FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION

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INTERNATIONAL AVIATION SAFETY FORUM

\"SAFETY FROM TOP TO BOTTOM\"

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PLENARY SESSION 1

THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 2, 2006

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Westfields Marriott

17450 Conference Center Drive

Chantilly, Virginia 20151

JOHN R. BYERLY Moderator, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Transportation
Affairs, U.S. Department of State

NICHOLAS A. SABATINI Associate Administrator for Aviation Safety,
Federal Aviation Administration

ROBERTO SALVARANI Head of the Unit for Air Transportation Safety and
Environment, European Commission

ALVIN W. TUALA Transport Sector Advisor, Pacific Islands Forum
Secretariat

ROBERT SHUTER Director of International Aviation and Technical Programs,
Transport Canada

C-O-N-T-E-N-T-S

AGENDA ITEM PAGE

Call to Order

Joseph Bogosian 4

International Safety Policies

Moderator: John R. Byerly 8

Roberto Salvarani 11

Alvin W. Tuala 16

Robert Shuter 20

Nicholas Sabatini 24

P-R-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S

10:15 a.m.

MR. STURGELL: If you\'ll all be seated, we can start with our first
session, thanks. If I can call everyone to take their seats, we can
begin the next panel. We\'ll begin momentarily, so if everyone can take
their seats.

MR. BOGOSIAN: Good morning, buenos dias, bonjour, (phonetic), dubra
utra, (phonetic), saba kreh (phonetic), nehow, (phonetic). Now I don\'t
want to take the translators\' job away so I\'m going to keep the rest
of my remarks to English. My name is Joe Bogosian. I am the FAA
Assistant Administrator for International Aviation. I want to add my
personal welcome to all of you. This is a wonderful opportunity, a
record-setting 495 person forum. It gives us a great opportunity to be
all together, FAA Domestic, Headquarters Resources, FAA US Resources,
FAA International Resources and all of our international colleagues in
this room to be together in one place at one time and have very
productive conversations. Our morning speakers set a very constructive,
productive tone and a great challenge to all of us at this forum.

Administrator Blakey challenged us to take safety to the next level,
manage risks, share data and information and create a safety culture.
Secretary Peters highlighted that safety is a challenge for all of us
all the time and called for 21^st^ Century solutions for 21^st^ Century
security challenges, safety challenges.

President Kobeh called on all of us to contain our work together,
improve our remarkable performance and pointed out that safety is a mind
set and an integral element in our industry\'s culture. And Mr.
Bisignani talked to us about the specific challenges that still remain
despite the tremendous gains, called for a businesslike approach to
safety, shared with us the six-point safety strategy, discussed the
global aviation safety roadmap and the IOSA and some honest assessments
and observations. It is now our collective challenge for this safety
forum to keep in mind those broad themes that our speakers identified
and through the discussions over this day and a half advance the
dialogue towards concrete solutions, concrete ideas. That requires the
work of the speakers and the panelists, but also the work of all of your
active participation.

Our first plenary session is moderated by somebody who has been involved
in many aviation policy challenges throughout his almost 30-year career.
He\'s younger than that, so I don\'t want to say 30. John Byerly is the
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Transportation Affairs at the US
Department of State. He has held many positions covering a range of
duties in US foreign policy, national security and international
economic relations and he has brought his legal and diplomatic skills to
work with many of you in this room and help solve the important
questions confronting international aviation.

So with that, I will turn it over to John and the panel.

(Applause)

MR. BYERLY: Thank you. Joe, thanks for that very kind introduction but
it\'s also an intimidating introduction. The fact that we get to follow,
attempt to follow Marion Blakey, Bobby Sturgell, Secretary Peters,
Giovanni Bisignani, Roberto Kobeh, that\'s a daunting challenge and
we\'ll do our best. Don\'t hold us to their high standard. We want to
invigorate this discussion in line with the guidance that Administrator
Blakey gave us to be provocative, to tackle the big questions, not to
hold back, that there are going to be disagreements. Let\'s bring those
out and see if we can get some enlightenment as a result.

This panel has been asked to address two questions. First; how can we
find the most appropriate standards to provide a system that is globally
safe, and second, is there the will to enforce those aviation safety
standards? We\'ll look to you in the audience during this panel and I
think in the others to be active participants. I\'m going to leave
plenty of time at the end of this session. We\'ll wrap up our discussion
leaving plenty of time for you to ask questions, to make comments.

I\'d ask that when you do so, raise your hand, get the mike, identify
yourself and your organization. And if anyone at any time, even right
now, wants to ask a question or feel you\'ve got something you want to
say, that\'s okay, too. Raise your hand, I\'ll see you, we\'ll get you
recognized. You\'ll be given the floor. We want an active dialogue, not
a series of mini-lectures. Now, it\'s really my privilege to introduce
the four members of the panel. First, to my immediate left, Roberto
Salvarani. Roberto serves as Head of Unit for Air Transport Safety and
Environment at the European Commission in Brussels. He holds a Doctorate
in Nuclear Engineering. That\'s intimidating for me to be sure. I\'m
just a mere lawyer. He joined the Commission in 1977. He worked early in
his career in Maritime Affairs, including Maritime Safety and he\'s also
handled telecommunications and transport network and infrastructure
issues. More recently, he has been and is the head of delegation and
negotiations between the United States and the European Union to
establish a framework for aviation safety cooperation with the still
fairly new European Aviation Safety Agency, EASA. Roberto, it\'s great
to see you again and have you here on this panel.

Let me turn next to Alvin Tuala. Since last November, Alvin has held the
position of Regional Transport Sector Advisor in the Pacific Islands
Forum Secretariat. He earlier served as Director for Civil Aviation for
Samoa from 1999 until 2005. He\'s been a pivotal figure in the
establishment and development of the Pacific Aviation Safety Office or
PASO. He holds a Bachelor of Arts and a Law Degree from universities in
New Zealand and an Advanced Business Management Degree from New England
University, that\'s New England in Australia for most of these. Alvin,
welcome.

MR. TUALA: Thank you.

MR. BYERLY: The third panelist, Bob Shuter. Bob serves as Director of
International Aviation and Technical Programs for Transport Canada.
Bob\'s a Civil Engineer by training, spent 17 years in the Canadian
Armed Forces and since has worked on a broad range of civil aviation
issues, including airworthiness, aviation environmental protection and
aviation security. Bob, it\'s good to have you here south of the border.

The fourth panelist, Nick Sabatini, already mentioned and recognized
appropriately here by Administrator Blakey. Nick is FAA\'s Associate
Administrator for Aviation Safety, a job he\'s held for over five years.
Before joining the FAA, this is something I didn\'t know, he joined the
FAA in 1979, Nick was a pilot for the US Customs Service and also a
helicopter pilot for the New York City Police Department. At FAA,
Nick\'s held a range of safety related positions and today is
responsible for a huge span of duties including certification of airmen,
aircraft, and air operators and safety oversight of some and again a new
figure for me, 7,300 US commercial airlines and air operators. Nick,
I\'m delighted you could join this panel.

I have a sad announcement to make, one I know some of you are aware of
but it\'s an announcement that makes so very clear why we\'re gathered
here today at an Aviation Safety Conference. As many of you know, we had
planned for Director General Harold Demuren of Nigeria to join us on the
panel. Because of a tragic accident in Abuja this past weekend, the one
that Secretary Peters mentioned, that all of you know about, he had to
remain in his home country. He has provided a comment of his
introductory remarks that will be made available by FAA in the materials
provided after the conference and I\'d refer you to those. I\'m very
sorry he can\'t be with us, and I want to express my sympathies, I\'m
sure they\'re shared by the panel and by all of you, both Dr. Demuren in
this very difficult time and most important of all, all the families who
lost love ones in that accident.

The accident in Abuja, like every other aviation tragedy, makes clear
that even as our discussions here today may lead us into technical,
regulatory, legal and policy debates, the ultimate focus is on human
beings. Our goal in this panel and this conference can be nothing less
than protection of human life. We all agree today, and this is a point
earlier speakers have made, by any measure, aviation is safer today than
it\'s been in the past. It\'s an extraordinary success story but our
success cannot lull us into complacency.

As Marion Blakey made so clear, the incredible growth in civil aviation
in the coming year requires, I repeat, requires us to grapple with
making a safe system safer. Whether one measures the number of
passengers, the tons of cargo, the number of flight departures, or the
introduction of new technology, new aircraft and aircraft types, whether
it\'s an A-380, a 787, a very light jet or a UAV, every metric shouts
out growth, growth, growth. That\'s a good thing, a good thing for the
people who want to use air services.

I\'m not a mathematician but multiplying the expected increase in flying
by today\'s very good accident rate, makes clear that unless we improve
aviation safety, the number of lives lost coming back to the human
element, the number of lives lost will increase substantially in coming
years. That\'s a result that none of us should or will accept. It\'s why
Administrator Blakey referred to the need to take safety to the next
level.

In advance of today\'s conference, I asked each of our panelists to be
prepared for a few minutes of introductory remarks and to offer a
response to the following general question; in international aviation
safety, what is the world doing right, but more important, where do we
need change, what do we need to do better? Without further ado, I\'m
going to invite Roberto to offer his views. Thank you, Roberto.

MR. SALVARANI: Thank you. Good morning, everybody. My short introduction
would be based on four C\'s, four points, complacency, concern,
compliance, cooperation. And I will start with the complacency. We\'ve
seen the figures so I will not repeat them. They may seem impressive in
terms of expressing a good level of safety, but I think there is little
reason for complacency. We are seeing the diversity in the various
regions. Therefore, I want to say that we have reason for concern rather
than complacency.

We have analyzed the work done on civil aviation authorities across the
world by assessment like the program, the Universal Safety Oversight
Program by ICAO, the work done by the Federal Aviation Administration,
US, the work done by ECAC, the European Civil Aviation Conference and
actually, of course, the work done by the European Commission. From that
analysis, it shows that more than 100 civil aviation authorities, all
members of ICAO, have limited to capacity to do their oversight work
properly. Thirty-five of these numbers come from ICAO, 25 from ECAC, 20
from the FAA, 17 from the EU Black List Approach that Mr. Bisignani
doesn\'t like, but in six months has already brought 147 companies of
the operation in Europe, scattered in 17 countries.

Some of these figures cross each other. Some are found \-- the same name
appears in one, two, even three other various lists thrown up by the
entities I\'ve named. But when you exclude duplicates, you\'re still
left with more than 100 Civil Aviation Administration who count
properly, so to me, this is an extremely serious reason for concern.

Part of the causes are the lack of resources and adequate resources or
adequately trained resources. Some of these situations come from the
fact that aviation safety is not a priority in a number of states, maybe
rightly, maybe \-- I\'m not making a judgment of that, but it\'s a fact.
Another group is formed by those who are definitely flag for convenience
and here with my 10 year\'s experience in shipping the work of aviation
should avoid a mistake made by shipping which ignore at the beginning we
were at about the end of the \`60s, early \`70s, the spread of the flags
of convenience phenomenon and ended up in a mess for years. They have
not totally recovered now. It\'s still possible today, I believe to
prevent the flags of convenience disease to spread in the aviation as
much as others might wish.

In order to do that, we need effective action. And I don\'t think we
have to look forward for identifying the action. All we have to do is
just to look backwards to seven, eight months ago at the ICAO Conference
on Safety organized in March 2006. Mr. Kobeh recalled some of the
elements of that and I will retain from the conference two major
elements which I think should be the focal point of action.

And that brings me to the third point, compliance. Make sure that the
civil aviation authorities, but also the operators, the undertakings,
the maintenance organizations, do fulfill the job in accordance to the
standards they are required to respect. How did we challenge \-- face
that challenge in Europe by a number of laws. The first one is by
introducing mandatory ramp inspection throughout the European community.
The second one is by establishing the black list, a criteria that allows
us if a company or a group of companies or indeed, a whole Civil
Aviation Administration of a state is not favorable to do the job that
it\'s supposed to do in comparison to internationally agreed ICAO
standard, not in comparison to EU standards, which are slightly higher,
if they fail that, they are banned from operating to or from Europe and
it should be so.

The third element we have used is by putting for the European Aviation
Safety Agency the inspection or standardization inspection of our own
member states, 25 in a few months, 27, as the top priority for the
European Aviation Safety Agency, so we are trying to make sure that
whoever comes to us is at least meeting international standard. We are
also trying to make sure that our own house is in order.

This mechanism is also in the process of being reinforced by cooperation
with Eurocontrol for the alarm functions so that we can detect if any of
the banned operators have tried to overfly Europe or reach a European
Airport. Now, I don\'t want to enter into here the discussion whether
this approach is better, our approach is better than other approach. I
think it is a line of defense that we are obliged to take. What I think
is more important is that \-- and I get to the fourth point, we do
cooperate and cooperation is part of the answer. We heard today from Ms.
Blakey underlining the importance of sharing of information and I
couldn\'t agree more. There is a wealth of intelligence that is being
collected by the various actions that are being made in order to find
out who is doing the job properly and who is not. It is a pity, it would
be a pity if this information is not commonly shared by all who are
determined to work for a real increase in safety.

The cooperation includes also technical assistance. As I mentioned
earlier, a number of the civil aviation authorities who are incapable to
do the job properly need assistance. The Commission, the European
Commission has invested not three million Euros like Mr. Bisignani was
saying that IATA are doing but 100 million Euros in the last five years
and we plan to invest more because we believe that this is the other
important element of cooperation. We are doing \-- many of the
investments are taking place through the ICAO COSCAP program, others on
a bilateral basis, particularly with those countries where we have
identified \-- they are today black-listed and we have identified that
the problem is not a lack of willingness to act on safety, but rather
the lack of resources. So training programs and other type of assistance
is a priority.

To give you an example, Congo has been black-listed by us in March and
already in September, we have concluded an agreement for fitting them
with almost five million Euros, so that\'s roughly \$6 million to assist
them in developing a newly organized Civil Aviation Administration. But
when it doesn\'t work, then the restriction to operate is a must. Where
there is no will, there has to be punishment and punishment is to
enforcement of restrictions to operate if we are to protect the lives of
the citizens, not only in Europe but also when in a global situation,
people travel across the world for business or for tourism. And they
need to know that if they want to move in a certain region, there are
companies that are operators that are not reliable. So that\'s why we
not only adopt the list of banned companies but we make sure it is made
public and as largely public as possible.

I think I will stop here because I guess I have injected a number of
awfully provocative points. Thank you.

(Applause)

MR. BYERLY: I asked for provocation and I\'ve already got some, so I\'m
happy. Alvin, you\'re next.

MR. TUALA: Thanks, John. Hopefully, I don\'t have four points like my
good friend, Roberto, but in essence I think the appropriate standards
worldwide are already in place. We have under ICAO, the ICAO standards
that are globally accepted. The problem is not the standards, it\'s
implementation of the standards. And we find that increasingly in
regions like ours in the Pacific, and I think equally in Africa and some
other regions, the standards are there for us, accepted by ICAO member
states. The problem is the capacity to implement these standards. We
struggle with trying to find the qualified people. We struggle to find
the financial resources and this is where, I think, we have a major role
to play by organizations such as the FAA, ICAO and IATA to a large
extent.

The political will is there by the leaders in the Pacific. Our leaders
have just met last week and endorsed the safety requirements under ICAO.
They\'ve endorsed what is called a Pacific Plan which has in there
safety and security as the number one concern for the Pacific,
especially a region opening up to tourism with all the region tensions
elsewhere. So for me, and having been the Director and seeing the last
ICAO USOAP orders that we had in the Pacific in 2003, most them are
members, failed by New Zealand and Australia and that\'s because of the
lack of capacity. We\'ve trying to address those concerns from Australia
and New Zealand where they have come in and offered financial
assistance, they\'ve offered training but we still need a lot more from
ICAO and I think ICAO has a lot more that they can offer to regions such
as ours.

The FAA as well, we \-- very few of our members fly to the US. The ones
that do have very stringent requirements to meet for their aircraft to
come to the US and that\'s fine, but we would also like to see them come
in, provide, you know, human resource training, provide especially
training. We lack that very much in the Pacific, not in all our members.
I represent 16 member countries and most of them are ICAO members and
they struggle to meet the ICAO requirements, the SARPs and the lot. So I
think that the system is in place already that ICAO provided. It\'s
implementation for most of us.

I know the bigger countries have no problems and some small wealthy
countries have no problems, but there are a lot of countries in the
Pacific and I know for Africa and some of the Caribbean countries, we
face similar problems of size and economic standards of our countries,
so those are some of the issues, but I fully agree with Marion Blakey
this morning, that it\'s a safety culture and it is a challenge. We\'ve
got to have that mind set and it\'s no use having the mind set and
nothing to back you up with.

We can all say in the Pacific, yes, we want to do this, we want to \--
but we have no resources and no training of our people. We\'ve had an
offer from China just this year to train 2,000 aviation personnel across
the Pacific for free and that starts next year. That includes pilots,
air traffic controllers, engineers, flight ops inspectors,
airworthiness, and that\'s something that we\'re seriously considering
now because we need that training for our people if we are to avoid all
these accidents and if we are to insure that we maintain the high
standards, we\'ve really got to train out people to the same level as
the people in America, people in Australia, New Zealand, Canada,
wherever. We can\'t be lagging behind and I\'m sure other regions don\'t
want to do the same. I guess this is why we\'ve had a lot of
proliferations in some of the accidents in other countries, because the
standards might be there but meeting them is a different \-- we go about
it differently and some countries struggle more than others. So but
that\'s for now. John, I\'ve got some more later, thank you.

MR. BYERLY: Thank you, Alvin. Bob?

(Applause)

MR. SHUTER: Thank you, John. Good morning everybody. I\'m going to start
by picking up on one of the points that Giovanni Bisignani mentioned
this morning, eliminate the inconsistencies. This is something that
we\'ve looked at as well because where it\'s not consistent there\'s the
potential for a safety concern. And that falls into two areas, the
standards, which is our main theme, and this sharing of information that
Marion mentioned as well this morning. The standards, we look to ICAO
but really when we say ICAO, we mean ICAO coordinating input from a
variety of countries so we have truly international standards. And
hopefully they will be implemented evenly, consistently across the
world.

In some cases, they\'re rewritten into a different language and I\'m not
going to make any lawyer jokes, here, John, but what happens is an
airline once complained to me, \"Why are your regulations so complex\"?
I said, \"It\'s very straightforward, every time we try to enforce a
violation, you get a team of lawyers together to poke holes in the
regulations, so we end up with more complex regulations and we end up in
a vicious cycle here. We have to have a bigger team of lawyers writing
regulations.

But the goal is to have something that people can understand in a fairly
easy method and can implement it consistently. But then we have to ask
ourselves, when we have these standards, are they the best we can do or
are they the minimum standard? And in many cases I hear the phrase, \"It
is the minimum standard and we expect more\". In discussions with our
air traffic service provider, they\'ve said to us, \"If it\'s a
prescriptive standard, it will work, but if you give us a performance
based standard, we will raise the bar.\"

And the point this morning on moving it to the next level, how do you
move it to the next level, go away from the prescriptive standards to
performance based standards. Everyone recognizes now that safety is good
business. In the past, it probably wasn\'t as widespread and we had
people who put money ahead of safety. Now most people; operators, ATC
providers, airports, maintenance, manufacturing, realize that if you put
safety first then the dollar will follow. If you do a risk assessment on
an issue and determine there\'s a risk and find a way to address it, and
look at the cost of the safety input, you\'ll probably find out that the
safety cost is much less than the cost of failure. So we\'re gradually
moving towards this culture that we\'ve talked about, the SMS culture
that we\'re bringing in worldwide, how we can make things better through
this culture.

And one of thee questions we were asked was this resource issue and how
can we improve where resources are in some areas and not in other areas.
A very effective program that has been used quite a bit and something
which Bill Voss pushed at the last assembly which was to work on a
regional basis and if we look at some of the regional organizations and
how successful they\'ve been, and the potential if they expand to share
information, to work together, to help each other, if I look at the
successes we\'ve had, I like to advertise here, the North American
Aviation Trilateral. We put a tremendous amount of work into looking at
our regulations, changing them where they were different, harmonizing as
much as we could or agreeing to accept each others, which led to a lot
of discussions on safety, a lot of work going into those presentations.
So we said why not include other people in those presentations from
other countries? We did that, so now we open it up to all our friends in
Central America and it\'s been a very successful program. Not only are
we sharing information, we\'re providing a more cost effective way of
enhancing safety. One of the questions we were asked was, is there a
will to enforce the standards? And that really depends on what you\'re
dealing with. If it\'s a domestic operator and that country isn\'t that
concerned, should we be concerned.

It\'s a very different story if you\'re talking about an international
operator going from one country to the other. One of my responsibilities
is foreign airline inspection. If an operator wants to come into Canada,
we inspect them. The first thing we do is look at the ICAO audit report.
Is there surveillance, the will to enforce within that country? If it
isn\'t there, right away a red flag goes up, we\'re not going to be
happy with that operator. And yes, Giovanni, I take your point on your
audits, a very good source of data. I\'ll include that.

We don\'t have a black list that was discussed earlier. What we do is
issue a certificate. If we\'re happy that the operator meets the ICAO
standards or our standards, then we\'ll issue them a certificate. We
also have the right, from time to time, to audit or inspect, ramp
inspections, to insure that they maintain those standards, maintain the
consistency that we\'re looking for. If it\'s not there, then we\'ll
take action.

We had an operator recently who handed in a certificate because he felt
they were not longer going to meet our standards and rather have us take
it away, he handed it back to us. So the message is getting out that you
have to have the standards, they have to be enforced, otherwise, you\'re
not going to have safe international traffic. And it\'s because we\'re
such an international organization that we have the leverage to say to
people, \"Here are the standards, let\'s work on them together, make
sure they are consistent, make sure that they are the highest that we
need to achieve for safety and let\'s enforce them\". Thank you.

(Applause)

MR. BYERLY: Thanks, Bob. Nick, the World Series is over, an American
joke here, but you can be cleanup. We welcome your remarks.

MR. SABATINI: Thank you, John, and good morning. I can tell you that
I\'m extremely disappointed that the Yankees didn\'t make it. So we\'ll
build up from there. You asked the question, John, what is the world
doing right and what do we need to change to do better? When you put it
in the perspective in terms of statistics and let\'s exclude what
Giovanni Bisignani brought to our attention here for the moment, just
for the purpose of discussion, exclude Africa for the moment. But when
you look at the global community, this is in incredible safe system and
the greatest challenge that we all face is to make this incredibly safe
global system safer yet.

So let\'s start from the very top. ICAO in 1944, we now have 189 member
states who have signed up. There are the SARPs, which are minimum
standards, but do you know what\'s interesting about minimum standards,
you can make them as high as you want. That is always going to be the
minimum standard for entry into the system. So it is what it is by
definition. It is the minimum level no matter how high that standard may
be. It is the minimum level for entry.

So what are we doing right? Forums like this, global community getting
together and sharing what is important to be understood, areas that need
to be addressed to be fixed and what can we do about it? It\'s aviation
professionals from around the globe getting together to have this kind
of a discussion. ICAO has SARPs and those other standards but they are
not enough. What you then need is a government with the political will
to put in place the infrastructure to execute an effective oversight
system and regulatory system. And ICAO, which we strongly support in
terms of USOAP and what they\'ve done over the years in going around the
global community, assessing and auditing the member states and they\'ve
almost completed their cycle. I think their cycle will end by 2010 and
we will have covered every single member state and then the next version
of that will be more of a data driven approach to auditing of the member
states.

But there continues to be a responsibility. You cannot default to ICAO
to do your work. Member states have an obligation and a responsibility
to have in place the infrastructure to assure for itself that any
operator wishing to operate into that member state is, in fact,
compliant with ICAO requirements and the air carrier itself is also
compliant with ICAO requirements. So we\'ll give you an example. In the
United States years ago we introduced the IASA program, International
Aviation Safety Assessment, and its purpose was to assess member states
who wished to travel or operate into and out of the United States. We
have established a bar; basically, one you must demonstrate that your
government is, in fact, compliant with the ICAO requirements, the SARPs
and once you have demonstrated that, we will place you in what we
consider or call a Category 1 determination. Following that, then the
air carrier must then gain economic authority from our Department of
Transportation. Once that is granted, you must then demonstrate \-- the
air carrier itself must then demonstrate to us that they have, in fact,
an air carrier operating certificate. They are from, of course, a
Category 1 country, whose government we have assessed and they are a
safe operation based on those parameters that are spelled out in the
federal regulation that we have FAR 129.

Now, we also need to operate as a community and I applaud what Giovanni
Bisignani and IATA is doing in terms of auditing through their IOSA
program. It is a critical component and we think it\'s a very effective
component and in fact, we have accepted their IOSA program to be the
code share audit when a US air carrier is code sharing with another air
carrier but that air carrier must come from a Cat 1 country. And we\'ve
always had in place a requirement for code sharing and we accept the
IOSA as a code share audit acceptable to the United States.

I would also tell you this; that when you look at data there is a
correlation between those countries that we have assessed and conducted
audits and their accident rate. So there is a direct correlation. Is
there a political will to assure that that nation state is, in fact,
putting in place the infrastructure to conduct proper oversight of their
industry?

I applaud what we\'re now doing with \-- at ICAO. The audits are now
made public. They\'re available to be seen on the web and it is
transparent. In fact, the last get together up on Montreal in March
there was an agreement that the information derived from audits would be
posted and it is now available and again, transparent. The Administrator
talked this morning about safety management systems. I would say this;
safety management systems are essential for developed nations to move
into and step up to because we can no longer stay in what we refer to as
forensics or the fix and fly model. Break one, fix it, fly again, find
out what happened, break it, fix it, fly again. That doesn\'t work.

In a time we have today where accidents are rare and they are random,
and there is no longer a common cause for an accident, each accident is
basically showing us that it\'s based on a unique set of circumstances,
so there aren\'t common causes any more but what we need to do and the
importance, again, of communities like this where we must share safety
information with one another.

The Administrator this morning pointed to a fact that the FAA through
its own efforts, compare to the information that we now voluntarily
receive through our own efforts only collect five percent of the
information. The rest of it is in the hands of the operators, whether
you\'re a repair station, air carrier, a manufacturer, whatever the case
may be, and if we\'re going to be successful in continuing to keep
pressure on the reduction of accidents and the elimination of risk to
the extent that it\'s humanly possible, then we\'ve got to work together
to share the information.

And what we learn, we will certainly make available to the global
community. So that\'s what I believe needs to be done, what we\'re doing
well, but where we need to improve is to help places like Africa.
There\'s got to be greater involvement on the part of the World Bank.
There\'s got to be greater involvement on the part of Exim \[Bank\]
(phonetic). More money needs to be poured into these countries to help
them, but all the money in the world will not help unless there is a
political will. My colleague said he has the desire but he doesn\'t have
the training and for a nation like that to have the desire and yet not
the wherewithal, requires that the global community assist them in ways
that is, in fact, bringing resources to them.

(Applause)

MR. BYERLY: At this point, I\'m going to ask any of the panelists who
would like to comment on anything that\'s been said. Second, I\'m going
to see if there\'s anyone from the audience who has a compelling
question or even a half good question you\'d like to ask at this point.
And if nobody gets this thing more mixed up, a little disagreement, I
will start throwing bombshells into the middle of the table. But, guys,
what would you like to say?

MR. SALVARANI: Maybe I could pick up on the last point concerning
accidents and occurrence reporting data. We are in the process of
implementing because the software is already available, a data base on
accident and occurrence reporting. The name is, or the nickname is
ECCAIRS. And it is based in Italy in the Joint Research Center of the
European Community. But it\'s the effort of not only European nations,
but also United States, Canada is taking part, ICAO is present, the
European \-- again, the European Civil Aviation Conference and the Joint
Aviation Authorities.

It\'s a large effort which I can only say I regret that it\'s taking
that long before it starts actually being used. There are at the moment,
I understand, only 17 states who started feeding data into it. I think
there is a need of a political massage to encourage the various partners
to move into the data exchange. It\'s no good to create a data base if
it\'s stay empty. And this, I think, is an area where we must make a big
effort. Again, it was born, if you like, in Europe but the steering
committee, when they met two weeks ago, there were 72 members. In my
opinion, it is no longer a steering committee but it was just an
indication of the importance that finally start being given to that
initiative.

It will be a success only if everyone takes part into it. The fact that
ICAO is actively present in it, should be the guarantee that it gets the
international dimension that it needs. But it\'s a call for support, for
intervention, for action, because I visited the UK, not to mention a
country, only a few weeks ago. When they told me and showed me what the
wealth of information on accident and occurrence reports, even more
important is being gathered in the UK and then I naively asked the
question, \"Why don\'t you feed them into this common database? Why do
you keep it for yourself\"? I think it\'s only \-- it\'s not that there
is not a determination to do it. It\'s second priority. It doesn\'t come
immediately. So we need to find something to trigger the actual use of
that database which is open to everyone.

MR. BYERLY: Roberto, let\'s pursue this because I think the theme of
sharing information has been highlighted with opening remarks here on
this panel already. Bob, maybe I could ask you, you talked about
performance based standards. Isn\'t one of the problems with
prescription, it\'s a gotcha mentality? You get the data, you find one
little mistake, \"We\'re pulling your certificate, we\'re fining you\".
Maybe I\'m being simplistic here but is there a connection between the
willingness to share data and moving from a prescriptive to a
performance based safety approach or am I just showing my ignorance?

MR. SHUTER: No, I think you\'re on the right track and as we look at
transitioning to SMS it won\'t work unless we have the data to make the
system become proactive instead of reactive. And that won\'t work unless
we have a shift in culture. We have to have this non-punitive reporting
system in place if people will come forward with information. Instead of
hiding accidents and little incidents, it will be in the database and
even small things that we don\'t think are important, once you see a
pattern developing, it can be something significant. For example, an
aircraft land and a tire blows, not significant and they\'re allowed to
continue. But if you document that and realize that on that particular
aircraft it\'s the same time on the same bogie that\'s always failing.
There\'s a pattern developing. There\'s a mechanical problem. Although
it didn\'t cause an accident, it could. It could cause the aircraft to
go off the runway. So by collecting the data which is a key part of SMS,
you have a better picture of the problem. Another example, of sharing
data, years ago we put together an international data base for accidents
and you could go through by different causes and different types of
accidents and look at them and look for trends, what led to that
accident, what was in that chain, the one link that we could have broken
to prevent that from happening? And we\'ve shared that with Canada,
Mexico, and the United States for many years and now we\'re making it
available to other countries if they want to use it. The more data, the
better the picture and more chance we have of determining underlying
causes for accidents, but as key we\'ve got to have the data and the
only way we\'re going to get it is through non-punitive reporting.

MR. BYERLY: Okay, Nick, you\'re in the congressional hearing. There\'s
been an accident last week. You had all the data, people are sharing,
you have love fests, encounter groups and so on. You let them by because
you\'ve got performance based and generally, they\'re okay but the data
was there, the congressional staff have that. Nick, why didn\'t you
ground that airline? How do you deal with that? How do you sell this
politically and to the public?

MR. SABATINI: Well, I would tell you, it didn\'t feel like a love fest.
(Laughter) That\'s a great question. First of all, we don\'t just
arbitrarily decide to ground an airline. You know, performance based
rules are interesting in the sense that they are a major departure from
prescriptive obviously and there are great limitations with prescriptive
\[rules\], but let me give you an example of a great performance based
concept and that is what we\'re doing with our next generation air
transportation system, the JPDO involving other federal agencies and
what we need to do to move into the future, to enable the integration of
many more airplanes coming into the system to do it seamlessly, not to
have the inconsistencies. We\'re working with CESAR and the folks in
Europe but it\'s going to be a performance based NAS and the foundation
for the next gen is performance based.

Now there are three elements that form the underpinning for that and
that\'s communication, navigation and surveillance. We\'ve done a great
deal of work around navigation because that is the greatest percentage
of the CNS elements. Rather than describe today, as we have been doing
for many years, that you will navigate along this airway and this airway
is, in fact, formed by a radio that is emanating from a ground-based
transmitter, so to speak. Rather to say we will allow you to operate
along this designated area and the aircraft itself will have onboard the
capability to navigate but you must stay within these defined
parameters.

So a nautical mile is 6,080 feet. FMS, Flight Management Systems today
are being designed to accommodate airplanes to fly either an RNAV route
along the route structure or to execute approaches into an airport. And
we define that by a percentage of that nautical mile, which describes
the width of the safe area that airplane will stay in. So we will way
that this approach, for example, requires that your aircraft be capable
of demonstrating performance at a 0.3 which is 1800 feet wide in terms
of the computed path or it can be better than that, a 0.1 performance
capability. So we don\'t get into telling you what kind of equipment you
must have onboard the aircraft, but rather that you aircraft must be
capable of demonstrating that it can navigate safely by using a .3 or .1
approach criteria. And the same would apply along an airway which is no
longer defined by a ground base radial but rather \-- or by technology
but rather by asking or putting out the requirements that the aircraft
must be able to demonstrate in terms of performance against the
parameter that has been established. So we do that for navigation.
We\'re doing that for communication and we\'re doing that for
surveillance and ADS-B is a wonderful example of how you can introduce
performance based is what we need to do for air traffic management is
very much the same that we\'ve done years ago for flight crews.

There was a time when we flew aircraft in the \`60s with as many as five
crew members; a captain, first officer, a flight engineer, a radio
operator, and a navigator. Today we\'re flying the most sophisticated,
most complex airplanes ever designed by man with two people. And we need
to do that so \-- and we did that by enhancing human performance with
technology. Technology will enable us to enhance human performance and
let me give you an example of how we\'ve done that for the ATM, the Air
Traffic Management side of the house.

In Atlanta and in DFW, we\'ve introduced RNP, RNAV departures that have
provided such accuracy that it gives the air traffic controller the
predictability that they need that once the clear an airplane, it will
be precisely where they expect it to be. We\'ve achieved that. The
aircraft is capable of doing that. And because we\'ve been able to do
that, there is a significant reduction in the amount of conversation
between the pilot and the air traffic controller and the figures \-- a
very conservative figure is a 40 percent reduction in the conversation
between the air traffic controller and the flight crews.

That is significant. It allows an air traffic controller to step back
and look at the greater picture rather than step by step guiding the
aircraft. We need to take advantage of what aircraft are capable of and
allow that aircraft to perform and bring with it the onboard technology
that is needed to perform the task at hand and not be bound by what is
on the ground, and ground-based devices. And we need to do that in a way
that it\'s interoperable with the global community and we\'re doing
that.

MR. BYERLY: Let me turn on that to you, Alvin. This is a system, great
vision, Nick has 7300 operators under him. How does this strike you? Is
this good news or is this news of technological sophistication that will
leave you farther behind if that\'s part of your message? Are you going
to be able to catch up or is this good news?

MR. TUALA: I mean, it definitely is good news, but I mean, for us it
would leave us farther behind. We \-- to put it in perspective, you all
probably are aware of the difficulties or the isolation that the Pacific
is. It\'s a very isolated area and with minimum resources, lack of
financial resources and everything. And what Nick is talking about is
all well and good here and in Europe probably but for our part of the
world, it\'s probably way ahead of us and although we will probably try
as hard as we can to achieve the same standards and meet the standards
Nick is talking about, unless you\'re Australia or New Zealand and to
some extent Fiji, a lot of our countries will struggle to meet these
requirements and struggle to equal or maintain them.

MR. BYERLY: If I can so we have an opportunity, it there anyone in the
audience that would like to intervene at this point? We\'ve got so many
countries represented. You may have a different or an amplifying
perspective. I want to give you an opportunity at this point. Courage,
I\'ll buy you a drink, first person? There\'s \-- okay, over here.

MR. Motevalli: Vahid Motevalli, George Washington University Aviation
Institute. John, the offer of a drink is taken, thank you. I\'d like to
ask the panel a question that \-- to be addressing specifically the CAA
oversight in developing countries and I think the comments by Alvin is
this would be a good followup. And to borrow from Administrator
Blakey\'s comments today, an example of the Battery Park wall, if I
decided tomorrow to build a wall around my yard and go to the Home Depot
or the Lowes Department Store being equal advertisement here, and buy
all the supplies and all the tools that I need, and it is certainly
affordable, and I can come up with an invention, being an engineer and
even try out getting the nuts and bolts.

And the nuts and bolts of Civil Aviation Authority is going to be the
inspectors, the software they need, the resources and things like that,
which I know it\'s hard to come by, just like I can\'t go to many
developing nations and be able to go get the tools that I need to build
something as easily because the infrastructure may not be there, those
same tools for oversight are not there.

And many of these nations we know that officials and inspectors all the
way up to the Director Generals may make salaries in hundreds of dollars
and resources at their disposals are equally limited and so this is
where get the flag of convenience airlines and so on, private industry
going in because they find it lucrative to do business in that
environment where enforcement would be difficult. So my question is, how
do you think the safety policies can be used to institutionalize safety
oversight system and empower CAAs around the world? To me clearly the
effect of IOSA, USOAP and so on is \-- it is getting up to the upper
limit. And talk about the will being there, but the resource is lacking.

So we\'re getting to a point where this model doesn\'t necessarily work
and although it may be heartwarming to IATA to see countries accepting
or requiring IOSA, but to me that\'s relinquishing obligations of the
CAA and it kind of clashes with what we do through IASAs and Europeans
require Civilian Aviations to do.

So we need a new model it seems to me to work, and I don\'t know whether
the panel have any particular vision for the future that we could
address.

MR. BYERLY: I\'ll ask Alvin to at least offer first remarks and then
others.

MR. TUALA: Thank you, Professor for that. A reaction from the Pacific
and similar to a lot of regions in the world is the setup of aviation
safety organizations to tackle that problem. We have COSCAP in Southeast
Asia. We have similar organizations in South America and the Caribbean.
In the Pacific what we\'ve done is we\'ve organized and put together a
group of countries to set up the Pacific Aviation Safety Office. Now as
you mentioned some of our civil aviation authorities have no
airworthiness inspectors at all now, nothing at all. You only have the
Director, probably the secretary and then two officers, Civil Aviation
Officers with no training at all. So what we\'ve done is we\'ve set up a
Pacific Aviation Safety Office based in \-- with 11 member countries and
we have hired inspectors and we\'ve just completed hiring the first
airworthiness inspector and what he will do is he will go around to the
countries and do safety oversight similar to what they do in South
America and the Caribbean.

And we hope that through this, we can get our members \-- our safety
oversight is done by the PASO office. They\'re an advisory body to tell
us, \"Okay, you need to do this, you need to do this, your airline needs
to do this\", similar as to audits. But that is an approach by us and
I\'ve seen similar approaches in other parts of the world, to address
this very question of no results, lack of \-- our Pacific leaders, our
Prime Ministers got together and pushed for this and we\'ve just
established it. We\'ve got our ADB loan and first regional organization
ever by the ADB and we\'re hiring our second inspector in the next week.

So it\'s a very positive development for us and we\'re hoping that \--
the FAA is one of our panel members. They\'re a council member on the
PASO council with ICAO as an advisory member, as an observer member, and
the ADB, but what\'s happening is we have our members up north, this is
Marshall Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Palowan (phonetic) and
I\'m sure Nick is well aware of and this safety oversight is done by the
FAA. And what we\'re trying to do is bring them into PASO because they
have the capacity and training and they can share with our other members
but they have refused to move down to join PASO because they feel that
the FAA gives them such a good deal that they don\'t need to do anything
else. They just sit back and relax and that\'s one of the criticisms
that I \--

MR. BYERLY: That\'s the problem.

MR. TUALA: \-- have and our leaders have is if we\'re all in the
Pacific, why not the FAA encourage these people to come and join PASO,
come and join us and help our people, I mean, help the Pacific Islands
to develop because they have the training and capacity, we don\'t. And
they refuse to do that because it comes from the FAA in Washington
saying, \"Well, you guys are fine where you are and stay there\". And
that\'s one of the criticisms that we have, a good criticism, not a bad
one. We just want them to come and help us and develop \-- you know,
they have the capability, come and help us. But the FAA have been very
helpful in that they\'re on the board and the advisory council but
that\'s one of the things, Nick, if you could, could you just push them
down our way a little bit and bring their training? Thanks.

MR. BYERLY: I think I have to let Nick comment but what we\'re seeing
here is this tension between, is it political will, is it a lack of
capacity? Does providing capacity from the outside undercut political
will? We can pursue that angle, but Nick, I think, you have a right of
reply here. You are the problem in the Pacific.

MR. SABATINI: Thank you, John.

MR. BYERLY: My first and last performance at one of these conferences.

MR. SABATINI: I\'m really sensitive to what Alvin was saying. The United
States has finite resources and you have to get to a point and
understand that there are certain priorities and if you say that
everything is important, than nothing is. So you have to establish
priorities. And you need to operate within the resources that you have.
So the FAA will do everything it can within the resources that it has to
assist in every way. We\'ll jawbone people into joining regional
cooperative associations and we\'ve had great success with that. ACSA
comes to mind. But where I see that there is a significant challenge for
the global community is the fact and case in point or any other nation
like that. They have the desire, they don\'t have the resources and the
United States, through TDA and USAID has really almost doubled or
tripled that amount of resources that we\'ve pumped into the
international community but I would implore the World Bank and EXIM to
step up their contributions as well, because it does come down to
resources.

You can have all the political will that you want and need and all the
desire that you want. Ultimately, you need the ability to hire people to
put in place an organization that is capable and competent to execute
its responsibilities to the global community. Now, having said that, and
this may sound terribly harsh, if you can\'t meet the safety bar, then
we have an obligation to the traveling public and people on the Rim.
I\'m sorry, you cannot come into the United States, I can\'t speak for
others, but unless you meet ICAO standards and unless you\'ve been
audited by ICAO or an IASA done by us, then we\'re not going to let you
in and that is an obligation that we all have as nation states to help
enforce and make meaningful the ICAO SARPs. But again, you know, the
global community needs to come together with providing resources to
enable others.

MR. BYERLY: Bob, Roberto, comments on this one of shall we turn,
whatever \--

MR. SALVARANI: There is one. Again, going back to the ICAO conference
safety in March, one of the outcome of that conference was the
promotion, the strengthening actually of the regional body to promote an
implementation of actions like the one you\'ve described for the Pacific
Region. And the program exists in South Asia, in Central Asia, in Africa
at various degree of difficulties with implementation but I think this
is the directions \-- one of the directions anyway that as it was
recommended at that conference, that more powers of initiative and
therefore, resources to act are given to ICAO regional offices.

MR. SHUTER: I think one of the more effective programs to come out of
ICAO was this universal safety oversight program. They look at the
country, they look at the regulations. They look at the inspectors, but
then they follow through, are the inspectors actually doing their job,
checking with the airlines, and where there\'s a deficiency identified,
ICAO encouraged states to work as a team.

Alvin has given us an example of how they have done it and you mentioned
Brazos based in Jamaica which brings a number of countries. So the
system is working and I think in many cases it will require support of
other countries but the problem is understood. The audits make it very
clear and if you\'re going to have international traffic, you have to
meet the standards.

MR. BYERLY: I think we\'ve got a question over here.

MR. MILLER: I\'m Mark Miller from Northwest Airlines. My question is
trying to get a little bit more at what I think Marion Blakey\'s
challenge was this morning. We\'ve said so far that you know, the world
is no longer kind of a forensic science. You know, we want to make sure
that there\'s a lot of good auditing that\'s done. We want to shore up
some of the disappointments in the world, but when you think about
trying to use information about incidents or precursors, I know we\'re
taking steps in that direction.

NTSB yesterday announced three incidents that they\'re going to be doing
some investigation on in the US. I know for the Lexington, Kentucky
event that happened, the FAA is looking at some information that might
have been precursors, airports where things like this have happened, how
many times, things like that. But as we share some of this information,
I\'m sometimes skeptical that we just set up data bases and share this
information and nobody really kind of looks at it very closely.

So my question is more along, don\'t we have to get more sophisticated
in our analysis of some of this information? You know, taking the
Lexington, Kentucky as an example, were there things there that really,
you know, we could have done some valid risk analysis on and really been
doing the appropriate prevention and if we\'re not doing the right
things and don\'t have the sophistication in our analysis, how can we
build it?

MR. BYERLY: Who would like a shot at that? Great question.

MR. SABATINI: I\'ll go, I\'ll take it.

MR. BYERLY: Nick?

MR. SABATINI: So let me start with saying that we now see that accidents
are no longer common cause accidents and Lexington is one and I am going
to be careful here not to get into the NTSB responsibilities but I will
state what is a known fact. The crew departed from an incorrect runway
and the end result is well-known. When you examine that fact, and you
begin to drill into what happened here and begin to ask the kinds of
questions, and Albert Einstein once said, \"If I only knew the right
question to ask\", and for us in our human condition, that is an
absolute limitation because we cannot guess what the right question is.

What we need to do is build an analysis capability and I\'m telling you
that we are working with NASA because there isn\'t the science that is
mature enough to do the kind of analysis that we need to be doing.
We\'re receiving megabytes and terabytes of safety data and you cannot
just hand-hack that. You need the ability to not have to be able to ask
the question but rather have a capability that is such that in and of
itself the algorithms continue to examine the normal against the
anomalies and as a result, generate that as information for you on an
ongoing basis because you have received the information and it is
comparing normal operations or \-- and the challenge again is, text data
mining. Ones and zeros are relatively easy but the challenge that we
have is the subjective information that is received by all. So let me
take you back for a moment to Lexington.

We did ask the question, is there a possibility of confusion around the
runway departure ends, and after the fact, we asked that question and we
would prefer to be in after the facts situations. When we asked the
question what we discovered is that over the course of a number of years
after going through 5.4 million records, what we discovered that there
were 117 separate individual isolated reports of crews being confused in
certain runway configurations and under certain conditions. Now, we have
data, tragically it\'s after the fact, and what we need to do is be able
to receive that information, not because we ask the question, because
the capability is such in the analysis that it produces it on an ongoing
basis and that\'s what we\'re doing with NASA and they\'re interested
because it\'s foundational science, it\'s an immature science. They know
they need to develop that, so there is a great deal of interest and
we\'re cooperating with them in that regard.

So long-winded answer, we need to move from having to ask the right
questions to having a system and analysis capability that \-- such that
it produces the information that we want because if you look at those
117 separate instances, I would tell you that one report by one person
in isolation does not generate a cause for concern, but rather what can
we do about that, maybe it needs more training or just take a look at
it, but it doesn\'t present a perspective that we will need for the
future. That is the future. It\'s information, sharing it together, the
ability to analyze it and getting to understand the root cause.

MR. BYERLY: Bob, did you want to follow up on that?

MR. SHUTER: Yes, thanks, John. I should have mentioned when I discussed
our data base that the first step is putting information in, the next
step is putting teams of experts together to go over that data and yes,
we are doing an analysis that you are suggesting should be done. There
are a number of issues that came up when we were doing this and one of
my concerns, I criticize my own process by saying when I look at your
list of contributing factors, I keep seeing pilot error. But that
doesn\'t give me something I can use. If you say it\'s pilot error,
well, the usual, more training and a rewrite. That doesn\'t fix it.

Under SMS that\'s very clear that if there\'s a situation there\'s an
error, you just don\'t address the pilot. You look back, what is wrong
with a system that caused that to happen? What can I look at deeper in
that accident and say this is what led to that pilot error. Give me
something I can fix.

But then when you\'re doing this process, you run into real life
constraints, legal issues, how public can the data be? Some of it is
protected, so you end up with smaller groups of people looking at the
information and you\'re restricted in how you can use it. There are
solutions. It means more processing before it goes in to sanitize it but
the potential is there, if you have the data and you have the people to
analyze it, you can start underlying there root causes. Long before an
accident happens, you can identify it as a trend which could lead to an
accident and you would have a more proactive approach.

MR. BYERLY: Do we have another question?

MR. PHILLIPS: Hi, I\'d like to ask \--

MR. BYERLY: You are from?

MR. PHILLIPS: Don Phillips, [International Herald Tribune]{.underline}.

MR. BYERLY: I thought I recognized, [Herald Tribune]{.underline} and all
of that. Great, good to see you.

MR. PHILLIPS: Great to see you, too. I\'d like to ask Mr. Salvarani, in
particular, but the rest of the panel, too, it seems that the elephant
in the room here right now when it comes to sharing information that has
not been talked about is this tendency of much of the world to
criminalize aviation crashes. And that gets in the way almost
immediately of getting some very important information. When officials
and pilots can go to jail, they\'re going to shut up. What can be done
about that? It seems to be getting worse.

MR. BYERLY: Roberto, you get the first shot, maybe is the wrong \-- you
get the first opportunity for reply.

MR. SALVARANI: Well, I brought with me, because I thought it would come
up, a Joint Resolution that was signed recently by the Flight Safety
Foundation by counsel and the Academie Nationale de L'Air and the Royal
Aeronautical Society. The title is \"Regarding Criminalization of
Aviation Accidents\". And I can tell you we share entirely the
conclusion they reach is one of the major obstacles we are hitting
against in trying to actually implement the ECCAIRS database I referred
to earlier, but even the direct mobilization of the personnel to
disclose faults.

We have recently reinforced the community regulation in this area. I
hope it will be adopted before Christmas and I\'m in the process of
getting a second layer of legislation adding to that, trying to move
more and more closely towards the, I can only say encouragement of
certain member states at least within the European community to reduce
the criminal presence in the context of denunciation, revealing,
informing about an occurrence.

The language is shared now of \-- the text that we had found is shared
by all the 25 states and it should help at reducing the cases where the
information cannot be released only to \-- sorry, when the punishment,
the criminal might follow in those cases where as the resolution say,
there is an overt open intent to act in a criminal way. So that that\'s
\-- or excess of negligence. That, hopefully, should reduce obstacles
and therefore, increase the participation and the willingness to
cooperate.

So that resolution which I appreciate a lot, goes along the same
direction of we are trying to move but with difficulties. There are
member states where they will have to change entirely the law and my own
country for example, is one of those difficult cases.

MR. BYERLY: I\'m going to ask Bobby if with his permission in my lawyer
role will introduce this into evidence. I think it will be helpful to
participants to have this. Not that I\'m endorsing it as such, but have
this as part of the FAA record, because a lot of people have seen this
very factual, very detailed Joint Resolution that\'s come out. I think
we have another question back there.

MR. MATTHEWS: Yes, Stuart Matthews, Flight Safety Foundation. I
certainly appreciate very much Mr. Salvarani\'s reference to the
resolution on which we spent a lot of time because we have been so
concerned about this increasing problem of criminalization. But it\'s
not just criminalization what\'s happened today. It\'s things that have
been happening many years in the past. There\'s a trial going on in
France right now, a criminal trial, where the designer of the airplane,
the head of the air traffic control, the chief radio officer and others
are on trial for criminal manslaughter for things that happened 14 years
ago. It would appear that in many cases they\'re applying today\'s
thoughts and ideas and technology to what happened all those years ago
and the thought that Nick Sabatini, for instance, might make a decision
today on what we might do and then 20 years from now somebody will say,
\"Hey, you\'re going to jail because of that decision because now what
we know means that you made a wrong decision all those years back\",
will certainly inhibit things.

But also earlier this year in ICAO we were successful in getting a
change to Annex 13, where the information collected from an accident
investigation is now protected because again, there\'s this very great
tendency as soon as there\'s an accident, somebody from the judiciary or
the police or whoever, to run in and arrest with the first person they
can see, usually the pilot if he survives, to say, \"You got there first
to the accident, you must be the one to blame\".

Okay, so I\'ve endorsed, I think, what we were hearing the panel saying
but do we not have a cultural problem? The bottom line is we know how to
solve most of the aircraft accidents today. It\'s true here in North
America and Europe we had random accidents. In other parts of the world,
we have accidents which we know how to deal with if we can implement the
things that we\'ve done in the past, the things that we are putting into
the ICAO global safety roadmap, but still we had this cultural problem
that society wants somebody to blame and the question I\'m saying is how
do we convince society that unless we look at the data that provides
that information without penalizing everybody in sight, you\'re never
going to get aviation safer and other industries, too, presumably. But
basically aviation has become so safe, we now have to do it this way,
otherwise, we can\'t proceed any further.

MR. BYERLY: Response or anyone in the audience want to respond? Is there
anyone out here who takes a different view, that criminalization of
accidents is really not \-- why is aviation \-- I\'ll be the devil\'s
advocate. Why is aviation so different?

I\'m driving my car, I\'m listening to my Ipod, I\'m cell phoning, sort
of reckless, car go off, I kill some people. I go to jail for it. Why
should it be different for pilots?

MR. SABATINI: John?

MR. BYERLY: Just to be \-- I\'m one of you understand, but Nick?

MR. SABATINI: When I first joined the New York City Police Department as
a young police officer, there was a law in the books. It was called
vehicular homicide. Any accident involving the death of a person was an
automatic arrest. That state recognized the futility of doing that
because that was not an approach they wanted to continue to take. So, in
aviation, it is global in nature, obviously. And if we\'re going to
continue on the public\'s expectation that we provide the safest form of
air transportation, then we as a society, a global society, have got to
move away from blame and punishment, from criminalizing that which is
inadvertent. Because when it is advertent, we need to understand not
only what happened, but why it happened. The effort of analysis is
trying to understand why things happen, getting to root causes and if
you continue to criminalize, then it inhibits the ability of the global
community to move forward.

So we at \-- the United States, we have the statutory authority now
granted by Congress, to protect that data which is voluntarily provided
for safety and security and we, in fact, do protect that and we\'ve made
great strides but that\'s the United States. We can jaw bone all we want
as we\'ve had discussions earlier in other settings, John. We cannot
interfere with the sovereign states and what they are doing in and of
themselves, but rather to take it to an international level and from a
global community perspective, continue to articulate why that is not a
benefit to the global community and why those sovereign states need to
reconsider their approach to aviation accidents.

MR. BYERLY: Bob?

MR. SHUTER: I would like to add to what Nick said. I agree completely.
Do you want data that\'s going to help you prevent other accidents or do
you want to punish somebody for that accident. And we fail to miss a key
point when we start talking about pilot error. It may have been caused
by the pilot but something was before that, pressures to leave on time,
pressures to do more work with fewer people, and there are issues behind
it. It could be a management responsibility that led to the error but we
tend to focus on the obvious and keeping data out of the public will
help us do our analysis. In most cases, criminal activity is very rare
but you want to take criminal action against them or punitive action.

It defeats the purpose of trying to have a safer system. As we
transition to SMS, we\'ve already told our operators that we\'re going
to have very few enforcement actions. If there\'s an error made and
there\'s a criminal activity, obviously, we\'ll get involved, but if
it\'s a series of violations that could have caused an accident and
didn\'t, are we going to get involved? Not very likely. We\'re going to
turn to the organization and say, \"What\'s wrong with your system\"? We
have to recognize it\'s not just the pilots. It\'s the system. Focus on
the system. You can\'t do that if you have this punitive environment and
that\'s the way to go also when you start talking about reporting
culture.

If you have a reporting culture where someone is going to turn you in,
it\'s not going to work. We want information to prevent the next
accident, not focus on punishing somebody for the last accident.

MR. BYERLY: I would like to continue this discussion. It\'s really
fascinating. It\'s important but I\'ve received the signal from my
masters. I want to thank our panelists for a great series of
discussions. Those who asked questions in the audience, thank you very
much. Marion, thank you very much for having the opportunity to be here.
Thanks.

(Applause)

MR. BOGOSIAN: Well, John, Roberto, Alvin, Bob, Nick, thank you for the
leadership and service each of you provided in your individual
professional capacities and thank you for your leadership and service
today in this discussion. It\'s been very productive and we truly
appreciate it.

Lunch will be served in the Washingtonian Room downstairs. At 2:30 p.m.
sharp, the concurrent breakout panels will begin in their respective
rooms, SMS, Airport Safety, Manufacturing and Maintenance and ATC
Service. So please enjoy the lunch and at 2:30 we\'ll look forward to
seeing you in the four breakout sessions. Thank you.

(Whereupon at 12:00 p.m. a luncheon recess was taken.)