Census 2000 Evaluation Q.1

October 8, 2003

Management Evaluation of Census 2000

FINAL REPORT

This evaluation study reports the results of research and analysis
undertaken by the U.S. Census Bureau. It is part of a broad program, the
Census 2000 Testing, Experimentation, and Evaluation (TXE) Program,
designed to assess Census 2000 and to inform 2010 Census planning.
Findings from the Census 2000 TXE Program reports are integrated into
topic reports that provide context and background for broader
interpretation of results.

Prepared by IBM Business Consulting Services

Fay F. Nash, Project Manager

Decennial Management Division

![](media/image1.png){width="3.2493055555555554in"
height="0.3333333333333333in"}\
 *Helping You Make Informed Decisions*

contents

[**EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 5**](#__RefHeading___Toc55114538)

[1. BACKGROUND 9](#background)

[2. METHODOLOGY 10](#methodology)

[2.1 Develop the Baseline Approach for the Decennial Census
11](#develop-the-baseline-approach-for-the-decennial-census)

[2.2 Develop Evaluation Dimensions 12](#develop-evaluation-dimensions)

[2.3 Evaluate the Management Approach
13](#evaluate-the-management-approach)

[2.4 Perform Qualitative Analysis on the Interview Data
13](#perform-qualitative-analysis-on-the-interview-data)

[2.5 Interpret the Results 14](#interpret-the-results)

[2.6 Assure Quality 15](#assure-quality)

[3. LIMITATIONS 16](#limitations)

[4. POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT 18](#__RefHeading___Toc55114548)

[4.1 Background 18](#background-1)

[4.2 The Sampling Debate 18](#the-sampling-debate)

[4.3 All Levels of Decennial Census Staff Felt the Impact of the
External Oversight
20](#all-levels-of-decennial-census-staff-felt-the-impact-of-the-external-oversight)

[5. FUNDING 23](#funding)

[5.1 Generous Funding or High Cost? 23](#generous-funding-or-high-cost)

[5.2 The Program Funding Lifecycle 25](#the-program-funding-lifecycle)

[5.3 External and Internal Controls Over Funding
27](#external-and-internal-controls-over-funding)

[6. STAFFING 28](#staffing)

[6.1 Inadequate Levels of Staffing and Experience Eroded the Knowledge
Base
28](#inadequate-levels-of-staffing-and-experience-eroded-the-knowledge-base)

[6.2 Recruitment and Retention Contributed to the Problem
28](#recruitment-and-retention-contributed-to-the-problem)

[7. executive LEADERSHIP 31](#executive-leadership)

[7.1 Census Bureau and Decennial Leadership Changed Often Throughout the
Decade
31](#census-bureau-and-decennial-leadership-changed-often-throughout-the-decade)

[7.2 Cultures Reflected Divisional Priorities
33](#cultures-reflected-divisional-priorities)

[8. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE AND MANAGEMENT APPROACH
34](#organizational-structure-and-management-approach)

[8.1 High Level Census Organization 34](#high-level-census-organization)

[8.2 Managing Across Directorates 35](#managing-across-directorates)

[8.3 Internal Management Structures and Approaches
36](#internal-management-structures-and-approaches)

[9. DECISION-MAKING 42](#decision-making)

[9.1 Decision-Making in the Centralized Management Approach
42](#decision-making-in-the-centralized-management-approach)

[9.2 Decision-Making in Large, Complex Organizations
45](#decision-making-in-large-complex-organizations)

[10. PLANNING AND RISK MANAGEMENT 48](#planning-and-risk-management)

[10.1 Weaknesses in the Planning Process
48](#weaknesses-in-the-planning-process)

[10.2 Program Master Plans (PMPs) 49](#program-master-plans-pmps)

[10.3 Contingency Planning 49](#contingency-planning)

[11. HUMAN RESOURCES MANAGEMENT 50](#human-resources-management)

[11.1 Promotions Based on Technical Knowledge, with Little Consideration
for Management Skills
50](#promotions-based-on-technical-knowledge-with-little-consideration-for-management-skills)

[11.2 Few Long Term Rewards for Working on the Decennial Census
50](#few-long-term-rewards-for-working-on-the-decennial-census)

[11.3 Minimal Use of Career Development and Succession Planning
51](#minimal-use-of-career-development-and-succession-planning)

[12. Communications 52](#communications)

[12.1 The Approach to Internal Communications
52](#the-approach-to-internal-communications)

[12.2 The Internal Communications Structure for Census 2000
54](#the-internal-communications-structure-for-census-2000)

[13. Management Information Systems 59](#management-information-systems)

[13.1 Common Themes on the MIS Used for Census 2000
60](#common-themes-on-the-mis-used-for-census-2000)

[13.2 The Master Activity Schedule (MAS)
61](#the-master-activity-schedule-mas)

[13.3 The Cost and Progress System (C&P System)
63](#the-cost-and-progress-system-cp-system)

[13.4 The Census 2000 Cost Model 64](#the-census-2000-cost-model)

[14. The Use of Contracting 66](#the-use-of-contracting)

[14.1 Some Business Activities of Census 2000 were Outsourced
66](#some-business-activities-of-census-2000-were-outsourced)

[14.2 Contractors Added Many Strengths to Census 2000
67](#contractors-added-many-strengths-to-census-2000)

[14.3 Staff member Comments on Improving Outsourcing
68](#staff-member-comments-on-improving-outsourcing)

[14.4 The Census 2000 Needed an Institutionalized Process for Defining
Requirements
69](#the-census-2000-needed-an-institutionalized-process-for-defining-requirements)

[14.5 The Internal Census Bureau Change Control Processes were not Fully
Developed.
71](#the-internal-census-bureau-change-control-processes-were-not-fully-developed.)

[15. SPECIFIC FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
72](#specific-findings-and-recommendations)

[15.1 Findings on Political Environment
72](#findings-on-political-environment)

[15.2 Recommendations on Political Environment
72](#recommendations-on-political-environment)

[15.3 Findings on Funding 73](#findings-on-funding)

[15.4 Recommendations on Funding 73](#recommendations-on-funding)

[15.5 Findings on Staffing 74](#findings-on-staffing)

[15.6 Recommendations on Staffing 74](#recommendations-on-staffing)

[15.7 Findings on Leadership 75](#findings-on-leadership)

[15.8 Recommendations on Leadership 75](#recommendations-on-leadership)

[15.9 Findings on Organizational Structure & Management Approach
76](#findings-on-organizational-structure-management-approach)

[15.10 Recommendations on Organizational Structure & Management Approach
76](#recommendations-on-organizational-structure-management-approach)

[15.11 Findings on Decision-Making 77](#findings-on-decision-making)

[15.12 Recommendations on Decision-Making
77](#recommendations-on-decision-making)

[15.13 Findings on Planning 78](#findings-on-planning)

[15.14 Recommendations on Planning 78](#recommendations-on-planning)

[15.15 Findings on Human Resources Management
79](#findings-on-human-resources-management)

[15.16 Recommendations on Human Resources Management
79](#recommendations-on-human-resources-management)

[15.17 Findings on Internal Communications
80](#findings-on-internal-communications)

[15.18 Recommendations on Internal Communications
80](#recommendations-on-internal-communications)

[15.19 Findings on Management Information Systems
81](#findings-on-management-information-systems)

[15.20 Recommendations on the MIS Processes
81](#recommendations-on-the-mis-processes)

[15.21 Findings on Large Scale Contracting
82](#findings-on-large-scale-contracting)

[15.22 Recommendations on Large Scale Contracting
83](#recommendations-on-large-scale-contracting)

[REFERENCES 85](#__RefHeading___Toc55114615)

[APPENDIX A: CRITERIA FOR EVALUATING THE MANAGEMENT APPROACH
87](#__RefHeading___Toc55114616)

[APPENDIX B: CENSUS BUREAU MANAGEMENT EVALUATION INTERVIEW ANALYSIS
QUICK REFERENCE GUIDE 89](#__RefHeading___Toc55114617)

[APPENDIX C: INTERVIEWEES FOR MANAGEMENT EVALUATION OF THE DECENNIAL
CENSUS 125](#__RefHeading___Toc55114618)

[APPENDIX D: LISTING OF ACRONYMS USED IN REPORT
127](#__RefHeading___Toc55114619)

[APPENDIX E: INTERVIEW GUIDE 129](#__RefHeading___Toc55114620)

[APPENDIX F: STUDY PLAN 131](#__RefHeading___Toc55114621)

LIST OF FIGURES

[Figure 1: Operational Timeline 10](#__RefHeading___Toc55114622)

[Figure 2: Party Control of the Administration, Senate, and House of
Representatives 19](#__RefHeading___Toc55114623)

[Figure 3: Timeline of Key Legislative/Judicial Events
20](#__RefHeading___Toc55114624)

[Figure 4: External Decisions Timeline 21](#__RefHeading___Toc55114625)

[Figure 5: The Relative Funding Per Person and as a Percentage of
National GDP (Adjusted for Inflation) 24](#__RefHeading___Toc55114626)

[Figure 6: The Relative Funding Per Housing Unit/Dwelling and as a
Percentage of National GDP (Adjusted for Inflation)
24](#__RefHeading___Toc55114627)

[Figure 7: Leadership Timeline 32](#__RefHeading___Toc55114628)

[Figure 8: Current Census Bureau Delegations of Authority
35](#__RefHeading___Toc55114629)

[Figure 9: Centralized Management Approach
39](#__RefHeading___Toc55114630)

List of Tables

[Table 1: Annual Census Funding Percentages by Country
26](#__RefHeading___Toc55114631)

[Table 2: Cumulative Census Funding Percentages by Country
26](#__RefHeading___Toc55114632)

#  {#section .unnumbered}

#   {#section-1 .unnumbered}

[]{#__RefHeading___Toc55114538 .anchor}EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This Report documents the effectiveness of the management approach used
in the Decennial Census in each of seven areas including the management
model, organizational structures and processes, the decision-making
process, management information tools, staffing, external influences,
and the use of contracts.[^1] Each of these areas was evaluated using
the questions in the Census 2000 Study Plan. The report addresses
opportunities for improving the Census Bureau's effectiveness in
executing its statutory responsibilities and its current ability to
achieve mission results.

> **Performance Measures**

-   Key performance indicators reveal that, in certain respects, Census
    2000 was the most successful U.S. decennial census ever conducted.
    According to senior Census Bureau officials, the most critical
    performance measure is Net Coverage. In Census 2000, the percent of
    net undercount estimate was --0.49.[^2] A net undercount estimate of
    --0.49 represents a small estimated overcount of the household
    population for Census 2000. Achievement of a small net coverage
    error that is close to zero is an important success factor given
    that in every census conducted prior to 2000, a positive net
    undercount was estimated.

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-   The national response rate that determined the Census 2000
    Nonresponse Followup workload was 65 percent, which matched the 65
    percent response rate from the 1990 Decennial Census and stemmed the
    decline that had been the trend over recent decades.

-   The Non-Response Follow Up effort was completed ahead of schedule.

> **Organization and Structure**

-   Post 1998, the Census Bureau operated within an organization that
    was well structured to support its performance objectives. The
    decennial organization, for example, was organized by business
    process drawing from functional capabilities residing within the
    participating divisions as required. Within the decennial census
    business process, a single process owner, the Associate Director
    (AD) for Decennial Census, controlled both line and funding
    authority for delivering the decennial census product. The overall
    Census Bureau organizational structure is logical, clearly defined
    and, for the most part, tailored toward achieving desired results.

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-   In many of the sub-structures and teams within the decennial
    organization, however, the leaders of the teams and decision-making
    bodies were not given or did not choose to exercise true
    decision-making authority. Leaders often served exclusively as
    facilitators and consensus builders of all the other interests of
    the stakeholders. Although the intent behind the creation of these
    organizational bodies was to push decision-making to the lowest
    management levels technically possible, there was no decision-making
    authority in place at these lower levels to support that intent.
    Only when all participants agreed or were present at a meeting could
    any issue come to conclusion; as such, decisions became watered down
    to what everyone in the group could agree on.[^3] The problem is
    that committees are horribly inefficient at making decisions. A
    committee with a true chairperson, endowed with final
    decision-making or recommendation-making authority to the next
    level, would have had the authority to arbitrate disputes and to
    expedite progress on the important issues under consideration.

-   Executives sometimes found themselves in situations where the
    interests in their directorates, divisions or teams were at odds
    with the interests of the greater decennial census organization
    within which these substructures reside. These executives at times
    can have conflicting responsibilities to represent the interests of
    their direct reports, as well as the interests of the greater Census
    Bureau. With any division of work resulting by the imposition of a
    reporting structure, these types of conflicts will occur and are
    natural. The Executive who resides one level up and at the apex of
    two or more directorates or divisions should anticipate when
    conflicts of interest at a level below will arise and should
    strongly weigh in as the point of coordination, in order to mitigate
    the impact on the organization of conflicts that will naturally
    occur.

> **Management Approach**

-   Mid-decade, the Census Bureau attempted to institute matrix
    management in order encourage teaming and to distribute
    decision-making to lower levels. This early attempt failed because
    the components of true matrix management were not fully implemented;
    there was no centralized integrating or coordinating process for
    census plans and operations, and decision-making mechanisms were not
    properly implemented. After 1998, a \"centralized\" management
    approach added strong coordination, integration and decision-making
    roles in the Decennial Management Division (DMD) to the teaming
    arrangements from the failed matrix approach. The centralized
    approach fulfilled the desired results of matrix management because
    it fit the matrixed business model of the decennial organization.
    The centralized management approach is the approach that best
    represents true matrix management because it features a more robust
    DMD on the y-axis counterbalancing and coordinating the interests of
    and the capabilities resident within the participating divisions on
    the x-axis.

-   Despite the operational successes, the evaluation of the management
    approach revealed areas that warrant improvement. In assessing the
    management model, it is important to consider two external drivers
    that Census Bureau management must respond to (political influences
    and technological advances) but over which the Census Bureau does
    not have significant control. The operations and approach for
    conducting the decennial census are impacted significantly by
    politics because of the federal, state and local distribution of
    funds that are tied to census results. During the 1990s, the
    congressional debate over the use of a sampling strategy versus
    traditional enumeration strategy caused significant challenges to
    the Census Bureau leadership's ability to plan for Census 2000.

-   As the debate over strategy continued, shoestring funding levels
    limited the number of staff members working on Census 2000 from the
    Decennial Management Division and the participating divisions; this
    constrained the Census Bureau's ability to generate detailed
    implementation plans for either a sampling or traditional
    enumeration approach. The funding shortfalls and an inability to
    maintain a core decennial staff throughout the decade also led to
    critical weaknesses in the decennial census knowledge base and had
    ramifications for many processes and procedures being executed
    during Census 2000.

-   Most of the individuals interviewed during the course of this
    evaluation perceived that staff members working on the decennial
    census, hired late in the decade when funding came through, lacked
    the training and experience to understand and manage the sheer
    magnitude of Census 2000 operations.

    **Communications and Knowledge Management**

-   There is little record of an internal communications approach or the
    implementation of a formal communications structure for Census 2000.
    The AD for Decennial Census should ensure that the communications
    groups throughout the decennial organization follow a communications
    strategy set forth by the AD for Decennial Census, and also address
    each of the phases important to the development of an effective
    communications approach.[^4] In order to ensure that the
    communications strategy is implemented, the AD for Decennial Census
    can, for example, tie the achievement of decennial communications
    goals with individual performance reviews.

-   A knowledge management capability to retain corporate knowledge, to
    support responses to external reporting requirements, and to
    communicate programmatic changes to decennial census participants in
    a timely manner would assist in improving communications and in
    stabilizing and maintaining the decennial census knowledge base
    throughout the decade.

    **The Management Evaluation**

Although the Census 2000 centralized management approach is an
appropriate approach that matches the decennial census business model,
improvements could be made that would make the implementation of the
approach more effective. Recommendations for improvement include:

-   Clearly define and communicate to all decennial census staff the
    roles and responsibilities of DMD program managers.

-   Develop program master plans describing operational plans earlier in
    the census cycle than was accomplished during census 2000

-   Develop risk management plans as an integral component of census
    planning

# BACKGROUND

In March of 2001, the U.S. Census Bureau retained an outside consulting
firm to conduct an evaluation of the management structure, processes and
tools of the 2000 decennial census. Pursuant to the contracted Statement
of Work, seven areas were to be evaluated: the management model for
Census 2000, organizational structures and processes, decision-making
process, management information tools, staffing, external influences,
and the use of contracts.[^5]

The Statement of Work aggregated the seven evaluation areas into three
phases for review. In the first phase, the contractor was asked to
address the management model for Census 2000, the organizational
structures and processes and the decision-making process. In the second
phase, the contractor was directed to examine the management information
tools, staffing, external influences, and the use of contracts. In the
third and final phase, the contractor consolidated the findings and
produced the final Management Evaluation Report.

The Management Evaluation Steering Committee directed the project team
to evaluate the management approach in terms of how well the management
plan worked. The Steering Committee determined that the management plan
for the evaluation would refer to the *Roles and Responsibilities*
document created in 1998 to describe the management approach that would
be used to coordinate the decennial census. This document loosely
defined the areas of responsibilities assumed by the Decennial
Management Division, Program Managers, the Participating Divisions, the
Census 2000 Working Groups (Census Operational Managers, Decennial
Division Chiefs Steering Committee), and decision-making processes
(Issue Resolution/Change Control).

# METHODOLOGY 

In order to properly evaluate the management approach of the decennial
census, the contractor began the assessment by gaining a clear
understanding of the baseline operations currently in place at the U.S.
Census Bureau. This provided the contractor with a "common
understanding" of how the Census Bureau is organized, the core products
and services offered, and the supporting systems architecture. This
common understanding is sometimes referred to as the "as is" baseline or
the current ways of working. The contractor's understanding of the
external and internal environment formed the foundation upon which the
detailed approach for assessing organizational and management
performance was based.

Many of the tools the contractor used to understand an organization's
management structure were taken from the contractor's business process
reengineering methodology; for this project specifically, the contractor
selected business modeling and process analysis. By comparing the vision
in the Census Bureau plan against current operations, the contractor
sought to identify gaps that may help to identify areas where the Census
Bureau can improve its management approach.

The contractor created a baseline of the decennial census by taking a
look at the core business processes, the organization and the management
structures that were in place to support the operations mentioned in the
timeline in Figure 1. The timeline describes the events that occurred
during the 12-year cycle leading up to Census 2000.[^6]

![](media/image3.wmf){width="5.625in" height="3.3in"}

## 2.1 Develop the Baseline Approach for the Decennial Census  {#develop-the-baseline-approach-for-the-decennial-census .unnumbered}

The baseline management approach and the supporting organization form
key elements in the contractor's understanding of the conduct of Census
2000. The creation of the baseline was largely based on a thorough
review of documentation provided by the Decennial Management Division
(DMD) and meetings with key members of the Management Evaluation
Steering Committee (the Steering Committee). The Steering Committee was
comprised of managers from the DMD, the Decennial Systems and Contracts
Management Office (DSCMO), and the Field Division (FLD).

To initially understand the organizational structure and management
approach, the contractor reviewed the delegations of authority and
funding strategies, areas of responsibility, reporting lines of
accountability, and resourcing capacity throughout the decennial census
decade. This understanding was critical to evaluating the management
approach used during the implementation of Census 2000.

The following steps were taken to create a baseline of the management
approach and organizational structure:

**Step 1:** The contractor reviewed documentation supplied by the
Steering Committee, in addition to external information available on the
Internet from the Department of Commerce, the General Accounting Office,
census oversight committees, Title 13 of the U.S. Code and the U.S.
Constitution. The primary internal documents used for the initial review
were the *Census 2000 Operational Plan* and the *Roles and
Responsibilities of Census 2000 Participants* document. The *Census 2000
Operational Plan* was written by the staff members of the DMD and it
describes the operations of the decennial census. The *Roles and
Responsibilities* document was written by the DMD in 1998 and describes
the baseline management approach determined for Census 2000.

**Step 2:** From this initial documentation, the contractor drafted
high-level organization charts and business process models, which were
reviewed by the Steering Committee. This was done to ensure that the
team correctly understood the operations and management approach as
outlined in the *Roles and Responsibilities* and *Census Operations*
documents. During the review, the authority, accountability, and
responsibility relationships, as well as the capacity of resources, were
clarified to enable the contractor to better understand the management
approach. The contractor incorporated the feedback from the Steering
Committee into the models and clarified interpretation of the management
approach described in the initial documents.

**Step 3:** The contractor used this knowledge to develop the list of
interview questions for Census Bureau management.[^7] The questions were
developed to focus discussions on key issues identified for the
evaluation by the Q.1 Study Plan.[^8]

**Step 4:** The contractor conducted a limited benchmarking activity in
an effort to gain some objectivity on the service delivery mechanisms of
the U.S. Census Bureau. To obtain an understanding of how other similar
organizations conduct business, the contractor spoke with members of
census organizations in other countries with similar processes to the
U.S Census Bureau.

## 2.2 Develop Evaluation Dimensions {#develop-evaluation-dimensions .unnumbered}

Once the team had a basic understanding of the management approach, the
contractor worked with the Steering Committee to identify dimensions
where the management approach was to be evaluated.[^9] These areas
included:

***Political Environment:*** This section discusses how the external
stakeholders, such as the Congress, the General Accounting Office (GAO),
the Department of Commerce (DoC), the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB), the Census Monitoring Board (CMB), and the Administration
impacted the implementation of Census 2000. It also includes some
advisory groups and the relationships that the Census Bureau had with
them.

***Census Environment:*** This section discusses the internal
environment at the Census Bureau during the decennial census; more
specifically, internal forces within the Census Bureau that drive change
and how the Census Bureau's atmosphere changes during the decennial
census year as compared to other years. Although not specifically
requested in the report, the project team found that ***Funding,
Staffing***[^10] and ***Leadership*** were areas of particular
importance to the staff members and had significant implications for the
management of Census 2000. For those reasons, the contractor included a
discussion of those comments in this report. ***Human Resources
Management*** issues also arose and are discussed.

***Census Management Model:*** This section discusses the approaches
that the DMD used to manage the conduct of Census 2000. Specifically
this refers to the matrix and centralized approaches used during the
decade in managing across all of the program areas and participating
divisions. ***Decision-making*** and ***Planning*** are also
specifically addressed in this section.

The evaluation dimensions also included specific performance related
questions from the *Census 2000 Study Plan*[^11] that formed the basis
for the contract to evaluate the management approach of Census 2000.
Throughout this document, there are text boxes with questions from the
Study Plan that pertain to a particular section under discussion. Some
subject areas emerged as a significant concern from the interviewees as
the project progressed and, as such, are not referenced by any specific
study plan question.

## 2.3 Evaluate the Management Approach  {#evaluate-the-management-approach .unnumbered}

The contractor evaluated the management approach by conducting
interviews with key Census Bureau staff. A total of 52 interviews were
conducted with Census Bureau personnel including 9 Executive Staff, 13
Division Chiefs (including Regional Directors), 18 Assistant Division
Chiefs, and 12 Branch Chiefs. The interview list[^12] included staff
members from the following areas: DMD, DSCMO, DSSD, GEO, Planning,
Research, and Evaluation Division (PRED), Housing and Household Economic
Statistics (HHES), Population Division (POP), Census 2000 Publicity
Office (C2PO), Field Division (FLD), and two Regional Offices. Fifty of
the fifty-two interviewees had prior decennial census experience and the
group collectively had over 900 years of experience with the Census
Bureau.

## 2.4 Perform Qualitative Analysis on the Interview Data  {#perform-qualitative-analysis-on-the-interview-data .unnumbered}

With the interviews completed, the contractor developed an approach to
organizing the interview information gathered from those who worked on
Census 2000. To assist the contractor in analyzing the data, the
contractor used the Non-Numerical Unstructured Data Indexing Searching
and Theorizing (NUD\*IST) software developed by Qualitative Solutions
and Research (QSR). The contractor wrote a summary of each of the 52
interviews and entered specific comments from the text, called "text
units, " one by one into the NUD\*IST software. The software allows the
analyst to group and sort common text units into a tree structure
according to common themes, as in the example below.

1\. Census Management Model

1.1 Organizational Structure

1.1.1 Strengths

1.1.2 Weaknesses

3.  Other observations

By using the software, the contractor was able to observe the
development of certain themes and findings as the interviews progressed.
The contractor structured the software tree according to the evaluation
criteria[^13] and initially coded the text units into strengths,
weaknesses, and general observations. By taking quotes from the
different interviews and looking at particular themes, the contractor
was able to cross analyze the data from all of the interviews in order
to identify trends as they emerged.[^14]

## 2.5 Interpret the Results {#interpret-the-results .unnumbered}

The final interview results can be found in Appendix B. Each line on the
NUD\*IST tree represents a particular category. Each contains numbers
associated with "N", "C", "n", and "c." "N" refers to the total number
of individuals commenting on a general subject area. "C" refers to the
total number of comments made on that general subject area. "n" refers
to the number of individuals commenting on a specific issue within a
general subject area. "c" refers to the number of comments on this
specific issue within the general subject area.

"N" = Number of Individuals Commenting on a General Subject

"C" = Comments on a General Subject

"n" = Number of Individuals Commenting on a Specific Issue within a
General Subject

"c" = Comments on a Specific Issue within a General Subject

Example:

Leadership (referring to the Executive Staff) (N=44, C=169) includes
comments on the following: the clarity of direction (n=33, c=65),
cohesiveness of the leadership team (n=18, c=33), leadership changes
(n=18, c=30), relationship of leaders with external stakeholders (n=14,
c=25), and how the decennial census relates to other Census Bureau
products (n=11, c=17).

In the results above, for example, forty-four people (N=44) made 169
comments (C=169) about leadership. Of the people who commented on
leadership, n=33 commented on the clarity of direction with a total of
65 comments, n=18 commented on the strength and cohesiveness of the
leadership team with c=30 comments, n=18 commented on leadership changes
with a total of c=30 comments, n=14 commented on the relationship of
leaders with stakeholders with a total of n=25 comments, and n=11
commented on how the decennial relates to other Census Bureau products
with a total of c=17 comments.

In sum, the contractor interpreted the information collected in the
interviews through the lenses of management theory and experience from
previous management reviews in order to evaluate the decennial census
management practices. The initial interview questionnaire was designed
to uncover symptoms that have their root causes in certain management
practices. Drawing on management theory and the contractor's management
review experience, the contractor then asked follow-up questions
designed to diagnose and confirm the root causes behind the symptoms of
the management issues being discussed. With 52 interviews, the project
team handled over 1,700 separate text units to determine the final
results. The rest of this document discusses the findings and analysis
that the contractor derived from the data.

## 2.6 Assure Quality {#assure-quality .unnumbered}

In order to assure the integrity of the information collected in the
evaluation process, and further assure that the project remained in line
with Census Bureau goals and objectives, the contractor employed a
quality assurance plan that incorporated various components designed to
monitor progress and maintain a standard of quality in project
deliverables. The quality assurance plan included development and
maintenance of a detailed project plan. The project plan was constructed
using MS Project and was continually updated throughout the life of the
project to reflect changes in schedule, deliverable due dates, project
objectives and goals.

Another component employed was the implementation of the stakeholder
quality process. The stakeholder quality review process was a mechanism
for verifying facts and identifying and monitoring the expectations of
the key stakeholders throughout the project. At the outset of the
project, the contractor reaffirmed the mission, scope and objectives of
the project, and obtained buy-in from the Census Bureau stakeholders.
This technique was used to assure that requirements were well defined
and understood, that Census Bureau expectations were being met, and that
contributions were made that positively impacted the Census Bureau
organization.

Where it was possible to identify information that would substantiate
individual observations, the contractor sought verifiable sources (e.g.,
funding schedules for U.S. and other national censuses, management
plans, departmental directives, organizational charts, leadership
communications, personnel information, etc.). When valid sources of
information were unavailable, the contractor noted that finding when it
was relevant to do so.

Lastly, an important mechanism in the quality assurance plan was the
submission of monthly status reports. These reports assured that the
Census Bureau was kept informed of progress, budget status, and schedule
modifications. The status reports also provided consistent documentation
of the critical issues that arose during the project that may have
impacted project outcomes.

# 3. LIMITATIONS {#limitations .unnumbered}

It is important to keep in mind the following caveats as they relate to
the conduct of the interviews and their impact on the final results:

-   The report follows the format as requested in the statement of work
    and responds directly to the questions outlined in the Study Plan.

-   When the contractor was engaged to perform the management
    evaluation, the assumption was that each component to be reviewed
    would have had a baseline management approach plan from which to
    compare planned versus actual implementation. Once the interviews
    were completed, the contractor concluded that some components had no
    baseline plan from which to evaluate. In such circumstances, the
    contractor suggested an appropriate approach or described the
    components thereof, and how they might be applied to the Census
    Bureau's situation.

```{=html}
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```
-   The interviews were conducted using questions from an *Interview
    Guide*[^15] developed in cooperation with the members of the Census
    Bureau Project Steering Committee. The interviews lasted from 60
    minutes to 90 minutes. The interviewees had varying levels of
    exposure to the issue areas mentioned in the *Interview Guide*, and
    they generally commented on areas with which they had direct
    knowledge or experience. The interviewees were provided the
    opportunity to discuss the issues they felt were most important.

-   Because the interviewees were not required to answer all of the
    questions in the *Interview Guide*,[^16] each of the issue areas
    will have comments from less than 52 interviewees.

```{=html}
<!-- -->
```
-   The contractor's knowledge base improved as the interview schedule
    progressed. The contractor was then able to ask more probing and
    in-depth follow-up questions in certain areas. Consequently, some of
    the more detailed questions asked later in the interview schedule
    generated fewer total comments because fewer interviewees were given
    a chance to respond to the more detailed questions. It was up to the
    consulting team to link the more detailed responses to the general
    findings they supported. It is important to recognize, therefore,
    that a relatively low number of comments does not diminish the
    validity or importance of some of the responses.

```{=html}
<!-- -->
```
-   There was no attempt to stratify the comments from the interviewees,
    since all the counts and comments were treated equally, independent
    of organizational unit, experience, or other differences. The
    interviews were conducted using questions from an *Interview
    Guide*[^17] developed in cooperation with the members of the
    Steering Committee.

```{=html}
<!-- -->
```
-   For the contracting component of the management evaluation, the
    contractor analyzed data from 16 interviews; therefore, any formal
    statistical stratification or analysis of the results becomes
    difficult. From the initial statement of work, the contractor had
    planned to interview only acquisition and contract management
    personnel from five federal agencies. Given the broader context of
    the review, the contractor broadened the interviewee roster to add
    staff from program management and include one additional federal
    agency.

-   In some cases, plans and documentation were not available to the
    contractor for use in identifying views and opinions that could not
    be factually supported. The contractor did require review from the
    members of the Census Bureau Steering Committee in order to identify
    perceptions that were inconsistent with known facts or events.

[]{#__RefHeading___Toc55114548 .anchor}4. POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT

## 4.1 Background {#background-1 .unnumbered}

While the conduct of the decennial census is authorized by the U.S.
Constitution and governed by statutes outlined in Title 13 of the U.S.
Code, the legal challenges to the census design and the politics
associated with Congressional reapportionment and redistricting had a
definite impact on the conduct of Census 2000. Public Law 94-521
authorizes the Secretary of Commerce to perform the decennial census and
allows him or her to delegate the functions, duties, and authority
needed to perform the tasks to officers and employees of the Department
of Commerce.[^18] The U.S. Constitution authorizes Congress to direct an
"actual enumeration" of the American public every ten years to provide a
basis for apportioning congressional representation among the
States.[^19]

The U.S. Constitution sets the boundaries for the conduct of the census
in the broadest sense. It provides insight into the basic reasons for
the political pressure on the Census Bureau during the planning and
execution of Census 2000. The results of the decennial census are used
to determine, at a minimum, three important political outcomes:

-   the apportionment of political representation, through congressional
    apportionment[^20];

-   the apportionment of federal, state, and local funding;[^21] and

-   the determination of state legislative districts.

The outcome of the decennial census, therefore, contributes to the
determination of the political landscape for the next ten years. The
impact of politics in the decennial census should therefore not be a
surprise; rather it should be expected and even planned for.

## 4.2 The Sampling Debate {#the-sampling-debate .unnumbered}

According to some of the interviewees, the 1990 census had been
portrayed (rightly or wrongly) as a failure, both in terms of cost and
the accuracy of the coverage. In the early part of the decade, the
Census Bureau announced a plan to use statistical sampling to address
the growing problem of "undercounting" some identifiable groups,
including certain minorities, children and renters. In an effort to
address growing concerns about the undercount in the census, Congress
passed the Decennial Census Improvement Act of 1991, which instructed
the Secretary to contract with the National Academy of Sciences (the
Academy) to study the "means by which the Government could achieve the
most accurate population count possible."[^22] Among the issues the
Academy was directed to consider were "the appropriateness of using
sampling methods, in combination with basic data-collection techniques
or otherwise, in the acquisition or refinement of population data."[^23]

The political landscape surrounding the Census Bureau in the mid to late
1990s was unusual because of conflicting views of the Democratic
Administration and the Republican-controlled House of Representatives
over the use of sampling. In 1995, the Republicans took control of the
House of Representatives (see Figure 2) while the Administration
remained in Democratic hands. The competing interests of these two
parties formed the basis for a number of legislative initiatives and
court challenges in the debate over the use of statistical sampling for
Census 2000.

![](media/image4.wmf)

In November of 1997, the U.S. Congress passed Public Law 105-119 stating
that the U.S. Constitution calls for an 'actual enumeration of the
population' and that the use of statistical sampling to determine the
population for congressional apportionment purposes could "risk an
inaccurate, invalid and unconstitutional census."[^24] The Census Bureau
(in cooperation with the direction from the DoC) then pursued a "dual
path" strategy for the Census 2000 Dress Rehearsal; i.e., to rehearse
both a traditional census approach and a sampling approach.

In early 1998, two sets of plaintiffs filed suits challenging the
legality and constitutionality of the census sampling plan. The courts
ruled that the sampling approach violated Title 13 of the U.S. Code and
granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment. On direct appeal,
the Supreme Court consolidated the cases for oral argument.[^25]

In January 1999, the Supreme Court decided that the sampling approach
was inconsistent with the direction to enumerate in Title 13 of the U.S.
Code. With 15 months until April 1, 2000, or "Census Day," the Census
Bureau had to develop and implement a full-scale plan to take the census
via the traditional enumeration approach.

## 4.3 All Levels of Decennial Census Staff Felt the Impact of the External Oversight {#all-levels-of-decennial-census-staff-felt-the-impact-of-the-external-oversight .unnumbered}

From the interviews with Census Bureau staff it was clear that they
understood the importance of politics and the role it plays in
influencing the conduct of the decennial census. Of the 52 interviews
conducted, 41 people commented on the political oversight with 116
individual comments (N=41, C=116). Some of those who had participated in
three or more censuses said that they had experienced an increasing
politicization of the decennial census in recent decades. The role that
politics played was made even more visible with the sampling debate.
There were a relatively high volume of comments on the sampling issue
and the role of Congress (n=19) and the Administration (n=5). These are
important findings because they demonstrate the degree to which
oversight requirements penetrated into the organization and the
potential influence of politics on executives and managers of Census
2000 in their management approach.

It was clear that the interviewees understood the relationship between
political agendas and the suggested approach to conducting a decennial
census. The impact of this political stalemate on the management of the
decennial census was threefold:

### **4.3.1 The political involvement intensified as partisan friction increased**  {#the-political-involvement-intensified-as-partisan-friction-increased .unnumbered}

The impact of politics on the management of Census 2000 was clear. Early
in the decade, the Census Bureau received instruction from the
Administration (via the Department of Commerce) to prepare a new
sampling approach rather than the traditional enumeration approach.
Eighteen individuals perceived that poor relationships with the
Department of Commerce impacted the amount of oversight activity and
inquiries regarding the census (n=18). By mid-decade, congressional
appropriators made it known that they were opposed to the sampling
approach. Six individuals perceived that Congress held back funds
mid-decade because the Members preferred the traditional enumeration
approach to the sampling approach (n=6).

![](media/image6.wmf)Obtaining funding for important planning activities
was problematical during this period. The opposition from Congress took
place at a crucial time in the program lifecycle. It is important to
remember that the entire federal government was following an initiative
to downsize in the early to mid 1990s. During this time, the Census
Bureau was to complete full program planning and two rounds of testing,
and should have been developing plans for the Census 2000 Dress
Rehearsal. There was the perception among interviewees that there was
little funding mid-decade (n=17), that appropriators held funding back
at crucial times in the program (n=6), and that they released funds
later when the Census Bureau agreed to a dual track planning approach
for FY98 (n=10). There is no direct evidence for this, although a
comparison of the funding profiles does indicate a relative lack of
funding during the sampling planning as opposed to later in the decade
when a dual track program was pursued (see Tables 1 and 2 in the Funding
section.)

###  {#section-2 .unnumbered}

###  {#section-3 .unnumbered}

### **4.3.2 The political environment impacted internal operations** {#the-political-environment-impacted-internal-operations .unnumbered}

Many staff perceived that the oversight activity and changes in strategy
from Congress were overwhelming from the start of the decade. Later in
the decade, the Department of Commerce, the Census Monitoring Board, the
General Accounting Office, the Inspector General, and other advisory or
state and local interest groups all began to take their own interest in
oversight. Staff members perceived that the oversight activities of the
Monitoring Board, the Department of Commerce, the General Accounting
Office and the Inspector General (n=22) were intrusive. Broadly, it was
felt that the oversight groups were more critical as opposed to helpful
in nature. The decennial census participants also perceived that they
were impaired by the draw on resources necessary to respond to the
volume of oversight requests, particularly toward the end of the decade
(n=19).

The political oversight also reduced the level of autonomy the decennial
census participants had to plan, mobilize, and execute Census 2000.
Because staff resources were already stretched thin, little attention or
effort could be afforded to contingency planning, exposing Census 2000
to potentially severe risks, with little action taken to mitigate them.
The decennial census planning was based solely on the sampling approach
until FY98 when the dual track planning approach began.

By that point, management was left in the awkward position of not having
enough funding to prepare one quality plan, let alone two. Though the
decision to plan for a dual path was made in 1997, the approach for
Census 2000 was not formally determined until the Supreme Court ruled in
January of 1999, with 15 months left until Census Day.[^26]

### **4.3.3 Toward the end of the decade, the Census Bureau Executive Staff managed the external environment well** {#toward-the-end-of-the-decade-the-census-bureau-executive-staff-managed-the-external-environment-well .unnumbered}

Director Ken Prewitt and Deputy Director Bill Barron assumed their
leadership positions in the late 1990s, and played roles that were
instrumental in improving relationships with external stakeholders. Both
were viewed as being extremely good at dealing with their
constituencies, specifically the Department of Commerce, Congress and
other oversight groups. (n=9). The Director was cited as having had a
management style that invited people in to the Census 2000 process. This
was seen as important, because the Census Bureau had previously come
across as distant, which may have negatively affected the relationships
with stakeholders. Both Prewitt and Barron focused on communicating with
external oversight groups, while their management team dealt with
operational issues to ensure that the oversight requests did not impair
the progress of Census 2000 operations.

For the 2010 Census, however, it will be imperative that the Census
Bureau be forward thinking from the start by proactively communicating
with all of its constituents, rather than by responding reactively to
requests for information and involvement in the decennial process.
Although progress was made in this area under the Prewitt/Barron regime,
the Census Bureau was not organized to do this earlier in the
decade.[^27]

# FUNDING

The decennial census requires a tremendous national effort to plan,
design, mobilize, and execute. Census 2000 required a workforce of over
900,000 employees at its peak and cost nearly \$6.375 billion. It is
clear from the interviews that both the level and strategic targeting of
funding were essential to the completion of Census 2000. Thirty-seven of
the interviewees made a total of 76 comments with respect to funding and
its impact on Census 2000 (N=37, C=76.) The timing of the acquisition of
funds, where these funds were applied, and the total value of funding
all played an important part in the management approach to Census 2000.

## 5.1 Generous Funding or High Cost? {#generous-funding-or-high-cost .unnumbered}

Most interviewees commenting on the level of funding took one of two
positions. These viewpoints correlated to the interviewees' general
perspective on the successes (or failings) of Census 2000:

The first viewpoint was that Census 2000 was generally underfunded until
the decision was made regarding sampling (n=8, c=9). In fact, Census
2000 was the costliest decennial census ever in terms of the absolute
cost and the relative measure of cost per capita. The primary reasons
for the generous funding levels late in the decade were the need to
change the design of the census from sampling to traditional census
taking methods and the need to mitigate the risk of program failure. It
was perceived that by the end of the decade, whatever was asked for was
generally given and that Census 2000 had enough money for what was
needed.

The second viewpoint was that the decennial census was well funded
during Census 2000 operational years, particularly the new initiatives
like front-loading the recruitment of field resources, securing higher
than minimum wages for enumerators, and the support for paid advertising
and outsourcing.

In addition to the qualitative data from the interviews, the contractor
collected funding data from the 1990 Census, Census 2000,[^28] and from
other countries. Figure 5 shows the funding per person for the U.S. and
three countries and the cost of the national census as a percentage of
Gross Domestic Product (GDP). The contractor used these broad measures
to give an indication of the comparative order of magnitude of these
funding measures between countries.

![](media/image7.wmf){width="4.375in" height="2.7777777777777777in"}

![](media/image8.wmf){width="4.375in" height="2.7291666666666665in"}

Clearly, each country adopts a different approach to conducting their
national censuses and the underlying characteristics and attributes of
that country's demographics are different. It is important to recognize
that Australia and Canada have five-year census cycles and the U.S. and
the United Kingdom (U.K.) follow a ten-year cycle. Census 2000 had an
improved response rate as compared to previous censuses and there are
costs associated with improving data quality. Comparing the 1990 U.S.
per capita spending with the figures from 2000, however, the contractor
identified a significant difference between the costs of the two U.S.
censuses. The per capita cost went from \$10.52 in 1990 to \$22.35 in
2000, a 112 percent increase.[^29] In comparing the per housing unit (or
dwelling) costs among countries, it is also evident that the relative
funding, \$54.34 per housing unit was significantly higher for the
U.S.[^30] The data appear to support the views and opinions of the
interviewees that Census 2000 was both comparatively well funded in the
operational years and expensive.[^31]

## 5.2 The Program Funding Lifecycle {#the-program-funding-lifecycle .unnumbered}

As the contractor began to develop the analytical framework to examine
funding it was important to establish two working principles. The first
was that the completion of a decennial census followed the typical
program lifecycle stages. A program may be defined as a portfolio of
projects that are managed in a coordinated way to deliver planned
outcomes, events, and products. The program lifecycle typically includes
the following stages:

*Strategic analysis and program definition,* including understanding the
need for the program, and developing the high-level scope of the effort;

*Organizational Structuring and Management Approach,* by clearly
aligning delegations of authority with areas of responsibility, by
creating reporting and accountability mechanisms tied to consequences,
and by securing adequate staff and other resources that provide the
capacity to get the design and planning work done;

*Design and planning,* including developing the conceptual framework and
plans, and building more detailed project plans and work breakdown
structures;

*Mobilization,* through the acquisition and deployment of program
resources to complete the program;

*Implementation,* delivering the program through to completion; and

*Evaluation,* to understand the benefits and lessons learned from the
program.

The second working principle was that the funding requirements should
match the cost profile of the program lifecycle. In the analysis the
contractor drew on comparative data from other countries to understand
potential shortfalls or excesses in funding.

[]{#__RefHeading___Toc55114631 .anchor}Table 1[^32]: Annual Census
Funding Percentages by Country

+-----+-------------+--------------+-----------------+---------------+
| Y   | US 2000     | UK 1991      | Australia 2001  | Canada 2001   |
| ear |             |              |                 |               |
|     | 10 Year     | 10 Year      | 5 Year          | 5 Year        |
+-----+-------------+--------------+-----------------+---------------+
| t-4 | 0.9%        | 1.2%         | 1.9%            |               |
+-----+-------------+--------------+-----------------+---------------+
| t-3 | 1.5%        | 2.6%         | 5.2%            | 8.8%          |
+-----+-------------+--------------+-----------------+---------------+
| t-2 | 6.7%        | 8.0%         | 8.0%            | 7.6%          |
+-----+-------------+--------------+-----------------+---------------+
| t-1 | 18.9%       | 23.9%        | 23.6%           | 28.0%         |
+-----+-------------+--------------+-----------------+---------------+
| t   | 71.9%       | 64.2%        | 61.3%           | 55.5%         |
+-----+-------------+--------------+-----------------+---------------+

Table 1 shows the percentage of funds spent annually during the five
years leading up to and including census year for the United States, the
United Kingdom, Australia, and Canada. Given that all censuses must
deliver census results by a designated date and assuming a time t =
Census Day, the contractor compared the cumulative funding percentages
for the years from t-4 to t for all of the censuses.

[]{#__RefHeading___Toc55114632 .anchor}Table 2[^33]: Cumulative Census
Funding Percentages by Country

+----+-------+-------+-----+---------+---------+-----------+--------+
| Ye | US    | UK    | UK  | Au      | Au      | Canada    | Canada |
| ar | 2000  | 1991  | %   | stralia | stralia | 2001      | (%     |
|    |       |       | o   | 2001    | (% over |           | over   |
|    | 10    | 10    | ver |         | US)     | 5 Year    | US)    |
|    | Year  | Year  | US  | 5 Year  |         |           |        |
+----+-------+-------+-----+---------+---------+-----------+--------+
| t  | 0.9%  | 1.2%  | 33% | 1.9%    | 111%    |           |        |
| -4 |       |       |     |         |         |           |        |
+----+-------+-------+-----+---------+---------+-----------+--------+
| t  | 2.4%  | 3.9%  | 63% | 7.1%    | 196%    | 8.8%      | 267%   |
| -3 |       |       |     |         |         |           |        |
+----+-------+-------+-----+---------+---------+-----------+--------+
| t  | 9.2%  | 11.8% | 28% | 15.1%   | 64%     | 16.4%     | 78%    |
| -2 |       |       |     |         |         |           |        |
+----+-------+-------+-----+---------+---------+-----------+--------+
| t  | 28.1% | 35.8% | 27% | 38.7%   | 38%     | 44.5%     | 58%    |
| -1 |       |       |     |         |         |           |        |
+----+-------+-------+-----+---------+---------+-----------+--------+
| t  | 1     | 1     |     | 100.0%  |         | 100.0%    |        |
|    | 00.0% | 00.0% |     |         |         |           |        |
+----+-------+-------+-----+---------+---------+-----------+--------+

Comparing the accumulation of funding, the contractor identified a
correlation between funding levels earlier in the census cycle and the
amount spent during census year. The data in Table 2 show that the other
countries spent comparatively more of their total budget earlier in the
cycle than did the United States. Starting in year t-4, the UK had spent
over thirty percent more than the U.S., while Australia spent over one
hundred percent more. At year t-3, the United Kingdom, Australia, and
Canada had all spent between sixty and 270 percent more than the United
States. By t-2, the UK, Australia, and Canada spent from twenty-five to
seventy percent more than the U.S. At year t-1 they spent approximately
twenty-five to eighty percent more than the United States. In contrast,
during census year, the United States spent seventy percent of the
funding, twelve to thirty percent more than the United Kingdom,
Australia, or Canada. This information, from a limited but comparable
sample, points to a direct correlation; the higher the percentage of
total funding spent in the years t-4 to t-1, the less percentage of
funding spent during census year.

The benchmarking interviews revealed that funding for the U.K., Canada,
and Australia was not a prominent management issue, as it was in the
United States. The U.S. staff perceived that funding was a significant
issue and indicated that the lack of adequate funding had an impact on
operations.

## 5.3 External and Internal Controls Over Funding {#external-and-internal-controls-over-funding .unnumbered}

Funding was used as a lever both externally and internally. From an
external standpoint, funding was used as a means to influence the extent
by which the Census Bureau could adopt sampling and also the extent to
which the Census Bureau would be successful during enumeration. It is
important to note that although some research and development (R&D)
efforts were funded very early in the decade, R&D does not replace the
need for census planning, which the interviewees perceived to be
underfunded during the middle of the decade. From an internal
standpoint, the Census Bureau itself exerted control over the targeting
and allocation of funding to influence how things got done.

# STAFFING

Fifty of the fifty-two interviewees commented on challenges with
headquarters staffing during Census 2000 (N=50). In the course of this
evaluation, the contracted project team identified the following
concerns regarding decennial headquarters staffing: 1) delays in funding
resulted in inadequate numbers of skilled and experienced resources and
a critical erosion of the knowledge base, and 2) recruitment and
retention challenges exacerbated the problem. One interviewee commented
that he considered the decennial human resources situation to be
extremely "fragile."

## 6.1 Inadequate Levels of Staffing and Experience Eroded the Knowledge Base {#inadequate-levels-of-staffing-and-experience-eroded-the-knowledge-base .unnumbered}

During Census 2000 many managers commented that they did not have the
right number of people needed to successfully complete tasks and that
resources were stretched too thin (n=25). Of the people who commented on
staffing, 15 felt strongly about the need to have people in place early
in the decade (n=15). Some people mentioned the importance of
maintaining a core decennial staff within the Decennial Directorate
throughout the decade (n=8), while others felt that a core
infrastructure should be in place by 2003 (n=10).

Thirty-six commented that the personnel working on the decennial census
lacked prior decennial experience (n=36) and thirteen mentioned that the
Executive Staff as a whole had little previous decennial experience
(n=13). Sixteen remarked that many people lacked the proper skill set
and experience to perform the duties associated with their position
(n=16).

## 6.2 Recruitment and Retention Contributed to the Problem {#recruitment-and-retention-contributed-to-the-problem .unnumbered}

Late in the decade, the Census Bureau finally had the funding resources
to staff the Decennial Census Directorate. When the leadership was ready
to staff the directorate, they tried to hire people from divisions
outside the decennial organization through transfers and temporary
promotions. Many people who had worked on previous decennial censuses
did not want to return for Census 2000.[^34] As such, many of those
hired into the DMD from the divisions were inexperienced with the
decennial census. In order to fill the remaining positions, divisions
within the decennial organization hired new employees from outside the
Census Bureau. Although it was difficult to attract people in a strong
economy and competitive job market, a job fair held in March 1999
attracted many applicants for the open positions (n=4).

Many of the personnel within the Decennial Census Directorate hired
towards the end of the decade were "term employees" [^35]\--new hires to
the Census Bureau and recent college graduates. Although use of term
employees satisfied the demand for staff resources, interviewees
perceived that many of the staff that were hired lacked the confidence
and experience to understand the complexities and to handle the sheer
magnitude of Census 2000 operations. The interviewees also perceived
that the Census Bureau staff members who transferred to the decennial
census did not have the knowledge and experience to manage the census,
particularly operational field knowledge (n=20); and with the hiring
surge late in the decade, not much time remained to adequately train and
develop the transferred and new staff members (n=5). This lack of
decennial experience placed additional stress on an already taxed
personnel system. The Decennial Census Directorate and the participating
divisions had to spend extra time educating inexperienced employees on
census processes. By 1997, the knowledge base had been so eroded that
the Census Bureau had to recruit individuals from retirement with
special incentive packages.[^36]

In order to maintain an adequate number of staff in the future, the
Decennial Census Directorate should bring personnel resources into the
organization early in the decade and maintain a base level of core
decennial area staff at all times. A core team should work together
during tests and the dress rehearsal leading up to the census to create
a continuity of working relationships and knowledge throughout the
process. Developing teams early in the decade would enable people to
build trust and teamwork. The 1990 Census had been managed by a core
decennial area staff that had worked together through the last half of
the decade. People were in place between 1984 and 1989, in time for the
tests and dress rehearsal (1988). Junior staff had the opportunity to
learn and develop. Having the people in place created team spirit and
continuity within the decennial organization (n=2).

Based on the contractor's benchmarking research with comparable census
organizations around the world, a successful census has adequate
staffing early in the decade. Other census organizations achieved this
with a more even flow of funding in pre-census years. Teams should be
formed earlier in the decade to ensure that they build trust and a
strong teamwork environment enabling them to function smoothly through a
challenging census.

# executive LEADERSHIP 

This section presents the comments related to the executive leadership
(Executive Staff) as was pertinent to the conduct of Census 2000.
Although not originally included in the Steering Committee's original
areas of evaluation, it became clear as the interviews progressed that
the changes to both the Executive Staff and decennial census leadership
throughout the decade had a significant impact on the management of
Census 2000.

## 7.1 Census Bureau and Decennial Leadership Changed Often Throughout the Decade  {#census-bureau-and-decennial-leadership-changed-often-throughout-the-decade .unnumbered}

Of the fifty-two individuals who were interviewed, forty-four commented
on certain aspects of leadership with 169 total comments (N=44, C=169).
Many interviewees commented that the Executive Staff leadership
positions had changed many times throughout the decade [^37](n=18) (see
Figure 6). They also perceived that each new leader brought his or her
own set of priorities (n=9) and that the overall strategic direction of
decennial census operations was unclear and changing throughout the
decade (n=21). Of those twenty-one, eleven perceived inconsistencies in
the messages from the leadership (n=11) and seven felt that the
leadership had too many priorities preventing some of the most critical
activities from being performed (n=7). Seven interviewees perceived that
there were too many new things being attempted and that the Census
Bureau should focus on a few critical areas (n=7), while six perceived
that the leadership did not know what to fix or what strategy to use
(n=6).

Some interviewees commented on the general lack of cohesion among the
Executive Staff. Individuals perceived that the Executive Staff did not
share a common vision or common leadership goals (n=9). Interestingly,
when asked whether the decennial census is a core product of the Census
Bureau, five interviewees indicated that it is a core product, while
eight indicated that the decennial census is a secondary product to
other economic censuses and surveys conducted throughout the decade.

Five people commented that the Ken Prewitt/Bill Barron team and the John
Thompson/Jay Waite team later in the decade were strong management teams
(n=5). Four people said that strong leadership is needed throughout the
decade and that the management team was brought on too late to be truly
effective (n=4).

In sum, interviewees perceived that each new leadership change, both at
the Director and the Decennial Census Directorate levels, accompanied a
change in internal strategy or approach. These changes in priority,
coupled with the greater strategic battle over sampling versus
traditional enumeration, caused the leadership's messages to be
perceived as inconsistent and unfocused. Later in the decade, however,
the management team under Director Ken Prewitt was perceived to have
been much more focused and effective.

## 7.2 Cultures Reflected Divisional Priorities {#cultures-reflected-divisional-priorities .unnumbered}

An organization's culture should be defined by the vision, priorities
and values promoted by its executive leadership. With each change in the
Executive Staff, the interviewees indicated that they perceived a change
of vision and priorities for the decennial census. Without clear and
consistent communication from the Executive Staff regarding the vision
and the values, it was difficult for one distinct decennial culture to
materialize and mature. As a result, the "culture" of the decennial
organization appeared to the interviewees to be fragmented and
inconsistent, reflecting the different cultures of the participating
divisions. Because the executive leadership had not promoted a
consistent message around which the decennial organization could rally,
individual sub-cultures (e.g., operations, management, statistical,
technology-based, etc.) based on divisional visions, priorities and
values governed.

# ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE AND MANAGEMENT APPROACH

Good organizational design theory is based on the premise that an
organization should be structured to achieve desired results and that
some structures are more conducive to achieving certain results than
others. Most organizations have at least two types of activities that
must be managed. First, an organization will have an idea generation or
consensus building activity in order to keep up with current trends and
to share knowledge. This is most effectively handled with a team-based
structure. Second, an organization will have production, final
decision-making or arbitration requirements; these are most effectively
satisfied with a streamlined chain of command structure. The challenge
to most chief executives is to mix and match these structures and
approaches within a single entity in order to achieve their desired
results.[^38]

## 8.1 High Level Census Organization {#high-level-census-organization .unnumbered}

The Census Bureau's primary activity is to produce demographic
statistics and economic indicators (as opposed to strictly developing
policy or coordinating the operations of other agencies, as do many
other federal organizations.) Since the Census Bureau is itself a
production organization, it is common business practice that its overall
structure be primarily top-down and hierarchical.[^39] The Census
Bureau, however, must also be innovative and flexible because it must
respond to pressure to improve the quality of the census data, to
incorporate the use of the latest practical technology, and to reduce
costs. Consequently, the Census Bureau must have pockets of idea
generating teams nestled within its primarily top down structure. The
challenge for Census Bureau executives is to apply these structures and
approaches as appropriate in order to create a well-run and efficient
production operation, while maintaining the flexibility to accommodate
requirements that change from one decennial census to the next.

The primary objectives of the Census Bureau leadership, the Decennial
Census Directorate and the other participating divisions, are to plan,
execute, report on the results of, and evaluate the decennial census.
The Census Bureau has a solid organizational structure that is well
thought out, consistent and supportive of its primary business goals and
objectives. It is structured in components according to its program
areas (decennial census, economic surveys, etc.) and functional support
business processes (field operations, human resources, finance), rather
than exclusively by function as is common in many other federal
agencies. Structuring according to programs and support processes is
more conducive to achieving results because the focus is more on
improving the end product rather than on protecting internal processes,
boundaries, turf, and existing resources.[^40] Because the Census Bureau
is a nationwide organization with a need for some sort of division of
labor, there will always be some tensions among various components of
the organizational structure. The objective is to minimize the
competition (where appropriate) inherent among the divisional interests.

## 8.2 Managing Across Directorates {#managing-across-directorates .unnumbered}

According to Department of Commerce and Census Bureau documentation, the
delegations of

authority to conduct the decennial census run from the Office of the
Census Bureau Director to the Associate Director (AD) for the Decennial
Census, through the Principal Associate Director (PAD) for Programs. The
Associate Director for the Decennial Census is directly accountable to
the PAD for Programs and to the Census Bureau Director for the success
of the decennial census program. The Associate Director acts as the
Chief Executive Officer for the conduct of the census and, during census
years, is assisted by the Assistant to the Associate Director (AAD), who
acts as the Chief Operating Officer. The Associate Director must
coordinate with his or her peers within the Programs Directorate\--the
Associate Directors for Methodologies & Standards and Demographics---in
planning and coordinating the decennial census. The AD for Decennial
Census must also plan, coordinate and implement the census in
cooperation with the Associate Director for Field who is outside the
Programs Directorate. The Field Division is the only operational unit
supporting the decennial census that reports through a different chain
of command to the Census Bureau Director. This poses management
challenges for the leaders of the decennial census in getting full
coordination on planning and implementation.

![](media/image9.wmf){width="5.995138888888889in"
height="3.1319444444444446in"}

At the highest levels of the organization, the Census Bureau's Field
Division has a separate reporting chain from the DMD and the rest of the
Decennial Census Directorate. Although organizational restructuring
recommendations are outside the scope of this evaluation, eleven
individuals commented on the separation of the planning and resource
management group from the field operations group in the organizational
structure (n=11).

The Executive Staff members that were interviewed overwhelmingly
supported maintaining the existing structure, keeping the
decennial-related Field staff under the PAD for Administration. They
felt that it mitigates the risk to the knowledge base and staffing of
field operations because the Field Division supports other surveys and
censuses during non-decennial years. At the division and operational
level,[^41] however, there was support for moving decennial-related
field operations back under the PAD for Programs because the current
structure presented management challenges in planning, communication and
coordination.

## 8.3 Internal Management Structures and Approaches {#internal-management-structures-and-approaches .unnumbered}

The requirements that the Census Bureau be flexible and innovative from
decennial census to decennial census, and the push to move to teams
throughout the agency, were behind the Decennial Census Directorate's
move away from a strong, centrally managed approach used in previous
censuses to the "matrix" management attempted during the early to
mid-1990s. At the end of the decade, the Decennial Census Directorate
returned to an approach where the Decennial Management Division played a
greater role in coordinating and integrating the conduct of the census.

### **8.3.1 Strengths & Weaknesses: Matrix Management/PSC & MIT Approach** {#strengths-weaknesses-matrix-managementpsc-mit-approach .unnumbered}

From the interviews the contractor found that, during the early to
mid-decade years under the matrix management approach, there were
consensus building and idea-generating teams in place. The intent behind
implementing a matrix approach was to decentralize decision-making to
the divisional stakeholders and to promote a sense of ownership for the
implementation plans. With little funding for the DMD in the early to
mid 1990s, the AD for Decennial Census at the time determined that the
planning, integration, and co-ordination of the census could be handled
successfully by the division participants. They would work on teams as
members of 25 Program Steering Committees (PSCs), each with an assigned
program area. The PSCs were comprised of Assistant Division Chiefs and
the groups were to come to agreement on specific program issues,
facilitated by a PSC lead. The PSCs would then report out to the
Management Integration Team (MIT), an assembly of the Division Chiefs
involved with census planning.[^42]

Of the fifty-two individuals interviewed, 50 interviewees made a total
of 450 comments on the management approach of the Census Bureau as
pertains to the conduct of the decennial census (N=50, C=450).[^43]

Thirty-eight of the interviewees discussed the weaknesses of the matrix
approach with 116 total comments (N=38). Most of the interviewees
commented that the matrix approach did not provide a mechanism for
overall program coordination and integration across and among
participating divisions (N=16).

The MIT was to serve as the strategic planning team that would integrate
and coordinate the high-level census plan. The interviewees, however,
said that there was little strategic integration of PSC efforts by the
MIT. They also indicated that there was not enough oversight from the
MIT to avoid duplication of effort and to ensure seamless coverage
(n=20). Many of the interviewees did not know about the MIT, some had
heard of the team but had not attended, and others felt that their
position on the MIT was not consistent with their knowledge, skill set
or experience. Moreover, the skill set of the MIT member did not
necessarily match up with the program area of the PSC.

Originally, the PSCs were to develop their own charters for their
program areas. Almost all of those involved with the PSCs commented that
there was a lack of clarity in the roles and responsibilities of the PSC
teams, that there were few clear lines of accountability and that it was
often unclear as to who was in charge (n=17). Many expressed concern
that there were just too many PSCs in play and that they took up too
much time.

Interviewees also said that there was difficulty on the PSCs in reaching
decisions and making progress (n=20). Some individuals commented that
there was a lack of subject knowledge from the people on the PSCs (n=5)
and that the people on the teams needed to have the appropriate
expertise. Others felt that there was too much of a focus on detail,
which all too often diverted attention from the more pressing strategic
decisions under consideration at the time. One theme that surfaced
consistently was that the PSCs often did not know who to interact with
from the other PSCs. Consequently, there was little communication across
PSCs on issues of overall coverage and interoperability of census
program plans.

Lastly, several individuals indicated that the matrix approach was a
disaster and put the decennial census at risk because it remained in
place long after management recognized that it did not work (n=12).

In evaluating the matrix management approach, the contractor determined
that during the early to mid-decade years the main activity within the
Decennial Census Directorate should have been policy development,
planning and resource management. A teaming, or matrix, structure is the
appropriate overall approach to take during this planning phase because
the Decennial participants are involved in developing, coordinating,
integrating, testing, and evaluating plans.[^44] A matrix management
approach, however, only works if there is a matrix management
organizational infrastructure in place to support it. A Census Bureau
matrix, for example, should have an x-axis (divisions) and y-axis
(census programs). This would provide the organizational infrastructure
from which to draw participants onto teams for activities conducive to
decennial planning and resource management. The problem with the
approach taken during the mid-90s was that, because of a strategic
decision made by the AD for Decennial Census at the time, there was no
DMD program management component on the y-axis to counterbalance and
coordinate the activities of the participating divisions on the x-axis.
In effect, there was no matrix to manage.

Moreover, without effective decision-making mechanisms in place, the PSC
structures were not adequately equipped for final decision-making and
arbitration activities. The result was that the PSC meetings lingered in
discussion phase with little reportable progress. The PSCs needed a
hierarchical decision-making mechanism, headed by single individuals
accountable for program areas, decision-making, and reporting through a
chain, to make decisions or recommendations or to arbitrate disputes
among interested parties.

Because of a lack of DMD resources and staffing, the mid-90s PSC/MIT
approach lacked an effective counterbalance to divisional interests as
well as a final decision-making and arbitration mechanism on the PSCs by
which to make decisions and finalize plans.

### **8.3.2 Strengths & Weaknesses: Strong Centralized Management, Strong DMD** {#strengths-weaknesses-strong-centralized-management-strong-dmd .unnumbered}

The alternative to the matrix approach has been called the "centralized"
management approach. The centralized approach, which was employed after
1997, consisted of a more adequately staffed DMD serving as coordinators
and integrators of decennial census program areas with the cooperation
of the participating divisions. Decisions were made primarily via
mechanisms within the Decennial Census Directorate and the funding was
controlled by the AD for Decennial Census. The centralized approach is,
in fact, the approach that best represents true matrix management
because it features a more robust DMD on the y-axis counterbalancing and
coordinating the interests of the participating divisions on the x-axis.
It is represented in Figure 9 below. The next section discusses how
effective this approach was for Census 2000.

Seventeen interviewees (N=17) said that there should be a strong
centrally managed approach in order to properly coordinate participants
and to integrate the planning and execution of the decennial census.
There was strong support (n=23) for the DMD to take on the integration
and coordination role. Of the twenty-three who commented, sixteen
individuals (n=16) said that the centralized DMD approach worked better
than the matrix approach, while ten (n=10) stated that the centralized
DMD approach is the only one that could achieve program coordination and
integration objectives.

Many of those interviewed, however, indicated that when the DMD was
staffed and resourced in the late 90s, the DMD staff roles were not
clear (n=13) and that the changes late in the decade to the management
approach were confusing (n=10). Others indicated, as a general rule,
that the roles and responsibilities for all those involved in the
decennial organization were not clear (n=12). There was also general
confusion as to whether the DMD staff members were to serve as true
program managers with decision-making authority, as program coordinators
facilitating decennial activity, or as liaisons/conduits of monitoring
information between the participating divisions and the decennial census
leadership. As the census years approached, it became apparent that most
DMD staff members functioned as facilitators and liaisons monitoring the
program. Most decision-making tended to occur at higher levels.

Lastly, there was strong support among the interviewees that the DMD
maintain a base staff with a prominent (decision-making) role during
years leading up to implementation (n=38), that the DMD be ramped up,
and that their roles be well established earlier in the decade (n=8).

The centralized management approach succeeds primarily because the
adequately staffed DMD and Decennial Census Directorate provide a single
component for coordination, integration, and knowledge of planning, and
a balance to the divisions. With the exception of Field division
requirements issues, the AD for Decennial Census and AAD also served as
the decision-makers and the arbiters of competing divisional interests
and issues, which was lacking in the PSC/MIT approach.

### **8.3.3 Using Different Management Approaches for Different Purposes During the Course of the Decade**  {#using-different-management-approaches-for-different-purposes-during-the-course-of-the-decade .unnumbered}

By the time the decennial census operational years approached, the
strategies, management approaches and staffing situations had changed
dramatically and were still in a state of flux. As a result, tangible
plans for conducting a traditional census, tailored to the needs of
Census 2000, had not yet been fully developed. This created confusion
regarding delegations of authority, roles and responsibilities, and
decision-making processes.

In the two years leading up to the decennial census, the Decennial
Census Directorate and the participating divisions had to develop plans
and deliver services simultaneously. The ideal management approaches for
developing plans and for delivering services, however, are very
different. Plan development is supported predominantly by a team-based
approach, which is by definition more collaborative in nature. Service
delivery and production processes, being more controlled and repetitive,
are best served by a more hierarchical approach which is less
collaborative.[^45]

What happened at the Census Bureau in the late 1990s was none other than
an attempt to do the planning effort and the service delivery
simultaneously without appropriately adjusting and communicating that
each required a different management approach. With the rush of activity
surrounding the census, it became unclear under which management
approach participants were operating and for what purposes. Planning and
implementation activities were occurring in the same meetings. Some
decisions were being made unilaterally within the hierarchy while others
were given consideration by all the participants. On the one hand, there
was consensus building and consideration. On the other hand, decisions
were often dictated from the decennial leadership. The result was some
confusion, misunderstanding and often resentment when decisions were
being made unilaterally.

A recognition of the use of different management approaches and
structures to achieve different results will go a long way toward
alleviating some of the confusion that accompanied Census 2000. If
staffing and resource issues are managed over the decade, and risks are
mitigated via contingency planning, then the census leaders should be
able to plan more effectively with a more collaborative approach and
supporting structure during the middle of the decade, and then switch to
a more exclusive service delivery approach and supporting structure
during census years.

The text that follows discusses how the Census Bureau could evolve from
a planning approach in the early years of the decade to a delivery
approach later in the decade.

For the purposes of this illustration, the census cycle has been
separated into three stages: planning, data collection and capture, and
data processing. The first is the planning stage, during which plans are
developed for the entire decennial census operation. In this stage, new
ideas are brought forward and buy-in is obtained among the participating
divisions through consensus building. As such, the management approach
should be predominantly team-based. At the same time, however, it is
important that there be a decision-making or recommendation mechanism
nestled into the team-based approach in order to move forward and make
continuing progress on day to day tasks and activities. The management
approach for this stage should reflect a combination of the two
management mechanisms.

The second stage is data collection and capture, which is comprised of
the wide range of tasks that take place to collect and capture the
census data. By the time the Census Bureau moves into the data
collection and capture stage, most of the planning should be completed.
Data collection and capture tasks, therefore, should involve the general
repetition of previously defined activities according to the overall
guidance of the approved plan. Since there is little need for idea
generation or consensus building at this stage, repetitive activities
are generally more efficient under a chain of command approach. The
chain of command should flow from the Director through the PAD for
Programs (in coordination with the PAD for Administration) and the
Associate Director for Decennial Census (in coordination with the
Associate Director for Field) out to the field. There is also, however,
a requirement for a free flow of information and open communications
with the other participating divisions, and continuous monitoring by the
Decennial Census Directorate. Some teaming must occur during the data
collection and capture phase, but these operational tasks generally do
not need review and consultation by all decennial participants.

The third stage is data processing, which like the data collection and
capture stage, consists of pre-determined tasks of processing the
previously collected data, and publishing the results. Again, since
there is little need for idea generation or consensus building at this
stage, the chain of command approach works best as plans are carried
out, within schedule and budget. Although there is a chain of command
structure flowing from the Director through the PAD for Programs to the
Associate Directors, it is very important to have a continuous flow of
information and open communications among other participating divisions,
and monitoring of progress by the Decennial Census Directorate. Again,
some teaming must occur during the data processing phase, but these
tasks generally do not need review and consultation by all decennial
participants.

# 9. DECISION-MAKING {#decision-making .unnumbered}

Decision-making, whether under the matrix or centrally managed approach,
provided challenges to managing the decennial census. Under the matrix
approach previously discussed, the lack of a functioning decision-making
mechanism resulted in an inability to reach decisions and to make
tangible progress. The centralized management approach, though better
designed than the matrix approach, was beset by its own set of
challenges. Decision-making was strongly controlled within the offices
of the AAD and AD for Decennial Census. It was tightly controlled as a
measure of mitigating the risks that accompanied the overwhelming volume
of inquiry from the political oversight organizations.[^46]

The centralized approach included a Census Operational Managers (COM)
forum, which was an interdivisional group for raising issues and
reaching consensus during the planning and implementation phase. The
approach also included a formal Issue Resolution and Change Control
(IR/CC) mechanism that was to arbitrate decisions within the DMD
structure pertaining to the settlement of divisional interests. Finally,
the approach included the Operational Status and Assessment Meetings
(OSAM), which were daily status report meetings for census managers
during the decennial operational years.

##  {#section-4 .unnumbered}

##  {#section-5 .unnumbered}

##  {#section-6 .unnumbered}

##  {#section-7 .unnumbered}

##  {#section-8 .unnumbered}

##  {#section-9 .unnumbered}

##  {#section-10 .unnumbered}

## 9.1 Decision-Making in the Centralized Management Approach {#decision-making-in-the-centralized-management-approach .unnumbered}

Of those interviewed, 35 commented on the decision-making processes
(N=35). This section covers interviewee comments about decision-making
groups from the centralized management approach (N=27, C=70). Many
commented on the irrelevance of the processes and said that decisions
floated up to senior management of the Decennial Census Directorate
(n=19). Fifteen indicated that the AD for the Decennial Census, assisted
by the AAD, made many of the decisions (n=15) and that there was little
empowerment for the lower levels to make decisions (n=6). Many felt that
decisions in general were not made in a timely manner (n=21), often
resulting in delays to the schedule. And when decisions were made, they
were often revisited, even if the resulting solution was working well
(n=9). Some commented that the decision-makers had not engaged the
appropriate divisions, particularly on funding issues (n=3), to hear how
a decision would impact a program (n=7).

The sections that follow discuss the forums for status reports and
decision-making that were proposed under the centralized management
approach. Many of the concerns raised in the comments above will be
addressed in the course of the discussions below.

### **9.1.1 Census Operational Managers (COM)** {#census-operational-managers-com .unnumbered}

In 1998, the *Roles and Responsibilities* document outlined a management
approach that included mechanisms for raising concerns, arbitrating
those concerns, handling appeals and managing change control for issues
that arose during the implementation of Census 2000 operations. The COM
was to be a forum through which issues could be initially raised and
considered. According to those interviewed, the COM became the first
step of the issue-resolution process and it facilitated communications
throughout the Census Bureau (n=8). Many interviewees, however,
considered the COM approach ineffective (N=16, C=21) with some managers
bypassing the entire process altogether (n=5). The process became
ineffective because decisions were made through ad hoc mediation and
approval processes, rather than through the formal process. This
challenge hampered the Data Capture System component. When issues were
initiated through the formal processes, little action occurred to
resolve them. The problem was perceived to be a lack of DMD staff to
implement the change management, rather than with the decision-making
process itself. In 1999, the COM meetings were discontinued completely
(n=7).[^47]

In studying the *Roles and Responsibilities* document it is clear that
the COM structure, from an organizational perspective, was inadequately
designed for resolving issues. Although the original document states
that the intent behind the creation of the COM was to push
decision-making to the lowest levels technically possible, there was no
mechanism in place to support that intent. The COM chair had no
decision-making authority and served exclusively as a facilitator of all
the other interests of the participating divisions. Only when all COM
participants agreed or were present at the meeting could any issue come
to conclusion.[^48]

The problem with this design is that committees are horribly inefficient
at making decisions. When all competing interests are required to be
satisfied before a conclusion can be reached, decisions become watered
down to what everyone on the committee can agree on. Because there are
often conflicts between what is best for a division versus what is
optimal for the census organization, the participants are generally put
into a position of conflict of interest. A true chair, endowed with
final decision-making or recommendation-making authority to the next
level, would have had the authority to arbitrate disputes and to
expedite progress on the important issues under consideration.

### **9.1.2 Issue Resolution/Change Control Process (IR/CC)**  {#issue-resolutionchange-control-process-ircc .unnumbered}

The *Roles and Responsibilities of Census 2000 Participants* document
also introduced the Issue Resolution/Change Control process (IR/CC),
which was proposed as a formal issue resolution mechanism to formally
arbitrate disputes and handle appeals (N=15, C=22). The IR/CC process
required that the DMD program managers write up a discussion of both
sides of the debate and hold a hearing of the issues. A decision was
made offline by the Decennial Associate Director or Assistant to the
Associate Director and was communicated via the "decision memo
series."[^49]

Interviewees claimed that the IR/CC did not work because the people with
the necessary knowledge often did not attend the meetings (n=8). Several
individuals commented that this process was too time-consuming (n=6)
and, particularly during census years, decisions needed to be made on a
more real-time basis. Communicating decisions via the electronically
distributed memos worked initially, but they became less useful later in
the process (n=6) when there was little time to read written
documentation.[^50]

The challenge to the IR/CC process was two-fold. First, it was too time
consuming during the census years because it was text based. The
text-based IR/CC decision series would function in a less time-pressured
environment, but did not function well during census operational years.
The IR/CC during census years requires a more real-time, streamlined
process---probably oral discussions---that are documented only after the
arguments have been put forth and decisions rendered. Decisions made
during decennial census operational years could be announced during
meetings or dispersed via voicemail in order to ensure that everyone's
attention has been drawn to the information.

Second, the Associate Director level leadership allowed decision-making
mechanisms to be by- passed, which often rendered the structured
processes irrelevant. For the DMD program managers to be held
accountable for integrating programs and for decision-making, the
program managers' authority must be fully aligned with an area of
responsibility and with appropriately aligned accountability in order to
complete implementation of the decennial census. By allowing dual chains
of command to the Decennial Census Directorate leadership, the
delegations of authority are voided and the leadership effectively
renders the DMD program managers and the structured decision-making
processes irrelevant. Dual chains also provide a perfect forum for
end-runs, when parties involved in a dispute do not agree with a
particular decision. This situation may explain why decisions were not
perceived to be final, and were revisited even if they appeared to have
solved the initial problem.

### **9.1.3 Operational Status and Assessment Meeting (OSAM)**[^51]  {#operational-status-and-assessment-meeting-osam .unnumbered}

The OSAM (N=16, C=27) was a one-hour daily status meeting that was
established in November 1999 as a way to monitor the day-to-day progress
of census execution. The DMD program managers would meet with
operational managers and staff every morning to get updates on the
progress of each of the programs consistent with the activities of the
Master Activities Schedule (MAS) and the Cost and Progress (C&P)
Reports.[^52] The DMD managers would each take five minutes to present
the status of their program's execution to the AD for Decennial Census,
the Assistant Director, participating division chiefs, DMD Assistant
Division Chiefs (ADCs) and program managers.

OSAM became a forum to identify implementation problems as they occurred
(n=10). Because the OSAM was primarily a status report meeting, it was
not pro-active in nature. Unfortunately, few strategic risk management
mechanisms were in place to identify potential challenges and problems
often went unreported (n=2). For OSAM meetings to have been more
effective, the DMD program managers and the decennial leadership should
have had decennial experience so that they could pro-actively identify
and address future risk areas before they got to be large problems.
Another concern was that the DMD staff members did not have the
background knowledge to effectively report on the programs; this was
sometimes embarrassing to the presenter and uncomfortable to the
attendees (n=2).

Including preparation and meeting time, OSAM was extremely
time-consuming (n=4). OSAM participants expressed the desire to listen
to status reports that were relevant to their areas (approximately
fifteen minutes of meeting time) and to use the rest of the time to be
back at their offices working on their programs. Some participants felt
that letting division chiefs present their own status reports would have
been more effective, more consensus-oriented, and would have reduced the
workload significantly.

## 9.2 Decision-Making in Large, Complex Organizations {#decision-making-in-large-complex-organizations .unnumbered}

The determination of decision-making approaches for large organizations
is important to its achieving tangible progress toward objectives. The
most important issues to consider are the sources of authority and the
criteria for each level of decision-making.

There are several sources of authority within an organization, some
formal and informal. Formal sources include delegations of authority as
outlined in legislation, department directives, or those formally
negotiated at lower levels of the agency. Relative grade level and
Senior Executive Service (SES) status among employees can also serve as
formal sources for determining who will have final authority within
federal agencies. There are also, however, sources of informal authority
including "referential" leadership (based on an individual's ability to
assume responsibility and get things done) and subject matter experts
(based on an individual's knowledge or skills).

When formal mechanisms for decision-making are unclear, ill-informed, or
not clearly communicated, the informal leaders often emerge to heavily
influence decision-making. If, for example, the formal decision-makers
are not knowledgeable in a certain subject area, then the informal
subject matter experts tend to assume an inordinate, and unauthorized,
amount of influence in decision-making. The experts or referent leaders
may not have the same interests as the formal decision-maker and, as
such, they may exert influence such that a different decision will be
made. This would be inconsistent with the intent with which the formal
mechanisms were created.

Applying the model above to Census 2000, the formal authority as of 1998
resided with the decennial program managers. The informal authority of
referential leadership and knowledge, on the other hand, resided with
the subject matter experts participating throughout the decennial
organization. The interviewees commented on their perception of the lack
of experience of the decennial program managers, the lack of clarity of
roles and responsibilities, and the need for a more formal strategic
integration and coordination role for DMD staff. These perceptions
generally indicate that the program managers, heavily dependent on the
subject matter experts for information, may not have had the skills to
independently evaluate information as a basis for decision-making. As
such, program managers were perceived as weak in providing integrated
and informed strategic direction. In addition, the perception that many
decisions were revisited, even if the solutions seemed to be working
well, indicates that there were probably challenges to the formal
authority figures from the informal sources dissatisfied with the
results.

As to the decision criteria for who should make decisions, we can
suggest that certain decisions be made at the executive level; for
example, general policy on staffing, funding prioritization,
interoperability among processes and technology, and decisions involving
cross-divisional programs. In addition, objective information should
serve as the basis from which the Executive Staff begin to evaluate the
decision to be made. There are other issues in the federal environment,
including political and functional feasibility of new ventures within a
determined time frame that must also be considered when making decisions
at the strategic level.

At the executive level, a formal designation and communication of the
delegations of decision-making authority to lower levels and criteria
should be undertaken in cooperation with the principles involved. The
delegations of authority should then be clearly communicated through a
formal process. In the absence of such a process, individuals such as
subject matter experts or referent leaders may assume "shadow" positions
of authority. Informal authority figures can dilute the authority of the
designated decision-maker and create confusion regarding the chain of
command.

In negotiating delegations of authority, executives held accountable for
program success may choose to delegate some of their authority to
program managers or may determine that all decisions require their
review. This is the executive's prerogative for which he or she will be
held accountable. Program managers, however, are usually delegated final
decision-making or recommendation authority for their program areas. If
program managers are given decision-making authority on policies and
guidance, they should also be given discretion over funding authority in
order to ensure that their decisions will be respected. Finally,
reporting lines should be formalized and should mirror the delegations
of authority. This would ensure that those with the authority to deliver
results would be held accountable for those results.

#   {#section-11 .unnumbered}

# 10. PLANNING AND RISK MANAGEMENT {#planning-and-risk-management .unnumbered}

Planning and Risk Management were not specifically targeted issue areas
in the original scope of this project. Many interviewees, however,
commented on the weaknesses in the planning process and the absence of
risk mitigation strategies. This section details interviewee comments
about census planning weaknesses, written guidance, the impact of the
late Supreme Court decision on planning, and 2010 Census planning.

Developing plans and mitigating risk should be core business processes
of the decennial headquarters organization and management approach;
plans and strategies should be the products of these processes. As such,
poor planning and poor risk management are simply symptoms and
by-products of many of the management challenges discussed previously in
this report. Addressing the structure, approach, funding and resource
management challenges already discussed should go a long way toward
ameliorating some planning and risk management challenges.

## 10.1 Weaknesses in the Planning Process {#weaknesses-in-the-planning-process .unnumbered}

Good planning processes include the following elements: 1) describe the
project, 2) identify stakeholders and divisions that will be impacted,
3) determine uncertainties, threats, and risks, 4) develop course of
action and project concept/activity plan(s), 5) design project
organization and recruit project staff, 6) develop project management
and controls, 7) develop communication strategy and plan(s), 8) identify
project staff, skills, and competencies, 9) identify other resources
(material, equipment etc), and 10) assess project costs. Of the
forty-seven people who commented on planning (N=47, C=207), thirty-four
perceived that there were weaknesses in the Census 2000 planning
strategy (n=34, c=87). They felt that the key to census success begins
with early planning (n=11), that the planning process should have
started earlier (n=27, c=49), but that few concrete plans existed by the
end of the decade (n=7). Furthermore, some felt that planning needed to
be led at a more strategic level (n=3).

The late Supreme Court decision impacted decennial census planning
significantly (N=23, C=31). With regard to the planning timeline,
interviewees commented that late planning caused problems during the
execution phase (n=14), in part because divisions planned for a sampling
design, rather than for a more traditional design. Changing the census
design could not easily be accomplished and resulted in significant
challenges (n=7). Although plans for the dress rehearsal were created
for both types of design, the second plan was incomplete, since it had
to be hurriedly implemented (n=9).

While all divisions participating in the decennial census could have had
more involvement with the planning process, it was perceived that more
involvement was particularly needed from the Regional Directors. (n=17).
Regional involvement in planning is crucial to ensuring that both field
and headquarters eventually implement strategies under the same general
framework (n=17). Of the seventeen senior managers interviewed with
experience in the DMD or Decennial Planning Division (DPLD), only six
(approx. 35 percent) had some form of experience in the field.

## 10.2 Program Master Plans (PMPs) {#program-master-plans-pmps .unnumbered}

Program Master Plans are documents that outline the activities,
schedules, and dependencies by which each of the program areas are to
execute their decennial census operations. As defined by the *Roles and
Responsibilities* document, the PMPs should have contained many of the
elements needed for good planning.[^53] Due to insufficient staff
resources, the development of PMPs was not started until 1998. This late
start coupled with the fact that the census design strategy was not
finalized until early 1999, resulted in most of the PMPs not being
finalized until after the census (n=10). In contrast, the PMPs for the
1990 census (called requirements documents) were finalized before the
census and provided significant documentation on guidance and
requirements (n=6). The Census 2000 Publicity Office (C2PO), in
cooperation with the DMD, completed their plan ahead of schedule and
credited the creation of the PMP as one of the crucial factors for the
advertising campaign's success.

## 10.3 Contingency Planning {#contingency-planning .unnumbered}

Twenty-one interviewees said that contingency planning (N=21, C=35)
should have been handled by the Executive Staff and leadership of the
Decennial Census Directorate at a strategic level. There was little
contingency planning in place for Census 2000 that might have enabled
the Census Bureau to react more effectively to the decision to pursue
the traditional census approach (n=9). Interviewees also felt that the
matrix approach and dual path planning put Census 2000 at significant
risk (n=6).

#  HUMAN RESOURCES MANAGEMENT

Human resources management is an area that could use significant
development within the Census Bureau. This section reports on the
comments of the interviewees in relation to human resources practices.
Although staffing levels were clearly a driver for many of the Census
2000 challenges, the situations were further complicated by inattention
to the use of human resources strategies to develop and maintain the
competencies of the staff members and the knowledge base of the
organization.

A significant number of interviewees (n=26) mentioned the importance of
succession planning, career development and management training to
better prepare and equip the staff members for conducting the next
census. They strongly supported the need to better prepare junior
employees for future management roles.

The comments below revolved around the need for management expertise in
the decennial leadership, long term rewards for participating in the
decennial census, and career development and succession planning as
tools to safeguard the decennial knowledge base.

## 11.1 Promotions Based on Technical Knowledge, with Little Consideration for Management Skills {#promotions-based-on-technical-knowledge-with-little-consideration-for-management-skills .unnumbered}

Some interviewees perceived that the hiring and promotions associated
with the decennial program were determined primarily by technical
knowledge, with little emphasis on management capabilities (n=7). Having
much more of a technical focus than a management focus, the newly
promoted managers did not have adequate training to handle the more
managerially related tasks. Participants should be rewarded for their
management skills in addition to the quality of their work. Many
interviewees stressed the need for the Census Bureau to focus as much on
rewarding good management skills as on good technical skills.

## 11.2 Few Long Term Rewards for Working on the Decennial Census {#few-long-term-rewards-for-working-on-the-decennial-census .unnumbered}

The decennial census, as a core product of the Census Bureau (n=5),
should have the best people working on it. Some interviewees indicated
that there was a perceived lack of rewards for participating in the
decennial census beyond the temporary promotion (n=9). In the staffing
section, the interviewees stated that some long-term Census Bureau
employees, outside the decennial area, are not enthusiastic about
working on the decennial census. They cited the hectic environment, the
downsizing and Reductions in Force (RIFs) that occurred after previous
decennial censuses, and the poor management and communications practices
of how personnel were let go or returned to their divisions after
previous censuses. Some employees had also cited losing the opportunity
for a permanent promotion in their home division while accepting a
temporary promotion in a decennial division.

The people who left their divisional positions to support this decennial
census demonstrated a willingness to manage risk and to be flexible.
They should be rewarded for taking risks and stretching their
capabilities as workers and as managers. In the future, criteria for
promotion could include competencies such as risk-taking, management
skills and training and the ability to demonstrate flexibility and
creativity in a fluid situation.

## 11.3 Minimal Use of Career Development and Succession Planning  {#minimal-use-of-career-development-and-succession-planning .unnumbered}

Because of the downsizing and the hiring freeze from 1991 to 1996,
junior staff may have been moved up too quickly and without the
appropriate amount of technical and managerial training, and experience
with test censuses and dress rehearsals into program leadership roles.
The lack of a clearly defined career development model and management
training plan resulted in a large number of managers who lacked both the
technical knowledge and the managerial expertise required for managing
decennial census operations.

Additionally, formal career development planning was lacking for
non-Mathematical/ Statistician mid-level managers. The introduction of
dedicated management training programs will help these managers to
develop the skills necessary to perform well at the next level.

Many interviewees commented on the need for succession planning (n=17).
People felt strongly about the importance of succession planning,
because more managers are becoming eligible for retirement in the coming
years. Interviewees mentioned that only a few rotational programs
existed throughout the Census Bureau, and stressed the need for more
rotational programs to enable staff to develop skills outside their area
of expertise.

# Communications

Managers develop and implement communications strategies to communicate
a shared vision and to convey important priorities and messages to
internal staff and/or external stakeholders about the status of
operations, the values of the organization, and the culture or the "way
we do business around here." In addition, communications strategies are
used to facilitate consensus building and buy-in among participants for
a new initiative. Communications processes generally consist of
activities through which a chain of important messages are communicated
to target audiences or stakeholders. Evaluating the success of decennial
communications is part of the overall effort to assess the management
approach used for Census 2000.

Census Bureau leadership had a challenging task in managing
communications because many internal and external players needed to know
what was going on at various times within the census cycle. Thirty-five
of the 52 individuals interviewed commented on the challenges in the
communications area (N=35, C=95).

## 12.1 The Approach to Internal Communications  {#the-approach-to-internal-communications .unnumbered}

To facilitate the discussion, the contractor introduced the following
framework and components for an effective communications approach. In
the section that follows, the contractor evaluated communications based
on this framework and approach.

### **12.1.1 Components of an Effective Strategic Communications Approach** {#components-of-an-effective-strategic-communications-approach .unnumbered}

Managers should consider five components of a communications approach
when making decisions regarding a specific message:

> ***Key Stakeholder/Target Audiences:*** Audiences who are critical to
> the communications objectives must be identified at the point of
> message creation.

***Messages:*** With key audiences identified, core messages that are
both relevant and substantive must be created.

> ***Vehicles and Channels:*** Many vehicles and channels of
> communication may be used, including meetings, written e-mail, memos,
> newsletters, brochures, videos, conference calls, voice mail,
> telephone hotlines, presentations, Internet/Intranet sites, press
> briefings, and press releases.

***Frequency:*** Communications strategists must consider how often a
message should be communicated to the target audience or stakeholder
group.

> ***Feedback:*** A method should be selected to receive feedback from
> the target audiences to determine what the audiences recall and retain
> about the message, how they feel about it, and what they did with that
> information.

Inattention to any of these components can lead to a communications
failure. During Census 2000, for example, interviewees reported that
some decisions were not communicated well because it took too long and
because the channel was text-based. The subsequent failure of the
decision dissemination from this forum was not because the decisions
were not made, but because the information was not delivered in a timely
manner through a channel that was useful to the target audiences.

The *Roles and Responsibilities of Census 2000 Participants* document,
drafted by Decennial Management Division (DMD) staff in 1998, describes
the internal communications structure for the decennial census.
According to the document, the delegations of authority for the internal
communications were as follows:

-   The Associate Director (AD) for Decennial Census works with the
    Executive Staff to create policy guidance and strategic direction.
    The AD communicates this guidance to the Assistant to the Associate
    Director (AAD) for Decennial Census. The AAD then communicates this
    guidance to the Chief, DMD, who in turn communicates the guidance
    and direction information to all Census 2000 participants.

-   The Chief of DMD communicates information between the participating
    divisions and offices and the Decennial Directorate leadership. The
    Chief, DMD communicates this information through the program
    management branches.

-   The Decennial Communications staff has the responsibility for
    communications of decennial census information to constituencies,
    both inside and outside the Census Bureau. Decennial Communications,
    led by the DMD Branch Chief for Decennial Communications, provides a
    focal point for access to information about the census program.[^54]

Although the *Roles and Responsibilities* document described the
delegations of authority and reporting lines, not all census
participants were made aware of the document. As was previously
described, the DMD leadership did not widely distribute the document or
deploy the approach through formal channels. There was limited awareness
of the document outside the DMD, and the contractor found that many
interviewees had never heard of it.

There is little record of an internal communications approach or the
implementation of a formal communications structure for Census 2000.
Some management groups and MIS tools provided information to
participants as a by-product of their primary function, but there is no
evidence that there was a strategic approach to developing and
implementing a methodology specifically designed to facilitate
communications across the organization.

![](media/image11.wmf){width="5.995138888888889in"
height="0.7597222222222222in"}

## 12.2 The Internal Communications Structure for Census 2000  {#the-internal-communications-structure-for-census-2000 .unnumbered}

With little documentation of formal communications plans to evaluate,
the contractor deferred to analyzing the interview data regarding the
management meeting groups[^55] and the MIS tools for their usefulness as
a communications tool within the decennial staff. Interview comments
generally reflected on the effectiveness of the information flowing
vertically between the executive staff and the operational staff and
horizontally among the operational divisions.

### **12.2.1 Interdivisional Communications**  {#interdivisional-communications .unnumbered}

While problems with internal communications existed, interviewees were
split in their opinions, specifically about the effectiveness of
communications across divisions. Interviewees commented that some
decennial census participants championed good communications across
divisions (N=14, C=18).[^56] Eleven interviewees indicated that the DMD
staff facilitated discussions between the DMD and the participating
divisions (nn=11, c=13). These interviewees commented that some of the
DMD staff created an environment that was conducive to discussions among
divisions and that certain reporting mechanisms and MIS tools served as
useful tools for interdivisional communication.

Some interviewees felt that there were too few opportunities to interact
with their counterparts in other divisions and that these interactions
would have helped the census participants to execute cross-divisional
census activities.

### **12.2.2 Census Operational Managers (COM)** {#census-operational-managers-com-1 .unnumbered}

COM was an interdivisional group whose primary purpose was to raise and
resolve issues on census operations and to build consensus among the
members. Although communications was not the primary purpose of COM, it
did serve as an informal internal communications mechanism; staff
members participating in COM were responsible for keeping their home
divisions abreast of issues addressed during the meetings.

As discussed previously, many interviewees considered the COM approach
to be operationally ineffective (N=16, C=21),[^57] with some managers
bypassing the process altogether (n=5). In 1999, COM meetings were
discontinued (n=7).[^58] Even when the COM was operational, it did not
succeed as an informal communications mechanism because the message
delivery was left to the discretion of the participants and was often
not completed. In other words, there was no specific process through
which the COM members should communicate with their divisional staffs
and little accountability for failure to do so.

### **12.2.3 Issue Resolution/Change Control (IR/CC) Process** {#issue-resolutionchange-control-ircc-process .unnumbered}

The Issue Resolution/Change Control Process was a formal mechanism whose
primary purpose was to provide a mechanism for operational decision
making, with the DMD Program Managers assuring that all budgetary,
timing, quality, policy, design, and other factors were considered.
Although communications was not the primary purpose of the IR/CC, it did
serve as an informal internal communications mechanism. The IR/CC
mechanism, however, suffered from lack of attendance by key personnel.
Some key persons chose not to attend and instead may have sent staff
members who lacked the requisite knowledge or authority.

Interviewees did not view the communications from the IR/CC process as
optimal because decisions were not communicated to all relevant
employees on a near real-time basis; formal communications were delayed
until the discussions and decision had been formally written. As the
Census Bureau moved closer to Census Day,[^59] participating staff
members indicated that they needed more near real-time information on
important decisions because they were operating under a scheduled time
frame. The delayed release of decisions was not conducive to effectively
managing the census on a real-time basis.

Decisions from IR/CC were also distributed via an electronically
distributed decision memo series. Participants indicated that as Census
Day approached, they had less and less time to read email regarding the
decision memo series. As a result, participants generally used
word-of-mouth communications or status meetings, as opposed to the
decision memo series, to find out about decisions that directly impacted
them.

### **12.2.4 Strategic Communications from Executive Staff to Operational Staff**  {#strategic-communications-from-executive-staff-to-operational-staff .unnumbered}

Twenty-two of the interviewees felt that although communications were
adequate among the divisions, the decennial leadership did not share
enough information through the DMD to the divisions (n=22, c=37).[^60]
These individuals perceived that the executive leadership did not
provide consistency and clarity of direction to the Census 2000
participants (n=6, c=15). Comments from interviewees indicated that the
overall strategic direction was unclear and fluctuated throughout the
decade (n=21).[^61]

Sixteen individuals commented that DMD's role as liaison between the
Executive Staff and the operational staff was not very effective (n=16,
c=19). More specifically, interviewees commented on the perceived lack
of strategic direction from the Executive Staff, through the Decennial
Directorate leadership and the DMD (n=11, c=21).[^62] Finally,
interviewees commented that they sometimes received direction too late
to be useful.

### **12.2.5 A "Close Hold" of Information Interfered with Communication Flow and Access to Critical Data**  {#a-close-hold-of-information-interfered-with-communication-flow-and-access-to-critical-data .unnumbered}

![](media/image12.wmf){width="5.995833333333334in"
height="0.46041666666666664in"}

Some of the interviewees speculated that the flow of information down to
the divisions may have been restricted because the DMD and the decennial
census leadership had concerns about the dissemination of information to
external stakeholders.[^63] The DMD staff may have felt the need to hold
information close because of a legitimate risk that inconsistent
information would be communicated to external parties through
uncoordinated channels. The "close hold" of information may have
hindered decennial census operations because not all Census 2000
participants may have had access to the informational resources they
needed to effectively perform their duties.

###  **12.2.6 Dual Communications Channels Sometimes Caused Confusion** {#dual-communications-channels-sometimes-caused-confusion .unnumbered}

Interviewees suggested that the Associate Director-level leadership
sometimes bypassed the decision-making mechanisms that were coordinated
by DMD staff.[^64] Similarly, some decennial participants commented that
they would receive instructions directly from the Decennial Census
Directorate or outside the Decennial Associate Directorate leadership
that were inconsistent with the communications from the DMD staff.

The operational staff members indicated that the dual channels of
communications caused confusion and that they often did not know which
guidance to follow. With dual communications channels and little time to
coordinate the internal messages, the DMD and other staff members from
participating divisions could not have had a full understanding of the
status of activities for which they had responsibilities.

##### 12.2.7 Operational Status and Assessment Meetings (OSAM) as an Executive-Level Communications Mechanism {#operational-status-and-assessment-meetings-osam-as-an-executive-level-communications-mechanism .unnumbered}

The Operational Status and Assessment Meetings (OSAM) were daily status
report meetings meant to give managers an independent assessment of
overall progress during the decennial operational years. OSAM provided a
forum for DMD Program Managers and senior staff to discuss progress and
issues with the participating Division Chiefs and the Decennial
Directorate leadership. Interviewees commented that these meetings
served as an effective forum for the exchange of status information, but
that there was no specific direction for communicating this information
to their respective operational staffs. Participants also commented that
the people with appropriate knowledge of the operations and status were
not always present at the meetings.

##### 12.2.8 Communications from Operational Staff to Executive Staff  {#communications-from-operational-staff-to-executive-staff .unnumbered}

According to interviewees, operational difficulties for certain
initiatives were at times not communicated to the Executive Staff,
Census Managers, and the Decennial Census Directorate leadership in a
timely manner. Some interviewees commented that this lag in
communications led the Executive Staff to make public statements or
commitments to local officials regarding the census based on erroneous
assumptions about the complexity, magnitude, and quantity of resources
necessary to complete certain programs.

###  **12.2.9 Other Methods That at Times Worked Well**  {#other-methods-that-at-times-worked-well .unnumbered}

Interviewees commented that certain MIS tools served as effective
informal communications mechanisms during Census 2000: the Master
Activity Schedule (MAS), the Cost and Progress System (C&P System), and
the Census 2000 Cost Model (Cost Model). Interviewees commented that
although these tools were valuable in sharing information and
facilitating communications among staff across divisions, the
effectiveness of these tools could be improved by enhancing
functionality, accuracy, and flexibility in adapting to changes.

### **12.2.10 Knowledge Management**[^65] {#knowledge-management .unnumbered}

Six interviewees commented on the lack of an effective knowledge
management approach for Census 2000 (n=6, c=9). According to the *Roles
and Responsibilities* document, the DMD Decennial Communications group
had responsibility for Census 2000 change and knowledge management
activities. Decennial Communications maintained a repository of key
Census 2000 documents via the Census 2000 Personal Computer Document
Organization and Control System (PCDOCS).[^66] According to
interviewees, most Census 2000 participants did not use or contribute to
the upkeep of the PCDOCS. Because a considerable number of employees
with decennial expertise would be eligible to retire shortly,
interviewees expressed concerns about safeguarding the knowledge base
with knowledge management tools.

# Management Information Systems

The Census 2000 Management Information System (MIS) was designed as "the
official source of information for Census 2000, including schedule,
performing divisions or organizations, budget, cost, and progress."[^67]
The MIS included functionality enabling system users to assess
performance on decennial-related activities by providing them with
easily accessible cost and schedule data. Census 2000 participants used
the MIS to access data for decision-making and "to facilitate a more
effective and efficient process for planning and implementing Census
2000."[^68]

The MIS is a loosely coupled system comprising a scheduling software and
a data warehouse that is used to report on the cost and progress of
major data collection, data capture, and data processing operations. The
data warehouse used SAS Information Delivery System software
products[^69] and is populated by a number of feeder systems.[^70]

This section discusses the general findings of the MIS in terms of how
well it supported participants in managing and conducting Census 2000.
Two primary levels of system users were program managers and operational
participants. The program managers used the MIS for resource planning
and for monitoring costs and progress. The operational participants used
the MIS for progress reporting, resource allocation, and for monitoring
costs, progress of operations, and related activities. The MIS comprises
the following components:

-   *The Master Activity Schedule (MAS)* is a Primavera-based project
    management application that documented the activities involved in
    planning, preparation, development, data-collection, data-capture,
    data-processing, data-dissemination, and evaluation activities. It
    also contained decision-support functionality, including critical
    path analysis.[^71] System users provided the status data and used
    the MAS as a "roadmap" for decennial census activities. The MAS also
    recorded the planned and actual start and finish dates for more than
    5,500 activities in Census 2000.

-   *The Cost and Progress System (C&P System)* was a data management
    system that allowed users to query the data warehouse for
    information on the costs and progress of Census 2000 activities. The
    C&P System produced predefined reports on the progress and cost of
    major data collection, data capture, and data processing operations
    for Census 2000. System users of the C&P System had access on a
    "read-only basis and were able to analyze the information on the
    server or create data extracts to download for analysis."[^72]

In addition to reviewing the MIS systems, the contractor also evaluated
the use of the Census 2000 Cost Model during Census 2000:

-   *The Census 2000 Cost Model (Cost Model)* was a financial model that
    the DMD Budget Office staff used to model the projected financial
    requirements necessary to support decennial census operations.

## 13.1 Common Themes on the MIS Used for Census 2000 {#common-themes-on-the-mis-used-for-census-2000 .unnumbered}

The contractor's assessment of the MIS begins with a discussion of the
themes that consistently emerged from the interviews. In general,
interviewees commented that it was useful to have access to data through
the MIS and that the applications were generally effective (n=17, c=30).
While the MAS helped the participants to understand the
interdependencies among the activities performed by the participating
divisions, the C&P System provided cost and schedule data in the same
place for the first time.

In specific areas, however, interviewees perceived problems with the
system (n=13, c=25). They commented on their desire for more
user-friendly interfaces and for capabilities that would allow them to
access desired data without having to understand the technical aspects
of the system.

Interviewees commented that inconsistencies in data definition and a
lack of quality control led to data discrepancies (n=10, c=12). There
was a perception that a lack of full integration between the C&P System
applications and the Field Division's internal reporting system
contributed to data-consistency problems (n=8, c=10). The discrepancies
led many users to distrust the data produced by the MIS and to rely on
information produced outside of the decennial management information
systems. The problem stemmed from the timing of when data were pulled
from the feeder systems, and also from a lack of common variable
definitions.

Interviewees commented on the difficulty of understanding the reports
from the information system, which limited the system's effectiveness in
supporting decision making for the individual users. Interviewees also
commented that the MIS components may have been useful tools for the
DMD, but that they did not necessarily produce information that was
useful to the operating divisions (n=6, c=8).

## 13.2 The Master Activity Schedule (MAS) {#the-master-activity-schedule-mas .unnumbered}

The Master Activity Schedule (MAS) is the component of the Management
Information System that provides the functionality to manage the project
schedule for the decennial census. The system is built in Primavera and
provides the project management capabilities that are standard in a
high-end commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) package. Customization of the
system is somewhat limited to queries and reports defined by users.
Management of the MAS is the responsibility of the Decennial Management
Division (DMD), which has program management and coordination
responsibility for the decennial census. To maintain control of the
information in the MAS and to ensure that all changes are properly
vetted before input, DMD maintains the schedule. Performing divisions
typically maintain more detailed project schedules to manage their daily
activities, while using the MAS to provide a more global view. These
detailed schedules are not interfaced with the MAS, but the information
is tied to upper-level information in the MAS. The Census Bureau
designed the MAS as a roadmap to help manage the conduct and integration
of the many Census 2000 activities. The MAS provided managers with
weekly schedule status updates and made them aware of the
interdependencies between activities and the impacts of changes to the
schedule.

Thirty of the 52 interviewees commented on the MAS (N=30, C=80).
Although some interviewees said that they felt that the MAS was an
effective tool for understanding the integration and interdependencies
among the decennial census activities (N=14, C=24), they found that it
was difficult to use (N=18, C=34).

### **13.2.1 MAS Requires a System Champion** {#mas-requires-a-system-champion .unnumbered}

The DMD's use of the MAS did succeed in serving some of the purposes
described in the *Census 2000 Operational Plan.*[^73] In spite of this,
user acceptance was not widespread among the participating divisions
because of perceived difficulties in using the system and the lack of a
system champion at the Executive Staff level.

### **13.2.2 Effectiveness of the MAS** {#effectiveness-of-the-mas .unnumbered}

Some interviewees commented that the MAS was a valuable tool because it
listed the activities that needed to be completed for the decennial
census and became a useful road map for coordinators and managers (n=8,
c=12). Nine interviewees said that the MAS "forced both the technical
(operational) and program planning groups to discuss their activities
and map out \[the interdependencies\]" (n=9, c=13).

In an effort to gather the necessary programmatic information from all
participating divisions, census staff members participated in a series
of meetings, or "lockups," over a six-week to eight-week period. Nine
interviewees commented on the MAS lockups (n=9, c=11). While some
interviewees perceived these meetings to be a waste of time and a
painful exercise, others commented that the lockups were a necessary
exercise and were useful in creating an understanding of divisional
interdependencies and in generating plans for Census 2000. Specifically,
new staff benefited from an increased understanding of the integration
of activities among the participating divisions and how the overall
decennial census worked.

### **13.2.3 Timeliness of MAS Development** {#timeliness-of-mas-development .unnumbered}

Seven interviewees commented that the MAS should have been in place
earlier in the decennial census cycle (n=7, c=7). For Census 2000, the
MAS was completed by the summer of 1997. Interviewees suggested that the
MAS should be completed by the "04" year and should be updated after the
tests and dress rehearsals as needed throughout the decade.

### **13.2.4 Ease of Use and Accessibility of the MAS** {#ease-of-use-and-accessibility-of-the-mas .unnumbered}

Eight interviewees commented on the difficulties encountered in using
the MAS (n=8, c=12). They mentioned that the system was difficult to use
and took too much time to maintain. Interviewees called the MAS "clunky"
and the process "a punishment."

Many of the Census 2000 participants did not use the MAS because they
felt that it contained too many levels of detail. Ten interviewees
stated that the MAS contained too many line items, which caused them
difficulties in keeping the system up to date (n=10, c=13).

In addition, interviewees perceived that the data were inaccurate.
Decennial census program managers commented that it was difficult to
obtain buy-in from the participating divisions because many of the
participants did not believe that the data being fed into the MAS were
accurate.

### **13.2.5 Flexibility in Adapting to Changes** {#flexibility-in-adapting-to-changes .unnumbered}

Some system users expected that the MAS would be used to support change
control during Census 2000; this process unfortunately did not occur.
"The MAS was to be updated with a collaboration between the operational
program managers, and the Census managers and staff in participating
divisions and offices."[^74] One of the purposes of the MAS, according
to the *Roles and Responsibilities* document*,*[^75] was to provide a
baseline for changes, and changes made to the MAS were to be reflected
in the other MIS components and the Cost Model.

Ten interviewees perceived the MAS to be an outdated system with
inflexibility in handling changes to dates (n=10, c=13). There are two
primary explanations for the inflexibility of system dates in the MAS:

First, interviewees commented that DMD program managers required the
system users to put dates to activities "whether or not the dates could
be met." The system contained a feature that allowed the administration
to manually change planned dates to actual dates when approved by the
DMD program manager. This feature prevented Census 2000 participants
from using the MAS initial plan as a baseline and performing variance
analysis on planned versus actual implementation progress. By not having
a baseline, the decennial census participants did not keep a paper trail
or record of changes made to the original schedule.[^76]

Second, Census 2000 participants perceived that when dates were changed,
task start and end dates were changed without a full understanding of
the cascading effect that a particular change would have on other tasks.
When making changes to the MAS, managers should be provided with
information that will help them to understand the impacts of changes to
all areas. They can then work with managers from other impacted areas to
discuss how the changes should be made to the MAS.

## 13.3 The Cost and Progress System (C&P System) {#the-cost-and-progress-system-cp-system .unnumbered}

The Census Bureau designed the C&P System to produce daily reports on
the major census activities which include all major data collection and
capture operations in the field,[^77] as well as the costs and
completion rates of scheduled tasks. C&P information is extracted from
feeder systems, including the Cost Model, the Data Capture System, the
Operations Control System (OCS), the Master Activity Schedule, and
PAMS/ADAMS (Pre-Appointment Management System/Automated Decennial
Administrative Management System).

New segments of users and data were added to C&P in "phases" as each new
operation began. Each received a combination of reports set up for its
specific use. C&P reports from the data warehouse displayed summary or
aggregate material updated on a daily or weekly basis as needed.

A total of seven interviewees had comments on the C&P System (N=7, C=8).
The interviewees mentioned concerns regarding the need for additional
levels of detail in the system (n=4, c=4) and improved data accuracy
(n=4, c=4).

### **13.3.1 Effectiveness of the C&P System** {#effectiveness-of-the-cp-system .unnumbered}

Four interviewees commented on the effectiveness of the C&P System (n=4,
c=4). System users commented on the limited reporting options regarding
the specific operations costs and suggested that the need for census
participants to "manipulate source data to obtain their desired
management information" was a critical weakness of the system's
functionality. Interviewees perceived that the system was "cumbersome to
use" and that the inconsistent definition of terms throughout the system
caused difficulties for users in understanding the information produced.

### **13.3.2 Accuracy of the C&P System** {#accuracy-of-the-cp-system .unnumbered}

Four interviewees expressed concern regarding the inaccuracy of data
produced by the C&P system (n=4, c=4). They said that "varying data
sources in the agency provided different costs and progress reports."
The data from the C&P System were often inconsistent with data in the
other systems, which caused census participants to distrust the C&P
System's data. Many of these problems resulted because the requirements
definitions established by DMD did not compare to those used by
divisions with their own reporting systems, specifically the Field's
system.

## 13.4 The Census 2000 Cost Model {#the-census-2000-cost-model .unnumbered}

In addition to reviewing the MIS, the contractor evaluated the Census
2000 Cost Model in this section.

The Census Bureau created the Census 2000 Cost Model to automate the
estimating processes for Census 2000 staffing and budget requirements in
an effort to improve the quality and accuracy of its cost estimates. The
Cost Model is based on a well-defined set of activities for the major
components of decennial census operations and was used to respond to
inquiries from Congress, the Department of Commerce, the Office of
Management and Budget, senior managers at the Census Bureau, and other
stakeholders.[^78] The DMD used the Census 2000 Cost Model as the
primary repository of assumptions and parameters for forecasting
components of the budget.[^79]

### **13.4.1 Effectiveness of the Census 2000 Cost Model** {#effectiveness-of-the-census-2000-cost-model .unnumbered}

The 16 interviewees who commented on the Cost Model disagreed on its
usefulness (N=16, C=25). Some did not understand that the Cost Model was
not a user application. The interviewees were pleased to have the first
"budget justification model" in decennial history, but they believed
that the model's effectiveness could be improved if it allowed for "what
if" analyses, scenario planning, and the ability to create reports
customized to a user's specific needs. Interviewees commented on their
inability to compare the data between the C&P and cost model systems and
expressed the desire that line items in the two systems be consistent.

### **13.4.2 Accuracy of the Model** {#accuracy-of-the-model .unnumbered}

Management evaluation interviewees had two views on the accuracy of the
Cost Model:

First, the Cost Model provided system users with a means to understand
the budget assumptions (n=5, c=6). Some of the interviewees perceived
that the assumptions were accurate, claiming that they "finally had
control and knew what assumptions the budget was based on." Booz Allen
Hamilton performed a verification and validation of the Cost Model that
supported the perception of the model's accuracy.[^80] System users also
perceived the budget assumptions to be clearly defined, which gave them
confidence in the data's accuracy.

On the other hand, some of the interviewees commented that the Cost
Model lacked accuracy and was used by the DMD as a showpiece and
communications tool for external stakeholders (n=7, c=9). They commented
that the Cost Model did not meet operational requirements. Some
interviewees disagreed with some of the assumptions used by the DMD in
the development of the Cost Model and questioned the model's validity
because these assumptions were not documented. Specifically, the Field
Division modified the DMD Cost Model by changing some of the assumptions
for the number of staff and time needed to complete certain tasks. For
future decennial censuses, the field operations participants would like
to have more involvement in making sure that the assumptions in the DMD
Cost Model are consistent with the information from field operations.

#  The Use of Contracting

Forty interviewees commented on the impact of competitively outsourcing
some of the important activities for Census 2000 (N=40, C=235). Census
2000 marked the first time the Census Bureau had made major efforts to
outsource any of its decennial census activities. Major contractors
included Lockheed Martin, TRW Incorporated, Young and Rubicam, and
Electronic Data Systems. In addition to these contracts, the Census
Bureau also used other smaller contractors during Census 2000. The use
of contractors to outsource key operational activities was perceived by
many as a new and innovative approach and as "stepping out of the box"
(N=13, C=24). The mid-decade leadership at the Census Bureau supported
the use of contractors and new innovation to make it happen. Contracting
was also a sizable undertaking because the major activities being
outsourced were large, high-value, and complex. The largest outsourced
programs were the development of the data capture system and the data
processing capabilities, the operation of the telephone questionnaire
assistance (TQA) facility, the advertising contract, the field
infrastructure contract, and the data access and dissemination contract.

The contractors employed by the Census Bureau brought with them the
capabilities and resources to accomplish the objectives (n=2, c=5),
including the development and deployment of new technologies. In
addition to the improved technical solutions, these capabilities
included valuable contract and program management skills (n=9, c=12).
The experience of working with contractors on such large and complex
outsourcing operations also exposed decennial census management
practices that were in need of development and improvement. This is
particularly true in the areas of large scale contract and program
management. At the inception of the outsourcing contracts, the Census
Bureau's procurement and acquisition management programs were not well
developed.

This section of the evaluation covers the following findings:

-   Some business activities of Census 2000 were outsourced.

-   Contractors added many strengths to Census 2000.

-   Staff members commented that the use of contractors and their best
    practices highlighted some internal management weaknesses in
    decennial operations.

-   Census 2000 needed an institutionalized process for defining
    requirements.

-   The internal Census Bureau change control processes were not fully
    developed.

## 14.1 Some Business Activities of Census 2000 were Outsourced {#some-business-activities-of-census-2000-were-outsourced .unnumbered}

The outsourcing activities and contracts management for the data
capture, data processing, TQA, and field infrastructure contracts were
handled through the Decennial Systems and Contracts Management Office
(DSCMO). DSCMO was created in 1995 and was given the responsibility for
contracting for Census 2000 (n=4, c=7.)[^81] The DSCMO began outsourcing
operational activities during 1996-1997. The two major areas that
generated the most commentary from the interviewees concerned the
outsourcing of the data capture system and telephone questionnaire
assistance operations:

-   ***Data-Capture System (DCS 2000) Operations (n=13, c=24):*** The
    design and development of the DCS 2000 was contracted out to
    Lockheed Martin. The Census Bureau contracted with TRW to develop
    and implement the day-to-day operations of the three supporting
    Data-Capture Centers (DCCs). The comments received in this area
    related to how the operations worked, with opinions on the strengths
    and weaknesses of outsourcing (which are presented in sections to
    follow).

-   ***Telephone Questionnaire Assistance (TQA) Operations (n=10,
    c=11):*** The Census Bureau contracted with EDS to operate the TQA
    facilities, although the contract was not in place until after the
    1998 dress rehearsal. This late award caused problems during Census
    2000 because there was insufficient development and testing time
    available prior to going live with operations.

## 14.2 Contractors Added Many Strengths to Census 2000 {#contractors-added-many-strengths-to-census-2000 .unnumbered}

The key advantage of using external resources was that they helped the
Census Bureau to strengthen the Census 2000 management practices and
processes (n=13, c=24).

-   ***Contractors helped to improve management and operational
    processes (n=9, c=12):*** The contractors positively impacted the
    internal management of Census 2000. The interviewees commented that
    contractors like Lockheed Martin and TRW provided rigor and
    discipline to the management of Census 2000 (n=2, c=2). "The
    external contractors forced people to make decisions," and staff
    "were not allowed to change their minds." One of the interviewees
    cited that making decisions for the contract requirements became a
    lever to force decision making within the Census Bureau. This was
    important in helping to mitigate the risks associated with the
    contract. The interviewees also commented that the contractors
    possessed the appropriate knowledge and skills to enable them to
    move quickly up the learning curve toward understanding Census 2000
    processes and activities.

Transitioning the internal workload to external service providers proved
difficult for both the decennial census participants and the
contractors. The difficulties surrounding the use of contractors
highlighted cultural differences and important issues that needed to be
addressed by a change management process.

One of the most important findings was that, at the time of procurement,
few contract requirements had been written by the Census Bureau staff
(N=23, C=56). Contractors made it clear that they would have to cease
operations until certain requirements were defined and more clearly
aligned with their contractual obligations. Conducting work that is
later found to be outside of scope or inconsistent with requirements
could have a negative financial impact on the contractor; therefore
poorly defined requirements can create additional risk. A contractor
would seek to mitigate this risk by refusing to work under a contractual
agreement that did not clearly define the requirements and objectives of
the client contracting the services. Problems with the requirements
definition process existed on three primary levels:

1\. The decennial census staff did not always clearly communicate system
and contract requirements to contractors (n=13, c=19).

2\. Many system and contract requirements were defined too late, after
the Census Bureau staff finalized contracts (n=9, c=15).

4\. The Census Bureau did not have the proper processes in place to
develop requirements (n=9, c=11). The interviewees commented that people
from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) were
brought in to assist with contract management/administrative activities
(n=5, c=5).

***Risks were reduced, and contractors got the job done (n=3, c=3):***
Contracting with third parties helps to mitigate risk. The overarching
reduction in risk occurred in the transfer of Census 2000 operational
activities to external service providers, after which those providers
were held accountable through their contractual obligations. The
contractors conducted their own risk assessment processes and had to
follow through with their risk mitigation strategies (n=3, c=3). The
contracting schedule was aggressive, but the contractors had the
resources to complete their obligations. In addition, contracting out
the operations made up for the Census Bureau's lack of experience in
areas outside of its core functions, and further mitigated the risk of
having to build up and then downsize a large infrastructure.

[]{.mark}

***Census 2000 staff learned about the contracting process (n=2,
c=2):*** As the use of contractors was new to the decennial census
management, this represented an opportunity for new business practices
and learning. The cost type contracts required the Census Bureau to
learn how to do earned value and trend analysis to manage contracts of
that magnitude.

## 14.3 Staff member Comments on Improving Outsourcing  {#staff-member-comments-on-improving-outsourcing .unnumbered}

Interviewees held the perception that working with contractors also had
certain negative effects on the organization (n=18, c=47):

-   ***Impact on internal functions (n=9, c=11):*** Most comments
    regarding the impact on internal functions were applicable to the
    systems engineering and programming areas. Responses indicated that
    staff members in these areas felt threatened by the presence of
    contractors, feeling that their roles and responsibilities had been
    taken away from them. The impact was also compounded by decennial
    management's perception that the internal systems staff and
    programmers would not be able to successfully complete Census 2000.
    The tension between these Census Bureau staff members and the
    contractors impacted the level of support provided to contractors
    and also the degree to which two-way knowledge and experience was
    transferred. Interviewees suggested that this tension may have been
    mitigated in three ways: (1) invest more in orientation and change
    management (including communications); (2) award the contracts
    earlier, in an effort to establish a better working relationship;
    and (3) allow internal staff to compete with the contractors for
    outsourced work, based upon demonstrated competencies and
    capabilities.

```{=html}
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-   ***Inexperience of working with contractors (n=6, c=14):*** Prior to
    Census 2000, decennial management had little experience in working
    with contractors on major acquisition-based programs. As a result,
    established management and operational models were not in place.
    Contracts negotiation, recognizing the impacts of poor user
    requirements definition, and weaknesses in change controls on cost
    were cited as areas of concern. The failure to share and retain
    knowledge and information and to employ appropriate quality
    assurance procedures caused further difficulties. In some cases, the
    quality assurance techniques requested by the Census Bureau were out
    of date compared to the new technology being introduced. Engaging
    contractors earlier would have eased some of the tensions by
    allowing more time for the development of constructive working
    relationships between the internal and contractor staffs (n=4, c=4).

-   Census Bureau programs had limited documentation and software
    development maturity compared with the contractors. The QA
    techniques and methods of the contractors were state of the art in
    comparison with the Census Bureau's, and this caused
    misunderstandings to occur.

## 14.4 The Census 2000 Needed an Institutionalized Process for Defining Requirements {#the-census-2000-needed-an-institutionalized-process-for-defining-requirements .unnumbered}

Clearly defining user requirements and planning are fundamental to
effective program and contracts management. Working to define user
requirements is seen as a way of engaging an important group of
stakeholders, but it is also the method used by program and contract
management to understand what needs to be done to capture the potential
risks and issues and to identify critical path activities. Any changes
to these defined user requirements must be clearly communicated through
the change control process.

More than half of the interviewees commented on requirements definition
(n=24, c=64), and nearly a third of those interviewed remarked on the
change control process (n=17, c=4). Most of the comments referred to
problems and issues in these areas, although there were some positive
comments as well.

-   ***Contract management and user requirements processes need to be
    institutionalized (n=9, c=11):*** The interviewees concluded that
    despite the success of using contractors, formal processes needed to
    be in place in many areas of the contract management life cycle. An
    important lesson learned from their experiences of working with
    contractors was the need to institutionalize and embed management
    controls and processes around the use of contractors within the
    organization. At a minimum, this process should address requirements
    development, documentation, communication, implementation, and
    change control. "We need to come up with a blueprint, test, and
    quality control for requirements development."

-   ***Strength and quality technical input to user requirements (n=5,
    c=7):*** In this area, two important issues were raised by the
    interviewees. The first issue was that user requirements cannot be
    defined in isolation and that inputs from group representatives
    about the organization and its operations need to be included in the
    definition of requirements. The second issue addresses the types of
    inputs required to formulate requirements; namely, the group
    defining the requirements needs to include people with the
    appropriate levels of relevant technical knowledge. These
    individuals need to take an active role in the development of user
    requirements. Non-technical staff may facilitate the development of
    these requirements, although technical representatives must
    participate to avoid "people writing requirements \[who lack\] the
    appropriate technical knowledge."

-   ***Knowledge management (n=4, c=6) and the right inputs (n=2,
    c=2)*:** The value and importance of knowledge management were
    established through the realization that there "must be a clear
    understanding of what the requirements are, and it should not be one
    or two people who carried them about in their head or their pocket."
    The identification and documentation of user requirements are key
    factors in the contractor's response to, and fulfilment of, those
    requirements. The requirements definition process also allowed the
    Census Bureau to model operations conducted internally after similar
    operations carried out by contractors, using the same approaches and
    documentation. The clearest illustration of this was the work
    undertaken by the Census Bureau at the data capture and processing
    facility at Jeffersonville. Assuming that the contractor is applying
    best practice techniques, by adopting these practices, the Census
    Bureau can learn and benefit from them. These tangible benefits
    provide evidence to support the argument that outsourcing work to
    contractors does yield measurable value.

The Census Bureau was also able to capitalize on existing knowledge when
developing the user requirements. In at least one case, the Requirements
Overview from the Census 1990 were used in the development of
requirements for Census 2000. Improvements in the quality and ability to
write comprehensive statements of work (SOWs) were also noted.

-   ***Timely completion of user requirements (n=9, c=15):*** Defining
    user requirements is inextricably linked to the program and
    contracts management planning process. Interviewees commented on the
    need to develop requirements earlier in the procurement process, and
    to improve this process as well. One interviewee added that the
    contracts were drafted before the true requirements were developed.
    For this reason, many of the user requirements were developed and
    implemented in real time, which allowed little margin for error, and
    no time for testing and cost containment. In order to mitigate this
    risk, the Census Bureau will need to set up contracts farther in
    advance for the 2010 Census.

## 14.5 The Internal Census Bureau Change Control Processes were not Fully Developed. {#the-internal-census-bureau-change-control-processes-were-not-fully-developed. .unnumbered}

The Census Bureau change control process focuses on the management and
programmatic impact of making changes to the costs, schedule, and
requirements for the fulfilment of user requirements established in the
underlying contract. A quarter of the interviewees commented on the
change control process, and none with favorable remarks (n=17, c=41).
Nonetheless, some comments recognized that efforts were being made: "We
tried to use the concept of change control \[though\] it was a little
less formal; we had daily conference calls." The comments regarding the
change control process can be categorized broadly in three areas:

-   **Changes were reactive and not proactive (n=9, c=10):**
    Interviewees perceived that changes were event-driven. They
    indicated that there were unanticipated or unplanned changes to
    contractor operations that resulted in changes to the underlying
    contract in the form of change orders. The interviewees felt that
    they never really had control of the change control process.

-   **Changes in requirements drove up costs (n=8, c=10):** The
    contractual obligations were based on a "cost plus" contract
    vehicle; therefore, any changes to the original requirements
    required a change order, which is priced separately from the
    original contract and added to the contract scope and value. One
    Branch Chief noted that "people began to realize that the processes
    contractors were being paid for were expensive \[and\] that the lack
    of schedules and requirements made contracts even more expensive."
    Finally, the process for changing contracts was easier to talk about
    than to put into practice. Change orders added a necessary
    administrative layer to managing a contract, and making these
    changes was difficult to achieve. It is important to note, however,
    that with scant requirements, a cost type contract allows for
    operation with Task Orders. The extra administrative burden is
    generally accepted as the trade-off. In this situation a strong
    change control process is critical.

-   **Changes were not documented (n=11, c=17):** Maintaining critical
    records and documenting decisions are essential for sound program
    and contract management. Documentation was cited as being weak in
    setting a baseline of user requirements (n=2, c=2) and in
    documenting changes as part of a rigorous change control process
    (n=9, c=15).

[]{.mark}

[]{.mark}

#  SPECIFIC FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

In the sections that follow, the major findings and recommendations in
each of the evaluation areas are reported. The text briefly summarizes
the major findings and is followed by a list of recommendations for each
evaluation area. More detailed descriptions and explanations of both the
findings and the recommendations are included in the body of this
report.

## 15.1 Findings on Political Environment {#findings-on-political-environment .unnumbered}

Of the 52 interviews conducted, 41 people commented on the political
oversight with 116 individual comments (N=41, C=116). Interviewees
reported that the strategic direction for conducting Census 2000
operations was significantly impacted by political tensions between the
legislative and executive branches throughout the decade. With
conflicting guidance over what census approach to follow and minimal
funding in mid-decade years, the Census Bureau had little to show in
terms of detailed implementation plans as the years wore on. As a
result, the Census Bureau incurred more oversight requirements from more
stakeholders than during any of the previous decennial censuses. At
first, the Census Bureau was ill-prepared to manage external stakeholder
relationships and to handle all of the inquiries. Responding to the
volume of inquiries seriously impacted Census 2000 personnel's ability
to complete their workload. When the census was conducted, however, the
Census Bureau leadership team of Ken Prewitt and Bill Barron stepped in
and modified the leadership approach in order to respond more
effectively.

## 15.2 Recommendations on Political Environment {#recommendations-on-political-environment .unnumbered}

-   **Continue to develop a pro-active leadership strategy (as
    determined by the Executive Staff) to anticipate and respond to
    political oversight requirements and to update strategic contingency
    plans:** By maintaining close coordination with core external
    constituencies, the Census Bureau Executive Staff would be in a
    better position to anticipate changing requirements and to influence
    Congressional decisions on strategy and funding levels. Developing
    and updating contingency plans for political developments or
    technological advances would serve to insulate decennial census
    Executive Staff from being unprepared for last minute reversals, as
    occurred leading up to Census 2000.

-   **Plan for the decennial census divisions to effectively respond to
    oversight requirements:** Late in the decade, some decennial census
    participating divisions had dedicated staffs to respond to external
    oversight inquiries. This response relieved the operational staff
    from having to respond to inquiries and facilitated a more effective
    response to stakeholders.[^82]

-   **Provide resources and training on managing oversight
    relationships:** As oversight requirements increase, the Decennial
    Census Directorate should identify and train dedicated staff members
    to effectively respond to external inquiries or to provide
    supporting responses to the census communications office. These
    staff members should be familiar with the legislative and budgeting
    processes of the federal government and its constituencies, and have
    program specific experience and knowledge regarding the decennial
    census.

-   **Improve the management of knowledge regarding census plans and
    strategic options:** Documentation on previous decennial census
    operations (sampling and traditional enumeration) should be
    completed and stored in a technology database that is easily
    queried. Previous requirements, inquiries from congressional and
    other stakeholders, and Census Bureau responses should be downloaded
    to an electronic database for easy access.

## 15.3 Findings on Funding {#findings-on-funding .unnumbered}

Thirty-seven of the interviewees made a total of 76 comments with
respect to funding and its impact on Census 2000 (N=37, C=76).
Interviewees reported that funding for decennial operations was minimal
throughout the decade until just before Census 2000 operational years.
Consequently, the Decennial Census Directorate was unable to maintain a
core base of staff members and suffered a significant loss to the
knowledge base. Although there was a decennial budgeting cost model in
place in the mid-90s, the strategic development of a defensible budget
strategy, supported by rigorous financial analysis, was not undertaken
until later in the decade.

## 15.4 Recommendations on Funding {#recommendations-on-funding .unnumbered}

-   **Promote census funding on the basis of a continuous 12-year
    operation that includes planning, testing and evaluating procedures
    in mid-decade years:** The execution of the decennial census
    consists of strategic planning, organization, design, mobilization,
    two tests, a dress rehearsal and continuous evaluation, all leading
    up to the full decennial activity. The decennial census processes
    should be reviewed and funded in accordance with its full 12-year
    cycle.

-   **Secure base funding for core decennial activities throughout the
    decade:** Although most of the funding for the decennial census
    occurs at the end of the decade, a core base of funding should
    maintain a "steady-state" of decennial operations in order to
    protect the knowledge base and to support mid-decade operations.

-   **Continue to support funding requests with rigorous financial
    analysis:** The budget requests for Census 2000 were supported by a
    financial cost model. The Census Bureau should continue to develop
    rigorous financial assumptions and cost model methodologies to
    support future requests.

## 15.5 Findings on Staffing {#findings-on-staffing .unnumbered}

Fifty of the fifty-two interviewees commented on problems with
headquarters staffing during Census 2000 with a total of 299 comments
(N=50, C=299). Interviewees reported that in the decade leading up to
Census 2000, the Decennial Census Directorate was plagued by strategic
reversals, from both inside and outside the organization. One result of
this was a lack of funding until just before the Census 2000 operational
years. Though the decennial organization suffered the consequences of
these reversals in many ways, it was particularly hard hit at Census
Bureau Headquarters in human resource management and staffing.

In the course of the evaluation, the project team identified the
following concerns regarding headquarters staffing for the decennial
census: 1) delays in funding resulted in inadequate numbers of skilled
and experienced resources and a critical erosion of the knowledge base,
and 2) recruitment and retention challenges exacerbated the problem.

## 15.6 Recommendations on Staffing {#recommendations-on-staffing .unnumbered}

-   **Apply funds toward securing a core decennial area staff throughout
    the decade:** Decennial funds, secured earlier in the decade, should
    be applied toward maintaining a core staff within the Decennial
    Management Division (DMD) and other participating divisions within
    the decennial organization throughout the decade. The DMD staff
    would develop requirements and budget, and coordinate, integrate,
    and monitor testing, evaluation and dress rehearsal program leading
    up to the 2010 census. They would also serve to maintain the
    decennial census knowledge base. Staff in participating divisions
    would work on requirements and implement the testing, evaluation and
    dress rehearsal program and thus also maintain decennial census
    knowledge and expertise.

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-   **Identify core competencies for personnel in key positions:** Key
    decennial census participants should be technically capable and
    should also possess strong management skills. Because of the fluid
    nature of the census, these individuals should also demonstrate
    characteristics such as dedication, flexibility, innovation, and
    good interpersonal skills.

-   **Ensure that DMD staff members have previous census experience
    and/or adequate training:** Many of those interviewed commented on
    the lack of decennial experience or training among the DMD staff.
    The Census Bureau environment should be conducive to providing
    decennial experience to junior Census Bureau personnel and should
    also provide training to staff members who participate on a
    temporary basis. Temporary appointments should be initiated sooner
    in the Census cycle to ensure that there is adequate time allotted
    for training.

-   **Promote dynamic working relationships by ensuring that key
    personnel work together through decennial tests and dress
    rehearsal:** Establishing teams who worked through issues during the
    testing and dress rehearsal years was perceived by interviewees as
    critical to the development of effective and efficient working
    relationships for the decennial census. These teams need to
    understand how their efforts fit into the integrated strategic plan,
    should have clearly defined objectives, deliverables, and schedules,
    and should have a designated lead to make decisions or
    recommendations.

-   **Continue to round out staff within the Decennial Census
    Directorate with term employees, but provide adequate training and
    guidance:** Term employees were used successfully to increase staff
    resources in the course of the decennial cycle, but interviewees
    determined that these individuals' usefulness was limited as they
    were not experienced or trained in decennial operations. Term
    employees should be subjected to a course of training in Census
    Bureau and decennial operations at the start of their employment,
    and should also be hired earlier to ensure adequate time for this
    training.

## 15.7 Findings on Leadership {#findings-on-leadership .unnumbered}

Of the 52 individuals who were interviewed, 44 commented on certain
aspects of leadership with 169 total comments (N=44, C=169).
Interviewees reported that the senior leadership had changed many times
throughout the decade. The contractor determined that over the 12-year
cycle, there were four Census Bureau Directors, at least three Deputy
Directors, the creation of two Principal Associate Directors in 1996,
another change to the Principal Associate Director for Administration
and CFO in 1997, and three Associate Directors for the Decennial Census;
this totals 13 decennial Executive Staff changes.

In general, interviewees perceived that each new leadership change, both
at the Director and the Decennial Census Directorate levels, accompanied
a change in internal approach. This, coupled with the greater strategic
battle over sampling versus traditional enumeration strategy, caused the
leadership's message to be perceived as inconsistent and unfocused. Many
of the Executive Staff did not have decennial experience. Later in the
decade, however, the executive management team was perceived by some to
have been much more focused and effective (n=5).

## 15.8 Recommendations on Leadership {#recommendations-on-leadership .unnumbered}

-   **Minimize, to the extent controllable, changes to leadership
    positions and priorities:** Changes to leadership positions at the
    Executive Staff and directorate levels caused significant confusion
    and reversals to decennial priorities as the decade progressed. The
    Census Bureau should try to maintain more continuity of leadership,
    particularly in the latter years of the decade leading up to the
    decennial census.

-   **Clearly communicate Executive Staff vision, values, priorities and
    direction in order to nurture an integrated decennial culture:**
    Communication on priorities internally to staff participating in the
    decennial census should be as important as communicating externally
    to outside stakeholders. With clear communication of the vision,
    values and priorities, the decennial organization would have a
    better chance at developing a distinct coordinated and mature
    culture.

## 15.9 Findings on Organizational Structure & Management Approach  {#findings-on-organizational-structure-management-approach .unnumbered}

Of the 52 individuals interviewed, 50 interviewees made a total of 450
comments on the management approach of the Census Bureau as pertains to
the conduct of the decennial census (N=50, C=450). At the highest levels
of the Census Bureau's organization, the Field Division has a separate
reporting chain from the Decennial Management Division and the rest of
the Decennial Census Directorate and other major participants.
Interestingly, ten individuals commented on the separation of planning
and resource management from operations in the organizational structure.
The Executive Staff overwhelmingly supported maintaining the existing
structure but division and operational level staff supported moving
decennial-related field operations to the Principal Associate Director
for Programs. The issue of whether to consolidate decennial Field staff
within the Programs Directorate is a contentious one. Either structure
has advantages and disadvantages.

Thirty-eight interviewees reported that the "matrix" approach,
implemented earlier in the decade, was not effectively implemented and
did not provide a mechanism for overall program coordination and
integration across and among participating divisions. Twenty-two
interviewees said that the matrix approach should include a strong
centralized management component in order to properly coordinate
participants and to integrate the planning and execution of the
decennial census. There was strong support for the Decennial Management
Division to take on the integration and coordination role, which
occurred later in the decade; of the twenty-two who commented, twelve
individuals said that the centralized approach worked better than the
matrix approach, while ten stated that the centralized approach is the
only one that could achieve program coordination and integration
objectives.

## 15.10 Recommendations on Organizational Structure & Management Approach {#recommendations-on-organizational-structure-management-approach .unnumbered}

-   **Define, communicate and enforce roles and responsibilities before
    the planning and design phases of the decennial census cycle:**
    Changes in decennial leadership, strategy and management approach
    caused significant confusion regarding the roles and
    responsibilities of decennial staff members and members of the
    participating divisions throughout the decade. Clearly defining
    roles, clarifying lines of authority, outlining areas of
    responsibility and ensuring that reporting lines are aligned to
    avoid end-runs should improve accountability and result in
    improvements to the designing, planning and decision-making
    activities for the decennial census.

-   **Continue with the "centralized" management component that
    fulfilled the desired results of matrix management:** The
    centralized component consisted of a strong and appropriately
    staffed DMD structure serving as coordinators and integrators of
    decennial census program areas with the cooperation of the
    participating divisions. It is, in fact, the approach that
    represents true matrix management because it features a more robust
    DMD on the y-axis counterbalancing and coordinating the interests of
    the participating divisions on the x-axis.

-   **Recognize the need to switch from a teaming approach for planning
    and resourcing activities in the years early in the decade to a more
    command and control approach when decennial census operations
    begin:** What happened at the Census Bureau in the late 1990s was
    none other than an attempt to do planning and service delivery at
    the same time without changing the management approach. An
    understanding of the use of different management approaches to
    achieve different results will go a long way toward alleviating some
    of the confusion that accompanied the Census 2000.

-   **The PADs each have the responsibility to represent the interests
    of their directorates, as well as the interests of the greater
    census organization.** Under the current organizational structure,
    the PADs may find themselves in situations where their interests in
    representing their directorates are at odds with the interests of
    the greater Census Bureau organization. The Director should act as
    the coordinating point between the two directorates, to mitigate
    challenges in areas of potential conflict of interest.

## 15.11 Findings on Decision-Making {#findings-on-decision-making .unnumbered}

Of those interviewed, thirty-five interviewees made 98 comments on the
decision-making processes (N=35, C=98). Decision-making, whether under
the matrix or centrally managed approach, provided challenges to
managing the decennial census. Under the matrix approach, poor
organization resulted in an inability to reach decisions and to make
tangible progress. The centralized management approach, though better
organized than the matrix approach, was beset by its own set of
decision-making challenges. Interviewees reported that because of the
inexperience of both the Decennial Management Division staff and the
Census 2000 leadership late in the decade, decision-making was strongly
controlled within the offices of the Associate Director and the
Assistant Director for Decennial Census.

## 15.12 Recommendations on Decision-Making {#recommendations-on-decision-making .unnumbered}

-   **Provide working groups and operational teams with a
    decision-making mechanism that is enforced and supported by
    superiors:** In analyzing some of the documentation describing the
    organization of the teams and working groups involved in the
    decennial census, it is clear that they were inadequately designed
    from an organizational perspective for coming to conclusion on
    issues. A true chairman, endowed with final decision-making or
    recommendation-making authority to the next level, would have had
    the authority to arbitrate disputes and enable progress on the
    important issues under consideration.

-   **Avoid allowing decisions to be re-addressed through alternate or
    unofficial chains of command:** The Associate Director level
    leadership allowed decision-making mechanisms to be by- passed,
    which often rendered the structured processes irrelevant. Dual
    chains also provide a perfect forum for end-runs, when parties
    involved in a dispute do not agree with a particular decision. This
    situation may explain why decisions were not perceived to be final,
    and were revisited even if they appeared to have solved the initial
    problem.

-   **Ensure that authority, responsibility, accountability and capacity
    are aligned in determining roles and responsibilities throughout the
    decennial organization:** Perhaps the single most important
    principle to adhere to for management efficiency is to ensure, for
    all positions, that areas of responsibility are clearly defined,
    that individuals are given sufficient authority to make final
    decisions regarding the activities in their areas of responsibility,
    and that those same individuals are held accountable to their direct
    superiors for the success or failure of the activities within their
    areas. Many of the unanticipated and unintended management
    challenges, like end-runs and an inability to reach final decisions,
    result from an improperly structured management approach due to a
    deviation from this principle. Furthermore, it is not possible to
    achieve organizational objectives without sufficient capacity. This
    includes making sure that positions are filled with capable and
    appropriate individuals and that resources are available to deliver
    the services successfully.

## 15.13 Findings on Planning {#findings-on-planning .unnumbered}

Of the 47 people who commented on planning (N=47, C=207), 34 believed
that there were weaknesses in Census 2000 planning strategy. They felt
that the key to census success begins with early planning, but that few
concrete plans existed by the end of the decade. Furthermore, some felt
that planning needed to be led at a more strategic level[^83].

## 15.14 Recommendations on Planning  {#recommendations-on-planning .unnumbered}

-   **Complete Program Master Plans (PMPs) and documentation on
    decennial census operations by the dress rehearsal and update as
    necessary:** PMPs provide significant documentation on guidance and
    requirements for the decennial census. They should be drafted before
    the dress rehearsal and modified as necessary based on the lessons
    learned. The modifications from the dress rehearsal should be
    completed before the census.

-   **Complete more detailed activity schedules earlier in the decade
    before testing:** Developing detailed preliminary activity schedules
    before the testing phase is important to ensure that the key
    activities have been considered and integrated into the end to end
    strategy.

-   **Encourage Field Headquarters to involve the regional staff in the
    planning phase earlier in the census cycle:** Involvement of the
    Field Division\'s Regional Offices in planning is crucial to
    ensuring that plans are "operable" and that both field and
    headquarters eventually implement strategies under the same general
    framework.

-   **Continually monitor risk and conduct contingency planning both
    strategically and at lower levels in the planning processes:**
    Interviewees stated that contingency planning might have enabled the
    Census Bureau to react more effectively to the decision to pursue
    the traditional census approach.

## 15.15 Findings on Human Resources Management {#findings-on-human-resources-management .unnumbered}

A significant number of interviewees (N=26, C=69) mentioned the
importance of succession planning, career development and management
training to better prepare and equip staff members for conducting the
next census. They strongly supported the need to better prepare junior
employees for future management roles.

## 15.16 Recommendations on Human Resources Management  {#recommendations-on-human-resources-management .unnumbered}

-   **Provide training on project management:** In planning for the next
    census, Census Bureau leadership should develop a formal management
    training plan to train individuals for managerial positions and a
    career development plan for the professional development of staff.

-   **Strategically recruit managers who have decennial census knowledge
    and experience and develop retention strategies:** Introducing
    strategic recruiting and developing retention strategies should work
    to maintain the decennial knowledge base.

-   **Promote managers based on both technical competence and management
    skills:** Many interviewees stressed the need for the Census Bureau
    to focus more on rewarding good management skills rather than just
    technical skills.

-   **Identify long-term rewards for individuals participating in the
    decennial census from other divisions:** Career plans and promotions
    should reward thought leadership[^84] and demonstration of the
    ability to stretch capabilities as workers and as managers. Criteria
    for promotion could include competencies such as thought leadership,
    management skills and training and the ability to demonstrate
    flexibility and creativity in a fluid situation.

-   **Minimize career impediments to individuals participating from
    other divisions:** In the staffing section, interviewees stated that
    some long-term Census Bureau employees are not enthusiastic about
    working on the decennial census. Minimizing long-term career
    impediments and improving communications could improve this trend.

-   **More fully develop career plans for non-Mathematician/Statistician
    personnel:** Career development plans should be developed for all
    key career paths within the Census Bureau and decennial
    participating divisions.

-   **Provide rotational assignments in testing and dress rehearsal
    years:** Testing and dress rehearsal years provide decennial
    management with the opportunity to cross-train key personnel in
    other areas of census planning and operations. Field implementation
    experience was cited by some as critical to the skill set of those
    coordinating the planning in the Decennial Census Directorate.

-   **Implement succession planning:** The Census Bureau leadership
    should also develop a well-defined succession plan as many key
    employees are close to becoming eligible for retirement.

## 15.17 Findings on Internal Communications {#findings-on-internal-communications .unnumbered}

Census Bureau leadership had a challenging task in managing
communications because of the sheer number of stakeholders who needed to
be kept informed of the information and events that were unfolding
during the census cycle. Thirty-five of the fifty-two individuals
interviewed commented on the challenges in the communications area
(N=35, C=95). The decision-making mechanisms, lines of authority, and
individual roles of the strategic planning participants were not clearly
defined, and as a result, internal communications were not very
effective. There was no clear communications strategy or approach for
handling internal communications among the decennial staff members early
in the decade. In order to improve internal communications, it is
important for the leadership to clarify communications, lines of
authority, and areas of responsibility in order to ensure that an
appropriate internal structure for communications is in place. Census
Bureau leadership must also make certain that the Associate Director
(AD) for Decennial Census assumes responsibility for coordinating
internal communications among the division chiefs and decennial census
managers and develops a strategic internal communications capability,
using a consistent and replicable approach.

## 15.18 Recommendations on Internal Communications {#recommendations-on-internal-communications .unnumbered}

-   **Clarify communications lines of authority, areas of
    responsibility, and reporting lines in order to ensure an
    appropriate internal communications structure:** Decennial Executive
    Staff should take the initiative early in the census cycle to define
    lines of authority, decision-making mechanisms, and decision-making
    criteria for communications issues at each level. They must outline
    areas of responsibility and ensure that reporting lines mirror
    delegations of authority in order to hold those with authority
    accountable for their respective areas of responsibility.

-   **Ensure that the AD for Decennial Census assumes final
    responsibility for coordinating internal communications and for
    holding the division chiefs and decennial census managers
    accountable for disseminating information to division staff
    members:** In order to achieve cooperation among division chiefs,
    the responsibility for coordinating internal decennial
    communications to and from the executive leadership must reside at
    the Associate Director level, one level higher in the reporting
    hierarchy than the division chief level.

-   **Develop a strategic internal communications capability using a
    consistent and replicable approach:** The AD for Decennial Census
    should ensure that the communications groups throughout the
    organization follow the communications strategy set by the AD for
    Decennial Census, and also address each of the phases important to
    the development of an effective communications approach[^85]. By
    considering the components through the four phases, the basis for a
    successful implementation would be established. In order to ensure
    that the communications strategy is implemented, the AD for
    Decennial Census can, for example, tie the achievement of decennial
    communications goals with individual performance reviews.

-   **Develop a knowledge management capability to retain corporate
    knowledge and to communicate programmatic changes to decennial
    census participants in a timely manner:** Throughout the census
    process, one group such as DMD should have responsibility for
    documenting and communicating the status of activities during the
    planning and conduct of the decennial census. Program managers could
    communicate operational deviations from schedule and technical
    changes to requirements through a change control database that
    tracks and updates approved changes.

## 15.19 Findings on Management Information Systems {#findings-on-management-information-systems .unnumbered}

Forty interviewees commented on the Management Information Systems
processes (N=40, C=138). In the assessment of the management information
system and tools (MIS), interviewees commented on the usefulness of
having data accessible through the various systems. Still, MIS was not
universally accepted due to perceived problems with data consistency,
system usability, and difficulties obtaining useful management reports.
To improve upon the MIS tools, it is important to develop an information
technology vision that is consistent with the goals of the strategic
plan. In addition, the Executive Staff and the Decennial Directorate
leadership must express their support of the MIS and must work to obtain
user buy-in and commitment throughout the Census Bureau. This will help
to increase user acceptance and utilization of the MIS for management
and decision-making. It is equally important to involve participating
divisions in the development of the MIS in order to establish a clear
understanding of the MIS components and data outputs.

## 15.20 Recommendations on the MIS Processes {#recommendations-on-the-mis-processes .unnumbered}

-   **Secure senior level commitment for the systems:** Increased
    commitment and championing of the MIS by the Executive Staff and
    Decennial Directorate leadership will help to legitimize the systems
    and the data. This will help to increase user acceptance and
    utilization of the MIS for management and decision-making.

-   **Develop an information technology vision that is consistent with
    goals of the Strategic Plan:** The development of an effective MIS
    strategy begins with the articulation of how information technology
    assets are streamlined to support business processes and objectives.
    These should be expressed in a strategic vision and plan.

-   **Determine and document the scope of each system:** It is not
    necessary for MIS to provide a universal solution for all issues
    surrounding the cost, progress, and schedule of the decennial
    census. The Census Bureau should clearly define the functionality of
    the MIS so system users will have a clear understanding of what
    functions they can expect the MIS to perform.

-   **Involve participating divisions in the development of the MIS:**
    User acceptance would increase if participating divisions had more
    involvement in developing system requirements. User acceptance
    levels would increase if certain functionalities were incorporated
    into the system. These include: having an additional level of detail
    that is specific to the participating divisions, having systems that
    are easier for users to navigate and make changes to, and allowing
    users to have increased flexibility in the level of reporting.

-   **Define a Decennial Change Management and Change Control
    methodology that includes MIS:** User acceptance of the MIS would
    increase if a decennial change management and change control plan
    was implemented, which covered the census participants' transition
    to use of the MIS. The plan would allow users to gain an
    understanding of each system's function and would include a plan for
    change that is based upon clear and consistent internal
    communication.

-   **Increase user training and begin training earlier in the decennial
    census cycle:** Increased training would help users to better
    understand the functionality of the MIS. Earlier training on the
    systems would help staff in participating divisions to increase
    their acceptance and understanding of the MIS components.

-   **Get a clear agreement on data definitions and ensure like terms
    are used consistently among the systems:** System users encountered
    problems that stemmed from the inconsistent use of terms throughout
    the Decennial systems. A clear set of data definitions, as well as
    proper identification of feeder system naming conventions, will help
    to ensure a better understanding of data outputs.

-   **Institute an effective quality control process so data in the
    feeder systems are trusted:** User acceptance is based on trusting
    the data produced by the MIS. Data produced by the MIS feeder
    systems are consistent within each system's own environment, however
    not all systems are perfectly aligned in real time to allow for
    consistency throughout the entire system. Ensuring that all data and
    data sources are clearly defined so that a user can identify what
    the data represent, where it came from, and how current it is will
    increase user confidence in the MIS.

## 15.21 Findings on Large Scale Contracting {#findings-on-large-scale-contracting .unnumbered}

Census 2000 marked the first time that the Census Bureau had made an
effort to outsource a large number of major decennial census activities,
and many at the Census Bureau perceived this to be a new and innovative
approach. Forty interviewees commented on the impact of competitively
outsourcing some of the important activities for Census 2000 (N=40,
C=235). Although contractors brought in new skills and competencies to
the Census Bureau that helped to improve management and operational
processes, many staff members also believed that the practice of
outsourcing also highlighted weaknesses in the Census Bureau's
operations. Because staff members within the Census Bureau were
unaccustomed to working with contractors, the management and operational
models used to structure this type of working relationships were not in
place. For example, the internal Census Bureau change control processes
were not fully defined, so the Census Bureau deferred to the change
control practices used by the contractor. These operational challenges
contributed to the Census Bureau's difficulty in integrating best
practices, new technologies, and knowledge transfer techniques into
other areas of the Census Bureau.

## 15.22 Recommendations on Large Scale Contracting {#recommendations-on-large-scale-contracting .unnumbered}

-   **Consider how risks can be reduced through contracting:**
    Contracting with third parties shares and mitigates the risks to the
    Census Bureau from using new technology in the decennial census.
    This risk mitigation was particularly advantageous, given the
    broader context of what was achieved with Census 2000 and given the
    scale and complexities involved.

-   **Define user requirements as the foundation of contracting and
    program management:** Using contracts and outsourcing activities
    forced the Census Bureau to make decisions, to define requirements,
    and to commit to the terms and conditions of the underlying
    contract. Very often the contracts were let out before the business
    and technical requirements were fully defined. The contractors
    followed CMM principles in their developmental processes and needed
    to have decisions made with sufficient time to adequately develop
    and test their systems. The Census Bureau culture regarding internal
    development, however, had historically supported changes until the
    last moment. In the new contracting environment, defining
    requirements and supporting last minute changes tended to drive up
    costs. It becomes fiscally important that the Census Bureau, as a
    steward of the public trust, have generally defined business and
    technology requirements as fully as possible before entering into
    contractual arrangements.

-   **View large contract management as a skilled discipline, requiring
    training and education on new skills and competencies:** The
    existing contracting and procurement function did not initially have
    the capacity or capability to handle large, complex procurements.
    The experience of working with contractors on such a large, complex
    outsourcing of operations exposed the decennial census staff to new
    management practices, particularly in the disciplines of contract
    and program management.

-   **Address cultural differences** **using** **"change management"**
    **practices and techniques that are appropriate to the Census Bureau
    organization:** Private sector companies operate very differently
    from government entities. Therefore, transitioning the internal
    workload to external service providers proved difficult for both the
    Census Bureau and the contractors. The working relationship between
    the Census Bureau and the contractors brought to light a number of
    potential areas for improvement within the Census Bureau's
    managerial operations. Change management techniques may involve
    developing change strategies, a communications plan and training,
    for example.

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-   **Consider a two-tiered acquisition strategy:** Many large
    acquisition efforts follow a two-tiered approach to outsourcing in
    order to ensure that requirements are defined before large contracts
    are signed. The first stage includes the definition of the business
    and technical requirements of the proposed program. The defined
    requirements can then be incorporated into the second stage, which
    includes the implementation and operational phase of the program
    effort. Two-tiered approaches should be paired with strong program
    management and change control processes.

-   **Include a knowledge transfer requirement in large contracting
    efforts:** In order to ensure that program management expertise is
    retained within the Census Bureau and that the Census Bureau does
    not become overly dependent on private sector organizations, the
    contracts should include a knowledge retention or knowledge transfer
    clause. Knowledge transfer activities could include developing a
    training program for Census Bureau personnel, shifting operations
    from contractor personnel to government personnel, and creating a
    steering group with a mix of Census Bureau and contract managers.

-   **Create change control and risk management committees:** Change
    control and risk management regimes should be implemented as a means
    of monitoring project progress and accommodating possible
    programmatic or departmental changes to an ongoing project. The
    change control capability will capture a proposed change in a change
    and risk register, address it at the working group level, elevate
    the change to project managers if an acceptable solution cannot be
    identified, identify and evaluate the associated risks, and require
    the project manager to direct an appropriate course of action.

[]{#__RefHeading___Toc55114615 .anchor}REFERENCES

The following are references related to this document:

+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| Nu   | Reference Name                                                |
| mber |                                                               |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| 1    | Summary of Census Laws, Specifically the U.S. Constitution    |
|      | and Title 13, Contractor Compilation.                         |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| 2    | [World Factbook]{.underline}, Washington: U.S. Central        |
|      | Intelligence Agency, 2001.                                    |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| 3    | Department of Commerce v. United States House of              |
|      | Representatives, 525 U.S. 316 (1999).                         |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| 4    | Drucker, Peter F., "Management's New Paradigms," *FORBES*,    |
|      | Oct. 1998, pp. 152-176.                                       |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| 5    | Hammer, Michael and Stanton, Steven, "How Process Enterprises |
|      | *Really* Work," *Harvard Business Review*, Nov 1999, pp.      |
|      | 108-118.                                                      |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| 6    | "The Census 2000 Battle -- Timeline," 2000, from              |
|      |                                                               |
|      | http://kings.edu/\~twsawyer/census/timeline.html.             |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| 7    | Bureau of the Census Management Evaluation, "Compilation of   |
|      | Funding Figures for Census in US, UK, Australia, and Canada," |
|      | Dec. 2001.                                                    |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| 8    | U.S. Department of Agriculture, *County-Based Agency Study*,  |
|      | 1998.                                                         |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| 9    | U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, *Census    |
|      | 2000 Study Plan*, Q.1 Evaluation of the Management Processes  |
|      | and Systems of the 2000 Decennial Census.                     |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| 10   | U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Decennial  |
|      | Management Division, *Updated Summary: Census 2000            |
|      | Operational Plan*, Feb. 1999.                                 |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| 11   | U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Decennial  |
|      | Management Division, *Census 2000 Program Steering Committee  |
|      | Charters*.                                                    |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| 12   | U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Decennial  |
|      | Management Division, *Roles and Responsibilities of Census    |
|      | 2000 Participants*, 1998.                                     |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| 13   | U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Office of  |
|      | the Director, *Memorandum for Operational Status and          |
|      | Assessment Meetings*, Preston Jay Waite, Nov. 18, 1999.       |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| 14   | Focus Group for Census Bureau Business Requirements Analysis  |
|      | for the Master Activity Schedule and Cost & Progress System,  |
|      | January 23, 2002.                                             |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| 15   | U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, *Census    |
|      | 2000 Study Plan*, Q.1 Evaluation of the Management Processes  |
|      | and Systems of the 2000 Decennial Census.                     |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| 16   | U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census,            |
|      | *Information Technology Operational Plan*, 1998--2002, for    |
|      | the Decennial Census, November 7, 1997.                       |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| 17   | U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, *2000      |
|      | Operational Information Technology Plan*.                     |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| 18   | U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, *2002      |
|      | Operational Information Technology Plan*.                     |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| 19   | U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Decennial  |
|      | Management Division, *Updated Summary: Census 2000            |
|      | Operational Plan*, Feb. 1999.                                 |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| 20   | U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Decennial  |
|      | Management Division, *Census 2000 Operational Plan*, Dec.     |
|      | 1998.                                                         |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| 21   | U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Decennial  |
|      | Management Division, *Roles and Responsibilities of Census    |
|      | 2000 Participants*, 1998.                                     |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+

[]{#__RefHeading___Toc55114616 .anchor}APPENDIX A: CRITERIA FOR
EVALUATING THE MANAGEMENT APPROACH

The Steering Committee requested that the contractor fulfill the
management evaluation requirements in the Statement of Work by
evaluating the implemented management approach against the planned
approach described in the 1998 Roles and Responsibilities document.
Despite the successes of Census 2000 and the fact that the decennial
organization eventually ended up with an approach that fit their
business model, the contractor conducted the evaluation of the
implementation against the 1998 plan. There are several key elements in
an effective management approach upon which the contractor based their
evaluation. The contractor used the following criteria: [^86] 1) clearly
defined roles and responsibilities, 2) a viable management approach with
appropriate mechanisms to achieve results, 3) the effective deployment
and communication of the management approach, 4) the sustained use of
the management approach and its components, and 5) the existence of
tangible performance results. More extensive discussion of the findings
from the interviews is provided in the results summarized below.

**Criteria 1: Clarity of Roles and Responsibilities:** The project team
met with the Steering Committee in an effort to get a better
understanding of which divisions within the decennial organization the
were responsible or contributed to which operations. During the
interview process, individuals indicated that DMD roles were not clear
(n=13) and that, as a general rule, the roles and responsibilities for
all those involved in the decennial organization were not clear (n=11).

**Criteria 2: Management Approach and Mechanisms:** The management
approach outlined in the Roles and Responsibilities document was
deployed, but it lacked key mechanisms for issue resolution. The Census
Operational Managers (COM) group was to be a forum through which issues
could be initially raised and considered. According to those
interviewed, the COM was to be the first step of the issue-resolution
process and was to facilitate communications throughout the decennial
organization (n=8). Many interviewees, however, considered the COM
structure ineffective (N=16, C=21) with some managers bypassing the
entire process altogether (n=5). With regard to the design of the IR/CC,
the members of the office of the Associate Director for Decennial Census
allowed decision-making mechanisms to be by-passed. By allowing dual
chains of command to the directorate leadership, the delegations of
authority were voided and the leadership effectively rendered the
structured decision-making processes irrelevant.

**Criteria 3: Deployment and Communication:** In the interviews with
decennial staff members, there was some awareness of the *Roles and
Responsibilities* document within the Decennial Management Division, but
little awareness in the rest of the decennial organization. Individuals
acknowledged participation in the Census Operational Managers meetings
but indicated that they considered the COM structure ineffective (N=16)
with some managers bypassing the entire process altogether (n=5).
Individuals also acknowledged participation in the IR/CC process, but
commented that the people with the necessary knowledge often did not
attend (n=8) and that the paper-based process was too time-consuming
during census years (n=6).

**Criteria 4: Sustainability of Management Approach Components:** In
1999, the COM meetings were discontinued completely. The COM structure
was replaced by the daily Operational Status and Assessment (OSAM)
meetings, which provided more real-time reporting on decennial census
operations. The IR/CC process was sustained through Census 2000, but it
was only used selectively. Consensus among the interviewees was that
there was very little change control because IR/CC issues were at a very
high, more policy related level, while a lot of lower level changes were
going on at the same time outside of the IR/CC mechanism.

**Criteria 5: Performance Results:** Developing strategic and
operational plans and risk mitigation strategies should be the core
business processes of the decennial organization and management approach
leading up to 1998; plans and strategies are the products of these
processes. Consequently, the lack of finalized plans and risk management
strategies in the years leading up to the decennial census were the
results of an ineffective management approach and a lack of staff
resources. Interviewees commented that major components of the Census
2000 operation were deployed without testing and evaluation, indicating
that there was a deficiency in planning and testing. Most of the Program
Master Plans, which were completed before the dress rehearsal leading up
to the 1990 census, were not updated or finalized before Census 2000.
Interviewees also conceded that the key to the success of Census 2000
was the knowledge base of a core group of census staff members who were
supported by the requirements documents from the 1990 census.

[]{#__RefHeading___Toc55114617 .anchor}APPENDIX B: CENSUS BUREAU
MANAGEMENT EVALUATION INTERVIEW ANALYSIS QUICK REFERENCE GUIDE

1.0 Interpreting the Results

This analysis results from 52 management interviews and over 1,700
comments from the interviews. The 52 interviewees consisted of 9
Executive Staff, 13 Division Chiefs, 18 Assistant Division Chiefs, and
12 Branch Chiefs from the Census Bureau. Of the 52 interviews, 22 were
from the Decennial Census Directorate, which is broken out as follows 2
Exec Staff, 4 Division Chiefs, 8 ADCs, and 8 Branch Chiefs. The
interview results do not specify which directorate a respondent is from
as a means to maintain confidentiality. Each bullet point refers to a
particular category and contains numbers for N and C. The N refers to
the number of people who made comments about a particular topic. There
were a total of 52 interviews, so N will not equal more than 52. A
capital N indicates that one or more small n\'s roll up into the larger
category. The C's refer to the number of comments made in a particular
category.

2.0 Political Environment

Political Oversight (N=41, C=116) includes comments about how external
oversight groups impacted the implementation of Census 2000, how the
Census Bureau communicated with these groups and the impact on the
Census Bureau from the political nature of the decennial census.

Congress (n=19, c=38)

As Congress has become more involved with the decennial census, the
process has become more complicated. Congress withheld funds mid-decade
until the census operational years approached. (n=19 is comprised of 3
Exec Staff, 7 Division Chiefs, 7 ADCs, and 2 Branch Chiefs)

Impact of Oversight to Processes (n=19, c=24)

The oversight was overwhelming, burdensome, and distracted us from
getting our work done. The oversight caused many things to change during
implementation. (n=19 is comprised of 5 Exec Staff, 5 Division Chiefs, 7
ADCs, and 2 Branch Chiefs)

The Department of Commerce, the Inspector General, and the General
Accounting Office (n=18, c=37)

The oversight from the DoC and the GAO was overwhelming. Poor
relationships between the Census Bureau and external advisory groups
also impacted these processes. (n=18 is comprised of 3 Exec Staff, 7
Division Chiefs, 7 ADCs, and 1 Branch Chief)

Political Nature of the Census (n=14, c=18)

Politics drives the census. To make the census more successful, we
should remove the politics. Congress and Commerce were particularly
concerned with the \$4 billion price cap. (n=14 is comprised of 2 Exec
Staff, 4 Division Chiefs, 6 ADCs, and 2 Branch Chiefs)

The Census Monitoring Board (n=5, c=6)

The Census Monitoring Board was disruptive because many of their visits
occurred during enumeration. Some of their comments lacked accuracy.
(n=5 is comprised of 1 Exec Staff, 1 ADC, 2 Division Chiefs, and 1
Branch Chief)

The Administration (n=5, c=6)

The Democratic Administration advocated the sampling approach. It
created another level of complexity to the political oversight. (n=5 is
comprised of 1 Exec Staff, 3 ADCs, and 1 Branch Chief).

3.  **Funding (N=37, C=76)**

Not Enough Funding (n=17, c=23)

We never had enough funding. Funding was light early in the decade.
There is generally a limited budget between census years. (n=17 is
comprised of 4 Exec Staff, 6 Division Chiefs, 4 ADCs, and 3 Branch
Chiefs)

Having the Right Amount of Money at the Right Time (n=11, c=11)

We need more money in the early years. (n=11 is comprised of 1 Exec
Staff, 6 Division Chiefs, and 4 ADCs)

Enough Resources (n=10, c=15)

Resources existed to procure top contractors. When we finally got to the
decennial census, there was enough money. Once the money came in,
decisions were made. (n=10 is comprised of 1 Exec Staff, 6 Division
Chiefs, 2 ADCs, and 1 Branch Chief)

Resources Came in After the Supreme Court Decision (n=8, c=9)

"For Census 2000 we spent \$1 billion in 9 1/2 weeks to get the job
done." "Census 2000 was conducted under tightly constrained budgetary
environment. Programs could not be staffed up without the money. The
funds came in only after the Supreme Court ruling."

Funding Requests (n=9, c=10)

The DMD was an advocate for the divisions in getting funding. In 1999,
we requested \$1.3 billion and got \$900 million. The budget seemed to
be in a big black box. (n=9 is comprised of 4 Exec Staff, 2 Division
Chiefs, and 3 Branch Chiefs)

Impact of Dual Path on Resources (n=10, c=16)

We had a lack of resources from trying to run two censuses at once.
(n=10 is comprised of 3 Exec Staff, 6 ADCs, and 1 Branch Chief)

Selling the Decennial Census to Congress and the Department of Commerce
(n=9, c=17)

The Executive Staff needs to do a better job in convincing Congress and
Commerce of the need for early planning funding. The Census Bureau is
one of the only agencies that does not specifically court the budget
examiner from Commerce. (n=9 is comprised of 5 Exec Staff, 3 Division
Chiefs, and 1 Branch Chief)

4.  Staffing & 10.0 Human Resources Management

Personnel resources (N=50, C=299) includes comments regarding hiring
processes, career development, decennial census and field experience,
and having the right number of staff.

4.1 Census Experience (N=41, C=101)

Census experience includes comments about the results on the impact of
not enough people having previous decennial census experience, field
experience, or the right skills to implement Census 2000. (n=41 is
comprised of 7 Exec Staff, 11 Division Chiefs, 13 ADCs, and 8 Branch
Chiefs)

**Decennial Census Experience (N=36, C=74)** (n=36 is comprised of 6
Exec Staff, 10 Division Chiefs, 13 ADCs, and 7 Branch Chiefs)

Inexperience of DMD Staff (n=20, c=34)

The DMD brought people on board who were not always from decennial or
who were not educated on the process. The DMD lacked experience. The DMD
needs to develop more technical expertise. (n=20 is comprised of 2 Exec
Staff, 5 Division Chiefs, 10 ADCs, and 3 Branch Chiefs)

Experience of Leadership (n=13, c=19)

Few people at the executive level had decennial census experience. (n=13
is comprised of 2 Exec Staff, 6 Division Chiefs, 3 ADCs, and 2 Branch
Chiefs)

General Inexperience of the Staff (n=9, c=9)

Many of the new people did not necessarily have the technical knowledge
to perform the job. (n=9 is comprised of 1 Exec Staff, 2 Division
Chiefs, 5 ADCs, and 1 Branch Chief)

High Learning Curve for New Hires (n=5, c=5)

The decennial census had a steep learning curve for new hires and people
unfamiliar with the processes. (n=5 is comprised of 1 Exec Staff, 1
Division Chief, 1 ADC, and 2 Branch Chiefs)

Some Staff had Prior Experience (n=4, c=7)

Some staff and many of the program divisions had decennial census
experience. (n=4 is comprised of 2 Exec Staff, 1 ADC, and 1 Branch
Chief)

Staff Having the Right Skills for their Positions (n=16, c=17)

For management, we had the wrong people in the wrong places. We should
find the right people and put them in the key positions. (n=16 is
comprised of 3 Exec Staff, 5 Division Chiefs, 4 ADCs, and 4 Branch
Chiefs)

Experience of the Field Staff (n=10, c=10)

Many of the regional directors had experience in one to five previous
decennial censuses. Many of the temporary and new hires did not have
previous field experience. (n=10 is comprised of 3 Exec Staff, 3
Division Chiefs, 3 ADCs, and 1 Branch Chief)

**4.2 Hiring Processes (N=36, C=111)** (N=36 is comprised of 6 Exec
Staff, 8 Division Chiefs, 14 ADCs, and 8 Branch Chiefs)

Hiring Late in the Process (n=15, c=20)

Hiring occurred late in the process. Hiring should be done earlier in
the process. The hiring of significant numbers of people did not start
until 1998 and 1999. (n=15 is comprised of 1 Exec Staff, 1 Division
Chief, 8 ADCs, and 5 Branch Chiefs)

Retention Processes (n=14, c=19)

We are trying to keep headquarters people. In 2003, we have to be
creative in order to maintain staff. After the census, turnover is high.
Staff retention will reduce risks. (n=14 is comprised of 2 Exec Staff, 4
Division Chiefs, 5 ADCs, and 3 Branch Chiefs)

**Recruitment to the decennial census (N=13, C=19)** (n=13 is comprised
of 1 Exec Staff, 4 Division Chiefs, 4 ADCs, and 4 Branch Chiefs)

Recruitment to the DMD (n=9, c=12)

Taking a position with the decennial census risks an employee\'s
divisional career development, which prevents people from volunteering
for the decennial.

March 1999 Job Fair (n=4, c=4)

In March 1999, Census held a job fair and many new people were brought
on.

Recruitment of Mathematical/Statisticians (n=3, c=3)

Aside from Math/Stats, there is little targeted recruiting.

Downsizing from the 1990 census (n=11, c=14)

After the 1990 census the organization scaled back, and very few people
remained. Experienced staff retired or took buyouts. The downsizing was
done poorly. (n=11 is comprised of 1 Exec Staff, 1 Division Chief, 5
ADCS, 4 Branch Chiefs)

Successes in Field Hiring (n=10, c=17)

We should keep the front loading practice and competitive wage rates for
field. (n=10 is comprised of 4 Exec Staff, 3 Division Chiefs, 2 ADCS, 1
Branch Chief)

Use of Temporary Hires (n=10, c=12)

The temporary status of staff caused many problems. (n=10 is comprised
of 4 Division Chiefs, 3 ADCS, 3 Branch Chiefs)

Knowledge Sharing (n=7, c=10)

We lost too much institutional knowledge during the downsizing. We
should keep staff on to create plans for 2010 Census so we do not lose
that information. (n=7 is comprised of 1 Exec Staff, 1 Division Chief,
and 5 ADCs)

Timing of Hiring for Census 1990 (n=2, c=3)

For Census 1990 the timing was different. Staff were in place between
1984 and 1989, in time for the tests and dress rehearsal (1988). Junior
staff got experience and developed team spirit, and continuity was
maintained. (n=2 is comprised of 2 ADCs)

**4.3 Career Development (N=26, C=69)** (N=26 is comprised of 7 Exec
Staff, 6 Division Chiefs, 6 ADCs, and 7 Branch Chiefs)

Succession Planning (n=17, c=30)

Succession planning is better in regional offices than at headquarters
because upcoming managers are trained on other censuses and surveys
during non-decennial years. We need to grow leaders and managers earlier
in the process. Management needs to put more of a structure in place to
replace all the people retiring over the next few years. (n=17 is
comprised of 4 Exec Staff, 5 Division Chiefs, 5 ADCs, and 3 Branch
Chiefs)

Training (n=15, c=26)

There was little access to training prior to Census 2000. More training
and rotation programs should exist. (n=15 is comprised of 3 Exec Staff,
3 Division Chiefs, 3 ADCs, and 6 Branch Chiefs)

Value of Program Management Skills (n=7, c=15)

More people are needed with program management skills. The Census Bureau
should embrace program management skills. (n=7 is comprised of 2 Exec
Staff, 2 Division Chiefs, and 3 Branch Chiefs)

4.4 Right Number of Staff (n=25, c=32)

I never had the number of staff that I needed. People were stretched too
thin. (n=25 is comprised of 4 Exec Staff, 7 Division Chiefs, 7 ADCs, and
7 Branch Chiefs)

5.0 Leadership

Leadership (N=44, C=169) includes comments about the impact of
leadership changes on decennial census operations, leadership
priorities, and how the leadership handled external oversight.

5.1 Clarity of Direction (N=33, C=65)

Clarity of direction includes comments about the problems from priority
changes and little strategic direction. (N=33 is comprised of 7 Exec
Staff, 6 Division Chiefs, 12 ADCs, and 8 Branch Chiefs)

**Little clarity existed in the strategic direction (N=21, C=34)** (N=21
is comprised of 5 Exec Staff, 5 Division Chiefs, 7 ADCs, and 4 Branch
Chiefs)

Little Strategic Direction (n=11, c=17)

There was a general lack of control and little strategic direction.
Leadership should set the priorities of the census. Inconsistencies
existed in the messages from the leadership. (n=11 is comprised of 3
Exec Staff, 3 Division Chiefs, 3 ADCs, and 2 Branch Chiefs)

Too Many Priorities (n=7, c=7)

There were too many things going on at the same time. The Census Bureau
needs to decide on the most critical priorities and focus on them. (n=7
is comprised of 1 Exec Staff, 1 Division Chief, 3 ADCs, and 2 Branch
Chiefs)

The Executive Staff Did Not Know What Strategy to Use (n=6, c=6)

The Executive Staff "did not know what to fix, let alone how to fix it,
and how to get the census done." The leadership did not know what
strategy to use. (n=6 is comprised of 2 Exec Staff, 2 ADCs and 2 Branch
Chiefs)

**Priority Changes (N=15, C=25)** (N=15 is comprised of 2 Exec Staff, 3
Division Chiefs, 7 ADCs, and 3 Branch Chiefs)

Priority Changes based on Changes in Census Bureau Leadership (n=9,
c=11)

The shifting of the leadership and their priorities made things very
unclear at the ADC level. Each new leader brought his or her own
priorities. (n=9 is comprised of 2 Exec Staff, 1 Division Chief, 5 ADCs,
and 1 Branch Chief)

Lack of Continuity (n=8, c=14)

Census 2000 suffered from a lack of continuity, constantly changing
priorities, and having no concrete plan. (n=8 is comprised of 1 Exec
Staff, 3 Division Chiefs, 2 ADCs, and 2 Branch Chiefs)

5.2 Cohesiveness of the Leadership Team (N=18, C=33)

Cohesiveness of the leadership team includes comments on the general
cohesiveness of the managers and the disparity in the goals. (N=18 is
comprised of 4 Exec Staff, 3 Division Chiefs, 7 ADCs, and 4 Branch
Chiefs)

Leadership Problems (n=9, c=14)

In 1997 the Census 2000 management was "in shambles" and "problematic."
The leadership up to that point did not share a vision or leadership
goals. (n=9 is comprised of 3 Exec Staff, 2 Division Chiefs, 3 ADCs, and
1 Branch Chief)

Hands-On Leadership (n=6, c=9)

The environment changed when Jay Waite came on board and he took a much
stronger control of the processes. (n=6 is comprised of 1 Exec Staff, 1
Division Chief, 1 ADC, and 3 Branch Chiefs)

Strength of Senior Management (n=5, c=5)

Ken Prewitt had a lot of charisma and was a superb manager. John
Thompson and Jay Waite are both strong managers. (n=5 is comprised of 1
Exec Staff, 2 Division Chiefs, and 2 ADCs)

A Strong Leadership Team is needed Throughout the Decade (n=4, c=5)

Leadership is needed throughout the decade and the management staff was
brought on too late for Census 2000. (n=4 is comprised of 2 Exec Staff,
1 Division Chief, and 1 ADC)

5.3 Leadership Changes (n=18, c=30)

During the 1990s the Census Bureau leadership changed many times. (n=18
is comprised of 6 Exec Staff, 6 Division Chiefs, 4 ADCs, and 2 Branch
Chiefs)

**5.4 Relationship of Leaders with External Stakeholders (N=14, C=25)**
(N=14 is comprised of 4 Exec Staff, 5 Division Chiefs, 4 ADCs, and 1
Branch Chief)

Positive Interaction with External Stakeholders (n=9, c=14)

The Executive Staff should have strong relationships with external
stakeholders. Ken Prewitt facilitated a positive environment with
Congress and the Department of Commerce. He provided strong
communications. (n=9 is comprised of 4 Exec Staff, 3 Division Chiefs,
and 2 ADCs)

Negative Interaction with External Stakeholders (n=6, c=11)

Communication and interactions with external stakeholders lacked
consistency. The Executive Staff made promises early on that the Census
Bureau could not keep. (n=6 is comprised of 1 Exec Staff, 2 Division
Chiefs, 2 ADCs, and 1 Branch Chief)

6.0 How the Decennial Census Relates to Other Census Products (N=11,
C=17)

The Decennial Census is a Core Product (n=5, c=8)

The decennial census is a core product of the Census Bureau. (n=5 is
comprised of 2 Exec Staff, 2 Division Chiefs, and 1 ADC.

The Decennial Census is a Secondary Product (n=8, c=9)

The decennial census as it relates to other operations is considered to
be \"other duties as assigned.\" (n=8 is comprised of 1 Exec Staff, 3
Division Chiefs, and 4 ADCs.)

7.0 Organizational Structure

The organizational structure (N=41, C=118) includes comments about the
impacts of the Field Division not reporting to the Decennial Census
Directorate, the impacts to the decennial census from having a
constantly changing organizational structure as well as how the lines of
authority and reporting worked during Census 2000.

7.1 Executive Level Organizational Structure (N=33, C=87)

Executive level organizational structure includes comments on the
challenges in the Field Division not reporting to the Decennial Census
Directorate and the need to have better integration between the Regional
Directors and DMD. (N=33 is comprised of 9 Exec Staff, 10 Division
Chiefs, 11 ADCs, and 3 Branch Chiefs)

The Relationship Between Field and DMD (n=19, c=32)

There needs to be a closer integration between the DMD and Field. The
relationship between the DMD and the Field Division needs to work
better. (n=19 is comprised of 6 Exec Staff, 6 Division Chiefs, 4 ADCs,
and 3 Branch Chiefs)

Reporting Lines (n=13, c=15)

Coordination between the PAD for Programs and the PAD for Administration
was difficult. Confusion existed in the reporting lines. (n=13 is
comprised of 3 Exec Staff, 4 Division Chiefs, 4 ADCs, and 2 Branch
Chiefs)

**Field Reporting to Non-Decennial Management (N=11, C=12)** (n=11 is
comprised of 4 Exec Staff, 2 Division Chiefs, 4 ADCs, and 1 Branch
Chief)

Created Problems (n=7, c=7)

There was a challenge with the Field Division not reporting to the AD
for Decennial. This caused many problems to be addressed late and there
was a competition between decennial and field in places. Field should
move under the PAD for programs. (n=7 is comprised of 2 Division Chiefs,
4 ADCs, and 1 Branch Chief)

Created a Positive Balance (n=4, c=4)

Having the Field Division under a different PAD than the Decennial
Census Directorate provides an additional system of checks and balances.
(n=4 is comprised of 4 Exec Staff)

The Role of the Field Division (n=6, c=6)

Field changes structure between planning and implementation. Field plays
more of an administrative role. (n=6 is comprised of 2 Exec Staff, 1
Division Chief, and 3 ADCs)

Changes to the Management Approach (n=23, c=27)

The decennial census would have worked much better with a permanent
organizational structure. The organizational structure did not work as
well as intended. The organizational structure should be decided early
on in the decade. (n=23 is comprised of 5 Exec Staff, 7 Division Chiefs,
7 ADCs, and 4 Branch Chiefs)

Management Approach Weaknesses (n=3, c=3)

The problems with implementation were based on structural issues. (n=3
is comprised of 1 Exec Staff and 2 Branch Chiefs)

Management Approach Strengths (n=2, c=2)

We should keep the current organizational structure in place. It worked
admirably. (n=2 is comprised of 1 Exec Staff and 1 ADC)

7.2 Matrix Management Approach

The matrix approach (N=39, C=163) includes comments on why only one or
two of the PSCs worked and the problems associated with the structure
that caused the other PSCs to struggle, as well as how the PSC structure
impacted decision-making processes.

Matrix Management Weaknesses (N=38, C=116)

The weaknesses of matrix management includes comments on the problems
associated with the MIT, how the lack of integration led to little
clarity and conflicting interests, and the negative impact the PSC
structure had on Census 2000. (N=38 is comprised of 7 Exec Staff, 9
Division Chiefs, 15 ADCs, and 7 Branch Chiefs)

Problems associated with the MIT (N=20, C=44)

Problems with the MIT include comments on weaknesses with the MIT
structure, little guidance from the MIT, level of MIT leadership, and
awareness of the MIT. (N=20 is comprised of 1 Exec Staff, 6 Division
Chiefs, 8 ADCs, and 5 Branch Chiefs)

Little Direction for Integration (n=10, c=20)

The "MIT never did its stated job of integrating the PSCs." Little
integration existed in the PSC environment. (n=10 is comprised of 3
Division Chiefs, 3 ADCs, and 4 Branch Chiefs)

Coverage Gaps and Overlaps (n=7, c=7)

Some topics fell through the cracks and others were duplicated
throughout the PSCs. (n=7 is comprised of 1 Exec Staff, 3 Division
Chiefs, 2 ADCs, and 1 Branch Chief)

Little Communication between the PSCs (n=5, c=6)

"Communications across the PSCs was not good." Few formal mechanisms
existed for PSCs to communicate with each other. (n=5 is comprised of 2
Division Chief, 2 ADCs, and 1 Branch Chiefs)

Little Guidance from the MIT (n=4, c=6)

There was little, if any, guidance from the MIT to the PSCs. (n=4 is
comprised of 1 Exec Staff, 1 Division Chief, and 2 ADCs)

Some Managers were not Aware of the MIT (n=4, c=4)

I was not aware of or did not attend the MIT meetings. (n=4 is comprised
of 1 Division Chief, 2 ADCs, and 1 Branch Chief)

Clarity of Roles (N=17, C=24)

There was little clarity in the PSC roles. Specifically, there was
little clarity of authority, no one knew who was in charge, and the
roles were unclear. (N=17 is comprised of 3 Exec Staff, 5 Division
Chiefs, 7 ADCs, and 2 Branch Chiefs)

The Person Responsible for Specific Tasks was Unknown (n=9, c=10)

In the PSC (matrix) environment, the interfaces and people who were
supposed to perform certain tasks were not known to members of other
PSCs. (n=9 is comprised of 1 Exec Staff, 3 Division Chiefs, 4 ADCs, and
1 Branch Chief)

Lines of Authority and Responsibility were Unclear (n=7, c=9)

The matrix does not work well for reporting or accountability. The PSC
chairs had no authority or line responsibility to make people do things.
(n=7 is comprised of 2 Exec Staff, 1 Division Chief, 3 ADCs, and 1
Branch Chief)

The Roles were Unclear (n=5, c=5)

Even the people working on specific PSCs did not understand what the
role of their particular PSC was. The roles were fairly amorphous. (n=5
is comprised of 2 Division Chiefs, 2 ADCs, and 1 Branch Chief)

The People on the PSCs did not possess the Right Skills (n=14, c=15)

The PSCs were not staffed with enough people or people with enough
technical expertise. (n=14 is comprised of 3 Exec Staff, 3 Division
Chiefs, 6 ADCs, and 2 Branch Chiefs)

Impact on Census 2000 (n=12, c=15)

The PSC experiment failed. I did not see the results from the PSCs. The
PSCs destroyed our division because it took you out of the division and
into the decennial. The PSCs were ineffective and detrimental to the
goals of the census. (n=12 is comprised of 1 Exec Staff, 1 Division
Chief, 7 ADCs, and 3 Branch Chiefs)

Leadership Not in Control of the Processes (n=8, c=8)

It was difficult to control the PSCs. The organization does not work
well with matrix management. (n=8 is comprised of 3 Exec Staff, 4 ADCs,
and 1 Branch Chief)

Budgets Unknown to PSCs (n=5, c=8)

The budgets were allocated via black box assumptions from the DMD to
divisions and bypassed the PSCs. Many PSCs did not see their budgets.
(n=5 is comprised of 2 Division Chiefs, 1 ADC, and 2 Branch Chiefs)

PSC Decision-making Processes (N=20, C=33)

PSC decision-making includes comments on the few decision-making
processes and little authority granted to PSC chairs to make decisions.
(N=20 is comprised of 2 Exec Staff, 5 Division Chiefs, 8 ADCs, and 5
Branch Chiefs)

Little Decision-Making (n=16, c=23)

There were few apparent processes for decision-making within the matrix
structure. Few decisions were made in the PSCs. People did not want to
take responsibility for making decisions. (n=16 is comprised of 2 Exec
Staff, 4 Division Chiefs, 5 ADCs, and 5 Branch Chiefs)

Little Empowerment (n=5, c=6)

The PSCs were never empowered to do their jobs. The PSC chairs and their
decisions were micro-managed by decennial management. (n=5 is comprised
of 3 Division Chiefs and 2 ADCs)

PSCs Facilitated Decision-Making (n=2, c=3)

The PSC structure succeeded in raising issues, setting the agenda and
resolving conflicts, due to steady memberships throughout and the
ability to make decisions. (n=2 is comprised of 2 ADCs)

Matrix Management Strengths (N=9, C=14)

Matrix management strengths include comments on what worked well in some
of the PSCs. (N=9 is comprised of 1 Exec Staff, 4 Division Chiefs, 2
ADCs, and 2 Branch Chiefs)

What Worked Well in the PSC Structure (n=5, c=6)

The matrix model worked well and good planning came out of our PSC. (n=5
is comprised of 3 Division Chiefs, 1 ADC, and 1 Branch Chief)

The Matrix Approach Enabled Interdivisional Understanding (n=3, c=4)

The matrix fostered interdivisional understanding and created a good
system of checks and balances. (n=3 is comprised of 1 Exec Staff, 1
Division Chief, and 1 Branch Chief)

Elements of Success (n=2, c=4)

The matrix approach works well when the right people work on the
appropriate PSCs. The DSSD PSC was set up well. (n=2 is comprised of 1
ADC and 1 Branch Chief)

7.3 Centralized Management Approach

The Centralized Management Approach (N=48, C=287) includes comments on
how the Centralized Approach provided more clarity than the Matrix
Approach, how the DMD's role was unclear and should be clarified for
future decennials, and how the leadership empowered few lower level
managers with the capability to make decisions.

**Centralized Management Approach Strengths (N=17, C=23)** (N=17 is
comprised of 1 Exec Staff, 3 Division Chiefs, 10 ADCs, and 3 Branch
Chiefs)

**How the Centralized Model Worked (N=16, C=20)** (N=16 is comprised of
1 Exec Staff, 3 Division Chiefs, 9 ADCs, and 3 Branch Chiefs)

The centralized model works well. (n=10, c=12)

The centralized model works best with a strong DMD. (n=7, c=8)

Accountability (n=2, c=3)

There was increased clarity by which divisions were responsible for
tasks. (n=2 is comprised of 1 ADC and 1 Branch Chief)

Centralized Management Approach Weaknesses (N=9, C=9)

The model was extremely hierarchical and there was little collaboration
among the management team members (n=5, c=5). The DMD did not take
control of the process (n=4, c=4) (N=9 is comprised of 1 Exec Staff, 2
Division Chiefs, 5 ADCs, and 1 Branch Chief)

Roles and Responsibilities (N=41, C=129)

Roles and responsibilities includes comments regarding the DMD's role
and the little clarity of the roles and responsibilities. (N=41 is
comprised of 4 Exec Staff, 11 Division Chiefs, 17 ADCs, and 9 Branch
Chiefs)

The DMD's Role (N=38, C=112)

The DMD's role includes comments on the little clarity in their roles,
how the census would run smoother if the DMD maintained a permanent
infrastructure, and the perception that the DMD staff should perform the
roles of program managers and integrators. (N=38 is comprised of 4 Exec
Staff, 10 Division Chiefs, 16 ADCs, and 8 Branch Chiefs)

The DMD Personnel as Program Integrators (n=23, c=36)

The DMD should provide a role of coordination and integration. For
future censuses the DMD should have a greater centralization of control.
The DMD sometimes performed the coordination and integration role
successfully and other times it was not as successful during Census
2000. (n=23 is comprised of 2 Exec Staff, 5 Division Chiefs, 11 ADCs,
and 5 Branch Chiefs)

Unclear Roles (n=13, c=16)

The DMD's role was not clearly defined; it lacked the clarity that was
present with the DPLD. Responsibilities were communicated in a piecemeal
fashion and the roles were not clear up-front. (n=13 is comprised of 1
Exec Staff, 1 Division Chief, 8 ADCs, and 3 Branch Chiefs)

Little Definition of Roles (n=12, c=17)

Roles and responsibilities throughout the Census Bureau need better
definition. The key requires defining them up-front. (n=12 is comprised
of 2 Division Chiefs, 8 ADCs, and 2 Branch Chiefs)

History of the DMD (n=11, c=20)

The DMD's role was similar to that of the Decennial Planning Division
(DPLD) and the Decennial Operational Division (DOD). The DPLD approach
of running the census first occurred during Census 1990. The DMD's role
changed throughout the 1990s. (n=11 is comprised of 1 Exec Staff, 2
Division Chiefs, 6 ADCs, and 2 Branch Chiefs)

Need for a Permanent Infrastructure (n=8, c=13)

The decennial should maintain a permanent infrastructure. This includes
having a skeleton presence throughout the decade and establishing the
DMD's role much earlier. (n=8 is comprised of 1 Exec Staff, 4 ADCs, and
3 Branch Chiefs)

The DMD Personnel as Program Managers (n=7, c=9)

The DMD personnel should serve in the program manager role. During
Census 2000, this was perceived more as micro-management. (n=7 is
comprised of 1 Exec Staff, 3 Division Chiefs, 1 ADC, and 2 Branch
Chiefs)

The Roles and Responsibilities Document (n=5, c=9)

DMD wrote the Roles and Responsibilities document without much input
from other divisions. Some people working on Census 2000 had not heard
about the document. (n=5 is comprised of 2 Division Chiefs, 1 ADC, and 2
Branch Chiefs)

The DMD Personnel as Decision Makers (n=4, c=5)

The DMD should be decision-makers. (n=4 is comprised of 1 Division
Chief, 1 ADC, and 2 Branch Chiefs)

Clear Roles (n=4, c=4)

By 1999 there was more clarity in the DMD's role. People knew what they
were supposed to be doing. (n=4 is comprised of 3 Division Chiefs and 1
ADC)

The DMD's Control of the Decennial Budget (N=23, C=42) (N=23 is
comprised of 4 Exec Staff, 7 Division Chiefs, 7 ADCs, and 5 Branch
Chiefs)

DMD Control of the Budget (n=20, c=33)

Jay Waite enabled the DMD to control the funding for the decennial
census when he came on in 1997 by making a case for the DMD's need to
control the budget. The budget should remain in the DMD. (n=20 is
comprised of 4 Exec Staff, 5 Division Chiefs, 7 ADCs, and 4 Branch
Chiefs)

Budget Decisions (n=5, c=9)

With the DMD controlling the budget there were more layers required for
review. Many of the divisions were unaware of the processes used to
decide on the budget. (n=5 is comprised of 3 Division Chiefs, 1 ADC, and
1 Branch Chief)

7.4 Meeting Groups in the Centralized Management Approach (N=27, C=70)

Meeting groups refer to the comments regarding COM, OSAM, the IR/CC
processes and the decennial divisions chiefs and how well these groups
worked. (N=27 is comprised of 3 Exec Staff, 6 Division Chiefs, 9 ADCs,
and 9 Branch Chiefs)

**Operational Status and Assessment Meetings (OSAM) (N=16, C=27)** (N=16
is comprised of 2 Exec Staff, 2 Division Chiefs, 5 ADCs, and 7 Branch
Chiefs)

Communication Forum (n=10, c=13)

OSAM became a forum to discuss problems. (n=10 is comprised of 1 Exec
Staff, 1 Division Chief, 4 ADCs, and 4 Branch Chiefs)

Meetings were Time Consuming (n=4, c=5)

The OSAM were painful because they were so time consuming. (n=4 is
comprised of 1 Exec Staff and 3 Branch Chiefs)

Little Decision-making (n=4, c=4)

Few decisions were made during the OSAM. Tactical meetings occurred
afterwards where the real decisions were made. (n=4 is comprised of 1
Division Chief and 3 Branch Chiefs)

Issues were Addressed Late in the Process (n=2, c=3)

Problems only surfaced when they became big problems. Few effective
mechanisms existed to raise issues early. (n=2 is comprised of 1 ADC and
1 Branch Chief)

The DMD Informing Leadership on the Data (n=2, c=2)

The DMD did not have all the needed knowledge to effectively report on
the programs. (n=2 is comprised of 1 ADC and 1 Branch Chief)

Census Operational Managers (COM) (N=16, C=21) (N=16 is comprised of 1
Exec Staff, 4 Division Chiefs, 7 ADCs, and 4 Branch Chiefs)

First Part of the Decision-Making Process (n=8, c=8)

In 1997 COM replaced the PSCs. It became the first part of the
decision-making process and facilitated communications throughout the
Census Bureau. (n=8 is comprised of 1 Exec Staff, 3 Division Chiefs, 3
ADCs, and 1 Branch Chief)

Meetings Stopped (n=7, c=7)

In 1999 COM meetings stopped. (n=7 is comprised of 2 Division Chiefs, 4
ADCs, and 1 Branch Chief)

Ineffectiveness (n=5, c=6)

COM was ineffective and some managers bypassed the entire process. (n=5
is comprised of 2 ADCs and 3 Branch Chiefs)

Issue Resolution/Change Control Process (IR/CC) (N=15, C=22) (N=15 is
comprised of 5 Division Chiefs, 6 ADCs, and 4 Branch Chiefs)

Ineffective (n=8, c=8)

The IR/CC did not work because the people with the necessary knowledge
were not at the meetings. (n=8 is comprised of 2 Division Chiefs, 4
ADCs, and 2 Branch Chiefs)

Decision Memo Series (n=6, c=7)

The IR/CC included a decision memo series. These memos provided a means
to communicate decisions. The memos worked at first, but not as much
later in the process. (n=6 is comprised of 2 Division Chiefs, 1 ADC, and
3 Branch Chiefs)

IR/CC as a Decision-Making Process (n=6, c=7)

The process created a forum to discuss and appeal decisions, which did
not always work. (n=6 is comprised of 4 Division Chiefs and 2 ADCs)

Moving from the Matrix to the Centralized Approach (N=10, C=14) (N=10 is
comprised of 5 Division Chiefs, 3 ADCs, and 2 Branch Chiefs)

The Transition was Difficult (n=6, c=7)

The approach change came late in the process, which made it difficult.
(n=6 is comprised of 3 Division Chiefs, 2 ADCs, and 1 Branch Chief)

Difficulties for the DMD in Establishing Authority (n=4, c=5)

People involved with the PSC process resisted a strong DMD because
people who did not lead PSCs now controlled the processes. (n=4 is
comprised of 2 Division Chiefs, 1 ADC, and 1 Branch Chief)

Centralized Management was Needed to Make the Census Work (n=2, c=2)

We need a centralized management approach to effectively implement the
decennial census. (n=2 is comprised of 1 Division Chief and 1 Branch
Chief)

8.0 Decision-making Processes (N=35, C=98)

**Impact of Timely Decisions Not being Made (N=21, C=41)** (N=21 is
comprised of 1 Exec Staff, 3 Division Chiefs, 11 ADCs, and 6 Branch
Chiefs)

Timely decisions not being made caused the following problems:

Indecision (n=17, c=26)

The need for consensus made decisions difficult. Indecision led to
schedule delays. Strategic decisions must be made early in the process.
(n=17 is comprised of 1 Exec Staff, 1 Division Chiefs, 9 ADCs, and 6
Branch Chiefs)

Changes to Decisions (n=9, c=13)

Once decisions were made they were always open to be revisited. Final
decisions did not exist. This caused additional work and delays. (n=9 is
comprised of 3 Division Chiefs, 4 ADCs, and 2 Branch Chiefs)

Last Minute Planning (n=2, c=2)

Much was done at the last minute from indecision. (n=2 is comprised of 1
ADC and 1 Branch Chief)

**Leadership's Control of Decision-making Processes (N=19, C=29)** (N=19
is comprised of 1 Exec Staff, 4 Division Chiefs, 6 ADCs, and 8 Branch
Chiefs)

Management's Involvement in Decision-making (n=15, c=17)

Jay Waite made most decisions. He felt that he had to be involved with
everything. (n=15 is comprised of 4 Division Chiefs, 4 ADCs, and 7
Branch Chiefs)

Little Empowerment (n=6, c=12)

The Executive Staff wanted all decisions to go through them. Jay Waite
did not empower his staff to make decisions. (n=6 is comprised of 1 Exec
Staff, 1 Division Chief, 3 ADCs, and 1 Branch Chief)

Lack of Involvement of the Necessary People (n=11, c=19)

Decision-making did not involve the right people. (n=11 is comprised of
3 Division Chiefs, 5 ADCs, and 3 Branch Chiefs)

Few Processes Existed (n=9, c=9)

Few formal processes existed for decision-making. The DMD needs a better
process. (n=9 is comprised of 1 Exec Staff, 2 Division Chiefs, 3 ADCs,
and 3 Branch Chiefs)

9.0 Census Planning

Census planning (N=47, C=207) includes comments on the lack of planning
and involvement of the right people in the planning processes, the lack
of written guidance completed before the census, how the 1999 Supreme
Court decision impacted the planning processes, and the current planning
for 2010 Census .

Planning Strengths (n=5, c=6)

Overall the planning was fair and successful where groups took the time
to plan ahead. (n=5 is comprised of 2 Exec Staff and 3 Division Chiefs)

Planning Weaknesses (N=34, C=87)

Planning weaknesses include comments on the need for the Regions to have
a larger involvement in the planning processes, the impacts of starting
the planning late, and the need for strategic planning. (N=34 is
comprised of 8 Exec Staff, 9 Division Chiefs, 11 ADCs, and 6 Branch
Chiefs)

**Planning Should Start Earlier (N=27, C=49)** (N=27 is comprised of 5
Exec Staff, 7 Division Chiefs, 10 ADCs, and 5 Branch Chiefs)

Impact of Late Planning (n=14, c=16)

Late planning caused problems to many activities during the execution
phase. (n=14 is comprised of 3 Exec Staff, 3 Division Chiefs, 5 ADCs,
and 3 Branch Chiefs)

Recommendations for Future Planning (n=11, c=13)

The key to success with the census begins with early planning. (n=11 is
comprised of 3 Exec Staff, 3 Division Chiefs, 3 ADCs, and 2 Branch
Chiefs)

Timing of Census 2000 Planning (n=9, c=11)

Late planning caused many of the problems with Census 2000. (n=9 is
comprised of 2 Division Chiefs, 5 ADCs, and 2 Branch Chiefs)

Little Planning (n=7, c=9)

Little planning existed for Census 2000. (n=7 is comprised of 3 Exec
Staff, 3 Division Chiefs, and 1 ADC)

Field's Involvement in Planning (n=17, c=35)

The Regional Directors should be more involved with the planning
processes. Headquarters needs to keep them involved in the processes.
This will help to ensure that both field operations and headquarters
make similar plans. (n=17 is comprised of 6 Exec Staff, 4 Division
Chiefs, 4 ADCs, and 3 Branch Chiefs)

Planning At the Strategic Level (n=3, c=3)

Planning needs to be addressed at a strategic level. (n=3 is comprised
of 1 ADC and 2 Branch Chiefs)

9.1 Written Guidance (N=24, C=44)

Written Guidance includes comments on how many of the plans were written
after Census 2000 and the lack of risk planning that occurred to
mitigate potential mistakes. (N=24 is comprised of 5 Exec Staff, 7
Division Chiefs, 6 ADCs, and 6 Branch Chiefs)

Contingency planning (N=21, C=35) (N=21 is comprised of 4 Exec Staff, 7
Division Chiefs, 5 ADCs, and 5 Branch Chiefs)

Little Documentation of Processes (n=8, c=13)

There was little documentation of processes and we should have had
documentation throughout the process. We did not have good records of
prior planning. (n=8 is comprised of 2 Exec Staff, 3 Division Chiefs, 2
ADCs, and 1 Branch Chief)

Little Completed (n=9, c=11)

Risk planning would have mitigated many mistakes. There was no
contingency plan (exit strategy) that enabled the Census Bureau to turn
around at a certain point and use the traditional decennial census
process. (n=9 is comprised of 3 Exec Staff, 5 Division Chiefs, and 1
ADC)

Strategic Level (n=7, c=11)

Contingency planning should occur at a strategic level by leadership.
(n=7 is comprised of 1 Exec Staff, 1 Division Chief, 3 ADCs, and 2
Branch Chiefs)

Census 2000 Risks (n=6, c=8)

The matrix approach and dual path planning put Census 2000 at risk. (n=6
is comprised of 1 Exec Staff, 2 Division Chiefs, 1 ADC, and 2 Branch
Chiefs)

Risk Reductions (n=4, c=5)

Using contractor's practices, keeping people on staff between censuses,
and having up-front dollars mitigates potential risks. (n=4 is comprised
of 2 Division Chiefs, 1 ADC, and 1 Branch Chief)

Program Master Plans (N=21, C=28) (N=21 is comprised of 1 Exec Staff, 4
Division Chiefs, 9 ADCs, and 7 Branch Chiefs)

Plans Completed After Census (n=10, c=12)

The PMP's were primarily completed after the census. (n=10 is comprised
of 2 Division Chiefs, 6 ADCs, and 2 Branch Chiefs)

1990 PMPs Completed Promptly (n=6, c=7)

For the 1990 census, we had completed requirements documentation. (n=6
is comprised of 1 Division Chief, 3 ADCs, and 2 Branch Chiefs)

Plans Completed Before Census (n=1, c=1)

Census 2000 Publicity Office (C2PO) completed their plan ahead of time
and was one of the few divisions that actually used the plan
successfully. (n=1 is comprised of 1 Division Chief)

No Baseline (n=7, c=7)

Operational plans did not exist before the census. Many are being
written now and there was no documented baseline. (n=7 is comprised of 1
Exec Staff, 1 Division Chief, 1 ADC, and 4 Branch Chiefs)

Prior to Census 1990 (n=1, c=1)

Leading up to 1990 clear operational guidelines existed. (n=1 is
comprised of 1 ADC)

**9.2 Impact of the Supreme Court Decision on Planning (N=23, C=31)**
(N=23 is comprised of 4 Exec Staff, 5 Division Chiefs, 10 ADCs, and 4
Branch Chiefs)

Got Planning Off Track (n=10, c=11)

Census 2000 planning problems occurred in part because groups planned
for sampling, rather than enumeration. The late decision caused planning
to get off track. (n=10 is comprised of 3 Exec Staff, 3 Division Chiefs,
2 ADCs, and 2 Branch Chiefs)

Planning for Both Types of Censuses (n=9, c=10)

We really created plans for both the sampling and the traditional
enumeration. A second plan was beyond comprehension since people
struggled keeping up with one plan. (n=9 is comprised of 1 Exec Staff, 1
Division Chief, 5 ADCs, and 2 Branch Chiefs)

Unable to Easily Change from Sampling to Traditional Enumeration (n=7,
c=9)

The sampling plans could not be changed to traditional enumeration plans
easily. This caused many problems in moving to traditional enumeration.
(n=7 is comprised of 1 Division Chief, 5 ADCs, and 1 Branch Chief)

**9.3 2010 Census Planning (N=18, C=27)** (N=18 is comprised of 7 Exec
Staff, 4 Division Chiefs, 6 ADCs, and 1 Branch Chief)

Timing (n=10, c=11)

The planning stage for 2010 has started on good footing this year. We
need a core infrastructure in place by 2003. (n=10 is comprised of 6
Exec Staff, 1 Division Chief, 2 ADCs, and 1 Branch Chief)

Current Planning Activities (n=6, c=8)

2010 Census planning activities are currently underway. (n=6 is
comprised of 2 Exec Staff, 1 Division Chief, and 3 ADCs)

Potential of Repeating Census 2000 Problems (n=6, c=6)

We are about to repeat the problems of Census 2000 for 2010 Census with
too many groups. (n=6 is comprised of 1 Exec Staff, 2 Division Chiefs,
and 3 ADCs)

Do Not Change What Worked (n=2, c=2)

We need to recognize the things that worked during Census 2000 and not
change them. (n=2 is comprised of 1 Exec Staff and 1 ADC)

10. Internal Environment of the Decennial Directorate

Internal environment of the Decennial Directorate (N=49, C=309) includes
comments about the strengths and weaknesses of the culture within the
Decennial Directorate, how field operations impacted the decennial
environment, and the complexities created from the large volume of data
processed during the decennial census.

Strengths (N=23, C=43)

Strengths include comments on the positive attitude of decennial census
participants and the good interactions between the DMD and other
participating divisions. (N=23 comprises 3 Exec Staff, 4 Division
Chiefs, 8 ADCs, and 8 Branch Chiefs.)

Attitude (n=11, c=13)

The staff working on the decennial census displayed an esprit de corps.
An attitude exists that the census cannot fail, and the dedicated
workforce puts in its all to make things happen. (n=11 comprises 3 Exec
Staff, 3 Division Chiefs, 2 ADCs, and 3 Branch Chiefs.)

Good Interactions with Other Divisions (N=16, C=30)

The DMD and the Executive Staff had positive interactions with other
divisions participating in the decennial census and the field
operations. (N=16 comprises 2 Exec Staff, 2 Division Chiefs, 6 ADCs, and
6 Branch Chiefs.)

Good Relationship with the Field (n=10, c=15)

The regional offices received good support from headquarters. The field
involvement with headquarters increased throughout the 1990s. (n=10
comprises 2 Exec Staff, 2 Division Chiefs, 5 ADCs, and 1 Branch Chief.)

Good Support from Decennial Leadership and the DMD (n=8, c=11)

Within the Decennial Directorate, there was high-level support. The DMD
gave the divisions the proper amount of autonomy to complete their
respective jobs. (n=8 comprises 1 Exec Staff, 1 Division Chief, 2 ADCs,
and 4 Branch Chiefs.)

The Divisions Worked Well Together (n=4, c=4)

The divisions worked well together. (n=4 comprises 2 ADCs and 2 Branch
Chiefs.)

Weaknesses (N=34, C=96)

During the decennial census, both trust and personality issues existed
among the decennial census participants in the Census Bureau divisions.
Interviewees perceived that the DMD had poor relationships with DSCMO
and a sometimes-adversarial relationship with the field division. (N=34
comprises 8 Exec Staff, 10 Division Chiefs, 11 ADCs, and 5 Branch
Chiefs.)

View of the Decennial (n=12, c=24)

Interviewees perceived that the mission of the decennial census differs
from that of other divisions. Some of the Census Bureau divisions resent
the decennial census for taking their best people and "dumping them."
The Census 2000 participating divisions felt that the DMD was constantly
asking for information, but did not provide value-added services in
return. (n=12 comprises 4 Exec Staff, 3 Division Chiefs, 3 ADCs, and 2
Branch Chiefs.)

Level of Trust (n=8, c=12)

The decennial leadership did not appear to trust the census staff. Some
managers feared making decisions because they might lose their jobs.
Many problems that were brought to management could have been resolved
at a lower level if more trust existed in the organization. (n=8
comprises 1 Exec Staff, 2 Division Chiefs, 4 ADCs, and 1 Branch Chief.)

Personality Issues (n=8, c=8)

"There was a cultural disconnect between the programmers and the
statisticians." "Everything is based on personal relationships." (n=8
comprises 1 Exec Staff, 2 Division Chiefs, 3 ADCs, and 2 Branch Chiefs.)

**Poor Interactions with Other Divisions (N=25, C=45)** (N=25 comprises
5 Exec Staff, 8 Division Chiefs, 7 ADCs, and 5 Branch Chiefs.)

Poor Relationship with the Field (n=12, c=23)

A good relationship between the people in field operations and the
people at headquarters did not exist. The DMD did not account for timing
and implementation procedures in the field when creating Census 2000
plans. This caused additional work for the regional offices. A closer
integration between the field and the Decennial Directorate needs to
exist. (n=12 comprises 4 Exec Staff, 5 Division Chiefs, 2 ADCs, and 1
Branch Chief.)

Poor Relationship with DSCMO (n=8, c=11)

DSCMO and the DMD had conflicting and contesting agendas. The two
organizations did not form good partnerships, which resulted in numerous
turf battles. (n=8 comprises 3 Division Chiefs, 2 ADCs, and 3 Branch
Chiefs.)

An Adversarial Environment Existed (n=9, c=9)

Turf battles existed within the Decennial Directorate. Coordination
between divisions turned into a "tug-of-war." (n=9 comprises 1 Exec
Staff, 3 Division Chiefs, 2 ADCs, and 3 Branch Chiefs.)

Demographic and Housing Divisions (n=1, c=2)

The demographic and housing areas were difficult to work with because
they did not have a group designated to the decennial census. They
should have more integration with the decennial census.

10.1 The View of the Field and Operations Divisions (n=6, c=7)

Field is viewed as being at the "bottom of the food chain." "Finance,
Budget, and Acquisitions are the lowest-ranking division chiefs." (n=6
comprises 2 Exec Staff, 2 Division Chiefs, and 2 ADCs.)

> **Field's Role in the Decennial Census (N=25, C=68)** (N=25 comprises
> 5 Exec Staff, 8 Division Chiefs, 6 ADCs, and 6 Branch Chiefs.)

Regional Directors with SES Status (N=13, C= 22) (N=13 comprises 3 Exec
Staff, 4 Division Chiefs, 4 ADCs, and 2 Branch Chiefs.)

Regional Directors with SES Status Was Difficult for Headquarters (n=7,
c=12)

The SES status of the Regional Directors made the field ADCs at
headquarters subordinate to the Regional Directors. The Field Division
could not control the Regional Directors. The Regional Directors would
bypass the Field Division and go straight to the Executive Staff to
resolve problems. (n=7 comprises 1 Exec Staff, 2 Division Chiefs, and 4
ADCs.)

Regional Directors Deserve SES Status (n=6, c=9)

The Regional Directors deserved SES status because of the number of
issues they dealt with. The SES status persuaded the Regional Directors
to take a more active role in decision-making activities at
headquarters. (n=6 comprises 2 Exec Staff, 2 Division Chiefs, 1 ADC, and
1 Branch Chief.)

Field Budget (n=11, c=26)

The bulk of the decennial census dollars goes into the field operations.
During the off years, the field is funded through other surveys. It was
difficult getting money from the DMD, and the Field Division had to
argue for funds. (n=11 comprises 2 Exec Staff, 4 Division Chiefs, 3
ADCs, and 2 Branch Chiefs.)

Role of Field in Completing the Census (n=10, c=12)

The decennial census cannot happen without the people in the field. The
field operations perform the collections function of the census. The
Regional Directors were responsible to "get the job done." (n=10
comprises 3 Exec Staff, 3 Division Chiefs, 3 ADCs, and 1 Branch Chief.)

Decennial Census in Relation to Other Surveys (n=6, c=8)

The decennial census is similar to other surveys the field performs.
(n=6 comprises 1 Exec Staff, 2 Division Chiefs, 2 ADCs, and 1 Branch
Chief.)

10.2 Reporting Lines (n=13, c=15)

There are multiple levels of reporting throughout the decennial census.
The leadership from the Decennial Directorate appear to believe that
staff in other directorates report to them. (n=13 comprises 4 Exec
Staff, 5 Division Chiefs, and 4 ADCs.)

Added Complexities from the Size of the Decennial Census (n=9, c=14)

The people working on the decennial need to understand the magnitude of
the census. Much of the complexity created by the decennial census is
based on its volume. (n=9 comprises 2 Division Chiefs, 4 ADCs, and 3
Branch Chiefs.)

10.3 Testing (N=28, C=74)

Testing reports on the dress rehearsal, activities that were not tested,
and general testing goals for 2004. (N=28 comprises 7 Exec Staff, 7
Division Chiefs, 10 ADCs, and 4 Branch Chiefs.)

Dress Rehearsal (N=18, C=23)

Comments on the dress rehearsal focus on the need for more time between
the dress rehearsal and the actual census, the need for better plans,
and the problems associated with running a dual-path dress rehearsal.
(N=18 comprises 3 Exec Staff, 3 Division Chiefs, 10 ADCs, and 2 Branch
Chiefs.)

Not Enough Time to the Census (n=8, c=9)

"It is too late to have a dress rehearsal in year eight. If the dress
rehearsal is late, there is no opportunity to implement new processes.
The dress rehearsal needs to be earlier." (n=8 comprises 1 Exec Staff, 2
Division Chiefs, 4 ADCs, and 1 Branch Chief.)

Need for Concrete Plans (n=6, c=6)

"Production requirements need to be completed by the dress rehearsal."
"We need to have the same procedures in place for the dress rehearsal as
for the census." (n=6 comprises 2 Exec Staff, 3 ADCs, and 1 Branch
Chief.)

Dual-Path Dress Rehearsal (n=3, c=4)

"The dress rehearsal was conducted using a dual path of sampling and
traditional enumeration." "If the sampling process had gone forward, the
dress rehearsal would have been fine." (n=3 comprises 2 ADCs and 1
Branch Chief.)

**Untested Activities (N=15, C=31)** (N=15 comprises 5 Exec Staff, 3
Division Chiefs, 5 ADCs, and 2 Branch Chiefs.)

Many Activities Were Untested (n=11, c=14)

"Every major new idea that was implemented was not tested, but it did
seem to work." "Testing was done on the fly during implementation." "The
tests and the dress rehearsal were not the methodology used in the
decennial census." (n=11 comprises 2 Exec Staff, 3 Division Chiefs, 4
ADCs, and 2 Branch Chiefs.)

Better Testing of Technology is Needed (n=9, c=13)

"We need to test the systems from top to bottom by the start of the
decennial census." "We were still testing technology in 1999." The lack
of testing for the telephone questionnaire assistance caused problems
during the actual census. (n=9 comprises 4 Exec Staff, 2 Division
Chiefs, and 3 ADCs.)

Untested Form (n=2, c=4)

"During Census 2000, we used an untested form. We also did not test
requests for forms in different languages." (n=2 comprises 1 ADC, and 1
Branch Chief.)

Test Goals for 2004 (n=6, c=10)

The systems should be ready for testing in 2004. We should also have a
targeted second mailing in place. "The decisions must be completed by
year two, the field work of implementing procedures and tests should be
done in year three, and the tests are performed in year four." (n=6
comprises 1 Exec Staff, 2 Division Chiefs, 2 ADCs, and 1 Branch Chief.)

Impact of Testing on the Strategic Development of the Census (n=5, c=7)

Testing shows us our capabilities. "Testing, strategic, and planning
decisions need to be made 2 years to 3 years prior to the test. The
decisions need to remain constant and not be changed." (n=5 comprises 1
Exec Staff, 1 Division Chief, 2 ADCs, and 1 Branch Chief.)

Need for Divisional Involvement in the Testing Processes (n=2, c=2)

Operational branches and management teams should be involved and work
together during the testing phases. (n=2 comprises 1 Exec Staff and 1
ADC.)

Testing for the 1990 census (n=1, c=1)

"For the 1990 census, senior managers for the management structure were
in place by 1984. Tests were run in 1985, 1986, and 1987, with a dress
rehearsal in 1988 with the management team. By 1990, there was a lot of
teaming and experience among the decennial census managers." (n=1
comprises 1 ADC.)

**11.0 Communications (N=41, C=134)**

Communications reports on the internal and external communications
processes used during the decennial census.

**Internal Communications (N=35, C=95)** (N=35 comprises 6 Exec Staff,
11 Division Chiefs, 11 ADCs, and 7 Branch Chiefs.)

Strengths of Internal Communications (N=14, C=18)

The DMD created an environment that facilitated discussions among
participating divisions. Reporting was also a good means for
communications. (N=14 comprises 3 Exec Staff, 4 Division Chiefs, 4 ADCs,
and 3 Branch Chiefs.)

Facilitation of Discussions (n=11, c=13)

The DMD was good at allowing people to talk and facilitating
discussions. Interdivisional meetings were facilitated. The weekly
address list meeting facilitated discussions among the divisions working
on the Master Address File (MAF). (n=11 comprises 2 Exec Staff, 2
Division Chiefs, 4 ADCs, and 3 Branch Chiefs.)

Reporting Processes (n=5, c=5)

Reports were used to communicate decisions. This worked well toward the
beginning of the process, but "fell through the cracks as time wore on."
(n=5 comprises 1 Exec Staff, 3 Division Chiefs, and 1 Branch Chief.)

Weaknesses of Internal Communications (N=30, C=77)

Little information sharing occurred among the participating divisions.
Few strong channels of communications existed between the Executive
Staff and the DMD. (N=30 comprises 4 Exec Staff, 11 Division Chiefs, 10
ADCs, and 5 Branch Chiefs.)

Little Information Sharing (n=22, c=37)

"Decisions were communicated on a need-to-know basis." The DMD generally
would not include other divisions on the distribution list when sending
out memos and reports. Other divisions also did not have many
opportunities to provide inputs. "Information flow went upwards and
sideways, and never came back down. It was one-way communication."
Information for Census 2000 was tightly held. (n=22 comprises 4 Exec
Staff, 8 Division Chiefs, 7 ADCs, and 3 Branch Chiefs.)

Poor Communications Existed Between the Executive Staff and the DMD
(n=11, c=21)

"Information was often mischaracterized at the Executive Staff level
because they were not involved in operations." "The midlevel managers
struggled to communicate the program's technical difficulty to the
executive leadership." The leadership (both Executive Staff and
Decennial Directorate) did not always communicate well with the
divisions. (n=11 comprises 1 Exec Staff, 6 Division Chiefs, 3 ADCs, and
1 Branch Chief.)

Lack of Clarity in Communications (n=6, c=15)

"Communications were confusing; Jay Waite would say one thing, but the
DMD would have a different set of directions." "It was not very clear
what was going on at any given time." Communications could be
inconsistent below the Associate Director level. (n=6 comprises 1 Exec
Staff, 1 Division Chiefs, and 4 ADCs.)

Little Change Management (n=4, c=4)

Change was not always welcome in the process. Better processes should be
used to effect change. (n=4 comprises 2 Division Chiefs, 1 ADC, and 1
Branch Chief.)

External Communications (N=15, C=31)

Much of the communications to external stakeholders were performed by
individual divisions, which led the overall communications to lack a
consistent message. (N=15 comprises 4 Exec Staff, 2 Division Chiefs, 6
ADCs, and 3 Branch Chiefs.)

Increase DMD Communications (n=8, c=12)

Toward the beginning of the decade, many production people within the
participating divisions spent a substantial amount of time responding to
external inquiries. Toward the end of the decade, there were groups set
up in many divisions to handle communications requests. (n=8 comprises 2
Exec Staff, 2 Division Chiefs, 2 ADCs, and 2 Branch Chiefs.)

Communications Lacked a Consistent Message (n=7, c=9)

"The Census Bureau needs to have one communications voice. We need to
find out what the operational branches are doing and then position the
communications strategy to set one vision." "We need to have continuity
of oversight groups by the same people." (n=7 comprises 2 Exec Staff, 3
ADCs, and 2 Branch Chiefs.)

Divisions Taking on Communications Responsibilities (n=6, c=10)

Responding to oversight groups took up substantial time from staff
working in the participating divisions. Giving information to external
groups took time away from program operations. (n=6 comprises 3 Exec
Staff, 2 ADCs, and 1 Branch Chief.)

Centralization of Knowledge (n=6, c=9)

"There is no centralized repository for any documentation. Many things
are not written and thus forgotten." (n=6 comprises 4 Division Chiefs, 1
ADC, and 1 Branch Chief.)

12.0 MIS Processes

MIS Processes (N=40, C=138) report on the Master Activity Schedule
(MAS), the Census 2000 Cost Model, the Cost and Progress System (C&P
System), and some of the problems that occurred from a lack of
integration among the systems.

Master Activity Schedule (MAS) (N=30, C=80)

While the MAS did facilitate the understanding of dependencies among the
participating divisions, the system was difficult to update and led to
misunderstandings regarding activity completion dates. (N=30 comprises 2
Exec Staff, 7 Division Chiefs, 13 ADCs, and 8 Branch Chiefs.)

**Upkeep of the MAS (N=18, C=34)** (N=18 comprises 1 Exec Staff, 4
Division Chiefs, 10 ADCs, and 3 Branch Chiefs.)

Volume of Activities Created Problems (n=10, c=11)

There was too much detail in the MAS. The detail created problems in
keeping the system up to date and in understanding the overall system.
(n=10 comprises 2 Division Chiefs, 6 ADCs, and 2 Branch Chiefs.)

Lockups (n=9, c=11)

The lockups were a waste of time and a painful exercise. The process
wore people out and resulted in a product that not everyone agreed with.
The lockups did help to increase understandings of dependencies among
the participating divisions. (n=9 comprises 1 Exec Staff, 2 Division
Chiefs, 5 ADCs, and 1 Branch Chief.)

MAS Was Not User-Friendly (n=8, c=12)

The "MAS was cumbersome and took too much time to maintain." The system
was not user-friendly. (n=8 comprises 1 Division Chief, 5 ADCs, and 2
Branch Chiefs.)

Inflexibility of Dates (n=10, c=13)

The MAS was used as an external document, but internally the dates had
to be met. Planned dates in the MAS turned into actual dates. The system
became outdated toward the end. (n=10 comprises 3 Division Chiefs, 3
ADCs, and 4 Branch Chiefs.)

The MAS Was an Effective Management Tool (N=14, C=24)

Facilitated Understanding of Dependencies (n=9, c=13)

The MAS "forced both the technical (operational) and program planning
groups to discuss their activities and map out their interrelations."
The process forced everyone to understand what others were doing and how
things fit together. (n=9 comprises 2 Exec Staff, 1 Division Chief, 3
ADCs, and 3 Branch Chiefs.)

Useful Tool (n=8, c=12)

The MAS was used as a roadmap for coordinators and managers. It was a
valuable tool. It was a good learning tool and helped everyone to
understand the census. (n=8 comprises 1 Division Chief, 4 ADCs, and 3
Branch Chiefs.)

Timing of MAS Completion (n=7, c=7)

The baseline for the MAS should be completed by year four. (n=7
comprises 1 Division Chief, 3 ADCs, and 3 Branch Chiefs.)

The Cost and Progress System (C&P System) (N=7, C=8)

The C&P System did not give accurate information. It was not a useful
tool for the participating divisions, only the DMD. (n=7 comprises 2
Exec Staff, 1 Division Chief, 2 ADCs, and 2 Branch Chiefs.)

The C&P System Lacked Accuracy (n=4, c=4)

"The C&P System numbers were not right." The information was from
different systems, and it never really came together properly. The C&P
System and the MAS were not integrated. (n=4 comprises 1 Exec Staff, 1
Division Chief, 1 ADC, and 1 Branch Chief.)

Effectiveness of the C&P System (n=4, c=4)

The C&P System was only useful for the DMD. The system was not used by
all of the participating divisions. (n=4 comprises 1 Exec Staff, 1
Division Chief, 1 ADC, and 1 Branch Chief.)

The Census 2000 Cost Model (N=16, C=25)

The Field Division had a cost model different from the one used in the
DMD. The cost model was used more for external than internal purposes.
Many of the model's assumptions were not documented. (N=16 comprises 2
Exec Staff, 6 Division Chiefs, 5 ADCs, and 3 Branch Chiefs.)

Effectiveness of the Cost Model (n=8, c=8)

The effectiveness of the cost model would be improved if it allowed for
"what if" analyses and had flexible reporting options. The model
produced information for the first time in decennial history on the
budget. (n=8 comprises 1 Exec Staff, 3 Division Chiefs, 3 ADCs, and 1
Branch Chief.)

The Model Lacked Accuracy (n=7, c=9)

The assumptions used to create the cost model were not realistic. The
model was used as an external showpiece for Congress as a means to
justify the cost of the decennial census. (n=7 comprises 2 Division
Chiefs, 2 ADCs, and 3 Branch Chiefs.)

The Model Was Accurate (n=5, c=6)

The DMD developed assumptions for each of the components within the cost
model. Booz Allen Hamilton verified and validated the data. (n=5
comprises 1 Exec Staff, 1 Division Chief, 2 ADCs, and 1 Branch Chief.)

The Model Had Little Flexibility (n=2, c=2)

"We had to jump through hoops to get changes made to the cost model."
(n=2 comprises 2 Division Chiefs.)

13. Contracting

Contracting Strengths (N=13, C=24)

Contracting strengths focuses on how contractors helped to improve the
overall decennial processes and helped to decrease certain risks for the
census. (N=13 comprises 1 Exec Staff, 5 Division Chiefs, 3 ADCs, and 4
Branch Chiefs.)

Contractors Helped to Improve Processes (n=9, c=12)

Contractors helped to instill discipline into the census process and to
the Census Bureau. The contracts forced us to make decisions. (n=9
comprises 1 Exec Staff, 4 Division Chiefs, 1 ADCs, and 3 Branch Chiefs.)

Decreased Risk to Census 2000 (n=3, c=3)

Contractors mitigated some of our risks by helping us to assess risks
and provide information to assess the changes and the consequences. (n=3
comprises 2 Division Chiefs and 1 ADC.)

Worked Well to Learn Contracting Processes (n=2, c=5)

We worked with the IG and GAO to learn good contracting practices.
Contracting had leadership support, so we had the necessary resources.
(n=2 comprises 1 Division Chief and 1 ADC.)

Contractors Got the Job Done (n=2, c=5)

It was easier to manage the contractors than it is to manage ourselves.
Lockheed Martin and TRW were able to deal with issues that the culture
at the Census Bureau could not. (n=2 comprises 1 Division Chief and 1
Branch Chief.)

Contracting Weaknesses (N=18, C=47)

Contracting weaknesses include comments on the impact of contracting out
internal software development functions, about the problems that
occurred because the Census Bureau did not know much about contracting,
that contracts had few evaluation criteria, and that the contracts
should have been started earlier in the decade. (N=18 comprises 3 Exec
Staff, 6 Division Chiefs, 5 ADCs, and 4 Branch Chiefs.)

Impact of Contracting Internal Functions (n=9, c=11)

The internal programmers felt threatened from the decisions to contract
out large processing functions. (n=9 comprises 1 Exec Staff, 3 Division
Chiefs, 3 ADCs, and 2 Branch Chiefs.)

Little Known About Contracting (n=6, c=14)

The divisions responsible for the jobs that were contracted out need to
be more involved in negotiating future contracts. We need a model for
working with contractors. "The decennial did not make a commitment to
creating an expertise and to developing skill sets to manage contracts."
More experience is necessary in managing contracts. (n=6 comprises 1
Exec Staff, 3 Division Chiefs, 1 ADC, and 1 Branch Chief.)

Contractor Problems (n=4, c=5)

There were difficulties from mismanaged expectations between the Census
Bureau and contractors. Specifically, Lockheed Martin called for a 2
percent error rate in the data capture, which was unacceptable for the
decennial. In addition, some contractors brought in foreign nationals
who required escorts. (n=4 comprises 2 Division Chiefs, 1 ADC, and 1
Branch Chief.)

Contracts Should Have Started Earlier (n=4, c=4)

Contracts should be in place in time for testing and evaluation
activities. (n=4 comprises 2 Exec Staff, 1 Division Chief, and 1 Branch
Chief.)

Few Evaluation Criteria (n=3, c=8)

Evaluation criteria were still being developed during program execution.
Quality control needs to be better for future decennial censuses. (n=3
comprises 2 Division Chiefs and 1 ADC.)

Inability to Transfer Technology to Other Census Bureau Programs (n=3,
c=4)

There are problems with contractors not providing the Census Bureau with
sufficient detail on the mechanics of the systems, which prevents the
system from being used in other census programs, such as the Economic
Census. (n=3 comprises 1 Exec Staff, 1 Division Chief, and 1 ADC.)

13.1 Requirements Definition (N=24, C=64)

Requirements Definition focuses on how well the decennial census
requirements were defined. (N=24 comprises 3 Exec Staff, 5 Division
Chiefs, 12 ADCs, and 4 Branch Chiefs.)

Strengths in Requirements Definition (N=5, C=8)

Requirements for technology were used for knowledge management and
contained the right amount of detail. (N=5 comprises 1 Division Chief, 2
ADCs, and 2 Branch Chiefs.)

Requirements Were Used for Knowledge Management (n=4, c=6)

"We used the same documents and requirements from our main contractors
(TRW and Lockheed Martin) to build out the centers and our site at
Jeffersonville." "Documentation and identification of requirements is
what takes us from each decade." (n=4 comprises 1 Division Chief, 1 ADC,
and 2 Branch Chiefs.)

The Right Data Were Used (n=2, c=2)

"We are learning how to write good SOWs." Classes exist on how to
develop good requirements and how to write good specifications. (n=2
comprises 1 ADC and 1 Branch Chief.)

Weaknesses in Requirements Definition (N=23, C=56)

Weaknesses in requirements definition specifically refers to the few
requirements that were written and the problems caused by late
requirements. (N=23 comprises 3 Exec Staff, 5 Division Chiefs, 11 ADCs,
and 4 Branch Chiefs.)

Few Requirements Were Written (n=13, c=19)

Requirements that were not communicated well to contractors caused
problems. Programs would be shipped without documenting the output. Many
project shortcomings were due to the lack of requirements. "For a
Request for Proposals (RFP), you need a good set of requirements." There
was little requirements oversight. (n=13 comprises 1 Exec Staff, 4
Division Chiefs, 5 ADCs, and 3 Branch Chiefs.)

Requirements Were Not Completed in a Timely Manner (n=9, c=15)

"Software development needs to be improved. Need to have the
requirements and system objectives early in the process." "Contract and
system requirements were defined too late." Contracts were finalized
before the requirements were defined. (n=9 comprises 2 Exec Staff, 1
Division Chief, 4 ADCs, and 2 Branch Chiefs.)

Few Processes Exist to Develop Requirements (n=9, c=11)

We need a drastic improvement in the process of developing requirements.
There were few processes in place to manage requirements. "We need to
make sure we consider the how as well as the what in dealing with the
plans for implementation and operations." (n=9 comprises 1 Exec Staff, 2
Division Chiefs, 5 ADCs, and 1 Branch Chief.)

Requirements Were Written by People Without the Proper Technical
Knowledge (n=5, c=7)

We need to have the right people involved for requirements development.
"During the census, we had people writing requirements who did not have
the proper technical knowledge." People from the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) were brought in to write census
requirements. (n=5 comprises 1 Division Chief, 3 ADCs, and 1 Branch
Chief.)

The Requirements Lacked Quality (n=5, c=5)

The need to get things done overrode the need to have quality data. We
need to have better requirements in the future. (n=5 comprises 1
Division Chief and 4 ADCs.)

13.2 Change Control Processes (N=17, C=41)

Change control processes focus on the programmatic impact (both cost and
schedule) of making changes and the few processes in place to manage
programmatic changes. (N=17 comprises 4 Division Chiefs, 7 ADCs, and 6
Branch Chiefs.)

**Documentation of Changes (N=11, C=17)** (N=11 comprises 2 Division
Chiefs, 5 ADCs, and 4 Branch Chiefs.)

Few Change Control Processes Existed (n=9, c=15)

"We did not have a good change control process for decennial
management." "We need to have good documentation throughout the
process." "We need a more rigorous change control process." (n=9
comprises 2 Division Chiefs, 5 ADCs, and 2 Branch Chiefs.)

Use of Baseline Schedule for Making Changes (n=2, c=2)

There was a decision used not to use a baseline. We should use a
baseline approach to document changes. (n=2 comprises 2 Branch Chiefs.)

Little Strategic Change Control (n=9, c=10)

There were constant changes until the last minute. "There is a need for
change management at the decennial census level---not just at the
directorate, but across the board." "There was no change control in
place; no one was looking at the big picture." "Change was out of
control." (n=9 comprises 2 Division Chiefs, 4 ADCs, and 3 Branch
Chiefs.)

Changes Increased Contract Costs (n=8, c=10)

Once a contract is signed, it is not easy to modify. We ended up with a
cost-plus contract. Change orders cost a lot more than expected.
"Contracting did not lose a lot of money, but changes in schedules and
requirements did." (n=8 comprises 2 Division Chiefs, 4 ADCs, and 2
Branch Chiefs.)

Change Control Processes Used (n=3, c=4)

At headquarters, the programmers write up the changes. Sometimes the
change control was less formal and was accomplished in the form of daily
conference calls. The MAS was supposed to be the official source of
changes, but that did not always occur. (n=3 comprises 1 Division Chief,
1 ADC, and 1 Branch Chief.)

**13.3 Technology (N=15, C=24)** (N=15 comprises 2 Exec Staff, 4
Division Chiefs, 6 ADCs, and 3 Branch Chiefs.)

A Better Strategy Is Needed for the Use of Technology (n=8, c=9)

It is difficult to know what technology should be used so many years
before it is needed. We need a strategy for technology and technological
changes. We need better software development practices. (n=8 comprises 2
Exec Staff, 1 Division Chief, 4 ADCs, and 1 Branch Chief.)

In-House Technology (n=6, c=8)

"Most internal software development is a struggle." "Internally, we were
not keeping up with the latest technology and capacity." (n=6 comprises
4 Division Chiefs and 2 Branch Chiefs.)

Technology Improved Census 2000 (n=3, c=3)

Technology has helped us to improve the decennial census. (n=3 comprises
3 ADCs.)

Issues with Automation (n=3, c=3)

Automation will cost more initially, but will save money in the end. It
is difficult making the transition from manual to automated. (n=3
comprises 1 Exec Staff, 1 ADC, and 1 Branch Chief.)

Data Capture (n=13, c=24)

The first contracting of the Data-Capture System (DCS 2000) began in
1996 to Lockheed Martin. TRW created the operations for the three
Data-Capture Centers (DCC). Data capture was up, and we believe that
this is a function of outsourcing. (n=13 comprises 2 Exec Staff, 3
Division Chiefs, 3 ADCs, and 5 Branch Chiefs.)

Telephone Questionnaire Assistance (n=10, c=11)

We contracted with TRW for telephone questionnaire assistance (TQA). We
did not have the TQA outsourcing in place for the dress rehearsal. This
caused problems during the actual census. (n=10 comprises 1 Exec Staff,
2 Division Chiefs, 4 ADCs, and 3 Branch Chiefs.)

DSCMO's Roles and Responsibilities (n=4, c=7)

DSCMO was responsible for forming partnerships with the contractors.
"DCSMO should manage all information technology (IT) contracts." (n=4
comprises 1 Division Chief, 2 ADCs, and 1 Branch Chief.)

First-Time Use of Contracting (n=3, c=3)

Census 2000 was the first time the Census Bureau used contracting for
information technology. In all, 11 different contractors were used,
including the subcontractors. (n=3 comprises 1 Exec Staff, 1 Division
Chief, and 1 ADC.)

[]{#__RefHeading___Toc55114618 .anchor}APPENDIX C: INTERVIEWEES FOR
MANAGEMENT EVALUATION OF THE DECENNIAL CENSUS

+--------------------------------+-------------------------------------+
| **Name**                       | **Role**                            |
+--------------------------------+-------------------------------------+
| EXECUTIVE STAFF                |                                     |
+--------------------------------+-------------------------------------+
| Barron, Bill                   | Census Bureau Director (Acting);    |
|                                |                                     |
|                                | Assistant Director                  |
+--------------------------------+-------------------------------------+
| Clark, Cynthia                 | AD Methodology and Standards        |
+--------------------------------+-------------------------------------+
| Collins, La Verne              | AD Communications (Acting)          |
+--------------------------------+-------------------------------------+
| Potok, Nancy                   | CFO & PAD Admin.                    |
+--------------------------------+-------------------------------------+
| Raines, Marvin                 | AD Field                            |
+--------------------------------+-------------------------------------+
| Thompson, John                 | AD Decennial Census;                |
|                                |                                     |
|                                | PAD Programs                        |
+--------------------------------+-------------------------------------+
| Van Horn, Carol                | AAD Field; Chief DMD (1998-1999)    |
+--------------------------------+-------------------------------------+
| Waite, Jay                     | AD Decennial Census                 |
+--------------------------------+-------------------------------------+
| DIVISION/OFFICE CHIEFS         |                                     |
+--------------------------------+-------------------------------------+
| Angueira, Terry                | Chief DMD                           |
+--------------------------------+-------------------------------------+
| Hogan, Howard                  | Chief DSSD                          |
+--------------------------------+-------------------------------------+
| Killion, RuthAnn               | Chief PRED                          |
+--------------------------------+-------------------------------------+
| Long, John                     | Chief POP                           |
+--------------------------------+-------------------------------------+
| Longini, Michael               | Chief DSCMO                         |
+--------------------------------+-------------------------------------+
| Marks, Jennifer                | Chief PIO/C2PO                      |
+--------------------------------+-------------------------------------+
| Marx, Bob                      | Chief GEO                           |
+--------------------------------+-------------------------------------+
| Miskura, Susan                 | Chief DMD, 1999--2000               |
+--------------------------------+-------------------------------------+
| Palensky, Michael              | Chief Acquisitions                  |
+--------------------------------+-------------------------------------+
| Petty, Judith                  | Chief NPC                           |
+--------------------------------+-------------------------------------+
| Weinberg, Dan                  | Chief HHES                          |
+--------------------------------+-------------------------------------+
| REGIONAL DIRECTORS             |                                     |
+--------------------------------+-------------------------------------+
| Holmes, James                  | Regional Director, Atlanta          |
+--------------------------------+-------------------------------------+
| Lavin, Susan                   | Regional Director, Denver           |
+--------------------------------+-------------------------------------+
| ASSISTANT DIVISION             |                                     |
|                                |                                     |
| CHIEFS                         |                                     |
+--------------------------------+-------------------------------------+
| Blass, Dick                    | FLD                                 |
+--------------------------------+-------------------------------------+
| Bolton, Debbie                 | PRED                                |
+--------------------------------+-------------------------------------+
| Cummings, Janet                | FLD                                 |
+--------------------------------+-------------------------------------+
| Dawson, Judy                   | TMO                                 |
+--------------------------------+-------------------------------------+
| Franz, Linda                   | GEO                                 |
+--------------------------------+-------------------------------------+
| Galdi, David                   | GEO                                 |
+--------------------------------+-------------------------------------+
| Gore, Ed                       | DMD                                 |
+--------------------------------+-------------------------------------+
| Kostanich, Donna               | DSSD                                |
+--------------------------------+-------------------------------------+
| Leithauser, Gail               | FLD                                 |
+--------------------------------+-------------------------------------+
| Monaghan, Brian                | FLD                                 |
+--------------------------------+-------------------------------------+
| Nash, Fay                      | DMD                                 |
+--------------------------------+-------------------------------------+
| Norry, Len                     | HHES                                |
+--------------------------------+-------------------------------------+
| Perez, Miguel                  | DMD                                 |
+--------------------------------+-------------------------------------+
| Pike, Ed                       | DMD                                 |
+--------------------------------+-------------------------------------+
| Singh, Raj                     | DSSD                                |
+--------------------------------+-------------------------------------+
| Stoudt, Dennis                 | DSCMO                               |
+--------------------------------+-------------------------------------+
| Wagner, Ed                     | DSCMO                               |
+--------------------------------+-------------------------------------+
| Weiler, Mike                   | Special Assistant to the Associate  |
|                                |                                     |
|                                | Director Field                      |
+--------------------------------+-------------------------------------+
| Whitford, David                | DSSD                                |
+--------------------------------+-------------------------------------+
| BRANCH CHIEFS                  |                                     |
+--------------------------------+-------------------------------------+
| August, Brenda                 | FLD                                 |
+--------------------------------+-------------------------------------+
| Hovland, Idabelle              | DMD                                 |
+--------------------------------+-------------------------------------+
| Ingold, Jane                   | DMD                                 |
+--------------------------------+-------------------------------------+
| Lichtman Panzer, Paulette      | DMD                                 |
+--------------------------------+-------------------------------------+
| Lucas, Sandra                  | FLD                                 |
+--------------------------------+-------------------------------------+
| Matsko, Mark                   | NPC                                 |
+--------------------------------+-------------------------------------+
| Miller, Carol                  | DMD                                 |
+--------------------------------+-------------------------------------+
| Sobel, Joel                    | GEO                                 |
+--------------------------------+-------------------------------------+
| Tinari, Barbara                | DMD                                 |
+--------------------------------+-------------------------------------+
| Treat, James                   | DSSD                                |
+--------------------------------+-------------------------------------+
| Urrutia, Maria                 | DMD                                 |
+--------------------------------+-------------------------------------+
| Wessler, Tracy                 | DSCMO                               |
+--------------------------------+-------------------------------------+

[]{#__RefHeading___Toc55114619 .anchor}APPENDIX D: LISTING OF ACRONYMS
USED IN REPORT

  ---------- ------------------------------------------------------------
  Acronym    Definition

  ACE        Accuracy and Coverage Evaluation

  AD         Associate Director

  ADC        Assistant Division Chief

  ADD        Assistant Director for Decennial Census

  C&P        Cost and Progress (System)

  C2PO       Census 2000 Publicity Office

  CMB        Census Monitoring Board

  COM        Census Operational Managers

  DoC        U.S. Department of Commerce

  DMD        Decennial Management Division

  DPLD       Decennial Planning Division

  DSCMO      Decennial Systems and Contracts Management Office

  DSSD       Decennial Statistical Studies Division

  FLD        Field Division

  FTE        Full-Time Equivalent

  GAO        General Accounting Office

  GEO        Geography Division

  HHES       Housing and Household Economic Statistics Division

  IG         Inspector General

  IR/CC      Issue Resolution/Change Control (Process)

  MAS        Master Activity Schedule

  MAF        Master Address File

  MIT        Management Integration Team

  NUD\*IST   Non-numerical Unstructured Data Indexing, Searching, and
             Theorizing

  OMB        Office of Management and Budget

  OSAM       Operational Status and Assessment Meetings

  PAD        Principal Associate Director

  PL         Public Law

  PMP        Program Master Plan

  PSC        Program Steering Committee

  POP        Population Division

  PRED       Planning, Research, and Evaluation Division

  PwC        PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP

  QSR        Qualitative Solutions and Research

  RIF        Reduction in Force

  SES        Senior Executive Service

  TIGER      Topologically Integrated Geographic Encoding and Referencing

  U.S.C.     United States Code
  ---------- ------------------------------------------------------------

[]{#__RefHeading___Toc55114620 .anchor}APPENDIX E: INTERVIEW GUIDE

Name Position: Interview Date: Time:

We would like to discuss some of the questions from the following table:

+-----------+----------------------------------------------------------+
| *         |                                                          |
| INTERVIEW |                                                          |
| GUIDE*    |                                                          |
+-----------+----------------------------------------------------------+
| D         | QUESTION POOL                                            |
| ISCUSSION |                                                          |
| AREA      |                                                          |
+-----------+----------------------------------------------------------+
| **[Role   | Describe your role in Census 2000 and how it fits into   |
| and       | the chain of command.                                    |
| Re        |                                                          |
| sponsibil |                                                          |
| ity]{.und |                                                          |
| erline}** |                                                          |
+-----------+----------------------------------------------------------+
|           | Have you been involved in previous census efforts?       |
|           | Briefly describe your role?                              |
+-----------+----------------------------------------------------------+
| **[M      | Describe the model used for Census 2000. How is the      |
| anagement | decennial census management approach different during a  |
| Mo        | census year than during other years?                     |
| del]{.und |                                                          |
| erline}** |                                                          |
+-----------+----------------------------------------------------------+
|           | What were the strengths and weaknesses of the Program    |
|           | Steering Committees and the Management Integration Team  |
|           | approach (matrix)? The centralized approach (DMD managed |
|           | across all programs)?                                    |
+-----------+----------------------------------------------------------+
|           | How did the hierarchical structure of the participating  |
|           | Divisions mix with each of Census 2000 management models |
|           | described above?                                         |
+-----------+----------------------------------------------------------+
|           | What challenges did each of these models present to you  |
|           | in accomplishing your objectives?                        |
+-----------+----------------------------------------------------------+
|           | What were the priorities of Census 2000 \[cost, quality  |
|           | (accuracy), customer service, timeliness\]?              |
+-----------+----------------------------------------------------------+
|           | How did the model used impact the overall management of  |
|           | the census? The conduct of the census? What alternatives |
|           | might have worked better or could be used in the future? |
+-----------+----------------------------------------------------------+
| **[Census | How was the decennial management environment different   |
| En        | during this census from that during other censuses?      |
| vironment |                                                          |
| and]{.und |                                                          |
| erline}** |                                                          |
|           |                                                          |
| **        |                                                          |
| [External |                                                          |
| Influen   |                                                          |
| ces]{.und |                                                          |
| erline}** |                                                          |
+-----------+----------------------------------------------------------+
|           | What has been the driving force for change in the        |
|           | conduct of the census over the last 10 years?            |
+-----------+----------------------------------------------------------+
|           | Did changes in the political environment affect the      |
|           | management structure and operations of Census 2000? If   |
|           | so, how?                                                 |
+-----------+----------------------------------------------------------+
|           | How has the management environment changed over the      |
|           | years? Leadership style? Rigor? Accountability? Size?    |
|           | Responsibilities? (internal, political, external,        |
|           | complexity, and volume changes)                          |
+-----------+----------------------------------------------------------+
|           | What constraints does the decennial census deal with     |
|           | that might not be prevalent in other federal agencies,   |
|           | private industry, or other similar organizations?        |
+-----------+----------------------------------------------------------+
|           | What impact, if any, did oversight groups (Monitoring    |
|           | Board, GAO, IG, OMB, Congress) have on the management    |
|           | and conduct of the census? Discuss the relationship      |
|           | between Census Bureau and Dept of Commerce, OMB, the     |
|           | Administration, and Congress.                            |
+-----------+----------------------------------------------------------+
|           | Did the environment encourage a free flow of information |
|           | (positive and negative) up and down the organization?    |
|           | Was there an open environment for professional debate on |
|           | issues?                                                  |
+-----------+----------------------------------------------------------+
|           | How effective were the Census Bureau's strategies for    |
|           | dealing with external stakeholders?                      |
+-----------+----------------------------------------------------------+
|           | How effective was the communications strategy, both      |
|           | internal and external? How well did the Census Bureau    |
|           | make its case to external stakeholders?                  |
+-----------+----------------------------------------------------------+
| **        | Describe your understanding of the management            |
| [Decision | decision-making process(es) that was used for Census     |
| Making    | 2000. What were the strengths and weaknesses of the      |
| Proces    | process(es)?                                             |
| ses]{.und |                                                          |
| erline}** |                                                          |
+-----------+----------------------------------------------------------+
|           | Describe your understanding of the levels of authority   |
|           | required for decision making.                            |
+-----------+----------------------------------------------------------+
|           | Did decision makers gather relevant information before   |
|           | making decisions?                                        |
+-----------+----------------------------------------------------------+
|           | Did decision makers encourage an open debate of          |
|           | difficult issues before making decisions?                |
+-----------+----------------------------------------------------------+
|           | Were the decisions made during the conduct of Census     |
|           | 2000 consistent with stated leadership priorities?       |
+-----------+----------------------------------------------------------+
|           | Were tactical decisions reached appropriately at lower   |
|           | levels? Was there a clear and communicated set of        |
|           | criteria by which to differentiate between appropriate   |
|           | levels at which decision making should be made? Were     |
|           | there specific criteria that were required to elevate a  |
|           | decision to leadership? What were they?                  |
+-----------+----------------------------------------------------------+
|           | How often were decisions elevated to higher levels of    |
|           | leadership? Was this appropriate, or should there have   |
|           | been more authority delegated to empower decision making |
|           | at lower staff levels?                                   |
+-----------+----------------------------------------------------------+
|           | Were all parties generally satisfied with the way        |
|           | decisions were arrived at?                               |
+-----------+----------------------------------------------------------+
|           | Describe your understanding of the issue resolution and  |
|           | change control process(es). What were the strengths and  |
|           | weaknesses of the process(es)? What changes would have   |
|           | made the process(es) more effective?                     |
+-----------+----------------------------------------------------------+
|           | How might you modify the issue resolution process to     |
|           | balance the need for quick decisions with the limited    |
|           | ability to get full information before making a          |
|           | decision?                                                |
+-----------+----------------------------------------------------------+
|           | How were decisions communicated internally? Were these   |
|           | communications effective?                                |
+-----------+----------------------------------------------------------+
|           | What impact, if any, did the oversight or advisory       |
|           | groups (formal and informal) have on the decision-making |
|           | process(es) used in Census 2000?                         |
+-----------+----------------------------------------------------------+
| **[Organ  | What was the DMD's stated versus actual role? What       |
| izational | should DMD's role have been?                             |
| Structure |                                                          |
| and       |                                                          |
| Proces    |                                                          |
| ses]{.und |                                                          |
| erline}** |                                                          |
+-----------+----------------------------------------------------------+
|           | What were the DMD program managers' stated versus actual |
|           | roles?                                                   |
+-----------+----------------------------------------------------------+
|           | What was the objective of the OSAM meetings? What would  |
|           | have been a more effective approach to achieving these   |
|           | objectives?                                              |
+-----------+----------------------------------------------------------+
|           | Did the executive leadership effectively communicate     |
|           | roles and responsibilities to the various participating  |
|           | divisions, components, and staffs working on the census? |
+-----------+----------------------------------------------------------+
|           | Is the organization entrenched in certain practices, or  |
|           | is it innovative and flexible?                           |
+-----------+----------------------------------------------------------+
|           | Are lines of authority clear, both in budget authority   |
|           | and guidance? Are activities within areas of             |
|           | responsibility clearly delineated? Do some staff members |
|           | routinely take on activities that are not in their       |
|           | formal area of responsibility to maintain continuity and |
|           | progress or to help other component staffs?              |
+-----------+----------------------------------------------------------+
|           | Do units within the Census Bureau operate in a           |
|           | compartmentalized and autonomous manner?                 |
+-----------+----------------------------------------------------------+
|           | Are there single process owners for distinct census      |
|           | operations? intra/interdivisional teams?                 |
+-----------+----------------------------------------------------------+
|           | How does collaboration occur? In what forum or           |
|           | structure? Is there a mechanism for "end-runs" of senior |
|           | managers to the executive leadership? Through other      |
|           | senior managers to build support? Are there mechanisms   |
|           | by which individuals can "end-run" others in positions   |
|           | of authority?                                            |
+-----------+----------------------------------------------------------+
|           | Describe the management culture during Census 2000?      |
|           | Leadership style? Census Bureau's corporate personality? |
+-----------+----------------------------------------------------------+
|           | Were the participating divisions able to access          |
|           | information efficiently and effectively? Were the DMD    |
|           | program managers able to access the appropriate amount   |
|           | of information and support from participating divisions? |
+-----------+----------------------------------------------------------+
|           | Were the management information support systems (Cost    |
|           | Model, budget process, MAS, and C&P) and components (DMD |
|           | administrative office) useful to you in carrying out     |
|           | activities in your area of responsibility?               |
+-----------+----------------------------------------------------------+
|           | Were the decennial management structures and tools used  |
|           | successful in achieving the desired objective? (OSAM     |
|           | meetings, Census Operational Managers, Decennial         |
|           | Division Chiefs, cost model, cost and progress systems,  |
|           | MIS) Were the structures and tools effective in          |
|           | facilitating program integration across the different    |
|           | program elements?                                        |
+-----------+----------------------------------------------------------+
|           | Were there activities in the areas of responsibility     |
|           | outside the Decennial Directorate that should have been  |
|           | more integrated? How effective were the organizational   |
|           | interfaces between the groups?                           |
+-----------+----------------------------------------------------------+
|           | How well did the Census Operational Managers (COM) work  |
|           | together? How is operational integration achieved in the |
|           | non-decennial census organizational structure?           |
+-----------+----------------------------------------------------------+
| **[       | What constraints does the Census Bureau deal with that   |
| Executive | might not be prevalent in other federal agencies,        |
| Leaders   | private industry, or other similar organizations?        |
| hip]{.und |                                                          |
| erline}** |                                                          |
+-----------+----------------------------------------------------------+
|           | What have been the greatest challenges to achieving your |
|           | goals and objectives?                                    |
+-----------+----------------------------------------------------------+
|           | What have you learned with 20/20 hindsight?              |
+-----------+----------------------------------------------------------+
|           | How would you run Census 2000 differently? What did you  |
|           | learn from your experience? Which management approaches, |
|           | organizational structures, or processes should stay the  |
|           | same for 2010 Census , and which might be different?     |
+-----------+----------------------------------------------------------+

[]{#__RefHeading___Toc55114621 .anchor}APPENDIX F: STUDY PLAN

**CENSUS 2000 STUDY PLAN\
Carol Miller (DMD)**

Q1. Evaluation of the Management Processes and Systems of the 2000
Decennial Census

1\. Background

Many complex and interrelated operations comprise a decennial census.
The key to a successful census is to assure that the right things happen
at the right time. Decisions about census operations are made using all
available information. The census design needs to be guided by explicit
objectives, policy decisions, and stakeholder input.

This evaluation, a comprehensive study to evaluate management of the
Census 2000, will provide valuable information for planning future
censuses and similar projects. It concentrates on evaluating management
structures, processes and procedures within the Decennial Census
Directorate, but also requires some investigation into the contributions
of other participating divisions. As deemed appropriate, it can be
expanded to other areas. In particular, it can be formulated to address
the structure and management of programs intrinsically related to the
2010 census, such as the American Community Survey, the Community
Address Updating System, the American Factfinder, and various address
list and geographic database updating systems.

The evaluation will be conducted under contract to an external
management consulting firm. The Decennial Management Division (DMD) and
Decennial Systems and Contracts Management Office (DSCMO) are
responsible for contract administration, defining the requirements for
the evaluation, providing information to the contractor, and
coordinating contacts with U.S. Census Bureau staff who may be
interviewed under contract provisions. The DMD and DSCMO also will
supply basic assumptions about the Census Bureau\'s structure, the
Directorate\'s structure, the functions of participating divisions, and
other parameters of the evaluation.

2\. Topics/Questions to Be Answered

There are seven major areas to be evaluated:

-the management model for Census 2000;

-organizational structures and processes;

-decision-making process;

-management information tools;

-staffing;

-external influences; and -the use of contracts.

A. [The Manaqement Model for Census 2000-]{.underline} The evaluation of
the Census 2000 management structure will supply a comparative study of
management models, including the efficacy of both the matrix (MIT/PSC)
and centralized program management approaches. What were the strengths
and weaknesses of the plan that was used? What were the strengths and
weaknesses of the matrix method? Were there other models that should
have been considered? Questions to be answered include:

How effective was each of these management approaches in helping to
ensure a successful census? How well did they work for management and
for staff? What are the relative strengths and weaknesses of each? What
is needed for each to work? What alternative models might have worked
better?

How well did the relationships and division of responsibilities among
the Associate Director, Assistant Director, and individual Division
Chiefs within the Decennial Census Directorate work?

How well did the DMD program management structure, which was oriented
towards assigning whole program components to various organizational
subunits, work? How effective was this structure in ensuring program
integration across program components? How effective was this structure
in collaborating with the separate staffs charged with budget/cost
modeling activities, management information systems development, and
communication? Is there a more appropriate management structure that
would have worked better? Would a functionally organized structure, or
some other combination between a functional structure and a program
management structure, have worked better? How might the weaknesses in
various models be addressed?

What was the relevance of timing and the impact, if any, of the
management model change from the matrix to the centralized program
management?

How effective was the organization in handling external relationships in
an efficient, accurate, and timely manner? Where were the functions
centralized or decentralized? Was this breakdown appropriate to achieve
objectives? The scope of this inquiry is based on a broad definition of
external relationships, including but not limited to oversight groups,
the Congress, advisory committees, stakeholder interest groups and
partners, the media, and the general public.

B. Orqanizational Structure and Processes- This portion of the
evaluation is designed to address (1) the roles and influences of
entities outside the Decennial Census Directorate; (2) the impact of
participating Census Bureau divisions and offices and their relationship
to the Decennial Census Directorate; (3) the organizational structure
within and outside the Decennial Census Directorate; (4) the
effectiveness of processes used across the organization; and (5) role
definition.

What was the effectiveness of different models used by divisions and
offices, such as those that created subunits dedicated to Census 2000
activities; and those that subsumed Census 2000 activities under
existing or generic subunits? Did it make a difference if the Decennial
Census Directorate supported staff directly or indirectly and if so how?

How effective was the mix of support provided within the Decennial
Census Directorate versus outside the Directorate? Should more or fewer
of the functions have been within the Decennial Census Directorate? This
includes, but is not limited to, IT support; contracting and procurement
support; human resources support; and the like.

How effective were the organizational relationships between the
Decennial Census Directorate divisions and other areas with major Census
2000 emphasis, such as Communications, Research and Evaluations, the
Technologies Management Office, the Field Division and its decentralized
offices, and the like?

How effective was the communication within the Decennial Census
Directorate, and between the Decennial Census Directorate and other
directorates with participating divisions and offices? What methods were
most effective and why? Which methods were least effective and why? What
methods could be used to communicate most effectively among the
participants for various purposes?

What were the roles and influences of the:

Decennial Executive Staff Steering Committee

U.S. Census Bureau Executive Staff

Department of Commerce

Economics and Statistics Administration

Office of Management and Budget

What was the relationship between the 2000 research and development
program and what new operations or technologies that were actually
implemented for Census 2000? What research and development projects were
most useful? What areas should have been emphasized more? Which had
little or no value?

Were the right divisions created with the right responsibilities, for
example, the Decennial Systems and Contract Management Office and the
Planning, Research and Evaluation Division? Was their tenure of the
correct length?

What was the impact of the political considerations that influenced
Census 2000 plans and planning?

Within the Directorate, how well did the combination of centralization
and decentralization of support functions within different divisions
work (in particular, LAN, administrative office, budget execution and
other functions),

C. Decision-Making Process- There were several formal processes, and
several .specific groups, defined for making decisions about Census
2000. This portion of the evaluation will review both these formal
structures and how decisions were actually made, particularly when
timing required that decisions depart from these processes, or new
influences arose. An evaluation of decision making for Census 2000 is
needed in order to identify the most effective components, the types of
decisions that might have been made differently, and the best ways to
document and to change decisions.

This portion of the evaluation also will examine not only the structure
and processes for decision making, but will provide case studies that
analyze the types of problems that occur, how problems are raised, the
use of information to provide objective and comprehensive options, what
influences them, and how effective the choices made are.

How effective was each of the components of the decision making process
(COM, IR/CC, the Executive Staff, various steering committees, and the
like)? How well did they work? How were policy decisions and issues
raised and considered? How were decisions made? How were the results of
the decisions disseminated to those who needed to know?

Were these the best decision making processes to use? What role
did/should objective information play in decision making? Were there
alternatives available at the time? What processes would have worked
better?

What was the process for reaching key decisions? (For example, the
process for arriving at the final design and implementation strategy for
the mailed questionnaires.

What were the best ways to document and disseminate decisions quickly?

What is the best way to develop requirements and approve changes to
requirements? What constitutes a requirement?

How effective were processes for change control?

How well were policy guidance, census objectives, and a vision to set
common priorities handled?

D. Management Information Tools -Cost Model/Budgeting; and Management
Information System (Cost and Progress, Master Activity Schedule,
Analytical Tools)- This part of the evaluation is designed to examine
the primary tools used to support management of Census 2000, especially
the relationships among them and their use and access both within the
DMD, which produced and maintained them, and other participating
divisions.

How effective was each of these management tools? How well did they
work, in terms such as (a) the timeliness of their development and their
products, (b) ease of use and accessibility to managers; (c) the
accuracy of their products; (d) flexibility in adapting to changes; (e)
acceptance among managers within and outside of the Decennial Census
Directorate; and (f) other relevant factors?

Were these the best systems to use? What other systems/models might have
been developed to address their weaknesses?

What were the problems with not having full integration between the (a)
cost model and budgeting systems and (b) cost and progress system and
the Master Activity Schedule? How can full integration be achieved? How
might the system be designed to assure appropriate access to, and use
by, all participating managers?

What is the correct balance between having the information needed to
manage our work versus the same information being available as public
information?

Is there a way to restrict the use of products or management tools? A
product or tool was defined for a specified need, yet frequently, the
product or tool was used for a .different purpose.

E. Staffing

For each decennial division, how appropriate was the span of control for
effective supervision of each branch, ADC area, or the like?

Did we have enough people at the right time?

Were various functions or subprojects adequately staffed? By adequate
staff, we assume everyone should not have had to work overtime as part
of the normal workday; on the other hand, there are some peak times when
staff must be available for long periods. What is the appropriate
benchmark to determine an adequate staff level?

By functional responsibility ,how early does an office need to increase
staff to be able to meet the demands of a decennial. census?

Did staff have a clear vision as to what they should have done or who
was responsible for what? This vision reflects the culture of the staff,
including management. The decennial census culture may be different from
the culture in the rest of the Census Bureau. There are components
within each of the different cultlJreS of our organization that may help
or hinder efficient operations. Do the Census Bureau and/or decennial
census culture or some components need to be changed?

What core competencies are needed in a decennial staff? How adequate was
both formal and on-the-job training for staff? How might staff be better
prepared in the future? Would rotational assignments be of benefit?

How effective was the use of term employees? Are there other, better
ways to meet the ten-year cyclical nature of decennial census staffing
needs?

How effective was the use of contractor staff? Should there have been
more widespread use of contract staff? What are the challenges/problems
and benefits of using contractor staff? Are there certain areas where
contracting staff is feasible? Are there other areas where it\'s not
feasible? Some areas made frequent or continual use of contract staff.
Other areas made no or minimal use of contract staff.

F. External Influences- This portion of the evaluation is designed to
examine the role and effects of various external influences, including
but not limited to:

-   IG

-   GAO

-   Office of Management and Budget

-   Congress

-   Other external public stakeholders

-   NARA

-   HUD

-   NOAA and other federal agencies (such as DOJ)

-   REAC and other advisory committees

-   CNSTAT

-   NAS

-   Census Monitoring Board

The evaluation will address the effectiveness of strategies dealing with
external stakeholders, and how well advisory groups might be best
utilized to provide needed information and cooperation.

G. [Use of Contracts]{.underline}. Contracting affected the way Census
2000 was managed and changed the way it operated (i.e., all components
technically had to be defined up front rather than on an ad hoc basis.)
This portion of the evaluation is designed to examine all aspects of
specific large scale contracts including:

-   administering the program

-   communicating with the contractor

-   contracting officer\'s technical representative (COTR)

-   quality control of the operations

-   management reports

-   types of contracts

1\. What impact did the contracting process have on the organization and
management of Census 2000?

2\. Were there effective ways to maintain interaction and communication
between subject matter staff and contract staff but minimize the
modification of contracts?

3\. Were COTRs used effectively in the contracting process?

4\. Did the quality control measures established assure the quality of
the final product(s)?

5\. What management issues should decennial census managers make high
priority to improve our effectiveness in working with contractors?

3\. Evaluation Methodology

Obtain contractor support to

-   evaluate all aspects of the organization, staffing, decision making
    processes, external influences, contracting processes, and work
    management processes.

-   evaluate the tools used in terms of software or applications,
    particularly the budgeting and management information tools. The
    Cost Model, the MAS, and the C&P system will be evaluated as a
    processes

-   do the evaluation using structured interviews, analysis of
    alternative models, benchmarking, and the like.

-   use actual decennial census case studies, if available, for the
    analysis.

-   identify and record lessons learned as applicable to the management
    process. consider the combined goals of managing the successful
    completion of the work in a timely and accurate manner with
    sufficient controls, and managing the external census, such as, the
    political involvement, public influence, and other factors that
    influenced the environment in which we worked.

-   provide specific recommendations for improving the management of the
    next decennial census.

This evaluation will be divided into three phases. In the first phase
the contractor will address the Management Model for Census 2000, the
Organizational Structure and Processes and the Decision-Making Process.
In the second phase the contractor will examine the Management
Information Tools, the External Influences and the Use of Contracts. In
the final phase information from the earlier phases will be integrated
and a final evaluation report will be developed and presented. Briefings
will occur for each interim report.

4\. Data Requirements

-   Staffing data

-   System specifications

-   Program Master Plans

-   Management Plan

5\. Division Responsibilities

-   DMD and DSCMO will manage this contract

-   PRED will provide QA support

-   DMD and DSCMO will manage this contract.

6\. Data Products

-   Study plan including: methodology, questions, schedule, and budget.

-   Notebooks containing documents used in doing this evaluation.

-   Interim reports.

-   Final report including oral and written presentations.

7\. Cost Information

  ----------------------------------- -----------------------------------
  CONTRACTS                           FY01

                                      Estimated cost: \$2 million
  ----------------------------------- -----------------------------------

8\. Milestone Schedule

  -------------------------------------------- ---------- ----------------
  Activity                                     Start      Finish

  Prepare study plan                           9/30/00    11/21/00

  Obtain study plan approval from division                11/27/00
  chief                                                   

  Transmit approved study plan to PRED                    11/28/00

  Prepare SOW                                  08/10/00   11/27/00

  Issue RFP/Task Request                                  12/07/00

  Conduct evaluations                          02/05/01   02/23/00

  Award contract                                          03/01/00

  Conduct post award meeting                   03/05/01   

  Receive revised work plan                               03/30/01

  Deliver work plan to PRED                               04/02/01
  -------------------------------------------- ---------- ----------------

  -------------------------------------------- ---------- ----------------
  [Phase 1]{.underline}                                   

  Contractor delivers draft survey instrument             04/02/01

  Contractor delivers final survey instrument             05/30/01

  Contractor conducts interviews- Phase 1      06/04/01   08/16/01

  Phase 1 Interim report due                              09/20/01

  [Phase 2]{.underline}                                   

  Contractor delivers draft survey instrument             08/06/01
  -Phase 2                                                

  Contractor delivers final survey instrument  09/07/01   08/31/01

  Contractor conducts interviews -Phase 2                 10/18/01

  Phase 2 interim report due                              11/08/01

  [Phase 3]{.underline}                                   

  Draft final report due                                  12/14/01

  Executive Briefing report                               01/21/02

  Final report due from contractor                        
  -------------------------------------------- ---------- ----------------

9\. Limitations

The success of this review is dependent upon two key factors. The
perception of those persons participating in the interview process can
significantly influence the quality of information gathered. For
instance, if there is a lack of communication about the purpose of the
review, less than optimal results will be obtained and the findings may
lack depth. The contractor conducting this evaluation will be requested
to preface each interview with an explanation about its purpose in order
to gain user understanding and commitment. A key factor in gaining such
commitment and a willingness to answer questions is to stress that the
review will be a balanced assessment. This approach can often reduce
concerns about hidden agendas.

10\. Related Studies

The following studies are related to this evaluation

Census 2000 Staffing Programs -G.1

Management Information System -R.3.c

11\. Issues That Need to be Resolved

The only issue that needs to be resolved is the selection of a
contractor to perform this study. That process is underway and should be
completed in early 2001.

##  {#section-12 .unnumbered}

[^1]: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, *Census 2000
    Study Plan,* Q.1 Evaluation of the Management Processes and Systems
    of the 2000 Decennial Census (see Appendix F).

[^2]: DSSD A.C.E. Revision II Memorandum Series #PP-54

[^3]: Decision-making within COM was based on the following criteria:
    The decision shall be consistent with overall policy and/or
    expectations; The decision has no adverse impact on other operations
    (or such impact can be obviated); The decision can be accomplished
    within time and budget constraints.

[^4]: The four phases of developing an effective communications approach
    are as follows: 1. Evaluate the environment. 2. Establish Goals. 3.
    Develop the communications strategy and plan. 4. Implement the
    communications plans.

[^5]: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, *Census 2000
    Study Plan,* Q.1 Evaluation of the Management Processes and Systems
    of the 2000 Decennial Census (see Appendix F).

[^6]: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Decennial
    Management Division, *Updated Summary: Census 2000 Operational
    Plan,* Feb. 1999.

[^7]: Bureau of the Census Management Evaluation, *Interview Guide*,
    September 2001 (See Appendix E).

[^8]: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, *Census 2000
    Study Plan,* Q.1 Evaluation of the Management Processes and Systems
    of the 2000 Decennial Census (see Appendix F).

[^9]: As a baseline for the evaluation criteria, the contractor began
    with the six key areas of integrated organization design as defined
    by their Organizational Design Methodology. The areas of the
    contractor methodology are as follows: 1. *Roles and
    Responsibilities:* The assignment of responsibility for performing
    specified activities to specific groups or individuals, such as, key
    organization roles and interfaces and accountabilities. 2.
    *Organizational Structure and Processes:* The definition of work
    activity groupings, reporting relationships, levels and spans, such
    as, functional, process, and product/ channel/customer grouping. 3.
    *Accountability and Decision-making:* The assignment of
    accountability for results of specific activities and the process
    for defining who is involved in and approves key decisions, such as,
    governance principles. 4. *Work Group Design:* The combination of
    related jobs and determination of resources needed to meet the
    organizational requirements, such as, cross functional teams,
    virtual teams, and integrating mechanisms. 5. *Job Design:* The
    assignment of groups of related tasks/activities and procedures to
    specific jobs, such as, detailed job specification. 6. *Skills &
    Behavior Development:* The development of skill sets and behaviors
    required to support new processes and leverage new technology at the
    individual and group level, such as, skills, knowledge, and
    behavior.

[^10]: This section refers to matters of recruiting and retention,
    promotion and terms of employment, succession planning and career
    development. We discovered that general concerns around staffing and
    human resources were significant to the staff and relevant to the
    discussion of the other three areas.

[^11]: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, *Census 2000
    Study Plan,* Q.1 Evaluation of the Management Processes and Systems
    of the 2000 Decennial Census (see Appendix F).

[^12]: Interviewees for Management Evaluation of the Decennial Census
    (See Appendix C).

[^13]: Criteria for Evaluating the Management Approach (Appendix A).

[^14]: Step 1: We developed an indexing system to establish a structure
    for the qualitative interview data. The indexing structure allowed
    us to code the interview text with titles, memos, and appropriate
    references. This allowed the content to be investigated in many
    different ways and for the structure to be rearranged. Step 2: We
    searched the texts for themes and created links to the different
    ideas that were presented by the interviewees. This allowed us to
    further develop and test our theories regarding Census 2000
    management approach. The NUD\*IST software also enabled our team to
    synthesize the project results and relate similar comments.

[^15]: Ibid.

[^16]: Bureau of the Census Management Evaluation, *Interview Guide*,
    September 2001 (see Appendix D).

[^17]: Ibid.

[^18]: 13 U.S.C. § 1; PL 94-521, § 3(a), Oct. 17, 1976, 90 Stat. 2459.

[^19]: U.S. Const. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.

[^20]: Article 1, Section 2, Clause 3 of the U.S. Constitution states
    that "Representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned among
    the several States which may be included within this Union,
    according to their respective numbers, which shall be determined by
    adding to the whole number of free persons, including those bound to
    service for a term of years." And it authorizes Congress to direct
    an "actual enumeration" of the American public every 10 years to
    provide a basis for apportioning congressional representation among
    the States.

[^21]: According to Census Bureau interviewees, the Voting Rights Act of
    1965, enacted as part of a program of civil rights reform, served to
    increase the political importance of the decennial census because it
    provided the statistics upon which the future distribution of
    federal funds would be based.

[^22]: §2(a)(1), 105 Stat. 635, note following 13 U.S.C. § 141

[^23]: From Justice O\'Connor\'s opinion, which was the opinion of the
    court, this information is found in the Supreme Court\'s opinion on
    the *Department of Commerce v. United State House of
    Representatives, 525 U.S. 316 (1999).*

    *"*Two of the three panels established by the Academy pursuant to
    this Act concluded that 'differential undercount cannot be reduced
    to acceptable levels at acceptable costs without the use of
    integrated coverage measurement,' a statistical sampling procedure
    that adjusts census results to account for undercount in the initial
    enumeration," Census 2000 Report 7-8. All three panels recommended
    including integrated coverage measurement in the 2000 census, *id.,*
    at 29. See National Research Council, Preparing for the 2000 census:
    Interim Report II (A. White & K. Rust eds. 1997) (report of Panel to
    Evaluate Alternative Census Methodologies); Modernizing the U.S.
    Census*, supra* (report of Panel on Census Requirements in the Year
    2000 and Beyond); U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of the Census,
    Census 2000 Operational Plan (1997).

[^24]: Public Law 105-119, title II, Sec. 209, November 26, 1997, 111
    Statute 2480.

[^25]: *Department of Commerce v. United States House of
    Representatives*, 525 U. S. 316 (1999)

[^26]: April 1, 2000

[^27]: Communications will be addressed more specifically in a later
    section of this report.

[^28]: Contractor, Bureau of the Census Management Evaluation,
    "Compilation of Funding Figures for Census in US, UK, Australia, and
    Canada," Dec. 2001, p. 1. U.S. Census Funding Figures provided by
    DMD budget staff.

[^29]: Census Cost per capita = Total Census Cost / Total Population.
    Total cost for the U.S. Census 2000 is \$6.375 billion (includes
    estimated costs for FY2003) and the total U.S. population (including
    Puerto Rico) of 285,230,516 million from U.S. Census Bureau website,
    Table DP-1. Profile of General Demographic Characteristics for the
    United States: 2000. Population determinations for the U.K. and
    Australia were taken from the [World Factbook]{.underline}, July
    2001.

[^30]: Census Cost per Housing Unit/Dwelling = Total Census Cost/Total
    number of housing units/dwellings. Housing unit/dwelling data was
    taken from the World Factbook 2000, Statistics Canada from the 2001
    Census, the Australian Bureau of Statistics 2001, and
    www.housing.odpm.gov.uk 2000.

[^31]: Census cost and population figures represent the 50 states, the
    District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico.

[^32]: Calculations made by contractor.

[^33]: Ibid.

[^34]: Some long-term Census Bureau employees are not enthusiastic about
    working on the decennial census. They cite the hectic environment,
    the downsizing and RIFs that occurred after previous decennial
    censuses, and the poor management and communications practices of
    how personnel were let go or returned to their divisions after
    previous censuses.

[^35]: \"Term employee\" is one who is hired from the outside
    (non-government) for a specific term of employment - usually 2-4
    years, to work at headquarters. At the end of their term, they are
    no longer employed by the Census Bureau. Employees understand when
    they take a term appointment that there is no guarantee that they
    will get a job at the Census Bureau after their term is up, although
    some do have the opportunity to compete for permanent jobs at the
    end of their term.

[^36]: Example: working a limited schedule as an incentive to return
    from retirement.

[^37]: The contractor determined that over the 12-year cycle, there were
    4 Census Bureau Directors, at least 3 Deputy Directors, the creation
    of two Principal Associate Directors (PAD) in 1996, another change
    to the PAD for Administration and CFO in 1997, and three different
    Associate Directors for the Decennial Census.

[^38]: Drucker, Peter F., "Management's New Paradigms," *FORBES,* Oct.
    1998, pp. 152-176.

[^39]: Ibid.

[^40]: Hammer, Michael and Stanton, Steven, "How Process Enterprises
    *Really* Work," *Harvard Business Review,* Nov. 1999, pp. 108-118.

[^41]: Including Field Division

[^42]: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Decennial
    Management Division, *Census 2000 Program Steering Committee
    Charters.*

[^43]: Some individuals interviewed did not feel that they had enough
    direct experience to comment on the specifics of the headquarters
    organization or management approach of the decennial census.

[^44]: Drucker, Peter F., "Management's New Paradigms," *FORBES*, Oct.
    1998, pp. 152-176.

[^45]: Drucker, Peter F., "Management's New Paradigms," *FORBES*, Oct.
    1998, pp. 152-176.

[^46]: See Section 4.0 on Political Environment

[^47]: The contractor followed up with 6-7 interviewees to obtain
    examples of when decisions went outside of the COM process. Most of
    the interviewees could not recall particular decisions that did not
    go through the COM/IRCC process, however, they did remember that the
    process was not always effective.

[^48]: Decision-making within COM was based on the following criteria:
    The decision shall be consistent with overall policy and/or
    expectations; The decision has no adverse impact on other operations
    (or such impact can be obviated); The decision can be accomplished
    within time and budget constraints.

[^49]: In general, changes will be evaluated based on criteria including
    impacts on operations, cost, coverage, content data quality,
    consistency with policy, and perceptual implications. (U.S.
    Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Decennial Management
    Division, *Roles & Responsibilities of Census 2000 Participants,*
    1998, Decision-making including IR/CC, Section 2: Information
    Gathering & Analysis).

[^50]: The contractor followed up with 6-7 interviewees to obtain
    examples of when decisions went outside of the IR/CC process. Most
    of the interviewees could not recall particular decisions that did
    not go through the IR/CC process, however, they did remember that
    the process was not always effective.

[^51]: Although OSAM were not decision-making forums, they were part of
    the "centralized approach," were specifically mentioned as within
    the scope of the evaluation, and are best discussed at this point in
    the document.

[^52]: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Office of the
    Director, *Memorandum for Operational Status and Assessment
    Meetings*, Preston Jay Waite, Nov. 18, 1999.

[^53]: The PMPs were required to contain the following planning
    elements: 1. Introduction -- Summary, Description, and Purpose of
    the Operation, 2. General Design and Workflow (describes inputs
    needed, who will provide the inputs, steps required in the workflow,
    and the outputs and deliverables each program area will produce, 3.
    Cost Assumptions, 4. Schedule and Responsibilities, 5. Evaluation
    Requirements, 6. Differences from the dress rehearsal, 7. Any
    additional elements - U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the
    Census, Decennial Management Division, *Roles and Responsibilities
    of Census 2000 Participants*, 1998.

[^54]: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Decennial
    Management Division, *Roles and Responsibilities of Census 2000
    Participants*, 1998, p 12.

[^55]: Mentioned in the *Roles and Responsibilities* document.

[^56]: N=14 comprises 2 Executive Staff, 5 Division Chiefs, 3 ADCs, and
    4 Branch Chiefs.

[^57]: See Section 10.1.1: Census Operational Managers (COM), p. 36.

[^58]: The consulting team followed up with six to seven interviewees to
    obtain examples of when decisions went outside of the COM process.
    Most of the interviewees could not recall particular decisions that
    did not go through the COM-Issue Resolution/Change Control (IR/CC)
    Process, but they did remember that the process was not always
    effective.

[^59]: April 1, 2000.

[^60]: N=22 comprises 4 Executive Staff, 9 Division Chiefs, 6 ADCs, and
    3 Branch Chiefs.

[^61]: "Of those twenty-one, eleven perceived inconsistencies in the
    messages from the leadership (n=11) and seven felt that the
    leadership had too many priorities preventing some of the most
    critical activities from being performed (n=7). Seven interviewees
    perceived that there were too many new things being attempted and
    that the Census Bureau should focus on a few critical areas (n=7),
    and six perceived that the leadership did not know what to fix or
    what strategy to use (n=6)."

[^62]: N=11 comprises 1 Executive Staff, 6 Division Chiefs, 3 ADCs, and
    1 Branch Chief.

[^63]: In the external communications section, we will discuss the
    practice of operational staff members speaking directly to the media
    and to external stakeholders.

[^64]: "For the DMD program managers to be held accountable for
    integrating programs and for decision making leading up to the
    implementation, the program managers' authority must be fully
    aligned with area of responsibility and accountability to allow for
    effective implementation of the decennial census. By allowing dual
    chains of command to the Decennial Census Directorate leadership,
    the delegations of authority are voided and the leadership
    effectively renders the DMD program managers and the structured
    decision-making processes irrelevant. Dual chains also provide a
    perfect forum for end runs, when parties involved in a dispute do
    not agree with a particular decision."

[^65]: Knowledge Management is the process through which organizations
    generate value from documenting, managing and maintaining their
    intellectual and knowledge-based assets. It is the way that
    organizations create, capture, re-use and learn from knowledge to
    continue to achieve organizational objectives.

[^66]: PCDOCS is the software used for maintaining and accessing an
    electronic library of documents. PCDOCS will document the operations
    of the Census 2000. The files are maintained by Decennial
    Communications in the Decennial Management Division. U.S. Department
    of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Decennial Management Division,
    *Roles and Responsibilities of Census 2000 Participants*, 1998, p.
    14.

[^67]: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, *Information
    Technology Operational Plan*, 1998--2002, for the Decennial Census,
    November 7, 1997, p. 36.

[^68]: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Decennial
    Management Division, *Census 2000 Operational Plan*, Dec. 1998, pp.
    1--4.

[^69]: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, *2000
    Operational Information Technology Plan,* p. 44.

[^70]: The feeder systems contain the Master Activity Schedule, the
    Operation Control System 2000, the Pre-Appointment Management
    System/Automated Decennial Administrative Management System, the
    Operations Control System, the Decennial Master Address File, the
    Address Listing Capture Operations, the Accuracy and Coverage
    Evaluation 2000, the Headquarters Processing System, and the
    Data-Capture Centers' Management Information System. U.S. Department
    of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, *Information Technology
    Operational Plan*, 1998--2002, for the Decennial Census, November 7,
    1997, p. 37. Also U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census,
    *2000 Operational Information Technology Plan*, p. 45.

[^71]: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Decennial
    Management Division, *Census 2000 Operational Plan*, Dec. 1998, pp.
    1--4.

[^72]: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, *Information
    Technology Operational Plan*, 1998--2002, for the Decennial Census,
    November 7, 1997, p. 36.

[^73]: "The MAS will assist in planning, preparation, development, data
    collection, data capture, data processing, data dissemination, and
    evaluation activities, as well as decision-support functions for
    Census 2000." U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census,
    Decennial Management Division, *Census 2000 Operational Plan*, Dec.
    1998, pp. 1--4.

[^74]: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Decennial
    Management Division, *Roles and Responsibilities of Census 2000
    Participants*, 1998, p. 15.

[^75]: "The DMD or Operational Program Manager is responsible to ensure
    that the resolution/change is properly reflected in the MIS,
    budget/cost model, and PMPs." U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of
    the Census, Decennial Management Division, *Roles and
    Responsibilities of Census 2000 Participants*, 1998, p. 10.

[^76]: Census 2000 change control procedures are discussed in Section 5
    of this report.

[^77]: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, *2002
    Operational Information Technology Plan*, p. 18.

[^78]: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Decennial
    Management Division, *Census 2000 Operational Plan*, Dec. 1998.

[^79]: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Decennial
    Management Division, *Roles and Responsibilities of Census 2000
    Participants*, 1998, p. 16.

[^80]: A separate contractor was engaged to validate and verify the
    accuracy of the Census 2000 Cost Model.

[^81]: According to the *Department Organizational Orders,* "The
    Decennial Systems and Contracts Management Office shall manage the
    development and implementation of major Census 2000 contracts,
    including development and implementation of data capture system,
    acquisition and hardware, software, telecommunications, and
    integration services required to support the temporary offices,
    acquisition of other support such as printing of census forms, and
    conduct of telephone questionnaire assistance; ensure that all
    requirements, functions, and system interfaces for contracted
    systems are identified and compatible; ensure that all hardware and
    software are adequate and that all charges are controlled; monitor
    the cost and schedule, and technical performance milestones for each
    system, and ensure that appropriate standards and supportability
    requirements are established and met; manage the development of
    software and systems necessary to support processing and tabulation
    of census data; be responsible for integration of systems necessary
    to support collection, processing, and tabulation systems, including
    management of a Beta site contract to support this integration
    effort." *Department Organizational Order 35-2B, Amendment 3*, U.S.
    Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Affairs, Bureau of the
    Census, Effective Date: April 2, 1999.

[^82]: Ibid.

[^83]: Interviewees indicated that they thought that the Executive Staff
    could have taken a more active role in decennial planning.

[^84]: A management concept where leadership is based on the quality,
    application and purpose of thought, coupled with industry knowledge
    and experience.

[^85]: The four phases of developing an effective communications
    approach are as follows: 1. Evaluate the environment. 2. Establish
    Goals. 3. Develop the communications strategy and plan. 4. Implement
    the communications plans.

[^86]: Criteria for Evaluating the Management Approach (See Appendix A).