July 28, 2003

TO: All Prospective Applicants

SUBJECT: Amendment No. 003 to Solicitation No. DE-PS36-03GO93010,

Controlled Hydrogen Fleet and Infrastructure Demonstration and
Validation Project

The Solicitation is amended as follows:

**1. Additional Documents:**

a\. The DOE "Program Safety guidance document" referenced in **Appendix
C, V. Tasks, A. Hydrogen-Powered Vehicles, 6. Safety Plan** is included
as Attachment 1 to this amendment and as a file attachment on the
"Financial Assistance Form" page on the Industry Interactive Procurement
System under this Solicitation number.

b\. The DOE draft "Data Management Plan" referenced in **Section V.,
Additional Information, D. Treatment of Proprietary Data** is included
as Attachment 2 to this amendment and as a file attachment on the
"Financial Assistance Form" page on the Industry Interactive Procurement
System under this Solicitation number. The draft plan is available for
public comment until COB Monday August 11, 2003. All comments must be
sent via email to <H2validation@go.doe.gov>. A final version will be
posted by amendment to the Solicitation in late August.

> /s/
>
> James P. Damm
>
> Contracting Officer
>
> Golden Field Office

**Guidance for Safety Aspects\
of Proposed Hydrogen Projects**

**July 2003**

![](media/image1.png){width="1.9791666666666667in"
height="1.9791666666666667in"}

U.S. Department of Energy\
Hydrogen, Fuel Cells & Infrastructure Technologies Program

#### Table of Contents

Overview page 1

Identification of Safety Vulnerabilities (ISV) page 2

Safety Assessment page 3

Detailed Outline of Risk Mitigation Plan page 4

Safety Performance Measurement and Monitoring page 4

Communications Plan Outline page 5

Appendix A: Example Hazard Identification Table page 6

Appendix B: Example Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) page 17

Appendix C: Risk-binning Matrix, Frequency Criteria, Consequence
Criteria page 18

**Guidance for Safety Aspects of Proposed Hydrogen Projects**

**Overview**

This guidance document provides proposers with clarification on safety
requirements for hydrogen-related solicitations from the U.S. Department
of Energy Hydrogen, Fuel Cells and Infrastructure Technologies Program.

The document will explain the objectives that must be met and provide
examples, but it will not outline the detailed steps that must be
completed in a safety plan. The responsibility of selecting the specific
safety methodology and the justification of that method falls upon the
principal investigator and related research groups. Standard practices
exist for the qualification of safety hazards, and the proposers must
choose which are best for their project.

Safe practices in the production, storage, distribution, and use of
hydrogen are essential for insurability. A catastrophic failure in any
hydrogen project could damage the insurance industry's perception of
hydrogen and fuel cells. The Hydrogen, Fuel Cells and Infrastructure
Technologies Program is developing and implementing practices that, if
implemented early in a project, will provide an environment where safety
is an integral component of any Department of Energy-funded project.

A safety plan identifies immediate (primary) failure modes as well as
any secondary failure modes that may come about as a result of other
failures. In such a plan, every conceivable failure is identified, from
catastrophic failures to benign collateral failures. The documentation
of benign failures can be used to address a more serious failure.

All potential hazards in a hydrogen production, utilization, or storage
system must be identified and analyzed, as well as any system aspects
that may be adversely affected by a failure. These aspects include:

-   **Personnel.** The identification and mitigation of any hazards that
    pose a risk of injury or loss of life to personnel. A complete
    safety assessment considers not only those personnel who are
    directly involved in a hydrogen process, but also those who may not
    be involved in the process at all, but are still at risk due to
    these hazards.

-   **Equipment.** The prevention of damage to or loss of equipment.
    Damage to equipment can be both the cause of incidents and the
    result of incidents. An equipment failure can result in collateral
    damage to nearby equipment, which can trigger additional equipment
    failures or even present additional risks to personnel. A complete
    safety plan must consider and minimize any risk of equipment damage.

-   **Environment.** Any damage to the environment. Any aspect of a
    natural or built environment that can be harmed due to a failure is
    identified and analyzed. A qualification of the failure modes
    resulting in environmental damage must be included in the safety
    plan.

Project proposals should include a preliminary safety plan that
identifies safety hazards. Systematic procedures must be used to
consider design modifications and alternatives to reduce risks when
hazards are identified, and should include mitigation (passive and
active ventilation, for example) in the case of unforeseen
circumstances.

The following actions are to be performed as a preliminary safety plan
for the proposal:

1.  **Identification of Safety Vulnerabilities (ISV)** -- a Preliminary
    Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA), hazard analysis, or
    probability risk assessment**,** including a plan for preparing the
    final analysis or assessment that identifies significant safety
    concerns. Published data should be used when available. If data are
    not available, engineering practice may be used. The approach should
    be explained if it differs from industry practice.

2.  **Brief example of a safety assessment** (up to 3 pages) for
    installing a new system or testing a new piece of equipment,
    including calculations.

3.  **Detailed outline of the Risk Mitigation Plan** that will apply to
    the project based on the preliminary FMEA/analysis/assessment.

4.  **Description of how safety performance will be measured and
    monitored** to ensure that the FMEA/analysis/assessment is updated
    regularly as data becomes available.

5.  **Detailed outline for the Communications Plan** that the project
    manager will develop and implement during the project. This should
    include a description of reportable accidents, management response,
    and independent reviews during the design/development and operations
    phases of the project and how they will be reported.

**Identification of Safety Vulnerabilities**

The preliminary Identification of Safety Vulnerabilities (ISV) can take
the form of a Preliminary Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA),
hazard analysis, or probability risk assessment**,** and demonstrates
that the proposer has assessed safety early in the process and has
integrated it into the proposed project. The three methodologies are all
established industry standards for reliability engineering. The purpose
is to analyze design components for safety hazards and to demonstrate an
understanding and anticipation of component failures. The most important
objective is the prevention of problems before they occur. In the case
of a failure, the ISV will minimize the effects of that failure. In a
sense, it is a reliability tool as well as a safety tool, as it can help
to identify areas within a system that are prone to failure.

Prior to performing the ISV, efforts should be made to compile
information central to the system. Pertinent information includes:

-   component specifications and configurations,

-   component interaction information,

-   operating procedures, and

-   equipment types.

Information from earlier projects may be effective in the collection of
the above information.

An example of a hazard identification table is shown in Appendix A.

**FMEA**

Various methodologies exist for the creation of a FMEA, and numerous
FMEA guides are available from traditional industry sources. Guidelines
on general safety information are available in various government and
military documents, including MIL-STD-882C and MIL-STD-1629A. In
addition, websites such as **http://www.fmeainfocentre.com/** (a
non-commercial web-based inventory dedicated to the promotion of Failure
Mode and Effect Analysis) and the NASA Technical and Information
Program's **http://www.sti.nasa.gov/new/fmea33.html** may provide
additional information on the development of FMEAs.

In general, the FMEA process follows a standard procedure, as detailed
below:

1.  Identify top level hazards/events

2.  Identify related equipment/components/processes

3.  Identify potential failures

4.  Identify design safety

5.  Identify corrective actions

This outline is repeated for every hazard or component for a complete
system.

A FMEA can be preformed via two different approaches. The hardware, or
component, analysis is the identification and analysis of ramifications
of component failures. This method is a bottom-up approach, wherein
failures are initiated on the subsystem level. The functional approach
is a top-down method, more suitable when specific components have not
yet been chosen. Either approach is acceptable. The development of the
FMEA is a continuous process, and the document should evolve as the
system design changes.

A sample excerpt from a FMEA table is shown in Appendix B.

**Safety Assessment**

Each project's proposal will be evaluated for its thorough investigation
and reporting of safety hazards. Therefore, a brief example of a safety
assessment (up to 3 pages) for installing a new system or testing a new
piece of equipment, including calculations, is required. Below is an
approach for a safety assessment.

1.  Perform safety assessment before construction begins---during design
    phase. Maintain construction oversight throughout the project.

2.  Review system design against existing codes and standards (ASME,
    NFPA, etc.)

3.  Develop detailed, reasonable-worst-case, credible scenarios
    describing process upsets, human errors, system failures, etc. that
    could result in unwanted or unacceptable consequences. These
    scenarios can be postulated without regard to existing design safety
    features.

4.  Identify and correct construction and code problems and deviations

    a.  Identify and brief appropriate permit, regulatory, and safety
        personnel early in the project (site/location specific)

    b.  Address mechanical and/or electrical issues, storage separation
        distances, component ratings, etc.

    c.  Identify "new" hazards, if any---some hazards are equivalent to
        other commonly accepted public and industrial hazards

    d.  Hazards can be characterized in terms of form, quantity, and
        location.

**Detailed Outline of Risk Mitigation Plan**

The purpose of a risk mitigation plan is to outline and minimize the
risks that hold the greatest potential for harm. It is essentially an
extension of the ISV, as its construction usually follows that
development. After identifying safety vulnerabilities, the proposer will
have a prioritized list of safety aspects that require action. A risk
mitigation plan provides detailed design and operational modifications
for each issue on that list. Typical aspects of a risk mitigation plan
include a discussion of mitigation measures, a cost-benefit analysis,
and an implementation strategy.

A detailed outline of the risk mitigation plan would assess the
scenarios and identified hazards from the safety assessment. The plan
should determine the likelihood of occurrence, which could be expressed
in frequency of occurrence, and the severity of consequence. It should
consider the cause(s) of the scenario (or initiating event\[s\]) and the
hazardous material or energy released as a result of the scenario.
During this phase of the analysis, no credit is taken for preventive or
mitigative features in reducing frequency or consequence, thereby
focusing on those hazards that are of greatest concern.

The following categories could be used for organizing and analyzing
data:

-   Event number

-   Event category

-   Postulated event description

-   Causes

-   Preventive features

-   Frequency level

-   Mitigative features

-   Consequences

-   Risk bin number

Risk binning is one analysis tool for risk mitigation. Each hazard can
be plotted on a frequency/consequence matrix, which would indicate its
level of risk -- high, moderate, low, or negligible. For example, if a
potential hazard's frequency is unlikely, and its consequence level is
high, it would be a high risk.

An example of a risk-binning matrix and frequency and consequence
criteria tables are shown in Appendix C.

**Safety Performance Measurement and Monitoring**

A good measure of a safe hydrogen project is its insurability, and an
important step is to quantify risks. A thorough safety plan will serve
as a basis on which the risks associated with a technology may be
measured. Each project proposal needs to include a description of how
safety performance will be measure and monitored, to ensure that the
FMEA is updated regularly as data becomes available.

**Communications Plan Outline**

The communications plan is an outline of reports that are made when an
incident occurs. A reportable incident is broadly defined as a failure
that results in damage to any of the factors (personnel, equipment,
environment) discussed above. The magnitude of these risks can vary
widely, and some discretion is left to the investigator. However,
certain incidents are reportable under any conditions. These failures
are as follows:

-   Any failure that results in a modification to any part of the FMEA

-   Any failure that results in a injury or lost time accident

-   Any failure that results in down time to process equipment

This list is not inclusive of all reportable incidents, but is
indicative of the severity of incidents that must be reported.

**Appendix A**

Example Hazard Identification Table

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height="8.518055555555556in"}

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height="8.546527777777778in"}

![](media/image12.wmf){width="6.370138888888889in" height="8.875in"}

**Appendix B**

This example FMEA is for a gaseous hydrogen production method using a
steam methane reformer. The excerpt details three components and
possible failures associated with those components. This excerpt is
typical of most FMEAs, although the complexity of the analysis will vary
by project.

  -------------------------- ------------- ---------------- ----------------- --------------------
  **Exhibit 2: Excerpt from                                                   
  a Typical Failure Mode and                                                  
  Effects Analysis**                                                          

  **Equipment Item**         **Parameter   **Cause**        **Consequences or **Recommendations or
                             or Operating                   Implications**    Comments**
                             Deviation**                                      

  Induced Draft Fan          High reformer Improper         Potential energy  Shut down reformer
                             draft         function of ID   release and       and isolate burner
                             pressure      fan suction      possible          fuel upon reaching a
                                           valve or fan     destruction of    high draft pressure
                                           itself           reformer furnace  set point

  Waste Heat Boilers         High pressure Line is isolated Pressure relief   A safety relief
                                           while boiler is  valves open       valve is installed
                                           in operation, or                   in the piping to
                                           pipe scaling                       release excess gas
                                           occurs due to                      pressure to the vent
                                           poor water                         stack system. Valves
                                           quality                            are sized
                                                                              appropriately to
                                                                              accommodate the
                                                                              maximum flow rate at
                                                                              the relieving
                                                                              pressure per the
                                                                              ASME code

                             Poor water    Improperly       Accelerated       Periodic testing is
                             quality       functioning      corrosion and     performed on the
                                           deaerator or     scaling occurs in water to determine
                                           water treatment  piping and        quality. Not a
                                           system           equipment         safety hazard

                             Low steam     Poor boiler      Low               Coking could form on
                             drum level    operation        steam-to-carbon   the reformer tubes
                                                            ratio could       
                                                            develop in the    
                                                            reformer          

                             Process       External impact  Potential for     Precautions should
                             leaking       or corrosion     serious burns to  be taken to avoid
                                                            personnel         potential impact
                                                                              areas and perform
                                                                              regular quality
                                                                              inspections on the
                                                                              water treatment
                                                                              system

  Boiler Feedwater Pumps     Low suction   Low water level  Pump does not     On/off pump control
                             pressure      in the deaerator prime which       will cycle pumps.
                                                            results in        The reformer will
                                                            premature seal    shut down on low
                                                            wear              steam drum level if
                                                                              the low suction
                                                                              pressure persists

  Source: Directed                                                            
  Technologies,                                                               
  Direct-Hydrogen-Fueled                                                      
  Proton-Exchange-Membrane                                                    
  Fuel Cell System for                                                        
  Transportation                                                              
  Applications, Hydrogen                                                      
  Safety Report,                                                              
  DOE/CE/50389-502, 1997.                                                     
  Table 5-1, Hazard Review                                                    
  of On-Site Gaseous                                                          
  Hydrogen Production by                                                      
  Steam Methane Reforming.                                                    
  -------------------------- ------------- ---------------- ----------------- --------------------

**Appendix C**

Example Risk-binning Matrix

+-------------+-------------+-------------+-------------+-------------+
| **          | **Beyond    | **Extremely | *           | **An        |
| Frequency** | extremely   | likely**    | *Unlikely** | ticipated** |
|             | unlikely**  |             |             |             |
| **[Cons     |             |             |             |             |
| equence]{.u |             |             |             |             |
| nderline}** |             |             |             |             |
+-------------+-------------+-------------+-------------+-------------+
| **High**    | **10**      | **7**       | **4**       | **1**       |
+-------------+-------------+-------------+-------------+-------------+
| *           |             | **8**       | **5**       | **2**       |
| *Moderate** |             |             |             |             |
+-------------+-------------+-------------+-------------+-------------+
| **Low**     |             | **9**       | **6**       | **3**       |
+-------------+-------------+-------------+-------------+-------------+
| **N         | **11**      | **12**      |             |             |
| egligible** |             |             |             |             |
+-------------+-------------+-------------+-------------+-------------+

Frequency criteria used for risk-binning

  ----------------------- ----------------------- -----------------------
  **Acronym**             **Description**         **Frequency level**

  A                       Anticipated, Expected   \> 1E-2/yr

  U                       Unlikely                1E -- 4 \< f 1E -- 2/yr

  EU                      Extremely Unlikely      1E -- 6 \< f 1E -- 4/yr

  BEU                     Beyond Extremely        1E -- 6/yr
                          Unlikely                
  ----------------------- ----------------------- -----------------------

Consequence criteria used for risk-binning

+-----------------------+-----------------------+-----------------------+
| Consequence level     | Impact on populace    | Impact on             |
|                       |                       | property/operations   |
+-----------------------+-----------------------+-----------------------+
| High (H)              | Prompt fatalities     | Damage \> \$50        |
|                       |                       | million               |
|                       | Acute injuries --     |                       |
|                       | immediately life      | Production loss in    |
|                       | threatening           | excess of 1 week      |
|                       |                       |                       |
|                       | Permanent disability  |                       |
+-----------------------+-----------------------+-----------------------+
| Moderate (M)          | Serious injuries      | \$100,000 \< damage   |
|                       |                       | \$50 million          |
|                       | Non-permanent         |                       |
|                       | disability            | Vehicle destroyed     |
|                       |                       |                       |
|                       | Hospitalization       | Critical equipment    |
|                       | required              | damaged               |
|                       |                       |                       |
|                       |                       | Production loss less  |
|                       |                       | than 1 week           |
+-----------------------+-----------------------+-----------------------+
| Low (L)               | Minor injuries        | Damage \$100,000      |
|                       |                       |                       |
|                       | No hospitalization    | Repairable damage to  |
|                       |                       | vehicle               |
|                       |                       |                       |
|                       |                       | Significant           |
|                       |                       | operational down-time |
|                       |                       |                       |
|                       |                       | Minor impact on       |
|                       |                       | surroundings          |
+-----------------------+-----------------------+-----------------------+
| Negligible (N)        | Negligible injuries   | Minor repairs to      |
|                       |                       | vehicle required      |
|                       |                       |                       |
|                       |                       | Minimal operational   |
|                       |                       | down-time             |
|                       |                       |                       |
|                       |                       | No impact on          |
|                       |                       | surroundings          |
+-----------------------+-----------------------+-----------------------+

#####  {#section .unnumbered}

##### DRAFT PLAN FOR PUBLIC COMMENT

**U.S. Department of Energy**

**Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy**

**Hydrogen, Fuel Cells and Infrastructure Technologies Program**

**Data Management Plan for**

**The Controlled Hydrogen Fleet and Infrastructure**

**Demonstration and Validation Project**

**July 25, 2003**

[Introduction]{.underline}

The Hydrogen, Fuel Cells and Infrastructure Technologies Program of the
Department of Energy=s (DOE) Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable
Energy issued a solicitation on May 6, 2003 for the Controlled Hydrogen
Fleet and Infrastructure Demonstration and Validation Project. Under
this Solicitation, DOE is soliciting Financial Assistance Applications
for validation projects that include testing, demonstrating and
validating hydrogen fuel cell vehicles and infrastructure and vehicle
and infrastructure interfaces for complete system solutions. Each
validation project will include a comprehensive safety plan; an activity
to assist in developing codes and standards; and a comprehensive,
integrated education and training campaign. DOE expects applications to
be submitted by either automobile manufacturers or energy companies with
teams composed of other organizations including hydrogen suppliers, fuel
cell suppliers, utility or gas companies, fleet operators, system and
component suppliers, small businesses, universities and government
entities. DOE plans to award Cooperative Agreements to the successful
applicants for a term of five years beginning in 2004.

The Statement of Objectives (SOO) for the Demonstration and Validation
Project requires the collection of data to monitor the performance of
the hydrogen vehicles and infrastructure throughout the project period.
The SOO sets forth in Tables 1 through 8 of the solicitation, the
minimum data sets that shall be collected by the awardees. The data will
be collected in a variety of different formats including log
information, chassis dynamometer data, vehicle data and maintenance and
operations data. Parameters included in Tables 6 through 8 require the
collection of detailed dynamic performance data at both the vehicle and
component level and the collection of data retrieved from on-board
computer data acquisition systems. Raw data shall be submitted to DOE in
accordance with the Deliverables Schedule in the Cooperative Agreements.

The purpose of this Data Management Plan is to describe how DOE will
handle data submitted by recipients as deliverables under the Controlled
Hydrogen Fleet and Infrastructure Demonstration and Validation Project.
Each recipient is responsible for marking data in accordance with the
data rights provisions of the Cooperative Agreements, including data
that they consider to be proprietary and/or trade secrets.

[Definitions]{.underline}

**Unrestricted Data -** recorded information, regardless of form or the
media on which it may be recorded, including technical data and computer
software, in which the Government has unlimited rights. The term does
not include data incidental to the administration of a Cooperative
Agreement such as financial, administrative, cost and pricing, or
management information.

**Unlimited Rights** - the rights of the Government to use, disclose,
reproduce, prepare derivative works, distribute copies to the public,
including by electronic means, and perform publicly and display
publicly, in any manner, including by electronic means, and for any
purpose whatsoever, and to have or permit others to do so.

**Limited Rights Data** - data, other than computer software, developed
at private expense that embody trade secrets or are commercial or
financial and confidential or privileged. The Government=s rights to
use, duplicate, or disclose limited rights data are set forth in the
Limited Rights Notice of subparagraph (g)(2) of the Rights in Data
Clause, FAR 52.227-14, contained in the Cooperative Agreements.

**Restricted Computer Software** - computer software developed at
private expense and that is a trade secret; is commercial or financial
and is confidential or privileged; or is published copyrighted computer
software, including minor modifications of any such computer software.
The Government=s rights to use, duplicate, or disclose restricted
computer software are as set forth in the Restricted Rights Notice of
subparagraph (g)(3) of the Rights in Data Clause, FAR 52.227-14,
contained in the Cooperative Agreements.

**Commercial and Financial Information** - information relating to
business or trade in which a submitter has a commercial interest.

**Restricted Distribution Data** - data first produced under a
Cooperative Agreement which is specifically protected by statute.

[Data Markings]{.underline}

Prior to delivering data to the Government under a Cooperative
Agreement, the Recipient has the responsibility to restrictively mark
data, if appropriate, in accordance with the Rights in Data Clause, FAR
52.227-14. As applicable, the recipient must affix the Copyright Notice
required by subparagraph (c)(1); the Limited Rights Notice required by
subparagraph (g)(2); or the Restricted Rights Notice required by
subparagraph (g)(3), of the Rights in Data Clause to data delivered
under the Cooperative Agreement. Data delivered to the Government
without these markings shall be deemed to have been furnished with
unlimited rights and the Government assumes no liability for disclosure,
use, or reproduction of such data.

DOE is currently seeking statutory authority to withhold data first
produced under the Cooperative Agreements contemplated by this program
similar to the protection afforded the technologies developed under the
Energy Policy Act (EPACT). Section 3001(d) of EPACT permits the
Government to withhold other data first produced under a research,
development and demonstration agreement relating to designated
technologies for a limited time, i.e., up to five years. Since the
solicitation for the Controlled Hydrogen Fleet and Infrastructure
Demonstration and Validation Project is issued under the authority of
the Hydrogen Future Act of 1996, it does not fall within the ambit of
EPACT=s data protection provision. However, if data developed in this
program under a Cooperative Agreement discloses an invention for which a
patent application may be filed or is pending, then the Government is
permitted to withhold such data for a limited time to protect the
potential patent rights in the invention under the authority of 35
U.S.C. \' 205.

If DOE obtains broad data protection authority for this program similar
to EPACT, the Department, with the mutual consent of the Recipients,
will identify data first produced under the Cooperative Agreements which
may be withheld from public disclosure consistent with program
objectives. However, since there currently is no such authority relating
to this program, the Limited Rights Data notice and the Restricted
Computer Software notice governing the protection of data developed
solely at private expense are the only data disclosure restrictions
which may be placed on data used in the program. Thus, except for use
limitations associated with a Recipient=s copyright claims, no other
restrictive markings may be placed on data developed solely under this
program. However, if data first produced under an agreement embodies
pre-existing Limited Rights Data or Restricted Computer Software then it
may be marked accordingly to the extent that it cannot be separated from
such data.

If any data delivered under a Cooperative Agreement are inappropriately
marked with restrictive or limiting markings not authorized by the
Rights in Data Clause, the Contracting Officer may either return the
data to the Recipient or cancel or ignore the restrictive markings in
accordance with the procedures contained in subparagraph (e)(1) of that
Clause. The Contracting Officer will make the final agency determination
as to whether or not the markings are authorized.

[Administrative Controls and Physical Data Protection]{.underline}

In recognition of the sensitivity of the data required to be submitted
to the Government as deliverables under the Cooperative Agreements for
the Controlled Hydrogen Fleet and Infrastructure Demonstration and
Validation Project, DOE will establish administrative and physical data
controls that limit access to the data as described below. By doing so,
DOE is not waiving its rights in data which are set forth under the
Rights in Data clause of the Cooperative Agreements, [i.e.]{.underline},
Rights in Data - General, FAR 52.227-14 (as modified by DEAR 927.409).
DOE intends to use the data developed in this demonstration program for
government purposes only in support of programmatic goals. Accordingly,
DOE may release to the public composite data used for systems modeling,
but DOE will protect and not release raw data received from recipients
to the maximum extent allowed under applicable law.

Data will be delivered on compact disc to the Department of Energy,
Golden Field Office (GFO) in Golden, CO, in accordance with the
Deliverables Schedule in the Cooperative Agreements. The only acceptable
medium for data delivery will be compact disc. Recipients shall not
deliver data to DOE either in hard copy or electronically. DOE will
establish a secure room located at the Golden Field Office in which to
store the data. As a federal facility, entry to the Golden Field Office
is controlled and limited to individuals with a government-issued
identification badge. Outside persons must obtain a visitor=s badge
before they may gain entry to GFO. In addition, the data room will
remain locked at all times with access controlled by key card entry.
Access will be limited to those individuals having a legitimate
Aneed-to-know@ as determined by appropriate DOE program officials from
the Hydrogen, Fuel Cells and Infrastructure Technologies Program. DOE
will maintain a log showing who enters and leaves the room and for what
purpose.

The controlled-access room will contain a dedicated server and
stand-alone computer work stations, none of which shall be connected to
the Internet or to the Local Area Networks at the Golden Field Office or
at the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL). The computers will
be password-protected. DOE will issue passwords to users under standard
computer security procedures. There will be no email access to or from
the computer stations. The secure room will contain a printer and a
shredder but not a copier. Users will be required to shred any material
containing raw data that they have printed during their work. The secure
room will also contain locked file cabinets where the CDs will be stored
when they are not in use.

DOE will designate one DOE person to be the Hydrogen Demonstration
Project Data Manager. This individual will be trained regarding the
sensitivity of the data, who is authorized to view the data and the
consequences for unauthorized disclosure. He or she will receive the
compact discs and transfer their contents to the dedicated server in the
data room. The Data Manager will be responsible for preparing tape
back-ups of the computer work stations on a daily basis. The back-up
tapes will be stored in a locked, fire safe cabinet in the secure room.
Neither compact discs submitted by recipients nor tape backups of data
will be removed from the secure data room for any purpose.

The Data Manager will give access to the data room to individuals who
can show a legitimate Aneed-to-know@ as designated by appropriate DOE
program officials from the Hydrogen, Fuel Cells and Infrastructure
Technologies Program. DOE anticipates that there will be a small number
of closely controlled individuals requiring access to the secure room
including but not limited to the following: DOE Hydrogen program
officials from Headquarters and the Golden Field Office, EPA officials
from the Office of Transportation and Air Quality, the DOE contracting
officer, approved support service contractor personnel, and approved
individuals from the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) working
in their capacity to support the Systems Integrator. All persons with
access to the data room will be subject to an appropriate non-disclosure
obligation consistent with the objectives of this program. DOE will
maintain these procedures until such time as the data may be destroyed.

The Hydrogen Program plans to model composite data for this
demonstration project. The Systems Integrator will generate composite
data for modeling based on the raw data and consistent with the data
room security procedures set out in the foregoing. In order to protect
raw data from disclosure to organizations conducting modeling, the
Systems Integrator will develop ranges of values for input data required
by modelers and will establish a set of values for input parameters to
be used by all modelers for the Hydrogen Program based on their analysis
of the raw data. Therefore, modelers will not need access to the raw
data in the secure data room and data cannot be attributed to particular
vehicle(s), systems, or entities.

[Interface with EPA]{.underline}

The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) participated with DOE in
developing the Statement of Objectives for DOE=s Controlled Hydrogen
Fleet and Infrastructure Demonstration and Validation Project. In
particular, EPA contributed to the data collection tables set forth in
Appendix C of the Solicitation which require extensive testing of
vehicles. EPA has a facility at its National Vehicle and Fuel Emissions
Laboratory (NVFEL) in Ann Arbor, Michigan where the required testing may
be performed. DOE anticipates entering into an appropriate Interagency
Agreement (IAA) with the EPA consistent with the objectives of this
program to provide funding for the Recipients using the EPA=s facility
on a task order basis. Any disclosure of data from the vehicles
participating in DOE=s program, whether in the form of technical papers
or otherwise, will require notification to and prior approval by DOE.
DOE will share with EPA data developed under the Cooperative Agreements
as necessary for government purposes.

[Freedom of Information]{.underline}

The Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. \' 552, is a federal statute
which generally requires Agencies to disclose information in the
Government=s possession upon a request from the public. There are
several exemptions to the disclosure requirements including exemption 3
for Amatters specifically exempted from disclosure by statute. \...@ 5
U.S.C. \' 552(b)(3) and exemption 4 for Atrade secrets and commercial or
financial information obtained from a person and privileged or
confidential.@ 5 U.S.C. \' 552(b)(4). As noted previously, DOE is
currently pursuing a statutory information and data protection provision
for the Hydrogen Program that would allow DOE to withhold data and
information developed under this program from public disclosure for up
to five years after the information is developed, if such information is
of a character that it would be protected under FOIA exemption 4. Under
the proposed statutory provision, any information developed pursuant to
a cost-shared Agreement entered into under the Hydrogen Future Act for
research, development or demonstration would qualify for protection from
disclosure based on FOIA exemption 3.