occurs. Local governments impacted by a disaster have every incentive
> to exaggerate their scales of damage in order to maximize the outside
> State and Federal post-disaster aid. If local governments pay little
> or no matching money for each dollar of State and Federal aid they
> receive, they have an incentive to detail every conceivable disaster
> loss that is eligible for State and Federal assistance. States also
> have an incentive to maximize, if not to exaggerate, their magnitudes
> of disaster loss. With a 75/25% Federal and State matching aid, 75
> cents of every dollar of State disaster loss may be subsidized by
> Federal assistance. When States share their matching burden with
> localities, sometimes 12.5% State and 12.5% local, the State
> government derives even greater gain. Since the Federal Government
> carries the bulk of the financial burden in paying for the public
> costs of Presidentially-declared emergencies and major disasters, it
> is no surprise that FEMA officials are often highly suspicious of
> State and local estimates of disaster losses. They sometimes suspect
> that State and local government officials are conspiring to maximize
> the Federal disaster dollars that are dispatched to their
> jurisdictions.
>
> It is in these interchanges that political factors often come into
> play. Mayors press Governors for more State and Federal aid. A
> Governor, lamenting the high costs of a disaster and the
> State-matching shares that they must produce, sometimes receives
> permission to borrow from the Federal Government the money that the
> State needs to pay its own match! At least one GAO Report indicates
> that States frequently fail to repay all or most of the Federal money
> they have borrowed to cover their matching share. In catastrophic
> disasters, Governors sometimes succeed in securing from the President
> a higher Federal match (100 percent for Florida after Hurricane Andrew
> and 90 percent for California after the Northridge earthquake). Such a
> generous Federal matching share is a tremendous stimulus for State and
> local loss estimators.

Intergovernmental Program Management

> American emergency management is based on SHARED AUTHORITY, not on a
> top-down command and control system. FEMA cannot tell States and
> localities what they must do in the emergency management arena.
> Instead, there is a bottom-up approach wherein local political
> subdivisions (i.e., cities, towns, and counties) are responsible for
> emergency management. In the United States, disasters are managed at
> the local level with the support of the State government as needed,
> followed by Federal Government support. State and local governments
> have, by history, tradition, and their own laws, been delegated
> authority and responsibility for disaster response. The Federal
> Government comes to the assistance of a State government when it is
> overwhelmed by, or incapable of addressing, a disaster. The Governor
> asks for assistance, and a Presidential Disaster Declaration is
> granted.
>
> A fragmented government is a political challenge for disaster
> managers. America has a highly decentralized, Federal system which,
> under the U.S. Constitution, affords the National Government a range
> of authority, with some powers reserved for the States under the 10th
> Amendment. In some policy domains (i.e., regulation of business,
> education, health care, and prisons, etc.) the National and State
> governments share authority concurrently. Similarly, local
> governments, although legally vestiges of their respective State
> governments, are also afforded certain powers under "Home Rule"
> provisions approved by their States, by each State's Constitution, or
> through enabling statutes. Thus, the need for multi-agency and
> multi-jurisdictional coordination challenges emergency management
> work.
>
> American emergency management is by its very nature intergovernmental
> and intercommunity. The American political and social system requires
> coordination and cooperation between and among various levels of
> government, as well as cooperation and coordination within a community
> in preparing for, and in respond to, a disaster.

*Objective 12.2*

Multi-agency coordination

> In any field of endeavor, the effectiveness of a system depends upon
> how well those who are part of that system understand the functions
> that must be carried out and their own roles and responsibilities in
> smoothly executing those functions. Certainly this is true of
> emergency management. The potential for human suffering and
> devastation in a disaster makes it critical that emergency managers
> and related personnel understand fully the character of potential
> hazards, what can be done about these hazards through the application
> of emergency management principles and programs, and their role and
> responsibilities in the system of emergency management.
>
> In the American system of disaster management there is a broad range
> of political and managerial transactions between and among governments
> of all levels.
>
> Each of the 50 States and each American commonwealth territory has an
> emergency management agency of some type. These agencies, like their
> local counterparts, are expected to be organized effectively, and
> should possess well-maintained emergency plans, facilities, and
> equipment. To become and remain eligible for Federal financial
> assistance, each State must manage a State emergency management
> program that augments and facilitates local emergency management
> programs.
>
> To make an intergovernmental system work, improvisation and
> flexibility must be part of the ethos of the system. Various emergency
> task domains must be identified and a consensus must be reached on who
> is going to perform each. But, every disaster presents unanticipated
> demands, so that the capacity to improvise must also be built in.

*Objective 12.3*

> Under Title VI of the Stafford Act, FEMA is promoting (as it has been
> since its formation in 1979) EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS. Emergency
> preparedness is defined as:
>
> "...all those activities and measures designed or undertaken to
> prepare for or minimize the effects of a hazard upon the civilian
> population, to deal with the immediate emergency conditions which
> would be created by such a hazard, and to effectuate emergency repairs
> to, or the emergency restoration of, vital utilities and facilities
> destroyed or damaged by the hazard." \[U.S. Congress, 42 U.S.C., Ch.
> 68, Title IV B, 5195a.\]
>
> Preparation measures for anticipated hazards include:
>
> "...establishment of appropriate organizations, operational plans, and
> supporting agreements, the recruitment and training of personnel, the
> conduct of research, the procurement and stockpiling of necessary
> materials and supplies, the provision of suitable warning systems, the
> construction or preparation of shelters, shelter areas, and control
> centers, and, when appropriate, the non-military evacuation of the
> civilian population." \[U.S. Congress, 42 U.S.C., Ch. 68, Title IV B,
> 5195a.\]
>
> The Stafford Act States:
>
> "The Congress recognizes that the organizational structure established
> jointly by the Federal Government and the States and their political
> subdivisions for emergency preparedness purposes can be effectively
> utilized to provide relief and assistance to people in the areas of
> the United States struck by a hazard. The Federal Government shall
> provide necessary direction, coordination, and guidance, and shall
> provide necessary assistance, as authorized in this title so that a
> comprehensive emergency preparedness system exists for all hazards..."
> \[U.S. Congress, 42 U.S.C., Ch. 68, Title IV B, 5195a.\]
>
> FEMA has been "encouraging the States and territories to adopt"
> interstate compacts as a form of a mutual aid agreement. This will be
> useful in managing multi-State emergencies and will help promote more
> uniform State emergency management across the Nation. FEMA officials
> have prepared a model Draft Interstate Compact which they hope will
> help diffuse this innovation.
>
> FEMA has been working out new MEMORANDUMS OF UNDERSTANDING with each
> respective State emergency management agency. At the same time the
> agency has endeavored to reduce the administrative burden it imposes
> on State programs and officials through greater simplification and
> flexibility. Moreover, the President Clintons' FEMA now routinely
> dispatches a representative to the staff of any Governor whose State
> faces imminent disaster or has experienced a major disaster. This is
> an attempt to smooth out the FEMA-State relations at the earliest
> possible time so that coordination and cooperation may be assured.

Intergovernmental Compact Example

> On October 9, 1996, Congress approved the Emergency Management
> Assistance Compact (EMAC)---initiated by the Southern Governor's
> Association. This Congressional action gives the Federal Government's
> seal of approval to the actions taken by 14 States and territories
> from 1995-1996. The compact is open to any State or territory that
> chooses to join. Besides the original 14 members, FEMA is a
> participant endorser of the compact. The National Emergency Management
> Association, through its Emergency Management Assistance Committee,
> moved the compact forward. The agreement commits member States,
> through their respective Governors, to cooperating in planning for the
> State-to-State extension of emergency management help. It represents
> an important intergovernmental agreement and it also indicates how
> political authorities give consent for, and legitimacy to, such
> arrangements.

*Objective 12.4*

> Memorandums of understanding are usually negotiated between
> governmental agencies. Unless approved through a formal rule-making
> process as a regulation, they usually do not have the force of law
> behind them and stand as voluntary agreements.
>
> In California's Santa Clara County, each municipality has agreed "to
> engage in planning and training together in normal periods and to
> exchange information and provide resources in the event of disaster,"
> although each provides for their own routine emergency services.
> \[Winslow, 1996, p. 115.\]
>
> MUTUAL AID AGREEMENTS are mandated in law and negotiated as legal
> contracts. Agencies may draw up agreements for reciprocal assistance
> under certain conditions or may set out contingent acquisition
> agreements between providers, vendors and contractors.
>
> An example of a mutual aid agreement might be the way the residents of
> a nursing home would be evacuated during an emergency as follows:
>
> "To ensure coordination among nursing homes, the committee provided
> mutual aid agreements to evacuating and hosting nursing homes, to be
> completed and included in each nursing home's disaster plan. These
> agreements outlined the understandings between facilities with respect
> to transfer of patients and medical information, transportation costs,
> and so on." \[Daines, 1991, pp. 164-165.\]
>
> An agreement, however expressed, identifies which agency controls
> certain resources in the field, and how and when they may be
> reassigned. Agreements help create working relationships between
> agencies and governments, and may facilitate trust. Intergovernmental
> relations are interwoven the mission goals of FEMA. (See the
> attachment to this session pp. 164-168, entitled "Fire Resources
> Mutual Aid Master Agreement.")

FEMA's Mission Goals and Intergovernmental Relations:

> 1\. Create an emergency management partnership with other Federal
> agencies, State and local governments, voluntary organizations, and
> the private sector to better serve customers.
>
> 2\. Establish, in concert with FEMA's partners, a National emergency
> management system that is comprehensive, risk-based, and all-hazards
> in approach.
>
> 3\. Make hazard mitigation the foundation of the National emergency
> management system.
>
> 4\. Provide a rapid and effective response to, and recovery from,
> disaster.
>
> 5\. Strengthen State and local emergency management.
>
> FEMA's Organization and Intergovernmental Relations:
>
> 1\. FEMA is geographically divided into 10 standard Federal Regions
> and each Regional Office of FEMA is directed by a politically
> appointed Regional Director.
>
> 2\. FEMA's primary purpose is to provide assistance to State and local
> governments to save lives and protect property, public health, and
> safety for all types of emergencies. It also coordinates Federal
> agency disaster response.
>
> 3\. While FEMA operates under many laws and regulations, the most
> important disaster-related statute governing its activities is the
> Stafford Act.
>
> The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act,
> (P.L. 93-288), as amended, is the core statute under which Federal
> emergency management is conducted today. (See Session 7, "Disaster
> Laws" for a brief outline of the major provisions of that law.)

*Objective 12.5*

> FEMA's relationship with States and localities is primarily through
> PERFORMANCE PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENTS (PPAs) and COOPERATIVE AGREEMENTS
> (CAs) with State offices of emergency management. The PPAs and CAs are
> a way to pass funds through State offices of emergency management to
> local offices of emergency management. PPAs and CAs are analogous to
> contracts. FEMA comes to an agreement with State officials regarding
> the outcomes expected from funding support.
>
> FEMA's success in carrying out its missions is directly related to its
> success with interagency coordination. FEMA has authority, funding,
> and some assets, but must depend on other Federal departments and
> agencies to provide additional resources to ensure a complete Federal
> response.
>
> The Federal-State agreement initiative has gained momentum under
> FEMA's second round National Performance Review. FEMA Director Witt
> declared, "A centerpiece of our reinvention is changing the way in
> which we do business with the States by empowering them through
> Performance Partnerships." State officials will be asked to integrate
> disparate programs into multi-year, risk-based agreements between the
> President and their respective Governors. FEMA funding to the States
> is eventually to be consolidated into two streams---one pre-disaster
> and the other post-disaster. FEMA authorities hope that this will
> reduce the State agency reportage to the Federal agency. State and
> FEMA officials also hope that this will reduce FEMA's
> "micro-management" of the existing grant processes.
>
> Under Performance Partnerships, States will be expected to achieve
> mutually agreed performance outcomes, while building their emergency
> management capacity. Director Witt envisions these agreements as a
> method for crafting "more objective Disaster Declaration criteria
> based on each State's unique capabilities." \[FEMA, March 23, 1995.\]
>
> The political relevance of PPAs and CAs reside in how effectively
> these agreements are both negotiated and implemented. Governors and
> State emergency managers need FEMA program resources and, most
> particularly, post-disaster FEMA assistance. However, Governors cannot
> afford to commit vast State resources to emergency management when
> Federal emergency management budgetary support to their emergency
> management State agencies is meager and shrinking. Governors are not
> without National political influence. Governors, who believe they are
> being obligated by FEMA to do too much for too little support, may
> press their arguments directly to the President or through the
> Congress. Correspondingly, FEMA can only expect to leverage the
> limited resources they receive from the Congress in modest ways. In
> other words, Governor and State emergency management commitments will
> be shaped by the FEMA resources provided. Everyone favors
> administrative efficiency, but more problematic is achieving a
> negotiated partnership and meeting the goals and objectives of the PPA
> and CA process.

**Supplemental**

**Considerations**

> Demonstrate to students the overlap and interdependence of
> governmental jurisdictions. Make certain students understand that
> intergovernmental relations are dynamic. Sometimes the Federal
> Government appears dominant and other times States or localities seem
> to gain the ascendancy, depending on the policy domain. Have the class
> discuss the "burden sharing" section of the Wamsley article---the
> ensuing discussion will provide a good exchange on the issue of
> emergency management's intergovernmental politics.

**Endnotes**

-   Daines, Guy E., "Planning, Training and Exercising," *Emergency
    Management: Principles and Practice,* Thomas E. Drabek and Gerard J.
    Hoetmer (eds.) (Washington, DC: International City Management
    Association, 1991): 164-165.\]

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-   Federal Emergency Management Agency, Emergency Information and
    Public Affairs, Internet news release, Washington, DC, March 23,
    1995.

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-   Kitsap County Department of Emergency Management and Pierce County
    Department of Emergency Management, "Fire Resources Mutual Aid
    Master Agreement."

-   U.S. Congress, Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency
    Assistance Act of May 22, 1974 (Pub. L. 93-288, title I, Sect. 101,
    May 22, 1974, 88 Stat. 143) as amended by Act of November 23, 1988
    (Pub. L. 100-707, title I, Sect, 103(a), Nov. 23, 1988, 102
    Stat. 4689) as amended by Act of December 3, 1993 (Pub. L. 103-181,
    Sect 1, Dec. 3, 1993, 107 Stat. 2054.) 42 U.S.C., Ch. 68-Disaster
    Relief, Sects. 5121-5402 C, reprinted March 1994. \[Title IVB,
    5195a\]

-   Winslow, Frances E., "Intergovernmental Challenges and California's
    Approach to Emergency Management," ***Disaster Management in the
    U.S. and Canada***, Richard T. Sylves and William L. Waugh, Jr.,
    (eds.) (Springfield, Ill.: Charles C. Thomas Publishers, 1996): Ch.
    V, pp. 101-125

["ATTACHMENT"]{.underline}

> **[FIRE RESOURCES MUTUAL AID MASTER AGREEMENT]{.underline}**
>
> **KITSAP COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT**
>
> **AND PIERCE COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT**
>
> [EXHIBIT "A-2]{.underline}"

THIS AGREEMENT is executed by Kitsap County Department of Emergency
Management acting as agent for each of the Kitsap County Fire Districts,
Fire Departments and Emergency Services Agencies listed on Exhibit "B"
attached hereto and by this reference incorporated herein and by the
Pierce County Department of Emergency Management, acting as agent for
each of the Pierce County Fire Districts and Fire Departments listed on
Exhibit "K" attached hereto and by this reference incorporated herein.
The fire districts/departments and emergency services agencies listed on
Exhibits "B" and "K" are the parties to this agreement; the respective
Departments of Emergency Management are the agents of the parties.

WHEREAS, each of the fire districts/departments and emergency services
agencies have specifically authorized a respective Department of
Emergency Management to act on its behalf for the purpose of entering
into this agreement as authorized by RCW 38.52.090(1), and;

WHEREAS, it is the purpose of this agreement to facilitate mutual aide
agreements between each of the fire districts/departments and emergency
services agencies with each of the other fire districts/departments and
emergency services agencies, including those districts within the same
County, and to accomplish these arrangements with a minimum number of
agreements through the use of one centralized master agreement; NOW,
THEREFORE;

> EACH OF THE FIRE DISTRICTS/DEPARTMENTS AND EMERGENCY SERVICES AGENCIES
> LISTED ON EXHIBITS "B" AND "K" AGREE AS FOLLOWS:
>
> **1. DEVELOPMENT OF AN OPERATION PLAN**
>
> Each party to this agreement shall assist in the development of a plan
> providing guidance for the mobilization and utilization of fire and
> emergency service resources to cope with agreed to types of
> emergency/disaster situations; listing the personnel, resources and
> services that can be made available by the parties to this agreement;
> and indicating the method and manner by which such personnel,
> resources and services may be utilized by the other party(s). Such
> plan shall also document the amount and manner of payment and/or
> compensation for the utilization of such personnel, resources and
> services, if appropriate.
>
> **2.** **FURNISH PERSONNEL RESOURCES OR SERVICES**
>
> Each party to this agreement agrees to furnish those personnel,
> resources and services to each other party hereto as outlined in the
> Mutual Aid Fire Resources Plan.
>
> **3. NO REQUIREMENT TO RENDER AID**
>
> It is hereby understood that unless the adopted Mutual Aid Fire
> Resources Plan dictates otherwise, all personnel, resources and
> services provided under the terms of this agreement are furnished
> and/or supplied voluntarily and at the discretion of the furnishing
> agency. The furnishing agency shall have the primary interest of
> protecting its own constituency.
>
> Refusal or failure of a party to this agreement to provide aid
> requested by another party shall not result in any liability for the
> party which did not provide such aid. The party requesting aid shall
> hold harmless the party which refused or failed to provide such aid
> from any liability incurred thereby.
>
> **4. AGREEMENT NOT EXCLUSIVE**
>
> It is hereby understood that the agreements entered into hereunder and
> the corresponding Mutual Aid Fire Resources Plan adopted shall not
> supplant preexisting mutual aid agreements nor deny the right of any
> party hereto to negotiate supplemental mutual aid agreements.
>
> **5. STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS**
>
> Mutual aid extended pursuant to this agreement shall be furnished in
> accordance with the provisions of Chapter 38.52 RCW, Washington
> Administrative Code (WAC) 118.04, and other applicable law.
>
> **6. DATE EFFECTIVE**
>
> This agreement shall be effective as to each party when each party has
> duly approved the same and has filed notice with the State of
> Washington Department of Community Development, Division of Emergency
>
> Management. Said agreement shall be operative and binding until
> terminated by said participants.
>
> **7. ADDITIONAL PARTIES**
>
> It is anticipated that from time to time additional fire districts
> within Kitsap or Pierce County may wish to join in this agreement. In
> the event any fire district or department within either of the
> Counties not a party to this agreement wishes to join as party to this
> agreement and that fire district has appointed its County's Department
> of Emergency (DEM) Management as its agent and authorized its DEM to
> enter into this agreement, then that DEM shall send a proposed
> amendment to the other DEM for review and approval, if appropriate.
>
> If approved, the respective DEM's shall execute a written amendment
> adding the additional fire district and shall notify each of the fire
> district or fire department parties to this agreement of the
> amendment.
>
> **8. TERMINATION**
>
> This agreement shall remain in full force and effect unless and until
> terminated as follows: any party to this agreement may withdraw from
> the same at any time by giving thirty (30) days written notice to the
> appropriate Department of Emergency Management, the State of
> Washington Department of Community Development, Division of Emergency
> Management.
>
> Said notice shall automatically terminate the agreement on the date
> set out unless rescinded prior thereto in writing.
>
> **KITSAP COUNTY BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS**
>
> \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_
>
> Win Granlund Date
>
> Chairperson
>
> \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_
> \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_
>
> Billie Eder Date
>
> Commissioner
>
> \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_
> \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_
>
> Chris Endresen Date
>
> Commissioner
>
> \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_
>
> Phyllis A. Mann Date
>
> Assistant Director, DEM
>
> APPROVED AS TO FORM:
>
> \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_
>
> County Attorney Date

# PIERCE COUNTY

> \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_
> \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_
>
> Doug Sutherland Date
>
> Pierce County Executive
>
> RECOMMENDED BY
>
> \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_
>
> William Lokey \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_
>
> Director of Emergency Mgmt. Date

APPROVED AS TO FORM

\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

Deputy Prosecuting Attorney Date

[AGREEMENT FOR APPOINTMENT OF AGENT AND]{.underline}

[AUTHORIZATION TO ENTER INTO MUTUAL AID AGREEMENT FOR]{.underline}

[IMPLEMENTATION OF MUTUAL AID FIRE RESOURCES PLAN]{.underline}

THE PARTIES to this agreement are \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ Fire
District/Department Number \_\_\_\_\_ (Fire District/Department), and
Kitsap County (County) acting by and through the Kitsap County
Department of Emergency Management.

WHEREAS, RCW 38.52.090(1) authorizes the development of mutual aid
arrangements between local emergency management organizations and other
public and private agencies to provide for emergency management aid and
assistance in the case of disasters too great to be dealt with
unassisted; and

WHEREAS, Fire District/Department finds it desirable and in its best
interest to use the services of the Kitsap County Department of
Emergency Management to act as a centralized coordinator to facilitate
mutual aid arrangements between other Kitsap County Fire Districts and
Departments and Fire Districts and Departments in other counties, so as
to attempt to decrease the number of documents necessary to accomplish
such arrangements; NOW, THEREFORE; IT IS AGREED AS FOLLOWS:

> 1\. Fire District/Department appoints and County agrees to act as Fire
> District's/Department's agent for the sole purpose of entering into
> centralized joint mutual aid agreements between Fire District and
> other Kitsap County fire districts and departments, and districts and
> departments in other counties, to implement a Mutual Aid Fire Resource
> Plan to be developed by the respective fire districts and departments.
>
> 2\. County is specifically authorized to execute the attached FIRE
> RESOURCES MUTUAL AID MASTER AGREEMENT attached hereto as Exhibit "A"
> on behalf of Fire District/Department and Fire District/Department
> agrees to hold County harmless from any expense arising from execution
> of or action pursuant to said Agreement.
>
> 3\. This agreement and appointment of agent may be terminated and
> revoked by either party at the expiration of thirty (30) days
> following receipt of written notice to the other party.
>
> 4\. Any amendment to this agreement must be in writing executed by
> authorized representatives of the parties.
>
> 5\. This document constitutes the entire agreement between the parties
> and supersedes any and all prior or written understandings or
> agreements of the parties with respect to the subject matter herein.

**Session No. 13**

**Course**: The Political and Policy Basis of Emergency Management

**Session**: Exam One **Time**: 1 Hour

**Objectives:**

At the conclusion of this session students should:

> 13.1 Understand the procedures and expectations related to Test 1
> (Take-Home Essay),
>
> 13.2 Be prepared for the in-class portion of Exam One.

**Scope**

> This session will concentrate on reviewing the highlights of materials
> covered in the previous 12 sessions and in providing advice regarding
> the content and format of the take-home essay assignment option.

**References**

1.  Professor: the course outline pertaining to the readings that are to

> be emphasized on the test; the handout of instructions on
>
> how to prepare the take-home essay.
>
> 2\. Student: notes, readings, outlines, and sample questions provided
>
> by the instructor.

**Requirements**

> Course outline, and handouts provided by the instructor, including
> sample questions. Also, the instructor should make available to the
> students their respective take-home essay questions. (This should be
> circulated to the students one week before the time that Exam One is
> given, if possible).

**Remarks**

> At the time that Exam One is given, the students should know how their
> work will be evaluated. This includes the credit weight of the
> in-class, short answer question scoring; the credit weight of the take
> home essay; and its corresponding in-class essay credit weight.
> Remember, that students have the option of either doing the take-home
> essay (turning it in at the start of the test, and therefore
> precluding the need to do the in-class essay portion of the test) or
> of forgoing the take-home essay option (and thus being required to
> complete the essay portion of the in-class test). Remind the students
> that NO EXTENSIONS ARE PERMITTED FOR THE TAKE-HOME TEST, SO THAT, IF
> THE TAKE-HOME TEST IS NOT COMPLETED AND TURNED IN AT THE START OF THE
> IN-CLASS TEST, THEY MUST COMPLETE BOTH THE ESSAY AND THE SHORT-ANSWER
> PORTION OF THE TEST.

**Supplemental**

**Considerations**

> On the first day of the course the instructor should have circulated a
> survey to the students. That survey provided information regarding the
> students' educational background, major fields of degree study, work
> experience, and disaster-related course work, as well as their degrees
> of interest in various types of disaster events. This information
> should be used to develop a custom-made, paragraph-long, take-home,
> essay question for each student.
>
> The formation of short-answer questions included in the test is
> obviously the purvey of the instructor. Questions can be framed as
> True or False, Multiple-Choice (in response to a statement that the
> student picks from items A, B, C, or D for which item best applies),
> or Matching (in which a student is given an alphabetized list of terms
> and then a series of individual statements each of which has ONE
> correct matching term contained in the alphabetized list).
>
> The purpose of the short-answer section is to ensure that each student
> has achieved a general knowledge of the material covered in the
> preceding sessions. Use of essays, take-home or in-class, indicates
> some aspects of the student's mastery of the material, but in-class,
> short-answer, closed-book, testing is a more definitive and objective
> indicator of what was learned. To reduce student anxiety levels, the
> instructor may chose to include several (perhaps 5 points worth) of
> EXTRA-CREDIT short-answer questions. Answers to extra-credit questions
> do not result in a point penalty if incorrect. Those extra credit
> questions answered correctly are added to the student's numeric test
> score. This, in effect, makes each student earn what might have been
> an across-the-board test scoring curve.
>
> Be sure to go over the test during the session in which you return to
> the students. This helps both the instructor and the student gauge the
> degree of difficulty in answering each question. It might also help to
> identify questions that most of the class missed and which might be
> re-asked on a future test. Take-home essay test results need to be
> discussed individually with each student who makes an inquiry. This is
> often a good occasion to promote good instructor-student interpersonal
> relations. It also produces better results on future tests.
>
> **Teaching tip**: Do not be afraid to concede to the class that you
> may have asked some very difficult questions. You have the option of
> providing all of the students some point credit for the question
> (extra credit if they answered it correctly, otherwise a segment of
> the class will cry foul) or you may instead remind them that the
> extra-credit questions were included to compensate for unfairly
> difficult questions the instructor may have inadvertently included in
> the test. Test reviewing should be therapeutic, not punitive.

**Session No. 14**

**Course**: The Political and Policy Basis of Emergency Management

**Session**: The Public, Interest Groups, and Disasters **Time**: 2
Hours

**Objectives:**

By the conclusion of this session, students should be able to:

> 14.1 Explain the general expectations of the public after disasters,
> their demands of the political system, and the political implications
> of public post-disaster needs.
>
> 14.2 Explain the general public attitude toward mitigation measures.
>
> 14.3 Outline how the Federal Government has attempted to improve its
> responsiveness to the public and its post-disaster needs.
>
> 14.4 Explain the significance of business in disaster recovery efforts
> at the community level.
>
> 14.5 Explain the importance of lifeline services on business interests
> and discuss the policy implications of disaster-induced lifeline loss
> for businesses.
>
> 14.6 Demonstrate an understanding of the significant role that the
> insurance industry plays in the Federal disaster policy, and discuss
> its political agenda.
>
> 14.7 Demonstrate an understanding of the important role that economic
> growth and development interests play in local disaster policy, and
> summarize the political agenda of those development interests.

**Scope**

> This session provides a grounding in the public demands that citizens
> impose on governments, both individually and as interest group
> collectivities---especially after disaster. It also considers the
> importance of business interests on the community during the recovery
> period after a disaster. Studies of businesses that were affected by
> disasters either directly or indirectly have several important
> political and policy implications. The session also surveys interests
> and organizations that are involved in disaster policy, and it focuses
> on insurance interests at the Federal level and economic growth along
> with developmental interests (e.g., builders and developers) on the
> local level.

**References**

> Assigned student readings:

-   Schneider, Saundra K., "The Gap Between Bureaucratic and Emergent
    Norms," ***Flirting with Disaster: Public Management in Crisis
    Situations***, (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1995): Ch. 5, pp. 55-72.

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-   Tierney, Kathleen J., Joanne M. Nigg, and James M. Dahlhamer "The
    Impact of the 1993 Midwest Floods: Business Vulnerability and
    Disruption in Des Moines," ***Disaster Management in the U.S. and
    Canada***, Richard T. Sylves and William L. Waugh, Jr. (eds.)
    (Springfield, Ill.: Charles C. Thomas Publishers, 1996): Ch. IX, pp.
    214-33.

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-   U.S. Senate, Bipartisan Task Force on Funding Disaster Relief, John
    Glenn (Chairman), Christopher S. Bond (Co-Chairman), "Federal
    Disaster Assistance: Report of the Senate Task Force on Funding
    Disaster Relief," 104th Cong., 1st Sess., ***Document No. 104-4***
    (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1995). \[Section
    2, NonFederal Disaster Assistance (Insurance Industry), pp. 18-35.\]

> Students may benefit by reviewing the reading below and its synopsis
> in Appendix E:

-   Anderson, James E., "Policy Impact, Evaluation and Change,"
    ***Public Policymaking: An Introduction***, 3rd ed. (Boston:
    Houghton-Mifflin Company, 1997): Ch. 7, pp. 271-314. \[Reproduced in
    Appendix E.\]

**Requirements**

> This session melds theory and practice. It emphasizes policy
> evaluation because it is critical to the public, to interest groups,
> and to agency officials themselves. Policy evaluation is an instrument
> that may be used to measure "customer" or "client" satisfaction with a
> public program, even a public emergency management program. (See
> Appendix E for the Anderson chapter synopsis.)
>
> Part of this session's "practice" side involves business and the
> impacts which disasters have on businesses. Two critical business
> interests are the disaster insurance industry (discussed in a previous
> session) and local developers. This session also investigates some of
> the problems that businesses confront in the post-disaster recovery
> period. Consultation with someone employed in an emergency management
> capacity with a local industry would be worthwhile for the instructor.
> The instructor may also want to consider this person as a possible
> guest speaker.

**Remarks**

> Previous sessions have, thus far, focused on topics such as the
> fundamentals of emergency management, disaster laws, disaster
> budgeting, elected officials, and governmental relations---all from a
> political perspective. Central to a political analysis of disasters
> and emergency management, however, are the roles of PUBLIC OPINION and
> INTEREST GROUPS. Public opinion and interest groups may have a
> significant impact on elected officials, and in turn on disaster
> policies and emergency management in general.
>
> THE ROLE OF PUBLIC OPINION
>
> PUBLIC OPINION has as much political importance today as it has ever
> had in American history. Among reasons for this are the sophisticated
> methodologies and technologies for measuring public opinion, and the
> effect of a rapidly moving free press and mass media able to provide
> copious news coverage of political matters.
>
> The general public's views on matters of DISASTER RELIEF and DISASTER
> MITIGATION sometimes dramatically affect disaster politics and policy.
> The public generally perceives governmental post-disaster relief
> efforts as both necessary and very important. However, the public, to
> the extent it actually understands what disaster mitigation means,
> tends to view mitigation as less salient and somewhat burdensome.

*Objective 14.1*

> In the aftermath of a disaster, people (especially those in the
> affected areas) often feel vulnerable, disoriented, and insecure.
> Disaster victims tend to look to the Government to restore their
> security and to re-establish the necessary lifelines. The wider public
> (those located outside of the affected areas) also want to be
> reassured that the Government is doing everything possible to help
> disaster victims. Ordinarily, DISASTER RELIEF EFFORTS of the
> Government have a high public salience.
>
> As explained in Session 5, "Executive Political Issues and Disasters,"
> over the past twenty years the American public has come to expect
> government to become more involved in disasters, particularly major
> ones. They expect the Federal Government, led by the President, to
> join in response and recovery. Americans routinely expect their
> President to both dispatch sufficient Federal disaster help
> immediately and to personally visit damaged areas. It is now customary
> for most of the President's Cabinet, especially officials heading
> disaster-relevant departments, to visit major disaster sites. Such
> visits have both political and administrative consequences.
>
> The Bush Administration's awkward handling of the Hurricane Andrew
> disaster in southern Florida serves as an excellent example. Although
> President Bush and the Director of FEMA visited the affected area soon
> after the hurricane had struck, that gesture was made to look hollow
> by the explosive comments of Kate Hale, the Dade County Director of
> Emergency Preparedness. Three days after the hurricane, Ms. Hale held
> a press conference in which she criticized Federal disaster relief
> efforts: "Where the hell is the cavalry on this one? We need food. We
> need water. We need people. For God's sake, where are they?"
> \[*Newsweek*, September 7 (1992) p. 23.\]
>
> In the midst of a close Presidential campaign race, President Bush
> took extraordinary actions to ensure that public opinion did not
> galvanize around this statement. Included in these actions was placing
> Secretary of Transportation Andrew Card in charge of the response and
> recovery activities of the Federal Government. Overall, public opinion
> concerning the President Bush Administration's handling of disaster
> relief efforts in southern Florida was alleged to have nearly cost
> Presidential Bush Florida's electoral votes in the 1992 election. This
> example underscores the claim that the way Presidents and Federal
> agencies manage disasters and how responsive they are to the needs of
> victims has political and electoral consequences.
>
> Such facts do not go unnoticed by other elected officials and
> emergency managers. They also realize that the way in which they
> manage and respond to disasters will reflect back on them. If elected
> officials and emergency managers appear to be unresponsive to the
> needs of disaster victims, public opinion may have NEGATIVE POLITICAL
> REPERCUSSIONS (such as the loss of an office or post). In the same
> manner, disasters may also provide a unique "WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY."
> Disasters produce the conditions that allow leaders to show their
> concerns for citizens' needs and demands. Officials sometimes use a
> disaster to demonstrate their leadership capabilities and willingness
> to tackle difficult problems. Thus, they can influence public opinion
> in their favor by displaying their responsiveness to the needs of the
> people.

*Objective 14.2*

> While disaster relief efforts receive a great deal of public
> attention, mitigation measures tend to be viewed by much of the public
> as less important or unnecessary. Some view mitigation with hostility.
>
> Many disasters result in significant human and financial losses.
> MITIGATION MEASURES may substantially reduce, if not eliminate, those
> costs by preventing the disaster or diminishing its destructiveness.
> Effective emergency management requires policies and programs which
> identify risk, prevent or lessen vulnerability, and maintain viable
> preparedness levels.
>
> Mitigation measures, however, are not a highly salient issue to the
> public. This is largely because disasters are, by their very nature,
> high-risk, low probability events. Their infrequency makes it
> difficult to justify the expenditure of public money and effort in
> view of seemingly more pressing, on-going public needs and issues.
> This has served as a major impediment to effective emergency
> policymaking.
>
> The American public tends to perceive mitigation measures as
> governmental intrusions and restrictions on their personal freedom,
> rather than as worthwhile precautionary activities. Mitigative
> measures which impose more stringent or limiting building codes,
> zoning practices, and land-use regulations are not well-received if
> they cost more money, if they encroach on private property rights, or
> if they impede the kind of development a community desires.
> Communities with little recent disaster experience are especially
> pre-disposed to think of disaster mitigation as burdensome and costly.
> Moreover, mitigation is often stymied by the traditional American
> opposition toward, or resistance to, National planning and regulation
> (especially fears of Federal zoning).

*Objective 14.3*

RESPONSIVENESS TO THE PUBLIC

> As the previous section demonstrates, responsiveness to the public and
> public opinion is an important political issue in emergency
> management. Several recent Federal reforms have been aimed at allaying
> public concerns and expediting disaster relief.
>
> The Federal Response Plan of 1992 (discussed in detail in Session 9:
> "Federal Organization and Policy") represents the most comprehensive
> of these reforms. The Federal Response Plan, inaugurated as a result
> of the substantial criticism of disaster relief efforts after
> Hurricane Hugo in 1989, is a cooperative agreement between 26 Federal
> agencies and the American Red Cross. The main purpose of the plan is
> to integrate the capabilities of Federal departments and agencies in
> order to produce a more coordinated Federal response to disasters and
> to provide better emergency assistance---all of which saves lives and
> protects property, health, and safety in a more efficient and timely
> way.
>
> In any disaster it is important that responders have a clear
> understanding of their roles so that they can effectively coordinate
> their efforts, use resources efficiently, and help disaster victims.
> No "single" agency can manage a disaster completely on its own. The
> response effort requires the resources and expertise of law
> enforcement, the fire service, emergency medical personnel, the public
> health, the public works, and many others. Preliminary reports confirm
> that the Federal Response Plan has broadly improved Federal disaster
> response, and public opinion regarding the FRP is favorable.
>
> FEMA has instituted other reforms designed to improve responsiveness
> to public concerns. Recent reforms of its response and recovery
> operations have included the expansion of its telephone application
> capability. Now citizens do not have to stand in long lines at
> application centers near disaster sites to receive the help they need.
> They can simply go to the nearest phone and call FEMA's toll-free 800
> number. FEMA has also sped up the disaster recovery and relief process
> by providing its field inspectors with hand-held computers. This
> enables them to complete inspections quickly and to transmit the data
> to a central processing office.
>
> FEMA reports that it now gets checks to victims in as little as 5-10
> days, whereas it used to take several weeks or a month. The agency is
> also reaching more people faster due to improvements made in its
> newspaper, *Recovery Times* and, "Recovery" television channel.
> *Recovery Times* is published in disaster areas and provides essential
> disaster aid information and telephone numbers. The Recovery Channel
> is FEMA's cable television broadcasting program employed in
> large-scale disasters.
>
> It is important to reiterate that all of these efforts to expedite and
> more efficiently provide disaster relief are responses to public
> opinion. In the event of a disaster, the public wants to know that the
> government is in control and that it is taking care of things. If the
> public is reassured of this, public opinion about responders and
> disaster relief efforts will be complimentary and supportive.
> Correspondingly, if the public becomes convinced, or suspects, that
> disaster relief efforts are inadequate, unresponsive, or mis-managed,
> polls will reflect criticism and diminished support for political
> officials deemed to be in charge or responsible.
>
> THE ROLE OF EVALUATION: DISASTERS AND BUSINESSES
>
> A key element in addressing disaster relief needs and in being
> responsive to public and interest group concerns is effective
> EVALUATION. Effective evaluations may lead to more timely and better
> directed pre- and post-disaster policies and assistance. Moreover,
> they may reveal issues which have important political and policy
> implications. The Tierney, Nigg, and Dahlhamer article is a good
> example of how social scientific evaluation via survey analysis has
> helped to evaluate business behavior in the wake of a major disaster.

*Objective 14.4*

> Disaster damage and disruption produce a range of impacts, not only
> for individual businesses, but also for communities. Businesses that
> depend on a steady cash flow and that are forced to close down for
> even short periods, may have difficulty remaining viable. Those that
> must relocate because of disaster damage may not do as well in their
> new locations, and marginal businesses may sink into insolvency as a
> result of disaster losses. Owners of commercial buildings that are
> destroyed or damaged typically encounter financial and other problems
> during reconstruction. Business closures may contribute to short- and
> long-term unemployment and may inconvenience residents by forcing them
> to go elsewhere to obtain needed goods and services.
>
> It is not uncommon for disasters to severely damage major commercial
> districts in the communities they strike. Most recently, the 1994
> Northridge earthquake created pockets of severe commercial damage,
> particularly near the earthquake's epicenter. When their business
> districts are damaged by disasters, communities face a host of
> problems, among them:

1\. Loss of property and sales tax revenues;

2\. Threats to long-term business district viability;

3\. The potential loss of important businesses;

> 4\. The need to continue to find a way to attract a client and
> customer base; and
>
> 5\. The need to undertake complex reconstruction and redevelopment
> projects.
>
> If these problems are not addressed, both individual businesses and
> the community as a whole may suffer.
>
> Despite the economic and social importance of businesses in the
> greater community, social scientists have, until recently, placed
> little emphasis on evaluating and understanding how businesses fare in
> disaster circumstances. Previous research on the economics of
> disasters have focused on the community as a unit of analysis, rather
> than on victimized business districts. Seldom has post-disaster
> economic well-being, at the community level, been examined. While this
> older research is useful, it does not provide data on the experiences
> of particular businesses, nor does it address key topics such as how
> businesses cope with disaster induced disruption, what measures they
> adopt to mitigate and prepare for such disruption, and how they manage
> the recovery process.
>
> The Tierney, Nigg, and Dahlhamer article provides a good example of
> how an effective evaluation may reveal factors that have political and
> policy implications. The authors identify three things that are
> necessary to properly evaluate losses due to disasters:
>
> 1\. Determine what is at risk by identifying the elements in the
> human-built, and natural environment that may be affected by the
> disaster;
>
> 2\. Anticipate direct effects of the disaster event, including deaths,
> injuries, damage to structures and lifelines, and disturbances to the
> natural environment; and
>
> 3\. Conduct a detailed research to determine how the physical damage
> to structures creates secondary and indirect losses and disrupts
> social and economic activity.

*Objective 14.5*

> The authors, applying this methodology, found that LIFELINE SERVICES
> were those which were most important for the continuity of businesses.
> Findings also indicated which types of lifeline outages were likely to
> contribute most to business interruption, and, hence, which types of
> failure were most important to avoid and contain. The study showed
> that businesses differed in the degree of dependence each had on each
> form of lifeline service. By analyzing how businesses used lifelines
> in their operations, it provided a clearer picture of the business
> functions most affected by lifeline failures and outages.
>
> Overall, the study also made an effort to disaggregate the effects of
> different types of disaster-related losses on business operations. The
> analysis of businesses in the aftermath of the 1993 Midwest flood
> revealed that damage to lifelines, and consequently to service
> interruptions, were a more important cause of business interruption
> than was flood inundation. Only 15 percent of the businesses in Des
> Moines, Iowa sustained direct flood damage, yet a very high proportion
> of undamaged businesses were affected by the loss of one or more
> critical lifeline services. Business people found themselves without
> telephone service or electricity, and most importantly, without water
> for drinking and sanitation. During the time that lifeline services
> were unavailable, a large proportion of businesses were, in effect,
> "out of business." Since so many more businesses were affected by
> lifeline outages than were directly affected by flooding, lifeline
> failures and outages probably generated more economic losses than did
> the direct physical flooding of businesses.
>
> These findings have important political and policy implications for
> hazard mitigation and preparedness programs. Current efforts to
> contain disaster losses tend to focus on the micro-level, encouraging
> individual homeowners and local businesses to secure their properties
> against damage. For example, the earthquake hazard mitigation
> officials recommend that people purchase earthquake insurance and
> retrofit buildings, while local officials are encouraged to enact
> stringent building codes and regulations. Underlying such
> recommendations and programs is the assumption that actions taken by
> individual property owners yield the greatest loss-reduction. The
> research, however, indicates that a home or business may escape direct
> damage and yet suffer extensive disruption as a result of lifeline
> service interruption.
>
> Lifeline failures were among many factors that led to business
> closures in Des Moines. Others factors included the loss of customers
> and the inability to obtain supplies. It is important to note that
> many of these disruptions originated away from, rather than at, the
> individual businesses. One of the major lessons of the study is that,
> in order to be more responsive to public and group interests and to
> reduce disaster losses, individually-focused mitigation efforts must
> be balanced by broader, macro-level efforts that seek to maintain the
> operation and viability of businesses, communities, and local
> economies. Ensuring continuity in the provision of lifeline services
> should be recognized as a critical element of that strategy.

KEY DISASTER INTERESTS

> In concert with public opinion, INTEREST GROUPS play an important role
> in disaster policy and emergency management. Session 6, "Legislative
> Political Issues and Disasters," provided a basic background on the
> role of interest groups. Recall that special interests employ lobbying
> efforts to influence the decisions of the Government through a variety
> of means, including direct communications with elected officials.
> Special interest groups represent an integral part of law-making and
> law enforcement because they provide stakeholder input and expertise.
> As evidence of their involvement and influence, special interests at
> the Federal level are often referred to as the "Third House" of
> Congress. \[Rosenthal, 1993, pp. 1-14\]

*Objective 14.6*

> Influential interest groups help to frame disaster issues and help to
> shape disaster policies. As previously noted in Session 6, there is a
> broad spectrum of disaster-related interest groups, among them:
> voluntary organizations (e.g., the American Red Cross), non-Federal
> organizations (e.g., the National Governor's Association), and even
> clientele groups (e.g., the International Association of Fire Chiefs
> of America). Two of the most influential interest groups, however, are
> those that represent private business interests, namely the DISASTER
> INSURANCE INDUSTRY and ECONOMIC GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT INTERESTS.
>
> At the Federal level, the insurance industry represents one of the
> most influential disaster-oriented special interest groups. This is
> because, in the United States, the insurance industry plays the
> critical role of spreading out the risk of catastrophic disasters
> through insurance policies, thereby lessening the financial impact on
> insured disaster victims and, in turn, on the United States
> Government. Disaster claim payouts by the property and casualty
> insurance industry routinely exceed Federal payments to cover disaster
> recovery and restoration. As a result of this crucial role, the
> insurance industry plays a substantial part in the Federal disaster
> policy decision-making arena.
>
> Although the disaster insurance industry, as a whole has been able to
> absorb the large and unprecedented losses that have resulted from
> recent catastrophic events, such as Hurricane Andrew, the frequency
> and severity of such events have led to bankruptcy for a few insurance
> firms in certain
>
> areas. Moreover, some solvent insurers have decided not to write
> insurance along some lines which they believe leave them exposed to
> paying claims for major disaster losses. This underscores a recent
> analysis which indicates that not long after experiencing
> catastrophes, States or localities discover that available, affordable
> insurance has virtually disappeared. In effect, the sensitivity of
> insurance to catastrophic events has caused insurance availability
> problems in certain areas of the United States, especially in
> California and Florida. This has raised questions and concerns
> regarding the capacity of the insurance industry to handle future,
> catastrophic, natural disasters.
>
> The politics of disaster insurance involve ongoing efforts by the
> insurance industry, in part through its lobbying arm, the DISASTER
> COALITION, to accomplish two goals: to secure Federal reinsurance
> against mega-disaster's financial impact on the insurance industry and
> to encourage the enactment and enforcement of stringent zoning laws,
> building codes, and land-use regulations aimed at lessening the
> potential impact of disasters.
>
> With regard to the first goal, an ambivalent relationship exists
> between the Federal Government and the disaster insurance industry.
> Insurers have long feared that the Congress might repeal the
> McCarran-Ferguson Act of 1944, a measure which exempts the insurance
> industry from the Sherman Anti-Trust Act and which prohibits the
> Federal Government from regulating private insurance companies unless
> States abdicate their regulatory responsibilities. Under current
> policy, insurance companies are subject to regulation by State
> insurance commissioners. At the same time, the industry wants the
> Federal Government to provide a "back-stop" against massive industry
> losses stemming from catastrophes, or from a succession of highly
> damaging major disasters, by underwriting help for the reinsurance
> industry (providing insurance for insurers). Correspondingly, many
> lawmakers suspect that the insurance industry wants to encumber
> taxpayers in a bailout scheme when the industry suffers major
> disaster-related losses.
>
> The disaster industry and the Federal Government are more in agreement
> on the second goal of mitigation measures. The primary reason for this
> is that both parties recognize that it is simply more cost-effective
> for them to prevent a disaster than to deal with its consequences.
> Although mitigation and preparedness programs cost money and time,
> they can be very cost-effective. For example, the establishment of
> stricter building codes and regulations in disaster-prone areas has
> saved millions of dollars in property damages while preventing the
> loss of human life as well. They also serve to move costs away from
> the insurers (the insurance industry and the
>
> government) and more directly toward individuals and businesses. While
> the insurance industry is clearly the most powerful interest group at
> the Federal level, economic growth and development interests dominate
> local level politics and policies.

*Objective 14.7*

> It is important to note that zoning regulations, building codes, and
> land-use decisions are issues of local government jurisdiction. As a
> result, they are greatly influenced by local officials, local
> interests, and local needs. Most prominent of these is that of
> economic growth and development. Builders and developers are subject
> to a number of pressures including to hold down building costs, to
> maximize the profitability of the land which they own, and to finish
> work on schedule, etc.) Tougher local codes and regulations often
> drive up construction costs and produce permit and inspection delays.
> Moreover, elected officials, and even zoning and building authorities,
> are cross-pressured by the need to advance economic development in
> their jurisdictions. Often locally-elected officials responsible for
> promoting disaster mitigation are swayed by the temptation to promote
> expeditious, hazard-vulnerable development. The local electorate
> rewards those leaders who advance economic development and local
> employment. Development interests, like as other interests, are free
> to offer local candidates campaign contributions. Obviously, the
> candidates perceived as facilitating economic development will enjoy
> more contributions from development interests than will candidates
> perceived to be qualifying or limiting development.
>
> Economic growth and development interests often challenge and surmount
> the pro-mitigative efforts of disaster-conscious citizens and
> insurance firms. This has impeded effective emergency management and
> has pitted interest groups and governments against one another.

**Supplemental**

**Considerations**

> This session imposes some heavy instructional demands, perhaps greater
> than in most sessions. Reproduce Anderson's section on "Policy
> Evaluation" in Appendix E as a handout for the class. Do not try to
> teach the statistical material in the Tierney, et al., article, but
> instead ask the class to consider it as an example of how to study and
> analyze the views of business people affected by disaster.
>
> The instructor may also want to more closely examine the chapter on
> insurance in the Bipartisan Task Force Report of 1995.

**Endnotes**

-   "What Went Wrong," *Newsweek*, September 7, 1992:23.

-   Rosenthal, Alan, The Third House (Washington DC: Congressional
    Quarterly Inc., 1993):1-14

**Session No. 15**

**Course**: The Political and Policy Basis of Emergency Management

**Session**: Non-Profit Organizations **Time**: 1 Hour

**Objectives:**

By the conclusion of this session, students should be able to:

> 15.1 Explain the various roles of voluntary organizations in emergency
> management and some of the many services they provide.
>
> 15.2 Summarize manner in which the emergency management work of
> voluntary organizations is coordinated.
>
> 15.3 Discuss three cases in which voluntary organizations facilitated
> disaster response and recovery.
>
> 15.4 Explain the dynamics of voluntary organizational support and
> general operation, and some of their inherent limitations.
>
> 15.5 Explain the difficulties and cross-pressures of governmental and
> voluntary emergency management work.

**Scope**

> In America, many voluntary, non-profit organizations are involved in
> disaster mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery efforts.
> Disasters trigger out-pourings of individual contributions of money or
> in-kind donations central to the operation and sustenance of many of
> these bodies. Governmental emergency management agencies often
> interact with these organizations, and do so for a variety of reasons.
> This lesson considers the dynamics of that interchange, the
> interdependence of public and private disaster management
> organizations, and the political positives and negatives of relying
> upon non-profit, voluntary, organizational help.

**References**

> Assigned student readings:

-   ***National Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster*** (NVOAD)
    Directory and handbook. \[Handed out in class.\]

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-   U.S. Senate, Bipartisan Task Force on Funding Disaster Relief, John
    Glenn (Chairman), Christopher S. Bond (Co-Chairman), "Federal
    Disaster Assistance: Report of the Senate Task Force on Funding
    Disaster Relief," 104th Cong., 1st Sess., ***Document No. 104-4***
    (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1995): \[Section
    2, Non-Federal Disaster Assistance (Voluntary and Other Private
    Efforts), pp. 46-50.\]

**Requirements**

> It would help to invite a disaster-experienced representative of a
> voluntary organization to the class as a guest speaker. The instructor
> should provide a formal invitation and adequate advanced notice to the
> organization's representative. The invitation should make it clear
> that organizational and political issues are a central concern in the
> course and that some challenging or controversial topics may come up
> in questions.
>
> Also, if emergency managers speak in later sessions, the instructor
> can use that opportunity to ask them about their relationships with
> non-profit organizations and volunteers. Recount their remarks in
> class discussion of matters in this session. Run this session
> informally.

**Remarks**

*Objective 15.1*

> By definition, a voluntary non-profit organization is one that
> provides a service to a community free of charge or for a minimal cost
> that is required to defray the cost of the service(s) furnished.
> Financial support for voluntary agencies is generally through
> donations, contracts, and grants. PRIVATE NON-PROFIT ORGANIZATIONS are
> legally characterized by the fact that they hold the special
> non-profit Federal tax exempt status---(501)(c)(3).
>
> Many such organizations provide facilities, such as educational,
> utility, emergency, medical, rehabilitational, and temporary or
> permanent custodial care facilities (including those for the aged and
> disabled), or other facilities that produce essential services for the
> general public.
>
> VOLUNTARY, NON-PROFIT ORGANIZATIONS, COMMUNITY SERVICE GROUPS, and
> CHURCH GROUPS that provide assistance in the aftermath of a disaster
> or an emergency are often referred to as VOLAGs, or VOLUNTARY
> AGENCIES. VOLAG involvement in disaster response and recovery has a
> long history in America. For example, in 1905, the U.S. Congress
> mandated that the American Red Cross should:
>
> "...continue and carry on a system of national and international
> relief in time of peace and apply the same in mitigating the
> sufferings caused by pestilence, famine, fire, floods, and other great
> national calamities, and to devise and carry on measures for
> preventing the same." \[U.S. Congress, 36 U.S.C. Ch. 1, Sects. 1-17b\]
>
> Similarly, the Salvation Army, a recognized church, has been providing
> disaster relief assistance since 1899. Together with some 29 other
> VOLAGs, the American Red Cross and the Salvation Army coordinate their
> response and recovery efforts through a National coalition of
> voluntary organizations active in disasters---National Voluntary
> Organizations Active in Disaster (NVOAD).
>
> There are a great many not-for-profit and voluntary organizations in
> the United States that have an interest and a role to play, in
> emergency management.
>
> Organized voluntary resource groups come in a great variety of forms.
> Examples are the Radio Amateur Civil Emergency Service (RACES), the
> American Red Cross, the Salvation Army, Volunteers of America, the
> Mennonite Disaster Service, the Southern Baptist Convention, Catholic
> Charities, and Church World Services, to name a few.
>
> States, localities, and nongovernmental organizations respond to many
> disasters that do not involve Federal assistance, and they play a
> vital role when Federal authorities are engaged as well. However,
> governmental emergency managers and those in voluntary assistance
> organizations do not necessarily share the same definition of disaster
> or emergency. Even among voluntary organizations themselves there are
> different emergency management terminology, different methods of
> budgeting and management, and different perceptions of the
> Government's role in disaster management.
>
> Non-profit voluntary relief organizations have historically provided
> considerable disaster assistance to victims, particularly by
> distributing food, and medical supplies, and providing temporary
> shelter. Churches, religious orders, and social welfare organizations
> have established organizations specifically dedicated to providing
> such assistance, such as the Disaster Response Office, of Catholic
> Charities USA, the Mennonite Disaster Service, and the American Red
> Cross.
>
> Although it is impossible to accurately quantify the amount of
> assistance provided by such voluntary efforts, the historic role of
> voluntary organizations in disaster relief is not questioned by
> governmental emergency managers. A report, issued by the National
> Academy of Public Administration (NAPA) after Hurricane Andrew, noted
> that various elements of the private sector and various individuals
> participate in all four phases of managing emergencies---mitigation,
> preparedness, response, and recovery---ranging from minor incidents to
> the most catastrophic.

VOLAGs are involved in:

-   **Preparedness**: They assist in developing disaster plans and in
    training disaster responders; provide facilities and resources as
    well as community disaster education; and join in drills, exercises
    and simulations.

-   **Response**: They furnish resources such as trained personnel,
    masses of untrained (but instrumental) helpers and facilities; in
    cooperation with local, State and Federal authorities, VOLAGs often
    provide the bulk of mass care services, such as sheltering, feeding,
    and clothing individuals and families; assisting high-risk, "gap
    group" clients; and help to coordinating an extended network of
    service organizations and interests not generally involved in
    disaster response.

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-   **Recovery**: VOLAGs work in partnership with the Government and
    affected communities to identify and meet the remaining long-term
    recovery needs of families and individuals.

-   **Mitigation**: VOLAGs often advocate that elected and appointed
    officials implement sound land-use planning and zoning, as well as
    the adoption of building codes and standards aimed at protecting and
    safeguarding people and property from disasters. Information about
    what the public can do to safeguard their property is shared through
    Community Disaster Education activities.

> The Red Cross and the Salvation Army work with all levels of the
> Government in a disaster and have a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with
> FEMA. The Mennonite Disaster Service, used as a third example below,
> has an MOA with FEMA as well. All three have MOAs with other disaster
> relief organizations, and they all belong to NVOAD. NVOAD promotes the
> coordination of relief organizations so that they do not duplicate
> their relief efforts.

*Objective 15.2*

NVOAD

> A growing trend in disaster relief is the cooperation and coordination
> of voluntary organizations active in disasters. At the National level,
> National Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster (NVOAD) is a group
> of voluntary organizations that have made disaster response a
> priority.
>
> The group grew out of Hurricane Camille in 1969, when organizations
> that had been involved in providing resources and services to victims
> and communities affected by disaster shared their mutual concern about
> the frequent duplication of services they were providing.
> Representatives from these organizations began to meet together on a
> regular basis. The purpose of those early meetings was for
> participants to learn about their respective activities, concerns, and
> frustrations so that duplication of effort could be minimized and made
> more efficient.
>
> NVOAD coordinates planning efforts of many voluntary organizations
> which respond to disasters. Member organizations provide more
> effective disaster aid and less duplication in services by getting
> together before disasters strike. Once disasters occur, NVOAD (or an
> affiliated State VOAD) encourages members and other voluntary agencies
> to convene on site. This cooperative effort has proven to be the most
> effective way for a wide variety of volunteers and organizations to
> work together in a crisis.
>
> NVOAD serves member organizations through:

-   **Communication**: It disseminates information through electronic
    mechanisms, its newsletter, the Directory, research and
    demonstration, case studies, and critique.

-   **Cooperation**: It creates a climate for cooperation at all levels
    (including grass roots) and provides information.

-   **Coordination**: It coordinates policy among member organizations
    and serves as a liaison, advocate, and National voice.

-   **Education**: It provides training, and increases awareness and
    preparedness in each organization.

-   **Leadership Development**: It gives volunteer leaders training and
    support to build effective State VOAD organizations.

-   **Mitigation**: It supports the efforts of Federal, State, and local
    agencies and governments, and lobbies for appropriate legislation.

-   **Convening Mechanisms**: It conducts seminars, meetings, board
    meetings, regional conferences, training programs, and local
    conferences.

-   **Outreach**: It encourages the formation of, and furnishes guidance
    to, State and regional, voluntary organizations active in disaster
    relief.

> NVOAD policy stipulates that,
>
> "The role of a VOAD group is not to manage disaster response
> operations; it is to coordinate planning and preparations in advance
> of disaster incidents and operations. When an event happens, the role
> of the VOAD chair is to convene or co-convene with an appropriate
> partner a meeting of all of the voluntary response organizations as
> soon as possible. Within a reasonable period of time, it is also
> appropriate for VOAD to convene or co-convene with an appropriate
> partner a meeting of the recovery organizations to discuss what form
> the long-range coordinating entity for unmet needs should take."

NVOAD Membership (as of 22 October 1996):

-   Adventist Community Services

-   The American Red Cross

-   The American Radio Relay League

-   The Ananda Marga Universal Relief Team

-   Catholic Charities USA Disaster Response

-   Christian Disaster Response

-   The Christian Reformed World Relief Committee

-   The Church of the Brethren General Board

-   Church World Service National Disaster Response

-   The Episcopal Church Fund for World Relief

-   Friends Disaster Services

-   Inter-Lutheran Disaster Response

-   The International Association of Jewish Vocational Services

-   The International Relief Friendship Foundation

-   Mennonite Disaster Services

-   Nazarene Disaster Response

-   The Phoenix Society---dedicated to providing psychosocial support to
    burn survivors and their families

-   The Points of Light Foundation---Partners in Disaster Response

-   Presbyterian Church (USA) World Services

-   REACT International---providing communications support

-   The Salvation Army

-   Second Harvest National Food Banks

-   The Society of St. Vincent de Paul

-   The Southern Baptist Convention

-   The United Methodist Committee on Relief

-   Volunteers in Technical Assistance---providing telecommunications
    and information management systems support to emergency services

-   Volunteers of America

-   World Vision

> For more information concerning participating NVOAD members contact
> NVOAD c/o the American Red Cross, 8111 Gatehouse Road, Falls Church,
> VA, 22042; (301) 270-6782; or through the NVOAD Internet address:
>
> http://www.vita.org/nvoad
>
> The Red Cross serves as the secretary for NVOAD and will forward
> inquiries to NVOAD members and leaders. To directly access the listing
> of member organizations, and information about them on the internet,
> go to:
>
> http://www.vita.org/nvoad/members
>
> VOADs (Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster) can also be found
> at the State level in most States and, in some instances, at the
> sub-State level. Through an agreement process, a State VOAD may become
> a partner with NVOAD. A common belief among governmental emergency
> managers is that States with VOADs seem to handle disaster response
> more effectively and efficiently than States without VOADs.
>
> NVOAD publishes a quarterly newsletter and provides information
> concerning member activities and Federal and State governmental
> actions related to disasters. For further information write: NVOAD
> Newsletter Editor, 12501 Old Columbia Pike, Silver Spring, MD 20904.

*Objective 15.3*

THE American Red Cross

> A key charitable disaster relief organizations is the American Red
> Cross, (ARC) made up of over 1.5 million volunteers. It is a
> humanitarian organization chartered by Congress "to continue and carry
> on a system of National and international relief in time of peace and
> apply the same in mitigating the sufferings caused by pestilence,
> famine, fire, floods, and other great National calamities, and to
> devise and carry on measures for preventing the same." It has
> established widespread measures to accommodate this, including:

-   A 24-hour-per-day, 7-day-per-week, year-round disaster operations
    center;

-   A fleet of more than 250 custom-designed multipurpose response
    vehicles located throughout the United States;

-   Ten warehouses with stockpiles of equipment and supplies in 7
    continental States, Puerto Rico, Hawaii, and throughout the Pacific
    (warehouse in Guam, American Samoa, and the Commonwealth of the
    Northern Mariana Islands);

-   Disaster specialists and planners placed throughout the country;

-   A "disaster skills database and personnel system" that lists about
    20,000 individuals familiar with the components of disaster relief;

-   An expanded "Community Disaster Education Program" to instruct
    individuals and families;

-   An established "Disaster Mitigation Initiative" to work with
    governmental and private organizations; and

-   The expanded training system and the American Red Cross college
    curriculum.

> From the 1982 to 1993, over 2,000 local ARC chapters and the National
> organization responded to an average of 50,000 to 60,000 domestic
> incidents. Approximately 200 to 300 of these incidents are classified
> by the ARC as "major disaster incidents."
>
> The American Red Cross is headquartered in Washington, DC, and is
> comprised of over 1,300 local chapters, with coordinating chapters in
> each State or, for small States, in multi-State areas. Its disaster
> relief operations follow an ascendant hierarchy: the local chapter is
> the first to respond to a disaster, calling for assistance from the
> State, the region, and the National offices as needed. As their
> services become no longer needed, the National ARC turns the control
> of disaster relief back to the local chapter. After every disaster,
> the National chapter surveys its efforts in order to improve its
> response to future needs.
>
> American Red Cross chapters have Disaster Services sections and each
> is responsible for providing disaster relief services in the community
> served. An example of these, disaster relief services would be the
> provision of food, first-aid, clothing, bedding, and medicines to
> disaster victims. In addition, in most communities served, the ARC is
> also responsible for staffing and managing shelters.
>
> The American Red Cross is funded by donations from the American people
> and corporations. The Federal Government will sometimes reimburse the
> organization for limited expenses when a Presidential Declaration is
> made for offshore disasters and when FEMA is unable to respond or
> designates the ARC to carry out some of its usual duties. The United
> Way is a major ARC donor. Also, various chapters may have
> fund-raisers, or they may solicit large corporations to donate
> proceeds to a particular disaster.
>
> Additional information on the American Red Cross may be accessed free
> of charge on the internet at:
>
> http://www.redcross.org/nvoad/members/arc.html
>
> Salvation Army
>
> The Salvation Army is a charitable organization with a network of
> social services that provide emergency disaster assistance. The
> Salvation Army officers provide food, clothing, furniture, medical
> items, and spiritual comfort to victims. They have developed local,
> regional, and National disaster services programs. Congress officially
> recognized the capabilities of the Salvation Army in the Disaster
> Relief Act of 1974.
>
> The Salvation Army is organized into four territories, 40 divisions
> and 1,264 local and core communities. Their National headquarters is
> located in Alexandria, Virginia. The Salvation Army works on a
> voluntary basis. Volunteers pay their own travel expenses and living
> arrangements (sometimes a motel will donate space for volunteers).
> They conduct disaster training programs, among other
> duties---sometimes with the American Red Cross.
>
> During a disaster, the Salvation Army provides a site for meals, opens
> shelters in Salvation Army facilities or other sites, provides
> counseling to victims and volunteers, helps family members locate each
> other, and provides information to inquiring relatives and friends
> about those affected by the disaster. They help in reconstruction work
> and they also work with State Emergency Operation Centers.
>
> The Salvation Army is funded by private and public donations,
> including the United Way. Long-term services are funded by special
> appeals. They are a member of NVOAD and have memorandums of agreement
> (MDAs) with FEMA, the Red Cross, and others.
>
> Additional information on the Salvation Army may be accessed free of
> charge on the internet at:
>
> http://www.vita.org/nvoad/members/0021.html
>
> Mennonite Disaster Service
>
> The Mennonite Disaster Service (MDS) is a nonprofit organization that
> has been assisting disaster victims since the late 1940s and often
> takes on the responsibility of cleaning up, salvaging, performing
> temporary repairs, and rebuilding for the elderly, widowed
> underinsured, and disadvantaged following a disaster. They provide
> labor and support, not money. It is the victim's responsibility to
> obtain funds and materials to rebuild, then MDS will provide the
> labor.
>
> The Mennonite Disaster Service currently involves more than 3,000
> Mennonite, Amish, and Brethren in Christ Churches and districts. MDS
> has four regions in the United States and one in Canada, as well as 50
> local units. They have 325,000 members in North America and are
> headquartered in Akron, Ohio, where they have four employees. All
> other personnel are volunteers. They travel to disasters in
> semi-trailers that are equipped with cots, tools, cooking equipment,
> and office supplies. They also have cargo trailers.
>
> Funding is by donations, and sometimes through fund-raisers. The funds
> are used to house and support volunteers while they are in the field
> and to provide materials and equipment needed for efficient work. MDS
> does not typically accept in-kind donations, except for needed
> vehicles, and other supplies.
>
> The MDS has a memorandum of agreement (MDA) with FEMA, the American
> Red Cross, and the Salvation Army describing each agency's role. They
> are all members of NVOAD.
>
> Additional information on the Mennonite Disaster Service may be
> accessed free of charge on the internet at:
>
> http://www.vita.org/nvoad/members/mds.html
>
> These organizations have worked together and apart to provide
> assistance to disaster victims. Some examples follow:
>
> **The Loma Prieta Earthquake**
>
> The Loma Prieta Earthquake occurred in San Francisco in October 1989.
> It measured 7.1 on the Richter scale, and caused over 60 deaths, and
> an estimated \$6.8 billion in direct damages. The American Red Cross
> and the Salvation Army had an emergency plan in place for the Loma
> Prieta area before the earthquake. They had agreed that the ARC would
> feed the shelter victims; the Salvation Army would feed the disaster
> workers and those not in shelters, and would provide clothing to
> victims with homes.
>
> Within 12 hours of the initial earthquake, the local Salvation Army
> opened a center to provide food and clothing to the victims and food
> for the emergency workers. When meals were not being served, blankets
> and clothing were distributed to those in need. They were effective,
> in the early stages of post-disaster assistance, in feeding those in
> need.
>
> The local ARC arrived at pre-designated shelter areas and were
> operational on the same day as the quake. They were responsible for
> shelter management, sleeping areas, feeding, mental health, nursing,
> families, registration of volunteers and victims, the Media, and
> security. With the assistance of a voluntary radio group, they
> established communications among local amateur radio groups throughout
> the county. Three days after the earthquake, regional and National
> chapter ARC officials arrived, and stayed for 6 months. They did mass
> care, counseling, temporary housing, sheltering, and helped people
> muster rent. The ARC held volunteer coordination meetings twice a week
> the first month, once a week the next month, and monthly thereafter
> for 6 months to coordinate efforts among voluntary organizations and
> the Government.
>
> **The Rapid City Floods**
>
> After heavy flooding occurred in Rapid City, South Dakota, in June
> 1972, the Mennonite Disaster Service arrived to provide assistance the
> following day. They projected a four-week effort and set up a
> temporary office to coordinate voluntary activities in cleaning up and
> rebuilding. The American Red Cross agreed to supply meals, cots, other
> amenities, and utilities needed by the volunteers. Many came at their
> own expense from thousands of miles away, totaling approximately 1,500
> volunteers.
>
> The major MDS operation was mud cleanup, and scrubbing-down and
> restoring of buildings. A group of Mennonite engineers in Denver
> assembled special conveyers and shipped them to Rapid City in order to
> facilitate the mud disposal. As the American Red Cross scaled down its
> operations, responsibility for cleanup and repairs was handed to MDS.
>
> **Hurricane Andrew**
>
> In August of 1992, Hurricane Andrew struck southern Florida, causing
> 40 deaths and leaving a quarter of a million people homeless.
> Charitable organizations arrived quickly to provide support. The day
> after the hurricane hit, the Mennonite Disaster Service arrived in
> Homestead, Florida, with 4,200 short-term volunteers (1-2 weeks) and
> almost 50 long-term volunteers (2-6 months). They also had volunteers
> helping hurricane victims in Louisiana. The Salvation Army provided
> mobile feeding stations for the initial months after the disaster.
> Distribution centers were serving 20,000 people per day, and meals and
> snacks were provided to approximately 43,000 people per day. The
> Salvation Army also formed a group called the "Reconstruction
> Alliance," comprised of nonprofit agencies, dedicated to rebuilding
> South Dade, Florida. They met weekly to discuss building requirements
> and particular needs of member organizations.
>
> The local chapter of the American Red Cross was struck by Hurricane
> Andrew, but the State unit responded immediately and within 72 hours
> the National chapter resources arrived. They worked closely with FEMA
> and the military. The ARC provided mass care, counseling, temporary
> housing, and shelter, and financially assisted residents in affording
> their first month's rent. Some volunteers were there for four to six
> months; the ARC is still working on cases from Hurricane Andrew.

*Objective 15.4*

> Most voluntary organizations are involved in immediate emergency
> response such as mass care which includes the feeding, sheltering, and
> clothing of victims, *et cetera*. Some are involved in recovery
> activities such as rebuilding, cleaning up local areas, and
> reconstituting community mental health. Many organizations provide the
> same or similar services. Problems of overlap or competition usually
> are avoided if there is coordination and cooperation among the
> agencies. VOLAGs must collectively agree to share the work by
> coordinating their limited resources so that as many agencies as
> possible are able take part in the response and recovery effort. By
> sharing and cooperating, VOLAGs may share credit for the recovery of
> their communities and for promoting the healing process. Where VOLAG
> coordination is absent, many perceive them as "fighting" among
> themselves, at the expense of the people they are trying to serve.
>
> VOLAGs by nature, however, compete for the donated dollar. This is not
> necessarily a problem unless during relief operations various VOLAGs
> are not provided an opportunity to serve or to be publicly recognized
> for the help they provide. VOLAGs need a chance to demonstrate their
> abilities to both their supporters and to the community at large.
> Sometimes governmental Public Information Officers report on the
> efforts of just a few VOLAGs without acknowledging the legitimate
> contributions of all VOLAGs engaged in a response or recovery
> operation. Such omissions sometimes create rancor and
> misunderstanding. VOLAGs themselves need to draft cooperative, or
> joint, press releases to illustrate their collaborative efforts.
>
> VOLAGs are private organizations with their own missions and
> responsibilities. This is sometimes overlooked by governmental
> officials. Governmental emergency managers would be wise to respect
> the individuality and independence of VOLAGs, and work collaboratively
> with them to solve problems.
>
> Many local VOLAGs report to a parent organization whose headquarters
> are located outside of the disaster area. Sometimes an agency's
> National headquarters will support their local agency by augmenting
> their disaster relief efforts with the aid of a National response-team
> or leadership-team. Conflicts sometimes arise when the National teams
> and the local response element do not coordinate, collaborate,
> cooperate, or communicate. Occasionally problems and awkwardness
> result when the National team makes a decision on behalf of their
> local affiliate without thinking about the long-term ramifications
> that that decision might have on the agency after the National team
> returns home. Sometimes a National team fails to understand cultural,
> economic, and political sensitivities of the local community and acts
> in a way which induces the community to look unfavorably upon the
> local affiliate. This may undermine years of trust and good faith that
> had been built up under conditions of normalcy before the disaster.
> The point is that parent organizations must not jeopardize the
> credibility or funding base of local affiliates during a disaster
> response or recovery effort.
>
> Some emergency managers fail to recognize that many VOLAGs have been
> engaged in providing disaster relief and recovery help for decades.
> Some believe that volunteers are not as dependable, knowledgeable, or
> organized as "paid" staff. All emergency managers need to realize that
> VOLAGs involved in disaster response and recovery in the United States
> maintain a network of TRAINED VOLUNTEERS who are usually experienced
> and well-organized. They do not require constant supervision and many
> are themselves professionals who are volunteering their services
> (i.e., social workers, clergy, physicians, and builders, etc.)
> Government officials would be wise to view VOLAGs as partners rather
> than inferiors.
>
> Admittedly, some "helping" agencies and groups form spontaneously
> after a disaster and do lack experience; in such cases authorities
> should refer these groups to the local or Nationally organized arms of
> Voluntary Organizations Active in Disasters.

*Objective 15.5*

> While it may appear unseemly to discuss the politics of the voluntary
> sector, such a discussion is necessary. First, disasters provide a
> major impetus for the solicitation of charitable contributions needed
> to administer these organizations and to fund their assistance
> programs.
>
> Second, many non-profit assistance organizations derive budgetary
> income from governments, both before and after disasters. Voluntary
> organizations must generate positive publicity in order to reassure
> contributors that their donations are getting to where they are
> intended. Voluntary organizations compete with each other for donors.
> Emergency managers must be aware of the possibility that competition
> among non-profit organizations may complicate the coordination of
> relief efforts. Certain organizations have strong political backing
> which they may bring to bear on disaster managers.
>
> Third, voluntary non-profit organizations enjoy a special tax status
> which exempts them from paying many Federal, State, and local taxes
> and which provides their donors with a tax deduction for
> charitable-dollar or in-kind donations. However, this special tax
> benefit limits these organizations from engaging in political
> activity, especially the lobbying of legislatures. Consequently,
> voluntary organizations appear not to be formally involved in public
> political issues. However, they are very much involved informally in
> public and community issues that are part of the world of politics and
> policy. These organizations and their members are free to express
> their views and to publish recommendations on matters of public
> policy. They are less able to make campaign contributions or directly
> lobby the Government for special benefits to their organizations.
> However, they often champion the causes of the general interests they
> represent including the following:

-   Children,

-   The elderly,

-   The disabled,

-   Minorities (of racial, ethnic, and religious origin),

-   Women,

-   The poor and homeless,

-   Victims of crime or abuse,

-   Victims of disaster,

-   The seriously ill or those needing hospice care,

-   Ex-convicts,

-   People suffering drug addictions or mental illness,

-   Health or social welfare clients, and

-   *Et cetera*.

> Consequently, by advocating government benefits for the interests they
> represent, they may gain from government programs indirectly.
>
> Governmental emergency officials can never be sure how much
> post-disaster help voluntary organizations are able to provide. Often
> voluntary organizations augment governmental assistance and do so
> admirably. However, sometimes, voluntary organizations may be
> overwhelmed, only modestly involved in offering assistance, or
> disengaged. Clearly, many voluntary organizations were for weeks
> overwhelmed by the human needs created by Hurricane Andrew in southern
> Florida. Sometimes non-profit organizations are reluctant to offer
> assistance if they have problems with those needing help. For example,
> some organizations may be highly reluctant to aid Haitian "boat
> people," or corrections parolees, or AIDS victims, *et cetera*. Some
> organizations were slow to respond to victims of the Los Angeles Riots
> of 1992.
>
> The disaster assistance process is based on an interagency referral
> system. Referrals are made between VOLAGs, between governments, and
> between VOLAGs and governments. Governmental assistance supplements
> individual and family resources, and VOLAG assistance augments these
> resources and helps address unmet needs. VOLAGs must balance their
> desire to serve communities with the realization that governmental
> programs often provide more assistance, and in recent years, with
> greater speed than the Government has acted with in the past.
> Moreover, VOLAGs must take into account the fact that, if they provide
> certain forms of financial assistance, that assistance may make the
> client ineligible to receive certain types of governmental disaster
> assistance. Ironically, by providing certain forms of aid too quickly,
> VOLAGs may decrease the total sum of governmental disaster assistance
> which might have flowed to the community. VOLAGs must reconcile their
> desire to quickly respond and assist in recovery efforts with the
> knowledge that it may be more resource-conserving to wait for the
> Government to distribute its resources and, only then, to offer the
> help to meet the remaining needs of disaster clients.

**Supplemental**

**Considerations**

> The Bipartisan Task Force Report emphasizes, as the instructor should,
> that organized and individual voluntary efforts have always been a
> mainstay in providing services and essential products to victims.
> Perhaps most significant is how such organizations support and nurture
> disaster victims and their families. Yet, despite this historical and
> traditional role, it is not possible to accurately quantify the amount
> of assistance provided through such voluntary efforts. Among the
> biggest charitable organizations active in the aftermath of disaster
> are the American Red Cross, Catholic Charities USA, and the Salvation
> Army.

**Endnotes**

-   U.S. Congress, Act of January 5, 1905 (January 5, 1905, Ch. 23,
    Sect. 1, 33 Stat. 599) as amended by Act of May 8, 1947 (May 8,
    1947, Ch. 50, Sects. 1-2, 61 Stat. 80; July 26, 1947, Ch. 343, Title
    II, Sect. 205(a), 61 Stat. 501) 36 U.S.C., Chapter I -- American
    National Red Cross, Sects. 1-17b.

**Session No. 16**

**Course**: The Political and Policy Basis of Emergency Management

**Session**: The American Fire Community **Time**: 1 Hour

**Objectives**

By the end of this session, students should be able to:

> 16.1 Explain the importance of the Fire Services to National emergency
> management and their role within FEMA.
>
> 16.2 Discuss the political affiliations associated with the Fire
> Services.
>
> 16.3 From a political vantage point, consider the roles of the fire
> service in disaster mitigation and disaster response.
>
> 16.4 Review the critical roles of the local Fire Services in fire
> suppression and the difficulties they experience in moving political
> officials to support their efforts.
>
> 16.5 Explain why there are sometimes political disagreements between
> the Fire Services and the emergency management personnel.

**Scope**

> The Fire Services are, arguably, the most important professional
> emergency responder group. Few other professions assume, on a daily
> basis, as much responsibility for disaster and emergency response. The
> Fire Service organizations are often the first responders on the scene
> in a fire, hazardous materials incident, or natural disaster. Their
> duties today involve more than just fire response. Emergency medical
> service, search and rescue, environmental protection, radiological
> emergency tasks, and a host of other often highly specialized duties
> are assumed today by the evolving Fire Services of the United States.
> The Fire Services involve a wide range of preparedness and response
> functions, as well as mitigation, in addition to their duties in the
> realm of fire inspections. This session looks at the American Fire
> Services and their expanding role in disaster management; their strong
> political linkages to Congress; their central position in the Federal,
> State, and local emergency management; and the political barriers that
> they may face in the management of emergencies disasters.

**References**

> Assigned student readings:

-   Ruchelman, Leonard, "MGM Grand Hotel Fire," ***Crisis Management: A
    Casebook***, Michael T. Charles and John Choon K. Kim (eds.)
    (Springfield, Ill.: Charles C. Thomas Publishers, 1988): Ch. 6, pp.
    101-114.

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-   Sutphen, Sandra, "California Wildfires: How Integrated Emergency
    Management Succeeds and Fails," ***Disaster Management in the U.S.
    and Canada***, Richard T. Sylves and William L. Waugh, Jr. (eds.)
    (Springfield, Ill.: Charles C. Thomas Publishers, 1996): Ch. VII,
    pp. 161-188.

> The instructor may choose to place on reserve:
>
> Hansen, Jon, ***Oklahoma Rescue***, (New York: Ballantine Books, 1995.
>
> This book is an exceptionally good account of the fire service
> operations during and after the Oklahoma City Murrah Office Building
> bombing in April 1995. Hansen is the Assistant Fire Chief of Oklahoma
> City and was integrally involved in all facets of the emergency. The
> book also contributes to sessions dealing with media relations
> (Session 17), structural collapse (Session 24), and big-city emergency
> management (Session 27).
>
> The instructor may wish to inspect portions of:
>
> Grant, Nancy K. and David H. Hoover ***Fire Service Administration***
> (Quincy, Mass.: National Fire Protection Association, 1994).

**Requirements**

> News clips regarding major local fire disasters, reproduced and
> circulated to the class, would be an excellent instructional aid. Ask
> students whether any of them have worked as either volunteer or career
> firefighters. If so, you have some built-in co-presenters. Invite a
> representative of one of the locally Fire Services, preferably someone
> of senior rank who routinely interacts with local elected political
> officials.

**Remarks**

*Objective 16.1*

> Although many Federal agencies have fire-related roles (e.g., the
> Department of Transportation, the U.S. Forest Service, the U.S. Bureau
> of Land Management, and the Department of Defense, etc.), the core
> statute concerning fire prevention activities at the Federal level is
> the Federal Fire Prevention and Control Act of 1974, referred to
> hereafter as the "Fire Act." \[U.S. Congress, October 29, 1974\] The
> administering agency is FEMA's U.S. Fire Administration (USFA), a body
> which receives an annual appropriation for administrative and
> operating expenses.
>
> The Fire Act was passed in response to concerns raised by the landmark
> report **America Burning** written by the Presidentially appointed
> National Commission on Fire Prevention and Control. That report
> identified fire as a major National problem and concluded that, though
> the United States was the richest and most technologically advanced
> Nation in the world, it led all major industrialized countries in per
> capita deaths and property loss from fire. Since the enactment of the
> original statute in 1974, Congress has continued to amend the Act
> assigning USFA additional responsibilities in arson prevention, hotel
> and motel fire safety, and firefighter health and safety. \[U.S.
> Senate, 1995, pp. 149-150.\]
>
> The mission of the USFA is to enhance the Nation's fire prevention and
> control activities and, thereby, to significantly reduce the Nation's
> loss from fire, while also achieving a reduction in property loss and
> non-fatal injuries due to fire. The USFA's policy is to prepare
> Federal, State, and local officials, their supporting staffs,
> emergency fire responders, voluntary groups, and the public to meet
> the responsibilities of domestic emergencies through planning,
> mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery.
>
> The USFA funds a range of activities, including the collection,
> analysis, and dissemination of fire incidence and loss data, the
> development and dissemination of public fire education materials, the
> development and dissemination of better hazardous materials response
> information to first responders, and the support of research and
> development for fire safety technologies. The USFA has responsibility
> for all fire and emergency medical programs and training activities
> within FEMA. The National Fire Academy develops and delivers
> off-campus and residential courses to fire service, rescue, and allied
> professionals at its campus---the National Emergency Training Center
> in Emmitsburg, Maryland (also the home of the Emergency Management
> Institute)---and at outreach sites with State and local fire service
> training partnerships.

*Objective 16.2*

> Students should understand that America's career and volunteer Fire
> Services constitute a powerful political force. The International
> Association of Fire Chiefs, the International Association of
> Firefighters, the National Fire Protection Association, the National
> Volunteer Fire Council, and other professional and special interest
> organizations regularly engage America's political process. As an
> indication of the clout these organizations possess and as a
> demonstration of their commitment to fire protection, a Fire Caucus of
> representatives and senators has been formed in the Congress.
> According to Congressman Curt Weldon (R-Pa.), the Fire Caucus is the
> largest member caucus of the U.S. Congress. It meets, renders policy
> advice, helps to fashion legislation, and raises funds on behalf of
> fire service-related interests. \[U.S. Senate, 1995.\]
>
> In spite of the attention and support that the Fire Services receive
> at the Congressional level, they continue to face political barriers
> on the local level. The Ruchelman and Sutphen articles illustrate how
> the Fire Services can be stymied by poor local governmental planning.
> For example the departments have been denied the opportunities to
> execute proven fire prevention measures including controlled burns,
> building codes that require more fire retardant construction
> materials, fire safety sprinkler systems, and the removal of
> vegetation surrounding residences. Unfortunately, community officials
> may not realize the importance of supporting the Fire Services and
> their disaster prevention strategies until after a fire---when these
> community officials are asked to identify the hindrances in local fire
> fighting abilities.
>
> Interest groups in the American political system look for, and
> sometimes help to establish, public agencies which work to protect and
> advance their member's concerns and interests. The U.S. Fire
> Administration within FEMA serves as just such an organization for the
> Nation's fire service interests.

*Objective 16.3*

> Political forces may sometimes work against efforts to mitigate and
> prepare for fire disasters. The price of discounting the of fire
> disasters threat often results in an increase in the frequency and
> magnitude of major fires and sub-optimal fire fighting response and
> capability. For example, political opposition to creating
> comprehensive land use plans, to strengthening building codes, and to
> conducting timely controlled burns (to prevent the spread of
> wildfires) may contribute to fire disasters. When weaknesses in fire
> safety procedures are identified, it is crucial that the fire and
> emergency services receive the necessary political support to enact
> positive changes. As Sutphen explains, this was not the case in
> southern California before the wildfires of 1993 burned out of
> control.
>
> The Fire Services disaster response can be delayed by a lack of
> communication and a lack of understanding among public administrators
> and officials. The Sutphen article, on the California wildfires of
> 1993, illustrates how integrated emergency management was impeded at
> that time by public administrators; it also shows the problems that
> were faced in coordinating the multi-agency emergency Fire Services.
> The firefighters did not receive Federal air support in the early
> stages of the blazes due to a confusion on the part of the Governor
> and other officials about the proper procedure for requesting and
> obtaining air assistance. If resources cannot be made available to the
> Fire Services in a timely matter, their effectiveness is weakened.
>
> A fully-integrated emergency management plan is crucial to a timely
> and positive response by the Fire Services. A few examples of what is
> needed in integrated emergency management are:

-   Universally compatible radio communications made available to
    disaster managers,

-   Interchangeable fire suppression equipment to be shared among
    organizations,

-   Predetermined and suitable evacuation routes, and

-   Emergency preparedness test exercises that include as participants
    all relevant groups.

> (See also sections of Session 28 regarding integrated emergency
> management.)

*Objective 16.4*

> Sutphen's article, perhaps more than any other Article assigned in
> this course, underscores the political controversies which advance and
> which set back emergency management---especially for the Fire
> Services. She charges that the unfettered use of private property,
> protected by the Nation's economic and political system, often
> confounds the mitigation efforts of the local disaster fire service.
> Ms. Sutphen observes that integrated emergency management has been
> given an impetus more by public administrators than by top
> policymakers. Her work demonstrates the perils and pitfalls of
> multi-agency coordination and incident command systems, not in order
> to criticize them so much as to show the difficulty of their
> implementation.
>
> She also provides the reader with a sense of how fire captains
> attempted to manage and distribute their resources and how the absence
> of disaster mitigation measures, that were requested BEFORE the fires,
> compounded the losses. For example, residents and local administrators
> who opposed a fire official's request for a new hill-top reservoir,
> because of aesthetic and environmental reasons, were later enraged
> when the firefighters lost water pressure while fighting their
> neighborhood fire. The narrow streets, through extensively wooded
> communities containing shake-roofed homes, tied up evacuees and
> firefighters. The residents had also blocked other recommended fire
> prevention efforts. Homeowners argued that the habitat protection
> rules of the Endangered Species Act blocked them from clearing
> vegetation from around their homes---vegetation which later ignited
> during the fires. Compounding matters, in the rapid spread of the
> fire, was the lack of controlled burns outside the fire season. Fire
> officials had requested the controlled burns, but were again
> over-ruled in the local political arena. Public administrators and
> community members need to better understand the benefits of disaster
> mitigation efforts and the possible consequences of ignoring fire
> prevention strategies.

*Objective 16.5*

> While not necessarily obvious, both assigned readings contain
> political features. A few examples of the political features of the
> readings that are worthy of class attention are: the inadequacy of
> fire mitigation in building codes, the disaster vulnerability
> attendant to shortsighted development approvals, the city-county
> zoning differences, the needed funding and staffing for appropriate
> fire inspection and enforcement, and the ineffective promotion of
> better fire protection public education programs, etc.
>
> Session 27 addresses "big city" emergency management and uses New York
> City (NYC) as a case study. Within that session and its assigned
> reading is a classic dispute between the New York Fire Department
> (NYFD) and the New York Police Department (NYPD). The NYPD, until
> April 1996, contained the NYC Office of Emergency Management
> (OEM)---an office which had long been the object of competition
> between the police and firefighters. Many NYC professional
> firefighters believe that emergency management is wholly within the
> domain of their occupation. Consequently, emergency managers from
> outside fire-fighting organizations have sometimes encountered
> opposition or hostility from firefighters. As the New York City case
> will show, a 20-year decline in fire calls and budget contractions by
> the city have encouraged the Fire Department to compete for lead
> jurisdiction over emergency management and the OEM. This type of
> competition has been duplicated in many other American cities and is
> often fought out in political arenas. Today, under Mayor Giuliani, New
> York City's emergency management agency is staffed by both police and
> firefighters. The NYC Office of Emergency Management is now
> organizationally closer to the Office of the Mayor and is distinct
> from other city departments and agencies. Moreover, the current NYPD
> Police Commissioner was previously the city's Fire Commissioner.

**Supplemental**

**Considerations**

> The Ruchelman article concerning the 1980 MGM Grand Hotel fire is old,
> but illustrative. The instructional value of the case resides in its
> review of how the hotel structure was allowed to manifest so many
> vulnerabilities to fire and smoke threats. The response operations
> were conducted admirably, if not heroically. The post-disaster
> investigation yielded important technological and structural reforms
> which today protect Las Vegas-area casinos and hotels. The diffusion
> of structural fire protection information throughout the American
> construction and building regulation domains involves political and
> managerial foresight.
>
> It is important to note that, in the United States, more people die
> each year because of fires (some 5,300 at this writing) than all other
> forms of disasters combined, according to the U.S. Fire
> Administration.
>
> Fire service organizations across the country have been incorporating,
> since it was issued in 1995, the reforms and recommendations of the
> National Fire Protection Association (NFPA)---"Recommended Practice
> for Disaster Management," NFPA 1600. This document incorporates
> state-of-the-art emergency management terms, procedures, and methods
> into recommended fire service practices.

**Endnotes**

-   U.S. Congress, the Federal Fire Prevention and Control Act of 1974
    (Pub. L. 93-498, Sect. 2, October 29, 1974, 88 Stat. 1535) as
    amended by the Hotel and Motel Fire Safety Act of 1990 (Pub. L.
    101-391, Sect. 1, September 25, 1990, 104 Stat. 747) as amended by
    The Arson Prevention Act of 1994 (Pub. L. 103-254, Sect 1, May 19,
    1994, 108 Stat. 679) 15 U.S.C., Ch. 49, Sects. 2201-2206 and 44
    C.F.R., Ch. 1, sub. Ch. C, Sects. 150-199.

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-   U.S. Senate, Bipartisan Task Force on Funding Disaster Relief, John
    Glenn (Chairman), Christopher S. Bond (Co-Chairman), "Federal
    Disaster Assistance: Report of the Senate Task Force on Funding
    Disaster Relief," 104th Cong., 1st Sess., *Document No. 104-4*
    (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1995):149-150.

**Session No. 17**

**Course**: The Political and Policy Basis of Emergency Management

**Session**: The Media **Time**: 1 Hour

**Objectives:**

By the end of this session, students should be able to:

> 17.1 Understand the breadth of the media's impact when reporting
> disasters.
>
> 17.2 Identify the differences in style and content among media forms
> when reporting on disasters.
>
> 17.3 Explain positive the public services which the Media provide to
> emergency managers and public officials.
>
> 17.4 Identify common biases in news reporting, as they apply to
> disaster circumstances.
>
> 17.5 Explain the "CNN syndrome," or camcorder politics, as it applies
> to the coverage of emergency and disaster incidents.
>
> 17.6 Discuss how disaster response reporting and investigative
> reporting produce political and administrative impacts during and
> after disasters, and give an example.
>
> 17.7 Identify the limitations of the Media's disaster coverage.
>
> 17.8 Make clear associations of how the Media shape the public image
> of political officials.
>
> 17.9 Discuss how emergency managers and their agencies deal with the
> Media.

**Scope**

> It is through the Media that most Americans are made aware of
> disasters. No one questions the importance of radio and television
> stations in issuing emergency advisories and public warnings about
> impending disaster. Some ways in which media people engage in news
> coverage may be counter-productive to emergency managers. This session
> gives students an explanation of the motivations and needs of the
> different media when reporting on disasters, and the impacts they can
> have on political forces and public policy.

**References**

> Assigned student readings:

-   Auf Der Heide, Erik, ***Disaster Response: Principles of Preparation
    and Coordination*** (C.V. Mosby Co., 1989): Ch. 10, 215-50.

-   Wamsley, Gary L. and Aaron D. Schroeder, "Escalating in a Quagmire:
    Changing Dynamics of the Emergency Management Policy System,"
    ***Public Administration Review***, Vol. 56, No. 3 (May/June 1996):
    235-244.

**Requirements**

> It would be helpful if the instructor has taped any television news
> coverage of a disaster or emergency. Some local TV stations are
> willing to loan out tapes of news stories from their archives, but
> they usually do so at some financial cost. It may also help to
> photocopy a newspaper story covering a disaster, circulating copies to
> the class as a short in-class reading assignment. It may also be
> worthwhile to invite a television, radio, or print correspondent who
> has covered a disaster or emergency (most have at one time or another)
> to speak with the class. It is also extremely worthwhile to invite an
> emergency management public information officer to the class, perhaps
> at the same session as the correspondent. This way an open forum might
> be created regarding the pros and cons of the news coverage of
> disasters. Students are more likely to be intrigued by the TV coverage
> of disasters than by radio or print coverage.
>
> A portion of the class might be devoted to role-playing as emergency
> managers, public information officers, or elected officials (i.e.,
> mayor, Governor, local legislator, or TV news correspondents). This
> can be done through a round-table, table-top exercise and the
> instructor may choose to assign one or more of the previous cases the
> students have already read for the course. For example, the Sylves and
> Pavlak article about New York City's emergency management contains
> plenty of elements which might be used to simulate media coverage of a
> disaster. (See "Big City Emergency Management," Session 27.)

**Remarks**

*Objective 17.1*

> Television, radio, and the print media are pathways of information
> dissemination and channels for public demands. Owing to the "freedom
> of the press," the news media are not obligated to report or withhold
> information simply because the government requests that it do so. This
> session demonstrates that, in certain circumstances, the news media
> provide an important disaster management public service, especially in
> broadcasting alerts, warnings, and advisories. However, the way people
> and political officials who are away from a disaster area perceive the
> event is very much determined by what is reported as TV news, radio
> broadcasts, and newspaper stories.
>
> News organizations are journalistic enterprises organized to maximize
> viewerships, listening audience, or readers and subscribers. For this
> reason they look for whatever is sensational, engrossing, or
> controversial. Consequently, news gathering and investigative
> reporting may produce politically and managerially troublesome
> outcomes for the emergency management community. Moreover, political
> officials must be, or must appear to be, responsive and sympathetic to
> the plight of citizens victimized by disaster. The Media provides an
> important outlet for demonstrating this responsiveness. When elected
> officials use the Media to help mobilize the governmental response,
> this has an impact on public and private officials. The Media gives
> disaster a spotlight, but the attention of the public is short-lived.
> When a disaster or emergency is no longer newsworthy, the Media news
> coverage dissipates and ultimately ends. The news coverage of a
> disaster almost always ends before the disaster recovery work is far
> advanced.
>
> The role of the Media in disaster politics is so significant that
> discussions of the Media will have come up in many previous sessions.
> Viewing a disaster through a television news coverage will be the way
> most students relate to the field. Students must understand that TV
> news coverage of a disaster is usually taped and edited before it is
> broadcast. Correspondents and editors follow various conventions of
> news. They look for controversy. Good visual images, meshed with
> voice-over commentary, need to tell a story and have a conclusion.
>
> Where there is disagreement, reporters usually afford each side an
> opportunity for representation. Conveying urgency, immediacy, and even
> danger is the goal of most correspondents---although it may press the
> edges of responsible journalism. The point is that television provides
> only one narrow perspective on disaster. Correspondents seldom cover
> the full scope and breadth of a major disaster, and it may not be
> possible to do so anyway. The disaster which emergency managers face
> is not always the same as the one depicted on television.
>
> News people may or may not cooperate with disaster responders.
> America's "freedom of the press" affords news people considerable
> latitude in what they cover and how they collect information. This
> creates an ambivalent relationship between the Media and emergency
> management people. Students need to think critically about what they
> view as news and what the facts actually are.

*Objective 17.2*

Below are some rules of thumb about the Media coverage of disasters.

> 1\. The local media:

-   Focus on the local effects of the incident;

-   Concentrate on the details; and

-   Tend to have better relations with local authorities than outside
    media people do.

> 2\. The National media:

-   Maintain the interest in a disaster during the crisis and during the
    immediate aftermath stage;

-   Provide general accounts of events with less attention to detail;
    and

-   Often ask tougher questions of the authorities than the local media
    do.

> 3\. The television media:

-   Seek powerful visuals;

-   Use short sound bites (often over disaster video images); and

-   Are often influenced by broadcast times and schedules.

> Interestingly, "all news" organizations like CNN1 Headline News and
> CNN2 Broadcast News have much more flexibility to stay with a story
> than network news organizations. Entertainment networks are reluctant
> to interfere with programs and advertising unless the event is truly
> catastrophic or sensational and even then coverage is often limited.

4\. Radio media:

-   Produce short reports;

-   Pride themselves on the immediacy of the information they convey;

-   Strive to be first to report the story;

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-   Can quickly get authorities on the air;

-   Are one of the most essential disaster warning tools available; and

-   Are highly perishable once reported, unless taped.

5\. Print media:

-   Are highly dependent on telephone linkages to transmit information
    to the publishing offices;

-   Have different, if not fewer, time constraints than television or
    radio media;

-   Are able to provide more depth and background than television or
    radio news reportage;

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-   Produce longer lasting archives and records of events; and

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-   Are highly perishable once reported, unless taped.

*Objective 17.3*

> As already mentioned, television, radio, and the print media are
> pathways of information dissemination and channels for public demands;
> it is how most citizens learn about disasters. No country has the
> number and concentration of news organizations that the United States
> has. The Media can be helpful, complimentary, critical, or
> indifferent.

Some of the Media's potential public services in disasters are:

-   Supplying information and directions to the affected public;

-   Disseminating information on preparedness measures for future
    similar disasters;

-   Stimulating volunteerism and donations, including blood donations;

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-   Disclosing needs for improvement in governmental response; and

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-   Sometimes withholding information which could be counterproductive.

*Objective 17.4*

> News people sometimes play a counter-productive role when covering a
> disaster or emergency. The Media can:

-   Exaggerate or speculate on facts to beef-up the disaster as a story;

-   Often over-estimate the amount of panic and looting, perpetuating
    disaster myths;

-   Sometimes falsely portray the severity of the damage on an entire
    community as equal to that of the most devastated victims; and

-   Hinder the possible options of authorities by overdramatizing the
    authorities' actions.

> Since few news people are knowledgeable about disasters, this tendency
> is understandable. However, it is one of the jobs of emergency
> managers to combat any media ignorance by helping them to become
> better informed. Obviously, public officials at all levels of
> government have this responsibility.

*Objective 17.5*

> Critical media coverage can provide an incentive for political leaders
> and public officials to demonstrate responsiveness through their
> investigations of incompetence, mismanagement, or wrongdoing.
> Similarly, political officials, observing the plight of the aggrieved
> disaster victims on the television, frequently react. Their responses
> may have National, State, and local repercussions. This is referred to
> as the "CNN syndrome," the tendency for local disasters to get
> sustained National television news coverage, especially by networks
> that are exclusively dedicated to news. A type of "camcorder" politics
> ensues under which sustained National coverage impels National and
> State leaders to respond to the event, even if their help is not
> requested by the local authorities. This is logical because National
> political leaders, particularly the President and his staff, realize
> that TV viewers are inclined to ask themselves, "So what is the
> National government doing about this?" The "CNN syndrome" has many
> political and managerial ramifications for modern emergency
> management.

*Objective 17.6*

> Investigative reporting of disasters and the regular coverage of
> disasters sometimes includes the placement of blame by the Media on
> public officials and agencies. Fault is assigned for the alleged
> negligence or lack of preparedness by the Government in the aftermath
> of a disaster. This is most likely in "technological" or man-made
> disasters, such as nuclear incidents, hazardous materials accidents,
> terrorist bombings, aviation disasters, oil spills, and building
> collapses, *et cetera*. The outcomes of such reportage may be reforms
> or reorganizations.
>
> Investigative and disaster response reportage often triggers
> investigations of Government agencies by legislators (i.e., usually
> done through public hearings). Sometimes legislative inquiries produce
> new laws, programs, or budgetary changes. A positive effect of this
> type of reporting also is that the publicity may help other community
> officials to recognize their locality's vulnerability to disasters,
> and this may compel them to improve their own local emergency
> management.
>
> Disaster management is normally a low salience issue, but media
> coverage of a disaster tends to give it high political salience. It
> also can bring wider attention and support to disaster-related issues
> and move them more quickly through the legislative, budgeting, and
> planning processes. Some of the problems, and possible solutions to
> those problems, may be catapulted on to the public policy agenda and
> so get action when they otherwise would not. Also, government
> officials find it easier to build political and financial support for
> emergency management when the memory of a disaster is fresh in
> peoples' minds. For example, although a reorganization was in the
> works before the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant accident, in
> 1979, news coverage of the incident helped to build support for the
> establishment of the Federal Emergency Management Agency.
>
> A striking example of the political repercussions that the Media can
> produce in disaster reporting is illustrated in the Wamsley article's
> depiction of the policy response to Hurricane Andrew. The hurricane
> hit southern Florida on August 24, 1992, a few months before the
> Presidential elections. President Bush and the Director of FEMA
> visited the disaster area the day of the hurricane.
>
> Initially, the response (during the aftermath of the hurricane)
> occurred in predictable fashion for the emergency management policy
> sub-system. A Disaster Declaration had been secured, and FEMA had
> dispatched officials to the State Emergency Operations Center (EOC)
> and had also dispatched communications equipment to Dade County---even
> before Andrew hit. For Dade County, and the State Emergency Management
> Organization, there was initially a sense of relief because the storm
> had missed the population center of Miami and the loss of life was
> small because the warning and evacuation had been relatively
> effective. Impressions quickly changed. The county and State emergency
> management systems were not prepared for the destruction of a Class IV
> hurricane. Many of the emergency support system personnel were
> disaster victims themselves. When officials in the State EOC asked the
> local officials what they needed, the response was "Send everything!"
> \[Wamsley, 1996.\]
>
> Amid chaos on the third day after the hurricane, and due to a lack of
> large-scale help from anywhere, Kate Hale, the Dade County Director of
> Emergency Preparedness, held a press conference. In frustration, Ms.
> Hale exclaimed, "Where the hell is the cavalry on this one? We need
> food. We need water. We need people. For God's sake, where are they?"
> \[*Newsweek*, September 7 (1992), p. 23.\] Her words became a
> nationally televised and publicized sound bite.
>
> The Presidential visit to Florida the day of the hurricane was now
> being portrayed as an empty gesture.
>
> President Bush was losing in the pre-election polls and Florida was a
> pivotal State to win, given its 25 electoral votes. FEMA, which had
> been responding with what it considered better than average speed,
> found itself completely bypassed as the White House hastily took
> action. The White House dispatched the Secretary of Transportation,
> Andrew Card, to take charge of the response and recovery efforts of
> the Federal Government, replacing the FEMA Director. Within 48 hours
> of Hale's nationally televised sound bite, 7,000 Federal troops
> arrived in Florida. The weekend after the hurricane brought another
> 7,500 troops. Later, Navy, Air Force and Coast Guard units brought the
> total to nearly 20,000." \[*Newsweek*, September 7 (1992).\]
>
> President Bush's actions brought much favorable press to the White
> House, but many involved in the emergency disaster efforts felt the
> whole response effort was set back several critical days by the White
> House's intervention.
>
> Hale's nationally broadcast comments had an immediate effect on the
> response process. The ad hoc policy process resulting from her widely
> publicized sound bite is one example of the way emergency disaster
> response reporting affected the policy process.

*Objective 17.7*

Some of the limits of media coverage of disaster are:

-   The effort to "sell" the story may interfere with accuracy;

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-   News people regularly perpetuate myths about disasters (i.e., that
    people always panic, that disaster damage incapacitates whole
    communities, that there is looting and lawlessness on a major scale
    after a disaster, and that victims cannot recover on their own
    without outside help, etc.);

-   News gatherers make demands on responders for physical and human
    resources that are often needed in the emergency;

-   News people are usually unfamiliar with the technical and
    programmatic aspects of a disaster (i.e., they often do not
    understand seismicity or meteorological information and they seldom
    understand the governmental programs that are in place to help
    victims); and,

-   News people sometimes interfere, complicate, or confound emergency
    management work in the response phase.

*Objective 17.8*

> How public officials and their response to disasters are perceived is
> very much a function of news coverage. Critical coverage often is
> unpleasant. The Media tends to be anxious to report disagreements
> among public officials or between the officials and other interests.
> Consequently, news gathering and investigative reporting may produce
> politically and managerially troublesome outcomes for the emergency
> manager. Disasters yield striking video, and stories of strong human
> interest, and they have the potential to "create" heroes and villains.
>
> Public officials must be, or at least appear to be, responsive and
> sympathetic to the plight of citizens victimized by disaster. The
> Media provides an important outlet for demonstrating this
> responsiveness. In this manner, politics enters disaster management.
>
> Disasters provide perfect locations and backdrops for demonstrating
> the heroism of a public figure. When a disaster hits, a President may
> fly directly into the heart of the event and be photographed and
> televised assisting in the disaster relief firsthand. In the midst of
> destruction, the President (or legislators, mayors, and Governors) may
> be filmed comforting and reassuring distressed victims. Senators,
> Representatives, State lawmakers and other State officials may garner
> publicity while visiting disaster sites and may demand that their
> State receive a Presidential Declaration for disaster relief.
> Decisions about Presidential Declarations involve a degree of
> subjectivity thus; media coverage may be a key factor in influencing
> the President and others to approve a "marginal" Gubernatorial request
> for a Declaration of emergency or major disaster.

*Objective 17.9*

> Not only are emergency managers responsible for disaster response and
> recovery efforts, they must also respond to media questions and
> sometimes media scrutiny. This may lead to friction between the news
> people and the emergency management personnel. Emergency management
> officials have good reason to be suspicious of news correspondents
> because emergency management people have little or no reassurance of
> how the information they provide to reporters will be used.
>
> Emergency responders are particularly vexed when they believe that
> media people are interfering with their work. Yet, the Media may
> positively portray emergency responders as heroes and publicize both
> their actions and their needs.
>
> Consequently, the Media-emergency management relationship is a
> "two-way street." Most emergency management organizations employ a
> PUBLIC INFORMATION OFFICER (PIO) to work with the Media during and
> after disasters. PIOs are on-scene officials responsible for preparing
> and coordinating the dissemination of public information in
> cooperation with other responding Federal, State, and local government
> agencies. Those officers also assume duties in responding to
> information requests from political VIPs, such a legislators and other
> senior officials.
>
> Experience has revealed to many emergency managers that favorable
> media coverage is more likely if media people are made part of the
> emergency management team before disasters occur. Whenever possible,
> local media representatives should be invited and included to
> participate in disaster planning and exercising activities. When
> reporters know local emergency management officials and their duties
> before a disaster, it is more likely that their event coverage will be
> more informed and accurate.
>
> How Emergency Managers Deal with the Media
>
> Emergency managers are told to:

-   Be prepared for a wide array of questions.

-   Do not make "off-the-record" comments.

-   Be honest and straightforward.

-   Avoid ambiguity and do not guess at an answer; get back in touch
    with the Media to provide information that is not immediately
    available.

-   Seek to relate to the audience.

-   Take the initiative.

-   Use a team approach.

-   Make special preparations for television appearances. While viewers
    often forget content, they do remember style, including appearance
    and voice quality.

-   Prepare for telephone interviews, including knowing who the
    interviewer represents and the planned use of the material.

> \[Auf der Heide, 1989, pp. 215-250.\]

**Supplemental**

**Considerations**

> Emphasize to students that media coverage of disaster shapes public
> and official perceptions of the event. News can be critical,
> complimentary, or indifferent toward emergency managers. However,
> critical coverage often provides an incentive for political leaders to
> demonstrate political responsiveness through investigations of
> incompetence, mismanagement, or wrongdoing. When political officials
> observe on television the plight of aggrieved disaster victims who are
> seemingly "ignored" or denied government help, those officials may be
> induced to champion their cause.
>
> It is important to stress, as Auf der Heide does, that disasters are
> supremely newsworthy, especially for television. Disasters yield
> striking video, strong human interest, and they have the potential to
> "create" heroes and villains. Large-scale coverage of a disaster
> generates, temporarily, a much larger audience than the people or
> community directly affected. Because local news organizations share
> information and video with their network, with other news services
> across the country and around the world, and have at their disposal
> satellite transmission capability, a "localized" disaster may get
> rapid State, National, and even international news coverage. Disaster
> researcher Henry Quarantelli claims that the degree of reported
> disaster damage increases positively with the distance away from the
> disaster. In other words, damage estimates reported by news
> organizations increase the farther the reporting news organization is
> away from the disaster area itself.
>
> Elected officials and emergency managers need to be aware of the
> Media's strengths and weaknesses. Cultivating a good working
> relationship with local media people often pays important dividends in
> times of an emergency or disaster.

**Endnotes**

-   "What Went Wrong," *Newsweek* (September 7, 1992):23.

**Session No. 18**

**Course**: The Political and Policy Basis of Emergency Management

**Session**: Natural Disasters: Earthquakes **Time**: 2 Hours

**Objectives:**

At the conclusion of this session, students should be able to:

> 18.1 Explain the basis of the earthquake policy in the United States
> and of California's political impact on that National policy.
>
> 18.2 Recount some of the political issues surrounding earthquakes,
> such as the Loma Prieta earthquake in 1989.
>
> 18.3 Describe cases involving political interchange in the process of
> earthquake disaster recovery.
>
> 18.4 Understand the barriers faced in implementing earthquake
> mitigation and preparedness policies, and the stakeholders involved.
>
> 18.5 Offer observations on the immense costs of earthquake recovery
> and the political issues surrounding the coverage and assumption of
> these costs.

**Scope**

> The readings and discussion in this session should give students an
> understanding of some of the political undercurrents of the Federal
> and State earthquake policy. The importance, and sometimes the
> breakdown, of intergovernmental responses to quakes will be addressed.
> The political interchanges faced in earthquake disaster mitigation,
> preparedness, and recovery will be reviewed and examples will be
> offered.

**References**

Assigned student readings:

-   Alesch, Daniel and William Petak "Rebuilding After the Long Beach
    Earthquake," ***Crisis Management: A Casebook***, Michael T. Charles
    and John Choon K. Kim (eds.) (Springfield, Ill.: Charles C. Thomas
    Publishers, 1988).

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-   Klebs, Robert and Richard T. Sylves "The Northridge Earthquake:
    Memoirs of a FEMA Building Inspector," ***Disaster Management in the
    U.S. and Canada***, Richard T. Sylves and William L. Waugh, Jr.
    (eds.) (Springfield, Ill.: Charles C. Thomas Publishers, 1996): Ch.
    VI, pp. 126-160.

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-   Schneider, Saundra K., ***Flirting with Disaster: Public Management
    in Crisis Situations*** (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1995). \[See "A
    General Framework for Examining the Success or Failure of the
    Governmental Response to Natural Disasters," Ch. 6, pp. 75-79; and
    "The Loma Prieta Earthquake in California," Ch. 10, pp. 113-121.\]

-   Settle, Allen K., "The Coalinga Earthquake," ***Crisis Management: A
    Casebook***, Michael T. Charles and John Choon K. Kim (eds.)
    (Springfield, Ill.: Charles C. Thomas Publishers, 1988).

-   Sylves, Richard T., "Earthquakes," ***Handbook of Emergency
    Management***, William L. Waugh, Jr. and Ronald John Hy (eds.)
    (Westport, Conn.: The Greenwood Press, 1991): Ch. 3.

**Requirements**

> The video of the television coverage of the Northridge earthquake
> disaster would be an outstanding audio visual aid in this session.
> Consider asking groups of two or three students to summarize the
> findings of the Alesch, Petak, and Settle articles. Be sure they
> emphasize the political features of each case study.

**Remarks**

*Objective 18.1*

> Earthquakes, like other disasters, sometimes overwhelm the emergency
> response and recovery capacity of individuals, businesses, and State
> and local governments. The human and economic loss inflicted by an
> earthquake and its consequences may be so great that tremendous help
> must be provided by people, businesses and governments outside the
> damage zone. This being the case, the problem of the threats and
> destruction of earthquakes has been manifested in National policy and
> Federal law. The Federal Government is expected to step in to provide
> basic humanitarian aid to the devastated areas.
>
> Many existing Federal programs, that are in place to serve purposes
> unrelated to disasters, have emergency provisions and disaster
> response capabilities that can be marshaled and coordinated to address
> the aftermath of an earthquake. Also, the President can independently
> issue a major Disaster Declaration or can grant a declaration once a
> Governor petitions for one. Clearly, earthquakes are a legitimate
> public policy problem in the United States, but there remains
> tremendous variability in the levels of earthquake mitigation and
> preparedness across the Nation.
>
> No American State is more prone to earthquake activity than is
> California. The State's earthquake politics and policies have been
> carried forward in National earthquake policy. The State has a U.S.
> House of Representatives delegation numbering fifty-two---more than
> twelve percent of the chamber. The State has enough political clout to
> influence National policy. As the Nation's most populous State, it is
> often a trendsetter for the Nation as a whole.
>
> The United States seismic safety constituency is not strong
> politically or economically. There are vocal and active political and
> administrative officials who are worried about seismic safety.
> However, these leaders are scattered thinly in areas that have already
> experienced earthquake destruction. Since 1982, the citizens and their
> political leaders have paid more attention to seismic safety, although
> much of this has been educational or symbolic.
>
> The Earthquake Hazards Reduction Act of 1977 \[U.S. Congress, 42
> U.S.C., 1990.\] provides the framework of the National earthquake
> policy, and FEMA is the lead agency charged with coordinating that
> program. Through the NEHRP, FEMA works with other Federal agencies,
> including the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS), the National Science
> Foundation (NSF), and the National Institute of Standards and
> Technology (NIST), and the States, academia, and the private sector to
> minimize the risk to life and property from future earthquakes. The
> primary goals are to make structures safer, to better inform the
> public, and to press for better seismic mitigation. This entails:

-   Better understanding, characterizing, and predicting seismic
    hazards.

-   Improving model building codes and land-use practices.

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-   Learning risk reduction through post-earthquake investigation and
    analysis.

-   Developing improved design and construction techniques.

-   Promoting the dissemination and application of research results.

> NEHRP provides for research, planning, and response activities
> conducted within each of four specified agencies and project grant
> programs that are funded through FEMA, USGS, NSF and NIST. The program
> is currently funded at about \$100 million, of which \$50 million goes
> to USGS, \$28 million to NSF, \$20.5 million to FEMA, and \$1.5
> million to NIST. FEMA is the lead agency and has about \$4 million
> available annually for project grants (cooperative agreements) that
> are consistent with the approved work plan of each eligible State. The
> State matching requirement rises to 50 percent over a four year period
> and a share of Federal-State funding must be used for mitigation
> activity.
>
> FEMA has a National Earthquake Mitigation Program Office within its
> Mitigation Directorate. This organizational location makes it clear
> that policymakers assume that earthquakes are a natural phenomenon
> whose effects the government can prepare for and help alleviate. USGS
> produces earth science data, promotes warnings about imminent
> earthquakes, and supports land-use planning and engineering designs,
> as well as emergency preparedness. NSF promotes sitings fundamental
> geotechnical engineering designs, and structural analysis (in part
> through the National Center for Earthquake Engineering Research). NIST
> and FEMA together work with State and local officials, model-building
> code groups, architects, engineers, and others to be sure that
> scientific and engineering research flows into building codes,
> standards, and practices.

*Objective 18.2*

> Sometimes local officials face difficulties in properly responding to
> the short-and long-term needs of their communities' term after an
> earthquake. Areas of difficulty are demonstrated in the Schneider
> chapter about the Loma Prieta earthquake in the San Francisco area in
> 1989.
>
> In the immediate aftermath of the earthquake, the emergency management
> process went fairly smoothly for all levels of government. Two months
> before the quake, FEMA conducted a major earthquake training exercise
> in California, in which Federal and State officials simulated the
> response to a major earthquake; but city and county officials were not
> included in the exercise.
>
> Although local officials dealt with the immediate dangers of the
> earthquake, they were less successful in addressing the long-term
> aspects of the relief effort (i.e., assisting residents in filing
> insurance claims, providing adequate housing, and directing supplies
> to appropriate areas). Some local officials were not familiar with
> their responsibilities in the event of a disaster, and they were not
> familiar with the roles of other governmental agencies. Unknowing
> local officials used improper channels to request assistance and, in
> doing so, impeded the functions of the intergovernmental response
> process. \[U.S. Congress, 1991\]. FEMA's Federal coordinating officer
> for the Loma Prieta earthquake later said that local officials should
> have been included in the Government's disaster preparedness and
> training exercises, which would have given them a better understanding
> of how the entire emergency response system works.
>
> The Klebs and Sylves article about the Northridge earthquake is a
> grassroots view of one FEMA inspector's experiences. Klebs' anecdotes
> illustrate the process by which FEMA conducts large scale recovery
> operations and they describe the human side of the demanding and
> stressful disaster work. His work was to ascertain applicant
> eligibility for help under programs like EMERGENCY MINIMAL REPAIRS and
> INDIVIDUAL ASSISTANCE. Among the article's recurring themes are the
> controversies surrounding homeowner earthquake insurance coverage,
> ascertaining fraud, the need to be fair and yet compassionate, the use
> of automated palm-top computing technology to conduct paperless
> inspections, the use of geographical information systems, and the
> indomitable spirit of most earthquake survivors.
>
> In their article, Klebs and Sylves review, among many cases, one of an
> elderly woman who directly petitioned the White House claiming that
> FEMA had improperly declared her home uninhabitable when she believed
> it could be repaired. FEMA inspectors had great difficulty convincing
> the woman that her home was bisected by a crack in the earth which
> made her home unrepairable. Klebs added his agreement to the
> recommendations of other inspectors, many of whom were dispatched
> because of instructions from the White House. The case demonstrates
> that when disaster assistance applicants disagree with Government
> agency officials, they often exercise their right to challenge those
> officials by seeking the intervention of their elected
> representatives, including the President. Such political intervention
> does not always yield the outcome that the petitioner seeks. Moreover,
> continued petitioning sometimes slows the necessary agency work and
> wastes resources and manpower.

*Objective 18.3*

> If "events" are defined as natural acts perceived to have social
> consequences and if those social consequences create human needs for
> which relief is sought, a "problem" is said to exist. However, not all
> "problems" deserve to become "public problems," that is, problems that
> governments are obligated to address. When the human needs produced by
> the social consequences of an earthquake cannot be met by private
> sources, a "public problem" results. The way in which Federal, State,
> and local governments address the earthquake policy before a seismic
> event, can make a difference in the magnitude of the need after an
> event.
>
> Moreover, when one level of government does not mitigate earthquake
> hazards, this has consequences for other levels of government.
> California, among other States, has the ability to push for strong
> Federal disaster relief policies. In 1982, the National Research
> Council reported that public officials in California, Washington,
> Missouri, and other States did not consider seismic safety an
> important issue. Officials also reported that their constituents did
> not express any significant interest in the area, and because of this,
> seismic safety has not often been an issue of importance in State and
> local elections. Vertical and horizontal informational exchange about
> the problem of earthquake mitigation, as well as selected
> demonstration projects funded by joint Federal-State arrangements,
> would go far in getting earthquake reinforcement on the policy agendas
> of each level of government.
>
> City administrators and public officials in California often face
> legal and political quandaries in the aftermath of an earthquake.
> California's local governments do not enjoy SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY and may
> be sued for mistakes that they are proven to have made which caused
> harm, injury, private loss, or commercial loss. For example, after the
> Coalinga earthquake, the State Seismic Safety Commission determined
> that Coalinga had weak, poorly-enforced, building codes and lax
> building inspection. In turn, insurance companies sued some
> communities through SUBROGATION SUITS. Subrogation suits are filed by
> insurance firms against city governments, when those governments are
> demonstrated to have been negligent in fire and building code
> enforcement. The insurance firms sought cost recovery for claims paid
> out to private property owners whose structures did not meet fire and
> building codes and which experienced damage during the earthquake
> \[Settle, 1988, p. 257\].
>
> NEGLIGENCE and PUBLIC DUTY DOCTRINAL issues may also be a factor. In
> Coalinga, property owners filed class action suits against the city.
> Some property owners argued that their right to due process was
> violated when municipal authorities demolished their structures in the
> aftermath of the quake. In other words, had they been allowed a
> hearing before the demolition, they may have been able to prove to
> municipal officials that their structure was repairable. Some claims
> involved INVERSE CONDEMNATION (taking property from the rightful owner
> without just compensation).
>
> Courts have ruled that State and local governments must sometimes pay
> landowners damages for zoning and other land use restrictions that
> reduce property value. However, State and local governments are
> sometimes liable if they do not stop certain development which may
> take place in hazardous zones. They are liable on the grounds that
> public authorities should have recognized the consequences of
> condoning such development (i.e., public duty doctrine). So, in the
> first instance, public officials are reluctant to promote disaster
> mitigation zoning because it leaves them open to claims alleging
> reduced property value. Yet, in the second instance, public officials
> are subject to lawsuits alleging that they should have curtailed
> development given their knowledge of a hazardous risk.

*Objective 18.4*

> Since people tend to discount the risk and probability of earthquakes;
> earthquake mitigation has LOW POLITICAL SALIENCE in normal times. The
> structural alternatives in mitigation are often either demolition or
> reconstruction of existing structures, both of which are expensive and
> controversial.
>
> Alesch and Petak provide an overview of the political history of
> earthquake mitigation in Long Beach and southern California in
> general. Their study depicts the political ebb and flow of quake
> mitigation and, explains the affect of counter forces like historic
> preservation, landlord resistance, and the opposition of retirees who
> are living on fixed incomes.
>
> The article recounts the effects of the Long Beach earthquake on March
> 10, 1933. The disaster was responsible for 120 deaths and extensive
> building damage. Since half of the damaged buildings were of
> unreinforced masonry construction, a political movement for tougher
> building codes was launched in the aftermath of the earthquake.
>
> Since Long Beach's building codes could not be enforced retroactively,
> it was difficult to compel owners of existing structures to reinforce
> or rebuild their buildings. The Long Beach City Council was able to
> require building fronts to be reinforced in 1950 on the pretense of
> protecting the public from their collapse. The next step came in 1959,
> when the council defined earthquakes as nuisances. This empowered
> local building officials to condemn earthquake-hazardous buildings and
> force property owners to strengthen or demolish their structures.
>
> A 1966, the State Court ruling for Bakersfield, California, which
> imposed similar laws, determined that California cities were
> authorized to use public nuisance laws to condemn unsafe buildings
> vulnerable to earthquakes.
>
> In a backlash response in 1969, local property owners launched an
> organized opposition to nuisance laws based on the PUBLIC TAKINGS
> clause. In response to that, the Long Beach City Council's legal
> counsel recommended the adoption of a uniform building code. The
> council resisted until after the San Fernando Valley earthquake, in
> February 1971, which killed 60 people and caused the collapse of an
> immense number of unreinforced structures.
>
> Fixed income and lower income retirees also protested and tended
> generally to be against mandatory building codes. Other citizen
> backlashes came from proponents of historic preservation. In
> particular, preservationists in Many Los Angelinos were vehemently
> against the demolition of old movie theaters which were vulnerable to
> seismic forces.
>
> It is important to know who the stakeholders are in political
> controversies that involve seismic mitigation. For example,
> developers, preservationists, low income retirees, and existing
> property owners have proven to be formidable opponents of seismic
> mitigation in Long Beach, while advocates of mitigation in Government
> and the insurance industry have possessed relatively limited
> power---except after major earthquakes. The use of building codes to
> require reinforced structures in earthquake prone areas represents a
> public good since they reduce the extent of structural damage and help
> to save lives.

*Objective 18.5*

> Earthquake response and recovery may be excessively difficult for a
> locality to manage. In the wake of the immense costs and lack of
> necessary support systems, mayors may petition a State Governor for a
> State Disaster Declaration. The Governor in turn can petition the
> President for a Presidential Disaster Declaration to alleviate the
> financial burden of earthquake recovery.
>
> Earthquakes of even moderate magnitude have triggered Presidential
> Disaster Declarations. As mentioned above, in 1983, Coalinga,
> California, experienced a moderate earthquake which caused extensive
> property damage, but no loss of life. Owing to National media
> attention, the mayor of Coalinga was successful in convincing Governor
> Deukmejian and, in turn, President Reagan to grant Coalinga a State
> and Presidential Disaster Declaration respectively. Allen Settle's
> case study of "The Coalinga Earthquake" documents how the earthquake
> devastated downtown businesses and how the mayor of Coalinga
> skillfully used the media and his political influence to secure very
> substantial disaster relief aid from the Federal and State Government,
> which was then used to refashion and rebuild the downtown into a
> shopping plaza.
>
> Another example of post-quake disaster rebuilding expense, which also
> spawned political controversy, stemmed from the costs of rebuilding
> Los Angeles area hospitals during the recovery from the Northridge
> temblor. FEMA contributes to disaster recovery costs, especially for
> improving health and safety facilities. In March 1996, FEMA announced
> that it would provide nearly \$1 billion in Federal funds in a new
> mitigation approach to strengthen the structural integrity of four
> local hospitals that were damaged by the Northridge earthquake. This
> decision was made after a heated dispute between FEMA officials and
> California officials. Initially FEMA complained that California's
> post-earthquake building code changes, applied to public structures,
> but waived for private structures, forced the rebuilding of many
> hospitals under the 90/10 Federal-State share in effect for damage
> caused by the earthquake. FEMA originally argued that most of the
> hospitals did not need as much rebuilding as the new codes required.
> However, facing strong political opposition from top State officials
> and the embarrassment of opposing an albeit expensive mitigation
> effort, FEMA reversed itself and agreed to the extremely expensive
> hospital rebuilding effort.
>
> Below is FEMA's announcement on the matter.
>
> "Through its seismic hazard mitigation for hospitals effort, FEMA
> offered more than \$831 million to Cedars Sinai Hospital, St. John's
> Medical Center, the Los Angeles County-USC Medical Center, and the
> UCLA Center for Health Sciences." \[FEMA, March 1996 (Opfer, November
> 19, 1997)\]
>
> These hospitals will receive more than \$947 million for the repair or
> replacement of damaged facilities through a cost-share agreement
> between FEMA, the State of California, and other local contributors.
>
> FEMA Director James Lee Witt remarked that,
>
> "...through comprehensive consultation with the State and the
> hospitals, FEMA provided the most cost-effective funding package that
> would ensure that these buildings will be able to operate after
> another major earthquake. This new mitigation effort is providing the
> means to repair or replace damaged buildings. More importantly, these
> funds will enable hospitals to build their facilities to stronger
> structural standards to withstand future earthquakes." \[FEMA, March
> 12, 1996, Opfer, November 19, 1997.\]
>
> By improving the performance of area hospitals, the need to evacuate
> patients could be avoided and post-disaster operations would be
> improved since these facilities would serve victims when they need
> assistance most.

**Supplemental**

**Considerations**

> This session entails heavy reading demands and considerable class
> discussion. Help students see through the drama and horror of
> earthquakes to the political matters embedded in rebuilding and
> recovery operations. This session provides a great chance for the
> instructor to review with the students, the politics of disaster
> mitigation, the intergovernmental relations of public facility and
> infrastructure repair or replacement, the budgeting of disaster costs,
> and the political value of capable disaster responsiveness for
> political leaders.
>
> A CATASTROPHIC EARTHQUAKE is a seismic event or series of events which
> results in great numbers of deaths and injuries, extensive damage, or
> an over-whelming demand on State and local response resources and
> mechanisms. It has a severe impact on National security facilities and
> the infrastructures that sustain them. It also has a severe long-term
> effect on general economic activity. It also inhibits State, local,
> and private sector initiatives of beginning and sustaining initial
> response activities.

**Endnotes**

-   Federal Emergency Management Agency, Emergency Information and
    Public Affairs, "FEMA to Provide Nearly \$1 Billion for
    Earthquake-Damaged Hospitals," March 12, 1996, Internet news
    release, Washington, D.C.

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-   Opfer, George J. Inspector General, "H-7-97: Audit of FEMA's Seismic
    Hazard Mitigation Program for Hospitals Damaged by the Northridge
    Earthquake," (Washington, DC: Federal Emergency Management Agency,
    Office of Inspector General, September 30, 1997 and updated November
    19, 1997) \[Available at FEMA Website: http://www.fema.gov Inquiries
    are directed to Nancy L. Hendricks, Assistant Inspector General for
    Audit at (202) 646-3911.\].

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-   U.S. Congress, the Earthqauke Hazards Reduction Act of 1977 (Pub. L.
    95-124, Sect. 2, Oct. 7, 1977, 91 Stat. 1098) as amended by the
    Earthquake Hazards Reduction Program Reauthorization Act (Pub. L.
    101-614, Sect. 3, Nov. 16, 1990, 104 Stat. 3231) 42 U.S.C., Ch. 86,
    Sections 7701-7706.

-   U.S. Congress, *Disaster Assistance: Federal, State, and Local
    Responses to Natural Disasters Need Improvement*, (Washington, DC:
    General Accounting Office; Resources, Community, and Economic
    Development Division, March 6, 1991).

**Session No. 19**

**Course**: The Political and Policy Basis of Emergency Management

**Session**: Natural Disasters: Hurricanes **Time**: 1 Hour

**Objectives:**

By the end of this session, students should be able to:

> 19.1 Articulate why politics enters into certain hurricane response
> and recovery efforts, but not others, and offer examples.
>
> 19.2 Explain political challenges posed in hurricane damage mitigation
> vis-a-vis zoning, building regulation, retro-fitting, and relocation.
>
> 19.3 Describe cases involving political interchange in the process of
> hurricane disaster recovery.
>
> 19.4 Offer observations on the mounting costs of hurricane damage and
> the political issues which surround the coverage and assumption of
> these costs.

**Scope**

> Hurricanes and politics may seem completely unrelated, but they are
> very much related. This session reviews America's political experience
> with hurricane disasters. It examines hurricane-related laws and
> programs aimed at each stage of the disaster cycle. At the local level
> in the pre-disaster period, hurricane-related politics involves
> decisionmaking regarding zoning, building regulations for hurricane
> mitigation, setback rules, beach preservation and dune protection,
> open space requirements, and a host of other concerns which affect a
> community's degree of protection and vulnerability to hurricanes. As a
> hurricane looms, authorities must decide whether or not to call for an
> evacuation of the threatened areas, and whether the evacuation will be
> voluntary or compulsory. These decisions embody dramatic economic and
> political implications.
>
> At the State level, authorities must promote and disseminate hurricane
> forecast and tracking information, help (along with localities) to
> effect evacuation and sheltering when needed, maintain State utility
> infrastructures, conduct damage assessments, and facilitate
> post-hurricane reconstruction.
>
> The Federal Government supplements State and local duties under the
> Federal response plan before, during, and after hurricane landfalls.
> Legislative officials engage in the post-disaster oversight of
> responding public agencies.

**References**

Assigned student readings:

-   Godschalk, David, "Rebuilding After Hurricane Frederick," ***Crisis
    Management: A Casebook***, Michael T. Charles and John Choon K. Kim
    (eds.) (Springfield, Ill.: Charles C. Thomas Publishers, 1988): Ch.
    11, pp. 199-212.

-   Schneider, Saundra K., ***Flirting with Disaster: Public Management
    in Crisis Situations*** (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1995). \[See
    "Hurricane Hugo in the Caribbean Islands," Ch. 7, pp. 80-86;
    "Hurricane Andrew in South Florida," Ch. 8, pp. 87-101; "South
    Carolina's Experience with Hurricane Hugo," Ch. 9, pp. 102-112;
    "Hurricane Hugo in North Carolina," Ch. 11, pp. 122-126; "Hurricane
    Andrew in Louisiana," Ch. 12, pp. 127-133.\]

-   Waugh, William L., Jr., "Hurricanes," ***Handbook of Emergency
    Management***, William L. Waugh, Jr. and Ronald John Hy (eds.)
    (Westport, Conn.: The Greenwood Press): 1991, Ch. 5.

**Requirements**

> This session embodies a substantial amount of reading. It may be
> worthwhile to break the class up into small groups and ask each group
> to become mini-experts on one of the hurricane cases in the reading
> set. Ask each group to briefly review the highlights of the hurricane
> event and to comment on the political aftermath of the disaster.
>
> If possible, it would be worthwhile to screen a video for the class
> which is either a compendium of news accounts or a program dedicated
> to reviewing a hurricane disaster in all of its dimensions, including
> its political dimensions. The Public Television program "NOVA" and/or
> "Frontline" may cover more recent hurricanes. The major networks often
> dedicate a whole news program to a hurricane disaster ("Dateline,"
> etc.). Often copies of such programs are sent for free to educators.

**Remarks**

> Waugh's article on "Hurricanes" defines the phenomenon as a huge,
> cyclonic, low pressure storm in the Atlantic and Caribbean. The
> western Pacific area refers to them as TYPHOONS and, in the Indian
> Ocean, they are called CYCLONES.

*Objective 19.1*

The Carolinas

> The Schneider book supplies the reader with a wide range of Federal,
> State, and local governmental responses to hurricanes and to the
> public's reaction to Federal Government efforts. The public's
> impression of how the Government handles disasters and emergencies is
> important and often has political consequences. How they vote in
> local, State, or National elections may be influenced by whether they
> believe emergency management is poorly handled or effectively
> operated. It may also affect legislators in their decisions about how
> emergency management is authorized and funded. The chapters on
> Hurricane Hugo in the Caribbean Sea, South Carolina, and North
> Carolina show the successes and failures the Governments' handling of
> response and recovery operations as well as different levels of
> political involvement. Schneider also elaborates on the response
> efforts and public impressions which have stemmed from the destruction
> of Hurricane Andrew's in southern Florida and Louisiana.
>
> North Carolinians seemed to react positively to the way Hurricane
> Hugo's recovery was managed in their State. In that State, emergency
> response procedures worked as planned (bottom-up approach) with FEMA
> and other Federal agencies supplementing local and State efforts, and
> the State government acting as the liaison between the Federal and
> local levels. The State had engaged in extensive emergency management
> training before the disaster, had full-time professionals trained in
> emergency management, and allocated more State money for disaster
> management in comparison with other State jurisdictions affected by
> the same hurricane. In North Carolina, State politicians did not
> criticize FEMA or other Federal efforts, and procedures were followed
> smoothly.
>
> South Carolina's experience was not as positive. The State allocated
> proportionally less money to disaster preparedness procedures and
> staffing. Confusion about procedures and duties resulted. The
> Governor, who was aware of the lack of knowledge of the State
> emergency management team appointed an ad hoc State emergency
> management team shortly before the hurricane made landfall in South
> Carolina. This created confusion about who to contact at the State
> level and proved frustrating for local and Federal emergency
> personnel. South Carolina's local authorities lacked a knowledge of
> emergency management procedures. Consequently, some localities
> improperly reported damage, and this seriously delayed their
> assistance. The dual State emergency groups caused an overlap in
> duties and actions, and also caused communication confusion. The
> bottom-up emergency response plan failed, and State and city officials
> and the public started placing blame---primarily on the Federal
> Government's level of emergency response. In this case, if local and
> State officials were better prepared, less confusion would have
> resulted and the bottom-up approach may have worked better.
>
> The Caribbean
>
> Hurricane Hugo caused massive devastation in the U.S. Virgin Islands
> and Puerto Rico. Virtually all transportation and communication
> systems were destroyed or disabled and life-threatening dangers
> abounded (e.g., contaminated drinking water and lack of food) and, as
> islands, these jurisdictions could not easily go to adjacent
> jurisdictions for help. Here, a bottom-up emergency response, in which
> the Federal Government supplements the local and State efforts, was
> not really possible.
>
> The residents, local leaders, and territorial leaders of the U.S.
> Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico were alike disoriented and somewhat
> powerless in coping with the disaster. Officials were unprepared and
> ill-equipped to provide guidance or assistance to their own
> jurisdictions. During the first 24 hours, most emergency personnel
> could not even be located, let alone mobilized to help relief efforts.
>
> By American law, only the Governor of a territory or State can request
> Federal assistance, and the Federal Government, in this case, was
> unwilling to bend this rule no matter how extreme the circumstances.
> This was problematic since the Governor of the U.S. Virgin Islands
> could not be contacted. He was on the island of St. Thomas with no
> means of communicating from that island to the mainland. Eventually,
> the Governor gained access to a ham radio and made a verbal request
> for Federal aid, which President Bush then granted. The Governor of
> Puerto Rico submitted a verbal request for aid in a similar fashion,
> and President Bush approved it. The Federal Government could now
> officially initiate a full-scale response.
>
> Emergency relief was not administered quickly or efficiently
> throughout all the disaster-stricken areas in the Caribbean. In Puerto
> Rico, several thousand displaced residents were living in makeshift
> shelters six weeks after the storm. It took several months for some
> hurricane victims in U.S. Virgin Islands to receive safe drinking
> water and appropriate medical supplies. The electrical power and
> communication systems were not repaired, in some areas, for almost a
> year.
>
> In the end, FEMA did play a critical role in facilitating recovery
> efforts in the Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico. It distributed an
> immense amount of financial aid to private businesses and governmental
> institutions, and helped over 200,000 victims obtain essential
> disaster assistance.
>
> The public's perception of the Government's response to Hurricane Hugo
> was not favorable. Most reports on Hugo focused on the outbreaks of
> civil disobedience (e.g., looting and domestic violence), the total
> failure of communication linkages with the American mainland, and the
> massive breakdown in electrical power systems on the islands. In
> addition, there were serious issues surrounding the Government's
> handling of this crisis, such as why local and territorial governments
> were completely unprepared, why the Federal Government seemed to be
> caught off-guard, and why the emergency management response was so
> slow in some areas. In sum, the Federal Government seemed to be
> tremendously unprepared for this disaster in this region. \[U.S.
> Congress, 1991.\]
>
> It should be noted that Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands have
> no electoral votes in American Presidential elections, although they
> are accorded limited participation in American political party
> convention activity, and until 1995, held limited voting status for
> committee votes only (or observer status) for their sole
> representatives to Congress. This infers that Puerto Rico and the U.S.
> Virgin Islands have little political influence within the United
> States Government, especially at the Presidential level. This may have
> been a contributing factor in poor interchanges between those island
> governments and the Federal Government.
>
> Conclusions About Hugo
>
> Political factors surrounded both preparedness and response in the
> Hurricane Hugo disaster. When the political leadership of a State or
> territorial jurisdiction supports, funds, and engages in pre-disaster
> emergency management, outcomes seem to be more favorable. Moreover,
> response activities also seem to be managed better when elected
> political leaders support disaster management.
>
> Political intervention in emergency management (e.g., when South
> Carolina's Governor felt the need to create an ad hoc emergency
> management during the disaster itself) is sometimes paralleled at the
> Federal level. Recall from Session 17, about the Media and disaster
> politics, that President Bush appointed his Transportation Secretary
> as the lead emergency manager in addressing Hurricane Andrew. When
> political officials make extraordinary changes in emergency management
> leadership during or shortly after a major disaster, this is often an
> indication of a breakdown in normal emergency management operating
> procedure.

*Objective 19.2*

> Waugh says that American hurricanes pose several political dilemmas.
> The death and injury toll from hurricanes is, in historical terms,
> diminishing. Americans are becoming more informed about the proper
> land use, building techniques, and practices which afford greater
> mitigation against wind and storm surge. Yet, coastal populations in
> hurricane-prone areas continue to increase, and the public knowledge
> and experience with hurricanes is relatively low. The political
> salience of hurricane disaster mitigation and preparedness is also
> low, especially in areas which have not been hit by hurricanes for a
> great many years.
>
> States sometimes undermine sound hurricane mitigation through policies
> which encourage coastal development, usually in the interest of
> increasing tax revenue and employment. Waugh observes that some States
> actually provide tax credits to coastal property owners in order to
> relieve some of the high insurance cost burdens they bear for owning
> structures along vulnerable shorelines.
>
> Hurricane mitigation efforts for hurricane prone communities can make
> a tremendous difference in the impact of such extreme climatic events.
> Waugh details three categories of mitigation efforts that coastal
> communities could adopt:

1\. Hard Engineering,

2\. Soft Engineering, and

3\. Passive Mitigation.

> The first three mitigation efforts need the support of public
> officials to be implemented. Issues like new setback requirements,
> changing zoning laws, and creating or strengthening building codes,
> can be political "hot cakes." What may be good for the community and
> provide more of a buffer to a force the hurricane may also be opposed
> by voters because they feel it infringes on their individual or
> business, property rights, or because it affects tourism. Resort
> developers oppose setbacks because they give them less usable
> property. Other considerations, like having suitable evacuation routes
> able to handle an entire population, can become overlooked in the face
> of development. Equally poor is the way State, regional, and local
> politicians create tax incentives to encourage further development
> into areas subject to hurricanes, especially when this increased
> development overwhelms evacuation abilities. The Godschalk article
> describes just such actions during the recovery from Hurricane
> Frederick, in Pleasure Island and Gulf Shores, Alabama.
>
> Relocating a town or certain structures may also be challenged
> politically. After a hurricane, it may be prudent to relocate
> communities or certain structures further inland, but the desire of
> people to immediately "get back to normal" may encourage officials to
> disregard building codes or relocation options in exchange for
> returning to business as usual.

*Objective 19.3*

> The Godschalk article is also an instructive study which demonstrates
> the political and economic forces which complicate hurricane
> mitigation, particularly at the local level. It illustrates these
> complications through the example of Gulf Shores, Alabama, a community
> racked by Hurricane Frederick in 1979 and a town devoid of National
> flood insurance at the time of the disaster. The case reveals that
> town officials feared that the disaster had permanently damaged the
> community's tax base. On top of this, owing to pre-disaster flaws in
> the town's preparedness planning and bungled evacuation efforts, the
> community's mayor and city council were voted out of office during the
> months after the disaster. The local Civil Defense Director resigned,
> and the building inspector and town clerk were replaced. This case
> clearly shows that disasters may carry local political consequences.
>
> The case also demonstrates the local ambivalence of official regarding
> how far to push hurricane mitigation during rebuilding. The town's new
> leadership group promoted better development regulations, zoning and
> subdivision ordinances, building codes, and local plans. But in their
> quest to capitalize on HURRICANE RENEWAL (a term coined by Godschalk),
> the town did not relocate utilities far enough back from the beach,
> imposed a temporary and uneven building moratorium, and ran into legal
> challenges in pressing a deeper setback line for reconstruction of
> beach-front structures. What is valuable in this case is the ability
> to generalize Godschalk's findings to the experience of many other
> coastal communities. With the exception of efforts like meteorological
> experiments, most mitigation techniques are the responsibility of
> State and local governments and are subject to economic and political
> considerations.

*Objective 19.4*

> Today, as in other catastrophic natural disasters, the costs of
> hurricane recovery efforts may be in the billions. Federal Government
> monies may be allotted once a Presidential Declaration has been
> issued. FEMA, as the lead Federal Agency, has its regional offices
> play a major part in its hurricane program. Those offices provide
> guidance to States that are eligible to participate in the program. In
> fiscal year 1994, FEMA reallocated \$2 million of its funds to that
> program. Up to that time and since 1980, FEMA's annual expenditures
> for hurricane preparedness totaled less than \$900,000. However, in
> 1995 FEMA asked for \$8 million for the Hurricane Program. \[U.S.
> Senate, 1995, pp. 147-149\]. The Agency received \$2,896,000 in fiscal
> year 1995 and 1996 each, and \$5,896,000 in fiscal year 1997.
>
> Researchers examining recent hurricanes have confirmed that many
> simple and inexpensive mitigation and preparedness measures taken by
> homeowners, apartment dwellers, and business people hold the potential
> to dramatically reduce hurricane damage and subsequent disaster
> assistance costs.
>
> The insurance industry also plays a role in the politics of paying for
> hurricanes. Insured losses from hurricanes are 20 times more costly
> now than in the 1960s. With this in mind, the insurance industry and
> its lobbying arm are becoming more political. The extent of insured
> losses has pushed some insurance companies into insolvency and caused
> others to terminate coverage in high risk areas. The Federal
> Government has deemed this act to be discriminatory and has insisted
> that insurance companies continue insuring against hurricane damage in
> hurricane-prone areas. In return, the insurance industry has demanded
> stronger hurricane mitigation efforts (e.g., stricter building codes
> and more suitable zoning of insured structures) in these high risk
> areas. Thus, special interests may also play a political role in who
> pays the costs of a hurricane disaster.

**Supplemental**

**Considerations**

> The Federal Hurricane Program's legislative authority resides in the
> Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act of
> 1988 (P.L. 93-288, as amended in 1994). The program is subject to
> annual appropriations and FEMA is the administering Agency.
>
> The Hurricane Preparedness Grant Program, as it was known before
> fiscal year 1994, consisted mainly of efforts to conduct studies for
> coastal areas to help State and local emergency management agencies in
> evacuation planning. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers played a role by
> managing and funding some studies, while the National Weather Service
> (NWS) supported the development of hurricane storm surge models for
> coastal areas. Overall, the major emphasis was on protecting the
> at-risk population from storm surge and coastal flooding, forces which
> had historically produced the most hurricane-related deaths (until
> Hurricane Andrew).
>
> Through 15 years, the Hurricane Preparedness Grant Program has
> completed hurricane evacuation studies for most of the Nation's
> coastal areas vulnerable to hurricanes, although many of these need to
> be updated to take into account population growth and new development.
> Such studies were in place and used in South Carolina when Hurricane
> Hugo struck, in September 1989, and in Florida when Hurricane Andrew,
> in August 1992. Public awareness materials and videos have been
> produced and distributed. Week-long training courses, sponsored by
> FEMA and conducted at the NWS National Hurricane Center now in Coral
> Gables, Florida, have provided valuable information to State and local
> emergency management officials. Various decision assistance tools have
> been developed and made available to coastal States. These and other
> activities have protected people vulnerable to hurricane storm surges,
> but they did not fully address the issue of reducing property damage
> associated with hurricanes.
>
> Since fiscal year 1994, FEMA has reconstituted the old program and now
> has in place its improved Hurricane Program. This enhanced program
> seeks to significantly reduce the loss of life and, property, the
> economic disruption, and the disaster assistance costs resulting from
> hurricanes. It embodies new mitigation programs. It has three
> components:
>
> 1\. State and local assistance to improve preparedness and mitigation
> capabilities;
>
> 2\. Evacuation studies, including hazard analysis, transportation
> analysis, shelter analysis, behavioral analysis, and post-storm
> analysis aimed at measuring the effectiveness of mitigation efforts
> and response activities; and
>
> 3\. Funding programs for training and exercises to fine-tune
> mitigation and operation planning, for public awareness and education
> to improve public warning capabilities, for public cognizance, and for
> State and local public information materials.
>
> FEMA must promote this program in the political environment of State
> and local governments. Public education is important, but it will take
> more than that to change the decisionmaking of the State and local
> building regulators, the zoning authorities, the homebuilders, the
> home buyers, and the development interests.
>
> Remind students that the Disaster Relief Act of 1969 coordinates
> hurricane recovery programs. The Disaster Assistance Act of 1970
> provides grants, loans, and temporary housing to victims of hurricane
> devastation. The chief laws applying to hurricanes are the National
> Flood Insurance Act of 1968 and the Flood Disaster Protection Act of
> 1973. The latter sets out penalties for local governments that do not
> participate in, or comply with, the National Flood Insurance Program.

**Endnotes**

-   U.S. Congress, *Disaster Assistance: Federal, State, and Local
    Responses to Natural Disasters Need Improvement* (Washington, DC:
    General Accounting Office; Resources, Community and Economic
    Development Divisions, March 6, 1991).

-   U.S. Senate, Bipartisan Task Force on Funding Disaster Relief, John
    Glenn (Chairman), Christopher S. Bond (Co-Chairman), "Federal
    Disaster Assistance: Report of the Senate Task Force on Funding
    Disaster Relief," 104th Cong., 1st Sess., *Document No. 104-4*
    (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1995):147-149.

**Session No. 20**

**Course**: The Political and Policy Basis of Emergency Management

**Session**: Natural Disasters: Floods **Time**: 1 Hour

**Objectives:**

By the end of this session, students should be able to:

> 20.1 Understand national flood mitigation and disaster laws; how they
> are implemented at the Federal, State, and local levels; and how
> politics are involved.
>
> 20.2 Articulate the political challenges posed in structural and
> non-structural flood hazard mitigation efforts.
>
> 20.3 Describe political issues associated with flood disasters and the
> recovery process, especially those encountered in the Midwest floods
> of 1993.
>
> 20.4 Offer observations on the mounting costs of flood damage and the
> political issues which surround the coverage and assumption of these
> costs.

**Scope**

> Floods are America's most frequently occurring agent of natural
> disaster. More than half of all Presidential Declarations of major
> disaster are for floods. \[Sylves, 1997\]. Owing to more than 100
> years of dissension, confusion, political intrusion, inadequate
> infrastructure, high cost, and unavailability of flood insurance,
> etc., the Federal Government decided to basically direct and subsidize
> flood insurance and to re-orient flood hazard mitigation from
> exclusively building dams and other flood works to a combination of
> structural and non-structural efforts.
>
> Political challenges in flood disaster involve, zoning for floodplain
> usage, building regulation decisions, the planning and funding flood
> control projects---including relocation actions---and the coordination
> of efforts from locality to locality and from State to State.

**References**

> Assigned student readings:

-   Cigler, Beverly A., "Coping with Floods: Lessons from the 1990's,"
    ***Disaster Management in the U.S. and Canada***, Richard T. Sylves
    and William L. Waugh, Jr. (eds.) (Springfield, Ill.: Charles C.
    Thomas Publishers, 1996): Ch. VIII, pp. 191-213.

-   Cigler, Beverly A. and Raymond J. Burby, "Floods," ***Handbook of
    Emergency Management***, William L. Waugh, Jr. and Ronald John Hy
    (eds.) (Westport, Conn.: The Greenwood Press, 1991): Ch. 6, pp.
    81-105.

-   Schneider, Saundra K., "Normal Disasters: 1990 Floods in South
    Carolina," ***Flirting with Disaster: Public Management in Crisis
    Situations*** (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1995): Ch. 13, pp.
    134-140.

> The instructor may benefit from reading the document below or any
> updated versions of the document below in preparing for this session.

-   Federal Interagency Floodplain Management Task Force, ***Floodplain
    Management in the United States: An Assessment***, Report Vol. 1,
    (Federal Insurance Administration) FIA-17; Vol. 2, FIA-18
    (Washington, DC: the Task Force, 1992).

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-   Federal Emergency Management Agency, "Questions and Answers on the
    National Flood Insurance Program," Federal Insurance Administration
    (FIA) August 2, 1987.

**Requirements**

> A short history of American flood management is necessary. Also, it is
> imperative that the instructor make clear that, besides FEMA, there
> are several other Federal agencies involved in flood control, among
> them, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the Agricultural Stabilization
> and Conservation Service of the U.S. Department of Agriculture, the
> Bureau of Reclamation and the Bureau of Land Management of the U.S.
> Department of the Interior, the National Weather Service of the U.S.
> Department of Commerce, and the U.S. Environmental Protection
> Agency---to name a few.
>
> More challenging will be the discussion and review of the National
> Flood Insurance Program. The Supplemental Considerations section below
> contains some key terms which may be of help.

**Remarks**

> A FLOOD or FLOODING is defined as the temporary inundation of normally
> dry land areas from the overflow of inland or tidal waters, or from
> the unusual and rapid accumulation or runoff of surface waters from
> any source. The rise in water may be caused by excessive rainfall,
> snow melt, natural stream blockages, wind storms over a lake, or any
> combination of such conditions. A FLASH FLOOD is a flood that crests
> in a short period of time and is often characterized by high velocity
> flow. It is often the result of heavy rainfall in a local area.
>
> Cigler and others advocate better floodplain management through a
> combination of structural and non-structural approaches.
> NON-STRUCTURAL approaches entail the restricting of development in
> flood-prone areas as well as the use of natural buffers, such as
> wetlands which help absorb flood waters. They modify the exposure of
> buildings to floods through flood-proofing, land-use planning, setback
> rules, warning measures, and insurance. STRUCTURAL approaches include
> the elements of building design and construction aimed at reducing
> flood vulnerability. One practice involves the ELEVATION of structures
> located in V-ZONES (vulnerability zones), that is, areas prone to
> flooding or coastal storm surges. "Elevation" means raising a
> structure to place it above flood waters on an extended support
> structure.
>
> FLOODPLAINS are normally dry land susceptible to being inundated by
> water from any natural source. These areas are usually low land
> adjacent to a river, a stream, a watercourse, an ocean or a lake.
> Flood frequency studies and flood hazard boundary mapping have been
> used to calculate a "100-YEAR FLOOD," which means a flood of magnitude
> expected to be equaled or exceeded on the average of once every
> hundred years. Such a flood has a one-percent chance of being equaled
> or exceeded in any given year. The general public, often mistakenly,
> believes that such 100-year floodplain areas are only subject to
> flooding every 100 years. Meteorological and natural forces may
> produce 100-year magnitude floods at anytime.
>
> Among structural floodplain management measures has been the highly
> controversial construction of "hard"-engineered public works projects
> such as dams, dikes, LEVEES, channel enlargements, diversions, and,
> along coastlines, seawalls, jetties, sea groins, and other physical
> structures. These actions are taken to modify the way floods behave.
> Owing to a mixed record of performance, high cost, negative
> environmental side-effects, and the realization that such structures
> often inadvertently contribute to over-development in flood-prone
> areas, the National policy has begun to back away from heavy reliance
> on "hard" engineered flood mitigation works.
>
> A LEVEE is a man-made structure, usually an earthen embankment,
> designed and constructed in accordance with accepted engineering
> practices, to contain, control, or divert the flow of water so as to
> provide protection from temporary flooding. A LEVEE SYSTEM is a flood
> protection system comprised of a levee, or levees, and associated
> structures, such as enclosure and drainage devices.

*Objective 20.1*

> Floods, like many other disasters, are low probability, high
> consequence events. From a National Government perspective, such
> disasters are a major problem. Floods are responsible for the majority
> of Presidentially declared disasters. For officials at the State and
> local level, however, flood disasters are experienced with relatively
> less frequency than they are on a National level. In other words,
> flood disasters perceived Nationally are more common than flood
> disasters perceived from any single State or locality.
>
> Ms. Cigler explains that local officials are less likely (than State
> and Federal officials) to perceive the flood problem as important and
> so, they tend to give the topic low priority on their policy agendas.
> She defines this as an "intergovernmental paradox," in that local
> government officials are unlikely to judge floods or other disasters
> as a major problem, but it is local authorities who must assume the
> center-stage as the first responders and emergency managers when
> floods or other disasters occur. Whether it is first-line emergency
> response, or land use planning and implementation activities
> associated with the mitigation of hazards, local governments have
> cardinal responsibilities.
>
> The first National flood control law was the Flood Control Act of
> 1936. Its central premise was that floods could be controlled or
> averted through the building of engineered structures such as levees,
> dikes, spillways, channels, jetties, reservoirs, dams, and flood
> walls, *et cetera*. The principal Federal agency involved in the
> construction of flood and erosion control projects is the U.S. Army
> Corps of Engineers, although other agencies have major roles. The
> Federal water resources development projects traditionally have
> multiple purposes and often include a flood- or erosion-control
> element. The U.S. Congress selects the Corps' projects through a
> two-phase authorization and construction appropriations process which
> is highly political. In the authorization phase, members of Congress
> vote collectively on a group of water projects in an "omnibus" rivers
> and harbors bill. Congress then selects many of the authorized
> projects for appropriations.
>
> Many of these flood control projects (i.e., dams and levee building)
> have embodied "PORK-BARRELING," under which Federal resources were
> concentrated in a way which over-benefited certain areas at the
> expense of the National taxpayer. Members of Congress may say that
> their States need costly structural flood control projects (regardless
> of the actual necessity), to generate substantial Federal funds for
> their jurisdictions. Elected officials at the State and local levels
> derive tremendous political gain from "bringing home the bacon," in
> terms of new Federally paid-for local infrastructure projects and
> facilities.
>
> Ms. Cigler indicates that structural flood control projects are often
> very costly, have limited utility, and routinely come with undesirable
> environmental side-effects. A National program was needed in order to
> curtail costly and confusing individual State flood-control efforts.
>
> The National Flood Insurance Program
>
> Congress established the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) with
> the passage of the National Flood Insurance Act of 1968. The act was
> broadened and modified later with passage of the Flood Disaster
> Protection Act of 1973 and other measures. The NFIP is administered by
> the Federal Insurance Administration (FIA) and is a component of FEMA.
>
> The National response to flood disasters in the decades before NFIP
> consisted of building flood control works such as dams, levees, and
> the like and providing disaster relief to flood victims. Disaster
> relief did not reduce losses or discourage unwise development.
> Moreover, the public could not buy flood insurance from insurance
> companies, and building techniques to reduce flood damage were
> overlooked. Owing to mounting flood losses and escalating costs of
> flood disaster relief, Congress created the NFIP.
>
> "The intent was to mitigate future damage and to provide protection
> for property owners against potential losses through an insurance
> mechanism that allows a premium to be paid for the protection by those
> most in need of it..." \[FEMA, August 2, 1987, p. 1\].
>
> The NFIP is based on an agreement between local communities and the
> Federal Government which states that, if a community will implement
> measures to reduce future flood risks to new construction in Special
> Flood Hazard Areas, the Federal Government will make flood insurance
> available within the community as a financial protection against flood
> losses which do occur.
>
> If a local government adopts building codes and zoning regulations
> which limit development in floodplains and promote flood mitigation,
> residents (homeowners and business owners) become eligible to purchase
> relatively low-cost National Flood Insurance (private flood insurance
> is unavailable). The National Flood Insurance Program provides to
> policyholders SUBSIDIZED RATES, meaning that the Federal Government
> encourages the purchase of National Flood Insurance on existing
> structures at "reasonable and affordable" rates, although these
> determinations are themselves a political issue. Unlike private
> insurers, the Federal Government does not need to make a profit on the
> sale of the insurance its sells.
>
> Over the years about 90 percent of America's flood-prone jurisdictions
> have enrolled in the NFIP. Local governments remain principal
> providers of flood mitigation while FEMA's role is one of information
> support and coordination. With approximately 18,500 of the 20,000 U.S.
> flood-prone communities currently participating in NFIP, the Federal
> Government's role is to build the commitment of local governments to
> floodplain management and to develop the local governments' capacities
> to design, enact, and enforce the required floodplain regulations.
>
> The State role in NFIP continues to evolve. However, Cigler and
> Burby's research discloses that State officials view the States as
> appropriate vehicles for providing flood abatement local technical
> assistance, and planning and coordination activities. This is
> surprising given that, in their survey, only 52 percent of the local
> officials were aware of their State's NFIP assistance program.
> \[Cigler and Burby, 1991, p. 95.\]
>
> Federal flood laws which called for a combination of structural and
> non-structural methods have been a mandate for State and local
> governments. But, as Cigler and Burby claim, little attention in
> floodplain management has been paid to developing the political will
> of the Nation's elected local and State officials---the authorities
> who must deal with the flood hazard problem first.

*Objective 20.2*

> It is the role of local governments to determine the kind of flood
> mitigation efforts they will use to protect their communities and the
> options they will choose. The choices to be made, the process of
> deciding, and the ultimate decisions made all involve politics.
> Historically, structural flood control measures, like building levees
> and dams, were popular since they created jobs and were financed
> largely by the Federal Government.
>
> Over time, flood prone areas protected by structural means have been
> heavily developed. Even if non-structural means might be more suitable
> for an area today, they are still harder for elected officials to
> adopt because people already in the affected areas do not want to
> relocate, do not want to adopt more floodproof building code
> requirements, and do not want future development limited. As with land
> use planning efforts for other natural disasters (hurricanes and
> earthquakes), locally elected officials face similar opponents of
> non-structural mitigation efforts. Non-structural methods often
> conflict with private property rights for homeowners, farmers, and
> developers alike.
>
> Non-structural mitigation options include regulations, education, and
> a variety of financial incentives, as well as technical assistance or
> capacity-building tools. Examples include zoning and other land-use
> regulations (e.g., restricting development in flood basins), elevation
> and other floodproofing of buildings, flood insurance, flood warning
> systems, land acquisition, permanent property relocation, and disaster
> preparedness and response planning.
>
> A Unified National Program for Floodplain Management was prepared
> independently of the Galloway Report and provided a conceptual
> framework that calls for managing floodplains as integrated systems of
> both human activities and natural functions. It has been highly
> praised by environmentalists and harshly criticized by property rights
> advocates, including many farmers. A growing property rights movement
> in the United States is attempting to end nearly all forms of land-use
> regulation. Thus, the goals and objectives of the report may be
> difficult to implement.
>
> Non-structural flood mitigation efforts also have complicated
> intergovernmental considerations. There is a clear mandate for a
> Federal regulatory role in floodplain management, but, under the U.S.
> Constitutional system, the management of private land-use is the
> responsibility of the State and especially local governments. Local
> and State elected officials may decide not to implement floodplain
> management measures for several reasons.
>
> 1\. They may feel that the Federal Government has no right to infringe
> on their governmental responsibilities;
>
> 2\. They assume it conflicts with their constituents' beliefs (e.g.,
> private property advocates);
>
> 3\. They want to continue only structural flood mitigation measures
> for which the Federal Government used to provide most of the funding;
> or
>
> 4\. They may obey the spirit of the NFIP by enacting appropriate
> floodplain management measures, but may fail to enforce those
> measures, believing that their non-compliance may go undetected as
> they bow to pressures to develop in the flood hazard areas of their
> communities.
>
> Non-structural mitigation efforts have produced politically
> controversial debates at the Federal level also. Cigler offers an
> example from 1994. A Senate bill, which incorporated the Unified
> National Program for Floodplain Management proposals, was blocked by
> Republican-led resistance in the summer of 1994. The defeated bill was
> a casualty of Republican efforts to derail the Democratic-supported
> legislation late in the session, in conjunction with advocates of
> property rights who view any measure to protect wetlands, in general,
> as a first step in taking additional farm land out of cultivation
> through unreasonable regulations. The kinds of buyouts used after the
> 1993 Midwestern floods were not made part of National flood policy in
> 1994 because there was great opposition to placing restraints on new
> flood control dams and levees. In addition, some Federal lawmakers led
> opposition to the measure on behalf of some farmers who opposed adding
> new wetlands as a flood control measure.
>
> Economic growth and the great political influence of development
> interests have combined to increase the demand for more building
> within floodplains. The interests promoting sound disaster mitigation
> land management at the local level are, in relative terms, very weak.
> Overhead governments, such as the State and Federal Government, must
> add a counterweight to the development interests, but this is not easy
> for a variety of reasons, including the resistance to non-local,
> outside pressures; the preservation of local land-use authority; and
> the political interference at higher levels of government by
> development interests, *et cetera*.
>
> Many protective land-use regulations are not enacted or enforced due
> to unresolved conflicts between private property rights and local,
> State, and National interests in the flood problem. Attempts to
> resolve conflicts lead to costly litigation for all parties, including
> suits by FEMA's Federal Insurance Administration (FIA) against
> localities for not complying with NFIP.
>
> The future challenges of flood policy involve harmonizing city-county
> relations; getting communities which share a watershed to cooperate
> and coordinate; and moving functionally distinct municipal departments
> to promote flood mitigation (e.g., water, sewer, environment, public
> health, public safety, police, fire, permits, and inspections
> departments, etc.). Inconsistency among State flood-control programs
> remains a problem.

*Objective 20.3*

> Even though floods are the most frequent type of natural disaster,
> each year, there tends to be less political intervention in the
> response and recovery process for flooding than for other natural
> disasters. This is in part because many floods are not considered
> major disasters. Schneider classifies floods as "normal" disasters,
> giving several reasons.

-   The magnitude of the event; normal disasters usually do not produce
    severe or prolonged disruptions in the social or physical
    environments, (i.e., communication and transportation
    accessibility);

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-   The frequency and recurrence of the event, which have made the
    American public more familiar and accustomed to normal disasters;
    and

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-   Government officials are aware of and attuned to these events, and
    they have designed a response system with exactly these
    circumstances in mind.

> Since the emergency management response process generally works as
> expected with floods, the need or desire for an elected official to
> intervene, or for media to criticize, is greatly diminished. An
> example is the flooding in South Carolina in 1990, as discussed in the
> Schneider book.
>
> Of course, not all floods are normal, and sometimes political
> intervention in the emergency management response to flooding does
> occur. An example is the 1993 flooding in the Midwest, which is
> elaborated upon in the Cigler chapter.
>
> The President appointed an ad hoc sub-group to his Floodplain
> Management Task Force to determine the major causes and consequences
> of the 1993 Midwest flood, to evaluate the performance of floodplain
> and watershed management programs; and to recommend changes in
> policies, programs, and activities likely to achieve risk reduction,
> economic efficiency, and environmental enhancement in floodplains and
> watersheds. The Interagency Floodplain Management Review Committee
> released the report, "Sharing the Challenge: Floodplain Management
> into the 21st Century," in June 1994. It was commonly referred to as
> the "Galloway Report." \[IFMRC, June 1994\]
>
> The GALLOWAY REPORT examined the functionality of Federal levees
> during the great Midwest flood of 1993. Its findings were
> controversial in that it praised the performance of Federal levees
> during the flood, but had little to add about the thousands of
> non-Federal levees in the region, many of which failed during the
> flood. Federal levees are those built in whole or in part by the
> Federal Government. The "non-Federal" levels are those that are owned
> and managed by the State, local, or special district governments, or
> which are privately owned and managed levees, and which may be subject
> to Federal regulation, but are not owned by the Federal Government. By
> suspending judgment of the performance of non-Federal levees, the
> Galloway committee seemed to be suggesting that "Federal" structural
> flood mitigation works had performed well, but that "private"
> structural flood control works had not, or at least were not worth
> reviewing.
>
> The report recommended that many failed levees not be repaired, so
> that they could buffer against future flooding. (This tactic proved
> beneficial when the areas again flooded in the 1995 Midwest floods.)
> This had important ramifications. Farmers (and others) whose
> properties had been protected from flooding up until the great Midwest
> flood of 1993 by private levees, now were left with no official
> guidance on whether or not to rebuild the failed private levees. A
> decision NOT to rebuild means that properties behind failed private
> levees would be exposed to a much greater flood threat in the future.
> The Galloway committee left it up to the Army Corps of Engineers (in
> conjunction with the Soil Conservation Service) to decide which
> private levees warranted reconstruction.
>
> In reviewing the aftermath of the Midwest floods of 1993, there was
> praise for FEMA's effort to RELOCATE towns frequently flooded by their
> adjacent rivers. Completely relocating a town may be politically
> controversial for several reasons.

-   Historic preservationists may oppose it because relocation destroys
    the history of the town (e.g., the buildings, town squares, and main
    streets, etc.).

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-   Private property advocates may oppose being ordered to move from
    their land, homes, and businesses---some of which have been passed
    down for generations; or

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-   Some may believe that more flood mitigation measures, like bigger
    dams and more levees, are the better solution to flooding than
    relocation.

> The dilemma of relocation was part of the aftermath of the Midwest
> floods of 1993. It was politically controversial at first, but there
> was increasing agreement that the damage-rebuild-damage-rebuild cycle
> should, wherever possible, be terminated.
>
> Many have complained that too few communities participate in, and too
> few homeowners buy, National Flood Insurance. Presumably, if flooding
> occurs in a community which is not participating in NFIP, "no Federal
> financial assistance can be provided for the permanent repair or
> reconstruction of insurable buildings in Special Flood Hazard Areas."
> \[FEMA, August 2, 1987.\] Once a community's Special Flood Hazard
> Areas have been identified on a Flood Hazard Boundary Map or Flood
> Insurance Rate Map, that community has up to a year to comply with and
> join the NFIP. Failure to do so may mean that those seeking to build
> in a Special Flood Hazard Area will be prohibited from receiving
> Veterans Administration loans or other mortgages from Federally
> regulated banks.
>
> However, there is huge political pressure exerted after every flood
> disaster not to penalize communities or residents---the former for
> failing to join or comply with the NFIP and the latter for failing to
> purchase National Flood Insurance when it was available.
>
> FEMA and the Small Business Administration (SBA) analyzed some 2,000
> claims arising from the 1993 Midwest flood and found that about half
> of the applicants with mortgaged homes in the floodplain did not have
> flood insurance. In 1993, the National Performance Review recommended
> that FEMA enforce existing requirements for mandatory flood insurance
> and urged the administration and the Congress to explore incentives to
> expand insurance coverage against most natural hazards. \[Gore, 1994,
> p. 64 and U.S. Senate, 1995.\]
>
> The Midwest floods of 1993 changed how governments would allocate the
> costs of future flood disasters. Several important policy and
> administrative reforms have been made since those floods. In January
> 1995, FEMA officials announced changes in regulations as part of the
> implementation of a new 1994 law. Among the changes were new rules
> that converted the existing five-day waiting period to a 30-day
> waiting period (with limited exceptions) before flood insurance
> coverage becomes effective under a standard flood insurance policy.
> The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers has also amended some of its rules
> governing construction cost sharing. Under a Congressional mandate to
> reduce the non-Federal share of flood mitigation projects based on
> "ability to pay," the Corps established criteria for reductions in the
> non-Federal cost share. The cost of recovering from these floods and
> other flood disasters is further elaborated in Objective 20.4.

*Objective 20.4*

> The cost of damages and recovery efforts from a flood disaster may
> enter the billions of dollars. The brunt of these costs are borne by
> the Federal Government and the property and casualty insurance
> industry. Cigler States that direct losses from floods cost
> approximately \$4 billion, and that at least 9.6 million households
> and \$390 billion in property are at risk from floods.
>
> After the extreme Midwestern floods in 1993, Congress allocated 15
> percent of the disaster aid for relocating people out of the
> floodplain. More than 7,000 have moved, including at least one entire
> town, making it the largest post-flood relocation in American history.
> Before the Midwest floods in 1993, \$4.5 million was budgeted for
> relocation; after the flood, another \$350 million was added, making
> this a pivotal turning point in American flood policy. \[Cigler, 1996,
> p. 204.\]
>
> Some evidence suggests that NFIP has been very effective in mitigating
> damage from floods; FEMA estimates that the floodplain management
> strategies and building standards required under NFIP prevent \$569
> million in flood damages annually. However, there is no required
> special mitigative measures for properties that have incurred repeated
> flood damages of less than 50 percent of the value of the structure.
> As of 1993, repetitive loss structures, properties for which two or
> more insurance payments have been received above a specified amount,
> represented only about two percent of the properties covered by flood
> insurance polities, but accounted for 52 percent of the claims paid
> and 47 percent of the dollars paid from the Flood Insurance Fund. If
> the NFIP fund runs empty, the fund may borrow up to \$1 billion from
> the U.S. Treasury. \[U.S. Senate, 1995, pp. 63-64.\]
>
> The Federal Government is using financial incentives or disincentives
> to hasten State and local implementation of flood hazard mitigation
> methods. The Senate Bipartisan Task Force Report on Funding Disaster
> Relief emphasized hazard mitigation through the use of incentives.
> Examples include Federal income tax credits for investments to upgrade
> existing facilities and Federal matching grants for building retrofit.
> The Report also made a number of budgeting proposals, such as
> requiring a three-fifths majority to approve emergency supplemental
> spending and more detailed written justifications by the President and
> Congress when enacting emergency supplemental appropriations.
> Budgeting proposals, if passed, would likely facilitate interest in
> mitigation tools for reducing the costs of floods and other disasters.
> By making it more difficult for State and local governments to receive
> Federal monies after a flood disaster, these levels of government may
> embrace more comprehensive flood management plans sooner than they
> would have without such Federal budgeting tactics.
>
> The Federal Insurance Administration has sought to promote wider sales
> of National Flood Insurance since 1981 under a "Write Your Own"
> program which reinvigorates the private sector insurance company
> involvement in the NFIP. The program invites all licensed property and
> casualty companies to enter into an arrangement with FIA to sell and
> service flood insurance under their own names.
>
> The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers has undergone a dramatic change in
> its role as a primary builder of dams, levees, dikes, and other "hard"
> engineering flood mitigation structures. Currently, the Corps spends
> \$1.6 billion a year to maintain structures that it has built and
> \$1.2 billion to erect new levees and dikes. Of its \$41 billion
> budget, \$13 billion is now allocated for environmental projects.
> \[Cigler, 1996, p. 209.\] Floodplain management efforts are receiving
> more attention and funding, in part as an outcome of the Midwest
> floods of 1993 and 1995. The Corps' fastest growing spending category
> is for environmental projects.
>
> National leaders expect State governments to induce their localities
> to make greater investments in all phases of floodplain management. To
> date, most States have been slow to respond. Increasing State disaster
> costs and less favorable Federal-State, post-disaster cost sharing
> constraints, may give States and their localities a greater financial
> incentive to engage in flood hazard mitigation.

**Supplemental**

**Considerations**

> This session takes up American flood mitigation policy, the evolution
> of National floodplain management philosophy, the evolution of Federal
> and State flood policy, and the continuing problems associated with
> flood disasters. Be sure to highlight that National Flood Insurance is
> one of the few fully Federally-backed forms of disaster insurance in
> the United States. Ask students whether they believe the experience
> and effectiveness of the NFIP justifies the parallel creation of a
> National all-hazards insurance program. Be sure the students know
> examples of structural, and non-structural, mitigation. \[See material
> under Remarks section in this session.\]
>
> Shortly after its creation in 1979, FEMA assumed flood management
> responsibilities from the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
> Development. FEMA is the lead agency in the implementation of the
> National flood disaster policy, but shares responsibility with several
> other Federal agencies.

**Endnotes**

-   Interagency Floodplain Review Committee, Brigadeer General G.E.
    Galloway (Chair), "Sharing the Challenge: Floodplain Management into
    the 21^st^ Century," Series: "A Blueprint for Change," (Washington,
    DC: Federal Emergency Management Agency, June 1994). \[Known as the
    "Galloway Report."\]

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-   Gore, Al, "Federal Emergency Management Agency -- Accompanying
    Report of the National Performance Review (NPR)" Series; "From Red
    Tape to Results: Creating a Government That Works Better and Costs
    Less," (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, Office of
    the Vice President, September, 1993):64.

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-   Sylves, Richard T., recompilation and analysis of Federal Emergency
    Management Agency DARIS database (August 19, 1997), unpublished.

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-   U.S. Senate, Bipartisan Task Force on Funding Disaster Relief, John
    Glenn (Chairman), Christopher S. Bond (Co-Chairman), "Federal
    Disaster Assistance: Report of the Senate Task Force on Funding
    Disaster Relief," 104th Cong., 1st Sess., *Document No. 104-4*
    (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1995):63-64

**Session No. 21**

**Course**: The Political and Policy Basis of Emergency Management

**Session**: Natural Disasters: Tornadoes and Severe Storms **Time**: 1
Hour

**Objectives:**

By the end of this session, students should be able to:

> 21.1 Identify which areas of the United States are most at risk for
> tornadoes and severe storms, and which government agencies are
> responsible for providing public warnings for tornado and severe
> thunderstorm threats.
>
> 21.2 Demonstrate an understanding of the limitations to tornado
> mitigation activities.
>
> 21.3 Identify various tornado warning methods and reasons that State
> and local politicians may choose one measure over another.
>
> 21.4 Explain how the National definition of "disaster" may affect
> State and local tornado preparedness, response, and recovery efforts.

**Scope**

> This section covers the Government's role in protecting against
> tornado hazard. It considers the political forces which shape public
> policy aimed at addressing tornado threats. This includes Government
> support (or lack of support) for greater public education on the
> subject, more and better warning systems, and more available emergency
> sheltering, especially in the vicinity of mobile home parks.

**References**

Assigned student readings:

-   Center for Disease Control, "Tornado Disaster---Alabama, March 27,
    1994," ***Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report***, Vol. 43, No.
    19(May 20, 1994):356-359. To purchase or view free of charge contact
    the CDC Internet site:

> http://www.cdc.gov/epo/mmwr/preview/mm4319.htm#TOC

-   Center for Disease Control, "Tornado-Associated
    Fatalities---Arkansas, 1997," ***Morbidity and Mortality Weekly
    Report***, Vol. 46, No. 19(May 16, 1997):412-416. To purchase or
    view free of charge contact the CDC Internet site at:

> http://www.cdc.gov/epo/mmwr/preview/mm4619.html#article2

-   Smith, Loran B. and David T. Jervis, "Tornadoes," ***Handbook of
    Emergency Management***, William L. Waugh, Jr. and Ronald John Hy
    (eds.) (Westport, Conn.: The Greenwood Press, 1991): Ch. 7, pp.
    106-128.

**Requirements**

> For up to the minute tornado statistics, the instructor and students
> should enlist the Internet. The National Weather Service has tornado
> information at its website:
>
> http://www.nws.noaa.gov/.
>
> One of its tornado sections, in particular, is located at:
>
> http://www.nws.noaa.gov/er/mhx/tornt.htm
>
> Use a map of the United States to identify States within America's
> "Tornado Alley." Remind students that tornadoes have occurred in
> virtually all 50 States, but mostly in the central and eastern United
> States.

**Remarks**

*Objective 21.1*

> The United States experiences more tornado activity than any other
> country. The National Weather Service (NWS) considers tornadoes to be
> nature's most violent storms, with winds that may exceed 200 mph.
> Tornadoes have resulted in an average of 80 deaths and 1,500 injuries
> each year. In 1995, there were 30 tornado fatalities, which were less
> than half of the 1994 total of 69 tornado fatalities, and
> significantly lower than the 30-year average death toll of 73. Alabama
> suffered the highest loss with 7 fatalities, but this figure was much
> lower than the 1994 toll of 22. The number of fatalities from
> tornadoes is, in part, attributable to the unpredictability and rapid
> speed of onset of tornadoes.
>
> Tornadoes have touched down in all 50 States, but the areas at
> greatest risk are the Great Plains region EAST of the Rocky Mountains
> and the Midwestern States of Wisconsin, Michigan, Illinois, Indiana,
> and Ohio. The Great Plains area from Texas to Canada is dubbed
> "Tornado Alley" because of the frequency of tornadoes that strike the
> area. Tornadoes cause more deaths EAST of the Mississippi River
> (higher population densities), and more damage WEST of it.
>
> Severe thunderstorms are also a cause for concern, especially since
> tornadoes are born from them. THUNDERSTORMS affect relatively small
> areas when compared with climate events such as hurricanes and winter
> storms. The typical thunderstorm is 15 miles in diameter and lasts an
> average of 30 minutes. Nearly 1,800 thunderstorms are occurring at any
> moment around the world. Despite their small size, all thunderstorms
> are dangerous. Every thunderstorm produces lightning, which kills more
> people each year than tornadoes. Heavy rain from thunderstorms can
> result in flash flooding. Strong winds, hail, and tornadoes are also
> dangers associated with some thunderstorms. The NWS reports that of
> the estimated 100,000 thunderstorms that occur each year in the United
> States, only about 10 percent are classified as severe.
>
> The National Weather Service (NWS), the National Severe Storm
> Laboratory, and FEMA's Emergency Alert System, in cooperation with
> State and local emergency management agencies, shoulder much of the
> burden for providing public warning of tornado threats. Inadequate
> advanced warning time, wind vulnerable structures, and an unknowing
> public, may expose many to tornado threats. Public education, drills,
> practices, siren warnings, and feasible structural mitigation (there
> is no such thing as a perfectly windproof building) could all help in
> reducing the public's vulnerability to tornadoes. However, strong
> National, State, and local leadership are needed to advance these
> purposes.

*Objective 21.2*

> Given the unpredictability and physical characteristics of tornadoes,
> there are few mitigation issues related to tornado-caused emergencies.
> Based on the 1995 statistics from the National Weather Service, the
> most dangerous locations during a tornado are in permanent homes and
> mobile homes where a total of 77 percent of the fatalities occurred.
> One mitigation measure which would probably save lives, but is
> unrealistic to adopt is to limit the use of mobile homes. Many mobile
> homes cannot withstand the high winds associated with tornadoes.
> Despite the increased risk, the 5 to 6 percent of the population who
> live in mobile homes and the manufactured housing industry would
> aggressively fight any attempt to limit the sale or location of mobile
> homes.
>
> As a result, much of the Federal Government's tornado mitigation
> policy is based on a program of public education. Options that local
> municipalities may consider include building reinforced shelters in
> mobile home communities where residents may go to better protect
> themselves in the event of a tornado.
>
> Three issues that the Smith chapter considers most important in
> tornado policy are:
>
> 1\. The degree of preparedness,
>
> 2\. The definition of disaster, and
>
> 3\. The amount of Federal aid that should go to individuals, the
> State, and local governments after a disaster.

All three have been influenced by politics and will be elaborated on
below.

*Objective 21.3*

> Many State and local governments are not as prepared to meet the
> threat of tornadoes as they could be. Locally elected officials have
> difficulty determining the costs and benefits of spending public funds
> on tornado preparedness measures. They often seriously discount the
> probability that a tornado will impact their jurisdiction.
>
> Doppler radar is a technology that can increase the warning time for
> those in a tornado's path. Meteorologists rely on weather radar to
> provide information on developing storms. The NWS has strategically
> located Doppler radars across the country which can detect air
> movement toward or away from the radar. Early detection of increasing
> rotation aloft within a thunderstorm can allow life-saving warnings to
> be issued before the tornado forms. However, not all tornadoes are
> detectable or trackable on radar of any type.
>
> The increased use and coverage of Doppler radar by the National
> Weather Service and other organizations has done much to improve
> public warning time in advance of tornado strikes. An ironic twist is
> that better tornado watches and warnings issued by Federal agencies
> and by radio and television news organizations, have inadvertently
> alleviated some of the burden of emergency notification handled by
> local governments. If local governments do not maintain adequate
> tornado warning systems for their people, as a consequence of
> over-dependence on tornado tracking by others, this may be a
> dereliction of their public responsibility.
>
> Since tornado and severe storm disasters are of such low probability,
> they have low political salience outside of areas that have been
> recently hit. Thus, State and local officials have been justifiably
> weary of allocating funds to better prepare for the possibility of a
> tornado disaster. Measures that could be taken by local jurisdictions
> may include siren warning systems, the building of permanent
> structures in the vicinity of mobile home communities, and supplying
> NOAA radios to residents. Many State and locally elected officials
> have decided to perpetuate inadequate tornado preparedness measures
> because, in their minds, the risk of a touch down is simply not great
> enough to warrant doing more.
>
> The NWS reports that an average 80 people are killed by tornadoes
> every year in the United States, and \$100,000,000 of property damaged
> is attributed to tornadoes. Most tornadoes are classified as WEAK
> tornadoes and account for less than 5 percent of all tornado deaths.
> About 70% of fatalities are from VIOLENT tornadoes, but only some two
> percent of all tornadoes are in this class. The Fujita Scale
> classifies tornado severity from 0 to 5 with F-5 tornadoes sometimes
> packing windspeeds of up to 300 mph. (Further review of these
> classifications appears in the Supplemental Considerations below.)
>
> The Smith chapter considers both the unlikelihood of a tornado and the
> cost of adopting measures like warning sirens. In 1980, the Civil
> Defense Director of Kalamazoo, Michigan, estimated that only 17
> percent of the city's residents were within hearing range of city
> sirens. Despite this and even though Kalamazoo had (earlier that year)
> suffered a tornado that killed five people, the city council opted not
> to appropriate money for additional sirens. Many cities within
> "Tornado Alley" have adopted a network of warning sirens. However,
> this is only one means of warning the public. NOAA radios may be a
> more suitable warning device for some residents.
>
> Federal attention has been able to influence some tornado preparedness
> technology. After a tornado killed many parishioners attending Sunday
> services in an Alabama church in 1994, Vice-President Gore visited the
> site of the tragedy. In an expression of sympathy, he publicly
> lamented the lack of early radio warning. This gesture helped to move
> forward technological advances which now make it possible for
> specially designed radios to automatically turn themselves on with the
> broadcast of an emergency warning signal. Churches and other public
> facilities around the country are now acquiring these relatively
> low-cost devices which may serve to prevent future tragedies similar
> to Alabama's.
>
> The National Weather Service asserts that the NOAA WEATHER RADIO is
> the best way to learn of warnings by its monitoring stations and
> units. The NWS continuously broadcasts updated weather warnings and
> forecasts that can be received by NOAA Weather Radios which are sold
> in many stores. The average range is 40 miles, depending on
> topography. The NWS recommends that people purchase a radio that has
> both a battery backup and a tone-alert feature which automatically
> turns on when a tornado watch or warning is issued. In conjunction
> with this, the American Red Cross has purchased 25,000 NOAA Weather
> Radios using a foundation grant. The ARC is in the process of
> providing these radios to all of its chapters and facilities
> Nationwide. Distributing these radios and educating the public on
> radio use and listener response may be more cost efficient and
> practical for local and State authorities in order to better protect
> their constituents from disasters.

*Objective 21.4*

> Defining tornado damage as a "disaster" in official terms is often
> controversial and an object of political dispute. Congress tends to
> establish and re-establish Federal disaster policy in response to
> statistically rare major natural catastrophes. In 1960, 1965, 1969,
> 1970, and 1974, Congress revised and expanded Federal disaster policy
> specifically in response to major natural catastrophes. In doing so,
> Congress may have inadvertently made it possible for any community,
> even slightly affected by a tornado or weather event, to claim that it
> had been struck by a "major" disaster.
>
> What may be defined as a disaster has ramifications at the State and
> local levels in the way that these elected government officials handle
> tornado disasters. The Smith chapter remarks that the trivialization
> of what constitutes a disaster has several important policy
> consequences \[Smith and Jervis, 1991, pp. 122-123\].
>
> 1\. Because a Presidential Declaration of a major disaster will bring
> about a major transfer of money, goods, and services that might
> otherwise have to be supplied by State and local politicians,
> communities and State governments are encouraged to highlight their
> losses and underestimate their resources. (Federal agencies often
> participate in damage assessment, however, and so may determine the
> veracity of claims made.)
>
> 2\. The large number of Disaster Declarations has placed tremendous
> pressure on the disaster relief funds available, prompting FEMA to
> reduce its contribution to repair the infrastructure of State and
> local governments. This in turn, has angered many State and local
> leaders who complain that they are not receiving their "fair share" of
> Federal aid funds.
>
> 3\. The expanded definition of what constitutes a disaster undermines
> Federal efforts to encourage State and local governments to adopt
> mitigation and preparedness plans, because it is assumed that Federal
> relief aid may be used to rebuild or even improve communities struck
> by a tornado.
>
> Other factors also play a part in determining the justification for a
> Presidential Declaration of major disaster or emergency. One such
> factor is the amount of insured and uninsured losses. If a locality
> devastated by a tornado has a large portion of uninsured losses,
> Federal and State help may be proven necessary. Correspondingly, a
> community whose tornado losses may be replaced or recovered through
> private insurance has less justification in proving declaration
> deservedness. For example, after a F-5 (maximum strength) tornado
> devastated Jarrell, Texas, in the summer of 1997 the Governor applied
> for a Presidential Declaration of major disaster, but his request was
> turned down. Apparently, disaster management officials determined that
> 77 percent of the homes that were destroyed were fully insured, and
> this may have been the basis for the rejected request. \[Lopez, July
> 29, 1997.\]
>
> The Media's portrayal of a tornado's impact on a region may also have
> a political influence on recovery efforts.

**Supplemental**

**Considerations**

> At the time of this writing, the NWS reported that WEAK TORNADOES
> accounted for some 69% of all tornadoes and less than 5% of tornado
> deaths. They last approximately 1 to 10+ minutes and have winds of
> less than 110 mph. STRONG TORNADOES accounted for about 29% of all
> tornadoes and nearly 30% of all tornado deaths. These tornadoes may
> last 20 minutes or longer and have winds of 110-205 mph. VIOLENT
> TORNADOES accounted for only 2% of all tornadoes, but 70% of all
> tornado deaths. They may last over 1 hour and produce winds of greater
> than 205 mph.
>
> The instructor may ask the students to recall previous tornado
> disasters reported by the Media. Ask them if they remember any laws or
> policies which may have stemmed from these tornado disasters. Ask if
> any one has seen the Hollywood movie, "Twister," and whether that
> dramatization conveyed any useful lessons to the public, keeping in
> mind the critical issues in tornado disasters. These critical issues
> include effective forecasting, credible announcements of tornado watch
> and tornado warning, tracking the general path of sighted tornadoes,
> public evacuation in advance of tornado hazards, appropriate
> sheltering of evacuees, de-mobilization, emergency response to damaged
> areas, search and rescue operations, emergency medical services,
> utility repair, business and residential insurance against wind and
> rain damage, disaster relief from public sources, and long-term
> recovery efforts.
>
> An excellent source of information about tornado disasters, as well as
> disasters in general, is the University of Colorado's Hazards Center
> website:
>
> www.colorado.edu/hazards/litbase/hazlit.htm

**Endnotes**

-   Lopes, Dr. Rocky, Community Disaster Education, American Red Cross,
    Internet communication (July 29, 1997).

**Session No. 22**

**Course**: The Political and Policy Basis of Emergency Management

**Session**: Exam Two **Time**: 1 Hour

**Objectives:**

At the conclusion of this session students should be able to:

> 22.1 Understand the procedures and expectations related to Test Two
>
> (the take-home essay).
>
> 22.2 Be prepared for the in-class portion of Exam Two.

**Scope**

> This session will concentrate on reviewing the highlights of material
> covered in Sessions 14-21 and in providing advice regarding the
> content and format of the take-home essay assignment option.

**References**

1.  Professor: course outline pertaining to readings to be emphasized on

> the test, and handout of instructions on how to prepare the take-home
> essay (see Appendix).

2.  Student: notes, readings, outlines, and sample questions provided by

> the instructor.

**Requirements**

> Course outline; and handouts provided by the instructor, including
> sample questions. Also, the instructor should make available to the
> students their respective take-home essay question (this should be
> circulated to students one week before the time that Exam Two is
> given, if possible).

**Remarks**

> At the time that Exam Two is given, students should know how their
> work will be evaluated. This includes the credit weight of in-class
> short-answer question scoring, the credit weight of the take-home
> essay and its corresponding in-class essay credit weight. Remember,
> students have the option to either do the take-home essay (turning it
> in at the start of the test---therefore precluding the need to do the
> in-class essay portion of the test) or forgoing the take-home essay
> option (thus requiring them to complete the essay portion of the
> in-class test). Remind them that NO EXTENSIONS ARE PERMITTED FOR THE
> TAKE-HOME TEST, SO THAT, IF THE TAKE-HOME TEST IS NOT COMPLETED AND
> TURNED IN AT THE START OF THE IN-CLASS TEST, THEY MUST COMPLETE BOTH
> THE ESSAY AND SHORT-ANSWER PORTION OF THE TEST.

**Supplemental**

**Considerations**

> As indicated for Exam One, the student survey provides information
> regarding the student's educational background, major field of degree
> study, work experience, disaster-related course work, and their degree
> of interest in types of disaster events. This information should be
> used to develop a custom-made, paragraph-long, take-home, essay
> question for each student.
>
> The content of short answer questions included in the test is
> obviously the purvey of the instructor. Questions can be framed as
> True or False, Multiple-Choice (in response to a statement the student
> picks from items A, B, C, D which item best applies), or Matching (in
> which a student is given an alphabetized list of terms and then a
> series of individual statements each of which has ONE correct matching
> term contained in the alphabetized list).
>
> The purpose of the short-answer section is to insure that each student
> has achieved a general knowledge of the material covered in the
> preceding sessions. The use of essays, take-home or in-class,
> indicates some aspects of the student's mastery of the material, but
> in-class, short-answer, closed-book, testing is a more definitive and
> objective indicator of what was learned. To reduce student anxiety
> levels, the instructor may chose to include several (perhaps 5 points
> worth) of EXTRA-CREDIT, short-answer questions. Answers to
> extra-credit questions result in no point penalty if incorrect. Those
> extra credit questions answered correctly are added to the student's
> numeric test score. This, in effect, makes each student earn what
> might have been an across-the-board test-scoring curve.
>
> Be sure to go over the test during the session in which you return it
> to the students. This helps both the instructor and the student gauge
> the degree of difficulty in answering each question. It also might
> help to identify questions that most of the class missed and which
> might be re-asked in a future test. Take-home essay test results need
> to be discussed individually
>
> with each student who makes an inquiry. This is often a good occasion
> to promote instructor-student interpersonal relations. It also
> produces better results on future tests.