> **Possibilities of War:\
> The Confluence of Persistent Contemporary Flashpoints**
>
> **and Worrisome New Trouble Spots**
>
> **Dr. Kurt M. Campbell**
>
> **Senior Vice President, Henry A. Kissinger Chair, and Director of the
> International**
>
> **Security Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies
> (CSIS)**
>
> **Washington, DC**

**The views expressed in this and other papers associated with the NIC
2020 project**

**are those of individual participants. They are posted for discussion
purposes**

**only and do not represent the views of the US Government.**

> **Possibilities of War:\
> The Confluence of Persistent Contemporary Flashpoints**
>
> **and Worrisome New Trouble Spots**
>
> **Dr. Kurt M. Campbell**
>
> **Senior Vice President, Henry A. Kissinger Chair, and Director of the
> International**
>
> **Security Program, Center for Strategic and International Studies
> (CSIS)**
>
> **Washington, DC**
>
> **For**
>
> **\"Changing Nature of Warfare\"**
>
> **A Conference in Support of Global Trends 2020**

## Introductory Thoughts

In 1985, the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University
convened a distinguished group of international strategists, academic
luminaries, prominent journalists, and accomplished policymakers to
consider the prospects for conflict at the turn of the century, just
fifteen years away. The group was asked to speculate about the
possibilities for war in an undefined international environment over the
horizon. After two days of extensive discussion, several features of the
dialogue stood out. While there was considerable discussion about the
possibility of a major conflict on the Indian subcontinent and
persistent worries about the militarized situation on the Korean
peninsula (global worries that continue to trouble us to this day), more
interesting was the various prevailing assumptions along with the
glaring omissions that were apparent among the group.

No one dared speculate about an end to the Cold War or the demise of a
narrow bipolar alignment in global affairs. There was, however,
considerable conversation about the prospects for major military clashes
staged in order to safeguard dwindling supplies of various \"strategic\"
resources like manganese and palladium. Much of the discussion was
centered on a still divided Europe and the prospects for inadvertent or
intentional conflict there. The discussants provided little
consideration for the role of ideology in global affairs given the
apparent demise of the attractiveness of communism as an [organizing
concept]{.underline} for political life. There was no real reflection on
global disease or the consequences of climate change. The technological
advances that led to the revolution in military affairs were in their
infancy and no one could imagine a breathtaking record of military
achievements to follow in Panama, the Persian Gulf War (I), Kosovo,
Afghanistan, and Iraq (II, part I). The group was much closer in mindset
and expectations to the tragedy of Vietnam or the dubious \"victory\" in
Grenada than to the sterling record of military accomplishment poised
just out of sight.

In short, the experience was a classic example of the limits of linear
thinking, the unintended and sometimes subtle constraints imposed by
\"serious\" policy audiences, and the tendency for \"out of the box\"
thinking to appear very conventional in hindsight. As a young post
graduate student, it was a very real reminder of how very hard it is to
write or say something useful in such gatherings. The question of the
future of major power conflict however, demands serious attention and
it's valuable to at least lay out some factors in the international
environment that bear watching in the years to come.

It is useful to ask three specific questions when it comes to the future
of fighting: (1) what will be fought over; (2) who will do the fighting;
(3) and with what will people fight. If the attacks of 9/11 have
demonstrated anything, it is that the greatest threats to U.S. security
in the period ahead probably come from non-state actors and that the
U.S. homeland is perhaps the Achilles heal of global American hegemony.
Any serious belligerent is likely to target the domestic society in some
way as part of its overall strategy (this matter will be taken up by
other speakers). It is also the case that increasingly virulent
technologies (cyber-transmitted, chemical, biological, nuclear, and
potentially nano-technologies in the not too distant future) are more
and more available to highly motivated individuals with apocalyptic
agendas. In this environment, it is sometimes difficult to imagine
traditional state-to-state violence on a massive scale, but if 9/11
taught us another thing, it is to be prepared for surprises.

While there is currently considerable celebration over the general
congeniality among the major powers in the international arena, there is
considerable cause to question the durability of this concert of powers.
The perception of China\'s rise is perceptible in the Asia-Pacific
region and elsewhere and would be more apparent to the U.S. if it were
not so fully preoccupied with the awful developments transpiring in the
Middle East. Indeed, the conventional wisdom on September 10,2001 was
that the U.S. and China were heading for an almost preordained clash in
the future and that the U.S. must begin to take steps to anticipate such
a conflict. Perhaps the biggest surprise of the last few years is just
how well Washington and Beijing have got on together given all the
challenging issues they must continuously negotiate (Taiwan, trade,
human rights, etc.).

There are likely to be innumerable scenarios that could trigger a major
clash between one or more major powers in the years to come. I will not
speculate in this paper about energy shortfalls and the rise of
nationalism or the prospects for arms races and how each of these might
trigger a major conflagration. Instead, the contention here is that
perhaps the greatest contributor to potential conflicts in the near
distant future is the prospect of a strategic failure for the U.S. (as
opposed to a military failure) in Iraq and the larger Middle East.
America bogging down for a sustained period is likely to lead to several
potential outcomes, each of which will be explored in greater detail
below. These are: innumerable regional problems as a consequence of our
policies in the greater Middle East, U.S. preoccupation away from Asia
(the setting for the most intense traditional interstate rivalries and
the place where U.S. involvement is the greatest brake on overt
rivalries), prospects for new nuclear proliferation, and a renewed
reticence about the American exercise of force in pursuit of its
interests.

## The Consequences of Failure in the American Crusade in the Middle East

Former Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara was fond of saying that
the Middle East was the graveyard of American diplomatic hopes and
dreams, and this is a man who knows something about disappointment in
global politics (as well as cemeteries). Now, the United States has
embarked upon an ambitious mission to remake the Middle East, from
rebuilding war-ravaged and leader-abused countries in Afghanistan and
Iraq, seeking to settle the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians,
blocking further nuclear proliferation, pushing the region to embrace
political moderation and reform, and hopefully improving America\'s
image in the region in the process.

There are unintentional though unavoidable echoes of the \"best and the
brightest\" of the Vietnam generation in this campaign as the U.S.
embarks upon a global crusade (call it what it is) to help re-direct the
course of one of the world\'s dominant civilizations and the
institutions that have served it so poorly. This uniquely American sense
of mission and manifest destiny is apparent in a range of endeavors
worldwide but it is in the Middle East where U.S. ambitions approach the
point of audacity. It is also in the Middle East where the consequences
of strategic failure raise the greatest prospects for ensuing conflict
that blurs the distinctions between state and non-state actors.

It would be difficult to exaggerate the stakes, both for the region and
long term American security. Yet it is unclear whether the American
leaders or people fully appreciate the magnitude of the task ahead or
the risks involved. To be successful in creating a more secure, stable,
prosperous, and democratic Middle East will likely require the
perseverance and patience of the long, twilight Cold War struggle, the
money and resources of the Marshall Plan, and perhaps even the military
sacrifices of conflicts past, but hopefully never on the scale of
Vietnam or Korea. This is a cross-generational project and we have
gotten off to an auspiciously bad start.

The Middle East is a region that defies easy generalizations and
one-size-fits-all solutions. Stretching from the deserts of the Maghreb
to the waters of the Persian Gulf and beyond, the region encompasses
enormous wealth and tragic poverty, political tyranny and religious
extremism, strong security partners and ruthless terrorist networks. It
will likely remain this way for some years to come. The Middle East is
also the proverbial head waters of perhaps the most immediate and
intractable threats to American security in the world today. U.S. grand
strategy in the past was notable for several features, including the
\"dual containment\" of Iraq and Iran through conventional deterrence, a
long-standing policy to ensure the safety of oil flows from the Gulf, a
robust commitment to the security of Israel, and periodic forays into
the business of promoting a Middle East peace.

This traditional agenda had general bipartisan appeal and support, but
the case for a more powerful set of policy objectives had been building
for years, and the shock of 9/11 served as the catalyst for embracing a
much more activist, even revolutionary, agenda for the region. While
there are some clear areas of continuity, the new approach \-- when
viewed in its entirety \-- represents both a substantial departure from
previous efforts and a fundamental increase in American concern and
commitment. The case for re­making the Middle East rests on five key
policy objectives, and the U.S. is currently operating along each of
these five distinct but interrelated tracks \-- and one might argue
failing distinctively on each. These are as follows:

*Pursue a Comprehensive Middle East Peace:* The U.S. has been committed
at least rhetorically to finding a Middle East peace, in part as an
appeal to Arab hearts and minds. One of the remarkable aspects of the
Israeli-Palestinian struggle is that even after so many unsuccessful
efforts at peacemaking, new initiatives can still rouse hopes, however
faint. They may not be high for the eventual success of the \"road map\"
and every politician on every side, including President Bush, has taken
pains not to exaggerate the prospects. Indeed, everything that has
transpired in the current process \--the summit meetings, the
ceasefires, the pullbacks, the tapping of special American envoys and
interlocutors, the subtle U.S. pressures behind the scenes \-- has all
been tried before.

For Hamas, Fatah, and Islamic Jihad, a temporary ceasefire is a tactic,
not a religious conversion on the road to Damascus. The Israelis are
nearing completion on their separation wall, and we are still a long way
from actually uprooting a settlement. For most Israelis, the time when
its citizens believed that a peace settlement was key to achieving
fundamental security has long since passed. Israelis want their
government to fight terror, first and foremost, and arguably Americans
consider Israel\'s security to be the prime directive in our overall
approach to the Middle East. The Bush administration, after initially
keeping some distance from the peace process (which looked like anything
but during the *intifada)* has now waded in at least part way and is
engaged in the dialogue. Despite all the early talk of being sparing
with Presidential prestige and notions of \"ripeness\" to prevent
diplomatic overextension, the U.S. is now inextricably in the mix. Yet,
there is near universal condemnation of the U.S. approach to the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict and there remains no real prospect for
finding any common ground given the current environment.

*Rebuild Afghanistan and Iraq:* After dashing to swift military
victories in Afghanistan and Iraq, the U.S. is now slogging through very
unsettling periods of nation-building in the former and occupation in
the latter. Historians and commentators have begun to recite the eerie
similarities between the triumphalist speeches by U.S. officials after
the fall of Baghdad and much earlier statements from an era when Iraq
was called Mesopotamia. When the British captured Baghdad in March of
1917, after hard fighting in which thousands of colonial Indian troops
were killed, Major General Stanley Maude greeted the suspicious
onlookers with a speech that could have been given by Paul Bremer: \"Our
armies do not come into your cities and lands as conquerors or enemies,
but as liberators.\" Of course, this turned out not to be the case for
Britain and it looks increasingly to be America\'s ultimate destiny as
well. It is certainly instructive to look back on that earlier effort by
the leading Western power of the time to refashion the Middle East,
especially as the American efforts in Iraq appear increasingly beset.

Certainly the very recent days in the desert bear little resemblance to
the last time America undertook occupations in Japan and Germany
respectively after World War II. But surely the biggest worry for the
U.S. will not be a long and unhappy occupation but rather a temptation
to cut and run when the going gets (or stays) tough on the ground. The
hope has been \-- recent events clearly underscore that there is yet to
be thoroughgoing plan \-- that a successful transition to democracy and
the establishment of a responsible, secular government in Iraq is still
possible and can provide a powerful example to other authoritarian
regimes in the neighborhood flirting with reform, a democratic domino
effect across the desert.

*Block nuclear proliferation and the spread of other weapons of mass
destruction to and from the Middle East:* Despite the furor over sixteen
words and the inability to find evidence of a serious WMD program, is
there any doubt that the United States went to war to prevent Iraq from
developing weapons of mass destruction? A classic case not of preemption
but of preventive war, the U.S. has already demonstrated a determination
to head off new nuclear proliferation among rogue regimes, either in the
Axis of Evil camp or those camping nearby. Iraq, for all its
difficulties, turns out to be the easy case in the region, as the U.S.
considers much tougher choices over Iran and possibly others. The
situation is further complicated by a host of transnational terror
groups based in the region that seek to acquire these forbidden weapons.
9/11 provided a convincing reminder, if we needed one, of the dangers of
these deadly technologies falling into the wrong hands.

Clearly, a strategy designed to mitigate arguably the single biggest
worry for the United States in international security requires a
multifaceted approach, including enhanced international cooperation in
intelligence sharing, greater efforts to secure the still dangerous WMD
inheritance of the former Soviet Union, a more serious approach to
homeland security, and potentially Osirak-style and larger military
options to deal with imminent proliferation. The long term plan is to
dramatically reduce the demand for such weapons through social and
political reengineering, but that still leaves us with urgent short term
challenges, beginning in Iran.

*Promote political liberalization and the modernization of the Middle
East states:* At the outset, it is important to declare that the United
States on its own cannot reform the Middle East. Only the region's
inhabitants can do that. But the idea has been that the United States
can be a catalyst to help introduce change into the grim stalemate that
currently exists between conservative, authoritarian governments and an
increasingly restive Arab intelligentsia and middle classes that hanker
for reform. The entire political system that has prevailed in the Muslim
world since the end of the colonial era is under siege from both radical
and moderate elements within societies.

Through much expanded and highly conditional foreign assistance,
increased opportunities for trade and investment, greater insistence by
the international community on accountability in terms of economic
decision-making and implementing true government reforms, the United
States, working with its western partners over a sustained period, can
make a difference in the region. Yet, we have left to join this struggle
very late in the day and with little national appreciation for the
complex forces \--both political and religious \-- that are swirling in
the region like sand in the desert. Ultimately, the U.S. must make an
effort to better understand the deep complexities and mysteries of the
Middle East to stand a better chance at succeeding at recreating the
failed political, educational and economic institutions that have
dominated the region for decades. Ironically, the Bush administration\'s
Greater Middle East Initiative, while designed to promote all of the
above, is thoroughly discredited in the region as a result of
inexcusable U.S. missteps in Iraq.

*Improving America\'s Image Problem:* While it is tempting to simply
focus on the rather self-referential question \"Why do they hate us?"
the Middle East reality is entirely more complicated. The main battle
ongoing in the Middle East today is for the very soul of Islam, as
expertly conveyed in Bernard Lewis' new book [The Crisis in
Islam.]{.underline} He describes not so much a clash of civilizations
between Middle East and West but an internal struggle between radical
Islam and its more moderate strains. As Jim Hoagland has written: \"The
American way of life, U.S. support for Israel, and Washington\'s
military power provoke specific animosities towards the United States by
the jihadists. But their rage against those they consider fallen-away
Muslims is great. Apostates are the worst of all infidels. Arab leaders
who exercise power through the nation-states created in the colonial era
are turncoats and usurpers.\"

The United States in many ways has stumbled into a central role in a
contest between the two main branches of Islam: the Shiites, a minority
who rule as a majority in Iran but are downtrodden elsewhere and the
Sunni majority that dominates commerce and politics in most Arab states.
Americans are somewhat uncomfortable acknowledging the role of religion
in politics (both at home and abroad) and as a result we have focused
our attention on the region\'s political class and used the military as
the primary tool of policy. Ultimately, the key to winning this battle
is for the U.S. to assist in the mobilization of a revitalized Islamic
mainstream that embraces public life and civic responsibility. This is
certainly no easy task and our tools for influencing the outcome of
events are limited. Further, the images of prison abuse from Iraq that
have spread like a desert storm throughout the region have severely set
back efforts to improve America\'s standing in the region.

A powerful case can be made that despite our efforts, we are failing \--
and failing badly - across each of these interrelated tasks. If these
trends continue, there are likely to be several severe consequences.
Authoritarian Arab regimes in the Middle East will cling more
tenaciously to power. Powerful regional players like Iran are likely to
be emboldened. In an effort to stem the negative tide, the U.S. will
devote more resources and attention to the Middle East at the expense of
other regions (notably Asia). It is even conceivable that Islamic
jihadists could gain greater power inside existing state structures in
countries like Pakistan or even Iraq. Even if the U.S. acquits itself
well on the battlefields of Iraq it is still possible to face a
strategic failure of manifest proportions. Such a major setback would
likely make it much more difficult to contemplate subsequent military
actions elsewhere given growing public questions and misgivings.

## New Nuclear States?

For nearly half a century, a central aspect of U.S. diplomacy and
national security strategy has been preventing the spread of nuclear
weapons. Over the last decade, this pursuit has focused primarily on
stopping unsavory regimes such as North Korea, Iran, and Iraq from
acquiring or developing a nuclear capability. After September 11th,
there was new urgency to stop terrorists from getting their hands on
such destructive power. Yet, for all the attention given these usual
suspects, there has been remarkably little consideration of another
class of future potential proliferators: those states that in the past
chose to forgo the nuclear option, but for a variety of reasons could in
the future revisit that decision and pursue a nuclear capability.[^1]
There is a real risk that the concerted diplomatic efforts during and
since the Cold War aimed at slowing, halting or reversing nuclear
proliferation may be starting to unravel \-- this time involving
so-called \"responsible\" states that decades ago decided against
developing a nuclear capability.

Countries such as Egypt, Germany, Japan, Saudi Arabia, South Korea,
Syria, Taiwan, and Turkey have an been mainstays in the non-nuclear club
even though some of them quietly flirted with nuclear weapons in the
past. However, a combination of security guarantees, domestic politics,
and international pressure has usually been enough to dissuade them. In
the simplest terms, the potential costs outweighed the perceived
benefits.

But much has changed that could upset the delicate balance of incentives
and disincentives that were so laboriously put in place during and after
the Cold War. There have been rapid changes in the international system
and there are major new sources of global upheaval and uncertainty,
including:

-   The now distant end of a bipolar, \"stable\" global environment in
    which security guarantees were a central part of the U.S.-Soviet
    standoff;

-   New nuclear states in India and Pakistan;

-   The dominant preeminence of American power and concerns about the
    future strategic direction of the United States;

-   Weak and potential failed states and havens of lawlessness and
    instability throughout an \"arc of instability\" from South America
    to Africa, the Caucasus, and Southeast Asia; and

-   New threats from terrorists with global reach.

A serious American setback in the Middle East could well be an ultimate
catalyst to drive nuclear reconsiderations in the not too distant
future.

Each of the states named above has experienced enormous domestic changes
in recent years and can anticipate more uncertainty ahead. For many, the
surrounding regional situation or larger international environment has
become less stable and in some cases more ominous. For instance, talk of
a nuclear option was virtually unthinkable in Japan a decade ago, but
there has been, more recently, a rising chorus of commentators both in
and out of government that publicly support open debate around the
highly contentious matter of Japan\'s potential nuclear future. It would
be an exaggeration to suggest that a collection of comments and opinion
pieces indicate a nuclear program on the horizon, but it would also be
imprudent to rule out a future with more nuclear powers without more
careful study and examination.

What specific factors would inspire a country to retreat from a
well-established non-nuclear national identity in favor of an arsenal
that includes atomic devices and the means for their delivery? The most
likely case would probably involve several factors interacting and
reinforcing in complex ways. Five key international and domestic factors
that could lead to a reversal in a country\'s nuclear posture are:

1.  Direction of U.S. Foreign and Security Policy

2.  Breakdown of the Global Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime

3.  Eroding Regional or Global Security Situations

4.  Domestic Imperatives

5.  Increasing Availability of Technology

Of course, no single feature of the new strategic landscape may give one
great pause. Instead, the various ways multiple factors might accumulate
and reinforce one another will account for many of the new dangers. For
example, there have always been terrorist groups, but there has never
before been the simultaneous concentration of terrorist groups with
global reach, the diffusion of bomb design information, and the
possibility of unaccounted nuclear material from the former Soviet
Union. Another example is the increasing ease with which a country like
Pakistan can miniaturize a nuclear device with assistance from China and
place it on top of a ballistic missile purchased from North Korea. This
type of transnational trade in weapons of mass destruction and related
technologies is a growing development and one that can exponentially
increase the threat of nuclear proliferation. These technical and
regional factors coincide with an unstable international period, in
which there are concerns about the direction of U.S. foreign policy and
anxieties about the sustainability of the global nonproliferation regime
(an exhibit being the apparent international nonchalance in the matter
of North Korea\'s brazen flouting of International Atomic Energy Agency
mandate).

The U.S. and others have tended to underestimate the prospects for new
nuclear proliferation and the potentially escalatory dynamic these steps
could trigger in delicate regional situations. Already the prospect of a
North Korea with a substantial nuclear arsenal is triggering a cascading
insecurity \-- and reconsideration of security related options \--
throughout Asia.

The potential for nuclear proliferation among states that had formerly
forsworn the option deserves study and attention from U.S. policymakers;
it is timely to consider what collection of incentives \-- or erosion of
disincentives \-- might provoke a country that we now place squarely in
the non-nuclear camp to reconsider their nuclear options. Identifying
the potential factors that could lead to a new round of proliferation
among these countries should now be seen as a critical new feature of
American intelligence collection and analysis, preventive diplomacy, and
U.S. decision-making on issues ranging from national strategy to public
diplomacy.[^2] A profound American setback in the Middle East could well
provide a nudge towards a \'\'nuclear tipping point\" that would usher
in a world with several more nuclear powers, with all the attendant
possibilities for conflict associated with that potentially ominous
development.

## Dynamic Asia \-- Preoccupied America

Asia enters the 21^st^ century on the cusp of major strategic change.
Japanese commentators have taken to referring to the 1990\'s as \'\'the
lost decade\" because of their own protracted economic malaise, while
others have appropriated the term in describing the lackluster progress
in Asian multilateralism in the security realm. While that moniker
obscures the many important developments in the decade \-- such as the
potentially calamitous Asian economic crisis and a host of other
security predicaments \-- the last ten years have set us up to expect a
degree of predictability and rationality in the progression of Asian
events. The end of the Cold War in Europe brought with it a host of
strategic challenges, including managing the reunification of Germany,
establishing the rationale and procedure for NATO enlargement, and
dealing with the difficult consequences associated with the
disintegration of Tito\'s Yugoslavia. There was nothing comparable in
strategic terms in Asia, at least in an immediate sense, and yet this
period of supposed strategic placidity has led to expectations in some
quarters that present trends will continue into the future.

However, the near future in Asia is likely to represent a significant
departure from the past. That is, Asia stands on the cusp of significant
strategic change. Indeed, the sense of continuity in Asian political and
security trends has tended to obscure developments that point to
potentially significant strategic changes ahead. Some of these could
well lead to big power competition and even overt conflict.

What are some of the likely indicators that point to change on the
horizon? The rise and fall of major states and the process of
\'hegemonic transition\' has historically been associated with periods
of upheaval (the perception of American hegemony coupled with the rise
of China and absence of Russia). Strong historical rivalries and endemic
political distrust among leading states can also be indicative of
underlying problems that threaten to break out on the surface
(essentially in all of Asia). Political incoherence \-- or worse yet the
disintegration of a state \-- in a regional setting can be very
disruptive to larger political dynamics (North Korea and Indonesia).
Regions that experience large disparities in economic performance also
bear watching (the successful Malaysian defection from the IMF programs
undertaken by Thailand and South Korea). The rise of a religious
fundamentalism in the cultural fabric of the region (much of Southeast
Asia). The potential success of a major ongoing negotiation (between
North and South Korea?) or a diplomatic failure (between China and
Taiwan or India and Pakistan?) can have an enormous impact on the
outlook of a region. Further, a sudden introduction of new military
technology (such as the large numbers of short-range PRC missiles
pointed at Taiwan or an ambitious anti-ballistic missile program
envisioned by the U.S.) can be very significant. The lack of a
functioning multilateral security structure (compare the ASEAN Regional
Forum (ARF) with NATO) or even a commonly shared set of regional
security norms (witness the difficulty in establishing a basic code of
conduct for managing competition in the Spratly Islands and the South
China Sea) can also prove to be detrimental to the preservation of peace
and stability in a larger regional setting.[^3]

Asia is simultaneously experiencing all of these conditions, and several
of them are intensifying and interacting in unpredictable ways. The
period of supposed strategic placidity (at least on the surface) of the
last decade is corning to an end, and the potential for non-linear,
discontinuous change is of a much higher level of probability now at the
start of the 21st Century.

The reality, of course, is that the seeds of current potential change
are found in previous developments. Some of these previous events or
trends were overlooked or misunderstood at the time, while other
developments can only be fully recognized or appreciated in retrospect.
While some commentators have tended to downplay the consequences for
Asia with the conclusion of superpower competition, the end of the Cold
War in fact triggered a series of crucial events in Asia whose ultimate
manifestations will only be fully realized in the coming years.

The end of U.S.-Soviet competition and rivalry removed the most obvious
rationale for Sino-U.S. cooperation, and ever since, leaders in
Washington and Beijing have struggled to identify the foundation upon
which a strategic partnership could be built.[^4] Japan, slowly but
inexorably, has begun to question some of the manifestations of its
long­standing security arrangements with the U.S. and its own defense
identity in Asia as the new realities of the post-Cold War world have
become better understood by the Japanese people and politicians.[^5]
North Korea, the last remaining vanguard of an outmoded form of
socialist organization, found itself truly isolated after the demise of
the Soviet Union and the onset of market sensibilities in Beijing. As a
result, the hermit leadership was left to increasingly (and desperately)
rely on its *juche* philosophy of self-sufficiency and contemplate more
daring diplomatic gambits (accepting the four party talks and embarking
upon high stakes North-South and U.S. Summitry).[^6]

The Cold War\'s demise also made it increasingly difficult to depict
various Southeast Asian states, notably Indonesia, as pieces on a global
chessboard. The presumed necessity of bolstering undemocratic regimes
for the sake of internal stability and maintaining regional balances was
blasted to bits, and the allegations about foreign-backed internal
subversion lost much of their appeal in Western capitals, particularly
in the United States. The way the Cold War ended also led many in the
region to assume two things about Russia: one, that Russia\'s focus
would continue to be almost exclusively on European developments (and
not Asian diplomacy), and two, that Russia was in decline \-- and not
likely to reemerge \-- as an important actor to be taken seriously again
any time soon (two suppositions that could well be challenged in the
future). Finally, the U.S. began the decade of the 1990\'s in apparent
decline, its energies allegedly wasted on a costly, protracted global
competition with the Soviet Union, only to emerge by the end of the
decade as the uber-power, unmatched in every dimension of national
capabilities.[^7]

Asia embarks upon the new century with a dubious distinction. While the
much-overused moniker \"The Pacific Century\" conjures up images of
commercial promise and political dynamism, the reality is that Asia is a
dangerous place. For the first time in modem political history every
major challenge to peace and stability in the international arena is
currently found in greater Asia. Any of three situations could trigger a
major conflagration virtually overnight: there is the still dangerous
division of the Korean peninsula; the increasingly tense and
unpredictable situation across the Taiwan Strait; and the dangerous
nuclear competition on the subcontinent between India and Pakistan.
Europe in comparison seems absolutely peace-loving, with troubles in the
Balkans for sure, but overall, relatively stable in historical terms.

Perhaps the most important place to start in identifying signs of
strategic change in the Asia-Pacific region is the United States. There
are several critical factors to watch here. American power and influence
is apparent in every aspect of international life, including military
affairs, international commerce, and global information and culture.
Nowhere is this U.S. influence more palpably felt and understood as in
Asia. In many ways, this is a truly remarkable turnaround from the
political-military aftershocks of the end of the Vietnam War in 1975 and
the economic recovery from the late 1980\'s era of economic malaise.
This unprecedented power \-- referred to in some Asian capitals as
simply \'hegemony\' \-- has led to intricate thinking about ways in
which Asian countries can both take advantage of American influence
while seeking to contain or undermine it at the same time. U.S.
leadership is generally appreciated and desired by most Asian states,
just not so much of it. Currently, American power and influence are seen
as too important to the smooth functioning of the global economy and
international political system to allow for simple obstructionist
approaches. A mix of self- interested cooperation \-- to go along with
the subtle and not so subtle undermining \-- is a necessary part of any
sophisticated strategy. One Asian Ambassador in Washington explains,
\"The current analogy between U.S. global dominance and Microsoft\'s
commanding market share is very compelling. Like Microsoft, we want to
see U.S. power weakened, but at the same time we use and appreciate the
operating system it provides.\" This proclivity to seek to counter
certain manifestations of American power will probably continue;
certainly while this period of U.S. predominance lasts. Indeed, the
contradictions in Asian attitudes towards the U.S. will likely be a
continuing feature in Asian security diplomacy.[^8]

Yet the biggest fear currently associated with the U.S. is that the
quagmire in Iraq will draw America away from Asia at a time of
potentially historic changes. Asians are constantly looking for evidence
\-- such as the recent announcement that several thousand army personnel
will be leaving strategic positions along the DMZ for Iraq \-- that the
U.S. is more focused elsewhere. This prospect of the U.S. engaged
elsewhere for a decade or so is deeply unsettling to much of Asia and
already there are signs of new coping strategies emerging.

The strategic uncertainty identified above, associated with the changing
security landscape, has led many Asian states to hedge, diplomatically
and militarily. This region- wide hedging takes many forms, including
the pursuit of ambitious diplomatic agendas with key states, notably
China, and simultaneous efforts to sustain stronger security ties with
the U.S. (including assisting the U.S. in out-of-area pursuits as part
of a larger American foreign policy agenda). However, the most obvious
way to hedge in the security sphere is by seeking to acquire greater
military capabilities. There are a number of trends to watch closely.
Japan and China provide an interesting contrast in this regard. China
still has a relatively outmoded military, but their leadership is
clearly investing in \"pockets of excellence,\" primarily in missiles,
fighter aircraft, and C4I for possible future contingencies in the
Taiwan Strait. Since the Taiwan Straits crisis of 1995-96, the Chinese
political and military elite has become increasingly preoccupied with
developing capabilities and plans for possible military options against
Taiwan in the future.[^9]

Japan on the other hand has a relatively sophisticated military -- it is
equipped with high performance fighter aircraft, Aegis class destroyers,
and a well-trained army \-- but has been engaged in a protracted
internal deliberation as to whether to amend the nation\'s restrictive
constitution when it comes to the use of force in situations beyond
simple self-defense. Japanese self-defense forces have already deployed
to support operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Simply put, China has the
will, but not yet the capabilities, while Japan has long possessed the
wherewithal, but not yet the national consensus. These two contrasting
trends in the two most powerful nations of Asia will have a crucial
bearing on the security situation in the region as a whole.

Several other Asian states \-- including Thailand, Indonesia, Singapore,
Malaysia, and South Korea \-- were in the midst of significant military
modernization efforts in 1997 when the economic crisis hit. Most of
these plans for upgrading capabilities in combat aircraft and naval
platforms were subsequently shelved. Only now, as their economies
rebound, are some Asian states looking again at incremental
modernization programs. Overall, Asia still has relatively modest
national arsenals, with only China taking significant steps to build
national military capabilities through internal procurement, extensive
purchases from Russia, and clandestine cooperation with Israel.[^10]

It is often said that Asia has only one true multilateral security
institution, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF hereafter), but the reality
is there are no true multilateral security institutions in Asia. This
absence is not an accident. Asian states large and small have been
reluctant to entertain the creation of a security architecture that
either sacrifices national sovereignty or legitimizes any form of
collective security. Existing region-wide institutions such as the ARF
promote multilateral dialogue, not collective defense arrangements.
Peace and stability since the end of the Vietnam war in 1975 has rested
on the forward deployment of substantial numbers of U.S. forces (roughly
100,000 soldiers, sailors, and marines) and a diverse collection U.S.
bilateral security ties with Japan, South Korea, Australia, Thailand,
and the Philippines. Virtually no country in Asia is fully satisfied
with this proposition, but the continuation of the status quo has often
seemed a better bet compared with the alternatives (i.e., some security
framework that potentially condones military actions in a crisis). ARF
has expanded its scope of activities into areas like exchanging defense
white papers and sanctioning search and rescue workshops, but the
progress has been slow in recent years, particularly when collective
attentions in Asia were focused more on economic recovery than
multilateral security.[^11]

This lack of a genuine security framework is acceptable as long as the
United States is present and engaged. Yet a prolonged strategic
stalemate for the U.S. in the Middle East could cause even further
hedging, with states either cozying up to China, seeking greater
unilateral capabilities, or both. These circumstances create situations
that are ripe for misunderstanding and miscalculation and could well
provide the setting for future clashes between major states.

## America Uncertain?

With the very recent history of robust American unilateralism and
demonstrated military supremacy, it is difficult to image a U.S. that is
much more reluctant to exercise force in a sustained, thoroughgoing
fashion. Yet, it is not inconceivable that one of the many negative
consequences of failure in Iraq \-- to accompany emboldening our
fundamentalist opponents, creating greater instability among the oil
producing countries of the Middle East, distracting our attention from
other global problem areas, and possibly setting back the very course of
political reform we are seeking to promote \-- will be a more timid
America that is less confident about the circumstances that call for the
employment of substantial military power. Such a development would
almost certainly be seen as an opportunity by some state such as a
rising China, a regionally unchallenged Iran, or others, to test
American power.

While non-state actors such as al-Qa'ida or other Islamic splinter
groups are likely to pose the most significant threats to global
security, the prospect for more conventional conflict between states \--
particularly in Asia or the Middle East \-- should not be dismissed.

Innumerable things are likely to trigger traditional conflicts between
states in fifteen years. Insecurity about energy supplies, worries
associated with new proliferation, and the prospects of profound turmoil
in the Middle East are all certainly possible, perhaps even likely. All
these problems will either be triggered by or exacerbated by an American
failure in Iraq.

It is difficult to imagine a strategic setback in Iraq that could match
the intensity or duration of the Vietnam War\'s aftermath. Yet, in
scarcely a decade, the U.S. position in Asia had nearly completely
recovered. The last two decades have been something of a golden age for
American power in Asia-Pacific region. It is difficult to imagine the
U.S. retaining its influence or recovering its prestige so quickly in
the Middle East should we suffer a similar strategic fate in Iraq.

[^1]: For an excellent treatment of why many advanced industrial
    countries chose *not* to seek nuclear weapons, see Mitchell Reiss,
    [Without the Bomb (Columbia]{.underline} University Press: New York,
    NY, 1988)

[^2]: Certainly there are those who believe that nuclear proliferation
    can be stabilizing and that the developments described in this
    chapter are not cause for alarm, but rather for optimism \-- see,
    for example, Kenneth N. Waltz, \"Chapter I: More May Be Better,\" in
    Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, *The Spread of Nuclear Weapons:
    A Debate.* W.W. Norton & Company, New York, 1995, Page 1. However,
    we assume that the U.S. desires to - and should - continue its
    long-standing policy of limiting nuclear proliferation.

[^3]: For a recent description of the emerging East Asian security
    architecture and the risks and possibilities associated, see Kent E.
    Calder, 2001. \"The New Face of Northeast Asia.\" *Foreign Affairs.*
    Volume 80, No. 1: 112-117.

[^4]: David Shambaugh. 2001. \"Facing Reality in China Policy.\"
    *Foreign Affairs.* Volume 80, No.1: 50-64.

[^5]: Japan has struggled with the issue of autonomy for \'years, as
    comprehensive examinations of their defense procurement plans
    demonstrate. See Michael J. Green. 1995. *Arming Japan: Defense
    Production. Alliance Politics and the Postwar Search for Autonomy.*
    Columbia University Press: New York. 147-149.

[^6]: Nicholas Eberstadt. 1995. *Korea Approaches Reunification.* M.E.
    Sharpe: Armonk, New York. 133-137.

[^7]: Richard N. Haass. 1999. \"What to Do With American Primacy.\"
    *Foreign Affairs.* Volume 78, No.5: 37.

[^8]: Calder, 2001: 114-122. Ted Galen Carpenter. 1999. \"Roiling
    Asia,\" *Foreign Affairs.* Volume 77, No.6: 2-6.

[^9]: William M. Carpentar. 2000. \"The Taiwan Strait Triangle.\"
    *Comparative Strategy.* Volume 19, No.4: 331,335.

[^10]: For a description of the relationship between the Asian economic
    crisis and military spending in Asia, see Glenn Shloss. 2000,
    \"Market for War turns Bullish,\" *South China Morning Post.* March
    15: 15. For analysis of recent Chinese arms acquisitions, see
    Shirley A. Kan. 2000. \"China\'s Foreign Conventional Arms
    Acquisitions: Background and Analysis.\" *CRS Report Order Code
    RL30700.* October.

[^11]: For a discussion of the benefits and limitations of Track II
    diplomacy in Southeast Asia see Herman Joseph S. Kraft. 2000. \"The
    Autonomy Dilemma of Track Two Diplomacy in Southeast Asia.\"
    *Security Dialogue.* Volume 3 I, No.3: 343-356. For a description of
    the evolving relationship between the ARF and defense cooperation in
    Southeast Asia, see Sheldon W. Simon. 1998. \"Security prospects in
    Southeast Asia: collaborative efforts and the ASEAN Regional
    Forum.\" *The Pacific Review.* Volume II, No.2: 195­212.