Governability

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2020 project**

**are those of individual participants. They are posted for discussion
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**only and do not represent the views of the US Government.**

# Governability

 

W*hat is the outlook for "illiberal democracies" in East Asia --
nominally democratic, but with authoritarian roots and tendencies? Has
privatization and the broad retreat of the state from many public good
choices made governments more stable? More accountable? More efficient?
Or less so across the board?*

* *

Compared with some of the other "drivers" identified as an underlying
force, which is likely to lead to systemic change in Asia, governability
is a variable much more heavily dependent upon other factors both
indigenous and exogenous. In that sense, it may even be conceived of
more as an end result rather than a driver. For the purpose of opening
the discussion, this short essay will try to point out certain key
issues, which will have to be addressed before any plausible scenario
can be worked out.

Until the financial crisis of 1997 broke out, Southeast Asia was
regarded as a success story. Terrorism in countries such as the
Philippines showed signs of abating and transitions to democracy were
proceeding steadily though not without setbacks. Thailand, Cambodia, and
Indonesia have now joined the states which regularly hold parliamentary
or legislative elections - the Philippines, Malaysia, and Singapore. The
new state of East Timor is following them. The remaining four members of
ASEAN, Brunei, Laos, Burma, and Vietnam, still remain outside of
politically open societies but serious concerns over governability seem
to be diminishing. The elections held or to be held throughout Asia this
year indicate that electoral votes will increasingly overpower the
backroom politics even in countries with very short democratic history.
In the formal sense of the terms defined as a "political system in which
people regularly vote to elect their leaders," democracy as a form of
government is likely to stay and continue to be consolidated through
revisions of electoral laws and increasingly active input made by NGOs.

The concern which increasingly moves to the foreground even in the
mainstream Western political science debate since the financial crisis
and after the terrorist act of September 11 seems other than that of
chances for liberal democracy. The unfolding of events since that
fateful day has brought the recognition that political theories and
analyses which had dominated the academic discourse has side-stepped
many of the vital issues of real life. How great is the correlation
between democratized form of government and governability in the
late-developing countries? Studies show that correlation between regime
support and political stability on the one hand and the degree of
democratization on the other is not always direct. In the third wave
democracies, the category into which most Asian democracies fall,
universal suffrage and free elections came before the vestige of
feudalism and colonial government was fully wiped out, the rule of law
was established, and economic base was secure enough to make the
exercise of individual voting rights truly meaningful.

Asia as a whole or even Southeast Asia represents such a wide diversity
of cultural and political heritage and economic situation that it goes
far beyond the scope of this short paper designed as a discussion leader
to address the issue of governability fairly. Singapore may not be the
freest country in the region yet in terms of governability and the
quality of living as an indicator of continued regime support, it ranks
above others. Its laws might be harsh but the firmly established rule of
law makes it possible to achieve great economic success and social
stability. In a different case, South Korea, which has garnered great
successes in democratizing its political system as well as developing
the economy, is experiencing a period of fresh political turmoil and a
constitutional crisis of sorts because a democratically elected
President was impeached by a democratically elected National Assembly
and the disgruntled masses took to the streets again.

It is assumed that democracy is conducive to economic prosperity from
the experience of the first world. But in most countries of Asia with a
weak tradition of self-government, an arbitrary but strong government
was often instrumental in laying the foundation of economic take-off. It
remains to be seen how the governments, more democratically elected but
weaker in power of mobilization, will fare in carrying out the vital
mission of safeguarding national security and feeding the people. North
Korea sets a doubly negative example. An undemocratic and arbitrary rule
by a Communist dynasty has led to economic stagnation and near
bankruptcy. Yet it has remained, beyond all expectations, amazingly
stable and resilient, most probably thanks to its heavy reliance on the
military.

Success or failure of democracy in Asia will depend to a large extent on
the ability of the democratically elected governments to generate enough
economic resources to meet the needs of the voting public and remain
free from corruption. The ability to cope with the problem of shadow
economy and organized crime is a closely related issue. So long as the
economy was growing and the emerging middle class was able to dominate
the political system becoming increasingly democratic and open, the
prospect looked good. But after the financial crisis of 1997, followed
by an economic down turn, most countries in Asia experienced sharper
bifurcation within the national bourgeoisie, a situation, which does not
bode well in terms of further development of democracy.

Some outside observers argue that fighting crime and establishing the
rule of law would be a task more easily to be handled than that of
developing the economy since that latter is more organically related to
the tide of globalization and does not allow for much scope for
independent action within a national sovereign entity. Corruption and
crime at the lower levels might fall into that manageable category. But
much of the more serious cases of corruption, perceived as gross
injustice by both voters and those who choose to stay outside of the
political system altogether, thereby seriously undermining the
governability, is linked to the larger process of globalization. Faced
with forces of globalization, the choice left for the national leaders,
even if democratically elected, is only that of choosing the least evil
of the bad alternatives being offered. Thus any discussion on the
stability of regimes and the future of democracy in Asia has to address
the issue of globalization and its economic and social impact on this
part of the world as a whole and on particular countries involved
individually.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union, Marxian analyses and the
dependency theory seem to lose much of their influence. But in the
aftermath of the economic crisis of 1997 and the spread of terrorism
throughout the world, they seem to attract fresh attention. In working
out a possible scenario for the future development of Asia, one ignores
at one's peril the unexhausted appeal such theories still hold to the
nationalistically minded intellectual communities in Asia. The memories
of colonial past and fear of a new upsurge of imperial domination are
forces much more deeply imbedded in the psyche of the people than is
often suspected. Critique of neo-liberalism is as fashionable as
criticism of capitalism was in the earlier decades in the formerly
colonized countries. Once a viewpoint gains a foothold in the
intellectual community with proclivities for political activism, its
mass dissemination is much faster than before thanks to the ICT
revolution which is also coming to Asia.

On the surface, the Third World movement launched at Bandung seems to
have been abandoned in favor developmentalism and movement for
democracy. But the anti-colonial obsession and solidarity which had
motivated the move has not died out. As globalization proceeds at an
accelerated pace with its pressure for further privatization and
weakening of the state's capacity directly to control the economic
process and thereby meet the demands of all those who feel threatened by
it, governments, even when democratically elected, get caught in
impossible positions. Not only those who had always lived on the
economic margin but also those who had enjoyed privileges, including the
military, internal security forces, industrial complexes, feel
threatened by globalization.

To obviate the charge or suspicion of collusion with international
capital, such governments may increasingly appeal to traditional
communal values such as nationalism or religion and use critique of
international capitalism and "Western" institutions in order to mobilize
and maintain popular support. But such compromises will not assuage the
extremist critics of globalization and world capitalist order who would
insist upon seeing the government itself essentially as agents of the
international capitalist order managed by the United States and other
advanced countries. In a modified version of the Marxian call, "the
Proletariat of the World, Unite", such dissident groups call for
international solidarity of the disadvantaged and oppressed, even
downgrading the notion of national sovereignty. The movement for Islamic
solidarity or world justice movement are examples which probably will
become increasingly prevalent. While various civic groups take full
advantage of the legal protection resulting from democratization of the
national political system, they accord little regard to the rule of law
or democratic form of government. In particular, the Islamic notion of
government is quite different from the western notion of governance in
which sovereign state remains the central axis. The fact that both the
Indonesian and Thai governments were surprised to discover that there
were terrorist cells in their countries only indicate the limits of
democratic governance in newly emerging democracies. In such countries,
for some time to come, traditional forms of social relations will
persist while free elections are predicated on the assumption that
individual citizens are fully autonomous and mature human beings capable
of taking responsibilities for the choices they make.

In discussing the issue of governability in Asia, another important
point to consider is the possibility of mass mobilization and
manipulation by small determined circles of interest. With the advent of
globalization, various stages of historical development, which took the
advanced Western countries decades if not centuries to live through, are
juxtaposed together. As familiar frames of reference are destroyed with
no ready replacement, possibilities of gross misinterpretation of
world-wide phenomena on sight and manipulation of public opinion by the
public media and the internet are open to an extent undreamt of in the
first world countries. Demagoguery find ready soil for reception when
the enormous disparity in living standard and life style is displayed in
vivid images abetting envy and anger.

Throughout Asia, the standard of living has risen perceptively and
democratic transition means greater guarantee for human rights in
general. But the sense of relative privation can easily increase rather
than decrease since the benefits of rapid economic development fall
unevenly both across the world spectrum and within each nation, and the
disparity is readily recognizable. Especially when the influence of
world financial capital becomes increasingly decisive and the
competition for limited resources becomes even more intensified, even
those countries in Asia which have already embarked upon the democratic
path for development might find it imperative to retreat from it.

In the face of the common challenge facing Asia as a whole, some
countries, like China and Japan, and possibly Singapore, will emerge as
winners, or "predator" states, capable of safeguarding their economic
security at the expense of others. Many more could fall on the side of
"failed" states, the quality of living of whose citizens will be
increasingly affected by decisions made by forces other than their
democratically elected governments. In such cases, both democracy and
statehood itself increasingly will be rendered meaningless. Some of
these might in the end become problem states, sources of international
crime and terrorism. Islam in Southeast Asia has been a characterized by
tolerance and moderation. But the fact that a hard-core militantism has
taken root is an indication that not all is well with democracy in
Southeast Asia. Democratic development might make it an even more
receptive soil for the idea of a pan-Islamic state capable of shielding
itself off from the effect of globalization driven by international
financial capital to take root.

The development of China is a great salutary influence for the moment in
terms of security and governability in Asia. But the longer effect of
the emergence of an Asian economic giant and, in particular, its impact
on China's immediate neighbors, can be unsettling as increasingly fierce
competition for limited vital resources will result in straining of
domestic as well as international relations. Governing a richer country
is no less difficult than leading a poor country is demonstrated by the
case of South Korea. Slowing down of economic growth will clearly have
adverse impact on the development of political systems.

One of the wild cards clearly lies with North Korea. Most Western
experts on North Korea have been unanimous in saying that the country as
an economic entity is beyond repair. Yet its has used its weakness as an
effective weapon in mobilizing South Korea's public opinion on its side,
greatly undermining South Korea's own governability. The outcome of the
two Koreas issue might not be of immediate concern to the countries in
Southeast Asia but the opinion concerning North Korea's nuclear threat
and other problems that country represents might be a useful gauge for
the deeper lying political sentiments in the region and thus an
indicator for the future of democracy in the region.