Caught In The Crossfire:

Australian and Asia-Pacific Responses to the Changing Nature of War

Dr Stewart Woodman

Professor

School of Humanities and Social Sciences

University of New South Wales

**The views expressed in this and other papers associated with the NIC
2020 project**

are those of individual participants. They are posted for discussion
purposes

**only and do not represent the views of the US Government.**

Caught In The Crossfire:

Australian and Asia-Pacific Responses to the Changing Nature of War

Dr Stewart Woodman

Professor

School of Humanities and Social Sciences

University of New South Wales

Just a decade ago, one could have been forgiven for thinking that the
Asia-Pacific region was on the doorstep of a new era of conventional,
high-technology warfare. The euphoria of post-Cold War security
cooperation and proclamations of a 'new world order' had dimmed amid
evidence of continuing arms acquisitions and recognition that jockeying
for position among the major powers was likely to determine the future
strategic landscape.

Australia's 1994 Defence White Paper pondered, with more than a hint of
nostalgia, the more fluid and complex environment that had replaced the
stability imposed by the Cold War. Rapid economic growth and greater
technological depth were substantially increasing the 'capacity of most
countries in Asia to buy or build modern defence equipment, and operate
it effectively'.[^1] There was a distinct shift from internal to
external security priorities. The range of military options available to
nations was widening as was the potential scale and intensity of
conflict.

For Australia, those concerns did not abate. Its 1997 Review noted that
the spread of high technology capabilities meant that the 'traditional
assumption that our forces will have an automatic technological edge
over others in the region is no longer plausible'.[^2] There was a
concern that, amid continued regional growth, the decline in Australia's
relative economic standing would ultimately undermine the nation's
capacity to defend itself. Only by exploiting the 'knowledge edge'
offered by the emerging revolution in military affairs could Australia
continue to provide for its defence in a cost effective manner.

Yet the reality of both conflict and force structure development has
been very different to those prognoses. While tensions have continued to
simmer in relation to both Taiwan and the Korean peninsula, the dynamics
of confrontation have shifted significantly towards ballistic missile
proliferation, possession of weapons of mass destruction, and theatre
missile defence. China's quest for military modernisation remains at a
fundamental stage with a more streamlined force and greater military
professionalism seen as necessary prerequisites for future progress. The
litmus test for Japan's re-emergence as a 'normal' state has been its
preparedness to commit the Self Defence Force to international peace
operations.

Progress in Southeast Asia has traversed a similar rocky road. The Asian
Financial Crisis of 1997 severely dented economic development, producing
a suspension in defence acquisitions. Significant domestic instability
in both Indonesia and the Philippines has delayed progress in
transforming their armed forces towards more professional militaries
with advanced capabilities for external defence. Apart from support for
internal stability operations and counter terrorism, the primary
operational commitments have been to peace operations in East Timor.
Unrest in Bougainville and Solomon Islands has seen the deployment of
Australian, New Zealand and South Pacific nation troops.

What these operations have revealed are some significant limitations on
the ability of smaller to middle-size Asia-Pacific nations to exploit
more advanced defence capabilities effectively. Planning horizons are
short. Equipment is acquired as individual platforms rather than based
on a holistic view of deliverable capability. The continuing primacy of
the individual services means that joint planning, command and doctrine
are frequently non-existent. Logistic support and maintenance are
limited, affecting the ability to sustain operations, and training
constrained. Peace operations in East Timor confirmed that
interoperability was only possible at a quite low level.[^3]

Outside Japan, only Singapore and China appear to have the ability or
the size to take advantage of the significant changes heralded by the
revolution in military affairs. For Singapore, its technological
sophistication as a nation and advanced military capabilities, together
with the vulnerabilities imposed by small size and lack of strategic
depth, make a powerful case for the greater transparency and control
proffered by the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). Special attention
is being paid to the development of C^4^I, enhanced surveillance and air
defence capabilities.

Taking advantage of advances in information systems and precision strike
technologies will be key to future SAF development. "Superior numbers of
platforms such as tanks, new planes and ships", Singapore's defence
policy notes, "will become less of an advantage unless all these
platforms can be integrated into a unified, flexible and effective
fighting system using advanced information technologies."[^4] The new
emphasis on battlespace awareness and digitised C^4^I seeks to enhance
the speed and precision of military manoeuvre. In pursuing this
objective, Singapore has the advantage of a strong indigenous
technological capability.

Apart from Malaysia, none of Singapore's neighbours have the capacity to
emulate that sophistication in conventional warfare except in the much
longer term. Outside the peninsular, future warfare in Southeast Asia
will continue to be dominated by low intensity conflicts ranging from
cross border incursions, terrorism and internal dissent with the
possible introduction of medium to longer range ballistic missile
systems as the main wild card. Introduction of the latter would
significantly destabilise the Southeast Asian strategic landscape. The
limited spread of chemical and biological weapons is possible in the
context of global terrorism but is unlikely to shape interstate
relations.

One possible catalyst for the introduction of more advanced conventional
capabilities could be Chinese moves to transform the PLA through the
introduction of RMA related technologies and the adoption of a more
proactive defence strategy. Early PLA interest in the potential for new
technologies to transform the nature of warfare was certainly galvanised
by the overwhelming superiority displayed by US forces in the 1991 Gulf
War. Chinese planners have identified the advantages of a more proactive
strategy providing greater strategic depth, of precision strike with
stand-off capabilities, and of smaller, more mobile forces integrated
through enhanced information technologies.[^5]

The jury is still out, however, on the practicalities of and timescales
for transforming the PLA. China does have powerful incentives including
great power recognition vis-à-vis the US, the capacity to reintegrate
Taiwan by force if necessary, and longer term rivalry with Japan.
However, the extent of change required is daunting. The necessary
preconditions of streamlining and professionalising the force,
developing a much higher technology research and industrial base,
bolstering political support for substantial resource expenditure, and
above all introducing a culture of more flexible and innovative thinking
will take decades -- and even then may well not be achievable.[^6]

A significant development in China's ability to project advanced
conventional forces, while of concern to other regional countries, would
be most unlikely to lead to a response in kind. While some capability
enhancements might be anticipated to protect specific interests,
particularly in surveillance, air defence and maritime patrol, China's
neighbours (apart from Japan and perhaps Russia) are not positioned to
respond comprehensively. They lack the comparative national resources,
industrial and educational infrastructure and, for the foreseeable
future, most armed forces will be unable to turn their backs on the
demands of national development and domestic stability.

Apart from limited contributions to a major power coalition, asymmetric
warfare capabilities are likely to offer the only alternative for middle
powers to respond. Yet, with the possible exception of intermediate
range missiles and information warfare, even those options are
constrained by the national capacity to develop, deploy and support such
weapons. For most, planning for future war will continue to be an
uneasy, and often not articulated, balance between the immediate demands
of stability operations, border protection and counter-terrorism and the
acquisition of selected, more technologically advanced platforms for
specific purposes. New operational concepts are likely to be largely
confined to the tactical environment.

Now, in the context of traditional defence planning, that assessment may
appear rather too sanguine. Outside the specific dynamics of Northeast
Asia, there is no realistic vision of a significant conventional
conflict drawing on the emerging advanced technologies. It is not that
some more advanced platforms will not be acquired. Economic growth is
likely to provide some shiny new toys to park on the end of the runway.
Rather, it is the quantum leap in planning, integration and whole of
capability approaches (so central to those new forms of warfare) that
will take generations to overcome. China's prolonged and currently
unrewarding quest to develop an aircraft carrier capability is a
chastening insight into the magnitude of the task presented by any such
transformation.

Perhaps the most pertinent litmus test for the shape of future conflict
and defence planning priorities in the Asia-Pacific is Australia. A
developed nation with technologically advanced forces, comprehensive
planning processes and a member of the Western strategic community,
Australia is also the Asia-Pacific nation with the most significant and
varied exposure to conflict in recent years. Deployments have stretched
from East Timor, Solomon Islands and Bougainville through to
Afghanistan, the Persia Gulf and Iraq.

Where the Australian experience is fascinating is that it reveals two
distinct and, in many respects, competing imperatives. The first is the
lure of technology. As a geographically large nation with a numerically
small defence force, Australia has long been concerned with how to
maintain a technological edge relative to potential regional
competitors. However, despite the impressive display of nascent RMA
capabilities in the 1991 Gulf War, resource pressures, the euphoria of
enhanced regional cooperation, and a quite tight strategic focus on
continental defence constrained early enthusiasm to embrace the new
technologies.

Rapid economic development in East and Southeast Asia, recognition that
the major regional powers would increasingly shape the strategic
environment, and the broader strategic ambitions of the new
Liberal-National Party Government were soon to change this emphasis. The
1997 Strategic Review pushed the RMA into the spotlight. With capability
margins narrowing, the exploitation of information technologies and
precision strike were seen as the key to both battlespace awareness and
to providing an unparalleled degree of precision and effectiveness in
destroying targets. Privileged access to the US underpinned this
'knowledge edge'.[^7]

An Office of the RMA was created, robust alternative future scenarios
were developed and wargamed, and future war fighting concepts explored.
"(T)he ability to increase vastly the speed and capacity to collect,
organize, store, process, tailor and distribute information", the
Defence 2000 White Paper assessed, was the most important development
changing the conduct of war.[^8] Continuous real-time surveillance over
Australia's northern approaches was to be complemented by integrated and
more flexible C^3^I systems, new command structures and a single,
integrated command support system.

Within the Defence Capability Plan, 'knowledge edge" capabilities became
the first priority.

For Australia, the concept had a strongly maritime emphasis. Military
strategy adopted a more proactive stance, extending beyond defence of
the sea and air approaches to strategic strikes against forward
operating bases in the northern archipelago. While the acquisition of
AEW&C aircraft was the immediate priority, the greater continuity of
coverage provided by space-based systems and UAVs was firmly on the
agenda. Long range stand-off strike weapons were to be acquired for the
F-111s but the potential of very long range Tomahawk land-attack cruise
missiles deferred[^9] -- not least, one suspects, because of its
potentially destabilising impact on the region. The ability to
contribute to coalition in high intensity conflicts further afield was
an important by-product for the Coalition Government.

In the real world of operations, the script did not go exactly to plan.
An influx of illegal refugees saw maritime assets and the Special Air
Service deployed to combat organised people smuggling in the north
western approaches. The dramatic events following the East Timorese vote
for independence from Indonesia in 1999 saw Australia vaulted into
leadership of the multi-national coalition to restore order and provide
a stable environment for the establishment of the new government. With
the collapse of central government authority in Solomon Islands, the ADF
was deployed to support the police in disarming the rival groups,
bringing rebel leaders to justice, and rebuilding the institutions of
central government. The Bougainville secession movement in Papua New
Guinea simmered in the background.

In contrast to the high tech agenda of the RMA, this second imperative
was very much about boots on the ground. And those commitments very
quickly revealed some real limitations on Australia's planning. Without
a recent Government decision to enhance Army readiness, the ADF would
simply not have been able to respond at short notice with a force of
sufficient size to accomplish the task. Moves to streamline and
civilianise combat support over the past decades in the interests of
resource efficiency had left the ADF ill-equipped to deploy and sustain
a significant force element at short notice beyond the reach of the
national infrastructure.

If faced with significant resistance or a higher tempo of operations,
the success of the Timor deployment would have been by no means assured.
The comprehensive, operational-level command arrangements developed for
the defence of Australia were largely bypassed. Sustainment of the
commitment was only possible by significant reliance on Reserve force
elements, a step requiring legislative amendments and shifting the role
of those forces from longer term mobilisation to a shorter term surge
capability. The demand for readily deployable capabilities undermined
the previous luxury of having units and platforms "fitted for but not
with" particular systems or capacities.[^10]

The dilemma created by these competing imperatives was clearly evident
in the public discussion paper that preceded the Defence 2000 White
Paper. If Australia wanted to maintain other war-fighting capabilities
at a reasonably high level, then enhancement of peacekeeping activities
would require increases in longer-term funding. Even then, it was likely
that some capabilities would need to be reduced to maintain funding
within fiscally realistic bounds.[^11]

In consequence, the Government committed itself to a significant
injection of additional funding. The decline in personnel numbers was to
be reversed. Six battalion groups were to be held "at no more than 90
days notice to move, and most at 30 days or less". Additional troop lift
helicopters were to be provided, the ADF's amphibious lift capability
retained at three major ships, and new medium lift aircraft acquired to
replace the ageing Caribous. The readiness of the Logistic Support Force
was enhanced together with its transport, water and fuel supply
capacities. 'Information capability', the first priority in 1997, was
the last capability area mentioned in Defence 2000. [^12]

Any expectation that an effective and sustainable balance had been
achieved between the immediate demands of stability operations and
longer term force development incorporating advanced technologies
collapsed with the attacks of September 11. The invasion of Afghanistan
and the subsequent war against Iraq saw Australian Special Forces, air
combat and surveillance elements, and specialist combat support
capabilities deployed to support the War against Terror. Naval frigates
continued to patrol the Persia Gulf, primarily for maritime interception
operations. At home a Special Forces Command was established,
counter-terrorist capabilities upgraded, and Reserve Forces given
primary responsibility for supporting the police in responding to a
terrorist incident.[^13] The Bali bombings enshrined global terrorism at
the top of Australia's security agenda.

At the heart of Australia's concerns, reflected in its 2003 Defence
Update, was the potentially deadly confluence between the global reach
of terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
(including to non-state actors), and the opportunities offered to
terrorists and transnational criminal groups by the growing incidence of
instability and possible state failure throughout the islands to the
north and east.[^14] The new threats left in tatters the geo-strategic
depth that, apart from the prospect of a nuclear exchange during the
Cold War, had previously constrained the prospect of a potentially
devastating attack. Weighing the advantages of strategic pre-emption to
thwart such asymmetric threats added a sharp edge to Australia's
regional posture.

The challenge for a middle power in the Asia-Pacific preparing for
future conflict is thus extremely daunting. There is a very wide
spectrum of current or potential conflicts. Its range and diversity is
such that relative importance and priority cannot be ordered according
to traditional criteria such as timescales, likelihood, proximity or
magnitude.

Short competes with longer term, conventional with asymmetric,
neighbourhood stability with global terrorism, quality and technology
with quantity and sustainment, coalition with independent, state
sponsored with non-state actors, external defence with homeland
security.

Amid these competing demands, choices will have to be made. The agenda
is simply too broad to be attempted by any but the major powers. With
the current uncertainty providing few leads, it is those choices rather
than any predictions of possible power balances or emerging threats that
will determine the nature of future conflict in the region. While that
conclusion may appear unexceptionable, it is particularly pertinent
because the region is facing a potentially fundamental transition in the
relationship between military force and the state.

There is increasingly a crisis of national capacity relative to the
established benchmarks of conventional defence of territory against
armed attack. Alternative systems for strategic balancing and if
necessary engagement, previously the preserve of the superpowers, are
now available to a much wider range of players, including potentially to
non-state actors. There has also been a quite dramatic compression of
strategic time. It is not simply a question of shortened acquisition
times for asymmetric capabilities and the collapse of the traditional
warning indicators for strategic power projection. Perhaps the greatest
challenge, as the last decade has demonstrated graphically, is the
capacity of the post-Cold War environment to fluctuate rapidly -- much
faster than the ability of defence decision-makers to transform the
force structure.

For some, the choice has already been made. Resource pressures and the
difficulty of identifying a direct and compelling strategic focus have
seen New Zealand disband its air combat capability.[^15] Amid the
disappointment and critical commentary, the compelling arguments were
simple. It was a choice between breadth and depth and between longer
term insurance and more immediate stability management. Even with an
enhanced resource allocation, that decision would still almost certainly
have had to be made. It was a shift, as the UK's Strategic Defence
Review put so neatly in 1997, moving 'from stability based on fear to
stability based on the active management of these risks'.[^16]

For others, the imperative of state survival whether from internal
dissent, cross border challenges or terrorism is compelling. Indonesia's
1997 Defence White Paper set out comprehensive strategy for defence of
the archipelago, including regional security cooperation, a layered
strategy of external defence and ultimately 'Total People's
Resistance'.[^17] With the instability accompanying the introduction of
democracy, the Asian Financial Crisis, and the new transnational
challenges, that vision barely rates a mention. Operations other than
war, including domestic stability and transnational challenges, dominate
a revised defence policy.[^18]

For several other Southeast Asian countries, the prognosis is little
different. Over time they may well acquire some more advanced platforms
but these will almost certainly be limited to specific tasks including
air defence and the protection of maritime areas. They lack the
resources to develop comprehensive conventional capabilities for
national defence, to project traditional combat power, and to integrate
those capabilities into even a rudimentary form of network warfare. That
situation is unlikely to change as the cost and complexity of modern
systems continue to rise and the short term demands of development and
national stability dominate the policy agenda.

Faced with any significant security challenge, the appeal and the
affordability of what are currently termed asymmetric warfare
capabilities will be their only option. Conventional platforms will
continue to provide a limited deterrence and first line response
capability but it is at the point of escalation that the most dramatic
change will occur. Not only will the shift be from systems that are
tactical to strategic in their impact but, because the tools of
engagement are potentially so different on either side of the threshold,
any escalation will be difficult to predict and to manage.

The critical question is whether that vision of future conflict is
confined to the smaller Asia-Pacific nations and those facing immediate
difficulty or has much wider significance. Here, Australia's planning
again offers some valuable insights, poised as it is neatly (or is it
precariously?) between competing visions of high-tech war and an
uncomfortable admixture of non-conventional challenges.

The planning effort that Australia has committed to understanding future
conflict, particularly in the context of guiding force structure
development, is difficult to fault. It has embarked upon an extensive
series of studies of alternative futures, sought to articulate a
comprehensive military strategy which captures all the current and
prospective challenges to the nation's security, undertaken extensive
simulation and war gaming to test concepts and develop skills, and
produced a detailed, long-term capability plan.[^19]

There are two key elements to that response. First, planners have
projected twenty years forward to the force after next, simply
leapfrogging the fog of the immediate future. The resultant Force
2020[^20] and Future Warfighting Concept[^21] construct an appealing
concept of multidimensional manoeuvre warfare. Together they envisage
the ADF as a seamless force with network enabled operations underpinned
by a common, real time battlespace picture and 'decision superiority'.

> "... the ADF will aim to deploy robust forces from secure bases
> against the adversary's most exposed vulnerabilities, with such speed
> and simultaneity that the adversary can neither interfere with our
> operations nor effectively develop their own."[^22]

While multidimensional manoeuvre is directly primarily at the warlike
end of the contingency spectrum, it is seen as an approach that would be
adaptable to other operations.

More immediately, Australia's defence planners have adopted several key
assumptions to guide planning in the shorter term. Australia, they
believe, simply cannot afford two different forces to undertake
stability operations and conventional warfare. While forces equipped for
high level conflict will be able to handle lesser tasks, that judgment
is not true in reverse. There was certainly a strong belief out of the
experience of East Timor that possessing a demonstrable warfighting
capacity was instrumental in achieving early success. The operational
level of war is enjoying a resurgence of popularity as the vehicle for
implementing a network centric approach. Concepts of a balanced force
and of combined arms warfare are seen to provide the flexibility to
respond to a diverse range of contingencies.

But does that vision really hold up to scrutiny? Significant questions
have already begun to be raised about the affordability of the Defence
Capability Plan. The Kinnaird review of defence procurement expressed
considerable concern about the underestimation of the costs of new
equipment. Current operations continue to put pressure on personnel and
logistics. The outcomes of the Defence Capability Review announced in
November 2003 include the early retirement of several major platforms,
reducing ADF capabilities in the shorter term at least.[^23] Australia,
like Japan, has also committed itself to supporting the United States in
exploring the possibility of developing a theatre missile defence system
for the region. Concern about missile proliferation is an issue that has
been lurking in the shadows of Australia's defence planning for a decade
but is only now beginning to slip into the spotlight.

Importantly, the question is not simply one of current budget levels.
During the last decade, the ADF has exhausted virtually all its
traditional tools of national mobilisation simply to sustain lower level
peace operations in its immediate neighbourhood. Civil support for
defence extends right through into the area of operations while Reserve
forces are being pushed closely to the boundaries of acceptability by
the twin demands of readiness and sustainability. While there is some
disquiet within Army about the apparently privileged treatment being
given to the special forces, the Chief of Army has raised the prospect
of the ground forces overall having to introduce special force
characteristics by 2020.[^24] Decisions to pension off the F-111 strike
aircraft earlier than anticipated and potential delays and cost overruns
with the Joint Strike Fighter may well reopen the Tomahawk debate.

Despite the impressive comprehensiveness of Australia's vision of
network centric warfare, there is no doubt that the gap between rhetoric
and reality is growing. The commitments to preparedness and
deployability for operations other than war are unlikely to abate in the
immediate future. Not only are the fundamental causes of the instability
deep-seated, but Australia's own domestic security and its regional
leadership credentials could quickly be jeopardised by a failure to
respond. The difficult choices will almost certainly fall on
capabilities at the higher end of the conflict spectrum with the greater
transparency that is available through the information revolution
potentially encouraging a shift to longer range stand-off systems.

Australia too will thus be looking at the prospect of a differential
force structure -- of necessity managing current crises as the first
priority, maintaining only selected capabilities for high level
operations - usually in coalition, and with little choice other than to
explore more exotic but cost effective options for strategic defence or
power projection. Making such a change as a conscious choice will,
however, not be easy. It would fundamentally affect the organisation and
structure of the ADF. There would be concerns about the perceptions of
both the United States and Australia's neighbours. Abandoning any major
capability would attract adverse public comment.

Both recent combat experience and the drivers of strategic change in the
Asia-Pacific thus point to a fundamental shift in the profile of future
conflict. While most developing nations had lacked the resources and
planning maturity to realise the ideal, the underlying objective was the
development of a balanced conventional force for the external defence of
the nation against external aggression (see Diagram 1 below).
Significant asymmetric capabilities, particularly when linked to weapons
of mass destruction, remained the province of the major powers and of
rogue states largely ostracised from normal strategic interchange. A
significant timeframe and substantial force development, with
appropriate warning indicators, were generally necessary preconditions
for strategic power projection.

That profile of conflict is now under sustained attack. An unheralded
casualty of the past decade has been the breakdown of the common
template of military modernisation which analysts applied assiduously to
explain future trends. While a competitive arms dynamic may continue in
Northeast Asia and on the Malay peninsular, for most middle and smaller
nations that agenda has slipped from the radar screen. Concerns about
development, domestic stability and the forces of separatism, fanned by
the impact of global terrorism and the new transnational challenges,
command priority. Those short term priorities, together with limited
available resources, will overwhelm any prospect of introducing the
longer term perspectives and capability programming necessary to pursue
high-tech warfare in the 21^st^ century.

That growing differential between nations has two fundamental
consequences for the shape of future conflict in the Asia-Pacific
region. First, not only is the nature of any confrontation or conflict
likely to be quite specific to the area in which it occurs but the
currently competing planning imperatives are likely to continue in
parallel for the foreseeable future. Second, for those nations unable to
bandwagon on the current revolution in military technologies, asymmetric
strategies will become increasingly attractive, and probably the only
affordable alternative, for responding to any significant external
military pressure.

For all but the largest powers or those like Singapore with a very
concentrated strategic outlook, the likely implication is that the
traditional continuum of conflict will collapse as a basis for defence
planning. Their first priority will fall clearly at the lower end of the
conflict spectrum, managing stability domestically or within their
immediate neighbourhood. They will need to embrace a multitude of
unconventional challenges presented by both state and non-state actors.
Agility, speed of response, and light scales and cooperation with other
agencies will be key characteristics but significant firepower, rather
than shaping the force, will shift to a supporting role.

Such conventional operations as do occur will be limited in scale and
duration and geographically contained. Maritime presence and border
protection operations would be prime candidates. Contributions to more
substantial conflict will only occur in the context of coalition
operations and will be increasingly confined to support operations on
the periphery. Expectations of any significant interoperability in an
advanced network centric warfare environment would be low.

At the other end of the conflict spectrum, short term imperatives,
resource constraints relative to the task, limited indigenous
technological and industrial capacity, and a simple inability to keep
pace with a rapidly evolving agenda will thwart any ambitions for a
comprehensive advanced capability for conventional war. The increasing
availability of alternative strategic weapons systems, particularly
medium to longer range ballistic missiles, with substantially lesser
acquisition times and support infrastructure, provides the opportunity
to change priorities and ramp up national defence within much shorter
timeframes.

These centrifugal forces point to the emergence of a distinct division
within the traditional spectrum of conflict (see Diagram 2 below). Any
major conventional engagements will be in the context of coalition
operations yet, without a clear agenda for longer term strategic
alignments, these will not be the major determinants of independent
national planning. That division in the spectrum of conflict is
particularly important for two reasons. First, it significantly changes
the timeframes applicable to conflict escalation and limits the ability
of nations to control the level of force and its progression. Second,
the division falls in the vary area of the conflict spectrum that has
been the focus of the revolution in military affairs. It contradicts the
recent resurgence of interest in the operational level of war.

What is not clear is whether and in what timeframes individual regional
countries may choose to embark upon such as course of their own volition
or whether, given its potential impact, an external catalyst may be
necessary. What is clear is that, in an environment of significant
proliferation of missiles or other asymmetric capabilities with
potential strategic impact, the region could become a very dangerous
place. Strategic warning time would collapse, strategic geography would
be greatly compressed, ambiguity would be rife as to presumed
adversaries and targets, the perceived advantages of pre-emption would
lower the threshold for conflict. Perhaps most importantly, the ability
to control escalation from lower intensity confrontation could be
thwarted by the press of a button.

Such a future would be most unlikely to evolve overnight. Responsible
governments are aware of the sensitivities of opening such a Pandora's
Box. Military organisations themselves are inherently conservative and,
while prepared to tinker at the margins, are unlikely to quickly embrace
an agenda when potentially undermines the rationale for much of their
current structure and capabilities. The danger, however, is that the
catalyst for such a change does not need to be the emergence of a major
threat.

Outside the current major power confrontations in Northeast and South
Asia, the simple acquisition of a non-conventional strategic strike
capability, a ballistic missile defence system or, as Iraq has
demonstrated, UAVs with indeterminate payloads could very quickly open
the floodgates. The sensitivities of pre-emptive strategies or
capability acquisitions, even as part of a considered response to an
asymmetric challenge from a non-state actor, can themselves release new
strategic dynamics. Setting aside the question of cost, all-encompassing
2020 visions will be of limited value should the ambiguity and potential
for surprise that makes the response to global terrorism so difficult be
transferred to the state on state arena.

The shape of future conflict in the Asia-Pacific is thus there to be
made. How it evolves and within what timeframes will depend very much on
the choices that middle powers make. There is considerable inherent
resistance, both political and military, albeit sometimes as much from
loyalty to the past as awareness of the potential pitfalls ahead, to the
emerging drivers of change. Yet, continued proliferation of asymmetric
capabilities together with the growing power differential between
nations (even within sub-regions) could dramatically change the
strategic landscape within a relatively short timeframe. Should that
occur, the core of the challenge for most nations will not be how to
maximise control of the conventional battlespace but how effectively it
is able to come to terms with discontinuity in the spectrum of conflict.

[^1]: *Defending Australia, Defence White Paper 1994*, Australian
    Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1994, p.9

[^2]: Department of Defence, *Australia's Strategic Policy*, Defence
    Publications 29785/97, Canberra, 1997, p.47

[^3]: Alan Ryan, *'Primary Responsibilities and Primary Risks',
    Australian Defence Force Participation in the International Force
    East Timor*, Study Paper No. 304, Land Warfare Studies Centre,
    Canberra, November 2000.

[^4]: Ministry of Defence, *Defending Singapore in the 21^st^ Century*,
    Singapore, 2000, p.10

[^5]: You Ji, "The Revolution in Military Affairs and the Evolution of
    China's Strategic Thinking", *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, December
    1999, Vol. 21, Iss. 3, pp.344ff

[^6]: Paul Dibb, *Force Modernisation in Asia: Towards 2000 and Beyond*,
    SDSC Working Paper o. 306, ANU, Canberra, 1997, pp.10-11

[^7]: *Australia's Strategic Policy*, pp.55-57

[^8]: *Defence 2000, Our Future Defence Force*, Defence Publishing
    Service OCT010/2000, Canberra, 2000, p.108

[^9]: *Ibid*, p.93

[^10]: *Defence 2000, Our Future Defence Force*, pp.53-57, 69-70

[^11]: Department of Defence, *Defence Review 2000 -- Our Future Defence
    Force, A Public Discussion Paper*, Defence Publications 38459/2000,
    Canberra, June 2000, pp.54-55

[^12]: *Defence 2000, Our Future Defence Force*, pp.77-97

[^13]: Minister for Defence, 'New Special Operations Command', Media
    Release, 5 May 2003,
    <http://www.minister.defence.gov.au/Hilltpl.cfm?Currentld=2689>

[^14]: *Australia's National Security, A Defence Update 2003*, Defence
    Publications NOV010/02, Canberra, 2003.

[^15]: New Zealand Ministry of Defence, A Modern, Sustainable Defence
    Force Matched to New Zealand's Needs, 8 May 2001 available at
    <http://www.defence.govt.nz/public_docs/Gov-Def-Stat-8May2001-contentspage.shtml>

[^16]: Ministry of Defence, *Strategic Defence Review*, July 1998,
    <http://www.mod.uk/issues/sdr/approach.htm> pp.1-2 (downloaded
    3/10/2003)

[^17]: *The Policy of the State Defence and Security of the Republic of
    Indonesia 1997*, Jakarta, May 1997,

[^18]: *Defending the Country Entering the 21^st^ Century*, Ministry of
    Defence, Jakarta, March 2003, pp.45-59

[^19]: See Michael Evans, *Australia and the Revolution in Military
    Affairs*, Working Paper No.115, Land Warfare Studies Centre, August
    2001.

[^20]: *Force 2020*, Department of Defence, Canberra, June 2002
    available at <http://www.defence.gov.au/publications/f2020.pdf>

[^21]: *Future Warfighting Concept*, Department of Defence, Canberra,
    December 2002 available at
    [http://www.defence.gov.au/publications/fwc.pdf](http://www.defence.gov.au/publications/f2020.pdf)

[^22]: *Ibid*, p.33

[^23]: Aldo Borgu, *The Defence Capability Review 2003, A Modest and
    Incomplete Review*, ASPI Strategic Insight, December 2003,
    Australian Strategic Policy Institute, Canberra, 2003, pp.1-12

[^24]: John Kerin, " 'All-commando' army planned",
    <http://www.news.com.au/common/printpage/0,6093,8648219,00.html>
    (download 11/2/2004)