Memo to STARS Group

On the eve of our first gathering I am composing this memo about key
items relevant to our project, while I have before me the sources that I
draw upon.

Our proposal lumps together the names of Gell-Mann and Hartle, and
Roland Omnes and Griffiths so many times as almost to make it appear
that these four are all in the same boat, which (boat) thereby gains the
authority of having four eminent physicists, all seeming to be on-board.

Actually, there are huge differences between Gell-Mann and Hartle, on
the one hand,

and Omnes and Griffiths on the other. The biggest difference concerns
the Many-Worlds/Minds (Everett) interpretation. Supporters of this
interpretation do indeed often mention these four names together, giving
the impression that all support it. But Griffiths (in his book,
"Consistent Quantum Theory" never mentions Everett or Many-Worlds (at
least if the index and my perusal are good indicators). Griffiths
obviously cannot distance himself too much from Gell-Mann and Hartle,
whose endorsement provides important support of the notion that his idea
is important. But he mentions Gell-Mann and Hartle only once in the main
text, on page 358, at the end of the penultimate main-text chapter. And
that reference is pretty weak. It mentions the (completely true) fact
that decoherence-effects make it very difficult to observe quantum
interference effects in macroscopic systems, and ASKS:

"If a quasi-classical family can be shown to be consistent, will the
histories in it obey, at least approximately, classical equations of
motion? Again, this is a nontrivial question."

Thus is the tie-in to G-MH. It is via a double question, neither of
which had in 1999 been answered, nor has either one yet been answered.
What has been encountered are, instead, huge difficulties, which become
truly enormous in a non-linear system with easily tapped energy sources
such as a human brain. He ends this chapter on "Decoherence and
classical physics" with the assertion "In conclusion, even though many
details have not been worked out and much work remains to be done, there
is no reason at present to doubt that the equations of classical
mechanics represent an appropriate limit of a more fundamental quantum
description based upon a suitable set of consistent histories." No
reason to doubt? That may be rue! But that is hardy an impressive tie-in
to Gell-Mann and Hartle, who, in sharp fundamental contrast to
Griffiths, say that their interpretation "is an attempt at extention,
clarification, and completion of the Everett interpretation." Gell-Mann
and Hartle treat "measurements" as key building blocks, and use
essentially von Neumann's formulas for probabilities of sequences of
*measurements*. Griffiths takes as basic, rather "possessed properties"
and uses von Neumann's formula for more than half his book before
introducing measurements, which are deemed merely special situations
where possessed properties of object and apparatus become correlated .
But why on earth should mere "possessed properties" be organized to
exist only at a sequence of times, which is the situation dealt with by
the concept of "consistent histories".

The same question can be asked about measurements, but G-MH tie
measurements to IGUSs (Information Gathering and Utilizing Systems)
which are supposed to "have interests" and "make observations", and
"employ the fundamental formula", which "is used to compute
probabilities on the basis of present data, make predictions, control
future perceptions on the basis of these predictions (i.e., exhibit
behaviour), ..."

These marvelous systems, which have a close similarity to our conscious
thinking selves, lie at the core of the G-MH scheme. But they say that
the research into them

"we cannot discuss here." But these systems are what hold their whole
logical scheme together, and tie the logic both to "our knowledge" and
to the issues of what determines the times at which the "measurements"
occur, and what is measured at those times.

The nature and functioning of the core elements and the answers to the
core questions are left unanswered. Only the relatively simple questions
are addressed.

Griffiths says (p.122) that the probability rules will depend on
"data...that...must be obtained from observation." So Griffiths, like
G-MH must really bring in "observations", hence presumably
**observers**, who have powers.

Thus Griffiths bases his work on the probability formulas of von
Neumann, which were about measurements that might be performed, or at
least **events that might occur,** and render certain specified
properties definite. But what brings about the specific arrangements of
possessed properties only at a particular set of times? The whole
approach seems to be radically incomplete, without a theory of event
generation/creation! That is, of course, is what Whitehead claims/tries
to supply!

Omnes is far more explicit about these issues. He explicitly rejects
Everett,

\["we feel it impossible to accept" p. 348; "bluntly contrary to
Ockham's rule"p.348:

"we are going to look for another answer" p. 348: "remains, to say the
least, difficult to accept" p.493; "is not fitted to bring back common
sense into quantum physics" p.511:

"Rule 5: Physical reality is unique." p. 494:in "The Interpretation of
QM" Princeton 1994: "Insane idea, you might think, and I would agree."
p.212, in Quantum Philosophy,

Princeton 1999.\]

On page 506 of his 1994 book Omnes summarizes his conclusions in
Twenty-one

Theses. Thesis 6 asserts: "The theory is unable to give and account of
the existence

of facts." In short, his theory is an empty-of-a-connection-to-REALITY
logical scheme.

This is a conclusion that he repeatedly affirms.

p.502 "Both theories (Copenhagen and Omnes's) however fail when asked to
provide an explanation of the existence of facts. ...a possible ultimate
difference between the mathematics of theoretical physics and reality."

I would dispute this as regards the Copenhagen which accepts
empirical/experiential

facts as givens, but it is, as Omnes himselt repeatedly emphasizes, true
of his theory, which does not have IGUSs, or conscious thinking human
beings and their thoughts.

His theory has a logically structure, but no *causation* in the real
world, which it fails to make contact with.

p.516 "Another feature of facts is still more striking. As long as one
only thinks of them (rather than experiencing them) by envisioning their
occurrence as so many possible phenomena, the representation takes care
of them perfectly well. This representation

however breaks down when one comes to their actuality."

p.504 "Finally there remains *the* problem, which is the existence of
facts.

It was somewhat hidden behind wave packet reduction in the older
interpretation,

but now that mostb other problems have been solved, or at least
clarified, it stands pure and alone."

In Omnes's "Quantum Philosophy" Princeton 1999:

"One more revelation must be borne in mind,...the unbridgeable gap
between theory and the real world, between thought and existence....Such
is the new state of affairs that we must now face. " p.238. This is an
often-emphasized theme o Omnes.

But it is just a feature of his narrow/restrictive view of theory, which
does not encompass an *ontological* theory that encompasses as
irreducible realities such things as our human thoughts, ideas, and
feelings, and similar simpler things also in the realm of concepts.

G-MH do include such realities, buried in the IGUSs that they introduce
but fail to provide a theory of. But Whitehead explicitly builds his
ontology around them.

Onmes casts doubt upon both the power of decoherence to do all that G-MH
require it to do, and even upon the need to invoke decoherence at all!

p.503 (1994) "One of their essential ideas is to attribute completely to
decoherence the dynamical origin of phenomena ....This point of view
....has a practical drawback,

which is that the theory of decoherence is still far from complete...,
This is why the G-MH theory is still partly a program." : p.504 The
logical interpretation described in this book also remains partly
incomplete because of the unsatisfactory state of decoherence theory.":
"What was said about the impossibility of circumventing decoherence is
still nearer to a conjecture than a proof."

All of this is meant to emphasize that the approaches of Gell-Mann and
Hartle,

and of Griffiths and Omnes are far from solid and complete, and that
their failings

open the door to Whitehead. The needed theory of events and of IGUSs is
built upon the Whiteheadian "Actual Occasions", whose mental poles are
conceptual representations

of the physically described structures that constitute their physical
poles, and whose mental poles provide in cases where their physical
poles are aspects of human brains the elements of our human streams of
consciousness. This allows the IGUSs to have both the observer and
control aspects that Gell-Mann and Hartle ascribe to them:

"Both singly and collectively we are examples of the general class of
complex adaptive systems. When they are considered within quantum
mechanics as portions of the universe, making observations, we refer to
such complex adaptive adaptive systems as

information gathering and utilizing systems (IGUSes).The general
characteristics of complex adaptive systems is the subject of much
ongoing research, which we cannot discuss here. From a
quantum-mechanical point of view the foremost characteristic of an IGUS
is that in some form of approxdimation, however crude or classical, it
employs th fundamental formula, with what amounts to a rudimentary
theory of ρ, H, and quantum mechnics.Probabilities of interest to the
IGUS include those for correlations between its memory and the external
world. (Typically these are assumed perfect, not always a good
approximation!) The approximate fundamental formula is used to compute
probabilities on the basis of present data, make predictions, control
future perceptions on the basis of these predictions (i.e., exhibit
behavior), acquire further data, make further predictions, and so on."

This is a tall order! So a natural task for our group is to use the
resources provided by Whitehead to fill this order in a way completely
concordant with the principles of relativistic quantum field theory.