Appendix:

Blanchard's Baker's Dozen

**Emergency Management Problems and Issues Points**

**(Background points for presentation at June 2001 FEMA Emergency
Management Higher Education Conference, Emmitsburg, MD)**

**Last Modification: 19 July 2005**

**[Slide 1]{.mark} \-- Blanchard\'s Baker\'s Dozen**

**13 Points:**

1.  Disaster Losses Are Enormous

2.  The U.S. Is Becoming More Vulnerable

3.  Disaster Losses Are Going Up

4.  Projected To Get Even Worse

5.  Disasters Impact Differentially

6.  Past and Current Practices Are Not Effective Enough

7.  Disasters Don't Kill People -- People Kill People.

8.  Disasters Stem From Failure To Manage Risk.

9.  Failure Is Primarily Governmental.

10. This Is Primarily a Political Problem

11. We Must Create A Culture of Disaster Prevention.

12. Emergency Management Needs to Continue to Evolve

13. Education Is Key

**Blanchard\'s Baker's Dozen Expanded Outline**

1\. Disaster Losses Are Enormous

A.  National Economic Losses Are Large

B.  National Life Loss Estimates

C.  Annual Average Economic Losses Per Hazard Are Large

D.  Federal Costs Are Large

E.  FEMA Costs, Though A Small Part, Are Large

F.  Insured Losses, Though A Small Part, Are Large

2\. The U.S. Is Becoming More Vulnerable and Unsafe

A.  Indicators of Increased Vulnerability

B.  Though There Are Hotspots, This Is A National Phenomenon

C.  Increase In Vulnerability Primarily By Social Factors Not Natural
    Ones

3\. Disaster Losses Are Going Up

A.  Going Up In The U.S.A.

B.  Going Up World-Wide

4\. Projected to Get Even Worse

> A. Larger Individual Losses
>
> B. Larger Total Losses

5\. Disasters Have Unequal Impact

A.  Some are more vulnerable, more at risk, less resilient (the poor,
    marginalized,

> elderly and frail, very young, etc.)

B.  Vulnerability is Socially Constructed

6\. Past & Current Practices Are Not Effective Enough

A.  Are Disasters Outpacing Our Ability To Cope?

> \-- Increasing Frequency and Magnitude?
>
> \-- Climate Change?

B. But perhaps there isn\'t much that we can do \-- we don\'t know
enough.

> \-- Multiple sources posit that we do know what to do

C.  Or that its too expensive?

> \-- Not true -- mitigation not only pays for itself, but pays
> dividends
>
> \-- Examples of mitigation working
>
> \-- More affordable than the alternatives

D. If Not, Then What?

7\. Disasters Don't Kill People -- People Kill People

> A. An important reason is that people and governments do not do the
> right things.

B. Hurricane Mitch, Central America, 1998

C. Turkey Earthquake, 1999

D.  El Salvador Earthquake 2001

E.  India Earthquake 2001

F.  USA flooding examples

G.  If Only We Applied Lessons Learned

> \-- General
>
> \-- Earthquakes
>
> \-- Flooding
>
> \-- Hurricanes
>
> \-- Tornadoes and Thunderstorms
>
> \-- Wildfires

8\. Disasters Stem From Failure To Manage Risk.

A.  Risk triangle model (hazard, exposure, vulnerability)

B. Emphasis in past has been on the hazard leg.

C. IDNDR started with emphasis on risk assessment and management.

> D. Federal government has still not conducted a national risk
> assessment

E. Most State and Local Governments Have Not Performed a Risk Assessment

9\. Failure Is Primarily Governmental

> A. Public Safety is a governmental responsibility
>
> B. Land-use regs., building codes, professional planing, etc. are gov.
> responsibilities
>
> C. Irresponsible to allow development, certainly unsafe development in
> hazard areas
>
> D. Emergency managers/hazards community need to press harder
>
> E. Need responsible rather than responsive government
>
> F. Needs press and media attention

10\. Primarily a Political Problem

> A. While there are many players, the key is top political commitment
>
> B. Reasons for Inaction \-- It Can\'t Happen Here

C. " \-- Higher Priorities

D.  " \-- Desire For Development and Tax Revenues

E.  " \-- Opposition Prevails

F.  " \-- Weak Grassroots Support/Advocacy

G.  " \-- Weak Corporate/B&I Support Advocacy

H.  " \-- Emer.Mgmt./Hazards Community Not Getting Through

I.  " \-- Insufficient State and Federal Carrots, Sticks & Examples

J.  Why Did It Happen Here?

11\. We Must Create A Culture of Disaster Prevention.

> A. We Need a Paradigm Shift

B.  The Time Is Now

C.  Own Up To Responsibilities

D.  From Disaster Response to Disaster Prevention

E. Focus on Sustainable Development

> F. Mainstream prevention, mitigation, sustainable development and
> "BDRC"

H.  Importance of the Media

I.  Good Examples

J. The Wave of The Future

12\. Emergency Management Needs to Continue to Evolve

A.  Fundamental Shifts Are Necessary

B.  Accept Responsibility

C.  Build on foundation of risk assessment, mapping and management

D.  From Response/Reactive to Preventive/Proactive

E.  \"Do-It-Alone\" Mentality to Partnering, Coordinating, Networking, &
    Cooperating

F.  Skills to Articulate and Document Persuasive Case to Top
    Decision-Makers

> G. Mainstream (integrate) Emergency Management Within Local
> Government.

H.  Emergency Managers Of Future Need To Be Catalysts For Change

I.  Must Assess and Evaluate Programs, Policies and Approaches

J.  Qualified Personnel Need to Inhabit the Positions

13\. Education is Key

A.  Role of Colleges and Universities

B.  Generate Knowledge

C.  Transfer Knowledge

> \-- Emergency Management
>
> \-- Other Professions and Disciplines, and The Public

D. Foster Change

**POINT 1 \-- DISASTER LOSSES ARE ENORMOUS [(Slide 3)]{.mark}**

**1A. [National Economic Losses Are Large]{.mark} \-- [Slide 4]{.mark}**

> [The U.S. experienced **\$500 billio**n in disaster losses during the
> last decade]{.mark} \-- total losses, not just Presidential
> Declaration losses.
>
> ([Mileti]{.mark}. 2001. Author of *[Disasters By Design]{.mark}*)
>
> **\[[Avg. = \$50B An.\]]{.mark}**
>
> "In recent years, U.S. losses due to natural disasters have averaged
> approximately **\$50 billion/year.**" (Darlington and Simpson 2001,
> 43)
>
> That's [about **\$1 billion per week**]{.mark}.
>
> This is a **[conservative estimate]{.mark}:** According to Raymond
> Burby, "if crops are included and losses standardized to 1994 dollars,
> the figure jumps to **[\$1 trillion]{.mark}**." (Burby 2001, 3)

**1B. [National Life Loss Estimates]{.mark}:**

> [Averaged annual **loss of life** due to natural hazards is
> approximately **1,500**]{.mark}**.** (Kunkel et al. 1999, 1080,
> drawing from www.dir.ucar.edu/esig/socasp/weather1)
>
> **Avalanches** 22 (1985-2004) (CAIC)
>
> **Cold, Extreme** 770 (1968-85) (Kunkel et al. 1999, 1080)
>
> 25 1995-2004 (10 year average), NWS 2005, 14
>
> **Earthquakes** 10 (Stein 2004, 555)
>
> **Floods** 96 (1986-95) (Kunkel et al. 1999, 1080)
>
> 107 1975-2004 (30 year average), NWS 2005, 14
>
> **Heat, Extreme** 384 (1979-92) (Kunkel et al. 1999, 1080)
>
> 235 1995-2004 (10 year average), NWS 2005, 14
>
> **Hurricanes** 20 (1986-95) (Kunkel et al. 1999, 1080)
>
> 15 1995-2004 (30 year average), NWS 2005, 14
>
> **Landslides** 25 Tallent 2004)
>
> 25-50 National Research Council 2004
>
> **Lightning** 175 (1940-81) (Kunkel et al. 1999, 1080)
>
> 66 1975-2004 (30 year average), NWS 2005, 14
>
> **Pipeline Breaks** 23 (1986-99 -- Sauter & Carafano 2005, 158)
>
> **Tornadoes** 44 (1985-95) (Kunkel et al. 1999, 1080)
>
> 65 1975-2004 (30 year average), NWS 2005, 14
>
> **Winter Storms** 47 (1988-95) (Kunkel et al. 1999, 1080)
>
> 44 1995-2004 (10 year average), NWS 2005, 14

**1C. [Annual Losses Per Hazard Are Large]{.mark}:**

**[Cold:]{.mark} [.7 million]{.mark} \--** in 2004
(http://www.nws.noaa.gov/om/hazstats.shtml#)

[]{.mark}

**[Drought:]{.mark} [1.2 million]{.mark} \--** in 2004
(http://www.nws.noaa.gov/om/hazstats.shtml#)

[]{.mark}

**[Earthquakes]{.mark}**: Annualized US earthquake losses average
**[\$4.4 billion]{.mark}**. (FEMA 2001b, 1)

**[Eco-Terrorism]{.mark}:** \~ **[\$25 million]{.mark}** (Sauter and
Carafano 2005, 128)

**[Fire]{.mark} (Structural) \--** losses annually average about [**\$10
billion**.]{.mark} (FEMA/USFA 1998, 2)

**[Flooding]{.mark}**: About **[\$9 Billion]{.mark}.**

> Annual US flood losses **about [\$6 billion]{.mark}** (Congressional
> Natural Hazards Caucus 2001 (Jan 22), 3)[^1] \-- up from **average of
> \$5.2 billion** 1989 to 1998 (FEMA 2001, 1, citing NWS).
>
> From FY 1992-FY 1999, **20 major flooding disasters** caused over
> **\$97 billion** in damages." (GAO 2001, 1; cited FEMA) \--averages
> **[\$12 B per year]{.mark}**, 9 year period.

**[Fog]{.mark}**: **[\$1.6 million]{.mark}** \-- in 2004
(http://www.nws.noaa.gov/om/hazstats.shtml#)

**[Hail:]{.mark}** Annual mean current U.S. losses due to **Hail** \--
**[\$2.3 billion]{.mark}**. (Kunkel et al. 1999, 1080)

**[Hurricanes]{.mark}**: Annual US Hurricane losses averaged **[\$5.4
billion]{.mark} between 1989 and 1998**. (FEMA 2001b, 1; citing The
National Climatic Data Center)

**[Landslides]{.mark}: [\$1-2 billion]{.mark}** in damages...on average
**each year**. (Congressional Natural Hazards Caucus Workgroup. 2001
(Jan 22), 3) **[\$1-3 billion]{.mark}** annually (National Research
Council 2004.)

**[Lightning:]{.mark}** Annual mean current (1941-81) U.S. losses --
greater than [**\$1 billion**.]{.mark} (Kunkel, et al. 1999, 1080)
**[\$4-\$5 billion]{.mark}."** (National Lightning Safety Institute
2004)

**[Pipeline Breaches]{.mark}:** "...from 1986 to 1999 releases from
pipelines caused, on average 23 fatalities, 113 injuries, and **[\$68
million]{.mark}** in damage per year." (**Sauter & Carafano** 2005, 158)

**[Tornadoes:]{.mark}** Annual mean current (1991-1994) losses \--
[**\$2.9 billion**.]{.mark} (Kunkel et al. 1999, 1080)

**[Wildfires:]{.mark}** The U.S. government spends annually **[between
"at least \$1.5 billion" and \$2]{.mark}** billion on fighting
wildfires. This is not wildfire damage, but suppression cost.[^2]

**[Wind:]{.mark}** **[\$3.65 billion]{.mark}** \-- in 2004
([http://www.nws.noaa.gov/om/hazstats.shtml#](http://www.nws.noaa.gov/om/hazstats.shtml))

**[Winter Storms:]{.mark}** Annual mean current U.S. losses greater than
[**\$1 B**.]{.mark} (Kunkel et al. 1999, 1080)

The above totals about **[\$47.6 billion]{.mark}** per year and does
**[not]{.mark}** include [**heat** **waves**, **hazardous materials**
accidents and releases, **train derailments**, **air crashes**, or
**wildfire damages**]{.mark}).

**Examples:**

**[Hail:]{.mark}** "Hail as large as three inches in diameter pummeled
the Dallas/Fort Worth, Texas, area as a series of severe windstorms
produced tornadoes and thunderstorms across 10 states in April
2003....The storms caused estimated total insured losses of more than
\$1 billion." (IBHS 2003 Annual Report)

**[Wildfire:]{.mark}** In October and early November 2003, in San Diego
and San Bernardino Counties, California, alone, wildfires resulted "in
**more than \$2 billion** in insured property losses." (IBHS 2003 Annual
Report -- "Making a Difference, Coast to Coast")

**[Winter Storms:]{.mark}** "Unusually severe winter weather struck
portions of 15 states in 2003, causing more than \$1 billion in insured
property damage." (IBHS 2003 Annual Report)

**[Tornadoes]{.mark}**: "In May 2003, more than 400 tornadoes ripped
through 18 states and left a bill of \$1.55 billion in insured property
losses." (IBHS 2003 Annual Report)

According to the Environmental and Societal Impacts Group at the
National Center for Atmospheric Research, in cooperation with the
Atmospheric Policy Program of the American Meteorological Society, in
their 2001 \"Extreme Weather Sourcebook\" an encyclopedic compilation of
statistics regarding \"Economic and Other Societal Impacts Related to
**Hurricanes, Floods, Tornadoes, Lightning, and Other U.S. Weather
Phenomena**,\" **Florida** easily led all other states with **annual
losses of \$1.67 billion** between 1955 and 1999. **Annual national
losses were \$11.4 billion (in 1999 dollars)**. (National Center for
Atmospheric Research 2001)

> The **statistics above** are, according to FEMA, ["**extremely
> conservative**"]{.mark}
>
> []{.mark}
>
> and [**do "not cover damage and losses to**]{.mark}
>
> **[critical facilities,]{.mark}**
>
> **[transportation and utility lifelines]{.mark}**
>
> [**or indirect economic loss**."]{.mark} (FEMA 2001, 1)

**1D. [Federal Costs Are Large]{.mark}**

> \"Federal disaster assistance costs billions of dollars annually.
>
> According to data compiled for the Senate Task Force, **federal
> agencies** obligated about **\$119.7 billion** (in constant 1993
> dollars) for disaster assistance during fiscal years **1977 through
> 1993**, the majority of which was for post-disaster assistance**.**
>
> **FEMA** accounted for about **22 percent** of this amount.\" (GAO
> 1998, 1)

**1E. [FEMA Costs Are Large (But Just The Tip of The Iceberg):]{.mark}**

> "The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) has spent more than
> **\$25 billion** in repairs and rebuilding over the past ten years."
> (Taylor 2001, 84)
>
> \"**\$24 billion** \-- FEMA dollars paid out in declared disasters
> over the past decade.\" (FEMA 365. Nov 2000. P. 5-12)
>
> \"**Since 1993, FEMA** has spent more than **\$20 billion** in over
> 5000 counties on disaster recovery. Growing costs are due in large
> part to the fact that more development stands in harm\'s way than ever
> before.\" (FEMA 2000, 7)
>
> \-- **Does not reflect the rest of the Federal government, State and
> local governments, insurance industry, business and industries,
> individuals.**

**1F. [Insured Losses Are Large and Most Losses Are Not
Insured:]{.mark}**

Writing in 1999, **Harvey Ryland**, President of the Institute for
Business and Home

Safety, notes that despite the IDNDR and its focus on prevention and
mitigation, that

> \"...**losses continue to rise**. Since 1989, the United States alone
> has suffered at least **US\$ 90 billion** in insured damage (not
> including disaster payments from governments or the costs property
> owners must absorb themselves, and has seen more than 23,000 people
> injured and at least 2,000 more killed....**Obviously, we still have a
> long way to go**.\" (Ryland 1999, 260)
>
> "Insurance data...also provide a measure of national economic losses.
>
> The normalized...data show a trend of increasing losses.
>
> **Prior to the late 1970s annual losses were on the order of a few
> hundred million dollars** (U.S. Congress 1995).
>
> During the **1980s,** losses had increased to the \$**0.5-\$2.5
> billion range.**
>
> **Then**, in 1989, **losses increased dramatically.**
>
> Annual insured losses from **1989-97** were as follows:
>
> **\$7.4,**
>
> **\$2.5,**
>
> **\$3.0,**
>
> **\$21.9,**
>
> **\$4.4,**
>
> **\$4.5,**
>
> **\$8.2,**
>
> **\$7.4, and**
>
> **\$3.1 billion...**

There has been a clear change in impacts on the insurance industry."
(Kunkel et al. 1999, 1080)

\"**\$9.3 billion**\--Flood Insurance claims paid out since 1969.\"
(FEMA 365, Nov 2000, pp. 5-12)

**1G. Additional Material:**

> The U.S. has averaged losses of **\$500 million a week** due to
> disasters the last ten years. (Witt, 2001)
>
> \[Witt's estimate would total to **\$25 billion per year,** or
> **\$250B for the decade**.\]
>
> "Over the **past 20 years**, the US has sustained **44 weather-related
> disasters** in which damages and costs **exceeded \$1 billion** each."
> (Armstrong 2000, 53)

**POINT 2. [THE U.S. IS BECOMING MORE VULNERABLE]{.mark} \-- [Slide
5]{.mark}**

**[Slide 6]{.mark} -- U.S. Is Becoming More Vulnerable**

**2A. [Indicators of Increased Vulnerability]{.mark}**

**Housing:**

75% of US housing stock is susceptible to natural hazards:

-   **10 million homes at risk from flooding**

-   **25 million homes at risk from wind hazards**

-   **2 million homes at risk from coastal storm surges**

-   **50 million homes in counties with significant earthquake risk.**
    (Wagoner 2000, SM I-10, citing FEMA)

**[Agro-terrorism:]{.mark}**

> "...an outbreak here \[of foot and mouth disease\] could result in
> **7.5 million livestock being destroyed** and an **economic hit
> ranging from \$10.4 billion to \$33.6 billion**." (Price Waterhouse
> Cooper Accounting Firm, in Godfree-Thom, May 2005, 26)

**[Earthquakes:]{.mark}**

> "While **seismic hazard** in the United States has remained **fairly
> constant** over the years, **seismic risk has been increasing
> substantially** because of **the increase of urban development** in
> seismic hazard areas and the **vulnerability of older buildings**,
> some of which were **not built to adequate seismic code**."
> (FEMA2001,2)
>
> "**[Ninety percent of the U.S. population lives in seismically active
> areas]{.mark}**. Some 5,000 quakes can be felt in the United States
> each year -- 400 capable of causing structural damage. More than 6
> million people live in the San Francisco Bay area, home to at least 10
> active faults." (ISO 1998, 5)
>
> A 7.5 magnitude quake on the Puente Hills fault, Los Angeles, could
> "**[kill up to 18,000 people]{.mark}**" and result in **[\$250 billion
> in economic losses]{.mark}**. (*Los Angeles Times* May 26, 2005)

**[Hurricanes:]{.mark}**

> **\"[In 1970, 31 percent of Americans lived in areas subject to
> hurricane]{.mark}** [winds]{.mark},
>
> 19 percent faced severe earthquake risk, and
>
> 22 percent lived in counties with high landslide risk.
>
> [By **1990**, more than **50 percent** of all Americans lived in
> coastal regions]{.mark}, and populations at risk to earthquakes and
> landslides had increased dramatically as well.
>
> In **Florida alone**, **over 80 percent of the State\'s population
> lives within 10 miles of the coast.**\" (FEMA 2000b, 7)
>
> "The example of **Florida** is a striking one. The number of people
> living in the counties **along the sea-shore**, on this low lying
> peninsula, has risen **from 0.5 million to nine million** in the past
> six decades. The value of **property at risk has risen by a larger
> degree.**" (Bruce 1999, 30)
>
> \"In the past **fifty years**...**Florida\'s population rose
> fivefold**; 80 percent of this burgeoning population lives **within
> twenty miles of the coast**. The great **Miami hurricane** of **1926**
> made landfall over a small, relatively poor community and caused about
> \$76 million worth of damage (in inflation-adjusted dollars). Today a
> storm of similar magnitude would strike a sprawling, affluent
> metropolitan area of two million people, and could cause more than
> **\$80 billion** worth of damage.\" (Sarewitz and Pielke 2000)
>
> **Florida\'s \"rate of growth\--25% in the last decade** versos a
> **national growth rate** of **13.2%...\"** (FEMA Region IV, 2001, 4)
>
> \"...the state of **Florida** represents more than US\$ **900 billion
> at risk**.\"
>
> (Ryland 1999, 260, citing the Insurance Information Institute, 1999)

**[Wildfires:]{.mark}**

> **"**No forested community is immune from a wildfire disaster.
> Lightning strikes and droughts will continue to occur (if not
> increase), campfires will get out of control, fuel will continue to
> accumulate, and more and more people will move into forests and the
> paths of forest fires. Is it not time we started looking at why we
> spend more money putting out fires and paying for lost homes than we
> do preventing these disasters?" (Disaster Prevention and Management
> 2001, 120)
>
> **2B. Though There Are Hotspots, This Is A National Phenomenon**

**[Slide 7]{.mark} \-- [Presidential Disaster Declarations 1965 -
1998]{.mark}**

> \"**[No part of the country is free from natural hazards]{.mark}**,
> whether they be hurricanes in North Carolina, earthquakes in
> California, flooding in Missouri, tornadoes in Oklahoma, wildfires in
> Montana, landslides in Alaska, or ice storms in New York. As
> the...\[FEMA\] map of presidential disaster declarations shows, all
> states are vulnerable.\" (Congressional Natural Hazards Caucus
> Workgroup, 2001 (Jan 22), 3)

**2C. [Increase in Vulnerability Primarily Driven By Social Factors Not
Natural Ones]{.mark}**

> "Most measures of the economic impacts of weather and climate extremes
> over the past several decades reveal increasing losses. But trends in
> most related weather and climate extremes do not show comparable
> increases with time. This suggests that [**increasing losses are
> primarily due to increasing vulnerability arising from a variety of
> societal changes, including a growing population in higher risk
> coastal area and large cities, more property subject to damage, and
> lifestyle and demographic changes subjecting lives and property to
> greater exposure**."]{.mark} (Kunkel, et al. 1999, 1077)
>
> [\"**We are becoming more vulnerable to natural hazards because we
> continue to build where we want and the way we want to and just
> attribute natural disasters to nature or acts of God**.\"]{.mark}
> (Mileti, 2001)
>
> **[\"Changes in who we are as a nation foretell greater risk to
> natural hazards \-- income disparity has been increasing for at least
> a dozen years. We are becoming more a nation of the rich and the poor
> as opposed to a growing middle class. Middle class white guys are now
> a minority. We are becoming a more diverse nation, and it is the poor
> and ethnic minorities who are impacted the most, who suffer the most,
> when disaster strikes. Much of what we do in the name of natural
> disaster reduction won\'t \-- it only postpones them.\"
> (Mileti,]{.mark} 2001)**
>
> \"We have only **shifted vulnerability**. **We have shifted it from
> wealthy areas**
>
> **to poorer area; from this generation to future generations**.\"
> (Dennis Mileti, Remarks on \"The Second Assessment: Implications for
> Disaster Public Education\" at the FEMA Community and Family
> Preparedness National Conference, June 8, 1999.
>
> "The final factor affecting our increased vulnerability is **[simple
> human neglect."]{.mark}** (IDNDR, 1999. "Where Do We Go From Here.")

**POINT 3. [DISASTER LOSSES HAVE BEEN GOING UP]{.mark} \-- [Slide
8]{.mark}**

\"**Natural disaster costs in this country are still sky-rocketing \--
and nobody cares.**\" (Mileti, 2001)

3.A. \-- Going Up In the U.S.A. [**Slide 9** \-- **Disaster Costs Are
Going Up Points:**]{.mark}

**"[In the past 10 years, 460 major disasters have been declared by the
President, nearly double the declarations for the previous 10-year
period]{.mark}**[."]{.mark} (Armstrong 2000, 53)

"Comparing the 3-year periods from 1989 to 1991 and 1997 to 1999, the
**federal costs** of severe weather disasters **rose by 337%."**
(Armstrong 2000, 53)

"[The Red Cross disaster fund shows a similar trend]{.mark} \[to FEMA
disaster fund trend\]. (Kunkel et al. 1999, 1081, citing U.S. Congress
1995)

\"**441 \-- Federally declared disasters in the last ten years...an
increase of 56%** from the **decade before**.\" (FEMA 365, Nov 2000, p.
5-12)

**[\"Each decade, property damage has doubled or tripled in terms of
constant dollars.\"]{.mark}** (Natural Hazards Caucus 2001a, 1)

**\"Today in the United States, we spend tens of billions of dollars
each year to rebuild communities after natural disasters. And the
frequency and severity of these disasters is growing.\" (FEMA-365, p.
5-11)**

\"For fiscal years 1984 through 1988, the average number of such
declarations was 26 per year, whereas, for the periods from fiscal years
1989 through 1993 and from fiscal years 1994 through 1997, the average
number was nearly 42 and 49 per year, respectively.\" (GAO 1998, 5)

[\"**The costs of natural disasters are rising** in the United States
despite our unprecedented scientific understanding of the nature of
natural hazards, new technology and tools for protecting lives and
property, and an unparalleled ability to forecast and warn the
population.\")]{.mark} **Congressional Natural Hazards Caucus Work
Group** 2001 (Jan 22), 2)

\"Ironically, **it was during a decade dedicated to reducing the loss
from natural disaster (1990-99), that we have seen some of the worst
losses of human life and largest economic losses in living memory**.\"
(Wisner 2001b, 1)

**3B. World-Wide Trend:** \"The combined cost of **disasters world
wide**, according to the Center for Epidemiology of Disaster in Belgium,
was U.S.\$ 741 billion (thousand million) between 1990-99. Human lives
lost during this period were 589,000, and the number of deaths has
climbed each year since 1994.\" (Wisner 2001b, 1)

> \"Over the past four decades, the frequency of natural catastrophes
> has tripled, inflation-adjusted economic losses have multiplied by a
> factor of nine and insurance losses have multiplied by a factor of
> fifteen.\" (Berz 1999, 12)

**POINT 4. [DISASTER LOSSES PROJECTED TO BECOME EVEN
WORSE]{.mark}\--[Slide 10]{.mark}**

> **\"We have every reason to believe that our citizens are going to
> face even bigger disasters in the future.\"** (**Witt**, 2001)
>
> ["**In our lifetime**, probably within two decades, Americans will see
> one or two catastrophic events that will be **beyond our
> comprehension**]{.mark}." (Tolbert 2001)

**4A. [Larger Individual Disaster Event Losses]{.mark} \-- [Slide
11]{.mark}**

**[Blackouts:]{.mark}**

> Rusk Management Solutions (2004) estimates a **[Northeast
> Blackout]{.mark}** could run up to **[\$17 billion]{.mark}** in direct
> economic losses. (Today's 10 Greatest Risks)

**[Cyber Attack:]{.mark}**

> Risk Management Solutions (2004) estimates that cyber attacks have
> already cost US companies billions and a single event has the
> potential to cost **[billions.]{.mark}**

**[Earthquakes]{.mark}:**

> \"...experts predict [**that multi-billion dollar mega-disasters are
> looming on the horizon**.]{.mark} [According to the US Insurance
> Information Institute, if an earthquake with an 8.3 magnitude hit
> **San Francisco**, as it did in 1906, losses could **reach US\$ 225
> billion**.]{.mark}\" ([Ryland]{.mark} 1999, 260)
>
> \"It is estimated that a repeat of a major **earthquake** like the
> 1906 or **[1964 Alaska]{.mark}** ones could cause **u[p to \$500
> billion]{.mark}** in [damage to a heavily populated area]{.mark}.\"
> (**[Congressional Natural Hazards Caucus Workgroup]{.mark}**, 2001
> (Jan 22), 3)
>
> \"...if a magnitude 7.0 earthquake hit on the Newport-Inglewood fault
> in the Los Angeles basin, it could cause **\$80 billion** in
> losses...\" (EPN, 13 March 2001, 56)
>
> Risk Management Solutions (2004) estimated in a scenario for a **[Los
> Angeles 7.0 quake]{.mark}** (big, but not The Big One), direct
> economic losses of **[\$100 billion]{.mark}** and upwards of **[400
> deaths]{.mark}**. (Today's 10 Greatest Risks)

**[Flooding]{.mark}:**

> Risk Management Solutions estimates that today's losses if the [**1927
> Mississippi** **Flood**]{.mark} were to repeat, would be **[\$28
> billion]{.mark}.** (Today's Ten Greatest Risks, 2004)

[]{.mark}

**[Hurricanes]{.mark}:**

> \"...based on PartnerRe\'s hurricane model, an insured market loss for
> the US East Coast runs at **US\$ 42 billion** with a return period of
> 100 years.\" (Adler 1999, 252)
>
> "Another storm **of [Camille's intensity]{.mark}** \[Cat.5\] [***will*
> strike the United States** the only question is when. When this future
> storm strikes, it will make landfall over conditions drastically
> different from those in 1969. The hurricane-prone regions of the
> United States have developed dramatically as people have moved to the
> coast and the nation's wealth has grown]{.mark}. Estimates of
> potential losses from a single [**hurricane approach \$100
> billion**."]{.mark} (NSTC 1996, 3)
>
> "[Hurricane Andrew]{.mark} in August 1992 skirted New Orleans on three
> sides, fortunately looping around the community and thus not putting
> its levees and other protective structures to a test. However, if the
> levees and dikes had broken during that storm, [as many as 100,000
> people could have drowned.]{.mark}" (Leatherman and Burkett, 2002)

**[Industrial Accidents:]{.mark}**

> Risk Management Solutions (2004) estimated direct economic losses from
> a not improbable large-scale industrial accident in
> **[Houston]{.mark}** at **[\$17-22 billion]{.mark}**, with upwards of
> **[600 deaths]{.mark}**. (Today's Greatest 10 Risks)

**[Oil Spills:]{.mark}**

> Risk Management Solutions estimated in 2004 that losses from an oil
> spill in the **[Washington's Puget Sound]{.mark}** could be **[\$18
> billion]{.mark}** in direct losses. (Today's 10 Greatest Risks 2004)

**[Pandemics:]{.mark}**

> Risk Management Solutions (2004) in a not improbable (1% probability)
> scenario of a future flu pandemic, estimated upwards of **[200,000
> deaths]{.mark}**. (Today's 10 Greatest Risks)

**[Terrorist Attack:]{.mark}**

> Risk Management Solutions (2004) estimated that another 9/11 terrorist
> attack, for example at the Federal Center Plaza in Chicago, could
> easily run to **[\$24 billion]{.mark}** in direct economic losses and
> **[5000 dead]{.mark}**. (Today's 10 Greatest Risks)

**[Wildfires:]{.mark}**

> Risk Management Solutions (2004) estimated an **[Oakland hills,
> CA]{.mark}** wildfire would run up to **[\$8.7 billion.]{.mark}**
> (Today's 10 Greatest Risks)

**Adverse National Trends:**

> "Future prospects are sobering. Continued U.S. population growth,
> increased urbanization and concentration in hazard-prone coastal
> areas, increased capital and physical plant, accelerated deterioration
> of the urban infrastructure, and emerging but unknown new
> vulnerabilities posed by technological advance virtually guarantee
> that economic losses from natural hazards **will continue to rise**
> throughout the early part of the coming century**. Losses of \$100
> billion from individual events, and perhaps unprecedented loss of
> life, loom in our future**." (NSTC 1996, 3)
>
> \"**The next President** must be ready to contend with myriad
> disasters carrying price tags of **\$10B and perhaps one or more in
> the \$100B range**.\" (Natural Hazards Caucus 2001a, 2)
>
> "While weather forecasters are predicting more frequent and more
> severe weather calamities in the coming years, there are also **other
> forces** that will lead to escalating costs.
>
> **First is the location of development**. A comprehensive report on
> coastal erosion recently released by FEMA (The H. John Heinz III
> Center for Science, Economics and the Environment, 2000;
> <http://www.fema.gov/nwz00/erosion.htm>) indicates that the **density
> of development in several high risk coastal study areas increased by
> more than 60% over the last 20 years.**
>
> Second is the **ineffectiveness of some local hazard regulations**.
> While the International Code Council has established a universal
> building code standard for application throughout the United States
> ([http://www.intlcode.org](http://www.intlcode.org/)), **many areas
> have not passed ordinances in support of this standard and, those
> communities that have passed the code do not always enforce it.**
>
> **Third,** is the failure to utilize the economic forces that promote
> smart local development and growth. The very tools that could promote
> risk reduction in the long run instead, are too often vehicles for
> short-term and **short-sighted economic gain.**
>
> We see this in **communities that rush to issue permits before the
> publication of new maps** that show that the area to be built in is
> vulnerable to an increased or changed flood hazard. Many times, a
> community will raise 'pseudo'-technical concerns about the proposed
> map with the object of postponing the publication date to extend the
> time they have for issuing permits that facilitate unwise development.
> Often, the Representative or Senator of an affected area is asked for
> help in delaying the revisions." **(Armstrong** 2000, 53)

**4B. [Hazards, Incidence Rates and Intensities Projected to
Increase]{.mark}**

> \"Multiple environmental, ecological, and socio-political forces are
> converging to increase the occurrence of both natural and
> technological disasters.\" (Kenneth Kizer, President and Chief
> Executive Officer, The National Quality Forum. 2000. 209)

**4C. [Total Losses Project To Get Larger]{.mark} -- [Slide 12]{.mark}
-- Disaster Losses Graph**

> \"[**We don\'t really know what the natural hazards problem is**
> \--]{.mark} we really can\'t say, for example, what our annual
> disaster losses are, since no two Federal agencies count the same
> things the same way. [**What we can say is that things are getting
> worse \-- and will continue to get worse no matter what we do
> next**.\" (Mileti,]{.mark} 2001)

From *Our Common Journey \-- A Transition Toward Sustainability*,
[National Research Council, Board on Sustainable Development:]{.mark}

> [\"Based on our analysis of persistent trends and transitions, the
> Board concludes that certain current trends of population and
> habitation, wealth and consumption, technology and work, connectedness
> and diversity, and environmental change are likely to persist well
> into the coming century and could significantly undermine the
> prospects for sustainability. If they do persist, many human needs
> will not be met, life support systems will be dangerously degraded,
> and the numbers of hungry and poor will increase.\"]{.mark} (NRC 1999,
> 101)

**POINT 5 \-- [DISASTERS IMPACT DIFFERENTIALLY]{.mark} -- [Slide
13]{.mark}**

**5A. Some Are More Vulnerable, More At Risk, and Less Resilient --
[Slide 14]{.mark}**

> \"The unequal distribution of the hazard impact causes a proportion of
> the population to experience major loss, while most of the rest of the
> community was less inconvenienced. Very often it is the **most
> socio-economically** (and sometimes politically) **disadvantaged**
> that settle in the areas at most hazard risk.\" (Berry and King 1999,
> 96)
>
> In answer to the question \"**why are the poor still the most
> vulnerable**\" to disasters, Luis Duran answers that \"**nature is not
> to blame**\" but that \"**disasters are caused by weaknesses and
> factors present before and during the disaster that are still present
> today with no end in sight**.\" (Duran 1999, 16-17)
>
> \"Studies have shown that in **general it is the weaker groups in
> society that suffer worst** from disasters: the poor (especially), the
> **very young** and the **very old, women,** the **disabled**, and
> those who are **marginalized by race** or caste.\" (Twigg 2001, 2)
>
> \"The factors affecting vulnerability vary considerably among
> populations, with **the poor** having the fewest options and limited
> resources to cope. The poor often occupy marginal or unstable lands,
> or inhabit sub-standard structures. Also, **hospitals and schools**
> often suffer **disproportionate damage** from natural disasters
> despite their fundamental importance to the well being of a society.\"
> (Hamilton 1999, 305)

**[Whittier CA Earthquake]{.mark} example:**

**[\"It took your average middle-class well-educated white guy 7 weeks
to get back into permanent housing. It took the average single woman of
color with children 7 years.\"]{.mark}** (Mileti 2001)

**5B. [Social Sciences Offer More of an Explanation than Natural
Sciences]{.mark} --- [Slide 15]{.mark}**

> \"To understand what makes people vulnerable, we have to move away
> from the hazard itself to look at a much wider, and a much more
> diverse, set of influences**: the whole range of economic, social,
> cultural, institutional, political and even psychological factors**
> that shape people\'s lives and create the environment that they live
> in....**vulnerability is socially constructed.**\" (Twigg, John
> (Benfield Greg Hazard Research Centre, University College London).
> 2001, 2)
>
> \"To the extent that most **natural disasters are indeed social in
> origin**, it also follows, as experts agree, that their burden falls
> disproportionately on those already most economically disadvantaged,
> both on an international level...and domestically. **The poor** within
> each society are forced to live in substandard structures on more
> dangerous land, and have fewer resources to lessen their own risk and
> vulnerability.\" (Hooke 1999, 283)
>
> When the impact of a disaster falls disproportionately across a
> community, it is frequently the case that the explanations of this
> phenomena lie not in the hazard event itself but in social, economic,
> cultural and political factors.
>
> \"Morality demands that we move to restore to human life some equity
> in the ability to adapt to hazards.\" (Alexander 2000, 188)

# POINT 6\-- [PAST & CURRENT PRACTICES NOT EFFECTIVE ENOUGH]{.mark}\--[Slide 16]{.mark}

> **[We must ask what explains increases in disaster losses, risks,
> vulnerabilities and disproportional effects.]{.mark}**
>
> **[Based on steadily escalating losses attributable to disasters one
> could readily conclude that what we are doing now is not effective
> enough.]{.mark}**
>
> **[This, in turn, could lead to the conclusion that what is being done
> now needs to change to something else if we are to hope to curtail
> this upward trend.]{.mark}**

**[Slide 17]{.mark} -- Past & Current Practices Points**

**[In order to draw such a conclusion, though, several questions need to
be addressed:]{.mark}**

# 6A. Are [Disasters Outpacing Our Ability To Cope?]{.mark}

[**Perhaps it is the case that hazard frequency and magnitude is
increasing in such a way that it is simply out-pacing our ability to
cope. If so, perhaps just doing more of the same is called
for**.]{.mark}

> [\"A 1999 study by the **German firm Munich Reinsurance Company**
> compared the **1960s with the 1990s** and concluded that \'the number
> of great natural catastrophes increased by a factor of three, with
> economic losses \-- taking into account the effects of inflation \--
> increasing by a factor of more than eight and insured losses by a
> factor of no less than sixteen.\' And **yet**]{.mark} [**scientists
> have been unable to observe a global increase in the number or the
> severity of extreme weather events**.\"]{.mark} (Sarewitz and Pielke
> 2000)
>
> "Dramatic record-setting increases in the number of catastrophes
> causing \>\$100 million in losses and in the amount of insured
> property loss occurred in the U.S. during the 1990s. However, there
> was no comparable increase in the frequency of catastrophes causing
> \>\$1 billion in losses revealing that the most extreme loss events
> had not increased. Catastrophes causing \>\$100 million in losses
> during the 1990-1996 period did not exhibit significantly greater
> areal extent nor intensities than those in prior years, indicating
> that the high catastrophe frequencies and the greater losses of the
> 1990s were a result of more damaging storms and/or shifts in society
> that had increased property vulnerability per unit area." (Changnon
> and Changnon 1999, 299)
>
> "Our ability to monitor and predict atmospheric phenomena on a wide
> range of scales, from international, global climate variations, to
> thunderstorm-scale, has improved dramatically in the past decade or
> so. Despite this, extreme weather and climate events continue to cause
> much destruction and loss of life. **[In the U.S.A., most measures of
> the economic impacts of weather and climate extremes reveal increasing
> losses over the past several decades, although most related weather
> and climate extremes do not exhibit comparable increases]{.mark}
> (Changnon and Changnon, 1999[). This suggests that the increasing
> losses are primarily due to increasing]{.mark}** [vulnerability
> arising from a variety of societal changes]{.mark}, including a
> growing population in higher risk coastal areas and large cities, more
> property subject to damage, and demographic changes subjecting lives
> and property to greater damage (Kunkel et al., 1999). Presumably, such
> increasing vulnerability will continue into the future, irrespective
> of actual climate change....**[Climate change remains a 'wild card',
> with the possibility that it will alter the frequency and intensity of
> climate and weather extremes]{.mark}.**" (Nicholls 2001, 137)

**[On Climate Change]{.mark}**:

> **"...the phrase 'climate change' is redundant. A changing climate is
> an unchanging attribute of a dynamic Earth....Climate changes. Let's
> deal with it."** (Pielke and Sarewitz 2001, 2 & 3.)

[Frequency and Magnitude of **Disasters** seems to be increasing --
**but this is due to growth of risk and vulnerability (development in
hazardous areas) not due to an absolute increase in events.**]{.mark}

[Thus**, it cannot be argued that nature is outpacing our coping
mechanisms.**]{.mark}

[This is not to say that there aren't prospects that we shouldn't be
concerned with, such as **global warming** resulting in **sea-level
rise,** more drought, more frequent and intense storms, etc. We should
be concerned with these prospects, but they do not explain our current
condition nor are these prospects at the bottom of projections for
future continued escalating disaster impacts and costs.]{.mark}

> "In reviewing climate statistics, there is strong evidence for
> regional **increases in**
>
> **frequency** of some severe climate events. For example, over
> continental USA the frequency of heavy one day rains in excess of
> 50mm, has increased 20% over the past century. The number of very
> severe extra-tropical storms in the northern hemisphere during winter
> has also increased over this period. These observed trends and other
> changes, such as increased frequency of droughts in mid continents,
> and accelerated sea level rise, have been projected by climate models
> with increased greenhouse forcing." (Bruce 1999, 30)

**6B. Then, Is It the Case That There Isn't Much that We Can Do? [Maybe
We Don't ]{.mark}**

**[Know Enough.]{.mark}**

**[No, we know what to do and how to do it.]{.mark}**

["The Decade has been established on the basic understanding that
**sufficient scientific and technical knowledge already exists,** which,
**with more extensive application, could save thousands of lives and
millions of dollars in property losses from natural and similar
disasters**."]{.mark} (Terry Jeggle, IDNDR Secretariat, Switzerland, in
Ingleton 1999, 24; see also, Alexander 2000, 157-158, & 241)

> [\"**We know what has to be done**. What is now required is the
> political commitment to do it.\"]{.mark}
>
> [(**UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan**]{.mark} in 1999 at IDNDR\'s
> closing conference, quoted in Twigg 2001, 3)

**U.S. National Academy of Sciences** (1999):

> **\"The causes of natural hazards are sufficiently well understood to
> provide a basis for undertaking actions to mitigate their effects**.\"
> (Hamilton 1999, 305)
>
> \"**Solutions exist** and the **knowledge and technology necessary to
> apply them are readily available**. These solutions include proper
> **land-use planning** aided by vulnerability mapping, to locate people
> in safe areas, the adoption of proper **building codes** based on
> local seismic risk assessments, as well as ensuring the control and
> **enforcement** of such plans and codes based on economic or other
> incentives. Systematic **awareness raising campaigns**, carried out
> with the active participation of the population will encourage people
> to live in safer environments.... However, long term commitment by
> public authorities is essential to building more disaster resilient
> societies.\" (Benn 2001, 4)
>
> ["We can't cap the volcano, or forestall the earthquake, or halt the
> winter storm. However, we can limit the damaging impacts of these
> extremes -- by appropriate policy, by **cautious land use, proper
> engineering,** and other steps, including **public education and
> awareness** well in advance of the hazardous event.]{.mark} We can
> provide **more timely warnings**, and thus improve emergency response.
> We can do more to **promote long-term recovery**. We can keep score,
> and **learn from mistakes**." (American Geological Institute 2001,
> quoting [Dr. William Hooke (Senior Policy Fellow, American
> Meteorological Society]{.mark}
>
> [\"...**we need not be continually and repeatedly victimized by
> natural disasters**. By using capabilities in hand, and through
> targeted research and technology development, add effective policy
> formulation, we can reduce our vulnerability dramatically." (Hooke
> 2001)]{.mark}
>
> "Evidence of recent earthquakes, such as those of Kobe (1995) and
> Quindio, Columbia (1999) have demonstrated [that **buildings designed
> to...newer codes do perform as expected**.]{.mark}" (Adams and Spence
> 1999, 54)
>
> \"**Tulsa, Oklahoma**, for example, raised money through city bonds
> and relocated hundreds of homes from an area repeatedly flooded over
> many years. Under Project Impact, such relocation projects have
> continued. Public support is high, community commitment is unwavering
> and **the death toll and the damage-repair cycle that had plagued
> Tulsa for years has ended.**\" (Witt 1999, 231)
>
> Susan Savage, Mayor of the City of Tulsa: More than 1000 buildings
> have been removed from the Tulsa floodplain since 1984 and strict
> zoning and building standards have been implemented and enforced. The
> result \-- no building built to flood standard has been flooded since
> 1984. Thus Tulsa has the best rating of any community in the NFIP CRS
> \-- 35% reduction. (Savage, 2001)
>
> [\"...it has been found that storm and flood discharge regimes from
> the state of Michigan cause considerably less damage when transposed
> to a comparable region of southern Ontario (Brown, Moin and Nicolson,
> 1997). **The explanation** for the **difference lies not in the
> magnitude of the floods** themselves (there is none), nor in the
> overall density of population and level of economic development**, but
> in the different patterns of flood plain land use** in the two
> jurisdictions.\"]{.mark} (Burton 1999, 74)
>
> \"While natural hazards will always exist, the disaster that follows
> in their wake can be lessoned through **assessment, prediction,
> prevention and mitigation**.\" (Purdom 1999, 118)
>
> "**Proven disaster mitigation measures, if more widely applied, could
> significantly reduce the losses and suffering**." (Bruce 1999. 28)

**6.C. [Perhaps It Is Just Too Expensive.]{.mark}**

> \"It is generally accepted that [**disaster mitigation pays**.]{.mark}
> For example, [the **World Bank and United States Geological
> Survey**]{.mark} once calculated that economic losses worldwide from
> natural disasters during the 1990s could be **reduced** by **\$280
> billion** if **\$40 billion** were **[invested in disaster mitigation
> and preparedness]{.mark}** \--a ration of [**\$7 saved for every \$1
> spent**.]{.mark} The **Federal Emergency Management Agency** in the
> USA reckons that every dollar spent on natural disaster preparedness
> and mitigation saves it **\$2** in emergency relief expenditure.\"
> (Twigg 2001, 3)
>
> \"...it is estimated that **[for every US dollar]{.mark}** spent in
> pre-disaster mitigation, **[FEMA]{.mark} [saves two US
> dollars]{.mark}** in future disaster relief costs...\" (Witt 1999,
> 231)

**Oakland CA Study on Mitigation Investment Returns:**

> "On average across the City \[Oakland CA\], the indicated **return on
> the mitigation investment** for the candidate SFR's \[**single family
> residential**\] is approximately **\$1.52 per dollar invested** (in
> 1998 dollars), and for some Oakland census tracts exceeds \$2.00 per
> dollar invested, or a 2-1 rate of return (assuming a 50-year project
> life and a 7% discount rate over and above inflation). (An expected
> return greater than 1-to-1 is usually accepted as indicating that the
> proposed investment is economically justified.)
>
> Greater returns are possible if other mitigation benefits are
> included, such as the obvious reductions expected in earthquake-caused
> injuries, homelessness, residential fire incidents, and property tax
> losses. Therefore, the benefit/cost results presented in this study
> give an incomplete picture of -- and almost certainly underestimate --
> the cost-effectiveness of earthquake hazard mitigation in Oakland's
> residential community." \[Estimated \$3,500 per residence to make
> retrofits.\] (EQE 1998, iv-v)
>
> \"In order to evaluate the merits of...mitigation measures, we
> applied...two damage

# models to a set of 10,000 randomly-located homes in Dade, Broward, and Palm Beach by approximately a factor of two by implementing simple measures to improve construction practice. Results also show that for the 100-year hurricane event, the loss difference would be, on average, about US \$4,000 per residence. These construction standards are probably cost-effective for any new construction and for upgrading homes in locations that are more exposed to hurricane damage.\" (Schneider, et al. 1999, 256)

[]{.mark}

[]{.mark}

**[Up-Front Mitigation Frequently Entails Only Incremental Cost
Increases]{.mark}**

> \"**The most expensive buildings are those that fail**....In 1977 the
> U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development funded a Cost Impact
> Analysis by Ralph W. Goers & Associates (structural engineers of
> California) which determined the extra costs of earthquake and
> hurricane resistance for a variety of **single-family dwelling
> houses**. The **incremental costs ranged from 0.24% to 2.2%**....M.
> Ipek\'s analysis in his paper \'Increase in Building Cost related to
> Seismic Coefficient\' (CENTO Conference on Earthquake Damage
> Minimization, Ankara, July 1968) indicated that for most
> **multi-story, reinforced concrete** structures the cost of the
> load-bearing structural components only increased by **0% to 14**% in
> order to provide earthquake resistance in severe seismic locations. A
> similar study carried out by R.V. Whitman and colleagues at the
> Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 1974 indicated that the
> increase in the structural cost, related to the overall building cost,
> ranged between **2% and 8% for multi-story buildings** with an
> **additional 1% for non-structural items**.\" (Gibbs 2001)
>
> \"Surprisingly, although mitigation is invariably cost effective in
> terms of damage avoided, there have been very few cost-benefit
> analyses, and hence it is often difficult to convince governments to
> invest in disaster prevention measures that do not show immediate
> benefits.\" (Alexander 2000, 225)

**[Nisqually Earthquake Example]{.mark}**:

\$1.3 million had been invested in seismic retrofitting of steel
reservoir tanks on a hill above Mercer Island. If the tanks had failed
it is estimated that approximately \$9 million in damages would have
resulted. (FEMA, 23 March 2001 Press Release)

Moorhead Minnesota River Oaks Subdivision **Red River** Repetitive Flood
Buyout **Example**:

> Repetitive damage to subdivision homes took place in six floods
> between 1969 and 1993. "In 1994 the City received about \$840,000 from
> the \[FEMA\] Hazard Mitigation Grant Program to acquire and move or
> demolish 8 of the homes at greatest risk. The lots were converted to
> open space and added to an existing city park in the area. About an
> equal number of homeowners declined to participate in the buyout
> program. In 1997 a record flood caused extensive damage to the homes
> that remained in the subdivision....The cost of the 1994 buyout of 8
> homes was more than recouped by avoiding damage to them in one flood
> event in 1997." (Minnesota 2001)

**2001 Mississippi River Flooding Examples:**

> "Today, Trenton Island \[Wisconsin\] is a powerful symbol of a simple
> idea: Floods can't devastate flood-prone properties that no longer
> exist. \[Mostly bought out.\]
>
> After the 1993 flood, federal officials adopted this
> ounce-of-prevention approach throughout the Midwest, collaborating
> with communities and states to buy out 13,000 flood-prone homes and
> businesses, or one-seventh of the damaged properties. That upfront
> investment helps explain why this year's flood, which carried as much
> water in some areas as the 1993 deluge, has caused only a tiny
> fraction of the damage." (Grunwald 2001, A01)
>
> Allbaugh: "You look at the damage in 1993 versus this time around:
> You've got to say that mitigation works." (Grunwald 2001, A01)
>
> "...flood-plain managers and other disaster officials agree with
> Allbaugh that the disparity is also a result of the aggressive
> mitigation strategy that begun in 1993, when Congress and FEMA agreed
> to focus a bit less on battling rivers and a lot more on moving
> families and buildings out of their path.
>
> For one thing, they thought the new strategy would save lives. They
> also thought that, in the long run, it would be cheaper to buy out the
> most flood-prone homeowners once and for all than to compensate them
> again and again for their losses.
>
> The surprise has been that even in the short run, as a series of
> floods has swept through the Midwest in recent years, a half-billion
> dollars' worth of pre-flood mitigation spending has paid huge
> dividends.
>
> In Missouri, Charles County suffered \$26 million in damage in 1993;
> after a big buyout, a similar flood two years later cost about
> \$300,000. In river towns such as Austin, Minn.; Independence, Iowa;
> and Grafton, Ill., officials say their buyouts have already paid for
> themselves in averted damage....
>
> FEMA believes that, in eight years, federal taxpayers have received a
> 200 percent return on their investment in mitigation -- and that
> doesn't include the local or environmental benefits from new parkland
> and open space.
>
> 'We're saving taxpayers huge money,' said Illinois emergency
> management director Michael Shamness, whose state has removed 3,000
> homes since 1993....
>
> \[Allbaugh\] 'It's like the old Fram \[oil filter\] commercial: you
> can pay me now, or pay me later. We're seeing all across the country
> that it makes a lot of sense to pay now. The president believes that,
> too'." (Grunwald 2001, A01)

**6D. [If Not, Then What?]{.mark}**

**If disaster costs have been escalating, and**

**If disaster costs are still escalating, and**

**If by all measures it looks like disaster costs will continue to
escalate, and**

**It is not because we are seeing a dramatic increase in the incidence
of natural events,**

**And, it is not because we don\'t know what to do, and**

**It is not because we can\'t afford to do what needs to be done or that
it isn\'t cost effective, then**

**Obviously, what we have been doing and are currently doing is not
effective enough.**

Moreover:

**If it is the case that people are being harmed and killed in
disasters, and**

**It is the case that we are suffering significant economic and social
losses, and**

**It is the case that we know what to do to prevent and significantly
mitigate these losses,**

**And, it is the case that we know that it is cost-effective, and we can
afford it, then**

[It isn\'t disasters that are killing most of the people who die in
disasters, it is people (individuals and governmental decision-makers)
who are killing people by their failure to do the right things.]{.mark}

# 

# POINT 7 \-- [DISASTERS DON\'T KILL PEOPLE \-- PEOPLE KILL PEOPLE]{.mark}\--[Slide 18]{.mark}

> \"Natural disasters have come to be seen as random, morally inert
> phenomena \-- chance events that lie beyond the control of human
> beings. In short, the emphasis has been on making nature the
> villain.\" (Steinberg 2000, xxiii)
>
> \"Of course, sometimes disasters do \'just happen,\' no matter what
> steps people have taken. Nevertheless, the view that chance
> geophysical factors are the *primary* culprit has led to the apathetic
> political atmosphere surrounding natural hazards policy.\" (Steinberg
> 2000, 22)
>
> \"Losses from hazards result from short-sighted and narrow conceptions
> of the relationships of humans to the natural environment.\" (Beavers,
> Mileti and Peek 2000, 65)
>
> **[\"What is most wrong in this country in the area of natural hazards
> is that we do not own up to our problems and responsibilities \-- we
> blame nature or God.\"]{.mark}** (Mileti, 2001)
>
> **[The large disaster losses we have experienced during the past
> decade \"has been the result of a lethal combination of fierce nature
> and human decisions.\"]{.mark}** (Witt, 2001)
>
> **["You can't prevent the weather but you can prevent the
> damage."]{.mark}** ([www.fema.gov/impact](http://www.fema.gov/impact),
> 1May2001)

**7A: [People and Governments Do Not Do The Right Things]{.mark} \--
[Slide 19]{.mark}**

Slide:

> \"In many instances, **we already know how to reduce the losses from
> natural disasters**, but **we just do not do it**.\" (**Congressional
> Natural Hazards Caucus Workgroup**, 2001 (Jan 22), 2)

[Elsewhere in this same paper attention is drawn to the fact that the
Federal government, over the past 50 years has assumed: \"a greater
share of the liability for **inappropriate ...decisions by all level of
government**.\"]{.mark}

**Dennis Mileti**, Director, Natural Hazards Research and Information
Center, in *Disasters by Design*:

> [\"**Human beings \-- not nature\-- are the cause of disaster
> losses**, which stem from choices about where and how human
> development will proceed.\"]{.mark} (Mileti 1999, 291)
>
> \"...it would seem that **total earthquake safety is a reasonable
> aim**.\" (Lomnitz 1999)
>
> [\"We build what we want to build, where we want to, the way we want
> to, because of **our narrow short-term interests** and because **we
> don\'t care that our grandchildren or great grandchildren will die as
> a result**.\"]{.mark} (Mileti, 2001)
>
> \"There is **a fatal flaw** in the nation\'s approach to natural
> disaster \-- that is our belief that **technology will solve** our
> natural disaster problem. This won\'t work \-- the wind will blow, the
> waters will rise, and the ground will shake \-- regardless of what we
> do. We cannot control nature \-- yet is that what we try to
> do...[**Natural hazards are not a problem \-- they are a symptom \--
> of shortsighted, self-interested, economic development.**\" (Mileti,
> 2001)]{.mark}

**Golden:**

> When it comes to a decision to put **a hot tub or a tornado safe
> room** in a home \-- what decision do you think the typical homeowner
> makes? What does that tell you about the value we place on human
> lives? (Golden, 2001)
>
> [\"The rather unique sociopolitical framework of building codes and
> practices in the United States presently hinders effective technology
> transfer and mitigation practice.\"]{.mark} (Golden and Snow 1991,
> 477)
>
> **May, Burby, et al**: "The effects of earthquakes, floods, and other
> hazardous events are as much a function of human activities as they
> are of the natural events. By locating development in hazard-prone
> areas, building structures that fail in natural disasters, and
> depleting the resilience of natural processes, humans both contribute
> to increased risk and modify natural hazards in undesirable ways."
> (May 1996, 11-12)

**7B: Example of Hurricane Mitch in Central America, 1998**

> "Unprecedented levels of destruction, \$3.5 Billion." (CDMHA 2000B, 2)
>
> "Overwhelmed disaster management structures, at national, regional and
> international, due to geographic impact." (CDMHA 2000B, 2)
>
> "Thousands of shattered lives; two million displaced." (CDMHA 2000B,
> 2)
>
> "Four countries seriously affected..." (CDMHA 2000B, 2)
>
> "Why has Hurricane Mitch been so devastating in Central America in
> 1998? Because **many of the natural systems, which used to buffer
> against devastation, have been drastically altered** over the years.
> In upper watersheds, **where forests used to protect** the soil and to
> retain water, there are now communities with their housing, livestock
> and agriculture. In these unprotected watersheds the topsoil and
> entire communities were swept away by torrential rains. **Gone are the
> previous absorptive capacity of forests and natural wetlands**."
> (Koch-Weser 1999, 70)
>
> "Human interventions lie at the root of much of the damage: farmers
> and urban population without access to adequate land or credit and
> technical assistance, homes in high-risk areas, deforestation,
> inappropriate farming practices." (CDMHA 2000B, 3)
>
> "Not well prepared disaster management structures or plans to address
> the effects of a major disaster, despite the recurrence of major
> disaster history in the region." (CDMHA 2000B, 4)
>
> "Lack of coordination/exercising of national emergency plans." (CDMHA
> 2000B. 8)
>
> "Communications and plans need to be known by community
> leaders---communications and plans have to be horizontal versus
> vertical." (CDMHA 2000B, 10)
>
> "...need to include prevention and mitigation." (CDMHA 2000B, 8)

**7.C: Example of [Earthquake, Western Turkey (Izmit]{.mark}) , August
7, 1999 -- 7.4 Magnitude**

> [\"The Turkish earthquake in 1999 killed perhaps **17,000 people
> \[18K\]**. This was **not the result of a lack of scientific or
> engineering expertise. Areas of seismic activity are mapped in
> Turkey,** and Turkish **building codes** are **quite strict.** But in
> practice, **regulation was lax,** and as a result **unsafe buildings**
> were **put up** in **unsafe areas. Weak government** was clearly **an
> important causal factor in the disaster....**\"]{.mark} (John Twigg
> (Benfield Greg Hazard Research Centre, University College London)
> 2001, 2; see also, *Boston Globe*, 2001)

**7.D: Example [of Earthquake in El Salvador]{.mark}, January 2001 \--
[Slide 20]{.mark}**

On Saturday **January 13^th^**, a **7.6 magnitude** earthquake rocked El
Salvador.

> [\"The official **death toll** is **over 700 people**, with
> **thousands** possibly **missing**....**1.1 million people (1/6 of the
> population) are homeless**....The earthquake **destroyed or left
> uninhabitable** over **192,000 homes**, **displacing over one million
> people**....The public **hospitals** in **Santa Tecla** and
> **Zacatecoluca** are **uninhabitable** and the **main hospital in the
> eastern city of San Miguel is condemned**.\"]{.mark}
>
> The government response was \"ineffective and irresponsible...the
> country has no national emergency plan....El Salvador is an
> environmental disaster. **97% of the country is deforested,** 77% is
> severely eroded, and **40% of the land has been deemed unsuited for
> development, but has been developed nonetheless**.\" ([El Salvador
> Watch)]{.mark}
>
> \"The **government has been sharply criticized** for, among other
> things, its failure to implement a national emergency plan before the
> earthquake. [**The region is particularly susceptible to natural
> disasters**. El Salvador experienced a **devastating earthquake in
> 1986** that **killed 1000 people**, and in **1998 was one of the
> nations hit by Hurricane Mitch**.\"]{.mark} (Herlinger 2001, 1)
>
> [\"...just as that decade of intensive scientific activity and public
> discussion of disasters has come to an end**, we witness the same old
> story**: an earthquake in Central American, **the 18^th^ damaging one
> since 1990**. The toll is tragically familiar: more than 700 dead,
> 2,000 missing \[\"**1200 people are believed missing from a landslide
> that buried the suburban neighborhood of Las Colinas**, just outside
> of the capital, San Salvador\" (Herlinger 2001, 1)\] thousands of
> homes demolished, two fifths of all hospital capacity destroyed**,
> one-fifth of all school buildings rendered unusable**.\"]{.mark}
> (Wisner 2001b, 1)

# 

# [\"More than enough knowledge was generated, refined, debated, systematized, and disseminated to have prevented the loss of life in the landslide in Las Colinas, El Salvador.\"]{.mark} (Wisner 2001b, 2)

[\"**These terrible losses were not necessary**.....]{.mark}In the case
of the middle-income neighborhood of Las Colinas in Santa Tecla, just
outside the capital, San Salvador, 400 homes were lost beneath a wall of
debris from a collapsing slope above. This was not an \'act of God.[**\'
Road building, deforestation, and property development on the slope
above Las Colinas should never have been allowed**....\"]{.mark} (Wisner
2001b, 1)

Mel Luna, University of the Philippines, calls this \"**development
aggression**.\" (Luna 2001, 5)

\"**The main medical laboratory in El Salvador\'s capital is unable to
function because bottles holding chemicals for medical tests were not
secured on their shelves with simple restraints of the kind that are
used on boats.** **Forty per cent** of El Salvador\'s **health care
facilities** suffered disabling damage. Yet it is very **well known**
**how to protect** health care structures and their non structural
elements.\" (Wisner 2001b, 2)

\"Environmental groups blamed **unchecked housing construction** for
stripping hillsides of soil-retaining vegetation that would have
prevented the killer landslide in Las Colinas. **\'We just don\'t want
to learn our lesson**.\' Ricardo Navarro, director of the private
environmental group Salvadoran Center of Appropriate Technology (CESTA),
told AFP in an interview. \'For over a year we\'ve been warning them not
to play around with nature. There should have been no construction or
deforestation on the Balsamo range\' where Las Colinas was built, he
said.\" Wisner 2001d, p. 1)

[\"**The terrible loss was not necessary**. **The earthquake did not
kill these people**. A combination of human error, indifference,
corruption and greed killed them. It is not part of the human condition
to be crushed and buried under a landslide triggered by an earthquake.
**Earthquakes happen. But the disaster follows because of human action
and inaction.\"**]{.mark} (Wisner, 2001c)

\"Experts agree that steep **slopes made of volcanic soil are
unstable**. Geologists know this. Planners know this. **It isn\'t rocket
science**.\" (Wisner, 2001c) The knowledge exists. It is possible to
identify zones subject to landslide. The engineering knowledge exists
and there are building codes that would provide for survivable collapse
of most buildings.\" (Wisner 2001c)

\"The cost of the January earthquake is estimated at about US \$1.5
billion, while preliminary information suggests the costs of the
February earthquake could be on the order of US \$400 million. The
combined estimated cost of US \$1.9 billion is equivalent to about 14
percent of GDP.\" (IMF 2001, 1)

Damages: Leahy notes 440 missing and 45,000 houses destroyed. Also noted
that "**most well-engineered structures appear to be only lightly
damaged**." (Leahy 2001, 1)

"The capital of San Salvador has been left in ruins 11 times since the
16^th^ century....In hilly Guatemala and El Salvador, landslides are the
common result of earthquakes, making the slopes of step hills
particularly unfit for development." (*Disasters* 2001, S-1)

**7.E: Example of [Earthquake in India]{.mark}, 26 January 2001 \--
[Slide 21]{.mark}**

Friday, 26 January 2001 [\-- **7.9**-8.0 **Richter-scale** Earthquake
hits **Gujarat**]{.mark}**,** India.

\"In India, the same scenario was repeated on an even greater scale in
the state of Gujarat. [**12,000 bodies** have been **recovered** from
the ruins of apartment houses, hospitals, smaller residences....]{.mark}

[]{.mark}

[An **area the size of Wales or West Virginia** has been **reduced to
rubble** as if it had been bombed.\"]{.mark} (Wisner 2001b, 1)

In **[town of Bhuj \"over 90% of the houses are damaged or have
collapsed]{.mark}**\" (Sinha, 2001)

**[\"Four hundred children were crushed in a public
building.\"]{.mark}** (*Economist*, 3 Feb 2001)

\"[This is the **eighth time** that the country recorded tremors
**measuring eight** or above on the Richter Scale in the **past 182
years**.\" \"**Gujarat,** which is a prime commodity trading center,
seems to be **prone to natural disasters** and calamities.\"]{.mark}
(Agribuzzreports@agribuzz.com)

[\"It is not an \'act of God\' that **no more than 10%** of the
multi-story structures in Indian cities are built according to
earthquake resistant norms. **The earthquake didn\'t kill, but the
buildings did**. The buildings go up rapidly with little planning and
inspection]{.mark} in a boom economy like Gujarat\'s. A study
commissioned by the Indian government warned in 1998 about the lack of
compliance with building codes throughout India, but especially in the
zones, such as Gujarat, where seismic risk is high.\" (Wisner 2001b, 1)

**[\"We...re-learn the same lessons...The governments are not prepared..
They directly or inditrectly contribute to increase in death by
permitting poor construction quality.\"]{.mark}** (Sinha, 2001)

From *Report of the Expert Group on Natural Disaster Prevention,
Preparedness and Mitigation having bearing on Housing and Related
Infrastructure* (1998, Ministry of Urban Affairs and Employment, New
Delhi, India): \"**Disasters don\'t kill people, buildings do**.\"
[Report noted that the problem in India is **not a lack of construction
standards, just an indifference to them.**]{.mark} (Bearak, *New York
Times*, 31Jan2001)

\"**Politicians and bureaucrats failed to update and enforce building
codes**.\" (*Boston Globe*. 2001. \"El Salvador, India, Buildings That
Fall Down.\")

\"It wasn\'t necessary that the major civilian hospital in the Gujarat
city of Bhuj collapsed on patients and staff.\" (Wisner 2001a)

**7.F \-- [Similar Story in the United States]{.mark} \-- [Slide
22]{.mark}** \-- Similar Story in the US Points

[\"My name is Doris Wilson and my home was flooded in 1997 after a
**developer destroyed a three acre wetland** that protected my home from
flooding for more than 20 years. I was flooded again this year.]{.mark}
The...**Army Corps**, Louisville District, gave the developers a
Nationwide Permit to destroy the wetland without warning me or neighbors
about the increased risk of flooding...\" (Sierra Club 2000, 2)

[\"Every year, **developers** and **agribusiness destroy** nearly
**120,000** net **acres** of **wetlands**]{.mark}....The Army Corps
issues these easy wetland destruction permits to any development of
three acres or less. The most dangerous of these permits, **called
Nationwide Permit (NWP) 26,** allows developers to drain and destroy
headwater or isolated wetlands located away from large river systems or
bays, but key to cleaning our lakes and streams, and providing wildlife
habitat, and storing floodwater. Depending on the type, **an acre of
wetlands can store up to five feet of water, or 1.5 million gallons of
floodwater**.\" (Sierra Club 2000, 2)

\"...**state and federal governments approved** virtually all or **99%**
of the **wetland destruction permits** between **1988 and 1996**,
regardless of **flood risk** or whether the permit was in a **100 year
floodplain**.\" (Sierra Club 2000, 4)

[\"American developers, timber companies, and agribusinesses have
drained and destroyed **half of our original wetlands through 1985**,
according to the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service estimates. **In the
Midwest, that destruction represents the loss of 90 million acre-feet of
flood storage \-- more than twice the volume of the 1993 Mississippi
River flood at St. Louis**.\" (Sierra Club 2000, 4)]{.mark}

[**\"Floods** have caused greater loss of life and property, and
disrupted more families than all other natural hazards combined. In
recent decades, over **80 percent of Presidentially declared** disaster
areas have been floods that resulted in billions of dollars of
losses.\"]{.mark} (Witt 1995, 1)

Evidence from the United States is that the construction of **levees**
increases land values and encourages urban development in the protected
area. Subsequently, when the levees are defeated, flood losses are
higher than in the pre-levee period." (Parker 1999, 40)

In reference to the **1993 Mid-West floods**:

> \"...over three-quarters of the approximately 1,000 non-Corps of
> Engineer constructed levees built and a third of the corps-constructed
> levees were damaged in the flood.\" (Zimmerman 1999, 227)

[\"When one reflects on the array of human forces, that conspired to
cause disaster along the Mississippi in 1993 \-- the **corps\'
construction of flood-walls**, the **government-sponsored levee
building** and **farming** that has led to the **disappearance**, for
example, of over **80 percent of Missouri\'s wetlands** \-- it may
surprise some to learn that almost one in five Americans saw the deluge
as an act of God.\" (Steinberg 2000, xxi)]{.mark}

**[Texas Medical Center example:]{.mark}**

[]{.mark}

> **[22 hospitals and medical schools]{.mark}**
>
> **[100K daily population (staff, patients, students,
> visitors)]{.mark}**

### [Largest medical center in the world]{.mark}

> **[\$25M losses for each day closed]{.mark}**
>
> **[But, no zoning in Houston]{.mark}**
>
> **[Is in a floodplain]{.mark}**
>
> **[5\" of rain in short time frame (10 year flood) can flood around
> the Center]{.mark}**
>
> **[6 roads in \-- and all prone to flooding \-- making the Center an
> island]{.mark}**
>
> []{.mark}
>
> **[Had bodies floating out of the morgue in the basement during the
> 1976 flood; had lab substances floating out; all six roads leading in
> were flooded.]{.mark}** (Wainerdi, 2001)

[]{.mark}

### [Now, \$450M Federal Control Project to address their flood problem]{.mark}

> **[Replacing 14 area bridges, including one build by the State just a
> few years ago that is 14 feet too low (at a cost of \$40 million for
> this one bridge).]{.mark}** (Bedient 2001)
>
> [\"...while **we know a great deal** about mitigation, **we do very
> little to act on our knowledge**. Loma Prieta and Northridge confirmed
> our knowledge of seismic forces and building behavior. **Yet we still
> build single-family homes on poor soil and steep slopes**. **In the
> Bay Area right now, new homes are under construction atop not only the
> Hayward fault, but also on its related ancient landslide**.\"]{.mark}
> (Winslow 2001, 4)

**7G. [Problems Frequently Stem From Failure to Apply Lessons
Learned]{.mark}.**

**General:**

> []{.mark}
>
> [**\"Enough. Enough wasted money. Enough needless pain. Much of our
> disaster loss was preventable. We can turn this around by applying
> what we already know**.\"]{.mark} (Witt 2001)

**Earthquakes:**

After noting a series of recent earthquakes, in a summary of the
findings at the 2000 "National Earthquake Risk Management Conference,"
it is stated that:

**["Much of their losses could have been avoided if understanding from
past earthquakes had been employed in building design and placement,
construction quality control, and land-use planning and
regulation."]{.mark}** (Western States Seismic Policy Council. 2000.
http://www.wsspc.org/conf2000/packet/policy sessions.htm)

"The group discussed how to develop a strategy for the adoption of the
International Building Code 2000 (IBC) & International Residential Code
(IRC)....In some cases laws need to be changed; for example, 93 counties
in Missouri are currently prohibited (by the state constitution) from
having building codes." (Western States Seismic Policy Council. 2000.
[http://www.wsspc.org/conf2000/packet/policy
sessions.htm](http://www.wsspc.org/conf2000/packet/policy sessions.htm))

"The California Seismic Safety Commission's investigation of damage from
the **[1995 Northridge]{.mark}** earthquake in southern California found
there would have been **[far less damage had building codes been
rigorously enforced."]{.mark}** (Burby 2001b, 5)

"I think that's when we're going to get policy. After a devastating
earthquake. Where there's lots of damage, and no one is going to have
insurance. That's when we'll have it. It's pretty classic." (Mary
Comerio, University of California, Professor of Architecture, in Herman
2001)

**Flooding:**

\"We do not prohibit building in the floodway \-- elevate on stilts and
its okay!\" (Larson 2001)

\"When we allow building the lowest floor at today\'s flood level we
know there will be a future flood problem.\" (Larson 2001)

\"Today our national policy is to tell you how to build in the
floodplain \-- Duh!\" (Larson 2001)

"Scott Faber of the advocacy group Environmental Defense warned that
Texas 'resembles Bangladesh when it comes to flood-plain management...."

But Allbaugh said he is equally tired of bailing out flood-prone
properties: 'How many times is the American taxpayer going to ante up?'

He called himself a staunch believer in mitigation, and called for a
nationwide expansion of Project Impact...\[and\] firmly supports
programs to restore wetlands..." (Grunwald 2001, A01)

**Hurricanes:**

**["...many of the lessons of Camille have been relearned in subsequent
hurricane impacts with hurricanes Agnes, Frederic, Alicia, Hugo, Andrew,
Opal, and so forth. For the most part, society acknowledges its need to
improve response to hurricanes. The greatest challenge we face is to
turn that knowledge into practical action. Another storm like Camille
might open a window of opportunity to improve the nation's hurricane
policies, but it would be far better if, instead of waiting for that
future storm, we learned the lessons that history has already
provided."]{.mark}** (Pielke 1999, 1)

\"Recent postdisaster studies of hurricanes...have shown that the
typical failure mode of residential construction...is as follows: (1)
windows or doors fail, admitting high-speed air and creating an internal
pressure buildup, (2) the roof system lifts off the walls, (3)
subsequent collapse of one or more walls. Wind engineering studies and
damage assessments have shown that, not only for hurricanes but for
thunderstorm-related wind hazards as well, damage to residential
construction occurs due to a lack of anchorage of roofs to walls, walls
to floor, and floors to foundation....Surprising damage is inflicted
upon some masonry buildings as well, in some locales, during
hurricanes...This is due to violation of limiting height-to-thickness
rations for unreinforced masonry (and absence of complete ties in
reinforced masonry, inadequate anchorage of the roof, and/or inadequate
anchorage of buildings to foundations\" (Golden and Snow 1991, 498-499
and 501)

\"In summary...studies show that recent hurricane wind damage has become
more severe because of (1) infrequent use of reinforced concrete and
masonry construction, (2) use of lightweight roof systems with
inadequate connections, (3) gravel ballast on built-up roofs...(4)
growing popularity of light-framed, poorly connected residential
construction sited near shorelines, and (5) lack of code compliance
and/or enforcement.\" (Golden and Snow 1991, 501)

**Tornadoes and Thunderstorms:**

\"One of the most useful discoveries by the wind engineers has been the
concept of in-residence tornado shelters.\" (Golden and Snow 1991, 490)

On tornado protection: \"...the greatest protection was afforded by
quality construction and reinforcement of walls, floorboards, and
ceiling.\" (Golden and Snow 1991, 490)

\"Another common sense approach toward mitigating against future tornado
and thunderstorm wind damages would be insistence upon better anchoring
of residence roofs to walls and of walls to foundations. Escalating
construction costs have led to increasing use of short cuts by some
building contractors, to the detriment of occupant safety in extreme
wind events.\" (Golden and Snow 1991, 492)

\"Engineers have found many cases where such roofs \[tornado damaged
residences\] were attached to the walls by only a few nails (i.e., no
bolts, steel plates, or straps...\" (Golden and Snow 1991, 492)

\"It is...imperative that state and local governments require that
mobile home park operators provide a permanent storm shelter facility
(preferably underground) that is quickly accessible by all residents.\"
(Golden and Snow 1991, 493)

**Wildfires:**

Under the subtitle "Not Unexpected" in reference to May 2000 Los Alamos
Cerro Grande fire:

"The area around Los Alamos has a history of threatening wildfires. In
the past 21 years, three major fires have broken out near the Los Alamos
National Laboratory....According to an article in *Forest Magazine* by
Keith Easthouse (September/October 1999), the three federal agencies
that manage the wooded areas surrounding the laboratory (the US Forest
Service, the US Department of Energy, and the National Park Service)
were well aware of the potential for such a devastating fire...the
federal government was not alone in inadequately preparing for the Cerro
Grande fire. When I visited the site, local folks said the county
Government had lacked funding for mitigation, but more importantly,
failed to recognize the seriousness of the problem or to actively search
for funding." (Disaster Prevention and Management 2001, 118)

**POINT 8 \-- [TOO MANY DISASTERS STEM FROM FAILURE TO MANAGE
RISK]{.mark}**

**[Slide 23]{.mark} \"Disasters are unmanaged risks**.\" (Maskrey 1999,
84)

> [\"**Florida**, like California, **was not born risky. It was built
> that way**]{.mark}.\" (Steinberg (IBHS) 2000, 47)

**8A. Risk Triangle Model**

> **[\"\'Risk\' is the probability of a loss, and this depends on three
> elements, hazard, vulnerability and exposure.\"]{.mark}** (David
> Chrichton 1999, *Natural Disaster Management,* 102.

[\"Many disaster losses...are the predictable result of interactions
among three major systems: the physical environment, which includes
hazardous events; the social and demographic characteristics of the
communities that experience them \[vulnerability\]; and the buildings,
roads, bridges, and other components of the constructed environment
\[exposure\].\" (Mileti 1999c, 3)]{.mark}

> **"[Understanding your risk is the first step to disaster
> prevention]{.mark}."** [(FEMA]{.mark} News release quoting Project
> Impact National Public Affairs Director Cindy Taylor, 2001)

**8B. [Emphasis in the Past Has Been Too Much On the Hazard
Leg]{.mark}**

> \"One central problem is that many of the accepted methods for coping
> with hazards have been based on the idea that **people can use
> technology to control nature** to make themselves safe. What\'s more,
> most strategies for managing hazards have followed a traditional
> planning model: study the problem, implement one solution, and move on
> to the next problem.\" (**Mileti** 1999c. 2)

Later in *Disasters by Design* Mileti criticizes traditional approaches
to hazard management, even mitigation measures, which focus too much on
the hazard event:

> \"Some successes have been achieved..., but the overall situation is
> that (1) the already staggering monetary losses from disasters are
> still increasing; (2) there is reason to believe that in many
> instances mitigation activities are simply postponing losses that will
> be more catastrophic when they do occur; and (3) many efforts at
> disaster mitigation and many disasters result in short-term or
> cumulative environmental degradation and ecological imbalance, which,
> besides being detrimental to society, also contributes to the
> occurrence and severity of the next disaster.\" (Mileti 1999c, 24)
>
> "Society would be safer, smarter, and fairer if our organizations and
> their masters could admit their limitations, declaring frankly that
> they can not control the uncontrollable." (Clarke 1999, 171)

**Now more relative emphasis needs to be placed on vulnerability and
exposure legs.**

> \"**Unsustainable development is the root cause** underlying the
> mounting cost of natural disasters.\" (FEMA 2000, 7)
>
> \"**Land development patterns** over the past several decades have
> emphasized **sprawl**ing suburban communities and homes constructed
> **with little or no attention paid to protection against high winds,
> flooding, wildfire, or other natural hazards**.\" (FEMA 2000, 7-8)

**8C. IDNDR Started With An Emphasis on Risk Assessment and Management**

> **"...risk** assessment, which combines information on the nature of
> the hazard with information on vulnerability of the targets is helping
> to clarify decision making for disaster management and the development
> of mitigation strategies." (Rodda 1999, 32)

**8D. Federal Government Has Still Not Conducted a National Risk
Assessment**

> \"...disaster reduction can and should be a national priority. The
> incoming administration can build U.S. resilience to extreme events by
> taking the following steps: Conduct, with Congress and the nation, a
> **national assessment of community vulnerability**...\" (Natural
> Hazards Caucus 2001a, 2)

**8E. [Most State and Local Governments Have Not Performed a Risk
Assessment]{.mark}**

**8F. Other**

> "People look more and more frequently to government to hold them
> harmless from the consequences of their risk-taking. The resulting
> cost to society in terms of death and injury, and property and
> economic loss, is simply too high." (Wagoner 2000, SM II-20)
>
> \"Making Project Impact work involves four basic steps:
>
> \-- Creating a community partnership
>
> \-- Identifying and evaluating disaster risks
>
> \-- Prioritizing mitigation actions to address these risks
>
> \-- Building public and financial support for mitigation actions.\"
> (Witt 1999, 232)

"Managing Risk depends on political will. Political will depends on
political leadership amid a shifting set of incentives, pressures and
polemics. The political costs of redirecting priorities from visible,
development projects to addressing abstract long-term threats are great.
It is hare to gain votes by pointing out that a disaster *did not*
happen." (Christoplos, et al. 2001. 195.

# POINT 9 \-- FAILURE IS PRIMARILY GOVERNMENTAL \-- [Slide 24]{.mark}

**9A \-- Public Safety is a Governmental Responsibility \-- [Slide 25
Points]{.mark}**

> ["The **police power**, delegated to local governments **by the
> state**, authorizes local government actions that **protect the public
> health, safety and general welfare**.]{.mark}
>
> []{.mark}
>
> [It can be argued that local governments are under an **affirmative
> duty** to promote the health, safety and general welfare of their
> citizens.]{.mark}
>
> []{.mark}
>
> [It can be further argued that **refraining** from managing growth and
> development in a responsible manner is a **dereliction of that
> duty**.]{.mark}

**Protection** of the community **from hazards** is clearly within the
purview of **health, safety and general welfare** duties." **[(Schwab,
Brower and Beatley]{.mark}** 2001b, 11; emphasis in the original.)

\"**Absolute safety is not a human right**. **Safety from avoidable
loss, injury and death is**. Nothing in the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights makes much sense if the human beings who are supposed to
enjoy these rights can be **snuffed out** **because a government
neglected to enforce its own building codes**.\" (Wisner 2001c)

It has to be admitted that there are **conflicting pressures concerning
land use**:

"On the one hand, there is the goal of promoting economically beneficial
uses of land, and the accompanying desire to allow individuals free use
of their property, unimpeded by governmental intervention where
possible. But these goals often conflict with the goal of promoting
public safety and the welfare of the larger community through land use
management policies that protect against the destructive effects of
floods, coastal storms, earthquakes, landslides and wildfires." (May and
Deyle 1998, 57)

\"Crises can be anticipated and mitigated, even avoided, but **only by
the executives** who are wise, competent and open enough to heed and
connect the warning signals. **Awareness works. Neglect can kill**.\"
(Pinsdorf 1999, 191)

[**James Lee Witt** on disasters in the US: \"What is not readily
evident is **how preventable** **much of this destruction is**. What we
don\'t realize at first glance is that many of these towns have been
down this road before, suffering previously from the vagaries of nature,
rebuilding without a plan for mitigating future losses, and then facing
the same disaster again.\" (Witt 1999, 230)]{.mark}

"[**We have created unsustainable, non-resilient communities by directly
placing people and property in harm's way**."]{.mark} (Schwab, Brower
and Beatley, 2001; emphasis in the original).

\"Since low probability-high consequence disasters are relatively
infrequent, especially for individual communities, it is difficult to
measure the benefits of a strong emergency management program. Hence,
emergency management has tended to have low political salience and
emergency management programs generally do not have politically
influential administrative constituencies.\" (**Britton** 2001, 1)

**9.B. Land-Use Regs., Building Codes, Inspections, Planning \--
Governmental Responsibilities**

\"**Governments have special responsibilities to ensure that appropriate
risk reduction and disaster preparedness activities are adopted and
implemented**....integration requires political acceptance that disaster
management is more than preparing for and responding to impact.\"
(**Britton** 1999, 214)

[**Bill Hooke,** National Science and Technology Council: \"economic
losses continue to rise....A **continuing failure to use best seismic,
wind, fire and flood mitigation and engineering practice**.....a **huge
amount of existing construction has taken place in an unsafe manner**
...\[and\] **in dangerous locations**...\" (Hooke 1999, 280)]{.mark}

Deni Benn, Director of UN Secretariat for International Strategy for
Risk Reduction, on **[factors that contribute to growing natural hazard
vulnerability in developed & developing countries:]{.mark}**

> [\"...factors such as **inappropriate land-use planning**; **poorly
> designed buildings and infrastructure**; **lack of institutional
> arrangements to deal with risk reduction and emergency management**,
> not to mention an...increasingly degraded environment...a **poor
> understanding by decision makers of ...risk**, as well as the tendency
> of some builders to use the cheapest designs and construction
> materials in increase short-term economic returns on their
> investment....are all linked to the current trend.\" **(Benn** 2001,
> 3)]{.mark}

**Helena Molin-Valdes, Senior Policy Advisor for the UN International
Strategy for Disaster Reduction**, on "the **importance of prevention**"
and enabling "all communities to become resilient to the impacts of
natural disasters:"

> "These measures should be an integrated part of development, not
> something you do after the fact. Risk reduction strategies include
> early warning systems, adequate shelters, hazard-resistant buildings
> and forestation programs. **Most important...is [not to develop any
> infrastructure in hazard-prone areas]{.mark}.** Unfortunately, many
> governments are not willing to invest in such measures." (Quoted in
> Bachmann 2001)

[\"We **allow** some **people to build in environmentally sensitive
areas susceptible to natural hazards, and then we pay to help them
recover when disaster strikes**. This is not sound environmental or
fiscal policy.\" (FEMA 2000, 8)]{.mark}

["Studies of the damage caused by Hurricane Andrew in 1992 attributed
**one-quarter of the storm's total damages** to a combination of
**shoddy workmanship** and a **lack of enforcement of the building
codes**."]{.mark} (Schwab, Brower and Beatley, 2001b, 13)

**[\"...the United States is one of the few countries in the world where
building codes and standards are not set by the federal government but
left to states or local jurisdictions.\"]{.mark}** (Golden and Snow
1991, 498)

**[\"...changes in code provisions which may influence the economic
health of a given community are feared and frequently rejected...there
must be an interdisciplinary research and technology transfer process to
ensure that new understanding of extreme windstorm phenomena is codified
into building codes and practice.\"]{.mark}** (Golden and Snow 1991,
501)

**9.C. [Need Responsible Rather Than Merely Responsive
Governments]{.mark}**

> "There is a need to develop a coherent disaster preparedness strategy
> on a country-to-country basis, especially in river basins.
> [**Coherence will come when governments treat disasters as normal
> events, which deserve consideration in mainstream, long term
> planning**."]{.mark} Koch-Weser 1999, 70)
>
> [**Mitigation** \-- allocating resources today to reduce a greater
> loss in the future \-- is **too rarely adopted as a strategy to deal
> with natural hazards**.\" (Natural Hazards Caucus 2001b, 1)]{.mark}
>
> **[\"The...lack of state and local government commitment to and
> capacity for mitigation is a fundamental impediment to loss
> reduction.\"]{.mark}** (Congressional Natural Hazards Caucus
> Workgroup, 22Jan2001, 7)
>
> \"Ultimately the crux of national risk indexing may **be the question
> of political will** expressed as legal and planning frameworks,
> investment in professional and citizen based capacity and
> capabilities, and enforcement of codes and standards.\" (Wisner 2000,
> 6)
>
> **[\"Incentives in this country are exactly upside down \-- the more
> development you allow the more you are likely to get disaster
> relief.\"]{.mark}** (Larson 2001)
>
> **[\"Local governments have a real problem saying we shouldn\'t do XYZ
> when right next door, State and Federal governments are doing XYZ \--
> State and Federal governments should lead by example.\"
> (]{.mark}**Larson 2001)
>
> "...limits to growth could have considerable potential for confining
> losses due to natural disasters..." (Disaster Prevention and
> Management 2001, 119

[**You cannot expect developers to take hazard risks seriously to
heart**.]{.mark}

[]{.mark}

"A real estate developer standing on the ground floor of a new apartment
building on the floodplain of a creek in a Missouri valley town was
asked whether he thought he was taking any risk in locating a structure
there. He replied to the contrary and, when pressed, observed further
that he knew that the stream had many years earlier reached a stage at
the point as high as his shoulders.. How then could he say there was no
risk? His answer was, 'There isn't any risk; I expect to sell this
building before the next flood season." (Burton et al. 1978, 96)

# POINT 10: [IT IS PRIMARILY A POLITICAL PROBLEM]{.mark} \-- [Slide 27 \-- Alexander]{.mark}

**10.A. While there are many players, the key is top political
commitment**

\"...it is perfectly possible to identify landslides...and reduce the
hazard...In the past I have done landslide hazard studies, and suggested
remedies, only to have my work ignored because the political will to do
something about the problem was not present.\" (Alexander 2001, p. 4)

**[\"Unless you have the political will all the technological solutions
in the world won\'t matter]{.mark}**.\" (Glasser, 2001)

**"The primary impediment to the adoption and enforcement of effective
natural hazards regulatory policy has to do with the 'willingness'
rather than the 'capacity' of governmental law-making bodies to
act..."** (Petak and Atkisson 1982, 422)

> ["Although **natural disaster reduction** involves a great deal of
> co-ordination within the world's scientific community, it **presents
> an essential political character**, namely the need of policy
> co-ordination among governmental, non-governmental agencies and the
> private sector, with a view to mitigating the social consequences of
> natural disasters and promoting a more effective use of available
> resources."]{.mark} (Fernando Henrique Cardoso, **President** of the
> Federative Republic of **Brazil**, in Ingleton 1999, 5)

"Disaster reduction is both possible and feasible. While we cannot
prevent an earthquake or hurricane from occurring, we can apply the
scientific knowledge and technical know-how that we already have to
increase the earthquake and wind resistance of houses and bridges, to
issue early warnings and organize proper community response to such
warnings. [The extent to which society puts this knowledge to effective
use **depends** firstly **upon** **the political will** of its **leaders
at all levels**. The culture of prevention must thrive both at the
national and the neighborhood level."]{.mark} (Federico Mayor,
**Director-General**, United Nations Educational, Scientific and
Cultural Organizations (**UNESCO**), in Ingleton 1999, 4)

[\"Unless **the most senior government officials** commit to
implementing mitigation practices, as an investment in protecting assets
and conserving resources, disaster reduction will be of low priority.
**History shows** that without such leadership, short-term crises will
overshadow the long-term considerations and absorb the resources needed
for effective loss-reduction measures.\"]{.mark} (Hamilton (National
Academy of Sciences) 1999, 305-306)

"What is needed...is **[the political will]{.mark}** to keep people from
building in the woods." \[Reference to growing wildfire hazard.\]
(Disaster Prevention and Management 2001, p. 119)

Gave example of Arkadelphia, Arkansas tornado as a disaster that could
have been greatly mitigated \-- poor construction, lack of code
enforcement, resistance of builders, sharks from Oklahoma and Missouri
came in to sell their lousy products to orphans and widows and no one
stopped them. (Glasser, 2001)

\"We need to require the placement of permanent shelters in mobile home
parks, especially in high wind risk areas.\" (Golden, NOAA, 2001)

**10B. Reasons for Inaction \-- [Slide 28\-- Political Problem
Points]{.mark}**

-   **Low Salience.**

-   **Ignorance**

> []{.mark}
>
> "With local officials usually elected for two-year terms, there is a
> tremendous learning curve for newly elected officials, and local
> officials are seldom well-informed about local hazards and risks
> (Burby 1998)" (Pearce 2000, 3-30)
>
> []{.mark}

-   **Disbelief \-- It won't happen here, or to me, or if it does
    someone will rescue us.**

-   **Fatalism \-- if it happens it happens**

-   **Cognitive dissonance \-- you hear only what you want to hear**

-   **Casualness, complacency and blind optimism**

-   **Not convinced \-- too speculative, difficult to access, economics
    tenuous**

"As one moves from national to local governments, the 'disaster damages
experienced from that level's perspective are less frequent' (Auf der
Heide (1989, 22) and the effects of a disaster become less apparent."
(Pearce 2000, 3-30)

Obstacles to local mitigation -- belief that the benefits would be
uncertain and would occur in the future. (Beatley and Berke 1993, 85)

> []{.mark}

-   **Over-confidence to Machoism \-- no big deal \-- we\'ll handle it**

-   **Let sleeping dogs lie \-- lawsuits**

-   May or may not be needed during political lifetime of
    decision-makers.

> []{.mark}
>
> [\"...natural disaster mitigation is seldom a political card that is
> worth playing, for it depends on prudence and wisdom, not show; it
> usually produces unremarkable results, not quick
> transformations]{.mark}.\" (Alexander 2000, 240)
>
> "Basically, paying now for uncertain payoffs in the future is a key
> point in understanding the dilemma in which politicians find
> themselves. Ideally, when additional resources are provided to deal
> with problems concerning crime and health, results are immediate;
> crime goes down, waiting lists for hospitals diminish. When resources
> are allocated to disaster mitigation, the results may not be evident
> in the residents' or the politicians' lifetimes. Politicians are aware
> of this, and thus disaster managemnt planning often needs to be
> regulated by higher levels of government." (Pearce 2000, 3-31)

-   **Higher Priorities**

> [\"**Disaster management costs money** and, in situations of
> competition for scarce resources, despite the risks, it is frequently
> **placed well down the agenda** for action. This can and will,
> eventually, cause unnecessary loss of life, jobs, property and
> environment.\"]{.mark} (Mike Evans (Disaster Management Centre,
> Cranfield University) 1999, "Turning Political Commitment Into Sound
> Practice," 217)
>
> **[\"...property values and development trump concerns about immediate
> hazards.\"]{.mark}** (Susman 2001, p. 4)
>
> Obstacles to local mitigation -- crime, health care, and so on deeded
> to be more pressing concerns than low probability events. (Beatley and
> Berke 1993, 85)

-   **Desire For Development and Tax Revenues**

> ["**Land use carries many opportunities** to promote disaster
> mitigation, but often **the political expedience of promoting economic
> growth at the expense of disaster mitigation** is **too tempting for
> authorities**. Moreover, development interests often have significant
> political influence, particularly through the medium of campaign
> contributions to those seeking to win or maintain political
> office."]{.mark} (Sylves 1998, 141)

"When it comes to urban development, local governments have trouble
resisting market pressures. When geographers suggest risk studies, it's
perceived as an obstacle to be stifled, for fear of upsetting the
promoters' clients and losing lucrative projects" (Grescoe 1997, 37).

Mitigation would place undue burdens on certain segments of the
population (e.g., land developers). (Beatley and Berke 1993, 85)

# 

# Opposition Prevails

> ["...not all communities will have the political will to place strong
> regulatory requirements in place to reduce risks from wildfire. As
> noted in the Oakland Hills case study, Oakland fire officials had
> warned about the risk and need for mitigative actions years before the
> Oakland Firestorm occurred and even in the aftermath of the disaster
> considerable pressure was created by property owners to relax firewise
> building practices."]{.mark} (Patterson 2001, 28c-13)

-   **Weak Grassroots Support/Advocacy**

\"Communities face a number of barriers to implementing hazard reduction
measures. Two major obstacles are **the public\'s misunderstanding of
risk** and the fact that **most people do not want to believe that their
community will ever experience another** if they\'ve already been
through one. The best way to deal with these issues is to educate your
community...\" (FEMA 2000, 25)

> []{.mark}
>
> Obstacles to local mitigation -- belief that the benefits are too
> diffuse and to not attach to any particular sector of the population.
> (Beatley and Berke 1993, 85)
>
> []{.mark}
>
> [\"**If each of us demanded safer communities** from our local
> elected/appointed officials there would be **tremendous impact on
> budgets**. We have to shift the U.S. culture: Hazard mitigation must
> be a basic American value.\"]{.mark} (Mileti 1999b, 2)

Ben Wisner on what is needed "to initiate the sea change in how nations
deal with natural hazards":

> "**The missing ingredient is the kind of moral imperative that can
> mobilize local political will**." (Wisner 2001e, p. 1)

\"You need an **effective champion** and you need **persistence** to
change political will.\" (Snow, 2001)

-   **Weak Corporate/B&I Support Advocacy**

-   **Insufficient State & Federal Carrots, Sticks, Examples**

**10C. Why Did It Happen Here?**

# [\"In the aftermath of a disaster it is inevitable that both victims and helpers alike will ask \'why did this happen?\' and \'why did this happen here?\" (Burton 1999, 75) It will be increasingly important for people to understand that disasters and their severity could have been a avoided or minimized.]{.mark}

> \"We learn again (who learns?) that our efforts miss the mark if we do
> not speak the language of empowerment, social justice, social change,
> political organizing \-- and insist in all our research, teaching,
> training, writing, consulting (and movie making!) that the central
> issues in disaster work are profoundly political.\" (Enarson, 2001)

# POINT 11 \-- [We Must Create A CULTURE OF DISASTER PREVENTION]{.mark} \--[Slide 29]{.mark}

> \"The time has come for a new national approach to natural hazards.\"
> (Natural Hazards Caucus 2001a, 1)
>
> \"You can replace a house but you can\'t replace a home.\" (Witt,
> 2001)
>
> **\"[When 20% to 40% of businesses fail after a disaster you lose the
> heart of the community]{.mark}.\"** (Witt, 2001)

# 11A. A Paradigm Shift Is Needed [(Read)]{.mark}

> **[Mileti and contributors to *Disasters by Design: A Reassessment of
> Natural Hazards in the United States* (1999) call for nothing less
> that a paradigm shift in how researchers, policy makers, and
> practitioners view and cope with disasters and disaster losses.
> Paradigms are our models or patters of reality, shaped by our
> understanding and experience into a system of rules and assumptions
> about the world around us (Kuhn 1970). The call for restructuring in
> disaster policy emerges from the sense that current policy guided by
> the 'hazards adjustment' paradigm is not working for the
> nation."]{.mark}** (Darlington and Simpson 2001, 43)

**11B. The Time Is Now \-- [Slide 30 \-- Disaster Prevention Culture
Points]{.mark}**

**["We can no longer afford, financially or socially, to rely only on
the expectations of emergency relief when disaster strikes. Much greater
attention must be paid to preventive strategies aimed at saving lives
and protecting resources and assets before they are lost."]{.mark}**

> (**Kofi Annan**, Secretary-General of the United Nations, in Ingleton
> 1999, "Statement By The Secretary-General")

Philippe Boulle', Director, IDNDR Secretariat, in Ingleton 1999, xiv:

> "...we should recall what the United Nations General Assembly
> emphasized in its founding resolution of the IDNDR (UNGA, 1989).
> There, it emphasized the importance of adopting an integrated approach
> for disaster management in all its aspects to initiate a process
> towards a global culture of prevention. It is now even more evident
> ten years after the IDNDR resolution that the escalating costs of
> natural disasters cannot continue to be tolerated, or absorbed."
>
> []{.mark}
>
> **[\"Decisions made today will determine whether in the future our
> money will go to disaster response and relief, or to education and
> health care.\"]{.mark}** (Witt, 2001)
>
> "Public perceptions and media attention...have often continued to be
> captivated by occasions of international emergency assistance and
> relief activities following individual disaster events. Subsequent
> policy analysis and technical assessment of the costs involved in
> these highly visible natural disasters have demonstrated **that modern
> societies can no longer afford, either financially or socially, to
> rely only on expectations of contingent relief assistance.\"** (Jeggle
> 1999, 24)

**11C. [Own Up To Responsibilities]{.mark}**

> \"Until people are ready to address the inter-dependent root causes of
> disasters and to do the difficult work of coming to negotiated
> consensus about which losses are acceptable, which are unacceptable,
> and what type of action to take, communities will continue a path
> toward ever-larger natural disasters.\" (Mileti 1999c, 64)
>
> To make progress we must shift from the stance that disasters are
> \'acts of God,\' or \'acts of nature,\' to one of \'disasters as acts
> of human intervention\'.\" (Britton 2001, 13)
>
> **[To successfully move to a culture of disaster prevention there must
> be \"a complete shift from the deterministic act-of-god perception to
> one in which communities take full responsibility for the implications
> of their planning decisions.\"]{.mark}** (**Britton** 2001, 16)
>
> \"We believe that it does not have to be this way....We can\'t always
> expect that someone else will solve our problems.\" (Russell, 2001)
>
> **["Our budget request \[fiscal year 2002\] fully funds FEMA's core
> operations for responding to disasters while continuing to emphasize
> empowerment and personal responsibility as they pertain to disaster
> preparedness and mitigation."]{.mark}** (**Allbaug**h 2001)**\
> **

**11D. [From Disaster Response to Disaster Prevention]{.mark}**

> **[\"We must...shift from a culture of reaction to a culture of
> prevention.... the most important task in the medium and long term is
> to strengthen and broaden programmes which reduce the number and cost
> of disasters in the first place....Prevention is not only more humane
> than cure; it is also much cheaper]{.mark}**.\" (Kof**i Annan,**
> quoted in Benn 2001, 3)

**11E. [Importance of Sustainable Development:]{.mark}**

> [\"**In its broadest context**, sustainable development **\'meets the
> needs of the present without compromising the ability of future
> generations to meet their own needs\'**.\"]{.mark}
>
> (**FEMA** 2000, 9, citing definition established by the United Nations
> World Commission on Environment and Development (the Brundtland
> Commission) in 1987.)
>
> [\"Sustainable communities work to maximize the overlap among
> **environmental, economic, and social values**.\"]{.mark} **(FEMA**
> 2000, 9)
>
> [On Sustainable Development: \"Think of it as **the Golden Rule**
> **extended through time**. We do unto our children as we would have
> our children do unto us.\"]{.mark} (Robert
>
> Gilman, Context Institute, **quoted in FEMA 365**, Nov 2000, p. 5-14)
>
> \"The U.S. must shift its natural hazards approach \-- we must work
> holistically \-- with the natural environment, with the social
> environment, and with the built environment. Nature and God do not
> give us disasters \-- we do.\" (Mileti, 2001)
>
> \"Protect the environment and it will protect you.\" (Witt, 2001)

**11F. [Mainstream Prevention, Mitigation, Sustainable Development, and
BDRC]{.mark}**

> "Success in the prevention and reduction of natural disasters is
> closely related to the pursuit of sustainable development policies.
> Therefore nations should incorporate preparedness against these
> phenomena into their social and economic agendas." (Fernando Henrique
> Cardoso, President of the Federative Republic of Brazil, in Ingleton
> 1999, 5)
>
> \"Communities and development organizations can reduce potential
> natural disaster losses by integrating mitigation measures into a
> comprehensive disaster prevention programme. Land-use plans and
> building standards are two of the major requirements for reducing
> vulnerability. Preparedness plans and warning systems are also
> essential elements. Mitigation can be effective only if it is accorded
> high priority and integrated into an overall planning and development
> process with organizations and governments.\" (Hamilton 1999, 306)
>
> **[\"Disaster prevention and mitigation is a matter of thorough,
> systematic, comprehensive institutional change throughout ALL
> government institutions at ALL levels.\"]{.mark}** (Jones, 2001)
>
> \"We can save lives and prevent damages \-- that\'s the reason behind
> Project Impact. Common purpose can take the place of old animosities
> when communities rally behind disaster reduction.\" (Witt, 2001)

**11G. [Importance of The Media]{.mark}**

# 

> **[\"For years, the media have played a crucial role both in educating
> communities about disaster risks and helping with recovery efforts.
> But now it\'s time to change the way media cover disasters. It\'s time
> to go beyond preparation and recovery. It\'s time to teach communities
> the steps they can take to reduce their risk of damage before a
> disaster.\" (FEMA 2000A, 2)]{.mark}**

"Most of the literature about disasters assumes that the media are the
most important mitigation tool for manager officials because its content
creates disaster and risk awareness." (Perez-Lugo, 2001, 55)

**[The media has a "significant role" to play "in promoting the disaster
reduction message]{.mark}." (Denis Benn, Director, UN Secretariat for
the International Strategy for Disaster Reduction, in *ISDR Highlights*
Vol. IV, Issue 2, February 2001, p. 1)**

# 11 H. Good Examples

# Midwest Floods of 1993 Buyout Program 

"The 1993 Midwest floods presented an unprecedented opportunity for
redirecting development out of flood plains. The Clinton Administration
initiated perhaps the largest buyout-relocation program in modern
history, directing a tremendous amount of federal resources toward the
program and making relocation its mitigation priority. All told, some
9,000 structures will have been moved out of the flood plain." (Beatley
and Manning 1997, 101)

# Pattonsburg, Missouri Relocation 

> "Following the 1993 Midwest floods, "Pattonsburg...relocated
> completely outside the flood plain... The town even adopted a Charter
> of Sustainability...to guide this redevelopment. The sustainable
> design features include new energy efficiency and resource
> conservation standards, a pedestrian-friendly and solar-oriented new
> street layout, the creation of a Sustainable Economic Development
> Council to encourage new sustainable local businesses, and development
> of a waste minimization policy for the town, among others." (Beatley
> and Manning 1997, 103; for additional information see Lerner 1997,
> 213-229.)

# Soldiers Grove, Wisconsin

"Another early pioneer in adopting a more sustainable strategy of
enhancing community resilience is Soldiers Grove, Wisconsin, a community
repeatedly devastated by flooding of the Kickapoo River. Eventually it
chose to relocate its business district entirely out of the flood plain,
while at the same time achieving a number of other sustainability
objectives, including the use of solar energy (new businesses were
required to obtain at least half of their energy from solar), life-cycle
analysis of building materials, siting buildings and landscaping based
on microsite analysis, and the mixing of housing into its downtown..."
(Beatley and Manning 1997, 100-101; for additional information on
Soldiers Grove see Lerner 1997, 215-216)

Tulsa Oklahoma

"Tulsa has done more than simply relocate homes out of the floodplain...
Its program of building community resilience is comprehensive and
holistic, moving well beyond the employment of structural components to
the general reduction of long-term flooding vulnerability. Among the
other elements of its strategy are watershed-wide regulations on new
development, a master drainage plan for the city, and a unique and
stable funding source for storm water management in which each home and
business in the watershed is assessed a monthly storm water fee as part
of its utility bill. (Businesses are assessed based on the extent of
their impervious surfaces.) This fee raises \$8 million annually. The
strategy also includes flood mitigation requirements that go beyond the
minimum required under the National Flood Insurance Program, including
'free boarding,' the practice of requiring construction to be elevated,
on fill or pilings, beyond what is mandated by the National Flood
Insurance Program.

Most important, Tulsa's strategy involves a fundamentally different way
of looking at floodplains and flood-prone areas. Under the new view,
these areas are transformed from areas of danger and liability to
resources that are part of the essential natural capital of the city and
region. The cleared areas become locations for open space and
recreation. Drainageways and maintenance roads along creekbeds have been
opened to the public as biking and hiking trails, and the city has been
working on developing a city-wide trail system to which these would be
connected." (Beatley and Manning 1997, 100)

**11 I. [The Wave of The Future]{.mark}**

> "The global appeal of disaster prevention...has come to be recognized
> as:

Universal in application, relevant to all countries, whether they are
rich or poor.

> ....realized through people's own local efforts, where they live and
> work.
>
> ...involving many different professional abilities and different types
> of organizations.
>
> Sustained by a collective appreciation of protecting social resources
> and economic assets that people believe are important to them."
> (Jeggle 1999, 27)

[A Culture of Disaster Prevention is]{.mark}

> []{.mark}
>
> **Realistic and Effective, Being Adopted Nationwide, Beneficial in
> Multiple Ways**
>
> **The Wave of the Future** (Adapted from FEMA 365, p. 5-11)

IBHS vision of the future \-- \"People will only buy or rent a fortified
structure.\" (Russell, 2001)

# 

# 

# 

# 

# 

# 

# 

# 

# 

# 

#  POINT 12 -- [EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT NEEDS TO CONTINUE TO EVOLVE]{.mark}

> **[\"We can not do today\'s job with yesterday\'s methods and be in
> business tomorrow]{.mark}**.\" (**John Salter** (Australia) 1999, 113)

**12A. Fundamental Shifts Necessary \-- [Slide 32 Points]{.mark}**

\"Data data everywhere, but not a thought to think.\" (Maskrey 1999, 89,
paraphrasing Coleridge)

**[\"Disaster management needs to undergo fundamental reform to meet the
needs and expectations of society in the next millennium]{.mark}**.\"
(**Britton** 1999, 216)

**["...in many instances, people are rarely concerned about hazards and
disasters until they actually occur. This means that disasters and
mitigation plans are much more likely a 'national' instead of regional
or community concern. As a result, in the end, emergency planning and
preparedness come from the top-down (national to regional to local
levels), without local participation and assessment of the needs and
problems of the disaster victims or affected communities. This
conventional top-down approach typically emphasizes technological and
technical aspects over important socio-economic factors and issues of
social inequality in improving disaster mitigation and rehabilitation,
for disaster is viewed merely as a 'natural' phenomenon requiring some
'technological fixes' to modify and/or control the physical
processes."]{.mark}** (Zaman 1994, 103)

**[\"...change in the emergency management sector is both inevitable and
necessary.\"]{.mark}** (Britton 2001, 1)

\"...**[higher and more diversified skill levels...\" are
needed]{.mark}**. (**Britton** 2001, 15)**\
**

"Does the top-down disaster planning and management approach reduce
vulnerability or increase it? The top-down approach, with stress on
physical protection of vulnerable areas, forecasting, early warning
systems, evacuation, and loss reduction strategies may, indeed, increase
risks more often by providing people a false sense of security. The
'protective measures may either be inadequate or fail miserably; the
1993 Mississippi flooding and the devastation caused by it is a good
example." (Zaman 1994, 103)

\"To develop a natural hazards mitigation program, both citizens and
officials of a community need to be aware that hazards exist and believe
that a risk of significant negative consequences is posed. At the same
time, officials need to believe that there are effective ways for coping
with the hazards. In addition, the policy programs being suggested must
be politically feasible to implement, which means that they are
compatible with community values.\" (Perry and Lindell 1982, 30) \[This
is the emergency managers job.\]

\"I look at some of the reasons why so little is being done to reduce
people\'s vulnerability to natural disasters, and I suggest that part of
the problem lies within the so-called disaster \'community\' and is
political, in the broadest sense of the word.\" (Twigg 2001, 1)

**12B. [Accept Responsibility]{.mark}**

\"Instead of accepting responsibility for creating conditions in which
the impact of a hazard can lead to disastrous consequences, disaster
managers call upon scientists to find a solution to tame the hazard.\"
(Kotze 1999, 149)

\"Human action is not triggered by scientific research but by owning a
problem and deciding to do something about it.\" (Mileti, 2001)

**12C. [Build on Foundation of Risk Assessment, Mapping and
Management]{.mark}**

\"**Hazard assessments** are combined with inventories of structures and
other facilities, plus demographic data, to produce risk assessments. A
risk assessment identities the most vulnerable areas or populations and
can be used for allocating resources. Risk assessment methodology is
well established and is becoming more widely employed...\" (Hamilton
1999, 305)

**[\"It is important to recognize that the risk management approach is
not \'business as usual\', nor does it merely provide \'a tool\' (for
analysis/assessment). The approach provides a fundamental basis for the
systematic application of management policies, procedures and practices
to the tasks of identifying, analyzing, evaluating, treating and
monitoring risk.\" (Salter 1999, 111)]{.mark}**

**12D. [From Reactive to Proactive Stance-From Response to
Prevention/Reduction \-- ]{.mark}**

[**i.e., Catalysts For A Safer America**]{.mark}

\"Preparedness measures for more efficient **rescue and relief**
activities will remain necessary, but their expenditure will be
justified less easily, unless efforts are first made **to save lives and
to protect assets before they become lost.**" (Jeggle 1999, 24)

\"...the emphasis has changed from **the \'emergency\' side** of the
balance sheet to **the \'management\' side**.\" (Britton 2001, 1)

\"Agencies must broaden their agenda from **emergency management to risk
reduction**. (Maskrey 1999, 86)

\"**Reducing risk** is based on...assumptions.

> First, it assumes that risk reduction efforts are more effective and
> sustainable if they are linked with or **integrated into existing
> community-based services**.
>
> Second, it assumes that the relationships between agencies involved in
> disaster mitigation and communities at-risk should be those of
> **active partnership**.
>
> Third, it assumes that **emergency operations are opportunities for
> promoting prevention, mitigation, preparedness and recovery** \-- as
> well as relief.\" (Maskrey 1999, 89)

**12E. [Pivot for Building Disaster Resilience \-- Means, in part,
\"Do-It-Alone\" Mentality must move to Partnering, Coordinating,
Networking & Cooperating]{.mark}**

\"**[Disaster management needs to be undertaken within, and in support
of, the wider social, cultural, environmental and economic fabric of
communities]{.mark}**.\" (**Britton** 1999, 215)

\"[Disaster management cuts across all sorts of national and local
activities]{.mark}. Effective horizontal and vertical partnerships must
be created and maintained. Significant linkages and relationships are
required throughout the wider community to achieve effective disaster
management. However, [many disaster management agencies have difficulty
in gaining acceptance among other agencies]{.mark} that are influential
in the adoption of risk management. This is primarily due to a
misconception that disaster management is solely about preparing for and
responding to events. It is therefore important that the wider interests
of disaster management are communicated on an ongoing basis, and that
those working in the field strengthen existing partnerships, as well as
forging new ones.\" (**Britton** 1999, 215)

\"...conventional approaches to promoting disaster management...imply
\[that\] it is an \'add-on\' or a separate process. Disaster management
would be better promoted as an implicit part of everyday decision-making
within communities.\" (**Britton** 1999, 215)

\"Emergency management is a co-ordination task, not a directive one.\"
(**Britton** 2001, 15)

\"...there is no one agency with the requisite technical and
administrative expertise to perform all the needed functions.\"
(**Britton** 2001, 15)

"Historically, disaster management planning \[in North America\] has
been viewed from a para-military perspective (Scanlon 1982); that is,
planning has been conducted for, not with, the community (Laughy 1999)

\"[We are not addressing hazards in a contextual manner \-- we don\'t
get enough people in enough contiguous communities involved \-- don\'t
partner enough]{.mark}.\" (**Mileti**, 2001)

Gave as an example, 1993 Midwest floods \-- \"All the dikes, dams,
levees were put in based on local risk evaluations. No one looked at the
total river system or the watershed \-- thus the high percentage of
failures and damage.\" (**Mileti**, 2001)

"In the early 1980s I quickly became aware that disaster management was
occurring in isolation: it was not part of the communities it was
designed to protect. Disaster managers believed that citizens would
panic if they knew the potential for disasters and, therefore, would be
unable to plan rationally for them. Disaster managers, who often had
para-military backgrounds and were involved in second careers, sat in
their offices and developed plans -- sometimes without even consulting
key response agencies (e.g. police, firefighters, and ambulance staff).
Disaster plans were seldom read, seldom understood, and seldom
up-to-date. They were seen as a necessary tool, but they remained a plan
without a process....Community planning still takes place in isolation
from disaster management planning" (**Pearce** 2000, Ch.1, pp. 15-16)

\"Emergency management has lacked a sufficient framework in the past and
was often marred by narrow, hazard-based approaches characterized by
working in isolation (from the community at risk).\" (**Salter** 1999,
111)

\"Mechanistic approaches to disasters and how to deal with them will not
be successful. There is urgent need to realize that [disasters do not
take place in a vacuum. They involve people, organizations and societies
that have their specific social, economic, cultural and political
characteristics.\"]{.mark} **(Uitto** 1999, 182)

**12F. [Develop Skills to Articulate & Document Persuasive Case to Top
Decision Makers]{.mark}**

**12G. [Mainstream (Integrate) Emergency Management Within Local
Government]{.mark}**

**12H. [Emergency Managers of the Future Must Be Catalysts For
Change]{.mark}**

"Efforts must maintain the momentum that has grown, particularly during
the later half of the 1990s, by recognizing the social, political and
economic values of risk management for disaster reduction." (Jeggle
1999, 27)

**[\"...at the commencement of a new millennium, an opportunity is
available to reflect on developments that are shaping the social
function of emergency management and the role of the emergency
manager.\"]{.mark}** (Britton 2001, 1)

**[\"Technical solutions to most hazards management issues exist, but
getting them used requires effectively communicating the solutions to
end-users and convincing potential users that they are desirable,
feasible, and cost-effective.\"]{.mark}** (Mattingly 1999, 136)

\"If messages are not communicated well enough, public and political
pressure will continue to emphasize immediate response and recovery,
undermining more comprehensive strategies offering greater long-term
benefits.\" (Britton 1999, 216)

\"Agencies overseeing disaster management must translate...core concepts
into practical models...guidelines and policy proposals that can be
implemented both nationally and locally....Much of the available
information is not reaching decision-makers, or it is often provided in
a form that cannot be readily used.\" (Britton 1999, 216)

\"...traditional disaster management training has to undergo a radical
shift in content, process and format if it is to undergo a
re-orientation from predominantly emergency preparedness and response,
to mitigation and prevention.\" (Kotze 1999, 148)

\"Emergency management exists within a complex political, economic and
social environment.\" (Britton 2001, 16)

\"A focus on disasters...tends to create a preoccupation with the
unusual event and a corresponding neglect of the ordinary. In the field
of disaster management this has had two important consequences. First,
at an intellectual level, interest has focused on the causes of
disasters rather than on the nature of hazards. It is rather **akin to a
study of history that focuses on wars, battles, and military technology
rather than the underlying causes of conflict.** Second, the practical
implication of this intellectual orientation is that much more emphasis
has been given to fighting (managing) the disaster events themselves,
than to understanding and modifying the social processes that create
vulnerability....It is increasingly recognized that disaster management
which focuses heavily on the extreme events and emergency situations can
serve at best as palliative treatment unless it is also accompanied by
efforts to address the more fundamental causes.\" (Burton 1999, 75)

\"...risk reduction involves attempts towards creating a more equitable
society.\" (Kotze 1999, 149)

**12I. Must Assess and Evaluate Programs, Policies and Approaches**

\"Wringing our hands that the public does not support what we want to
do, we rarely take stock of how we\'re doing, much less build in
feedback loops to modify what we do.\" (Mileti, 2001)

**12J. Qualified Personnel Need to Inhabit Emergency Management
Positions.**

> \"The impetus for improvement must come from the higher echelons of
> government and the agencies overseeing disaster management.\" (Britton
> 1999, 216)

# POINT 13 -- EDUCATION IS KEY \-- [Slide 33]{.mark}

**\"...although knowledge does not guarantee power over natural
catastrophe, it is a prime requisite of disaster prevention.\"
(Alexander 2000, 249)**

**\"Human history becomes more and more a race between education and
catastrophe.\"** (H.G. Wells)

> "Success in significantly reducing disasters is within our reach. Now
> is the time to act, for tomorrow is always too late." (Federico Mayor,
> Director-General, UNESCO, in Ingleton 1999, 4)

"By sharing effective methods of preparedness and promoting a greater
awareness of the social and technological advances we have made in
disaster prevention, we can help mitigate the often tragic and always
destructive effects of natural disasters." (President Bill Clinton, in
Ingleton 1999, 2)

**13A. Role of Colleges and Universities \-- [Slide 34 Points]{.mark}**

> \"The Seminar on the Role of Universities and Scientific Institutions
> in Natural Disaster Reduction, organized by the IDNDR and the
> University of Geneva, in Geneva in August, 1995 has identified that
> **universities** and technical institutions **contribute** to
> preparedness and mitigation efforts for disasters in the following
> ways:
>
> \-- **Generation of knowledge** (carrying our research)
>
> \-- **Transfer of knowledge** (training, education, consulting)
>
> \-- Developing networks among universities and other institutions.\"
>
> (Erdik 1999, 234)

\"Academia must develop a multidisciplinary approach to natural
hazards.\" (Mileti, 2001)

"The role of the University:

-   Create the infrastructure and culture necessary for engagement

-   Provide curricula that promotes engagement

-   Redefine scholarship to include both basic and applied research and
    professional service

-   As a knowledge hub: find new ways to disseminate and receive
    knowledge to and from the local, national and international
    communities

-   Form new funding partnerships for engagement activities

-   Develop systems of accountability for engagement activities

-   Be a proactive local, regional, national and international citizen"
    (CDMHA, 2000A)

**13B. Generate Knowledge**

Typical research function:

Hazards and Disaster Technology

Risk Assessment

Risk Management

Cost-Effective Mitigation Measures

Communication of Hazard Risk

**13C. Higher Education Function of Knowledge Transfer \-- [Slide
36]{.mark}**

[Academia may be viewed as neutral or impartial and thus community
members may be willing to listen and trust.]{.mark}

> \"A preparedness strategy involving government, academic, professional
> and technical institutions, the private sector, and individual
> citizens, should be developed with the initiatives of: hazard
> identification and risk assessment; applied research and technology
> transfer; public awareness, training, and education; incentives and
> resources; and leadership and co-ordination to further the goal of
> reducing risk to life and property from natural hazard events.
> **[Reliable and accessible scientific information]{.mark}** about
> disaster risks is critical to making sound decisions on appropriate
> mitigation and response strategies. As such, the primary challenge for
> the academic and technical institutions is to expand the risk
> assessment efforts and to communicate the information of disaster risk
> and mitigation to diverse stakeholders in an easily understandable
> format.\" (Erdik 1999, 234)
>
> \"One of the key results of the IDNDR has been the willingness of
> member countries and other participants to build **a \'culture of
> prevention\'**. Universities can and should **spread this culture** to
> young generations, policy and decision-makers and to the community at
> large.\" (Erdik 1999, 235)
>
> These requirements can only be met through an educational effort that
> will **[provide the knowledge and tools]{.mark}** so that all
> concerned practice hazard mitigation on a regular basis. Education of
> everyone involved, from children to adults, professionals in many
> fields to elected officials, from bureaucrats to the citizen-at-large,
> becomes an essential component of mitigation." (Ricardo Alvarez,
> Florida International University. "Tropical Cyclone," pp. 34-36 in
> Ingleton 1999, 36)
>
> \"While ...public education campaigns of the past have had some
> success in persuading people to check their radio batteries and remove
> their hanging baskets when faced with a cyclone, they are unlikely to
> bring about the kinds of people needed to create the safe society
> envisioned by \[Dr. Frank\] Press[^3]. It has become obvious that this
> fundamental aim of the Decade **will only be achieved if the hazard
> management community and the educational community work together** to
> promote an appropriate environmental ethic in our young people.\"
> (Lidstone 1999, 236)
>
> \"Community understanding and commitment have been demonstrated to
> help create and reinforce political will and commitment to take action
> at the local government level. Elected leaders respond to the desires
> and demands of their constituents. When disaster reduction becomes a
> public value, government commitment comes more easily. It is
> frequently stated that government commitment is the key to getting
> risk reduction implemented.\" (Mattingly 1999, 136)

"In order to consolidate the accomplishments of the IDNDR, there are
lasting principles which can guide collective efforts into a 'Safer
World in the 21^st^ Century'. They include the following:

> \-- Recognition among policy and decision makers that disaster
> reduction is feasible, viable, and makes sense -- in terms of policy,
> practice and investment.
>
> \-- The identification of disaster reduction with sustainable and
> long-term national or organizational development plans and
> accomplishments.
>
> \-- The recognition that effective disaster reduction involves the
> application of a full range of professional disciplines, which extend
> from the scientific to the social and from the academic to the
> practical.
>
> \-- Advanced technical and scientific research is desirable, but more
> basic public understanding of hazards and a shared responsibility to
> prevent disasters from occurring, are fundamental considerations.
>
> **\-- Structured information exchange** \[education\] and the
> formation of effective organizational relationships that extend
> knowledge and transfer practical experience are essential for
> institutionalizing a 'culture of prevention'." (Jeggle 1999, 27)

**13D. Create Partnerships \-- [Slide 37]{.mark}**

"Networking:

-   Communicate regularly with regional institutions engaged in crisis
    mitigation and response

-   Collaborate in research and training." (CDMHA, 2000A)

> Academia (Break Discipline Barriers
>
> Hazards Community
>
> Emergency Management Community
>
> Interest Groups
>
> Community Stakeholders
>
> Public
>
> Be Good Community Citizen

**13E. Foster Change \-- [Slide 38]{.mark}**

> \"Universities have the responsibility to foster change.\" (Snow,
> 2001)

In answer to the question "What do we need to do to change the culture
of mitigation in this country?", Bill Anderson of the National Science
Foundation's Hazard Research Program, responded:

"...we need to give increasing attention to...educating the next
generation of practitioners and researchers. I think that we have not
done a good job here and currently are not doing a good job, especially
in the social sciences. In engineering and the physical sciences we are
in better shape, but the human resource base is lacking with regards to
the hazards field....If we want to change our culture, we need to give
more attention to those researchers who are going to be a part of
society in years to come, because they will have the burden of making
society safer." (Environmental Hazards 2000, 48)

"If you look around at both the pool of practitioners and the pool of
researchers, what do you find? That there are very few African
Americans, and very few Hispanics....If we are going to change the
national culture of hazard mitigation in the United States we've got to
be inclusive and incorporate representatives of all groups that are
vulnerable to natural hazards." (Environmental Hazards 2000, 48)

"Question: We are working on a program to train practitioners and we
would love to have underrepresented communities involved. I would like
to hear your ideas on how we might attract those groups.

Bill Anderson: One suggestion I can think of immediately is to establish
partnerships with minority institutions. The historically black colleges
and universities would be a good source of recruits. A number of
Universities and Community Colleges throughout the US have large pools
of Hispanic students. The University of Puerto Rico produces the largest
number of undergraduate Hispanic engineers in the country and not only
that, many of them are women. I am thinking of the University of Puerto
Rico at Mayaguez. I think establishing partnerships with places like
this would be very useful. There are a number of success stories. For
example, among minority institutions, Georgia Tech has, over the years,
produced the largest number of African American Ph.D.s in engineering
and the reason is that they established connections with historically
black Colleges and Universities in Atlanta (Morehouse, Spellman and so
on). They have a very successful 3-2 program and as a result they
graduate a large number of African American students. Georgia Tech also
has a large number of African American professors on the faculty who are
attracted by this relationship with the historically black colleges. So,
think regionally or nationally. You don't need to think in terms of just
the local area; that's very important. And look to the Community
Colleges, because at the Community Colleges you have the lare
percentages of underrepresented groups, and they are a wonderful source
of recruits. Studies indicate that students who graduate from those
schools do as effectively in a 4-year environment as others."
(Environmental Hazards 2000, 51.)

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[^1]: \$5.9 billion annually according to FEMA (Diane Mastrull, "Danger
    An Issue, US Set To Remap Flood-Prone Areas," *Philadelphia
    Inquirer*, January 12, 2003).

[^2]: Brock N. Meeks. "Fight Against Wildfires Chronically Underfunded."
    *MSNBC.com*, June 16, 2004

[^3]: President of the US National Academy of Sciences.