**The Search for Principles of**

**Disaster Management**

by

David Etkin, Graduate Program Director, Disaster and Emergency
Management, Atkinson Faculty of Liberal and Applied Studies, York
University, <etkin@yorku.ca>

and

Ian Davis, Visiting Professor in Disaster Management, Cranfield,

Coventry, Oxford Brookes and Kyoto Universities,
<i.davis@n-oxford.demon.co>  

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  **This is a working paper in draft form. Comments and suggestions are
  welcomed by the authors.**

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**1. Why are principles needed for disaster management?         **

The Oxford dictionary defines a principle as a *"fundamental truth as
(a) basis of reasoning". Principles guide people's decisions and
actions, policies and procedures developed by organizations, and laws
and doctrines of political entities".* The Collins English Language
Dictionary further defines a principle as *'A general rule that you try
to obey in the way that you try to achieve something. Principled actions
or behaviour, based on clear guidance concerning the way to act."* These
definitions place emphasis on the implicit authority contained in a
principle as a 'fundamental truth' or 'general rule'. Their purpose
concerns practical action, thus principles exist to 'guide actions',
'achieve something', or define the 'way to act'.

The statement *"We hold these truths to be self evident..."* (U.S.
Constitution -- Thomas Jefferson) is one of principles. If there is not
a clear understanding and statement of principles, then there cannot be
a consistent, cohesive and embracing disaster management strategy, or
effective communication between different organizations. A further
incentive to develop guiding principles to provide direction to decision
making in both disaster management and disaster risk management[^1] has
come from external pressures being exerted by donor governments and
International Financial Institutions (IFIs). In return for their support
to developing countries needing grants and loans following disasters,
they are increasingly demanding improved accountability to beneficiaries
of assistance and overall transparency of operations --especially in
financial management. For these demands to be satisfied shared ethical
principles are needed to support policies and practice. ADB (2005)

Within the field of emergency and disaster management there are a
plethora of principles (CRHNet 2005) described in various books (e.g.
Alexander, 2002) and organizational websites (e.g. Eight Principles of
Disaster Management:
http://www.onphilanthropy.com/bestpract/bp2002-08-16.html). These
principles purport to provide a guiding and enduring basis for how the
practice of disaster management is pursued. Yet, a perusal of the
various sets of principles reveals little convergence. Why is this so
and what are the implications of this diversity?

The authors suggest that the divergence emerges because of three basic
reasons. (1) The first relates to differences in fundamental values and
organizational mandates. For example, an NGO such as the Red Cross or
CARE with a strong focus on disaster assistance at the community level
will not share all of the same values or purposes as the World Bank,
which tends to work at international and national levels, though
disaster management is important to both. Their cultures are quite
different, one rooted in humanitarian assistance and the other in a
highly politicized economic environment where development has
traditionally been viewed through the perspective of neo-classical
economics. Other differences may relate to discipline. A meteorological
agency may focus on technology and advance warning, while a development
agency might focus on community sustainability.

\(2\) But also, divergence exists because different people or
organizations address disaster management from different operational
perspectives. An academic might be philosophical, a government agency
strategic and a relief-based operation tactical. As such their
principles, which should reflect their personal or organizational
purpose, would look quite different though they might not be in conflict
with each other. For example, the first of the eight principles from the
philanthropy website noted above is "*Do no harm*", while the first
principle from Auf der Heide (1989) is "*Because of the limited
resources available, disaster preparedness proposals need to take
cost-effectiveness into consideration*." These two principles bear
little relationship to each other, though it is quite possible that
proponents of both would not object to the assertion of the other. (3)
Finally, people or organizations may work in different parts of the
disaster management spectrum (mitigation, preparedness, response and
recovery). Each of these "pillars" has its own requirements that would
result in varying concerns and strategies.

Beyond the more idealistic aspects of organizational mandates lies the
often unstated tendency of organizations to ensure their own survival
and growth, even at the expense of optimally assisting disaster victims.
Numerous examples of this self-interest can be detected. For example,
after the 2004 Asian Tsunami, national and international agencies poured
into the affected countries and embarked on energetic funding campaigns,
often in competition with other agencies even though it was rapidly
became apparent to everyone in the relief system that there was a
plethora of agencies present --well beyond local needs. It was also
apparent that far more money had been collected than could possibly be
managed given limited local capacities or available funding channels. In
addition, there was a marked lack of cooperation between many of the
hundreds of NGOs while working to assist the disaster victims. From this
chaotic situation successive evaluations have highlighted the urgent
need for some consensus to be reached from agreed-to guiding principles.
This would enable agencies to 'sing from the same song sheet' Without
such cooperation one can expect more scenarios like the Sri Lanka NGO
circus of uncoordinated actions of hundreds of international ands
national NGO's, where each pursues their own individual goals. The risk
is of this pattern being repeated in all future mega-disasters that
attract the attention of vast numbers of agencies. Competition for
projects by agencies also applied to competition to secure media
attention. Clinton, (2006); Scheper (2006); Telford and Cosgrave (2007)

Further examples relate to the political turf wars during and after the
Hurricane Katrina disaster in the US that hindered effective response,
Few, if any, organizations are monolithic enterprises -- competing
agendas and internal priorities inevitably exist even in disaster
situations.[^2]

These issues of agency self interest becoming dominant concerns
highlight the continual need for guiding principles that asserts the
priority or primary mission of humanitarian agencies to be based
exclusively on the 'needs of the affected community' rather than any
other internal consideration. This was the precise motivation of the
'*Good Humanitarian Donorship'* Initiative. (Good Humanitarian
Donorship, 2003) and the Red Cross when they first promoted the
'*International Code of Conduct'* in 1995. By February 2007 an
astonishing total of 404 national and international agencies have signed
the code, meaning that they will seek to abide by its conditions or
principles. Two of the 'codes' give a flavour of the overall focus:

***"Code of Conduct No. 1.***

> ***The Humanitarian imperative comes first.**\
> The right to receive humanitarian assistance, and to offer it, is a
> fundamental humanitarian principle which should be enjoyed by all
> citizens of all countries...."*

***"Code of Conduct No. 2.***

> ***Aid is given regardless of the race, creed or nationality of the
> recipients and without adverse distinction of any kind. Aid priorities
> are calculated on the basis of need alone.**\
> Wherever possible, we will base the provision of relief aid upon a
> thorough assessment of the needs of the disaster victims and the local
> capacities already in place to meet those needs. Within the entirety
> of our programmes, we will reflect considerations of proportionality.
> Human suffering must be alleviated whenever it is found; life is as
> precious in one part of a country as another. Thus, our provision of
> aid will reflect the degree of suffering it seeks to alleviate. In
> implementing this approach, we recognize the crucial role played by
> women in disaster-prone communities and will ensure that this role is
> supported, not diminished, by our aid programmes. The implementation
> of such a universal, impartial and independent policy, can only be
> effective if we and our partners have access to the necessary
> resources to provide for such equitable relief, and have equal access
> to all disaster victims."\
> *\
> International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
> (IFRCS) (1995) 'Code of Conduct' IFRCS: Geneva

However, given high levels of agency staff turnover in International
NGO's, it is possible that initiatives such as the *Good Humanitarian
Donorship* or the *Code of Conduct* may be totally unknown to new staff.
In 2007 Ian Davis, then a consultant to one of the largest Global NGO's
(who are developing an International Strategy to guide their global
humanitarian programmes), in varied discussions within a document on
ethical concerns noted that there was a total absence of any reference
to the Code of Conduct despite the fact that this agency was one of the
early signatories, agreeing to abide by the requirements of the code.
Subsequent enquiries indicated that this was because key staff were
totally unaware of the existence of the code and their own agencies
agreement to abide by its contents.

Drabek (2005) presents another reason why the field of disaster
management does not have a well defined set of principles, and that is
because there is no general theory that underlies it. He argues that
there are aspects of theories such as those coming from social
constructionism, sustainable development and vulnerability theory that
are and can be used as a foundation of an emergency management theory,
but that it is still very much in a stage of development. Along a
similar vein, Alexander (1999) notes that *"Models and interpretations
of disaster abound, but the phenomenon is so multi-faceted that a
general theory of universal explanatory power is unlikely ever to be
formulated".*

The authors propose that the field of disaster/disaster risk management
would benefit greatly from a dialogue on the topic of principles for the
purpose of creating a greater degree of convergence. There would appear
to be three reasons why a body of agreed principles are needed:

**First, they allow organizations to create more coherent sets of
policies of procedures.**

These would assist institutions with different values and mandates to
better understand and talk to each other. But beyond such discourse, if
clearly defined principles are accepted and agreed upon between
different organizations then it is possible for genuine cooperation and
coordination to occur on the basis of consensus.

**Second, principles can provide an agreed upon and ethical base for
action.**

It is essential to emphasise the ethical dimension in all aspects of
disaster risk management since the lives of people and the viability of
communities are at stake. Principles can assist in enabling decision
makers to distinguish between *relative* ethical issues and *universal*
ethical issues (see below for a discussion on the distinction). Ethical
principles form the bedrock or platform to assist decision makers as
they seek, (or are reluctantly pushed) into becoming more accountable to
beneficiaries of their support, as well as becoming transparent in
handling their operations and managing their finances.

**Third, principles are needed to guide the various elements in disaster
planning and implementation**

They can assist in the development of policy, strategy, planning,
tactics and actions on the ground as well as post disaster learning and
adapting. It is essential to undertake disaster planning in all
countries, and without guiding principles disaster/disaster risk
management can be little more than a directionless formality. There are
an abundance of principles to guide disaster managers and each of these
'relative, or locally applicable principles' can be tailored to suit an
organisation and its role. It is important to recognise that while some
principles may be consciously followed, others may be subconsciously
recognised and applied. As well, some principles are explicit while
others implicitly underpin operations.

An important part of the essence of any useful principle is in its
simplicity, but disasters are always complex events that relate to
varied hazards affecting multiple stakeholders, many levels of decision
making and diverse sectors managed by a host of line ministries and
departments. Thus principles inevitably simplify (or over-simplify)
subtle nuances and varied situations or demands. Nevertheless, despite
this inherent complexity, it remains essential in guiding officials who
need to act in a decisive and positive manner, to 'boil down' complex
variables into simple, direct and easily comprehensible principles to
assist the process.

**2. The ethical basis for principles**        

Disaster management fundamentally deals with a response to human misery
and losses of people's livelihoods and assets, while disaster risk
management is concerned with mitigating or preventing such losses; both
processes tend to be rather anthropocentric. People and societies engage
in such humanitarian actions because they believe it is the 'right thing
to do', and therefore this field is closely tied to ethics and morality.
Ethics is not about what is; rather, it is about what should be. Ethical
theories use principles tied to the norms of society in order to assess
and justify actions and behaviors. In this sense they are prescriptive
and normative (describing what ought to be) as opposed to descriptive,
which describes what is (though one hopes the two are closely linked!).

The basis for a set of disaster management principles could lie within
the context of a social contract between government and its citizens, or
upon moral theory (Zack, 2006). A social contract is based upon the idea
that the purpose of government is to make life better for its citizens,
and for that purpose they consent to be governed. The primary questions
that need to be addressed from this perspective, according to Zack, *are
"What do governments owe citizens in situations in which government is
temporarily dysfunctional?"*, and "*What responsibilities does it have
in terms of preparing for disasters?*" Varying answers are possible,
depending upon such factors as whether property is publicly or privately
owned, what degree of risk citizens should accept for living and
developing in hazardous areas, and the degree to which a government
accepts benevolence as an operating principle. A social contract would
be based upon a theory of social justice (see for example, *"A Theory of
Justice"* by John Rawles), which would be based upon either distributive
justice or retributive justice. The former is based upon a fair
distribution of goods, rewards or benefits. This is particularly
important to the issue of disaster compensation and recovery. The latter
is based upon punishing wrong doings and emphasizes fair process, fair
trials and proportional sentencing. This approach has a very long
history in society[^3]; an example would be suing a contractor who built
a house improperly with the result that it was damaged in a disaster.

There are two main types of moral theories. The first, called ethical
relativism, states that morality varies between people and societies
according to their cultural norms. The second, called universalist or
objectivist moral theories states that there are objective, fundamental
principles that are invariant throughout time and space. Both types of
theories have both strengths and weaknesses. For example, cultural
relativism suggests (taken to an extreme) that one should accept the
murderous excesses of ethnic cleansing, simply because another cultural
group accepts it as its cultural norm. Most people, and certainly the
authors, find this repugnant. Alternately, disregarding values of other
cultures, even paternalistically, can lead to unintended and negative
consequences (e.g. Jigyasu, 2005).

An example of a 'relative' ethical principle in disaster management
could be as follows:

*'Before decisions and actions are taken that will either increase or
decrease the risks facing a given community, responsible government
officials need to actively consult people who are 'at-risk', or their
representatives and be prepared to take account of such local opinion.'*

Within western democracies, it is likely that there would be general
agreement on the above principle, with the possible exception of people
holding political views from the extreme right. Furthermore, most people
would probably assume that this principle is universally applicable
rather than being merely relative. However, we have placed this
principle in the relative category since there are many societies, such
as China (or possibly Cuba) where the 'right' to being listened to or
consulted on matters of public policy is not part of the current
political ideology or operational process.

A further example concerns the evacuation of communities when faced with
an impending threat or actual hazard impact. For example, in many
western democratic cultures disaster evacuation is voluntary and
consequently often ineffective, in contrast to other more controlled
societies such as Cuba, where evacuation planning is not optional and
therefore highly effective.

A more common example of the clash of differing principles relates to
the collision between progressive development thinking and entrenched
traditional attitudes. One of Millennium Development Goals (MDG)
concerns the aim of securing gender equality by the year 2015. Doubtless
this is a noble intention, but what possible chance does such an
aspiration have of being realized, given deeply held male dominated
cultural and religious norms present within some cultures?owever

This issue inevitably provokes a social controversy, since the entire
process of developing and applying principles grows out of values and
attitudes, which are inevitably in conflict with other sets of values.
But - in a pluralist world most would agree that the quest for
principles must never become simply a sermon from a pulpit but should
rather be based, at least in part, upon a pragmatic understanding and
acceptance of differing value systems. This suggests a recognition of
the important difference between where societies '*are'* (descriptive
ethics), and where we might wish them '*to be'* (normative ethics).

An example of a 'universal' ethical principle in disaster risk
management (though clearly there have been many governments that have
violated this notion) might be as follows:

> *"People have a basic right to safety and it is a fundamental
> obligation of all governments to ensure that their citizens are
> protected to a reasonable degree from known risks, and that citizens
> are informed and warned of any risks known to governmental officials
> that threaten public safety."*

Dunfee (2000) suggests several other principles that might be considered
universal (or hypernorms):

-   *"To respect the equal dignity of all human beings, recognizing a
    basic right to life and subsistence.*

-   *The condemnation of coarse public sector corruption*

-   *The obligation to respect human autonomy."*

There are different kinds of objectivist moral theories (Boss, 2005),
including utilitarianism/ consequentialism (maximizing some utility,
such as happiness, by considering outcomes of actions -- though the
issue of what happiness is becomes a thorny one), ones that emphasize
duties and rights (deontology), and ones that focus on being virtuous in
character and intent. Different moral theories can result in very
different disaster/disaster risk management strategies. Consider
disaster financial assistance as an example. If one based this strategy
on a utilitarian ethic emphasizing recovery to a pre-disaster state,
then a program based upon this would reallocate societies resources to
all victims, as needed. However, one based upon the libertarian
perspective on individual rights might take a very different approach
and rely upon voluntary donations to charity to assist disaster victims.
This divergence is very much evident in the climate change debate, where
some group (environmentalists and climatologists, for example) argue for
mandatory reduction of greenhouse gas emissions while others (often
funded by the petroleum industry) argues for voluntary reductions
(Etkin, 2007). Virtue ethics, duty ethics and consequentialism
/utilitarianism are all important to disaster management. Some people
will always perform virtuous acts, particularly in responding to
disasters; many people have duties to others, such as parents to
children or first responders to victims; and the consequences of actions
need to be considered, such as being efficient and efficacious in the
allocation of resources. Virtue ethics emphasizes right being over right
action and is more about the overarching quality of goodness than a list
of specific traits (such as courage, honesty etc). Aristotle and
Confucius are examples of philosophers who believed in virtue ethics.

Examples of duties are*:* (W.D. Ross's Seven Prima Facie Duties):

-   *Beneficence* -- the duty to do good and promote happiness

-   *Nonmaleficence* -- the duty to do no harm and to prevent harm

-   *Fidelity* -- duties arising from past commitments and promises

-   *Reparation* -- duties that stem from past harms

-   *Gratitude* -- duties based upon past favors and unearned services

-   *Self improvement* -- the duty to improve our knowledge and virtue

-   *Justice* -- the duty to give each person equal consideration

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-   *Retributive justice* -- punishment for wrongdoing

-   *Distributive justice* -- fair distribution of benefits and burdens

Each type of moral theory has its strengths and weaknesses. Virtue
ethics is criticized as being incomplete and not providing enough
guidance for making real life decisions. It does, however, give morality
a personal face. Deontology places importance of duty and justice, and
right actions, but fails to incorporate sentiment and care issues[^4].
Utilitarianism challenges us to critically analyze traditional moral
values and to consider outcomes, which can be critical. But, by
considering only consequences it ignores important issues such as
integrity and responsibility, and goals other than an 'arbitrarily'
chosen utility such as pleasure. Some philosophers argue that choices
must be made between the different moral theories, but to the authors it
seems reasonable that all three are relevant to disaster management and
that a blended approach should be used.

Historically, moral theory focused primarily upon duties. For example,
feudal society was based upon reciprocity - sets of mutual obligations
where duties were paramount -- the vassal to the lord and the lord to
his vassal. The notion of 'noblesse oblige' is also based in duty, in
that with power and privilege come responsibility (to those less
fortunate). Modern western society emphasizes rights to a much greater
extent (for example, the constitution of the United States declares that
people have inalienable rights). The notion that rights and duties need
to be linked is a strong one, in that rights are derived from duties
(Boss, 2005). The alternative comes from natural rights theory (such as
expressed by John Locke), which says that having rights does not imply
duties to others.[^5]

It is beyond the scope of this paper to examine different types of moral
theories in detail and how they apply to disaster management (the reader
is referred to Zack, 2006 or Dunfee, 2000 for more on this issue) --
suffice it to say that a set of principles of disaster and disaster risk
management must, of necessity, incorporate such notions or lack the
roadmap needed to avoid going astray. Having a clear vision of ethical
principles that underlie a disaster management strategy will also
enhance communication and coordination between different organizations.
An example of this is information sharing. It is common for
organizations to consider data that they have gathered confidential --
yet not sharing information can make disaster recovery much more
difficult, tedious and less effective. The tradeoff here is a process
that may benefit an institution as opposed to one that may benefit
disaster victims. Once the values of an organization have been clearly
articulated, information sharing (the authors hope, reflecting a helping
ethic that focuses on the importance of victims as compared to
institutions) would be greatly enhanced. Other tradeoffs can be much
less clear and far more tortuous. For example, Wall (1998) in his book
*"Famine Crimes"* discusses how the practice of humanitarianism in
Africa, though often practiced with the most noble of intentions,
nevertheless hindered the formation of the necessary social contract
needed to truly create a society resilient to this type of disaster.

**2. The complexity of current principles**  

An internet search using the phrase "disaster management" resulted in
168 million hits; "principles of disaster management" resulted in 18
million hits. Clearly, the words are much in use! In order to get a
sense for the variance of stated principles, the authors selected 15
sources in a rather arbitrary fashion, including various government and
NGO web sites and books. The stated principles varied greatly in number,
perspective, and depth. Some were comprised of a few short statements,
sometimes embedded in much longer documents (for example, the Republic
of South Africa Disaster Management Bill[^6]), while others went into
considerable depth and were multi-tiered (The Wingspread Principles: A
Community Vision for Sustainability[^7] and Gujarat State Disaster
Management Policy[^8]) Some statements emphasized values and ethics
(South Asia: Livelihood Centered Approach to Disaster Management -- a
Policy Framework[^9]) while others were more management oriented (Erik
Auf Der Heide: Disaster Response: Principles of Preparation and
Coordination[^10]). These examples support the notion that the field of
disaster management lacks a cohesive approach, in terms of principles.

The three examples below (Table 1) illustrate some of these points. The
first, taken from the Government of Canada is managerial in context,
reflecting responsibilities at different levels of society. There is
nothing in this list that reflects normative values or ethics, or how
disasters should be coped with in terms of types of actions. The second,
taken from the SPHERE Humanitarian Charter is very different,
emphasizing how people should live and act, and the fundamental values
that drive organizations. The third example, taken from Auf der Heide
(1989) are much more practically oriented, focusing on implementation
strategies and error avoidance.

+-------------+--------------------------------------------------------+
| **Table 1:  |                                                        |
| Examples of |                                                        |
| Principles  |                                                        |
| of Disaster |                                                        |
| Management  |                                                        |
| from Three  |                                                        |
| Sources:**  |                                                        |
+-------------+--------------------------------------------------------+
| **(1) Fact  | Emergency management in Canada is based on the         |
| Sheets:     | following principles:                                  |
| Canada\'s   |                                                        |
| Emergency   | 1\. It is up to the individual to know what to do in   |
| Management  | an emergency.                                          |
| Sy          |                                                        |
| stem**[^11] | 2\. If the individual is unable to cope, governments   |
|             | respond progressively, as their capabilities and       |
|             | resources are needed.                                  |
|             |                                                        |
|             | 3\. Most local emergencies are managed by local        |
|             | response organizations, which are normally the first   |
|             | to respond.                                            |
|             |                                                        |
|             | 4\. Every province and territory also has an Emergency |
|             | Management Organization (EMO), which manages any large |
|             | scale emergencies (prevention, preparedness, response  |
|             | and recovery) and provides assistance and support to   |
|             | municipal or community response teams as required.     |
|             |                                                        |
|             | 5\. Government of Canada departments and agencies      |
|             | support the provincial or territorial EMOs as          |
|             | requested or manage emergencies affecting areas of     |
|             | federal jurisdiction. From policing, nuclear safety,   |
|             | national defence and border security to the protection |
|             | of our environment and health, many federal            |
|             | departments and agencies also work to prevent          |
|             | emergencies from happening or are involved in some way |
|             | in a response and recovery effort.                     |
+-------------+--------------------------------------------------------+
| **(2)       | We reaffirm our belief in the humanitarian imperative  |
| Sphere      | and its primacy. By this we mean the belief that all   |
| H           | possible steps should be taken to prevent or alleviate |
| umanitarian | human suffering arising out of conflict or calamity,   |
| Charter and | and that civilians so affected have a right to         |
| Minimum     | protection and assistance.                             |
| Standards   |                                                        |
| in Disaster | It is on the basis of this belief, reflected in        |
| Resp        | international humanitarian law and based on the        |
| onse**[^12] | principle of humanity, that we offer our services as   |
|             | humanitarian agencies. We will act in accordance with  |
|             | the principles of humanity and impartiality, and with  |
|             | the other principles set out in the Code of Conduct    |
|             | for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent       |
|             | Movement and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) in  |
|             | Disaster Relief (1994).                                |
|             |                                                        |
|             | **1.1 The right to life with dignity**                 |
|             |                                                        |
|             | This right is reflected in the legal measures          |
|             | concerning the right to life, to an adequate standard  |
|             | of living and to freedom from cruel, inhuman or        |
|             | degrading treatment or punishment. We understand an    |
|             | individual\'s right to life to entail the right to     |
|             | have steps taken to preserve life where it is          |
|             | threatened, and a corresponding duty on others to take |
|             | such steps. Implicit in this is the duty not to        |
|             | withhold or frustrate the provision of life-saving     |
|             | assistance. In addition, international humanitarian    |
|             | law makes specific provision for assistance to         |
|             | civilian populations during conflict, obliging states  |
|             | and other parties to agree to the provision of         |
|             | humanitarian and impartial assistance when the         |
|             | civilian population lacks essential supplies.          |
|             |                                                        |
|             | **1.2 The distinction between combatants and           |
|             | non-combatants**                                       |
|             |                                                        |
|             | This is the distinction which underpins the 1949       |
|             | Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols of   |
|             | 1977. This fundamental principle has been increasingly |
|             | eroded, as reflected in the enormously increased       |
|             | proportion of civilian casualties during the second    |
|             | half of the twentieth century. That internal conflict  |
|             | is often referred to as 'civil war' must not blind us  |
|             | to the need to distinguish between those actively      |
|             | engaged in hostilities, and civilians and others       |
|             | (including the sick, wounded and prisoners) who play   |
|             | no direct part. Non-combatants are protected under     |
|             | international humanitarian law and are entitled to     |
|             | immunity from attack.                                  |
|             |                                                        |
|             | **1.3 The principle of non-refoulement**               |
|             |                                                        |
|             | This is the principle that no refugee shall be sent    |
|             | (back) to a country in which his or her life or        |
|             | freedom would be threatened on account of race,        |
|             | religion, nationality, membership of a particular      |
|             | social group or political opinion; or where there are  |
|             | substantial grounds for believing that s/he would be   |
|             | in danger of being subjected to torture.               |
+-------------+--------------------------------------------------------+
| **(3) Erik  | 1\. Because of the limited resources available,        |
| Auf Der     | disaster preparedness proposals need to take           |
| Heide:      | cost-effectiveness into consideration.                 |
| Disaster    |                                                        |
| Response:   | 2\. Planning should be for disasters of moderate size  |
| Principles  | (about 120 casualties); disasters of this size will    |
| of          | present the typical inter-organizational coordination  |
| Preparation | problems also applicable to larger events.             |
| and         |                                                        |
| Coordina    | 3\. Interest in disaster preparedness is proportional  |
| tion**[^13] | to the recency and magnitude of the last disaster.     |
|             |                                                        |
|             | 4\. The best time to submit disaster preparedness      |
|             | programs for funding is, right after a disaster (even  |
|             | if it has occurred elsewhere).                         |
|             |                                                        |
|             | 5\. Disaster planning is an illusion unless: it is     |
|             | based on valid assumptions about human behavior,       |
|             | incorporates an inter-organizational perspective, is   |
|             | tied to resources, and is known and accepted by the    |
|             | participants.                                          |
|             |                                                        |
|             | 6\. Base disaster plans on what people are \"likely\"  |
|             | to do, rather than what they \"should\" do             |
|             |                                                        |
|             | 7\. For disaster planning to be effective, it must be  |
|             | inter-organizational.                                  |
|             |                                                        |
|             | 8\. The process of planning is more important than the |
|             | written document that results.                         |
|             |                                                        |
|             | 9\. Good disaster management is not merely an          |
|             | extension of good everyday emergency procedures. It is |
|             | more than just the mobilization of additional          |
|             | personnel, facilities, and supplies. Disasters often   |
|             | pose unique problems rarely faced in daily             |
|             | emergencies.                                           |
|             |                                                        |
|             | 10\. In contrast to most routine emergencies,          |
|             | disasters introduce the need for multi-organizational  |
|             | and multi-disciplinary coordination.                   |
|             |                                                        |
|             | 11\. In disasters, what are thought to be              |
|             | \"communications problems\" are often coordination     |
|             | problems in disguise.                                  |
|             |                                                        |
|             | 12\. Those who work together well on a daily basis     |
|             | tend to work together well in disasters.               |
|             |                                                        |
|             | 13\. Disasters create the need for coordination among  |
|             | fire departments, law enforcement agencies, hospitals, |
|             | ambulances, military units, utility crews, and other   |
|             | organizations. This requires inter-agency              |
|             | communication networks utilizing compatible radio      |
|             | frequencies.                                           |
|             |                                                        |
|             | 14\. Procedures for ongoing needs assessment are a     |
|             | prerequisite to efficient resource management in       |
|             | disasters.                                             |
|             |                                                        |
|             | 15\. A basic concept of triage is to do the greatest   |
|             | good for the greatest number of casualties.            |
|             |                                                        |
|             | 16\. Triage implies making the most efficient use of   |
|             | available resources.                                   |
|             |                                                        |
|             | 17\. Good casualty distribution is particularly        |
|             | difficult to achieve in \"diffuse\" disasters, such as |
|             | earthquakes and tornadoes, that cover large geographic |
|             | areas.                                                 |
|             |                                                        |
|             | 18\. Effective triage requires coordination among      |
|             | medical and non-medical organizations at the disaster  |
|             | site and between the site and local hospitals          |
|             |                                                        |
|             | 19\. Panic is not a common problem in disasters;       |
|             | getting people to evacuate is                          |
|             |                                                        |
|             | 20\. Inquires about loved ones thought to be in the    |
|             | impact zone are not likely to be discouraged, but can  |
|             | be reduced or channeled in less disruptive ways, if    |
|             | the needed information is provided at a location away  |
|             | from the disaster area.                                |
|             |                                                        |
|             | 21\. Many of the questions that will be asked by       |
|             | reporters are predictable, and procedures can be       |
|             | established in advance for collecting the desired      |
|             | information.                                           |
|             |                                                        |
|             | 22\. Newsworthy information will rapidly spread among  |
|             | news organizations and from one type of media to       |
|             | another.                                               |
|             |                                                        |
|             | 23\. The media will often withhold newsworthy disaster |
|             | stories it feels would be detrimental to the public.   |
|             |                                                        |
|             | 24\. Local officials will have to deal with different  |
|             | news media in times of disaster than those with which  |
|             | they interface on a routine basis.                     |
|             |                                                        |
|             | 25\. Adequate disaster preparedness requires planning  |
|             | with the rather than for the media.                    |
|             |                                                        |
|             | 26\. The propensity for the media to share information |
|             | and to assume \"command post\" perspective facilitates |
|             | the establishment of a central source of disaster      |
|             | information.                                           |
+-------------+--------------------------------------------------------+

 

**3. Introducing
models**                                                

In view of the somewhat chaotic state of existing principles, as noted
above, the authors propose that the field of disaster/disaster risk
management needs to engage in a discourse of its principles. In order to
provide some structure to the discussion, we present a model that we
hope will clarify the discussion, and a process that could be used for a
person or organization to develop an appropriate set of principles.

**3.1 Principles Pyramid**

We propose a four level hierarchy of principles (Figure 1) that can be
used to provide structure to this issue. Level 1, the broadest, reflects
the fundamental values and ethics that motivate our behaviors. Level 2
is strategic and level 3 tactical. Level 4 deals with implementation.
Levels 1 and 2 are broad enough so that they should be generally
applicable over a large range of possibilities. However, levels 3 and 4
become increasingly sensitive to local culture and legislation and are
very difficult or impossible to generalize.

**Level 1.** Ethical, Core Value Principles, which relate to the
underlying shared beliefs and concerns of organizations and of their
mandate as it seeks to undertake community based disaster risk
management (CBDRM). Using a food metaphor, Level 1 would relate the
ethics of food production (such as a human rights based approach). An
example would be the SPHERE principle in Table 1 - *"A right to a life
with dignity".*

**Level 2.** Strategic Principles that concern the policy direction of
CBDRM will be informed and be based upon the ethical principles
articulated in Level 1 (such as what actions to consider taking-why,
where and with what expected consequences?). Using a food metaphor,
Level 2 would be a nutrition guide. An example of this level of
principle would be the Canadian principle in Table 1 -- *"If the
individual is unable to cope, governments respond progressively, as
their capabilities and resources are needed."*

**Level 3.** Tactical Principles that concern the practical outworking
of the strategic principles. Using a food metaphor, Level 3 would be a
cookbook (such as how to adopt the agreed strategy, considering staffing
/ financial implications etc). An example of this might be a specific
mutual aid agreement between two organizations or the post audit of the
response of an organization to a disaster, such as occurred with FEMA
after Hurricane Katrina.

**Level 4.** Implementation Principles that are related to all the
preceding levels: core values, strategies and tactics (such as actions
taken as well as their monitoring and evaluation). Using a food
metaphor, Level 4 would be eating the meal as well as congratulating the
cook or writing a letter of complaint to the restaurant. An example
might the exchange of vulnerability and victim information between NGOs.

It is important to note that the authors do not consider this to be a
linear unidirectional process, but rather one that necessitates
continual feedback between ethical principles and how they are
implemented. It is not just that theory informs practice - it is also
the reverse. As a person or organization develops its strategies, it
would have to revisit the more fundamental principles on an ongoing
basis, and also consider how changes to values might affect higher
levels of the pyramid. It is not just about creating a "state function"
but more about developing a "process" that incorporates ethics and
values in an ongoing way.

Figure 1

INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE

**3.2 Principles Matrix**

The practice and theory of disaster management depends upon various
factors, such as which pillar of disaster management is being considered
(mitigation, preparedness, response or recovery), disaster type,
capacity, scale and complexity. Though underlying values are likely to
be fairly robust, strategies, tactics and implementation increasingly
depend upon these factors. For example, the mitigation of drought might
include multi levels of government working together to develop
strategies to conserve water, develop crop insurance plans and
incentives to switch to drought resistant crops, while responding to
terrorism might emphasize a command and control first responders
approach. At larger scales of mitigation (for natural hazards in
particular), environmental stewardship and sustainable development would
be important to include, though not for the case of response to smaller
scale technological emergencies. The authors therefore suggest a matrix
methodology, to help distinguish between these factors (Figure 2).

Figure 2

INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE

Figure 2 shows an example of how the pyramid discussed above might be
slotted into the matrix model, in order to help focus the development of
principles. Similar figures could be constructed using different
variables; disaster type is the most obvious one. For example, disasters
that are rapid onset, well defined and understood, of natural origin and
of short time frame would require a very different set of coping
strategies than one that was slow onset, diffuse, ill defined, poorly
understood and of technological/human origin.

**3.3 Constructing Principles**

Constructing principles of disaster/disaster risk management is a
complex task that should, if it is to be effective, involve an entire
organization. A useful process must allow for a discussion should begin
at a very fundamental level, one that defines worldview and then moves
increasingly towards a more detailed perspective. The authors suggest
that a three step process be used as follows:

1\. Step one begins with defining a **Frame of Reference**. This refers
to a person's role as it relates to disaster management, their values,
moral code and worldview. Examples of roles could be: managing a
government agency that provides disaster assistance, a business
continuity manager for IBM, a victim without access to resources who
cannot recover without help, or a Red Cross volunteer who responds to
disasters. Of course, people in different frames of reference might
share the same values, but it is not uncommon for them to approach
disasters from a very different set of needs and perspectives; hence,
the sort of post disaster conflict that can arise between recovering
victims and insurance companies[^14]. In cases such as this, the values
associated with disaster relief can conflict with other important
institutional values, such as profitability.

2\. The second step in the process is to define a **Purpose of Disaster
Management**. Depending upon philosophy, ethic and job, different
purposes seem possible. Three possible ones are listed below -- more can
certainly be constructed.

a.  Minimize the loss, pain and damage caused by disasters, within the
    larger social context.

b.  Minimize the damage caused by disasters, while maintaining the
    structures of rights, power and wealth within society, as well as
    the institutions that support them.

c.  Provide jobs, careers and pensions to people who work in
    organizations related to disaster management, and ensure that these
    organizations are well funded[^15].

This discussion should begin with explicit statements of the nature of
the social contract and moral theories that are chosen. Clear
distinctions need to be drawn between descriptive ethics (what is) and
normative ethics (what ought to be). In cases where rights and duties
conflict with each other, it is suggested that they be ranked where
possible.

3\. The third step is to construct a **Set of Principles**, linked to
the above, using the hierarchical structure and matrix models discussed
above.

It is clear that different organizations will arrive at different
results using the above process. There is no "correct" answer -- in fact
engaging in the process[^16] may well be more important than any
specific set of results.

**4. Applications** 

The multi-layered hierarchy of principles described above in Model 1 was
tested by Ian Davis by applying the concept within two projects that he
has authored or co-authored. The first, undertaken in 2005/06 for the
Asian Disaster Preparedness Centre (ADPC) was entitled: '*Community-
Based Disaster Risk Management*.' (Davis and Murshed, 2006). The second
was *'Learning from Disaster Recovery- Guidance to Decision Makers'*
published by the International Recovery Programme (IRP) in 2007 (Davis,
2007).

**FIRST EXAMPLE:**

***'Critical Guidelines - Community-Based Disaster Risk Management'***

This document attempted to develop a set of principles and indicators
relating to performance and outcomes to enable various groups involved
in disaster risk reduction to measure progress. In this document the
four levels described in Figure 1 were adopted; the results were as
follows:

**LEVEL 1: ETHICAL PRINCIPLES**

1.  **Observe basic rights of beneficiaries** *(Ethical Issue:
    Respecting human dignity)*[^17]

-   People possess basic rights that are to be observed, respected and
    followed when undertaking Community Based Disaster Risk Management
    (CBDRM) These include rights to:

    -   safety,

    -   be listened to,

    -   be consulted over any issue that may affect their well-being or
        future,

    -   receive appropriate assistance following disaster impact.

    1.  **Share risk information** *(Ethical Issue: Protecting lives)*

-   Any person or organization undertaking local risk assessment and
    discovering that a given community is 'at-risk', has an ethical
    responsibility to share this potentially life preserving information
    with the individuals, families and communities in question.

    1.  **Share assessment data** *(Ethical Issue: Respecting human
        dignity)*

-   Groups collecting post-disaster damage, needs and capacity
    assessments will share such information with other NGO's or
    governments to avoid multiple questioning of affected communities
    and duplication in responding to needs. This principle grows from a
    concern to respect the dignity of beneficiaries of assistance.

    1.  **Collaborate rather than compete** *(Ethical Issue: Integrity)*

-   Given a common overriding desire to serve the needs of the poor and
    vulnerable, there is an ethical demand for NGO's undertaking CBDRM
    to agree to [collaborate]{.underline} with other NGO's and local
    governments, rather than [compete]{.underline} with them. This
    concern is expressed by:

    -   avoiding competition to secure funds or projects,

    -   avoiding poaching staff from the local government or adjacent
        agencies

    -   using accurate images and data in publicity for fund-raising

    -   sharing information-(as noted above under 1.2 and 1.3)

    -   accepting government coordination of their work

    -   providing mutual support to assisting bodies

**LEVEL 2: STRATEGIC PRINCIPLES**

> ***2.1* Recognise strategic considerations** *(Strategic Issue:
> Integrity through Planning/Design)*

-   Before embarking on CBDRM a given NGO or government will build the
    following into project design:

    -   indicators to measure progress,

    -   a clear aim and the objectives to reach it,

    -   baseline data,

    -   ways to ensure transparency and accountability to beneficiaries,

    -   monitoring and evaluation procedures,

    -   an exit strategy.

> ***2.2*** **Balance of trust vs. control** *(Strategic Issue: Expert
> judgment)*

-   In measuring the effectiveness of CBDRM it is vital to secure a fine
    balance between trust and control, since the greater the level of
    trust the smaller the need for controls. Excessive controls in the
    form of performance and outcome indicators and a lack of involvement
    of key stakeholders in the formulation of indicators will
    significantly erode trust.

> ***2.3*** **Ensure staff commitment and competence** *(Strategic
> Issue: Integrity through quality control)*

-   Agency and government officials who implement CBDRM projects and
    programmes need to be fully convinced that performance and outcome
    indicators are necessary and that they can significantly improve the
    efficiency and quality of risk reduction measures. Training will be
    required to support this process.

**LEVEL 3: TACTICAL PRINCIPLES**

1.  **Recognise tactical considerations** *(Tactical Issue: Integrity
    though measuring effectiveness)*

-   To be effective, performance and outcome indicators need to satisfy
    a range of demands. Effective indicators are:

    -   transparent,

    -   robust,

    -   representative,

    -   relevant,

    -   replicable,

    -   nationally comparable,

    -   sustainable,

    -   measurable,

    -   achievable,

    -   time-framed,

    -   easily understood.

    1.  **Establish baseline positions** *(Tactical Issue: Integrity
        through measuring effectiveness)*

-   For each performance indictor a baseline indicator is necessary.

    1.  **Measure both quantifiable as well as non-quantifiable
        indicators**

*(Tactical Issue: (Tactical Issue: Integrity through measuring
effectiveness)*

-   Given the bias of performance indicators towards tangible,
    measurable and quantifiable elements it is essential to devise
    alternate ways to maintain and measure performance standards for
    non-quantifiable measures.

    1.  **Establish minimum requirements** *(Tactical Issue: Integrity
        through quality control)*

-   Minimum requirements are needed to make risk reduction effective to
    ensure that the competency of personnel, effectiveness of
    procedures, quality of measures does not fall below acceptable
    standards.

    1.  **Ensure relevance of indicators** *(Tactical Issue: Integrity
        through quality control)*

-   Each performance indicator should define the conditions to which it
    applies since it is not expected that indicators will apply in all
    situations.

    1.  **Mainstream actions into normal development** *(Tactical Issue:
        Integrity through quality control)*

-   Actions taken to implement Community Based Disaster Risk Management
    need to be integrated into normal development policies, planning,
    programming, and practice.

**LEVEL 4: IMPLEMENTATION PRINCIPLES**

1.  **Adapt indicators to suit local cultures** *(Implementation Issue:
    Respecting human dignity)*

-   All performance indicators need to be considered to satisfy local
    social, cultural, economic and environmental variables.

    1.  **Be aware of potential negative side effects** *(Ethical Issue:
        Integrity)*

-   In any project indicators are needed to indicate whether unexpected
    side effects are taking place, to enable swift evasive action to be
    taken.

**COMMENTS ON THESE PRINCIPLES**

Almost two years after writing the above principles, with the benefit of
reflection, four issues emerge:

-   It is much easier to develop principles that apply to the ethical or
    strategic level than at the tactical or implementation level. This
    is on account of the more *general* relevance of issues at ethical
    or strategic levels and the more *specific* relevance at tactical
    and implementation levels.

-   In developing principles it is important to understand their
    underlying ethical intentions, as stated in italics after each
    principle. This is a positive process that provides an important
    emphasis on the underlying core values of disaster risk management.

-   Many of the 'principles' proposed for tactical or implementation
    levels, can be better regarded as 'issues' or 'recommendations'.

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-   There are far too many principles for this specific task in managing
    community risks, since officials who have the task of applying them
    are unlikely to remember all fifteen and thus risk ignoring all of
    them.

-   However, the process of systematic thought needed to develop this
    set of principles, within this hierarchy of categories, was of
    particular importance for us as the authors of this report, and of
    even more importance as we debated them with a workshop of
    experienced officials in Bangkok in January 2005. This is a reminder
    that a *process* of enquiry can be more important than a subsequent
    *product.*

The second document where principles were included is *'Learning from
Disaster Recovery- Guidance to Decision Makers'* published by the
International Recovery Programme (IRP) in 2007 (Davis, 2007). In writing
this book, which contains twelve themes each relating to disaster
recovery, the initial intention was to apply the full hierarchy of
principles to each theme, to conclude each chapter of the book. However,
reviewers of the draft chapters commented that there was a 'bewildering
excess of principles' and suggested that they be replaced by a single
principle for each chapter.

**SECOND EXAMPLE:**

***'Learning from Disaster Recovery- Guidance to Decision Makers'***

This report anticipates the later publication of the full book and
includes just two of the chapters on the topics of *'Reducing Risks in
Disaster Recovery'* and '*Organising Recovery'.* The principles selected
for each chapter are as follows:

**Guiding Principle:** '**Reducing Risks in Disaster Recovery'**

'Risk Reduction is a central aim of recovery management. Therefore, it
is essential to use the recovery process to reduce future risks to avoid
a repetition of the disaster. To achieve such protection it is necessary
for officials to secure adequate budget and political support as well as
the 'buy-in' of the intended beneficiaries of the undertaking. When this
support is assured, and only then, devise and implement an integrated
risk reduction strategy'

**Guiding Principle:** '**Organising Recovery'**

'Effective recovery requires a single point of overall responsibility in
government. This may be best achieved by having a dedicated organization
at the apex of political power and decision making. The organisation
also needs:

-   a clear mandate supported by appropriate legislation

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-   adequate financial, human and material resources

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-   to be based on the ethical principles of accountability and
    transparency

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-   direct links to all line ministries

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-   knowledge of the dynamics of the disaster recovery process

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-   mechanisms that permit continual two-way consultation with surviving
    communities

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-   an effective Disaster Recovery Management Information System
    (DRMIS)'

**Three Comments on these Principles:**

First: It is not an easy process to capture the essence of a complex
task and summarise it within a single guiding principle.

Second: The 'Guiding Principles' cited above could also be described as
recommendations, or critical issues.

Third: These chapters containing the above principles were submitted to
a senior technical editor, employed by one of the sponsoring UN agencies
who commissioned this publication : 'The International Strategy for
Disaster Reduction' (ISDR) In the final version of the paper, following
heavy internal editing, both of the principles stated above were
excluded. However, the broad spirit of the sentiments that are implicit
within them has been retained, but without the force of the designation
'principle'. This omission may illustrate a reluctance on the part of an
official international body such as the United Nations to set out
'principles' lest these be regarded as controversial, attracting
criticism or because they may have policy or financial implications.

**5. Conclusions and where next?**                                 

At the outset we stated that principles are essential to 'guide
actions', 'achieve something', or define the 'way to act'. We hope that
the discussion in this paper adds substance to this conviction. The
following concerns need to be noted and responded to.

**Varied Perspectives**

Devising a set of universal principles is not an easy task; in fact it
may not even be possible, due to cultural relativism and varying frames
of reference. A set of principles for an identical disaster recovery
operation would tend to differ for survivors, the national government,
the private sector and international relief agencies. Disasters occur
within diverse cultural settings, so it is highly unlikely that specific
'tactical' or 'implementation' principles of disaster management that
could relate to Canada would be relevant to Cambodia.

Nevertheless, the diversity of standpoints can present a useful
challenge in searching for a common approach, a shared understanding and
common principles that effectively merges different interests. To do
this will require (1) a disciplined thought process and (2) a dialogue
to establish an ethical consensus from all standpoints. It is suggested
that any principle for disaster recovery should start from the primary
object of concern -namely the needs of the surviving population.

There is an important distinction to be made between *process* and
*content.* There will be many difficulties, (if not impossibilities) in
creating uniform sets of principles that are applicable to different
cultures or organizations. But, the process of searching for principles
are, in the authors opinion, essential.

The four stage hierarchy of principles introduced in this paper provides
a useful template for programme and project managers. The process
encourages an ethical basis for planning and decision making. However,
we recognize the concern of officials, as noted in a cited example, to
reduce principles to a manageable total.

We believe that the process of creating principles seems likely to yield
many significant benefits, by helping people and organizations to create
policies that are consistent with their values, to explicitly consider
how actions and values relate to each other, and by helping to create a
shared understanding, not only within individual organizations but
between them. Dwight D. Eisenhower said, *\"The plan is useless; it\'s
the planning that\'s important\"*; this same notion has applicability to
the issue of disaster management and in the development of principles.

**Maintaining Principles**

While principles of disaster management exist, and in the case of the
Red Cross 'Code of Conduct ' have been widely endorsed, it is
nevertheless clear that this is insufficient to ensure their compliance
in the long term. Given the rapid turnover of agency staff and minimal
induction training for new staff in most agencies, it would appear to be
necessary for organizations to regularly re-launch ethics training.

**International Dialogue**

The time seems to be ripe for an international conference under UN
auspices, (or Red Cross auspices) to specifically address this issue:
*"The quest for working Principles of Disaster Management"* This could
usefully include a discussion concerning the way principles are being
followed in the Sphere Guidelines as well as in the Red Cross Code of
Conduct The conference and subsequent book could usefully cover both
Disaster Management (post-event) and Disaster Risk Management
(pre-event).

**7. References** (to be completed)

ADB, OECD and Transparency International (2005). Curbing Corruption in
Tsunami

Relief Operations Manila: Asian Development Bank (ADP) , Organisation
for

Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and Transparency
International

Alexander (1999). in What is a Disaster? New Answers to Old Questions

Alexander, D. (2002). Principles of Emergency Planning and Management
Harpenden: Terra

Auf der Heide, Erik. (1989). Disaster Response: Principles of
Preparation and Coordination.
<http://orgmail2.coe-dmha.org/dr/Images/Main.swf>.

Alexander de Waal (1998). Famine Crimes; Politics and the Disaster
Relief Industry in Africa (African Issues), Indiana University Press.

Boss, J.A. (2005). Analyzing Moral Issues: Third Edition, New York,
McGraw-Hill

Clinton, B. (2006). Lessons for a Safer Future: Drawing on the
experience of the Indian Ocean tsunami disaster . Eleven key actions for
building nations' and communities' resilience to disasters. New York and
Geneva: ISDR

CRHNet (2005). The Principles for Disaster Management as a Key for
Successful Management. In: Reducing Risk Through Partnerships.
Proceedings of the 2nd Annual Canadian Risk and Hazards Network (CRHNet)
Symposium. Toronto, Canada, November 17-19, 2005.

Davis, I (2007). *'Learning from Disaster Recovery- Guidance to Decision
Makers'* Geneva: International Recovery Programme (IRP)

Davis. I. and Murshed, Z (2006). Community- Based Disaster Risk
Management Bangkok: Asian Disaster Preparedness Centre (ADPC)

(this document can be ordered from ADPC by contacting Vicky
Puzon-Diopenes at <Vicky@adpc.net> or it may be downloaded from
www.adpc.net)

de Waal A.(1998). Famine Crimes; Politics and the Disaster Relief
Industry in Africa (African Issues), PLACE?: Indiana University Press.

Drabek, T.E. (2005). Theories relevant to emergency management versus a
theory of emergency management. Journal of Emergency Management, Vol
3(4), 49-4.

Dunfee, T.W. and Strudler, A. (2000). Moral Dimensions of Risk Transfer
and Reduction Strategies. In Disaster Risk Management Series no. 2:
Managing Disaster Risk in Emerging Economies, Washington D.C: World
Bank, Kreimer A. and Arnold M. editors, pp. 109-120.

Erik Auf der Heide, Disaster Response: Principles of Preparation and
Coordination \[book on-line\]; available from
<http://orgmail2.coe-dmha.org/dr/static.htm>.

Etkin, D. and Ho, E. (2007). Climate Change: Perceptions and Discourses
of Risk. Journal of Risk Research (in press).

Good Humanitarian Donorship (2003). 'Principles and Good Practice of
Humanitarian

Donorship' 17 June
http://[www.reliefweb.int](http://www.reliefweb.int/)/
ghd/a%2023%20Principles %20EN- GHD19.10.04%20 RED.doc

Jigyasu, R. (2005). *"Disaster: A Reality or Construct? Perspective From
the East",* in What is a Disaster?

Scheper, E et al ( 2006). Impact of the tsunami response on local and
national capacities.

Tsunami Evaluation Coalition, (cited p.21) of Telford,J and Cosgrave, J
(2007) The

international humanitarian system and the 2004 Indian Ocean earthquake
and tsunamis

Disasters Vol. 31 No.1 March 2007

Telford,J and Cosgrave, J (2007). The international humanitarian system
and the 2004

Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunamis Disasters Vol. 31 No.1 March 2007
pp 1-28

Zack, N. (2006). Philosophy and Disasters. Homeland Security Affairs,
Vol. 2(1)

**Figure 1**

![](media/image1.jpeg){width="5.879861111111111in"
height="4.822222222222222in"}

**Figure 2**

![](media/image2.jpeg){width="6.129861111111111in"
height="4.597222222222222in"}

[^1]: In recent years these terms have been widely accepted. *'Disaster
    Management'* refers to the post-disaster management of emergencies
    while *'Disaster Risk Management'* describes the pro-active
    processes of risk assessment and risk reduction. Another term,
    *'Disaster Recovery Management'* referring to longer-term disaster
    recovery, is gradually being added to these descriptions as recovery
    secures belated recognition amongst policy makers and funding
    institutions.

[^2]: Ian Davis was on the management board of an international relief
    agency during the 1970's and witnessed the forces of self-interest
    in action. He recalls some alarming boardroom discussions where the
    agency financial director would express the 'need' for a major
    disaster to occur within a given financial year to produce the
    consequent influx of funds from agency supporters to ensure that
    staff redundancies would not occur. This was on account of a 14 -20%
    allocation of administrative and handling charges that the agency
    deducted from every contribution and disasters provided the major
    'financial surges' needed to fill the agencies administrative
    budget. Therefore, we were faced as board members with the blunt
    reality that if there were few disasters in a given year the agency
    had to loose staff and cut back on essential administrative
    requirements. However, some 'creative accounting' mechanisms were
    introduced by certain agencies to offset this risk by dubiously
    charging the salaries of home or overseas based aid administration
    staff as a project or donation item, as a way to boost the
    administration 'top-slice'. Needless to say, loyal constituency
    supporters of agencies were never informed about such subtleties as
    the agency 'adjusted', (or manipulated) their supporters
    contributions to meet the agency's internal requirements

[^3]: For example, law 229 of the Code of Hammurabi from 1760 B.C.
    states that *"If a builder build a house for some one, and does not
    construct it properly, and the house which he built fall in and kill
    its owner, then that builder shall be put to death."*

[^4]: The importance of care and sentiment has been given greater focus
    as a result of the incorporation of feminism into moral theory.

[^5]: An example of this is whether or not providing disaster assistance
    to people is linked to their taking reasonable precautions to
    mitigate their risk. For example, if somebody knowingly builds in a
    flood zone when they have alternative options, do they have a right
    to compensation in the event of a disastrous flood.

[^6]: <http://www.info.gov.za/gazette/bills/2001/b58-01.pdf>

[^7]: <http://www.smartcommunities.ncat.org/wingspread2/wingprin.shtml>

[^8]: <http://www.gujaratindia.com/Policies/Policy2.pdf>

[^9]: <http://www.itdg.org/?id=disasters_livelihood_approach>

[^10]: <http://orgmail2.coe-dmha.org/dr/disasterresponse.nsf/section?openview>

[^11]: <http://www.ocipep.gc.ca/info_pro/fact_sheets/general/EM_can_emerg_man_sys_e.asp>

[^12]: <http://www.sphereproject.org/handbook/index.htm>

[^13]: <http://orgmail2.coe-dmha.org/dr/disasterresponse.nsf/section?openview>

[^14]: For example, after the Hurricane Katrina disaster victims
    launched a class action suit against State Farm Insurance and
    American International Group regarding denial of claims or lack of
    response.

[^15]: Our thanks to Dennis Mileti for this suggestion.

[^16]: This perspective was put forth by Dwight D. Eisenhower who said,
    \"*The plan is useless; it\'s the planning that\'s important*.\"

[^17]: The issues stated after each principle, (as set in italics), have
    been added to the original text