+----------------------+-----------------------------------------------+
| ![](media/           | **Driver Behavior at Highway-Railroad Grade   |
| image1.wmf){width="2 | Crossings:**                                  |
| .9895833333333335in" |                                               |
| height="1.4486111111 | **A Literature Review from 1990--2006**       |
| 11111in"}![](media/i |                                               |
| mage2.wmf){width="0. |                                               |
| 46111111111111114in" |                                               |
| height="0.           |                                               |
| 5034722222222222in"} |                                               |
|                      |                                               |
| U.S. Department      |                                               |
|                      |                                               |
| of Transportation    |                                               |
|                      |                                               |
| **Federal Railroad** |                                               |
|                      |                                               |
| **Administration**   |                                               |
+----------------------+-----------------------------------------------+

![](media/image3.jpeg){width="5.0in"
height="3.75in"}![](media/image4.wmf){width="1.6493055555555556in"
height="0.3104166666666667in"}

+----------------------+-----------------------------------------------+
| **Office of          | U.S. Department of Transportation             |
| Research**           |                                               |
|                      | Research and Innovative Technology            |
| **and Development**  | Administration                                |
|                      |                                               |
| **Washington DC      | John A. Volpe National Transportation Systems |
| 20590**              | Center                                        |
|                      |                                               |
|                      | Cambridge, MA 02142-1093                      |
+----------------------+-----------------------------------------------+

+------------------------+--------------------+------------------------+
| DOT/FRA/ORD-08/03      | > Final Report     | This document is       |
|                        | >                  | available to the       |
| DOT-VNTSC-FRA-08-03    | > October 2008     |                        |
|                        |                    | public through the     |
|                        |                    | National Technical     |
|                        |                    | Information Service,   |
|                        |                    | Springfield, VA 22161  |
+------------------------+--------------------+------------------------+

+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+
| > Notice                                                              |
|                                                                       |
| This document is disseminated under the sponsorship of the Department |
| of Transportation in the interest of information exchange. The United |
| States Government assumes no liability for its contents or use        |
| thereof.                                                              |
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+
|                                                                       |
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+
| > Notice                                                              |
|                                                                       |
| The United States Government does not endorse products or             |
| manufacturers. Trade or manufacturers' names appear herein solely     |
| because they are considered essential to the objective of this        |
| report.                                                               |
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+

+------------------+---+--------------+---+-------+---+---+--------------+
| Report           |   |              |   |       | F |   |              |
| Documentation    |   |              |   |       | o |   |              |
| page             |   |              |   |       | r |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       | m |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       | A |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       | p |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       | p |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       | r |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       | o |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       | v |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       | e |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       | d |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       | O |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       | M |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       | B |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       | N |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       | o |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       | . |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       | 0 |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       | 7 |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       | 0 |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       | 4 |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       | - |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       | 0 |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       | 1 |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       | 8 |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       | 8 |   |              |
+------------------+---+--------------+---+-------+---+---+--------------+
| Public reporting |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
| burden for this  |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
| collection of    |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
| information is   |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
| estimated to     |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
| average 1 hour   |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
| per response,    |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
| including the    |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
| time for         |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
| reviewing        |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
| instructions,    |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
| searching        |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
| existing data    |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
| sources,         |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
| gathering and    |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
| maintaining the  |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
| data needed and  |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
| completing and   |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
| reviewing the    |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
| collection of    |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
| information.     |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
| Send comments    |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
| regarding this   |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
| burden estimate  |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
| or any aspects   |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
| of this          |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
| collection of    |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
| information ,    |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
| including        |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
| suggestions for  |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
| reducing this    |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
| burden to        |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
| Washington       |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
| Headquarters     |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
| Service,         |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
| Directorate for  |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
| information      |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
| Operations and   |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
| Reports. 1215    |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
| Jefferson Davis  |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
| Highway, Suite   |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
| 1204, Arlington, |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
| VA. 222202-4302, |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
| and to the       |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
| Office of        |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
| Management and   |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
| Budget,          |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
| Paperwork        |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
| Reduction        |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
| Project          |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
| (0704-0188),     |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
| Washington, DC   |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
| 20503.           |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
+------------------+---+--------------+---+-------+---+---+--------------+
| 1\. Agency Use   |   | 2.  Report   |   | 3.  R |   |   |              |
| Only (*Leave     |   |     Date     |   | EPORT |   |   |              |
| blank*)          |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
|                  |   | October,     |   |  TYPE |   |   |              |
|                  |   | 2008         |   |       |   |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |   AND |   |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   | DATES |   |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |    CO |   |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   | VERED |   |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   | Final |   |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   | R     |   |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   | eport |   |   |              |
+------------------+---+--------------+---+-------+---+---+--------------+
| 4.  Title and    |   |              |   |       | 5 |   |              |
|     subtitle     |   |              |   |       | . |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
| Driver Behavior  |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
| at               |   |              |   |       | F |   |              |
| Highway-Railroad |   |              |   |       | U |   |              |
| Grade Crossings: |   |              |   |       | N |   |              |
| A Literature     |   |              |   |       | D |   |              |
| Review from      |   |              |   |       | I |   |              |
| 1990-2006        |   |              |   |       | N |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       | G |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       | N |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       | U |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       | M |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       | B |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       | E |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       | R |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       | S |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       | R |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       | R |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       | 0 |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       | 4 |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       | / |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       | D |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       | D |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       | 1 |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       | 0 |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       | 5 |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       | R |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       | R |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       | 0 |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       | 4 |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       | / |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       | E |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       | D |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       | 1 |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       | 0 |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       | 5 |   |              |
+------------------+---+--------------+---+-------+---+---+--------------+
| 6.  AUTHOR(S)    |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
| Michelle Yeh and |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
| Jordan Multer    |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
+------------------+---+--------------+---+-------+---+---+--------------+
| 7.  PERFORMING   |   |              |   |       | 8 |   |              |
|     ORGANIZATION |   |              |   |       | . |   |              |
|     NAME(S) AND  |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
|     ADDRESS(ES)  |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       | P |   |              |
| U.S. Department  |   |              |   |       | E |   |              |
| of               |   |              |   |       | R |   |              |
| Transportation\  |   |              |   |       | F |   |              |
| Research and     |   |              |   |       | O |   |              |
| Innovative       |   |              |   |       | R |   |              |
| Technology       |   |              |   |       | M |   |              |
| Administration\  |   |              |   |       | I |   |              |
| John A. Volpe    |   |              |   |       | N |   |              |
| National         |   |              |   |       | G |   |              |
| Transportation   |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
| Systems Center\  |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
| Cambridge, MA    |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
| 02142-1093       |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       | O |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       | R |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       | G |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       | A |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       | N |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       | I |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       | Z |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       | A |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       | T |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       | I |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       | O |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       | N |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       | D |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       | O |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       | T |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       | - |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       | V |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       | N |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       | T |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       | S |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       | C |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       | - |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       | F |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       | R |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       | A |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       | - |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       | 0 |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       | 8 |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       | - |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       | 0 |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       | 3 |   |              |
+------------------+---+--------------+---+-------+---+---+--------------+
| 9.  SPONS        |   |              |   |       | 1 |   |              |
| ORING/MONITORING |   |              |   |       | 0 |   |              |
|     AGENCY       |   |              |   |       | . |   |              |
|     NAME(S) AND  |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
|     ADDRESS(ES)  |   |              |   |       | S |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       | P |   |              |
| U.S. Department  |   |              |   |       | O |   |              |
| of               |   |              |   |       | N |   |              |
| Transportation\  |   |              |   |       | S |   |              |
| Federal Railroad |   |              |   |       | O |   |              |
| Administration\  |   |              |   |       | R |   |              |
| Office of        |   |              |   |       | I |   |              |
| Research and     |   |              |   |       | N |   |              |
| Development      |   |              |   |       | G |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       | / |   |              |
| 1200 New Jersey  |   |              |   |       | M |   |              |
| Avenue, SE\      |   |              |   |       | O |   |              |
| Washington, DC   |   |              |   |       | N |   |              |
| 20590            |   |              |   |       | I |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       | T |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       | O |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       | R |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       | I |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       | N |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       | G |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       | A |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       | G |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       | E |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       | N |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       | C |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       | Y |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       | R |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       | E |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       | P |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       | O |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       | R |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       | T |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       | N |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       | U |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       | M |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       | B |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       | E |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       | R |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       | D |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       | O |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       | T |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       | / |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       | F |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       | R |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       | A |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       | / |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       | O |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       | R |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       | D |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       | - |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       | 0 |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       | 8 |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       | / |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       | 0 |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       | 3 |   |              |
+------------------+---+--------------+---+-------+---+---+--------------+
| 1                |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
| 1. SUPPLEMENTARY |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
|     NOTES        |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
+------------------+---+--------------+---+-------+---+---+--------------+
| 12a.             |   |              |   |       | 1 |   |              |
| DISTRIBUT        |   |              |   |       | 2 |   |              |
| ION/AVAILABILITY |   |              |   |       | b |   |              |
| STATEMENT        |   |              |   |       | . |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       | D |   |              |
| This document is |   |              |   |       | I |   |              |
| available to the |   |              |   |       | S |   |              |
| public through   |   |              |   |       | T |   |              |
| the National     |   |              |   |       | R |   |              |
| Technical        |   |              |   |       | I |   |              |
| Information      |   |              |   |       | B |   |              |
| Service,         |   |              |   |       | U |   |              |
| Springfield, VA  |   |              |   |       | T |   |              |
| 22161            |   |              |   |       | I |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       | O |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       | N |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       | C |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       | O |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       | D |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       | E |   |              |
+------------------+---+--------------+---+-------+---+---+--------------+
| 13. ABSTRACT     |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
|     (Maximum 200 |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
|     words)       |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
| Accidents at     |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
| grade crossings  |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
| continue to be   |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
| the leading      |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
| cause of         |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
| fatalities in    |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
| the railroad     |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
| industry. A      |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
| large proportion |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
| of these         |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
| accidents are    |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
| the result of    |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
| driver error.    |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
| The purpose of   |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
| this report is   |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
| to review        |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
| research that    |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
| addresses driver |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
| behavior at      |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
| grade crossings  |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
| to better        |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
| understand the   |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
| decisions and    |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
| actions drivers  |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
| make so that     |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
| countermeasures  |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
| can be developed |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
| to discourage    |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
| dangerous        |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
| driving          |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
| behavior. This   |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
| report is        |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
| intended to      |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
| update a 1990    |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
| literature       |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
| review titled,   |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
| *Driver Behavior |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
| at Rail-Highway  |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
| Crossings*, by   |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
| Lerner, Ratte,   |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
| and Walker, that |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
| provided a       |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
| comprehensive    |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
| examination of   |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
| factors          |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
| contributing to  |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
| driver           |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
| noncompliance at |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
| grade crossings. |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
| This report      |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
| focuses on grade |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
| crossing         |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
| research         |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
| conducted since  |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
| 1990 and extends |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
| the review by    |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
| Lerner, et al.   |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
| by examining the |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
| grade crossing   |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
| problem in the   |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
| context of the   |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
| general driving  |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
| task. This       |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
| literature       |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
| review is        |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
| organized using  |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
| the framework of |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
| a sociotechnical |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
| model such that  |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
| driver behavior  |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
| is examined not  |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
| as individual    |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
| elements but as  |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
| a system.        |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
| Recommendations  |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
| for additional   |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
| research are     |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
| also identified. |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
+------------------+---+--------------+---+-------+---+---+--------------+
| 14. SUBJECT      |   |              |   |       |   | 1 |              |
|     TERMS        |   |              |   |       |   | 5 |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       |   | . |              |
|     Driver       |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
|     behavior,    |   |              |   |       |   | N |              |
|     highway-rail |   |              |   |       |   | U |              |
|     grade        |   |              |   |       |   | M |              |
|     crossing,    |   |              |   |       |   | B |              |
|     traffic      |   |              |   |       |   | E |              |
|     control      |   |              |   |       |   | R |              |
|     devices,     |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
|     grade        |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
|     crossing     |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
|     safety,      |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
|     active       |   |              |   |       |   | O |              |
|     crossings,   |   |              |   |       |   | F |              |
|     passive      |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
|     crossings    |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       |   | P |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       |   | A |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       |   | G |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       |   | E |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       |   | S |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       |   | 1 |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       |   | 3 |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       |   | 5 |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       |   | 1 |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       |   | 6 |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       |   | . |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       |   | P |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       |   | R |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       |   | I |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       |   | C |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       |   | E |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       |   | C |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       |   | O |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       |   | D |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       |   | E |              |
+------------------+---+--------------+---+-------+---+---+--------------+
| 17. SECURITY     | 1 |              | 1 |       |   |   | LIMITATION   |
|                  | 8 |              | 9 |       |   |   | OF ABSTRACT  |
|   CLASSIFICATION | . |              | . |       |   |   |              |
|     OF REPORT    |   |              |   |       |   |   | Unclassified |
|                  | S |              | S |       |   |   |              |
|     Unclassified | E |              | E |       |   |   |              |
|                  | C |              | C |       |   |   |              |
|                  | U |              | U |       |   |   |              |
|                  | R |              | R |       |   |   |              |
|                  | I |              | I |       |   |   |              |
|                  | T |              | T |       |   |   |              |
|                  | Y |              | Y |       |   |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
|                  | C |              | C |       |   |   |              |
|                  | L |              | L |       |   |   |              |
|                  | A |              | A |       |   |   |              |
|                  | S |              | S |       |   |   |              |
|                  | S |              | S |       |   |   |              |
|                  | I |              | I |       |   |   |              |
|                  | F |              | F |       |   |   |              |
|                  | I |              | I |       |   |   |              |
|                  | C |              | C |       |   |   |              |
|                  | A |              | A |       |   |   |              |
|                  | T |              | T |       |   |   |              |
|                  | I |              | I |       |   |   |              |
|                  | O |              | O |       |   |   |              |
|                  | N |              | N |       |   |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
|                  | O |              | O |       |   |   |              |
|                  | F |              | F |       |   |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
|                  | T |              | A |       |   |   |              |
|                  | H |              | B |       |   |   |              |
|                  | I |              | S |       |   |   |              |
|                  | S |              | T |       |   |   |              |
|                  |   |              | R |       |   |   |              |
|                  |   |              | A |       |   |   |              |
|                  |   |              | C |       |   |   |              |
|                  |   |              | T |       |   |   |              |
|                  | P |              |   |       |   |   |              |
|                  | A |              |   |       |   |   |              |
|                  | G |              |   |       |   |   |              |
|                  | E |              |   |       |   |   |              |
|                  |   |              |   |       |   |   |              |
|                  |   |              | U |       |   |   |              |
|                  |   |              | n |       |   |   |              |
|                  |   |              | c |       |   |   |              |
|                  |   |              | l |       |   |   |              |
|                  | U |              | a |       |   |   |              |
|                  | n |              | s |       |   |   |              |
|                  | c |              | s |       |   |   |              |
|                  | l |              | i |       |   |   |              |
|                  | a |              | f |       |   |   |              |
|                  | s |              | i |       |   |   |              |
|                  | s |              | e |       |   |   |              |
|                  | i |              | d |       |   |   |              |
|                  | f |              |   |       |   |   |              |
|                  | i |              |   |       |   |   |              |
|                  | e |              |   |       |   |   |              |
|                  | d |              |   |       |   |   |              |
+------------------+---+--------------+---+-------+---+---+--------------+

METRIC/ENGLISH CONVERSION FACTORS

<table style="width:100%;">
<colgroup>
<col style="width: 23%" />
<col style="width: 1%" />
<col style="width: 0%" />
<col style="width: 23%" />
<col style="width: 0%" />
<col style="width: 23%" />
<col style="width: 0%" />
<col style="width: 1%" />
<col style="width: 0%" />
<col style="width: 0%" />
<col style="width: 24%" />
</colgroup>
<thead>
<tr class="header">
<th colspan="5"><strong>ENGLISH TO METRIC</strong></th>
<th colspan="6"><strong>METRIC TO ENGLISH</strong></th>
</tr>
<tr class="odd">
<th colspan="5"><strong>LENGTH (APPROXIMATE)</strong></th>
<th colspan="6"><strong>LENGTH (APPROXIMATE)</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr class="odd">
<td><strong>1 inch (in)</strong></td>
<td><strong>=</strong></td>
<td colspan="2"><strong>2.5 centimeters (cm)</strong></td>
<td colspan="2"><strong>1 millimeter (mm)</strong></td>
<td colspan="3"><strong>=</strong></td>
<td colspan="2"><strong>0.04 inch (in)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr class="even">
<td><strong>1 foot (ft)</strong></td>
<td><strong>=</strong></td>
<td colspan="2"><strong>30 centimeters (cm)</strong></td>
<td colspan="2"><strong>1 centimeter (cm)</strong></td>
<td colspan="3"><strong>=</strong></td>
<td colspan="2"><strong>0.4 inch (in)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr class="odd">
<td><strong>1 yard (yd)</strong></td>
<td><strong>=</strong></td>
<td colspan="2"><strong>0.9 meter (m)</strong></td>
<td colspan="2"><strong>1 meter (m)</strong></td>
<td colspan="3"><strong>=</strong></td>
<td colspan="2"><strong>3.3 feet (ft)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr class="even">
<td><strong>1 mile (mi)</strong></td>
<td><strong>=</strong></td>
<td colspan="2"><strong>1.6 kilometers (km)</strong></td>
<td colspan="2"><strong>1 meter (m)</strong></td>
<td colspan="3"><strong>=</strong></td>
<td colspan="2"><strong>1.1 yards (yd)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr class="odd">
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td colspan="2"></td>
<td colspan="2"><strong>1 kilometer (km)</strong></td>
<td colspan="3"><strong>=</strong></td>
<td colspan="2"><strong>0.6 mile (mi)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr class="even">
<td colspan="5"><strong>AREA (APPROXIMATE)</strong></td>
<td colspan="6"><strong>AREA (APPROXIMATE)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr class="odd">
<td><strong>1 square inch (sq in, in<sup>2</sup>)</strong></td>
<td><strong>=</strong></td>
<td colspan="2"><strong>6.5 square centimeters
(cm<sup>2</sup>)</strong></td>
<td colspan="2"><strong>1 square centimeter
(cm<sup>2</sup>)</strong></td>
<td colspan="3"><strong>=</strong></td>
<td colspan="2"><strong>0.16 square inch (sq in,
in<sup>2</sup>)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr class="even">
<td><strong>1 square foot (sq ft, ft<sup>2</sup>)</strong></td>
<td><strong>=</strong></td>
<td colspan="2"><strong>0.09 square meter (m<sup>2</sup>)</strong></td>
<td colspan="2"><strong>1 square meter (m<sup>2</sup>)</strong></td>
<td colspan="3"><strong>=</strong></td>
<td colspan="2"><strong>1.2 square yards (sq yd,
yd<sup>2</sup>)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr class="odd">
<td><strong>1 square yard (sq yd, yd<sup>2</sup>)</strong></td>
<td><strong>=</strong></td>
<td colspan="2"><strong>0.8 square meter (m<sup>2</sup>)</strong></td>
<td colspan="2"><strong>1 square kilometer
(km<sup>2</sup>)</strong></td>
<td colspan="3"><strong>=</strong></td>
<td colspan="2"><strong>0.4 square mile (sq mi,
mi<sup>2</sup>)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr class="even">
<td><strong>1 square mile (sq mi, mi<sup>2</sup>)</strong></td>
<td><strong>=</strong></td>
<td colspan="2"><strong>2.6 square kilometers
(km<sup>2</sup>)</strong></td>
<td colspan="2"><strong>10,000 square meters
(m<sup>2</sup>)</strong></td>
<td colspan="3"><strong>=</strong></td>
<td colspan="2"><strong>1 hectare (ha) = 2.5 acres</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr class="odd">
<td><strong>1 acre = 0.4 hectare (he)</strong></td>
<td><strong>=</strong></td>
<td colspan="2"><strong>4,000 square meters
(m<sup>2</sup>)</strong></td>
<td colspan="2"></td>
<td colspan="3"></td>
<td colspan="2"></td>
</tr>
<tr class="even">
<td colspan="5"><strong>MASS - WEIGHT (APPROXIMATE)</strong></td>
<td colspan="6"><strong>MASS - WEIGHT (APPROXIMATE)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr class="odd">
<td><strong>1 ounce (oz)</strong></td>
<td><strong>=</strong></td>
<td colspan="2"><strong>28 grams (gm)</strong></td>
<td colspan="2"><strong>1 gram (gm)</strong></td>
<td colspan="2"><strong>=</strong></td>
<td colspan="3"><strong>0.036 ounce (oz)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr class="even">
<td><strong>1 pound (lb)</strong></td>
<td><strong>=</strong></td>
<td colspan="2"><strong>0.45 kilogram (kg)</strong></td>
<td colspan="2"><strong>1 kilogram (kg)</strong></td>
<td colspan="2"><strong>=</strong></td>
<td colspan="3"><strong>2.2 pounds (lb)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr class="odd">
<td><strong>1 short ton = 2,000 pounds (lb)</strong></td>
<td><strong>=</strong></td>
<td colspan="2"><strong>0.9 tonne (t)</strong></td>
<td colspan="2"><strong>1 tonne (t)</strong></td>
<td colspan="2"><p><strong>=</strong></p>
<p><strong>=</strong></p></td>
<td colspan="3"><p><strong>1,000 kilograms (kg)</strong></p>
<p><strong>1.1 short tons</strong></p></td>
</tr>
<tr class="even">
<td colspan="5"><strong>VOLUME (APPROXIMATE)</strong></td>
<td colspan="6"><strong>VOLUME (APPROXIMATE)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr class="odd">
<td><strong>1 teaspoon (tsp)</strong></td>
<td colspan="2"><strong>=</strong></td>
<td colspan="2"><strong>5 milliliters (ml)</strong></td>
<td colspan="2"><strong>1 milliliter (ml)</strong></td>
<td colspan="3"><strong>=</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.03 fluid ounce (fl oz)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr class="even">
<td><strong>1 tablespoon (tbsp)</strong></td>
<td colspan="2"><strong>=</strong></td>
<td colspan="2"><strong>15 milliliters (ml)</strong></td>
<td colspan="2"><strong>1 liter (l)</strong></td>
<td colspan="3"><strong>=</strong></td>
<td><strong>2.1 pints (pt)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr class="odd">
<td><strong>1 fluid ounce (fl oz)</strong></td>
<td colspan="2"><strong>=</strong></td>
<td colspan="2"><strong>30 milliliters (ml)</strong></td>
<td colspan="2"><strong>1 liter (l)</strong></td>
<td colspan="3"><strong>=</strong></td>
<td><strong>1.06 quarts (qt)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr class="even">
<td><strong>1 cup (c)</strong></td>
<td colspan="2"><strong>=</strong></td>
<td colspan="2"><strong>0.24 liter (l)</strong></td>
<td colspan="2"><strong>1 liter (l)</strong></td>
<td colspan="3"><strong>=</strong></td>
<td><strong>0.26 gallon (gal)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr class="odd">
<td><strong>1 pint (pt)</strong></td>
<td colspan="2"><strong>=</strong></td>
<td colspan="2"><strong>0.47 liter (l)</strong></td>
<td colspan="2"></td>
<td colspan="3"></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr class="even">
<td><strong>1 quart (qt)</strong></td>
<td colspan="2"><strong>=</strong></td>
<td colspan="2"><strong>0.96 liter (l)</strong></td>
<td colspan="2"></td>
<td colspan="3"></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr class="odd">
<td><strong>1 gallon (gal)</strong></td>
<td colspan="2"><strong>=</strong></td>
<td colspan="2"><strong>3.8 liters (l)</strong></td>
<td colspan="2"></td>
<td colspan="3"></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr class="even">
<td><strong>1 cubic foot (cu ft, ft<sup>3</sup>)</strong></td>
<td colspan="2"><strong>=</strong></td>
<td colspan="2"><strong>0.03 cubic meter (m<sup>3</sup>)</strong></td>
<td colspan="2"><strong>1 cubic meter (m<sup>3</sup>)</strong></td>
<td colspan="3"><strong>=</strong></td>
<td><strong>36 cubic feet (cu ft, ft<sup>3</sup>)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr class="odd">
<td><strong>1 cubic yard (cu yd, yd<sup>3</sup>)</strong></td>
<td colspan="2"><strong>=</strong></td>
<td colspan="2"><strong>0.76 cubic meter (m<sup>3</sup>)</strong></td>
<td colspan="2"><strong>1 cubic meter (m<sup>3</sup>)</strong></td>
<td colspan="3"><strong>=</strong></td>
<td><strong>1.3 cubic yards (cu yd, yd<sup>3</sup>)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr class="even">
<td colspan="5"><strong>TEMPERATURE (EXACT)</strong></td>
<td colspan="6"><strong>TEMPERATURE (EXACT)</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr class="odd">
<td><strong>[(x-32)(5/9)] °F</strong></td>
<td colspan="2"><strong>=</strong></td>
<td colspan="2"><strong>y °C</strong></td>
<td colspan="2"><strong>[(9/5) y + 32] °C</strong></td>
<td colspan="2"><strong>=</strong></td>
<td colspan="2"><strong>x °F</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

![](media/image5.wmf)

![](media/image6.wmf)

For more exact and or other conversion factors, see NIST Miscellaneous
Publication 286, Units of Weights and Measures. Price \$2.50 SD Catalog
No. C13 10286 **Updated 6/17/98**

Acknowledgements

This research was conducted with funding from the Federal Railroad
Administration's (FRA) Office of Research and Development. The authors
wish to thank Dr. Thomas Raslear of the FRA Office of Research and
Development for his direction and helpful guidance in the development of
this report. Special thanks also go to Susan Dresley, Dr. Monica Gil,
Marilyn Gross, and Cathy Guthy for their help and assistance in
conducting this literature review and to Dr. Stephen Popkin, who
provided suggestions and feedback on this report.

The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not
necessarily reflect the views of the John A. Volpe National
Transportation Systems Center, the Research and Innovative Technology
Administration, or the United States Department of Transportation.

Feedback on this document can be sent to Dr. Michelle Yeh
(Michelle.Yeh@volpe.dot.gov) or Dr. Jordan Multer
(Jordan.Multer@volpe.dot.gov).

Contents

[Executive Summary ii](#executive-summary)

[1 Introduction 2](#introduction)

[1.1 Background 2](#background)

[1.2 Method 2](#method)

[1.3 Organization of this Report 2](#organization-of-this-report)

[2 Review of *Driver Behavior at Rail-Highway Crossings*
2](#review-of-driver-behavior-at-rail-highway-crossings)

[2.1 Technical/Engineering System 2](#technicalengineering-system-1)

[2.1.1 Traffic Control Devices 2](#traffic-control-devices)

[2.1.1.1 Signs 2](#signs)

[2.1.1.2 Pavement markings 2](#pavement-markings)

[2.1.1.3 Active warning devices 2](#active-warning-devices)

[2.1.2 Crossing Characteristics 2](#crossing-characteristics)

[2.1.2.1 Illumination 2](#illumination)

[2.1.2.2 Sight Restrictions 2](#sight-restrictions)

[2.1.2.3 Increasing Crossing Conspicuity
2](#increasing-crossing-conspicuity)

[2.1.3 Trains 2](#trains)

[2.2 Personnel subsystem 2](#personnel-subsystem-1)

[2.2.1 Driving skill 2](#driving-skill)

[2.2.2 Driving style 2](#driving-style)

[2.3 Organizational/Management Behavior
2](#organizationalmanagement-behavior)

[2.4 Environmental context 2](#environmental-context-1)

[2.5 Summary 2](#summary)

[3 Technical/Engineering System 2](#technicalengineering-system-2)

[3.1 Traffic Control Devices 2](#traffic-control-devices-1)

[3.1.1 Signs 2](#signs-1)

[3.1.1.1 Crossbuck and Advance Warning Signs
2](#crossbuck-and-advance-warning-signs)

[3.1.1.2 Distinguishing Active from Passive Crossings
2](#distinguishing-active-from-passive-crossings)

[3.1.1.3 Providing other information 2](#providing-other-information)

[3.1.1.4 Summary 2](#summary-1)

[3.1.2 Pavement markings 2](#pavement-markings-1)

[3.1.3 Active Warning Devices 2](#active-warning-devices-1)

[3.1.3.1 Violations at Active Grade Crossings
2](#violations-at-active-grade-crossings)

[3.1.3.2 Improvements to Gated Crossings
2](#improvements-to-gated-crossings)

[3.1.3.3 Improving Warning Device Credibility
2](#improving-warning-device-credibility)

[3.1.3.4 Summary 2](#summary-2)

[3.2 Crossing Characteristics 2](#crossing-characteristics-1)

[3.2.1 Illumination 2](#illumination-1)

[3.2.2 Sight Restrictions 2](#sight-restrictions-1)

[3.2.3 Increasing Crossing Conspicuity
2](#increasing-crossing-conspicuity-1)

[3.2.4 Summary 2](#summary-3)

[3.3 Train 2](#train)

[3.3.1 Active alerting lights 2](#active-alerting-lights)

[3.3.2 Reflectorization 2](#reflectorization)

[3.3.3 Locomotive Horn 2](#locomotive-horn)

[3.3.4 Summary 2](#summary-4)

[4 Personnel Subsystem (Driver) 2](#personnel-subsystem-driver)

[4.1 Driving Skill 2](#driving-skill-1)

[4.1.1 Age 2](#age)

[4.1.2 Experience 2](#experience)

[4.1.3 Driver Distractions 2](#driver-distractions)

[4.1.4 Driver Impairment 2](#driver-impairment)

[4.2 Driving Style 2](#driving-style-1)

[4.2.1 Expectancy 2](#expectancy)

[4.2.2 Costs of Compliance 2](#costs-of-compliance)

[4.2.3 Risk Perception and Risk Taking
2](#risk-perception-and-risk-taking)

[4.2.4 Moderating Factors: Gender Differences and Age
2](#moderating-factors-gender-differences-and-age)

[4.3 Summary 2](#summary-5)

[5 Organizational/Management Behavior
2](#organizationalmanagement-behavior-1)

[5.1 Identifying Crossings for Improvements
2](#identifying-crossings-for-improvements)

[5.2 Interconnection of Traffic Signals
2](#interconnection-of-traffic-signals)

[5.3 Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS)
2](#intelligent-transportation-systems-its)

[5.3.1 In-Vehicle Warning Displays 2](#in-vehicle-warning-displays)

[5.3.2 Advanced Warning of Railroad Delays
2](#advanced-warning-of-railroad-delays)

[5.3.3 Intelligent Grade Crossings 2](#intelligent-grade-crossings)

[5.4 Summary 2](#summary-6)

[6 Environmental Factors 2](#environmental-factors)

[6.1 Regulations: Repealing the Whistle Ban
2](#regulations-repealing-the-whistle-ban)

[6.2 Education 2](#education)

[6.3 Enforcement 2](#enforcement)

[6.3.1 Arkansas 2](#arkansas)

[6.3.2 California 2](#california)

[6.3.3 Illinois 2](#illinois)

[6.3.4 Iowa 2](#iowa)

[6.3.5 North Carolina 2](#north-carolina)

[6.3.6 Texas 2](#texas)

[6.3.7 Alberta, Canada 2](#alberta-canada)

[6.4 Summary 2](#summary-7)

[7 Summary and Conclusions 2](#summary-and-conclusions)

[7.1 Summary 2](#summary-8)

[7.2 Areas for Further Research 2](#areas-for-further-research-1)

[8 References 2](#references)

[Appendix A: Guidance Summary 2](#appendix-a-guidance-summary)

[A.1 Technical/Engineering System 2](#technicalengineering-system-3)

[A.2 Personnel Subsystem (Driver) 2](#personnel-subsystem-driver-1)

[A.3 Organizational/Management Behavior
2](#organizationalmanagement-behavior-2)

[A.4 Environmental Factors 2](#environmental-factors-1)

Illustrations

[Figure 1. Sociotechnical model of the highway-rail grade crossing
domain. 2](#__RefHeading___Toc207426998)

[Figure 2. Signs and markings at grade crossings.
2](#__RefHeading___Toc207426999)

[Figure 3. Sign systems evaluated by Bridwell, et al. (1993).
2](#__RefHeading___Toc207427000)

[Figure 4. Crossbuck systems used in Zwahlen and Schnell (2000).
2](#__RefHeading___Toc207427001)

[Figure 5. Advance warning signs for passive crossings.
2](#__RefHeading___Toc207427002)

[Figure 6. Advance warning signs for active crossings.
2](#__RefHeading___Toc207427003)

[Figure 7. Signs for passive crossings. 2](#__RefHeading___Toc207427004)

[Figure 8. Freight car reflectorization pattern used in the in-service
revenue test conducted by Carroll, et al. (1999).
2](#__RefHeading___Toc207427005)

[Figure 9. Marking systems generated in a focus group of human factors
and traffic experts (from Ford, et al. (1998)).
2](#__RefHeading___Toc207427006)

[Figure 10. Standard reflectorization pattern for large trucks and
tractor trailers (from Ford, et al. (1998)).
2](#__RefHeading___Toc207427007)

[Figure 11. Marking systems for objective evaluation (from Ford, et al.
(1998)). 2](#__RefHeading___Toc207427008)

# Executive Summary {#executive-summary .unnumbered}

The Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) working with the Federal
Highway Administration (FHWA) and Federal Transit Administration (FTA)
has significantly improved highway-rail grade crossing safety in the
past decade. The *2004 Audit of the Highway-Rail Grade Crossing Safety
Program* (Office of the Inspector General, 2004) reported that in the 10
years from 1994 through 2003, the number of grade crossing accidents
decreased by 41 percent and the number of fatalities fell by 48 percent.
Despite the reductions, accidents at grade crossings continue to be a
significant concern to the railroad industry. A large proportion of
these accidents result from driver error. In fact, the Office of the
Inspector General attributed 94 percent of grade crossing accidents and
87 percent of grade crossing fatalities for that 10-year period to risky
driver behavior or poor judgment.

This report is intended to update a 1990 literature review titled,
*Driver Behavior at Rail-Highway Crossings*, by Lerner, Ratte, and
Walker, that comprehensively addressed the roles of perception,
knowledge, and driver attitudes in decision making at grade crossings
and discussed countermeasures to encourage compliance. The goal of this
report is to review research conducted since 1990 that addresses driver
behavior at grade crossings and to provide further input for the
development of countermeasures to discourage dangerous driving behavior.
This report continues the literature review by Lerner, et al. and
extends it by examining the grade crossing problem in the context of the
general driving task as applicable to the grade crossing situation.

![](media/image7.wmf)This literature review is organized using a
sociotechnical model of the highway-rail grade crossing situation. This
framework examines driver behavior at grade crossings through a systems
perspective, with each element of the system examined with respect to
how it interacts with other system elements. The sociotechnical model
consists of four subsystems, summarized in the figure below.

At the center is the *technical/engineering system*. As defined here,
this layer consists of elements of the grade crossing environment,
techniques, and systems that assist the driver in detecting the crossing
and presence of a train. How the driver processes the information from
the grade crossing environment is represented by the second layer, the
*personnel subsystem*. Factors influencing driver behavior may be
classified into those that influence [driving skill]{.underline} and
those that influence [driving style]{.underline}. The former concerns
behavioral characteristics of human information processing that limit
driver performance whereas the latter addresses biases and attitudes
that affect how one chooses to drive by influencing one's perception of
the situation. Improvements to grade crossing safety will also require
coordination among the different agencies involved, as shown by the
*organizational/management infrastructure* layer. All these layers
function within a political, cultural, and social environment, as
highlighted by the outermost layer of the model, the *environmental
context*. Regulatory oversight and public support or opposition to
specific policies and actions also influences safety. The contribution
of each layer of the model to grade crossing safety is reviewed briefly
below. An operational summary of the recommendations from each layer is
provided in Appendix A.

## Technical/Engineering System {#technicalengineering-system .unnumbered}

In considering the design of the grade crossing, several traffic control
devices are present at the crossing (e.g., signs, pavement markings, and
flashing lights), and some are also equipped with gates. With respect to
signs, the results of the literature review show that drivers generally
recognized the advance warning and crossbuck signs but did not know
where they were located in relation to the crossing, when the signs were
used, and the action required. Several research studies examined driver
comprehension and compliance to alternative sign systems. Most of these
sign systems consisted of a stop sign or yield sign presented in
conjunction with the standard warning signs. The *Manual on Uniform
Traffic Control Devices* (MUTCD) allows the use of stop or yield signs
at passive grade crossings, where two or more trains operate daily.
However, the use of stop signs at grade crossings is controversial.
Compliance with stop signs at grade crossings is low, and the results of
an accident analysis suggest that use of the stop sign may not reduce
the accident risk at grade crossings relative to the presentation of the
crossbuck alone. Additionally, there is concern that noncompliance at
grade crossings could foster disrespect for stop signs in non-grade
crossing situations. In light of these concerns, the FHWA clarified
their position on the MUTCD provision by recommending that the yield
sign be the default choice for traffic control and that use of the stop
sign be limited to unusual situations where the need for vehicles to
make a full stop is assessed through an engineering study or judgment.
Research examining use of the yield sign or incorporating a yield
message into the sign system show that the driver's understanding of the
action required is improved relative to a crossbuck alone, but its
effect on driver behavior was mixed.

Flashing lights and gates provide active protection at a grade crossing,
signaling to drivers when a train is in close proximity. However,
observations of behavior at active grade crossings indicated that
drivers were quite willing to violate active warning signals. Compliance
at actively protected crossings may be improved in two ways:
*explicitly* by increasing the level of protection to prevent drivers
from violating the crossing (e.g., by installing barrier-type systems
such as four-quadrant gates and median barriers), or *implicitly* by
improving the credibility of the warning signals (e.g., with constant
time warning systems to reduce waiting time, identifying signal
malfunctions to reduce the false alarm rate at the crossing, or
incorporating highway traffic signals that have high credibility in the
general driving situation).

Noncompliance may also be due to a failure by the driver to detect the
grade crossing or train, particularly at crossings that lack active
protection. The detectability of the crossing may be improved by simply
illuminating the crossing, presenting strobe lights in conjunction with
signs at the crossing, and reflectorizing the crossbuck and crossbuck
post. To optimize the use of reflectorization, the MUTCD requires that
the crossbuck and crossbuck post be reflectorized and that reflective
sheeting be applied on the front and back along the full length of the
crossbuck posts.

The train itself is equipped with alerting lights, reflective markings,
and a horn to facilitate its detection. Regulations regarding their use
are provided in the *Railroad Locomotive Safety Standards: Clarifying
Amendments; Headlights and Auxiliary Lights; Final Rule* (codified in 49
Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) § 229); *Reflectorization of Rail
Freight Rolling Stock; Final Rule* (codified in 49 CFR § 224); and *Use
of Locomotive Horns at Highway-Rail Grade Crossings; Final Rule*
(codified in 49 CFR § 222 and 229). Field tests have shown the
effectiveness of alerting lights and reflective markings. Participants
detected trains equipped with these devices at further distances than
trains equipped with the headlight alone or trains without reflective
markings. The train horn is a secondary alerting system, with one
significant disadvantage; its effectiveness is limited by the dampening
of its sound (e.g., from background noise associated with the specific
location, interior noise in the vehicle, community whistle bans, or
insertion loss as the sound tries to penetrate the vehicle shell). An
alternative auditory warning system is a wayside horn, mounted at the
crossing. Results of field tests showed that its use had no negative
impact on safety relative to the sounding of a train horn, while at the
same time, it had a positive impact on nearby communities by reducing
the noise level.

## Personnel Subsystem {#personnel-subsystem .unnumbered}

Safety improvements at the technical/engineering system level must be
evaluated with respect to the *personnel system*, that is, the driver.
Characteristics inherent to the driver relate to skill level and driving
style. With respect to the former, driving skill is affected by age,
experience, internal or external distractions, and driver impairment.
Aging results in changes in one's perceptual and cognitive abilities,
and these changes may hinder one's ability to detect and respond to cues
at grade crossings. Lack of experience, particularly for young drivers,
led to a less than efficient visual search strategy and underestimation
of potential driving hazards. The effects of internal and external
distractions and driver impairment (e.g., due to alcohol use and
fatigue) are similar. Both prevent the driver from detecting a grade
crossing or approaching train in a timely manner. Countermeasures to
compensate for reduced driving skill, in particular the effects of aging
and experience, include techniques for facilitating detection of the
crossing at night (e.g., reflectorization of trackside objects) and
installing additional signs at the crossing to indicate the action
required.

With respect to driving style, drivers' decisions how to drive
influences the perception of the dangers posed by a grade crossing and
the decision whether to comply. Generally, drivers do not expect to
encounter a train at a grade crossing and sometimes do not even look for
a train. This behavior is partially attributable to familiarity with an
area; drivers who were familiar with a crossing were *more* likely to be
involved in a grade crossing incident than drivers unfamiliar with the
crossing. However, some drivers are simply risk-takers and find
noncompliant behavior exciting (e.g., beating a train across the
tracks). Although risk-takers understood the consequences of their
actions, they tended to be overconfident in their driving skill and
optimistic in their abilities to avoid an accident.

These attitudes in driving style are moderated by gender differences and
age. Statistics showed that male drivers committed more violations and
were involved in more grade crossing accidents than female drivers. In
addition, young drivers were more aggressive in their driving style than
older drivers. Studies addressing drivers' attitudes towards committing
violations in the general driving situation reported that males and
young drivers were less concerned with the negative outcomes of
committing violations than their counterparts, viewed the risk of
negative outcomes as being less likely, and possessed a sense that
committing the violation was out of their control. Because driving style
reflects a driver's personality, it will be more difficult to change
than driving skill.

## Organizational/Management Infrastructure {#organizationalmanagement-infrastructure .unnumbered}

Efforts to improve grade crossing safety require coordination and
collaboration among federal, state, and local agencies, as described by
the *organization/management infrastructure* layer of the sociotechnical
model. Coordination among public agencies, railroad companies, and
highway engineers may be necessary to identify which crossings to
improve and determine what those improvements should be. The FRA
maintains a crossing inventory and accident/incident database of public
and private grade crossings that can be used by states to determine
which crossings to improve, but input to the inventory and database is
voluntary and therefore problematic. Coordination among rail and state
agencies is needed to ensure that the inventory includes all grade
crossings and contains accurate information regarding the level of
protection at the crossing. Additionally, coordination between these
agencies and the public may be necessary to address the public's
concerns about the impact of the changes on traffic, on their
neighborhood, and on their convenience.

One example of successful collaboration among states, railroad
companies, and industry is in the development, implementation, and
evaluation of Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS) technologies.
These systems include in-vehicle displays to alert drivers to the
presence of grade crossings and approaching trains, variable message
signs located along freeways to inform drivers of approaching trains at
crossings near freeway exits so drivers can select alternate routes, and
"intelligent grade crossings" where intelligent rail and automotive
technologies are integrated. The effectiveness of these systems depended
on their accuracy. In field evaluations of in-vehicle ITS technologies,
drivers did not trust systems with a high rate of false alarms and
perceived the systems to be unnecessary, particularly when used at
active grade crossings.

## Environmental Context {#environmental-context .unnumbered}

The *environmental context*, the outermost layer of the sociotechnical
model, addresses the oversight and the social and cultural impact of
actions by regulatory authorities. This layer encompasses the
development of policies requiring safe practices, educating the public
to the driving rules at grade crossings, and the enforcement of those
rules. It also includes the state legislatures and court system that
adjudicates the rules. The failure to recognize the political, social,
and cultural forces in this process can prevent the implementation of
valid safety improvements or result in an ineffective implementation.

The FRA recently finalized a rule requiring trains to sound their horns
when approaching public crossings and specified guidelines for
communities who want to implement safe alternatives to the train horn
(see *Use of Locomotive Horns at Highway-Rail Grade Crossings; Final
Rule*, 49 CFR § 222). In developing this rule, the FRA reached out to
communities, local municipalities, state agencies, and railroads to
balance safety concerns with quality of life issues. Additionally, the
FRA, in partnership with Operation Lifesaver, has worked with state and
local agencies, the rail industry, and other transportation
organizations to inform the public about the dangers of highway-rail
crossings. The FRA has also worked with local law authorities to improve
enforcement at grade crossings through automated photo enforcement.
Several states in the United States and one province in Canada have
conducted demonstrations of this technology and reported positive
impacts when its use was publicized and where consequences were
tangible. However, judges in some states have noted concerns about the
process for admitting digital photos as evidence and if violators were
sufficiently notified of their rights and responsibilities.

## Areas for Further Research {#areas-for-further-research .unnumbered}

Based on the results of the literature review, additional research is
recommended in the following areas:

-   Evaluate the use of highway intersection-related traffic control
    devices, in particular the use of stop and yield signs, at passive
    grade crossings,

```{=html}
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```
-   Examine the use of traffic calming techniques at grade crossings,

-   Conduct a cost-benefit analysis to determine the impact of different
    factors that contribute to driving style,

-   Examine methods for improving drivers' perception of signal
    reliability,

-   Conduct further research in the use of ITS technologies, and

-   Evaluate different approaches to educating drivers. In particular,
    examine methods that deviate from traditional approaches to
    education and take advantage of current technologies such as the
    Internet.

# Introduction

The Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) working with the Federal
Highway Administration (FHWA) and Federal Transit Administration (FTA)
has significantly improved highway-rail grade crossing safety in the
past decade. The *2004 Audit of the Highway-Rail Grade Crossing Safety
Program* (Office of the Inspector General, 2004) reported that in the 10
years from 1994 through 2003, the number of grade crossing accidents
decreased by 41 percent and the number of fatalities fell by 48 percent.
However, accidents at grade crossings continue to be a significant
concern to the railroad industry, and a large proportion of these
accidents are the result of driver error. In fact, the Office of the
Inspector General attributed 94 percent of grade crossing accidents and
87 percent of grade-crossing fatalities from 1994 through 2003 to risky
driver behavior or poor judgment. In 2003 alone, 93 percent of accidents
at grade crossings and 83 percent of fatalities resulted from drivers
who failed to stop at a crossing, drove through the crossing, drove
around activated automatic gates, or stopped their vehicles on the
crossing (Office of the Inspector General, 2004).

This report is intended to update a 1990 literature review titled,
*Driver Behavior at Rail-Highway Crossings*, by Lerner, Ratte, and
Walker, that provided a comprehensive examination of factors
contributing to driver noncompliance at grade crossings. The Lerner, et
al., report addressed the roles of perception, knowledge, and driver
attitudes in decision making at grade crossings and discussed
countermeasures developed to discourage noncompliance. The goal of this
report is to review research conducted since 1990 that addresses driver
behavior at grade crossings, which may be used to develop
countermeasures to discourage dangerous driving behavior at grade
crossings. This report updates the literature review published by
Lerner, et al. and extends it by examining driver behavior at grade
crossings in the context of the general driving task.

## Background

A highway-rail grade crossing[^1] can be compared to a highway
intersection with two conflicting streams of traffic, but it is unique
in that it is a multimodal intersection in which the train always has
the right-of-way. A train moves along a fixed path, limiting the
avoidance maneuvers that the locomotive engineer can take, and its
operating characteristics prevent the operator from braking quickly to
avoid a collision. Drivers sometimes underestimate the danger at grade
crossings and engage in behavior that increases the likelihood of an
accident.

In 1994, the Secretary of Transportation issued the first Rail-Highway
Crossing Safety Action Plan, with the goal of reducing highway-rail
grade-crossing collisions and fatalities by at least 50 percent over a
10-year period. The Action Plan, developed by the FRA, FHWA, FTA, and
the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), proposed six
initiatives for improving crossing safety:

1.  Increasing enforcement at grade crossings,

2.  Conducting comprehensive reviews of all crossings using a systems
    approach by examining crossings in a corridor to determine
    candidates for potential closure or consolidation and upgrades,

3.  Increasing public education and expanding the Operation Lifesaver
    program,

4.  Improving safety at private crossings,

5.  Conducting research on signs, signals, lights, and pavement markings
    and demonstrating the use of innovative technologies, and

6.  Preventing trespassers.

An audit by the Office of the Inspector General (2004) noted that the
United States (US) Department of Transportation (DOT) came close to
meeting its goal of reducing grade crossing accidents by 50 percent.
From the end of 1993 to the end of 2003, the number of grade crossing
accidents decreased by 41 percent and the number of fatalities decreased
by 48 percent. However, much of the improvements in grade crossing
safety were attributed to closures of public and private grade crossing,
upgrading passive crossings with active warning devices, and public
education campaigns (Office of the Inspector General, 2005).
Consequently, achieving the same scale of reduction in accidents and
incidents will be difficult without a better understanding of remaining
problem areas.

One of these problem areas is driver behavior at grade crossings.
Several research reviews have addressed this problem. In 1990, Lerner,
Ratte, and Walker published a comprehensive report titled, *Driver
Behavior at Rail-Highway Crossings*, that addressed contributing factors
and driver characteristics associated with behavior at grade crossings
and presented the results of research examining countermeasures to
improve compliance prior to 1989. Westat (1999) updated the report in a
review of research published after 1989 that discussed the effectiveness
of various grade crossing traffic control devices. However, the review
focused specifically on passive crossings and countermeasures
appropriate at those crossings. As part of Canada's efforts to reduce
grade crossing accidents, Caird, Creaser, Edwards, and Dewar (2002)
conducted a comprehensive literature review examining behavioral
contributors to grade crossing accidents in the US and applied their
findings to Canadian crossings. Their review addressed research
examining the effectiveness of countermeasures at US grade crossings to
develop a taxonomy to understand patterns of driver error. Caird, et al.
focused on the characteristics of the crossing, the traffic control
devices used at crossings, and driver characteristics contributing to
compliance but did not address factors in the perception and detection
of trains at or approaching the crossing that also contribute to
compliance.

This document is intended to complement the previous reviews, and in
particular, provide a comprehensive update to Lerner, et al. (1990).
Specifically, this report will review relevant research, conducted since
the publication of Lerner, et al., that addresses driver behavior at
grade crossings and present the results of evaluations examining the
effectiveness of current and proposed countermeasures. This literature
review extends the previous reviews by addressing the grade crossing
problem using a systems perspective. Driver compliance at grade
crossings is considered not only with regard to features of the crossing
and train and characteristics of the driver, but also in light of the
actions of organizations involved in improving grade crossing safety and
the impact of economic, political, and social forces. To make further
progress in improving grade crossing safety, all these factors and their
interactions must be better understood.

## Method

Relevant literature was identified through bibliographic searches, a
review of academic journals and government reports, review of
bibliographies from prior research, and Internet searches. The review of
articles and research studies focused on those that addressed human
behavior at grade crossings. Because negotiating a grade crossing is
only one aspect of the driving task, research addressing general driving
behavior was included when relevant to the grade crossing problem. This
document includes literature addressing the effectiveness of
countermeasures on driver compliance but does not include discussions of
the technical aspects of grade crossing and locomotive technologies
(e.g., the costs of installation and/or maintenance or traffic
engineering issues).

## Organization of this Report

This literature review is organized in the framework of a sociotechnical
model (first proposed in Moray and Huey, 1998 and applied to the rail
domain in Moray, 2006). This approach allows driver behavior at grade
crossings to be examined not as individual elements but as a system and
thus considers each element of the system with respect to how it
interacts with other elements of the system. The system can be described
in various ways and at many levels. Figure 1 depicts the representation
describing the problem of driver behavior at grade crossings used here.

[]{#__RefHeading___Toc207426998 .anchor}Figure 1. Sociotechnical model
of the highway-rail grade crossing domain.

As shown in Figure 1, the sociotechnical model consists of four
subsystems. The innermost layer is the *technical/engineering system*,
which is defined here to consist of elements and characteristics of the
grade crossing environment (e.g., traffic control devices) and the
train. How this information is processed by drivers will depend not only
on the design of the components of the technical system but also on the
drivers' cognitive and perceptual processes and social factors, as
represented by the *personnel subsystem*. Factors influencing driver
behavior may be classified into two types: those that influence driving
skill and those that influence driving style. Driving skill consists of
behavioral characteristics of human information processing that limit
driver performance. Characteristics such as age, experience,
distractions, and impairment due to alcohol use or fatigue change one's
skill level. On the other hand, driving style refers to biases and
attitudes that affect how one chooses to drive. Driving style is shaped
by expectancy, the costs of complying with warning devices at grade
crossings, risk perception and risk taking, and moderated by gender and
age differences. Note that age-related effects are a factor in both
driving skill and driving style. For the former, increasing age impairs
information processing and for the latter, it moderates the level of
risk a driver is willing to accept.

Improving grade crossing safety requires coordination among agencies at
the federal, state, and local levels, as shown by the
*organizational/management infrastructure* layer. Examples of this
coordination include efforts to identify which crossings to improve, how
to interconnect highway signals and grade crossing warning devices, and
research and development in the use of Intelligent Transportation
Systems (ITS) technologies.

All these layers function within a political and social context. That
is, public support or opposition and the specific policies and actions
of regulators also influence safety. This is highlighted by the
outermost layer of the model, the *environmental context*, which
addresses the regulatory oversight and the public pressures imposed on
regulatory authorities. This layer includes developing policies
requiring safe practices, educating the public to the driving rules at
grade crossings, and enforcing those rules. In particular, the actions
of state legislatures and courts impact the effectiveness of the rules
based on how the rules are adjudicated.

This report reviews research addressing the topics in each of the layers
shown in Figure 1. Section 2 begins by summarizing the findings by
Lerner, et al. (1990) in the context of a sociotechnical system.
Sections 3 through 6 present research and literature published since
1990 that address the different layers of the model. Section 3 focuses
on the technical/engineering system; Section 4 reviews literature
pertaining to the personnel subsystem; Section 5 addresses the
organizational/management infrastructure; and Section 6 discusses the
impact of regulatory oversight and the political and social environment
on improving compliance. Section 7 presents a summary of the findings
and recommends areas where new research is needed. To facilitate
implementation of the findings, operational recommendations based on the
results of the literature review is provided in Appendix A.

Note that several documents contain guidance for maintaining safety at
grade crossings. The *Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices* (MUTCD;
FHWA, 2003) provides standards for traffic control devices (signs,
signals, and pavement markings) and their placement at the crossing. The
*Guidance on Traffic Control Devices at Highway-Rail Grade Crossings*
(FHWA, 2002) provides more detailed guidance to aid in decisions
regarding their selection and installation. The *Railroad-Highway Grade
Crossing Handbook---Revised Second Edition 2007* (FHWA, 2007) is a
reference for improving grade crossings, and *A Policy on Geometric
Design of Highways and Streets* (American Association of State Highway
and Transportation Officials (AASHTO), 2000) provides specifications for
critical dimensions, such as formulas for calculating sight distance
requirements at grade crossings, and specifications for safe vertical
and horizontal roadway alignments.

# Review of Driver Behavior at Rail-Highway Crossings

The report, *Driver Behavior at Rail-Highway Crossings*, by Lerner, et
al. (1990), provides a comprehensive review of human factors issues
contributing to driver behavior at grade crossings and the effectiveness
of countermeasures developed to improve this behavior. This section
summarizes the findings in the Lerner, et al. report using the framework
of the sociotechnical model presented in Figure 1.

## Technical/Engineering System

The information at a grade crossing provides several cues and features
to assist the driver in detecting the crossing and the presence of a
train. Public crossings have advance warning signs (see Figure 2a), a
crossbuck (Figure 2b) and pavement markings (Figure 2c), and some are
equipped with active warning devices such as flashing lights or gates
that indicate the presence of a train.

  ----------------------------------------------------- ----------------------------------------------------- ------------------------------------------------------
  ![](media/image8.jpeg){width="0.8194444444444444in"   ![](media/image9.jpeg){width="1.3395833333333333in"   ![](media/image10.jpeg){width="1.4388888888888889in"
  height="0.8805555555555555in"}                        height="1.3395833333333333in"}                        height="2.426388888888889in"}

  \(a\) Advance Warning Sign (W10-1)                    \(b\) Crossbuck (R15-1)                               \(c\) Pavement Marking
  ----------------------------------------------------- ----------------------------------------------------- ------------------------------------------------------

[]{#__RefHeading___Toc207426999 .anchor}Figure 2. Signs and markings at
grade crossings.

However, characteristics of the crossing, such as sight distance or its
visibility at night may hinder detection of the train at the crossing.
Methods to improve the conspicuity of the train at the crossing (e.g.,
by removing sight restrictions or illuminating the crossing) and as the
train approaches and enters the crossing (e.g., headlights,
reflectorization, and train horn) will be discussed.

### Traffic Control Devices

Drivers generally understand that they are approaching a grade crossing
upon seeing one of five traffic control devices: the crossbuck, advance
warning sign, pavement markings, flashing light signals, or automatic
gates. However, drivers do not understand their precise meaning, the
action required, and their location at the grade crossing. Additionally,
drivers' comprehension of pavement markings is unclear. With respect to
active warning devices, drivers generally know the meaning conveyed by
flashing lights and automatic gates although they do not always comply
with them. Each of these warning devices will be discussed in more
detail below.

#### **Signs**

Numerous studies have extensively addressed driver detection and
comprehension of the advance warning and crossbuck signs. The unique
shapes of these signs (i.e., the advance warning sign is round and the
crossbuck is "X-shaped") draws drivers' attention to the crossing but
may also violate driver expectations about what a warning sign should
look like. In fact, the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices
(MUTCD) requires that warning signs be diamond-shaped. With respect to
comprehension, studies consistently find that drivers do not understand
the distinction between the crossbuck and the advance warning sign and
are unaware of the action required.

Proposed alternatives to the standard signs have attempted to improve
their conspicuity and driver comprehension. The conspicuity of a sign
depends not only on characteristics of the sign itself, such as its
color and size, but also on its location at the crossing and the
contrast of the sign with respect to its immediate surroundings.
Prototype advance warning signs described by Lerner, et al. (1990) used
a diamond-shape to conform to stereotypes of warning shapes and varied
their color used in signage. Whereas drivers generally understood these
advance warning sign alternatives as indicating the presence of a
crossing, the comprehension rate for these signs were not as high as
that for the standard advance warning sign. Moreover, their use did not
show a significant benefit for alerting drivers to the presence of a
crossing.

Studies evaluating the comprehension of alternative crossbuck signs have
found that the shape of the crossbuck conveyed meaning to drivers.
Prototype crossbuck designs varied by color, the angle between the
blades, and the presence of the "Railway Crossing" message. These
prototype designs improved the conspicuity of the crossbuck, although in
the evaluation, the presentation of the experimental crossbucks was
atypical of the driving environment. In the study, participants viewed
the experimental crossbucks against a uniform background, and the
success of the crossbuck design varied depending on the background
color.

Lerner, et al. note that a major limitation of the advance warning and
crossbuck signs is that they provide no information regarding whether a
crossing is equipped with active warning devices or not. Of concern is
the fact that many drivers believe that active warning devices are used
at all, or most, grade crossings, and thus, the absence of an active
warning system could be interpreted as signaling the absence of a train.
Various foreign countries use distinctive active and passive crossing
signs, but no data were available regarding the effectiveness of the
signs in helping drivers recognize the type of crossings ahead when
Lerner, et al. reviewed the literature. Other proposed alternative sign
systems have attempted to enhance the information provided by warning
devices. The supplementary signs indicated to the driver when it was
safe to proceed, the status of the signals system (i.e., whether or not
it is malfunctioning), and information about the approaching train. The
benefits of these sign systems were unknown.

#### **Pavement markings**

Pavement markings consist of an "X," the letters "RR," a no passing
marking on two-lane highways with marked centerlines, and transverse
lines. When shown three different illustrations of pavement markings
(the standard marking versus ones that show an RR or an X, but not
both), 70 percent of drivers identified the correct one. Because the
integrity of the pavement markings may degrade over time (e.g., due to
wear from tires), alternative markings that eliminated the RR or reduced
the size of the X were evaluated. However, the level of comprehension
for each of the markings, and the contribution of the letters (X, RR) to
comprehension, was not clear because the order in which participants
viewed the markings was not varied in the study, and the results showed
increasing accuracy through the sequence of markings.

In addition to pavement markings, rumble strips may call attention to
the presence of a grade crossing. Rumble strips provide kinesthetic and
auditory information, so they can alert the driver if he/she is visually
distracted. Evaluations of rumble strips showed that drivers responded
to the presence of a grade crossing faster than at crossings without
rumble strips, and painting the rumble strips increased their visibility
and reduced approach speeds to the intersection. However, although
rumble strips promoted compliance, in some cases, they also promoted
unsafe avoidance behavior. For example, observations showed that some
drivers moved into the opposing lane to avoid the rumble strips.

#### **Active warning devices**

Studies evaluating driver comprehension of active warning devices
indicated that drivers understood that the onset of flashing lights
meant that "a train is coming" and that they must stop, but they did not
know what action to take afterwards. In some states, drivers may proceed
at flashing-light only grade crossings once the train has passed and
they deem it safe to do so; however, many drivers did not realize that
they had this option, believing instead that they needed to wait until
the flashing stopped. Other drivers understood the meaning of the
flashing lights but did not comply. Violations were highest at crossing
protected only by flashing lights, signals, and signs, that is, at
crossings where there is no physical barrier. In fact, in one
observational study, more than half the drivers who encountered the
crossing failed to comply with flashing light signals, even though they
saw the flashing light signal in advance.

The tightly-focused narrow beams of the flashing lights that signal the
approach of a train may hinder detection. Although designed to maximize
intensity, the beams may be difficult to detect at close distances to
the crossing under non-ideal viewing conditions, when small deviations
in where the signal is aimed, or when variation is in the driver's
viewing angle on the approach to the crossing (e.g., curves or grade
changes on the roadway). Efforts to increase the conspicuity of the
flashing light signal focused on varying the parameters of the signals,
such as its intensity, size, color, and flash rate, but there was little
objective evidence that optimization of these parameters increased the
effectiveness of the alert. The use of alternately flashing strobe
lights, mounted above or below the conventional flashing lights, was
more successful. Subjective judgments obtained from field studies
indicated that the strobe lights increased the visibility of the signal
system. When strobe lights were added to gate arms, drivers' decelerated
earlier and approached the crossing at slower speeds than without the
strobe lights. Whether the increased conspicuity of the flashing lights
provided by the strobe lights improved driver compliance in the
long-term was not addressed.

### Crossing Characteristics

Poor visibility of the train at the crossing is often a contributing
factor when a vehicle strikes a train. Lerner, et al. noted that the
number of these incidents was greater at night than in daylight, with
many of these nighttime accidents occurring at crossings that were not
illuminated. This fact highlighted not only the difficulty of detecting
the train at night, but also the difficulty of detecting the crossing.
Additionally, becoming alerted to the presence of an approaching train
is important for negotiating grade crossings, but in a large percentage
of crossing accidents, drivers failed to detect an approaching train
before it reached the crossing. Evidence suggests that a critical factor
is inadequate sight distance that prevents the driver from scanning the
tracks at a far enough distance from the crossing to make the decision
of whether to stop or proceed. Countermeasures to improve the
conspicuity of the crossing and to inform drivers of sight restrictions
are addressed below.

#### **Illumination**

Illumination of the crossing improves detection of the crossing at
night, particularly for passive grade crossings. Illumination can also
be effective at crossings with the following characteristics: nighttime
train activity, low train speeds, high rate of accidents caused by
drivers failing to detect trains at night, crossings that are occupied
for long periods at night, limited sight distance, and low illumination
levels. Reflectorizing trackside objects (e.g., the backs of crossbucks
or other track hardware) can also call attention to the grade crossing,
particularly when a train is occupying the crossing. In this case,
vehicle headlights, intermittently reflected off the backs of the signs
as the train passes through the crossing, will create a strobe-like
effect. No formal evaluations regarding the use of reflectorization at
the crossing were available at the time Lerner, et al. conducted their
review.

#### **Sight Restrictions** 

Limited sight distance to the crossing, along the track when approaching
the crossing or when stopped at the crossing, hinders drivers' ability
to detect an oncoming train and is a critical accident factor at passive
grade crossings. Sight restrictions limit the time available for the
driver to respond to the grade-crossing situation and affects drivers'
ability to judge the speed and distance of an approaching train where
cues regarding time and distance are more available with an unrestricted
lateral view. However, drivers are usually not aware when sight
restrictions exist, and even when they are aware, they do not adjust
their driving behavior accordingly. Signs at crossings with limited
sight distance that indicate the sight restriction and provide the
appropriate approach speed and the point on the approach at which the
driver should search for trains may improve driver behavior.
Additionally, the site could be physically improved by removing
visibility obstructions.

#### **Increasing Crossing Conspicuity**

Tests of active advance warning devices presented in conjunction with
warning signs have examined their impact on increasing the conspicuity
of the crossing. In one study, flashing yellow beacons, located above
and below warning signs, were installed at active grade crossings with
restricted sight distance. The active advance warning devices appeared
to improve detection of the crossing, although the unique
characteristics of the grade crossings used in the evaluation limited
the generalizability of the results. During the day, the flashing
beacons were effective when they were active before the crossing signal;
at night, they were effective if they flashed continuously.

### Trains

The difficulty in detecting a train when it is already on the crossing
may account for approximately 25 percent of accidents at passive
crossings and for about 10 percent of all vehicle-train collisions.
Trains are equipped with several devices to facilitate their
detectability: headlights, reflective markings, and a horn. However,
there are limitations to the effectiveness of these devices.

First, the standard locomotive headlight is not easily visible under all
viewing conditions. During the day, its visibility is limited by its
narrow beam width; at night, the light may not be distinctive from other
moving light sources. Several studies have examined alternatives to the
standard headlight (e.g., an oscillating headlight that rotates 15º to
the right and left and partially illuminated panels along the sides of
railcars). In particular, the use of roof-mounted xenon strobe lights
received much attention. The results of evaluations indicated that these
lights were detectable from larger viewing angles and greater distances
than the standard headlight, but their detectability may have been
facilitated by participants' expectancy for seeing a strobe-equipped
train. As a result, more testing is needed to fully evaluate their
effectiveness in facilitating detection of trains in normal crossing
conditions.

Second, with regards to the use of reflective markings, reflectors
improved train visibility when there were no visual obstructions at the
crossing and when the driver had an adequate visibility of the crossing
on the approach. However, the intensity of reflective markings degraded
over time as the reflectors deteriorated with age or dirt accumulation
on the reflectors. Thus, constant maintenance of the reflectors is
required for reflectorization to be effective.

Finally, although the train horn has the advantage in alerting the
driver by not requiring the driver to be oriented towards its signal,
other sounds may limit its effectiveness (e.g., noise from neighboring
communities, background noise and insertion loss in a car, or
environmental noise). A general consensus is that the use of on-train
auditory warning devices is not an effective primary warning device.
Consequently, alternative auditory signals have not been evaluated
extensively.

## Personnel subsystem

Non-compliance at grade crossings may be the result of error due to a
deficiency in *driving skill*, such as lack of knowledge. For example, a
significant number of drivers do not recognize that they are primarily
responsible for avoiding accidents at grade crossings nor do they
possess a clear responsibility of what action is required. However, some
drivers simply choose not to comply with the action required, a decision
formed through intention and how one chooses to drive; that is, their
*driving style*. Each of these factors is addressed below.

### Driving skill

At a grade crossing, the driver must determine whether he/she can safely
cross the tracks prior to a train's arrival. Drivers must look for the
train, judge its arrival time, and judge their own time to clear the
tracks. Perception occurs primarily in the visual system; auditory and
kinesthetic systems may contribute to detection of the train and
crossing but provide little information towards estimating train speed,
distance, and closing rate.

Several errors in the detection and identification process can arise.
Detection requires becoming aware that an object is present whereas
identification involves determining what the object is and understanding
its attributes. First, at low levels of illumination, detection of speed
and distance cues is poor and identification is hindered due to low
visibility. Train detection occurs primarily in one's peripheral vision,
which is more sensitive to movements than foveal vision but does not
have as good an acuity. When a train is detected, one turns in the
direction of movement to bring it into focus and to identify it. Low
illumination at night hinders this identification process. Second,
restricted sight distance at the crossing further limits the time the
driver has to determine the train's speed and arrival time. Third,
drivers do not always complete a sufficient scan of the grade crossing
to look for trains; studies examining drivers looking behavior at
crossings indicated that 15--35 percent of drivers did not even look for
an approaching train.

Estimates of train speed and distance are also subject to several
misjudgments in motion and gap perception. While little data exists on
speed judgments for trains at a grade crossing, several studies examined
how well drivers estimated the speed and distance of approaching
vehicles in highway situations. The results indicated that these
judgments were subject to a number of errors and were often inaccurate.
With respect to the grade crossing situation, some unique features of
trains and crossings can contribute to misjudgments in speed and
distance. First, perception of train speed is subject to the "large
object illusion," in which the speed of larger objects is perceived to
be slower than that of smaller objects, even when both are moving at the
same speed. Second, the viewing angle and sight distance at the crossing
influence the driver's perception of train distance. Depth cues, such as
the convergence of the railroad tracks, may lead to overestimates of the
train's distance from the crossing. Third, the rate of retinal
displacement (i.e., the rate at which the size of the image changes on
the retina, which provides cues to speed) is small. Virtually no change
occurs in the size of an approaching train until it is close. Fourth,
drivers fail to properly incorporate the speed of other vehicles into
gap judgments.

Judgments of train speed and distance are also more difficult in
nighttime viewing conditions. The degree of separation between
automobile headlights provides distance information but the separation
of headlights on a train is so close that the headlights may appear as a
single source of light from a distance. Additionally, pursuit tracking
of the train headlight to obtain its speed and distance is subject to
lag, resulting in underestimations. Pursuit tracking is a function of
the eye-head movement system; when tracking a moving target against a
nondescript background, the major source of information comes from the
path and speed of the eye movements. However, this tracking is not
perfect, and the eye may lag the target. The amount of this lag
increases as the speed of the target increases, and may result in
underestimations of the train speed.

Countermeasures to improve the driver's judgment of his/her own vehicle
speed and distance or train vehicle speed and distance have focused on
methods that create or capitalize on visual illusions at the grade
crossings to distort judgments of vehicle speed or train speed in order
to induce the driver to slow down. However, Lerner, et al. warns that
altering one's perception of speed may have an unintended, opposite
effect such that the driver speeds up more to try to beat the train
across the track.

Alcohol use, drug use, or fatigue also limits a driver's perceptual
performance and decision making. Much research exists addressing the
effect of these factors in the general highway driving situation but
little research is available regarding the contribution of these factors
to grade crossing accidents. Studies that are available suggest that
alcohol use is a significant contributing factor to nighttime
grade-crossing accidents. It is expected that drug use and fatigue could
increase the accident risk, but the incidence rate is not known.

### Driving style

One's driving style, that is, how one chooses to drive, influences how
the information acquired about a grade crossing is processed and
applied. The decision to comply at a grade crossing is influenced by
one's expectancies regarding the likelihood of a train and about the
crossing itself. Studies showed that drivers' estimates of train volume
were based on their familiarity with the area. Consequently, drivers who
are familiar with a crossing will be *less* likely to look for a train
at the crossing or to reduce their speed on their approach to the
crossing than drivers who are *un*familiar with the crossing. At active
crossings, expectancies regarding the credibility of the warning device
and warning time, developed from past experiences, may be a factor in
one's decision to comply. If a high number of false alarms occur or if
the delay between the onset of the warning and the train arrival is
long, then over time, the driver may perceive warnings at crossings as
being unreliable so that the warning becomes less effective.

Compliance must also be weighted with its costs. Stopping and waiting
for a train results in delays, and slowing when approaching a crossing
increases one's likelihood of having to stop for an approaching train.
Additionally, sometimes safety concerns preclude compliance. For
example, speed variability at grade crossings increases the highway
accident rate, so by slowing down for a train, the driver increases the
likelihood for an accident with a close-following vehicle. In fact,
Mortimer (1988) noted that a large proportion of grade crossing
accidents were not train-vehicle collisions but vehicle-vehicle
collisions, and in particular, rear-end crashes.

Of concern is the behavior of risk-takers. Studies reported that drivers
exhibiting dangerous behavior at grade crossings accepted higher levels
of risk, as measured by "unsafe" behaviors, such as failing to wear seat
belts and running red lights. Social factors, such as perceived pressure
from peers and other drivers, also influenced the likelihood that a
driver would exhibit risky behavior. Although drivers were generally
more conservative when there were other passengers in the car, there was
an exception when both the driver and passenger were males; in this
case, the male driver exhibited riskier behavior. Additionally, the
behavior of drivers in other vehicles influenced one's risk-taking
behavior. For example, drivers of a lead vehicle accepted shorter gap
times for entering traffic when there were other cars following or
violated a grade crossing because other drivers did.

Age and gender differences moderate driving style. The patterns for
rail-highway accidents were similar to those for highway accidents in
general such that young and older drivers were involved in more highway
and grade crossing accidents than middle-aged drivers, and male drivers
were involved in more highway and grade crossing accidents than female
drivers.

## Organizational/Management Behavior 

To positively impact driver behavior, organizations must have an
appropriate view of the driver. A "typical" driver is a rational, but
imperfect, decision maker. Decisions are not based solely on the
information at the crossing but are also determined by one's perceptions
and experiences. Thus, a driver's decision at a grade crossing, derived
from a weighting of the costs and benefits of various actions, may
differ from that determined by a highway-safety specialist.
Consideration of the driver as a reasonable decision maker allows the
evaluation of countermeasures in the full context of the driving task,
placing less emphasis on countermeasures that are aimed at informing
drivers of rules and more emphasis on countermeasures that target the
driver's decision making process.

Although Lerner, et al. does not specifically discuss the role
organizations and management play in improving grade crossing safety,
the authors do note the importance of addressing improvements in grade
crossing safety at a systems level rather than on a site-by-site basis.
Taking this systems approach will require coordination among local,
state, and federal agencies, railroads, and communities to identify
which crossings to improve and what those improvements should entail
because a change at one grade crossing could have implications for
driver behavior at all grade crossings.

For example, improving the credibility of a warning signal at one
crossing could foster respect for all active warning signals. In one
approach, the public helps identify signal malfunctions so that the
problem can be addressed immediately. In the state of Texas, signs are
posted at all active crossings on state highways with a toll free number
and a crossing number to identify the site. Drivers calling to report a
problem speak to the Department of Public Safety who notifies the
railroad company. Another approach is to implement constant warning time
systems to reduce the waiting time. Shorter waiting times at one
crossing may reduce drivers' perception of the waiting time at *all*
grade crossings and thereby improve compliance, even at grade crossings
without constant warning time systems. Because upgrading technologies at
grade crossings is determined on a site-specific basis using a hazard
index, a systems-wide view would allow sites to be selected to best
enhance driver perception of signal credibility.

Implementation of countermeasures may also require coordination with the
appropriate highway agencies. Many standard highway traffic control
devices have been proposed for use at grade crossings, and use of these
devices may have implications for the general highway driving situation.
For example, although drivers tend to comply with stop signs, yield
signs, and traffic signals at highway intersections, the results of
several studies indicated that drivers do not show the same respect to
these devices when they are installed at grade crossings. In these
studies, drivers frequently ignored stop signs at crossings and crossed
during the red phase when a traffic signal was used. Consequently, there
is concern that the use of standard highway traffic control devices at
grade crossings may lead to system-wide effects of a general disregard
for these devices in other situations. This issue is discussed in more
detail in Section 3.1.1.1.

## Environmental context

Lerner, et al. discussed the role of two environmental forces that
influence driver behavior: *education* and *enforcement*. With respect
to the former, the use of education is often cited as a countermeasure
for improving driver understanding of the meaning of crossing-related
traffic control devices, the actions required, and the risks at grade
crossings. The most widespread education program is Operation Lifesaver,
and although it has been credited with declines in grade crossing
accidents, no formal evaluation has been conducted. Other suggestions
for educating drivers include incorporating material on highway-rail
grade crossings in high school driver education curriculums, driver
licensing handbooks and exams, and public service activities; targeting
specific driver groups, such as older drivers or truck drivers, to
highlight the types of accidents in which these driver groups are most
frequently involved; and educating drivers about their perceptual
limitations. Whereas much interest in developing an education program to
improve driver behavior exists, it is important to note that the effects
of education are not known. Only a few studies have evaluated the
effectiveness of education programs, and these have not found a positive
correlation between safe driving behavior and knowledge of a sign's
meaning, the action required, accident-risk factors, or the estimated
number of fatalities.

With respect to traffic enforcement, grade crossings are rarely
patrolled. Enforcement is difficult due to the low frequency of trains
at a given crossing. Even though the presence of enforcement at grade
crossings improved compliance, this improvement was only temporary. To
make better use of enforcement, Lerner, et al. recommended policing
crossings at those times of greatest vehicle traffic and train traffic
or using automated cameras to record violators. One innovative method is
a "trooper on the train" concept in which a police officer, riding on
the train, identifies violators and passes their information on to an
officer at the crossing who stops the violator. This program allows
policing of numerous crossings and is efficient in that drivers are only
observed when a train is present. However, the fact that the enforcement
is not visible may reduce its impact. At the time Lerner, et al.
conducted their literature review, no evaluation of the trooper on the
train program had been conducted.

## Summary

The report by Lerner, et al. highlights the issues confronted by drivers
when negotiating a grade crossing. Although drivers generally understand
the meaning of signs and warning devices at grade crossings, many do not
understand the specific action required and fail to appreciate the
potential hazards at crossings. Compliance at grade crossings is
variable, and failure to comply may result from error or intention. With
respect to the former, perceptual limitations may result in missed cues
regarding the presence of a crossing or train, particularly at night, or
misjudgments in train speed or distance. These limitations are
exacerbated by alcohol use, drug use, and fatigue. With respect to the
latter, a driver's decision to violate a crossing is the result of a
cost-benefit analysis in which factors such as one's expectancies
regarding the likelihood of a train, familiarity with the crossing, and
perceived credibility of the warning devices are weighed. Of particular
concern are drivers who are risk-takers and simply accept higher levels
of risk. Social pressure, from either peers or other drivers, increased
risk-taking behavior, with young, male drivers being the most
susceptible.

Lerner, et al. reviewed a wide range of countermeasures to assist the
driver: redesigning the advance warning sign and other warning devices,
improving the saliency of the train, improving the credibility of the
warning device, better educating the public regarding their risks at
grade crossings, and enforcement. In implementing these countermeasures,
the use of a systems perspective may be valuable, particularly in
determining the extent of their effectiveness.

The Lerner, et al. (1990) report provided the starting point for this
literature review. Many of the issues discussed by Lerner, et al. are
still relevant to the grade crossing problem, and thus this document
discusses similar issues and countermeasures to offer additional insight
into driver behavior. Since negotiating a grade crossing is only one
aspect of the general driving task, this review addresses the grade
crossing problem from a larger perspective by examining driver attitudes
in the general driving situation and applying those lessons learned to
the grade crossing domain. Additionally, by considering driver behavior
in the context of a sociotechnical system, this review will address in
more detail than the Lerner, et al. report, the role and influence of
organizations and management and the coordination and collaboration that
will be required to improve grade crossing safety.

# Technical/Engineering System

This technical/engineering system component of the sociotechnical model
consists of elements of the grade crossing environment and the train.
This section addresses the design of warning devices at grade crossings
and on the train, and the effectiveness of these devices in influencing
driver compliance. It also considers crossing characteristics and
attributes of the train that contribute to their detection and
recognition by drivers. First, research addressing driver comprehension
and compliance to traffic control devices at grade crossings is reviewed
and proposed alternatives are discussed. Second, factors affecting
detection of the crossing, such as low illumination or physical
characteristics of the crossing, are examined. Third, efforts to
increase the detection of the train through both visual and auditory
means are described.

## Traffic Control Devices

Signs, pavement markings, and active warning devices, such as flashing
lights and gates, indicate the presence of a crossing and convey the
safe driving actions required. Laboratory studies and field tests have
extensively evaluated driver comprehension, detection and compliance
with these traffic control devices and have examined alternatives to
these devices to determine their effects on driver behavior.

### Signs

Although the crossbuck and advance warning sign convey the message that
a grade crossing is near, the driver action required and the location of
the sign with respect to the grade crossing is not well understood
(Bridwell, et al., 1993; Dolan, 1996; Fambro, et al., 1994; Picha, et
al., 1997). This section addresses research conducted since the
publication of Lerner, et al. (1990) that examined driver understanding
of the signs at grade crossings and discusses proposed alternative sign
systems to improve driver comprehension.

#### **Crossbuck and Advance Warning Signs**

Several studies have examined driver attitudes towards grade crossings
and driver comprehension of signs at grade crossings. The results
generally show that drivers recognize the warning signs (Dolan, 1996;
Global Exchange, 1994; Picha, et al., 1997). In one focus group,
participants named the advance warning sign as the most familiar
indication of a grade crossing followed by the crossbuck and pavement
markings (Dolan, 1996), and participants in another focus group
indicated that they considered crossbuck to be the basic marker
identifying the location of railroad tracks (Global Exchange, 1994).

However, many drivers do not know where the signs are located relative
to the grade crossing, that both the advance warning sign and crossbuck
are used at active and passive crossings, or what driver action is
required. Responses to a questionnaire examining driver understanding of
the standard advance warning sign showed that although 81 percent of
drivers could identify the sign when shown an image of it, 18 percent of
drivers did not know where the sign was located with respect to the
crossing (Picha, et al., 1997). Similarly, a survey conducted by Fambro,
Schull, Noyce, and Rahman (1997), which tested driver understanding of
traffic control devices at grade crossings and their responsibilities,
found that 30 percent of the drivers did not know where the advance
warning and crossbuck signs were located with respect to the crossing,
50 percent of drivers did not know that the advance warning sign was
used at both active and passive crossings, and 34 percent did not know
that the crossbuck was used at both crossings. When asked what action
was required at active and passive grade crossings, the majority of
drivers (66 percent) noted that they would "stop, look, and listen" for
a train at a passive grade crossing; 18 percent indicated they would do
so at an active crossing. A follow-on in-vehicle observational study
showed, however, that few drivers actually stopped at crossings.

In the study, an in-vehicle observer guided 30 drivers along a course
containing active and passive grade crossings and recorded the driver's
looking behavior and deceleration behavior on the approach to each
crossing. Observations indicated that the majority of drivers did not
slow down or stop when approaching a grade crossing. Even at a stop-sign
controlled passive crossing, 10 percent of drivers slowed on the
approach but did not stop, and 33 percent of the drivers came to a
rolling stop. Drivers decelerated at grade crossings primarily out of
concern for the perceived roughness of the grade crossing surface rather
than their responsibility for ensuring crossing safety. Additionally,
drivers did not always look both ways at crossings. Looking behavior was
greater at passive crossings than at active crossings, but at one
passive crossing with a low-train volume, more than half the drivers
failed to look in either direction.

As part of a larger study to improve the traffic control devices at
passive grade crossings, Lerner, et al. (2002) conducted focus groups to
understand driver beliefs, perceptions, and expectancies at grade
crossings and of traffic control devices. Participants were drawn from
two regions: one with relatively few grade crossings, most of which had
active traffic control devices, and one from a rural area with many
grade crossings, including a number of passive crossings. In the focus
group, each participant was given a sheet with a plan-view diagram of a
two-lane roadway with a grade crossing and asked to draw the signs and
markings present at a typical crossing. Examination of the drawings
showed that most of the participants lacked an accurate understanding of
how traffic control devices were used. Only one out of the 23
participants drew a diagram that resembled actual practice. The
crossbuck was drawn by only five of 23 participants, suggesting that
drivers forgot or ignored them. Twenty of 23 participants included an
active traffic control device or some indication to stop, suggesting
that drivers expected an explicit indication of the behavior required at
the crossing and that they believed that they must stop and look at the
crossing although, as noted in the study by Fambro, et al (1997), few
actually did so.

After participants completed the drawing, they discussed the use of the
advance warning sign and crossbuck, the driver actions required, their
location, and their effectiveness. Similar to the findings of previous
studies, the discussion showed that drivers generally did not understand
the message and use of the standard crossbuck. Participants thought the
crossbuck was used solely to mark the location of the railroad tracks,
and some thought that it required drivers to "stop, look, and listen."
Additionally, many participants did not realize the crossbuck was
present at all grade crossings or even that it was widely used. In fact,
some participants thought the crossbuck was used only in rural locations
or on back roads. Thus, the results of the focus groups highlighted that
the current sign systems used at grade crossing is not well understood
and that drivers expect, and want, more information than is currently
provided.

##### Alternative Sign Systems

Driver understanding of the crossbuck and advance warning sign have been
evaluated with alternative signs to improve methods for communicating
driver requirements at active and passive grade crossings. In
particular, the presentation of supplementary signs for use in
conjunction with the standard advance warning sign and crossbuck has
received much interest. Picha, et al. (1997) evaluated driver
understanding for the standard advance warning sign when it was
presented alone and with a supplementary plaque stating "500 ft." Two
additional alternative sign systems for conveying the presence of a
crossing were also evaluated as part of the study: a circular sign with
an image of a black locomotive, and a circular sign with an image of a
black locomotive with the text "500 ft" below the image. Participants
completed a survey in which they were shown images of signs and asked to
select the correct response. As reported above, the majority of
participants recognized the standard advance warning sign. Additionally,
their comprehension of its meaning and their knowledge of its location
was significantly improved when it was presented with the supplementary
plaque that indicated the distance to the crossing. The two signs that
showed the image of the train were not as well understood as the
standard advance warning sign.

The similarities between driver actions at a grade crossing and that at
a highway intersection have prompted particular interest in the use of
stop and yield signs at grade crossings intersections. The general
belief is that these two signs are easily understood by drivers and thus
may result in more desirable behavior. The Intermodal Surface
Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991 (ISTEA) required that the FHWA
revise the MUTCD to allow state and local governments to use stop or
yield signs at passive grade crossings where two or more trains operated
daily. A joint memorandum from the FHWA and the FRA contained additional
guidance for the use of these signs. In particular, the document
recommended that two considerations be met when using the stop sign:

1.  State and/or local police should commit to a program of enforcement
    for stop sign-controlled grade crossings as rigorously as they would
    a stop-sign controlled highway intersection, and

2.  Use of the stop sign should not create a riskier condition
    (considering the likelihood and severity of traffic risks and
    highway-rail collisions) than that existing with use of a yield
    sign.

Additionally, the memorandum listed several crossing characteristics
where the use of a stop sign could reduce the accident risk:

-   Crossings where the maximum train speed was greater than or equal to
    30 miles per hour (mph) (48 kilometers per hour (km/h)),

-   Crossings where the highway traffic mix consisted of buses,
    hazardous materials carriers, and/or large equipment,

-   Crossings with train movements of 10 or more per day on five or more
    days per week,

-   Crossings with rail lines used by passenger trains,

-   Crossings where the rail line is used to regularly transports
    significant quantities of hazardous materials,

-   Crossings where the highway meets two or more tracks, and in
    particular, where both tracks are main tracks or one track is a
    passing siding that is frequently used.,

-   Crossings with a skewed angle of approach, and

-   Crossings with a restricted line of sight such that approaching
    traffic must substantially reduce its speed.

The memorandum noted that these conditions should be weighed against the
existence of a highway that is not secondary in character (i.e., where
the annual daily traffic is 400 in rural areas and 1,500 in urban areas)
or at crossings where a steep ascending grade occurs on the approach to
or through the crossing, unrestricted sight distance in relation to
maximum crossing speed, and used by heavy vehicles (FHWA, 2002).

In 1998, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) examined safety
at passive grade crossings and recommended the use of stop signs at all
passive grade crossings because the presence of the stop sign provides
consistent information and requires a response by the driver that is
well understood (NTSB, 1998). The use of stop signs at grade crossings
is controversial, and the recommendation by the NTSB to equip all
passive grade crossings with stop signs has been widely criticized.
Lerner, et al. (1990) noted that although the use of stop signs reduced
approach speed and increased looking behavior, actual rates of
compliance with stop signs at grade crossings were lower than at roadway
intersections. In fact, results of observational studies suggested that
drivers made a distinction between stop signs used at highway
intersections and those at grade crossings and failed to comply with
stop signs at crossings. More recent studies have reported similar
results. Burnham (1995) observed driver behavior at seven grade
crossings equipped with stop signs for traffic control and found that
only 18 percent of drivers came to a full stop at the crossing. Fifty
percent of drivers slowed to a roll or stopped on the tracks, and 32
percent did not stop at all. Furthermore, the percentage of drivers
stopping at sites with limited sight distance was low. Similarly, in an
analysis of 60 passive grade crossing accidents by the NTSB, 22 of the
accidents occurred at intersections protected by a stop sign, and in
half of these accidents, the drivers made no attempt to stop (NTSB,
1998). Although this noncompliance may be the result of a lack of
enforcement at grade crossings (this issue will be discussed in more
detail in Section 6.3), concern that noncompliance at grade crossing
stop signs could foster a general disrespect for the stop sign and carry
over to nongrade crossing situations is prevalent (Lerner, et al.,
2002). Additionally, uncertainty about whether a driver will comply with
the stop sign at the grade crossing could affect the potential for
rear-end collisions and other non-train related collisions (Burnham,
1994; Lerner, et al., 2002).

In addition to the problem of low compliance, two other concerns have
been noted with respect to the use of stop signs at grade crossings.
First, stopping at the crossing may hinder the driver's ability to judge
the speed of an approaching train. As noted in Lerner, et al. (1990),
drivers have difficulty estimating approaching train speed at a distance
away from the crossing where the lateral movement of the train provides
cues regarding the train's arrival time at the crossing. These cues are
not available when the driver is stopped at the crossing, and the driver
must rely on the rate of apparent change in the train's size.
Consequently, drivers, stopped at the crossing, may believe that they
have enough time to start and clear the crossing before the train's
arrival. Second, drivers of large trucks will require more time to clear
the crossing if a stop is required than if they cross the tracks at a
slow roll. While acknowledging these concerns, the NTSB believed that
the safety benefits gained outweighed the costs. A stop sign clearly
conveys the action required, a driver stopped at the crossing will have
more time to look for a train, and there is usually adequate sight
distance along the tracks when viewed from the stop line (NTSB, 1998).

The results of a recent accident analysis suggest that the installation
of stop signs may not increase safety at grade crossings, however, and
in fact raises questions regarding its use. Raub (2006) analyzed
collision data for 10 years from 1994 through 2003 for seven Midwestern
states, using information from the FRA accident/incident database. The
analysis examined the annual rate of collisions and casualties (defined
as a combination of injuries and fatalities) as a function of the
warning device at the crossing: crossbucks, stop signs, flashing lights,
or gates. Other warning systems (e.g., no device, traffic signals, and
flagmen) were excluded from the analysis because they were used at few
crossings (7 percent) and accounted for less than 3 percent of crashes.
A comparison of crash rate per 100 million of crossing vehicles (MCV;
calculated as the sum of the average daily traffic at the crossing
divided by 1 million), crash rates per 1 million annual trains, and
exposure level (calculated as a product of the average daily traffic and
crossing trains) all showed that the likelihood of a collision at stop
sign controlled grade crossings was higher than that at crossings
protected by other warning systems. Crossings with stop signs had a
crash rate of 4.76 per 100 MCV, a rate 1.5 times greater than that for
crossings with crossbucks (1.87 per 100 MCV), and over 7 times greater
than that at active crossings (0.59 per 100 MCV for flashing lights and
0.71 per 100 MCV for gates). The crash rate per 1 million annual trains
at stop sign controlled crossings was 2.93 per 1 million trains, a rate
25 percent higher than that at crossbuck-only crossings (2.21 per 1
million trains). Crossings with flashing lights had a crash rate of 2.75
per 1 million trains, and crossings with gates had a crash rate of 1.14
per 1 million trains. Finally, a comparison of the exposure level showed
that crossings with stop signs had an exposure level 9 times higher than
that at crossbuck-only crossings, 18 times higher than at flashing light
crossings, and 31 times higher than at gated crossings. Raub also
conducted an analysis examining the crash rate at stop sign controlled
crossings before and after the protection at the crossing changed from
crossbucks to stop signs, or vice versa. The results of this analysis
showed that crash rates increased slightly when stop signs replaced
crossbucks, but this difference was not significant due to the low
sample size; there were only 1,939 crossings in this analysis, and
collisions at only 175 of the crossings. Nevertheless, the finding
suggests that the use of stop signs at grade crossings may not have the
hoped for improvements to safety.

Raub hypothesized that the high crash rates for the stop sign relative
to other warning devices may reflect a pattern of noncompliance with the
stop sign when it is used at low-volume traffic intersections, as
reported by Mounce (1981). In that study, Mounce observed driver
violations and compliance at stop sign-controlled traffic intersections
as a function of traffic volume and found that there was a correlation
between the two. Compliance with the stop sign decreased as traffic
volume decreased from a rate of 5,000 -- 6,000 average daily traffic to
below 2,000 in average daily traffic. This noncompliance was attributed
to a lack of respect for the stop sign, resulting from its overuse for
controlling traffic, particularly at intersections where stop sign
control might not be needed (e.g., at low volume intersections).
Consequently, drivers see stop signs at intersections where they can
easily see that there is little cross traffic and that the potential for
conflict is low and begin treating these stop signs as yield control. In
fact, Lum and Stockton (1982) found that fewer drivers stopped or slowed
below 5 mph at intersections controlled by stop signs than at
intersections controlled by yield signs. Furthermore, an examination of
accident rates showed more accidents at stop sign-controlled than at
intersections with yield signs or no signs at all.

The results suggest that other passive warning devices may be more
effective than presenting stop signs at grade crossings and that
particular consideration should be given to the use of the yield sign.
In fact, the MUTCD allows the choice of using a stop or yield sign in
conjunction with the crossbuck at all highway approaches to passive
grade crossings (FHWA, 2003). Given the concern that indiscriminate use
of the stop sign at all or many passive grade crossings could lead to
noncompliance, on March 17, 2006, FHWA issued a memorandum clarifying
their position on the MUTCD provision by recommending yield signs be
considered the default traffic control choice at passive crossings,
unless an engineering study or judgment indicated that a stop sign would
be more appropriate. Thus, the use of a stop sign at passive crossings
is limited to unusual conditions.

Most drivers do not associate the action to yield with the crossbuck
sign (Lerner, et al., 2002), so incorporating the yield message into the
sign system may be beneficial. Although yield signs are not used
frequently at grade crossings, several studies have examined the
effectiveness of the standard yield sign or evaluated the effectiveness
of sign systems that incorporate the "yield" message with the crossbuck.
Bridwell, et al. (1993) evaluated the comprehension of the standard
crossbuck to six alternative sign systems (shown in Figure 3), four of
which presented an explicit message to "yield":

-   Standard crossbuck on a "barber striped" pole,

-   Standard crossbuck with a standard yield sign (R1-2) mounted below,

-   Standard crossbuck with Conrail yield sign mounted below. The
    Conrail sign is a three-paneled sign with "yield" written vertically
    on the front panel in red letters on a silver background and two
    side panels with alternating red and silver diagonal stripes bent
    backwards at 45-degree angles,

-   Modified Canadian crossbuck, a white X-shaped sign with a red
    border,

-   Modified Canadian crossbuck with the Conrail yield sign mounted
    below, and

-   "Yield to Trains": Standard yield sign with a regulatory plaque
    below reading "TO TRAINS"

  ------------------------------------------------------ ------------------------------------------------------ ------------------------------------------------------ ------------------------------------------------------ ------------------------------------------------------ ------------------------------------------------------ ------------------------------------------------------
  ![](media/image11.jpeg){width="0.7395833333333334in"   ![](media/image12.jpeg){width="0.7395833333333334in"   ![](media/image13.jpeg){width="0.7395833333333334in"   ![](media/image14.jpeg){width="0.7395833333333334in"   ![](media/image15.jpeg){width="0.7291666666666666in"   ![](media/image16.jpeg){width="0.7194444444444444in"   ![](media/image17.jpeg){width="0.5493055555555556in"
  height="1.8618055555555555in"}                         height="1.8409722222222222in"}                         height="1.8229166666666667in"}                         height="1.8854166666666667in"}                         height="1.86875in"}                                    height="1.8770833333333334in"}                         height="1.7194444444444446in"}

  Standard crossbuck                                     Standard barber                                        Standard yield                                         Standard Conrail                                       Canadian crossbuck                                     Canadian Conrail                                       Yield to trains
  ------------------------------------------------------ ------------------------------------------------------ ------------------------------------------------------ ------------------------------------------------------ ------------------------------------------------------ ------------------------------------------------------ ------------------------------------------------------

[]{#__RefHeading___Toc207427000 .anchor}Figure 3. Sign systems evaluated
by Bridwell, et al. (1993).

Note: the bottom 12" (30 cm) of the poles was not shown.

Participants were shown images of each of the seven signs and asked to
provide its meaning and required action. If the participant's initial
response was unrelated to grade crossings, the participant was provided
with context information and shown an advance crossing sign, and asked
whether seeing that sign before the test sign would change the response.
The results showed that the meaning of the standard crossbuck sign and
the test signs that included the standard crossbuck were identified with
perfect accuracy without requiring any additional context. The Canadian
crossbuck and the "Yield to Trains" sign required context but once
participants saw the advance warning sign they understood their meaning
with perfect accuracy. Comprehension of driver action was highest for
the standard crossbuck with the yield sign and "Yield to Trains" sign,
regardless of whether participants saw the advance crossing sign. Driver
action was least understood for the standard crossbuck and Canadian
crossbuck. Thus, the results showed that the standard crossbuck used in
conjunction with the yield sign was best understood for both meaning and
required action and highlighted the fact that the standard crossbuck,
when used alone, did not effectively convey the required action.

Russell and Kent (1993) addressed the effectiveness of the standard
yield sign on short-and long-term driving behavior as part of a larger
effort to evaluate the use of low-cost traffic control systems for
passive grade crossings. They evaluated five prototype systems:

> System 1: A crossbuck with a Conrail shield attached to crossbuck post
> below the crossbuck
>
> System 2: A delineator system presenting roadside reflectors between
> the advance warning sign and the crossbuck. A standard crossbuck was
> presented at the crossing, and high-intensity retroreflective tape was
> placed on the front and backsides of the crossbuck posts,
>
> System 3: A highway yield sign at the crossing with a "Yield Ahead"
> sign on the approach to the crossing,
>
> System 4: A combination of Conrail shield and delineators (i.e.,
> Systems 1 and 2), and
>
> System 5: A combination of Conrail shield, delineators, and yield sign
> with a "Yield Ahead" sign on approach (i.e., Systems 1, 2, and 3).

Each system was installed at one passive grade crossing in Kansas, with
the delineator system installed at two crossings. Comparisons of
drivers' deceleration rate, distance of brake application, and looking
behavior before and after the system installations served as measures of
driver behavior. Data collection in the "after" phase occurred in two
time periods: two months after the installation to determine the
short-term effects of the systems on driver behavior, and seven months
after the installation to determine if more long-term, permanent changes
occurred.

Of the five systems tested, only the delineator system (System 2) showed
any long-term improvements in driver behavior, particularly in terms of
deceleration rate and looking behavior. The use of the standard yield
sign (System 3) showed slight improvements in the short term, as
exhibited by increased deceleration rate and braking percentage, but
braking percentage actually decreased over the long-term. Of more
concern was the fact that looking behavior showed significant decreases
in both the short- and long-term, suggesting that the yield sign could
negatively affect driving behavior. The results for the Conrail shield
system (System 1) showed increased deceleration rates, increased braking
at night, and increased looking behavior in the short-term, but
observations of driver behavior 7 months after installation showed only
increased deceleration rates. Combining the devices (as in System 4 and
5) did not result in increased benefits. In fact, the combination of the
Conrail shield, delineators, and the standard yield sign showed no
significant long-term improvements and may simply have created more
visual clutter near the crossing. Whereas the results did not show
significant benefits for the use of the yield sign, the authors noted
that the data collected was limited in scope and size and consequently,
urged caution in concluding that systems that did not show positive
long-term results were not effective.

Several studies conducted by the Texas Transportation Institute
addressed the effectiveness of incorporating the "yield" message into
sign systems at passive grade crossings (Fambro, Beitler, and Hubbard,
1994; Fambro, et al., 1997; Fambro, Schull, Noyce, and Rahman, 1998;
Noyce and Fambro, 1998). In the first study, Fambro, Beitler, and
Hubbard (1994) measured and compared driver behavior and opinions of the
standard advance warning sign and crossbuck sign system to three
experimental sign systems:

1.  The railroad advance warning sign presented with a modified Canadian
    crossbuck,

2.  Two advance warning signs on the approach to the crossing (the
    standard advance warning sign and a diamond shaped yellow sign
    showing a black train symbol with a supplementary plaque reading
    "Look for Trains") and a modified Canadian crossbuck and the
    standard yield sign presented with a "to trains" advisory plate
    presented at the crossing, and

3.  Same as sign system 2, except the standard crossbuck was presented
    at the crossing rather than the Canadian crossbuck.

Participants drove through a test course that contained the current sign
system with the standard advance warning sign and crossbuck and the
three experimental systems. An in-vehicle observer collected objective
and subjective data. Objective measures consisted of participants'
approach speeds to the crossings and their looking behavior. Subjective
measures included participants' opinions on the signs and rankings of
their effectiveness.

The results showed no difference in approach speed to the crossing
between the current sign system and the experimental sign systems.
Although the data on looking behavior showed that drivers looked more at
the experimental sign systems than at the current sign system, it was
not clear if this was attributable to the experimental sign systems
themselves, to a novelty effect, or to sampling differences between the
test groups. Subjective rankings of the sign systems showed that
participants considered the experimental sign systems that provided
explicit instructions (e.g., "Look for Trains" or "Yield to Trains") to
be more effective than the standard sign system. However, similar to the
comprehension results reported above by Bridwell, et al. (1993), not all
participants understood the meaning of the Canadian crossbuck.

The "Look for Trains" and "Yield to Trains" signs were further evaluated
in a field study conducted at eight passive grade crossings in Texas
(Fambro, Beitler, and Hubbard, 1994; Fambro, Schull, Noyce, and Rahman,
1998). The "Look for Trains" sign was placed at the start of the
pavement marking for the crossing, and the standard yield sign with a
"to trains" message plate was installed next to the crossbuck. Observers
at the crossings measured drivers' approach speed and looking behavior.
Observers stationed beyond the crossing stopped drivers after they had
passed the crossing and asked questions to determine drivers'
understanding of and attitudes towards the sign system.

The results of the field study showed that the effectiveness of the sign
system varied by crossing. Observers noted reduced approach speeds and
increased looking behavior at some but not all of the crossing
locations. The presentation of the "Yield to Trains" sign decreased
approach speeds at two of six sites and increased looking behavior at
three of eight sites. The use of the "Look for Trains" sign decreased
approach speeds at one of the two sites at which speed data was
collected and increased looking behavior at one of four sites. Although
the overall effectiveness of the two supplementary signs on looking
behavior and approach speed was not clear, the authors stressed that the
implementation of the signs did not have negative effects. Neither sign
caused an increase in approach speed or a decrease in looking behavior.
Driver feedback was positive for the two signs; a significant proportion
of drivers noticed the new warning signs and felt that their use could
improve crossing safety.

Collectively, the results of studies addressing the use of the standard
yield sign or sign systems incorporating the "yield" message with the
crossbuck showed improved driver comprehension regarding the action
required over the crossbuck alone, but the results of field data were
mixed. The series of studies conducted by the Texas Transportation
Institute indicated driver preference for sign systems that incorporated
the "yield" message, but objective results of field evaluations were
inconclusive regarding its effect on looking behavior or approach speed
(Fambro, et al, 1994, 1997, 1998; Noyce and Fambro, 1998). Of particular
concern were the results reported by Russell and Kent (1993), which
found a *negative* effect on looking behavior when a standard yield sign
was used. It is also possible that the standard yield sign does not
receive the level of respect drivers have for the stop sign in the
highway driving situation, an attitude that could influence driver's
compliance with the yield sign at grade crossings. Thus, additional
studies are needed to evaluate the use of the yield sign and examine how
best to incorporate the message to improve driver behavior in the long
term.

##### Conspicuity {#conspicuity .Style-Heading-5-+-12-pt}

Particular attention has been given to enhancing the conspicuity of the
crossbuck. In the study conducted by Bridwell, et al (1993), described
above, the standard crossbuck had the lowest conspicuity level of the
sign systems evaluated. As part of the study, participants completed a
recognition distance and conspicuity task. In the recognition distance
task, participants saw slides of each of the sign systems (shown in
Figure 3) at incremental sizes and responded as soon as the sign could
be described. A computer-controlled zoom lens projected the sign
systems, presenting each sign system initially at a small size and then
gradually increasing its size to make it appear as if one were
approaching in a vehicle. In the conspicuity task, the number of times a
test system was identified accurately after only a brief presentation
(i.e., 2 seconds) was measured. Participants saw a test slide containing
nine signs presented in a 3x3 matrix. After the test slide, a slide
showing an empty 3x3 matrix with an arrow pointing to one of the three
rows appeared, and participants identified the signs shown in the
selected row. The signs in the task included six of the seven test sign
systems (the "Yield to Trains" sign was excluded) and 48 signs from the
MUTCD. Accuracy for a sign system was defined to be the number of times
it was correctly identified when presented within the matrix of nine
signs. The results showed no differences in recognition distance among
the seven signs but found that the standard crossbuck presented with the
standard yield sign, the standard crossbuck on the barber-striped pole,
and the Canadian crossbuck with the Conrail shield had the highest
conspicuity scores.

Reflectorization is a simple, low-cost method for improving conspicuity.
Many experimental sign systems discussed previously incorporated
reflectorization, although the benefits of reflectorization alone were
not the focus. The use of reflectorization in the sign systems evaluated
by Russell and Kent (1993), described above, contributed to a high
visual impact; the reflectorized crossbuck presented with delineators
resulted in the most improvements in driver looking behavior and
deceleration rate.

Zwahlen and Schnell (2000) compared the effectiveness of the standard
crossbuck to two reflectorized crossbuck systems: a standard improved
crossbuck and the Buckeye crossbuck. The crossbuck systems are shown in
Figure 4.

  ----------------------------------------------------- ----------------------------------------------------- ------------------------------------------------------
  ![](media/image18.jpeg){width="1.948611111111111in"   ![](media/image19.jpeg){width="1.948611111111111in"   ![](media/image20.jpeg){width="1.9479166666666667in"
  height="3.178472222222222in"}                         height="3.191666666666667in"}                         height="3.1881944444444446in"}

  \(a\) Standard Crossbuck                              \(b\) Buckeye Crossbuck                               \(c\) Standard Improved Crossbuck
  ----------------------------------------------------- ----------------------------------------------------- ------------------------------------------------------

[]{#__RefHeading___Toc207427001 .anchor}Figure 4. Crossbuck systems used
in Zwahlen and Schnell (2000).

Dimensions shown are in mm.

The standard improved crossbuck was similar to the standard crossbuck
except reflectorization was added on its blades and the wooden crossbuck
post. The Buckeye crossbuck consisted of a crossbuck presented in
conjunction with an improved version of the Conrail shield. The
crossbuck in the Buckeye crossbuck contained the words "Railroad
Crossing" written in red letters on a silver background, and the shield
incorporated the "yield" message and was illuminated with high
performance reflective material along all its sides and along the
crossbuck post.

A before and after study was conducted along four rail corridors in
Ohio. Video data provided information on driver compliance, as measured
by the number of near collisions and violations. In the "before" part of
the study, all the crossings were equipped with the standard crossbuck.
In the "after" part of the study, half the crossings were equipped with
the standard improved crossbuck and the other half with the Buckeye
crossbuck. Although the overall results showed no differences in driver
compliance, data examining time-to-collision, defined to be the time
between a non-compliant vehicle crossing the tracks and the train's
arrival at the crossing, showed that the standard improved and Buckeye
crossbucks had a 5 second greater time-to-collision rate (median time 20
seconds) than the standard crossbuck. Zwahlen and Schnell suggested that
the higher time-to-collision rates for the experimental systems could be
attributable to the greater conspicuity of the new crossbuck designs.
Not surprisingly, luminance measures of the standard improved crossbuck
and Buckeye crossbuck showed that both had higher luminances than the
current crossbuck because of the incorporation of the reflective
markings.

The three crossbuck systems were further evaluated using an accident
analysis and user acceptance questionnaire. In the accident analysis, a
comparison of crash data for the past 10 years showed a significant
benefit for the use of the Buckeye crossbuck in reducing the daytime and
nighttime accident rates relative to the standard crossbuck. The results
showed no difference between the use of the standard improved crossbuck
and the standard crossbuck. In the user acceptance questionnaire, Ohio
residents, school bus drivers, delivery drivers, and law enforcement
officials indicated their subjective preference for the three crossbuck
systems. The questionnaire presented respondents with color pictures of
the three crossbuck designs, taken during the daytime, and respondents
indicated which one of the designs was preferred. The questionnaire
results showed a preference for the Buckeye crossbuck over the standard
improved crossbuck. Participants particularly liked the addition of the
Conrail shield as they felt it increased the saliency of the sign.

Sign conspicuity is influenced by the location and pattern with which
reflective sheeting is applied. Brich (1995) found that the use of
reflective sheeting applied to the full length of both sides of the
crossbuck posts, plus double-sided crossbucks with high intensity
sheeting, would be most conspicuous at grade crossings. Brich evaluated
five reflectorized systems, which varied according to five
characteristics:

-   The crossbuck sign presented (the existing standard crossbuck or a
    double-sided, reflectorized crossbuck),

-   The type of reflective sheeting used,

-   The location of the sheeting on the crossbuck (i.e., whether the
    sheeting was applied to the crossbuck blades or not),

-   The length of the sheeting on the crossbuck post (on the back only
    or on the front and back), and

-   The location of the sheeting on the crossbuck post (at or near
    ground level to center of crossbuck mounting, one foot above the
    track, or three feet above ground level).

Participants saw photographs of each sign configuration, installed at a
passive crossing, and rated the visibility of each sign configuration.
The photographs showed the signs at night illuminated by a vehicle's low
and high beams. Participants also watched a videotape, which showed the
sign configuration as a train passed through the crossing. After viewing
the videotape, participants ranked the configurations from best to
worst.

Participants gave the highest visibility ratings to the sign
configuration with fully reflectorized posts and double-sided crossbucks
with reflective sheeting. Participants' comments indicated that the
fully reflectorized posts allowed them to see where the roadway met the
railroad tracks, whereas reflectorizing only part of the crossbuck post
resulted in the perception that the crossbucks were floating. Because
participants viewed the images passively (i.e., they did not need to
actively navigate the crossing), the results do not relate the impact of
this perception on the driving task. Additionally, participants reported
seeing a strobe-light effect, created by the reflection of vehicle
headlights off the backs of the reflectorized crossbucks when a train
was passing through the crossing. This strobe-light effect could help
drivers approaching the crossing determine the presence of a train.
Thus, to optimize the use of reflectorization, the MUTCD requires that
the crossbuck and crossbuck post be reflectorized and that reflective
sheeting be applied on the front and back along the full length of the
crossbuck posts (FHWA, 2003).

In addition to reflectorization, simply lowering the height of the
crossbuck sign may enhance the conspicuity of the crossbuck (Russell,
2002; Russell and Rys, 1997). The MUTCD recommends that the crossbuck be
installed so that the center of the sign is 9 feet (ft) (2.8 meters (m))
above the ground, with allowable deviations based on local conditions
(FHWA, 2003). However, the results of an examination of headlight
illumination from a typical vehicle distributed along a standard
crossbuck sign at its current height showed that the maximum
illumination was at the base of the crossbuck post. Lowering the
crossbuck by 2 ft (0.61 m) would significantly increase the sign
illuminance. In fact, the current height of the crossbuck may limit the
benefits of reflectorization. Zwahlen and Schnell (1999) noted that
luminance measurements indicated that reflectorizing the crossbuck
blades was not as effective at short distances because of the height of
the blades. The use of the Buckeye crossbuck, which presents a Buckeye
shield 3.2 ft (1 m) from the ground, provided for a much higher light
return than the blades.

#### **Distinguishing Active from Passive Crossings**

Every review of grade crossing traffic control devices has criticized
the use of presenting the same advance warning sign at both active and
passive crossings (Westat, 1999). One problem is that drivers do not
realize that the advance warning sign and crossbuck are used at both
active and passive crossings (e.g., Fambro, et al., 1997; Lerner, et
al., 1990, 2002). A number of countries use distinct advance warning
signs that inform the driver that a passive crossing is ahead, but there
is no common standard (Small, George, and Roop, 1998). No evidence is
available that one design is superior to another, and no study shows the
effectiveness of discriminating active versus passive crossings relative
to current U.S. practice.

Wigglesworth (2001) hypothesized that drivers' failure to distinguish
between active and passive crossings was attributable to the use of the
same signage for different procedures. In order to test this hypothesis,
he observed driver looking behavior at grade crossings in Australia. In
one study, observers collected data on the looking behavior of 92
drivers from unmarked cars at one active and one passive grade crossing,
spaced 1,640 ft (500 m) apart. If drivers distinguished between the two,
then they would make few head movements at the active crossing but look
both ways at the passive crossing. Instead, the results showed that 57
percent of drivers made identical head movements at both crossings; 37
percent made no head movements at either crossing, 4 percent looked one
way, and 15 percent looked both ways. In a second study, observers noted
the looking behavior of 264 drivers at active and passive crossings from
two marked police cars. Although it was expected that the possibility of
enforcement would encourage looking behavior at passive crossings, the
results showed that 44 percent of drivers made identical head movements
at both active and passive crossings. Eleven percent of drivers looked
in both directions, 10 percent looked in only one direction, and 44
percent did not look in either direction.

Lerner, et al. (2002) identified four information requirements needed by
the driver at a passive grade crossing:

(1) Information that a grade crossing is ahead,

(2) Information that the crossing is a passive crossing and therefore
    that the driver is responsible for determining if a train is
    approaching,

(3) Information regarding the actions required at the crossing,

(4) Information regarding whether the crossing has any special
    conditions, such as limited sight distance.

To convey these requirements, Lerner, et al. developed a comprehensive
set of 28 alternative sign concepts from candidate sign systems in
existing literature, published studies, signs in use, proposed signs,
and the results of the focus group on drivers' understandings of grade
crossings and traffic control devices (discussed above). The concepts
consisted of 12 advance warning signs at passive crossings (shown below
in Figure 5), 7 advance warning signs at active crossings (shown in
Figure 6), and 10 crossing signs for passive crossings (shown in Figure
7).

![](media/image21.png){width="5.147222222222222in"
height="3.5729166666666665in"}

[]{#__RefHeading___Toc207427002 .anchor}Figure 5. Advance warning signs
for passive crossings.

![](media/image22.png){width="5.147222222222222in"
height="2.4805555555555556in"}

[]{#__RefHeading___Toc207427003 .anchor}Figure 6. Advance warning signs
for active crossings.

![](media/image23.png){width="5.147222222222222in"
height="4.154166666666667in"}

[]{#__RefHeading___Toc207427004 .anchor}Figure 7. Signs for passive
crossings.

The alternative sign systems were presented in a test booklet, with each
of the prototype signs shown twice on a page by itself, once in a
highway context and once without context. Participants completed both a
comprehension task and preference-and-opinion task. In the comprehension
task, participants indicated the meaning of the sign and the action
required. In the preference-and-opinion task, participants, presented
with subsets of the prototype signs grouped by their intended purpose,
ranked the prototype signs in each subset in order of preference.

The comprehension results for the prototype signs for passive crossings,
shown in Figure 5 above, indicated that the current advance warning sign
(Figure 5, sign A) was not well understood, and in fact, could lead to
dangerous behavior because some participants assumed the sign indicated
a crossing with active protection. Not surprisingly, test sign
configurations that included a yield icon most frequently conveyed the
requirement to yield at a passive crossing (Figure 5, signs B, J, and
L). The results for the preference-and-opinion section showed that
participants preferred those signs that presented the standard advance
warning sign in conjunction with a word or regulatory-sign-ahead
supplementary panel (signs B, D, F, G, H, K, and L, Figure 5) and
considered these signs to be most informative and instructive.

Figure 6 above shows the prototype signs for active crossings.
Comprehension results for these signs indicated that all the test signs
conveyed the message that a grade crossing was ahead, that the crossing
had some indication when a train was approaching, and that the driver
should look for signals and/or gates and be prepared to stop if
activated. Similar to the comprehension results for the prototype
passive crossing signs, participants did not understand the meaning of
standard advance warning sign (Figure 6, sign A) as well as the test
signs and preferred the standard advance warning sign less than the
other test signs. Again, the results for the preference-and-opinion
section showed that participants preferred test signs that presented the
standard advance warning sign with supplementary information (Figure 6,
signs B, E, and G). The two supplementary panel signs with text (Figure
6, signs B and E) were preferred over the graphic only version (Figure
6, sign G).

The comprehension results for prototype signs indicating a passive
crossing (presented above in Figure 7) indicated the standard crossbuck
(Figure 7, sign A) was generally understood to convey the concept of a
grade crossing but was not well understood beyond that. When used alone,
participants felt that the crossbuck did not convey enough information
and did not indicate the required action. Participants preferred the use
of a crossbuck in conjunction with a stop or yield sign (Figure 7, signs
D, E, H, and I) and commented that these signs were instructive,
informative, easy to see, conspicuous, and attention getting.

The results of Lerner, et al. (2002) highlighted the fact that the
standard advance warning sign and crossbuck, when presented alone, did
not fully convey the intended message. The results did not identify any
one icon that clearly indicated the presence of a passive crossing;
participants' ratings showed low preference for the use of the crossbuck
alone or the use of regulatory signs alone at passive crossings.
However, the combination of these signs (i.e., the combination of the
standard advance warning sign and crossbuck with text or graphics) was
more instructive, improving comprehension of driver action, and
preferred by participants over the presentation of the signs alone.

#### **Providing other information**

Other advance warning signs have been proposed to notify the driver of
crossing characteristics, such as limited sight distance, crossing
angle, and location. One concept receiving considerable attention is a
sign that alerts drivers and pedestrians to the possibility of a second
approaching train at a grade crossing (PB Farradyne, Inc., 2002; Sabra,
Wang, and Associates, 2002). Drivers and pedestrians at grade crossings
with multiple tracks may think they are acting safely by cross the
tracks when they see one train stopped at a station or approaching from
a considerable distance and may not realize that there is a second train
in the vicinity approaching from the opposite direction. The Baltimore
Central Rail Line developed and evaluated the use of a prototype sign
system to inform drivers of an approaching second train. The prototype
system consisted of a dynamic display that started by flashing the text
message "Warning" for 2.5 seconds, followed by a steady text message
"2nd Train Coming" displayed for 2.5 seconds, and concluded with an
animation of two trains approaching from opposite directions, one on
each of two tracks, at a highway-rail intersection. Installation of the
prototype system occurred at one busy highway-rail grade crossing in
Maryland, and observations noted changes in "risky" driver and
pedestrian behavior from before the installation of the system to one
month after installation and then again two months after installation.
Measurements of "risky" behavior consisted of the number of pedestrians
and drivers that crossed in front of lowered gates, the number of
drivers that tried to proceed after the first train passed but then
stopped after realizing a second train was approaching, and the number
of cars that cleared the tracks after the first light rail vehicle
cleared the crossing while the gates were ascending and before the gates
descended again for the second light rail vehicle. Risky behavior
dropped by 80 percent two months after installation of the prototype
system. Of note was the fact that the number of vehicles that crossed
the tracks in between the first and second trains decreased by 26
percent. A driver survey, conducted to determine subjective opinion on
the effectiveness of the sign, indicated that most drivers felt the sign
increased awareness at the crossing (Sabra, Wang, and Associates, 2002).

The Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transit Authority developed and
evaluated a similar sign system concept but focused primarily on
improving pedestrian safety (PB Farradyne, Inc., 2002). Their prototype
second train warning sign consisted of two static images. The first
showed a pedestrian watching one light rail vehicle approach on a track
from the right; the second showed a pedestrian watching a second light
rail vehicle approach on a second track from the left. Observation of
pedestrian behavior before and after the installation of the prototype
sign system showed benefits for the use of the prototype sign. The
number of pedestrians crossing the tracks within six seconds of an
approaching train decreased by 32 percent after the sign was installed.
However, the meaning of the sign was not intuitive; only 4 percent of
pedestrians understood the sign's meaning that two trains were at the
crossing. Despite this, 92 percent of pedestrians noted that the sign
increased the likelihood that they would take additional precautions by
stopping or looking both ways at the crossing, although whether these
pedestrians actually continue to do so is not known.

#### **Summary**

Although drivers recognized the advance warning and crossbuck signs,
many did not know where they were located in relation to the crossing,
when the signs were used (e.g., many think that the crossbuck sign is
used only at passive crossings), and the action that was required
(Bridwell, et al., 1993; Dolan, 1996, Fambro, et al., 1994; Picha, et
al., 1997). Several alternative sign systems that convey the action
required have been proposed. The MUTCD allows the use of the stop or
yield sign at grade crossings where two or more trains operate daily,
and the NTSB has recommended the use of the stop sign at all passive
grade crossings because it presents a consistent message that is
well-understood by drivers (FHWA, 2003; NTSB, 1998). The use of the stop
sign is controversial, and observations of its use at grade crossings
showed a high rate of noncompliance (Burnham, 1994; Lerner, et al.,
2002). The results of an accident analysis provide additional evidence
that stop signs may not increase grade crossing safety; the crash rate
over 10 years in seven Midwestern states was higher at crossings
protected by stop signs than at crossings protected by crossbucks,
flashing lights, or gates (Raub, 2006). More interest exists in the use
of the yield sign at grade crossings or incorporating the yield message
into sign systems at grade crossings. The results of studies examining
the use of the yield sign have found that presenting a yield message in
conjunction with the crossbuck improved driver understanding of the
action required more than the crossbuck alone and was preferred by
drivers over the presentation of the crossbuck alone (Bridwell, et al.,
1993; Fambro, et al, 1994). However, field results addressing the
presentation of the yield message on looking behavior were mixed
(Fambro, et al, 1994, 1998; Russell and Kent, 1993).

Other studies have addressed methods to enhance the saliency of signs at
grade crossings, and in particular, the conspicuity of the crossbuck.
The current height of the crossbuck does not allow it to be illuminated
effectively by vehicle headlights (Russell, 2002; Russell and Rys, 1997;
Zwahlen and Schnell, 1999), so reflectorization of the crossbuck and
crossbuck posts provides a high visual impact. Studies showed benefits
for reflectorizing the signs at the crossing, which increased driver
looking behavior (Russell and Kent, 1993), increased deceleration rates
to the crossing (Russell and Kent, 1993), and increased the time between
vehicles crossing the tracks and the train's arrival at the crossing
(Zwahlen and Schnell, 2000).

Research on the design of signs for grade crossings has also addressed
the need to provide additional information at the crossing. Lerner, et
al. (2002) reported that a combination of the standard advance warning
sign and crossbuck with supplementary signs that discriminated between
active and passive crossings or provided warnings regarding specific
site characteristics was more instructive than current sign systems.
Additionally, several studies have examined the use of signs notifying
drivers and pedestrians to the possibility of a second train's approach
at a crossing (PB Farradyne, Inc., 2002; Sabra, et al., 2002).
Demonstrations of these signs showed a positive impact on driver and
pedestrian behavior in the short-term.

### Pavement markings

Very few studies have evaluated the comprehension and design of current
pavement markings since the publication of Lerner, et al. (1990). Only
one study was identified addressing the issue of pavement markings, but
its focus was on the use of supplemental markings that provided drivers
with cues about whether there was sufficient space for their vehicle
beyond the grade crossing. At crossings located near signalized highway
intersections, drivers approaching the crossing must decide whether
there is enough space to clear the tracks. In Europe, an "X" drawn in a
box is painted on the roadway past the track. If the entire X is not
visible before the driver begins to cross the track, then there is not
enough space for the vehicle to safely clear the track.

The Florida Department of Transportation sponsored a study to evaluate
the effectiveness of the Eurpoean X-marking by installing 25-ft (7.62 m)
X-box pavement markings at one rural and one urban test site (Stephens
and Long, 2003). Note that the length of the marking was large enough to
accommodate most passenger vehicles but not larger road vehicles. It was
expected that these larger vehicles would be primarily commercial, and
thus operated by professional drivers who would be more sensitive and
skilled at determining whether there was enough space for their vehicles
beyond the tracks. Observations consisted of video data, collected
before and after the installation of the pavement markings to determine
how often drivers stopped in a hazard zone, an area approximately 15 ft
(or 5 m) from either side of the closest and farthest rail.

The results of the study were inconclusive; the effectiveness of the
X-box marking varied depending on the site. At rural intersections with
few grade crossing signs and markings, the X-box marking improved
safety, reducing the number of stops in the hazard zone by 60 percent.
At busier intersections, where there were more crossing-related signs,
markings, and signals, the X-box marking resulted in little, if any,
changes to driver behavior. The authors attributed the benefits of the
X-box markings at rural crossings to its high salience at those
locations and considered the lack of an effect at busy intersections due
to the effectiveness of the many grade crossing signs, markings, and
signals at those urban intersections.

### Active Warning Devices

Upgrading a passive crossing with active warning devices improves safety
at the crossing, but the use of active warning devices is not foolproof.
Upgrading a passive crossing with flashing lights *or* gates reduced the
accident rate by only 44 percent, and upgrading a passive crossing by
adding both flashing lights *and* gates reduced accident rates by 64
percent (Mortimer, 1988). In fact, in the 10 years from 1994 through
2003, approximately half of all grade crossing accidents occurred at
crossings protected with active devices (Office of Inspector General,
2004). This is partially due to exposure; crossings protected by active
warning devices generally have more vehicle and train volume, and thus a
greater potential for conflicts.

The results of studies that have observed driver behavior at active
crossings to determine the violations that occur are discussed below.
Two general approaches to improve compliance at active crossings are
considered. One approach is to explicitly improve compliance by
providing barriers that prevent drivers from circumventing lowered
gates. The second approach is to implicitly encourage compliance by
improving the credibility of active warning systems (e.g., by reducing
the waiting time at the crossing or by improving the perceived
credibility of the warning system). Each of these approaches is
discussed in more detail.

#### **Violations at Active Grade Crossings**

The most salient active protection system is the presence of flashing
lights and gates. Upgrading a flashing light crossing with flashing
lights and gates reduced the accident rate by approximately 44 percent
(Mortimer, 1988). However, exposure at gated crossings is greater than
that at non-gated crossings, so the accident rate at gated crossings is
still high; in fact, in 2004, almost 33 percent of highway-rail
incidents occurred at crossings protected by gates (FRA, 2004). To
understand drivers' approach behavior to active crossings, Meeker, Fox,
and Weber (1997) observed drivers at a crossing protected by flashing
lights and half-barrier gates (approximately 13 ft (4 m) long) and
compared it to observations collected 5 years earlier at that same
crossing when it was protected with only flashing lights. The data
collected consisted of whether the driver slowed upon approaching the
crossing or stopped, the time between the onset of the warning signal
and the arrival of the vehicle at the crossing, the time it took for the
vehicle to clear the crossing, and the time of train arrival at the
crossing. As expected, the number of crossing violations in front of
oncoming trains decreased with the presence of gates. When the crossing
was protected with flashing lights and bells, 67 percent of drivers
crossed the tracks in front of an approaching train, but once the gates
were added, only 38 percent of drivers violated the crossing. However,
drivers who violated the gated crossing stopped or slowed significantly
less than those who violated the flashing lights. Of the drivers who
violated the gated crossing, 52 percent did not stop or slow down, 30
percent slowed down on their approach, and 17 percent stopped at the
tracks before proceeding. Of the drivers who violated the flashing light
crossing, 13 percent did not stop or slow down, 51 percent slowed on
their approach and 36 percent stopped before proceeding. The authors
hypothesized that the presence of gates forced drivers inclined to
violate gated crossings into a hurried and risky crossing decision as
they determine that the only way they can violate the crossing "safely"
is without slowing or stopping. Such behavior would account for the
substantial number of accidents at crossings protected by flashing
lights and gates.

Abraham, Datta, and Datta (1998) conducted a similar observational study
of driver behavior, classifying the types of violations that occur at
grade crossings and identifying factors contributing to these
violations. Drivers were observed at 37 Michigan grade crossings. All
the crossings had active protection with either flashing lights only or
flashing lights and gates. Observers recorded violations and noted the
license plate of the violating vehicle and characteristics of the
vehicle (make, model, and color) and driver (age and gender). The
observed violations were classified according to risk level. *Routine*
violations, the least risky, accounted for 27 percent of the violations.
At gated crossings, routine violations occurred after the train cleared
the crossing but before the gates were completely raised and the
flashing red signal had stopped; at flashing light crossings, routine
violations occurred when the driver violated the flashing red signal 4
seconds or longer after the train had passed. In committing these
violations, the authors hypothesized that the driver perceived a low
risk in not complying with the traffic control device because the train
had already passed. *Risky* violations, those occurring immediately
after the train crossed the intersection, accounted for 33 percent of
the violations. At gated crossings, the driver crossed when the gates
were still down and the lights were still flashing, and at flashing
light crossings, the driver crossed within 4 seconds of the train's
passage. Similar to routine violations, drivers perceived a low risk
because the train had passed, but they did not consider the possibility
of a second train approaching, a concern especially at multi-track
crossings. *More risky* violations accounted for 19 percent of the
observations. These violations occurred before the train's arrival at
the crossing with active flashing lights. At gated crossings, these
violations were those in which the driver crossed while the gates were
lowering, and at flashing light crossings, these violations were those
occurring 8 to 10 seconds before the arrival of the train. Not
surprisingly, drivers committing *more risky* violations generally sped
up to clear the crossing. *Severe* violations accounted for 19 percent
of the violations. Drivers committed these violations before the train
arrived, by maneuvering around lowered gates at gated crossings or
crossing the tracks with a clearance time between 4 to 8 seconds at
flashing light crossings. Drivers committing *severe* violations
generally made a risk assessment of the situation before speeding up to
cross the tracks. However, observations showed that once one driver
violated the crossings, drivers behind the lead vehicle tended to follow
without assessing the risk. Finally, 2 percent of the violations were
considered "near-miss" situations, or *critical* violations, in which
drivers crossed the tracks when the gates were down with a clearance
time less than 5 seconds or at flashing light crossing, when the driver
crossed the track with less than 4 seconds before the train's arrival.
These violations tended to occur when the train was moving slowly.

Abraham, et al. examined the data on observed violations with respect to
the crossings' crash history over the past 7 years to evaluate the
effect of various site characteristics. They classified the 37 grade
crossings into four groups based on the type of protection at the
crossing (flashing lights only or flashing lights and gates), the number
of tracks at the crossing (single or multiple), and the number of lanes
on the approach (single or multiple). It is important to note that the
classification of sites into these categories was not balanced. Of the
37 crossings, 24 were gated crossings with multiple tracks and multiple
lanes on the approach, 6 were gated crossings with multiple tracks and
single lanes on the approach, 8 were flashing-light crossings with
single tracks and multiple lanes on the approach, and 5 were
flashing-light crossings with single tracks and single lanes on the
approach.

A comparison of the data across the four groups showed significantly
more crashes at gated crossings with multiple tracks and multiple lanes
on the approach than at flashing light crossings with single tracks and
single lanes on the approach. The rate of violations at these gated
crossings and flashing light crossings was not significantly different.
Collectively, the results highlight the higher risk at gated crossings
due to a higher exposure level and suggest that drivers may simply have
had a better chance of clearing the intersection before the train's
arrival in the absence of gates. Although the finding that more crashes
occurred at gated crossings than flashing light crossings seems contrary
to expectations, the result may be attributable to the nature of the
roadways on the approach to the crossing rather than the protection
system. The multi-lane approaches provided drivers the space to maneuver
around the gates, and in fact the data also showed a significantly
higher rate of crashes and violations at gated crossings with multiple
lanes on the approach than gated crossings with single lanes on the
approach. Flashing light crossings with single tracks and two-lane roads
on the approach tended to have low-risk violations, and these violations
were attributable to long warning times or driver misunderstanding of
the flashing red light signal.

The results of Abraham, et al. (1998) highlight two approaches for
improving compliance at active crossings. The first is to improve the
traffic control device at gated crossings to provide a physical barrier
to separate the traffic from the tracks to reduce violations at gated
crossings. The second is to improve the credibility of the warning
signal. Each of these issues will be considered in turn.

#### **Improvements to Gated Crossings**

Crossings with a large number of gate arm violations typically have one
or more of the following features: they are located on a four-lane
undivided roadway; they have two or more tracks separated by a distance
greater than or equal to the storage requirement for one or more
vehicles; there are large variations in train speed and warning time at
the crossing; they are crossings at which a vehicle-train collision
would pose a large safety problem (e.g., crossings traversed by a large
number of school buses); and they have high accident rates (Heathington,
et al., 1990). To reduce gate violations, improvements in gate
technology have focused on systems that prevent drivers from going
around the lowered gate arms. These systems include four-quadrant gates
that have two extra gate arms to block both approach and departure lanes
to the crossing, extended gate arms that cover more of the roadway to
discourage drivers from maneuvering around lowered gates, median
barriers installed along the roadway centerline to prevent drivers from
crossing lanes, and vehicle arresting barriers in which a net barrier is
lowered to block entrance to the crossing.

Several field studies have evaluated the effectiveness of these systems
in reducing gate violations. Heathington, Fambro, and Richards (1989)
reported that four-quadrant gates increased the safety margin at a grade
crossing relative to two-quadrant gates. They collected observational
data at one grade crossing for two months with a two-quadrant gate
system and again for one to two months after the installation of a
four-quadrant gate system. The results showed that the number of gate
violations decreased from 84 out of every 100 train arrivals with the
two-quadrant gate system to zero after the installation of the
four-quadrant gate system, the number of vehicles crossing the tracks
less than 20 seconds before the arrival of a train decreased from 60 per
100 train arrivals to zero, and the number of vehicles crossing less
than 10 seconds before the arrival of a train decreased from 5 per 100
arrivals to zero.

Hellman, et al. (2001) reported similar decreases in crossing violations
when they observed driver behavior at a grade crossing in Connecticut
before and after a four-quadrant gate was installed to replace a
two-quadrant gate. Data, collected for 13 months before the installation
of four-quadrant gates and for 22 months after the installation,
recorded the number of violations occurring after the warning lights had
started flashing but before the gate arms had completely descended
(described as Type 1 violations) and the number of violations occurring
after the gate arms had fully descended (described as Type 2
violations). The violation rates were calculated per 100 train
movements. The results showed that the installation of the four-quadrant
gate system reduced both types of violations. The number of Type 1
violations decreased by four times from a rate of 85.2 per 100 train
movements with the two-quadrant gate system to a rate of 21.4 per 100
train movements with the four-quadrant gates. The number of Type 2
violations decreased from three per 100 train movements with the
two-quadrant gates to zero with the four-quadrant gates. As part of the
study, Hellman, et al. also surveyed locomotive engineers to obtain
their opinion on the use of the four-quadrant gate system. In responding
to the survey, the engineers reported that the new gates reduced their
anxiety level at the crossing without impacting their ability to control
the train.

One concern in the implementation of four-quadrant gates is the timing
with which the gates are lowered to ensure that vehicles do not become
trapped between the gate arms. The operation of the four gate arms
varies. The system may lower all four arms simultaneously, or it may
delay lowering the gate arms on the exit side of the crossing to allow
vehicles in the track zone to clear the area. The calculations to
determine the gate delay and descent time for four-quadrant gates
generally assumes that drivers are approaching the grade crossing at a
constant speed. This, however, is not always the case. Moon and Coleman
(1999) measured driving speed for passenger vehicles, trucks, and school
buses at grade crossings and noted that vehicles tend to reduce their
speed on the approach. Single vehicles approaching the crossing reduced
their speed by approximately 5 mph. Groups of vehicles approaching the
crossing reduced their speed even further, with the lead vehicle
approaching at a higher speed than following vehicles. Thus, the timing
of four-quadrant gates must be able to accommodate for this slowing
behavior.

In contrast to four-quadrant gates that prevent vehicles from entering
the track zone, median barriers prevent drivers from crossing into the
opposite lane of traffic to maneuver around lowered gate arms. The
Washington State Utilities and Transportation Commission and the BNSF
(Burlington Northern Santa Fe) Railroad evaluated the effectiveness of
median barriers in reducing gate violations at a grade crossing in
Spokane, Washington. Video cameras installed at the crossing recorded
the number of gate activations and incidents four months before and
after the installation of median barriers. The incident rate was
calculated as a function of the number of gate activations with a train
present.

The median barriers reduced the number of incidents at the crossing from
approximately 9 per 100 gate activations to 0.65 per 100 gate
activations, a difference of approximately 14 to 1. The data was further
analyzed to take into account the severity of the incident. For example,
violations in which a vehicle crossed the occupied track were considered
more dangerous than violations in which a vehicle crossed the unoccupied
track but then stopped or reversed direction to avoid crossing the
occupied track. When the analysis accounted for incident severity, the
results showed the median barriers reduced the number of violations by a
ratio of approximately 17 to 1, from 5 per 100 gate activations to 0.3
per 100 gate activations. Additionally, the number of "risky" crossings,
that is the number of vehicles crossing the occupied track within
seconds of a train's arrival, was reduced; the number of vehicles
crossing the occupied track within 10 seconds of an approaching train
decreased from 41 to zero, and the number of vehicles crossing the
occupied track within 5 seconds of an approaching train decreased from
five to zero. In fact, the minimum time with which a vehicle crossed in
front of an approaching train when the median barriers were present was
15 seconds (Applied System Technologies, 2000).

The use of these improved barrier systems has received a lot of
attention for deployment at grade crossings along high-speed rail
corridors, where trains may travel at top speeds of 90 mph or greater.
Median barriers and vehicle arresting barriers may offer a level of
protection similar to that achieved with grade separation, and while
four-quadrant gates do not offer this same level of protection, they
have reduced violations at two-quadrant gate crossings with a history of
driver noncompliance (Coleman, Eck, and Russell, 2000). Several of these
barrier systems have been evaluated for use at different crossings along
North Carolina's Southeast High Speed Rail Corridor. In 1992, the
Washington, DC--Raleigh--Charlotte rail corridor was designated as one
of five future high-speed rail corridors, and the state of North
Carolina received special funding to improve grade crossing safety as
part of this Sealed Corridor project. The State took a systems approach
to evaluate new technologies to enhance current warning devices at grade
crossings. The first improvements occurred at the Sugar Creek Road grade
crossing in Charlotte. This grade crossing had the highest average
annual daily traffic rate along the corridor with over 21,000 vehicles
per day. The State installed median barriers and four-quadrant gates at
this crossing. The median barriers consisted of prefabricated, mountable
islands with flexible panel delineators or tubes that were highly
reflectorized for visibility at night and were anchored so that they
would return to their original position if hit by a vehicle. A
four-phase observational study was conducted, in which video cameras
recorded driver behavior at the crossing before and after improvements
to the crossing had been made. In the first phase, only flashing lights,
bells, and single arm gates protected the crossing. Median barriers were
installed at the crossing in the second phase, and in the third phase,
four-quadrant gates were installed without median barriers. The fourth
phase included both four-quadrant gates and median barriers at the
crossing.

Observations showed that there were approximately 43 close calls (i.e.,
near misses) per week when the crossing was protected with two-quadrant
gates. The addition of median barriers reduced the number of close calls
to approximately 10 per week, a 77 percent reduction in violations.
Four-quadrant gates reduced the violation rate by 86 percent to six per
week, and when the median barriers were used in conjunction with
four-quadrant gates, the number of violations decreased by 98 percent to
a rate of only one violation per week (Carroll and Haines, 2002; FRA,
2002; Hughes, Stewart, and Rogman, 1999; Vantuono, 1997).

The State installed longer gate arms that covered three-fourths of the
roadway at a second crossing along North Carolina's Southeast High Speed
Rail Corridor, on Orr Road in Charlotte, with an average annual daily
traffic of 11,000 vehicles per day. Observations of the number of
crossing violations showed a 67 percent reduction in violations
immediately after its installation, and an overall 84 percent reduction
in violations one year later (FRA, 2002; Worley, 1999).

The use of these gate technologies, in conjunction with other safety
improvements along North Carolina's Southeast High-Speed Rail Corridor,
has reduced the accident risk at these crossings. The difference in
annual fatality rates at the crossings before and after improvements to
the crossing were implemented was compared by examining crash history
for the crossings between 1987 and 2000. The results of the analysis
showed that approximately five lives were saved with the improvements,
and that this accident reduction rate could be sustained even as traffic
volume and train speed along the corridor increased by implementing
similar improvements at additional crossings along the corridor (Carroll
and Haines, 2002; FRA, 2002).

Vehicle arresting barriers were evaluated at grade crossings along the
Chicago--St. Louis high-speed corridor. These systems consisted of
flashing light signals and gate arms and included a fence-style net,
similar to those used to stop planes on aircraft carriers. The net was
lowered across the approach to a grade crossing when the warning signal
was activated. Vehicle arresting barriers were installed at three grade
crossings in Chicago, and driver behavior was observed at one of the
three grade crossings to determine its effect on stopping and crossing
behavior. The majority of drivers (83 percent) complied with the vehicle
arresting barrier warning lights and stopped. In interpreting this
result, it is important to note that the vehicle arresting barrier
warning lights were different from the flashing light signals at the
crossing, and thus some drivers who failed to stop might not have
understood the action required when the vehicle‑arresting barrier lights
were activated. Nevertheless, the fact that the majority of the vehicles
stopped and remained stopped was promising. Of the drivers who violated
the warning lights, most did so without stopping, similar to the
behavior observed at gated crossings by Meeker, et al. (1997). Only 1.5
percent of drivers who violated the crossing stopped before proceeding
across the tracks (Coleman and Venktaraman, 2001).

Although the vehicle arresting barriers improved compliance, the cost of
maintenance was high. The vehicle arresting barriers operated
successfully 90 percent of the time during its demonstration period, but
maintenance was performed frequently. Some of the maintenance calls were
for routine work; others were for repairs due to intrusions or
entanglements at the crossing. Video data showed four incidents in which
a vehicle attempted to cross under the lowered net, and two instances in
which the net dropped on top of a vehicle. Each of these incidents cost
between \$6,000 and \$8,000 for repair. A cost-benefit analysis of the
use of vehicle arresting barriers at all three crossings indicated that
while the barriers were predicted to reduce the number of grade crossing
accidents, the systems were not cost effective due to the maintenance
required (Sööt, Metaxatos, and Sen, 2004).

#### **Improving Warning Device Credibility**

Instead of installing barriers at the crossing to prevent violations, an
alternative approach is to encourage drivers to comply by improving the
perceived credibility of the warning device. The results of field
studies discussed in Section 3.1.3.1 indicated that some drivers would
violate an active signal regardless of the level of protection at the
crossing (Abraham, et al., 1998; Meeker, et al., 1997), possibly due to
the drivers' perceived lack of credibility for the warning signal. In a
focus group examining attitudes towards warning devices, many drivers
indicated that they did not rely on the information provided by active
warning devices because they felt that warning devices operated
improperly. The reasons cited for the perceived failure were that the
warning devices were activated too early, remained active for too long
past the crossing event, or malfunctioned frequently (Global Exchange,
1994). The effect of warning time and signal reliability on driver
compliance will be discussed in more detail. Countermeasures to improve
drivers' perceived credibility of warning devices are also addressed.

##### Reducing Warning Time {#reducing-warning-time .Style-Heading-5-+-12-pt}

The MUTCD requires that active warning devices provide a minimum warning
time of 20 seconds before the arrival of a train at grade crossings
where trains operate at speeds of 20 mph or higher. As train speed
varies, however, the warning time at crossings becomes unpredictable.
Wilde, Hay, and Brites (1987) measured the warning time of signals and
total signal duration at five grade crossings in Ontario, three
protected by flashing lights and bells and two protected by gates. They
found that the length of the warning time and signal duration varied
considerably, both at a grade crossing and across all the grade
crossings observed. Warning time ranged from 13 seconds to 73 seconds;
at one crossing, the average mean warning time was 58 seconds. The
signal duration varied from 28 seconds to over 9 minutes, with an
average time loss to drivers between one to three minutes. This
variability in warning time and signal duration had an observable effect
on driver behavior. As part of the study, Wilde, et al. (1987)
videorecorded vehicles at seven grade crossings when they were within
328 ft (100 m) of the approach to the crossing (note that two of the
crossings were passive crossings and protected by crossbucks only).
Incidents occurred in approximately half of the train approaches.
Although some drivers violated the crossing unintentionally (i.e., the
signals at the crossing started to flash at a point where the driver
could not safely stop the vehicle), observations also showed drivers
deliberately disregarded signals and violated the crossing. Although the
observations only detail the violation and not the drivers' motivations
for violating the grade crossing, the authors noted that the rate of
violations was highest at the crossing with the highest warning time
relative to the other crossings.

As the warning time increases, the number of violations also increases.
A logistic regression model created by Carlson and Fitzpatrick (1999)
indicated that waiting time was a significant variable in high violation
rates at grade crossings. Similarly, in the study by Coleman and
Venktaraman (2001), discussed in Section 3.1.3.2, the number of
violations to the vehicle-arresting barrier lights increased as the
warning time at the crossing increased. The mean warning time at the
crossing was 55 seconds, with an overall range from 26 seconds to 93
seconds. No violations occurred when the waiting times were less than 20
seconds because the barrier nets and gates began to lower within this
time interval. However, the number of violations increased by
approximately 10--15 percent for every 10 second delay beyond 20
seconds.

Richards and Heathington (1990) found that most drivers expect a train
to arrive within 20 seconds of the onset of the active control device,
and that the number of drivers who stop and wait at a crossing declines
when the waiting time extend.s beyond that. They conducted field
observations and a laboratory study to determine driver tolerance to
waiting times at grade crossings. In the field study, they observed
drivers at two flashing light crossings and one gated crossing to
determine their willingness to wait based on their arrival time to the
crossing relative to the train's arrival time. Observational data
indicated that at flashing light crossings, over 95 percent of drivers
stopped and waited when arriving at the crossing within 10 seconds of
the train, over 50 percent stopped when arriving within 10 to 20 seconds
of the train, but only 30 percent stopped and waited when arriving with
more than 20 seconds before the train. At the gated crossing, over 80
percent of drivers arriving at the crossing within 20 seconds of the
train stopped and remained stopped, but the number of drivers who did so
decreased sharply as the waiting time increased beyond 20 seconds. The
data also showed that the majority of drivers arriving at an active
crossing at the onset of the signals were unlikely to wait. At flashing
light crossings, the majority of drivers who arrived at the crossing
within 5 seconds of the onset of the signals ignored the warning device,
even though they had sufficient time to stop. At the gated crossing,
drivers approaching the crossing at the onset of the signal did not stop
or react to the onset of the signal; in fact, 60 percent of drivers
crossed without stopping in the first 9 seconds of the warning period
suggesting that drivers' first response to the onset of the flashing
light warning was to try to beat the gates.

To determine drivers' expectations and tolerance regarding warning
times, Richards and Heathington conducted a laboratory study in which
they showed drivers videotapes of traffic control device activation
events and asked them to indicate two points in time: (1) the time they
would expect the train to arrive at the crossing and (2) the point at
which they considered the waiting time too long. Half of the drivers
watched a video of a flashing light crossing; the other half watched a
video of a crossing with flashing lights and gates. The results showed
that at flashing light crossings, drivers expected a train to arrive
within 14.5 seconds of the signal activation, with a mean waiting time
of 39.7 seconds. At crossings with gates and flashing light signals,
drivers expected a train to arrive within 30.6 seconds of the signal
activation (13.2 seconds excluding the gate delay and descent time),
with a mean waiting time of 66.2 seconds (48.8 seconds excluding the
gate delay and descent time). At first glance, the data suggests that
the mean acceptable waiting time at gated crossings was significantly
higher than that for flashing light crossings, but there was actually
little difference between the two once the gate delay and descent time
was excluded. That is, drivers did not appear to consider the gate delay
and descent time in calibrating their expected waiting time at a
crossing. However, the mean waiting time for the two types of crossings
did differ, even after the gate delay and descent time was subtracted,
suggesting that drivers accepted a longer waiting time at gated
crossings, possibly due to the more restrictive appearance of the gates.

Constant warning time systems that present a uniform waiting time are
expected to improve compliance. Several studies have compared the use of
constant warning time systems to fixed-distance systems, with mixed
results. Halkias and Blanchard (1989) conducted an accident analysis in
which they compared the accident rate at crossings protected by constant
warning time systems to that at crossings protected by fixed-distance
systems between 1975 through 1984. Although the analysis showed no
overall benefit for constant-warning time systems, an examination of the
warning times at fixed-distance crossings suggested that inconsistent
warning times led drivers to distrust the warning signals, and extended
warning times resulted in crossing violations. The authors hypothesized
that because drivers were unaware of whether the crossing was equipped
with a constant-warning time system or fixed-distance warning system,
the inconsistency of warning times at crossings equipped with
fixed-distance warning systems may have reduced credibility for warning
signals in general. Consequently, benefits for constant warning time
systems were not observed.

Bowman (1989) reported similar results for an accident analysis of
vehicle-train incidents using data from 1980 through 1984 from crossings
equipped with constant warning time systems and fixed-distance systems.
While fewer accidents occurred at crossings with constant warning time
systems than at crossings with fixed-distance systems, this difference
was not significant. Bowman attributed the lack of a significant
difference to one of two reasons. The first was the low credibility for
warning signals in general resulting from long warning times at crossing
equipped with fixed-distance systems, as noted by Halkias and Blanchard.
The second was the small sample size of accidents at grade crossings
with constant warning time systems. To obtain more data, Bowman
conducted a field study in which he observed driver behavior at 12 grade
crossings, half that were equipped with constant warning time systems
and half with fixed-distance systems. Half of these sites were equipped
with flashing lights only, and the other with flashing lights and gates.
The field analysis showed significant reductions in violations at
crossings protected with constant warning time systems. Most of the
violations occurred when the warning time was greater than 50 seconds,
even at gated crossings. At flashing light crossings, violations
increased when the warning time exceeded 35 seconds.

More recently, Richards, Heathington, and Fambro (1990) conducted a
before and after study comparing driver behavior at an active grade
crossing equipped with a fixed-distance warning system to subsequent
behavior with a constant warning time system. They collected data for a
2-month period before and after the installation of the constant warning
time system. Data for the "after" phase was collected two months after
the installation of predictors so that drivers could become familiar
with the change in warning time at the crossing. An analysis of warning
times showed that the constant warning time system reduced the mean
warning time at the crossing (from 75.2 seconds to 41.7 seconds) and
reduced the number of excessively long warning times. Driver compliance
with the crossing improved, with a reduced number of cars crossing
against activated flashing light signals, a reduced number of cars
crossing within 10 seconds of the train's arrival, and a decreased
average speed for the first vehicle approaching the crossing.

##### Improving Warning Reliability {#improving-warning-reliability .Style-Heading-5-+-12-pt}

The perceived credibility of the warning system is determined not only
by the waiting time but also by the number of false alarms or missed
signals. False alarms occur when a warning signal is activated at a
grade crossing when no train is approaching. On the other hand, missed
signals occur when a warning signal is not activated when a train is
approaching. Even though both false alarms and missed signals contribute
to the drivers' perception of the warning signals' reliability,
generally false alarms at grade crossings result in a lack of compliance
whereas missed signals lead to more cautious behavior.

Wilde, et al. (1987) recorded the signal reliability of active warning
devices as part of his observational study of incidents at grade
crossings, as previously described. The data indicated that false alarms
at the grade crossings observed were relatively infrequent. False alarms
occurred at only one of the grade crossings, but at this crossing, false
alarms accounted for 50 percent of the warning signal activations.
Observations of driver behavior noted a high rate of violations at this
crossing with respect to other crossings, although, as noted above, the
drivers' specific motivations for violating the crossing were not known.

Gil and Multer (in preparation) conducted two studies to evaluate the
effect of warning signal reliability on driver compliance at active
grade crossings. In the first study, they applied signal detection
theory to measure participants' sensitivity to the reliability of a
warning signal and their response bias when confronted with an ambiguous
grade crossing situation. Participants indicated whether they would stop
or proceed when shown trials that contained an image of a gated crossing
with the gate arm in the lowered position; in other words, when the
warning device signaled an approaching train. The signal reliability was
varied at eight levels from 23 percent to 97 percent, but participants
were not informed of the reliability level beforehand. Instead,
participants were primed to reliability of the warning signal by
providing feedback after each trial that indicated the accuracy of their
last response. Participants' responses were classified into four
categories: a *valid stop*, in which drivers were compliant to a
reliable and accurate signal; a *false stop*, in which drivers were
compliant to an unreliable signal that provided an alert a train's
arrival when in fact no train was approaching; a *high-risk violation*
in which drivers disregarded a reliable and accurate signal; or a
*no-risk violation*, in which drivers disregarded an unreliable and
inaccurate signal. The results indicated that participants required a
high degree of system reliability before they became sensitive to the
differences between a reliable warning versus a false alarm. As
reliability increased, participants' were more conservative in their
responses and were more likely to comply with the warning signal. This
bias resulted not only in more valid stops but also in more false stops.
Although this more cautious behavior seems desirable, false stops could
actually have a negative impact on driver behavior and contribute to
under trust of activated warning signals. In fact, the results of the
study also showed that when participants perceived the warning signal to
be unreliable, they were more likely to proceed and commit a gate
violation.

In the second study, Gil and Multer examined participants' response at
grade crossings as a function of warning signal reliability in a more
realistic driving situation. The reliability of the warning signal was
varied at three levels: 40 percent, 60 percent, and 83 percent.
Participants were first primed to the reliability of the warning signal
using the procedure from the first study, described above, with three
modifications. First, trials contained not only images of active gates
(with lowered arms) but also images of inactive gates (with raised
arms). Second, half the trials included a train horn that indicated an
approaching train. Third, participants no longer received feedback
regarding the accuracy of their response as the other two modifications
reduced the difficulty of the task. After completing the priming task,
participants drove a simulated vehicle on a course with active grade
crossings.

The results of the priming task showed that similar to the previous
study, as warning reliability increased, driver compliance also
increased. However, unlike the previous results, drivers erred on the
side of caution when presented with unreliable information. In the
driving task, the likelihood that participants complied to the warning
signal increased as signal reliability increased from 40 percent to 60
percent, with no additional improvement when reliability increased from
60 percent to 83 percent. Most of the vehicle-train collisions occurred
when the signal reliability was 40 percent, the lowest level. An
analysis of driving time showed that participants completed the course
fastest in this low reliability condition, mostly attributable to the
fact that two-thirds of the participants did not comply with any of the
warning signals along the course. Additionally, the time to impact,
defined as the time between the vehicle crossing the tracks and the
train's arrival time, was lowest (4.18 seconds) when signal reliability
was only 40 percent.

The results of Wilde, et al. and Gil and Multer highlight the impact of
signal reliability on the perceived credibility of the warning system,
and in particular, the negative effect of false alarms. Research in
other domains has also found that systems with frequent false alarms are
ignored or result in slower response times to the event (Getty, et al.,
1995; Parasuraman, Hancock, and Olofinboba, 1997; Sorkin, 1988).
Warnings that present operators with an alert when a predefined
threshold is exceeded may be mistrusted or ignored if the thresholds are
too sensitive (Billings, 1997). In the aviation domain, Parasuraman and
Riley (1997) reported that alerting systems in aircraft, such as the
ground proximity warning system, which indicate to the pilot when the
aircraft is too close to the ground, were sometimes disabled because of
their propensity for false alarms.

Thus, countermeasures to reduce the false alarm rate to improve the
perceived credibility of active warning devices should be considered;
for example, by identifying signal malfunctions and repairing them
without delay. Alternatively, research has examined the effectiveness of
warning devices that are considered to be more credible than the current
active warning devices to encourage compliance. Section 3.1.1.1
discussed the use of stop signs and yield signs at passive crossings.
For active crossings, there is interest in incorporating the standard
highway traffic signal.

##### Use of Traffic Signals {#use-of-traffic-signals .Style-Heading-5-+-12-pt}

Drivers believe highway traffic signals to be credible. As a result, the
expectation is that drivers will be more likely to comply with a highway
traffic signal at a grade crossing than with a flashing light signal,
particularly at crossings near signalized intersections and crossings
with complex geometries and driving maneuvers where drivers may have a
difficult time determining whether it is safe to proceed across the
tracks (Heathington, et al., 1990). Traffic signals were originally
proposed as an alternative to flashing light signals to provide more
information to drivers. In particular, drivers who are in close
proximity to a grade crossing when the flashing lights are activated
must decide whether to stop, knowing that they cannot do so safely, or
to continue and violate the crossing. The yellow light would provide
drivers with a pre-warning signal, indicating when there is an impending
change in the right-of-way (Heathington, 1996; Van der Horst, 1988).

In observations of drivers at grade crossings in the Netherlands to
determine behavioral factors contributing to grade crossing accidents,
Tenkink and Van der Horst reported that some drivers, who approached the
crossing at the onset of the red signal, stopped at the grade crossing
by decelerating rapidly at a rate greater than 9 miles per hour second
(4 m/s^2^), and a few drivers stopped close to the first railway track.
These stops could result in rear-end collisions by a following car or
lead to drivers stopping on the tracks, and could be prevented by the
presentation of a yellow light. Additionally, their observations noted
that 15 percent of the drivers crossed the tracks as soon as the train
cleared the intersection while the flashing red light signals were still
activated. Presentation of the yellow light could reduce ambiguity at
the end of the red phase, indicating to the driver when it is safe to
proceed.

Fambro, Heathington, and Richards (1989) evaluated the effectiveness of
an enhanced traffic signal to the standard flashing lights in reducing
grade crossing violations. They observed driver behavior at a
flashing-light crossing two months before and after the installation of
a traffic signal with white bar strobe lights in each of the red signal
lens. Observations showed that the traffic signal reduced the number of
crossing violations by 80 percent from that with the standard flashing
light signal; there were 3.35 violations per signal activation for the
flashing light signal and 0.73 violations per signal activation for the
traffic signal. Additionally, the number of drivers who violated the
signal within 20 seconds of an approaching train decreased from 0.78 for
the flashing light crossings to 0.24 with the traffic signals. While the
number of "risky" crossings, characterized as crossing within 10 seconds
of an approaching train, was also lower with the traffic signals (0.05)
than with the standard flashing lights (0.13), there were not enough
observations for a rigorous statistical analysis. There was no
difference in driver's approach speed, braking behavior, or deceleration
levels.

Because traffic signals are less expensive to install than traditional
active warning devices, enhanced traffic signals may be applicable in
the grade crossing domain and used at crossings where flashing light
signals are needed. Drivers perceive highway traffic signals to have a
high level of credibility because they are typically well-operated and
maintained when used at highway intersections. These same standards of
operation and maintenance will be needed if traffic signals are used at
grade crossings so that driver credibility for the traffic signal is not
compromised. In particular, traffic signals should not be used at
crossings where false activation or malfunction of signals is frequent
or at crossings where the warning or occupancy times are higher than 1
minute (Heathington, et al., 1990).

#### **Summary**

Active warning devices increase the level of safety at a grade crossing
relative to passive crossings, but because exposure at active crossings
is higher than at passive crossings, the accident rate is still high.
Observations of driver behavior at active grade crossings indicated that
some drivers were quite willing to violate active warning signals, and
that the presence of lowered gates could be viewed by some drivers as an
impediment to beating the train at the crossing resulting in rushed and
unsafe crossing decisions (Abraham, et al., 1998; Meeker, et al., 1997).
Compliance at active crossings may be improved explicitly by
implementing barrier-type gate systems to prevent drivers from
maneuvering around lowered gates or may be encouraged implicitly by
improving the driver's perceived credibility of the active warning
device. With respect to the former, the results of observations from
field studies noted the effectiveness of four-quadrant gates
(Heathington, et al., 1990; Hellman, et al., 2001), longer gate arms
(FRA, 2002; Worley, 1999), and median barriers (Applied Systems
Technologies, 2000; Carroll and Haines, 2002; FRA, 2002, Vanutono, 1997)
in improving compliance relative to two-quadrant gates. The use of these
improved gate systems reduced the violation rate at the crossing and
increased the "time to impact" (i.e., the time between a vehicle
crossing the tracks and the arrival of the train). Although the use of
vehicle arresting barriers was effective at reducing violations (Coleman
and Venktaraman, 2001), the costs of maintaining the system was greater
than its anticipated safety benefits (Sööt, et al., 2004).

With respect to the latter, the perceived credibility of warning signals
is reduced by long warning times and frequent false alarms (Global
Exchange, 1994). Examination of driver tolerance to warning times
indicated that most drivers expected trains to arrive within 20 seconds
of the activation of the warning signal (Richards and Heathington,
1990), and the likelihood that drivers would not comply increased as the
warning time extended beyond that point (Bowman, 1989; Coleman and
Venktaraman, 2001; Richards and Heathington, 1990). One countermeasure
to reduce the length of the warning time is the use of constant warning
time systems, as noted in Lerner, et al. (1990). Several studies have
been conducted since the publication of their report evaluating its
effect on driver behavior. The results of accident analyses comparing
the accident rate at crossings equipped with constant warning time
systems and fixed distance systems have generally shown no differences
between the two (Bowman, 1989; Halkias and Blanchard, 1989). However,
low sample sizes or low signal credibility due to long wait times at
crossings without constant warning time systems may account for the lack
of a difference. On the other hand, the results of field studies in
which driver behavior was observed at crossings with constant warning
time systems have generally reported significant reductions in crossing
violations relative to crossings protected with fixed-distance systems
(Bowman, 1989; Richards, et al., 1990). False alarms due to
malfunctioning signals also account for unnecessary wait times. Signal
reliability is a function of the rate of false alarms and missed
signals, with frequent false alarms leading to noncompliance (Gil and
Multer, in preparation; Wilde, et al., 1987) and missed signals in more
cautious behavior and potentially unnecessary compliance.

Countermeasures to improve the perceived credibility of active warning
signals have also included the use of highway traffic signals. Because
drivers believe traffic signals are credible, they may be more willing
to comply (Heathington, et al., 1990). One field study showed that the
use of an enhanced traffic signal, with white bar strobe lights in the
red signal lens, reduced crossing violations relative to the standard
flashing light signals (Fambro, et al., 1989), but no significant
research has been conducted regarding its use. One note of caution
should be mentioned. The use of traffic signals at grade crossings could
impact drivers' perceptions of credibility for traffic signals in
general and thus, traffic signals should not be used at crossings where
signals malfunction frequently or at crossings with high waiting times
(Heathington, et al., 1990).

## Crossing Characteristics

Some drivers do not realize they are approaching a grade crossing.
Driver detection of the grade crossing is difficult at night if it is
not illuminated, and physical characteristics of the crossing may limit
its visibility. Both these factors delay detection and recognition of
trains at or approaching the crossing and may contribute to
approximately 10 percent of all crossing accidents (Lerner, et al.,
1990). Methods to increase the conspicuity of the crossing at night and
to mitigate the effect of sight restrictions are addressed in this
section.

### Illumination

Visual search at night is more constrained than it is during the day.
Examination of drivers' eye movements show that at night, drivers were
most focused on the road directly ahead in the areas illuminated by
headlights, but during the day, drivers focused not only on the scene
directly in front of them but also to areas to the right and left
(Rackoff and Rockwell, 1975). To compensate for these limitations in
visual search at night, drivers generally adopt a more conservative
approach behavior. Studies have found that drivers approached crossings
at slower speeds and were less willing to commit crossing violations at
night than during the day.

In one such study, Ward and Wilde (1995) compared approach speed and
brake light activations to grade crossings in daytime and nighttime
conditions. Vehicle approach speed was tracked at eight incremental
distances from the crossing, and two observers recorded whether drivers
applied their brakes as they approached the crossing. Although flashing
lights and bells protected the crossing, all observations occurred when
the signals were inactive. The results showed that both approach speed
and brake-light activation was lower at night than during the day,
suggesting that drivers were reducing their speeds prior to the approach
at night (and hence, less braking) rather than modifying their speed on
the approach as they did during the day.

Richards and Heathington (1990) observed similarly cautious behavior, in
their study measuring acceptable warning times at active grade crossings
(discussed in Section 3.1.3.3). Their observations showed that 20
percent more drivers stopped and waited at the gated crossing at night
than during the day. Thus, drivers appeared less willing to try to beat
the train due to the reduced visibility.

At night, simply illuminating the grade crossing can increase its
conspicuity. Mather (1991) conducted a small study in which he compared
the number of train-vehicle accidents at grade crossings in Oregon from
1984 through 1989, the time period when the Oregon Public Utility
Commission began illuminating crossings as a low-cost alternative to
improving safety. Crossings that had regular nighttime movement but had
too low train or vehicle volume to qualify for automatic warning device
were equipped with illumination devices. In his study of 34 crossings,
he noted that illumination reduced the number of nighttime grade
crossing accidents from 18 accidents at 13 of those crossings to three
at two crossings.

### Sight Restrictions

Drivers should be able to determine whether or not a train is
approaching a crossing with enough time to stop safely at a distance of
15 ft (4.5 m) from the track (FHWA, 2002). However, sight restrictions
often exist due to terrain, vegetation, or other structures, which
cannot be easily removed or it would be economically infeasible to do
so. An NTSB (1998) safety analysis of 60 passive grade crossing
accidents noted that one-third of the accidents in the study were
attributable to physical characteristics of the crossing, such as
inadequate sight distance, oblique angles to the crossing, curvature of
the roadway or railroad track, or vertical alignment to the crossing. In
particular, limited sight distance has often been cited as a
contributing factor to accidents at passive crossings (Mortimer, 1988;
Russell, 2002), although no data exists to support this claim (Messick,
1994; Ward and Wilde, 1996; Wigglesworth, 2001).

Observations of driver looking behavior at grade crossings suggest that
drivers do not usually consider sight limitations a problem.
Wigglesworth (2001) observed driver behavior at one passive grade
crossing with limited sight distance at three of the four quadrants.
Surprisingly, he found no difference in looking behavior between drivers
traveling in either direction. Approximately 33 percent of the drivers
looked in both directions, 33 percent looked in only one direction, and
33 percent looked in neither direction.

Ward and Wilde (1996) hypothesized that drivers know that their view of
the tracks is restricted and modify their approach speeds to compensate.
They observed driver behavior at a passive grade crossing before and
after the lateral sight distance was enhanced by clearing vegetation
that obscured drivers' view. The observations showed that as the sight
distance increased, drivers increased their speeds to the approach, thus
resulting in no net safety benefit. A survey of local residents,
conducted to determine their perceptions on whether or not safety of the
approach was improved, indicated that most drivers noticed the
improvements and felt that their level of risk was lowered.

### Increasing Crossing Conspicuity

Several methods have been proposed to improve detection of grade
crossings; examples include "illuminated" signs, flashing lights, and
strobe lights. Russell and Rys (1996) evaluated the use of a sign they
called the Passive Warning Sign, which is made from a material that
redirects the train's headlights so the sign is illuminated when a train
approaches the crossing. The Passive Warning Sign is intended for use in
conjunction with the standard crossbuck and can be used to display
messages to the driver. Russell and Rys conducted field studies in which
participants were driven across grade crossings equipped with the
Passive Warning Sign system and asked to indicate the distance at which
the sign was recognized and the distance at which the text could be
read. In the field evaluation, the Passive Warning Sign contained the
text "yield" written vertically in white capital letters on a red
background. Participants viewed the sign in daylight and nighttime
conditions. The results showed that the Passive Warning Sign did not
detract attention from the crossbuck and was detectable at a far enough
distance when approaching the crossing at 55 mph that the driver could
take safe action at the grade crossing, if needed. However, discussions
with participants afterwards indicated public education regarding the
location of the sign would be needed before implementation.

Studies have also evaluated the use of flashing lights or strobe lights,
presented in conjunction with current warning signs at the crossing.
Fambro, et al. (1998) compared the presentation of the advance warning
sign to an advance warning sign with a flashing beacon and an advance
warning sign with a strobe light. In their study, participants drove
through a test course containing the three advance warning systems with
an in-vehicle observer who recorded driver actions. After driving the
test course, participants ranked each of the advance warning systems
based on their ability to attract attention and redirect attention to
the driving task. Observations of driver behavior showed that drivers
exhibited more caution, as shown by increased braking, as they
approached the crossings with the two experimental light systems. More
importantly, neither of the light systems resulted in any adverse
driving behavior (e.g., slamming on the brakes or erratic driving
maneuvers). Participants' preference ratings indicated that the two
advance warning systems with lights were preferred to the standard
advance warning sign in attracting attention. However, the presentation
of the supplemental lights was somewhat confusing to drivers, who were
uncertain of its meaning. Some thought that the flashing light implied
that a train was approaching, and this impression was greater with the
use of the flashing beacon than with the strobe light.

These two advance warning systems evolved into a third prototype system
that consisted of the advance warning sign, a vehicle-activated strobe
light located above the advance warning sign, and a supplemental sign
below the advance warning sign stating "Look for Train at Crossing"
(Fambro, Noyce, Frieslaar, and Copeland, 1997; Noyce and Fambro, 1998).
This new sign system was installed at a passive grade crossing and
evaluated with a before and after field study comparing vehicle speeds.
To obtain driver feedback on the system, drivers, who had passed the
crossing, were stopped and asked to recall the approach to the crossing
and whether they had noticed anything different about the crossing
relative to other crossings. The results showed that the strobe light
plus sign system increased drivers' awareness of the crossing, as
measured by reduced approach speeds to the crossing. Fifty-two percent
of drivers who participated in the driver survey reported that they
noticed something unique about the crossing. Of these drivers, 88
percent were able to attribute it to the strobe light, and 71 percent
identified the supplemental sign. Not surprisingly, drivers were more
likely to notice the strobe light as illumination decreased. More
interestingly, drivers who were familiar with the crossing were *less*
likely to notice the experimental system. When drivers were asked what
message they thought the strobe light conveyed, many drivers responded
that they associated the strobe light as an indication that they should
exercise more caution when approaching the crossing. None of the
participants confused the activation of the strobe light with the
presence of a train at the crossing.

### Summary

Detection of grade crossings is more difficult at night, when drivers
rely on a different set of cues than during the day (Rackoff and
Rockwell, 1975). Additionally, inadequate sight distance along the track
hinders the detection of trains at the crossing or approaching the
crossing (NTSB, 1998). To compensate for these reductions in visibility,
drivers have generally adopted a more conservative approach behavior
(Richards and Heathington, 1990; Ward and Wilde, 1995; Ward and Wilde,
1996). Countermeasures to improve the conspicuity of the grade crossing
have included illumination (Mather, 1991), the "illumination" of signs
when a train is at the crossing (Russell and Rys, 1996), or the use of
strobe lights in conjunction with the advance warning signs and a
supplementary sign reminding drivers to look for trains (Fambro, et al.,
1997; Fambro, et al., 1998; Noyce and Fambro, 1998).

## Train

The large size of trains and their dark colors combined with low
illuminations or limited visibility hinder their detectability (Lerner,
et al., 1990). Approximately 26 percent of all grade crossing accidents
from 1975 to 1996 involved a vehicle striking a train, with 53 percent
of these accidents occurring at night (Carroll, et al., 1999). Thus,
additional warnings regarding the presence of a train are needed to
improve safety at grade crossings.

Several warning devices on trains can improve their conspicuity. The
train may be equipped with active and passive lighting systems to
improve its detectability in low illuminations. Active systems, such as
oscillating lights, rotating beacons, strobe lights, crossing lights,
ditch lights, or ground lights, emit light to the driver, whereas
passive systems, such as reflectorization, reflect light from vehicles.
In addition to visual indications of a train's approach to or presence
at a crossing, the train horn provides auditory alerts. The use of these
three on-train devices (i.e., active alerting lights, reflectorization,
and the train horn) and technological advances that have improved their
effectiveness in enhancing train conspicuity is addressed.

### Active alerting lights

Although a train's headlights provide a signal to the driver that it is
approaching a grade crossing, its headlights were not originally
intended to be used as an alerting system and may not be as effective as
other systems. As Lerner, et al. (1990) noted, the standard headlight is
not very conspicuous due to its narrow beam width, particularly during
the day, when the angle illuminated by the train's headlight will most
likely be smaller than the angle between a vehicle and an approaching
train.

The FRA initiated a program to examine the conspicuity of various
external alerting lighting systems in 1991. As part of this program,
Carroll, Multer, and Markos (1995) conducted a comprehensive evaluation
of visual alerting devices in several field studies to provide input to
the FRA's effort to develop regulations for locomotive conspicuity. Rail
operations have used various alerting lights, and the FRA provided
specifications for the color, operational aspect, and horizontal and
vertical spacing for the use of oscillating lights, strobe lights, ditch
lights, and crossing lights. In particular, specifications regarding the
spacing of the lights allowed the FRA to define a distinctive triangular
pattern that could facilitate driver detection and recognition of a
train and estimations of its location with respect to the crossing.

Carroll, et al. conducted a controlled field test to evaluate the
effectiveness of some of these lighting systems relative to the standard
headlight. Two trains were equipped with strobe lights, ditch lights,
and crossing lights and operated at a simulated grade crossing site at a
railway yard facility. The crossing lights operated in a flashing mode
and the ditch lights in a steady burn mode. The alerting lighting
systems were presented one at a time in conjunction with the standard
headlight. The strobe lights were mounted on the roof of the train, the
ditch lights were mounted on the outside corners of the train and angled
15º outward from the train, and the crossing lights were mounted on the
centerline of the train. Participants, seated 205 ft (62.5 m) from the
simulated grade crossing, were asked to indicate when they first noticed
a train approaching in their periphery while performing a visual
monitoring task on a laptop computer that simulated the attentional
demands of driving. Participants wore headphones so they could not hear
the train approaching. Once participants detected the train, they
performed a distance estimation task by indicating when the train was a
specified time interval away from the crossing (e.g., 22, 17, 12, or 7
seconds). Half of the participants performed the tasks during the day,
and the other half performed the tasks at night.

The results showed that the train was detected at greater distances when
it was equipped with any of the auxiliary alerting lights relative to
the use of the standard headlight alone. Participants detected the train
at the greatest distance when it was equipped with the crossing lights,
followed by the ditch and strobe light systems. Not surprisingly,
detection distance for all three systems was greater at night than
during the day. This difference in ambient light level did not affect
drivers' judgments of train arrival time. In general, participants
tended to judge the train as being farther away from the crossing than
it actually was, therefore leading to overestimates in the train's
arrival time. The degree of this overestimation increased as the
estimated arrival time increased beyond 12 seconds. Arrival time
judgments were most accurate for crossing lights, followed by the strobe
and ditch light systems. Use of the standard headlight, alone, resulted
in the highest number of overestimations.

Carroll, et al. then conducted an in-service operational test of the
alerting light systems to determine the capital costs, maintenance
requirements, operational concerns, and potential safety benefits of
their use. The effect on safety is of specific interest here. In the
field test, two crossing lights, used in conjunction with the standard
headlight, were installed on the locomotives of three participating
railroad companies for a 2-year period. To measure the safety impact,
accident data prior to, during, and after the installation of the
crossing lights were collected and compared. The accident rates were
normalized by the level of train operations with and without the use of
alerting light system to control for exposure level. The results showed
decreases in accident rates of 76.4 percent, 74.3 percent, and 54.6
percent for the three railroads with trains equipped with the crossing
lights versus those equipped with the standard headlight alone. While
the results were promising, the data collected was limited. The authors
also acknowledged the possibility that the novelty of the crossing light
system or other factors, such as public education or enforcement
programs, that were not accounted for in the study, influenced driver
behavior.

A larger accident analysis to determine factors contributing to
improvements in grade crossing safety noted the benefits of alerting
lights. Mok and Savage (2005) analyzed nationwide data on grade crossing
accidents and incidents from 1975 through 2001 using a negative binomial
regression analysis. The use of ditch lights was only one of several
explanatory variables included in the analysis; other variables included
the amount of vehicle and rail traffic, the protection at the crossing,
highway safety measures, and Operation Lifesaver (to be discussed in
more detail in Section 6.2). The results of the regression analysis
indicated that the use of alerting lights had a large safety impact.
Estimates suggested that equipping trains with ditch lights reduced the
number of grade crossing incidents by 29 percent and the number of
fatalities by 44 percent. Additionally, whereas the data showed that
safety at grade crossings improved steadily since 1979, further
examination showed a period of swift decline of 30 percent from 1994 to
1998, which coincided with the FRA's requirement to install crossing or
ditch lights on locomotives. Although the results of the regression
analysis by Mok and Savage show the benefits to the use of ditch lights,
it is important to note that the analysis conducted did not include a
comprehensive list of factors due to limitations in the databases used.
As a result, the relative contribution of the factors that were included
may be overestimated, and the impact of ditch lights, while still
positive, may not be as high as predicted by their analysis.

Regardless, the use of alerting lights has been successful in increasing
the conspicuity of the train and the triangular pattern in which the
lights are placed has been effective in allowing drivers to judge the
train's distance from the crossing and its speed. The FRA Final Rule
regarding the use of alerting lights is discussed in *Railroad
Locomotive Safety Standards: Clarifying Amendments; Headlights and
Auxiliary Lights; Final Rule* and codified in 49 CFR § 229.

### Reflectorization

Trains may also be equipped with passive alerting devices, such as
reflective markers, to increase their conspicuity. Reflectorization is
already used by several railroads in the U.S., Australia, and Canada and
is expected to reduce the number of grade crossing accidents in which a
vehicle runs into a train. By increasing the conspicuity of all rail
cars, it is anticipated that reflectorization will prevent accidents in
which the vehicle collides with a train after the lead locomotive car
has entered the crossing.

The benefits of reflectorization were initially limited by the
degradation of its intensity over time due to railroad environmental
conditions. As a result, the reflective markers required frequent
maintenance or replacement (Lerner, et al., 1990). However, improvements
in reflective materials resulted in enhancements to their brightness and
durability and thus the use of reflectorization warranted further
evaluation. This was the goal of a series of studies conducted by
Carroll, et al. (1999), who evaluated the performance characteristics of
three reflective materials to determine their degradation over time
under controlled conditions. The materials consisted of:

-   Enclosed lens (engineering grade), in which microscopic beads,
    bonded within the material, reflect light in a diffuse pattern
    toward the observer,

-   Bonded reflector---typically used for pavement markings---in which
    exposed reflective beads are attached to the reflector backing and
    reflect light in a diffuse beam pattern. This pattern is wider than
    that reflected with the enclosed lens, and

-   Prismatic retroreflector (diamond grade), in which microscopic
    prisms that contain three surfaces, oriented at 90º of each other,
    reflect light. The resulting beam pattern is more concentrated than
    with the enclosed lens or bonded reflectors.

The first study tested the reflectivity of the three materials over a
one-year period. The materials were applied in various sizes, colors,
and patterns to 14 open top hopper cars. The accumulated mileage,
weather, and scheduled washings were noted. The results showed that of
the three materials, the prismatic retroreflector was the most durable,
maintaining 87 percent of its intensity level over the course of the
year. Washing the prismatic reflectors restored its intensity to nearly
its original level. The bonded lens material was the least effective of
the three, with such low initial intensity levels that it did not
warrant further consideration.

Because the conditions in the demonstration test did not fully simulate
true railroad operations, Carroll, et al. conducted a second study to
evaluate the effectiveness of the prismatic reflectors through an
in-service revenue test. Reflectors were applied to four freight car
fleets from two railroad companies. Three white 4- by 8-in decals were
applied horizontally at the bottom of the railcar, spaced 9 ft apart,
and two red-and-white 4- by36-in red-and-white delineators were applied
vertically at the ends of the railcar, as shown in Figure 8.

![](media/image24.jpeg){width="2.6770833333333335in" height="0.925in"}

[]{#__RefHeading___Toc207427005 .anchor}Figure 8. Freight car
reflectorization pattern used in the in-service revenue test conducted
by Carroll, et al. (1999).

The pattern used was based on reflectorization research conducted on
freight cars and tractor trailers. The intensity of the markers was
measured periodically over a period ranging from 21 to 29 months,
depending on the fleet. The results showed that the intensity of the
reflectors was not significantly affected by natural environmental
conditions. As in the demonstration test, washing the reflectors
restored its intensity significantly to nearly its original levels. The
in-service revenue test included one route for one fleet that could be
used to measure the safety impact of reflectorization by allowing a
comparison of the incident rate for vehicles running into a train before
and after the application of the reflective markers. While there was
very limited accident data, the comparison indicated that the number of
accidents decreased from six before the in-service test to zero with the
addition of reflectorization.

There was no consensus regarding the pattern in which reflective markers
should be applied. To define an optimal marking system, Ford, Richards,
and Hungerford (1998) conducted a series of studies to develop and
evaluate marking patterns for the application of reflectorization. The
first study consisted of a subjective evaluation of 11 candidate-marking
systems. Eight of the marking systems were generated by a focus group of
human factors and traffic experts; these are shown in Figure 9 below.
These systems varied in color (fluorescent yellow, red, white, and/or
orange) and distribution pattern (distributed over a relatively small
area, distributed so that it outlined the shape of the railcar, or
spaced uniformly over a relatively large area of the rail car side).

  ------- ------------------------------------------------------ ------- ------------------------------------------------------
  \(a\)   ![](media/image25.jpeg){width="2.509027777777778in"    \(b\)   ![](media/image26.jpeg){width="2.511111111111111in"
          height="0.7291666666666666in"}                                 height="0.6847222222222222in"}

  \(c\)   ![](media/image27.jpeg){width="2.5083333333333333in"   \(d\)   ![](media/image28.jpeg){width="2.5104166666666665in"
          height="0.6847222222222222in"}                                 height="0.6840277777777778in"}

  \(e\)   ![](media/image29.jpeg){width="2.511111111111111in"    \(f\)   ![](media/image30.jpeg){width="2.5097222222222224in"
          height="0.7in"}                                                height="0.7597222222222222in"}

  \(g\)   ![](media/image31.jpeg){width="2.5097222222222224in"   \(h\)   ![](media/image32.jpeg){width="2.5097222222222224in"
          height="0.66875in"}                                            height="0.7298611111111111in"}
  ------- ------------------------------------------------------ ------- ------------------------------------------------------

[]{#__RefHeading___Toc207427006 .anchor}Figure 9. Marking systems
generated in a focus group of human factors and traffic experts (from
Ford, et al. (1998)).

The other three marking systems included the design used by Carroll, et
al. (1999) in the in-service evaluation of reflective materials (shown
in Figure 8), the standard design used for large trucks and
tractor-trailer units (shown in Figure 10), and no reflectorization.

![](media/image33.jpeg){width="2.470138888888889in"
height="0.6986111111111111in"}

[]{#__RefHeading___Toc207427007 .anchor}Figure 10. Standard
reflectorization pattern for large trucks and tractor trailers (from
Ford, et al. (1998)).

Participants completed a questionnaire in which they indicated their
preference for the candidate marking systems based on their alerting
effectiveness. Participants were *experts*, with traffic, railroad
engineering, and human factors backgrounds, or *novices*, drivers with
no special knowledge of reflectorization. The questionnaire contained
three tasks:

-   A paired comparison of the marking systems in which participants
    indicated the system in the pair which they felt would be most
    effective for enhancing train visibility, and

-   A ranking test in which participants ranked the systems from best to
    worst; and

-   A semantic differential evaluation, in which panelists were asked to
    evaluate the attributes of each marking system.

The expert group completed the questionnaire using color photographs of
the marking systems. The novice group viewed actual scale models of
railcars with the marking patterns under simulated nighttime conditions.

The overall results of the subjective evaluation did not indicate a
preference for the use of a specific color or distribution pattern. The
expert and novice groups did differ, however, in the attributes they
considered in their rankings. Experts appeared to base their preferences
for marking systems on color, with fluorescent yellow markings preferred
the most, followed by a red-and-white combination and red-only markings.
On the other hand, novices did not appear to focus on either color or
pattern alone. Not surprisingly, both groups ranked the use of no
reflective markings as the worst.

Although there was no clear preference for a color or a distribution
pattern, Ford, et al. conducted a second study to objectively measure
the effect of different marking systems on enhancing train conspicuity.
Three colors and three distribution patterns were combined to create
nine reflective marking systems, as shown in Figure 11 below.

  ------- ------------------------------------------------------ ------- ------------------------------------------------------ ------- ------------------------------------------------------
  \(a\)   ![](media/image32.jpeg){width="1.7201388888888889in"   \(b\)   ![](media/image34.jpeg){width="1.6472222222222221in"   \(c\)   ![](media/image35.jpeg){width="1.6465277777777778in"
          height="0.5041666666666667in"}                                 height="0.4597222222222222in"}                                 height="0.4673611111111111in"}

  \(d\)   ![](media/image30.jpeg){width="1.7201388888888889in"   \(e\)   ![](media/image36.jpeg){width="1.6472222222222221in"   \(f\)   ![](media/image37.jpeg){width="1.6465277777777778in"
          height="0.5208333333333334in"}                                 height="0.47291666666666665in"}                                height="0.475in"}

  \(g\)   ![](media/image38.jpeg){width="1.6465277777777778in"   \(h\)   ![](media/image39.jpeg){width="1.6493055555555556in"   \(i\)   ![](media/image40.jpeg){width="1.6479166666666667in"
          height="0.47638888888888886in"}                                height="0.46875in"}                                            height="0.4618055555555556in"}
  ------- ------------------------------------------------------ ------- ------------------------------------------------------ ------- ------------------------------------------------------

[]{#__RefHeading___Toc207427008 .anchor}Figure 11. Marking systems for
objective evaluation (from Ford, et al. (1998)).

As Figure 11 shows, the colors were yellow (the first column),
red-and-white combination (the second column), and red only (the third
column). The three distribution patterns consisted of a *fence* pattern
of vertical markings along the side sill of the car (the first row of
Figure 11); a *dash-like* pattern of horizontal markings along the
bottom side sill of the car (the second row); and the *field-test*
pattern used by Carroll, et al. (1999) with vertical markings on the
side stakes of the car and horizontal markings along the bottom sill of
the car (the third row). A tenth marking system with no reflectorization
served as a control. Participants saw slides that showed each of the
marking systems applied to the side of a hopper car in simulated
nighttime conditions, with each subsequent slide presenting the car at a
closer distance than the previous slide. Participants indicated the
point at which they could detect the marking system.

The results showed that participants detected and recognized all of the
nine test reflective markings faster than the nonreflective car, and
that the distribution pattern appeared to improve detection more than
the color of the markings. The effectiveness of the marking system
improved as the horizontal and vertical visual angles formed by the
distribution pattern increased; of the three distributions, the field
test pattern that outlined the shape of the rail car was most effective
and the dash-like pattern the least effective. Of the three colors
tested, the fluorescent yellow was the most effective for detection and
recognition and the red-white color pattern was the least effective.

The benefits for reflectorization, reported by Ford, et al. (1998), were
found using static images without context, outside of the actual driving
scenario. In real driving conditions, various sources of information,
such as road signs, other vehicles, and other lights, compete for the
drivers' attention. Thus, Multer, Conti, and Sheridan (2001; see also
Conti, Multer, and Sheridan, 1998) conducted a series of studies to
evaluate the effectiveness of reflectorization in more realistic
situations using a low-fidelity driving simulator. Because
reflectorization may be used to increase the conspicuity of other
vehicles, Multer, et al. also wanted to determine if drivers could
discriminate between reflectorized trains and other moving reflectorized
vehicles at grade crossing intersections. Discriminating between the two
is important because different actions may be required. For example,
drivers may be able to simply slow down to avoid a collision with a
truck but must stop to avoid a collision with a train.

In the first study, participants, who were seated in front of a
projection screen, viewed scenes showing a two-lane road that
intersected a railroad track and another two-lane road at a 90‑degree
angle. Participants were positioned approximately 500 ft (152 m) from
the intersections and asked to identify whether a vehicle passed through
the intersection and if so, whether the vehicle was a train or a truck.
The scenes varied with respect to the environmental condition (rural
with no visual distracters versus urban with lighting from streets and
nearby buildings), freight car type (hopper versus a flat car), and
reflective pattern (outline, horizontal bars, vertical bars, variable
length vertical bars, and no reflectorization). A signal detection
analysis, measuring whether participants could discriminate trains from
trucks, found no difference as a function of the reflective pattern
used. The results did show an effect of the environmental condition,
such that participants were better able to detect unreflectorized
freight cars in urban environment scenes (92 percent accuracy) where
illumination facilitated the task, than in rural environment scenes (85
percent accuracy) where visual cues were not sufficient.

A second study was conducted to evaluate the reflective patterns in a
more naturalistic setting. In the study, participants drove a simulated
car along a test course containing roadway intersections and grade
crossings and were asked to identify each object in the scene. Objects
consisted of other cars, lights, signs, trains, and trucks. As in the
first experiment, the freight car type (hopper versus a flat car) and
reflective pattern were manipulated (outline, horizontal bars, vertical
bars, variable-length vertical bars, and no reflectorization).
Recognition distance for trains and trucks and the recognition accuracy
served as dependent measures of reflectorization's effectiveness.

The results showed that participants detected the reflectorized objects
at greater distances than unreflectorized objects. Participants also
detected the patterns on the hopper car at a farther distance than the
flat car, but it is important to note that the hopper car also had twice
the reflective material than the flat car. The effectiveness of the
reflective patterns varied depending on the type of freight car. With
respect to recognition distance, the vertical bar, horizontal bar, and
variable length vertical bar patterns aided recognition for both flat
cars and hopper cars, but the outline pattern was more effective for the
hopper car than the flat car. With respect to recognition accuracy, the
use of the vertical bar and variable-length vertical bar patterns
resulted in less confusion regarding the vehicle type than the
horizontal bar or outline patterns. The horizontal bar pattern resulted
in errors in which a train was confused with a truck, and the outline
bar pattern resulted in errors in which a train was confused with a
truck or another car. The overall pattern of results suggests that the
use of vertical bar patterns will enhance conspicuity of the train and
minimize confusion with other vehicles.

The FRA acknowledged the benefits of reflectorization in 49 CFR § 224,
which requires the use of reflective materials on the sides of all
trains and freight cars (see *Reflectorization of Rail Freight Rolling
Stock; Final Rule* for more information). The use of reflectorization in
conjunction with alerting lights will provide drivers with effective
visual warnings regarding the presence of a train or its approach to a
grade crossing. These warnings will be informative, however, only if the
driver is oriented towards the train, and thus auditory signals will
also be beneficial in calling attention to approaching trains.

### Locomotive Horn

The FRA issued 49 CFR § 222 requiring that train horns be sounded when
trains approach and enter public crossings to warn drivers and
pedestrians at the intersection (see *Use of Locomotive Horns at
Highway-Rail Grade Crossings; Final Rule* for more information). The
horn must have a minimum warning sound level of 96 dB, 100 ft (30.5 m)
to the front of the train in the direction of travel. Exceptions are
allowed under certain circumstances; for example, when there is no risk
of injury or loss of life, when use of the horn is impractical, or when
other safety measures are in place to compensate for the absence of the
warning from the train horn. However, the auditory warning from a train
horn is effective only if the driver detects the sound, recognizes it,
and responds by taking the appropriate action. A sound must be 3 to 8
decibels (dB) above the threshold of detection to be heard, and 10 dB
above the ambient noise level to attract attention (Skeiber, Mason, and
Potter, 1978, as cited in NTSB, 1998). Thus, noise levels in the
vehicle, the enhanced sound attention qualities of the vehicle, and
characteristics of the terrain at the crossing (e.g., sound can be
reflected from hard surfaces, absorbed by other surfaces, or blocked by
buildings or other terrain elements) all influence the detectability of
the train horn.

The potential for grade crossing accidents due to the dampening of sound
is of particular concern to the NTSB. Two school bus accidents at grade
crossings, one in Fox River Grove, Illinois (NTSB, 1996) and the other
in Conasauga, Tennessee (NTSB, 2001), were identified in which the train
horn did not provide a sufficient warning to overcome the interior noise
levels and sound attenuation characteristics of the buses. In both
accidents, the train horn functioned properly and was sounded well in
advance of the crossings, but had limited effectiveness because the
buses' doors and windows were closed, radios were played inside the
buses, and the buses' ceilings were partially covered with sound
attenuating panels capable of reducing sound by as much as 25dB.
Audibility tests conducted as part of the investigation indicated that
in one accident, the decibel level of the train horn only exceeded the
ambient noise level in the driver's seat when the train was 100 ft from
the crossing (1.1 seconds from impact), and in the other accident, the
driver may not have heard the train horn at all (NTSB, 1996, 1998, 2001;
Rosenker, 2005).

Similarly, in their analysis of 60 passive grade crossing accidents, the
NTSB (1998) noted that the train horn was sounded prior to impact in 55
of the 60 cases, and 14 of the 18 cases in which the NTSB was able to
interview the driver. Of these 14 accidents, only four of the drivers
indicated that they heard the train horn, but two of these drivers were
no longer in their car at the time of impact. Of the other 10 drivers,
three indicated that they were still not aware of an approaching train
prior to impact, and eight reported a combination of internal and
external noises that distracted them from hearing the train horn.

Numerous research studies have varied the audibility characteristics of
the train horn to better understand how to improve its effectiveness.
Lerner, et al (1990) reported that the number of flutes used in the
train horn influenced its detectability; systems with five flutes were
more effective than systems with three flutes. More recent studies have
reported similar results. Keller and Rickley (1992) measured different
acoustic characteristics for three "traditional" horn systems mounted on
trains---two with three flutes and one with five flutes---and one
wayside horn mounted at the crossing. Acoustic measurements, collected
at points along a circle centered 100 ft (30.5 m) from each horn system,
indicated that the sound outputs from the three traditional horn systems
were more detectable than the sound output from the wayside horn. Of the
three traditional horn systems, the five-flute signal created a
broadband signal that was more effective at higher frequencies than
signals from the three-flute systems. Because background noise in
vehicles and from communities rarely contains high frequency sounds,
Keller and Rickley concluded that the five-flute system was more likely
to attract drivers' attention than three-flute systems. While Keller and
Rickley based their recommendations for the mounting location of
traditional horn systems on measurements collected in a static
environment, sound level measurements from moving trains have produced
similar results. English and his colleagues compared the acoustic
spectrum of three-flute and five-flute horn systems not only in a
stationary environment but also when used on moving freight, commuter,
and passenger trains (English, et al., 2003; English and Moore, 2004).
The additional flutes broadened the sound spectrum, improving the
detectability of the train horn.

The audibility of the horn also varies depending on its location and for
the wayside horn, its orientation. Traditional horn systems placed in
front and as high as possible on the train produced maximum sound output
towards the front of the train in both static (Keller and Rickley, 1992)
and dynamic (English, et al., 2003; English and Moore, 2004) field
tests. In fact, as train speed increased, sound output to the front of
the train from horns mounted in other locations (e.g., towards the
middle of the train, behind the engine exhaust hood, or recessed in a
well) deteriorated. The wayside horn, which was stationary, directed
most of its sound energy forward, so mounting the horn to face oncoming
traffic would maximize its audibility (Keller and Rickley, 1992).

The frequency of the horn may also play a role. English, et al. (2003)
found that participants detected mid-frequency signals better than
signals at other frequencies when they compared pure-tone signals
spanning eight different frequencies at six intensity levels relative to
background noise. Detection of signals at higher frequencies was more
vulnerable to masking whereas signals at lower frequencies were less
audible. In particular, English et al. reported a "sweet spot" at 562
hertz (Hz), where detection rates were highest.

The effects of the various acoustic characteristics of the train horn
may be interactive rather than additive. Melnik, Russo, and Popkin
(2006) examined the relative contributions of the number of flutes
(three-flute versus five-flute systems) and frequency (with and without
a 562 Hz tone) on the detectability of the sound. Participants performed
a tracking task to simulate the cognitive demands of driving while
detecting signals (the sounds of a train horn) against background noise.
The results showed that participants most easily detected a five-horn
system with a 562 Hz tone, but surprisingly, there was no main effect
either for the number of flutes or for the inclusion of a horn with a
562 Hz tone.

Although sounding the train horn has important safety benefits,
communities near grade crossings have complained that the noise
negatively impacts their quality of life. In fact, acoustic data,
collected from trains at six grade crossings in Jacksonville, Florida,
showed that sound levels at locations less than 200 ft (61 m) from the
crossing were unacceptable for an outdoor residential noise environment,
based on criteria set forth by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development (Rapoza, Raslear, and Rickley, 1999). Several states and
communities issued whistle bans to pacify residents, but analyses have
shown that these whistle bans increased the rate of grade crossing
accidents and incidents (this topic will be discussed in more detail in
section 6.1).

One alternative is the use of a wayside horn, mounted at the crossing,
to provide a similar audible warning as the train horn but minimize the
noise impact on surrounding communities. Keller and Rickley (1992) noted
that the wayside horn was less detectable than traditional horn systems
in a laboratory evaluation, but they did not examine its impact on
driver behavior. That is, the "detectability" of a sound may not be
defined solely by auditory characteristics (Rapoza, et al., 1999). As a
result, several studies have evaluated the effectiveness of the wayside
horn on improving compliance and have examined its benefits to
communities living near grade crossings.

In one study, Multer and Rapoza (1998) examined the effectiveness of
wayside horns mounted at three gated grade crossings in Gering,
Nebraska. In 1995, driver behavior at two of the three grade crossings
was videotaped for a period of 12 weeks before and after the
installation of the wayside horn. Data collected consisted of the
frequency with which drivers violated the grade crossing as the gate
arms were descending (Type 1 violations), the frequency with which
drivers violated the gated crossing after the gate arms had completely
descended (Type 2 violations), the warning time at the crossing, the
time to collision defined as the time between a driver crossing the
tracks and the train's arrival at the crossing, and the violation time
defined as the time between the gates descent and the driver's arrival
at the grade crossing. The results indicated that the use of the wayside
horn did not decrease safety at the crossing relative to the train horn.
In fact, the number of Type 1 violations was significantly lower with
the wayside horn than with the train horn. However, this result should
be considered in light of the fact that the train horn had a false
activation rate that was two times higher than the wayside horn. As a
result, drivers' perception that the train horn was not reliable or that
a train was not in close proximity may have led to the increased rate of
Type 1 violations observed. There was no difference in the number of
Type 2 violations, time to collision, or violation times attributable to
the horn systems.

Multer and Rapoza also conducted telephone surveys of residents in
nearby communities before and after the installation of the wayside horn
to examine its impact on their quality of life. The "before" survey
addressed the impact of the train horn on noise in the community, and
the "after" survey, conducted one-year later, measured the impact of the
wayside horn. Participants living within 3,200 ft (975 m) from the
tracks were asked questions that addressed how frequently they heard the
auditory warning, how they were affected by the noise, what types of
activity the noise interfered with, and what measures they took to
minimize the negative effects of the noise. As part of the study,
acoustic measurements of the loudness and frequency distribution of the
train horn and wayside horn were collected at 14 sites around the city.
The survey results showed that the use of the wayside horn had a
positive impact. Fewer residents were highly annoyed with the noise from
the wayside horn than with the noise from the train horn. Additionally,
the wayside horn interfered less with activities inside or outside the
home and required fewer actions to minimize the noise impact. The
acoustic measurements indicated that the wayside horn was approximately
13 dB quieter than the train horn at peak sound levels, and in fact, the
wayside horn did not meet the minimum sound level required of train
horns. The acoustic data also indicated that the wayside horn impacted
residents over a smaller geographical area than the train horn; the
locations where the wayside horn had a significant noise impact were
limited to locations within 100 ft (30.5 m) of the wayside horn, whereas
the locations where the train horn had a significant noise impact
extended out to 1,000 ft (305 m) from the track. Interestingly, the
locations of those residents who were highly annoyed by the noise were
distributed throughout the geographical area covered in the survey and
not related to the proximity to the track or grade crossing. This
finding may be the result of obstructions and/or environmental factors
that distort the relationship between the sound level and distance from
the noise source.

Gent, Logan, and Evans (2000) conducted a similar study in Ames, Iowa.
They evaluated the impact of the wayside horn through noise level
readings before and after the installation of wayside horns at three
grade crossings and surveys of residents living near the crossing,
drivers stopped for trains at the crossing and for train engineers. The
noise level readings showed that the wayside horn system had a lower
volume than the train horn at all locations. Noise contour maps
depicting the geographical impact of the horn systems showed that the
wayside horn reduced the geographical area affected by the noise than
the train horn. Subjective data was positive regarding the use of the
wayside horn. A survey of residents two months before and after the
installation of the wayside horn found that residents felt the wayside
horn improved their quality of life; 77 percent of residents indicated
that train horn had a negative impact in the before study, whereas only
3 percent felt that the wayside horn had a negative impact. Drivers
indicated that they preferred the wayside horn system compared to the
train horns, with 22 percent of drivers indicating that the wayside horn
was their first alert to an approaching train. Feedback from the
locomotive engineers indicated that the majority considered the use of
the wayside horn system at the crossing as being just as safe, if not
safer, than with the train horns.

The acoustic data collected in the field by Multer and Rapoza (1998) and
Gent, et al. (2000) and in the laboratory by Keller and Rickley (1992)
all indicated that the wayside horn systems was less audible than the
train horn. The wayside horn systems evaluated in these three studies
were developed by Railroad Controls Limited (RCL). On the basis of the
results, RCL increased the warning volume of the wayside horn and added
low frequency tones to better match characteristics of the traditional
train horn (Mike Fann & Associates, 2000). Two field tests of this
improved horn system were conducted: one by the City of Richardson,
Texas, and the other in the Village of Mundelein, Illinois. In
Richardson, Texas, noise level readings were collected at different
locations around the grade crossing at which a wayside horn was located
and compared to that obtained with the train horn. The results showed
that while the sound level from the wayside horn was greater than or
equal to the sound from the train horn at a distance of 100 ft (30.5 m)
from the crossing, sound levels in the surrounding neighborhood
decreased relative to that obtained with the train horn. In fact, the
number of homes experiencing noise levels above 90 dB dropped from 38
homes to two (P.B. Farradyne, Inc., 2001).

In Mundelein, Illinois, wayside horn systems were installed at all 9
grade crossings in or near the Village and evaluated in a field study
patterned after Multer and Rapoza (1998) and Gent, et al. (2000). Video
cameras at three crossings recorded drivers for 3 months before and
after the installation of the wayside horn systems. Analysis compared
the rates of Type 1 and Type 2 violations, as defined in Multer and
Rapoza to be the frequency with which drivers violated the grade
crossing as the gate arms were descending and the frequency with which
drivers violated the gated crossing after the gate arms had completely
descended, respectively, before and after the installation of the
wayside horn systems. The noise impact of the wayside horn was measured
by comparing acoustic measurements of the wayside horn with that of the
traditional train horn at nine locations throughout the Village.
Finally, residents and train engineers were surveyed regarding their
perception of the effectiveness of the system.

The results from the driver observations showed that the overall
violation rate declined significantly by 68 percent after installation
of the wayside horn from 3.53 per 100 gate closings to 1.12 per 100 gate
closings. The rate of Type 1 violations dropped by 74 percent, from 358,
with the train horn, to 93 violations after the installation of the
wayside horn. The rate of Type 2 violations dropped by 56 percent, from
nine with the train horn to four with the wayside horn.

Measurements of the sound level of the two horn systems indicated the
sound level of the wayside horn was greater than or equal to the sound
of the train horn as the driver was approaching the grade crossing,
similar to that found in Richardson, Texas (P.B. Farradyne, Inc., 2001).
The train horn was only louder than the wayside horn when the train was
at the crossing. The acoustic results also showed that the wayside horn
impacted fewer residents than the train horn; the wayside horn affected
85 percent less area than the train horn at the highest decibel levels.
Residents who benefited the most from the installation of the wayside
horn were those living at angles 45º or greater from the horn. However,
in some areas (in particular, those locations in a direct line of the
wayside horn), the sound level remained constant or increased. The
results of the acoustic analysis were reflected in the results of
resident surveys addressing quality-of-life issues. Residents generally
found the wayside horn less annoying than the train horn, unless they
lived close to or in a direct line with the wayside horn. Both residents
and train engineers indicated that they perceived the crossing to be as
safe as or safer with the wayside horn than they had been with the train
horn. Most of the train engineers indicated that they had not noticed a
difference in driver behavior, although most also admitted to sounding
the train horn occasionally when they felt that the wayside horn as not
working or believed that the train horn was needed (e.g., when
pedestrians and bicyclists were crossing in front of approaching trains)
(Raub, Lucke, and Thunder, 2003; Thunder, Raub, and Lucke, 2003).

The studies discussed above only examined the effect of the wayside horn
on driver behavior in the short-term immediately after its installation.
To determine the longer-term effects of the wayside horn, Roop (2000)
conducted a follow-on study to Multer and Rapoza (1998), 5‑years after
the wayside horn was installed in Gering, Nebraska, and data on driver
compliance was first collected. To determine if there was a long-term
change in driver compliance, determined by the number of Type 1 and 2
violations, driver behavior was video recorded at one of the three grade
crossings in Gering with the wayside horn. The results showed an
increase in the rate of Type 1 violations (i.e., the number of drivers
who violated the crossing as the gate arms were descending) relative to
that observed by Multer and Rapoza in the initial post-test period and
no difference in the rate of Type 2 violations. Whereas the rate of Type
1 violations rose in the time following system implementation, it is
important to note that the violation rate was similar to that observed
with the train horn. It is possible that the initial drop in Type 1
violations observed by Multer and Rapoza was attributable to driver
unfamiliarity with the sound intensity of the wayside horn, so that
drivers using auditory intensity as a cue to train proximity perceived
the train as being close to the grade crossing upon hearing the wayside
horn. Over time, as drivers became more familiar with the wayside horn,
they learned that auditory intensity was no longer an effective
indicator of train distance and were less responsive to its alert.

### Summary

In order to increase the conspicuity of trains at or approaching grade
crossings, the FRA requires equipping trains with alerting light systems
(49 CFR § 229), using reflective markings (49 CFR § 224), and sounding
the train horn (49 CFR § 222 and 229). The results of field tests have
shown the effectiveness of alerting lights; participants detected trains
equipped with alerting lights at further distances than those with the
headlight alone and were less likely to overestimate its arrival time to
the crossing (Carroll, et al., 1995). Additionally, the results of
accident analyses have found significant reductions in the number of
incidents and fatalities attributable to the use of alerting lights (Mok
and Savage, 2005).

Improvements in reflective materials renewed interest in the use of
reflectorization to enhance train conspicuity. The results of
demonstration tests and in-service revenue tests showed that prismatic,
diamond grade reflectors were most durable in maintaining their
intensity level over time, and simple washing of the reflectors restored
intensity to original levels (Carroll, et al., 1999). Participants
detected trains with reflective markers at greater distances than
nonreflectorized trains (Ford, et al., 1998; Multer, et al., 2001), and
accident data, while limited, suggested that reflectorization reduced
the number of grade crossing incidents and accidents (Carroll, et al.,
1999). In applying reflective markings to trains, the distribution
pattern may contribute more to the effectiveness of reflectorization
than the color of the markings. No study has identified an optimal
pattern, but Ford, et al. (1998) found that the effectiveness of the
markings improved the larger the horizontal and visual angle formed by
the distribution pattern. Because reflectorization is also used to
enhance the conspicuity of other vehicles, it will be important to
select a pattern that minimizes confusion. In particular, reflective
patterns used on trucks in revenue service consist primarily of
horizontal bars located along the bottom of the vehicle, so reflective
patterns for trains that contain vertical bars may be more effective at
facilitating train-truck discriminability than patterns consisting
solely of horizontal markings (Multer, et al., 2001).

The train horn provides an auditory warning to alert drivers and
pedestrians of its approach to a grade crossing. The audibility of the
train horn is most effective when it is mounted at the front of the
train; sound output from horns mounted at other locations deteriorates
with increasing train speed (Keller and Rickely, 1992; English and
Moore, 2004). However, the train horn is effective only if it is
detected, and the dampening of sound is of particular concern (NTSB,
1998). At the same time, communities located near grade crossings have
complained of the noise impact from the train horn. The use of a wayside
horn mounted at the crossing to alert the driver when a train is
approaching is promising. Observations of driver behavior indicated that
the wayside horn does not decrease safety. In the short-term (i.e.,
immediately after its installation), observations of driver behavior
reported a decrease in the rate of violations with the wayside horn as
compared to the train horn as the gate arms were descending (Multer and
Rapoza, 1998; Raub, et al., 2003), although this effect did not last in
the long-term (Roop, 2000). Several studies have noted the impact of the
wayside horn on reducing community noise; noise level readings collected
before and after the installations of wayside horns showed that the
wayside horn impacted residents over a smaller geographical area, while
still providing a sound level greater than or equal to the train horn on
drivers' approach to the crossing (P.B. Farradyne, Inc., 2001; Thunder,
et al., 2003).

This section focused primarily on improvements to the grade crossing
environment to better convey the driver action required and facilitate
detection and recognition of the grade crossing and the presence or
approach of trains. However, these improvements to the grade crossing
alone may be insufficient. To be truly effective, any measure must
engage the driver. Thus, characteristics inherent to the driver that
influence compliance must be considered.

# Personnel Subsystem (Driver)

Driver exposure to a highway-rail grade crossing accident is increasing
as the number of total vehicle miles and train miles per railway
increases. Warning devices at highway-rail intersections offer some
protection by alerting the driver to the presence of a crossing (e.g.,
with a railroad advance sign on the approach to the crossing and a
crossbuck at the crossing) and the presence of a train (e.g., the train
horn or active warning devices, such as flashing lights and/or automatic
gates). However, some drivers simply choose not to comply. In fact, in
most grade crossing accidents, a clear warning and adequate visibility
of the train's approach was available (Leibowitz, 1985). Thus, other
factors influencing a drivers' behavior at grade crossings must be
considered.

Drivers' actions at grade crossings are based not only on their
perception and comprehension of the information available at the
crossing but also by their motivations. Thus, limitations in *driving
skill* that lead to error or characteristics of *driving style* (i.e.,
intention) contribute to noncompliance. With respect to the former,
age-related decrements in perception and cognition, lack of experience,
driver distractions, or impairment all influence the driver's skill
level. With respect to the latter, the driver's biases and attitudes
towards grade crossings and compliance determines driving style; for
example, the driver's expectancy of trains, perceived costs of
compliance, and perception of risk. Additionally, because one's
character is reflected in one's driving style, personality differences
attributable to gender and changes attributable to age and maturity must
also be considered.

This section addresses decrements in driving skill and the contributions
of driving style to overall driving performance. While studies examining
these factors on behavior in the grade crossing situation are limited,
much research has been conducted in the context of the general driving
situation and provide additional insight into driver behavior.
Implications of this research related to the grade crossing situation
will be noted.

## Driving Skill

Driving skill addresses performance limits in detecting the train or the
crossing, estimating the train's arrival time, and executing the
appropriate action. Lerner, et al. (1990) discussed much of the research
examining perceptual limitations influencing driving performance, and
little research has been conducted since the publication of their report
addressing countermeasures for improving the perceptual process.
Extensive research exists, however, examining factors that limit driving
skill and understanding the performance decrements due to aging, lack of
experience, driver distractions, and alcohol/drug use or fatigue. Each
of these topics is addressed below.

### Age

An analysis of accidents in the NHTSA Fatal Accident Reporting System
(FARS) from 1975 to 1992 showed that drivers between the ages of 25 and
34 years old accounted for the greatest percentage (24 percent) of fatal
grade crossing crashes, followed by drivers between 16 and 20 years old
(17 percent). In contrast, drivers 65 to 74 years old accounted for only
7 percent of fatal grade crossing crashes, and drivers over the age of
74 years old accounted for approximately 5 percent of fatal grade
crossing crashes (Klein, Morgan, and Weiner, 1994). Alhtough the FARS
data suggest that older adults are not at an increased crash risk
relative to other drivers, the data do not reflect exposure level. When
examining statistics for highway traffic accidents, older adults
appeared to be the safest age group on the road on a licensed driver
basis, but when crash rates were calculated as a function of exposure
(defined by miles traveled), older drivers were at an increased crash
risk. In fact, while the average rate of fatalities in highway accidents
was 2 per 1,000 crashes, drivers between the ages of 65 to 74 had a
fatality rate of 3.2, drivers aged 75 to 84 had a fatality rate of 5.3,
and those 85 and older had a rate of 8.6 (Potts, et al., 2000).

The causes for accidents at different ages are attributable to different
factors related to one's skill and ability. Higher accident rates for
younger drivers may be due to a lack of knowledge and driving
proficiency. In fact, younger drivers tend to underestimate the risk of
potential driving hazards. Groeger and Chapman (1996) measured driving
skill for younger and older drivers using a hazard perception test in
which drivers rated the perceived danger in videotaped driving scenes.
The results showed that drivers generally evaluated the driving
situation as a function of the perceived difficulties in driving, the
dangers observed, and the uniqueness of the situations. Younger drivers
were more likely than are older drivers to perceive the danger in the
driving scenes, but underestimated the risk of these dangers relative to
older drivers.

On the other hand, older drivers suffer from impairments in information
processing. Crashes by elderly drivers have been attributable to
degradations in basic visual acuity and failure to respond to the
rapidly changing traffic situation (Ball and Owsley, 1991; Elander,
French, and West, 1993; Viano, 1990). In particular, visual detection
declines among older drivers, and this problem is exacerbated at night.
An analysis of grade crossing accidents in Texas from 1992 to 1994 found
that the frequency of elderly drivers involved in a grade crossing
accident at night was higher than their involvement in all other crashes
at night (Fambro, et al., 1995).

Staplin, Lococo, Sim, and Drapcho (1989) examined age-related
differences in visual performance for young to middle-aged drivers and
older drivers and their effect on driving. *Young to middle-aged
drivers* ranged from 18 to 49 years old, and *older drivers* ranged in
age from 65 to 80 years old. Visual performance was assessed using a
contrast sensitivity test. Participants, presented with a Landolt-C (the
target) in one of eight orientations, detected the orientation of the
gap. The target was shown in varying levels of intensity. Once
participants completed the contrast sensitivity test, they performed two
driving-related tasks. The first was a pavement-marking task, in which
participants saw nighttime roadway scenes with right- and left-bearing
curves and indicated whether they should steer right or left based on
pavement markings superimposed in the scene. The level of glare in the
scene and the brightness of the pavement marking with respect to the
background were manipulated. The second task measured the participant's
ability to read signs presented in different text sizes, text colors,
and background colors. Three types of signs were shown: *guidance* signs
printed in white lettering on a green background, *warning* signs
printed with black lettering on a yellow background, and *regulatory*
signs printed with black lettering on a white background.

Young to middle-aged drivers had higher contrast sensitivity and
performed better on the two driving-related tasks than the older
drivers. Visual contrast sensitivity differed between the age groups at
the lowest level of illumination, with young to middle-aged drivers
better able to detect the orientation of the Landolt-C at lower
contrasts than are older drivers. This diminished visual acuity affected
performance in detecting pavement markings and reading road signs. In
the pavement-marking task, older drivers required a level of contrast
approximately 20 percent greater than young to middle-age drivers.
Although glare increased the response time in both groups relative to
the no glare condition, it did so more for the older drivers than the
young to middle-aged drivers. In the sign task, young to middle-aged
drivers read the sign information at smaller mean letter sizes relative
to the older drivers. The results highlight the need for more contrast
in the roadway environment to accommodate older drivers in order for
pavement markings and road signs to be effective for all drivers.

Older drivers may also require more time to make the decision to stop or
proceed and execute that action (Staplin and Fisk, 1991). Ranney and
Pulling (1990) compared performance on a driving test for young drivers,
ranging in age 30 to 51, to that for older drivers, ranging in age from
74 to 83. The driving test involved three 30-minute trips around a
closed course. Each trip consisted of up to 20 laps around the course,
during which participants responded to variable-timed traffic signals
and route information presented on traffic signs. A secondary task
required participants to avoid moving and stationary hazards and respond
to regulatory signs. Driver performance was measured both subjectively
by in-car raters and objectively. After completing the driving task,
participants completed a series of laboratory tasks that measured
cognitive factors such as perceptual style, response speed, short-term
memory, selective attention, efficiency of attention switching, reaction
time, and risk taking. Subjective performance ratings by in-car
observers on the driving task showed that young drivers received higher
ratings than older drivers for decision speed, gap execution, route
selection, and comprehension of task instructions. Objective performance
results indicated that older drivers had longer lap times and exhibited
poorer vehicle control than the young drivers. Additionally, older
drivers were more likely to make judgment errors regarding acceptable
gap sizes by selecting gaps that were too small or avoiding gaps that
were equal or greater than the width of the car. Older drivers also had
a higher number of gap execution errors and struck objects or moved at
an excessively slow speed. The results of the laboratory cognitive tasks
were similar to the ratings and objective performance results; older
drivers showed poorer performance relative to younger drivers. In
particular, complex tasks that required the use of short-term memory and
attention switching between two sources of information showed large
performance differences between young and older drivers.

Ranney and Pulling measured drivers' gap judgments statically, without
moving vehicles. In a general driving situation, gap judgments require
integration of speed and distance information. The accuracy of these
calculations has often been evaluated in the highway-driving domain by
measuring the time between two successive vehicles accepted by drivers
(e.g., see Ebbesen, Parker, and Konecni, 1977). Results of these
evaluations showed that the accuracy of these gap estimations improved
with experience but declined with age. An analysis of overtaking
accidents in England showed that the most frequent error, passing a
vehicle when it was turning right, was committed primarily by drivers
under 25 years old and those over 60 years old. Errors committed by
younger drivers were the result of a failure of attention to the driving
environment combined with lack of skill, such as losing control after
overtaking the car. Older drivers, on the other hand, failed to wait
long enough when turning onto a road or waited too long when turning off
a road (Clarke, Forsyth, and Wright, 1998; Clarke, Ward, and Jones,
1998).

Although most of the perceptual decrements related to driving are
visual, impairments to the auditory system will reduce the alerting
effectiveness of the train horn. Approximately 30 percent of persons
aged 65 or older have some sort of hearing impairment (Department of
Health and Human Services, 2005). This hearing loss increases one's
accident risk. Accident records showed that completely deaf males were
involved in more accidents than non-deaf males, although their exposure
level was also higher (no difference for female drivers was noted).
Since the majority of older drivers are not completely deaf, of more
relevance is accident data suggesting that drivers wearing hearing aids
were involved in more accidents than their non‑hearing-impaired
counterparts. Drivers with visual loss in addition to hearing loss had
an even worse driving record than those with hearing loss only (Janke,
1994).

Staplin, et al. (2001) provides suggestions for compensating for
age-related decrements at passive grade crossings. In addition to
reflectorization of the crossbuck post, additional signs that indicate
driver action should be included (e.g., a yield sign or "Look for
Trains") and reflectorized. At illuminated crossings, the luminaries
should be aligned toward the track rather than the road. Finally, at
non-illuminated rural grade crossings, delineators should be used from
the advanced warning sign to the crossbuck to indicate the approach to
the crossing.

### Experience

As driving experience increases, the likelihood of being in an accident
decreases. Maycock, Lockwood, and Lester (1991) asked drivers in the
United Kingdom to provide information on their accident involvement over
the last 3 years, or for new drivers, their accident involvement since
they started driving. The results showed that one's likelihood of being
in an accident decreased as a function of age and experience, and this
change in accident liability was greater for younger drivers than for
older drivers, suggesting a steep learning curve for new drivers.

Much of the learning process may be in determining an efficient visual
search strategy. McKenna and Crick (1991) noted that drivers' ability to
detect hazards improves with experience. In their study, participants
watched videos of various road and traffic situations and were asked to
detect hazards by responding with a button press. Participants consisted
of novice drivers with 1--3 years of driving experience, experienced
drivers with a mean driving experience of 22 years, and expert drivers
who were driving instructors with a mean driving experience of 22 years.
The results of the task showed that expert drivers responded to hazards
the fastest and novice drivers the slowest. Expert drivers detected
hazards from a greater distance than novice drivers did and missed fewer
incidents. The results suggest that expert drivers were better able to
scan the entire driving scene because of their increased experience
whereas novice drivers tended to focus on areas close to their vehicles.
The expert drivers also performed better than the experienced group,
despite the same number of years of driving experience. Because the
expert group was exposed to many weeks of intensive training, some of
which was aimed at improving their hazard perception, the results
suggest that this skill can be improved with additional instruction.

Crundall and Underwood (1998) noted differences in visual sampling as a
function of experience. Participants, wearing an eye tracker, drove a
20-minute route on three road types that imposed different levels of
visual demand: a rural single lane road; a suburban road through a small
village; and a busy road with two lanes of forward moving traffic with
traffic merging on the left. Novice drivers had 2 years or less of
driving experience and experienced drivers had approximately nine years.
Experienced drivers adapted their sampling strategies by looking at more
locations but spending less time at each location for the visually
demanding roads (i.e., the busy road and the suburban road), but novice
drivers did not.

Similar results were observed by Pradhan, et al. (2005) when they
compared novice drivers' scanning behavior to that of more experienced
drivers in their abilities to acquire and respond to risk-relevant
information. Novice drivers who had less than six months of driving
experience and two groups of experienced drivers (young drivers between
19--24 years old and older drivers between 60--75 years old) navigated
through scenarios in a driving simulator. The scenarios presented
drivers with risk-relevant information such as warning signs, traffic
control devices, pedestrians, and other vehicles. Behavior was measured
through eye movements to determine where drivers looked and through
observations of driver actions, such as failing to stop at a stop sign.
The results showed that experienced drivers engaged in behaviors that
indicated their recognition of the risk potential in the scenarios
significantly more than novice drivers, with older, experienced drivers
engaging in these behaviors significantly more than younger, experienced
drivers. The scanning behavior of novice drivers indicated their failure
to obtain risk-relevant information and as a consequence, they were
unable to respond appropriately.

Taken together, these results suggest that detection of grade crossings
and trains will improve with driving experience. The countermeasures
proposed by Staplin, et al. (2001) to call older drivers' attention to
passive grade crossings might also be effective for the inexperienced
driver. The important point to note is that with increased experience,
noncompliance with grade crossings due to a lack of skill will decrease.

### Driver Distractions

Distractions are a common component in driving. The NTSB (1998) reported
that driver distractions were the primary cause or a contributing factor
in 20 percent of the passive grade crossing accidents analyzed. Internal
distractions included adjusting the stereo system or talking to
passengers. Traffic-related distractions included road intersections and
traffic, which drew attention away from the grade crossing.

Little research has been conducted specifically examining the role
driver distractions cause in grade crossing accidents. More data is
available regarding the role of distractions in the general driving
situation. Stutts, et al. (2005) collected video data of behavior inside
the vehicle and found that drivers engaged one or more potentially
distracting activities 14.5 percent of the time when the vehicles were
moving. The activities drivers engaged in differed depending on whether
the vehicle was stopped or moving, suggesting that drivers chose to
engage in certain activities at "safer" times during driving.

In a larger study of in-vehicle driver behavior, 100 drivers in the
northern Virginia/Washington DC Metro area were observed for 1 year to
better understand the cause of crashes and develop effective
countermeasures to prevent them. One hundred vehicles were equipped with
video cameras and sensor systems to monitor events in and around the
vehicle. In the 1-year observation period, drivers in the study were
involved in 82 crashes (defined as any contact between the vehicle and
another vehicle, object, person, or animal), 761 near crashes (any
conflict situation requiring a rapid evasive maneuver), and 8,295
incidents (a conflict requiring an evasive maneuver but not as serious
as a near crash). Driver inattention was measured by secondary task
distractions, inattention to the forward roadway, drowsiness, and other
non‑driving related eye glances. Of these four categories, secondary
task distractions contributed to the highest percentage of crash and
near crash events. In particular, use of wireless devices, such as cell
phones and personal digital assistants, accounted for the highest
frequency of distractions followed by passenger-related inattention
(e.g., conversations) and internal distractions (Dingus, et al., 2006;
Neale, et al., 2005).

The results addressing the impact of distractions on highway driving
suggest that distractions could have a significant impact on driver
behavior at grade crossings. Drivers distracted by another task may not
realize they are approaching a grade crossing (particularly a passive
crossing), fail to attend to activated warning devices, or fail to
detect an approaching train. The distracted driver may be especially
susceptible to the hazards at grade crossings; however, the amount of
increased risk is not known.

### Driver Impairment

The roles of alcohol use and fatigue have been noted as contributing
factors to highway accidents, and it is believed that they play a role
in a significant number of grade crossing accidents as well (Lerner, et
al., 1990). In fact, an accident analysis of grade crossing accidents in
Texas from 1992 to 1994 by Fambro, et al. (1995) showed that driver
impairment as a result of alcohol use, drugs, medication, or fatigue
accounted for 14 percent of crashes in that time period. Although these
factors have been studied extensively to measure their effects on human
performance, little information was available specifically regarding
their impact on driver performance at grade crossings.

##### Alcohol Use {#alcohol-use .Style-Heading-5-+-12-pt}

With respect to alcohol use, the accident analysis conducted by Klein,
et al. (1994) reported that the rate of alcohol involvement in grade
crossing crashes (67 percent) from 1975 to 1992 was similar to the rate
of alcohol involvement in highway crashes (66 percent) for that same
time period. A more recent comparison was not available. An examination
of highway statistics showed that in 2004, alcohol use (defined by a
blood-alcohol level of 0.10 or greater) contributed to 7 percent of all
traffic crashes and 39 percent of the total traffic fatalities, a 2.4
percent decrease from 2003 and a 4 percent reduction in the ten-year
period from 1994. The incidence of alcohol-related crashes was five
times greater at night (16 percent) than during the day (3 percent).
Additionally, young drivers were more likely to be involved in an
alcohol-related crash than older drivers; drivers aged 21 to 24 years
old accounted for the highest percentage (32 percent) of fatal crashes
followed by drivers aged 25 to 34 (27 percent) (NHTSA, 2005).

While the legal blood-alcohol level nationwide is 0.01, driving skills
are impaired at moderate departures from a blood-alcohol level of zero.
In a review of the literature from 1981 to 1997 regarding the effects of
alcohol use on driving related skills, Moskowitz and Fiorentino (2000)
reported that one's ability to divide attention to perform two
concurrent tasks may become impaired at a blood-alcohol level as low as
0.005, the ability to track an object becomes impaired with a
blood-alcohol level of 0.02, perceptual abilities are impaired at a
blood-alcohol level of 0.03, and reaction time at levels of 0.04.

Several countermeasures have been implemented to reduce the rate of
alcohol-related crashes. Many of these countermeasures consisted of
legislation addressing the legal blood-alcohol level. A majority of
states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico lowered the legal
blood-alcohol level from 0.10 to 0.08 and noted declines in
alcohol-related fatal crashes as a result. Additionally, zero-tolerance
laws setting the legal blood-alcohol level between 0.00 to 0.02 for
drivers younger than 21 years old have led to a 20 percent decline in
fatal crashes for drivers in that age group. In Maine, a law lowering
the legal blood alcohol level to 0.05 for drivers previously convicted
of driving under the influence (DUI) significantly reduced the number of
fatal crashes for this group.

Legislation has also provided for immediate punishment of DUI offenses.
Laws allowing for immediate license suspension at the time of arrest for
first-time and repeat DUI offenders reduced alcohol-related fatal
crashes and repeat DUI offenses. However, up to 75 percent of drivers
with suspended licenses continued to drive. Also, impounding or
immobilizing vehicles for repeat DUI offenders resulted in lower
recidivism rates.

Public information campaigns, such as high school and college prevention
programs and community initiatives to prevent drinking and driving, have
also been successful in reducing the number of fatal crashes, the number
of alcohol-related fatal crashes, and the number of traffic injuries.
Additionally, interventions in emergency rooms with patients injured in
alcohol-related crashes reduced future drinking and emergency room
re-admission. Finally, breath alcohol ignition interlock devices that
prevent vehicle operation if the drivers' blood-alcohol level is above a
predetermined level has lowered the recidivism rate, although the
long-term effects on driver behavior after the interlocks have been
removed, are unclear (National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and
Alcoholism, 2001).

##### Fatigue {#fatigue .Style-Heading-5-+-12-pt}

Fatigue has a similar effect on driving skill as alcohol use, resulting
in deficiencies in information processing, reduced vigilance, and slower
reaction times. While it is not possible to attribute with certainty the
cause of a crash to drowsy driving, NHTSA estimates that
100,000 police-reported crashes are attributable to driver fatigue. The
National Sleep Foundation's 2005 Sleep in America poll reported that 60
percent of adult drivers indicated that they have driven while fatigued
in the past year; this is a significant increase of approximately 8
percent from the past three years. Additionally, 37 percent of drivers
indicated that they have nodded off or fallen asleep while at the wheel,
and of these drivers, 13 percent indicated that they did so at least
once a month. In fact, 4 percent indicated that they had an accident or
near accident attributable to drowsy driving (National Sleep Foundation,
2005). Dingus, et al. (2006) reported that drowsiness was a contributing
factor in 12 percent of crashes and 10 percent of near crashes in their
observations of 100 drivers over 1-year; this rate is higher than the
2--4 percent estimate for fatigue-related accidents in existing crash
databases.

Most drowsy driving accidents occurred in the nighttime, after midnight,
with a smaller peak in the midafternoon. Three driver groups are
especially at risk. First are young drivers, and in particular males,
between the ages of 16 and 29 years old. Accident data indicated that
young drivers under 30 years old accounted for almost 66 percent of
fatigue-related crashes and were four times more likely to be involved
in such a crash than drivers over 30. Additionally, male drivers were
involved in 75 percent of crashes in which the driver fell asleep at the
wheel, and were 5 times more likely than females to be involved in a
fatigue-related crash. The second at-risk group is shift workers, who
because of continuous disruptions in their sleep schedule, are at an
increased risk of sleepiness. Rotating shifts, such as working four or
more day or evening shifts and four night shifts or more within a
1-month period, are particularly disrupting to sleep. In fact, studies
of nurses have found that those who work a rotating schedule reported
more vehicle, on-the job, and near-miss accidents than nurses on other
schedules, and 95 percent of night nurses working a 12-hour shirt
reported having had an accident or near-miss while driving home from
work. Finally, a third at-risk group is those with untreated sleep
disorders, such as sleep apnea and narcolepsy. Note that while these
sleep conditions put the drivers at risk for drowsy-driving accidents,
there is no link between these sleep disorders and impaired driving
(NHTSA, 1997).

Countermeasures include getting a sufficient amount of sleep, avoiding
alcohol when sleepy, and limiting driving between the hours of midnight
to 6 a.m. When a driver becomes sleepy, it is important to stop driving
and take a short nap or consume caffeine equivalent to two cups of
coffee. Other steps to improve alertness when sleepy, such as listening
to the radio or opening a window, have not been sufficiently
demonstrated. The use of rumble strips, placed on high-speed rural
roads, reduced the number of crashes in which a drowsy driver steered a
vehicle off road, but no study has evaluated their effectiveness in
preventing drowsy driving crashes in other situations. Public
information campaigns that target the at-risk groups may be beneficial
(NHTSA, 1997).

## Driving Style

One's choice of driving style is a reflection of drivers' perception of
the dangers at grade crossings. In general, drivers have a low
expectancy for encountering a train at a grade crossing. The decision to
comply is often weighed with the "costs" for doing so. For example, if
drivers are in a hurry, they may be tempted to ignore the flashing
lights. In fact, over 80 percent of grade crossing fatalities occur at
active crossings because drivers ignored the warning device (Savage,
2006).

The discussion regarding the effect of driving style on grade crossing
behavior focuses on the role of expectancy, the perceived costs for
compliance, and risk perception and risk-taking behavior. These three
factors will be moderated by gender differences and age, as addressed
below. Proposed countermeasures for changing driving style are also
discussed, but it is important to note that driving style is an
expression of one's personality, so it will be more difficult to change
than driving skill.

### Expectancy

Expectancy guides attention and determines when and where drivers look
for trains. Drivers who are familiar with a crossing have an expectancy
about the likelihood of encountering a train at that crossing. If
expectancy is low, then the driver who is familiar with the crossing
will be *less* likely to detect a train at that crossing than a driver
who is unfamiliar with the crossing or a driver who frequently
encounters trains at that crossing (Lerner, et al., 1990). In fact,
grade crossing accidents were committed more frequently by drivers
familiar with the area than unfamiliar drivers (Abraham, et al., 1998).

In general, drivers do not expect to encounter a train at a grade
crossing. Minnesota residents participating in a focus group reported
that while they encountered grade crossings regularly, they usually did
not meet a train (Dolan, 1996). This low expectancy is reinforced each
time the driver passes the crossing without encountering a train, and as
a result, drivers tended to underestimate the frequency of a train at a
crossing by a factor of two or three (NTSB, 1998). In the general
driving situation, low expectancies of other vehicles were a significant
factor in highway accidents (Triggs, 1988). Additionally, attention to
road signs is based on perceived importance; drivers who pass warning
signs frequently without being required to take any action have less
motivation to use the information provided by the sign and other
comparable signs (Rumar, 1990). Thus, a low expectancy and low frequency
of trains at grade crossings may cause drivers to simply disregard the
warning signs.

Observations of driver behavior at grade crossings have shown that many
drivers fail to even look for a train and make no head movements at the
crossing. Åberg (1988) reported that of 584 drivers observed at 16
active grade crossings in Sweden, 60 percent of drivers made no head
movements at all. Only 25 percent of the drivers looked both ways at the
crossing, 10 percent looked in the direction in which visibility was
less restricted, and 5 percent looked in the direction in which
visibility was more restricted. Because Åberg observed behavior at
active grade crossings, it can be argued that drivers did not need to
look for trains since the warning devices at the crossing would provide
information regarding approaching trains. However, observations of
driver looking behavior at passive grade crossings have shown similar
results. In the study by Wigglesworth (2001), described in Section
3.1.1.2, the results of observations at one passive crossing indicated
that 37 percent of drivers made no head movements, and the results of
observations at a second crossing where visible enforcement was present,
found that 44 percent of drivers made no head movements. Enhancing the
conspicuity of the warning devices, advising drivers on the action to
take, and orienting drivers' attention toward trains could improve
compliance.

Drivers not only have a low expectancy of trains but also have a low
expectancy of encountering a grade crossing (Mortimer, 1988). In the
study by Wilde, Hay, and Brites (1987) described in Section 3.1.3.3,
measurements of driving speed showed high variability, suggesting that
drivers only realized they were approaching a crossing only when they
were close to it. This variability in approach speeds may result in
rear-end crashes (Mortimer, 1988).

### Costs of Compliance

When a train arrives at a grade crossing, drivers are usually not
motivated to stop because of the potential for delay (Lerner and Ratte,
1990; Mortimer, 1988). Drivers participating in a focus group examining
driver attitudes towards grade crossings indicated that they would cross
the tracks in front of an approaching train if they thought there was
enough time to cross safely because they viewed waiting for a train as
an unwelcome delay. Even fairly minor delays perceived as being long
(Global Exchange, 1994). This concern for time delays due to long
warning times and false alarms may cause drivers to speed up on their
approach to the crossing when the signals are not activated. This way,
if the signal becomes activated, they can violate the grade crossing in
the first few seconds after the signal activation, or they have enough
time to violate the crossing after stopping first.

### Risk Perception and Risk Taking

Drivers often do not perceive risk at grade crossings (Dolan, 1996;
Lerner, et al., 1990). This may be the result of a misperception of
potential crossing hazards (e.g., drivers are often not aware when sight
distance is limited) attributable to past experiences with grade
crossings. Additionally, even if risk is perceived, the driver may still
choose to accept a level of risk that leads to unsafe driving behaviors
(Lerner, et al., 1990). In fact, Witte and Donohue (1998) reported that
approximately 10 to 20 percent of drivers are likely to exhibit risky
behavior at grade crossings. In their study, 1200 Michigan residents,
ranging in age from 15 to 68 years old, were surveyed to determine their
perception of being involved in a grade crossing accident. Most drivers
reported that they would comply with grade crossings; 80 percent of the
respondents indicated that they would err on the side of caution at
grade crossings, and 40 percent indicated that they would not violate a
gated crossing even if there was no sign of a train. Of concern,
however, was that 14 percent of drivers said they would violate a gated
crossing with a train in sight, and 10 percent of drivers considered it
exciting to beat the train across the tracks. Although these risk
seekers understood that their risky driving behavior put them at an
increased risk of a grade crossing accident, prior close calls at grade
crossings also biased their judgments about their abilities to
successfully beat the train again.

McKenna, Stanier, and Lewis (1991) attribute this belief to an illusion
of control, in which drivers enhance their own abilities and believe
they are more proficient than they really are. In fact, drivers
generally believe that they are less likely to be involved in an
accident than the "average" driver. Additionally, drivers may attempt to
"beat the train" because they are optimistic and overconfident about
their abilities to avoid a grade crossing accident. In fact, drivers are
generally optimistic with regards to their skill, safe driving behavior,
and accident risk relative to the average driver (DeJoy, 1989).

Several theories have attempted to explain driver behavior as a function
of the level of risk the driver is willing to accept. *Risk homeostasis*
models propose that drivers behave in a way to maintain an acceptable
level of risk, adjusting their behavior based on their perceived
subjective risk of an accident. Thus, countermeasures may not have the
desired effect because drivers may "compensate" for safety improvements
in traffic with less cautious driving to maintain risk at a constant
level. For example, in the study by Ward and Wilde (1996), discussed in
Section 3.2, drivers slowed when they approached a grade crossing with
limited sight visibility because they realized that their view was
restricted and were motivated to search for hazards, but when the sight
obstruction was cleared, drivers increased their approach speed based on
the perceived safety benefit of clearing the obstructions.
*Risk-threshold* models, also called zero-risk models, propose that
drivers attempt to maintain a level of zero risk. Drivers compensate
when their level of perceived risk exceeds a threshold; for example, in
the general driving situation, when the distance between one's car and a
lead vehicle decreases (Näätänen and Summala, 1974; Summala, 1996).
Finally, *risk avoidance* models propose that drivers behave to make
progress towards a goal (e.g., a destination); actions selected in
response to potentially aversive events are based on weighting the
rewards or punishment. "Learned riskiness" results when the driver is
continuously rewarded for progressively risky behavior. One example from
the grade crossing situation is risk taking in response to expectations
that there will be no train (Fuller, 1984, 1992).

Risk taking may also be the result of social pressure. Drivers'
intentions to engage in risky behavior is not only based on their
attitudes about the outcomes of that behavior but also based on their
perception of social norms associated with those behaviors (Parker, et
al., 1992). For example, in the survey conducted by Witte and Donohue,
30 percent of drivers indicated they would violate a gated crossing if
no train was in sight if they saw another driver do so. In fact, drivers
who regularly commit violations assume that their behavior is common and
accepted. Manstead, et al. (1992) evaluated drivers' perception of
social consensus for their actions using a questionnaire in which
drivers indicated their frequency of committing driving errors and
violations and their perception of how frequently other drivers
committed these same errors and violations. Drivers who reported that
they regularly committed errors and violations made higher estimates of
the percentage of others who regularly engaged in that behavior than
those who did not regularly commit errors and violations. On the other
hand, drivers who did not frequently commit errors and violations tended
to underestimate the occurrence of the negative behavior. Providing
consensus information in campaigns to improve driving behavior may help
those who routinely drive in a dangerous manner understand that their
behavior is not as common as they imagine it to be.

Other studies examining drivers' motivations for violating general
traffic laws find that drivers who reported that they regularly commit
errors and violations showed a reduced perception of committing a
violation or may simply accept a higher level of risk than other
drivers. These drivers also showed less concern about how other drivers
perceived their driving or the consequences of risky driving
(Adams-Guppy and Guppy, 1995; Evans and Wasielewski, 1982; Palamara and
Stevenson, 2003; Parker, et al., 1990; Parker, et al., 1995; Reason, et
al., 1990). These same motivating factors influence the behavior of
drivers who commit violations at grade crossings, so it is not
surprising that Hughes, Stewart, and Rodgman (1999) found that drivers
who committed traffic violations were also more likely to commit
violations at grade crossings. In their study, a video ticketing system
installed at one gated crossing along North Carolina's Sealed Corridor
captured photographs of drivers at the crossing (the use of this system
for photo enforcement will be discussed in more detail in section 5.3).
The driving history of drivers who violated the grade crossing was
compared to those of a general population of drivers who regularly used
the crossing. The video cameras captured 64 instances of drivers
violating lowered gate arms as a train approached. These drivers were
classified as "violators" for the purposes of the study and were
identified through photographs taken of the rear license plate of the
violating vehicle and driver photographs taken of the front window of
the vehicle. Hughes, et al. obtained the driving history for the two
groups of drivers through the North Carolina Department of Motor
Vehicles and mailed a questionnaire addressing issues related to risk
perception and risk taking as related to grade crossings and general
traffic situations to "violators" and the general grade crossing users.
A comparison of driving history for the two groups found that
"violators" were more likely to have prior speeding violations than
general grade crossing users, with a non-significant trend towards a
higher number of traffic violations and crashes. The questionnaire
results indicated that these "violators" were more likely to find
risk-taking exciting and considered trying to "beat the train" at grade
crossings as less risky than the general population of drivers. The
"violators" also had a limited view of the potential risk of violating
grade crossings to those other than themselves.

### Moderating Factors: Gender Differences and Age

Attitudes in driving style may be moderated by gender differences and
age. As noted earlier, males are involved in more accidents than females
(Elander, et al., 1993; Klein, et al., 1994; Palamara and Stevenson,
2003; Reason, et al., 1990). In their analysis of FARS data, Klein, et
al. (1994) reported that male drivers were involved in 77 percent of
fatal grade crossing crashes, a statistic similar to their level of
involvement in fatal highway crashes. Similarly, observations of
violations at actively protected grade crossings by Abraham, et al.
(1998), described above in Section 3.1.3.1, showed that male drivers
committed more violations than female drivers (64 percent and 36
percent, respectively) and had a higher number of violations in all five
severity categories than females.

The higher violation rate for male drivers may be attributable to their
greater willingness to take risks, even at grade crossings, than female
drivers. An analysis of grade crossing accidents in Texas from 1992 to
1994 reported that males were involved in more accidents than females in
which trying to beat the train was a primary contributing factor
(Fambro, et al., 1995). Similarly, Witte and Donohue (1998) found that
the "risk seekers" in their survey were more likely to be male than
female. In the general highway-driving situation, males were more likely
to be involved in accidents caused by intentional violation of traffic
laws (e.g., the result of speeding, drunk-driving, and risky driving)
than female drivers. In a study conducted by Reason, et al. (1990),
drivers completed a questionnaire in which they indicated the frequency
with which they committed different errors and violations while driving.
Errors were considered *unintentional*, resulting from incorrect
judgments or failures in information processing, whereas violations were
*deliberate* deviations from safe practices, such as exceeding the speed
limit or running red lights. Driver self-reports indicated that males
had more violations than females, whereas females were more prone to
errors and harmless lapses during driving.

The effect of gender on accident type may be the result of differing
attitudes towards driving violations. Parker, et al. (1992) found that
male drivers were less concerned with the negative outcomes of
committing violations than female drivers and found it more difficult to
resist committing violations. In the study, participants were presented
with four driving scenarios that depicted their commission of a
violation: drunk-driving, speeding, close following, and dangerous
overtaking. Based on the information in the scenarios, participants made
judgments of their likelihood of exhibiting the behavior; the perception
of that behavior by their significant others, family members, friends,
law enforcement officials, other drivers on the road, and the "typical
young male driver;" their evaluation of the outcome; their motivation to
comply; the level of control over committing the violation; their
intention; and attitude. While participants viewed all four violations
as being negative, they considered speeding as being less negative than
the other three types of violations. Additionally, participants' ratings
indicated that they considered the negative consequences of committing
the violations to have more costs than benefits. However, the data
showed a trend for males to consider the outcomes of the violations as
less costly than female drivers and to have weaker intentions to resist
committing the violation. With respect to speeding, male drivers tended
to view the risk of negative outcomes (e.g., receiving a ticket or being
involved in an accident) as less likely than female drivers, considered
putting the lives of others at risk through their actions as less
negative than female drivers, and felt more pressure from their same-sex
friends to speed than females.

The pattern of results reported for male drivers was similar to that
found for young drivers. In the study conducted by Reason, et al., the
rate of violations decreased with age whereas the rate of errors did
not. Parker, et al. reported that young drivers were not as aware of or
as concerned with the negative outcomes of driving violations as older
drivers, and were more focused on the potentially positive outcomes,
such as getting to a destination on time. Personal values influenced
young drivers' motivation to comply with traffic laws more than external
factors such as punishment. Young drivers indicated that they were more
likely to commit the violations than older drivers and perceived the
outcomes of committing the violations as less negative than older
drivers. Additionally, young drivers perceived more approval from their
peers for speeding, close following, and overtaking, than older drivers,
and found it more difficult to resist committing those violations than
older drivers.

In the grade crossing domain, the analysis by Klein, et al. (1994) noted
that the greatest proportion of fatal accidents were attributed to
drivers aged 25 to 34, but the accident rate for the 16 to 20 group (17
percent) was still fairly high, especially considering that this age
group only included only a 5-year time span. While lack of experience
may partially account for the high accident rate, the results of Reason,
et al. (1990) and Parker, et al. (1993) show that the attitudes of young
drivers must also be considered. Young drivers' aggressive driving style
can be seen in the grade crossing domain. Fambro, et al. (1995) found
that young drivers between the ages of 16 to 24 years old were involved
in significantly more accidents where driving around the gates was a
contributing factor.

Since young drivers are more susceptible to perceived peer pressure than
older drivers, campaigns that stress the disapproval of their friends
and significant others may be effective at changing their attitudes
towards committing violations. At the same time, educational materials
and programs that highlight the negative consequences of risky driving
behavior and indicate that the positive outcomes are insignificant or
less likely to occur than they believe may be beneficial. Finally, it is
important to convince young drivers that the decision whether or not to
commit a violation is something that they control (Parker, et al., 1992,
1995).

## Summary

Limitations in information processing due to age, lack of experience,
driver distractions, or driver impairment contribute to noncompliance at
grade crossings. In general, the effects of age and experience are
coupled. Younger drivers tended to have less skill and underestimated
the risk of potential driving hazards (Groeger and Chapman, 1996),
leading to an increased chance of being involved in an accident
(Maycock, et al., 1991). With increased experience, drivers adopted a
more efficient visual sampling strategy and looked at more locations
than less experienced drivers (Crundall and Underwood, 1998) and were
better able to detect hazards (McKenna and Crick, 1991). However, the
benefits of experience decline with age. Age-related decrements in
visual acuity (e.g., in contrast sensitivity) hinders the ability of
older drivers to detect cues to a grade crossing, particularly at night,
and read warning signs on the approach to the crossing (Staplin, et al.,
1989). Additionally, older drivers tended to be less accurate than
younger drivers in integrating speed and distance information to
determine acceptable gap times (Clarke, Forsyth, and Wright, 1998;
Clarke, Ward, and Jones, 1998) and thus were more likely to make errors
estimating the speed and arrival time of the train at the grade
crossing. Countermeasures to improve compliance among elderly drivers
and less-experienced drivers include techniques for facilitating
detection of the crossing at night (e.g., reflectorizing trackside
objects) and installing additional signs at the crossing to indicate the
action required (Staplin, et al., 2001).

The effects of distraction during driving and driver impairment due to
alcohol use or fatigue are similar. Drivers may not realize that they
are approaching a grade crossing, fail to attend to the warning device,
or fail to detect a train. Much of the research addressing the effects
of driver distractions or impairment has been conducted in the general
highway-driving situation. Although it is acknowledged that these
factors leave drivers exposed to the hazards at grade crossings, the
amount of increased risk is unknown.

Drivers' failures to comply at grade crossing may also be attributable
to their biases and attitudes towards compliance and their perception of
the dangers at grade crossings. Drivers had low expectancies for
encountering a train at a crossing (Dolan, 1996; NTSB, 1998), and some
drivers did not even look for a train at a crossing (Åberg, 1988;
Wigglesworth, 2001). The low expectation for trains is reinforced each
time the driver passes a crossing without meeting a train at that
crossing. Consequently, drivers who were familiar with the crossing were
involved in more grade crossing incidents than drivers who were not
(Abraham, et al., 1998).

Compliance must also be weighed with its costs; stopping for a train
will result in delays, and drivers perceived even fairly minor delays to
be long (Global Exchange, 1994). Unfortunately, some drivers find
noncompliant behavior exciting. Witte and Donohue (1998) reported that
14 percent of drivers surveyed in their study would attempt to violate
lowered gates, even with a train in sight. These "risk seekers"
understood the risks of their behavior, but they were optimistic about
their chances of beating the train, because of prior close calls and
also possibly to overconfidence of their abilities (DeJoy, 1989;
McKenna, et al., 1991). Social factors and the perceived acceptance of
that behavior may also influence this risk-taking behavior (Parker, et
al., 1992; Manstead, et al., 1992). For example, drivers will be more
willing to violate a crossing if they see another driver do so (Witte
and Donohue, 1998).

These attitudes in driving style are moderated by gender differences and
age; the tendency to commit violations and the reasons for committing
the violations is similar for male drivers and young drivers. Male
drivers committed more violations at grade crossings than female drivers
(Abraham, et al., 1998) and were involved in more grade crossing
accidents than female drivers (Klein et al., 1994), particularly when
attempting to beat the train was a contributing factor (Fambro, et al.,
1995). Young drivers have a more aggressive driving style than older
drivers and were involved in significantly more accidents due to
violating gated crossings as a result (Fambro, et al., 1995). In both
cases, noncompliance may be attributable to differing attitudes
regarding driving violations. In the general driving situation, male
drivers and young drivers were less concerned with the negative outcomes
of committing violations, viewed the risk of a negative outcome as being
less likely, and found it more difficult to resist committing those
violations than their counterparts (Parker, et al., 1992).
Countermeasures such as information campaigns to highlight the negative
consequences of committing a violation and to emphasize that the driver
can exert self-control to resist committing a violation may be
beneficial in changing driver attitudes (Parker, et al., 1992, 1995).

# Organizational/Management Behavior

The U.S. DOT provides funding to each state to eliminate hazards at
public grade crossings through Title 23 United States Code (23 USC)
Section 130 (called "Section 130 funds"), under the guidance of
legislation specified in the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient
Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users (SAFETEA-LU). Each state
determines how to allocate the funds by identifying which public
crossings need improvements and what improvements to make, but
coordination among management and different organizations at the
federal, state, and local levels is necessary for implementation. This
is particularly difficult in the railroad industry where a number of
different agencies are involved and various authorities exercise
jurisdiction. Railroad companies own the tracks and the property on
either side of the tracks (i.e., the rights-of-way). They install the
tracks and are responsible for the maintenance of those tracks, the
roadway between and around the rails, and the traffic control devices at
the crossing. Public or private entities own the roadway at a grade
crossing. Public agencies such as a municipality, county, or state
agency exercise jurisdiction of and maintain public crossings. On the
other hand, private parties own private crossings, which are usually
located on roadways that the public does not use.

This section discusses coordination issues and collaborative efforts
among federal, state, and local agencies in improving safety at grade
crossings. The section addresses the coordination between federal,
state, and local agencies in identifying which crossings to improve, the
need for communication between railroad and highway engineers to
interconnect highway traffic signals and grade crossing warning devices
to prevent vehicles from being trapped on the tracks when trains
approach, and the collaborative efforts between state agencies, railroad
companies, and industry to improve grade crossing safety through
intelligent transportation systems (ITS) technologies.

## Identifying Crossings for Improvements

To assist states in determining which crossings are in need of
improvement, the FRA maintains a crossing inventory and
accident/incident database of public and private grade crossings that
can be used in conjunction with individual state databases. However, the
FRA inventory is incomplete and sometimes inaccurate because no rule
mandates the reporting of grade crossing inventory information. Rather,
states and railroads voluntarily submit entries into the FRA database.
As a result, transit-related grade crossings maintained by the FTA are
often not included in the FRA database due to incompatibilities between
the two systems, and information regarding the warning devices used at
grade crossings has been found to be missing or inaccurate (Bowman and
Colson, 1994; Office of Inspector General, 2004).

There is also inconsistency across states for determining which
crossings to improve. Whereas most states consider the train volume,
traffic volume, and accident history, many do not consider physical
characteristics of the crossing that contribute to safety, such as
crossing angle, sight distance, curvature, or nearby intersections.
Several organizations and agencies provide guidelines and standards
addressing highway or railroad design to assist highway engineers for
improving the safety at grade crossings (e.g., *A Policy on Geometric
Design of Highways and Streets*, AASHTO, 2004; *Guidance on Traffic
Control Devices at Highway-Rail Grade Crossings*, FHWA, 2002; MUTCD,
FHWA, 2003; *Railroad--Highway Grade Crossing Handbook--Revised Second
Edition 2007*, FHWA, 2007). However, each state and locality still has
the flexibility to develop designs for each grade crossing
independently. As a result, the process for building, maintaining, and
inspecting grade crossings and controlling the traffic at the crossings
is inconsistent from one state to another (US DOT, 1996). In fact, the
NTSB (1998) reported that the grade crossing characteristics for 54 of
the 60 accidents in their study did not conform to at least one of the
applicable standards and guidelines. Thus, a standardized accident
prediction formula that includes all variables determined by research to
be valuable in evaluating the safety of a grade crossing may be useful
(NTSB, 1998).

Coordination between state and local agencies, railroad companies,
highway engineers, and the public may be necessary to implement the
crossing improvements. For example, the most effective countermeasure
for passive grade crossings is consolidation through closure or grade
separation by constructing bridges or overpasses, but proposals to
consolidate or close grade crossings have met with resistance from the
general public, who are concerned about its impact on emergency response
times, traffic delays, the neighborhood, and convenience (Office of the
Inspector General, 2004). In fact, representatives from railroad
agencies have reported that only one out of 15 crossings proposed for
closure actually succeeds due to public objections (NTSB, 1998).

States have taken different approaches to facilitating crossing closure
or consolidation. In Missouri, a task force of representatives from
county and municipal governments, state agencies, and railroad companies
informed constituents of the state's reasons for consolidating or
closing crossings and offered constituents the opportunity to voice
their concerns (NTSB, 1998). In North Carolina, the Rail Division of the
State Department of Transportation worked with municipalities to
evaluate traffic patterns and establish a method for implementing
improvements, while engineering consultants examined train and vehicle
traffic and the economic impact of the closing. The recommendations were
then presented to the public for comment (Judge, 2005). As a result of
their efforts, both states have reported success in facilitating
crossing closures.

## Interconnection of Traffic Signals

The preemption of traffic signals at intersections near grade crossings
prevents traffic queues at the intersection from extending into the
grade crossing by allowing vehicles stopped on the tracks in response to
at a red light at a nearby intersection, to be cleared from the tracks
and prevents vehicles stopped for the train from queuing back into
nearby intersections blocking the traffic flow. The failure to
coordinate the timing of highway and railroad signal systems was called
to the public's attention on October 25, 1995, when an Illinois commuter
train collided with a school bus, stopped on the tracks, at Fox River
Grove, Illinois. The bus, stopped for a red light, did not completely
clear the tracks; the rear of the bus extended about three feet into the
commuter train's path. The NTSB determined that while the probable cause
of the accident was the fact that the bus driver had stopped the school
bus on the railroad tracks, the failure by the state to take sufficient
action to prevent vehicles from stopping on the railroad tracks at that
intersection was a contributing factor (NTSB, 1996). In fact, tests
conducted by the NTSB after the accident, showed that that while the
active warning devices at the crossing provided the required minimum 20
second warning time before the approach of a train (FHWA, 2003), in
approximately 50 percent of the trials, the traffic lights provided 10
seconds or less clearance time for vehicles at the highway intersection
to clear the tracks.

Signal preemption requires coordination by the railroad companies, local
and state transportation departments, light rail transit agencies, and
regulatory authorities. In particular, both highway and railroad
agencies must work together to ensure the appropriate timing of signals.
Poor communication between these modal agencies has led to problems
integrating highway and rail traffic control devices, such as adequate
information regarding traffic flow (Caird, et al., 2002).

Preemption of traffic signals near grade crossings is complex and the
design of the warning systems must be customized for each specific
location to take into account the unique conditions. To ensure that
there is sufficient time for vehicles to vacate the track when a train
is approaching, calculations of maximum preemption time considers three
parameters:

1.  the time needed following the start of the preemption sequence for
    traffic signals to complete the transfer of the right-of-way to the
    grade crossing warning signal,

2.  the time for vehicles stopped within the minimum track clearance
    distance to move through the crossing, and

3.  the time the minimum track clearance distance must be clear of
    vehicles prior to the train's arrival.

Simultaneous preemption, in which the highway traffic signal and
railroad active warning devices are notified at the same time of an
approaching train, may be used when maximum preemption time is equal or
less than the minimum warning time. If the maximum preemption is greater
than the warning time, then advance preemption, in which the traffic
signal provides notification of an approaching train before the grade
crossing warning device, may be necessary. Once signal preemption is
implemented, ensuring continued compliance of the interconnected system
may require joint inspections by the appropriate rail and highway
authorities. For example, rail inspectors may consider grade crossing
warning signals to perform effectively without considering the highway
traffic demands. Conversely, highway engineers may consider highway
traffic signals to perform adequately without considering rail
operations (Bremer and Ward, 1997; FHWA, 2002; U.S. DOT, 1996).

Preemption practices vary widely. The MUTCD recommends that signal
preemption be considered when the distance between the grade crossing
and a signalized intersection is less than 200 ft (60 m) (FHWA, 2003).
The *Railroad-Highway Grade Crossing Handbook--Revised Second Edition*
(FHWA, 2007) recommends signal preemption at grade crossings near
highway intersections that lead to either of the following two
conditions (FHWA, 2007):

-   The potential for highway traffic queues to extend across a nearby
    rail crossing; or

-   The potential that traffic queue from a nearby downstream grade
    crossing could interfere with the signalized highway intersection.

Additional guidance on signal preemption is provided in the *Preemption
of Traffic Signals NearRailroad Crossings: An ITE Recommended Practice*
(ITE, 2006).

Different states have taken different approaches to preemption and
coordination. Michigan and South Carolina reported success with
pre-signals; these are traffic signals upstream of the standard highway
traffic signals controlling the intersection. In Michigan, the use of
pre-signals made additional pre-emption unnecessary, and in South
Carolina, enforcement of pre-signals actually encouraged drivers not to
stop their vehicle on the tracks, regardless of whether a train was
approaching or not. Oregon and Wisconsin implemented methods to
coordinate the appropriate parties. In Oregon, public authorities
responsible for maintaining an interconnected signal system must notify
the railroad dispatcher so that train crews operating through grade
crossings with malfunctioning traffic signal preemptions systems are
aware of the problem. In Wisconsin, notices are placed in the traffic
signal controller and railroad equipment cabinets to alert engineers
that the device is part of an interconnected highway-rail signal system
and that any modifications to either system require coordination with
the appropriate parties (Korve, 1999).

## Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS)

State agencies, railroad companies, and industry have collaborated to
develop, introduce, and evaluate ITS applications to improve grade
crossing safety. New digital data communications, computer, and sensor
technologies installed along highways and transit systems are expected
to improve safety, efficiency, productivity, control, and communication.
Examples of ITS applications at grade crossings include the
implementation of second train warning signs at grade crossings
(discussed in Section 3.1.1.3), in-vehicle warning systems and variable
message signs located along the highway to alert drivers of approaching
trains (discussed in Section 5.3.1), advanced warning of railroad delays
(discussed in Section 5.3.2), and the use of automated photo enforcement
(discussed in Section 6.3). In the long term, ITS technology is expected
to facilitate the development of "intelligent grade crossings" where ITS
for railroads and vehicles are integrated. This will be discussed in
more detail below in Section 5.3.3.

While several states have initiated ITS programs that address similar
functions, different, and often competing, technologies are used. A
general overview of ITS systems and summaries of ongoing ITS efforts can
be found in Carroll and Oxley (1999) and Gribbon (1997).

### In-Vehicle Warning Displays

One application of ITS technologies is to assist drivers in detecting
the presence of a grade crossing or train through the presentation of
in-vehicle alerts. These systems will be particularly useful at
crossings where there is limited sight distance to the crossing, along
the track when approaching the crossing or when stopped at the crossing
(Caird, et al., 2002). The Minnesota Department of Transportation in
conjunction with 3M Corporation, Dynamic Vehicle Safety System, and
Hughes Transportation Management System developed the use of an
in-vehicle signing system that detected the presence of grade crossings
and approaching trains and broadcasted that information to drivers (SRF
Consulting Group, 1998). The displays were installed in 29 school buses
in Minnesota for evaluation during the 1997--1998 school year. Sensors,
installed at five active grade crossings, transmitted signals to a
receiver located at the grade crossing, which in turn communicated with
the in-vehicle unit to present auditory and visual alerts when the bus
was in close proximity of a grade crossing and indicated whether a train
was at or near the crossing. To increase credibility of the warning,
sensors at four of the five of the crossings possessed a directional
feature that allowed the system to determine the direction of the bus
relative to the crossing and inhibited warnings if the bus was in
vicinity of the crossing but did not intend to cross the tracks. Because
the fifth crossing was located at a complex geometric approach, the
accuracy of the directional feature was limited, so the feature was not
used. In the evaluation study, driver behavior at the crossings equipped
with the warning system was observed and compared to behavior at similar
grade crossings without the warning system. Objective data consisted of
the bus' approach speed and stopping distance and the bus driver's
scanning behavior. Additionally, bus drivers provided subjective data
regarding the accuracy, usability, utility, and effectiveness of the
system.

The objective measures showed no differences in driver behavior at grade
crossings equipped with the warning system to those without the system.
Interestingly, the observations showed that bus drivers' compliance with
state laws regarding the actions required at grade crossing rules was
not ideal. Although bus drivers must come to a full stop at grade
crossings, activate their flashers, and look both ways at the crossing,
some did not stop at all. The subjective measures showed that bus
drivers generally perceived the system to be effective in alerting them
to the presence of a grade crossing and to the presence of a train.
However, drivers' confidence in the warning system and their perception
of its accuracy was higher at crossings where the directional feature
was available. The rate of false notifications at the crossing without
the directional feature reduced driver confidence in the system.

A subsequent study evaluated the use of the in-vehicle alerting display
at passive grade crossings. Only subjective data was collected in this
evaluation. Bus drivers, interviewed regarding their perceptions,
indicated that they felt that the system improved safety. While the
results are promising, additional tests are necessary due to the small
number of observations.

The Illinois Department of Transportation developed a similar system in
conjunction with Raytheon Company, Metro Transportation Group, and
Calspan SRL. In the system, a trackside transmitter signaled in-vehicle
receivers (IVR) when trains were approaching or occupying a grade
crossing (Benekohal, 2004; Benekohal and Aycin, 2002, 2004; Benekohal
and Rawls, 2004a, 2004b). To demonstrate the system, transmitters were
installed at five active grade crossings, used by passenger, freight,
and commuter trains, in the northern Chicago suburbs, and 300 in-vehicle
displays were installed in the vehicles of 38 participating public and
private organizations. The in-vehicle display presented alerts in one of
three modes: visual, auditory, or visual plus auditory. Two groups of
drivers participated in the study. One group experienced all three
alerting modes of the IVR system, each for a 3-month period, and the
other used the IVR system in the visual mode only for 9 months. For the
former group, their perception of the system was evaluated through
questionnaires at four times throughout the study: once prior to using
the system, and then 3, 6, and 9 months after using the system. For the
latter group, their perception was evaluated twice; once before using
the system and then again 9 months later. Feedback was also obtained
through three focus groups: one with some of the drivers, a second with
operations managers who reported feedback from their drivers, and a
third with members of the project team who used the IVR system in their
vehicles.

Driver opinions regarding the effectiveness of the IVR system were
mixed. The questionnaire results indicated that over the 9-month period,
less than half the drivers rated the effectiveness of the IVR system as
"high" or "very high" (an average of 43 percent with 40 percent of
drivers rating it as "high" or "very high" after three months, 46
percent after 6 months, and 42 percent after nine months). In fact, an
average of 25 percent of drivers rated its effectiveness as being "low"
or "very low" (25 percent after three months, 24 percent after six
months, and 27 percent after nine months). Not surprisingly, the
perceived effectiveness of the IVR system was influenced by false
alerts. As a result, only an average of 15 percent of drivers indicated
that they trusted the system very much (14 percent, 18 percent, and 13
percent of drivers after 3, 6, and 9 months, respectively), and a
greater number of drivers (an average of 38 percent) indicated that they
did not trust the system at all (36 percent, 34 percent, and 43 percent
after 3, 6, and 9 months, respectively).

In general, participants in the study did not perceive the IVR system as
being as effective as current active warning devices used at the grade
crossing or the warning provided by the train horn. When drivers rated
the effectiveness of the IVR system and that of warning devices at grade
crossings (gates, flashing lights, bell, train horn, advance warning
sign, and crossbuck sign), the ratings showed that drivers considered
gates and flashing lights to be most effective followed by the bell and
the train horn. The IVR system and advance warning and crossbuck signs
were considered to be the least effective. However, the mode in which
the IVR system presented the alerts influenced drivers' effectiveness
ratings; when participants used the IVR system with auditory alerts
(either alone or in conjunction with visual alerts), they rated the
system as being comparable to that of other auditory warnings at the
crossing (i.e., the bell and train horn). The effectiveness ratings
suggest that drivers relied on other sources of information to determine
whether there was a train at the crossing. In fact, focus group results
indicated that drivers did not understand why an IVR system was needed
at crossings protected by flashing lights and gates. Only 47 percent of
drivers felt the system should be installed at more grade crossings, and
the number of drivers who indicated they would continue using the system
(47 percent) was almost equal to the number who indicated that they
would not (42 percent).

The results from the evaluations in the states of Minnesota and Illinois
highlight the fact that drivers' perceived reliability of the system's
effectiveness is an important factor in compliance. This is similar to
drivers' responses to active warning devices, discussed in Section
3.1.3.3. Chugh and Caird (1999) conducted a study to further examine the
effect of reliability on driver compliance with an in-vehicle warning
display. Participants were shown driving scenes of grade crossings in a
driving simulator and were asked to slow and stop as they approached the
grade crossing. At some crossings, participants received visual and
auditory warnings about approaching trains via an in-vehicle head-up
display. The reliability of the warning signal was varied at two levels
(83 percent or 50 percent). The experiment consisted of four blocks of
trials. In the first two blocks, the warning system was 100 percent
reliable. In the third block, the reliability was reduced, and
participants experienced one of the three failures: a false alarm in
which the system presented a warning when no train was present, a false
alarm in which the system presented a warning with no crossing, or a
missed signal in which the system failed to alert the driver to a train.
In the fourth block, the reliability of the warning system returned to
100 percent. "Baseline" data on driver response times to grade crossings
was collected in the first two blocks of trials and compared to driver
reaction times to the failures in the third block of trials. As
expected, the results showed that false alarms and missed signals
affected driver behavior differently. Drivers responded slower to
warnings after false alarms were presented. In fact, when the warning
system was only 50 percent reliable, 6.9 percent of participants no
longer responded to the warning system after experiencing false alarms.
On the other hand, participants responded faster to grade crossing
warnings after a missed signal. Response time returned to baseline
levels in the fourth block of trials only when reliability was high (83
percent). Although trust in the warning system was not sensitive to the
failure type (i.e., false alarms versus missed signals), trust decreased
due to the system reliability, and did so to a greater degree when the
reliability level was 50 percent than when it was 83 percent. However,
in both cases, participants regained their trust in the warning system
by the end of the fourth block of trials. Of particular concern is the
possibility that the use of such a system may induce over-reliance, such
that drivers no longer search adequately at crossings for approaching
trains or other hazards (Caird, et al., 2002).

### Advanced Warning of Railroad Delays

The Texas Department of Transportation proposed the development of a
system to alert drivers of delays at grade crossings due to the presence
of a train or other obstruction. In the proposal, sensors, placed along
the railroad tracks, would detect the presence, speed, and length of
approaching trains and transmit that information to a control unit that
calculated the time and duration those grade crossings at or near
highway exits would be blocked. The information would then be
broadcasted to in-vehicle displays in public vehicles and presented on
variable message signs along freeways. The original proposal also called
for the installation of sensors and cameras at grade crossings to detect
the presence of vehicles on the tracks. If a vehicle was detected, the
system would transmit a warning and image of the crossing to oncoming
trains. However, the railroads were concerned that the implementation of
such a system would transfer liability from the vehicle to the rail
company and were hesitant to participate in the study. As a result, the
project was modified to focus on driver information, and participation
of the railroads was not mandatory. The prototype Advanced Warning to
Avoid Railroad Delays (AWARD) used sensors, mounted on poles that did
not intrude upon the railroad companies' right-of-way, to collect
information on a train's arrival time at a grade crossing and the
duration of the train. The sensors relayed information to variable
message signs, located along the freeway, so that drivers could select
alternative routes. The first test of the system occurred in San Antonio
and consisted of field interviews and the development of simulation
models that measured whether a reduction in delays on freeways and
access roads near the grade crossing resulted.

Unfortunately, the results of the study indicated no actual need for the
AWARD system at the location selected. Field interviews indicated that
the presence of a train at the selected location rarely caused traffic
to back onto the freeway, since the crossing selected had low train
volume (only 2 to 3 trains per day) and trains generally crossed at
off-peak times. The simulation results confirmed the results of the
driver interview, showing that the presence of trains at the selected
crossing rarely disrupted freeway operations. In fact, the results of
the simulation predicted that drivers would benefit more from simply
waiting for the train to pass than selecting an alternate route. In the
study, in-vehicle navigation units carried by emergency service
providers also displayed AWARD information on train delays, but driver
interviews indicated that this feature was not used frequently due to a
lack of knowledge of the feature and problems with the displays.

While the implementation of the AWARD system was not warranted at the
crossings in the study, the demonstration was successful. It is
hypothesized that the system may have future benefits with growth in
train and traffic volume. The city of Houston is considering similar
efforts to integrate train location and speed into traffic management
systems as part of their ITS Priority Corridor Project (Carter, 2001).

### Intelligent Grade Crossings

It is worth noting that the long-term vision for ITS technology is the
development of "intelligent grade crossings" where intelligent rail
technology is integrated with intelligent automotive technology. One
vision consists of rail operations centers that have real-time
information regarding the location, direction, and speed of each train,
communicating with automotive ITS service providers, who have real-time
information regarding the location, route, and speed of each vehicle.
Rail operations centers could notify ITS service providers of the
approach of trains at grade crossings, and this information could be
passed along to alert drivers approaching a grade crossing as to whether
or not a train is present. At the same time, ITS service providers could
communicate with rail operation centers and notify them if a vehicle
becomes disabled at a grade crossing so that trains could be slowed or
stopped to prevent a collision (Weiland and Woll, 2002).

The New York State Department of Transportation is collaborating with
Alstom, Inc. to develop the Intermodal Control System (ICS) for the Long
Island Rail Road. The ICS integrates the control of trains, warning
devices at grade crossings, and traffic through three components:
*automatic train control*, an *intelligent grade crossing controller*,
and an *intelligent traffic system*. The *automatic train control*
determines train position and speed based on information received from
transponders mounted on the tracks and readers mounted in the trains.
Positive train separation can be achieved by limiting train speed based
on the length of clear track ahead, the train's speed, and its
acceleration and deceleration profile. The *intelligent grade crossing
controller* operates the active warning devices at the crossing and
communicates with the *intelligent traffic system* that presents
information regarding approaching trains and gate operations to
in-vehicle displays or variable message signs. Additionally, the
intelligent traffic system can receive requests from emergency vehicles
approaching the crossing if signal preemption is needed, and interfaces
with the intelligent grade crossing controller and automatic train
control to determine whether the request can be accommodated.

The impact of the ICS is expected to reduce delays at the crossing by
facilitating the presentation of a constant warning time at the
crossing, preventing gates from being lowered if the train has stopped
upstream of the crossing, and controlling the timing of traffic signals
near the crossing to minimize the delay resulting from the gate down
time. A cost-benefit analysis based on seven prototype scenarios that
varied in the level of train traffic, vehicle traffic, and whether the
train was continuing through the crossing or stopping at the crossing
indicated that the system, implemented at a cost of \$150,000, had
approximate net benefits in savings of \$225,000 in preventing vehicle
delays and \$307,000 in reducing collisions (Carroll and Oxley, 1999;
Lee, et al., 2004; Gribbon, 1997).

## Summary

Coordination among federal and state agencies, local municipalities,
railroad companies, and industry is needed to improve the safety of
grade crossings. The FRA maintains a crossing inventory and
accident/incident database of public and private grade crossings that
can be used to assist states in determining which crossings to improve,
but states and railroads must voluntarily submit information to keep
this database accurate and up-to-date (Bowman and Colson, 1994; Office
of Inspector General, 2004). Additionally, implementation of
countermeasures may require coordination with the public and the
appropriate highway authorities (NTSB, 1998; Judge, 2005). In
particular, the use of signal preemption, requires that highway and rail
agencies work together to ensure the appropriate timing to signals to
allow vehicles to vacate the track when a train is approaching and also
to ensure continued compliance of the interconnected signals (Bremer and
Ward, 1997; US DOT, 1996).

States have taken different approaches to improving grade crossing
safety. States use different formulas to determine which crossings to
improve (Bowman and Colson, 1994) and different processes for building,
maintaining, and inspecting grade crossings (U.S. DOT, 1996). Several
states have pursued efforts to develop and implement ITS technologies to
alert drivers to the presence of a grade crossing or train. The states
of Minnesota and Illinois examined the use of in-vehicle display to
alert drivers to the presence of grade crossings and approaching trains
(Benekohal, 2004; Benekohal and Aycin, 2002, 2004; Benekohal and Rawls,
2004a, 2004b; SRF Consulting Group, 1998); the state of Texas evaluated
the use of variable message signs, located along freeways, to inform
drivers of the approach of a train at grade crossings near freeway
exists so drivers could select alternate routes (Carter, 2001); and the
state of New York developed a plan to implement an intelligent grade
crossing system where technologies for trains, grade crossings, and
traffic control are integrated (Carroll and Oxley, 1999; Lee, et al.,
2004, Gribbon, 1997). The impact of these systems depended not only on
the reliability of the system but also drivers' perceived reliability of
the system. Drivers did not trust systems that had a high rate of false
alarms; consequently, these systems were underutilized (Benekohal, 2004;
Benekohal and Aycin, 2002, 2004; Benekohal and Rawls, 2004a, 2004b;
Chugh and Caird, 1999; SRF Consulting Group, 1998).

# Environmental Factors

The outermost layer of the sociotechnical system addresses the
political, social, and cultural forces that affect safety at grade
crossings. The failure to recognize these forces can prevent the
implementation of valid safety improvements or result in an
implementation that is ineffective. The FRA guides the direction of its
safety program on accident and inspection data to address those areas
with the highest safety risks through regulations and countermeasures to
improve compliance. This section considers the policies and actions of
regulators and the effects of education and enforcement. First, the role
of the public in the development of regulations is discussed in the
context of the FRA's efforts to develop regulation requiring the use of
train horns. Second, methods for educating the public and the
effectiveness of these programs are addressed. Finally, approaches to
enforcement, and in particular the concerns in the implementation of
photo enforcement at grade crossings, and its effectiveness are
discussed.

## Regulations: Repealing the Whistle Ban

The implementation of FRA regulations requires significant interaction
between local communities and municipalities, state agencies, and
railroads to balance safety concerns with community quality of life
issues. An example of the value of this interaction was demonstrated in
the FRA's process to develop a policy regarding the use of train horns
at grade crossings. The train horn has long been accepted as one way to
indicate a train's proximity to the grade crossing, and state laws and
railroad companies mandated its use (FRA, 1995b). As discussed in
Section 3.3.3, residents living in communities near railroad tracks
noted the adverse impact of train horns on their quality of life. In the
1970s, special interest groups looked for ways to silence train horns
and lobbied states and local counties throughout the nation to establish
local whistle bans prohibiting the sounding of the horn as the train
passed through the community, despite safety concerns from the railroad
industry.

Whistle bans were especially widespread along Florida's east coast rail
line, where in 1984, local governments enacted a nighttime whistle ban
that prevented trains from sounding their horn between 10 p.m. and 6
a.m. The whistle bans applied only to grade crossings owned by the
Florida East Coast Railway Company (FEC). In 1990, the FRA conducted a
study to examine the effect of the Florida whistle ban to determine if
there was any correlation between communities with regulations against
sounding the train horn and their nighttime accident rate (FRA, 1995a).
An analysis compared the accident rate for 600 of FEC's grade crossings,
85 percent of which were affected by the whistle ban, to four data sets:

1)  the number of nighttime accidents at those crossings before the
    enactment of the whistle ban,

2)  the daytime accident rate at those crossings (i.e., when sounding
    the train horn was allowed),

3)  the accident rate at crossings unaffected by the whistle ban, and

4)  the accident rate for similarly equipped crossings owned by a
    different rail company (CSX Transportation, Incorporated (CSX))
    unaffected by the whistle ban. The analysis included accident data
    from 1975 through 1989.

The results showed that whistle bans had a significantly negative impact
on safety. FEC's nighttime accident rate at whistle-banned crossings
increased by almost three times after the enactment of the whistle ban
(39 accidents before the ban versus 115 accidents after the ban), with
no change in their daytime accident rate. In contrast, the nighttime
accident rate at FEC's crossings, unaffected by the whistle ban
increased by only 23 percent. A comparison of FEC's accident rate with
that of CSX, who did not need to comply with the whistle ban, showed
that although nighttime accident rates increased at both railroads,
CSX's accident rate increased by 67 percent whereas FEC's accident rate
almost doubled.

Further examination of the data highlighted the safety impact of the
Florida whistle ban. When accidents that would not have been prevented
by the train horn were eliminated from the analysis (e.g., accidents
caused by vehicles stopped or stalled on the tracks), the accident rate
increased by 467 percent (21 accidents before the ban versus 98 after
the ban). Additionally, examination of vehicle-train collisions
indicated that before the enactment of the whistle ban, accidents in
which the driver struck the train occurred long after the locomotive
sounding the horn had passed through the crossing (on average, vehicles
hit the 37th train car behind the locomotive) whereas after the whistle
ban, vehicles hit the 12th car behind the locomotive. Based on the
results of this analysis, the FRA issued Emergency Order No. 15, which
required FEC to sound their train horns at all public grade crossings.
An examination of the accident rate 2 years after the issue of the
emergency order showed that the nighttime accident rate fell by 69
percent, returning to pre‑whistle ban levels (FRA, 1995b; 2005a).

In 1991, the FRA issued a notice announcing their intention to issue a
nationwide rule regarding the use of train whistles at grade crossings.
As part of this rulemaking initiative, the FRA conducted a nationwide
study of train whistle bans in conjunction with the Association of
American Railroads (AAR) to determine how many crossings in the nation
were subject to whistle bans and whether the nationwide data showed an
increased accident risk at whistle-ban crossings, similar to that found
in Florida (FRA, 1995b). AAR surveyed railroad companies and asked them
to provide a list of all their crossings subject to whistle bans.
Twenty-five railroad companies responded to the survey, 17 of which
operated along grade crossings subject to whistle bans. AAR reported
whistle bans at 2,122 grade crossings across 27 states, with 94 percent
of the whistle bans in effect 24 hours of the day. Note that the 537
Florida grade crossings subjects to whistle bans were not included in
the count nor were they included in the nationwide study.

To determine if there was an increased safety risk as a result of
whistle bans, the change in the accident rate before and after the
enactment of the whistle bans was examined using accident data from 1989
through 1993. The nationwide accident analysis showed results similar to
that found in the Florida study (FRA, 1995a); crossings with whistle
bans had on average 84 percent more collisions than similar crossings
with no whistle bans. The cancellation of whistle bans at some of these
crossings allowed a direct comparison of the accident rate during and
after the ban, and showed an average of 38 percent fewer collisions in
the post-ban period. An "Accident Prediction Formula" that calculated
the likelihood of an accident at a grade crossing based on its physical
characteristics (e.g., the number of tracks and highway lanes, types of
warning devices, rural or urban location, road condition) and
operational aspects (e.g., number of highway vehicles and train volume,
speed, type, and schedule) found that the risk of a grade crossing
accident was 84 percent higher when the train horn was silenced (FRA,
1995b).

The FRA began an outreach program to share their findings with
communities with whistle bans and to better understand local issues and
concerns. During this outreach, an additional 664 crossings subject to
whistle bans that had not been included in the 1995 study were
identified, with 95 percent of these crossings located in Chicago,
Illinois. As a result, the FRA conducted a second nationwide analysis
that included these additional crossings and used updated accident data
from 1992 to 1996. The FRA also refined their methodology for the
accident analysis by examining the effect of the whistle ban as a
function of the protection level at the crossing (i.e., signs only,
flashing lights only, or flashing lights and gates) and by excluding
from their analysis those accidents where sounding the train horn would
not have been a factor (e.g., accidents involving pedestrians or
accidents where the vehicle hit the side of the train beyond the fourth
train car). As in the previous nationwide study (FRA, 1995b), the
analysis excluded the data from the state of Florida. Consistent with
the results of the previous study, the analysis showed that the whistle
ban impacted safety, with a 62 percent increase in accidents at
whistle-ban crossings protected with gates, 119 percent increase at
whistle-ban crossings protected by flashing-lights only or another type
of active warning device, and a 27 percent increase at whistle-ban
passive crossings. Of note was the fact that an accident resulting
because a motorist drove around lowered gates was 128 percent higher at
whistle-ban crossings than at non-whistle ban crossings (FRA, 2000).

Interestingly, FRA (2000) analysis noted one anomaly: crossings with
whistle bans in the Chicago Region of northeastern Illinois did not have
an increase in their accident rate. In fact, the accident rate at
crossings with whistle bans was 16 percent lower than the accident rate
at crossings without whistle bans. An examination of the ten-year
accident rate at grade crossings in Illinois between 1988 and 1998
showed 48 percent of all grade crossing accidents occurred at crossings
with whistle bans and 52 percent at crossings without the whistle ban. A
calculation of the accident likelihood based on the number of grade
crossings and the accident rate over the past 10 years showed only a
slightly higher risk of an accident at whistle ban crossings
(7.1 percent versus 5.1 percent for non-whistle ban crossings) even
though crossings with whistle bans experienced significantly higher
train and traffic volumes (Laffey, 2000).

On January 13, 2000, the FRA published a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
(NPRM) addressing the use of the locomotive horns at grade crossings,
solicited written comments from the public for approximately 5 months,
and held public hearings. As part of this comment process, various
states informed the FRA that they had more accurate data and information
regarding which crossings were subject to whistle bans, and the amount
of this data was sufficient to warrant an update to the FRA (2000)
nationwide study. Additionally, commenters from the Chicago Region
presented the FRA with the results of their regional analysis, and
commenters from Wisconsin noted that although there were a significant
number of crossings in the state with whistle bans but without active
warning devices, the crossings had good safety records.

Based on the feedback received, the FRA contracted Westat, Inc., to
update the FRA (2000) data analysis with the new data and to
specifically evaluate the regional effects of whistle bans in the
Chicago Region and the state of Wisconsin. Westat, Inc. conducted two
analyses. In the first, updated data (again excluding data from Florida)
for the same time period examined in the FRA (2000) study (i.e., 1992 to
1996) was re-analyzed, with similar results; whistle bans had a negative
impact on safety on a nationwide basis. Again, the data for the Chicago
Region showed a higher accident rate at non-whistle ban crossings than
at whistle ban crossings. When the accident rate for whistle ban
crossings in the Chicago Region was compared to the nationwide data for
similar crossings where trains sounded their horns, the results showed
no difference in accident rates at passive crossings and crossings
protected only by flashing lights. However, the results showed a
significantly higher accident rate at gated crossings in the Chicago
Region subject to whistle bans compared to similar non-whistle-ban
crossings nationwide. The FRA believed that this finding suggested that
observation of the whistle ban was discretionary, and that locomotive
engineers did not sound the horn at crossings that they considered
inherently safer than other crossings. In fact, the FRA had received
information suggesting that several hundred crossings believed to be
under a whistle ban were not or had not been for several years. With
regards to the state of Wisconsin, due to a small sample size, no
difference was found between the accident rates at whistle ban versus
non-whistle ban crossings (*Use of Locomotive Horns at Highway-Rail
Grade Crossings; Interim Final Rule*).

In the second analysis, Westat, Inc. updated the nationwide data and
compared the accident rates from 1997 through 2001 at whistle-ban
crossings versus non-whistle ban crossings (again excluding data from
Florida). Additionally, the data for the Chicago Region was updated to
reflect more accurately the number of non-whistle banned crossings.
Similar to the previous analyses, the results showed a higher nationwide
accident rate at whistle ban crossings than at non-whistle ban
crossings. The results reported a 43 percent difference in accident rate
at gated crossings, a 22 percent increase at flashing-light only
crossings, and a 72 percent increase at passive crossings. With respect
to the Chicago Region, once again, the data showed no statistical
difference in accident rates, but suggested that accidents at gated
crossings without a whistle ban had a 17.3 percent higher risk of a
grade crossing accident than non-whistle ban gated crossings in the
nation (Zador and Duncan, 2003). However, results of independent studies
conducted in Illinois noted that this 17.3 percent increased risk was
not statistically significant and therefore these studies concluded that
there was no overall difference in safety (*Use of Locomotive Horns at
Highway-Rail Grade Crossings; Final Rule*).

The FRA Final Rule on the use of train horns is codified in 49 CFR § 222
and 229. The regulation requires the sounding of the train horn, except
at crossings where there is no significant risk of loss of life or
injury, where other safety measures are in place to compensate for the
absence of the warning provided by the train horn, or where use of the
train horn is not practical. The Final Rule preempts all local whistle
bans at public grade crossings, with an exception for crossings in the
Chicago Region, in which current whistle bans can remain in effect
pending further data analysis. For all other regions, the rule allows
local traffic control and law enforcement authorities to establish Quiet
Zones, sections of a rail line with one or more consecutive public grade
crossings where train horns are not sounded. Coordination with railroad
companies is required to establish these Quiet Zones since supplemental
safety measures, such as active warning devices, will need to be in
place to mitigate the silencing of the train horn (*Use of Locomotive
Horns at Highway-Rail Grade Crossings; Final Rule*).

## Education

Public education can inform drivers of the dangers at grade crossings
and of the actions required. Rules specifying driver actions at grade
crossings vary from state to state, and some states do not even discuss
grade crossings in their driver education manuals (Jeng, 2005). One
popular education program, Operation Lifesaver, was first established in
1972 in Idaho to increase awareness of safety issues at grade crossings
and encourage safe driving behavior. Since then, each state has adopted
the program, although the programs operate independently. Operation
Lifesaver is a volunteer organization with participation from railroads,
law enforcement, and communities. Its primary activity consists of
presentations at schools, drivers' education classes, and communities.
Federal, state, and local government agencies, railroads, and highway
safety organizations sponsor programs.

Nationwide, Operation Lifesaver has had a positive safety impact. The
results of the negative binomial regression accident analysis conducted
by Mok and Savage (2005), discussed earlier in Section 3.3.1, found that
Operation Lifesaver reduced the number of vehicle-train collisions by 15
percent and the number of deaths by 19 percent. According to the
analysis, the effectiveness of Operation Lifesaver in reducing grade
crossing fatalities was greater than that prevented by the installation
of active warning devices at passive grade crossings. Additionally, the
authors noted a period of swift decline in the accident rate from 1979
to 1983 that coincided with the time when states across the country
adopted the Operation Lifesaver program. In that five-year period, the
predicted accident rate dropped by almost 40 percent, and Operation
Lifesaver prevented 1,455 incidents and 164 fatalities annually. Since
the early 1980s, grade crossing safety has improved significantly,
attributable not only to Operation Lifesaver but also to the
implementation of other countermeasures. As a result, the impact of
Operation Lifesaver, while still positive, has been reduced, although
the program is still credited with preventing 500 incidents and 75
fatalities annually.

It is important to mention one note of caution in interpreting the
results of the regression analysis. As indicated earlier, the analysis
conducted by Mok and Savage did not include a comprehensive list of
factors that contribute to grade crossing violations. Consequently, the
factors included in the analysis may appear to have a greater impact
than is actually the case. While it is clear that Operation Lifesaver
has had a positive safety impact, it is important to note that the
estimates of its relative contribution may not be as great as the
regression analysis indicated.

Because the Operation Lifesaver program is implemented differently in
each state, it is valuable to measure the relationship between the
extent of activity in a state and the difference in activity level from
year-to-year to determine their effect on reducing the accident rate at
grade crossings. This was the goal of a second negative binomial
regression analysis, conducted by Savage (2006), using accident data
from 1996 through 2002. The results of the analysis showed a significant
positive effect of Operation Lifesaver activity in reducing the number
of incidents; increasing the activity level was shown to reduce the
number of collisions with a point elasticity of --0.11. Since most
drivers are often unaware of the risks at grade crossings and unsure
regarding the action required, the result of the regression analysis
showing a benefit to public education is not surprising, but does
highlight the safety benefits of making drivers better informed.
However, the result did not speak to the effectiveness of any one
program and what educational cues were most beneficial.

Several studies have evaluated the effectiveness of Operation Lifesaver
activities within a state. The General Accounting Office (GAO) reviewed
active education and enforcement programs and noted the success of the
Ohio Operation Lifesaver program in reducing grade crossing accidents in
that state by 75 percent in the 25 years from 1978 to 1993 (US GAO,
1995). Ohio's program used three methods to target different segments of
the population and alert current and future drivers to the consequences
of violating grade crossings: Officer-on-the Train,
Trucker-on-the-Train, and mock train crashes. In the
*Officer-on-the-Train* approach, law enforcement officials and media
rode in a train cab and observed driver behavior at grade crossings.
When law enforcement officials observed driving violations, they radioed
vehicle descriptions to state and local police at the crossing, who then
cited the drivers for the violation. The *Trucker-on-the-Train* approach
was similar to the *Officer-on-the-Train* approach with commercial
vehicle operators in the train cab rather than law enforcement
officials. Finally, *mock train crashes* were demonstrated to
school-aged children to highlight the severity of vehicle-train
accidents.

In Iowa, the implementation of one Operation Lifesaver program had a
short-term positive effect on driver behavior. A safety campaign lasting
for one-month consisted of presentations in schools, with special
emphasis on high schools and driver education courses; a 3-day open
house at a railway depot; an accident investigation course for law
enforcement; and public media assistance to increase awareness through
billboards, newspaper articles, video billboards on local cable
channels, mayoral proclamation declaring April 1991 as Operation
Lifesaver month, information booths at shopping malls, and safety
messages at fast food restaurants and grocery stores. The effectiveness
of the campaign was measured by collecting data on drivers' approach
speed to the crossing, vehicle speed when crossing the tracks, looking
behavior, and braking behavior at 22 grade crossings two months prior to
a 1-month long Operation Lifesaver campaign and again 1 month after the
campaign.

The results after 1 month showed that the campaign succeeded in reducing
vehicle approach speeds and crossing speeds but did not alter drivers'
looking behavior or increase their likelihood of stopping at the
crossing (Brewer, 1992). However, the positive speed reduction benefits
did not last in the long-term. A follow-up study, conducted 6 months
after the campaign, showed that approach speeds and crossing speeds had
returned to levels recorded before the campaign. The results suggest
that a one-time public education campaign was not sufficient to improve
driver behavior in the long term but rather highlighted the need for
continuous education (Iowa Department of Transportation, 1992). The
results are consistent with research on warnings showing that the
effectiveness of warnings decreased the farther away they were presented
from the hazard in terms of time or space (Kalsher and Williams, 2006;
McCarthey, Ayers, and Wood, 1995).

Although educating the public about grade crossing hazards may dissuade
some drivers from violating crossings, the design of safety campaigns
should also consider the social aspects of driving behavior and in
particular, methods for changing drivers' motivation and attitudes
rather than their skill and knowledge. Since drivers believe they are
more skilled than they really are, safety campaigns may not succeed
because drivers may feel the message is directed to others who are less
skilled (McKenna and Lewis, 1991). Additionally, young drivers, who
perceive more approval from their peers than older drivers to commit
violations, as noted in Section 4.2.4, may respond more to campaigns
that highlight disapproval from peers for risky behavior and emphasize
drivers' self-control over committing violations than to educational
campaigns (Parker, et al., 1992, 1995). Safety campaigns may also take
advantage of drivers' tendency to imitate other drivers. Although this
tendency is often observed in the commitment of violations (e.g., a
driver violates a grade crossing because the lead vehicle did so without
consequences), this same tendency may improve compliance if desirable
driving behavior is highlighted (Wilde, et al., 1971).

Educational campaigns may also be implemented in conjunction with
enforcement. FRA and the Illinois Commerce Commission examined the
effectiveness of education combined with enforcement in improving safety
in a joint program (Illinois Commerce Commission, 2005; Secretary of
Transportation, 2004). Representatives from the two organizations met
with representatives from local railroad companies and Illinois
communities to review rail safety concerns and develop a customized
safety program to meet the needs of each community. Although the
specifics of the programs varied from one community to another, the
education and enforcement programs consisted of the following core
components:

[Education]{.underline}

-   Programs aired on cable access channels and local radio, which
    consisted of 30-second public service announcements and in-depth 5-,
    10-, and 30-minute safety segments,

-   Videos, played on a continuous loop, at points of interest around
    town (e.g., commuter rail stations, shopping centers, and schools),

-   Contests in local schools to develop safety posters,

-   "It's the Law" safety poster campaign in which posters were placed
    in the windows of stores near commuter rail stations,

-   Rail safety messages played on community telephone systems to
    callers on hold,

-   Use of local media outlets, such as newspapers and community
    newsletters, to print press releases and safety columns,

-   Inclusion of rail safety messages on routine mailings (e.g., utility
    bills),

-   Training of public works in communities (e.g., police officers and
    firefighters), to be Operation Lifesaver presenters to provide a
    consistent safety message,

-   Operation Lifesaver presentations, and

-   Town hall meetings to highlight grade crossing safety and trespass
    prevention program.

[Enforcement]{.underline}

-   Use of positive reinforcement to reward compliance, such as coupons
    for coffee,

-   Routine patrols along the railroad right-of-way to prevent
    trespassing,

-   Focused enforcement at "hot spots" with a high rate of traffic
    violations,

-   Trooper on the Train program so that members of law enforcement and
    the judiciary could see what locomotive engineers routinely
    experience, and

-   Specialized training for law enforcement and first responders who
    investigate or respond to collisions.

The effectiveness of the education and enforcement program was measured
via video surveillance, which captured train movements at eight grade
crossings in three Illinois communities (Arlington Heights, Bartlett,
and Macomb) 2 months prior to the initiation of the program, for 1-year
during the program, and for 2 months after. Although data was collected
from three communities, the video from only one of those communities was
analyzed (Arlington Heights). In that community, the education campaign
consisted of 122 presentations that reached at least 3,730 individuals
over the 1-year period. Approximately 512 hours of enforcement
accompanied the education program; this enforcement resulted in the
issuance of 83 citations and 234 warnings. Of the citations issued, 72
percent were to drivers who violated the warning device, 11 percent were
to pedestrians who violated the warning device, and the rest were to
trespassers and for other grade crossing violations.

Observers viewed the video recordings to identify and count the rate of
warning device violations. The violations were classified into three
groups according to severity:

-   Type 1A: violations in which the flashing lights were activated but
    the gate arms were up,

-   Type IB: violations in which the lights were flashing and the gate
    arms were descending, and

-   Type 2: violations in which the lights were flashing and the gate
    arms were lowered.

In first considering the Type 1A violations, the results showed a rate
of 0.46 violations per train before the campaign, 0.48 violations per
train during the campaign, and 0.53 violations per train after the
campaign -- an overall increase of 15 percent. For Type 1B violations,
observations recorded 1.40 violations per train before the campaign,
1.10 during the campaign, and 1.00 after the campaign, an overall
reduction of 29 percent. For Type 2 violations, observations recorded
0.78 violations per train before the campaign, 0.36 during the campaign,
and 0.22 after the campaign, a drop in 72 percent. Thus, while the
results showed an increase in the rate of Type 1A violations, the
education and enforcement programs succeeded in reducing the more
serious Type 1B and Type 2 violations (Sposato, Bien-Aime, and
Chaudhary, 2006).

Feedback from the Illinois communities noted the challenge in finding
the appropriate balance between education and enforcement. With respect
to education, the sustained use of the local cable access programs and
town hall meetings helped keep the safety message active for residents
over time. Although enforcement techniques did not deviate from
traditional enforcement of traffic laws, it did change the public's
perception of the acceptability of violating active warning devices,
which had previously gone without punishment. The results of Illinois'
program provide a framework that may be adapted to other communities.

The studies discussed so far demonstrated the benefits of education
alone (e.g., Operation Lifesaver; see Mok and Savage, 2005, and Savage,
2006) and education in conjunction with enforcement (Illinois Commerce
Commission, 2005; Sposato, et al., 2006) on grade crossing safety.
However, none of these studies measured the impact of implementing an
education program alone versus the use of education and enforcement in
combination. Tarawneh, Virendra, and McCoy (1999) examined this issue to
determine the relative contribution of enforcement to enhancing the
benefits of education in a safety campaign to deter red-light running.
In their study, driver behavior was observed at six signalized
intersections before and after the implementation of a safety campaign.
The campaign educated drivers on the hazards of running red lights using
30-second public-service announcements on television and radio, print
ads supporting enforcement efforts, safety brochures mailed with utility
bills, and truck signs presented on city vehicles. At three of the six
approaches, enforcement was present. Enforcement occurred at one
intersection at a time, with the schedule of enforcement randomized so
that drivers could not predict when and where the officers were likely
to be. The results showed the campaign had a positive effect in
modifying the behavior of drivers who approached the intersections after
the yellow onset and that vehicles' mean entry time into the
intersection after the onset of the yellow light decreased significantly
after the campaign. However, there was surprisingly no difference in
behavior due to education alone versus education with targeted
enforcement. One possible explanation is that drivers were generally
more conservative after the campaign, because they were aware that
enforcement was present but did not know where it was, so they may have
simply assumed that all the intersections at which driver behavior was
observed would also be enforced. Note that it is not clear whether the
results of Tarawneh, et al. are generalizable to other situations and
domains since differences in the design and implementation of safety
campaigns may change their impact considerably. Additionally, different
approaches to enforcement may not have the same impact, an issue that
will be examined further.

## Enforcement

Enforcement of grade crossings can occur via one of two methods: a
traditional traffic stop, in which a law enforcement officer witnesses a
violation and issues a citation to the driver in person; or automated
photo enforcement, in which violations are detected via a sensor and
captured on film and the appropriate law enforcement authority issues a
citation via mail. The first method, traditional traffic enforcement, is
difficult at grade crossings where law enforcement presence may not be
feasible due to the large number of crossings and relative infrequency
of trains at those crossings and where pursuit of violators requires
committing the same violation and risking a collision with an
approaching train (Bowman, et al., 1998; Fitzpatrick, Bartoskewitz, and
Carlson, 1997).

The second method, the use of automated photo enforcement to gather
evidence of violations, is relatively new at grade crossings but has
been more commonly used in general highway driving to improve compliance
to traffic laws. In the US, the use of red-light cameras has reduced
crashes by approximately 40 percent. The public recognizes its safety
benefits; more than 75 percent of residents polled in cities *with*
cameras and over 70 percent of residents polled in cities *without*
cameras favored the use of automated photo enforcement to prevent
red-light running (Insurance Institute for Highway Safety, 2001).
However, several issues need to be addressed with respect to its
implementation at grade crossings. First, because the photo enforcement
system "observes" drivers to determine if a violation occurs, privacy
concerns have been raised. For the most part, these concerns may be
alleviated through public education campaigns that highlight the safety
benefits and objectives of automated enforcement or by designing the
automated enforcement system so that it does not photograph the driver
(e.g., by capturing an image of the vehicle's rear license plate).
Whether an image, that does not capture the driver, contains sufficient
information to issue a ticket depends on the state and leads to the
second issue. Who receives the ticket: the owner of the vehicle or the
driver? This decision will depend on whether the citation is treated as
the equivalent of a parking ticket or as a moving violation. Because
moving violations result in "points" on the violators' license,
conclusive evidence of the driver committing the violation will be
required. The third issue regards whether or not citations may be
mailed. In some states, allowing for this method of distribution may
require legislation (Carroll and Warren, 2001; Fitzpatrick, et al.,
1997; Turner and Polk, 1998).

No studies have compared the effectiveness of traditional enforcement
versus photo enforcement, but the success of the enforcement method will
be a function of how drivers perceive it. Enforcement must be visible.
In the general driving situation, parking a police car in a highly
visible location improved driver compliance to speed limits and reduced
the average speed of traffic not only at the site of enforcement but
also at locations downstream and upstream of the enforcement site
(Hauer, Ahlin, and Bowser, 1992). Additionally, drivers must perceive a
risk and believe that the enforcement agent will be able to apprehend
them. For example, a police car positioned at the downstream side of a
grade crossing that allows pursuit of violators as they exit the
crossing may be more effective than a police car stationed before the
tracks. Finally, enforcement efforts must be publicized. The
effectiveness of this publicity will be improved if campaigns
continuously educate the public, are continuously highlighted by news
coverage, and prevent the public from expecting a level of enforcement
that cannot be maintained (Shinar, 1985).

Six states in the US---Arkansas, California, Illinois, Iowa, North
Carolina, and Texas---and the province of Alberta in Canada have
conducted demonstration projects of automated photo enforcement at grade
crossings. The remainder of this section discusses the implementation of
photo enforcement, the issues encountered, and the results of
evaluations examining its impact on driver compliance.

### Arkansas

The city of Jonesboro, Arkansas, in conjunction with BNSF Railroad
installed and tested the first automated photo enforcement system in the
US in 1991. In the evaluation, video cameras were installed at one grade
crossing that had experienced eight collisions in the past 5 years.
Drivers frequently knocked down the gates at the crossing; prior to the
installation of the photo enforcement technology, the gates were
repaired an average of three times per week.

Video cameras at the grade crossing transmitted real-time images via a
standard telephone line connection to the Jonesboro Police Department.
Citations for violations were issued through the mail. Violations at
grade crossings were treated similarly as parking violations; violators
received a letter detailing the statute that authorized citations to be
issued to registered vehicle owners, the citation itself, and two photos
of the violation. The local judge also required a time-stamped picture
of the motorist driving around the gate, a zoomed-in view of the license
plate with clearly legible characters, and a time-stamped picture of the
train passing through the intersection.

No warning signs were presented to inform drivers of the use of photo
enforcement. Instead, a media campaign was conducted to increase the
public's awareness. After one year, city officials reported that they
had issued 10 citations and drivers had knocked the gates down only six
times. Conversations with city officials indicated that most of these
violations occurred immediately after photo enforcement was implemented
(Fitzpatrick, et al., 1997; Lammert, 1999).

### California

The Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transit Authority implemented the
use of photo enforcement at grade crossings along the Los Angeles Metro
Blue Line. The Metro Blue Line corridor is unique in that it contains
tracks for commuter trains and freight trains, and two trains often
cross at the same time or cross very close to one another. Consequently,
gates at the crossings are often lowered for an extended period of time
or begin to rise and quickly lower again, and as a result, many drivers
violated the gates or ignored the flashing light signals. In the 3 years
from the corridor's opening in July 1990 through June 1993, 158 grade
crossing incidents occurred.

The use of photo enforcement was evaluated in three demonstration
projects along the Metro Blue Line corridor. Drivers, who violated the
crossing gates, activated cameras, and photos captured the vehicle,
license plate, and driver. Superimposed on the photo was the date, time,
location of the violation, vehicle speed, and number of seconds from the
activation of the warning device. Citations were issued based on the
photos within 72 hours of a violation.

The first demonstration of the technology took place at one grade
crossing over a seven-month period. Comparison of the violation rate
before and after its implementation showed that the use of photo
enforcement decreased the number of violations by 92 percent, reduced
the rate of violations from one per hour to one every 12 hours, and
decreased the number of train-vehicle collisions by 70 percent. At a
second crossing, the impact of photo enforcement was measured over three
months with similar results. The number of violations decreased by 78
percent, and the rate of violations was reduced from a rate of one every
2 hours to one every 9 hours. At the third demonstration site, photo
enforcement captured vehicles that made illegal left turns across the
tracks against a red left-turn arrow. In a 6-week period, the number of
left-turn violations dropped by 34 percent.

The success of photo enforcement at these three crossings led to the
installation of the technology at 17 more crossings, with signs at the
crossings notifying drivers of the use of photo enforcement.
Additionally, the California vehicle code was modified to legalize
citations recorded by photo enforcement. These citations are subject to
the same procedures as those for moving violations (Carroll and Warren,
2001; Vantuano, 1994).

### Illinois

In 1996, the Illinois General Assembly required the Illinois Commerce
Commission to conduct a two-year evaluation to determine the
effectiveness of photo enforcement technologies. Three locations were
selected based upon an accident analysis of collision frequencies.
Although the specific technology differed at each site, each system
generally used the same process: a camera, started upon activation of
the warning device, recorded potential violations, and these violations
were reviewed using specialized software packages to identify actual
violations and to determine which violations should receive citations.
In order to issue a citation, a clear image or photograph of the
vehicle, driver, and vehicle registration plate with a record of the
time, date, and location of the violation was required. Crossings with
photo enforcement had signs to indicate that the grade crossing was
under surveillance, and that citations for violations would be issued,
and that specified the amount of the fine. Citations were automatically
generated using custom software and sent to registered vehicle owners.
Citations were issued only to non‑corporate owned vehicles registered in
Illinois and were dismissed if the registered owner was not the driver
when the violation occurred.

The results of evaluations of photo enforcement at three crossings
showed that it was effective in deterring grade crossing violations. The
first site to complete installation of a photo enforcement system (on
Irving Park Road in the city of Wood Dale) reported a 47 percent
reduction in violations per month over a 9-month period. At a second
site (in the city of Naperville), the use of photo enforcement reduced
violations by 73 percent over a 5-month period. At a third site, only
one violation was recorded during the observation period before the
automated enforcement system was installed and none after. Although no
conclusions could be drawn regarding the effectiveness of photo
enforcement at this location due to the limited number of observations,
the low daily traffic and low violation rate during the observation
period suggested that the use of automated enforcement might not be
justified at the location.

It is worth noting that a procedural issue stopped the use of photo
enforcement in the city of Wood Dale during the demonstration period.
There, a local judge identified a problem concerning the issuing of
citations at Irving Park Road and ruled that the notice for informing
violators of their rights and responsibilities and the process for
admitting digital images into evidence was not sufficient. As a result
of the ruling, the local police department in the city of Wood Dale
began to issue only warnings to drivers who violated the crossing. Since
that time, the Illinois General Assembly has issued a state statute to
clarify the admission of photos as evidence, and the city of Wood Dale
hoped to resume the issuing of citations (Laffey, 2003).

### Iowa

Officials from Ames, Iowa, the Iowa Department of Transportation, and
the FHWA conducted an evaluation on the use of photo enforcement in
1996. The crossing selected for the evaluation experienced heavy volumes
of train and vehicle traffic (50--60 trains and approximately 20,000
vehicles per day). In the 5 years prior to the evaluation, three
accidents were attributed to drivers maneuvering around lowered gates.

The project included a public education campaign to initiate the program
and to feature the system in the local news media. Additionally, signs
were provided at grade crossings to indicate the use of photo
enforcement. Iowa state law required a high-resolution picture of the
driver of the violating vehicle in order to issue a citation and
prohibited the mailing of traffic citations, so once the violation was
verified and the citation process completed, a police officer hand
delivered the citation to the violator's home. City officials decided to
issue citations only to drivers who violated the grade crossing a few
seconds after the gates were lowered. Motorists who drove around gate
arms after they had been lowered for an excessive amount of time were
not considered to be in violation because it was hypothesized that the
protection system had malfunctioned; these drivers were sent a warning
letter by mail.

The results of the demonstration project in the first year of the
evaluation noted problems in the pictures taken of violations. Pictures
taken during the day were not of sufficient resolution for identifying
the driver. However, because the pictures had enough resolution to
indicate the license plate number, violating drivers were sent warnings.
On the other hand, pictures taken at night were not of sufficient
resolution to read the license plates and the drivers' face was often
obstructed by glare, so no violations were issued (Fitzpatrick, et al.,
1997; Lammert, 1999).

### North Carolina

North Carolina evaluated the use of photo enforcement at one crossing
with a high-train volume (approximately one every 15 minutes) and a
history of violations and incidents along its High-Speed Rail Sealed
Corridor (the evaluation of median barriers, four-quadrant gates, and
longer gate arms along this corridor was discussed in Section 3.1.3.2).
The camera captured photographs of drivers, vehicles, and their license
plates, and law enforcement and judicial officials prosecuted violators.
The results showed a 72 percent reduction in gate violations over the
5-month demonstration period at the crossing (Carroll and Warren, 2001;
FRA, 2002).

### Texas

In 1995, the 74th State Legislature of Texas passed legislation that
required the Texas Department of Transportation to investigate the use
of automated enforcement at up to 10 gated crossings. To determine which
crossings would benefit most from automated photo enforcement, Carlson
and Fitzpatrick (1999) conducted a study to identify operational and
geometric variables that influenced violations at gated grade crossings.
In the study, they observed and recorded drivers at 19 grade crossings
in Texas. Three categories of violations were defined based on the time
in which the driver crossed the tracks. *Flashing light violations*
occurred between the times the lights were activated and two seconds
after the gate arms started to descend and accounted for 47 percent of
all violations. *Typically enforced violations*, defined as (1) the time
period after the gate arms were in motion more than 2 seconds and
lasting until the arms were horizontal or (2) the time period after the
gate arms were horizontal but before the train arrived, accounted for
another 47 percent of the violations. Finally, *after the train*
*violations*, violations occurring after the train departed but before
the gate arms were completely raised, were the most infrequent of the
three, and accounted for only 5 percent of the violations (Carlson and
Fitzpatrick, 1999).

From the 19 grade crossings, six sites were selected for the
demonstration of photo enforcement. A signal from the grade crossing
warning system activated the photo enforcement system, and cameras at
the crossing recorded vehicles continuing around or through the gate
arms. The images showed the vehicle, a close-up of the rear license
plate, the location of the crossing, the date and time of the violation,
and the number of seconds before the train's arrival time. The
demonstration project did not allow for the issuing of citations, so
drivers, who violated the warning device, were sent educational material
instead. The results of the demonstration showed no difference in the
violation rates at three of the six grade crossings. The other three
sites experienced technical or coordination difficulties. Although no
difference in the violation rate was observed, this finding could be
attributable to the fact that drivers did not perceive a risk of
enforcement since citations were not issued. The implementation of
appropriate fines in conjunction with education, as used in other
states, may result in a more positive safety impact (Fitzpatrick, et
al., 1997).

### Alberta, Canada

Transport Canada sponsored a pilot study of automated photo enforcement
and equipped one crossing in Strathcona County, protected by flashing
lights and bells only (i.e., no gates) with video cameras (English and
Murdock, 2005). Owners of violating vehicles received warning citations
by mail with two images. The first image showed the vehicle prior to its
crossing the stop line with the flashing red lights activated, and the
second showed the vehicle violating the crossing. Both images showed the
date and time of the violation and the time since the activation of the
flashing lights. The second image also indicated the vehicle speed and
the time interval from the first image.

To increase the public's awareness to the system, Strathcona County and
the Royal Canadian Mounted Police distributed an information card about
the system to drivers who frequently used the crossing, installed two
signs on each of the approaches one week prior to issuing warning
citations alerting drivers to the presence of the system, and conducted
a media campaign. The campaign consisted of a news release describing
the pilot project and interviews with the Royal Canadian Mounted Police.

Measures of the effectiveness of photo enforcement consisted of a before
and after comparison of the violation rate. When citations were issued,
the number of violations in which drivers failed to stop at the crossing
dropped by 53 percent, and the number of violations in which the drivers
stopped and then proceeded through the flashing lights dropped by 10
percent. However, some drivers exhibited unsafe behavior after the
introduction of photo enforcement by moving into the lane of oncoming
traffic to bypass vehicles stopped at the crossing or to avoid the
detection loops installed in the highway. Detectors placed on both
entrance and exit lanes to the crossing could reduce these violations.

## Summary

The specific policies and actions of regulators influence safety at
grade crossings. The impact of social and political forces can be seen
in the enactment and subsequent repeal of whistle bans to achieve a
balance between safety and the interests of neighboring communities. The
FRA conducted several studies that showed whistle bans had a detrimental
effect on safety and increased the accident rate at night in most
communities (FRA, 1995a, 1995b, 2000, 2003), but residents continued to
be concerned about the negative impact of the train horn on their
quality of life. While the Final Rule repeals the majority of whistle
bans, it does allow for the establishment of Quiet Zones and the use of
alternative technologies, such as wayside horns, to pacify communities.

Public education also improves grade crossing safety. Statistically,
Operation Lifesaver has had a significant nationwide impact (Mok and
Savage, 2005), but the implementation of the program and its success
varied from state to state (US GAO, 1995). The benefits of education may
also be short-lived if it is not continuous. In Iowa, for example, a
short public information campaign showed some success in improving
drivers' approach behavior to the crossing after 1 month (Brewer, 1992),
but observations of driver behavior 6 months after the campaign
suggested the need for continuous education to effect more permanent
changes (Iowa Department of Transportation, 1992). Additionally,
education should consider the social aspects of driving (e.g., pressure
from peers and other drivers to commit violations as noted by Parker, et
al., 1992, 1995 and Wilde, et al., 1971), and drivers' beliefs regarding
their accident risk and skill level (McKenna and Lewis, 1991). A public
education campaign can be incorporated successfully with enforcement to
improve driver compliance (Illinois Commerce Commission, 2005), although
the benefits of education with enforcement versus education alone are
not clear (Tarawneh, et al., 1999).

The use of enforcement alone at grade crossings may be implemented via
the traditional traffic stop or via photo enforcement. While no
comparison of the effectiveness of the two has been made, the methods
used by traditional enforcement may not be feasible at grade crossings
where there are a large number of crossings, a low frequency of trains,
and where pursuit requires committing a violation (Bowman, et al., 1998;
Fitzpatrick, et al., 1997). The use of photo enforcement is promising,
with positive impacts reported from demonstration projects. In
particular, in the states of California and North Carolina, the rate of
violations dropped by more than 75 percent at crossings with photo
enforcement (Carroll and Warren, 2001; FRA, 2002; Vantuano, 1994), and
in Illinois, the rate of violations decreased by almost 50 percent
(Laffey, 2003). Transport Canada reported similar benefits in a pilot
study conducted in Alberta; the introduction of photo enforcement
decreased the rate of violations at the crossing by an average of 69
percent (English and Murdock, 2005). However, the effectiveness of photo
enforcement will be limited based on how the tickets are adjudicated, as
judges in some states do not allow photo enforcement to be admitted as
evidence (Laffey, 2003). The success of any enforcement strategy will be
improved by its visibility, drivers' perception of its effectiveness,
and publicity.

# Summary and Conclusions

Although safety at grade crossings has improved in the past 10 years,
driver noncompliance, attributable to error, risky driving behavior, or
poor judgment, remains a significant problem. Lerner, et al. (1990)
first addressed this issue in a comprehensive review that explored
noncompliance as a result of human information processing limitations,
errors in decision making, impairment, and the driver's inherent
characteristics. A review of the literature since the publication of
Lerner, et al. highlighted the fact that many of the issues discussed in
1990 are still relevant to the grade crossing problem today.

This review used a sociotechnical model to examine driver noncompliance
at grade crossings. This approach allowed the consideration of factors
pertaining not only to the grade crossing environment and driver but
also to the influence of federal and state agencies and local
municipalities and the forces exerted by the public. The review was
organized in the framework of a sociotechnical system, shown in Figure
1, with four components. The innermost layer contains elements of the
grade crossing environment: traffic control devices, the crossing
layout, and trains. Moving out from the center of Figure 1, the next
layer addresses characteristics of the driver with respect to skill and
choice of driving style. Improvements to the grade crossing environment
require coordination among public agencies, railroad companies, and
highway authorities, as described by the third layer of the
sociotechnical system. The outermost layer addresses the influence of
social forces, such as public support or opposition to regulations and
actions taken by regulators (Moray and Huey, 1998).

This document reviewed the literature addressing the topics in each of
the layers of the sociotechnical model, as summarized below. Negotiating
a grade crossing is only one component of the driving task, so this
review included literature examining driver attitudes in the general
driving task and applied it to the grade crossing domain. Following the
summary, this section lists areas where further research is needed.
Operational recommendations based on the results of the literature
review are provided in Appendix A.

## Summary

The *technical/engineering system* component, discussed in Section 3,
describes characteristics in the design of traffic control devices
(e.g., signs, pavement markings, and active warning devices) at grade
crossings and the train that influence driver compliance. The findings
of the literature review indicate that:

-   Drivers generally recognized the advance warning and crossbuck signs
    but did not know where they were located in relation to the
    crossing, when the signs were used, and the action that was
    required.

-   Proposed alternative sign systems typically included the
    presentation of a stop sign or a yield sign in conjunction with the
    standard crossbuck. The MUTCD allows the use of stop or yield signs
    at passive crossings where two or more trains operate daily (FHWA,
    2003). The NTSB (1998) recommended the use of stop signs at all
    passive grade crossings because it would provide consistent
    information at grade crossings and clearly convey the action
    required, but this recommendation has been controversial.

-   Observations showed that compliance with stop signs at grade
    crossings was low, and the results of an accident analysis indicated
    that the collision rate at stop sign protected crossings were higher
    than that at crossings protected by other warning devices
    (crossbucks, flashing lights, or gates). In light of concerns that
    indiscriminate use of the stop sign at grade crossings could lead to
    noncompliance, FHWA (2006) clarified their position on the MUTCD
    provision by recommending that the yield sign be considered the
    default traffic control device for passive grade crossings and
    limited the stop sign to unusual situations where requiring vehicles
    to make a full stop was determined to be necessary by an engineering
    study or judgment.

-   Use of the yield sign or incorporating a yield message into the sign
    system is more promising than use of the stop sign. Systems
    incorporating the yield message improved driver understanding of the
    action required relative to presentation of the crossbuck alone, but
    its effect on driver behavior, as measured through looking behavior,
    was mixed.

-   Other proposed alternative sign systems discussed in the review
    distinguished active from passive crossings or alerted drivers to
    the possibility of a second train at the crossing.

-   Little research has addressed the design of pavement markings since
    the publication of the Lerner, et al. (1990) report. Instead,
    research conducted examined the use of supplemental markings to
    provide drivers with information about whether there is safe storage
    for their vehicle beyond the grade crossing. Results showed these
    markings had limited success. Their effectiveness depended on
    characteristics of the site, such that larger benefits were found at
    crossings with few signs and markings relative to "busier"
    intersections where the markings could be missed among other
    crossing-related signs, markings, and signals.

-   Observations of behavior at active grade crossings indicated that
    drivers were quite willing to violate active warning signals. This
    review discussed two methods for improving compliance: *explicitly*
    by providing barriers to prevent drivers from violating the crossing
    or *implicitly* by improving the credibility of the warning signals.
    Explicit methods include the implementation of four-quadrant gates,
    median barriers, and vehicle arresting barriers. Implicit methods
    include the use of constant time warning systems that reduce waiting
    time, identifying signal malfunctions to reduce the false alarm rate
    at the crossing, or incorporating highway traffic signals that have
    high credibility and compliance in the general driving situation.

-   Noncompliance at crossings may be due to a failure by the driver to
    detect the grade crossing. Illumination of the crossing, using
    strobe lights in conjunction with signs at the crossing, and
    reflectorization of the crossbuck and crossbuck post facilitated
    detection, particularly in low illuminations. To optimize the use of
    reflectorization, the MUTCD requires the application of reflective
    sheeting on the front and back along the full length of the
    crossbuck posts to facilitate detection as well as reflectorizing
    the crossbuck (FHWA, 2003).

-   Trains are equipped with alerting lights, reflective markings, and a
    train horn to facilitate their detection at a grade crossing.
    Regulations regarding their use are provided in three documents:

    -   *Railroad Locomotive Safety Standards: Clarifying Amendments;
        Headlights and Auxiliary Lights; Final Rule* (codified in 49 CFR
        § 229)

    -   *Reflectorization of Rail Freight Rolling Stock; Final Rule*
        (codified in 49 CFR § 224)

    -   *Use of Locomotive Horns at Highway-Rail Grade Crossings; Final
        Rule* (codified in 49 CFR § 222 and 229)

> Findings from field tests showed the effectiveness of alerting lights
> and reflective markings; participants detected trains equipped with
> these devices at further distances than trains equipped with the
> headlight alone or nonreflectorized trains, respectively.
> Additionally, the results of accident analyses noted the benefits of
> alerting lights and suggest the potential for the use of
> reflectorization to reduce accidents in which a vehicle runs into a
> train. With respect to the use of the train horn, acoustic tests
> showed the train horn was most audible when mounted at the front of
> the train. However, its effectiveness will be limited by the dampening
> of its sound (e.g., from community noise or interior noise in
> vehicles) and is of particular concern. Several studies evaluated the
> use of wayside horns, mounted at the crossing, and reported that they
> had no negative impact on safety while at the same time, reduced the
> noise level for residents in nearby communities.

The effectiveness of safety improvements at the technical/engineering
system level must be evaluated with respect to the *personnel system*,
the driver, as discussed in Section 4. Characteristics inherent to the
driver relate to his/her skill level and choice of driving style, as
summarized below.

-   Driving skill is impaired by aging, lack of experience, internal or
    external distractions, or driver impairment.

    -   With aging, changes in perceptual and cognitive abilities hinder
        the ability to detect cues to grade crossings and respond in a
        timely manner. For example, reduced visual acuity hindered the
        ability to detect signs and pavement markings at grade
        crossings, and less accurate estimations of speed and distance
        led to misjudgments of a train's arrival time at the crossing.

    -   Lack of experience, particularly for young drivers, resulted in
        a less than efficient visual search strategy and underestimation
        of potential driving hazards.

    -   The effect of driver distractions and impairment due to alcohol
        use or fatigue has similar consequences. Drivers may not realize
        they are approaching a grade crossing or fail to detect an
        approaching train. These two factors were significant
        contributing factors to highway accidents, but the increased
        risk at grade crossings is not known.

    -   Countermeasures to compensate for reduced driving skill, in
        particular the effects of aging and experience, include
        techniques for facilitating detection of the crossing at night
        (e.g., reflectorizing trackside objects) and installing
        additional signs at the crossing to indicate the action
        required.

-   Driving style, which is a drivers' choice of how to drive,
    influences the perception of the dangers at grade crossings and the
    decision whether or not to comply.

    -   Drivers do not expect to encounter a train at a grade crossing
        and sometimes do not even look for a train. This behavior is
        partially attributable to familiarity with an area, such that
        drivers who are familiar with a crossing are *more* likely to be
        involved in a grade crossing incident than drivers unfamiliar
        with the crossing.

    -   Some drivers are also risk takers and find noncompliant
        behavior, such as beating a train across the tracks, exciting.
        Studies showed that risk takers understood the consequences of
        their actions but were overconfident in their driving skill and
        optimistic in their abilities to avoid an accident. Risk-taking
        behavior was encouraged by social factors such as peer pressure
        and the perceived acceptance of that behavior.

    -   Drivers' attitudes were moderated by gender differences and age.
        Male drivers committed more violations and were involved in more
        grade crossing accidents than female drivers, and young drivers
        were more aggressive than older drivers. Noncompliance for males
        and young drivers was attributable to less concern with the
        negative outcomes of committing the violations than their
        counterparts, the perception that the risk of negative outcomes
        was not likely, or a sense that committing the violation was out
        of their control.

    -   Changes to driving style are more difficult than changes to
        driving skill because they require a change in drivers'
        attitudes. Information campaigns that highlight the negative
        consequences of committing violations, reduce the perception of
        peer approval for committing violations, and emphasize
        self-control to resist committing violations may be beneficial.

The implementation of countermeasures to improve safety at grade
crossings will require coordination and collaboration among federal,
state, and local agencies. Decisions by different organizations
regarding the design and structure of grade crossings impact the
selection of which crossings to improve and the selection and
implementation of countermeasures, as described by the
*organization/management system* layer and discussed in Section 5. Some
examples are presented below:

-   The FRA requires the assistance of states and railroads to maintain
    their crossing inventory and accident/incident database of public
    and private grade crossings. Input is provided through voluntary
    submission, and reviews of the information in the database found
    that a significant number of grade crossings were missing and
    information regarding the warning devices at crossings was missing
    or inaccurate.

-   Coordination between public agencies, railroad companies, and
    highway engineers may be necessary to determine which crossings to
    improve and what those improvements should be. Additionally, public
    discussions may be necessary to address any concerns about the
    impact of the changes on traffic, the neighborhood, and the public's
    convenience.

-   Signal preemption to prevent traffic queues at intersections near
    crossings from extending into the grade crossing requires
    coordination between railroad companies, local and state
    transportation departments, light rail transit agencies, and
    regulatory authorities. Poor communication has resulted in problems
    integrating highway and rail traffic control devices. Additionally,
    joint inspections by the appropriate rail and highway authorities
    may be necessary to ensure continued compliance of the
    interconnected system.

-   Several states have collaborated with railroad companies and
    industry to develop, implement, and evaluate the use of ITS
    technologies. These systems include in-vehicle displays to alert
    drivers to the presence of grade crossings and approaching trains,
    variable message signs located along freeways to inform drivers of
    approaching trains at crossings near freeway exits, so drivers can
    select alternate routes, and "intelligent grade crossings" where
    intelligent rail and automotive technologies are integrated. The
    effectiveness of these systems depended on their accuracy and
    drivers' perceived reliability of the system. Drivers did not trust
    systems that had a high rate of false alarms perceived them to be
    unnecessary and, when used at active grade crossings, redundant with
    the warning device.

The outer layer of the sociotechnical model, the *environmental system*,
addresses the influence of public support and specific policies and
actions by regulatory authorities to improving grade crossing safety.
Components of this layer include the development of federal regulations
and education programs and the use of enforcement, as discussed in
Section 6, and summarized below.

-   Notice of the FRA's development of regulations requiring the use of
    train horns at grade crossings was confronted with significant
    public opposition. Previously, state and local laws mandated rules
    regarding use of the train horn, and many communities established
    local whistle bans prohibiting the sounding of the train horn. The
    FRA conducted several accident analyses examining the effect of
    whistle bans in specific states and nationwide and found that these
    whistle bans had a significant negative impact on safety. Whistle
    ban crossings had an increased accident rate relative to crossings
    without whistle bans. In fact, the risk of a grade crossing accident
    increased by 84 percent when whistle bans were in effect. The one
    anomaly in the data was in the Chicago, Illinois area, where there
    was no significant difference in the accident rate at crossings with
    whistle bans compared to those without. As a result, the FRA
    developed regulation preempting all local whistle bans, with an
    exception for crossings in the Chicago Region, pending further data
    analysis. The Final Rule allows communities to establish Quiet Zones
    through coordination with railroad companies.

-   The Operation Lifesaver program has had a significant impact in
    improving grade crossing safety nationwide by educating the public
    on grade crossing hazards. Education can be incorporated
    successfully with enforcement to improve driver compliance.

-   Enforcement alone may be implemented via a traditional traffic stop
    or through automated photo enforcement. Several states in the US and
    one province in Canada have conducted demonstrations of photo
    enforcement and found positive impacts when its use was publicized
    and where consequences were tangible (e.g., through the issuance of
    fines).

-   The actions by state legislatures and court system to adjudicate the
    rules of driver behavior at grade crossings must also be considered.
    For example, judges in some states have concerns about allowing
    photo enforcement as evidence, because it was not clear whether
    violators were sufficiently notified of their rights and
    responsibilities.

## Areas for Further Research

The literature review addressed efforts to improve grade crossing
safety, and identified areas where there are gaps in our understanding
and additional research is needed. We propose the following topics for
consideration.

-   **Evaluate the use of highway intersection-related traffic control
    devices, in particular the use of stop and yield signs, at passive
    grade crossings.**

> As noted in Section 3.1.1.1, the similarities between driver actions
> at grade crossings and that at highway intersections has prompted
> interest in the use of stop and yield signs at passive grade
> crossings. The NTSB (1998) recommended the use of stop signs at all
> passive grade crossings because it clearly indicates the driver action
> that is required, but the recommendation has been controversial.
> Compliance with stop signs at grade crossings is low (Burnham, 1994;
> Lerner, et al., 2002), and there is concern that its use at grade
> crossings could foster disrespect for stop signs at traffic
> intersections. Thus, additional research is needed to examine the
> effectiveness of stop signs at grade crossings and empirically
> evaluate if the high rate of noncompliance at grade crossing stop
> signs could foster a general disrespect for the stop sign and carry
> over to non-grade crossing situations.
>
> The use of the yield sign has gained interest, but it has been
> evaluated in the field on a limited basis. The results of laboratory
> studies show that the use of the yield sign or a sign that
> incorporates the yield message improved comprehension of the action
> required. The results from field studies were mixed, but the studies
> had low sample sizes, so additional field data is needed to address
> its effectiveness.
>
> Traffic signals, which are less expensive to install than traditional
> active warning devices, may be applicable at grade crossings (see
> Section 3.1.3.3). In particular, the yellow light is expected to be
> useful to signal to drivers when there is a change in the
> right-of-way. Observations showed that the onset of the flashing
> lights resulted in rapid decelerations to the crossing, so the yellow
> light could improve safety by providing drivers with a sufficient
> warning. However, similar to the use of stop signs, there is concern
> that its use at grade crossings could impact its credibility at
> traffic intersections. Although traffic signals have been proposed as
> an alternative to traditional active warning devices, no empirical
> research has been conducted examining its use at grade crossings, but
> one study was identified, which found improved compliance with an
> enhanced traffic signal (Fambro, et al., 1989). Thus, additional
> research is needed to examine the feasibility of traffic signals at
> crossings.

-   **Examine the use of traffic calming techniques at grade
    crossings.**

> Traffic calming techniques improve safety by discouraging
> inappropriate behavior through environmental modifications. This
> approach is similar to that proposed by ecological psychology, which
> focuses on the relationship between humans and their environment and
> examines how environmental design can modify human behavior by
> creating a perception of stronger or weaker affordances that in turn
> encourage or constrain certain actions. One example is the use of
> rumble strips at some grade crossings, which have been effective in
> alerting drivers to the presence of the crossing and reducing their
> speeds on the approach. However, its use may also promote unsafe
> behavior such that some drivers, aware of the presence of the rumble
> strips, swerve in the opposing lane to avoid them.
>
> Other traffic calming techniques may be applicable at grade crossings
> and should be evaluated to determine their potential for encouraging
> compliance as well as their potential consequences. In particular, it
> will be important to determine whether the use of traffic calming
> technique to reduce speed upon approach to the grade crossing will
> divert attention away from the hazard at the grade crossing to the
> driving task of navigating the roadway.

-   **Conduct a cost-benefit analysis to determine the impact of
    different factors that contribute to driving style.**

> Although the installation of active protection at grade crossings
> improves its safety, it does not guarantee compliance. Several studies
> have shown that some drivers are quite willing to ignore active
> warnings (Abraham, et al., 1998; Meeker, et al., 1997) and in fact,
> some found it exciting to "beat the train" (Witte and Donohue, 1998).
> Barriers at the crossing, such as four-quadrant gates, improved
> compliance, but these systems are expensive to install. Thus, it is
> important to understand factors that implicitly influence driver
> behavior at grade crossings.
>
> The decision a driver makes at a grade crossing is based on a
> weighting of costs and benefits. Factors that influence compliance may
> be internal to the driver (e.g., one's expectancy of a train) or
> external (e.g., the state of the warning device). The first step in
> the cost-benefit analysis is to understand what cues the driver uses
> in the decision whether or not to comply at a grade crossing, and then
> to model the costs and benefits of the cues (Edworthy, 2000).
> Understanding the contributions of different motivations can help
> determine which factors play significant roles in decision making at
> grade crossings and can be used to develop methods for improving
> compliance.

-   **Examine methods for improving drivers' perception of signal
    reliability.**

> The effectiveness of countermeasures to influence drivers' perception
> of warning device credibility, discussed in Section 3.1.3.3, should be
> evaluated further. Drivers were more likely to commit a crossing
> violation as warning time increased beyond 20 seconds or if they
> perceived the signal to have a high number of false alarms (Richards
> and Heathington, 1990). No maximum warning time has been specified,
> but it is expected that reasonable and consistent waiting times by
> implementing constant warning time systems will encourage compliance
> (FHWA, 2002). While previous analyses comparing the accident rate at
> crossings with constant time warning systems to those at crossings
> with fixed distance warning systems found no difference between the
> two, it was not clear whether the results were due to limited data
> (Bowman, 1989) or to general driver distrust of grade crossing warning
> devices attributable to inconsistent warning times at fixed distance
> crossings (Halkias and Blanchard, 1989). Accident data collected in
> the time period since these analyses were conducted may speak to the
> effectiveness of constant time warning systems. Comparison of its use
> with fixed-distance systems should also examine its impact on safety
> along a rail corridor. Additionally, it may be worthwhile to determine
> if there are methods to reduce drivers' perception of waiting time,
> which is generally higher than the actual wait time.
>
> The false alarm rate may be reduced through improvements in track
> circuitry and train detection equipment, the incorporation of good
> maintenance practices, and the identification and correction of signal
> malfunctions in a timely manner (FHWA, 2002). Continued research to
> identify the factors that contribute to drivers' judgments of signal
> reliability is needed. In particular, external cues, such as the sound
> of a train horn, presented in conjunction with a warning signal, may
> help drivers discriminate between reliable and unreliable warnings
> (e.g., see Gil and Multer, in preparation). Research should also
> address the effectiveness of auditory warnings when the warning comes
> from a wayside horn versus the train horn and the impact if the
> auditory warning is not available (e.g., in a quiet zone). Other
> external cues should also be considered.
>
> The combined effect of these external cues with the signal provided by
> the warning system can be examined using the framework of distributed
> team signal detection theory. The theory proposes that an operator (in
> this case, the driver) and warning system are a team, working to reach
> a joint decision to optimize their performance (Lehto, 2006). Changes
> in performance by one team member can be used to alter the decision
> criterion for the other to optimize overall team performance (Lehto,
> 2006). In other words, while an understanding of the cues a driver
> uses to assess the warning signal's reliability (e.g., visual or
> auditory cues providing information about the presence of a train) can
> provide insight into how a driver determines whether to proceed or
> stop, observing drivers' compliance at crossings could also help
> warning designers determine how stringently to set the decision
> threshold for the warning system. Research exploring the applicability
> of this model of decision making to driver behavior at grade crossings
> is needed.

-   **Conduct further research in the use of ITS technologies.**

Several states have examined the use of ITS technologies to alert
drivers to the presence of crossings and trains at the crossing. Many of
these evaluations were conducted at crossings where the technology had
little impact; for example, at active grade crossings where the
in-vehicle warning was redundant with the active warning device, or
areas where traffic was not significantly affected by the presence of a
train at a crossing. Additionally, in most of the studies, the systems
were evaluated subjectively, through user questionnaires, so little
objective data is available regarding the impact of these technologies
on driver compliance.

Additional research is needed that examines the effectiveness of
in-vehicle warning displays on compliance at passive crossings. Because
drivers' subjective preferences are not always consistent with
performance results, objective data regarding the use of ITS
technologies would be valuable. In particular, it will be important to
examine drivers' perception of the reliability of the information and
the level of reliance on the in-vehicle warning display. It is possible
that use of this automation will reduce drivers' looking behavior at
grade crossings such that drivers will no longer perform an adequate
visual search for approaching trains or other hazards due to
over-reliance on the automation (Caird, et al., 2002).

-   **Evaluate different approaches to educating drivers.**

> The positive impact of public education on improving grade crossing
> safety, and in particular the effectiveness of the Operation Lifesaver
> program, was noted in the literature review (Illinois Commerce
> Commission, 2005; Mok and Savage, 2005, Savage, 2006). Finding the
> right balance in developing an education program to improve grade
> crossing safety is challenging. The implementation of education
> campaigns differ, and even the success of Operation Lifesaver varies
> from state to state, due to variations in funding levels and available
> resources.
>
> Traditional methods of education, while effective, may not be enough
> in the near future where new media technologies are changing how
> information is transmitted. New methods utilizing the Internet and
> other resources for engaging drivers should be considered (Secretary
> of Transportation, 2004).

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# Appendix A: Guidance Summary {#appendix-a-guidance-summary .Appendix-Heading-1}

This appendix provides a summary of the recommendations from the
literature review. The recommendations are based on federal regulations
and research on countermeasures to improve driver compliance at grade
crossings. The appendix is intended to provide operational guidance for
the implementation of countermeasures and can be used as a quick
reference or checklist. The section of the literature review where more
detail can be found is provided in brackets following each
recommendation.

## Technical/Engineering System {#technicalengineering-system-3 .Appendix-Heading-2}

The technical/engineering system addresses the design of the grade
crossing environment and techniques to assist the driver in detecting
the crossing and train. More detail can be found in Section 3.

-   Although the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices (MUTCD)
    allows the use of a Stop or Yield sign in conjunction with the
    crossbuck at passive grade crossings, concerns that indiscriminate
    use of the stop sign could lead to noncompliance led the Federal
    Highway Administration to clarify this provision and recommend that
    the Yield sign be the default traffic control choice. Use of the
    stop sign is limited to unusual conditions when a full stop is
    determined to be necessary by engineering analysis or judgment.
    \[3.1.1.1\]

-   Warning sign conspicuity is improved through reflectorization or by
    lowering the height of the crossbuck so that it can be better
    illuminated by vehicle headlights. \[3.1.1.1\]

-   Supplementary signs may be used in conjunction with the crossbuck
    and advance warning signs to provide drivers and pedestrians with
    additional information about the crossing (e.g., to discriminate
    between active and passive crossings, provide warnings regarding
    site characteristics, or to notify drivers to the possibility of a
    second train's approach). \[3.1.1.1\]

-   Compliance at active crossings may be improved explicitly by
    installing barrier systems, such as four-quadrant gates and median
    barriers, which prevent drivers from violating the crossing.
    \[3.1.3.2\]

-   Maintaining reasonable and consistent waiting times and reducing
    false alarm rates through good track maintenance practices can
    implicitly improve driver compliance at active grade crossings.
    \[3.1.3.3\]

-   Illuminating the crossing improves its conspicuity and may reduce
    the number of nighttime grade crossing accidents by facilitating
    driver detection of the crossing. Other successful approaches for
    improving conspicuity are to use "illuminated" signs or strobe
    lights at the crossing. \[3.2\]

-   49 CFR § 229 requires the use of alerting lights on a train to
    increase its conspicuity. Additionally, placing the lights in a
    triangular pattern allows drivers to estimate the train's speed and
    distance from the crossing. \[3.3.1\]

-   49 CFR § 224 requires the use of reflective materials on the sides
    of all trains and freight cars. With the exception of flat cars and
    tank cars, the retroreflective sheeting should be applied in a
    vertical or horizontal pattern along the length of the car sides,
    and the bottom edge of the sheeting should be as close to 42 inches
    above the top of the rail as possible. \[3.3.2\]

-   49 CFR § 222 requires that the train horn be sounded when trains
    approach and enter public crossings. The horn must have a minimum
    warning sound level of 96 dB at a distance of 100 ft (30.4 m) to the
    front of the train in the direction of travel. Exceptions are
    permitted under certain circumstances. \[3.3.3\]

-   Wayside horns, located at the crossing, can be used to alert drivers
    to an approaching train. Wayside horns provide a sound level greater
    than or equal to the train horn on drivers' approach to the
    crossing, while still reducing community noise in surrounding
    neighborhoods. \[3.3.3\]

## Personnel Subsystem (Driver) {#personnel-subsystem-driver-1 .Appendix-Heading-2}

The personnel subsystem addresses the driver's skill and the
contributions of driving style to overall driving performance. More
detail is provided in Section 4.

-   Reflectorizing the crossbuck and crossbuck post, illuminating
    crossings, and providing and reflectorizing additional signs that
    indicate driver action may compensate for age-related perceptual
    decrements and lack of driving experience. \[4.1.1, 4.1.2\]

-   Distractions or impairment due to alcohol-use or fatigue exposes
    drivers to the hazards at grade crossings, but the level of
    increased risk is unknown. \[4.1.4\]

    -   Countermeasures to prevent alcohol-related traffic accidents may
        be implemented at the state or local levels. At the state level,
        countermeasures include lowering the legal blood-alcohol level,
        setting zero-tolerance laws for drivers younger than 21 years
        old, and providing legislation for immediate punishment for
        alcohol-related offenses (e.g., automatic license suspension).
        At the local level, public information campaigns, such as high
        school and college alcohol prevention programs and community
        initiatives to prevent drinking and driving, and emergency room
        interventions with patients injured in alcohol-related crashes
        can help reduce future drinking.

    -   Fatigue-related accidents at grade crossings can be prevented by
        getting a sufficient amount of sleep, avoiding alcohol when
        tired, and limiting driving between the hours of 12 a.m. to 6
        a.m. When a driver becomes sleepy, stopping and taking a short
        nap or consuming caffeine equivalent to two cups of coffee may
        improve alertness.

-   Reasonable and consistent waiting times and low false alarm rates at
    active crossings can encourage drivers to comply. \[4.2.1, 4.2.2\]

-   Public information campaigns to highlight the negative consequences
    of committing violations at grade crossings and to emphasize driver
    self-control to resist committing a violation may help reduce risky
    driving behavior (e.g., the temptation to "beat the train" at the
    crossing). \[4.2.3\]

## Organizational/Management Behavior {#organizationalmanagement-behavior-2 .Appendix-Heading-2}

The Organizational/Management behavior subsystem describes the
coordination and collaboration required among federal, state, and local
agencies to improve safety at grade crossings. This is addressed in
detail in Section 5.

-   States' voluntary submission of information to the FRA crossing
    inventory and accident/incident database would improve the accuracy
    of these resources and allow them to be used to determine which
    crossings are in need of improvement. \[5.1\]

-   A standardized accident prediction formula that includes all
    variables determined to be valuable in evaluating grade crossing
    safety would be beneficial. \[5.1\]

-   The implementation of improvements to grade crossings is facilitated
    with proper coordination between states and local agencies, railroad
    companies, highway engineers, and the public. \[5.1\]

-   The implementation of successful signal preemption requires
    coordination by the railroad companies, local and state
    transportation departments, light rail transit agencies, and
    regulatory authorities. In particular, both highway and railroad
    agencies must work together to ensure the appropriate timing of
    signals. \[5.2\]

-   Driver use and acceptance of intelligent transportation system (ITS)
    technologies, such as in-vehicle displays that alert drivers to the
    presence of a train, is dependent on the driver's perceived
    reliability of the system and the driver's perception of whether the
    system is needed. \[5.3\]

## Environmental Factors {#environmental-factors-1 .Appendix-Heading-2}

Environmental factors constitute the outermost layer of the
sociotechnical model. This layer examines the political, social, and
cultural forces that influence safety, as discussed in Section 6.

-   Implementing FRA regulations requires adequately balancing the needs
    of local communities, municipalities, state agencies, and railroads
    to address safety concerns and community quality of life issues.
    \[6.1\]

-   Public education campaigns can information drivers of the dangers at
    grade crossings and the actions required. Short information
    campaigns may have some success, but improving driver behavior in
    the long-term may require continuous education. The campaigns should
    consider the social aspects of driving behavior and methods for
    changing drivers' motivation and attitudes. \[6.2\]

-   Photo enforcement is a more feasible alternative to identifying
    violators at grade crossings than the traditional traffic stop.
    However, the effectiveness of photo enforcement will depend on how
    the tickets are adjudicated in the legal system. \[6.3\]

-   A successful enforcement strategy must be visible, perceived by
    drivers to be effective, and well publicized. \[6.3\]

[^1]: Highway-rail grade crossings are also referred to as "highway-rail
    crossings", "highway-rail intersections", "railroad crossings",
    "grade crossings", or simply "crossings". These terms are used
    interchangeably in this review.