**COMMENTS ON PROPOSED EXTENSION**

**OF DEPREDATION ORDERS FOR DOUBLE-CRESTED CORMORANTS**

**50 C.F.R. 21.47 AND 21.48**

**AND SUPPORTING ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT**

**per Fed. Register 73(236):74445-74447**

Submitted by:

Kenneth L. Stromborg, Ph. D.

Certified Wildlife Biologist

Denmark, Wisconsin

My first comment on this Federal Register notice is that the time
allowed for analyzing the proposed actions and their effect is
insufficient given the scattered nature of the supporting background
information. Five years have elapsed since the original Aquaculture
Depredation and Public Resource Depredation Orders (hereafter, AQDO and
PRDO, respectively) but no organized set of documents evaluating the
effectiveness or environmental consequences of those actions exist.
Therefore, making comprehensive informed comments on those subjects
within the 30 day comment period is virtually impossible. Much of the
information related to this decision is unpublished and anecdotal in
nature and members of the public do not have access to it.

A related comment is that the supporting Environmental Assessment (EA)
does not comply with the \"Clarity of This Regulation\" description in
the Federal Register notice. Particularly, items (a) and (d) are not
followed in that there are references to sections that are identified by
a hierarchical numbering system, but no such numbers appear anywhere in
the EA. Several specific examples are:

p\. 28, l. 29 \-- 4.2.1 above

p\. 28, l. 31 \-- in 4.2.2 above

p\. 29, l. 9 \-- in 4.2.5

etc.

Lack of a clear reference system to other pieces of the EA makes it
extremely burdensome to review this document within the extremely short
time frame allocated.

My next comment is about the amendments to 50 CFR 21.47 and 21.48 that
extend the current dates of expiration from 2009 to 2014. For reasons
detailed in the following comments on the EA, I believe that a 5 year
extension is unwarranted and should be shortened to the minimum time
required to: 1) analyze the extant data in depth, 2) publish that
analysis in the open scientific literature where it can be reviewed by
the broad community of wildlife and fishery population biologists, and
3) develop a real adaptive management plan that can be discussed by
stakeholder groups, including those interested in the ethical issues
arising from these proposed actions, not just those with economic or
fish harvest objectives. I suggest a time frame of extending these
orders on the order of 2 years to force the Federal management agencies
(particularly the Fish and Wildlife Service - hereafter, FWS) to take
these issues seriously and provide leadership on these issues. The
shallow and economically driven determination of non-significance by OMB
is incorrect according to criteria a) and d) of the Regulatory Planning
and Review section of the Fed. Register notice. Specifically, the
removal of more than 50,000 adult cormorants (more than 100 tons of
biomass) from the Interior population and the destruction of the
reproductive capacity of more than 15% of the Great Lakes population are
significant environmental actions by any reasonable interpretation. The
continuation of these depredation orders under the cover of an
Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) prepared more than 6 years ago is
unjustified in light of the data which have accumulated during the years
since it was issued. Vague promises of issuing a Supplemental EIS at
some unspecified time in the future are insufficient (page 15 of the
EA). A specific timetable has to be proposed. The very concept of
granting states, tribes, and aquaculturists license to take cormorants
without permit is a novel policy issue in that it sets a precedent for
similar actions regarding other species of migratory fish-eating birds
like pelicans, herons, and egrets. Many of those species were severely
threatened by similarly large scale killing programs a century ago.
Protection of those species in particular was a major impetus for
developing the Migratory Bird Treaty under which FWS now operates. Is it
now FWS policy that conserving migratory bird populations means nothing
more than that those populations do not reach dangerously low, perhaps
irreversibly low, levels so that they require action under the
Endangered Species Act?

[General and Specific Comments on EA]{.underline}

In general, this EA lacks specific scientific information on many of the
important points underpinning the decision being proposed. For that
reason, the final decision has to include a plan for expanding the
knowledge base to provide an ethically acceptable basis for applying
extremely negative and widespread population pressures on a native
migratory bird species which FWS is mandated to conserve. This position
is not founded on an animal rights basis, rather, it arises from a
concern that management actions favoring some ecosystem components at
the expense of others be justified with objective information, not just
speculation or prejudice. For a recent explication of this point of
view, see Warburton and Norton (2009). The European Union has a model
for the type of effort FWS should be promoting, the REDCAFE project
(Reducing the Conflict Between Cormorants and Fisheries on a
Pan-European Scale) (see final report at
http://web.tiscali.it/cormorants/Redcafe/Redcafe_vol1_part1.pdf). Surely
if the diverse multitude of sovereign European nations can organize such
a cooperative effort, FWS can manage to promote such an effort between
the two (potentially three) affected countries in North America.
Anything less is a total abrogation of leadership responsibility. Most
effort to date has resulted from voluntary efforts by individual
scientists, several scientific societies and their members, notably, the
Symposium sponsored by the Waterbird Society in the 1990s, the more
recent Symposium sponsored by the International Association for Great
Lakes Research, and two sessions at recent Midwest Fish and Wildlife
Conferences.

Many of the conclusions reached in the EA are based on unpublished data
and analyses that are without environmental context. For example, the
unpublished data from WDNR cited on pp. 8 and 9 are used uncritically to
illustrate why fish managers are concerned by cormorant (hereafter DCCO)
predation. No attempt was made to put these data into the context of
what the theoretical consumption of forage fish by DCCO might mean to
other ecosystem components and whether or not this \"substantial
amount\" of fish might actually have any measurable effect on those
components relative to the influence of other factors affecting those
resources. I have commented in detail on statements like this by WDNR
during the development of a state level EA for Wisconsin (Stromborg
2008). A portion of those comments follows.

> Moving to the question about the effect of the cormorant population on
> the forage base of Wisconsin waters of Lake Michigan and Green Bay,
> the EA correctly notes that putting the estimated total fish
> consumption of the cormorant population in context is virtually
> impossible. This is particularly noteworthy because it is an admission
> that the proposed CDM program is based on gut feelings, not on data.
> The proposed decimation of a native bird species seems particularly
> egregious when the basis for such devastation is not based on
> objective fact. The complex interrelationships between the multitude
> of fish stocks in this system virtually ensure that compensatory
> mechanisms exist to buffer whatever effects avian predators might
> have. There is no evaluation of these potential mechanisms in the EA.
> Instead, the document proceeds to build a one-sided argument in favor
> of CDM. At a minimum, there should be a plan for data acquisition
> advanced that would inform future management decisions. Within the
> context of this EA, the calculated worst case amount of fish removed,
> 20 million pounds per year, is meaningless. No attempt has been made
> to project what the effect of not removing that 20 million pounds of
> fish would mean in terms of the real objective here, producing more
> exotic Pacific salmon in the sport fishing harvest. In fact, according
> to the latest results I have at hand, for 2006, USGS reported to the
> Great Lakes Fishery Commission that approximately 75% of the available
> forage biomass is composed of deep water species that are normally not
> even available for cormorant predation. We are talking here only about
> some portion of 25% of the biomass available to these exotic fish
> species. Any adaptive management program should be based on monitoring
> the effects of management activities. The EA should make a minimal
> attempt to estimate the expected benefits of the chosen alternative. I
> have to emphasize that what I mean is the benefit to the fishery
> resource, not just the reduction of the cormorant population. Without
> this context, there is no way to judge whether or not the proposed CDM
> program is justified, either biologically or economically. On page 22,
> the "health of the fishery ecosystem" is identified as an objective of
> WDNR fisheries management. Most definitions of ecosystem health
> recognize that viable predator-prey relationships are an indicator of
> ecosystem health. It appears that the objective of this EA is directed
> at a single ecosystem service, fish harvest, not healthy ecosystem
> interrelationships.
>
> The EA also discusses the geographic distribution of likely cormorant
> effects on fisheries. In Wisconsin waters, the shoreline of Lake
> Michigan, including Green Bay, is approximately 500 miles. Using data
> from the EA, the shoreline affected by cormorant breeding populations
> is approximately 100 miles based on flight distances of breeding birds
> measured by Custer and Bunck. The EA implicitly accepts that this 20%
> of the nearshore habitats used by foraging cormorants is an
> unacceptably high amount. If only the National Wildlife Refuge (NWR)
> breeding colonies are included, the affected area is approximately 40
> miles (8%) of the total habitat available. The question of how an
> appropriate allocation of habitat was determined is not addressed.
> Instead, NWR managers are targeted as impediments to WDNR\'s numerical
> goals for cormorant populations. The answer seems to be that WDNR is
> pandering to unlimited demands for harvest as a goal of ecosystem
> management in the Wisconsin waters of Lake Michigan. No consideration
> is given to the goal of maintaining even a scrap of habitat for the
> natural population interactions of native species of waterbirds. The
> two Refuge islands targeted at many points in the EA as standing in
> the way of the WDNR population goal were established specifically in
> 1912 and 1913 to provide refuge and sanctuary to overexploited and
> persecuted species of migratory birds. "\...reserved and set apart for
> the use of the Department of Agriculture as a preserve and breeding
> ground for native birds." (from Executive Orders of W. H. Taft).

The most serious general inadequacy of the EA is the lack of focus on
the relationship between the resource objectives and the action
proposed. There is a more detailed discussion of this position given
below under specific comments, but the essence of this point is that
almost the entire content of the EA concerns DCCO population numbers and
whether or not they will increase or decrease as a result of the
proposed actions. There is limited discussion about whether or not any
resource objectives will be achieved as the result of these altered
populations. This disconnect between results and actions amounts to
management decisions based on faith, not science. It is a sad commentary
that an Agency which prides itself on saying it is science based makes
decisions in such a manner. If adequate data do not exist to inform
decisions, then a plan to obtain such data at the earliest practical
time should accompany a statement acknowledging the limitation of the
information base on which the decision was made.

Specific Comments

p\. 1, ll. 36/37 \-- One of the terms and conditions for management
agencies operating under the PRDO is that annual reports have to include
a description of resource conflicts which agencies think require action
under the PRDO and the results of management actions taken to reduce
those conflicts. Note that this condition focuses on resource conflicts,
not on DCCO populations. After 5 years of operating under the PRDO,
there should be a large data base available on the effectiveness of PRDO
actions in reducing conflicts. Nowhere in the EA are these data
presented or even discussed. If FWS has such data, they should be
available for public scrutiny, and if FWS does not have these data, they
should say so and explain why they are not requiring agencies to comply
with this most basic condition of the PRDO.

p\. 2, third paragraph \-- Extending the original expiration dates for
the AQDO and PRDO in April, 2009 for 5 additional years with vague
promises of doing further analysis and a Supplemental Environmental
Impact Statement (SEIS) sometime before the extension expires because
\"We anticipate a need\" and \"we have decided to complete an EA\" are
unacceptable excuses for not getting the job done. What has FWS been
doing for the past 5 years? There needs to be a firm timetable
established and honored for analyzing all the data gathered on the
environmental effects of the depredation orders to date. Such timetable
should not exceed 2 years and should probably be much shorter. Once data
are gathered, graduate dissertations are usually completed by
individuals within a year. Surely an agency such as FWS can manage its
personnel and affairs on a similar timetable. This would allow an
additional year for the various machinations necessary to decide on
whether or not a full 5 year extension is warranted and to get the
paperwork done.

p\. 3, paragraph 3 \-- FWS claims that it has followed a process for
thoroughly considering adverse impacts to the environment but there are
no data presented on the magnitude of harm done to existence and
aesthetic values by actions under the depredation orders. To the best of
my knowledge, no attempt has even been made to measure these values, nor
are there any plans to do so. How FWS justifies its analyses as thorough
given these glaring data gaps is a mystery. These values might be, as
FWS believes, small, but how can such a belief be supported? There might
be many more citizens who value ecosystems with intact predator/prey
interactions and consequently would object to the actions permitted
under these orders than expected. The point is that FWS has made no
demonstration of knowledge on this topic.

p\. 7, last paragraph \-- In this discussion of potential negative
effects on various sport fish populations, a number of species are
listed. However, the data for most of these are mixed. For walleye in
Oneida Lake there was a clear demonstration of negative effect, but at
Leech Lake, MN, results are still equivocal. Smallmouth bass near Little
Galloo Island, NY were affected by DCCO, but no such effect was found
near the Beaver Islands in Lake Michigan and the issue has not been
raised in Green Bay. Yellow perch in the Les Cheneaux Islands of Lake
Huron have been studied extensively. The original research on this
problem was summarized in a detailed final report that concluded there
was no significant effect of DCCO on perch populations (Belyea 1999).
More recent work has not been published in such detail and exists as
abstracts and oral talks and claims to document perch population
processes consistent with what would be expected to result from
significant DCCO predation. Clearly, there is disagreement about effects
at this location. In lower Green Bay, WI, an extensive research program
found temporally limited effects on which I have commented in detail
relative to the Wisconsin EA and from which I quote (Stromborg 2008):

> \...the yellow perch population of Green Bay suffered a decade long
> reproductive failure during which harvest limits were reduced to a
> fraction of what they were during the halcyon days of the 1980s. It is
> vital to recognize that this was a reproductive problem, not an avian
> predation problem. In addition, the standard of harvest set during the
> years of record perch abundance is a misleading target for more normal
> conditions. It is unrealistic to think that such abundance can be
> produced consistently by any fisheries management program.
>
> The incredibly successful reproductive season in 2003 led the
> Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources (WDNR) to commission a study
> of cormorant food habits in southern Green Bay. This study provided
> much of the data used in later analyses in the EA and it is important
> to understand that this study was not designed to give a complete
> picture of cormorant effects on fish stocks. Instead, it was designed
> to measure the combined functional and numerical behavioral response
> of an avian predator to an unusually abundant food resource. The
> critical point is that this study was conducted under conditions which
> were extremely rare and almost certain to determine that yellow perch
> were a mainstay of the cormorant diet during at least some of the time
> covered by the study. As recognized in the EA, during the year in
> which this age class of perch were at an optimal size and
> availability, cormorants took advantage of this abundant food
> resource. During the next two years, other species, e.g., gizzard
> shad, round gobies, became the staples of the cormorant diet outside
> the limited time window when yellow perch were particularly vulnerable
> during the spawning season. Two very important points about this are
> barely recognized in the EA. First, the resurgence of the yellow perch
> population occurred concomitantly with the largest cormorant
> populations ever recorded in lower Green Bay. This is clear evidence
> that cormorant predation can be tolerated relative to yellow perch
> populations. The limiting factor to yellow perch seems to be
> reproduction, not predation. This fits with ecological knowledge about
> the life history strategies of r and K-selection. Second, two of the
> most abundant fishes in the cormorant diet, gizzard shad and gobies
> are exotic invaders in the Great Lakes ecosystem. Cormorants may in
> fact be providing an invaluable ecological service in helping to
> reduce the harmful effects of these invaders on the health of the Lake
> Michigan ecosystem.

Please note the concluding sentence of the first quoted paragraph above.
The perceived conflicts between DCCOs and sport fish harvesters largely
may be problems of unrealistic expectations by sport fishers who expect
record abundance and harvest every year even from species that have life
histories that produce highly variable population levels. In commenting
on the concerns over salmonids in Wisconsin, I said,

> \...Both of these fish species are managed as feral species under
> conditions analogous to livestock grazing on the open ranges of the
> 19^th^ century. However, these exotic species are so maladapted to the
> Great Lakes ecosystem that they are dependent on artificial
> reproductive and stocking programs\....the data are correlational and
> do not demonstrate any cause-effect relationship. This being the case,
> why are these data even introduced into the discussion? The idea that
> picking a single factor for discussion without considering even a
> single alternative hypothesis is, simply put, indefensible. The use of
> a covariance analysis *post hoc* to examine the time course of harvest
> in two geographic areas of Wisconsin is statistically wrong. The data
> set was not gathered in accordance with the assumptions necessary for
> this analysis and it is wrong to misuse statistics in this manner.
> More appropriate techniques, e.g., Information-theoretic or Bayesian
> analysis, might have been used, however, they depend on identifying *a
> priori* alternative explanations to test against the actual data
> gathered. Because this was not done, the quantitative results
> presented are incorrect and irrelevant to the discussion. The argument
> that cormorants might be preying heavily on brown trout but that this
> would be undetectable in a food habits study is flimsy to the point of
> being insulting. If it is impossible to even detect an effect, then
> bringing it into a management decision relies on faith, not knowledge.
> This approach does not comport with modern resource management
> philosophy.

p\. 8, first paragraph \-- The Canadian research cited here is
instructive but hardly conclusive. In discussions with FWS fisheries
biologists, I have found that there are limitations in methods and
interpretations that cause these biologists to question the
applicability of these findings to broader geographic areas. If these
questions about the systems perspective are important to managing fish
eating birds, why hasn\'t FWS embarked on a research program with or
without the collaboration of USGS fisheries biologist to answer these
fundamental questions within U.S. waters? Have FWS fishery biologists
been included in the discussions of the biological basis for the
depredation orders, particularly the PRDO? If not, why not?

p\. 8, second paragraph through first paragraph on p. 9 \-- See my
comments in paragraph 2 of these general and specific comments that
begin with; \"Many of the conclusions reached in the EA are based on
unpublished data and analyses that are without environmental context.\"

p\. 10, second paragraph \-- This section on vegetation effects of DCCO
colonies begins by stating that these effects are direct and easy to
document. This sentence fails to note that they are also highly
localized and can be dealt with apart from the PRDO. The number of sites
where DCCO damage is still at a stage where vegetative damage can be
stopped and reversed is small. Most sites with damage are so far past
quick recovery that they must written off in the short term. A very real
question exists about whether or not damage by colonial bird colonies
and subsequent recovery is a natural component of the local sites where
it occurs. The difficulty is that the time span of human observation may
just be insufficient to yet recognize the entire cycle. There does seem
to be some degree agreement that limiting the number of sites dominated
by DCCO is appropriate, but as noted above, there are mechanisms other
than the PRDO to accomplish this limited objective.

p\. 12, paragraph 3 \-- This section of the EA contains the most
incomplete and inadequate parts of the decision making process. A vague
theoretical discussion of the meaning of existence and aesthetic values
is given, but not a single datum related to these values relative to
DCCO is cited. As far as I know, there are no plans to obtain such data
even though they are central to an honest analysis of this situation. As
so eloquently discussed by Warbuton and Norton (2009), the absence of
data or presence of substantial uncertainty requires a commitment to
support and conduct research to produce relevant data to better inform
decisions. I am not aware of any plans to conduct such research or
locate such data related to the DCCO management decision. These facts
call into question the ethical validity of decisions made regarding the
depredation orders that can only be answered by action on the part of
FWS and other partners. This situation presents a perfect opportunity
for FWS to demonstrate true leadership in resolving what is termed a
\"wicked\" problem by Warburton and Norton (2009).

p\. 13, ll. 17-19 \-- If \"\...DCCOs are not solely , or even largely,
responsible for declines in fishing participation\...\", how can FWS
cite this as one of the valid reasons for permitting the take of
\>50,000 adult birds per year and the elimination of a large proportion
of the reproductive potential of a major population of this species? In
my experience, the misconceptions of anglers about the role of predation
in determining fish stocks are much more influential than the actual
amount of that predation in determining fishing participation. A public
education program would be a more honest approach to this economic
effect than pandering to these misconceptions under the PRDO.

p\. 13, third paragraph \-- In light of the comment immediately above,
USDA-WS is to be commended for undertaking research on this subject,
even though the effort has been late in starting. This should have been
one of the first questions asked at the very beginning of the PRDO
process. I encourage FWS to become a full partner in this effort.

p\. 17, paragraph 3 \-- Even though Seamans *et al.* (in review) used
all available data, they were unable to resolve questions about the
effect of depredation orders on the population dynamics of Great Lakes
DCCOs (\"likely had a negative effect\", \"\...effect\...was
unclear.\"). The need for further, targeted research is obvious and
should be included in the decision about extending these depredation
orders.

p\. 18, last paragraph, p. 19, first paragraph \-- There are other
interpretations of the role of DCCOs in the yellow perch fishery in the
Les Cheneaux area. In particular, the yellow perch fishery throughout
Lake Michigan collapsed simultaneously regardless of whether or not
DCCOs were present at any particular location. Recovery occurred even
though DCCO populations were at maximum historical levels. The counter
argument that perch would have been even more abundant in the absence of
DCCO predation exposes the real management question here; should fishery
stocks be managed only for the purpose of maximizing yield for human
consumption?

p\. 19, paragraph 3 \-- It is encouraging to note that research is in
progress on the bass/DCCO connection in Lake Ontario. The absence of
research on other fisheries should be noted and a plan to fill this data
gap should be proposed as part of the decision on extending the PRDO.

p\. 23, second paragraphs 2 and 3 \-- This discussion of the Economic
Environment provides a stinging indictment of the knowledge base on
which the efficacy and legitimacy of these depredation orders is based.
The acknowledged lack of data on the economic impact of both the AQDO
and PRDO causes FWS to rely on \"qualitative assessment\" and
\"\...would expect such an improvement to eventually result\...\". These
statements reflect guesswork and faith, not demonstrable cause/effect
relationships. As Warburton and Norton (2009) point out, this type of
process leads to decisions that have very shaky ethical groundings. FWS
has to address this data gap by presenting a plan for correcting this
situation if a decision to extend the depredation orders is to have any
legitimacy.

p\. 24, first paragraph \-- FWS \"predicts with confidence\" that
continuation of the depredation orders and the yearly take of
50,000-100,000 adults combined with reproductive controls will not
\"threaten the long-term conservation\" of DCCO populations. This EA is
full of statements about lack of data and documents the absence of plans
to fill these data gaps. How can FWS \"predict with confidence\" the
results of any decision based on inadequate data? The crux of the
problem is that FWS has used a very objectionable definition of
\"long-term conservation\". Seriously disrupting the population dynamics
of the most important segment of the continental population of DCCOs
seems to be a very twisted interpretation of \"conservation\". At a very
minimum, such a plan erodes the ethical basis of wildlife management in
general and this threatens the long-term conservation of all fish-eating
species in particular and predatory species in general. As suggested by
Warburton and Norton (2009), ethical management plans must include
attempts to close critical data gaps. They also point the way to do this
within the context of continuing control activities. FWS should
incorporate these suggestions into the current decision on extension of
these depredation orders.

p\. 26, paragraph 2 \-- This discussion is severely biased in favor of
the proposed alternative because only the few instances where localized
control programs have seemed to result in higher sport fish stocks are
recognized. There is an inherent bias against reporting negative results
and situations like Green Bay where fish stocks rebounded to record
levels even in the presence of historically high DCCO populations are
not considered. The absence of evidence is not evidence of absence of
effects. Research to date has been focused on situation that are likely
the most extreme cases of local problems. Extrapolating results more
generally amounts to speculation if used to support management plans.
Potentially, these speculations could be the basis of management
experiments if research is incorporated into the management plan.

p\. 27, last paragraph, p. 28, first paragraph \-- This discussion of
values exposes the most serious bias in this EA. FWS takes the view that
mass killing of adults and reproductive control of major segments of the
DCCO population \"**To some,** might be aesthetically offensive but to
**many others**\...management would provide aesthetic benefits\"
(emphasis mine). FWS has presented no evaluation or data supporting
these judgments about the relative numbers of citizens in these groups,
not even an evaluation of responses to the original depredation orders.
Granted, FWS has an obligation to manage migratory bird populations that
transcends simple vote-counting of opinions, but the discussion of
values in this section betrays an inherent bias against opponents of the
proposed action. There is no basis in fact for categorizing one group as
small compared to the many in the other group. This deficiency is the
single most glaring defect in the decision process documented in this
EA. Even though many other elements of the process are based on
incomplete data, this portion is based on no data. This is the area
where FWS can and should exhibit leadership and step up to the
responsibility to gather the facts necessary for a scientifically
informed decision.

p\. 29, Summary \-- There is an extremely important point noted in this
summary that should be emphasized throughout the EA. The point is that
the goal of the depredation orders is not to change DCCO populations,
rather, both orders have a goal of changing other resource values;
reducing DCCO populations is a tool, not an end in itself. That being
the case, evaluations of the response of other resource values to
changes in DCCO populations should be the focus of whatever actions are
implemented through the depredation orders. As a particular example, the
most extreme reproductive controls in the Great Lakes have been
instituted in the Wisconsin waters of Green Bay (Appendix 3). In
addition, large numbers (approximately 500) of breeding adults were
removed for research purposes in each of 3 years (effectively
eliminating the productivity of that many nests). To date, no research
targeted at determining whether or not these severe population
management actions have had any effect has been conducted or announced.
If the goal of the depredation orders is to produce changes in resource
values, not just DCCO numbers, how does FWS propose to enforce its
responsibility to determine the effectiveness of the depredation orders?

p\. 29/30, Consultation and Coordination \-- Even though the author
contacted and coordinated with a number of individuals and agencies
during preparation of this EA, the consultation was completely biased
with respect to likely points of view. Aside from technical points,
coordination was limited to action agency personnel. No non-governmental
organizations were consulted, nor were any individuals holding negative
opinions of the depredation orders listed as having been included as
contributors of opinions on the depredation orders. As noted in my first
paragraph of comments on the EA, the REDCAFE Project is a good example
of how stakeholders should be involved in making the type of decision
covered by this EA. The lack of early stakeholder involvement during the
development of the action proposed here will lead to rejection of the
legitimacy of the final decision by those who feel that their opinions
were marginalized in the process (see above comment on pp. 27/28). Some
form of stakeholder involvement early in the process of developing a
proposal is essential if the final decision is to have any possibility
of acceptance. Accepting comments only after a preliminary decision is
formalized is not a productive route for producing acceptance of the
final decision.

p\. 31, paragraph 3 \-- Despite what FWS thinks about whether or not the
issues involved in these depredation orders have changed since they were
finalized, there is now more than 5 years of experience with the
implementation of these orders and data are now available to assist in
evaluating the issues. The 30 day notice period has fallen at a
particularly unfortunate time in that there is currently a change in
administrations underway. The reality is that new leadership at FWS
could very well drastically change the policy environment within which
these orders operate. There is a vacuum of policy leadership right now
at FWS and decisions should not be finalized at this point that will
impose long term policy direction that might not reflect the goals of
the new leadership. As suggested in many of my other comments, a
temporary (e.g., 2 year) extension of these depredation orders combined
with an enforceable commitment to fully analyze existing data and
develop research plans that will fill data gaps would be the basis of an
ethical approach to managing DCCO populations. I urge FWS to adopt such
a interim strategy instead of making a 5 year or longer commitment to a
scientifically unsupported strategy based on data that are inadequate in
both scope and quantity.

p\. 45, Table \-- Wisconsin, Hog Island; no eggs have ever been oiled on
this island.

[Literature Cited]{.underline}

Belyea, Glenn Y., Susan L. Maruca, James S. Diana, Philip J.
Schneeberger, Steven J. Scott, Richard D. Clark, Jr., James P. Ludwig,
and Cheryl L. Summer. 1999. Impact of Double-Crested Cormorant Predation
on the Yellow Perch Population in the Les Cheneaux Islands of Michigan.
pp. 47-59 *in* Tobin, Mark E. (technical coordinator). Symposium on
double-crested cormorants: population status and management issues in
the Midwest. USDA APHIS Technical Bulletin No. 1879. USDA, Animal and
Plant Health Inspection Service. Washington, D.C. Proceedings of a
symposium held at the 59th Midwest Fish and Wildlife Conference in
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