**Before the**

**Federal Communications Commission**

**Washington, D.C. 20554**

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| In the Matter of                 | *  | EB Docket No. 06-119         |
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| Recommendations of the           | ** | WC Docket No. 06-63          |
| Independent Panel Reviewing the  |    |                              |
| Impact of Hurricane Katrina on   | *  |                              |
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**ORDER**

**Adopted: May 31, 2007 Released: June 8, 2007**

By the Commission: Chairman Martin and Commissioners Copps, Adelstein,
Tate and McDowell issuing

separate statements.

Table of Contents

Heading Paragraph \#

I. introduction 1

II\. BACKGROUND 2

III\. DISCUSSION 8

A. Preparation for Disasters 8

B. Recovery Coordination 32

C. First Responder Communications 61

D. Emergency Communications to the Public 103

E. Other Recommendations 111

IV\. procedural matters 122

V. Ordering Clauses 126

APPENDIX A -- List of Commenters

APPENDIX B -- Final Rules

APPENDIX C **--** Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis

# introduction

1.  In this Order, we direct the Public Safety and Homeland Security
    Bureau (PSHSB) to implement several of the recommendations made by
    the Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane Katrina on
    Communications Networks (Katrina Panel). We further order PSHSB to
    report to us on its efforts three months from the date of release of
    this Order and nine months from the date of release of this Order.
    We also adopt rules requiring some communications providers to have
    emergency/back-up power and to conduct analyses and submit reports
    on the redundancy and resiliency of their 911 and E911 networks.
    Finally, we extend limited regulatory relief from Section 272 of the
    Communications Act of 1934, as amended, accorded last year by the
    Wireline Competition Bureau (WCB).

# BACKGROUND

2.  Hurricane Katrina struck the Gulf Coast of the United States on
    Monday, August 29, 2005, causing extraordinary destruction to
    communications companies' facilities and communications services
    upon which citizens rely, in Alabama, Louisiana, and Mississippi.
    Hurricane Katrina knocked out more than three million customer phone
    lines in the region. The wireline telecommunications network
    sustained enormous damage -- dozens of central offices and countless
    miles of outside plant were damaged or destroyed as a result of the
    hurricane or the subsequent flooding. Local wireless networks also
    sustained considerable damage -- more than a thousand cell sites
    were knocked out of service by the hurricane. In the aftermath of
    the hurricane, more than thirty-five Public Safety Answering Points
    (PSAPs) were out of service, and some parishes in Louisiana remained
    without 911 or enhanced 911 (E911) service for weeks.[^1]

3.  In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, the Commission took a number
    of steps to assist the public safety community and the industry to
    restore communications. For example, the Commission staff reached
    out to industry to assess the status of their operations and
    coordinated with other federal agencies to address FCC licensees'
    needs with respect to restoration of their systems. In addition, the
    Commission instituted an expedited process of approving requests for
    Special Temporary Authority, waivers and other regulatory relief to
    FCC licensees.

4.  In January 2006, Chairman Kevin J. Martin established the Katrina
    Panel pursuant to the Federal Advisory Committee Act, Public Law
    92-463, as amended.[^2] The mission of the Katrina Panel was to
    review the impact of Hurricane Katrina on communications
    infrastructure in the areas affected by the hurricane and to make
    recommendations to the Commission regarding ways to improve disaster
    preparedness, network reliability and communications among first
    responders such as police, fire fighters, and emergency medical
    personnel.[^3]

5.  The Katrina Panel submitted its report on June 12, 2006. The Katrina
    Panel's report described the impact of the worst natural disaster in
    the Nation's history, as well as the overall public and private
    response and recovery efforts. The Commission's goal is to take the
    lessons learned from that disaster and build upon them to promote
    more effective, efficient response and recovery efforts, as well as
    heightened readiness and preparedness.

6.  To accomplish this goal, the Commission issued a Notice of Proposed
    Rulemaking (*Notice*) on June 19, 2006 inviting comment on what
    actions the Commission should take to address the Katrina Panel's
    recommendations.[^4] Noting that several of the Katrina Panel's
    recommendations involved Commission actions that were not dependent
    on a rulemaking or measures that may not fall within the
    Commission's statutory authority and jurisdiction, the *Notice*
    asked commenters to note what actions would fall within the
    Commission's statutory authority and jurisdiction, and what the
    Commission could do to encourage the appropriate entities to take
    action. The *Notice* also generally sought comment on whether, in
    adopting any of the Katrina Panel's recommendations, any additional
    safeguards should be implemented to limit disclosure of sensitive
    infrastructure information or commercial information to prevent
    exposing potential targets to wrongdoers and subjecting regulated
    entities to competitive harm. In addition, the *Notice* asked
    whether the Commission, in implementing the Panel's recommendations,
    should rely on voluntary consensus recommendations as advocated by
    the Panel or whether it should rely on other measures for enhancing
    readiness and promoting more effective response efforts. The
    *Notice* also sought comment on whether and how the Commission can
    assist organizations whose primary business is not communications
    (*e.g.*, hospitals, nursing homes, day care facilities, and so
    forth) with developing communications plans for an emergency.

7.  On July 26, 2006, the Commission issued a Public Notice asking
    commenters to address the applicability of the Katrina Panel's
    recommendations to all types of natural disasters (*e.g.*,
    earthquakes, tornadoes, hurricanes, forest fires) as well as other
    types of incidents (*e.g.*, terrorist attacks, influenza pandemic,
    industrial accidents). The Public Notice also asked parties to
    address whether the Panel's recommendations are broad enough to take
    into account the diverse topography of our Nation, the
    susceptibility of a region to a particular type of disaster, and the
    multitude of communications capabilities a region may possess. The
    Commission received over 100 comments and reply comments in response
    to the *Notice*.

# DISCUSSION

## Preparation for Disasters

8.  [Readiness Checklists]{.underline}. The Katrina Panel recommended
    that the Commission work with and encourage each industry sector,
    through their organizations or associations, to develop and
    publicize sector-specific readiness recommendations. This
    recommendation further stated that "such a checklist should be based
    upon relevant industry best practices as set forth by groups such as
    the Media Security and Reliability Council ("MSRC") and the Network
    Reliability and Interoperability Council ("NRIC"). The Katrina Panel
    also stated that such checklists should include: (1) developing and
    implementing business continuity plans; (2) conducting exercises to
    evaluate business continuity plans and train personnel; (3)
    developing and practicing a communications plan to identify "key
    players" and multiple means of contacting them; and (4) routinely
    archiving critical system backups and providing for their storage in
    "secure off-site" facilities.[^5]

9.  Commenters generally supported the creation of voluntary
    sector-based readiness checklists with input from industry.[^6] Some
    commenters specifically encouraged development by industry trade
    associations with encouragement from the Commission.[^7] In fact,
    one such readiness checklist has already been developed for the
    telecommunications industry by the Alliance for Telecommunication
    Industry Solutions ("ATIS") Network Reliability Steering Committee
    ("NRSC").[^8]

10. Testimony before the Katrina Panel revealed that industry sectors
    had not adequately prepared for a disaster of Hurricane Katrina's
    magnitude. We find that implementation of the Panel's
    recommendations in this area will improve the security and
    reliability of the Nation's communications infrastructure. Hence, we
    direct the Public Safety & Homeland Security Bureau to work with the
    industry to develop voluntary industry-sector readiness checklists
    to ensure that industry is better prepared for future disasters and
    emergencies, including an influenza pandemic. MSRC and NRIC best
    practices and other materials should serve as a foundation for
    developing these checklists. To ensure that the checklists take into
    account the needs of different types of companies, we direct the
    Bureau to reach out to a variety of trade organizations including
    those representing small communications companies. The Bureau should
    also publicize and promote implementation of the readiness
    checklists once developed, for example, by placing the readiness
    checklists on the Bureau's website and encouraging use of these
    checklists at summits and conferences.

11. [Awareness Program on Alternative Technologies]{.underline}. In the
    *Notice*, we sought comment on the Katrina Panel's recommendation
    that we act to enhance the public safety community's awareness of
    non-traditional emergency alternative technologies that might be of
    value as back-up communications systems in a crisis. In particular,
    the Panel mentioned satellite systems and two-way paging systems as
    especially resilient to disaster. Other technologies, such as WiFi
    and WiMAX, were cited for their ability to restore service rapidly.
    In addition to a lack of knowledge about these alternatives, the
    Panel described the need that members of the public safety community
    be trained in their use prior to disasters.[^9] The Katrina Panel
    suggested that the lack of such training may have contributed to
    these technologies being overlooked during Katrina, and such
    training would have to occur prior to a crisis since the days
    following such an event are consumed with far more pressing issues.

12. Commenting parties favored the Katrina Panel's recommendation that
    the Commission work to enhance the public safety community's
    awareness of alternative communications technologies. Many
    emphasized the importance of satellite technologies,[^10] with most
    of these commenters stressing the need for training in alternative
    technologies before disaster strikes.[^11] Motorola also emphasizes
    that ". . . these important technologies will be of little help
    unless public safety trains on them frequently."[^12] SIA and USA
    Mobility suggested that the Commission improve awareness through a
    combination of fact sheets and web site distribution of relevant
    information about alternative technologies.[^13] Several commenters
    suggested that the public safety community be educated about the
    applicability of amateur radio in a crisis.[^14] MAET observed that
    digital television datacasting is an alternative technology that
    should not be overlooked for emergency communications.[^15]

13. The Commission agrees that improving the public safety community's
    knowledge of, and training in, alternative technologies would
    improve preparedness for future crises. We direct PSHSB to develop
    and implement an awareness program to educate public safety agencies
    about alternative technologies and to encourage agencies to provide
    regular training on any alternative technologies to be used. The
    program could include: (1) web pages describing alternative
    technologies and how they work; (2) hosting summits and conferences
    that include discussion of alternative technologies; (3) educating
    public safety agencies about alternative technologies at events
    sponsored by third parties; and (4) making staff available to
    provide advice to public safety agencies on issues regarding
    specific technologies.[^16] Commenters have suggested a number of
    technologies be included in this program, including two-way paging,
    satellite, IP-based systems, WiFi and WiMAX. We agree that these
    technologies as well as others to be determined by PSHSB should be
    included.

14. [Outreach Program for Emergency Medical and Other
    Communities]{.underline}. The Katrina Panel recommended that the
    Commission work to assist the emergency medical community to
    facilitate the resiliency and effectiveness of their emergency
    communications systems. Specifically, the Katrina Panel stated that
    the Commission should: (1) educate the emergency medical community
    about emergency communications and help to coordinate this sector's
    emergency communications efforts; (2) work with Congress and other
    appropriate federal departments and agencies to ensure emergency
    medical personnel are treated as public safety personnel under the
    Stafford Act; and (3) support the U.S. Department of Homeland
    Security's (DHS) efforts to make emergency medical providers
    eligible for funding for emergency communications equipment under
    the State Homeland Security Grant Program.[^17] In the *Notice*, we
    also sought comment on whether and how the Commission can assist
    organizations whose primary business is not communications (*e.g.*
    hospitals, nursing homes, day care facilities) with developing
    communications plans for an emergency.[^18] Commenters generally
    support these recommendations.

15. The PSHSB provides guidance and assistance to state and local
    governments, health care providers and law enforcement agencies on
    the use of Land Mobile Radio (LMR) equipment and systems, licensing
    requirements, and spectrum and frequency use for public safety
    emergency communications. The PSHSB continues to provide assistance
    to various stakeholder groups in their efforts to ensure that they
    have operable, reliable, resilient and redundant emergency
    communications systems in place. In 2006, several state and regional
    hospital associations ran on-line articles describing the
    Commission's expanded outreach to the health care sector regarding
    emergency communications, noting that the PSHSB is committed to
    working closely with the nation's health care providers to further
    strengthen emergency response capabilities and preparedness.[^19] As
    discussed further *infra* at paragraphs 45--48 the Commission has
    also conducted outreach to encourage the emergency medical community
    and others to enroll in priority communications service programs.

16. We direct PSHSB to continue these efforts, including its
    coordination with the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)
    in the area of health care emergency preparedness as it relates to
    communications. PSHSB should continue to educate and encourage the
    ability of health care providers to employ a plurality of
    communications systems (*e.g.*, land mobile relay systems, satellite
    communications, and/or high frequency communications) on premises,
    outside of their facility, and facility-to-facility. PSHSB should
    also work with DHS and other federal agencies to ensure emergency
    medical personnel are treated as public safety personnel under the
    Stafford Act. This recommendation is critical because the medical
    sector will be supporting first responders and potential disaster
    victims.

17. We further direct PSHSB to work with the Nation\'s health care,
    education and business communities to include, in their business
    continuity planning, robust emergency communication plans that
    ensure that these entities will be able to function during
    emergencies such as an influenza pandemic.[^20] Such emergencies
    could result in sudden and significant shortages of personnel,
    changes in communications traffic, possible disruptions to
    communications networks (*i.e.*, due to increased telecommuting by
    the nation\'s workforce and society in general during an influenza
    pandemic), and lack of manpower to immediately repair affected
    communications networks. PSHSB has already begun efforts to
    establish a new federal advisory committee that will replace NRIC
    and MSRC and will address, *inter alia*, communications issues
    related to an influenza pandemic. PSHSB has also started to assemble
    information regarding pandemic influenza to place on its website. We
    direct PSHSB to continue with these efforts. In particular, PSHSB
    should update its website as soon as possible to include information
    that addresses pandemic influenza and how to prepare communications
    systems for such an emergency. The website should include links to
    other relevant government websites, such as
    [http://www.pandemicflu.gov](http://www.pandemicflu.gov/).

18. [Monitoring of Situational Awareness During Disasters]{.underline}.
    The Katrina Panel observed that there was often a lack of clarity
    about which federal agency was responsible for collecting outage
    information and that competing requests for such information at the
    federal, state and local levels was distracting to restoration
    efforts and added to confusion about agency roles.[^21] In the
    *Notice*, we sought comment on the Katrina Panel's recommendation
    that the Commission coordinate all federal outage and infrastructure
    reporting requirements in times of crisis, functioning as a single
    repository and contact with consistent data collection procedures.
    We asked parties to comment on the appropriate content of such
    emergency outage reports, their format, frequency, distribution and
    related issues. We also asked parties to comment on whether
    additional safeguards should be put into effect to address the
    potential disclosure of commercially sensitive information to avoid
    potential harm to communications providers or others. [^22]

19. The vast majority of commenting parties agreed with the Katrina
    Panel's recommendation that the Commission serve as a single
    repository for outage information and implement appropriate
    safeguards to protect sensitive information that would be provided
    in such instances.[^23] DHS agrees that a central repository for
    network outage information during a disaster is necessary and
    suggests that a rulemaking is necessary to facilitate outage
    reporting to such a repository to improve NS/EP programs.[^24] The
    National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA)
    supports the Panel's recommendation to the extent that it does not
    include Federal communications system outages and suggests that the
    outage database be maintained by the Commission representative to
    the Joint Field Office (JFO).[^25] Several commenting parties urged
    the Commission to ensure that the data collection effort is
    coordinated with the National Communications System (NCS) and the
    National Coordinating Center for Telecommunications[^26] (NCC) and
    conducted in a way that does not alter the NCC's role as the
    "primary entity in the federal government for coordinating
    communications network recovery and information sharing among
    affected industry members."[^27] Commenting parties urged the
    Commission to implement the steps necessary to protect network
    outage information from unauthorized disclosure.[^28] Commenters
    also encouraged the Commission to work proactively with state and
    local entities on a process to share outage information that
    preserves appropriate confidentiality safeguards, thereby minimizing
    duplicative requests for such information from different
    sources.[^29] Others encouraged the Commission to work with industry
    prior to the onset of a disaster to select data fields that are
    necessary to support emergency management and systems that
    facilitate data collection,[^30] and asserted that the decisions
    about what data to collect should be balanced against the burden
    that it would impose on communications providers that are actively
    engaged in restoration efforts.[^31] SIA suggested that reporting
    entities maintain a method of submitting outage data to the
    Commission during a disaster even if their primary reporting
    facility is impaired and urges the Commission to encourage the use
    of satellite technology for this purpose.[^32] NENA suggests that
    the Commission conduct detailed analyses of the 911 outage data that
    it routinely collects pursuant to Part 4 and ". . . work with
    appropriate entities to mitigate these conditions where
    appropriate."[^33]

20. We agree with the Katrina Panel that the Commission should serve as
    the central point of contact for communications outage information
    during major events and should provide access to this information to
    other agencies. The Commission has extensive experience in this area
    both through its collection of outage information pursuant to Part 4
    of the Commission's rules (outage reporting requirements) and from
    its efforts to collect situational awareness information from
    licensees in the aftermath of the 2005 hurricanes. Moreover, we note
    that, prior to the Katrina Panel's Report, PSHSB staff had already
    begun working with the communications industry and the NCS on ways
    to streamline the process used to collect situational awareness
    information from FCC licensees during emergencies. Indeed, PSHSB is
    now in the late stages of developing a system and process for
    collection of this information. Under the process contemplated by
    the PSHSB staff, communications companies serving areas affected by
    disasters could voluntarily submit information regarding, *inter
    alia*, the status of their operations, the status of their
    restoration efforts, their power status (i.e.*,* are they operating
    based on commercial power, a generator or battery power) and their
    use of fuel. The information submitted would be accorded
    confidential treatment, and would be shared with NCS on a
    confidential basis. This information would allow the Commission and
    other governmental agencies to not only track the status of
    communications companies' operations in the aftermath of a disaster,
    but also their restoration status. The information could also be
    used to determine communications companies' needs (*e.g.*,
    generator, fuel).[^34]

21. We direct PSHSB to continue working with NCS and the communications
    industry, including the broadcast and cable industries, to resolve
    any outstanding issues in order to facilitate the activation of the
    system as soon as possible. The Bureau should also work to obtain
    any necessary regulatory approvals for collection of this
    information as soon as possible.[^35] Finally, we direct the Bureau
    to work with the communications industry, NCS and state government
    agencies to address whether information submitted by the industry
    should be shared with state governments.[^36]

22. We decline to initiate a rulemaking at this time to make the outage
    reporting process mandatory. The voluntary process that was put in
    place during Katrina provided the necessary information on a timely
    basis. Furthermore, a mandatory process would be less flexible and
    would not adapt well to the unique needs of a particular crisis. For
    these reasons we find that a voluntary situational awareness process
    is more effective during disasters. Finally, we note that PSHSB
    currently conducts the analyses of 911 outage data recommended by
    NENA, including coordination with appropriate entities and industry
    bodies to effectuate improvements in 911 reliability where
    appropriate.

23. [Automatic Special Temporary Authority and Waiver
    Relief]{.underline}. The *Notice* sought comment on the Katrina
    Panel's recommendation that the Commission establish a prioritized
    system by which affected parties could automatically be granted
    waivers of certain regulatory requirements, or be granted automatic
    Special Temporary Authority (STA) in a particular geographic area if
    the President declares that area to be a "disaster area."[^37] The
    Katrina Panel stated that, as a condition of such waivers or STAs,
    the Commission could require verbal or written notification to
    Commission staff contemporaneously with activation or promptly after
    the fact. The Katrina Panel also recommended that the Commission
    examine expanding the on-line filing opportunities for STA requests.
    In this recommendation, the Katrina Panel also included a list of
    "possible rule waivers and STAs to study for this treatment."[^38]
    For the reasons indicated below, we have concluded not to automate
    the waiver and STA process.

24. Although most commenters supported this recommendation, few
    commented on how such an automatic waiver/STA process would work or
    be structured. Further no commenter asserted that the manner in
    which the Commission expedited the grant of waivers and STAs during
    the 2005 hurricanes was not effective.[^39] We believe that, on
    balance, public safety would be better served by an expedited
    review, rather than a fully automated system. Although we wish to
    relieve all licensees of unnecessary regulatory burdens during an
    emergency, we are concerned that a general policy of allowing the
    automatic grant of STAs and waivers of operational requirements
    could have serious consequences.

25. For example, without minimal Commission review, an automatic STA
    could allow operations of a new facility using spectrum already in
    use by an essential communications provider and thereby
    inadvertently cause essential communications to fail. We believe
    that it would be far easier, and more consistent with public safety
    to grant expedited review of an STA application than to try to undo
    an automatic STA once operations have begun. Further, the
    declaration of a "presidential disaster area" does not appear to be
    a sufficient basis, by itself, to grant an STA or waiver, whether
    automatically or otherwise.[^40] For example, there could be
    instances where the communications infrastructure in a
    Presidentially declared disaster area remains intact. In such a
    case, an STA or waiver may be unwarranted. On the other hand, there
    may be situations where there is damage to a telecommunications
    carrier's infrastructure in an area that is never declared a
    disaster area. Thus, an automatic STA or waiver process based on a
    Presidentially declared disaster area could be overinclusive in some
    cases and underinclusive in others. For the same reason we disagree
    that the triggering by a licensee of its emergency plan generally
    should act as a trigger for automatic STAs or waivers. There may
    also be legal impediments to automatic STAs for Title III
    authorizations under Sections 308(a) and 309(f) of the
    Communications Act. Finally, we agree with NTIA that, in an
    emergency, the close coordination that is required between the
    Commission and NTIA regarding the use of shared Federal/non-Federal
    bands and shared spectrum management responsibilities precludes a
    fully automated waiver/STA process.[^41] Accordingly, we conclude
    that some level of Commission review is necessary during an
    emergency to ensure that STAs or waivers are properly granted.

26. We believe, at this time, the best approach would be to use an
    expedited process for acting on requests for STAs, waivers and other
    regulatory relief based on the particular circumstances of the
    disaster at hand. An expedited process would allow the Commission to
    ensure that there is a link between the relief being requested and
    the emergency at issue. During Hurricane Katrina, the Commission
    publicized its procedures for seeking regulatory relief, granted
    some relief on its own motion and otherwise processed requests for
    relief on an expedited basis. Many of these requests were processed
    within four hours and all were processed within 24 hours.[^42]
    Additionally, Commission rules permit the suspension or waiver of
    rule requirements on its own motion, STA requests by telephone
    during emergencies and the grant of station licenses, modification,
    renewal or STAs without the filing of formal applications in certain
    emergency situations.[^43] Other rules provide additional
    flexibility for licensees to adjust operations during emergency
    situations.[^44] Therefore, the Commission has procedures in place
    to ensure that waivers and STAs are promptly reviewed and granted
    during an emergency. Accordingly, we direct PSHSB to work with other
    Bureaus and Offices, as necessary, to publicize emergency-related
    rules and procedures prior to disaster. This could be done by, among
    other things, providing relevant information on PSHSB's website as
    well as through outreach programs directed at public safety agencies
    and the industry.[^45]

27. [Other Pre-Positioning Recommendations From Commenters.]{.underline}
    Several commenters submitted additional suggestions for improving
    network resiliency and redundancy.

28. *Permanent Relief from InterLATA Restrictions.* BellSouth[^46]
    recommends that the Commission grant the Bell Operating Companies
    (BOCs) permanent relief from interLATA boundary restrictions. It
    argues that such action would enhance network resiliency and
    redundancy. The BOCs have already raised the issue of relief from
    Section 272 and its implementing rules in a number of pending
    forbearance petitions and waiver requests. Accordingly, we will
    consider this issue in those proceedings as appropriate.

29. *One Year Section 272 Relief.* Last year, WCB granted a one-year
    Special Temporary Authority from enforcement of Section 272 and its
    implementing rules to BOCs in order to allow them to share
    non-public, BOC network information with their Section 272 and other
    affiliates to engage in disaster planning.[^47] In addition, WCB
    granted Verizon a one-year waiver of Part 64 requirements to allow
    Verizon to engage in disaster planning with its former GTE company
    affiliates. The relief for disaster planning ends April 20, 2007 for
    AT&T[^48] and June 9, 2007 for BellSouth, Qwest and Verizon. Verizon
    and BellSouth argue that the Commission should reconsider the
    one-year limitation of this relief or change its rules so that an
    STA or waiver is not necessary. Verizon, for example, states that it
    will need to conduct disaster planning well beyond June 2007 to
    prepare for, among other things, next summer's hurricane
    season.[^49]

30. In light of the upcoming hurricane season and the separate tornadoes
    that recently struck parts of Kansas and Alabama, we grant an
    extension of the regulatory relief granted by WCB last year to AT&T,
    Qwest and Verizon for a period of one-year from the date the
    originally-granted relief is due to expire.[^50] Specifically, we
    grant AT&T, Verizon and Qwest a one-year STA and waiver of Section
    272 of the Act and the Commission's accounting and non-accounting
    structural separation safeguards. We also extend for an additional
    year, a waiver previously issued to Verizon to engage in integrated
    disaster recovery planning with its former GTE affiliates. Under the
    STA and waiver, AT&T, Qwest and Verizon will continue to be
    permitted to share non-public BOC network information with its
    Section 272 affiliates (as well as other affiliates that adhere to
    the Section 272-like safeguards), as necessary to engage in
    integrated disaster planning.[^51]

31. We find that an extension of the regulatory relief previously
    accorded these carriers serves the public interest. The unique
    circumstances of a hurricane, tornado or other disaster warrant a
    deviation from Section 272 and the accompanying rules, and such
    deviation will better serve the public interest in a time of
    emergency. This relief will allow AT&T, Verizon and Qwest to
    continue to develop risk mitigation strategies and contingency plans
    that will reduce the likelihood and duration of any service outage
    and will permit these carriers' networks to continue to operate in
    the event a "choke point" is compromised.

## Recovery Coordination

32. [Credentialing Guidelines]{.underline}. In the *Notice*, we sought
    comment on the Katrina Panel's recommendation that the Commission
    work with other appropriate federal departments and agencies and the
    communications industry to promptly develop national credentialing
    requirements and process guidelines to enable communications
    infrastructure providers and their contracted workers access to
    affected areas after a disaster. The President's National Security
    Telecommunications Advisory Committee's (NSTAC's)[^52] made similar
    recommendations to the President last year.[^53] The Panel
    advocated, however, expanding the NSTAC's credentialing
    recommendations to include repair workers of all communications
    infrastructure (*e.g.*, wireline, wireless, Wireless Internet
    Service Providers (WISPs), cable, broadcasting, and satellite).
    Further, the Katrina Panel recommended that the Commission work with
    the communications industry to develop an appropriate basic NIMS
    training course for communications repair workers that can be
    completed online as a requirement for credentialing. Additionally,
    the Katrina Panel recommended that the Commission should: (1)
    encourage states to develop and implement a credentialing program
    consistent with NSTAC guidelines as promptly as possible and
    encourage appropriate communications industry members to secure any
    necessary credentialing; (2) encourage states to recognize and
    accept credentials issued by other states; and (3) encourage, but
    not require, each regional, state and local EOC or JFO to develop
    credentialing requirements and procedures, consistent with any
    national credentialing guidelines, for purposes of allowing
    communications infrastructure providers, their contracted workers
    and private security teams, if any, access to the affected areas
    post-disaster.[^54]

33. Most commenters generally supported credentialing communications
    personnel to access affected areas post-disaster. Many stressed that
    credentialing recommendations should apply to all communications
    providers, including their contracted workers. In fact, DHS noted
    that it is making significant efforts to advance the implementation
    of a national standard for the credentialing of telecommunications
    repair workers.[^55] Commenters were split regarding whether NIMS
    training should be required as a requirement for credentialing.

34. The Commission's experience with Hurricane Katrina and the record in
    this proceeding reveal that access to affected areas post-disaster
    was one of the most critical issues for the communications industry.
    As the National Response Plan[^56] makes clear, DHS has primary
    responsibility to coordinate federal incident management activities,
    including disaster site access and credentialing, for all emergency
    personnel. As such DHS, rather than the FCC, has jurisdiction and
    authority to adopt credentialing guidelines that apply to the
    communications industry.

35. DHS and the states have taken a number of steps to develop
    credentialing guidelines that would allow communications providers
    access to disaster areas. For example, DHS/NCS worked with the State
    of Georgia and BellSouth to develop a pilot access program focused
    on priority access for critical response personnel, including
    telecommunications, which resulted in the publication of a Georgia
    Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) for emergency access.[^57] This
    SOP has been distributed as suggested protocol to all 50 states and
    the territories.[^58] DHS/Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
    is also working on an access pilot program to give telecommunication
    repair crews better access to disaster areas and is aggregating
    documentation for emergency personnel nationwide into a National
    Emergency Responder Credentialing Program that DHS/FEMA expects to
    make operational this year.

36. PSHSB staff is already working with DHS to help ensure that any
    credentialing program would encompass critical communications
    infrastructure repair crews and their contracting support staff and
    to support coordination with regional, state and local officials
    regarding the development of consistent credentialing programs for
    communications providers. We believe the issue of whether to require
    NIMS training as a requirement for credentialing is best addressed
    by DHS/NCS and regional, state and local authorities as they develop
    their credentialing programs. We agree with DHS's assertion that the
    Commission's credentialing efforts should complement, not supersede
    or duplicate, those of DHS/NCS.[^59] We direct PSHSB to continue to
    work with DHS and the states on these efforts.

37. [Emergency Responder Status for Communications Infrastructure
    Providers]{.underline}. In the *Notice*, we sought comment on the
    Katrina Panel's recommendations that the Commission work with
    Congress and appropriate federal departments and agencies to afford
    all communications infrastructure providers, including wireline,
    wireless, WISPs, satellite, cable and broadcast infrastructure
    providers and their contracted workers emergency responder status
    under the Stafford Act and to incorporate this designation into the
    National Response Plan ("NRP") and state and local emergency
    response plans.[^60] Most commenters supported this recommendation
    and stressed that the emergency responder status should be afforded
    to all communications service providers.

38. Section 607 of the recently enacted Warning, Alert and Response
    Network Act (WARN Act) amended the Stafford Act to add the term
    "essential service provider" which includes entities that provide
    telecommunications service.[^61] This section of the WARN Act also
    states that, unless exceptional circumstances apply, in an emergency
    or major disaster, the head of a Federal agency, to the greatest
    extent practicable, shall not deny or impede access to the disaster
    site to an essential service provider whose access is necessary to
    restore and repair an essential service and shall not impede the
    restoration or repair of telecommunications services.[^62] We direct
    PSHSB to work with DHS, and all other relevant federal, state,
    tribal and local government agencies, to facilitate: (1) access to
    disaster areas for communications provider personnel so that
    recovery efforts can be expedited; and (2) the incorporation into
    the NRP and state, tribal and local emergency response plans of the
    designation of telecommunications service providers as "essential
    service providers." PSHSB should also encourage DHS to seek
    Congressional action, if necessary, to ensure that the term
    "essential service provider" includes all communications service
    providers.

39. [Utilization of State/Regional Coordination Bodies]{.underline}. The
    Katrina Panel recommended that the Commission work with state and
    local governments and the communications industry (including
    wireline, wireless, WISP, satellite, cable and broadcasting) to
    better utilize the coordinating capabilities at regional, state and
    local Emergency Operations Centers (EOCs), as well as the Joint
    Field Office (JFO). In particular, the Panel recommended that the
    Commission encourage, but not require, each regional, state and
    local EOC and JFO to: (1) facilitate coordination between
    communications infrastructure providers and state and local
    emergency preparedness officials (such as the state EOC) in the
    state or region at the EOC or JFO; (2) develop and facilitate
    inclusion in state emergency preparedness plans, where appropriate,
    one or more clearly identified post-disaster coordination areas for
    communications infrastructure providers, their contracted workers,
    and private security teams to gather post-disaster where
    credentialing, security, escorts and further coordination can be
    achieved; and (3) share information and coordinate resources to
    facilitate repair of key communications infrastructure
    post-disaster.

40. Commenters generally support the recommendation that the Commission
    work with state and local governments and the communications
    industry to better facilitate coordination between emergency
    responders and the communications infrastructure providers. In its
    comments CTIA recommended that the Commission work with Federal,
    state and local governments to create a process to establish
    embarkation points for communications recovery efforts in the wake
    of a disaster.[^63] DHS agrees that it would be advantageous to
    engage the EOCs and JFOs in support of greater communications crisis
    preparedness and more effective response planning.[^64] DHS asserts,
    however, that it would be more appropriate, and consistent with
    mission responsibilities and existing relationships between the
    entities, for such activities to be coordinated jointly by NCS and
    DHS/FEMA in the first instance rather than by the FCC. Cingular
    asserts that the Commission should urge states to refrain from
    imposing emergency preparedness requirements on the industry.[^65]
    Cingular states that the adoption of state specific requirements,
    while well intended, hinder recovery efforts by eliminating
    flexibility and creating a patchwork of inconsistent requirements
    that carriers must follow.[^66]

41. These recommendations generally fall under the jurisdiction of the
    NCS which, as the coordinator and primary agency for ESF #2
    (Communications) of the NRP, performs these functions. The
    Commission supports these efforts in its role as an ESF #2 support
    agency. ESF #2 coordinates Federal actions for the restoration of
    the telecommunications infrastructure and ensures the provision of
    Federal communications support to Federal, state, tribal, local and
    private sector response during an Incident of National Significance.
    NCS assists in the coordination of planning and provision of
    emergency preparedness communications for the Federal government
    under all circumstances, including crisis or emergency, attack,
    recovery and reconstitution. The Commission and other government
    agencies such as FEMA have also taken a number of steps in this
    area. The Commission reached out to its licensees to determine their
    status and needs and provided the collected information to the NCS.
    The Commission then helped coordinate ESF #2 response efforts to aid
    the Commission's licensees (*e.g.*, arranged for helicopter
    overflights, fuel shipments, access, curfew and airport
    information). The Commission is also working with DHS/NCS to
    encourage regional, state and local EOCs and/or JFOs to identify
    post-disaster coordination areas for communications providers and
    their contract workers and to create a process to establish
    embarkation points for communications recovery efforts. For example,
    the Commission assisted DHS with developing proposals making federal
    property available as a staging area for communications
    infrastructure providers under the Stafford Act.

42. We direct PSHSB to continue to work with DHS, state, tribal and
    local governments and the communications industry on these issues.
    However, we decline to take action to urge the states to refrain
    from imposing emergency preparedness requirements on the
    communications industry as Cingular advocates.[^67]

43. [Priority Utility Restoration for Communications
    Providers]{.underline}. In its report, the Katrina Panel recommended
    that the Commission encourage, but not require, each regional, state
    and local EOC and JFO to facilitate electric and other utilities'
    maintenance of priority lists that include commercial communications
    providers for commercial power restoration. The Katrina Panel stated
    that power restoration activities should be coordinated with
    communications restoration. The majority of commenters support this
    recommendation.

44. Other agencies, such as DHS, the Department of Energy, and state
    agencies, have primary jurisdiction and authority over this matter.
    Loss of power is a critical failure that DHS/NCS is aware of and
    focused on. For example, NCS coordinates priority lists with the
    agencies responsible for NRP's Emergency Support Function #12 -
    Energy. The communications sector is number two on the ESF #12
    priority lists. NCS also has tools that can identify communication
    sites. The agencies responsible for ESF#12 have tools that can
    locate energy sites near communications providers and determine
    whether there have been critical failures. Coordination of these
    priority lists between Emergency Support Functions 2 and 12 is
    ongoing. We direct PSHSB to support DHS/NCS and the other agencies
    addressing this issue in their efforts to ensure priority power and
    other relevant utility restoration for commercial communications
    providers during and after disasters.

45. [Expanding and Publicizing Priority Communications Service
    Programs]{.underline}. The Katrina Panel recommended that the
    Commission work with the NCS to promote the use of existing priority
    communications services, such as Telecommunications Service Priority
    (TSP), Government Emergency Telecommunications Service (GETS) and
    Wireless Priority Service (WPS), to all eligible entities,
    particularly eligible government, public safety, emergency medical
    community, and critical industry groups.[^68] Further, the Katrina
    Panel stated that the Commission should work with NCS to clarify
    whether broadcast, WISP, satellite, and cable company repair crews
    are currently eligible for GETS and WPS and, if so, should also
    promote the availability of those priority services to those
    entities. The Katrina Panel also recommended that the Commission
    work with NCS and industry to establish and promote best practices
    to ensure that all WPS, GETS, and TSP subscribers are properly
    trained in how to use these services. Finally, the Katrina Panel
    recommended that the Commission work with NCS to explore whether it
    is technically and financially feasible for WPS calls to
    automatically receive GETS treatment when they reach landline
    facilities, thus avoiding the need for a WPS caller to also enter
    GETS information.[^69]

46. DHS fully supports the Katrina Panel's recommendation that the
    Commission work with NCS to promote wider use of GETS, WPS and TSP
    programs among government, public safety, and critical industry
    groups.[^70] Broadcasters that provided comments support granting
    broadcasters access to GETS and WPS.[^71] Other commenters state
    that promotion of these programs must be coordinated with industry
    to ensure that providers can absorb additional demands placed on
    their networks through increased participation in the programs.[^72]

47. PSHSB staff members are actively engaged in priority services
    outreach. For example, PSHSB staff recently worked with the NCS TSP
    Program Office, various telecommunications carriers, and the State
    of New York to enroll over 2,000 circuits into the TSP program.
    Additionally, PSHSB staff is closely coordinating with the HHS to
    increase awareness among health care providers, particularly
    hospitals, about the benefits of enrollment and participation in
    federal priority service programs. This initiative includes expanded
    outreach in the health care sector and with state health departments
    to increase their understanding of TSP, GETS and WPS during and in
    the aftermath of a natural disaster or other emergency, such as an
    influenza pandemic. HHS is considering options to better incorporate
    support for these federal priority service programs into their
    emergency preparedness funding streams. The Commission is also
    working with hospital associations to educate the medical community
    about priority communications services.[^73] In addition, PSHSB is
    working with NCS to enhance WPS and resolve the issue of whether it
    is feasible for WPS calls to automatically receive GETS treatment
    when they reach landline facilities.

48. We direct PSHSB to continue to work with DHS, including the NCS
    Committee of Principal's Priority Services Working Group (PSWG), to
    promote the priority communications services to all eligible
    entities, particularly eligible government, public safety, emergency
    medical community, and critical industry groups, including repair
    crews which could qualify under the eligibility criteria for both
    WPS and GETS under the category of disaster recovery. PSHSB should
    work with DHS to ensure that communications systems' capabilities
    are not overwhelmed by increased demands placed on networks by
    increased participation in these programs. We also direct PSHSB to
    support the creation and promotion of best practices to ensure
    proper training in how to use these services. Finally, we direct
    PSHSB to continue working with DHS and NCS's PSWG to enhance WPS and
    resolve the issue of whether it is feasible for WPS calls to
    automatically receive GETS treatment when they reach landline
    facilities.

49. [Broadening NCC to Include All Communications Infrastructure
    Sectors]{.underline}. The Katrina Panel recommended that the
    Commission work with the NCS to broaden the membership of the NCC to
    include adequate representation of all types of communications
    systems, including broadcast, cable, satellite and other new
    technologies, as appropriate. The NCC is a government and industry
    organization within DHS/NCS. It functions at the operational level
    and assists in initiating, coordinating, restoring and
    reconstituting national security and emergency preparedness (NS/EP)
    telecommunications services or facilities under all conditions of
    crises and disasters.

50. In January 2000, the NCC was designated an Information Sharing and
    Analysis Center (ISAC) for Telecommunications in accordance with
    Presidential Decision Directive 63.[^74] The NCC-ISAC facilitates
    the exchange among government and industry participants regarding
    vulnerability, threat, intrusion, and anomaly information affecting
    the telecommunications infrastructure. Since its creation, the NCC
    has coordinated the restoration and provisioning of national
    security and emergency preparedness telecommunication services and
    facilities during natural disasters and armed conflicts. The NCC
    leverages its unique joint government/industry structure and
    all-hazard emergency response capabilities to coordinate the
    initiation, restoration, and reconstitution of United States
    government national security and emergency preparedness
    telecommunications services both nationally and
    internationally.[^75]

51. DHS fully supports the Katrina Panel's recommendation that the
    Commission work with NCS to broaden the membership of the NCC.[^76]
    DHS states that NCS is already working with the members of industry
    to explore expansion of NCC membership and would welcome the
    Commission's engagement in this area.[^77] Several additional
    commenters support this recommendation.[^78]

52. In coordination with DHS/NCS, PSHSB is currently engaged in efforts
    to make the NCC more of an overall communications information
    sharing and analysis center instead of one focused solely on
    telecommunications. The Commission is working with communications
    trade groups and broadcasters, among others, to encourage them to
    consider NCC membership. Recently, a fiber optic provider the
    Commission introduced to the NCC signed up for membership as did
    APCO, COMPTEL, Global Crossing, and Cox Cable. We direct PSHSB to
    continue its efforts in this area.

53. [Website for Emergency Coordination]{.underline}. The Katrina Panel
    recommended that the Commission create a website identifying the key
    state emergency management contacts, particularly for communications
    coordinating bodies, and post-disaster coordination areas for
    communications providers. Some commenters support the proposal that
    the Commission create a disaster response website for communications
    providers; other commenters state that this function is best suited
    for other agencies, such as FEMA or DHS.

54. FEMA and many states already have publicly available information
    identifying key state emergency management contacts. FEMA's website
    has a compilation of state emergency contacts
    (<http://www.fema.gov/about/contact/statedr.shtm>) and the NCC
    website (<http://www.ncs.gov/ncc>) has links to federal agencies.
    Accordingly, we do not believe it is necessary for the Commission to
    create a similar website.

55. To facilitate access to this information by communications
    companies, we direct PSHSB to coordinate with FEMA to provide
    updated links to the relevant state emergency contact information
    contained on the FEMA website. Specifically, PSHSB should create a
    link on its website to FEMA's listing of state emergency contact
    information.

56. [FCC Website for Emergency Response Team Information]{.underline}.
    The Katrina Panel recommended that the Commission create a website
    to publicize the Commission's emergency response team's contact
    information and procedures for facilitating disaster response and
    outage recovery. Commenters unanimously support the Katrina Panel's
    recommendation. Commenters contend that the Commission should
    maximize existing resources by developing and posting on the
    Commission's website the Commission's emergency response team's
    contact information and procedures.

57. We agree that a website providing emergency contact information,
    procedures for facilitating disaster response and outage recovery,
    and procedures for obtaining regulatory relief during emergencies
    would be helpful. We direct PSHSB to work with other Bureaus and
    Offices, as appropriate, to do so.

58. [Other Recovery Coordination Recommendations]{.underline}.
    Commenters submitted the following suggestions for improving the
    recovery coordination process:

59. *Expedited Importation of Essential Communications Technology*.
    Iridium Satellite LLC suggests that the Commission work with other
    federal agencies to establish a system that facilitates the delivery
    of replacement infrastructure and equipment during a disaster.[^79]
    Additionally, Inmarsat asserts that, as part of creating redundancy,
    the federal government should recognize the importance of, and
    encourage the building of, mobile units that can be deployed as
    needed to any given disaster zone to assist in rapid restoration of
    vital communications using Mobile Satellite Service.[^80] These
    functions are covered by ESF #2. The Commission is already working
    with other agencies to support these functions and will continue to
    coordinate with DHS/NCS and other agencies regarding these matters.
    Inmarsat also asserts []{.mark}that the Commission should work with
    U.S. Customs to ensure that bottlenecks do not slow the importation
    of essential communications technology in the aftermath of a
    disaster.[^81] Inmarsat and other satellite operators apparently
    experienced a sharp rise in demand after Hurricane Katrina that
    could not be met by the existing stock of satellite terminals in the
    U.S.[^82] We direct PSHSB to coordinate with DHS/NCS, U.S. Customs
    and other appropriate agencies to develop a systematic approach
    toward the importation of communications equipment needed for
    disaster response in the wake of disasters.

60. *Real Time Tracking of Progress and Shared Experiences*. Champaign
    Urbana Wireless Network, The Texas ISP Association, The Association
    for Community Networking, and Acorn Active Media (CUWN, et al.)
    suggest that the Commission provide a means by which communications
    responders could record their progress, share experiences in real
    time and avoid accidental conflicts. This function is primarily a
    responsibility of DHS/NCS under ESF #2 and PSHSB should continue to
    coordinate with DHS/NCS regarding these matters.

## First Responder Communications

61. [Emergency Restoration Supply Cache and Alternative
    Inventory]{.underline}. To facilitate the restoration of public
    safety communications, the Panel recommended that the
    Commission: (1) support the ongoing efforts of the NCC to develop
    and maintain a database of state and local public safety system
    information, including frequency usage, to allow for more efficient
    spectrum sharing, rapid on-site frequency coordination, and
    emergency provision of supplemental equipment in the event of system
    failures; (2) support the efforts of the NCC to develop an inventory
    of available communications assets (including local, state, federal
    civilian and military) that can be rapidly deployed in the event of
    a catastrophic event[^83] and work with the NCC and the appropriate
    agencies to educate key state and local emergency response personnel
    on the availability of these assets and how to request them; and (3)
    coordinate with the NCS/NCC to assure that, immediately following
    any large disaster, there is an efficient means by which federal,
    state and local officials can identify and locate private sector
    communications assets that can be made rapidly available to first
    responders and relief organizations. The Katrina Panel noted that
    one means by which to identify and locate private sector
    communications assets would be a website maintained by either the
    FCC or NCC through which the private sector could register available
    assets along with product information and stated that such a website
    should be designed with a special area for registering available
    equipment to assist persons with disabilities in their
    communications needs.[^84]

62. *Support NCC Efforts to Develop a Database of State and Local Public
    Safety System Information*. PSHSB has already provided support for
    the NCC's ongoing efforts to develop and maintain a database of
    state and local public safety system information. With assistance
    from PSHSB, the NCC has developed a public safety first responder
    frequency sharing guide. PSHSB consulted private frequency
    coordinators and collected and coordinated information from them for
    this effort. Additionally, although it was only developed for the
    states affected by Hurricane Katrina, FEMA recently developed a Gulf
    Coast communications plan for use during emergencies that identifies
    all public safety equipment and spectrum currently in use.

63. *Coordinate with NCC to Facilitate the Availability of
    Communications Assets for First Responders Post-Disaster*. The
    Commission already coordinates with the NCS/NCC to assure that,
    following any large disaster, there is an efficient means by which
    federal, state and local officials can identify and locate private
    sector communications assets that can be made rapidly available to
    first responders and relief organizations. PSHSB has been providing
    a supporting role to FEMA on this issue. For example, per FEMA's
    request, PSHSB recently set up a meeting between FEMA and
    communications industry representatives to discuss, among other
    things, contingency contracts for equipment and the identification
    of equipment that can be airlifted through the Department of
    Defense. PSHSB already supports the efforts of the NCC to develop an
    inventory of available communications assets, in 2006 the NCS began
    development of an inventory database of government and industry
    assets. This inventory database of available government and industry
    communications assets developed by NCC and available to ESF #2
    addresses this recommendation. Regarding a website, a function
    already exists whereby industry can report their available assets
    directly to the NCC.[^85]

64. We direct PSHSB to continue to work with DHS, NCS, NCC, FEMA, state
    governments, and industry on these issues. We also direct PSHSB to
    continue to work with NCC to address the Katrina Panel
    recommendation regarding the identification of private sector
    communications assets, including specifically identifying equipment
    available to assist persons with disabilities in their
    communications needs.

65. *Equipment Cache*. Another Katrina Panel recommendation intended to
    facilitate the restoration of public safety communications includes
    that the Commission encourage state and local jurisdictions to
    retain and maintain, including through arrangements with the private
    sector, a cache of equipment components that would be needed to
    immediately restore existing public safety communications within
    hours of a disaster. The Katrina Panel stated that the cache
    should: (1) include the necessary equipment to quickly restore
    communications capabilities on all relevant mutual aid channels; (2)
    be maintained as a regional or state-wide resource, and located in
    areas protected from disaster impacts; and (3) be included as an
    element of the NRP. Further, the Katrina Panel recommended that the
    Commission encourage state and local jurisdictions to utilize the
    cache through training exercises on a regular basis.[^86]

66. In its comments, DHS stated that it has reservations about the
    recommendation concerning the stockpiling of equipment. DHS noted
    that already limited budgets do not provide funding to procure
    additional equipment and, in many cases, the redundant equipment for
    network restoration is often unavailable because the systems at
    issue are legacy systems that are obsolete and no longer supported
    by manufacturers.[^87] We agree. The Commission is reluctant to
    encourage state and local jurisdictions to maintain such a cache of
    equipment unless funding for such an effort has been specifically
    identified. Many local jurisdictions do not have the requisite funds
    for this effort. Although some states have such equipment under
    "mutual aid agreements," most states do not have funds for equipment
    not in use; their funds are used for equipment intended for
    immediate use. Further, there are already a number of training
    exercises for responders. For example, there are regional annual
    training exercises held to demonstrate equipment in a disaster and
    to show options for restoration.[^88]

67. [Facilitating First Responder Communications
    Capabilities]{.underline}. To facilitate interoperability among
    first responder communications, the Katrina Panel recommended that
    the Commission: (1) maintain the schedule for commencing commercial
    spectrum auctions by January 28, 2008 to fully fund the \$1 billion
    public safety interoperability program, consistent with recent
    legislation; (2) work with NTIA and DHS to establish appropriate
    criteria for the distribution of the \$1 billion in a manner that
    best promotes interoperability with the 700 MHz band - among other
    things, such criteria should mandate that any radios purchased with
    grant monies must be capable of operating on 700 MHz and 800 MHz
    channels established for mutual aid and interoperability voice
    communications; (3) encourage the expeditious development of
    regional plans for the use of 700 MHz systems and move promptly to
    review and approve such plans; (4) expeditiously approve any
    requests by broadcasters to terminate analog service in the 700 MHz
    band before the end of the digital television transition in 2009 in
    order to allow public safety users immediate access to this
    spectrum; (5) work with the NTIA and DHS to develop strategies and
    policies to expedite allowing Federal (including the military),
    state and local agencies to share spectrum for emergency response
    purposes, particularly the Federal incident response channels and
    channels established for mutual aid and interoperability; and (6)
    publicize interoperability successes and/or best practices by public
    safety entities to serve as models to further interoperability.

68. *Schedule for 700 MHz Spectrum Auction.* We agree that the
    Commission should, consistent with recent legislation, maintain the
    schedule for commencing commercial spectrum auctions in the 700 MHz
    bands by January 28, 2008.[^89] Accordingly, the Commission should
    proceed with current plans for developing auction rules and
    procedures, including the conclusion of a pending rulemaking
    addressing the commercial 700 MHz spectrum. The Commission will
    commence auction of this spectrum in a manner consistent with the
    Digital Television Transition and Public Safety Act of 2005.

69. *Criteria for the Distribution of the \$1 Billion Public Safety
    Interoperability Program*. We direct PSHSB to offer to work with
    NTIA and DHS, as appropriate, to establish criteria for the
    distribution of the \$1 billion interoperability fund in a manner
    that best promotes interoperability with the 700 MHz band. No
    commenter opposed the idea of the FCC offering to work with NTIA and
    DHS in this regard. Although the statute places responsibility for
    implementing this grant program upon NTIA and DHS, the Commission
    could provide helpful input. We believe, however, that such funds
    should not be limited to the 700 MHz and 800 MHz bands and that the
    PSHSB should encourage NTIA and DHS to explore ways to use IP
    technology to facilitate interoperability with VHF and UHF. An
    IP-based approach would allow legacy systems to evolve into a
    broadband communications system. Additionally, any action relating
    to the 700 MHz band should include consideration of DHS' concern
    that the Katrina Panel's recommendations are focused only on state
    and local communications with little standardization across regions
    and, therefore, fail to address the need to incorporate federal
    coordination with state and local first responders into the
    solution.

70. *Expeditious Development, Review and Approval of Regional Plans*. We
    direct PSHSB to encourage, as part of their outreach efforts, the
    expeditious development of regional plans for use of 700 MHz systems
    and to promptly review and, where possible, approve such plans when
    submitted. This received strong support in the record. PSHSB should
    initiate outreach efforts to encourage states, tribal governments
    and localities to participate in the regional planning processes.
    PSHSB can work with regional planning committees in their efforts to
    develop regional plans and coordinate their plans with adjacent
    regions.

71. *Requests by Broadcasters to Terminate Analog Service in the 700 MHz
    Band*. Although we understand the importance of ensuring access to
    this spectrum by public safety agencies as quickly as possible, we
    must balance this goal with the need to protect consumers who could
    potentially lose service if they have not yet obtained digital
    televisions or converters. Accordingly, although we will endeavor to
    process requests from broadcasters to terminate analog service as
    quickly as possible, we will continue to review such requests
    pursuant to the policies previously adopted in *Upper 700 MHz
    Memorandum Opinion and Order and Further Notice of Proposed
    Rulemaking*.[^90]

72. *Sharing of Spectrum*. We agree that implementation of the
    recommendation that the Commission work with NTIA and DHS to develop
    strategies and policies to expedite allowing Federal, state and
    local agencies to share spectrum for emergency response purposes
    would serve the public interest. We direct PSHSB, together with the
    Office of Engineering and Technology, to work with NTIA and DHS on
    this issue. There is record support for the Commission working with
    NTIA and DHS to allow Federal and non-Federal spectrum sharing for
    emergency response purposes, both in spectrum allocated for Federal
    and non-Federal uses.[^91] NTIA states in its comments that it and
    the Interdepartment Radio Advisory Committee ("IRAC") already are
    considering a proposal to revise current rules to allow more
    flexible use by state and local governments, and to simplify the
    regulations governing the use of Federal interoperability
    channels.[^92] The Commission should assist in these ongoing efforts
    in the IRAC and its subcommittees and should consider other possible
    solutions for making spectrum available for shared use by federal,
    state, tribal and local agencies for emergency response purposes.

73. *Publicizing Interoperability Successes and Best Practices*. We
    direct PSHSB to work with other federal agencies, the public safety
    community and the industry, as appropriate, to develop best
    practices to promote interoperability. In addition, PSHSB should
    encourage public safety organizations to provide interoperability
    success stories and make this information available on its website.

74. [Resiliency and Restoration of E-911 Infrastructure and
    PSAPs]{.underline}. In order to ensure a more robust 911 and E-911
    service, the Katrina Panel recommended that the Commission encourage
    the implementation of the following three best practices issued by
    the Network Reliability and Interoperability Council (NRIC):

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(1) Service providers and network operators should consider placing and
    maintaining 911 circuits over diverse interoffice transport
    facilities (*e.g.,* geographically diverse facility routes,
    automatically invoked standby routing, diverse digital cross-connect
    system services, self-healing fiber ring topologies, or any
    combination thereof).[^93]

(2) Network operators, service providers, equipment suppliers and public
    safety authorities should establish alternative methods of
    communication for critical personnel.[^94]

(3) Service providers, network operators and property managers should
    ensure availability of emergency/backup power (*e.g.,* batteries,
    generators, fuel cells) to maintain critical communications services
    during times of commercial power failures, including natural and
    manmade occurrences (*e.g.,* earthquakes, floods, fires, power
    brown/blackouts, terrorism). The emergency/backup power generators
    should be located onsite, when appropriate.[^95]

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75. We agree that PSHSB should be proactive in encouraging
    implementation of the first two of these NRIC recommendations, for
    example, through additional outreach efforts which could include,
    *inter alia*, NRIC best practice outreach efforts, promoting
    industry guidelines on its website, and working with FEMA to educate
    PSAP managers in disaster management, PSAP rerouting, and the
    National Incident Management System. This is consistent with the
    recommendations of both NRIC and the Katrina Panel that these best
    practices be encouraged, but not required. No commenters asserted
    that there is a need to make these best practices mandatory at this
    time. Additionally, there may be legitimate concerns that
    implementation of diverse 911 circuits would be cost-prohibitive in
    certain cases.

76. NENA recommends that "the FCC or the state commissions, as
    appropriate, require all telephone central offices to have an
    emergency back-up power source."[^96] St. Tammany's Parish
    Communications District 1 emphasizes the need for wireline providers
    to have backup procedures in place.[^97] Several commenters
    supported this voluntary best practice and indicated that they have
    backup power available at their facilities. For example, AT&T agrees
    that it is important to have backup power to ensure the continued
    operation of the nation's 911 system during disasters and states
    that it looks forward to helping implement the Katrina Panel's
    recommendation that the Commission encourage the implementation of
    the NRIC backup power best practice.[^98] AT&T reported that all of
    its central offices are equipped with backup batteries and/or diesel
    generators.[^99] Verizon also stated that every critical component
    in its networks is protected by automatic power back-up
    systems.[^100]

77. We agree with NENA's and St. Tammany Parish's suggestion and find
    that adoption of this requirement serves the public interest.
    Accordingly, pursuant to our authority under Section 1 of the
    Communications Act, as amended,[^101] we will require all local
    exchange carriers (LECs), including incumbent LECs (ILECs) and
    competitive LECs (CLECs), as well as commercial mobile radio service
    (CMRS) providers to have an emergency back-up power source for all
    assets that are normally powered from local AC commercial power
    including those inside central offices, cell sites, remote switches
    and digital loop carrier system remote terminals. LECs and CMRS
    providers should maintain emergency back-up power for a minimum of
    24 hours for assets inside central offices and eight hours for cell
    sites, remote switches and digital loop carrier system remote
    terminals that normally are powered from local AC commercial power.

78. Our expectation is that this requirement will not create an undue
    burden since several reported in their comments that they already
    maintain emergency back-up power. We realize, however, that this
    requirement may present a financial burden to some small carriers.
    Accordingly, we will not impose this requirement on LECs (including
    both ILECs and CLECs) that meet the definition of a Class B company
    as set forth in Section 32.11(b)(2) of the Commission's rules.[^102]
    We will also not apply this requirement to non-nationwide CMRS
    providers with no more than 500,000 subscribers.[^103]

79. For the same reasons set forth in ¶75, we find that PSHSB should be
    proactive in encouraging implementation, by all other communications
    providers, of the third NRIC recommendation set forth above in ¶74
    which states that communications service providers, network
    operators and property managers should ensure the availability of
    emergency/backup power.

80. The Katrina Panel also recommended that the Commission encourage the
    implementation of an NRIC best practice that states that network
    operators should consider deploying dual active 911 selective router
    architectures to enable circuits from the caller\'s serving end
    office to be split between two selective routers in order to
    eliminate single points of failure. This NRIC best practice further
    states that diversity should also be considered on interoffice
    transport facilities connecting each 911 selective router to the
    PSAP serving end office.[^104] Some commenters asserted that
    selective routers represent technology whose time has passed.[^105]
    NENA contends that deployment of a dual selective router at this
    point should be done only if particular circumstances strongly favor
    such an approach.[^106]

81. PSHSB should neither encourage nor mandate implementation of this
    NRIC best practice. We agree with the many commenters who advocated
    that public safety communications planning, including the 911
    infrastructure, instead should move to incorporate IP-based
    technologies.[^107] This will enable the public safety community to
    focus on future needs rather than requiring more from legacy
    systems, offer more redundancy and flexibility, and contribute
    greatly to improving compatibility between public safety systems
    that operate using different proprietary standards.

82. *Grant Eligibility*. We agree with the recommendation of the Katrina
    Panel that the FCC urge federal grant programs to permit state or
    local 911 commissions or emergency communications districts that
    provide 911 or public safety communications services to be eligible
    to apply for 911 enhancement and communications
    enhancement/interoperability grants. This recommendation also
    received strong support from APCO and NENA. We, therefore, direct
    PSHSB to consult with DHS and administrators of other applicable
    federal grant programs to explore this possibility. We caution,
    however, that PSHSB refrain from advocating any particular funding
    approach for state, tribal or local 911 commissions. Our goal is to
    support state, tribal and local 911 commissions in their efforts to
    enhance the redundancy, interoperability, and resiliency of their
    operations.

83. *Secondary Back-Up PSAPS*. The Katrina Panel also stated that the
    Commission should recommend the designation of a secondary back-up
    PSAP that is more than 200 miles away to answer calls when the
    primary and secondary PSAPs are disabled.[^108] Most commenters,
    including APCO and NENA, did not support this recommendation.[^109]
    APCO asserts that PSAPs 200 miles away would have difficulties with
    dispatch and that a better approach would be to have "mirrored"
    telephone central offices at remote locations. We decline to
    implement this Katrina Panel recommendation. Use of back-up PSAPs
    should be based on capabilities, common vulnerabilities and
    technical capabilities, not an arbitrary distance. Geographic
    remoteness is only one consideration; other considerations include
    the probability of disaster affecting both PSAPs, size of the PSAPs,
    the level of technology used at both PSAPs, radio interoperability,
    availability of operating support systems, and logistics for
    transporting and staffing PSAP personnel familiar with the
    geographic area covered by the disaster.

84. [Other Recommendations Regarding First Responder
    Communications]{.underline}. Various commenters submitted additional
    recommendations for addressing first responder communications
    issues. We will address those issues below.

85. *Relocation of Existing Licensees on Interoperability Channels.* The
    Tennessee Statewide Interoperability Executive (the Tennessee SIEC)
    asserts that the Commission should move existing licensees on the
    VHF and UHF interoperability channels so that such channels are
    available for interoperability usage and do not have to compete with
    grandfathered dispatch operations or secondary telemetry, etc. The
    Tennessee SIEC also suggested that the Commission eliminate
    licensing of the interoperability channels for any purpose other
    than interoperability.

86. When the Commission designated the VHF and UHF interoperability
    channels, it sought to balance the need for improved
    interoperability capabilities below 512 MHz with the need to
    minimize the impact on incumbent licensees. The Commission therefore
    "grandfathered" incumbent licensees on a secondary basis only to
    interoperability communication rather than ordering them to vacate
    the channels or use them exclusively for interoperability
    purposes.[^110] With regard to new licenses, the rules provide that
    these frequencies will be available primarily for
    interoperability-only communications.[^111] We decline to amend our
    rules at this time to move existing licensees on the VHF and UHF
    interoperability channels. Instead, we find that a prudent approach
    would be first to consult with public safety coordinators.
    Accordingly, we direct PSHSB to consult the public safety frequency
    coordinator community through the Public Safety Communications
    Council to determine the extent of the problem, if any, and whether
    moving grandfathered licensees at this time would be feasible, and
    if so, how.

87. *Use of a Standard Continuous Tone Coded Squelch System.* The
    Tennessee SEIC suggested that the Commission mandate the use of a
    standard Continuous Tone Coded Squelch System ("CTCSS") to promote
    interoperability and minimize disruption at a disaster scene. We
    decline to initiate a rulemaking to implement Tennessee SEIC's
    suggestion at this time. The Commission has designated 5 VHF
    frequencies and 4 UHF channel pairs for interoperability use
    nationwide. Generally, VHF and UHF *analog* public safety radios
    include the CTCSS feature. Each radio "listens" for CTCSS tones
    transmitted by base stations, mobiles, or portables. If the tone is
    present, the user hears the communications directed to him/her, but
    other transmissions on the same frequency using a different CTCSS
    tone (or lacking a tone) are muted (squelched). Because these
    frequencies also have grandfathered, non-interoperable licensees,
    mandated use of a standard CTCSS on these channels would exclude
    (*i.e.*, tune out) these incumbents. Use of different tone coded
    squelch frequencies on the interoperability channels could prohibit
    units from different jurisdictions from communicating at the scene
    of a disaster, which undermines the purpose of interoperability.
    Mandating a common CTCSS tone could impose unwarranted economic
    burdens by requiring the purchase of additional equipment or
    modification of existing equipment to employ such a tone. A
    mandated, common CTCSS also could adversely impact grandfathered
    licensees operating on the VHF and UHF interoperability channels.

88. There is not enough information in the record to recommend a
    rulemaking at this point. However, it would be prudent to consult
    with the public safety frequency coordinators to ascertain the scope
    of the problem and determine whether Commission action is warranted.
    We therefore direct PSHSB to consult with public safety frequency
    coordinators and ask them to study this proposal and provide further
    input to the Commission.

89. *Statewide Channels.* The Tennessee SIEC advocates that, in order to
    help states keep their statewide channels clear, the Commission
    should allow state agencies to provide FCC designated frequency
    coordinators with a list of FCC designated "Statewide" channels for
    protection within 35 to 50 miles of the state border depending upon
    terrain protection.[^112] We direct PSHSB to consult with public
    safety coordinators on the problem of keeping statewide channels
    clear.

90. *Licensees Adjacent to Interoperability Channels.* The Tennessee
    SIEC also advocates that the Commission mandate that the wideband
    licensees adjacent to the VHF/UHF interoperability channels move to
    narrowband emission to minimize interference to interoperability
    channels. We note our rules already require that this be done.[^113]
    Accordingly, no further action is necessary at this time.

91. *Designation of 155.370 MHz as a Nationwide Inter-agency
    Channel*[.]{.underline} The Tennessee SIEC also advocates that the
    Commission designate 155.370 MHz as a nationwide inter-agency
    channel and implement a CTCSS tone to minimize interference.[^114]
    We refrain, at this time, from initiating a rulemaking to amend our
    rules to designate 155.370 MHz as an inter-agency channel nationwide
    and implement a CTCSS tone to minimize interference. Designating
    this public safety frequency as an inter-agency channel nationwide
    may have a significant impact on existing incumbents on this
    frequency and adjacent channel incumbents. Overcoming interference
    concerns, particularly since VHF spectrum is traditionally
    congested, may prove challenging. The potential impact on existing
    licensees, including increased equipment costs, outweighs any
    benefits of designating a sixth VHF frequency for interoperability.
    We also note that the existing nationwide inter-agency channels were
    recommended by the four public safety coordinators and were adopted
    by the Commission partly because these were the "least licensed."

92. *Common Nomenclature.* The Tennessee Statewide Interoperability
    Executive and others recommend that the Commission mandate a common
    nomenclature for the designated interoperability channels and
    require each state to have a functional Statewide Interoperability
    Executive Council.[^115] These issues were raised in the 7^th^ NPRM
    in WT Docket No. 96-86 and we will address them in that
    proceeding.[^116]

93. *Mutual Aid Channels*. The Tennessee SIEC also stated that the
    Commission should encourage public safety frequency coordinators to
    keep designated Fire mutual aid channels (*i.e.* 154.265, 154.280,
    154.295 MHz) and their narrowband counterparts and the National Law
    Enforcement Channel (*i.e.* 155.475 MHz) for mutual aid only.[^117]
    We refrain from concluding that the Commission should encourage
    public safety frequency coordinators to keep designated mutual aid
    channels for aid only, until the Commission can engage the public
    safety frequency coordinator community further on this issue. These
    frequencies have special limitations that make them available for
    specified mutual aid purposes, but the Tennessee SIEC suggests that
    the public safety frequency coordinators currently approve the use
    of these frequencies for non-mutual aid purposes. In order to
    evaluate the merits of this proposal, the Commission should consult
    with the public safety frequency coordinator community through the
    Public Safety Communications Council. Accordingly, we direct PSHSB
    to engage in such consultation and provide a recommendation on this
    issue.

94. *911 Analysis*. NENA asserts that the Commission should require all
    911 system service providers (SSPs) to analyze and provide detailed
    information on the redundancy, resiliency, and dependability of 911
    networks and to provide detailed information to the Commission on
    areas where these issues are treated in the network and areas where
    there are gaps.[^118] NENA states that all 9-1-1 SSPs should be
    required to submit a plan to the Commission outlining this
    information and steps they intend to take to ensure diversity and
    dependability in the network, including any plans they have to
    migrate their network to an IP-based platform that will enable the
    migration from the existing 911 system to next generation 911
    architecture. NENA also argues that these plans should be made
    available to leading public safety organizations.[^119]

95. AT&T asserts that NENA's proposal is misdirected because it is the
    PSAP, not the service provider, that must determine the best way to
    mitigate single points of failure within its 911 network in a cost
    effective manner.[^120] Similarly, the United States Telecom
    Association (US Telecom) argues that ILECs do not own 911 networks,
    but merely provide inputs for them and should not, therefore, be
    required to report to the Commission regarding the dependability of
    these networks.[^121] US Telecom argues that ILECs do not need to be
    burdened with additional reporting requirements and regulatory
    mandates, but rather need flexibility to create redundancies in
    their networks not mandates requiring them to do so where it is
    unnecessary.[^122] AT&T also asserts that the NENA fails to explain
    how the Commission could make use of such detailed information in
    any manner that does not duplicate how 911 service providers already
    interact with PSAPs and state regulatory authorities.[^123] AT&T and
    US Telecom assert that requiring the unnecessary further
    dissemination of this information could have serious adverse
    consequences for service providers, for whom those proprietary data
    have substantial competitive value, and for the general public if
    that information is compromised and comes into possession of persons
    and groups with criminal intentions.[^124]

96. We agree that the Commission should require the analysis of 911 and
    E911 networks and the submission of reports regarding the status of
    these networks. Although NENA's proposal appears to be limited to
    911 SSPs, which are typically incumbent local exchange carriers
    (ILECs), we believe that, with the exceptions described below, this
    requirement should apply all LECs, including ILECs and CLECs, CMRS
    providers required to comply with the wireless 911 rules[^125] and
    interconnected Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) service
    providers.[^126] It is critical that Americans have access to a
    resilient and reliable 911 system irrespective of the technology
    used to provide the service. Therefore, we will require LECs,
    including both ILECs and CLECs, CMRS providers required to comply
    with the wireless 911 rules and interconnected VoIP service
    providers analyze and provide detailed reports on the redundancy,
    resiliency, and dependability of their 911 and E911 networks and
    systems. Where relevant, the reports should include steps the
    service provider intends to take to ensure diversity and
    dependability in the network and/or system, including any plans they
    have to migrate their network to a next generation IP-based E911
    platform. This requirement will serve the public interest and
    further the Commission's statutory mandate to promote the safety of
    life and property through the use of wire and radio
    communication.[^127]

97. We are mindful that this requirement may cause a financial burden to
    certain small carriers. Accordingly, we will not impose this
    reporting requirement on LECs, including ILECs and CLECs, that meet
    the definition of a Class B company set forth in Section 32.11(b)(2)
    of the Commission's rules.[^128] We will also not impose this
    reporting requirement on Tier III CMRS carriers.[^129]
    Interconnected VoIP service providers will be exempt from this
    requirement if their annual revenues fall below the revenue
    threshold established pursuant to Section 32.11 of the Commission\'s
    rules. NENA recommends that these reports be shared with "leading
    public safety organizations." Although we believe there is some
    benefit to sharing these reports with certain public safety
    organizations, we also understand that these reports will likely
    contain competitive and other information that should be accorded
    confidential treatment under our rules. To balance these concerns,
    we will share these reports with NENA, APCO, and The National
    Association of State 9-1-1 Administrators, the public safety
    organizations that previously have been provided copies of
    911-related reports, but only pursuant to a protective order
    consistent with the model protective order previously adopted by the
    Commission.[^130] We delegate authority to PSHSB to issue such
    protective orders.

98. AT&T and US Telecom argue that this should not be the duty of SSPs
    which are typically ILECs, suggesting that PSAPs are better situated
    to perform such an analysis. PSAPs know whether they have
    alternative facilities into their buildings and whether they have
    backup/alternative PSAP sites. However, carriers, not PSAPs, know
    about the selective routers, the routing between selective routers
    and the central offices from which customers may call, and the
    diversity in the interoffice facilities between the selective router
    and the central office serving the PSAP. PSAPs should know whether
    they ordered facility diversity, but they do not have insight
    regarding how, or even if, this was provisioned. US Telecom also
    argued that ILECs should not be subject to mandates requiring them
    to create redundancies in their networks; however, the rule we adopt
    requires only an analysis and report, it does not require carriers
    to create additional network redundancies.

99. Accordingly, pursuant to our authority under Section 403 of the
    Communications Act, as amended,[^131] we will require LECs, CMRS
    providers required to comply with the wireless 911 rules and
    interconnected VoIP service providers, except those exempted above,
    to conduct an analysis of the resiliency and reliability of their
    911 networks or systems and to submit a report to the Commission. We
    delegate to PSHSB the authority to implement and activate a process
    through which these reports will be submitted, including the
    authority to establish the specific data that will be required from
    each category of communications provider. We also direct PSHSB to
    make efforts to ensure that carriers subject to state regulations
    requiring the reporting of similar information are afforded the
    opportunity to meet this requirement by submitting the state report.
    The report will be due 120 days from the date that the Commission or
    its staff announces activation of the 911 network and system
    reporting process.

100. We also note that NRIC VII developed best practices that could
     address this issue. Accordingly, we direct PSHSB to continue to
     encourage industry to implement NRIC's best practices in this area,
     to continue to encourage industry to develop best practices in this
     area specific to their locale, and to continue to work to see that
     such recommendations, and any resulting adopted best practices, are
     made available on the Commission's website.

101. *Two-Way Paging Initiative.* Commenters recommended that the
     Commission permit the use of 900 MHz B/ILT pool of spectrum for
     two-way paging systems either owned by public safety users or
     dedicated to the provision of emergency communications.[^132] We
     direct PSHSB, in coordination with WTB, to consider this issue and
     to determine what action, if any, should be implemented.

102. *McVey Petition for Rulemaking.* In his comments, W. Lee McVey
     requests that the Commission initiate a rulemaking to create a new
     radio service in the 148-150 MHz band "to facilitate
     interoperability between different first responders during and
     following a national emergency."[^133] We note that the 148-149.9
     band is allocated on a primary basis for federal Fixed, Mobile and
     Mobile Satellite (Earth-to-Space) service and the 149-150.05 MHz
     segment is allocated on a co-primary basis for federal and
     non-federal Mobile Satellite (Earth-to-space) and Radio navigation
     Satellite Services, and that the petition does not address this use
     nor does it explain what rules would be necessary to govern access
     to this spectrum. Given the potential impact of McVey's proposal to
     spectrum allocated for federal use, we direct PSHSB, together with
     OET, to seek feedback from NTIA on this petition. Upon receiving
     such feedback, we direct PSHSB and OET to make a determination on
     the appropriate action to be taken on this petition.

## Emergency Communications to the Public

103. [Revitalize and Publicize the Emergency Alert System]{.underline}.
     The Katrina Panel suggests a number of recommendations to
     revitalize and publicize the existing Emergency Alert System
     ("EAS"). To facilitate and complement the use of the existing EAS,
     the Katrina Panel recommends that the Commission should: (a)
     educate state and local officials about EAS, its benefits, and how
     it can be best utilized; (b) develop a program for educating the
     public about the EAS and promote community awareness of potential
     mechanisms for accessing those alerts sent during power outages or
     broadcast transmission failures; (c) move expeditiously to complete
     its proceeding to explore the technical and financial viability of
     expanding the EAS to other technologies, such as wireless services
     and the Internet, recognizing that changes to communications
     networks and equipment take time to implement; (d) consistent with
     proposed legislation, work with Congress and other appropriate
     federal departments and agencies to explore the technical and
     financial viability of establishing a comprehensive national
     warning system that complements existing systems and allows local
     officials to increase the penetration of warnings to the public as
     well as target, when necessary, alerts to a particular area; (e)
     work with the DHS and other appropriate federal agencies on pilot
     programs that would allow more immediate evaluation and testing of
     new notification technologies; and (f) work with the Department of
     Commerce to expand the distribution of certain critical non-weather
     emergency warnings over National Oceanic and Atmospheric
     Administration (NOAA) weather radios to supplement the EAS.[^134]

104. We agree that we should encourage state, tribal and local
     governments to use EAS as a mechanism to deliver emergency alerts.
     Accordingly, we direct PSHSB to engage in outreach efforts to
     educate state, tribal and local governments about the EAS. In
     addition, we direct PSHSB to take steps to educate the public about
     EAS. We also note that PSHSB has coordinated with DHS on EAS
     issues, including issues related to the development of a
     state-of-the-art public alert and warning system. We direct PSHSB
     to continue those efforts.

105. Finally, on the issue of expanding the scope of EAS to include new
     technologies, as the Katrina Panel acknowledges, this issue is
     already the subject of our ongoing EAS rulemaking proceeding.[^135]
     In addition, pursuant to the recently enacted WARN Act,[^136] the
     Commission established an advisory committee \-- the Commercial
     Mobile Service Alert Advisory Committee -- to develop and recommend
     technical standards and protocols by which commercial mobile
     service (CMS) providers may voluntarily transmit emergency alerts.
     The Committee has a diverse membership, including over forty
     representatives from the wireless and broadcast industries, public
     safety, equipment manufacturers, organizations representing people
     with disabilities and the elderly, FEMA and NOAA. Thus far, the
     Committee has held three full Committee meetings and a number of
     informal working group meetings. The Commission expects that the
     Committee will meet its statutory deadline of submitting
     recommendations to the Commission by October 12, 2007.

106. [Ensuring that People with Disabilities and Non-English Speaking
     Persons Receive Alerts]{.underline}. The Katrina Panel recommended
     that the Commission promptly find a mechanism to resolve technical
     and financial hurdles in the EAS system to ensure that non-English
     speaking people or people with disabilities have access to public
     warnings, if readily achievable.[^137] The Panel also recommended
     that the Commission work with trade associations and the disability
     community to create and publicize best practices for serving
     persons with disabilities and non-English-speaking Americans and
     encourage state and local government agencies that provide
     emergency information to take steps to make this information
     accessible to persons with disabilities and non-English speaking
     Americans.[^138]

107. We note that the issue of making EAS alerts accessible to people
     with disabilities and to those who do not speak English is already
     the subject of the EAS rulemaking proceeding.[^139] Moreover, the
     Commercial Mobile Service Alert Advisory Committee will consider
     these issues in the context of wireless carriers' participation in
     emergency alerts. On the broader issue of ensuring that emergency
     information reaches people with disabilities and non-English
     speaking Americans, we direct PSHSB, along with Consumer &
     Government Affairs Bureau (CGB) as appropriate, to work with the
     industry, state, tribal and local governments and organizations
     representing people with disability and non-English speaking
     persons on these issues.[^140]

108. [Ensuring Consistent and Reliable Emergency Information Through a
     Consolidated and Coordinated Public Information
     Program]{.underline}. The Katrina Panel recommended that public
     information functions should be coordinated and integrated across
     jurisdictions and across functional agencies, among federal state,
     local and tribal partners, and with private sector and
     non-governmental organizations.[^141] The Panel recommended that
     the Commission work with involved parties to facilitate the
     integration of media representatives into the development of
     disaster communications plans (Emergency Support Function
     #2).[^142] The Panel also urged the designation of a public
     information officer at each Emergency Operations Center to handle
     media and public inquiries, emergency public information and
     warning, and other functions. The Panel advocates the formation of
     a Joint Information Center ("JIC") during large scale
     disasters.[^143] The JIC would collocate representatives from
     federal, regional, state, local and/or tribal EOCs responsible for
     primary incident coordination responsibilities. The JIC would
     provide a mechanism to integrate public information activities from
     various jurisdictions and organizations and would include media
     operations.

109. We believe this issue is thoroughly addressed by the National
     Response Plan under Emergency Support Function #15---External
     Affairs and the Public Affairs Support Annex. ESF #15 ensures that
     sufficient federal assets are deployed to the field during a
     potential or actual Incident of National Significance to provide
     accurate, coordinated, and timely information to government, media,
     the private section and the local populace. This provides the
     resource support and mechanisms to implement the NRP Incident
     Communications Emergency Policy and Procedures described in the NRP
     Public Affairs Support Annex. The NRP Public Support Annex
     describes the interagency policies and procedures used to rapidly
     mobilize federal assets to prepare and deliver coordinated and
     sustained messages to the public in response to Incidents of
     National significance and other major domestic emergencies. In
     addition, the NRP Public Affairs Support Annex specifically
     addresses the formation of JICs.

110. The Katrina Panel recommended that the Commission should work with
     federal, state, and local agencies to ensure consistent and
     reliable emergency information through a consolidated and
     coordinated public information program. We note that state, tribal
     and local officials play a key role in forming messages as they are
     sent to the public. Nonetheless, we direct PSHSB to continue to
     work with DHS and state, tribal and local governments on the
     consolidation and coordination of public information as part of its
     supporting role under the NRP's ESF #15 and the Public Affairs
     Annex.[^144]

## Other Recommendations

111. [Amateur Initiatives]{.underline}. Several amateur radio operators
     recommended changes to Part 97 of the Commission's rules which
     govern amateur radio. Many of the changes have already been
     implemented and thus require no further action. For example, the
     Commission recently eliminated Morse Code proficiency as a license
     qualification requirement,[^145] an action supported by several
     commenters in this proceeding.[^146] The Commission also previously
     decided to phase out RACES station licenses,[^147] making proposed
     changes to rules relevant to these licenses moot. Finally, the
     Commission previously clarified that Part 97 does not prohibit
     amateur radio operators who are emergency personnel engaged in
     disaster relief from using their amateur radio bands while in a
     paid duty status.[^148] We also note that several recommendations
     made by amateur radio operators remain pending before the
     Commission and, accordingly, we take no action on those in this
     proceeding.[^149] We do note that the amateur radio community
     played an important role in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina and
     other disasters. Accordingly, we order PSHSB to include the amateur
     radio community in its outreach efforts.[^150]

112. [Low Power Broadcast Service Initiatives]{.underline}. Prometheus
     Radio Project and Amherst Alliance submitted a number of
     recommendations regarding the Low Power FM service as well as other
     low power broadcast services. Specifically, these commenters
     recommended that the Commission: (1) remind Congress that it has
     previously recommended that the statutory restrictions on adjacent
     channel spacing of Low Power FM stations should be repealed; (2)
     open a filing window for 10 watt LPFM license applications; (3)
     establish 250 watt LPFM stations; and (4) establish Low Power AM
     stations; and (5) resolve the LPFM rulemaking proceeding.[^151] We
     will refer these issues to the Media Bureau for handling as
     appropriate.

113. [Modification of "Substantial Service" Policies for NPCS
     Channels]{.underline}. The American Association of Paging Carriers
     (AAPC) asserts that the Commission should "modify its 'substantial
     service' policies governing Part 24 NPCS channels so that licensees
     leasing, disaggregating or partitioning NPCS spectrum for use by
     two-way paging systems for emergency communications, including
     leasing, disaggregating or partitioning spectrum for 'back haul'
     channels that can be paired with traditional 929/931 MHz paging
     channels, also will be deemed to be providing 'substantial service'
     on the spectrum retained by the NPCS licensee."[^152] Because this
     issue relates to general construction policy, we will refer this
     issue to the Wireless Telecommunications Bureau for appropriate
     handling.

114. [Designation of 700 MHz Spectrum for Critical
     Infrastructure.]{.underline} Some commenters recommend that the
     Commission designate a portion of the 700 MHz band for use by
     critical infrastructure industry use.[^153] We will address this
     issue in the context of our 700 MHz proceedings.

115. [CALEA Exemption for Temporary Ad Hoc Networks]{.underline}.
     Champaign Urbana Wireless Network *et al* asks that the Commission
     clarify that volunteers who build ad hoc networks in response to an
     emergency need not comply with CALEA. They state that, in response
     to Hurricane Katrina, volunteers created numerous wireless networks
     to provide needed Internet connectivity for Red Cross shelters and
     others in areas where Katrina destroyed or substantially degraded
     existing infrastructure. On completing construction of these ad hoc
     networks, the volunteers turned these networks over to local
     operators and move on to help others.

116. Champaign Urbana *et al* states that many of these ad hoc networks
     remained in operation for months and may still remain in operation
     today. They state that volunteers who generally did not maintain
     contact or provide any services for these networks once they turn
     them over to local operators. They state that these volunteers are
     not telecommunications carriers to whom CALEA generally applies and
     that these volunteers do not provide these services for hire. In
     addition, they state that these volunteers do not fall under the
     "substantial replacement provision" of the Act.

117. They request that the Commission establish a blanket waiver for *ad
     hoc* wireless networks created in response to a state of emergency;
     and that any liability that might arise for failure to comply with
     CALEA if the networks remain in operation after the emergency would
     not lie with those who created the network so long as they turned
     control over the network to others. To the extent the Commission
     determines that these volunteers are subject to CALEA, Champaign
     Urbana *et al* requests that the Commission provide a general
     waiver pursuant to its authority to exempt any "class or category
     of telecommunications carrier."

118. We do not have sufficient information in the record to justify
     grant of a blanket waiver as Champaign Urbana suggests. First it is
     not clear whether Champaign Urbana's request is for a blanket
     waiver of ad hoc temporary networks in all cases of emergencies,
     including those involving terrorist attacks. If so, such a waiver
     could actually impede law enforcement and thus hinder the purposes
     of CALEA. Moreover, we note that CALEA exemptions may only be
     granted after formal consultation with the U.S. Attorney General
     and that the Federal Bureau of Investigation (which formally has
     been designated by the Attorney General to handle CALEA
     obligations) has previously opposed granting blanket CALEA
     exemptions. For these reasons, we decline to issue a blanket waiver
     for these types of networks. Rather, we think the appropriate
     approach would be to review requests for exemptions of these types
     of networks (and the volunteers who construct them) on a
     case-by-case basis.

119. [Closed Captioning and Telecommunications Relay Service
     Issues]{.underline}. Telecommunications for the Deaf and Hard of
     Hearing (TDI) recommends that: (1) broadcasters establish contracts
     or cooperative agreements among captioning providers to ensure that
     broadcasts can be captioned in the event of emergencies regardless
     of the emergency's location;[^154] (2) captioning services
     personnel should be designated as essential personnel;[^155] (3)
     the Commission require all Telecommunications Relay Service ("TRS")
     providers to have back-up power ready to operate for a minimum of
     72 hours;[^156] (4) the Commission should require that all TRS
     providers have contingency plans for transfer of calls from TRS
     centers that may be unable to operate due to catastrophic damage or
     overwhelming volume of calls from other centers;[^157] and (5) all
     TRS personnel should be deemed essential personnel during
     emergencies.[^158]

120. We direct CGB to consider these issues in an appropriate
     proceeding. In this regard, we note that, on December 29, 2006, the
     Commission released a Public Notice that provides steps that video
     programming distributors may take to obtain closed captioning
     services quickly in the event of an emergency.[^159] With respect
     to TDI items (2) and (5), we note that the FCC has no jurisdiction
     over who is declared an "essential service provider," nonetheless
     we will direct PSHSB to work with DHS on this issue.

121. The American Association of People with Disabilities (AAPD)
     suggests that the Commission consider encouraging IP Relay and
     Video Relay Service (VRS) providers to develop solutions for
     handling emergency calls through TRS.[^160] This issue was raised
     in the November 30, 2005 VRS 9-1-1 NPRM,[^161] has been the subject
     of an E9-1-1 Disability Access Summit held at the Commission on
     November 15, 2006, and is pending before the Commission. CGB's
     Disability Rights Office and PSHSB will continue to work with the
     disability community and Internet-based TRS providers on these
     issues.[^162]

# procedural matters

## Final Regulatory Flexibility Act Analysis

122. As required by Section 603 of the Regulatory Flexibility Act (RFA),
     5 U.S.C. § 604, the Commission has prepared a Final Regulatory
     Flexibility Analysis of the possible impact of the rule changes
     contained in this Order on small entities. The Final Regulatory
     Flexibility Act analysis is set forth in Appendix C, *infra*. The
     Commission's Consumer & Government Affairs Bureau, Reference
     Information Center, will send a copy of this Order, including the
     Final Regulatory Flexibility Act Analysis, to the Chief Counsel for
     Advocacy of the Small Business Administration.

## Final Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 Analysis

123. This Order contains new information collection requirements. The
     Commission, as part of its continuing effort to reduce paperwork
     burdens, invites the general public, the Office of Management and
     Budget ("OMB") and other Federal agencies to comment on the
     information collection requirements contained in this Order, as
     required by the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, Public Law
     104-13[.](http://web2.westlaw.com/find/default.wl?tf=-1&rs=WLW7.04&fn=_top&sv=Split&tc=-1&findtype=l&docname=UU(I709E6621BB-9C4517AFA0B-7DE603F675F)&mt=Communications&db=1077005&vr=2.0&rp=%2Ffind%2Fdefault.wl&sp=caij-1000)
     Public and agency comments are due 60 days from date of publication
     of the Order in the Federal Register. In addition, pursuant to the
     Small Business Paperwork Relief Act of 2002, Public Law 107-198,
     *see* 44 U.S.C. 3506(c)(4), we previously sought specific comment
     on how the Commission might "further reduce the information
     collection burden for small business concerns with fewer than 25
     employees." In this present document, we have assessed the effects
     of requiring the analysis of 911 and E911 networks and the
     submission of a report on the resiliency and reliability of those
     networks, by LECs, CMRS providers required to comply with the
     wireless 911 rules, and interconnected VoIP service providers. We
     have specifically exempt LECs that meet the definition of a Class B
     company set forth in Section 32.11(b)(2) of our rules,[^163] Tier
     III CMRS carriers, and interconnected VoIP service providers with
     annual revenues below the revenue threshold established pursuant to
     Section 32.11 of our rules from these requirements.[^164] We find
     that this imposes minimal regulation on small entities to the
     extent consistent with our goal of advancing our public safety
     mission.

## Congressional Review Act Analysis

124. The Commission will send a copy of this Order in a report to be
     sent to Congress and the Government Accountability Office pursuant
     to the Congressional Review Act, *see* 5 U.S.C. 801(a)(1)(A).

## Alternative Formats

125. Alternative formats (computer diskette, large print, audio
     cassette, and Braille) are available to persons with disabilities
     by sending an e-mail to <FCC504@fcc.gov> or calling the Consumer
     and Governmental Affairs Bureau at (202) 418-0530, TTY (202)
     418-0432.

# Ordering Clauses

126. Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED, pursuant to the authority contained in
     Sections 1, 4(i)-(k), 4(o), 5(c), 201, 214(a), 218, 219, 271, 272,
     301, 303(g), 303(j), 303(r), 332, 403, 621(b)(3), and 621(d) of the
     Communications Act of 1934, as amended, 47 U.S.C. §§ 151,
     154(i)-(k), 154(o), 155(c), 201, 214(a), 218, 219, 271, 272, 301,
     303(g), 303(j), 303(r), 332, 403, 541(b)(3), and 541(d), that this
     Order in EB Docket No. 06-119 and WC Docket No. 06-63 IS ADOPTED
     and that the Commission's Rules are amended as set forth in
     Appendix B. The rules adopted in this Order shall become effective
     30 days after publication in the Federal Register, except that the
     new information collection requirement contained in Appendix B will
     not become effective prior to OMB approval. The reports on the
     redundancy, resiliency and reliability of 911 and E911 networks are
     due 120 days from the date that the Commission or its staff
     announces activation of the OMB-approved reporting process. The
     remainder of this Order shall become effective upon the release
     date of this Order, except as noted in ¶ 128.

127. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Commission's Public Safety and
     Homeland Security Bureau, Consumer and Governmental Affairs Bureau
     and Office of Engineering and Technology take action as directed in
     this Order. The Commission's Public Safety and Homeland Security
     Bureau shall report to the Commission on its efforts three months
     from the date of release of this Order and nine months from the
     date of release of this Order.

128. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Special Temporary Authority and
     waiver of Section 272 of the Act and its implementing rules to
     allow AT&T, Verizon and Qwest to share non-public, Bell Operating
     Company (BOC) network information with their Section 272 and other
     affiliates, as necessary to engage in integrated disaster recovery
     planning, IS EXTENDED to a one year period ending April 20, 2008
     for AT&T[^165] and to June 9, 2008 for Verizon and Qwest, effective
     on the date of release of this Order.

129. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Commission's Consumer and
     Governmental Affairs Bureau, Reference Information Center, SHALL
     SEND a copy of this Order, including the Final Regulatory
     Flexibility Analysis, to the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the
     Small Business Administration.

     **FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION**

     Marlene Dortch

     Secretary

**APPENDIX A**

**List of Commenters**

**Comments in EB Docket No. 06-119**

[Comments]{.underline}

1.  Agile Communications Group

2.  Alabama Broadcasters Association, Florida Association of
    Broadcasters

3.  Louisiana Association of Broadcasters and the Mississippi
    Association of Broadcasters

4.  Alliance for Telecommunications Industry Solutions

5.  American Association of Paging Carriers

6.  American Association of People with Disabilities[^166]

7.  American Association of State Highway and Transportation Officials

8.  American Petroleum Institute

9.  ARINC

10. Association of Public-Safety Communications Officials --
    International, Inc.

11. Association of Public Television Stations

12. AT&T Inc.

13. Batteiger, Allan R.

14. Bechtel National Inc., Federal Telecoms

15. BellSouth Corporation

16. California Department of Transportation

17. Candell, Michael C.

18. Champaign Urbana Wireless Network, Texas ISP Association,

Association for Community Networking & Acorn Active Media

19. Chandler, Charles

20. Cingular Wireless LLC

21. Cisco Systems, Inc.

22. Cleco Corporation

23. Cline, Michael

24. Comcare Emergency Response Alliance

25. Comcast Corporation

26. Consumer Electronics Association

27. Cox, Mickey D.

28. Creal, Robert R.

29. CTIA -- The Wireless Association

30. Cyren Call Communications Corporation

31. Delaware Emergency Management Agency

32. Dye, Brad and Mercer, Ron

33. Enhanced 911 Program of the State of Washington

34. Erickson, Ronald Dale

35. Finnstrom, Rick

36. First Response Coalition

37. Flynn, James C. Jr.

38. Francisco, Albert K.

39. Gorham, Gold, Greenwich and Associates, LLC

40. Hamel, Patrick E.

41. Hampton, Rickey L.[^167]

42. Hams for Action

43. Headrick, Loyd C.

44. Hejl, Robert

45. Holmes, Adolph

46. Hunt, J. Kevin, Esq. (filed jointly with the Oregon City Disaster
    Services)

47. Independent Spanish Broadcasters Association, Office of
    Communications of the United Church of Church and the Minority Media
    and Telecommunications Council

48. Inmarsat Ventures Limited

49. International Association of Fire Chiefs, Inc. and the

International Municipal Signal Association

50. Interstate Wireless, Inc.

51. Intrado, Inc.

52. Iridium Satellite LLC

53. Isaachsen, Alan

54. Keown, Malcolm P.

55. Leggett, Nicholas E and Shellhardt, Donald J.

56. Lowenthal, Joseph A.

57. Lucent Technologies, Inc.

58. M2Z Networks, Inc.

59. M/A-Com, Inc.

60. Maddocks, Hugh C.

61. Martin, Richard T.

62. McVey, W. Lee

63. Meinrath, Sascha D.

64. Merritt, Harold F.

65. Miller, Jeffrey

66. Mississippi Authority for Educational Television

67. Mobile Satellite Ventures Subsidiary LLC

68. Motorola, Inc.

69. Murray, Gerald W.

70. National Association of Broadcasters

71. National Association of State EMS Officials

72. National Cable & Telecommunications Association, Louisiana Cable &
    Telecommunications Association and the Mississippi Cable
    Telecommunications Association

73. National Emergency Number Association

74. National Public Safety Telecommunications Council

75. National Rural Electric Cooperative Association

76. National Sheriffs' Association

77. New York State Department of Public Service

78. Northeast Utilities

79. NTI Group, Inc.

80. PacketHop, Inc.

81. Plasters, Paul

82. Prometheus Radio Project

83. Public Service Commission of the State of Missouri

84. Puerto Rico Telephone Company, Inc.

85. Pulver.com/Evslin Consulting

86. Qwest Services Corporation

87. Randall, James L.

88. Redden, Clay

89. Rural Cellular Association

90. Russell, James

91. Sastry, Ambatipudi

92. Satellite Industry Association

93. Schellhardt, Don

94. Schumpert, Doug

95. Scott, Benson

96. Sewell, Alvain Dale

97. Sherman, Jared

98. Smith, Steven L.

99. Society for the Preservation of Amateur Radio

100. SouthernLINC Wireless

101. Sprint Nextel Corporation

102. SquareLoop, Inc.

103. St. Tammany Parish Communications District I

104. St. Tammany Parish Office of the President

105. Staats, Wayne P.

106. Tennessee Statewide Interoperability Executive

107. Texas Commission on State Emergency Communications and the Texas
     9-1-1 Alliance

108. Tropos Networks

109. United States Telecom Association

110. Unrath, John

111. USA Mobility, Inc.

112. U.S. Department of Homeland Security

113. USMSS, Inc.

114. Verizon

115. Wade, Martin David

116. Walz, Danial L.

117. Whitman, Alan

118. Wooddell, Jim

119. Young, Charles[^168]

120. Young, Stan

[Reply Comments]{.underline}

1.  Alabama Power Company, Georgia Power Company, Gulf

2.  Power Company, Mississippi Power Company, SouthernLINC Wireless and
    Southern Company Services

3.  Amherst Alliance

4.  AT&T, Inc.

5.  Altaphon, Inc.[^169]

6.  BellSouth Corporation

7.  Consumers Energy Company and Excel Energy Services, Inc.

8.  Cox Enterprises, Inc.

9.  Cyren Call Communications Corporation

10. Enterprise Wireless Alliance

11. GlobalStar, Inc.

12. Gorham, Gold, Greenwich & Associates, LLC

13. Hatch, Larry

14. Martin, Richard T.

15. M/A Com, Inc.[^170]

16. McVey, W. Lee

17. Named State Broadcasters Association[^171]

18. Space Data Corporation

19. TDS Telecommunications Corp.

20. Telecommunications for the Deaf and Hard of Hearing, Inc.,

American Association of People with Disabilities, Association of

Late-Deafened Adults; California Coalition of Agencies Serving the Deaf

And Hard of Hearing; Deaf & Hard of Hearing Consumer Advocacy Network
and National Association of the Deaf

21. T-Mobile USA, Inc.

22. Union Telephone Company

23. United States Telecom Association

24. United Telecom Council

25. Verizon

[Ex Parte]{.underline}

1.  Agile Communications Group

2.  Alliance for Telecommunications Industry Solutions

3.  AT&T, Inc.[^172]

4.  Austin Wireless/Campaign-Urbana Wireless Network/Media Access
    Project

5.  CTIA -- The Wireless Association

6.  Minnesota Broadcasters Association and Missouri Broadcasters
    Association

7.  National Emergency Number Association

8.  National Telecommunications and Information Administration

9.  NTI Group[^173]

10. Pinellas County Emergency Communications Department

11. Pittman Broadcasting Services, LLC

12. Pulver.com

13. Rosum Corporation

14. State of New York Department of Public Service, New Jersey Board of
    Public Utilities, Connecticut Department of Public Utility Control,
    Center for Technology in Government at the University of Albany,
    National Communications System and the National Coordinating Center.

15. New York State Department of Public Service, the Connecticut
    Department of Public Utility Control, the Center for Technology in
    Government at the University of Albany, New York Emergency
    Management Office, New York Office of Cyber Security and Critical
    Infrastructure, New York Office of Homeland Security, ChicagoFIRST,
    AT&T Communications of NY, Inc., and Sprint Nextel Corporation.

16. United Telecom Council

17. USA Mobility

18. Verizon[^174]

**APPENDIX B**

**Final Rules**

For the reasons discussed in the preamble, the Federal Communications
Commission creates new Part 12 of Chapter I of Title 47 of the Code of
Federal Regulations (C.F.R.) as follows:

**[PART 12 -- REDUNDANCY OF COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS]{.underline}**

**12.1 Purpose.**

**12.2 Backup Power.**

**12.3 911 and E911 Analyses and Reports**

**Authority:** Sections 1, 4(i), 4(j), 4(o), 5(c), 218, 219, 301,
303(g), 303(j), 303(r), 332, 403, 621(b)(3), and 621(d) of the
Communications Act of 1934, as amended, 47 U.S.C. §§ 151, 154(i),
154(j), 154(o), 155(c), 218, 219, 301, 303(g), 303(j), 303(r), 332, 403,
621(b)(3), and 621(d), unless otherwise noted.

**[§ 12.1 Purpose.]{.underline}**

These rules include requirements that will help ensure the resiliency,
redundancy and reliability of communications systems, particularly 911
and E911 networks and/or systems.

**[§ 12.2 Backup Power.]{.underline}**

Local exchange carriers (LECs), including incumbent LECS (ILECs) and
competitive LECs (CLECs), and commercial mobile radio service (CMRS)
providers must have an emergency backup power source for all assets that
are normally powered from local AC commercial power, including those
inside central offices, cell sites, remote switches and digital loop
carrier system remote terminals. LECs and CMRS providers should maintain
emergency back-up power for a minimum of 24 hours for assets inside
central offices and eight hours for cell sites, remote switches and
digital loop carrier system remote terminals that are normally powered
from local AC commercial power. LECs that meet the definition of a Class
B company as set forth in Section 32.11(b)(2) of the Commission's rules
and non-nationwide CMRS providers with no more than 500,000 subscribers
are exempt from this rule.

**[§ 12.3 911 and E911 Analyses and Reports.]{.underline}**

The following entities must analyze their 911 and E911 networks and/or
systems and provide a detailed report to the Commission on the
redundancy, resiliency, and reliability of those networks and/or
systems: (1) local exchange carriers (LECs), including incumbent LECs
(ILECS) and competitive LECs (CLECs); (2) commercial mobile radio
service providers required to comply with the wireless 911 rules set
forth in Section 20.18 of the Commission's rules; and (3) interconnected
Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) service providers. LECs that meet
the definition of a Class B company set forth in Section 32.11(b)(2) of
the Commission's rules, non-nationwide commercial mobile radio service
providers with no more than 500,000 subscribers at the end of 2001, and
interconnected VoIP service providers with annual revenues below the
revenue threshold established pursuant to Section 32.11 of the
Commission\'s rules are exempt from this rule.

\(a\) The Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau (PSHSB) has the
delegated authority to implement and activate a process through which
these reports will be submitted, including the authority to establish
the specific data that will be required. Where relevant, these reports
should include descriptions of the steps the service providers intend to
take to ensure diversity and dependability in their 911 and E911
networks and/or systems, including any plans they have to migrate those
networks and/or systems to a next generation Internet Protocol-based
E911 platform.

\(b\) These reports are due 120 days from the date that the Commission
or its staff announces activation of the 911 network and system
reporting process.

\(c\) Reports filed under this Part will be presumed to be confidential.
These reports will be shared with The National Emergency Number
Association, The Association of Public Safety Communications Officials,
and The National Association of State 9-1-1 Administrators only pursuant
to a protective order. PSHSB has the delegated authority to issue such
protective orders. All other access to these reports must be sought
pursuant to procedures set forth in 47 C.F.R. § 0.461. Notice of any
requests for inspection of these reports will be provided to the filers
of the reports pursuant to 47 C.F.R. § 0.461(d)(3).

**APPENDIX C**

**Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis**

1.  As required by the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, as amended
    (RFA),[^175] an Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis (IRFA) was
    incorporated in the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking *(Notice)* in EB
    Docket No. 06-119.[^176] The Commission sought written public
    comment on the proposals in this docket, including comment on the
    IRFA. This Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis (FRFA) conforms to
    the RFA.[^177]

**A. Need for, and Objectives of, the Rules**

130. In this Order, we adopt a rule that requires local exchange
     carriers (LECs), other than those that meet the definition of a
     Class B company as set forth in Section 32.11(b)(2) of the
     Commission's rules,[^178] and commercial mobile radio service
     (CMRS) providers, other than non-nationwide CMRS providers with no
     more than 500,000 subscribers, to have an emergency backup power
     source for all assets that are normally powered from local AC
     commercial power, including those inside central offices, cell
     sites, remote switches and digital loop carrier system remote
     terminals. We also adopt a rule that requires the analysis of 911
     and E911 networks and systems and detailed reporting to the
     Commission of the redundancy, resiliency and reliability of those
     networks and systems by: (1) LECs, including incumbent LECs (ILECs)
     and competitive LECs (CLECs); (2) commercial wirelesss service
     providers required to comply with the wireless 911 rules set forth
     in Section 20.18 of the Commission's rules;[^179] and (3)
     interconnected Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) service
     providers. LECs that meet the definition of a Class B company set
     forth in Section 32.11(b)(2) of the Commission's rules,
     non-nationwide commercial mobile radio service providers with no
     more than 500,000 subscribers at the end of 2001, and
     interconnected VoIP service providers with annual revenues below
     the revenue threshold established pursuant to Section 32.11 of the
     Commission\'s rules are exempt from this rule.

131. These rules, which are part of a broader initiative taken with this
     Order to implement several of the recommendations made by the
     Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane Katrina on
     Communications Networks (Katrina Panel), will promote
     communications readiness and preparedness for future natural
     disasters and other emergencies. The measures taken today will also
     facilitate more effective and efficient recovery efforts in the
     wake of such events. These actions will advance efforts to save
     lives and protect property in the event of a natural disaster or
     other emergency.

     **B. Summary of Significant Issues Raised by Public Comments in
     Response to the IRFA**

132. No comments specifically addressed the IRFA.

     **C. Description and Estimate of the Number of Small Entities to
     Which the Rules Will Apply**

133. The RFA directs agencies to provide a description of, and, where
     feasible, an estimate of, the number of small entities that may be
     affected by the rules adopted herein.[^180] The RFA generally
     defines the term "small entity" as having the same meaning as the
     terms "small business," "small organization," and "small
     governmental jurisdiction."[^181] In addition, the term "small
     business" has the same meaning as the term "small business concern"
     under the Small Business Act.[^182] A "small business concern" is
     one which: (1) is independently owned and operated; (2) is not
     dominant in its field of operation; and (3) satisfies any
     additional criteria established by the Small Business
     Administration (SBA).[^183]

134. Nationwide, there are a total of approximately 22.4 million small
     businesses, according to SBA data.[^184] A "small organization" is
     generally "any not-for-profit enterprise which is independently
     owned and operated and is not dominant in its field."[^185]
     Nationwide, as of 2002, there were approximately 1.6 million small
     organizations.[^186] The term "small governmental jurisdiction" is
     defined generally as "governments of cities, towns, townships,
     villages, school districts, or special districts, with a population
     of less than fifty thousand."[^187] Census Bureau data for 2002
     indicate that there were 87,525 local governmental jurisdictions in
     the United States.[^188] We estimate that, of this total, 84,377
     entities were "small governmental jurisdictions."[^189] Thus, we
     estimate that most governmental jurisdictions are small.

135. In the following paragraphs, the Commission further describes and
     estimates the number of small entity licensees that may be affected
     by the rules the Commission adopts in this Order. The rule changes
     affect LECs, including both incumbent LECs (ILECS) and competitive
     LECs (CLECs), CMRS providers, and interconnected VoIP service
     providers.

136. Since this Order applies to multiple services, this FRFA analyzes
     the number of small entities affected on a service-by-service
     basis. In the case of CMRS providers, when identifying small
     entities that could be affected by the Commission's new rules, this
     FRFA provides information that describes auctions results,
     including the number of small entities that were winning bidders.
     However, the number of winning bidders that qualify as small
     businesses at the close of an auction does not necessarily reflect
     the total number of small entities currently in a particular
     service. The Commission does not generally require that licensees
     later provide business size information, except in the context of
     an assignment or a transfer of control application that involves
     unjust enrichment issues.

137. *[Cellular Licensees]{.underline}.* The SBA has developed a small
     business size standard for small businesses in the category
     "Cellular and Other Wireless Telecommunications."[^190] Under that
     SBA category, a business is small if it has 1,500 or fewer
     employees.[^191] For the census category of "Cellular and Other
     Wireless Telecommunications," Census Bureau data for 2002 show that
     there were 1,397 firms in this category that operated for the
     entire year.[^192] Of this total, 1,378 firms had employment of 999
     or fewer employees, and 19 firms had employment of 1,000 employees
     or more.[^193] Thus, under this category and size standard, the
     majority of firms can be considered small.

138. *[Broadband Personal Communications Service]{.underline}.* The
     broadband Personal Communications Service (PCS) spectrum is divided
     into six frequency blocks designated A through F, and the
     Commission has held auctions for each block. The Commission has
     created a small business size standard for Blocks C and F as an
     entity that has average gross revenues of less than \$40 million in
     the three previous calendar years.[^194] For Block F, an additional
     small business size standard for "very small business" was added
     and is defined as an entity that, together with its affiliates, has
     average gross revenues of not more than \$15 million for the
     preceding three calendar years.[^195] These small business size
     standards, in the context of broadband PCS auctions, have been
     approved by the SBA.[^196] No small businesses within the
     SBA-approved small business size standards bid successfully for
     licenses in Blocks A and B. There were 90 winning bidders that
     qualified as small entities in the C Block auctions. A total of 93
     "small" and "very small" business bidders won approximately 40
     percent of the 1,479 licenses for Blocks D, E, and F.[^197] On
     March 23, 1999, the Commission reauctioned 155 C, D, E, and F Block
     licenses; there were 113 small business winning bidders.[^198] On
     January 26, 2001, the Commission completed the auction of 422 C and
     F PCS licenses in Auction 35.[^199] Of the 35 winning bidders in
     this auction, 29 qualified as "small" or "very small" businesses.
     Subsequent events concerning Auction 35, including judicial and
     agency determinations, resulted in a total of 163 C and F Block
     licenses being available for grant.

139. *[Specialized Mobile Radio]{.underline}.* The Commission awards
     "small entity" bidding credits in auctions for Specialized Mobile
     Radio (SMR) geographic area licenses in the 800 MHz and 900 MHz
     bands to firms that had revenues of no more than \$15 million in
     each of the three previous calendar years.[^200] The Commission
     awards "very small entity" bidding credits to firms that had
     revenues of no more than \$3 million in each of the three previous
     calendar years.[^201] The SBA has approved these small business
     size standards for the 900 MHz Service.[^202] The Commission has
     held auctions for geographic area licenses in the 800 MHz and 900
     MHz bands. The 900 MHz SMR auction began on December 5, 1995, and
     closed on April 15, 1996. Sixty bidders claiming that they
     qualified as small businesses under the \$15 million size standard
     won 263 geographic area licenses in the 900 MHz SMR band. The 800
     MHz SMR auction for the upper 200 channels began on October 28,
     1997, and was completed on December 8, 1997. Ten bidders claiming
     that they qualified as small businesses under the \$15 million size
     standard won 38 geographic area licenses for the upper 200 channels
     in the 800 MHz SMR band.[^203] A second auction for the 800 MHz
     band was held on January 10, 2002 and closed on January 17, 2002
     and included 23 BEA licenses. One bidder claiming small business
     status won five licenses.[^204]

140. The auction of the 1,050 800 MHz SMR geographic area licenses for
     the General Category channels began on August 16, 2000, and was
     completed on September 1, 2000. Eleven bidders won 108 geographic
     area licenses for the General Category channels in the 800 MHz SMR
     band qualified as small businesses under the \$15 million size
     standard. In an auction completed on December 5, 2000, a total of
     2,800 Economic Area licenses in the lower 80 channels of the 800
     MHz SMR service were sold. Of the 22 winning bidders, 19 claimed
     "small business" status and won 129 licenses. Thus, combining all
     three auctions, 40 winning bidders for geographic licenses in the
     800 MHz SMR band claimed status as small business.

141. In addition, there are numerous incumbent site-by-site SMR
     licensees and licensees with extended implementation authorizations
     in the 800 and 900 MHz bands. The Commission does not know how many
     firms provide 800 MHz or 900 MHz geographic area SMR pursuant to
     extended implementation authorizations, nor how many of these
     providers have annual revenues of no more than \$3 million or \$15
     million (the special small business size standards), or have no
     more than 1,500 employees (the generic SBA standard for wireless
     entities, discussed, *supra*). One firm has over \$15 million in
     revenues. The Commission assumes, for purposes of this analysis,
     that all of the remaining existing extended implementation
     authorizations are held by small entities.

142. *[Advanced Wireless Services]{.underline}.* In the *AWS-1 Report
     and Order*, the Commission adopted rules that affect applicants who
     wish to provide service in the 1710-1755 MHz and 2110-2155 MHz
     bands.[^205] The *AWS-1 Report and Order* defines a "small
     business" as an entity with average annual gross revenues for the
     preceding three years not exceeding \$40 million, and a "very small
     business" as an entity with average annual gross revenues for the
     preceding three years not exceeding \$15 million. The *AWS-1 Report
     and Order* also provides small businesses with a bidding credit of
     15 percent and very small businesses with a bidding credit of 25
     percent.

143. [*Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers (Incumbent LECs)*.]{.underline}
     As noted above, a "small business" under the RFA is one that,
     *inter alia*, meets the pertinent small business size standard
     (*e.g*., a telephone communications business having 1,500 or fewer
     employees), and "is not dominant in its field of operation."[^206]
     The SBA's Office of Advocacy contends that, for RFA purposes, small
     incumbent LECs are not dominant in their field of operation because
     any such dominance is not "national" in scope.[^207] We have
     therefore included small incumbent local exchange carriers in this
     RFA analysis, although we emphasize that this RFA action has no
     effect on Commission analyses and determinations in other, non-RFA
     contexts. Neither the Commission nor the SBA has developed a small
     business size standard specifically for incumbent local exchange
     services. The appropriate size standard under SBA rules is for the
     category Wired Telecommunications Carriers. Under that size
     standard, such a business is small if it has 1,500 or fewer
     employees.[^208] According to Commission data,[^209] 1,303 carriers
     have reported that they are engaged in the provision of incumbent
     local exchange services. Of these 1,303 carriers, an estimated
     1,020 have 1,500 or fewer employees and 283 have more than 1,500
     employees. Consequently, the Commission estimates that most
     providers of incumbent local exchange service are small businesses
     that may be affected by our proposed rules.

144. *[Competitive Local Exchange Carriers (Competitive LECs),
     Competitive Access Providers (CAPs), "Shared-Tenant Service
     Providers," and "Other Local Service Providers."]{.underline}*
     Neither the Commission nor the SBA has developed a small business
     size standard specifically for these service providers. The
     appropriate size standard under SBA rules is for the category Wired
     Telecommunications Carriers. Under that size standard, such a
     business is small if it has 1,500 or fewer employees.[^210]
     According to Commission data,[^211] 769 carriers have reported that
     they are engaged in the provision of either competitive access
     provider services or competitive local exchange carrier services.
     Of these 769 carriers, an estimated 676 have 1,500 or fewer
     employees and 93 have more than 1,500 employees. In addition, 12
     carriers have reported that they are "Shared-Tenant Service
     Providers," and all 12 are estimated to have 1,500 or fewer
     employees. In addition, 39 carriers have reported that they are
     "Other Local Service Providers." Of the 39, an estimated 38 have
     1,500 or fewer employees and one has more than 1,500 employees.
     Consequently, the Commission estimates that most providers of
     competitive local exchange service, competitive access providers,
     "Shared-Tenant Service Providers," and "Other Local Service
     Providers" are small entities that may be affected by our proposed
     rules.

145. *[Cable and Other Program Distribution.]{.underline}* The Census
     Bureau defines this category as follows: "This industry comprises
     establishments primarily engaged as third-party distribution
     systems for broadcast programming. The establishments of this
     industry deliver visual, aural, or textual programming received
     from cable networks, local television stations, or radio networks
     to consumers via cable or direct-to-home satellite systems on a
     subscription or fee basis. These establishments do not generally
     originate programming material."[^212] The SBA has developed a
     small business size standard for Cable and Other Program
     Distribution, which is: all such firms having \$13.5 million or
     less in annual receipts.[^213] According to Census Bureau data for
     2002, there were a total of 1,191 firms in this category that
     operated for the entire year.[^214] Of this total, 1,087 firms had
     annual receipts of under \$10 million, and 43 firms had receipts of
     \$10 million or more but less than \$25 million.[^215] Thus, under
     this size standard, the majority of firms can be considered small.

146. *[Cable Companies and Systems.]{.underline}* The Commission has
     also developed its own small business size standards, for the
     purpose of cable rate regulation. Under the Commission's rules, a
     "small cable company" is one serving 400,000 or fewer subscribers,
     nationwide.[^216] Industry data indicate that, of 1,076 cable
     operators nationwide, all but eleven are small under this size
     standard.[^217] In addition, under the Commission's rules, a "small
     system" is a cable system serving 15,000 or fewer
     subscribers.[^218] Industry data indicate that, of 7,208 systems
     nationwide, 6,139 systems have under 10,000 subscribers, and an
     additional 379 systems have 10,000-19,999 subscribers.[^219] Thus,
     under this second size standard, most cable systems are small.

147. [*Cable System Operators*.]{.underline} The Communications Act of
     1934, as amended, also contains a size standard for small cable
     system operators, which is "a cable operator that, directly or
     through an affiliate, serves in the aggregate fewer than 1 percent
     of all subscribers in the United States and is not affiliated with
     any entity or entities whose gross annual revenues in the aggregate
     exceed \$250,000,000."[^220] The Commission has determined that an
     operator serving fewer than 677,000 subscribers shall be deemed a
     small operator, if its annual revenues, when combined with the
     total annual revenues of all its affiliates, do not exceed \$250
     million in the aggregate.[^221] Industry data indicate that, of
     1,076 cable operators nationwide, all but ten are small under this
     size standard.[^222] We note that the Commission neither requests
     nor collects information on whether cable system operators are
     affiliated with entities whose gross annual revenues exceed \$250
     million,[^223] and therefore we are unable to estimate more
     accurately the number of cable system operators that would qualify
     as small under this size standard.

148. *Internet Service Providers.* The SBA has developed a small
     business size standard for Internet Service Providers (ISPs). ISPs
     "provide clients access to the Internet and generally provide
     related services such as web hosting, web page designing, and
     hardware or software consulting related to Internet
     connectivity."[^224] Under the SBA size standard, such a business
     is small if it has average annual receipts of \$23 million or
     less.[^225] According to Census Bureau data for 2002, there were
     2,529 firms in this category that operated for the entire year.
     [^226] Of these, 2,437 firms had annual receipts of under \$10
     million, and an additional 47 firms had receipts of between \$10
     million and \$24, 999,999. Consequently, we estimate that the
     majority of these firms are small entities that may be affected by
     our action.

149. *Web Search Portals.* Our action pertains to interconnected VoIP
     services, which could be provided by entities that provide other
     services such as email, online gaming, web browsing, video
     conferencing, instant messaging, and other, similar IP-enabled
     services. The Commission has not adopted a size standard for
     entities that create or provide these types of services or
     applications. However, the Census Bureau has identified firms that
     "operate web sites that use a search engine to generate and
     maintain extensive databases of Internet addresses and content in
     an easily searchable format. Web search portals often provide
     additional Internet services, such as e-mail, connections to other
     web sites, auctions, news, and other limited content, and serve as
     a home base for Internet users."[^227] The SBA has developed a
     small business size standard for this category; that size standard
     is \$6.5 million or less in average annual receipts.[^228]
     According to Census Bureau data for 2002, there were 342 firms in
     this category that operated for the entire year.[^229] Of these,
     303 had annual receipts of under \$5 million, and an additional 15
     firms had receipts of between \$5 million and \$9,999,999.
     Consequently, we estimate that the majority of these firms are
     small entities that may be affected by our action.

     **D. Description of Projected Reporting, Recordkeeping, and Other
     Compliance Requirements for Small Entities**

150. *[911 System Information Collection.]{.underline}* The rules
     adopted in this Order require certain specified communications
     providers to analyze their 911 and E911 networks and systems and
     provide one-time detailed reports to the Commission regarding the
     redundancy, resiliency and reliability of those networks and
     systems. The communications providers subject to this rule are: (1)
     LECs, including ILECs and CLECs; (2) commercial wirelesss service
     providers required to comply with the wireless 911 rules set forth
     in Section 20.18 of the Commission's rules; and (3) interconnected
     Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) service providers. The
     Commission has delegated to the Chief, Public Safety and Homeland
     Security Bureau, the authority to implement and activate a process
     through which these reports will be submitted, including the
     authority to establish the specific data that will be required.

151. The reports required by this Order will be filed one time only and
     are due 120 days from the date that the Commission or its staff
     announces activation of the 911 network and system reporting
     process. Since most companies can be expected to have knowledge of
     their network and/or system architecture, we estimate that for the
     great majority of entities the total time required to complete a
     filing with the Commission will be approximately eight to 24 hours,
     depending on the size and type of entity. In making our time
     estimate, we have taken into account that this report must be filed
     only once and that the report will likely be made electronically,
     through a "fill in the blank" template, thereby minimizing the
     burden on all reporting entities. Finally, in order to avoid
     imposing financial burden on small carriers, the Commission exempt
     the following from this rule: (1) LECs that meet the definition of
     a Class B company set forth in Section 32.11(b)(2) of the
     Commission's rules;[^230] (2) non-nationwide commercial mobile
     radio service providers with no more than 500,000 subscribers at
     the end of 2001; and (3) interconnected VoIP service providers with
     annual revenues below the revenue threshold established pursuant to
     Section 32.11 of the Commission\'s rules.

152. *Back-Up Power Supply.* The Order also adopts a rule that requires
     LECs and CMRS providers to have an emergency back-up power source
     for all assets that are normally powered from local AC commercial
     power, including those inside central offices, cell sites, remote
     switches and digital loop carrier system remote terminals. The rule
     adopted provides that LECs and CMRS providers should maintain
     emergency back-up power for a minimum of 24 hours for assets inside
     central offices and eight hours for cell sites, remote switches and
     digital loop carrier system remote terminals that normally are
     powered from local AC commercial power. Our expectation is that
     this requirement will not create an undue burden since several
     communications providers reported in their comments that they
     already maintain emergency back-up power. Additionally, LECs that
     meet the definition of a Class B company as set forth in Section
     32.11(b)(2) of the Commission's rules and non-nationwide CMRS
     providers with no more than 500,000 subscribers are exempt from
     this rule.

     **E. Steps Taken to Minimize the Significant Economic Impact on
     Small Entities, and Significant Alternatives Considered**

153. The RFA requires an agency to describe any significant alternatives
     that it has considered in reaching its proposed approach, which may
     include (among others) the following four alternatives: (1) the
     establishment of differing compliance or reporting requirements or
     timetables that take into account the resources available to small
     entities; (2) the clarification, consolidation, or simplification
     of compliance or reporting requirements under the rule for small
     entities; (3) the use of performance, rather than design,
     standards; and (4) an exemption from coverage of the rule, or any
     part thereof, for small entities.[^231]

154. *911 System Information Collection.* In order to minimize any
     adverse impact of the 911 system information collection on small
     entities, we have exempted LECs (both ILECs and CLECs) that meet
     the definition of a Class B company that is set forth in Section
     32.11(b)(2) of the Commission's rules.[^232] We will also not
     impose this reporting requirement on Tier III CMRS carriers.[^233]
     Finally, interconnected VoIP service providers will be exempt from
     this requirement if their annual revenues fall below the revenue
     threshold established pursuant to Section 32.11 of the
     Commission\'s rules.

155. *Back-Up Power Supply*. We recognize that the provision of a backup
     power supply as directed by the rule adopted in this Order may be a
     significant financial hardship for certain small businesses.
     Accordingly, we will not impose this requirement on LECs (both
     ILECs and CLECs) that meet the definition of a Class B company as
     set forth in Section 32.11(b)(2) of the Commission's rules. We will
     also not apply this requirement to non-nationwide CMRS providers
     with no more than 500,000 subscribers.[^234]

     **[Report to Congress:]{.underline}** The Commission will send a
     copy of the Order, including this FRFA, in a report to be sent to
     Congress pursuant to the Congressional Review Act.[^235] In
     addition, the Commission will send a copy of the Order, including
     this FRFA, to the Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the SBA. A copy of
     the Order and FRFA (or summaries thereof) will also be published in
     the Federal Register.[^236]

**STATEMENT OF\
CHAIRMAN KEVIN J . MARTIN**

*Re: Recommendations of the Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact of
Hurricane Katrina on Communications Networks, EB Docket No. 06-119 and
Docket No. 06-63.*

Today, the Commission takes action to implement the recommendations of
the Independent Katrina panel. Experts on the panel from all sectors of
the communications industry and leading public safety organizations
worked hard to study the impact of the disaster and focus the
Commission's attention on proposals that would improve our response and
recovery efforts for the future.

The recommendations we adopt today address a wide range of initiatives
designed to improve disaster preparedness, network reliability and
resilience, and communications among emergency responders. In
particular, we require local exchange carriers and CMRS providers to
have an emergency back-up power source for certain critical network
facilities and we also require these service providers and VoIP
providers file a report with the Commission on the resiliency and
reliability of their 911 networks or systems.

I am pleased that, upon release of the Panel's final recommendations,
the Public Safety Bureau moved quickly to begin the process of
implementing many of these recommendations. I look forward to receiving
the Bureau's first full progress report this fall, and commit to
continue to work with my colleagues to ensure that this Commission
remains vigilant to improve communications for the needs of emergency
preparedness and response.

I would again like to thank all the members of the Katrina panel for
their public service and dedication. The American public has benefited
greatly from the thoughtful contributions made by all the industry and
public safety participants who gave their time and effort in this
endeavor.

I would also like to thank Nancy Victory for her leadership as Chair of
the panel. Her knowledge and expertise helped guide the panel and ensure
that it would deliver a quality work product within a very tight
timeframe. Finally, I would also like to express my appreciation to my
fellow Commissioners for their continued support of the work of the
Panel, and the efforts of our Public Safety Bureau as it enacts the
improvements we adopt today.

**STATEMENT OF**

**COMMISSIONER MICHAEL J. COPPS**

 

 *Re:      Recommendations of the Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact
of Hurricane Katrina on Communications Networks*, EB Docket No. 06-119
and WC Docket No. 06-63.

 

            Hurricane season begins anew tomorrow.  News programs are
filled with predictions of how many and how intense this year's storms
may be; stories about the extent of preparations that are being made to
cope with the disruptions that might once again befall New Orleans, the
Gulf Coast and other hurricane-prone areas of the country; and stories
chronicling the thus-far disappointing reconstruction of the areas hit
so hard by Hurricane Katrina.  Our nation was a nation scarred by the
images of suffering and destruction that were broadcast into our homes
in the days and weeks following Katrina and also Hurricane Rita.  I
visited the Gulf Coast with Chairman Martin and other communications
leaders in the days following the catastrophe, and I know that I will
never forget the searing images of devastation we witnessed there. 

 

            The region's suffering was severely compounded by the almost
total failure of public safety and commercial communications networks. 
For a week or more, more often than not, 911 calls went unanswered,
broadcast stations were dark, public safety radio systems were seriously
compromised, wireless phones were inoperable, and wireline phones had no
dial tone.  Most painful of all was that a significant portion of this
failure was unnecessary and could have been prevented, or at least
seriously ameliorated, by better pre-disaster planning and more
coordinated public sector-private sector teamwork.  I say this not to
point fingers, but to point up our local, regional and national
shortfalls in public safety and disaster preparedness.  Part of our
problem today, as a country, is our failure to come to grips with how
much work remains to be done to build effective public safety
communications.  It is huge, it is expensive and it is totally
necessary.

 

            The Gulf Coast tragedy presented us with a solemn duty to
sift through the shortfalls, in both the private and the public sectors;
to grasp the harsh lessons that needed to be learned; and to enhance our
preparedness for the next major cataclysm.  As I hope we are all aware,
there ***will*** be a next one---certainly other natural disasters or,
even more terrifying if that is possible, more terrorist attacks. 

 

            The FCC undertook an active role in the days following the
big storm.  The Commission team, under Chairman Martin's leadership,
worked around the clock, for days and weeks, to restore communications
and provide assistance all along the Gulf Coast.  Communications
industries likewise worked long and hard to restore critical services
and we owe them a large measure of gratitude, too.  Subsequently an
Independent Panel was established under former NTIA Administrator Nancy
Victory to review thoroughly what had happened, what systems had worked
and which had not, and to provide recommendations for the road ahead. 
Today, after putting these recommendations out for comment, the
Commission takes a step forward.

 

But it is only that---another step forward.  This is not a Report and
Order that brings a proceeding to a close.  It is an incremental step
against the backdrop of a challenge that will continue to stalk us and
might even get worse in coming years as climate changes suggest more
frequent and more intense storms and disruptions across much of the
country.  There is so much left undone and so much yet to do. 

 

I consider it a positive step that today's item announces two new
regulations for carriers who fall under the Commission's jurisdiction. 
First, following the suggestion of the National Emergency Number
Association (NENA), all carriers of a certain size must now ensure the
availability of emergency/backup power in all their central offices. 
Second, they must file with the Commission an analysis of the
redundancy, resiliency, and dependability of their 911 facilities. 

 

            These requirements will help improve the nation's readiness
for the next disaster and I appreciate my colleagues' willingness to
make these measures mandatory. Their adoption represents recognition by
this Commission that we cannot rely exclusively on the workings of the
free market and the sometimes-too-sanguine assurances of industry when
it comes to assuring public safety.  I am pleased that we seem to be on
the cusp of realizing that a more proactive approach may be necessary.
 As Justice Frankfurter once observed, "Wisdom too often never comes,
and so one ought not to reject it merely because it comes late."[^237] 
It is important that the Commission is taking this up.

 

             But I also think that record that was developed was too
heavily skewed by the belief---I think the pernicious belief---that the
FCC either ***will*** ***not*** or ***should*** ***not*** take a lead
role in mandating network resiliency standards.  I simply cannot accept
this view.  The nation's experience with 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina
indicates to me that industry best practices and voluntary best efforts
are not by themselves always going to get the job done.  You don't have
to take my word for it.  The comments filed in this docket by St.
Tammany Parish, one of the Louisiana areas most devastated by Hurricane
Katrina, put it well:  "Regarding the question of whether to 'rely on
voluntary consensus or other measures for enhancing readiness and
promoting more effective response efforts' we encourage the Commission
to actively pursue positive results to the extent permitted.  Voluntary
consensus measures, while well intended, have fallen short many times." 
 

 

            I can't put it any better than that.  The individual
citizens who bore the brunt of Katrina's fury and the PSAPs who tried to
cope with it certainly understand that some things need to be done, and
done soon, and done on a mandatory basis if they are not going to be
voluntarily implemented.  These are the times when the Commission needs
to step in and make it happen.  Otherwise an effective system of public
safety will never be achieved.  So I hope that our willingness today to
implement mandatory actions will be the beginning of a broader and more
general reorientation of our approach to public safety issues.  I am
pleased we are beginning down this road and I hope we stay on it.  I
also hope and trust that the private sector realizes the public trust it
has been given to aid in the protection of our citizens.  The private
sector played a critical role in the aftermath of Katrina and Rita, and
still does, as it rebuilds the network infrastructure in that devastated
region.  The industry's continuing involvement in these efforts is
essential if government and industry together are going to be successful
next time. Our nation's citizens deserve, and expect, no less. Public
safety is not something nice to have---it is a national imperative and
the first obligation of all of us in this room as public servants.

 

Another role that I suggested for the Commission was to act as a
clearinghouse for ideas that can better prepare organizations of all
sizes for the next disaster.  I am talking here about the hundreds of
thousands of public safety agencies, hospitals, nursing homes,
charities, small businesses, and other organizations that lack the
resources to come up with self-generated, custom-built and fully-tested
disaster readiness plans.  Why should each of these groups have to start
from scratch and re-invent the public safety wheel?  Wouldn't it be far
better if they could come to the FCC to learn about what has worked for
other organizations and what hasn't?  After all, learning that your
disaster plan doesn't work in the middle of a disaster is emphatically
***not*** the right time to make that discovery.  The technologies and
protocols that organizations rely upon in a crisis need to work every
time.

 

           Today's item instructs the Commission's new Public Safety and
Homeland Security Bureau---under its new Bureau Chief, Derek Poarch---to
take the lead role in building such a clearinghouse.  As I have noted
many times before, this is where the Commission should have gone six
years ago, right after 9/11.  I commend Chairman Martin's willingness to
take a leadership role in this critically important area and I applaud
his efforts to initiate processes that will hopefully put this agency in
the forefront of communications readiness planning, exactly where it
belongs. 

 

            As with all public safety initiatives, the proof will be in
the pudding.  In the weeks and months ahead, our new Bureau and Chief
are tasked with developing readiness checklists for each industry
sector; awareness programs on alternative technologies such as satellite
and paging systems, Wi-Fi, and WiMAX; and outreach programs for
emergency medical and other communities.  It will require significant
resources to realize these and many other objectives, such as developing
and publicizing a first-rate website that communicates the Commission's
latest learning on how to prepare for disasters. Commission outreach is
so central to all this and I am pleased that the Bureau will issue
regular reports detailing our outreach activities.  I, for one, will be
monitoring these reports closely to assure myself that the Bureau is
doing everything that it can to reach those who can benefit from the
FCC's research, experience and programs.  I urge Chief Poarch to be
aggressive in this task---to become a tireless advocate and proselytizer
on this issue.  It was never my idea that we would settle for rebuilding
a communications system that was taken down by Katrina---a terrible
storm, to be sure, but far less devastating than a direct hit from a
Category 5 hurricane would have been.  The good citizens of New Orleans
and the Gulf Coast have a right to expect, and should settle for no
less, than the best and most up-to-date communications systems that our
country can provide.

 

            So I vote to approve this item as a step along the way, but
just a step, holding out the prospect of continuing commitment to see
the job through and to deploy the full decision-making authority of this
Commission to make it happen.  Thanks to the Bureau, all the commenters,
our hard-working bureau and staffs, and my colleagues for their efforts
here.  

**STATEMENT OF**

**COMMISSIONER JONATHAN S. ADELSTEIN**

*Re: Recommendations of the Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact of
Hurricane Katrina on Communications Networks; EB Docket No. 06-119 and
WC Docket No. 06-63.*

Hurricane Katrina and the 2005 hurricane season represented one of the
most challenging times our country has seen in recent years. Its memory
should serve as ample reminder of the commitment that will be necessary
to achieve disaster readiness and preparedness. All aspects of daily
life in the Gulf Coast region were severely impacted by the devastation
caused by these storms -- telecommunications and media services were no
exception. With such destruction of our communications infrastructure,
Hurricane Katrina demonstrates in stark relief the essential role of
communications during emergencies, whether citizens are trying to find
out what is happening with their families, officials are trying to
disseminate critical information, or emergency personnel are responding
to an urgent situation.

The Katrina Panel Report confirmed that our nation's communications
systems and our government's response capabilities were put to the test,
with very mixed results. While our Order today achieves some limited
gains, there is still much to be done before we face our next national
test.

The Commission can and must play a key role in improving our nation's
disaster preparedness, network reliability, and communications among
first responders. Through our Public Safety and Homeland Security
Bureau, the Commission must take a more active lead in coordinating with
state, local and Tribal governments, public safety answering points
(PSAPs), and first responders in advance of future disasters; in
providing important outreach to our nation's emergency medical
communities; and in working with other federal agencies to ensure that
credentialing procedures and other requirements are developed in advance
to ensure access by communications workers to affected areas
post-disaster. This item sets out several important directives to our
staff to meet these worthwhile objectives. These efforts are critical if
the Commission is to establish and maintain a position of leadership.
Many of these proposed outreach efforts were specifically recommended by
the Hurricane Katrina Panel, so I want to extend again my thanks to
Nancy Victory and the members of the Panel for investing their time and
effort to draw out lessons from this disaster and to better prepare our
communities for the future.

Unfortunately, we still have much work remaining to improve the
country's communications preparedness in light of the events of 20
months ago. As the Order and the Hurricane Katrina Panel Report each
point out, Hurricane Katrina knocked out more than three million
customer phones in the region and more than a thousand cell sites. More
than 35 PSAPs were off-line and unable to provide 911 or enhanced 911
services. The Katrina Panel Report identified three main problems that
caused the majority of communications network interruptions: flooding;
lack of power and/or fuel; and failure of redundant pathways.[^238] I am
pleased that we were able to improve the item by addressing these
concerns through two modest provisions dealing with (1) emergency
back-up power requirements, and (2) an obligation on service providers
to file 911 analysis reports. These are worthwhile efforts, but they
alone will not be sufficient to ensure that our communications systems
are ready to handle the high hurdles that disasters can bring.

Indeed, the larger focus of the item is on a series of aspirational
objectives for our new Bureau rather than more concrete assurances for
our nation's citizens and first responders. For example, one of the key
findings in the Katrina Panel Report was the widespread damage caused by
unprecedented flooding: "While communications infrastructure had been
hardened to prepare against strong winds from a hurricane, the
widespread flooding of long duration associated with Katrina destroyed
or disabled substantial portions of the communications networks and
impeded trained personnel from reaching and operating the
facilities."[^239] There may be no silver bullets to address the
widespread flooding caused by a disaster such as Hurricane Katrina; yet,
this Order does not in itself require any concrete actions to address
this very real problem. The Commission needs to initiate a discussion of
hardening the network to address flood related issues. While the Order
directs the Bureau to encourage the development of voluntary checklists,
it still leaves work to be done. Although outreach and voluntary
measures can play a critical role, we must continue to push
communications providers to go the extra mile to achieve a true level of
preparedness. Without firm commitments, can we seriously tell the people
of the Gulf Coast region that this Commission has taken all of the
necessary steps to ensure that such a communications disaster will never
happen again?

Similarly, the Katrina Panel Report analyzed extensively the problem of
the failure of redundant pathways and the impact on communications
networks throughout the region from the loss of switches, T1s, and other
leased lines. "As an example, a major tandem switch in New Orleans was
isolated, which meant that no communications from parts of New Orleans
to outside the region could occur."[^240] Once again, the Commission
offers little in the way of solutions for a serious network shortfall
that may well be present in many other communities. Rather, the item
encourages carriers to adopt voluntary readiness checklists based on
best practices advanced by the Network Reliability and Interoperability
Council (NRIC) and the Media Security and Reliability Council (MSRC),
our recently-terminated Federal Advisory Committees. I understand that
neither group has met in well over a year, with NRIC VII holding its
last meeting on December 16, 2005, just a couple of months after the
hurricane season ended. Now that these committees have been replaced
with a new combined reliability council, we will need to seek input more
regularly if we are going to rely on a system of carrier commitments and
best practices to effectuate network reliability changes.

To all of the affected citizens in the Gulf Coast area -- and to the
many diverse communities at risk for future catastrophic events -- we
owe an honest assessment of the performance of the telecommunications
and media infrastructure during Hurricane Katrina and of our strengths,
weaknesses, and commitment to preparedness going forward. Shortly after
the storm, I had an opportunity to witness first hand some of the
widespread destruction and personal loss in the Gulf Coast and to meet
with communications workers and first responders, who labored around the
clock to restore connectivity to the Gulf Coast, often at great personal
sacrifice. It was humbling to see Americans act so selflessly when
others are in need, particularly when so many were themselves suffering
the loss of homes, communities, or loved ones. We owe them not only deep
gratitude but also a serious effort to develop real solutions to address
identified weaknesses and holes in the preparation process. While we
have made some limited advances in this Order, I believe our work is
still far from over.

**STATEMENT OF**

**COMMISSIONER DEBORAH TAYLOR TATE**

*Re: Recommendations of the Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact of
Hurricane Katrina on Communications Networks*, EB Docket No. 06-119 and
WC Docket No. 06-63.

Today's item marks an important step towards ensuring that the
Commission and the industries it is responsible for are better prepared
to respond in the face of natural disasters and other types of
incidents, such as a pandemic, industrial accident, environmental
incident, or terrorist attack. I am proud to vote in support of an item
which, I believe, reflects the best aspects of the Independent Panel's
report and the subsequent input from a diverse array of commenters.

When we released the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking that led to today's
order, I specifically asked and encouraged industry to develop and share
their thoughts, strategies and ideas on disaster preparedness and
emergency system interoperability. While the industry certainly stepped
to the plate, they were matched in their expertise, passion, and
innovation by a diverse array of public safety agencies, federal and
state government agencies, equipment manufacturers, and concerned
citizens. This diversity and depth of participation in this proceeding
created a record which led to an item which I think everyone should be
proud of, and marks a standard which we should strive to achieve across
the board.

Finally, I would like to again thank Nancy Victory and the members of
the Independent Panel for all of their efforts. I hope and trust that
they will take pride and, to some extent, comfort in the fact that they
have played such a key role in helping to prepare our Nation for
whatever challenge it faces next.

**STATEMENT OF**

**COMMISSIONER ROBERT M. McDOWELL**

*Re: Recommendations of the Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact of
Hurricane Katrina on Communications Networks, EB Docket No. 06-119 and
WC Docket No. 06-63.*

I support our action today to move forward on a number of the
recommendations made by the Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact of
Hurricane Katrina on Communications Networks (Hurricane Katrina Panel).
Our work is particularly timely, given that the Atlantic Hurricane
season begins tomorrow, June 1, and scientists at the National Oceanic
and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) Climate Prediction Center are
projecting a 75 percent chance that hurricane activity will be above
normal this year.

Moreover, it is particularly helpful that our efforts regarding
emergency preparedness have broad applicability, given the need to plan
for not only natural disasters such as hurricanes, but also for
incidents like terrorist attacks, influenza pandemic outbreaks and
industrial accidents. Any of these emergencies could result in sudden
and significant shortages of personnel, a surge in communications
traffic, possible disruptions to communications networks (due to
increased telecommuting during an influenza pandemic, for example), and
lack of manpower to immediately repair affected communications networks.
I am pleased that we have built upon the lessons learned from the
Hurricane Katrina disaster to promote more effective, efficient response
and recovery efforts, as well as heightened readiness and preparedness.
Thank you to all involved.

[^1]: *See generally* Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact of
    Hurricane Katrina on Communications Networks, *Report and
    Recommendations to the Federal Communications Commission*, 5-31
    (Katrina Panel Report); *see also* Federal-State Joint Board on
    Universal Service, Order, 20 FCC Rcd 16883, para. 2 (2005) (*Katrina
    USF Order*).

[^2]: 5 U.S.C. App. 2 (1988).

[^3]: *See* the Katrina Panel Charter *available at*
    http://www.fcc.gov/eb/hkip/HKIPCharter.pdf (last visited June 15,
    2006); *see also* the Notice of Establishment of the Commission's
    Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane Katrina on
    Communications Networks, 71 Fed. Reg. 933 (2006).

[^4]: *Recommendations of the Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact of
    Hurricane Katrina on Communications Networks*, Notice of Proposed
    Rulemaking, EB Docket No. 06-119, 21 FCC Rcd 7320 (2006)
    ("*Notice*").

[^5]: *Katrina Panel Report* at 31.

[^6]: Some commenters noted that providers should be afforded the
    flexibility to create practices tailored to their unique
    circumstances. *See, e.g*., BellSouth Comments at 8-9; T-Mobile USA
    Reply Comments at 4-5; United States Telecom Association Comments at
    9-12. Some commenters asserted that the Commission should require
    that regulated communications entities develop and maintain business
    continuity plans for significant disruptions. *See* AT&T Comments at
    4-5; Adolph Holmes Comments at 3. However, several others opposed
    this and encourage industry self regulation regarding development of
    business continuity plans. *See, e.g.*, Sprint Nextel Comments at
    7-8.

[^7]: *See, e.g.,* Motorola Comments at 3-4; NAB Comments at 5-6.

[^8]: On October 19, 2006, the NRSC adopted a Hurricane Checklist and
    submitted that checklist in the docket for the Katrina Panel NPRM
    (EB Docket 06-119). *See*
    <http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native_or_pdf=pdf&id_document=6518531475>.
    Commenters noted that NRSC had been developing readiness checklists
    for the telecommunications industry.

[^9]: The Katrina Panel learned that a variety of non-traditional,
    alternative technologies could have served as effective, back-up
    communications for public safety until primary systems were repaired
    during Hurricane Katrina. The Katrina Panel noted that satellite
    infrastructure was generally unaffected by the storm and could have
    provided a viable back-up system. Two-way paging operations also
    remained generally operational during the storm. These paging
    operations did provide communications capabilities for some police,
    fire emergency medical personnel and could have been more widely
    utilized. The Katrina Panel noted that other types of
    non-traditional but easily deployable technology, such as WiFi and
    WiMax, or self-contained communications vehicles, could also have
    been effectively utilized. The Katrina Panel noted that these
    technologies appear deserving of exploration as back-up
    communications options to primary public safety systems. *Katrina
    Panel Report* at 24.

[^10]: Globalstar Reply Comments at 2-5; Inmarsat Comments at 2-4;
    Iridium Comments at 2-5; MSV Comments at 4; and SIA Comments at 3-8.

[^11]: Globalstar Reply Comments at 6; Inmarsat Comments at 6; Iridium
    Comments at 5-7; and MSV Comments at 8-9.

[^12]: Motorola Comments at 4.

[^13]: SIA Comments at 9-10; USA Mobility Comments at 10-12.

[^14]: Society for Preservation of Amateur Radio Comments at 4; Whitman
    Comments at 3.

[^15]: Mississippi Authority for Educational Television (MAET) Comments
    at 4-5.

[^16]: As suggested by one commenter, PSHSB should also encourage public
    safety entities to consider whether pooling communications funds
    could help better prepare for future emergencies. *See* Globalstar
    Comment at 7.

[^17]: The Katrina Panel also recommended that the Commission educate
    the emergency medical community about the various priority
    communications services (*i.e.,* GETS, WPS and TSP) and urge them to
    subscribe. This recommendation is addressed *infra* at ¶¶45-48.

[^18]: *Notice* at para. 10.

[^19]: http://mhanewsnow.typepad.com/prepared/.

[^20]: A pandemic influenza occurs when a novel strain of the virus
    appears that causes readily transmissible human illness for which
    most of the population lacks immunity. History shows that influenza
    pandemics typically occur with very little warning and hit wide
    geographic areas in multiple waves, lasting two to three months at a
    time. *See* CDC Influenza Pandemic OPLAN (20 December 2006) at 11
    which can be found at
    <http://www.cdc.gov/flu/pandemic/pdf/cdc_oplan_122006.pdf>[.]{.underline}

[^21]: *Katrina Panel Report* at 21.

[^22]: *See* *Notice* at 4.

[^23]: *See* ATIS Comments at 5; Bechtel Comments at 10; BellSouth
    Comments at 13-14; Cox Comments at 17-18; Named State Broadcasters
    Association Reply Comments at 3; NAB Comments at 4; NCTA *et al*
    Comments at 21; PRT Comments at 8; Qwest Comments at 6-7; SIA
    Comments at 10-11; Sprint Nextel Comments at 10-12; T-Mobile Reply
    Comments at 6-8; Union Telephone Reply Comments at 8-9; US Telecom
    Association Comments at 17-18; Verizon Comments at 17.

[^24]: DHS Comments at 5-6.

[^25]: NTIA Ex Parte at 2.

[^26]: ATIS Comments at 5; Qwest Comments at 6-7; Union Telephone Reply
    Comments at 8-9; DHS Comments at 5-6.

[^27]: AT&T Comments at 5. We note that NCC is not part of the Federal
    government.

[^28]: AT&T Comments at 5-6; BellSouth Comments at 14; Cox Comments at
    18; Iridium Comments at 8-9; Motorola Comments at 5; SIA Comments at
    10-11; Sprint Nextel at 10-12.

[^29]: AT&T Comments at 6-9; T-Mobile Reply Comments at 6-8; US Telecom
    Association Comments at 17-18.

[^30]: AT&T Comments at 6-7; Cox Comments at 17; Motorola Comments at 5;
    Qwest Comments at 6-7; Sprint Nextel at 10-12; T-Mobile at 6-8; DHS
    Comments at 5-6.

[^31]: Cox Comments at 17-18; CTIA Comments at 15; NCTA *et al* Comments
    at 21; PRT Comments at 8; SIA Comments at 10-11; Union Telephone
    Reply Comments at 8-9.

[^32]: SIA Comments at 10-11.

[^33]: NENA Comments at 17.

[^34]: This process is separate from the mandatory reporting
    requirements that apply to certain communications carriers under
    Part 4 of the Commission's rules, 47 C.F.R. Part 4.

[^35]: *See, e.g.*, Paperwork Reduction Act, 44 U.S.C. § 3501, *et seq*.

[^36]: We take no action on SIA's recommendation that the Commission
    urge terrestrial carriers to apply satellite technology as a back-up
    to their primary reporting facilities, noting that terrestrial
    carriers are likely to be aware of a number of alternative reporting
    mechanisms that could be so applied and will use the ones that best
    suit their needs.

[^37]: *See Notice*, 21 FCC Rcd at 7320, ¶9; *Katrina Panel Report* at
    32. []{.mark}

[^38]: *See Katrina Panel Report* at 32-33.

[^39]: Rather, commenters such as the Association of Public Television
    Stations (APTS) noted that "\[t\]he Commission was particularly
    responsive to these kinds of waiver requests in the aftermath of
    Katrina . . ." APTS Comments at 12.

[^40]: We note that in certain specific instances, it may be appropriate
    to allow automatic relief of certain regulations based on a
    Presidentially declared disaster or the activation of a licensee's
    emergency plan. In fact, there may be circumstances where licensees
    have received certain types of regulatory relief based on these
    triggers. Our concerns here relate to establishing a general policy
    of automatic relief that would apply across the board. We will
    continue to consider specific requests for regulatory relief based
    on the underlying facts supporting these requests.

[^41]: NTIA Ex Parte at 2.

[^42]: The Commission granted more than 90 STA requests and more than
    100 temporary frequency authorizations for emergency workers,
    organizations and companies to provide wireless and broadcast
    service in the affected areas and shelters around the country. *See*
    Written Statement of Kevin J. Martin, Chairman, Federal
    Communications Commission at Hearing on Public Safety Communications
    from 9/11 to Katrina: Critical Public Policy Lessons, Before the
    Subcommittee on Telecommunications and the Internet, Committee on
    Energy and Commerce, U.S. House of Representatives (September 29,
    2005).

[^43]: *See, e.g.*, 47 C.F.R. §§ 1.3, 1.915(b), 1.925, 1.931(b)(5).

[^44]: *See, e.g*., 47 C.F.R. § 90.407 (providing a self-actuating
    mechanism whereby private land mobile and public safety licensees
    may utilize their radio stations for emergency communications in a
    manner other than that specified in the station authorization or in
    the rules and regulations governing the operation of such stations,
    during a period of emergency in which the normal communication
    facilities are disrupted as a result of hurricane, flood, earthquake
    or similar disaster).

[^45]: Verizon noted that the Commission granted Verizon Wireless
    authority to lease spectrum temporarily to vendors operating on CMRS
    equipment to assist the Department of Defense in the Hurricane
    Katrina recovery effort. Verizon suggested that the Commission adopt
    an expedited procedure for temporary spectrum leases. Verizon
    Comments at 16. However, no such action is necessary because the
    Commission already has an expedited process for granting short-term
    leases which allows the grant of leases overnight. *See* 47 C.F.R.
    § 1.9035(e) (immediate approval procedures for short-term de facto
    leasing arrangements). Verizon has not shown that this process is
    insufficient.

[^46]: We note that, subsequent to filing its comments in this
    proceeding, BellSouth merged with AT&T. For purposes of this Order,
    we will refer to BellSouth\'s comments separately from those filed
    by AT&T.

[^47]: *See Petition of AT&T Inc. for Special Temporary Authority and
    Waiver To Support Disaster Planning and Response*, Order, WC Docket
    No. 06-63, 21 FCC Rcd 4306 (Wireline Comp. Bur. 2006); *Petition of
    BellSouth Corporation for Special Temporary Authority and Waiver To
    Support Disaster Planning and Response*, *Petition of Verizon for
    Special Temporary Authority and Waiver To Support Disaster Planning
    and Response, Petition of Qwest Communications International Inc.
    for Special Temporary Authority and Waiver To Support Disaster
    Planning and Response*, Order, WC Docket No. 06-63, 21 FCC Rcd 6518
    (Wireline Comp. Bur. 2006).

[^48]: The Public Safety & Homeland Security Bureau extended the STA to
    April 27, 2007. *See* Letter from Derek Poarch, Chief, Public Safety
    & Homeland Security Bureau, FCC, to Frank Simone, Executive
    Director, Federal Regulatory, AT&T Services, Inc., WC Docket No.
    06-63 (issued April 23, 2007).

[^49]: Verizon Comments at 16.

[^50]: We note that a broader request for extension of this regulatory
    relief remains pending. *See* Letter from Terri L. Hoskins, Senior
    Counsel, AT&T Services, Inc. to Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC,
    WC Docket No. 06-63 (filed March 9, 2007) (seeking a two-year
    extension of the Special Temporary Relief and waiver that the
    Commission granted AT&T for disaster recovery purposes). In its
    request, AT&T states that as a result of its merger with BellSouth,
    BellSouth is an affiliate of AT&T and is included in its request for
    an extension of the STA and waive relief. *Id*, at 2.

[^51]: While the Section 272 requirements have sunset for AT&T, Verizon
    and Qwest, AT&T and Verizon may continue to provide in-region,
    interstate, interLATA telecommunications services through Section
    272 separate affiliates, and these affiliates should be treated as
    nondominant in the provision of such services. *See Regulatory
    Treatment of LEC Provision of Interexchange Services Originating in
    the LEC's Local Exchange Area and Policy and Rules Concerning the
    Interstate, Interexchange Marketplace*, CC Docket No. 96-149 and
    96-61, Second Report and Order in CC Docket No. 96-149 and Third
    Report and Order in CC Docket No. 96-61, 12 FCC Rcd 15756, 15834-35,
    paras. 133-34 (1997), recon. denied, Second Order on Reconsideration
    and Memorandum Opinion and Order, 14 FCC Rcd 10771 (1999). In
    addition, we understand that Qwest has begun implementing the relief
    granted by the Commission to provide in-region, interstate,
    interLATA telecommunications services on an integrated basis subject
    to nondominant carrier regulation. Qwest may be able to benefit from
    the relief granted here to engage in disaster recovery planning and
    implementation during its transition from section 272 separation to
    integrated provisioning and therefore, we continue to include Qwest
    in granting this relief. *See Petition of Qwest Communications, Inc.
    for Forbearance form Enforcement of the Commission's Dominant
    Carrier Rules as They Apply After Section 272 Sunsets*, Memorandum
    Opinion and Order, WC Docket No. 05-333, 22 FCC Rcd 5207 (2007);
    *see also* Letter from Boucher, Corporate Counsel, Qwest, to Marlene
    H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC, CC Docket No. 00-175 and WC Docket No.
    05-333 (filed May 22, 2007).

[^52]: Bechtel suggests that the Commission spearhead the transfer of
    network resilience and reliability work currently performed by
    voluntary bodies like NSTAC or NCC to a formal and professional
    cross-disciplinary entity with hands-on experience supported by
    government professionals. Bechtel Comments at 8-9. The Commission
    does not have authority to transfer work currently performed by
    NSTAC, a Presidential committee established by Executive Order, or
    NCC which is organized by NCS. The Commission should continue to
    work with these entities to support their efforts.

[^53]: The President's National Security Telecommunications Advisory
    Committee Trusted Access Task Force, *Screening, Credentialing, and
    Perimeter Access Controls*, p. 9 (January 19, 2005).

[^54]: *See Katrina Panel Report* at 34.

[^55]: *See* DHS Comments at 7-8.

[^56]: *See* NRP, paragraph 15.

[^57]: *See* DHS Comments at 7.

[^58]: *Id.*

[^59]: *See* DHS Comments at 8.

[^60]: The Panel "support\[ed\] the NSTAC's recommendation that
    telecommunications infrastructure providers and their contracted
    workers be afforded emergency responder status under the Stafford
    Act and that this designation be incorporated into the NRP, as well
    as state and local emergency response plans." *See Katrina Report*
    at 35. However, the Katrina Panel recommended that this be broadened
    to include all communications infrastructure providers.

[^61]: Title VI of the Security and Accountability for Every Port Act of
    2006, Pub. L. 109-347, § 607 (October 13, 2006) (Warning Alert and
    Response Network Act, or the "WARN Act").

[^62]: *Id.*

[^63]: CTIA Comments at 18.

[^64]: DHS Comments at 8.

[^65]: Cingular Comments at 7.

[^66]: *Id.*

[^67]: Cingular Comments at 9-10.

[^68]: *See Katrina Panel Report* at 36.

[^69]: *Id*.

[^70]: DHS Comments at 8, n.13.

[^71]: Gulf States Broadcasters Comments at 6; National Association of
    Broadcasters Comments at 13.

[^72]: Cox Reply Comments at 21; NCTA *et al* Comments at 15.

[^73]: *See* *supra* at para. 15, for more information regarding the
    PSHSB's outreach to hospital associations and the emergency medical
    community regarding emergency communications.

[^74]: The Clinton Administration's Policy on Critical Infrastructure
    Protection: Presidential Decision Directive 63, White Paper (May 22,
    1998).

[^75]: *See* <http://www.ncs.gov/ncc>.

[^76]: DHS Comments at 8, n.13.

[^77]: *Id.*

[^78]: *See*, *e.g.*, Gulf State Broadcasters Comments at 3-4; AT&T
    Comments at 5; Cox Reply Comments at 20-21; Motorola Comments at 9;
    NCTA *et al* Comments at 10-11; PRT Comments at 10; Qwest Comments
    at10; SIA Comments at 13; USA Mobility Comments at 15; Verizon
    Comments at 21.

[^79]: Iridium Comments at 6-7.

[^80]: Inmarsat Comments at 8.

[^81]: *Id*. at 7. []{.mark}

[^82]: *Id.*

[^83]: The Katrina Panel stated that the list should include land mobile
    radios, portable infrastructure equipment, bridging
    technologies/gateways, and backup power system components and the
    information should include the steps necessary for requesting the
    deployment of these assets. *See Katrina Panel Report* at 38.

[^84]: *Katrina Panel Report* at 38.

[^85]: For security purposes, industry groups or entities advise the NCC
    of assets and the NCC inputs the information directly into the
    database.

[^86]: *Katrina Panel Report* at 37.

[^87]: DHS Comments at 9.

[^88]: E*.g.*, National Communications System's Emergency Support
    Function 2 Training Conference, Homestead Air Reserve Base,
    Homestead, Florida (May 20-26, 2006).

[^89]: The Commission is required, under the Digital Television
    Transition and Public Safety Act of 2005, to commence the auction no
    later than January 28, 2008. *See* [47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(15)(C)(v),
    (vi)](http://web2.westlaw.com/find/default.wl?rp=%2Ffind%2Fdefault.wl&vc=0&DB=1000546&DocName=47USCAS309&FindType=L&AP=&fn=_top&rs=WLW7.01&mt=Communications&vr=2.0&sv=Split),
    as enacted by the Digital Television Transition and Public Safety
    Act of 2005, Title III of the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, [Pub.
    L. No. 109-171, 120 Stat.
    4,](http://web2.westlaw.com/find/default.wl?rp=%2Ffind%2Fdefault.wl&vc=0&DB=1077005&DocName=UU(I8C07B6609C-AA11DA90E8D-87FFEC6AE2E)&FindType=l&AP=&fn=_top&rs=WLW7.01&mt=Communications&vr=2.0&sv=Split)
    22, § 3003(a)(2)(2006) ("Digital Television Transition and Public
    Safety Act of 2005"). []{.mark}

[^90]: Service Rules for the 746-764 and 776-794 MHz Bands and Revisions
    to Part 27 of the Commission's Rules, Carriage of the Transmissions
    of Digital Television Broadcast Stations, Review of the Commission's
    Rules and Policies Affecting the Conversion to Digital Television,
    *Memorandum Opinion and Order and Further Notice of Proposed
    Rulemaking*, WT Docket No. 99-168, CS Docket No. 98-120, MM Docket
    No. 00-83, 15 FCC Rcd 20845, 20871, ¶ 62 (2000).

[^91]: *See, e.g.*, BellSouth Comments at 20.

[^92]: NTIA Ex Parte at 1.

[^93]: *See NRIC VII Recommendation 7-7-0566*

[^94]: *See NRIC VII Recommendation 7-7-1011.*

[^95]: *See NRIC VII Recommendation 7-7-5204.*

[^96]: NENA Comments at 6.

[^97]: St. Tammany's Parish Communications District 1 asserts that "it
    is imperative that the LEC, CLECs, and wireless telephone providers
    be required to demonstrate they have adequate backup procedures in
    place." St. Tammany Parish Communications District 1 Comments at 2.

[^98]: AT&T Comments at 2.

[^99]: AT&T Comments at 13.

[^100]: Verizon Comments, at 7-8.

[^101]: 47 U.S.C. § 151.

[^102]: Section 32.11 provides that Class B companies are those
    companies that have annual revenues from regulated
    telecommunications operations that are less than the indexed revenue
    threshold. 47 C.F.R. § 32.11. The Wireline Competition Bureau
    recently announced that the 2006 revenue threshold for Class A to
    Class B companies is \$134 million. *Public Notice*, "Annual
    Adjustment of Revenue Thresholds," DA 07-1706 (WCB, April 12, 2007).
    Although Section 32.11, by its terms, applies only to ILECs, we are
    applying the same revenue categories to CLECs for the purpose of the
    exception to this requirement.

[^103]: Although this standard is based on the Tier III CMRS definition
    which is defined as non-nationwide CMRS providers with no more than
    500,000 subscribers as of the end of 2001, we note that we are not
    exempting from this requirement those non-nationwide CMRS providers
    that have grown to exceed the 500,000 subscriber threshold since
    2001 as we believe that such providers are at a size where they
    should be able to comply with the emergency back-up power rule.

[^104]: *See NRIC VII Recommendations 7-7-0571.*

[^105]: AT&T Comments at 12-14; Cisco Comments at 4-7.

[^106]: NENA Comments at 4-5.

[^107]: AT&T Comments at 12-14; Cisco Comments at 4-7; NENA Comments at
    3-5; St. Tammany Parish Communications District 1 Comments at 3;
    Texas Commission on State Emergency Communications and the Texas
    9-1-1 Alliance (Texas 9-1-1 Entities) Comments at 2-5; TDI Reply
    Comment at 15-16.

[^108]: *Katrina Panel Report* at 39. The Panel noted that this
    "requires the FCC to eliminate any regulatory prohibition against
    the transport of 911 across LATA boundaries. As noted supra at ¶28
    with respect to whether the Commission should grant carriers
    permanent relief from interLATA boundary restrictions as a way to
    enhance network resiliency, the BOCs have already raised the issue
    of relief from Section 272 and its implementing rules in a number of
    pending forbearance petitions and waiver requests. We will consider
    this issue in those proceedings as appropriate.

[^109]: *See, e.g.,* APCO comments at 5; NENA comments at 7-8.

[^110]: *The Development of Operational, Technical and Spectrum
    Requirements for Meeting Federal, State and Local Public Safety
    Agency Communication Requirements Through the Year 2010,
    Establishment of Rules and Requirements For Priority Access
    Service*, WT Docket No. 96-86, Third Memorandum Opinion and Order
    and Third Report and Order, 15 FCC Rcd 19844, 19844-45 (2000). [
    ]{.mark}

[^111]: 47 C.F.R. § 90.20 (d)(80).

[^112]: *See* Tennessee SEIC Comments at 1 (July 31, 2006).

[^113]: 47 C.F.R. § 90.209(b)(5) n.3, (b)(6); *see also Implementation
    of Sections 309(j) and 337 of the Communications Act of 1934 as
    Amended*, WT Docket No. 99-87, Second Report and Order and Second
    Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 18 FCC Rcd. 3034 (2003).

[^114]: *See* Tennessee SEIC Comments at 2 (July 21, 2006).

[^115]: Tennessee State Interoperability Executive Committee Comments at
    2 (July 21, 2006).

[^116]: *See Development of Operational, Technical and Spectrum
    Requirements for Meeting Federal, State and Local Public Safety
    Communications Requirements Through the Year 2010*, WT Docket No.
    96-86, Fifth Memorandum Opinion and Order, Sixth Report and Order
    and Seventh Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 20 FCC Rcd 831, 854-58,
    ¶¶ 57-61, 64-68 (2005).

[^117]: Tennessee State Interoperability Executive Committee Reply
    Comments at 1 (July 31, 2006).

[^118]: NENA Comments at 5-6; St. Tammany Parish Communications District
    1 Comments at 2.

[^119]: *Id*.

[^120]: AT&T Reply Comments at 3-4. AT&T recommends that PSAPs
    "routinely review their 911 networks with the service providers and
    identify points where facilities are not diverse." AT&T Comments at
    12-13; AT&T Reply Comments at 3-4.

[^121]: US Telecom Reply Comments at 8-9.

[^122]: US Telecom Reply Comments at 8-9.

[^123]: In support of this assertion, AT&T cites Public Utility
    Commission of Texas Rules, Section 26.433, *available at*
    [www.puc.state.tx.us/rules/subrules/telecom/26.433/26.433.pdf]{.underline}.

[^124]: AT&T Reply Comments at 3-4; US Telecom Reply Comments at 8-9.

[^125]: *See* 47 C.F.R. § 20.18.

[^126]: "Interconnected VoIP services" are services that (1) enable
    real-time, two-way voice communications; (2) require a broadband
    connection from the user's location; (3) require IP-compatible
    customer premises equipment; and (4) permit users to receive calls
    from and terminate calls to the public switched telephone network.
    *See* *IP-Enabled Services; E911 Requirements for IP-Enabled Service
    Providers*, WC Docket No. 06-36, 05-196, First Report and Order and
    Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 20 FCC Rcd 10245, 10257-58 ¶ 24
    (2005), *aff'd, Nuvio Corp v. FCC*, 473 F.3d 302 (D.C. Cir. 2006)
    (*VoIP 911 Order*).

[^127]: *See* 47 U.S.C. § 151.

[^128]: Section 32.11 of the Commission's rules defines Class B
    companies as "\[c\]ompanies having annual revenues from regulated
    telecommunications operations that are less than the indexed revenue
    threshold." 47 C.F.R. § 32.11 (b)(2). The Wireline Competition
    Bureau recently announced that the 2006 revenue threshold for Class
    A to Class B companies is \$134 million. *Annual Adjustment of
    Revenue Thresholds*, Public Notice, DA 07-1706 (WCB, April 12,
    2007). Although Section 32.11, by its terms, applies only to ILECs,
    we are applying the same revenue categories to CLECs for the purpose
    of the exception to this requirement.

[^129]: Tier III carriers are non-nationwide CMRS providers with no more
    than 500,000 subscribers at the end of 2001. *See Revision of the
    Commission's Rules to Ensure Compatibility with Enhanced 911
    Emergency Calling Systems; Phase II Compliance Deadlines for
    Non-Nationwide Carriers*, CC Docket No. 97-102, Order to Stay, 17
    FCC Rcd 14841, 14848 ¶ 22 (2002).

[^130]: *See* *In the Matter of Examination of Current Policy Concerning
    the Treatment of Confidential Information Submitted to the
    Commission,* Report and Order, GC Docket No. 96-55, 13 FCC Rcd 24816
    (1998).

[^131]: 47 U.S.C. § 403.

[^132]: *See e.g.*, AAPC Comments.

[^133]: McVey Petition at 22.

[^134]: *Katrina Panel Report* at 40.

[^135]: *Review of the Emergency Alert System*, First Report and Order
    and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, EB Docket No. 04-296, 20
    FCC Rcd 18625 (2005). We note that, in a separate action on May 31,
    2007, the Commission adopted a Second Report and Order and Further
    Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in the EAS proceeding that addresses
    some of the Katrina Panel\'s recommendations. *See* FCC Takes Action
    To Further Strengthen Nation\'s Emergency Alert System, *News
    Release*, (May 31, 2007) *(\"EAS News Release*\")*.*

[^136]: The Warn Act establishes a framework by which commercial mobile
    service providers may voluntarily transmit emergency alerts.

[^137]: *Katrina Panel Report* at 41.

[^138]: *Id.*

[^139]: We note that, in the Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
    adopted in the EAS proceeding on May 31, 2007, the Commission sought
    further comment on these issues. *See EAS News Release, supra*.

[^140]: In addition, in the EAS Second Report and Order, the Commission
    directed PSHSB to convene a meeting, or a series of meetings, as
    soon as possible to address providing emergency information to
    non-English speakers. *See EAS News Release, supra*.

[^141]: *Katrina Panel Report* at 41.

[^142]: *Id*.

[^143]: *Id*. at 41-42.

[^144]: The Commission is a Support Agency for the NRP's ESF #2 which
    addresses communications. ESF #2 ensures the provision of Federal
    communications support to Federal, State, local, tribal and
    private-sector response efforts during an Incident of National
    Significance. This Emergency Support Function supplements the
    provisions of the National Plan for Telecommunications Support in
    On-Wartime Emergencies. Coordination of public information is not a
    function assigned to ESF #2.

[^145]: Amendment of Part 97 of the Commission's Rules to Implement
    WRC-03 Regulations Applicable to Requirements for Operator Licenses
    in the Amateur Radio Service, *Report and Order and Order on
    Reconsideration*, WT Docket No. 05-235, FCC 06-178 (released
    December 19, 2006).

[^146]: *See e.g.,*, Cline Comments at 1; Creal Comments, at 1; Walz
    Comments, at 1; Flynn Comments at 1; Wade Comments at 1-2; Sewell
    Comment at 1.

[^147]: *1998 Biennial Regulatory Review --- Amendment of Part 97 of the
    Commission\'s Amateur Service Rules*, Report and Order, WT Docket
    No. 98-143, 15 FCC Rcd 315, 351, ¶63 (1999).

[^148]: Amendment of Part 97 of the Commission's Rules Governing the
    Amateur Radio Services, *Report and Order*, WT Docket No. 04-140,
    FCC 06-149 at para. 52 (released October 10, 2006).

[^149]: For example, we note that some commenters requested that the
    Commission adopt rules overriding bands of antennas used by amateur
    radio operators who are trained as emergency communicators. *See,
    e.g.,* Amherst Alliance Reply Comments at 8-11. We note that a
    petition for rulemaking has been filed separately on this issue and
    we will address this issue in the context of that filing. Other
    commenters raised issues that are part of the Commission's pending
    consideration of a Petition for Rulemaking filed by ARRL (RM 11306).
    Those issues will be addressed in that proceeding.

[^150]: We decline to take regulatory steps to protect the
    communications infrastructure from Electromagnetic Pulse ("EMP")
    attacks as recommended by amateur radio operators Nicholas Leggett
    and Donald Schellhardt*. See Leggett, et al. Comments*, at 1-12. The
    Commission has previously addressed and rejected such requests by
    Mr. Leggett and Mr. Schellhardt. Other government agencies, such as
    DHS and the National Institute of Standards and Technology are
    examining issues relating to EMP threats.

[^151]: *See* *e.g.*, Prometheus Radio Comments at 12-13; Amherst
    Alliance Reply Comments at 2-6.

[^152]: AAPC Comments at ii.

[^153]: UTC Reply Comments at 6.

[^154]: Telecommunications for the Deaf and Hard of Hearing,
    Incorporated; American Association of People with Disabilities;
    Association of Late-Deafened Adults; California Coalition of
    Agencies Serving the Deaf and Hard of Hearing; Deaf & Hard of
    Hearing Consumer Advocacy Network; and National Association of the
    Deaf Reply Comments ("TDI Reply Comments") at 7.

[^155]: TDI Reply Comments at 14.

[^156]: The rules currently require that most TRS providers operate, 24
    hours a day, seven days a week and that they have redundancy
    features similar to those in central offices, including
    uninterruptible power for emergency use. *See* 47 C.F.R. §
    64.604(b)(4)(i-ii).

[^157]: TDI Comments at 14.

[^158]: *Id*.

[^159]: *See Obligation Of Video Programming Distributors To Make
    Emergency Information Accessible To Persons With Hearing
    Disabilities Using Closed Captioning,* DA 06-2627 (Public Notice)
    (released December 29, 2006).

[^160]: AAPD Comments at 2-3.

[^161]: *In the Matter of Telecommunications Relay Services and
    Speech-to-Speech Services for Individuals with Hearing and Speech
    Disabilities*, (Notice of Proposed Rulemaking), CG Docket No.
    03-123, 20 FCC Rcd 19476 (2005).

[^162]: Citing Section 255 of the Communications Act, AAPD urges the
    Commission to consider requiring captioning for PDAs, cell phones
    and other "converged" devices that have the ability to display text
    along with video. AAPD Comments at 2-3. Section 255, however, is
    restricted to "telecommunications service and equipment" devices,
    and not equipment such as televisions, iPods, etc. We also believe
    that extension of the closed captioning requirements to the types of
    devices mentioned by AAPD would require an amendment to the
    Television Decoder Circuitry Act of 1990, or other legislation by
    Congress.

[^163]: *See supra* n.Error: Reference source not found and n.Error:
    Reference source not found.

[^164]: *See supra* n.Error: Reference source not found and n.Error:
    Reference source not found.

[^165]: AT&T\'s relief was originally scheduled to expire on April 20,
    2007, but was extended by PSHSB to April 27, 2007. In light of this,
    we grant AT&T\'s extension *nunc pro tunc* back to April 27, 2007.

[^166]: ^?^ These comments were filed on August 17, 2006, ten days after
    the August 7, 2006 comment due date.

[^167]: These comments were filed on August 8, 2006, one day after the
    August 7, 2006 comment due date.

[^168]: These comments were filed one day after the August 7, 2006
    initial comment deadline.

[^169]: These reply comments were filed on August 23, 2006, two days
    following the August 21, 2006 reply comment filing deadline.

[^170]: These reply comments were filed on August 22, 2006, one day
    following the August 21, 2006 reply comment filing deadline.

[^171]: Commenters jointly expressing comments as the Named State
    Broadcasters Association: Alaska Broadcasters Association, Arizona
    Broadcasters Association, Arkansas Broadcasters Association,
    California Broadcasters Association, Colorado Broadcasters
    Association, Connecticut Broadcasters Association, Illinois
    Broadcasters Association, Indiana Broadcasters Association, Kansas
    Association of Broadcasters, Kentucky Broadcasters Association,
    Maine Association of Broadcasters, MD/DC/DE Broadcasters
    Association, Massachusetts Broadcasters Association, Michigan
    Association of Broadcasters, Nevada Broadcasters Association, New
    Hampshire Association of Broadcasters, New Jersey Broadcasters
    Association, New Mexico Broadcasters Association, The New York State
    Broadcasters Association, Inc., North Dakota Broadcasters
    Association, Oklahoma Association of Broadcasters, Oregon
    Association of Broadcasters, Pennsylvania Association of
    Broadcasters, Rhode Island Broadcasters Association, South Carolina
    Broadcasters Association, Tennessee Association of Broadcasters,
    Texas Association of Broadcasters, Utah Broadcasters Association,
    Vermont Association of Broadcasters, Washington State Association of
    Broadcasters, Wisconsin Broadcasters Association, and Wyoming
    Association of Broadcasters. In an August 28, 2006 letter, the
    Minnesota Broadcasters Association and Missouri Broadcasters
    Association expresses their support of the Reply Comments of the
    Named State Broadcasters Association and asks the Commission to add
    their names to the Comments of the Named State Broadcasters
    Association.

[^172]: AT&T Inc. filed separate ex parte filings on April 19, 2007 and
    April, 23, 2007, respectively.

[^173]: NTI Group filed a total of five separate ex parte filings. NTI
    Group filed separate filings on October 30, 2006, May 21, 2007 and
    May 23, 2007, respectively; and NTI Group filed two separate filings
    on May 24, 2007.

[^174]: Verizon filed two separate ex parte filings on April 30, 2007.

[^175]: *See* 5 U.S.C. § 603. The RFA, *see* 5 U.S.C. §§ 601-12, has
    been amended by the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness
    Act of 1996 (SBREFA), Pub. L. No. 104-121, Title II, 110 Stat. 857
    (1996).

[^176]: *See* Recommendations of the Independent Panel Reviewing the
    Impact of Hurricane Katrina on Communications Networks, *Notice of
    Proposed Rulemaking*, 21 FCC Rcd 7320, 7330, Appendix A. (2006).

[^177]: *See* 5 U.S.C. § 604.

[^178]: Section 32.11 provides that Class B companies are those
    companies that have annual revenues from regulated
    telecommunications operations that are less than the indexed revenue
    threshold. 47 C.F.R. § 32.11(b)(2). The Wireline Competition Bureau
    recently announced that the 2006 revenue threshold for Class A to
    Class B companies is \$134 million. *Public Notice*, "Annual
    Adjustment of Revenue Thresholds," DA 07-1706 (WCB, April 12, 2007).
    Although Section 32.11, by its terms, applies only to ILECs, we are
    applying the same revenue categories to CLECs for the purpose of the
    exception to this requirement.

[^179]: 47 C.F.R. § 20.18.

[^180]: 5 U.S.C. § 604(a)(3).

[^181]: 5 U.S.C. § 601(6).

[^182]: 5 U.S.C. § 601(3) (incorporating by reference the definition of
    "small-business concern" in the Small Business Act, 15 U.S.C. §
    632). Pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 601(3), the statutory definition of a
    small business applies "unless an agency, after consultation with
    the Office of Advocacy of the Small Business Administration and
    after opportunity for public comment, establishes one or more
    definitions of such term which are appropriate to the activities of
    the agency and publishes such definition(s) in the Federal
    Register." 5 U.S.C. § 601(3).

[^183]: 15 U.S.C. § 632.

[^184]: *See* SBA, Programs and Services, SBA Pamphlet No. CO-0028, at
    page 40 (July 2002).

[^185]: 5 U.S.C. § 601(4).

[^186]: Independent Sector, The New Nonprofit Almanac & Desk Reference
    (2002).

[^187]: 5 U.S.C. § 601(5).

[^188]: U.S. Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United States:
    2006, Section 8, page 272, Table 415.

[^189]: We assume that the villages, school districts, and special
    districts are small, and total 48,558. *See* U.S. Census Bureau,
    Statistical Abstract of the United States: 2006, section 8, page
    273, Table 417. For 2002, Census Bureau data indicate that the total
    number of county, municipal, and township governments nationwide was
    38,967, of which 35,819 were small. *Id.*

[^190]: 13 C.F.R. § 121.201, North American Industry Classification
    System (NAICS) code 517212.

[^191]: *Id*.

[^192]: U.S. Census Bureau, 2002 Economic Census, Subject Series:
    Information, "Establishment and Firm Size (Including Legal Form of
    Organization," Table 5, NAICS code 517212 (issued Nov. 2005).

[^193]: *Id.* The census data do not provide a more precise estimate of
    the number of firms that have employment of 1,500 or fewer
    employees; the largest category provided is for firms with "1000
    employees or more."

[^194]: *See* Amendment of Parts 20 and 24 of the Commission's Rules --
    Broadband PCS Competitive Bidding and the Commercial Mobile Radio
    Service Spectrum Cap, *Report and Order*, 11 FCC Rcd 7824, 7850-7852
    ¶¶ 57-60 (1996); *see also* 47 C.F.R. § 24.720(b).

[^195]: *See* Amendment of Parts 20 and 24 of the Commission's Rules --
    Broadband PCS Competitive Bidding and the Commercial Mobile Radio
    Service Spectrum Cap, *Report and Order*, 11 FCC Rcd 7824, 7852
    ¶ 60.

[^196]: *See* Letter to Amy Zoslov, Chief, Auctions and Industry
    Analysis Division, Wireless Telecommunications Bureau, Federal
    Communications Commission, from Aida Alvarez, Administrator, Small
    Business Administration, dated December 2, 1998.

[^197]: FCC News, "Broadband PCS, D, E and F Block Auction Closes," No.
    71744 (rel. January 14, 1997).

[^198]: *See* "C, D, E, and F Block Broadband PCS Auction Closes,"
    *Public Notice*, 14 FCC Rcd 6688 (WTB 1999).

[^199]: *See* "C and F Block Broadband PCS Auction Closes; Winning
    Bidders Announced," *Public Notice,* 16 FCC Rcd 2339 (2001).

[^200]: 47 C.F.R. § 90.814(b)(1).

[^201]: *Id*.

[^202]: *See* Letter to Thomas Sugrue, Chief, Wireless
    Telecommunications Bureau, Federal Communications Commission, from
    Aida Alvarez, Administrator, Small Business Administration, dated
    August 10, 1999. The Commission notes that, although a request was
    also sent to the SBA requesting approval for the small business size
    standard for 800 MHz, approval is still pending.

[^203]: *See* "Correction to Public Notice DA 96-586 'FCC Announces
    Winning Bidders in the Auction of 1020 Licenses to Provide 900 MHz
    SMR in Major Trading Areas,'" *Public Notice*, 18 FCC Rcd 18367 (WTB
    1996).

[^204]: *See* "Multi-Radio Service Auction Closes," *Public Notice*, 17
    FCC Rcd 1446 (WTB 2002).

[^205]: Service Rules for Advanced Wireless Services in the 1.7 GHz and
    2.1 GHz Bands, WT Docket No. 02-353, *Report and Order*, 18 FCC Rcd
    25162 (2003) (*AWS-1 Report and Order*).

[^206]: 15 U.S.C. § 632.

[^207]: Letter from Jere W. Glover, Chief Counsel for Advocacy, SBA, to
    William E. Kennard, Chairman, FCC (May 27, 1999). The Small Business
    Act contains a definition of "small-business concern," which the RFA
    incorporates into its own definition of "small business." *See* 15
    U.S.C. § 632(a) (Small Business Act); 5 U.S.C. § 601(3) (RFA). SBA
    regulations interpret "small business concern" to include the
    concept of dominance on a national basis. *See* 13 C.F.R. §
    121.102(b).

[^208]: 13 C.F.R. § 121.201, NAICS code 517110.

[^209]: *Trends in Telephone Service,* Table 5.3.

[^210]: 13 C.F.R. § 121.201, NAICS code 517110.

[^211]: *Trends in Telephone Service,* Table 5.3.

[^212]: U.S. Census Bureau, 2002 NAICS Definitions, "517510 Cable and
    Other Program Distribution";
    <http://www.census.gov/epcd/naics02/def/NDEF517.HTM>.

[^213]: 13 C.F.R. § 121.201, NAICS code 517510.

[^214]: U.S. Census Bureau, 2002 Economic Census, Subject Series:
    Information, Table 4, Receipts Size of Firms for the United States:
    2002, NAICS code 517510 (issued November 2005).

[^215]: *Id*. An additional 61 firms had annual receipts of \$25 million
    or more.

[^216]: 47 C.F.R. § 76.901(e). The Commission determined that this size
    standard equates approximately to a size standard of \$100 million
    or less in annual revenues. *Implementation of Sections of the 1992
    Cable Act: Rate Regulation,* Sixth Report and Order and Eleventh
    Order on Reconsideration, 10 FCC Rcd 7393, 7408 (1995).

[^217]: These data are derived from: R.R. Bowker, *Broadcasting & Cable
    Yearbook 2006*, "Top 25 Cable/Satellite Operators," pages A-8 & C-2
    (data current as of June 30, 2005); Warren Communications News,
    *Television & Cable Factbook 2006*, "Ownership of Cable Systems in
    the United States," pages D-1805 to D-1857.

[^218]: 47 C.F.R. § 76.901(c).

[^219]: Warren Communications News, *Television & Cable Factbook 2006*,
    "U.S. Cable Systems by Subscriber Size," page F-2 (data current as
    of Oct. 2005). The data do not include 718 systems for which
    classifying data were not available.

[^220]: 47 U.S.C. § 543(m)(2); *see* 47 C.F.R. § 76.901(f) & nn. 1-3.

[^221]: 47 C.F.R. § 76.901(f); *see* Public Notice*, FCC Announces New
    Subscriber Count for the Definition of Small Cable Operator*, DA
    01‑158 (Cable Services Bureau, Jan. 24, 2001).

[^222]: These data are derived from: R.R. Bowker, *Broadcasting & Cable
    Yearbook 2006*, "Top 25 Cable/Satellite Operators," pages A-8 & C-2
    (data current as of June 30, 2005); Warren Communications News,
    *Television & Cable Factbook 2006*, "Ownership of Cable Systems in
    the United States," pages D-1805 to D-1857.

[^223]: The Commission does receive such information on a case-by-case
    basis if a cable operator appeals a local franchise authority's
    finding that the operator does not qualify as a small cable operator
    pursuant to § 76.901(f) of the Commission's rules. *See* 47 C.F.R. §
    76.909(b).

[^224]: U.S. Census Bureau, "2002 NAICS Definitions: 518111 Internet
    Service Providers";
    <http://www.census.gov/epcd/naics02/def/NDEF518.HTM>.

[^225]: 13 C.F.R. § 121.201, NAICS code 518111.

[^226]: U.S. Census Bureau, 2002 Economic Census, Subject Series:
    Information, "Establishment and Firm Size (Including Legal Form of
    Organization)," Table 4, NAICS code 518111 (issued Nov. 2005).

[^227]: U.S. Census Bureau, "2002 NAICS Definitions: 518112 Web Search
    Portals"; <http://www.census.gov/epcd/naics02/def/NDEF518.HTM>.

[^228]: 13 C.F.R. § 121.201, NAICS code 518112.

[^229]: U.S. Census Bureau, 2002 Economic Census, Subject Series:
    Information, "Establishment and Firm Size (Including Legal Form of
    Organization)," Table 4, NAICS code 518112 (issued Nov. 2005).

[^230]: Section 32.11 provides that Class B companies are those
    companies that have annual revenues from regulated
    telecommunications operations that are less than the indexed revenue
    threshold. 47 C.F.R. § 32.11(b)(2). The Wireline Competition Bureau
    recently announced that the 2006 revenue threshold for Class A to
    Class B companies is \$134 million. *Public Notice*, "Annual
    Adjustment of Revenue Thresholds," DA 07-1706 (WCB, April 12, 2007).
    Although Section 32.11, by its terms, applies only to ILECs, we are
    applying the same revenue categories to CLECs for the purpose of the
    exception to this requirement.

[^231]: 5 U.S.C. § 603(c).

[^232]: *See supra* n. 224.

[^233]: Tier III carriers are non-nationwide CMRS providers with no more
    than 500,000 subscribers at the end of 2001. *See Revision of the
    Commission's Rules to Ensure Compatibility with Enhanced 911
    Emergency Calling Systems; Phase II Compliance Deadlines for
    Non-Nationwide Carriers*, CC Docket No. 97-102, Order to Stay, 17
    FCC Rcd 14841, 14848 ¶ 22 (2002).

[^234]: Although this standard is based on the Tier III CMRS definition
    which is defined as non-nationwide CMRS providers with no more than
    500,000 subscribers as of the end of 2001, we note that we are not
    exempting from this requirement those non-nationwide CMRS providers
    that have grown to exceed the 500,000 subscriber threshold since
    2001 as we believe that such providers are at a size where they
    should be able to comply with the emergency back-up power rule.

[^235]: *See* 5 U.S.C. § 801(a)(1)(A).

[^236]: *See* 5 U.S.C. § 604(b).

[^237]: *Henslee v. Union Planters Nat. Bank & Trust Co.*, 335 U.S. 595,
    600 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).

[^238]: *See* Independent Panel Reviewing the Impact of Hurricane
    Katrina on Communications Networks, *Report and Recommendations to
    the Federal Communications Commission* (Katrina Panel Report) at 13.

[^239]: *Id*.

[^240]: *Id.* at 14.