**EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AND HOMELAND SECURITY CURRICULA: CONTEXTS,
CULTURES, AND CONSTRAINTS**

**Thomas E. Drabek**

**John Evans Professor, Emeritus**

**Department of Sociology and Criminology**

**University of Denver**

**Denver, Colorado 80208-2948**

[**zted@dd-do.com**](mailto:zted@dd-do.com)

\*A paper presented at the annual meeting of the Western Social Science
Association, Calgary, Alberta, Canada, April, 2007. I wish to thank Ruth
Ann Drabek for her work on this paper. Partial support was received from
the University of Denver through the John Evans Professorship Program
and the Higher Education Project, Federal Emergency Management Agency,
Department of Homeland Security. Any opinions, findings, conclusions or
recommendations expressed in this paper are those of the author and do
not necessarily reflect the views of the University of Denver or the
Federal Emergency Management Agency.

**EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AND HOMELAND SECURITY CURRICULA: CONTEXTS,
CULTURES, AND CONSTRAINTS**

**ABSTRACT**

During the past three decades, emergency management has become more
professionalized. An important part of this transformation has been the
explosive growth in higher education programs designed to provide the
fundamental knowledge and skills required of emergency managers.
Following the attacks of September 11, 2001, however, curricula
reflecting homeland security issues and competencies have been
established. Some have proposed that these programs should be better
integrated. Following a brief summary of the historical context in which
these developments occurred, key points of culture clash are identified.
It is concluded that future faculty and administrative initiatives will
be constrained by these cultural differences and deflected by future
governmental policies, disaster events, and other external factors.

**EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AND HOMELAND SECURITY CURRICULA: CONTEXTS,
CULTURES, AND CONSTRAINTS**

When disaster strikes, most people think immediately of first
responders---police, fire, emergency medical, and the like. And they
should! These are the people who we depend on to confront the
consequences of disaster, at least initially. But behind the scenes,
away from the tornado path or the flooded homes, sits another important
responder whose primary mission is to facilitate coordination among the
hundreds of on-scene personnel who represent dozens of agencies. This
person, and their staff, perform the emergency management function
during the full life cycle of any disaster, i.e., response, recovery,
mitigation and preparedness. The multiorganizational networks they seek
to coordinate are comprised of personnel and resources from local, state
and federal government organizations and from the private sector (Drabek
2006b).

During the past three decades, emergency management has become more
professionalized (e.g., Petak 1984; Drabek 1987, 2003; Kuban 1993;
Wilson and Oyola-Yamaiel 2000, 2005). An important part of this
transformation has been the explosive growth in higher education
programs designed to provide the fundamental knowledge and skills
required of emergency managers (Blanchard 2006). Following the attacks
of September 11, 2001, however, curricula reflecting homeland security
issues and competencies have been established. Some have proposed that
these program areas should be better integrated. Indeed, some faculty
and administrators decided to simply adopt both terms for program
identification as if there was no difference in content, culture, or
perspective. This essay explores these matters through the examination
of three themes: 1) historical context; 2) curricula and cultural
differences; and 3) alternative integrative strategies. The analysis
points toward the conclusion that future faculty and administrative
initiatives for increased integration among emergency management and
homeland security curricula will be constrained by important cultural
differences, future governmental policies, disaster events, and other
external factors.

**Historical Context**

Human response to disaster, both initial impacts and longer term
consequences, was ignored by most social scientists during the formative
years of their disciplines. A notable exception was Sorokin's (1942)
treatise wherein he theorized about the human impacts and responses to a
wide variety of socially disruptive events. Earlier, and more exacting
and focused, however, was the seminal documentation of responses to the
Halifax harbor explosion by Prince (1920). Using this tragedy (December
6, 1917) as a case study, Prince formulated a series of generalizations
whereby future scholars might transcend the details of this single case,
e.g., Scanlon 1997; Scanlon and Handmer 2001. Three decades later, field
teams from the University of Chicago interviewed hundreds of disaster
victims and completed the first comparative studies whereby modal
patterns of response were identified (e.g., Fritz 1961; Fritz and Marks
1954). Often, especially regarding panic behavior, immobility, and
anti-social acts such as looting, the documented patterns were not
consistent with the public image (Quarantelli and Dynes 1972; Dynes,
Quarantelli and Kreps 1972). And paralleling these research findings
were those of social geographers like White (1945), who unraveled the
decision dynamics related to users of flood prone areas (see also
Hinshaw 2006). Collectively, these empirical studies provided the
intellectual foundation on which a new profession could be built.

Apart from the theoretical and empirical research base that was driven
primarily by scholars working within frameworks developed within
sociology and social geography, government employees were guided by two
evolving policy streams that reflected legislative responses to both war
and a wide variety of so-called "natural" disasters, including floods,
hurricanes, earthquakes, tornadoes, and the like (Drabek 1991). Hence,
"civil defense" offices were funded for state governments and some local
communities to prepare for potential enemy attacks. But when natural or
technological agents caused havoc within communities, local officials
confronted over 150 different federal units that had specialized
interests, programs, and resource priorities. One of the legacies of
President Jimmy Carter was the reorganization of this "bureaucratic
buffet" into a single unified bureau he named the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA). Upon its creation in July, 1979, the new
federal bureau confronted the predictable reorganization growing pains
reflective of the cultures learned by its agency personnel. Under
President Reagan the controversies regarding FEMA most often focused on
war related initiatives like the ill-fated "crisis relocation program"
(May and Williams 1986). Local governments repainted office doors with
varying names ranging from civil defense to emergency preparedness to
emergency management or various combinations of these and related terms.

During the 1990's, the agency that too often was easy fodder for late
night comics, was turned around. President Clinton's experiences as
governor helped him realize the defects in the local-state-federal
partnerships that had failed President Herbert Walker Bush during the
response to Hurricane Andrew in 1992. Clinton appointed his former state
emergency manager from Arkansas---Mr. James Lee Witt---as the FEMA
director. Witt's leadership, buttressed by continual and consistent
support from Clinton and key professionals like the late Lacy Suiter who
had directed the program in Tennessee, transformed the agency and headed
the nation toward an alternative philosophy of hazard and disaster
management. No longer were floods to be viewed as enemies best dealt
with by the construction of more dams; rather a philosophy of
environmental sustainability became the assumption base. New federal
policies, reflecting the full life cycle of disaster, provided local and
state officials with new tools and higher levels of legitimacy than ever
had been accorded most of those wearing civil defense clothes (McEntire
2006; 2007, pp. 86-104)). Collectively, more and more local government
employees whose agency missions were changing joined their national
professional organization whose leadership renamed the unit to become
the International Association of Emergency Managers (IAEM) (former name
was National Coordinating Council on Emergency Management) (e.g., see
Drabek 1991; Haddow and Bullock 2003).

A few faculty, mostly in sociology and geography, designed courses to
introduce students to the burgeoning research literature. Graduate
students worked within an expanding set of institutes and centers. Most
notable among these was the Disaster Research Center at the University
of Delaware, which had been relocated from The Ohio State University in
1985, and the University of Colorado's Natural Hazards Research and
Application Information Center. Graduates of these and other social
science departments founded additional research and teaching programs at
numerous other universities throughout the U.S.A.

In 1996, I joined several other researchers at a workshop sponsored by
the Emergency Management Institute at FEMA's National Emergency Training
Center in Emmitsburg, Maryland. Dr. Wayne Blanchard, director of a new
initiative---The Higher Education Program---summarized his research on
university curricula. At that time only two formal degree programs
existed in emergency management---University of North Texas and Thomas
Edison College (Neal 2000). It was decided that FEMA should host an
annual conference for all college and university faculty teaching
courses related to emergency management. Recognizing the professional
needs of practitioners and opportunities for curricular expansions into
an important new substantive area, faculty and administrators quickly
responded with course and program proposals (see Drabek 2006d). Under
Blanchard's watchful eye, a dozen or so faculty produced a series of
instructor guides to facilitate course proposals and preparation. These
have been posted on the FEMA Higher Education Project website and may be
downloaded free of cost (<http://training.fema.gov/emiweb/edu>).

By June, 2006, over 100 formal programs in emergency management were
being offered throughout the nation's colleges and universities. And
about another 100 were in the process of being created (Blanchard 2006).

While terrorism was a topic within these "all-hazard" programs, the
attacks of September 11, 2001, changed the priorities of many. As
numerous groups critiqued both the response and the intelligence
failures that permitted these attacks to occur, many within higher
education questioned the adequacy of existing curricula including the
newly formed emergency management programs. Building on the testimony,
observations, and the final report of the 9-11 Commission (2004), some
quickly produced new course and program proposals. By the June, 2006,
conference, over 60 programs in "Homeland Security/Defense" were
identified. Indeed, for the first time, what had been an emergency
management conference was co-sponsored (Federal Emergency Management
Agency, Department of Homeland Security [and]{.underline} the NORTHCOM
Homeland Security/Defense Education Consortium). It was in this setting
that many faculty were first exposed to the cultural clashes that
reflected important differences in perspective. These differences are
not limited to alternative course titles, rather they reflect very real
contrasts in perceptions of risk and vulnerability and approaches to
solution. Thus, the definition of "the problem" differs as does the
priority among strategies for addressing it.

**Curricula and Cultural Differences**

Prior to the June, 2006, FEMA conference, I was invited to serve as a
panelist for a session focused on issues of potential integration among
homeland security and emergency management programs. In preparation for
this assignment, I reviewed numerous program outlines for both types of
curricula. My review identified five important contrasts which were
amplified by faculty I listened to throughout the conference.

1\. *Disaster agent*. As would be expected, within homeland security
programs, terrorism is identified as the major risk currently
confronting the U.S.A. One faculty member, echoing lines I had read
previously in White House position statements (e.g., Bush 2006),
emphasized "we are at war." He went on to stress his view that increased
awareness of the scope, intensity, and commitment of our enemies must be
a major program goal. Risk perceptions of Americans must be changed
because most are unaware of our vulnerability and unprepared to respond.
While emergency management faculty, reflecting an all-hazards
perspective, might agree with that last sentence in principle, they
would focus on building support for flood mitigation measures and better
hurricane evacuation procedures. So at the outset, the very definition
of "the problem" is a sharp contrast.

2\. *Management paradigm*. Again reflecting documents flowing from the
White House, most homeland security faculty reflected a top-down
approach to management. I encountered this in the White House analysis
of the failed Katrina response.

> "A useful model for our approach to homeland security is the Nation's
> approach to *national* security. . . . operationally organized, it
> stresses the importance of unity of command from the President down to
> the commander in the field." (White House 2006, pp. 66-67).
>
> "Our model for the command and control structure for the Federal
> response in the new National Preparedness System is our successful
> defense and national security statutory framework. In that framework,
> there is a clear line of authority that stretches from the President,
> through the Secretary of Defense, to the Combatant Commander in the
> field. . . . Although the Combatant Commander might not 'own' or
> control forces on a day-to-day basis, during a military operation he
> controls all military forces in his theater; he exercises the command
> authority and has access to resources needed to affect outcomes on the
> ground." (White House 2006, p. 71).

In direct contrast, emergency management faculty have been teaching an
alternative model, one that emphasizes cooperation, not command;
coordination, not control. A "bottoms-up" perspective is evident within
the curricula of emergency management programs (Drabek 2004, 2006d;
McEntire 2007) and reflects the research based critiques of command and
control management models (e.g., Dynes 1994; Neal and Phillips 1995).

3\. *Scope of event*. Disasters come in a wide variety. Indeed, many
wise researchers have suggested that much attention must be given to a
fundamental question, i.e., What is a disaster? (Quarantelli 1998, Perry
and Quarantelli 2005, Perry 2006, Quarantelli et al. 2006). In part at
least, the issue has to do with establishing appropriate limits of
generalization of research findings (for elaboration, see Committee on
Disaster Research in the Social Sciences 2006, pp. 144-146). Do the
responses to a small tornado in Topeka, Kansas, inform our predictions
regarding those that might be forthcoming following an airplane crash in
the same locale? How might the response pattern differ if the crash was
into an office building following a hijacking by a band of terrorists?
And would there be even more differences if the hijackers had been
successful in smuggling a nuclear device onboard? If detonated in the
crash, the potential disaster scene escalates immediately from a single
plane and office building to an entire city. It is such "what if's" that
Clark (2006) urges disaster officials to build into their training and
planning activities so as to stimulate the imagination. And by doing so,
he recommends more focus on "the possible" rather than the current
blinders reflecting focus on "the probable."

Homeland security faculty are advised to study the wisdom within Clark's
analysis so as to go beyond their limited projections of terrorists'
plots. But by a near singular focus on "the enemy," these faculty fail
to benefit from the insights of a much larger picture. In a framework I
will outline below, I will suggest potentials for greater integration
with emergency management. We learned long ago that a primary focus on
planning for "the big one"---in those days nuclear attack from the
Soviet Union---was a barrier to both public credibility and effective
use of community resources during times of disaster. That lesson should
not be forgotten. Furthermore, the failed Katrina response must not be
used to narrow our focus to "catastrophic" events to the neglect of the
hundreds of disasters that probably will occur before another event of
that scope.

4\. *Intergovernmental system*. All disasters are local. At least, the
first response to any type of major event will reflect local resources.
Emergency management programs emphasize the horizontal pattern of
relationships that must be nurtured if the emergent response network is
to be effective (Drabek 2006, 2003; McEntire 2007). And procedures to
rapidly access state and federal resources are among the core knowledge
that any emergency manager must know thoroughly. Homeland security
faculty, however, emphasize "the crime scene" nature of the disaster
setting and the important roles played by law enforcement agencies.
Intelligence gathering designed to thwart potential enemy attacks and
the quick capture of those who might be successful in implementing their
plot becomes a top priority. While local officials are recognized, the
role of the federal bureaus rises to the top of the homeland security
agenda. Students are thereby socialized into a culture that differs
significantly from the world of emergency management as it is practiced
within most local communities.

5\. *Content*. In 2005 a group of experts was convened by a committee
within the National Academy of Sciences to examine proposals regarding
undergraduate degrees in homeland security. What would comprise the
content? Many topics were discussed, some of which reflect courses
currently being offered at various universities and colleges. Topics
like these are listed in different program statements: "Port Security,"
"Aviation Security," "Asymmetric Threats and Terrorism," "Civil-Military
Relations," "The Intelligence Community and the Intelligence Process,"
"Principles of Criminal Investigation," "Legal and Constitutional Issues
in Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness," "Nuclear, Biological,
and Chemical Threats," "Energy and Transportation Security." Obviously
this is just a sampling, but the NAS experts were concerned. Their
conclusion? "Not a single workshop participant, or any of the committee
members, voiced support for an undergraduate degree program focused
specifically on homeland security. As an area of study, it was deemed
too immature and too broad." Such matters seemed best pursued at the
graduate level. (Committee on Educational Paradigms for Homeland
Security 2005, p. 19).

Regardless of one's position on the issue of university degrees, the
contrast in substantive content to that offered within undergraduate
emergency management programs is informative. Beyond the "introduction
to" classes, typical course topics are: "Hazard Mitigation Theory and
Practice," "Disaster Response and Recovery," "Leadership and
Organizational Behavior," "Hazardous Materials," "Private Sector
Issues," "Computers in Emergency Management," "Building Disaster
Resilient Communities," "Voluntary Agency Disaster Services," "Crisis
Communications" and "Community Disaster Preparedness."

As with Homeland Security, the multidisciplinary nature of emergency
management has resulted in program placement issues. The first
undergraduate degree program was founded at the University of North
Texas and is administered within the Department of Public Administration
which identified an "Emergency Administration and Planning Program." In
contrast, the first Ph.D. program in emergency management was created at
North Dakota State University and is housed within the "Department of
Sociology, Anthropology, and Emergency Management."

Others have evolved with much greater specificity. For example, graduate
degrees and certificates may be earned at George Mason University's
National Center for Biodefense. Among the courses offered are these:
"Threat Analysis I: Bacterial Agents"; "Threat Analysis II: Viral
Agents"; "Threat Analysis IV: Toxins"; "Epidemiology of a Bioterror
Attack"; "Approaches to Bioweapon Medical Treatment and Response" and
"Into the Hot Zone: Working in a High Threat Environment."

After reviewing dozens of program outline statements that have been
prepared by emergency management and homeland security faculty, I was
reminded of C.P. Snow's (1959) classic statement on the difficulties of
bridging "the two cultures." Of course, the orientations of the
so-called "hard scientists" differ greatly from those reflecting the
disciplines that comprise the humanities or the social sciences. But as
Snow argued, one is not "better" than the other, rather bridges must be
built so that the understanding of the human condition can better be
informed by the wisdom inherent in each.

**Alternative Integrative Strategies**

Mindful of Snow's (1959) classic two culture juxtaposition---the
sciences versus the humanities---I began to wonder how some level of
integration might be achieved. That is not to say that content
differences should be put aside or ignored. As I listed various issues
and concerns, three major strategies became clear: 1) expansion of
emergency management curricula; 2) expansion of homeland security
curricula; and 3) complimentary expansions.

Too many faculty I have discussed these issues with, like their
counterparts in the practitioner communities, view these matters much
too narrowly. Hence, I proposed that the first step toward improved
integration requires that the *diameter of the straw be increased*. So
starting with the emergency management side, I suggest that the
all-hazards paradigm be retained. Preparedness for, response to,
recovery from, and mitigation of all disaster events, and potential
disasters, should define the outer parameters of this emerging
profession. This means that local communities must be encouraged to
complete vulnerability analyses and then take appropriate actions. So
too must state governments and those responsible for federal agencies.
For emergency management types, especially those working within local
governments, this means that an *expansion of vision* must occur so that
terrorism and other forms of "willful" disaster is included. Challenges
resulting from catastrophic events, like Hurricane Katrina, must be
included within the agency domain and priority structure. So too must
those resulting from willful acts of terrorists be they "homegrown" or
of foreign origin. Beyond all of these agents, local preparedness
actions also must address issues flowing from potential pandemics, e.g.,
the 1918 flu (Barry 2004). Consequently, portions of the content that
comprises homeland security may be absorbed into emergency management
programs.

Conversely, and probably with greater difficulty, the diameter of the
"straw" that constrains the vision of faculty teaching within homeland
security programs may also benefit from expansion. Most important along
these lines are some fundamental questions that students should be
encouraged to address. My sense is that they rarely are. For example,
what do we mean by "security"? How is "security" best attained? What are
the limits to "security" attained by more locks on doors or inspections
of airline passengers? How many millions of shoes must be removed before
we can feel "secure"? Hence, homeland security faculty must challenge
students to expand their vision and approach by carefully integrating
the perspectives proposed by analysts like Hart (2006), who argue
effectively that America will never be secure until ". . . we undertake
to address the multiple sources of insecurity." (p. 176).

To state the error resulting from an overly narrow vision, Hart put the
matter most clearly. "As we did during the Cold War, even now during the
war on terrorism we are in danger of defining our security too narrowly
as simply a military shield, and therefore we may also be in danger of
selling ourselves and our nation short." (p. 176).

So rather than prophesying risk perceptions of fear, homeland security
faculty must push students toward an expanded vision that includes the
wisdom of seasoned and effective local emergency managers
[and]{.underline} a recognition that the promotion of fear is a wrong
headed policy. Rather, as any county commissioner or city manager knows
in his or her gut, both homeland security and emergency management
budgets must be juxtaposed against all of the other needs of a community
that collectively promote citizen well-being and security. Hart
expressed the required expansion of "the straw" very well when he stated
the following.

> "America will not be truly secure, or free from fear, until we
> undertake to address the multiple sources of insecurity. . . . If
> freedom is the product of security, then we must create a new
> understanding of security in the twenty-first century much as Franklin
> Roosevelt did in the twentieth century. Our new four freedoms should
> be freedom of the commons, freedom of the livelihood, freedom of a
> sound environment, and freedom from fear." (Hart 2006, p. 176).

From this vantage point, emergency management perspectives are subsumed
within homeland security. But it is an image of homeland security far
different than those found currently. The concept is expanded and pushed
in several different directions. Management styles are no longer limited
to top-down directives, risk communication is not limited to fear
mongering, and mitigation is not focused on locking up bad guys. A world
view of pluralism and respect for other cultures and customs defines the
initial premise set, not simplistic notions of "democracy of all" or
"eradication of evil". And the marketing of fear is exposed as a process
used by a variety of activists of differing political persuasions with
very different agenda. Thus, the insights of analysts like Furedi (2006)
help expand the concept of homeland security. "The fear market thrives
in an environment where society has internalized the belief that since
people are too powerless to cope with the risks they face, it is
continually confronted with the problem of survival. This mood of
powerlessness has encouraged a market where different fears compete with
one another in order to capture the public imagination." (Furedi 2006,
p. 519).

Finally, some faculty might be best guided by an alternative image. In
contrast to the "expanding the diameter of the straw" positions
advocated above, others might best adopt a more complex image. Rather
than a straw, why not a kaleidoscope? I am indebted to a wise emergency
manager---J.R. Thomas---for this idea, one he shared with me during the
June conference referenced above (Thomas 2006).

From this perspective, the future emergency manager or homeland security
officer is encouraged to become skilled at shifting focus. An integrated
whole is thereby achieved by addressing the interfaces and complexities
that define these two approaches to community safety. Hence, refusing to
remain overwhelmed by the scope and complexity of the issues, managers
are encouraged to temporarily focus on a single sector of issues. Having
addressed these, they can then pull back and see how this pattern of
activities is related to other sectors that can then be addressed. In
doing so they can better see how each part interfaces with the others.
And so, with the image of a kaleidoscope as their model, they can better
design and implement an integrated program that will advance the
emerging profession of emergency management, including the issues and
concerns that define homeland security. And equally important, they can
better conceptualize their relationships with other professionals, be
they medical, fire service, law enforcement, social services, or what
have you. In short, they can better conceptualize the pathways flowing
from and toward specific academic disciplines on whose research they
must depend for the scientific knowledge in which the profession must
remain grounded.

A version of this "kaleidoscope" perspective was reflected in a
presentation at the annual meeting of the Canadian Risk and Hazards
Network (Montreal, October, 2006). A seasoned local emergency
manager---Alain Normand---currently serves as the President of the
Ontario Association of Emergency Managers and directs the program for
the city of Brampton. After describing his efforts to integrate security
issues and preparedness for a possible pandemic, he displayed a series
of power points that resembled the changing images one sees upon looking
into a kaleidoscope (Normand 2006). Hence, the components of emergency
management can be focused and refocused reflecting a *temporary*
priority or program emphasis. But the collective whole can thereby be
viewed albeit in rather fractured parts. For many, the blurred vision
caused by cultural differences precludes this imagery of integration.

This third perspective appears to be consistent with the conclusions
reached by Waugh (2006) who was studying terrorism long before the
events of 9/11. The longevity of his research focus brings an uncommon
wisdom, a depth of insight from which many can learn.

> "The next terrorist disaster could take many forms---from a dam
> collapse to a biological attack to a nuclear attack. The attackers may
> be al-Qaeda operatives or American militia members or they may be from
> any number of other international or domestic extremist groups. . . .
> The point is simply that the range of possibilities is so great that a
> broad approach is necessary to ensure that law enforcement, military,
> and emergency response personnel have a range of capabilities,
> therefore a more generic 'all-hazards' program would be more adaptable
> to circumstances than a terrorism-focused program (Waugh 1984, 2005)."
> (Waugh 2006, p. 401).

**Conclusion**

I first voiced some of these ideas while a panel member at a conference
sponsored by the Federal Emergency Management Agency in June, 2006
(Drabek 2006c). I began by stressing my personal commitment to the
values reflected in the Constitution of the United States of America and
my belief that it is the responsibility of all citizens to be critical
of government policies that they believe are wrong headed. I also noted
my concerns about the erosion of civil liberties through technologies
implemented and policies adopted during the past decade. I then
suggested that we ought to put discussion of the potential integrations
of emergency management and homeland security curricula into the broader
contexts of social problems perspectives and major societal and global
social processes.

As I recall it, I then said something like: "So to broaden our
discussion---expand the diameter of our respective straws, a theme I
will elaborate on momentarily---let's consider the wisdom contained in
two recently published books."

I then noted Jared Diamond's (2005) insightful analysis of the
geographic, social and economic patterns in societal collapse. "Think
about the curricular implications of his conclusion."

> "When people are desperate, undernourished, and without hope, they
> blame their governments, which they see as responsible for or unable
> to solve their problems. They try to emigrate at any cost. They fight
> each other over land. They kill each other. They start civil wars.
> They figure they have nothing to lose, so they become terrorists, or
> they support or tolerate terrorism." (Diamond 2006, p. 516).

I then quoted from John Barry's (2004) brilliant social history of the
1918 flu pandemic. "Epidemiologists today estimate that influenza likely
caused at least fifty million deaths worldwide and possibly as many as
one hundred million." (p. 4). "Influenza killed more people in a year
than the Black Death of the middle ages killed in a century; it killed
more people in twenty-four weeks than AIDS has killed in twenty-four
years." (p. 5).

At this point two or three participants walked out of the room! As I
spotted another about to exit toward the back door, I asked him to stay
for the discussion that would begin shortly. "You obviously don't agree
with my views, but all of us need to hear your objections and
suggestions." His response was brief, firm, and trailed off as he
exited. "No! I've heard enough. It's this kind of academic BS that
really hurts the morale of the troops." Later, I engaged this person in
further discussion during a coffee break in a hallway. He elaborated.
"Our guys in the Middle East are doing their best against an enemy that
is determined to bring us down. We need a focus on specific tactics and
strategies to improve command and control during disaster responses, not
all this stuff you're talking about that just muddies up everyone's
thinking." I mention this here, because it illustrates my first
conclusion.

1\. *Different cultural views of "the problem" and will preclude a
simple integration of existing, or future, emergency management and
homeland security curricula*. This conclusion is illustrated by the
example just given. But it also reflects the cultural variations I
detailed above regarding everything from the intergovernmental system,
management styles, and preparedness priorities.

2\. *Within all democratic societies, universities and other
institutions of higher learning, have performed many functions,
including the stimulation of political and social criticism*. Many have
emphasized the absolute requirement for all systems that are to
survive---families, organizations, and societies---that critical
examination is a must. Furthermore, those who dissent must be protected.
Such protection is the most fundamental requisite of system self-renewal
(Gardner 1965). Hence, within emergency management and homeland security
programs, students must be encouraged to critically examine current
doctrine, no matter its source. It is not enough to just "know" the
book. The capacity for critical analysis must be developed, encouraged,
and protected. Indeed, it must be required of all participants, students
[and]{.underline} faculty. Reflecting remarks I made at a recent
symposium (Drabek 2006a), I offer this judgment. This lack of capacity
for policy criticism is the *most important shortcoming* in existing
emergency management and homeland security courses. Given their recent
creation, such a shortcoming is understandable. But it must be
corrected.

3\. *Curricular developments and programs in emergency management and
homeland security should be promoted and stimulated by various
governmental bureaus, but they must not dictate*. These include the
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), other components of the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and additional agencies ranging
from the Department of Defense (DOD), the US Geological Survey (USGS),
National Science Foundation (NSF) and others. As faculty implement a
wide variety of courses, programs, and credentials of various types,
including specialized certificates and formal degrees, all governmental
bureaus should maintain a clear boundary. Their role is to nurture, not
to prescribe. As with curricular innovations of the past, the pathways
will be many and marked with both successes and failures. But the
independence and autonomy of the universities, and those working within
all settings of higher learning, must be maintained. Decisions regarding
curricular content and assessments of academic excellence must come from
within these institutions and accreditation procedures and bodies they
construct. As the professions of emergency management and homeland
security continue to evolve, they must become more active participants
in the standard setting process.

4\. *Future disaster events, including those reflective of natural,
technological, and conflict agents, will deflect the long-term
developmental pattern of such curricular innovation*. This is to be
expected. All professions evolve within specific historical contexts and
reflect the ebb and flow of the knowledge building process. Barry's
(2004) social history of medical schools and curricular reform is most
instructive in this regard. As opportunities for new research become
available, in part because of new disaster events, some of which can not
be imagined by most faculty today, program priorities and content will
change. This is as it should be; it is not a sign of failure or poor
quality. Rather it reflects desired growth. And disagreements regarding
program and course change, elimination, or initiation, should be
anticipated and welcomed. Such is the process of curricula development
and societal change. Only the pace or degree of change is up for grabs.
And given the turbulence and uncertainties, both within and among, all
nation states probably will confront during the next several decades, it
is very likely that the pace of change will be quite high. Welcome to
the "new normal."

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