<table>
<colgroup>
<col style="width: 7%" />
<col style="width: 5%" />
<col style="width: 13%" />
<col style="width: 9%" />
<col style="width: 13%" />
<col style="width: 13%" />
<col style="width: 8%" />
<col style="width: 9%" />
<col style="width: 10%" />
<col style="width: 5%" />
<col style="width: 2%" />
</colgroup>
<thead>
<tr class="header">
<th colspan="7"><h1 id="payload-flight-hazard-report">PAYLOAD FLIGHT
HAZARD REPORT</h1></th>
<th>a. NO:</th>
<th colspan="3">AMS-02-F07</th>
</tr>
<tr class="odd">
<th colspan="2">b. PAYLOAD</th>
<th colspan="5">Alpha Magnetic Spectrometer-02 (AMS-02)</th>
<th>c. PHASE:</th>
<th colspan="3">II</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr class="odd">
<td colspan="2">d. SUBSYSTEM:</td>
<td colspan="2">Electrical, Radiation</td>
<td>e. HAZARD GROUP:</td>
<td colspan="2">Radiation, Injury/Illness</td>
<td>f. DATE:</td>
<td colspan="3">May 25, 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr class="even">
<td colspan="2" rowspan="2">g. HAZARD TITLE:</td>
<td colspan="5" rowspan="2">Excessive Field Strengths: EMI, Magnetic (DC
Field)</td>
<td>i. HAZARD</td>
<td colspan="2">CATASTROPHIC</td>
<td><strong>X</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr class="odd">
<td>CATEGORY:</td>
<td colspan="2">CRITICAL</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr class="even">
<td colspan="3">h. APPLICABLE SAFETY REQUIREMENTS:</td>
<td colspan="8">NSTS 1700.7B and ISS Addendum, paragraphs 200.2,
212.2</td>
</tr>
<tr class="odd">
<td colspan="3">j. DESCRIPTION OF HAZARD:</td>
<td colspan="8">The AMS-02 generates energy fields by way of RF and
magnetic fields that may have a hazardous effect on Orbiter Systems, ISS
systems and equipment (SSRMS, SPDM), Extravehicular Mobility Unit (EMU),
Russian Orlan Suit, Simplified Aid for EVA Rescue (SAFER), EVA tools
(including the Pistol Grip Tool) and other safety critical
subsystems.</td>
</tr>
<tr class="even">
<td>k. CAUSES</td>
<td colspan="10" rowspan="2"><p>1. AMS-02 Generates an Excessive
Magnetic Field Strength</p>
<p>2. AMS-02 Radiates an Excessive Electromagnetic Radiation (RF) Field
Strength</p>
<p>3. AMS-02 Changing Magnetic Fields induces currents in proximity
systems</p></td>
</tr>
<tr class="odd">
<td><em>(list)</em></td>
</tr>
<tr class="even">
<td colspan="11"></td>
</tr>
<tr class="odd">
<td colspan="3">o. APPROVAL</td>
<td colspan="3">PAYLOAD ORGANIZATION</td>
<td colspan="5">SSP/ISS</td>
</tr>
<tr class="even">
<td colspan="3">PHASE I</td>
<td colspan="3"></td>
<td colspan="5"></td>
</tr>
<tr class="odd">
<td colspan="3">PHASE II</td>
<td colspan="3"></td>
<td colspan="5"></td>
</tr>
<tr class="even">
<td colspan="3">PHASE III</td>
<td colspan="3"></td>
<td colspan="5"></td>
</tr>
<tr class="odd">
<td colspan="11"></td>
</tr>
<tr class="even">
<td colspan="9">l. HAZARD CONTROL (CONTROL), m. SAFETY VERIFICATION
METHODS (SVM), n. STATUS OF VERIFICATIONS (STATUS)</td>
<td colspan="2">OPS CONTROL</td>
</tr>
<tr class="odd">
<td colspan="9">1. CAUSE: AMS-02 Generates an Excessive Magnetic Field
Strength</td>
<td colspan="2"></td>
</tr>
<tr class="even">
<td colspan="9"><p>1.1 CONTROL: The AMS-02 Cryomagnet has been designed
with multiple magnetic coils oriented to reduce the overall magnetic
field outside of the AMS-02 envelope as much as possible. The
implementation of precision located racetrack and dipole coils create a
large magnetic field (0.86 Tesla/8600 gauss minimum) inside the bore of
the Cryomagnet and a greatly reduced field outside.</p>
<p>1.1.1 SVM: The actual magnetic field of the AMS-02 Cryomagnet will be
measured and compared to analytic model.</p>
<p>1.1.2 SVM: Waiver to SSP 57003 for excessive magnetic fields.</p>
<p>1.1.1 STATUS: Open.</p>
<p>1.1.2 STATUS: Open.</p></td>
<td colspan="2"></td>
</tr>
<tr class="odd">
<td colspan="9"><p>1.2 CONTROL: The AMS-02 magnetic field profile does
not exceed the maximum safe exposure limits for ISS subsystems located
within the proximity of the AMS-02 while the AMS-02 Cryomagnet is
charged. TIA-310, attached to this hazard report, provides a list of ISS
subsystems and the field strength they will likely experience.</p>
<p>1.2.1 SVM: An analysis of the final, measured field strength.</p>
<p>1.2.2 SVM: Program Acceptance (waiver to SSP 57003) of magnetic field
strength on ISS Systems.</p>
<p>1.2.1 STATUS: Open. Initial analysis of the predicted field strength
has been completed and only requires confirmation of measured field
strength to confirm no impact to ISS systems. This is documented in
TIA-310.</p>
<p>1.2.2 STATUS: Open. Initial assessment based on the analytic model
has been accepted by the ISS Program by the approval of TIA-310.
Confirmation of analytic model with measured values will be reported as
confirming this assessment.</p></td>
<td colspan="2"></td>
</tr>
<tr class="even">
<td colspan="9"><p>1.3 CONTROL: The AMS-02 will only charge the magnetic
field or retain it’s intense field strength when it is berthed in its
ISS operational location at PAS Site on the S3 truss, upper inboard (PAS
2). Procedure will require that the magnetic field be dissipated and
confirmed dissipated prior to any robotic operations removing it from
the ISS. The Cryomagnet may be discharged through a number of
mechanisms, commanded discharge of stored current in a controlled ramp
down through AMS-02 Dump Diodes and a controlled quench. In the event
that power from the ISS is lost and commanded control is absent the
battery powered watchdog timer will initiate a controlled ramp down of
the Cryomagnet after 8 hours.</p>
<p>1.3.1 SVM: Functional demonstration of the ability to dissipate the
magnetic field and monitor this through the AMS-02 Cryomagnet Self
Protecting System controlled ramp down.</p>
<p>1.3.2 SVM: Functional demonstration of the ability to dissipate the
magnetic field by way of a controlled quench and monitor results.</p>
<p>1.3.3 SVM: Functional testing of the AMS-02 Cryomagnet Self
Protection System/Watch Dog Timer ability to initiate a controlled ramp
down in the event of loss of ISS power services.</p>
<p>1.3.4 SVM: Formal acceptance of procedural requirement by MOD through
an OCAP</p>
<p>1.3.5 SVM: &lt;deleted&gt;</p>
<p>1.3.1 STATUS: Open</p>
<p>1.3.2 STATUS: Open</p>
<p>1.3.3 STATUS: Open</p>
<p>1.3.4 STATUS: Open</p>
<p>1.3.5 STATUS: &lt;deleted&gt;</p></td>
<td colspan="2">I</td>
</tr>
<tr class="odd">
<td colspan="9"><p>1.4 CONTROL: (Ascent Phase)The AMS-02 Cryomagnet
cannot be energized within the Shuttle Payload Bay (T&gt;0) as the power
provided by the Orbiter can not be supplied to the magnetic field coils
without an EVA exchange of cables.</p>
<p>1.4.1 SVM: Review of Design to confirm that APCU power feed cannot
power the AMS-02 Cryomagnet charging subsystem.</p>
<p>1.4.2 SVM: Inspection of Flight hardware to confirm EVA accessible
cables are configured properly prior to flight.</p>
<p>1.4.1 STATUS: Open.</p>
<p>1.4.2 STATUS: Open.</p></td>
<td colspan="2"></td>
</tr>
<tr class="even">
<td colspan="9"><p>1.5 CONTROL: (Pre-launch) The AMS-02 Cryomagnet
charging circuitshave power connection through the Shuttle T-0 power
feed. There is no plan to initiate charging of the AMS-02 cryogenic
magnet while in the shuttle, prior to launch. AMS-02 systems will be
monitored prior to launch up to L-9 minutes or later to confirm that the
AMS-02 Cryomagnet is operationally quiescent. If ground monitoring
indicates a charging Cryomagnet or a charged Cryomagnet during launch
count down, a No Go will be issued for launch. Once the multiple
commands (seven discrete sequenced commands with special
timing/conditions are required from the ground systems) necessary to
initiate a charge are issued the AMS-02 Cryomagnet requires 1.5 hours to
charge. Monitoring of AMS-02 systems will be accomplished using 1553 and
RS 422 communications available through the T-0 Connection.</p>
<p>1.5.1 SVM: Functional Testing of AMS-02 Cryomagnet charging to
confirm Cryomagnet charge profile.</p>
<p>1.5.2 SVM: Confirm flight Go/No-Go Procedure/Launch Commit Criteria
in place.</p>
<p>1.5.3 SVM: Functional testing of monitoring paths through T-0
lines.</p>
<p>1.5.4 SVM: Ground Operational Procedure and Standards for preflight
check of AMS-02 Status for Go-No Go.</p>
<p>1.5.5 SVM: Review of AMS-02 Cryomagnet Charging Procedure to confirm
multiple process command steps.</p>
<p>1.5.1 STATUS: Open</p>
<p>1.5.2 STATUS: Open</p>
<p>1.5.3 STATUS: Open</p>
<p>1.5.4 STATUS: Open</p>
<p>1.5.5 STATUS: Open</p></td>
<td colspan="2">G</td>
</tr>
<tr class="odd">
<td colspan="9"><p>1.6 CONTROL: (EVA Access) Worst case magnetic fields
experienced during an uncontrolled quench will not exceed 175 gauss
(1.75 x 10<sup>-2</sup> Tesla) within the EVA translation path past the
AMS-02 (including translations around the AMS-02 associate with adjacent
PAS locations). A quench event can produce the worst case magnetic field
along the MT translation path for the period of the quench. Nominal
AMS-02 magnetic fields will generate the worst case fields (more compact
and not dispersed) for other AMS-02 EVA activities (if the Cryomagnet
was operating). The US EMU, SAFER and PGT have been tested to be
compatible with a magnetic field of 600 gauss and have been assessed to
be good for a field exposure of 300 gauss (a factor of 2 based on
testing). The Russian Orlan suit has been qualified to be compatible
with a magnetic field of 175 gauss and will require the AMS-02 magnetic
field be dissipated prior to an EVA with the Orlan suit in the immediate
proximity to the AMS-02 (accessing the AMS-02, not translations past).
The AMS-02 Cryomagnet will have its magnetic fields dumped and power
inhibited prior to <u>any</u> EVA procedure to be conducted on/with the
AMS-02. A keep out zone will be documented to restrict entry into
excessive magnetic field strength zones during non-AMS-02 EVA tasks.
Cryomagnet charge status can be ascertained through health monitoring
systems to the ground. NOTE: 300 Gauss threshold line shown on A7-12</p>
<p>1.6.1 SVM: Analytic assessment of uncontrolled quench magnetic field
decay.</p>
<p>1.6.2 SVM: Magnetic field mapping of flight AMS-02.</p>
<p>1.6.3 SVM: Magnetic field compatibility testing/assessment for EMU,
SAFER, PGT and EVA equipment.</p>
<p>1.6.4 SVM: Confirmation of Operational limits of Orlan suit,
compatible with magnetic fields 175 gauss or less.</p>
<p>1.6.5 SVM: Keep Out Zones Assessment for EVA translation paths
documented for AMS-02 Magnetic Fields.</p>
<p>1.6.6 SVM: Requirement for Cryomagnet discharge prior to EVA
involving proximity and direct EVA operations with the AMS verified
through acceptance by MOD of an OCAD.</p>
<p>1.6.7 SVM: &lt;deleted&gt;</p>
<p>1.6.8 SVM: Verification of Monitoring Capabilities.</p>
<p>1.6.1 STATUS: Closed. Space Cryomagnetics Ltd Memo dated January 30,
2004, Titled "AMS Stray Field During Unprotected Quench"</p>
<p>1.6.2 STATUS: Open</p>
<p>1.6.3 STATUS: Closed. “Extravehicular Mobility Unit (EMU) with 12
Volt Accessories and Tools Magnetic Certification Test Report for the
International Space Station/Orbiter Environments”, EMU 1 – 13-054,
Contract NAS 9-97150, including Field Engineering Memo, FEM-0032 dated
8/4/2000.</p>
<p>1.6.4 STATUS: Open</p>
<p>1.6.5 STATUS: Open</p>
<p>1.6.6 STATUS: Open</p>
<p>1.6.7 STATUS: &lt;deleted&gt;</p>
<p>1.6.8 STATUS: Open</p></td>
<td colspan="2">I</td>
</tr>
<tr class="even">
<td colspan="9"><p>1.7 CONTROL: (SSRMS Ops) While on the SSRMS the
Cryomagnet cannot be charged. Both AMS-02 power feeds are available
while on the SSRMS, however the primary power feed the SSRMS is
providing can not charge the Cryomagnet. The SSRMS would have to be
powering the secondary power supply to the AMS-02 to have any
possibility of charging the Cryomagnet. While power can be made
available to the charging circuit, the Cryomagnet must be commanded to
charge and the limited power through the SSRMS must be made available,
nominal power is consumed by the thermal protection and monitoring
systems. The lack of a 1553 bus connection (as well as RS 422 and fiber
optic links, the AMS-02 terminates the Power Video Grapple Fixture 1553
lines and does not connect them to the AMS-02 system) while on the SSRMS
precludes a command path and also shuts down (through the CPU) the
ability of the J crate to communication with other systems. With the
J-Crate waiting for exterior communications the Cryomagnet Avionics Box
(CAB) is off and will not be commanded on, inhibiting the command and
power paths to the Cryomagnet. The charging process for the
superconducting magnet is operationally complex and there are no stored
commands on the AMS-02 computer within the J-Crate that can direct
AMS-02 wakeup and Cryomagnet charging operations.</p>
<p>1.7.1 SVM: Review of design.</p>
<p>1.7.2 SVM: Functional Testing of AMS-02 Avionics.</p>
<p>1.7.3 SVM: Testing of J-Crate and CAB to confirm that lack of
communication path connections inhibits crate function.</p>
<p>1.7.4 SVM: Robotic handling procedural requirements verified by
formal acceptance by MOD of an OCAD.</p>
<p>1.7.1 STATUS: Open</p>
<p>1.7.2 STATUS: Open</p>
<p>1.7.3 STATUS: Open</p>
<p>1.7.4 STATUS: Open</p></td>
<td colspan="2">I</td>
</tr>
<tr class="odd">
<td colspan="9"><p>1.8 CONTROL: The AMS-02 has three levels of control
to preclude introduction of greater than 459A into the coils, and hence
a more powerful magnetic field. The first is located in the AMS-02
software to preclude operational commands to raise the value above a
maximum of 459A. The second exists in the FPGA that establishes a
current limit also to 459A. The third barrier is implemented in a
majority voting system with three conditioning circuits in parallel that
keeps the current limited to 455.5 ± 3.5A. Cryomagnet charge status can
be ascertained through health monitoring systems to the ground. See
attachment describing levels of control.</p>
<p>1.8.1 SVM: Functional testing of software control.</p>
<p>1.8.2 SVM: Functional testing of FPGA logic array.</p>
<p>1.8.3 SVM: Functional testing of majority voting system.</p>
<p>1.8.4 SVM: Functional testing of AMS-02 charging system.</p>
<p>1.8.5 SVM: Verification of Monitoring Capabilities.</p>
<p>1.8.1 STATUS: Open</p>
<p>1.8.2 STATUS: Open</p>
<p>1.8.3 STATUS: Open</p>
<p>1.8.4 STATUS: Open</p>
<p>1.8.5 STATUS: Open</p></td>
<td colspan="2"></td>
</tr>
<tr class="even">
<td colspan="9"><p>1.9 CONTROL: When discharged, the AMS-02 Cryomagnet
will retain a residual field that will be less than 10 gauss (0.0010
Tesla.)</p>
<p>1.9.1 SVM: Residual Magnetic Field Assessment of AMS-02</p>
<p>1.9.1 STATUS: Open</p></td>
<td colspan="2"></td>
</tr>
<tr class="odd">
<td colspan="9">2. CAUSE: AMS-02 Radiates an Excessive Electromagnetic
Radiation (RF) Field Strength</td>
<td colspan="2"></td>
</tr>
<tr class="even">
<td colspan="9"><p>2.1 CONTROL: AMS-02 has been designed such that
conducted and emitted electromagnetic fields remain within the allowable
levels for the Shuttle and the ISS.</p>
<p>2.1.1 SVM: The AMS-02 will be tested as a unit at ESTEC for excessive
RF energy.</p>
<p>2.1.2 SVM: Acceptance of EMI Testing Results by NASA EMEP.</p>
<p>2.1.1 STATUS: Open.</p>
<p>2.1.2 STATUS: Open.</p></td>
<td colspan="2"></td>
</tr>
<tr class="odd">
<td colspan="9">3. CAUSE: AMS-02 Changing Magnetic Fields induces
currents in proximity systems</td>
<td colspan="2"></td>
</tr>
<tr class="even">
<td colspan="9"><p>3.1 CONTROL: The AMS-02 Cryomagnet can not be
energized within the Shuttle Payload Bay (T&gt;0) as the power provided
by the Orbiter can not be supplied to the magnetic field coils without
an EVA exchange of cables. See Control 1.4.</p>
<p>3.1.1 SVM: Review of Design to confirm that APCU power feed cannot
power the AMS-02 Cryomagnet charging subsystem.</p>
<p>3.1.2 SVM: Inspection of Flight hardware to confirm EVA accessible
cables are configured properly prior to flight.</p>
<p>3.1.1 STATUS: Open.</p>
<p>3.1.2 STATUS: Open.</p></td>
<td colspan="2"></td>
</tr>
<tr class="odd">
<td colspan="9"><p>3.2 CONTROL: The AMS-02 Cryomagnet is capable of
being energized through the Shuttle T-0 power feed. AMS-02 systems will
be monitored prior to launch up to L-9 minutes to confirm that the
AMS-02 Cryomagnet is operationally quiescent. If ground monitoring
indicates a charging Cryomagnet or a charged Cryomagnet during launch
count down, a No-Go will be issued for launch. Under commanded charging
the AMS-02 Cryomagnet requires 1.5 hours to charge. Monitoring of AMS-02
systems will be accomplished using Mil-Std-1553 and RS 422
communications available through the T-0 Connection. (See Control
1.5)</p>
<p>3.2.1 SVM: Functional Testing of AMS-02 Cryomagnet charging to
confirm charging time profile.</p>
<p>3.2.2 SVM: Confirm flight Go/No-Go Procedure/Launch Commit Criteria
in place.</p>
<p>3.2.3 SVM: Functional testing of monitoring paths through T-0
lines.</p>
<p>3.2.4 SVM: Ground Operational Procedure and Standards for preflight
check of AMS-02 Status for Go-No Go.</p>
<p>3.2.1 STATUS: Open</p>
<p>3.2.2 STATUS: Open</p>
<p>3.2.3 STATUS: Open</p>
<p>3.2.4 STATUS: Open</p></td>
<td colspan="2"></td>
</tr>
<tr class="even">
<td colspan="9">3.3 CONTROL: &lt;deleted&gt;</td>
<td colspan="2">I</td>
</tr>
<tr class="odd">
<td colspan="9"><p>3.4 CONTROL: Charging and quenching of the AMS-02
Cryomagnet will not induce adverse currents in any closed loop/eddy
current susceptible structure in proximity of the Cryomagnet. Note:
Effects of induced currents can manifest as electrical transients or
structural loads.</p>
<p>3.4.1 SVM: Analysis of magnetic field strength and time rate change
to induce currents.</p>
<p>3.4.1 STATUS: Open</p></td>
<td colspan="2"></td>
</tr>
<tr class="even">
<td colspan="9"><p>NOTES:</p>
<p>1 Tesla = 10,000 gauss</p></td>
<td colspan="2"></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

  -----------------------------------------------------------------------
  ACRONYMS                            
  ----------------------------------- -----------------------------------
  °C -- degrees Centigrade (Celsius)  MHz -- Mega HertzDC -- Direct
                                      Current

  A -- Ampere                         MLI -- Multilayer insulation

  amp-m^2^ -- Amperes per square      MM -- (CMG) Momentum Manager
  meter                               

  AMS-02 -- Alpha Magnetic            mm -- millimeter
  Spectrometer - 02                   

  APCU -- Auxillary Power Control     mT -- milli Tesla
  Unit                                

  CAB -- Cryomagnet Avionics Box      MT -- Mobile Transporter

  CCS -- Cryomagnet Current Supply    mV -- milli Volts

  CMG -- Control Moment Gyroscope     mWb -- milli Weber

  CO~2~ -- Carbon Dioxide             PAS -- Payload Attach Site (ISS
                                      Side of interface)

  CPU -- Central Processing Unit      PGT -- Pistol Grip Tool

  DC -- Direct Current                psi -- Pounds per square inch

  EMC -- Electromagnetic              RF -- Radiofrequency
  Compatibility                       

  EMI -- Electromagnetic Interference SAFER -- Simplified Aid for EVA
                                      Rescue

  EMU -- Extravehicular Mobility Unit SFHe -- Superfluid Helium

  EVA -- Extravehicular Activity      SPDM -- Special Purpose Dexterous
                                      Manipulator

  FPGA -- Field Programmable Gate     SRMS -- Shuttle Remote Manipulator
  Array                               Mechanism

  GHz -- Giga Hertz                   SSRMS -- Space Station Remote
                                      Manipulator Mechanism

  GSE -- Ground Support Equipment     STP -- Standard Temperature and
                                      Pressure

  He -- Helium                        SVM -- Safety Verification Method

  HW, H/W -- Hardware                 SW, S/W -- Software

  Hz -- Hertz                         TRD -- Transition Radiation
                                      Detector

  Imax -- I (current) maximum         TTCS -- Tracker Thermal Control
                                      System

  kHz -- kilo Hertz                   USS-02 -- Unique Support Structure
                                      02

  MDP -- Maximum Design PressureHe -- Xe -- Xenon
  Helium                              
  -----------------------------------------------------------------------

+------+-------------+----------------+------+-----------------------+
| *    |             |                |      |                       |
| *EMC |             |                |      |                       |
| Requ |             |                |      |                       |
| irem |             |                |      |                       |
| ents |             |                |      |                       |
| Ap   |             |                |      |                       |
| plic |             |                |      |                       |
| able |             |                |      |                       |
| to   |             |                |      |                       |
| AMS- |             |                |      |                       |
| 02** |             |                |      |                       |
+------+-------------+----------------+------+-----------------------+
| **   | **Name of   | **Coverage**   | **A  | **Comments**          |
| Type | Test**      |                | ppli |                       |
| of   |             |                | cabi |                       |
| Te   |             |                | lity |                       |
| st/R |             |                | to   |                       |
| equi |             |                | AMS- |                       |
| reme |             |                | 02** |                       |
| nt** |             |                |      |                       |
+------+-------------+----------------+------+-----------------------+
| C    | SSP 30237,  | DC power, lo   | **Re | Tailored to +120 VDC  |
| ondu | Rev F       | freq, 30 Hz to | quir | bus                   |
| cted |             | 15 kHz.        | ed** |                       |
| E    | CE01        |                |      |                       |
| miss |             |                |      |                       |
| ions |             |                |      |                       |
+------+-------------+----------------+------+-----------------------+
| C    | SSP 30237,  | DC power, 15   | **Re | Tailored to +120 VDC  |
| ondu | Rev F       | kHz to 50 MHz. | quir | bus                   |
| cted |             |                | ed** |                       |
| E    | CE03        |                |      |                       |
| miss |             |                |      |                       |
| ions |             |                |      |                       |
+------+-------------+----------------+------+-----------------------+
| C    | SSP 30237,  | DC power       | **Re | Tailored to +120 VDC  |
| ondu | Rev F       | leads, spikes, | quir | bus                   |
| cted |             | time domain.   | ed** |                       |
| E    | CE07        |                |      |                       |
| miss |             |                |      |                       |
| ions |             |                |      |                       |
+------+-------------+----------------+------+-----------------------+
| C    | SSP 30237,  | DC power       | **Re | Invoked by power      |
| ondu | Rev F       | leads, 30 Hz   | quir | quality requirements  |
| cted |             | to 50 kHz.     | ed** | to demonstrate        |
| Su   | SSP 30237   |                |      | immunity to known     |
| scep | SSCN 3282   |                |      | ripple voltage and    |
| tibi | D.2         |                |      | noise conditions on   |
| lity |             |                |      | the +120 VDC bus      |
|      | CS01        |                |      |                       |
+------+-------------+----------------+------+-----------------------+
| C    | SSP 30237,  | DC power       | **Re | Invoked by power      |
| ondu | Rev F       | leads, 50 kHz  | quir | quality requirements  |
| cted |             | to 50 MHz.     | ed** | to demonstrate        |
| Su   | SSP 30237   |                |      | immunity to known     |
| scep | SSCN 3282   |                |      | ripple voltage and    |
| tibi | D.2         |                |      | noise conditions on   |
| lity |             |                |      | the +120 VDC bus      |
|      | CS02        |                |      |                       |
+------+-------------+----------------+------+-----------------------+
| C    | SSP 30237,  | Spikes, power  | **Re | Invoked by Power      |
| ondu | Rev F       | leads.         | quir | Quality requirements  |
| cted |             |                | ed** | to demonstrate        |
| Su   | SSP 30237   |                |      | immuntiy to switching |
| scep | SSCN 3282   |                |      | transients on the     |
| tibi | D.2         |                |      | +120 VDC bus          |
| lity |             |                |      |                       |
|      | CS06        |                |      |                       |
+------+-------------+----------------+------+-----------------------+
| Radi | SSP 30237,  | Electric       | **Re | Establishes that      |
| ated | Rev F       | field, 14 kHz  | quir | equipment             |
| E    |             | to 10 GHz      | ed** | unintentional         |
| miss | RE02        | (narrowband),  |      | radiated emissions    |
| ions |             | 13.5 -15.5     |      | will not interfere    |
|      |             | GHz.           |      | with platform mounted |
|      |             |                |      | sensitive antenna     |
|      |             |                |      | connected receivers;  |
|      |             |                |      | tailored to Space     |
|      |             |                |      | Station requirements  |
+------+-------------+----------------+------+-----------------------+
| Radi | SSP 30237,  | Magnetic       | Des  | Intended to determine |
| ated | Rev F       | induction      | ired | immunity from         |
| Su   |             | field          | by   | interference          |
| scep | RS02        |                | EP4  | inductively coupled   |
| tibi |             |                | /JSC | from electrical power |
| lity |             |                |      | cables                |
+------+-------------+----------------+------+-----------------------+
| Radi | SSP 30237   | Electric       | Des  | Demonstrates immunity |
| ated | SSCN 3282   | field, 14 kHz  | ired | to known              |
| Su   |             | to 20 GHz.     | by   | intentionally         |
| scep | PIRN        |                | EP4  | radiated              |
| tibi | 57          |                | /JSC | electromagnetic       |
| lity | 003-NA-0023 |                |      | environment external  |
|      |             |                |      | to Space Station. Use |
|      | RS03PL      |                |      | alternate RS level    |
|      |             |                |      | for noncritical       |
|      |             |                |      | attached payloads     |
+------+-------------+----------------+------+-----------------------+

Desired tests will be accomplished.

+-----------------------------------+----------------------------------+
| # ![](media/ima                   | # ![](media/image2               |
| ge1.png){width="4.464583333333334 | .png){width="4.336805555555555in |
| in" height="3.686111111111111in"} | " height="3.5131944444444443in"} |
+-----------------------------------+----------------------------------+
| # Pre                             |                                  |
| dicted Magnetic Fields for AMS-02 |                                  |
+-----------------------------------+----------------------------------+

  ----------------------------------------------------- -----------------
  ![](media/image3.png){width="6.583333333333333in"     AMS-02 Magnetic
  height="5.45625in"}                                   Field Represented
                                                        in Magik

  ![](media/image4.png){width="6.9527777777777775in"    AMS-02 Magnetic
  height="5.784722222222222in"}                         Field Represented
                                                        in Magik -- ISS
                                                        Systems
                                                        Encroachment

  ![](media/image5.png){width="6.911111111111111in"     AMS-02 Magnetic
  height="5.221527777777778in"}                         Field Represented
                                                        in Magik -- 6
                                                        Gauss Box
  ----------------------------------------------------- -----------------

  ---------------------------------------------------- ---------------------------------------------------- --
  ![](media/image6.png){width="8.447916666666666in"                                                         
  height="6.488194444444445in"}                                                                             

  ![](media/image7.png){width="8.490972222222222in"                                                         
  height="6.499305555555556in"}                                                                             

  ![](media/image8.png){width="8.458333333333334in"                                                         
  height="6.499305555555556in"}                                                                             

  ![](media/image9.png){width="3.9715277777777778in"   ![](media/image10.png){width="3.613888888888889in"   
  height="6.463888888888889in"}                        height="6.176388888888889in"}                        

  ![](media/image11.png){width="3.745833333333333in"   ![](media/image12.png){width="3.807638888888889in"   
  height="6.40625in"}                                  height="6.5569444444444445in"}                       
  ---------------------------------------------------- ---------------------------------------------------- --

Attachment 4 -- Cryomagnet Power Circuitry

+--------------------------------------------------+-------------------+
| ![                                               | Power             |
| ](media/image13.png){width="6.385416666666667in" | Availability for  |
| height="5.248611111111111in"}                    | Charging the      |
|                                                  | Cryomagnet.       |
|                                                  |                   |
|                                                  | Only the "A" bus  |
|                                                  | is capable of     |
|                                                  | charging the      |
|                                                  | Cryomagnet, the   |
|                                                  | "B" bus is        |
|                                                  | isolated from the |
|                                                  | Cryomagnet        |
|                                                  | charging circuit. |
|                                                  | An EVA accessible |
|                                                  | panel allows the  |
|                                                  | crew to exchange  |
|                                                  | cables to cross   |
|                                                  | strap the AMS-02  |
|                                                  | bus "A" and bus   |
|                                                  | "B" inputs to the |
|                                                  | other circuits    |
|                                                  | within the        |
|                                                  | AMS-02. This      |
|                                                  | exchange does not |
|                                                  | result in Ams-02  |
|                                                  | bus "A" and bus   |
|                                                  | "B" being         |
|                                                  | interconnected.   |
|                                                  |                   |
|                                                  | Within the        |
|                                                  | Shuttle only the  |
|                                                  | T-0 line supplies |
|                                                  | power to AMS-02   |
|                                                  | bus "A" and is    |
|                                                  | capable of        |
|                                                  | charging the      |
|                                                  | Cryomagnet.       |
|                                                  | During this time  |
|                                                  | the AMS-02        |
|                                                  | systems will be   |
|                                                  | monitored for any |
|                                                  | unplanned         |
|                                                  | charging          |
|                                                  | activity. There   |
|                                                  | is no planned     |
|                                                  | charging of the   |
|                                                  | AMS-02 Cryomagnet |
|                                                  | while in the      |
|                                                  | Orbiter Payload   |
|                                                  | Bay.              |
|                                                  |                   |
|                                                  | Default SSRMS     |
|                                                  | Power is applied  |
|                                                  | through connector |
|                                                  | P9.               |
+--------------------------------------------------+-------------------+

  -----------------------------------------------------------------------
  ![](media/image14.png){width="8.5375in" height="5.998611111111111in"}

  **CRYOMAGNETIC AVIONICS**
  -----------------------------------------------------------------------

[]{.mark}

Attachment 5 -- Quench Generation of Induced Currents

\-\-\-\--Original Message\-\-\-\--

From: Steve Milward \[mailto:stevemilward@spacecryo.co.uk\]

Sent: Monday, April 05, 2004 11:01 AM

To: Martin, Trent

Cc: S M Harrison

Subject: Quench Pulse effects on ISS systems

Trent,

Further to our \'phone conversation earlier here are some thoughts:

During a quench the field decays with a time constant of 2 to 4 seconds.

The voltage induced in any circuit will be proportional to the rate of

change of flux through it and I suspect that for most circuits this will

be small as the systems you are thinking of are in fields of 30 gauss or

less. For example 30 gauss is 3 mT and a circuit 1 m in diameter

perpendicular to the field has a flux of the order 3 mWb. If the field

collapses in 1 second then the single turn voltage induced is 3 mV which

sounds small to me.

I hope this helps.

Regards, Steve.

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**Magnet Current Control and TM, Summary for Safety**

13/11/2023

CAB design has included three protection barriers in series in order to
not permit an actual current of the magnet higher than 459A. These are
the protection barriers:

-   SW protection (digital value)

-   FPGA protection (digital value)

-   Control electronics protection circuitry

The first SW protection prevent from any error of the operator command.
In nominal case and typical conditions, it should be enough to guarantee
that the maximum current of 459A is not exceeded at magnet level. Final
SW limit value to be decided after testing. This barrier avoids
continuous operation of the HW protection of the third barrier.

The second protection is used at FPGA (Field Programmable Gate Array)
level. This protection barrier should work in case of a failure at CPU
H/W or S/W level. The FPGA protection limit is 459A. This second barrier
avoids also the continuous operation of the third barrier in case of
internal failure of the active CPU.

The third protection is implemented in a majority voting configuration
(three conditioning circuits of the control circuitry). The nominal
value of this third protection is 455.5A. In case of failure, and in
worst case analysis up, the current limit of the third protection will
be depending on the protection circuitry error (±1.5A) and the control
electronics error (±2A). This represents an inaccuracy of ±3.5A for the
third protection barrier, then 455.5A + 3.5A = 459A Max.

**Performance Table of the Magnet Current Control**

In the table below, the performances of the magnet current control have
been adjusted to assure that the current passing through the magnet must
never exceed the [absolute maximum value of 459A]{.underline}, still in
failure mode.

+--------------------------------+-----------------+------------+-----+
| **Performances Table of the    |                 |            |     |
| Magnet Current Control**       |                 |            |     |
+--------------------------------+-----------------+------------+-----+
| **Parameter**                  | **Required by   | **Pe       | **F |
|                                | CCS Technical   | rformances | ail |
|                                | Spec**          | in WCA**   | ure |
|                                |                 |            | Mod |
|                                |                 |            | e** |
+--------------------------------+-----------------+------------+-----+
|                                |                 |            |     |
+--------------------------------+-----------------+------------+-----+
| **Normal output current        | **(20A to 0.992 | 20A to     | N/A |
| control range**                | Imax)**         | 457.33A    |     |
|                                |                 |            |     |
| **in WCA up ↑**                | **20A to        |            |     |
|                                | 455.33A**       |            |     |
+--------------------------------+-----------------+------------+-----+
| **Normal output current        |                 | 20A to     | N/A |
| control range**                |                 | 455.33A    |     |
|                                |                 |            |     |
| **In Nominal Case**            |                 | (\*1)      |     |
+--------------------------------+-----------------+------------+-----+
| **Normal output current        |                 | 20A to     | N/A |
| control range**                |                 | [452A]{.   |     |
|                                |                 | underline} |     |
| **in WCA down ↓**              |                 |            |     |
|                                |                 | (\*3)      |     |
+--------------------------------+-----------------+------------+-----+
|                                |                 |            |     |
+--------------------------------+-----------------+------------+-----+
| **Magnet Current Accuracy**    | **\< ±0.5%**    | \< ±0.5%   | N/A |
|                                |                 |            |     |
| **• Long term output current   | **(\*2)**       | (\*2)      |     |
| repeatability**                |                 |            |     |
|                                | **Electronics & |            |     |
| **• Output current             | Current Shunt   |            |     |
| measurement**                  | Errors**        |            |     |
+--------------------------------+-----------------+------------+-----+
|                                |                 |            |     |
+--------------------------------+-----------------+------------+-----+
| **Max Current permitted in     | **459A**        | 457.33A    | 4   |
| WCA, drift and trip circuit    |                 |            | 59A |
| failures**                     |                 |            |     |
|                                |                 |            |     |
| **Imax**                       |                 |            |     |
+--------------------------------+-----------------+------------+-----+
| **SW protection digital        |                 | 455.33A    |     |
| value**                        |                 |            |     |
|                                |                 | (\*1)      |     |
+--------------------------------+-----------------+------------+-----+
| **FPGA protection digital      |                 | 459A       |     |
| value**                        |                 |            |     |
+--------------------------------+-----------------+------------+-----+
| **Control Electronics          |                 | 459A Max   |     |
| protection value**             |                 |            |     |
|                                |                 | 455.5A     |     |
| **(This includes errors of the |                 | Typical    |     |
| control and protection         |                 |            |     |
| circuitries)**                 |                 | 452A Min   |     |
+--------------------------------+-----------------+------------+-----+

> (\*1) Note that the upper value of the normal output current control
> range corresponds to 455.33A. This value is derived from the setting
> values permitted at SW level. Now, 455.33A is the SW protection
> digital value (upper limit corresponding to the maximum setting value
> permitted, in nominal case)
>
> (\*2) The error of ±0.5% required in the CCS technical specification
> includes the accuracy of the electronics and the current shunt.
>
> (\*3) See an explanation in paragraph below.
>
> The performances are:

-   (20A to 455.33A) in typical case

-   (20A to 457.33A) in WCA max↑

-   (20A to 452A) in WCA min↓

> 455.33A is the upper limit corresponding with the maximum setting
> value permitted at SW level, in typical case.
>
> 457.33A is the maximum current value, which should be controlled
> regarding a Worst Case Analysis going up.
>
> 452A is the minimum current value, which should be controlled
> regarding a Worst Case Analysis going down.
>
> The conclusion is that regarding the present baseline, if the operator
> sends a setting value of 455.33A, the magnet will be charged at
> 455.33A typically, 457.33A max in WCA up, and 452A min in WCA down, or
> any other value between them. Nevertheless, the current TM will
> acquire the actual current of the magnet with accuracy better than
> ±2A.
>
> The maximum error of current control electronics is also ±2A. However,
> at this value of current of 455.33A, it is necessary to take into
> account in WCA both contributions, the control electronics and
> protection circuitry. This is the reason why the minimum value of
> magnet could get 452A instead of 453.33A in WCA min (due to the
> clamping of the protection circuitry added to the control electronics
> error)
>
> For example, if the operator sends a setting value of 454A, the magnet
> will be charged at 454A typically, 456A in WCA up and 452A in WCA
> down, then guaranteeing accuracy better than ±2A.

  -----------------------------------------------------------------------
  ![](media/image15.png){width="5.998611111111111in"
  height="4.803472222222222in"}

  Principle Grounding Path for AMS-02 is through PDS system

  ![](media/image16.png){width="8.988888888888889in"
  height="6.1506944444444445in"}

  **AMS-02 GROUNDING PATH WHILE ON THE PAD**

  ![](media/image17.png){width="8.984722222222222in"
  height="5.459027777777778in"}

  **AMS-02 GROUNDING PATH WHILE ON THE ORBITER DURING FLIGHT PHASE**

  ![](media/image18.png){width="8.998611111111112in"
  height="5.805555555555555in"}

  **AMS-02 GROUNDING PATH WHILE ON THE ISS SSRMS**

  ![](media/image19.png){width="8.996527777777779in"
  height="5.815277777777778in"}

  **AMS-02 GROUNDING INTERFACE WHILE INSTALLED ON ISS PAS LOCATION**

  ![](media/image20.png){width="7.694444444444445in"
  height="6.043055555555555in"}

  ![](media/image21.png){width="9.618055555555555in"
  height="5.4631944444444445in"}

  ![](media/image22.png){width="9.461805555555555in"
  height="5.347222222222222in"}

  **CAB GROUNDING AND BONDING DIAGRAMS**
  -----------------------------------------------------------------------