**HEADQUARTERS**![](media/image1.png){width="1.1875in"
height="1.1826388888888888in"}![](media/image2.jpeg){width="1.4833333333333334in"
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**HAWAII WING, CIVIL AIR PATROL**

**UNITED STATES AIR FORCE AUXILIARY**

**P. O. Box 29417, Honolulu, HI 96820**

Ph. 808-836-3417 FAX: 808-834-4065

**OPERATIONS MEMO 06-10** **21 May 2006**

# 

From: Hawaii Wing DO/DOS

To: Squadron Commanders/DOs

# 

**Subject: HIWG MEMORANDUM - CAP AIRCRAFT JUSTIFICATION CRITERIA FOR THE
STATE OF HAWAII**

Ref: (a) Pacific Region Conference 28-29 April 2006

\(b\) Mr. Ed Teixeira, Vice Director, State Civil Defense letter to
General Antonio J. Pineda dated 24 February 2006

\(c\) Colonel Roger Caires, former HIWG Commander, letter to Colonel
Ernest C. Pearson former Pacific Region Commander dated 5 January 1995

\(d\) Colonel Roger Caires Memorandum to the National Vice Commander
dated 21 March 1994.

> \(e\) Congressman Ed Case Letter to General Michael Mosley, Chief of
> Staff USAF, dated 18 April 2006

**1. Background and Justification** - This memo concerning the
justification of the total number of CAP aircraft assigned to the State
of Hawaii is forwarded to Pacific Region Headquarters at the request of
Pacific Region staff members during reference (a). By way of a
historical perspective, HIWG has repeatedly attempted to explain the
unique requirements and special considerations that should be considered
when analyzing the total number of aircraft required for our State.
References (c) and (d) are two examples of correspondence forwarded to
higher headquarters addressing the CAP aircraft assigned to the State of
Hawaii. Numerous Wing Commanders have elucidated for years our aircraft
requirements to various levels of Command in the CAP. In addition,
during countless SAREVALs, Compliance Inspections, National Boards,
Region meetings, and informal discussions with CAP National Staff, the
staff of HIWG has provided evaluators and various CAP staff members'
detailed data on our exclusive needs for proper CAP support to the State
of Hawaii. Unfortunately, despite these repeated attempts, it appears
that the message of our requirements has not been understood and/or
considered.

**2. Fleet Size** - To date the HIWG has operated a total of ten (10)
aircraft, which by our mission-based assessments, represents the minimum
number needed to fulfill those missions. References (c) and (d) actually
requested an increase of aircraft for our State to a total of (12)
aircraft. The complement of 10 aircraft has served the HIWG well for
years. In 2005, one of our aircraft was sold via an auction by CAP
National Headquarters. This move has resulted in numerous inquiries and
questions, both from CAP members and state officials, as to why aircraft
might be taken from HIWG. Many responses and various reasons were
provided for such action, the primary ones being founded around the
flight hour program and national fleet reduction requirements.

**3. Flight Hours** - In recent years, the HIWG has been told we were
not flying our aircraft enough, the target being 200 hours per aircraft
per year. This has admittedly not been attainable due to numerous
challenges in all areas of operations. In previous years however, HIWG
far exceeded this goal when it was flying Counter Drug (CD) missions in
the islands. At that time HIWG was a flight hour leader in the nation,
with a robust flight hour program funded by CD resources. As a result of
political decisions by senior CD personnel that were not favorable to
HIWG, funding for this program disappeared. The Wing returned to USAF
and member funding to conduct most of its flight operations. However,
because of Hawaii's high costs of living, most CAP members do not have
the discretionary resources to conduct member funded flying. This meant
the flight hour program reverted primarily to USAF funded flying and
limited member funded flying. It should be noted that HIWG met all
mission tasking during this frustrating period of time.

**4. National Fleet Reduction** - Another response given as to the
drawdown of aircraft is a reduction in the overall numbers in the CAP
fleet -- from 550 to 530 aircraft. With a reduction in funding for the
CAP National budget, this cut in total aircraft inventory is a realistic
goal to meet budget requirements. While this fleet reduction is mandated
from National Headquarters, HIWG staff thinks the resulting allocation
criterion do not take Hawaii's unique situation and mission requirements
into account. A further reduction in our fleet will seriously impact our
ability to conduct our primary and secondary missions.

**5. State Funding** - State funding for HIWG CAP is unreliable based on
appropriations availability. This trend seems to be changing with recent
action on the part of our State Civil Defense and legislature
leadership. Dating back to the late 1980s, State law was changed to
provide HIWG approximately \$190,000 dollars a year to operate and
provide service to the State. Under Title 15, Transportation and
Utilities, Chapter 261 on Aeronautics, the following piece of
legislation became law:

***§261-6 Civil air patrol.** (a) Beginning in fiscal year 1988-1989 and
in accordance with chapter 42F, the sum of \$190,600 annually or so much
thereof as may be necessary shall be granted from the general fund to
carry on the operations and defray the expenses of the Hawaii wing,
civil air patrol; provided that not less than \$3,000 shall be allocated
to each Hawaii based civil air patrol unit that meets minimum
requirements established by national headquarters and has demonstrated
its capability to respond to emergencies within the State.*

After an initial allocation of funding, the funding line was terminated
with a change of administration. Numerous attempts were made with little
success to reinstate the funding. Finally, on July 16, 2004, Hawaii
Governor Linda Lingle signed into law Senate Bill 2045 \-- CAP
Appropriations, which authorized the Hawaii Wing to receive \$50,000
from the State and an additional \$50,000 from the Hawaii State Civil
Defense. Once again, it was a combination of the State Civil Defense
officials and CAP friendly legislators that came to our aid - State
funding was approved for FY 2005 for a total of \$100,000.00. For FY
2006, before the appropriation was approved, State Civil Defense
committed \$50,000 so that the Wing could continue tsunami training
flights. In this year's (FY06) legislative process, we petitioned for
approximately \$160,000 and were awarded \$110,000. This positive step
is, in part, thanks to the focus on recent national disasters and our
State Civil Defense Agency and prominent legislators realizing the
benefit of having the CAP assist the State with tsunami warning and
disaster relief. The untiring efforts of numerous HIWG members have made
great progress in educating government officials. This remarkable effort
has taken time and a great deal of work by local CAP members, indicative
of their commitment to the program.

**6. Current Situation** - One can easily see the quandary for the HIWG
staff and squadrons as the aforementioned information is digested. On
one hand we are told to fly our aircraft to meet a minimum flight hour
requirement. This is tough to accomplish without funding to fly the
required flight hours. We now begin to have a hope of recovery with the
award of some State funding, but are faced with a fleet reduction.
Restarting serious increases in flight hours takes some time -- there is
a lag in getting crews re-established and proficient. After convincing
State officials of our need for funding to fly and fix aircraft we are
faced with the predicament of explaining a possible fleet reduction in
this supposedly vital program. It is a frustrating situation that is
difficult to explain to both our members and state/local government
leaders. In reference (b), Ed Teixeira, the Vice Director for State
Civil Defense, was so concerned and frustrated he wrote a personal
letter to General Pineda to seek his response for reasoning on why CAP
aircraft are being removed from the State.

**7. Current Performance Trends** - Through all of this turmoil, HIWG
has slowly and steadily been making a mark for itself. As any old IG
inspector would tell you "What are the trends telling you?" [HIWG
performance trends are very positive]{.underline} as illustrated by the
following data points:

-   [State Funding]{.underline} -- FY 06 funding allocation of
    \$110,000. This is the largest amount of funds given recently to the
    HIWG for support to the State.

-   [CAP membership in Hawaii]{.underline} -- Hawaii ranks in the top
    three (3) States in acquiring new CAP members, both senior members
    and cadets, again thanks to the recognition of the importance of our
    missions and programs.

-   [Flight Hour Program is increasing]{.underline} -- The flight hour
    program has steadily increased over the last few years indicating
    that the State funding has the ability to make our Flight Hour
    Program meet the requirement of 200 hours per aircraft per year.
    HIWG recently requested an additional \$10,000 dollars of USAF
    funding to fly cadets and perform additional operational training
    for FY 06.

-   [More qualified crewmembers]{.underline} -- With the increased
    flight hours there has been a corresponding increase in total number
    of qualified crewmembers.

-   [Cadet programs]{.underline} -- Cadets continue to receive more
    appointments to service academies than at anytime in the past.

-   [Successful SAREVAL]{.underline} -- With all the numerous challenges
    facing HIWG, the staff successfully completed the newly formatted
    SAREVAL in April 2006.

**8. Analysis and Minimum Fleet Size Justification** -- As we have done
in the past, we continue to contend that **[the minimum number of
aircraft required to perform our CAP missions in Hawaii is ten (10)
aircraft]{.underline}**. A 10 aircraft complement provides the State
with the required amount of coverage and redundancy that State Civil
Defense officials have requested - and expect. *We feel that
particularly for HIWG that aircraft need to be allocated based on
missions, not on past hours flown, a criterion that overlooks
operational factors.* Our logic follows, and is based on the fact that
HIWG has been tasked to provide support for the following missions (in
order of priority):

-   **Tsunami Warning and Damage Assessment Mission**

> As stated by our State Civil Defense Vice Director, Ed Teixeira,
> ***"With Tsunamis, it's not a question of if -- but when!!"***
>
> **The Tsunami Warning Mission is the primary mission for HIWG.** Most
> of our funding from the State is granted to provide support for this
> mission. It typically consists of three phases: The first and most
> important is the warning phase. If time allows after the warning phase
> has been conducted, the aircraft are launched again to help monitor
> evacuation efforts, advising of bottlenecks and other impediments.
> Lastly, post-incident, the aircraft would be used for damage
> assessment and relief work.
>
> After the tsunami disaster in Southeast Asia in 2004, renewed emphasis
> and concern has been focused on tsunamis and the warning system in
> Hawaii. Presently, HIWG is tasked to be airborne within one hour of
> official tsunami warning - for all islands coverage 24/7. This is an
> enormous task with a cadre of volunteers. [This is a standing CAP
> mission that is unique to the nation!]{.underline} Additionally, it is
> unique in the State of Hawaii, in that HIWG is the *only* agency
> tasked to do the wide area warnings and assessments for the State.
> There is no other agency to do this job.
>
> Tsunamis in Hawaii are described as a "near tsunami -- 1 hour until
> wave comes ashore" or "far tsunami - 4 to 5 hours until the wave comes
> ashore". Obviously, the near tsunami would be generated by an
> earthquake generated on/near the Big Island of Hawaii. One should be
> able to see very quickly that time is of the essence, which reinforces
> our commitment to a one hour alert launch status.
>
> The worst possible scenario for a tsunami mission would be a call at
> 0300 in the morning to launch within an hour. With a CAPR 60-1
> requirement of having two mission pilots on board that are Instrument
> Flight Rated (IFR) rated and current, you can begin to understand our
> concerns and challenges in ensuring proficiency and currency for these
> complex missions.
>
> On 3 May 2006, a tsunami warning was issued due to an earthquake in
> the vicinity of Tonga. It should be noted that all aircraft locations
> were successfully alerted and manned, ready to launch within the one
> hour response time requirement. CAP members stopped their normal
> morning activities and proceeded to their hangers to ready their
> aircraft. While their hanger was staffed, the island of Maui was not
> able to launch because of maintenance performed on their aircraft.
> This typical timeline could not happen if aircraft were not collocated
> near major population centers with corresponding CAP squadrons. The
> following diagram shows the current distribution of aircraft in the
> islands. Only 8 of these aircraft are equipped with siren and PA
> systems.

![](media/image3.png){width="6.9in" height="5.175196850393701in"}

> A quick study of the chart shows how aircraft are strategically
> located in the islands to deploy quickly and meet the mission
> requirements for tsunami warning. After having one aircraft removed
> from our inventory in 2005 we now do not have any backup capability in
> the event of a maintenance problem or other related issue (see note
> about recent Maui response above). The islands span a distance of
> almost 400 miles. Depending on the type of tsunami, we would not have
> the ability to move from one location to another in a timely fashion
> for initial tasking. We cannot drive from one island to another. [With
> only 8 aircraft equipped with sirens and PA equipment, some of the
> islands will not receive a warning]{.underline}. Hawaii being an
> island State also means that, unlike our continental cousins, we do
> not have the luxury of being able to call a neighboring CAP Wing and
> receive assistance. We will execute our mission with what we have on
> hand. Given probable warning times, mission profiles would most likely
> be:

-   Lihue aircraft would fly profiles over Kauai and Niihau.

-   Honolulu aircraft would fly east-west profiles over Oahu.

-   Wheeler aircraft would fly profiles over Molokai. Lanai island would
    not receive coverage.

-   Hilo aircraft would fly profiles over the windward side of the Big
    Island.

-   Kona aircraft would fly profiles over the leeward side of the Big
    Island. Note: This island is big enough to justify the need for
    another aircraft.

-   Maui aircraft would fly profiles over the island of Maui only.

> Members of the HIWG have launched 5 times on actual warning missions
> in the past 20 years. The HIWG staff and State Director continue to
> work with Civil Defense Training and Operations to train for the
> damage assessment part of the tsunami warning mission. This particular
> area is becoming part of future training scenarios.
>
> This picture represents a typical shoreline on many of the islands in
> Hawaii. As the State of Hawaii continues to grow, more housing and
> transportation routes are being built near or in the inundation zone
> of potential incoming tsunami waves. In short, the need for effective
> warnings is growing and getting more complex.
>
> ![](media/image4.jpeg){width="5.904861111111111in"
> height="4.411111111111111in"}
>
> This Route Map illustrates the route(s) to be flown around the island
> of Oahu. This particular route is normally flown by two aircraft --
> one on an eastern route and the other on a western route. The time to
> fly each side of the island is approximately 1.5 \~ 2.0 hours. The
> requirement to fly at 70-75 knots and 500 feet places high demands on
> the aircrew.
>
> ![](media/image5.jpeg){width="5.75in" height="4.606944444444444in"}

-   **Search and Rescue (SAR)**

> Unlike mainland search and rescue responsibilities, the CAP is not the
> first responder to a search and rescue requirement. The U.S. Coast
> Guard (USCG) is the primary agency for initial SAR support in Hawaii.
> However, the HIWG has augmented the USCG numerous times on actual
> searches in Hawaii.

-   **Disaster Relief -- Hurricanes and floods**

> The HIWG participates in most disaster relief operations in Hawaii.
> Recently, we provided airborne photo support of the floods at Kauai.
> As first responders after Hurricane Iniki in 1992, HIWG provide
> critical transport and communications support for the State and
> county.

-   **Spade Mission -- Air Defense Interceptor Mission**

> This mission is a long range mission for practice fighter intercepts.
> Our twin engine aircraft is required for this mission due to distances
> from landfall and controlled ranges over the ocean.

-   **Counter Drug -- Helicopter Escort**

> Formerly a crown jewel mission for the HIWG, this mission now consists
> of escorting DEA helicopters interisland for DEA missions. We continue
> to interface with law enforcement officials and hope that might lead
> to future tasking with various agencies.

-   **25^th^ ASOS Mission -- Training Of Enlisted Tactical Air
    Controllers (ETACs)**

> This mission enables HIWG to train ETACs using a CAP aircraft versus
> an expensive fighter aircraft. Numerous trainees are now serving in
> Afghanistan and Iraq.

-   **Cadet Support -- CAP and USAF ROTC Cadet support**

> Numerous sorties in support of our CAP and ROTC cadets.

-   **Advanced Airborne Test Frame (AATF) Mission -- [FUTURE
    MISSION]{.underline}**

> This is a new mission at Barking Sands Pacific Missile Range Facility
> in Kauai, Hawaii. The Office of Naval Research is to provide funding
> for this mission. It involves flight profiling for new radar systems.
> This mission will require our twin engine aircraft to fly required
> ranges for the requestor. Currently contractors on Kauai are drafting
> an MOU for coordination with HIWG and CAP National Headquarters.

-   **Seal Monitoring - [FUTURE MISSION]{.underline}**

> This is another new mission of great potential. It involves flying
> over and around a number of our islands tracking federally listed
> endangered seals with a FM receiving mechanism. This mission will need
> additional approval requirements as it will entail some hardware
> installation on our aircraft.

**9. Other Impact Factors** - Other factors that impact the ability of
HIWG to execute its mission are minor and major maintenance costs for
our aircraft. There is a higher cost of doing business in Hawaii, which
also drives up the cost of member funded flying. Shipping items to
Hawaii entails additional delays and costs, which can add 30 to 40
percent to the price of an item. Additionally, fuel is more expensive in
Hawaii. Maintenance rates are higher, because mechanics have to deal
with our high costs of living. Shopping around for rates is limited,
because there are very few qualified, properly insured, maintenance
facilities.

**10. Summary and Closing** - As stated previously, for HIWG the
political and government tide has turned and is working in our favor. As
we continue to garner support from our State officials, we have to deal
with the constant uncertainty of losing more CAP aircraft assigned to
our state. There is air of confusion amongst members and State and
government officials -- if our mission is so important, why are we being
impacted? Congressman Ed Case in reference (e) sent a letter to General
Moseley, Chief of Staff of the United States Air Force, to address his
concerns and seek greater understanding of the situation.

Regardless of the aircraft flight hour requirement and the National
Headquarters drawdown of all CAP aircraft, Hawaii is a unique State in
our country with special needs and considerations. For all the members
of HIWG it is patently obvious how many aircraft we need to perform all
our assigned missions. This document has attempted to codify the
requirement for the 10 aircraft needed to support our gamut of
responsibilities to the State. We are ready to investigate any
mechanisms - waivers, exemptions, or other administrative tools - to
enable us to continue to properly serve Hawaii.

To quote Major General Pineda at the Pacific Region Conference on 29
April 2006, his guidance to the attendees was clear and simple; "#1 -
have fun in CAP, #2 - be operationally ready to perform all assigned
missions, and #3 - take care of each other". The members of the HIWG CAP
have heard his guidance and fully comply with his direction.

We are aware that other Wings in the CAP have received brand new
aircraft and corresponding increased capabilities. HIWG has continued to
achieve mission excellence with older aircraft and never criticized
policy decisions. We have proven ourselves on numerous occasions. We ask
that higher headquarters provide us the tools necessary to continue to
support General Pineda's vision and provide uncompromised CAP support to
the State of Hawaii.

**LTCOL TOM BREHM LTCOL TONY SCHENA**

**HIWG DO HIWG DOS**

<hawaiishine@aol.com> [kh6pv1@msn.com]{.underline}

H 373-7982 H 689-6689

# C 429-7982 C 778-3145

P 525-0125