**Written Statement of Dr. James S. Holt**

**to the**

**Committee on Agriculture**

**U.S. House of Representatives**

**October 4, 2007**

Mr. Chairman, thank you for the invitation to provide testimony for this
hearing.

I am an agricultural labor economist. I was a professor of agricultural
economics and farm management at The Pennsylvania State University for
16 years. For the past 30 years I have conducted research, consulted and
lectured on agricultural labor and human resource management,
immigration and employment issues, and the H-2A temporary agricultural
worker program for government agencies, universities and private
organizations. I have been a consultant to many grower associations,
individual farming operations and other employers throughout the United
States using the H-2A program, and to national agricultural
organizations, including the National Council of Agricultural Employers
(NCAE). However, I am not representing any specific organization here
today.

I do not speak lightly, nor engage in hyperbole, when I testify today
that the U.S. agricultural industry is in the midst of a labor crises,
the resolution of which will determine whether U.S. producers of fruits,
vegetables, and horticultural and other specialty commodities are more
than marginal participants in U.S. and global markets for the
commodities they produce in future decades. The current agricultural
labor crisis will also have a profound impact on the U.S. dairy and
sheep industries, U.S. grain producers, the agricultural processing
sector, and many other agricultural operations. It will also largely
determine the future of the domestic upstream and downstream businesses
that service these sectors.

The labor intensive fruit, vegetable and horticultural sectors, which
account for \_\_ percent of the value of U.S. agricultural production,
are already overwhelmingly dependent on foreign workers, the majority of
whom are working in the U.S. illegally. The U.S. dairy, meat packing,
and food processing sectors are significantly dependent on a foreign,
and preponderantly illegal, work force and becoming more so every year.
U.S. custom combine operators who harvest the great plains grain crops,
and sheep producers in the western states, are heavily dependent on
foreign workers obtained through the nearly dysfunctional H-2A program.
The labor problems of U.S. agriculture have been ignored and swept under
the rug for decades, only to become more problematical with each passing
year. At a minimum, several hundred thousand new farm workers have
illegally entered the United States to work on U.S. farms, and fill the
jobs vacated several hundred thousand illegally present farm workers who
have moved into the non-farm work force since the members of this
Committee were last elected or re-elected. The public is now insisting,
and our national security demands, that our government and the Congress
squarely face and resolve this problem. How you resolve it will
determine the future of important sectors of U.S. agriculture.

**Hired Farm Employment and the U.S. Hired Farm Work Force**

Hired labor is an essential input in U.S. agriculture. More than 550,000
U.S. farmers hire workers to fill more than 3 million agricultural jobs
each year. The farms that hire labor are the backbone of American
agriculture, accounting for the overwhelming majority of U.S.
agricultural production.

Farmers pay an annual payroll estimated at \$\_\_ billion. Expenses for
hired and contract labor account, on average, for \$1 of every \$8 of
farm production expenses, and up to \$1 of every \$3 or more of farm
production expenses on farms in the labor intensive fruit, vegetable and
horticultural sectors.

Because a high proportion of U.S. agricultural jobs are seasonal, the 3
million U.S. agricultural jobs each year are filled by a hired farm work
force of about 2.5 million persons. About 1.6 million of these are
non-casual hired farm workers who perform more than 25 days of hired
farm work a year. Approximately 1.2 million of the non-casual hired farm
work force are likely not authorized to work in the U.S.

The fact that the U.S. hired farm work force is overwhelmingly illegal
is not speculative, it is well documented. Ironically, agriculture is
the one sector of the U.S. workforce for which the federal government
actually produces official statistics on illegal alien employment. These
come from the National Agricultural Worker Survey (NAWS), a survey
program begun after the enactment of the Immigration Reform and Control
Act of 1986, and conducted biannually by the U.S. Department of Labor
Among other questions, the survey asks seasonal agricultural workers
whether they are authorized to work in the United States. In the first
survey, conducted in FY 1989, 7% of U.S. seasonal agricultural workers
said they were unauthorized. By FY 1990-91 the figure was 16%. By FY
1992-93 it was 28%. By FY 1994-95 it was 37%. In the most recently
published NAWS survey, covering the \_\_\_\_\_\_\_ season, *53 percent
of all seasonal agricultural workers admitted they were not authorized
to work in the U.S.* Experience on the ground, based on work place
audits and other evidence, suggests that closer to 75 percent of U.S.
farm workers are not legally entitled to work in the U.S.

Even more significant for the future is that one sixth of seasonal
agricultural workers are "newcomers", working their first season in U.S.
agriculture. An astonishing 99 percent of these newcomers self-identify
that they are not authorized to work in the U.S. This means that for all
practical purposes every new worker entering the U.S. hired crop work
force is illegal. The NAWS does not survey livestock workers, and the
percentage of illegal workers and replacements may be somewhat lower
than in the crop sector. However, it would be a huge mistake to assume
that illegal workers are not a large and rapidly growing proportion of
the hired work force in the livestock sector as well. Dairying, in
particular, is heavily dependent on foreign born, and likely
preponderantly illegal, workers.

Social Security Administration no-match statistics also document the
high level of illegal alien employment in agriculture. Agriculture,
which accounts for only 1.2 percent of U.S. employment, accounts for 17
percent of all Social Security no-matches, more than any other sector of
the U.S. labor force.

Some commentators blame U.S. agriculture for not attracting and
retaining a legal U.S. work force. I believe that is misplaced blame.
The decade of the 1990's was a period of unprecedented economic growth
and job creation in the U.S. But it was also a decade when the rate of
growth in the native-born U.S. work force continued to slow, and the
number of new labor force entrants from the native born population and
legally admitted foreign workers was far below the rate of new job
creation. At the beginning of the decade, 31 % of the U.S. seasonal
agricultural work force was still U.S. born. By the end of the decade,
only 19 % was U.S. born. During the decade of the 1990's the real hourly
wage rate in agriculture increased at a more rapid rate than for the
non-agricultural work force. But the lure of year round work, easier
jobs and more pleasant working conditions in most non-agricultural
employment was obviously enough to attract many U.S. workers out of
agriculture, even into jobs in which the nominal hourly wage was lower
than in agriculture. By the FY 1997-98 NAWS survey, 81% of U.S. seasonal
agricultural workers were foreign born and 77% were born in Mexico.
One-third had immigrated to the U.S. within the last 2 years. More than
one-third were under the age of 25, and two-thirds were under the age of
35.

The U.S. seasonal agricultural work force is a very diverse work force
in many respects. One of the respects in which it is diverse is in its
international migratory status. About 40% of U.S. seasonal agricultural
workers are international migrants whose permanent residence is outside
the United States and who come into the U.S. temporarily to perform
agricultural work. This work force is preponderantly young, single and
illegal. The other 60% of the seasonal agricultural work force are
permanent residents of the U.S. This group includes most U.S. born farm
workers, *but is also majority foreign born and majority illegal*.
Over-all, only one half of the U.S. seasonal agricultural work force are
married, and only one quarter have children with whom they reside in the
U.S..

Agricultural migrancy within the U.S. is the exception rather than the
rule. Almost two-thirds of U.S seasonal agricultural workers hold only
one farm job in the U.S. during the year, and more than 90 % hold 3 or
fewer jobs per year. Only 1% hold as many as 6 different agricultural
jobs during the year. Only 17% are what are traditional
"follow-the-crop" migrants, who hold two or more agricultural jobs
during the year which are more than 75 miles apart and are more than 75
miles from their residence.

**The Impact of Immigration Policy on Agriculture**

Now let us relate this to immigration policy.

Economic growth in the United States (or any other country in the world)
is determined by two factors, growth in the labor force -- the number of
persons who are engaged in producing goods and services -- and growth in
productivity -- the quantity of goods and services each worker produces
each hour and each day they work. The story of how the United States has
become the economic engine of the world is largely the story of an
expanding labor force coupled with phenomenal improvements in worker
productivity. Although often overlooked or taken for granted in this
story, the phenomenal growth in U.S. agricultural productivity has been
a critical contributor to U.S. economic growth. It has enabled an ever
larger proportion of the U.S. labor force to engage in the production of
other goods and services rather than food and fiber, to the point where
less than 2 percent of the U.S. labor force is now engaged in
agriculture.

Immigration has also been an important historical factor in the nation's
economic growth. It has enabled the expansion of the U.S. labor force
far more rapidly than would have occurred through normal reproduction by
the native born population. Imagine, for example, that we had stopped
immigration in 1776 and relied only on natural birth after that, or that
we had closed our borders in 1812, or 1865, or 1910, or even 1950.

Immigration is even more important to sustaining U.S. economic growth
today than it was in any of those past periods. That is because, like
Japan and Western Europe before us, and increasingly even Mexico, China,
India, and second world countries, the birth rate of native born
Americans is declining. In some developed countries birth rates have
declined to the point where they are not even replacing, much less
expanding, the labor force. It is important that we understand that even
in the U.S. we long ago passed the point where we were producing enough
native born workers to fill all the new jobs being created in the U.S.
economy. In fact, we long ago passed the point where we were producing
enough native born workers AND legally admitting enough aliens, to fill
all of the jobs we were creating in the U.S.

When I hear people say illegal aliens only take the jobs Americans won't
do, I say that is a result, not a cause. *Illegal aliens take the jobs
there aren't enough American workers to fill.* There are literally
millions more JOBS in our economy than there are American workers to
fill them, even if we include in the term "American worker" every person
who is legally entitled to work in the United States, whether they were
born here or not. Given this huge imbalance between jobs and workers, it
is not surprising that American workers gravitate to the more attractive
jobs, leaving the less attractive ones to be filled by illegal
immigrants.

The reality is that the U.S. is dependent on illegal immigration for
economic growth, and growing more so by the year. The rate of growth in
the native born labor force continues to decline, and could become
negative as it already has in some developed economies. The only way we
can sustain our current level of economic activity, much less expand it,
is through in-migration of alien workers. That is why Alan Greenspan was
so concerned about immigration policy while he was chairman of the
Federal Reserve. Job creation is one of the most important engines of
economic growth. But job creation can not occur if there are not workers
to fill the jobs. The economic slow down after 9/11 provided a window on
the importance of immigration to the national economy. One of the most
important contributors to that slow down was a temporary reduction in
both legal and illegal immigration, coupled with a small exodus of
foreign workers already here, because some foreign workers were afraid
to be in the United States.

Imagine, therefore, what the economic impact of really effective border
control that stopped illegal immigration would be. And then imagine, if
you dare, what the economic impact would be of removing from the work
force, through effective work place enforcement or otherwise, the
illegal workers who are already here.

Some suggest that such a scenario would be a good thing. According to
this view, agricultural employers should be left to "compete in the
labor market just like other employers have to do." Under this scenario,
there would be strict workplace enforcement and no guest workers. To
secure legal workers and remain in business, agricultural employers
would have to attract sufficient workers away from competing
non-agricultural employers by raising wages and benefits. Those who were
unwilling or unable to do so would have to go out of business or move
their production outside the United States. Meanwhile, according to this
scenario, the domestic workers remaining in farm work would enjoy higher
wages and improved working conditions.

No informed person seriously contends that wages, benefits and working
conditions in seasonal agricultural work can be raised sufficiently to
attract workers away from their permanent nonagricultural jobs in the
numbers needed to replace the illegal alien agricultural work force and
maintain the economic competitiveness of U.S. producers. With hired
labor accounting, on average, for 12 percent of all farm production
costs, a substantial increase in wage and/or benefit costs will have a
substantial impact on growers' over-all production costs. U.S. growers
are economically competitive with foreign producers at approximately
current production costs. If U.S. producers' production costs are forced
up by, for example, restricting the supply of labor, some U.S.
production will become uncompetitive in the foreign and domestic markets
in which U.S. and foreign producers compete. U.S. producers will be
forced out of business until the competition for domestic farm workers
has diminished to the point where the remaining U.S. producers'
production costs are again at global equilibrium levels. *The end result
of this process will be that domestic farm worker wages and working
conditions (and the production costs of surviving producers) will be at
approximately current levels, while the volume of domestic production
will have declined sufficiently that there is no longer upward pressure
on domestic farm worker wages.* Given the large proportion of illegal
workers in the current farm labor market, the reduction in domestic
production is likely to have to be very substantial to clear the labor
force of illegal workers. Consumers will likely feel little impact,
because the market share abandoned by U.S. producers will be quickly
filled by foreign production.

The domestic employment impacts of this adjustment will not be limited
to alien farm workers and U.S. farmers. Since agricultural production is
tied to the land, the labor intensive functions of the agricultural
production process cannot be foreign-sourced without foreign-sourcing
the entire production process. We cannot, for example, send the
harvesting process or the thinning process overseas. Either the product
is entirely grown, harvested, transported and in many cases initially
processed in the United States, or *all* of these functions are done
somewhere else, even though only one or two steps in the production
process may be highly labor intensive. When the product is grown,
harvested, transported and processed somewhere else, *all* the jobs
associated with these functions are exported, not just the seasonal
field jobs. These include the so-called "upstream" and "downstream" jobs
that support, and are created by, the growing of agricultural products.
U.S. Department of Agriculture studies indicate that there are about 3.1
such upstream and downstream jobs for every on-farm job. Most of these
upstream and downstream jobs are "good" jobs, i.e. permanent, average or
better paying jobs held by citizens and permanent residents. Thus, we
would be exporting about three times as many jobs of U.S. citizens and
permanent residents as we would farm jobs filled by aliens if we
restrict access to alien agricultural workers.

The U.S. farm workers and workers in upstream and downstream jobs that
would be displaced by the elimination of the alien farm labor supply
would presumably be absorbed into the non-agricultural economy, which
would be hungry for domestic workers to replace the foreign workers to
whom they no longer had access. But the total volume of U.S. economic
activity (and GDP) would have been reduced. And the U.S. would be
substantially more dependent on foreign suppliers for food.

ireHHHH

**Background on the H-2A Temporary Agricultural Worker Program**

The only current program for legally employing foreign agricultural
workers in the United States is the H-2A temporary agricultural worker
program. This program was enacted 55 years ago as a part of the
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952. From 1952 until 1986, there was
no statutory distinction between temporary agricultural and
non-agricultural workers \-- both entered under the "H-2" program.
However, almost from the outset the Department of Labor promulgated
separate regulations governing the requirements for H-2 agricultural and
non-agricultural programs, and this distinction was recognized
statutorily in the division of the H-2 admission category into H-2A and
H-2B in the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986.

From 1970 through the late 1990's the number of H-2 and H-2A
agricultural job opportunities certified fluctuated from about 15,000 to
25,000 annually. In the past decade usage has increased substantially,
with 59,112 H-2A agricultural job opportunities certified in FY 2006.
Many alien workers fill two or more H-2A certified job opportunities
within the same season, so only about half as many individual H-2A
aliens are admitted each year as the number of job opportunities which
are H-2A certified.

Despite its recent dramatic growth, use of the H-2A program is miniscule
in comparison with U.S. agricultural employment. Fewer than 2 percent of
the 3 million U.S. agricultural job opportunities are H-2A certified,
and only about 1 percent of the hired farm work force are H-2A aliens.

The above statistics underscore that we currently have *two*
agricultural guest worker programs operating in this country -- a
*legal* guest worker program that fills a miniscule 2 percent of U.S.
agricultural jobs, and an *illegal* guest worker program that fills at
least half, and likely more than three quarters, of U.S. agricultural
jobs. This situation exists as a result of a cascade of failures --
failure of our border control system, failure of our system for interior
enforcement, failure of our work authorization documentation procedures,
failure of our immigration laws to address realistic labor force needs,
and the Labor Department's antagonistic administration of the H-2A
program.

**Benefits and Problems of the H-2A Program**

A legal, workable agricultural guest worker program benefits farmers,
alien farm workers, domestic farm workers, and the nation.

It benefits farmers by providing assurance of an adequate supply of
seasonal workers at known terms and conditions of employment. In an
industry where more than 80 percent of jobs are seasonal, and a work
force must be reassembled at the beginning of every season, it provides
assurance that when farmers and their families invest millions in farm
production assets, there will be a labor force to perform the work. It
also promotes continuity, stability and productivity in agriculture.
While there are no official statistics, anecdotal evidence is that
three-quarters or more of the H-2A work force in any given year are
returning workers, and H-2A employers almost universally find that this
stable, experienced work force is more productive, and employers can get
by with fewer workers than when they are recruiting a new, inexperienced
work force every year.

A workable guest worker program benefits alien workers by providing a
legal, regulated way for aliens to work in the United States in jobs
where their services are needed. It may surprise members of the
Committee to learn that the pressure on employers to participate in the
H-2A program often comes from their illegal workers, who pay exorbitant
costs to be smuggled into the U.S., often under life threatening
conditions, and face fear and abuse while they are here. As H-2A guest
workers, they enter legally and work with rights and guarantees. Not
withstanding the allegations of opponents of the program, H-2A aliens
value their jobs, are careful to comply with program requirements, and
return as legal workers year after year. In the words of one former
illegal alien whose employer got into the H-2A program, "I thank God
every day for the H-2A program".

The program also benefits domestic farm workers. It assures open
recruitment for and access to H-2A certified job opportunities for local
and non-local domestic workers who want such work. It assures that U.S.
workers have preference in these jobs, even if they are already filled
by aliens. It provides labor standards and employment guarantees that
are above the norms for most agricultural jobs and for many rural
non-agricultural jobs. Equally important, the H-2A program assures the
viability of the jobs of U.S. workers in the upstream and downstream
jobs that are dependent on agricultural production in the U.S.

An adequate supply of legal labor also benefits the nation. Food and
fiber are basic commodities. It is not in our national interest to be
significantly dependent on foreign sources for such commodities.
However, it is also clearly not in our national interest to have such a
basic industry as food and fiber production almost entirely dependent on
a work force which has entered the U.S. and is living and working here
illegally and without control. In a mature economy like that of the
U.S., where the native born work force is growing at a substantially
lower rate than job growth, our *only* policy options are a workable
agricultural guest worker program or dependence on foreign producers for
our food and fiber.

That is what works about the H-2A program. What often doesn't work are
the cumbersome, bureaucratic procedures of the program. Farmers seeking
to use the program must first apply for a labor certification from the
U.S. Department of Labor and attempt to recruit qualified U.S. workers.
If the employer's application meets the requirements of the Department
of Labor and sufficient U.S. workers cannot be found, a labor
certification is issued. The employer then files a petition with the
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service (USCIS) for the admission of
H-2A aliens. Meanwhile, a supply of alien workers must be recruited. If
the employer's petition is granted, it is transmitted to the U.S.
consulate where the aliens will apply for visas. The aliens complete
visa applications and are interviewed. They must meet the same criteria
as any other applicant for a non-immigrant visa. The aliens who are
granted visas then travel to the port of entry and apply for admission
to the U.S. Those who are admitted travel to the employer's farm. In
order for workers to arrive at the by the employer's date of need, this
entire process must take place in 45 days. Once the workers arrive, H-2A
employers face a barrage of compliance monitoring and enforcement
officers, outreach workers, social service agencies and legal service
activists. Nowhere else are so few monitored by so many. Lawsuits are
commonplace.

Many employers are daunted by the imposing H-2A administrative
processes, and simply never try to use the program. Those who do use it
must navigate a gauntlet of obstacles. Not withstanding statutory
performance deadlines, H-2A labor certifications are often issued late
and after interminable haggling over the wording of application
documents. The problem of late labor certifications is compounded by
processing delays in approving petitions at the Department of Homeland
Security and in securing appointments for visa applicants at U.S.
consulates. During the 2007 season, the arrival of many H-2A workers was
seriously delayed, imposing substantial costs and potential losses on
employers who are paying a premium to do things right and comply with
the law. Even brief delays in the arrival of workers can be disastrous
to producers of perishable agricultural commodities.

The H-2A certification process is also unnecessarily complicated. Even
though 97.5 percent of H-2A labor certification applications, and 92
percent of the job opportunities on those applications, were certified
in FY 2006, it nevertheless required an extremely labor intensive, paper
intensive process for individually processing, recruiting on and
adjudicating every single one of the 6,717 H-2A applications certified.
This process is repeated annually, not withstanding the fact that
approval rates have been in the 90 percent range for decades, and the
availability of legal U.S. workers as a percentage of the need has been
in single digits. This repetitious and labor intensive process for
demonstrating annually that there are not sufficient able, willing and
qualified eligible (i.e. legal) workers to take the jobs offered for
each and every application, even when the same labor market is tested
multiple times a week and month for identical job opportunities, and
when the USDOL's own statistics show that more than half of the domestic
agricultural work force is illegal, is government bureaucracy at its
worst.

**The Need for Reform**

The nation's agricultural labor policy is in desperate need of reform.
Reforms are needed in the administration of the H-2A program, the H-2A
regulations, and the nation's basic agricultural immigration statutes.

In August of this year the Administration announced its intent to
incorporate Social Security no-match information into its strategy for
immigration enforcement, and the rules employers would be expected to
follow upon receipt of no-match notifications in order to protect
themselves from charges of knowing hiring or continued employment of
illegal workers. In recognition of the impact the no-match regulation
was likely to have on agriculture, the Administration also promised to
make every effort to reform the H-2A administrative procedures and
regulations in order to make it as useable an option as possible for
agricultural employers to meet their needs for adequate legal labor.

The National Council of Agricultural Employers has presented the
Administration with a list of more than 3 dozen administrative and
regulatory actions that need to be taken to remove obstacles and
bottlenecks in the H-2A program and make it reasonably cost competitive
for potential users. I understand that the NCAE is filing these letters
with the Committee in a written statement for the record, and I will not
reiterate them here. Suffice it to say here that the labor certification
process, in particular, is predicated on woefully outdated assumptions
with respect to the demographics of the U.S. agricultural work force and
labor supply and U.S. agricultural labor markets. This is compounded by
a culture of hostility toward the program and program users within the
Department of Labor. The H-2A petition adjudication and visa issuance
processes are bogged down by the shear volume of other work these
agencies are mandated to perform.

Unless the no-match regulation is blocked by the courts, it will begin
having an immediate impact on agriculture in the southern growing areas
this winter, and its effects will quickly march northward with the 2008
growing season. It is imperative that the administration make a good
faith effort to quickly implement the administrative reforms, and
immediately begin work on regulatory reform. *However, it is also
imperative that Congress realize that administrative and regulatory
reform of the H-2A program is not enough.* Many of the most important
long term reforms of our broken agricultural labor system can only be
made statutorily. The responsibility for these statutory reforms lies
squarely with the Congress.

**The Agricultural Job Opportunities and Benefits Act (AgJOBS)**

In 2001 agricultural employers and farm worker advocates and unions
achieved an historic milestone in negotiating an H-2A reform legislation
package known as the Agricultural Job Opportunities and Benefits Act, or
AgJOBS. AgJOBS has broad bipartisan support in Congress as well as among
ethnic groups, religious groups, and farm worker and agricultural
organizations that have historically battled over agricultural guest
worker policy and procedures. It is intended to address many of the
economic, justice and administrative problems with the current H-2A
program.

AgJOBS reforms the administrative structure of the H-2A program to make
it more efficient and more reliable as a source of timely legal labor.
It also reforms the conditions for use of the program, making it more
economically accessible to agricultural employers. It does this in a way
that protects U.S. farm workers and assures access to agricultural jobs
for those who want them. It also protects alien farm workers. Finally,
it addresses the heavy reliance of U.S. agriculture on a currently
illegal work force by providing a pathway to adjustment of status for
illegal farm workers that is humane, and which will not cause chaos and
disruption in the U.S. agricultural economy.

It is impossible to overstate the significance of the broad support
AgJOBS has among historic adversaries. AgJOBS has the support of the two
major U.S. farm worker unions, the United Farm Workers and the Farm
Labor Organizing Committee, hundreds of other immigrant advocacy and
labor advocacy groups, religious organizations, and the overwhelming
majority of agricultural employer organizations.

**Conclusion**

The United States faces a serious economic, labor market and security
challenge. The demographics of the U.S. population are such that we are
barely replacing the existing work force through native born workers. We
are not coming close to producing enough native born workers to meet the
requirements of our growing economy. This has been true for more than a
decade. Yet our legal immigration policies have been largely blind to
the labor force needs of the economy. As a consequence, we now have
millions of persons living and working in the U.S. illegally. And a good
thing for us that this is so. Our economic growth over the past decade
has been sustained and nourished by our failed immigration policies.

Agriculture has been particularly affected by the shortage of legal
native born and immigrant workers, for reasons that are obvious on their
face. With more available jobs than legal workers, the legal workers
have migrated to the more skilled, year round, more pleasant, urban,
higher paying jobs. This is not an indictment of U.S. agricultural jobs.
It is a reflection of the reality that when there are more jobs than
workers, the less attractive jobs are more likely to go unfilled. If
these jobs were not critical to our national economy and security, this
would not necessarily pose a problem. But when they are in an industry
as critical as the food and fiber sector, it poses a serious problem.

It is clear that the status quo -- a U.S. agricultural industry almost
completely dependent on unauthorized workers who have entered the U.S.
illegally, is untenable. It is equally clear that ceding U.S. production
of food and fiber to foreign producers is untenable. Congress and the
administration have ignored this problem far too long.