**Sectoral Perspectives on Corruption**

### *January 2003*

# Corruption in the Justice System

Mary Noel Pepys

*The views and interpretations represented in this paper belong solely
to its author and should not be attributed to USAID or to MSI.*

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# 

# 

# [CORRUPTION IN THE JUSTICE SYSTEM]{.underline}

## I. INTRODUCTION

Systemic corruption within the justice system is commonly defined as the
use of public authority for personal gain that results in an improper
delivery of judicial services and legal protection for citizens. The
justice system can be broadly defined to include judges, prosecutors,
police, public defenders, private bar, court personnel, and court
decision enforcement agencies, such as penal institutions. This paper
will cover corruption carried out by judges, prosecutors, police, and
court personnel within developing countries and countries in transition.

As the ultimate decision-maker and the highest governmental official
within the justice system, the judge is the focal point for reducing
corruption within the justice system.

Whether the judge is engaged in criminal, civil, commercial or
administrative decision-making is essentially immaterial to the causes
and forms of corruption. Corruption in the justice system covers all
aspects of judicial oversight. Police, prosecutors and court staff play
a role in improperly influencing the provision of judicial services, and
their involvement in corruption can have a menacing effect on the entire
judicial process.

Why should a democratic country be concerned that corruption pervades
its justice system?

In a democracy based on the rule of law, the role of the judiciary, as
an independent and equal branch of government, is to protect human
rights and civil liberties by ensuring the right to a fair trail by a
competent and impartial tribunal and to provide a check on other
governmental entities. All citizens expect equal access to the courts
and equal treatment by the investigative bodies, prosecutorial
authorities, and the courts, regardless of their position in society.
Yet, under most corrupt judicial systems, the powerful and wealthy can
escape prosecution and conviction, while large segments of society are
excluded from their rightful access to fair and effective judicial
services.

Police and magistrates in many developing countries receive dismally low
salaries, perform their duties under abominable working conditions,
overcrowded office space, and dilapidated courtrooms, with little or no
support staff or equipment, and a modicum of access to current laws or
revisions to laws. A justice system replete with individuals who are
ill-informed, underpaid and overworked is a well-tested recipe for
corruption.

Although the role of the courts is to protect the human rights and civil
liberties of every citizen in a democratic country, many public opinion
polls show that the public typically views the judiciary as one of the
most corrupt governmental institutions in their countries.

USAID's rule of law programs have traditionally been comprised of
assistance to the judiciary, attorneys in the courtroom, specifically
prosecutors and defense counsel, and the police. With such a broad
focus, the rule of law programs have resulted in positive outcomes in
USAID's attempt to contain corruption across the board.

Until corruption within the judicial sector is severely controlled or
eradicated, most legal and programmatic mechanisms put forth to reduce
corruption in other sectors of society will be significantly undermined.

**II. VULNERABILITIES TO CORRUPTION IN THE JUSTICE SYSTEM**

It is critical to understand the vulnerabilities to corruption, that is,
the factors, forms, levels and location of corruption in the justice
system, to effectively design a response to the problem.

### **A. Underlying Factors of Corruption in the Justice System**

There are several underlying factors of corruption in developing
countries or countries in transition that tend to make their judiciaries
more prone to corruption practices, some of which are institutional and
others attitudinal.

#### [Role of Government]{.underline}

Government and those who serve in government in corrupt countries
receive little respect from within and outside the government.
Governmental leaders are viewed cynically by citizens as serving their
own self-interests rather than the interests of the public. Given the
fact that in many countries around the world, the role of government is
to promote the State's rights over citizens' rights, citizens have
traditionally observed with skepticism the legitimacy of their own
governmental leaders.

Rather than view the judiciary as a separate and equal branch of
government with a democratic check on the executive and legislature,
citizens often view the judiciary, particularly judges, as being part of
the problem rather than part of the solution. In such countries, judges
do not receive the same respect and prestige which accompanies their
position in other countries.

#### [Governmental Leaders Engaged in Corrupt Behavior]{.underline}

It is difficult to expect citizens to abide by the law when governmental
leaders, particularly police, prosecutors and judges, seemingly
disregard the very laws, rules and procedures they are mandated to
enforce. Until governmental leaders who publicly sidestep laws are
prosecuted and convicted, the average citizen will consider himself
foolhardy if he continues to abide by the very system his leaders are
eschewing.

### *System Based on Personal Influence and Contacts*

When the foundation of receiving governmental goods and services is
based on contacts rather than on merit, where appointment and promotion
is a product of patronage, and professional success is achieved when the
right connections are employed, citizens will gravitate to powerful
individuals rather than succumb to the law to secure a self-serving
outcome. In countries where it is whom you know and not what you know,
merit-based rewards are seldom forthcoming. The conviction in the power
of contacts rather than content is so pervasive in many countries that
even when governmental decisions are based on merit, most citizens
dismiss the decisions as the product of personal influence.

### *Tolerance towards Corruption*

In most corrupt countries, there is a tolerance for corruption,
particularly because it is viewed as the only avenue for accomplishing
certain actions. In some instances, the payment of a bribe is a normal
and acceptable way of doing business. Corruption is so common in certain
arenas that citizens do not even view their behavior as immoral. For
instance, attorneys who consider themselves law-abiding do not hesitate
to pay a bribe to a court clerk to expedite a case file. Since the
attorney is not interfering in the substance of the case, he does not
believe any corrupt activity has been conducted. Such an attorney
overlooks the fact that his behavior can have the effect of distorting
the average citizen's access to the court's procedural process.

#### [Non-Judicial Role of the Judge]{.underline}

Governments in many countries require judges to undertake non-judicial
responsibilities, such as serving on commissions of inquiry, or assume
heavy burdens of administrative duties, which deter judges from pursuing
their primary judicial duties, thus causing severe delay in the
resolution of cases. In corrupted systems, such delay is averted by
using improper influence on judges.

### *Lack of Professional Benefits*

When the remuneration system, including wages and other employment
benefits, retirement and working conditions of those within the justice
system is meager, and does not adequately correspond to the functions of
the office nor allow for an acceptable standard of living, police,
prosecutors and judges will be forced to pursue self-serving rather than
public-serving ends.

### *Administrative Court Procedures*

The vast array of administrative responsibilities which are inadequately
monitored create a climate for unfettered corruption in the courts. In
many countries, administrative court procedures are bureaucratic,
cumbersome and confusing, and are carried out by court personnel who
have broad discretionary powers with little accountability.

### **B. Forms of Corruption in the Justice System** 

Corruption that exists in the justice system can take place at any time
beginning at the commencement of a criminal investigation or the filing
of a civil lawsuit through the judicial process culminating in
enforcement of the court's decision. Much of the corruption occurs
outside the public eye and often between only two individuals, both of
whom are engaged in the illegal conduct and each receiving a personal
benefit. Consequently, corruption within the justice system is difficult
to expose and challenging to prove, which impedes prosecution of the
corrupt behavior.

In the investigation of criminal conduct, police have wide discretionary
powers, much of which goes unchecked. For a proper sum, police can
suppress the filing of police reports, can distort the evidence thereby
ensuring certain outcomes, can engage in delaying tactics until the
evidence is lost or destroyed, and can even refuse to investigate. If
the alleged perpetrator is politically powerful, wealthy, or of a
certain ethnicity, the police can use their discretionary powers to
protect rather than investigate the individual. Police can also commit
crime, such as rape or robbery, in the investigation of other crimes.

Even with excellent police investigation, prosecutorial discretion can
thwart the lawful processing of a criminal case. Similar to the police,
prosecutors can also be bribed to delay the investigation and processing
of a case. Moreover, powerful governmental ministries can exert
substantial pressure on the public prosecutor to withhold prosecution.
Such prosecutorial indiscretions go unchecked as there are no objective
criteria for managing caseloads and prioritizing investigations that
would allow a departure from the procedures to be identified.

Other criminal procedures such as the inconsistent issuance of summons,
the unjustifiable refusal or granting of bail, the discrepancy in
prosecuting high profile criminal suspects versus petty criminals,
unwarranted acquittals, and the disparities in sentencing give rise to
the public's suspicion that corruption exists within the criminal
justice system.

In the filing of a civil lawsuit, the court user is faced with a
daunting array of court procedures, many of which are complex and
arcane. Often, court employees are willing to circumvent the
administrative process for their private benefit. Due to their vast
responsibilities, which receive little oversight by court
administrators, court personnel are in a position to manipulate the
rules and procedures. They may accelerate or delay a case without
detection. They may "lose" the case file and then "find" it for a fee.
They may allow or deny access to a judge for a fee. They may influence
the assignment of cases for a fee.

And lawyers do not hesitate to single out those court employees who
knowingly and expertly engage in corrupt, unsupervised administrative
tasks in exchange for an illicit fee, as they know there is a low risk
of being detected. For those litigants who do not have legal
representation and can barely pay the legitimate fees, let alone the
illicit payments of bribery, equal access to justice is denied.

### *Financial, Political and Societal Pressures*

One of the most common forms of corruption within the police and
judiciary is the payment of a bribe, either sought after by the police
or magistrate (prosecutor or judge) or offered by the accused, the
litigant or lawyer as an inducement to make certain decisions. For the
payment of a fee, police and magistrates can alter the substance of the
outcome. Judges can also affect the procedural process of a case, i.e.
continually adjourning a case until a fee is paid.

Illicit remuneration comes in many forms. Governmental leaders,
particularly those who wield immense power over the judicial system, are
in a position to offer tangible benefits such as housing, car and
vacations to those magistrates who curry favor by tacitly agreeing to
decide according to the leader's desires. In some cases, the magistrate
becomes accustomed to the higher standard of living and, when facing
retirement, will accelerate the quest for illegal financial means from
the private sector to maintain a higher lifestyle after leaving office.

Apart from receiving an illicit fee payment, magistrates may also
benefit from succumbing to political pressure by obtaining professional
advancement. Responding favorably to those who have undue influence on
the judicial system, who have power or powerful connections, can result
in promotion or other professional benefits to the magistrate.

During the Soviet regime, "telephone justice", i.e. directives received
by telephone concerning pending cases by senior governmental officials,
was not uncommon, and continues today to a lesser degree. Ministries
with historical power over the judiciary are accustomed to exerting
pressure on the judicial branch and are loathed to relinquish their
control. Evidence of such political pressure is substantiated by the
disproportionate number of decisions favoring the executive branch or
powerful local enterprises that have political or financial connections
to the government.

Other sources of pressure are family members or friends who seek
"favors" from the magistrate. Due to their personal relationship with
the magistrate, close associates expect certain outcomes. Rather than
reveal the conflict of interest and seek disqualification, magistrates
often submit to the pressure without compunction.

*[Pressure Within the Justice System]{.underline}*

An insidious form of corruption emanates from within the justice system
itself. Chief police officers, prosecutors or judges can exert
significant administrative authority over their subordinates. By the
simple act of assigning an investigation to a certain police officer, or
a case to a certain prosecutor or judge, the outcome of the
investigation or case can be determined. In some courts, the senior
judge reviews the decisions of the other judges to assure the
"correctness" of their opinions. While the purpose of the review may be
to seek accuracy of the facts and law, such internal pressure can have
the effect of assuring compliance with senior officer's position in
order to maintain good relations and to receive future benefits.

##### Fear of reprisal 

Rather than being motivated to receive a tangible benefit from making
certain decisions, police and magistrates are often cowed into making
decisions out of fear of retribution. The fear of demotion or transfer
to an undesirable location or position is a powerful incentive to make
unjustifiable decisions. Fear of revenge if the decision is against or
in favor of an objectionable political party or ethnic group can distort
the outcome. Being perceived as politically incorrect or unpatriotic can
force police and magistrates to decide against their better judgment.

#### [Ineffective Enforcement of Judgments]{.underline}

Civil or criminal lawsuits that have emerged unscathed from the judicial
process can still be subject to corruption during the enforcement phase.
Bailiffs can extort payments from losing parties to ignore the judgment.
Even reputable bailiffs can encounter difficulty during the enforcement
phase due to imprecise and confusing judgments or even contradictory
judgments. Police who object to the judge's conviction of an individual
can refuse to incarcerate the guilty. Banks that are required by a
judicial decision to levy the bank account of a powerful or wealthy
individual can refuse to do so. Such defiant behavior stems from acute
disrespect for the judicial system.

**III. RESPONSES TO CORRUPTION IN THE JUSTICE SECTOR**

#### **A. Assessment of Corruption**

An independent assessment of corruption involving all stakeholders to
corruption, i.e. parties to a civil dispute, the accused, the victim,
police, prosecutor, defense counsel, private bar, judges, court
personnel, and court decision enforcement agencies, including penal
institutions, is essential before any systematic response to eradicating
corruption can be developed and implemented. Evidence of corruption, and
not just suspicions or popular belief, is required in order to
effectively assess corruption and develop a framework of anti-corruption
policies.

#### [False Assumptions and Allegations of Corruption]{.underline}

One of the major issues when developing a response to combat corruption
is the public's perception of corruption. In countries where corruption
is endemic, where the public views the government with disrespect, where
governmental leaders reputedly engage in serious corruption, and where
contacts and not content determines the outcome, citizens view any
unfavorable decision to be the product of corruption.

Citizens in such countries refuse to believe that unfavorable judicial
decisions are based on merit. Incompetent attorneys exacerbate the
problem in masking their own shortcomings by convincing their clients
that the case was lost because the other party paid a bribe to the
magistrate. It is not uncommon for attorneys who are unscrupulous to
seek a bribe from their client under false pretenses, claiming the judge
demanded it for a favorable outcome, when in fact the illicit fee only
lines the pocket of the attorney. If the outcome is unfavorable, the
attorneys' defense is simply that the bribe was not sufficiently
adequate.

#### [Judicial Leadership in Assessing and Combating Corruption]{.underline}

Reform-minded and respected leadership of the police and magistracy
within the justice system must not only be involved in the assessment of
corruption, but also, and more important, in determining the priorities
and sequencing of reforms. Corruption within the justice system is
multi-faceted and multi-layered and to be effectively combated must have
committed leadership at each level of corruption.

#### **B. Institutional and Attitudinal Reforms**

As with the factors of corruption, the responses to corruption can be
grouped into two categories, institutional and attitudinal. In general,
anti-corruption reforms must:

-   limit the authority of decision-makers within the justice system and
    those who have control over the justice system;

-   reduce the unfettered discretion of administrative officeholders
    within the justice system;

-   strengthen the transparency and accountability of all who are
    involved in the justice system;

-   improve the terms of employment within the justice system, including
    appointment, remuneration, working conditions, and training; and

-   transform societal attitude's towards corruption in general and the
    justice system in particular.

[*Increase Independence of the Judiciary*]{.underline}

The judiciary must fiercely guard its independence in order to balance
powers equitably among the branches of government. To insulate
magistrates from political influence, the judiciary, rather than the
executive, should control or at least have oversight authority of its
administration and budget. Additionally, the budget for the justice
system must be at a level that allows for effective and efficient
administration of justice.

#### [Role of Judicial Councils]{.underline}

Judicial councils that are independent from the ministry of justice can
be helpful in promoting judicial independence by assuming the
responsibility of appointing and promoting judges. When employed,
judicial councils have usually substituted the traditional authority of
the president or parliament in making judicial appointments, in efforts
to reduce the politicization of nominations. During the last fifteen
years, numerous **Latin America** countries have created judicial
councils that have developed substantial track records. [^1]

#### [Enhance Prosecution Capability of Public Prosecutor]{.underline} 

The autonomous role of the public prosecutor in fighting corruption must
be strengthened in order to effectively investigate governmental
officials, including judges, and well-known businessmen. Additionally,
the criminal code must allow for prosecution and conviction not only
with direct evidence of bribery, but also with circumstantial evidence,
such as possessing wealth that is unexplained by employment and other
lawful activities. Until the public observes that corrupt behavior by
governmental leaders and private individuals is not tolerated within the
justice system, corruption within other sectors of society will
continue.

In Latin America, efforts have been underway to strengthen the
prosecutor's office. For instance, in **Colombia** the Attorney General
was granted significant investigatory powers to fight corruption, which
he used successfully to prosecute senior governmental officials and drug
lords. In **Honduras** an office of the general prosecutor against
corruption was established and sufficiently funded which allowed the
general prosecutor to successfully expose corruption in the military. In
**India** the Supreme Court took a leadership role in exposing political
kickbacks and is now rated as one of India's most trusted
institutions.[^2]

##### Appointment, Promotion, Dismissal 

The system for appointments, promotions and dismissals must be
transparent and based on due process procedures in order to reduce
nepotism and political patronage within the employment process.
Objective and merit-based standards must be applied to each applicant
for appointment and promotion.

The **Republic of Georgia**, with the assistance of foreign donors,
required all sitting judges to pass a rigorous examination resulting in
numerous judges being forced out of office. A competitive examination is
an excellent tool in securing competent magistrates, but it can only be
effective if the demand exceeds the supply.

#### [Term of Appointment]{.underline} 

In order to shield the judge from external influence and to reduce the
opportunity and need to succumb to political pressure and favoritism,
the term of office for judges should be lengthy, if not life-time, to
increase job security and stability, and to enhance the personal will to
avoid governmental pressure. If there were a system of life-time
appointments, there must be substantial and visible accountability
mechanisms that ensure judges do not take advantage of their positions.

#### [Increase Salary and Enhance Working Conditions]{.underline} 

It is very difficult to combat corruption within the justice system when
magistrates and police are paid considerably lower wages than
individuals in comparable governmental offices and in the private
sector. Increasing the income of magistrates and police will aid in
eliminating the necessity to supplement their paltry income with bribes.
However, it has been noted that a significant increase in the
compensation across the board for judges and law clerks in **Venezuela,
Ecuador** and **Argentina** (78, 89 and 130 percent respectively) may
have affected corruption, but did [not]{.underline} affect the
perception of corruption in these countries from the period of
1991-1999.[^3]

In **Bosnia** a pre-condition by the international community in
assisting to eradicate corruption within the judiciary was to require
the government to significantly increase the wages of judges. As of
2002, Judges in Bosnia receive \$900-\$1,800 monthly while judges in
Serbia receive only \$200-\$350 monthly.[^4] Although it is too early to
ascertain the affect increased compensation will have on the ethics of
judicial decision-making in Bosnia, it is the intent of the donors that
higher wages will reduce corruption.

Enhancing the working conditions of magistrates, particularly judges, so
that their environment is conducive to thoughtful deliberation is
essential to ensuring that judicial decisions are well-reasoned. Many
judges within corrupt judiciaries share offices, often four judges to a
small room, with malfunctioning office equipment and little support
staff. Improving their working conditions will not only assist in
improving the quality of their decision making, but also increase their
professional prestige.

*[Declare Assets]{.underline}*

In order to combat corruption as well as the perception of corruption,
all magistrates and police should disclose their assets and the assets
of close family members 1) prior to taking office, 2) periodically
throughout their tenure, and 3) upon departing from office. Such
declarations should be verified and monitored on a regular basis by an
independent official.

### *Enhance Professionalism* 

An effective weapon against corruption is an acute understanding of the
law. Often magistrates succumb to pressure because their knowledge of
the law and its application is faulty and unsound. A
government-sponsored system for the education and training of
magistrates on substantive and procedural legal matters prior to
assuming their roles, and a comprehensive curriculum which enables
magistrates to be continually educated and trained during their term in
office is essential to enhance judicial accountability.

In numerous countries in Central and Eastern Europe as well as the
former Soviet Union, foreign donors, with the assistance of the local
ministry of justice or the judges' association, have created judicial
training schools that have successfully trained all new judges as well
as most of the sitting judges in the country. Judicial training centers
in **Latvia,** **Albania**, **Bulgaria**, **Moldova** and **Kyrgyzstan**
are examples of such assistance.

#### [Enforce Codes of Ethical Conduct]{.underline}

In order to strengthen the integrity of magistrates and police, a code
of ethical conduct, one that is rigorously enforced, is crucial. Codes
of ethical conduct oblige magistrates and police to become accountable
for their actions and decisions. If magistrates are seen to sanction
their own for inappropriate behavior, the public's respect for
prosecutors and judges will increase.

In Albania, comprehensive training of the ethics code for mid-level
police officers was conducted throughout the country by a democracy NGO
under a USAID grant. Not only did this training reinforce an
understanding of appropriate ethical conduct by the police, but it
reestablished the linkage and sense of mutual responsibility between the
police and the civil society that it is meant to protect.

*[Ensure Immediate Access to the Laws]{.underline}*

### Lack of legal knowledge about the prevailing laws and regulations, and lack of immediate access to such legal doctrines can result in incorrect rulings, part of which is based on the innocent ignorance of the magistrate. However, an unsuspecting magistrate who is subject to improper external or internal influence has little legal defense when he is without timely access to the laws and their amendments.

### *Random Case Assignment*

In countries with corrupt judiciaries, case assignment is usually within
the jurisdiction of a powerful authority who can manipulate assignment
to ensure certain court decisions. On the surface, purposeful assignment
can be defended if it is based on the experience, expertise or workload
of magistrates, but it is a system susceptible to abuse. Thus, the
distribution of cases should be random and not influenced by any person
concerned with the outcome of the case.

### *Publication of Judicial Decisions*

One of the most effective responses to eliminating corruption within the
justice system, one that not only reduces corruption, but also the
perception of corruption is the publication of judicial decisions. In
numerous countries, often civil law countries, judicial decisions are
not traditionally published, nor are there verbatim court transcripts.
Thus, where there are inconsistent applications of the law, or where
there is an indefensible ruling, it is difficult for the public to
ascertain and establish such facts.

It is not uncommon for judges sitting on the same bench to apply the law
differently to similar fact patterns, or, more insidiously, for a judge
to apply the law differently to cases with similar fact patterns.
Without verbatim court transcripts or published decisions, such
discrepancies are difficult to detect.

Even when not for the purpose of establishing precedence, publication of
judicial decisions that are well-reasoned and that properly apply the
applicable law to the facts can protect the innocent judges while
exposing the guilty ones.

#### [Vigorous Enforcement of Judicial Decisions]{.underline} 

In many countries, over half of the judicial decisions are not enforced.
The delay or even absence of court decision enforcement gives rise to
the public's disrespect for the judicial system. Much of the enforcement
problem is due to a lack of sufficient resources. Yet, when those
resources do exist and individuals or institutions defy the court's
decision by refusing to enforce it, vigorous sanctions must be imposed.

#### [Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR)]{.underline} 

An essential component of a multi-faceted response program to reduce
corruption within the judiciary is a system which provides for
alternative dispute resolution. Alternative dispute resolution is a
process by which the plaintiff and defendant attempt to reach a
settlement outside the courtroom, either through arbitration, mediation
or civil settlement. Alternative dispute resolution reduces the
monopolistic nature of state-sponsored judicial services by providing
alternative channels to secure a resolution through the private sector.
**Chile, Ecuador and Uganda** have implemented ADR mechanisms which have
resulted in a reduction in the reports of court-related corruption.[^5]

*[Increase Transparency and Accountability of the Administrative
Process]{.underline}*

Due to the complexities of administrative procedures, there is a
significant level of administrative discretion given to court personnel.
This intricate environment entices not only court staff to seek illegal
payment for services, but also a willingness on the part of the court
user to pay them. Court administrative procedures must be streamlined
and easily understood by all so that arbitrary decision-making by court
staff is reduced. Uniformity and transparency in the administrative
process significantly diminish court personnel's capacity to obtain
illicit payments.

The institutional accountability of the justice system must ensure that
public resources are allocated and used efficiently and for their
intended purposes. The personal accountability of court staff requires
them to perform their roles and responsibilities in compliance with all
applicable rules and regulations and standards of ethical conduct.
Performance standards for all court personnel must require that salaries
and promotion be based on clearly enunciated performance standards.

### *Enhance Transparency and Efficiency of Case Management Systems* 

A case tracking system is essential in order to enhance the transparency
of court administration. Computerized case tracking may also be used to
increase the transparency of court proceedings by providing court users
with an opportunity to observe the consistent, or inconsistent,
application of time standards to each case filed. In several courts in
**Bulgaria**, most notably the Supreme Administrative Court, the court
record system has been computerized allowing litigants and their
attorneys to access public court records and track each case through its
resolution. Users of the Supreme Administrative Court's web site may
learn the date of filing of each case, the location of the file, and the
length of time a particular file has languished at each judicial
station.[^6]

#### [Role of the Bar Associations]{.underline}

Anti-corruption measures for the judicial system do not rest solely
within the court structure. Frequently overlooked is a recognition by
the bar that it contributes to the corruption of the judiciary by acting
as a conduit between the litigant and the magistrate. Bar associations
have the responsibility to expose and reduce bribery within the justice
system by imposing strict sanctions against any of its members who
engage in corrupt judicial practices.

*[Role of Law Faculties]{.underline}*

### The culture for bribing decision-makers begins at a very young age. In law faculties in those countries where corruption is endemic, it is not uncommon for students to bribe school administrators and law professors to be admitted, to receive passing grades, or to ultimately graduate from the law faculty. 

### 

### 

### The legal education system must be significantly improved, including increasing the compensation of academics and mandating courses on professional ethics, so that law students who become the future lawyers and judges of the country are no longer learning how to manipulate the system, but rather how to succeed within it. 

#### [Role of Civil Society]{.underline} 

Non-governmental organizations can play an important role in reducing
corruption within the justice system by enhancing public awareness of
judicial procedures and citizens' rights, while also creating pressure
on the government for reform. In **Latvia and Albania**,
non-governmental organizations in conjunction with the court system
developed and distributed to the public street law pamphlets which
clearly enunciated the public's rights and obligations under certain
laws, and the process for filing and adjudicating cases.

Non-government organizations can be useful in ferreting out corruption
by engaging in court monitoring. In **Croatia,** an NGO was successful
in exposing magistrates who were not abiding by judicial procedures
during war-crime trials of public individuals.

In **Ukraine, Russia and Albania**, Citizen Advocacy Offices (CAO)
specializing in providing legal support to victims of alleged corruption
and excessive bureaucracy have been established under USAID grants.
Publicity of their very establishment produces hundreds of requests for
legal help with issues of corruption, indicating a pent-up demand in
society for a trusted and independent source of legal assistance. These
CAOs have been extremely effective not only in representing individual
claimants, either through court proceedings or administrative solutions,
but in identifying institutions or groups of officials where corruption
is endemic by analyzing trends in grievances. Through their independence
and objectivity, these CAOs quickly achieve legitimacy not only among
the public, but with judicial authorities as well. For example, in
**Albania**, a tripartite commission was established to expedite the
investigation and prosecution of corruption cases that included the
general prosecutor and the minister of state in charge of
anti-corruption programs.

##### Role of the Private Sector

As with NGOs, the private sector must also play a role in demanding
reform from the government. Additionally, the business community must
address its own behavior in contributing to the problem.

#### [Role of the Press]{.underline} 

News reporters who cover the courts and who are ignorant of the law and
judicial procedures can nourish the public perception of a corrupt
judiciary by inaccurately reporting false allegations of judicial
corruption. Reporters who do not understand judicial rulings or
decisions may misinterpret a judge's reasoning and thereby distort the
motive of the judge. Such reporters grossly misuse their power as the
gatekeeper of public information. Those reporters who routinely cover
the courts must be educated in the law and about court procedures, and
must recognize their responsibility to be factually correct. Further,
they must have access to court records and court press officers who can
enhance their understanding of court rulings and decisions.

Conversely, the press can play a positive influence in promoting
judicial reform. A multi-year USAID program in **Paraguay** focused on
training journalists of the new penal code while teaching court
employees of the critical role the media plays in developing public
trust in the judiciary.

[^1]: See Linn Hammergren, *Do Judicial Councils Further Judicial
    Reform? Lessons from Latin America*, June 2002.

[^2]: See USAID Handbook for Fighting Corruption, Washington, DC, 1999.

[^3]: See *An Economic and Jurimetric Analysis of Official Corruption in
    the Courts*, UNDP, CICP-12, May 2001.

[^4]: See ABA/CEELI's *Judicial Reform Index for Bosnia and
    Herzegovina*, October 2001, and ABA/CEELI's *Judicial Reform Index
    for Serbia*, February 2002.

[^5]: See E. Buscaglia, *Judicial Corruption in Developing Countries:
    Its Causes and Economic Consequences*, Hoover Institution, 2002.

[^6]: See www.sac.government.bg.