# Session No. 18

### Course Title: Disaster Response Operations and Management

### 

### Session Title: Donations Management

## Time: 50 minutes

**Objectives:**

1.  Comprehend the massive outpouring of donations when disaster
    strikes.

2.  Become familiar with typical problems associated with disaster
    donations.

3.  Identify specific donations management problems in a few important
    case studies.

4.  Know what can be done to effectively manage donations during the
    response phase of disaster.

**Scope:**

In the following session, the professor discusses the generosity shown
toward victims of disaster and explains why donations are often
problematic for those involved in emergency management. Well-known cases
pertaining to donations management are reviewed. The session concludes
with a list of steps that can be taken to manage donations in an
effective manner when disaster strikes.

**Session Requirements:**

1.  Instructor Reading:

> Boyer, Dave. 2003. "Disaster Donations: Manage or 'be managed.'"
> Kentucky Division of Emergency Management.
> <http://www.kyem.dma.state.ky.us/donation.htm>.
>
> Cosgrave, John. 1997. "Estimating the Capacity of Warehouses."
> *Disasters* 21 (2): 155-165.
>
> Faulkner, S., A. McLean, M. Othan-Chande, A. Hassan Quoreshi, J.
> Alvaro Ruiz, J. Taylor, and A. Wenger. 1989. *The Things We Give: A
> Critical Look at Donations in Kind*. Henry Dunant Institute: Geneva.
>
> FEMA/National Donations Management Steering Committee. 1985.
> *Donations Management Guidance Manual*. Federal Emergency Management
> Agency: Washington, D.C.
>
> Harbaugh, Bill. 2001. "So the Red Cross Tugged Hearts to Raise Money
> After the Sept. 11 Attacks; the Cause is Worthy and Donors, However
> Well-Intentioned, Don't Know What's Best." Oregonian, November 11.
> <http://www.oregonlive.com/commentary/oregonian/index.ssf?/x.../10053969102097322.xm>.
>
> Henriques, Diana B. and David Barstow. 2001. "Red Cross Pledges All of
> Terror Fund to Sept. 11 Victims." New York Times, November 15.
> [wysiwyg://1/http://nytimes.com/2001/11/15/nyregion/15CROS.html?todaysheadlines]{.underline}.
>
> Kendra, James M. and Tricia Wachtendorf. 2002. *Rebel Food . . .
> Renegade Supplies: Convergence after the World Trade Center Attack*.
> Preliminary Paper 316. Disaster Research Center, University of
> Delaware: Newark, DE.
>
> Ketcham, Jim. 1998. "The Trouble With Trousers." November 17,
> <http://www.disasternews.com/disasters/clothing.shtml>.
>
> Kim, Susan. 1999a. "Making Disaster Donations Count." May 20,
> <http://www.disasternews.com/howtohelp/greenbeans.shtml>.
>
> Kim, Susan. 1999b. "Needed Donations Can Change Lives." April 14,
> <http://www.disasternews.comhowtohelp/gettingitright.shtml>.
>
> Kim, Susan. 1999c. "Unwanted Donations are 'Second Disaster.'" April
> 5, <http://www.disasternews.com/howtohelp/inappropriate.shtml>.
>
> McEntire, David A., Robie J. Robinson and Richard T. Weber. 2003.
> "Business Responses to the World Trade Center Disaster: A Study of
> Corporate Roles, Functions, and Interaction with the Public Sector."
> Pp. 431-459 in *Beyond September 11^th^: An Account of Post-Disaster
> Research*. Special Publication #39, Institute of Behavioral Science,
> Natural Hazards Research and Applications Information Center,
> University of Colorado: Boulder.
>
> McEntire, David A. 2002. "Coordinating Multi-Organizational Responses
> to Disaster: Lessons From the March 28, 2000, Fort Worth Tornado."
> *Disaster Prevention and Management* 11 (5): 369-379.
>
> McEntire, David A. 1997. "Reflecting on the Weaknesses of the
> International Community During the IDNDR: Some Implications for
> Research and its Application." *Disaster Prevention and Management* 6
> (4): 221-233.
>
> Mravcak, Agnes. 1994. "From the General to the Specifics: National
> Donations Management Policy." Presentation at the Donated Goods and
> Services Workshop, National Hurricane Conference, March 10.
>
> Neal, David M. 1994. "The Consequences of Excessive Unrequested
> Donations: The Case of Hurricane Andrew." *Disaster Management* 6 (1):
> 23-28.
>
> North Dakota, Division of Emergency Management. 1998. "After Action
> Report of Donations Management." North Dakota Division of Emergency
> Management: Bismark.
>
> Oklahoma Department of Civil Emergency Management. 1996. *Donations
> Management Case Study of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building
> Bombing, 19 April 1995 in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, Summary and Lessons
> Learned*.
>
> Pan American Health Organization. 1994. *A World Safe From Natural
> Disasters: The Journey of Latin America and the Caribbean*. PAHO:
> Washington, D.C.
>
> Portsea, Lord Judd of. 1992. "Disaster Relief or Relief Disasters? A
> Challenge to the International Community." *Disasters* 16 (1): 1-8.

1.  Student Readings:

> Excerpts from Faulkner, S., A. McLean, M. Othan-Chande, A. Hassan
> Quoreshi, J. Alvaro Ruiz, J. Taylor, and A. Wenger. 1989. *The Things
> We Give: A Critical Look at Donations in Kind*. Henry Dunant
> Institute: Geneva.
>
> Neal, David M. 1994. "The Consequences of Excessive Unrequested
> Donations: The Case of Hurricane Andrew." *Disaster Management* 6 (1):
> 23-28.

3\. Handouts:

Common Donations

Typical Donation Problems

Recommendations

Letter from Joe Allbaugh (Re: 9/11 donations)

**Remarks:**

1.  In order to introduce the subject of donations management, the
    professor may wish to utilize a recent disaster or current response
    operation to illustrate the media's plea for disaster assistance
    from the general public. This will help to catch the students'
    attention and underscore the convergence of needed and unrequested
    resources at the scene of a disaster.

2.  A representative from the American Red Cross or a local emergency
    management office may be an excellent guest speaker for this
    session. One or both of these individuals can provide relevant
    information to students, especially if there has been a recent
    disaster in the area.

3\. The professor should reiterate the need to think critically about
the media's request to send everything, and people's desire to send
supplies from all over the country to the affected area.

4\. If desired, the professor may divide the class into groups and ask
that each group read a case study about donations, looking specifically
at ways to help manage them effectively. The groups may then take turns
presenting their findings about donations management.

5\. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers has models of what will be needed
in the way of water and food after hurricanes of various sizes. The
model also discusses how to set up distribution sites, which can help
streamline relief operations.
<http://www.englink.usace.army.mil/igp/commodities.htm>

6\. The most important point to reiterate in this session is how
disaster donations often complicate emergency response operations
(rather than necessarily helping victims or those who are providing
disaster assistance). The professor should repeatedly stress how
disaster donations often result in a "second disaster."

**Objective 18.1 Comprehend the massive outpouring of donations when
disaster strikes.**

**Requirements:**

**Present the following information as a lecture.**

I.  **When a disaster occurs,** **relatives, neighbors, and concerned
    citizens** in other cities, states and nations will **send donations
    to the affected area**.

> A. This outpouring of **generosity is owing to several factors**:
>
> 1\. People that have survived disaster **feel the pains of those who
> have lost loved-ones or material possessions**, and they desire to
> ease the trials others are going through.
>
> 2\. Those close to the scene **have witnessed the trauma inflicted by
> the event on individuals, families and the community as a whole**, and
> they desire to do something about it.
>
> 3\. **Victims, public information officers or politicians stress the
> need to get resources to the affected areas.**
>
> 4\. **Others** far away from the disaster **have seen the
> devastation** on national news broadcasts, and **have heard the
> media's request for disaster assistance** (whether this is warranted
> or not).
>
> a\. Kathy Guy, a FEMA donations coordinator, states "**The media --
> particularly television -- is pretty bad about sticking a microphone
> in people's faces right after a disaster so they can film them saying
> 'We need everything**'" (Kim 1999a).
>
> B. **Emergency managers** and others should therefore **expect that a
> variety of donations will arrive, often in very large quantities.**

1.  Anheuser Busch frequently supplies **pallets of canned drinking
    water** to victims and workers after disaster (Mravcak 1994).

> 2\. There was an abundance of ice after a hurricane affected many
> Northeastern states in 2003.

1.  The GM Foundation provided numerous **vehicles** to those in need
    after an earthquake in California (Mravcak 1994).

2.  After a tornado in Kansas, the Salvation Army received enough
    **clothes** to fill a 50-foot warehouse (Kim 1999a).

3.  One victim of a tornado received **a wagon, a swing set, a fruit
    trailer, new pillows and blankets, and Christmas ornaments** from
    various donors (Kim 1999b).

4.  After the March 28, 2000, Fort Worth tornado, it was reported that
    "**Pizza, hamburgers, fruit and other food** was delivered by local
    restaurants and grocery stores to the emergency operations center.
    Home improvement stores distributed stacks of **plywood** to victims
    and owners who needed to make quick repairs to protect homes and
    office buildings. **Cash** was donated to the American Red Cross
    tornado fund, and calls from around the world were made to see what
    could be done to help the City of Fort Worth and its citizens"
    (McEntire 2002, 374).

5.  Similar findings were evident after the 9/11 terrorist attack in New
    York City. "Many of the donations were provided by the private
    sector. For example, a manager of a sporting goods store mentioned
    how first responders used his store for protection when the
    buildings collapsed. The manager then provided **swimming goggles
    and socks** to help the responders equip themselves in order to
    continue their emergency response. The U.S. Forest Service received
    containers of **coffee** form Starbuck's for personnel at the USAR
    staging area. Likewise, the personnel at Ground Zero dawned
    **overalls** and other **protective equipment** provided by various
    manufacturers. **Respirators** **and mask cartridges** were given to
    responders to alleviate breathing problems created by fire, smoke,
    and unknown particulate matter. **Gloves, batteries, and other
    supplies** were sent by private companies" (McEntire, Robinson and
    Weber 2003, 452).

6.  **Other common donations** sent to disaster areas include:

```{=html}
<!-- -->
```
a.  **medicines**

b.  **diapers**

c.  **baby formula**

d.  **coats**

e.  **shampoo**

f.  **soap**

g.  **cots**

h.  **sleeping bags**

i.  **tents**

**Objective 18.2 Become familiar with typical problems associated with
disaster donations.**

**Requirements:**

**Present the following information as a lecture.**

I.  According to research (McEntire 1997), **donations may present
    several challenges** for those involved **in disaster response**.

A. Some of the problems may be in regards to the **quantity of
donations**.

> 1\. There is often **too many donations** (Faulkner et. al. 1989).
>
> a\. **Clothing** is often sent in **large quantities.**
>
> 2\. An alternative situation is where there may be **insufficient
> donations**.
>
> a\. There may be a **limited number of generators** to meet the high
> demand for electricity when power is out.

B. **Other problems may** result from the **quality of the donations**.

> 1\. Most **donations are not requested or needed**.
>
> a\. A **pallet of dog food** arrived in New York City after 9/11 for
> the canines involved in response operations. Unfortunately, the
> **search and rescue dogs have a regimented diet** so the **food was
> not needed.**
>
> 2\. Some **donations cannot be used**.
>
> a\. **Medicines** have **no labels, are damaged or expired**.

7.  Other goods are **not applicable to the disaster context**.

> a\. **Coats are sent to warmer regions** of the United States.
>
> 4\. **Donations** may **not be culturally acceptable** to some
> disaster victims.
>
> a\. **Followers of certain religions** **may** **not eat certain types
> of food** (e.g., pork or other meats).
>
> b\. **Ethnic groups** may **prefer their own national cuisine**,
> rather than America's canned or fast foods.
>
> C. **Excessive and unwanted donations result in additional work** for
> those involved in disaster response.
>
> 1\. **Donations have to be transported** from the donors to the
> disaster area.
>
> a\. **Over 20 trucks** had to be used to move donations to Eagles
> Pass, Texas after a 1954 flood (Neal 1994, 23).
>
> 2\. **Donations have to be stored** until they can be given to
> disaster victims.
>
> a\. After a flood in Southwest Texas, a **relief organization had to
> rent a 25,000 square-foot warehouse** for donations (Kim 1999c). Note:
> warehouses may eventually be needed for other purposes and remaining
> donations may need to be thrown away or moved.
>
> 3\. **Donations have to be sorted** by type, size, purpose, etc.
>
> a\. After a 1952 tornado in Arkansas**, it took** **500 volunteers two
> weeks to sort through donations to determine what could be used**
> (Neal 1994, 23).
>
> 4\. **Donations must then be distributed** to those in need or dealt
> with in other ways.
>
> a\. In 1957, officials had to **dump or destroy unrequested food and
> clothing** after Hurricane Audrey in Louisiana (Neal 1994, 24).
>
> 5\. **All of this results in incredible** **logistical challenges**
> for emergency and relief workers.
>
> a\. "**The spontaneous generosity of outpouring of unsolicited aid to
> disaster-stricken populations can be documented in every peacetime
> disaster. The value of such aid in facilitating both material and
> psychological recuperation cannot be underestimated. Nevertheless,
> this spontaneous generosity often has negative consequences which are
> unanticipated by both the donors and the recipient population**"
> (Fritz and Mathewson in Neal 1994, 24).
>
> b\. "**This 'convergence' or 'mass assault' of unrequested, in-kind
> donations creates problems. First, officials must allocate scarce
> resources to sort, distribute, store, or even destroy large numbers of
> unwanted donations. Second, the large number of donations creates
> logistical problems leading to slow distribution of needed donated
> items to victims**" (Neal 1994, 24).
>
> D. **Similar problems** are **evident at the international level**.
>
> 1\. The Pan American Health Organization has stated that "**donations
> have not been requested, and their usefulness, in terms of immediate
> needs, is questionable**" (1994, 69).
>
> 2\. This organization also notes that **useless or unneeded donations
> keep** "**personnel from attending to other more pressing tasks**"
> (PAHO 1994, 71).

**Objective 18.3** **Identify specific donations management problems in
various important case studies.**

**Requirements:**

**Present the following information as a lecture.**

I. **Hurricane Andrew (see Neal 1994).**

> A. On August 24, 1992, **a major hurricane struck South Florida**.
>
> 1\. The **category 4 hurricane**, with sustained **winds of at least
> 141 mph** and a **storm surge of up to 16 feet**, pummeled Dade
> County.
>
> 2\. The hurricane left **170,000 homes in partial or complete ruin**,
> resulting in **250,000 people being homeless**.
>
> 3\. The storm **killed over 40 people and injured hundreds more**.
>
> B. As the extent of the devastation was realized and spread, **a
> massive donations campaign was undertaken**.
>
> 1\. **Too much food was donated.**
>
> a\. "**Around Dallas, Texas, various television stations, radio
> stations, and grocery stores coordinated numerous food drives.
> Television and radio advertising encouraged grocery shoppers to buy
> and donate canned food for disaster victims, and supermarkets served
> as central donation drops. Also, the supermarket trucks delivered
> (often unannounced) tons of food to disaster warehouses around the
> disaster zone**" (Neal 1994, 25).
>
> 2\. Other **donations were not needed or useful**.
>
> a\. Some of the **clothing was dirty** and had to be cleaned.
>
> b\. "**Some of the clothing was not appropriate for the tropical
> climate of Dade County (e.g., winter coats)**" (Neal 1994, 25).
>
> C. Such **donations created numerous problems** for relief workers.
>
> 1\. **There was a lack of personnel, electricity and water to clean
> the clothes** (Neal 1994, 25).

2.  "Often, **truck drivers with loads of clothes drove straight to
    severely damaged areas**. Sometimes intentionally, other times by
    accident, **they bypassed the formal warehouse** areas outside the
    disaster area. Upon arrival, **they often did not know where to
    deliver the donated clothes, so they unloaded them on the side of
    the road.** **The heat and usual afternoon rains, quickly turned the
    piles into heaps of stinking, rotting cloth**. Due to the smell and
    potential health hazard, **local authorities used city work crews
    and the military to gather and dispose of the clothes**. **A rag
    company assisted** by gathering excessive clothing which had not yet
    rotted. Thus, the **donated clothes created a health hazard, took
    volunteers and city workers away from other important disaster
    tasks, further increased traffic around the disaster area, and
    exacerbated a large waste disposal problem in Southern Florida**."
    (Neal 1994, 25).

3.  "A Salvation Army official described and summarized the problem in
    the following manner: '**Clothing, there is too much**. What you've
    got to know, **we have got a tremendous amount of non-usable
    clothing**. It's not that anybody has dumped on the agencies. **It's
    all sent in clear conscience, clear compassion**, but I imagine if
    you took all of the heavy winter coats, **you could fill 25
    warehouses** in the Miami areas -- **coats that in a lifetime would
    never be worn in Miami**. What you have got is a truckload that
    could be 75 per cent heavy coats and **shoes that have been put on
    so fast that the pairs get separated in different trucks**. . . .
    **The man-hours alone of matching . . . (clothes) to a victim is
    hard to imagine**.'" (Neal 1994, 25).

4.  "Excessive canned non-perishable donated food generated problems in
    disaster areas. Individuals donating **16 to 20 ounce cans of food
    created large distribution, sorting and cooking problems**. For
    initial shipping, first **the small cans must be put in a
    container** to transport them effectively to the disaster area.
    Often, they are placed in boxes and other containers and **without
    pallets**, their distribution takes time. Second, once the canned
    food reaches a disaster kitchen, many **volunteers must sort it into
    logical categories**. Authorities must therefore use valuable time,
    resources and more volunteers for this process. Sorting becomes a
    necessity, as **relief cooks do not wish to mix hundreds of cans of
    various types of food into one container**. For example, hungry
    **victims or relief workers may not find a pot of randomly mixed
    beets, corn and baked beans too appetizing**. Also, **opening
    hundreds of 12 or 16 ounce cans of corn (or other similar food) is
    both slow and tedious work**. As some areas were without electricity
    for weeks, **volunteer cooks had to open thousands of small cans
    without the aid of electric can openers**. Finally, the massive
    number of **trucks arriving with food exacerbated traffic problems
    at the disaster site**, and **strained any remaining warehouse
    space**."

5.  " . . . **Other excessive donations**, many initially requested by
    various disaster organizations, **exacerbated traffic, storage and
    distribution problems**. For example, **in addition to baby food,
    dry condensed milk, and canned food, the Red Cross asked for such
    items as disposable diapers, flashlights and batteries,
    non-prescription medicines, portable radios, pet food and cash
    contributions**. The Red Cross **warehouses were quickly inundated**
    with these requested items. **By two weeks after the disaster, the
    Red Cross requested only cash donations**. Similarly, **the
    Salvation Army initially requested diapers, in addition to food and
    clothing**. About two weeks later, **the Salvation Army altered
    their requests and asked that people cease sending clothes, diapers
    and baby food**. Therefore, in addition to the massive unanticipated
    in-kind efforts, **the donations system also became overwhelmed with
    many requested items**" (Neal 1994, 26).

6.  "**A large number of emergency management personnel, disaster
    volunteers, military vehicles, truckloads of donations and others,
    used the major highways between Miami and Homestead**. After the
    hurricane, **a 30 minute trip** from Miami to Homestead **became
    between a two to three hour ordeal**" (Neal 1994, 27).

7.  "In an effort to control and organize the relief effort,
    **authorities attempted to stop unauthorized vehicles laden with
    donations**. Yet **the convergence** **of** unannounced and
    unplanned **delivery trucks strained an already overburdened highway
    system**" (Neal 1994, 27).

8.  "After most major disasters, including that of Hurricane Andrew,
    **warehouses are difficult to obtain**. **They are hard to find, and
    if located, may be damaged or already in use**. **The influx of
    donations quickly exceeded the distribution and warehouse system**"
    (Neal 1994, 27).

9.  "Also, **volunteers and emergency managers expended precious time
    sorting, distributing, and even destroying, unplanned and
    unannounced in-kind donations**. As a result, **the ability of
    relief organizations to distribute necessary goods to victims
    diminished**" (Neal 1994, 27).

10. "**Red Cross personnel had to spend time locating extra storage
    space**. Once they located space, **volunteers spent time and energy
    unloading the extra supplies**. Overall, the extra unrequested
    **donations usurped resources such as time and people** in the
    initial distribution and delivery process" (Neal 1994, 27).

11. "Finally, **excessive and unappropriated donations strain various
    organizations' public relations efforts**. For example, **news
    reports and videos throughout the US showing rotting clothing,
    warehouses overflowing with supplies and bulging trucks full of
    donations being turned back**, created two related images. **Reports
    implied that further donations were not needed**. This was not the
    case. Organizations needed money or specific donations (e.g.
    institutionalized food) to assist victims. **Images of city work
    crews or the military carting away rotting clothes, could imply to
    viewer that organizations such as the Redo Cross or Salvation Army
    did not appreciate the donations**. Simultaneously, organizations
    continued to request donations (e.g., money) (Neal 1994, 27).

II\. **The 9/11 World Trade Center Terrorist Attack**.

> A. On the morning of **September 11, 2001**, several teams of
> **hijackers boarded planes** and began the **largest and most
> coordinated terrorist attack** on U.S. soil.

1.  An **American airlines jet** headed from Boston to Los Angeles is
    **overtaken by men with box cutters** and is **intentionally crashed
    into the north tower of the World Trade Center**. A short time
    later, **a United airlines plane**, also departing from Boston to
    Los Angeles, **is hijacked and flown into the south tower at the
    World Trade Center**.

2.  Within minutes, **hundreds of people are dead**. As the resulting
    **fires spread** throughout the twin towers, **the massive
    structures weaken and collapse** to the ground.

3.  As the dust settles**, nearly 3,000 World Trade Center employees,
    fire fighters, police officers, and spontaneous volunteers are
    killed** by the hijackings, crashes, fires and structural failures.

> B. Virtually **all Americans see the tragic event unfold on national
> television. People are stunned** that anyone would desire to perform
> such a deadly act, and **their hearts are turned to those who have
> lost loved ones and the heroic efforts of emergency workers**.
>
> 1\. Over the next few days and months, **a large and diverse
> collection of** **donations flow into the area** from around the
> nation and world.

a.  A massive **blood drive** is kicked off in New York and around the
    United States **for the injured**.

b.  **Food and drinks** are provided to thousands of **emergency
    personnel**.

c.  **Gear and equipment** are provided to **search and rescue teams**.

d.  **Computers, phones, fax machines and other office supplies** are
    donated or provided to a **new emergency operations center** (as the
    established center is destroyed in the collapse).

e.  **Fire apparatus, heavy equipment, and cranes** are sent to
    **replace losses or help with debris removal**.

> C. **Recognizing the enormous loss of life and resulting expenses** in
> terms of **medical care, funeral costs, and future needs of surviving
> spouses and children**, the **American Red Cross welcomed and
> encouraged financial contributions via cash, check and credit card
> donations**.
>
> 1\. Within a few days and weeks, **donations to the American Red Cross
> totaled over \$564 million** (out of \$1.3 billion total donations for
> the victims of the 9/11 disasters).
>
> 2\. This **pool of money** became known as the **Liberty Fund**.
>
> D. Because the **donations were sizable**, this organization decided
> to **keep some of the donations as a reserve** for future disasters.

1.  **Dr. Bernadine Healy**, the chief executive officer of the American
    Red Cross, **announced plans to retain \$200 million** for potential
    future terrorist attacks and other disasters.

2\. In some ways, **the strategy made sense** (Harbaugh 2001).

> a\. **Any division of donations would undoubtedly ensure** that
> **victims in New York would receive a much larger allotment** in
> comparison to those affected by other disasters.

b.  **Resources are always tight** for this disaster relief
    organization, and a **reserve could ensure operations** well into
    the **future**.

> E. Nonetheless, there was **an immediate outcry about the withholding
> of funds** for disaster victims.
>
> 1\. The **media quickly publicized** **the** organization's
> **position** about the donations.

1.  **Donors and victims decried the plan** as a misuse of funds.

2.  **Lawmakers** also criticized **the misleading of donors** and
    **requested that all of the funds be used for the victims of 9/11**.

> F. **Because of the negative press and pressure** to utilize the funds
> as intended by the donors, **the Red Cross immediately changed its
> position**.

1.  It promised to **spend half of the funds on cash grants** for the
    affected families **by December 31, 2001**.

2.  The **Red Cross would cover up to one year's worth of living
    expenses** for those in need.

3.  Some of **the Liberty Fund would be used to hire 200 case workers**
    to assist the disaster victims and their surviving families.

4.  It agreed to **develop a database** with other charitable
    organizations **to oversee the distribution of all of the remaining
    money**.

> G. The **American Red Cross learned a difficult** lesson from the
> experience.
>
> 1\. **Under significant public scrutiny,** **Dr. Healy resigned** her
> leadership position with the organization.
>
> 2\. The agency had been accused of "**using the September 11 tragedies
> to address long-term fund-raising goals and of siphoning tens of
> millions of dollars from widows and children**" (Henriques and Barstow
> 2001).
>
> 3\. **David McLaughlin**, Chairman of the Board of Governors,
> **confessed** that "**The people of this country have given the Red
> Cross their hard-earned dollars, their trust and very clear direction
> for our Sept. 11 relief efforts**" (Henriques and Barstow 2001).

1.  The new director, **Harold Decker**, reiterated that "**we deeply
    regret that our activities over the past eight weeks have not been
    as sharply focused as America wants, nor as focused as the victims
    of this tragedy deserve**" (Henriques and Barstow 2001).

2.  The **reputation of the American Red Cross had been tarnished**,
    which would lead to **fund raising problems** for several months
    after the 9/11 disasters.

> 6\. The Red Cross realized that it had **to be upfront with its
> intentions** to use donations and **make sure that its plans were in
> conformity with public opinion**.

III\. **Oklahoma City Bombing** (see ODCEM 1995).

> A. On the morning of Wednesday, April 19, 1995, **a disgruntled
> American utilized a 24-foot Ryder rental truck to deliver an ammonium
> nitrate and diesel fuel bomb to** North side of the **Alfred P. Murrah
> Federal Building**, in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma.

1.  A **detonation cord** was used to **set off the explosive** mixture.

2.  The **blast destroyed approximately 1/3 of the building**, causing
    major **portions of the nine floors to crash on top of one another**
    as they fell to the ground and **resulted in a pile of rubble and
    debris**.

3.  **Vehicles** in the parking lot and in the street **flipped over and
    caught on fire**.

4.  **Several nearby buildings**, including an apartment complex, the
    Oklahoma Water Resources Board office Building, the First Methodist
    Church, YMCA, a federal courthouse, a cathedral and Post Office,
    **received heavy damages**.

5.  But **structural damages** were **extended over a 48-square-block
    area**.

> 6\. The **bomb killed 168 people**, virtually all of which were
> working in or visiting the Murrah Building (some of the deaths
> occurred in surrounding buildings and 1 emergency worker died when
> debris fell as she was responding to the incident).
>
> B. **As the responders worked** to locate survivors, remove victims
> and process the crime scene, **donations began to arrive in the
> area**.
>
> 1\. After moving the ICP to Southwestern Bell Corporate Headquarters
> parking lot, **voluntary organizations brought in food to feed
> emergency workers**. Some donations were stored in this area.
>
> 2\. Some of the **donated goods included rain gear**, due to the
> prospect of bad weather.
>
> 3\. "**Commercial tractor-trailors, pick-ups and other private
> vehicles began lining-up at the corner of N.W. 8^th^ St. and Harvey
> Ave., loaded with everything from wheel barrows to football helmets.
> Voluntary organizations began storing items as best they could, but
> new drop-off locations had to be established rapidly and inventory
> control became an overwhelming task.** It should also be noted that
> the **ICP \[incident command post\] was not the only location where
> donated goods were being delivered**. **This added to the overall lack
> of donations coordination and represents one of the major deficiencies
> in the state and local planning effort**" (ODCEM 1995, 6).
>
> 4\. "The American Red Cross . . . activated the National Disaster
> Services Human Resources Team to administer large scale disaster
> assistance to the victims of this incident. **Over the phone, and in
> person, hundreds of thousands of dollars were being donated to Red
> Cross Disasters Services. Blood collection centers, across Oklahoma,
> were crowded with hundreds of people donating blood**" (ODCEM 1995,
> 6).
>
> 5\. "**Feed The Children responded by shipping requested food and
> disaster supplies** out of their local warehouse at 32 N. McCormick,
> in Oklahoma City, **by processing newly donated items supplied by the
> public**, **by calling corporate contacts with requests for
> specifically needed items**, and by supervising volunteers. **They
> also set up and staffed an on-site supply center** near N.W. 5^th^ St.
> and Robinson Ave., **where a coordinated effort was established to
> provide needed items to rescue workers** from their international
> headquarters at 333 N. Meridian and their warehouse" (ODCEM 1995, 7).
>
> 6\. "The **Oklahoma Restaurant Association** had just finished their
> annual conference when the explosion occurred. Subsequently, **they
> quickly established a 24-hour food service operation**, at the Myriad
> Convention Center, **to feed all emergency response workers**.
> Eventually, **the Myriad was established as a center which met the
> needs of all personnel responding to the incident**" (ODCEM 1995, 8).
>
> 7\. "**Donated clothing, food, equipment and supplies were available
> on a 24-hour basis**. Other volunteer and donated services included
> **over-the-counter pharmaceutical and personal hygiene items, hair
> care, optometric, chiropractic, and podiatric care and massage
> therapy**. AT&T provided **free telephone calls** home for the US&R
> Task Forces, complimented by a **free mail and parcel delivery**
> service provided by the United Parcel Service" (ODCEM 1995, 8).
>
> 8\. Southwestern Bell donated the use of a "**cellular-on-wheels"
> tower**, with free-use phone to anyone responding to the incident.

C.  **Several efforts were made to coordinate** the reception and
    distribution of **donations**.

> 1\. The **Red Cross coordinated** logistical support for **donations
> management from the ICP and at a U.S. Post Office**.
>
> 2\. The **Red Cross** also **established a warehouse at a Coca-Cola
> plant** for donations staging.
>
> 3\. On April 22^nd^, **FEMA sent a Donations Coordination Team to the
> Disaster Field Office**.
>
> 4\. An **In-Kind Donations Coordination Team \[was\] established** at
> the Disaster Field Office, and **included representatives of FEMA,
> ODCEM and voluntary organizations**. "**The team's functional
> responsibilities \[were\]** outlined as follows:
>
> a\) **Process information provided by FEMA's toll-free donations
> hotline**.
>
> b\) **Establish a single, coordinated, unmet needs list**.
>
> c\) **Provide direct communication with the MACC** \[multi-agency
> coordination center\].
>
> d\) **Address the management of spontaneous volunteers**.
>
> e\) **Provide a liaison to the local business community**.
>
> f\) **Share information concerning warehouse space and current
> inventory**" (ODCEM 1995, 13).
>
> 5\. On April 25^th^, **Lt. Governor Mary Fallin participated in the
> Donation Coordination Team meeting**. At this meeting, **it is decided
> that there is no longer a need for mass quantities of goods**, and **a
> press release is issued** accordingly.
>
> 6\. On April 26, 1995, "**a Donations Task Force is identified and an
> organizational meeting is held at the DFO**. Represented at the
> meeting are **Lt. Governor Fallin, the Federal Coordinating Officer,
> State Coordinating Officer, Oklahoma City officials, Oklahoma
> Department of Human Services, FEMA's donations specialist, FEMA
> Voluntary Agency Coordinator, American Red Cross, Salvation Army, Feed
> The Children, Adventist Community Services, Oklahoma Restaurant
> Association and Americorps**" (ODCEM 1995, 13).
>
> 7\. "**The Donations Task Force is presented with two separate
> issues** to address:
>
> a\. **Items needed by individuals and families affected by the blast,
> and the workers supporting them**; and,
>
> b\. **Items needed by individuals and organizations working within the
> blast area**.
>
> c\. **It is emphasized that the task force is not challenged with
> meeting long-term needs of victims nor the donated funds** which have
> been arriving from around the world, since the explosion" (ODCEM 1995,
> 13).
>
> 8\. On Saturday, May 6, 1995, **the FEMA Donations Team starts to
> return donated goods to original donors**.
>
> 9\. By the middle of May 1995, **the donations distribution centers
> close down, and an Unmet Needs Committee is formed to deal with
> long-term disaster assistance issues**.
>
> D. There were numerous **reasons why this was a successful
> operation**:
>
> 1\. "**Unquestionable responsiveness, teamwork, and caring incurred on
> the part of all first responders**.
>
> 2\. **The American Red Cross and other voluntary organizations'
> response was immediate** and continued to meet the needs of all those
> affected by disaster.
>
> 3\. **Communication support from Cellular One, Southwestern Bell, et.
> al., was superb**, and provided and loaned equipment and donated
> services to the responders.
>
> 4\. Many officials indicated that city, county, state and federal
> **response procedures for this incident would become a model for the
> future**. **Urban Search and Rescue Task Force members commented
> regularly that they had never been treated so well, and that the care
> and compassion they received here, because of the outpouring of
> donated goods, services and dedicated volunteers had become . . . "The
> Oklahoma Standard**." (ODCEM 1995, 18).
>
> E. In spite of the success, lessons were learned and **there were
> things that could have been done better.**
>
> 1\. "**Oklahoma City had no method of identifying resources or
> managing the staging area, on 8^th^ Street or along Robinson Ave.,
> during the first two days of the event**.
>
> 2\. **They did not appear to have the manpower nor an individual or
> city department, identified in advance to handle this problem**.
>
> 3\. **Property accountability at the staging areas and donated goods
> accountability were virtually non-existent** during the major portion
> of the incident.
>
> 4\. **In-kind donations management was non-existent during the initial
> days of this incident**. In a catastrophic incident of this
> proportion, **the local jurisdiction should establish an in-kind
> donations management team and assign a liaison to the local Emergency
> Operations Center (EOC)** for the purpose of locating and arranging
> for the delivery of critical needs assets.
>
> 5\. **No instrument . . . \[existed\] that \[would\] identify when a
> requested resource arrives at its intended location**.

6.  Throughout this event, **there were numerous problems with resources
    not being available at the appropriate place and time of need**.
    Subsequent events of this magnitude should consider establishing a
    more **centralized warehousing system** for storing in-kind
    donations, in order to more effectively manage the proper
    distribution of all valuable technical resources.

7.  **Supplies and equipment were being requested on a short notice
    basis** by both the Oklahoma City Fire Department Logistics Center
    and the State Medical Examiner's Office, with apparently little or
    no planning for future needs. **Respective supervisors should
    consider long-term plans and request necessary supplies and/or
    equipment 72 hours in advance, if possible.**

> 8\. **Local, state and federal emergency management agencies need to
> consider developing an initial equipment issue system for emergencies
> of this magnitude**. Several items of individual **equipment, needed
> by search and rescue personnel**, might include: **steel-toed work
> boots, heavy protective clothing, such as military Battle Dress
> Uniforms (BDUs), gloves, hard hats, face protection, respirators with
> high efficiency particulate filters (HEPA), saranex-coated TYVEK
> protective clothing, long underwear, back supports, and protective
> eyewear**.
>
> 9\. A State Donations **Management Plan/Annex must be developed** . .
> . . Additionally, once said plan is completed**, it must be
> distributed** as guidance for local government's development of their
> own plans" (ODCEM 1995, 18-19).

**Objective 18.4 Know what can be done to effectively manage donations
during**

**the response phase of disaster**

**Requirements:**

**Present the following information as a lecture.**

I. **Emergency managers** should **work diligently to manage donations**
in an effective manner.

> A. A **donations management plan or annex (and capabilities to
> implement it) should be created**.
>
> 1\. "**National, regional and local organizations from both the
> private and public sectors which assist with donations, should
> coordinate their efforts before a disaster strikes**. Such
> organizations can make formal commitment in advance, allowing for a
> more systematic delivery of supplies, and knowledge of what should
> arrive. **Obvious resources for in-kind donations include hardware
> stores (e.g., building supplies), supermarkets (e.g., food), church
> groups (e.g., clothes), clubs and organizations (e.g., people). Thus,
> when disaster strikes, these resources can be mobilized quickly and
> efficiently**. At the very least, **these pre-disaster efforts may
> begin to institutionalize part of the donations process. This will not
> stop unannounced in-kind donations, but should curb the problem**"
> (Neal 1994, 28).
>
> B. After a disaster, it is imperative to **conduct a very thorough
> damage, impact and needs assessment** so that your requests for
> donations will be accurate.
>
> 1\. **There is a very close relation between donations management and
> numerous types of post-disaster assessments**.
>
> C. Be sure to **communicate needs for donations to the media in a
> clear manner** (e.g., request only those items that you need). (See
> Allbaugh letter). Keep in mind:
>
> 1\. "**Kitchen volunteers prefer institutional sized cans of food
> delivered on palettes to the kitchen**. **Through this approach,
> volunteers and others can sort, open, cook, and deliver food more
> quickly. As a consequence, disaster kitchens need fewer volunteers and
> less time to prepare palatable meals**. The palettes used to ship
> effectively institutionalized cans serve as useful flooring on cement
> or wet, muddy floors" (Neal 1994, 26).
>
> 2\. "In summary, **disaster chefs would prefer food arriving on
> palettes (easy to deliver, no sorting) in institutional sized cans
> (easier to open and prepare)**" (Neal 1994, 26).
>
> D. **Stress** to the media and the public **the importance and benefit
> of cash donations**.
>
> 1\. "**A system similar to the new donations philosophy adopted by the
> American National Red Cross, should improve the process in the US.
> After a disaster, the Red Cross primarily asks for only cash
> contributions from the public**. **This request helps stem the tide of
> unneeded or hard to handle in-kind donations"** (Neal 1994, 28).

E.  **Find ways to get donations from sources other than the public**.

> 1\. Similar to the process described above, **it \[the American Red
> Cross\] has working relationships with many national businesses to
> obtain various types of in-kind donations immediately after a
> disaster. It therefore knows exactly how many donations it is
> receiving. Thus it knows how many volunteers are needed, and how much
> storage space it will have to locate, and will more effectively and
> efficiently provide necessary service to disaster victims**" (Neal
> 1994, 28).
>
> F. **Ensure** that **donors know and agree with your plans for
> donations**.
>
> 1\. For example, **to avoid public relations problems** which
> confronted the American Red Cross after the 9/11 disasters.
>
> G. **Expect and be prepared to deal with massive quantities of both
> requested and unrequested donations**.
>
> 1\. You will **probably get most of what you ask** for **and** even
> **more**.
>
> 2\. **Have forms or computer programs to track donation needs, donor
> contact information, donation quantity, donation location, etc**.
>
> 3\. **Ensure sufficient and adequately trained individuals to staff
> phone inquiries (about donation needs and offers) and donation sites
> (e.g., storage and distribution)**.
>
> 4\. **Acquire or be able to locate storage facilities, shipping
> arrangements, fork lifts, etc**.
>
> 5\. **Review donations distribution frequently for accountability
> purposes**.
>
> 6\. "Unlike the clothing situation, at least **officials found a more
> effective way to dispose of the food by donating unneeded food to soup
> kitchens and homeless shelters throughout Florida**" (Neal 1994, 26).
>
> H. **Hold meetings to coordinate donation needs, storage issues,
> distribution issues, disposal issues, or their return to original
> donors**.
>
> 1\. These can include **regular EOC meetings or special gatherings for
> local, state and federal donations committees**.

I.  **Make certain that donations get to the right place, at the right
    time, and in the right quantities**.

> 1\. Those involved in donations management must **pay attention to
> detail**.

**Questions to be asked:**

1.  **Why are people generous with their donations when disasters
    strike?**

2.  **What types of donations are sent to disaster-affected areas?**

3.  **What problems do donations present to disaster responders?**

4.  **Should donations be discouraged?**

5.  **How can the drawbacks of donations be overcome by the emergency
    manager and others?**

6.  **What lessons can be learned about donations management in various
    disasters?**

**Common Donations**

> Drinking Water
>
> Ice
>
> Clothes
>
> Food
>
> Medicines
>
> Diapers
>
> Baby Formula
>
> Coats
>
> Shampoo
>
> Soap
>
> Cots
>
> Sleeping Bags
>
> Tents

**Typical Donations Management Problems**

-   Too many donations

-   Insufficient donations

-   Unrequested donations

-   Unusable donations (e.g. broken or damaged)

-   Donations are not applicable to disaster context

-   Donations are not culturally acceptable

-   Donations have to be transported

-   Donations have to be stored

-   Donations have to be sorted

-   Donations have to be distributed

**Recommendations**

-   Create a Donations Management plan and develop capability to
    implement it.

-   Conduct a very thorough damage, impact and needs assessment after
    disaster.

-   Communicate donation needs to the media in a clear manner.

-   Stress the importance of cash donations.

-   Find ways to get donations from sources other than the public.

-   Ensure that donors know and agree with your plans for donations.

-   Expect and be prepared to deal with massive quantities of both
    requested and unrequested donations.

-   Hold meetings to coordinate donations needs, storage issues,
    distribution issues, disposal issues, or their return to original
    donors.

-   Make certain that donations get to the right place, at the right
    time, and in the right quantities.

**Letter From Joe Allbaugh**

**Re: 9/11 Donations**

**After the 9/11 terrorist attack in New York, FEMA Director, Joe
Allbaugh, sent the following letter to volunteers and the media
regarding donations:**

**September 13, 2001**

**To: All Those Who Offered Volunteer Time or Donated Items**

**From: FEMA Director Joe M. Allbaugh**

**"We have received literally hundreds -- nearly a thousand -- of
e-mails from people interested in volunteering their time or donating
goods and services in support of the rescue efforts in New York City and
the Pentagon. At this very busy time, we are, unfortunately, unable to
respond individually to each e-mail regarding this topic.**

**"We are very gratified by your outpouring of generosity throughout
America. However, the State of New York has reported that there is no
additional need for volunteers or donated goods for the World Trade
Center response. In addition to the federal, state and local government
resources being deployed to the scene, there are a considerable number
of goods and services already in the pipeline.**

**"The same situation exists at the Pentagon and no volunteers or
donations are needed at this time.**

**"However the public is encouraged to make financial contributions. You
can call the New York State donations coordination hotline at
1-800-801-8092. To make contributions to help the federal victims at the
Pentagon or the World Trade Center, send your checks to FEMA; World
Trade Center/Pentagon Fund, 8441 West Bowles Avenue, Suite 200,
Littleton, Colorado, 80123.**

**"For further information about blood donation needs, call
1-800-GIVE-LIFE.**

**"Again, thank you so much for your concern and support for those
affected by the disaster and for those working to rescue victims."**