# **Before the United States Postal Regulatory Commission**

**Docket No. PI2008-4**

**Comments of American Target Advertising, Inc.**

**in Response to Notice and Order of**

**April 22, 2008 on the Cooperative Mail Rule**

To the Honorable Commissioners:

Thank you for the opportunity to comment in this matter. American Target
Advertising, Inc. (ATA) first pioneered direct mail marketing and
fundraising for nonprofit, ideological and political causes in 1965. Its
clients have included 501(c)(3) and 501(c)(4) nonprofits, and political
committees.

The PRC was given a specific but limited obligation under Section 711 of
the Postal Accountability and Enhancement Act (PAEA) to determine
whether the Cooperative Mail Rule (CMR) of the Domestic Mail Manual
contains adequate safeguards to protect against abuses of the nonprofit
postage rates and deception of consumers.

To address that concern, it is necessary first to distinguish the
boundaries and purposes of the CMR especially in light of highly
charged, but foundationally suspect, claims that the CMR needs to be
modified. Given that it could be to the benefit of certain interests to
restrict use of the nonprofit rates as a means to suppress competition
and criticism, ATA respectfully urges the PRC to make specific findings
when fulfilling its obligation under PAEA.

#### PART 1 -- THE COOPERATIVE MAIL RULE AND FUNDRAISING

## The Cooperative Mail Rule Was Not Meant to Apply to Nonprofit Fundraising

## Letters Mailed by and for Qualified Nonprofit Organizations

The CMR is statutorily limited in its application to unqualified mail
matter. Some matter, such as commercial advertising, is presumed to be
unqualified to mail at the nonprofit rates. Nonprofit fundraising
letters are, of course, presumed to be eligible to mail at the nonprofit
rates.[^1]

The governing statute restricts application of the CMR to commercial
advertisements such as "TIF" (travel, insurance and financial) under 39
USC 3626(j)(1)(A) -- (C), and other "***mail matter*** involved \[as\]
part of a cooperative mailing (as defined under regulations of the
Postal Service) with any person or organization not authorized to mail
at the \[nonprofit rates\]" under 39 USC 3626(j)(1)(D).[^2]

The legislative history to the addition of subparagraph (D) to section
3626(j)(1) makes clear that its purpose was to "eliminate\[\] the use of
nonprofit third-class mail for ***promoting any item or service for
which an organization is subject to unrelated business income
tax.***"[^3] (Emphasis added.) The CMR is therefore limited in
application by law to commercial advertising mail matter, whether of
third parties or nonprofits.

To suggest that nonprofit fundraising letters prepared by commercial
marketing and fundraising agencies on behalf of those nonprofit
organizations are unqualified mail matter is entirely inconsistent with
the scope and purposes of the CMR since the nonprofit rates were created
for the mailing of such matter, but not commercial advertisements.

The CMR was first developed by the USPS under Harvey Altergott, General
Manager of the Domestic Mail Classification Division, 1979 -- 1985,
whose July 27, 1999 affidavit I attach as Exhibit 1. The factors in the
CMR[^4] were developed not as an end unto themselves, but as a means to
detect the mailing of ***unqualified commercial matter*** at the
nonprofit rates under arrangements not visible to the USPS at the point
of entry of the mail. As Mr. Altergott states:

The factors, including the risk factor, were not intended to regulate or
limit the amount of money that could be spent by a non-profit
organization for the development and distribution of its mail. This is
because the purpose and objectives of an organization are determinants
as to whether an organization qualifies for the Special \[nonprofit\]
rates. The Postal Service is not charged with determining how effective
an organization is achieving its objectives. . . Simply put, Postal
regulations are intended to limit use of the \[nonprofit\] rates to
qualified, authorized not for profit organizations and the "factors"
were developed and applied to limit those rates for the ***selling a
product or service by others***. Cooperative mailing rules and
guidelines were not developed to limit mailings that ***did not promote
products, services or objectives of those not eligible for the
\[nonprofit\] rates***. (Emphasis added.)

As a matter of law, the CMR could not apply to the fundraising letters
mailed by nonprofits using the services of commercial marketing and
fundraising agencies, even if the factors listed in the CMR applied to
those mailings, because the ***mail matter*** itself is qualified to
mail at the nonprofit rates.[^5] The CMR test is two-pronged, with
commercial advertising mail matter always being one prong.

The regulatory CMR was created as a Postal Service rule before it was
incorporated statutorily into 39 USC 3626. It was expressly limited by
statute to its purpose of preventing use of the nonprofit rates to mail
commercial advertisements, i.e., matter for which the nonprofit rates
were ***not*** created. Had it been the intent to make the CMR apply to
fundraising letters prepared by commercial agencies, the statute could
and should have said so. But it doesn't.

I.  [Mistaken Application of the CMR Beginning in the 1990s]{.underline}

> There are certainly grounds to dispute the description of the USPS
> 2003 final rule for the CMR as a "fundraising exception."[^6]
>
> Under a short-lived, limited and discriminatory application of the CMR
> beginning in the mid- to late-1990s, after the USPS was reformed and
> no longer received the level of taxpayer subsidies it once did,
> several nonprofit organizations were denied entry of their mail at the
> lower nonprofit rates, and were forced to mail at the higher standard
> bulk mail rates. For the first time, the USPS had begun to apply to
> CMR standards without regard to the mail matter itself. That was
> challenged as an unlawful, *ultra vires* interpretation of the
> CMR.[^7] That interpretation was inconsistent with the original
> purposes of the CMR and the statutory framework, which were to prevent
> the mailing of commercial matter at the nonprofit rates.

It was a standard industry practice since at least the 1960s, but
probably before that, for marketing and fundraising agencies to prepare
nonprofit fundraising letters under the standards in the CMR. Agencies
(1) designed packages and (2) advanced postage; (3) net income was used
to pay for losses on donor acquisition mailings, and (4) agencies bore
some risk of financial losses.

For example, Federal Election Commission Advisory Opinion 1979-36
expressly recognized that fundraising agencies could advance postage and
share risk as a "standard" industry practice, and "the proposed type of
financing agreement represents an ordinary mode of operation." The
contract at issue in FEC AO 1979-36 stated that the commercial agency
would advance all funds for each mailing by the political committee. No
more than 25 percent would be available for the political committee to
use for its "program," and direct mail costs needed to be paid out of 75
percent of the revenue, even if costs were higher. The direct mail
agency charged 20 percent of the costs of the mailings as it fee.

The USPS 2003 final rule on the CMR provides various reasons for how it
was reached, ***all of which still apply today***. The USPS, however,
never sought statutory authorization to make fundraising letters
ineligible for the nonprofit rates under the CMR. To make fundraising
letters ineligible for the nonprofit rates would be a change in
classification, and that may be done only by statute.

The USPS understandably called its 2003 CMR final rule an "exception,"
because calling it a correction of a misapplication or misinterpretation
could have resulted in liabilities to the nonprofits that were denied
entry at the nonprofit rates beginning only in the mid- to late-1990s
following the major conversion of the USPS.[^8] However, the facts and
the history demonstrate that the 2003 CMR regulation was a correction of
an *ultra vires* misapplication of the CMR regardless of what it was
called. Fundraising letters are qualifying matter of nonprofits even
though nonprofits employ professional agencies, and even under factors
listed in the CMR.

ATA respectfully urges the PRC to avoid relying on third-party
mischaracterizations of the CMR, or even accepting the characterization
of the 2003 final rule as a "fundraising exception," at face value or as
a starting point in its obligation under Section 711 of PAEA.

## Recent Calls for Changes to the CMR Based on Congressional Hearings Lack

##### Factual and Legal Support

Some have used recent hearings about veterans' charities before the
House Oversight Committee[^9] as grounds to revise the CMR, or to hasten
regulations under Section 711 of the PAEA. However, the CMR was not
raised as an issue at either of those hearings. The CMR was expressly
addressed at an April 24, 2008 hearing before the Subcommittee on
Federal Workforce, Postal Service and the District of Columbia.

Despite highly charged allegations at those three hearings, noticeably
and strikingly absent were any findings, indeed, any evidence, that
cooperative mailings \-- under anyone's interpretation of the CMR \--
have contributed to (1) abuses of the nonprofit rates, (2) deception of
consumers, (3) high costs of fundraising or even (4) any of the issues
that were addressed at the two hearings on veterans' charities.[^10]
[^11] Indeed, the issues raised at the veterans' charities hearings
apply to nonprofit practices ***regardless*** of the CMR factors.[^12]
See Footnote 4 herein.

Those hearings were based in large part on the ***objectively false***
representation that the sole purpose of nonprofit fundraising
communications, particularly through the United States Mail, is to
solicit contributions. Nonprofits use their so-called fundraising
letters to inform and persuade citizens about health, religious, public
policy and a plethora of other issues.[^13] Nonprofit letters help
citizens take action other than making contributions.[^14] Nonprofit
mail influences behavior for the public good by far more citizens than
those who make contributions.[^15] Donor acquisition mailings typically
lose money, so costs of fundraising is a false measure of efficiency or
tax-exemption.

It appears from the lack of findings, therefore, that proponents of
change to the CMR are merely using highly charged issues unrelated to
the CMR as justification for pushing an agenda that the USPS rejected in
its 2003 final rule of the CMR about fundraising. Indeed, one can
conclude from the facts, Supreme Court opinions on the need to protect
nonprofit fundraising communications as an essential First Amendment
right, and other factors, that harmful consequences may result from what
proponents seek.[^16] Those consequences would include less competition
within the nonprofit sector, or stifling, even silencing, some nonprofit
critics of government by making the mail more expensive, and thus less
accessible, for some nonprofit organizations.

### [PART 2 \-- RECOMMENDATIONS]{.underline}

### 

### IV. [Absent Express Factual and Legal Findings, Make No Change to the CMR]{.underline} 

### 

###  ATA respectfully suggests that no changes to the CMR be made at this point (but see Section VII herein with respect to political committee mailings). There have been no findings that the CMR has been involved in any abuse of the nonprofit rates to mail nonprofit fundraising letters, or that the CMR was involved in any deception of consumers by nonprofits.

### 

### The Office of Inspector General (OIG) is conducting a study on these issues, and its finding have not been released. Should the OIG's findings indicate abuses or deception grounded in the CMR, ATA respectfully urges the PRC to open a period for comments on that report. 

Special interests within the nonprofit sector plan to re-propose CMR
changes that were rejected by the USPS in its 2003 final rule.[^17]
Given the findings made by the USPS in 2003 and the lack of findings at
any congressional hearings to date linking cooperative mailings to
abuses of the nonprofit rates or deception of consumer, proponents of
modifying the CMR should bear an awfully strong burden of linking facts
to the agenda they desire. This second-bite-at-the-apple lobbying
approach requires more than innuendo as grounds for changing the CMR.

## V. Ownership of Donor Lists

At the April 24 hearing, it was suggested that nonprofits should own
their lists. Nonprofits, of course, build their lists through multiple
ways including donor acquisition mailings to portions or "selects" of
lists "owned" by other nonprofit organizations, magazines, etc.
Therefore, nonprofits come to "own" their lists by using many other
lists "owned" by other nonprofits, but available on the list rental
market.[^18]

One obvious element of ownership is the right to do what one wants with
what one owns. Therefore, to suggest that nonprofits may not use the
lists they "own" to leverage their ability to communicate and raise more
money sounds counterintuitive, would be a restraint on ownership rights,
and would impede their ability to communicate and raise money. It is not
unreasonable to suspect that certain special interests in the nonprofit
sector desire those consequences.

Lists are valuable means to leverage the ability to raise money,
especially for nonprofits with no other assets. For example, Senator
John McCain used his presidential campaign donor list as collateral to
secure a bank loan so that he could communicate and raise money.[^19]
Large, wealthy and more established charities with investments in real
estate or other assets may more easily obtain capital by leveraging
those assets.

There are in excess of 1.5 million 501(c)(3) and 501(c)(4) nonprofit
organizations. The special interests pushing to make the CMR restrict
fundraising represent ***cumulatively*** less than ***four
one-hundredths of one percent*** (.0004) of nonprofits. These special
interests are also financed by corporations and wealthy foundations.
Their lobbyists clearly do not speak for the entire nonprofit sector,
but only for those nonprofits and corporations that finance them.

Membership societies for nonprofits and fundraisers are entirely free to
establish guidelines for membership in their own organizations without
imposing those requirements on others. They are free to promote and
distinguish their guidelines to encourage entities to join and pay dues.
But to impose their membership requirements on others in the nonprofit
sector who do not agree with those guidelines, by laws that amount to
restrictions on ownership rights, competition, and even the right and
ability to communicate, requires more stringent findings than what has
been presented.

### VI. [Competition Combined with Constitutional Disclosure is a Universal Solution]{.underline} 

If nonprofit fundraising costs are already high, then it seems to be
counterproductive to make nonprofit mailings by some nonprofit
organizations even more expensive by making them ineligible to mail at
the nonprofit rates.

Although not directly related to the task at hand for the PRC, but
bearing on the issue as a more comprehensive solution, I have submitted
to Members of Congress a proposal for legislation that would be an
online disclosure system for nonprofits that solicit contributions from
the general public.

The proposal would apply to more entities than just charities that
solicit contributions. It would apply to entities that not only rely on
direct mail, but other media such as the Internet, and thereby would not
discriminate against nonprofits that communicate via United States mail.
It would allow for disclosure of information directly to donors
consistent with First Amendment standards against government-compelled
speech, as described in the four principal U.S. Supreme Court opinions
about fundraising regulation and disclosure.[^20] [^21]

This proposed online disclosure system would not be administered by the
United States Postal Service. The USPS should not bear that burden for
many reasons, including the fact that much nonprofit fundraising is
already shifting towards the Internet due to the increasingly high costs
of direct mail. The proposal is described briefly in the attached
article, Exhibit 2.

## Deceptive Fundraising and Abuse of Nonprofit Rates by National Political

## Committees

National political committees are deemed "qualified political
committees" eligible to mail at the nonprofit rates.[^22] Exhibit 2
("Where does political donor money go"),[^23] which describes the online
disclosure proposal, also states that the online disclosure system would
apply to federal candidate and national political committees. Under a
loophole left in the campaign finance laws after the Bipartisan Campaign
Reform Act of 2002,[^24] lawmakers' own campaign committees are able to
make unlimited contributions to the national political committees.[^25]
Under that loophole, unqualified committees help finance the direct mail
of qualified committees in amounts larger than the contribution limits,
as explained below.

"Unqualified" candidate committees raise money ostensibly for their own
campaigns, but without informing donors, transfer substantial sums to
the national committees.[^26] That practice is certainly deceptive to
donors because in some cases more than 30 percent of donor contributions
to lawmakers' campaigns are being used to finance the national
committees and their direct mail. As the article at Exhibit 2 notes,
national parties dictate amounts lawmakers must raise for the national
committees through fundraising conducted by the lawmakers' own
committees. Lawmakers are therefore acting as undisclosed fundraising
agents for the national committees, and this deceptive fundraising
appears to be knowing and willful given that the national committees
dictate in advance of the solicitations amounts in excess of the
contribution limits that lawmakers must raise and pass through to their
national committees.[^27]

Qualified committees that receive contributions from individual
lawmakers in excess of the contribution limit under 2 USC 441a(a)(1)(B),
currently \$28,500 per cycle, or are financed by fraudulent
solicitations, should not be eligible to mail at nonprofit rates since
that is both an abuse of the nonprofit rates and deceptive.[^28]

Respectfully submitted,

Mark J. Fitzgibbons

President of Corporate and Legal Affairs

American Target Advertising, Inc.

9625 Surveyor Court, Suite 400

Manassas, VA 20110

\(703\) 392-7676, <mfitzgibbons@americantarget.com>

May 20, 2008

Attachments: Exhibit 1 Altergott Affidavit

> Exhibit 2 "Where does political donor money go?"

[^1]: "It is a classification which is used by charitable institutions
    to solicit funds and membership and to inform the public of \[the
    nonprofit organizations'\] programs." *H. Rep. No. 93-1084*, for
    Pub. L. 93-328 (1974).

[^2]: 39 USC 3626(j)(1) (emphasis added), which was added by amendments
    of 1990 (Pub. L. 101-509) and 1993 (Pub. L. 103-123).

[^3]: Congressional Research Service Summary of HR 2403, as of
    9/24/1993. HR 2403 became Pub. L. 103-123. Section 705 of Pub. L.
    103-123 added subparagraph (D) to 39 USC 3626(j)(1), and applies
    only to "advertising."

[^4]: \(1\) Who devised, paid for the package, (2) who paid postage, (3)
    how are revenues divided, (4) who bears the risk, (5) who make
    decisions about content, and (6) what are the participant's
    intentions and interests. USPS Publication 417, 5-2.

[^5]: Some proponents of modifying the CMR have implied that high costs
    of fundraising are an abuse of the CMR, which is objectively and
    legally a false presumption. Chairman Henry Waxman acknowledged at
    the April 24 hearing that the current system of disclosure has
    contributed to a failure to understand costs versus net income of
    nonprofit communications. As to the issue of disclosure, see Part VI
    herein, which discusses a proposal for a constitutionally acceptable
    direct-to-donor online disclosure system. The current
    disclosure-to-government systems, whereby nonprofits disclose to the
    Internal Revenue Service and state charitable offices, and political
    committees disclose to the Federal Election Commission, are becoming
    widely more recognized as the problem, not the solution.

[^6]: *See* 68 FR 58273 (October 9, 2003).

[^7]: See for example *Aid Association Lutherans v. USPS*, 321 F.3d 1166
    (DC Cir. 2003).

[^8]: To have called the 2003 final rule a correction rather than an
    exception could have been used as an admission against interest by
    those nonprofits that were denied entry at the nonprofit rates.

[^9]: December 13, 2007 and January 17, 2008.

[^10]: The December 13 hearing on veterans' charities focused primarily
    on costs of fundraising and net income available for "program
    services," and it was asserted that high costs of fundraising and
    administration constitute "fraud." See the chart presented at
    2:07:15 of December 13 Oversight Committee hearing,
    <http://oversight.house.gov/story.asp?ID=1666>. While it may
    certainly be appropriate to debate the efficiency and effectiveness
    of nonprofit organizations and their fundraising costs, the United
    States Supreme Court has made abundantly clear on four separate
    occasions that high costs of fundraising are not an indicia of
    fraud, but are in many cases necessary as a means by which
    nonprofits inform, educate, persuade and engage in their rights
    expressly protected by the First Amendment. *See* *Illinois ex rel.
    Madigan v. Telemarketing Associates, Inc.*, 538 U.S. 600 (2003);
    *Riley v. National Federation of the Blind*, 487 U.S. 781 (1988);
    *Secretary of State v. Munson*, 467 U.S. 947 (1984); and *Schaumburg
    v. Citizens for Better Environment*, 444 U.S. 620 (1980).

[^11]: It is more plausible that marketing and fundraising for veterans'
    charities, whose purposes differ even less widely than the many
    issues facing veterans and their families, can be costly because
    citizens generally do not understand that the federal government has
    failed to adequately care for our veterans. The testimony of one
    witness in particular at the December 13, 2007 hearing supports that
    conclusion. *See*, testimony of Edgar Edmundson, 35:00 -- 38:20 of
    the hearing, <http://oversight.house.gov/story.asp?ID=1666>. More
    recent revelations of alleged government cover-ups and failures to
    deliver services demonstrate why many citizens do not understand the
    full scope of issues affecting veterans. *See* "In Federal Suit, 2
    Views of Veterans' Health Care," *The New York Times*. April 22,
    2008,
    *<http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/22/washington/22vets.html?ref=us>.*

[^12]: If the issues raised at the veterans' charities hearings were not
    the result of mailings under the CMR factors, or if those issues are
    practices within the nonprofit sector even absent the CMR factors,
    that certainly should demonstrate lack of merit in the allegations
    that the veterans' charity hearings as a basis to revisit the CMR.

[^13]: Nonprofits that seek low-dollar contributions from many citizens
    are unquestionably bound to have higher costs of fundraising than
    nonprofits financed, even if in part, by the government,
    corporations, foundations, etc.

[^14]: Not only do the purposes and needs of 501(c)(3) organizations
    differ widely, ranging from soup kitchens to purely providing
    information to the general public on issues such as drunk-driving
    laws, global warming, etc., thereby making fundraising costs an
    improper measure of effectiveness, but the purposes of 501(c)(4)
    organizations differ even further from those of 501(c)(3)s.
    501(c)(4)s may be created to generate petitions under grassroots
    lobbying efforts whose sole communication vehicles may be so-called
    fundraising letters.

[^15]: Contribution response rates to direct mail are generally far less
    than ten percent for most nonprofit mailings, which means that more
    citizens receive information from nonprofits than donate to
    nonprofits, often at a ratio of 50 to 1. There is value consistent
    with the creation of the reduced nonprofit rates even in nonprofit
    direct mail that results in financial losses or that have high costs
    of fundraising. For example, a "green" charity that raises money
    through mail informing readers how to save energy costs may have a
    societal impact far larger than measured by its costs of
    fundraising, or the amount of net income that it spends on "green"
    projects using net income derived from those mailings.

[^16]: Clearly, harming the ability of nonprofits to use and pay for the
    services of commercial agencies inures to the benefit or larger,
    wealthier nonprofits that (1) receive financing by the government,
    corporations or foundations, or that have other sources of income
    and investments and (2) have the financial wherewithal to hire
    marketing and fundraising experts on staff, which are "luxuries" not
    available to most nonprofits.

[^17]: *See* statements of ADRFCO and Alliance of Nonprofit Mailers at
    the April 24, 2008 Subcommittee hearing,
    <http://federalworkforce.oversight.house.gov/story.asp?ID=1890>.

[^18]: Nonprofits are of course free to acquire donors by other means,
    and to make their donor lists unavailable on the list rental market.
    However, many nonprofits use donor acquisition mailings by renting
    lists on the market as a means to both communicate with the general
    public beyond their existing membership or donor lists, and to grow
    their organizations.

[^19]: *See* "McCain's Donor List," *Wall Street Journal*, Feb. 14,
    2008,

    <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB120294942811566819.html>. It should
    be noted that under federal election laws, political committees may
    obtain loans only through banks. As recognized by the USPS in its
    2003 final rule, many nonprofits are unable to obtain loans and
    other institutional financing due to lack of collateral, poor credit
    history, etc.

[^20]: *See* *Illinois ex rel. Madigan v. Telemarketing Associates,
    Inc.*, 538 U.S. 600 (2003); *Riley v. National Federation of the
    Blind*, 487 U.S. 781 (1988); *Secretary of State v. Munson*, 467
    U.S. 947 (1984); and *Schaumburg v. Citizens for Better
    Environment*, 444 U.S. 620 (1980).

[^21]: Postmaster General Potter suggested at the April 24 hearing that
    nonprofits should be required to disclose in their mailings how much
    is spent on fundraising. My online disclosure proposal would achieve
    that result without violating the Supreme Court's mandates against
    government-compelled speech expressed in the decisions cited in
    Footnote 20, herein. Justice Brennan wrote in his *Riley* opinion
    about the reasons against such government-compelled speech:

    \[Compelled disclosure\] necessarily discriminates against small and
    unpopular charities, which must usually rely on professional
    fundraisers. Campaigns with high costs and expenses carried out by
    professional fundraisers must make unfavorable disclosures, with the
    predictable result that such solicitations will prove unsuccessful .
    . . In the context of a verbal solicitation, if the potential donor
    is unhappy with the disclosed percentage, the fundraiser will not
    likely be given the chance to explain the figure; the disclosure
    will be the last words spoken as the donor closes the door or hangs
    up the phone." *Riley v. National Federation of the Blind*, 487 US
    781, 799 (1988).

[^22]: ^?^ *See* 39 USC 3626(e)(2)(A). These committees include the
    Republican National Committee, Democratic National Committee,
    National Republican Congressional Committee, Democratic
    Congressional Campaign Committee, National Republican Senatorial
    Committee and the Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee. These
    Democratic and Republican political committees became eligible to
    mail at nonprofit rates after a 1978 amendment adding subsection (e)
    to 39 USC 3626. *See* Pub. L. 95-593.

[^23]: *Politico*, May 13, 2008,
    <http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0508/10306.html>.

[^24]: Pub. L. 107-155.

[^25]: ^?^ 2 USC 439a(a)(4) allows candidate committees to transfer
    unlimited amounts of excess campaign funds to the national
    committees. Other donors to the national committees are limited to
    contributing only \$28,500 per election cycle (2 USC 441a(a)(1)(B)),
    which is price indexed.

[^26]: ^?^ For example, the top 20 contributors to the NRCC and DCCC are
    all lawmakers, and the average contribution by House Members was
    approximately \$430,000, which is ***15 times the contribution
    limit*** ***for citizens***.

[^27]: The transfers by unqualified lawmaker committees to national
    committees also benefit the unqualified lawmakers' committees. A
    congressional lawmaker in a leadership position who transfers
    \$700,000, for example, to his or her national congressional
    campaign committee personally benefits from advertising mail sent at
    the nonprofit rates urging voters to keep or make that party a
    majority in Congress.

[^28]: "Qualified political mailings are subject to the cooperative mail
    requirements." USPS Pub. 417, section 5-4.1.