W

TO: A/Administrator

> A/Chairman, NASA Advisory Council
>
> Z/Associate Administrator for Policy and Plans

FROM: W/Assistant Inspector General for Inspections, Administrative

> Investigations, and Assessments

SUBJECT: Shuttle-Mir Rendezvous and Docking Missions and

> International Space Station Operational Readiness Task Forces

The Office of Inspector General (OIG) is conducting an inquiry on United
States (U.S.) participation in the Phase I Russian Mir Space Station
Program (Phase I). As part of that inquiry, we examined the external
review teams NASA appointed to identify and analyze issues for the first
Shuttle-Mir rendezvous and for subsequent Shuttle-Mir missions (the
Stafford Task Forces). Because NASA will continue to rely on the
Stafford Task Forces' assessments regarding the final NASA-Mir mission
as well as the International Space Station (ISS) program, we are making
recommendations to improve the effectiveness of these external reviews.

**Introduction**

In May 1994, the Acting Deputy Administrator established the Task Force
on the Shuttle-Mir Rendezvous and Docking Missions (SR&DM) to assess ISS
Phase I Shuttle-Mir missions under the charter of the NASA Advisory
Council (NAC). Lt. General Thomas P. Stafford, USAF (Ret.) (General
Stafford) was selected as chair for the Task Force based on his
expertise regarding on‑orbit rendezvous and docking maneuvers,
especially between U.S. and Russian space craft. The Task Force
initially focused on technical and management aspects of the Shuttle-Mir
Program. At the Administrator's request, it expanded that focus to
include flight readiness.

In November 1996, the Administrator established the Task Force for ISS
Operations Readiness (IOR) to conduct reviews and assessments and issue
recommendations to the NAC regarding the operational readiness of the
ISS. General Stafford also chairs the IOR Task Force.

General Stafford's knowledge and experience with U.S. and Russian space
programs and his familiarity with Russian political and social
environments has been credited with being instrumental in increasing
Russian cooperation and communication on the ISS program. This may be
one of the most important benefits NASA derives from the continued work
of the Stafford Task Forces.[^1]

**The Role of the Task Forces**

The SR&DM Task Force was initially established "to review Phase 1
(Shuttle-Mir) planning, training, operations, rendezvous and docking,
and management and to provide interim reports containing specific
recommendations to the Advisory Council."[^2] After the fourth formal
report of the SR&DM Task Force, the Stafford Task Force began issuing
letters of flight readiness and focusing on Shuttle-Mir safety
assessments (See Appendix A for a list of report and letter dates). The
SR&DM Task Force addressed the first five reports to the NAC Chairman.
It addressed the letters of flight readiness to the NASA Administrator
and presented results of its assessments at quarterly NAC meetings.

The Task Forces are largely volunteer organizations and the period
between Shuttle-Mir missions is relatively short. For these reasons, the
Task Forces rely on mission-related presentations made to them by NASA
as a primary source of information for making their assessments. In
addition, the Task Forces form small teams (working groups and "Red
Teams") which, among other activities, visit Russia to gather additional
information to assist in making their assessments. Individual members
also contact NASA employees or others with expertise in specific areas.
General Stafford communicates with his counterpart Academician Utkin
(Utkin) either in person or by telephone on specific issues.[^3] Many of
the issues General Stafford addresses to Utkin have been discussed
earlier by the Phase I staff and their mission counterparts in
Russia.[^4] Nevertheless, the dialogue in which General Stafford engages
with Utkin is important as part of the contextual negotiations between
the Russians and Americans.[^5]

The Administrator increasingly relies on the Stafford Task Force to
provide safety assessments of Shuttle-Mir missions, and on July 15,
1997, the Agency described the Task Force to Congress as "the third part
of a three-fold safety assessment process" (See Appendix B).[^6]

**A. [NASA Should Reevaluate The Role Of The Task Forces For Future
Missions]{.underline}**

The ISS assembly schedule of more than 40 combined U.S. and Russian
launches over a 6-year time frame will be very aggressive (much more so
than Shuttle-Mir missions with 4 to 6 months between mission launches).
As presently staffed, the time constraints and demands on the largely
volunteer Task Force members precludes members from providing immediate
safety and mission assessments of every ISS mission.[^7] NASA has
alternative methods to perform safety assessments. There are external
advisory groups that either focus on safety, such as the Aerospace
Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP),[^8] or look at safety-related issues
(e.g., the National Research Council has conducted studies on orbital
debris and the NAC Advisory Council on the ISS, headed by A. Thomas
Young, also examines some safety-related issues).

The Stafford Task Forces could better serve NASA by focusing on specific
areas of review for the remainder of the Phase I mission and for ISS
Phases II and III. For instance, topics could include crew training,
crew compatibility, habitation, procedural documentation, and lessons
learned. These focused reviews are more germane to the original charters
of the Task Forces and the framework of the NAC. Safety assessments
should be limited to habitation-related issues or specific safety or
technical concerns and should be coordinated with other external
advisory groups such as the ASAP.[^9]

**[Recommendation:]{.underline}** The Agency should follow its original
charter for the Stafford Task Forces to perform studies on specific
areas rather than having them provide immediate safety assessments prior
to launches.

**B. [NASA Should Reevaluate The Composition Of The Task
Forces]{.underline}**

The members and support staff of the Stafford Task Forces include
special Government employees (SGE's),[^10] NASA civil servants, and
three contractor employees hired under a task on a Johnson Space Center
(JSC) contract. The current SR&DM Task Force consists of the Chairman
(General Stafford); 14 voting members; 2 technical advisors, one of whom
is an "ex officio" member;[^11] and an Executive Secretary. A part-time
contractor administrative assistant provides administrative support to
the Task Forces.

The composition of the SR&DM Task Force has remained relatively constant
since it was created in May, 1994. The IOR Task Force's composition is
similar to that of the SR&DM Task Force. Several members serve on both
the SR&DM and the IOR Task Force (See Appendix E).

Most members of the Task Forces (SR&DM and IOR) are current or former
NASA employees and contractors, or are affiliated with the aerospace
industry or NASA by contract. Some members have backgrounds in
engineering and operations management, some are former astronauts, and
three members are physicians. Task Force members who are current NASA
civil servant employees are involved in the Agency's Space Shuttle,
Shuttle-Mir, ISS, science, microgravity, and safety programs.

The SGE Task Force members are appointed federal experts and consultants
and are subject to the identical ethical requirements (e.g., conflict of
interest constraints) imposed on civil servant employees pursuant to the
*Standards of Ethical Conduct for Employees of the Executive
Branch.*[^12] As part of their appointment process, SGE's must submit
Confidential Financial Disclosure Reports (OGE/SF Form 450) which are
reviewed by the Office of General Counsel. As with civil servant
employees, the SGE's must annually resubmit an OGE/SF Form 450. The
SGE's serve voluntarily and receive no compensation for their services
beyond reimbursement for travel expenses (including per diem).

Unlike the SGE's and civil servants, the three contractor employees are
not subject to the *Standards of Ethical Conduct for Employees of the
Executive Branch*. Moreover, the contractor employees are not volunteers
but are paid employees of private companies.

Our examination of the composition of the Stafford Task Forces indicates
the following:

> 1\. [The Presence Of NASA Civil Servants As Voting Members Negates The
> Appearance Of An Objective, External Advisory Task Force]{.underline}
>
> NASA characterizes the Task Forces as being "independent" and
> "objective."[^13] Yet, NASA civil servant employees serve as voting
> members of the Stafford Task Forces. As NASA employees responsible for
> mission and program success, they are in conflict (or potential
> conflict) with their role as voting members of
> [independent]{.underline} Task Forces. The perception of the
> integrity, independence, and objectivity of the Task Forces is
> diminished by the employees' dual roles.
>
> For example, the Office of Safety and Mission Assurance Deputy
> Associate Administrator is a voting member of the Task Forces. The
> perception of independent safety reviews may be negated by a voting
> Task Force member who is not independent from and external to the NASA
> safety process. Likewise, members of the Task Force who are currently
> astronauts may impact the perception of independence and objectivity
> as they vote on issues directly affecting their programs.[^14] Another
> example is the Associate Administrator for Life and Microgravity
> Sciences and Applications who serves both as a voting member of the
> Task Forces and also provides oversight of the Mir and ISS science
> programs for which his office is responsible. Information in these
> areas is vital to the success of the Task Forces, but representation
> should be limited to technical advice, assistance, or information.
>
> **[Recommendation:]{.underline}** Current NASA civil servant members
> of the Task Forces whose positions are directly related to specific
> issues being assessed should serve only in a non-voting advisory role.
>
> 2\. [The Presence Of SGE Members Whose Professional Livelihoods Are
> Closely Aligned With NASA's Shuttle-Mir And ISS Programs Negates The
> Appearance Of An Objective, External Advisory Task Force]{.underline}
>
> Some SGE members of the Task Forces are contractors closely linked to
> NASA contracts and NASA programs dealing with the Space Shuttle,
> Shuttle-Mir, and ISS. Some SGE's are so closely aligned with NASA
> programs and contracts or hold significant financial interests in NASA
> contractors that they may have to recuse or disqualify themselves from
> any discussions regarding the operations of the contracts vis-à-vis
> Shuttle-Mir or ISS programs. [^15] Having SGE members closely aligned
> with related Russian and NASA programs, contracts, and grants may
> create the perception of a bias or lack of impartiality. [^16]
>
> For example, an SGE who is a former astronaut is also the Chief
> Operations Officer for the United Space Alliance (USA) contract. Under
> the Space Flight Operations Contract, USA provides operations and
> processing services for the Space Shuttle. The success of the Space
> Shuttle program is directly related to the Shuttle manifests
> (supported by USA) for construction of the ISS. This close
> relationship with the Space Shuttle program may create a perception of
> bias and may diminish the perception of independence and objectivity.
>
> One SGE, a retired Rockwell executive, is also Vice President and
> Deputy Program Manager of Kistler Aerospace Corporation (Kistler).
> Kistler has contracted with Aerojet to purchase a total of 76 Russian
> engines to power Kistler's future K-1 reusable launch vehicles. This
> SGE has served on Stafford Task Force Red Teams and has traveled with
> the Stafford Task Force to Russia. The position held by this SGE at
> Kistler and the financial dealings Kistler has with the Russian
> aerospace industry may negatively impact the perception of
> independence and objectivity. [^17]
>
> Another SGE and former astronaut is President and Chief Executive
> Officer of ANSER Corporation.[^18] ANSER, once a small Air Force
> Federal Contract Research Center, is now a multimillion dollar
> organization with a large foreign customer base that includes joint
> working agreements with Russia, the Ukraine, and Kazakhstan. ANSER not
> only fosters opportunities for international cooperation by providing
> analysis of current Eastern European technologies and space activities
> but also contracted with NASA to produce a report assessing NASA
> science performed on Mir.[^19] The position held by this SGE coupled
> with the related activities of his organization with Russian and NASA
> aerospace and science organizations may weaken the perception of the
> Task Forces' independence and objectivity.
>
> **[Recommendation:]{.underline}** The Task Force Executive Secretary
> should closely review with an ethics counselor the Confidential
> Financial Disclosure Reports of all SGE members to evaluate potential
> disqualifying interests. Where the perception of bias exists, but the
> technical expertise of the individual is vital to the mission of the
> Task Forces, the SGE member should serve solely in a non-voting
> advisory role.
>
> 3\. [The Task Forces Can Better Function As An External Objective
> Group By Diversifying Its Professional Membership]{.underline}
>
> The composition of the SR&DM Task Force has remained relatively
> unchanged since its creation in 1994 (See Appendix E). However, the
> focus of the SR&DM Task Force has changed from producing
> topic-specific, detailed reports for the NAC to primarily assessing
> safety and flight readiness of Shuttle-Mir missions for the
> Administrator. [^20]
>
> As stated earlier, the Task Force is generally comprised of current or
> former NASA employees, or with individuals who are affiliated with the
> aerospace industry or with NASA by contract. For the Task Forces to
> achieve maximum effectiveness, a membership balance should be
> maintained between individuals with in-depth NASA knowledge and those
> with relevant outside perspectives.
>
> General Stafford (with input from Task Force members) currently
> recommends individuals for appointment to the Task Forces. However, a
> revised selection procedure could yield a more diverse Task Force
> membership with the appropriate expertise to address emerging issues
> and also reduce the potential for a selection bias that tends to
> perpetuate a professionally homogenous group. This professional
> homogeneity fosters the perception of a lack of objectivity. Although
> astronauts and other professionals closely associated with NASA
> generally have a high degree of objectivity, the Task Forces must
> weigh all external perceptions.[^21]
>
> The Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA) requires the membership of
> advisory committees (including task forces) to be "fairly balanced in
> terms of the points of view represented."[^22] The Act also requires
> that precautions be taken to ensure that the advice and
> recommendations of the committees "will not be inappropriately
> influenced by the appointing authority or by any special interest, but
> will instead be the result of the advisory committee's independent
> judgment."[^23] Advisory committees and task forces not only provide
> ideas and advice to the Government, but they can also bestow political
> legitimacy on that advice. Because of the value that can be placed on
> advisory committee and task force recommendations, care must be taken
> to assure objectivity.
>
> Even though not covered under FACA, when the National Research Council
> (NRC) selects experts to work on various studies, the possible
> perception of a lack of objectivity is avoided by employing a
> committee to screen potential members. The screening includes
> discussions of bias and appearance issues. The committee balances the
> composition of the group to embrace members with divergent views. To
> increase openness, the NRC posts the names of the recommended study
> group members on a webpage for public comment prior to making the
> final selection. In this way, additional rigor is placed on the
> selection process to maximize the opportunity to include individuals
> with diverse viewpoints as committee members.
>
> Members and advisors with long-term experience and in-depth knowledge
> of NASA and Russian programs and technical areas are essential
> elements of the Stafford Task Forces. However, to be most effective,
> the Task Forces should be routinely infused with the perspectives of
> highly qualified, new, and diverse members while maintaining the
> continuity of core membership.[^24] This action would not only provide
> consistency and familiarity to their Russian counterparts but would
> also prepare the next generation of NASA employees or SGE's to
> interface with the Russians.
>
> The Stafford Task Forces should seek divergent views from individuals
> possessing relevant expertise who are not associated with NASA. For
> example, adding non-NASA personnel from the NRC; the Federal Aviation
> Administration; the Department of Defense; or the National
> Transportation Safety Board, would increase the Task Force's
> credibility and enhance its capabilities. Recommendations from
> prestigious bodies outside NASA carry great weight with Congress and
> the public and would help focus attention on specific issues.
>
> **[Recommendation:]{.underline}** NASA should increase the
> professional diversity of the Task Forces by rotating membership and
> appointing highly qualified individuals from various backgrounds as
> members or advisors. The Agency should seek recommendations for
> qualified Task Force members from outside sources. The expertise and
> skills of those recommended for membership should relate directly to
> ISS issues.[^25]

**C. [More Economical And Efficient Use Of Support
Contractors]{.underline}**

In addition to SGE\'s and civil servants, the Stafford Task Forces rely
on contractors to provide technical and administrative support. These
services are contracted under a JSC contract, NAS9-18800, with Johnson
Engineering Corporation (JEC).[^26] Technical and administrative support
for the Stafford Task Forces is provided through a task order under WBS
A.1.4 of the JEC contract valued at \$1,574,000 with a period of
performance ending April 30, 1998. Additional technical support is
provided by a sole source subcontractor, Engle Technologies, Inc. (ETI),
under JEC task order WBS A.1.4. The ETI firm, fixed price subcontract
(JE-9019-SN3043), consisting of one employee, is valued at \$725,091
with a 30 month period of performance ending April 30, 1998. [^27]

Our review of the support contractors services includes:

1\. [Administrative Support Services]{.underline}

> The administrative support for the Task Forces is provided through
> task order WBS A.1.4 of the JEC contract. The administrative tasks
> provided to the Stafford Task Forces include, but are not limited to:
> taking notes and supplying minutes of meetings, scheduling
> conferences, arranging travel and lodging, coordinating and completing
> paper work for travel reimbursements and Confidential Financial
> Disclosure Reports for some SGE's. Provisions for administrative
> support, however, are not included in the task descriptions or task
> requirements for this task order.
>
> According to the Office of Policy and Plans, other NAC committees or
> task forces rely on civil servants or use the Jorge Scientific
> Corporation contract (NAS5-32459)[^28] available through the Technical
> Information Services Branch at the Goddard Space Flight Center for
> most of their administrative support. NASA Headquarters management
> advocates the Jorge Scientific Corporation contract for providing
> consolidated administrative support to NAC committees, task forces,
> and other Headquarters offices. This is consistent with support
> service contract consolidations efforts throughout Headquarters and
> the Agency (See Appendix H).
>
> The Stafford Task Forces could also obtain additional administrative
> support from civil servant support staff at Headquarters. [^29]
> Headquarters downsizing has created a small surplus of support
> personnel that could be made available for administrative support of
> the Stafford Task Forces. Also, the Office of Headquarters Operations
> is evaluating civil service support staff balances to determine the
> feasibility of consolidating civil servant administrative support to
> assist the NAC.
>
> Finally, having JSC administer a contract to provide administrative
> support for a NAC task force rather than using the Jorge Scientific
> Contract only serves to reinforce the perception that the Stafford
> Task Forces are closely aligned with JSC.
>
> **[Recommendation:]{.underline}** In keeping with the NAC's general
> reliance on and the Agency's encouragement to use the Jorge Scientific
> Corporation contract or civil servant support staff for administrative
> support, the Executive Secretary of the Stafford Task Forces should
> follow this same procedure for obtaining administrative support for
> the Task Forces. The current study by the Office of Headquarters
> Operations should include the specific needs of the Stafford Task
> Forces to determine if Headquarters civil servants are available to
> support the Task Forces.
>
> 2\. [Technical Support Services]{.underline}
>
> Technical support for the Stafford Task Forces is provided by JEC
> under task order WBS A.1.4 using JEC employees and the sole source
> subcontractor ETI. The JEC contract provides the "ex officio" member
> who serves in a technical support capacity.[^30] The ETI sole source
> subcontract provides a technical advisor[^31] for the Stafford Task
> Force. According to the Office of Policy and Plans no other NAC
> committees or task forces rely on continuing contractor supplied
> technical support.
>
> a\. [Technical Support Provided By JEC]{.underline}
>
> The "ex officio" technical support provided by the JEC task order
> under WBS A.1.4 is very broad. This support not only covers assisting
> in the Stafford Task Forces' external reviews, but also includes
> working on "JSC internal technical tasks" of Space Shuttle,
> Shuttle-Mir, ISS, and other advanced programs (See Appendix K). In
> addition to technical assessments, the contractor also appears to
> provide some administrative support services that are outside any task
> descriptions or task requirements as provided under this task order.
> Deliverables for this task order are monthly reports which are, in
> actuality, nothing more than ETI monthly invoices and listings of
> meetings attended by ETI.
>
> Furthermore, the "ex-officio" member of the Task Forces is apparently
> in a position to justify the technical and cost reasonableness of the
> ETI subcontract proposal. This relationship increases the perception
> of partiality which in turn lessens the appearance of independence and
> objectivity (See Appendix L).
>
> b\. [ETI Sole Source Contract]{.underline}
>
> We have two main concerns with the Stafford Task Forces' use of the
> ETI sole source subcontract. First, the initial basis for the ETI sole
> source subcontract to JEC is no longer apparent. The basis used to
> justify the current sole source subcontract to ETI is that only one
> responsible source can satisfy Agency requirements. [^32] However, it
> is no longer clear as to how this technical advisor is uniquely
> qualified to perform this work. Given the number of Shuttle-Mir
> rendezvous and docking missions that have occurred since this sole
> source was established, other qualified sources are probably available
> to perform the technical aspects of this effort (e.g., several Shuttle
> astronauts now have firsthand knowledge with Shuttle-Mir rendezvous
> and dockings). The technical expertise provided by ETI may now be
> available from sources within the civil service staff, the astronaut
> corps of the Agency, or other the private sector entities.[^33] These
> sources could serve as non-voting members of the Task Forces (if they
> are current civil servants) or as SGE's. Moreover, using other
> qualified individuals as technical advisors in no way precludes the
> Stafford Task Forces' from using the ETI advisor as an SGE.
>
> Our second concern is that a contractor employee affiliated with the
> Stafford Task Forces may be serving or acting in positions that are
> inherently Governmental in nature.[^34] For example, a contractor
> employee has led working groups made up of civil servants and SGE's,
> to include leading working groups or various activities on visits to
> Russia. This activity is not only contrary to Office of Management and
> Budget (OMB) Circular A-76 guidance but could also give the perception
> that a contractor employee is directing Federal employees and/or
> conducting foreign relations.[^35]
>
> As in the JEC task description, the ETI Statement of Work also directs
> the contractor to "maintain communication and relations with the
> Russian Space Agency Advisory Expert Council" (See Appendixes J and
> K). This specific tasking may place the contractor in a position to
> conduct foreign relations or to give the perception of conducting
> foreign relations. This function should be performed by General
> Stafford, other SGE's, or civil servant employees who can
> appropriately provide continuity and long-term relationships with the
> Russians.
>
> Various Stafford Task Force documents have identified the ETI
> contractor employee as serving as deputy to General Stafford or as the
> deputy of independent reviews. This again places the contractor in a
> potential position of directing Federal employees (including SGE's),
> conducting foreign relations (in the stead of the Task Force Chairman)
> and strengthens the perception that a contractor employee is directing
> Federal employees and/or conducting foreign relations.
>
> The Agency should consider structuring and staffing the Task Forces to
> perform taskings without using support contractors. Scientific and
> engineering technical support can be provided a number of different
> ways including an expansion of SGE appointments, civil servant
> detailees within NASA or from other Federal departments or agencies,
> term or temporary civil service appointments, or the use of "NASA
> excepted" appointments.[^36] If expertise provided by current
> technical support is essential to the success of the Task Forces, then
> such support can also be provided through any of the aforementioned
> methods.
>
> **[Recommendation:]{.underline}** The Agency and the Stafford Task
> Forces should review current sources of technical support and explore
> using alternatives. NASA should reevaluate the use of and
> justification for support service and sole source contracts to provide
> technical support for the Stafford Task Forces, especially since the
> JEC task order and ETI subcontract periods of performance end on April
> 30, 1998.[^37] The Agency should also examine and correct all
> situations found to be contrary to OMB Circular A-76 policy.

**Summary of NASA Management's Response**

NASA's response states the activities of the Stafford Task Forces are
within the discretion of NASA management and are within the approved
terms of reference. NASA also states the composition of advisory
committees in the "absence of legal constraints" is left to the
discretion of management. In balancing members' expertise and
independence, expertise may legitimately outweigh total independence.
The Agency asserts members of NASA advisory groups are selected based on
technical expertise and the ability to "contribute to deliberations."
NASA also states membership in advisory groups is balanced to represent
various points of view. In addition, the Agency cited no FACA, OMB
Circular A-76, or conflict of interest (18 U.S.C., section 208)
violations by the Stafford Task Forces.

NASA states that some recommendations in our report will be addressed at
the time the IOR Task Force is renewed. These recommendations include
evaluating membership, assessing the status of NASA members and
technical advisors, and adhering to the correct application of "ex
officio" status. The Agency will also evaluate sources for
administrative and technical support. Finally, NASA will also designate
a deputy chair for the IOR Task Force from among the SGE membership and
will assure that working groups are led by Government employees.

NASA's complete response to our draft report dated January 12, 1998, is
provided in Appendix P.

**Evaluation of Management Response**

In his cover memo to NASA's response, the Administrator states, ". . .
\[Y\]ou raise a serious issue regarding the perception of bias in our
activities. We share this concern and plan to exercise appropriate
review and management judgment as we proceed with NASA Advisory Council
activities." We believe our recommendations will improve the Task
Forces' credibility, effectiveness, and balance in points of view and
lessen the perception of selection bias.

We will continue to review and monitor the operation of the Stafford
Task Forces and NASA's actions in response to our recommendations.

**Conclusion**

NASA characterizes the independent assessments of the Stafford Task
Forces as vital for the safety and flight readiness of Shuttle-Mir and
ISS missions. The credibility, independence, objectivity, and value of
the Task Forces' recommendations are therefore essential to the mission
success of the remaining Shuttle-Mir and future ISS missions. We feel
our recommendations will increase the credibility and effectiveness of
the Stafford Task Forces.

David M. Cushing

16 Enclosures

cc:

Distribution

**Distribution**

**[National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)
Officials-In-Charge]{.underline}**

AD/Acting Deputy Administrator

AT/Associate Deputy Administrator (Technical)

C/Associate Administrator for Headquarters Operations

F/Associate Administrator for Human Resources and Education

G/General Counsel

H/Associate Administrator for Procurement

I/Associate Administrator for External Relations

J/Acting Associate Administrator for Management Systems and Facilities

L/Acting Associate Administrator for Legislative Affairs

M/Associate Administrator for Space Flight

P/Associate Administrator for Public Affairs

Q/Associate Administrator for Safety and Mission Assurance

U/Associate Administrator for Life & Microgravity Sciences &
Applications

**[NASA Advisory Officials]{.underline}**

Chairman, NASA Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel

Chairman, Advisory Committee on the International Space Station

Chairman, Shuttle-Mir Rendezvous and Docking Missions and ISS
Operational Readiness

Task Force

**[Chairman and Ranking Minority Member of each of the following
Congressional]{.underline}**

**[Committees and Subcommittees:]{.underline}**

Senate Committee on Appropriations

Senate Subcommittee on VA-HUD-Independent Agencies

Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation

Senate Subcommittee on Science, Technology and Space

Senate Committee on Government Affairs

House Committee on Appropriations

House Subcommittee on VA-HUD-Independent Agencies

House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight

House Subcommittee on National Security, International Affairs, and
Criminal Justice

House Committee on Science

House Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics

For copies of Appendices A to P, please contact Dana Mellerio.

[^1]: Other contributions of the Task Forces include the recommendation
    to establish the Phase I Program Office and Program Manager position
    and to reorganize the Moscow Technical Liaison Office.

[^2]: Introduction to the second, third, and fourth reports of the SR&DM
    Task Force, dated July 29, 1994,

    November 2, 1994, and March 1, 1995, respectively.

[^3]: For example, while in Russia, General Stafford personally spoke
    with Utkin about the June 25, 1997, Progress collision with the Mir.
    He spoke with Utkin via telephone about last minute computer
    problems days before the STS-86 launch.

[^4]: Prior to General Stafford's discussions with Utkin, the Phase I
    Program Manager, Frank Culbertson (Culbertson), and his team were in
    contact with both NASA's Moscow teams and their Russian counterparts
    discussing how to avoid future Progress collisions with the Mir and
    establishing U.S./Russian communication and mission protocols on
    automatic (KURS) and manual (TORU) dockings. Likewise, U.S./Russian
    discussions on the computer problems just prior to the STS-86 launch
    occurred at the

    Team 0 meetings at Kennedy Space Center on September 20, 1997,
    before General Stafford was notified and before he called Utkin.

[^5]: In his *Manual for Negotiating with Russians* prepared for Johnson
    Space Center, Steven D. Jones points out the importance of having
    someone of recognized stature build and maintain trusting, long-term
    relationships with the Russians. In addition, Jones also notes the
    importance of strengthening relationships through social
    interactions. The formal signing of contracts or protocols are a
    ceremonial result of many social meetings where the actual
    agreements have been reached.

[^6]: The Agency has since corrected its depiction of the Stafford Task
    Force's relationship with the formal NASA safety assessment process.
    The Task Force, however, remains one of three checks the
    Administrator reviews for Shuttle-Mir safety. See also the OIG
    report, *Timing of Independent Team Meetings and Communications for
    Shuttle-Mir and International Space Station (ISS) Missions*, dated
    November 20, 1997.

[^7]: The launch of STS-86 bringing David Wolf (Wolf) to Mir and the
    future launch of STS-89 exchanging Wolf for Andrew Thomas,
    demonstrate the constraints on the Stafford group. They originally
    planned a visit to Russia around the K. F. Tsiolkovsky 140th
    Anniversary Conference. The Task Force had scheduled a meeting with
    experts on ISS topics but because of the heightened attention on Mir
    safety issues, the Task Force requested the Russians to schedule
    additional briefings on Mir issues, even if some ISS issues were not
    addressed (See Appendix C). As requested by the Administrator, the
    Stafford Task Force has formed another Red Team led by General Ralph
    Jacobson, USAF (Ret.) (Jacobson), to assess safety issues for the
    STS-89 Shuttle-Mir mission now scheduled to launch in late January.
    However, because of personal schedules, Jacobson is not available
    for the first 2 weeks of January. The Task Force's open meeting to
    discuss the results of their assessments is scheduled for January
    14, 1998.

[^8]: See ASAP Charter, Appendix D.

[^9]: Obviously, if the Task Force perceives critical issues impacting
    safety and mission assurance, they should report these issues
    immediately to the Phase I Program Office, the Office of Safety and
    Mission Assurance, the Administrator, and other relevant officials.
    Moreover, nothing precludes the Task Force from conducting their own
    "reality check" on the Agency's efforts by contacting experts on
    safety issues they believe require examination.

[^10]: 18 U.S.C., Section 202(a) defines an SGE as:

    > ". . . an officer or employee. . . who is retained, designated,
    > appointed, or employed to perform, with or without compensation,
    > for not to exceed one hundred and thirty days during any period of
    > three hundred and sixty-five days, . . . temporary duties either
    > on a full-time or intermittent
    >
    > basis. . . ."

[^11]: The "ex officio" member of the Stafford Task Force provides
    technical assistance and some administrative support and is a
    support contractor. The prior "ex officio" member supplied the same
    type of support and was also a support contractor. It appears that
    the Task Force is using the term "ex officio" to mean "unofficial."

[^12]: *Standards of Ethical Conduct for Employees of the Executive
    Branch*, Part 2635, Subpart A, General Provisions, 2635.102,
    Definitions, specifies:

    > \(h\) Employee means any officer or employee of an agency,
    > including a special Government employee.

[^13]: For example, in response the OIG report *Timing of Independent
    Team Meetings and Communications for Shuttle-Mir and International
    Space Station (ISS) Missions*, the Agency describes the Task Forces
    "operating parallel to but independent of NASA activities." In
    responding to the same report, General Stafford also characterizes
    the Task Forces' role as providing "independent assessments."

[^14]: Also, with limited space flight opportunities, astronauts may not
    be inclined to raise issues that could jeopardize future flight
    selections. This does not mean that astronauts would sacrifice the
    safety of their colleagues, but raises a concern that flight
    selection may weigh in the decision making process of the
    astronauts.

[^15]: See *Standards of Ethical Conduct for Employees of the Executive
    Branch*, Part 2635, Subpart D, Conflicting Financial Interests,
    2635.402, Disqualifying financial interests.

[^16]: *Standards of Ethical Conduct for Employees of the Executive
    Branch*, Part 2635, Subpart A, General Provisions, 2635.101, Basic
    obligations of public service, states:

    > \(8\) Employees shall act impartially and not give preferential
    > treatment to any private organization or individual. . . .
    >
    > (14)Employees shall endeavor to avoid any actions creating the
    > appearance that they are violating the law or the ethical
    > standards set forth in this part. Whether particular circumstances
    > create an appearance that the law or these standards have been
    > violated shall be determined from the perspective of a reasonable
    > person with knowledge of the relevant facts.

[^17]: Kistler Aerospace Corporation is a privately funded, U.S.
    company. Kistler's Board of Directors and Technical Team is
    comprised of many former top level NASA and private aerospace
    corporation officials. Kistler recently (January 5, 1998) awarded a
    \$145 million contract to Northrop Grumman Corporation to design,
    develop, and manufacture structures for the K-1 two stage reusable
    launch vehicle program (See
    http://www.newspace.com/industry/Kistler).

[^18]: ANSER is a not-for-profit public service research institute
    providing analytic and technical support to Federal agencies, as
    well as some U.S. and foreign corporations, in the areas of
    aerospace systems, aerospace science and technology, foreign
    technology analysis, and information systems services. ANSER created
    the Center for International Aerospace Cooperation (CIAC) to enhance
    development and cooperation on international aerospace projects.
    CIAC has joint cooperative working agreements with over two dozen
    Russian, Ukrainian, and Kazakhstani agencies and institutions,
    including the Russian Space Agency. In its 1996 Annual Report, ANSER
    describes the CIAC as having "earned the trust of the Russian
    scientific community." ANSER claims "\[t\]his trust defined the
    basis for cooperative missions to the Russian orbiting laboratory
    Mir and for eventual co-construction of the International Space
    Station" A member of the CIAC Board of Advisors serves as a
    consultant in support of the U.S.-Russian Joint Commission on
    Economic and Technological Cooperation which has led the development
    of U.S./Russian agreements. In this capacity, the CIAC board member
    serves as a consultant to an activity whose mission is U.S./Russian
    cooperation. (See ANSER homepage at http://www.anser.org).

[^19]: On September 30, 1997, ANSER's CIAC produced a final report,
    *Assessment of the NASA-Mir Science Program in Life and Microgravity
    Sciences: Benefits to Date and Expectations for the Future*, under a
    firm, fixed-price Headquarters contract NASW-97007 valued at \$4.1
    million, which includes 4 option years.

[^20]: Although the composition of the IOR Task Force is very similar to
    the SR&DM Task Force, some changes in membership have been made as
    they relate to ISS-specific issues.

[^21]: Most current and former Task Force members have long term direct
    or indirect ties with current and former astronauts (or are current
    astronauts), JSC, and/or the JSC Director (See Appendix E). Also,
    many current and former Task Force members have or had a subordinate
    relationship to the JSC Director or relationships based on the JSC
    Director's previous positions (e.g., Deputy Associate Administrator
    for Space Flight; Deputy for Operation for the Synthesis Group;
    Director, JSC Flight Crew Operations; and Director, JSC Flight
    Operations).

[^22]: Federal Advisory Committee Act, Section 5(b)(2). See also
    Appendix F for an explanation of FACA Amendments of 1997 placing
    FACA-like requirements on committees created by the National Academy
    of Sciences and the National Academy of Public Administration and
    the use of advice from these committees.

[^23]: Ibid., 5(b)(3).

[^24]: ^?^ Several weeks ago, the Inspector General spoke with General
    Stafford about the composition of the Task Forces and its potential
    for perceived bias. General Stafford expressed his receptiveness to
    expanding the expertise and professional diversity of the Task
    Forces. Likewise, General Stafford was receptive to other ideas such
    as increasing communications with the astronaut corps on issues
    impacting Phase I and ISS missions and concerns the astronauts may
    have about open communications and Stafford Task Force independence.
    Since that discussion, General Stafford has met with the astronaut
    corps at JSC.

[^25]: For example, the Stafford Task Forces should consider adding
    expertise in the specific area of human (psychological) factors.
    Human factor specialists can provide insights into many areas vital
    to the success of the ISS due to larger and multinational crews and
    long-duration missions.

[^26]: This contract vehicle is a Cost Plus Award Fee task order
    contract with an estimated value of \$157 million.

[^27]: The ETI subcontract value of \$725,091 is included in the JEC WBS
    A.1.4 value of \$1,574,000. The ETI subcontract value includes a
    travel allowance not to exceed \$95,000 which may not be completely
    exhausted by the end of the period of performance.

[^28]: The Jorge Scientific Corporation contract makes travel and
    lodging arrangements and provides conference logistics support,
    along with taking notes and providing minutes of technical meetings
    (See Appendix G for specific services provided by the contract).

[^29]: For example, the Space Science Advisory Committee (SScAC) uses
    the Jorge Scientific Corporation contract for administrative
    support. It uses the Headquarters Printing and Design Branch for
    publication support. The SScAC webpage
    (http://www.hq.nasa.gov/office/oss/advisory.htm) is maintained by
    Code S civil servants and Headquarters Information Technology
    support staff and contains meeting dates, charter, membership
    listings, subcommittee listings, and minutes.

[^30]: This position (as currently staffed) provides general engineering
    and analysis as well as some administrative support.

[^31]: The responsibilities of the technical advisor appear to include
    handling the day-to-day workings of the Task Forces, interfacing
    with NASA personnel, leading work groups, and occasionally serving
    as the deputy to General Stafford (See Appendix I). The ETI
    technical advisor supports the Office of the Administrator, the
    Office of Space Flight, the JSC Center Director, and the NAC for
    reviews of Shuttle, Shuttle-Mir, and ISS programs. The ETI Statement
    of Work was modified on October 29, 1996, to require the contractor
    to support the JSC Center Director (See Appendix J).

[^32]: Source: Justification for Other Than Full and Open Competition
    document dated September 20, 1995.

[^33]: As far back as October 1994, the Agency was cautioned by the
    Internal Review Team (commissioned by the Acting Deputy
    Administrator to review the validity and need for Headquarters
    support contracts) to ensure that the ETI effort be "closely
    monitored to insure that the services involve expertise that is not
    available within NASA. . . ." (See Appendix M).

[^34]: OMB Circular A-76 (Performance of Commercial Activities) defines
    inherently Governmental functions

    as "being so intimately related to the public interest as to mandate
    performance only by Federal employees." Governmental functions
    include, but are not limited to, directing Federal employees and
    conducting foreign relations (See Appendix N).

[^35]: Ibid.

[^36]: Section 203(c) of the Space Act of 1958 (as amended) authorizes
    the NASA Administrator to:

    > "appoint not more than four hundred and twenty-five. . .
    > scientific, engineering, and administrative personnel. . . and. .
    > . fix the compensation of such personnel not in excess of the
    > highest rate of grade 18 of the General Schedule. . ." (See
    > Appendix O).

[^37]: We are forwarding to management under separate cover additional
    concerns we have with NASA management's use of the JEC and ETI
    contracts.