**[A Comprehensive Approach to Modern Insurgency:]{.underline}**

**[Afghanistan and Beyond]{.underline}**

**Ambassador Eric Edelman,**

**Undersecretary of Defense for Policy**

**27 March 2007**

Good morning. I am pleased to be with you today and have the opportunity
to discuss one of the major challenges that face our alliance.

I would like to start by recognizing and thanking John Rose and the
George C. Marshall Center and our German hosts for their role in
organizing this important effort to allow representatives of countries
involved in the Afghanistan effort to share their perspectives. I would
also note the many people in the audience who had made important
personal contributions to the effort in Afghanistan. There are too many
here and not enough time to cite everyone individually, but I would like
to note General David Richards and my friend, Minister Hikmet Cetin; as
well as Lieutenant General Dave Barno and Dick Norland.

I encourage you all to sustain the momentum that has begun here this
week. Our effort to overcome ideological extremists in Afghanistan and
beyond is one of the most important international security challenges of
our time. We simply must get it right.

**INTRODUCTION**

Let me begin by describing the nature of the threat we face today.

Some may think that the problem in Afghanistan is a "U.S. problem" --
that we are there as a response to the fact that we, the U.S., were
attacked on September 11, 2001 by people working for the Al Qaeda
leadership in Afghanistan. Or that maybe this is a problem for the UK,
since they too were attacked in 2005 by people who had links to
terrorists on the Afghan/Pakistani border. But one need only look to the
way in which our enemies are organizing and the statements they are
making.

For example, in January, the Algerian terrorist group GSPC, known for
brutal attacks throughout the 1990\'s, switched its name to the
"Al-Qaeda Organization in the Lands of Islamic North Africa," pledged
its loyalty to Osama bin Laden, and reaffirmed that its top external
target is France. GSPC is forging links with terrorists groups in
Morocco, Nigeria, Mauritania, Tunisia and elsewhere. Moreover, they are
actively seeking to enhance their network within Europe, which is
already believed to be 800 to 900 strong.

As we all know, the four-month terrorist bombing campaign that targeted
Paris and Lyon in 1995 was linked to Al Qaeda. We have also had the Bali
bombings, and any number of other plots that can be traced back to the
zone along the Afghan-Pakistani border. Our adversaries are networked,
have global reach and are actively targeting our populations.

So, let me be perfectly clear: This is a global threat we all face. And
I believe we all share the same interest in working together to meet
this challenge.

Afghanistan is a vital battleground in this larger struggle.

**AFGHANISTAN**:

Noruz is here. Many expect increased levels of violence on the part of
the Taliban. Others often describe this anticipated increase in Taliban
activity as a Spring Offensive. I do not like that label. It seems to
imply that Taliban tactics are legitimate military actions. They are
not.

We [should]{.underline} expect the Taliban to increase the level of
violence this Spring, but it will be a campaign of terror. We know when
they enter a village the first thing the Taliban does is burn the school
and frequently kill the schoolteacher. They send letters telling Afghan
villagers to stop educating their daughters. They bomb health care
clinics and police stations and specifically target police officers for
assassination. The Taliban also do what they can to thwart economic
reconstruction and development efforts. They will do whatever it takes
to undermine the work of the international community in bringing even
the rudiments of civilization to a country where 80% of the population
is illiterate and which is the 5^th^ poorest country in the world. That
is the basis of their "insurgency."

I know that some, if not many, do not care for the terms "insurgency"
and "counterinsurgency." In the last several years, we in the U.S. have
taken a hard look at what is required to counter the efforts of
extremists in Afghanistan and elsewhere, and have concluded that we need
an approach that employs all elements of national power. The U.S. Army
and Marine Corps have developed a new manual to help us apply such an
approach, and have labeled it quite simply, "Counterinsurgency."

Some might think of counterinsurgency as a blunt military effort that
focuses solely on capturing and killing high value targets, but I think
a quick read of the manual, which I understand is linked to the
Conference website, is enough to establish that it espouses a
comprehensive, interagency approach to these problems. For those who
believe a comprehensive approach is necessary, we are in violent
agreement. So if I slip during the course of my remarks and say
"counterinsurgency," please just pretend that you heard "comprehensive
approach."

I do think we all agree that Afghanistan is a place where such a
comprehensive approach is needed. Throughout the country, the Alliance
is attempting to promote:

-   the development of democratic and accountable institutions,

-   the commitment to the rule of law, and

-   the effective delivery of public services;

-   while also simultaneously fighting to neutralize myriad spoilers,
    from criminals, militias, and drug-lords to violent insurgents.

The challenges we face in Afghanistan and elsewhere are daunting, but we
are all learning and adapting. We can and should be learning from each
other.

Great progress has been made on the ground by our civilians and our
militaries, who have learned to work together and have adapted in
innovative ways to meet these challenges. But for every ingenious
adaptation we see in the field, we should ask ourselves -- what
institutional failure were they trying to overcome? What tools did we
fail to provide them?

Our experience in Afghanistan reinforces the need for our nations, and
our Alliance, to develop better non-military capabilities and processes
for integrating civilian and military efforts.

Indeed, the Afghanistan Compact -- endorsed at NATO's Riga summit --
identifies three "pillars" of activity. Only one of these three pillars
(security) relies predominantly on the military. The other two
(Governance, Rule of Law and Human Rights; and Economic and Social
Development) require expertise from the civilian side of government.

This perspective has been repeatedly reinforced by history and "classic"
COIN theory derived from this experience. As British General Sir Frank
Kitson warned: "the first thing that must be apparent when contemplating
the sort of action which a government facing insurgency should take, is
that there can be no such thing as a purely military solution because
insurgency is not primarily a military activity." French infantry
officer and counterinsurgent expert, David Galula, also emphasized this
theme, claiming that counterinsurgency requires an approach that is 80%
political, and only 20% military.

Although military personnel in Afghanistan have been engaged in many of
various non-military activities, these are not areas in which our
military seeks, nor should it necessarily, take the lead. Military
commanders on the ground need the expertise of the other agencies of our
governments to help them get the job done. In the United States, we
believe that the military component should ideally be in support of the
broader civilian-led effort, in order to put a particular country on a
sustainable, stable trajectory. Coordinating such a civil-military
approach is a difficult task; but our history demonstrates that it can
be done, and provides us with useful lessons to help us meet the
irregular challenges we face today.

As we approach the task of developing unity of effort in conducting
these missions, we should all look to each others' experiences for
insight. Let me now discuss the way in which we in the United States, in
both the military and the civilian agencies, are re-discovering and
learning from out own past and from the experience of others.

**AMERICA HAS A LONG HISTORY IN COIN**

The American scholar Max Boot's bestselling book, [The Savage Wars of
Peace]{.underline}, outlines the long history of U.S. forces in what he
calls "small wars," from the Barbary Wars in the early 19th century, to
20th century conflicts in the Philippines, the Caribbean and Vietnam.
Indeed, for over 200 years, Americans have conducted operations we today
might call "irregular war;" but somehow we have lost this historical
thread and have failed to institutionalize lessons from this experience.
In a recent article, "Déjà vu all over again," Bruce Hoffman of the RAND
Corporation claims that this American cycle of re-learning in
counterinsurgency is unfortunate, as we repeatedly repress these
memories and simply revert to basic bureaucratic instincts. We then have
to relearn the same lessons over and over again. It is time to reverse
that trend.

The re-discovery of the 1940 Marine Corps Small Wars Manual as well as
our new Army-Marine Corps Field Manual on COIN are, in part, steps in
re-capturing the existing font of historical knowledge. But we still
have a long way to go.

A look at past efforts reveals many lessons and a few warnings. I would
like to highlight four in particular that I think are relevant today 1)
the importance of civil-military unity of effort; 2) the need to
overcome bureaucratic inertia; 3) the importance of adaptation and
learning; and 4) the need for cultural knowledge.

I have chosen to focus on these not only on the basis of academic study
but also based on my experience in government looking at these
challenges from different vantage points, including my service in the
White House, the State Department, and now in the Department of Defense.

**1. Unity of Effort:**

One of the most important lessons most of us can take from America's
experience in counterinsurgency is the need for unity of effort. Our
experience reveals that despite rhetoric expounding the virtues of a
clear unified civil-military approach, unified government effort has
repeatedly proven to be an elusive goal. Some of the same issues we
struggled with in Somalia, Haiti, and the Balkans in the 1990's, and in
Iraq and Afghanistan today were debated as far back as 1898 between
General Arthur MacArthur and his civilian counterpart in the
Philippines, William H. Taft.

In Vietnam, we struggled with this as well; but eventually developed
what Gen Creighton Abrams described as a "One War" approach, "with all
of us on one side and the enemy on the other." The clearest reflection
of this approach was the Civil Operations and Revolutionary (later
"Rural") Development Support program, known as CORDS. CORDS managed to
achieve a combined civilian and military effort by eventually developing
a clear chain of command toward a single objective. Civilian
contributions to CORDS included several civilian agencies working with
their military partners, including among others, the Central
Intelligence Agency, Agency for International Development, U.S.
Information Service, and State Department. These civilian-military teams
worked closely with their Vietnamese counterparts to meet the needs of
the population and also develop better intelligence to identify and
defeat Viet Cong.

CORDS was an instrumental element in clearing the insurgency from 93% of
South Vietnam's villages. In the end, the South Vietnamese army was
defeated not by a guerrilla insurgency, but by 17 North Vietnamese
divisions.

Unfortunately, because of the controversies and trauma surrounding the
Vietnam War at the conclusion of this conflict, our country summarily
repressed much of this experience and the lessons that might have been
gleaned from it.

Many American scholars and policy-makers have begun to examine the CORDS
model more closely to determine what lessons might be applicable today.
I am sure many of you in this room are doing similar analyses based on
your own country's experience.

Whatever lessons we all recapture from that experience, and whatever new
lessons we learn from Afghanistan today, I urge us not to repeat our
American mistake of assuming that we will never do anything similar --
on a larger or a smaller scale -- again. We simply cannot predict - or
choose -- the types of challenges we will face in the future. But
history makes it fairly clear that the problem of unity of effort has
been a perennial one.

**2. Bureaucratic inertia**

The second lesson I'd like to address is the need to overcome
bureaucratic inertia. Bob "Blowtorch" Komer, the man who developed the
CORDS concept, in a critical study for RAND in 1972 identified the
dysfunctional institutional inertia that hindered the effort in Vietnam.

In "Bureaucracy Does Its Thing," Komer pointed out that in Vietnam even
though many in the individual bureaucracies knew what needed to be done,
and even though there were high level policies in place articulating the
right strategy, individual organizations tended to revert to the tasks
they were designed to conduct rather than adapting to the circumstances
on the ground. They optimized for success in their respective
stovepipes, but this resulted in less-than-optimal outcomes for the
overall endeavor.

For example, the U.S. military, which was designed to fight the Soviet
Union in conventional warfare, applied inappropriate strategies and
tactics against the Vietcong. As Komer says, "we fought the enemy our
way -- at horrendous cost and with tragic side effects -- because we
lacked the incentive and much existing capability to do otherwise."

The French had a similar problem. According to French COIN expert, Roger
Trinquier, "From one campaign to another, our commanders tried to drive
the Vietminh into a classic pitched battle, the only kind we knew how to
fight, in hope that our superiority in materiel would allow an easy
victory.\"

Even worse, when a key objective should have been to assist the host
nation in developing its own capabilities, we transferred our own
orientation to the Vietnamese military:

"Molding conventional Vietnamese armed forces in the 'mirror image' of
the U.S. forces... was a natural institutional reaction," Komer noted.
"We organized, equipped, and trained the \[Vietnamese\] to fight
American style, the only way we knew how."

Fortunately today, thanks to the efforts of many Allies and Partners,
and particularly the efforts of Gen. Bob Durbin at CSTC-A, I believe we
have avoided making this mistake in Afghanistan. Working with the
Afghans, we are not creating, nor have we attempted to create, a "mirror
image" of our own militaries. Instead, we are helping to build forces
that can fight effectively, as the ANA did last summer during Operations
Medusa. We are also now shifting and intensifying our effort to develop
commensurate police capabilities that will allow the Government of
Afghanistan to provide greater security and other benefits to the Afghan
people. Finally, we need to remember that the ANSF that we help build
must be sustained, in the long run, by the Afghan national authorities.

Komer's warning, however, is sure to be equally valid for other
disciplines as well. Whether helping nations or working independently,
the tendency for bureaucracies and bureaucrats to revert to their
comfort zones is a real threat, and something we cannot afford as we
carry out our strategy in Afghanistan. Your efforts this week, and more
importantly, what you do after this week, will help ensure that the
bureaucracies in which we all work are the focal points for
cross-cutting, strategic solutions rather than individualized
institutional roadblocks.

**3.** **Need to be a "learning organization"**

One way to guard against such bureaucratic inertia is to design systems
that promote institutional learning. This need to learn and adapt on the
fly is another key lesson from past experience in counterinsurgency. As
Bernard Fall tersely observed of the need for constant adaptation in
COIN, "If it works, it is obsolete" -- or it will be shortly!

So we must develop a unified, government-wide approach to
contemporaneous experiential learning -- the kind of organizational,
bottom-up learning LTC (and PhD) John Nagl talks about in his justly
celebrated book, [Learning to Eat Soup With a Knife]{.underline}, which
compares the British experience in Malaya and theU.S. experience in
Vietnam. According to Nagl, a key to success in these missions is
organizational adaptability -- that is, the ability to learn and adapt
to the changing circumstances on the ground, faster than the enemy does.

Since the Vietnam War the U.S. military has developed remarkable systems
to capture lessons learned from the field and disseminate the knowledge
gained rapidly throughout the training infrastructure. These systems
have enabled the U.S. personnel in Afghanistan to make steady
improvements to many of their tactics, techniques, and procedures
Afghanistan, such as patrolling, check points, and cordon and knock
procedures.

We need to find ways to develop systematized learning across all
agencies of our governments in an integrated fashion -- so that as
lessons are identified, the strategy is adjusted in a coherent, unified
way. We also need to do this across the Alliance as well, so that
successes and best practices in PRTs can be shared and replicated
rapidly.

A key vehicle for this process is General Casey's COIN academy --
established in Iraq last year -- which provides unit leaders with the
most up-to-date knowledge of what is working and what is not. NATO
should think about creating a similar academy in Afghanistan for
ISAF/PRTs that could help the Alliance learn and adapt
contemporaneously.

Allied Command Transformation is doing great work capturing lessons
learned from Alliance operations and disseminating them into NATO
schoolhouses. A good example is the Joint Warfare Center in Stavanger.
But I submit that to truly deliver a comprehensive approach in
counterinsurgency or any other environment, NATO must promulgate lessons
learned for civilian as well as military activities.

Learning within our organizations must also take place with respect to
the development of indigenous capacity. Many parts of the U.S. and
allied governments are helping Afghanistan and other states develop
capabilities that are key to preventing or defeating insurgencies. These
efforts are focused on police, justice systems, border forces, customs,
counter-narcotics, intelligence, and agriculture to name a few. All of
us should be working hard -- and learning -- to ensure we are not only
helping in the right areas, but truly helping in a way that will produce
durable capabilities.

**4. Cultural Knowledge**

Finally, in order to succeed in stability operations, we must understand
the cultures with which we are operating. This is actually much more
difficult than it sounds. Truly understanding another culture requires
more than speaking a language or knowing certain social customs so that
we do not offend our hosts. Certainly those things are important.

But to truly have an impact, and to do more good than harm, we must
understand the social power structures that informally govern societies
as well as the internal motivations of the enemy and the people.

What motivates them at the individual and social level? To what extent
is the conflict about religion, or economics, or ideology, as opposed to
other grievances?

Our enemies understand the importance of cultural factors. Indeed,
today's conflicts are catalyzed by the enemy's ability to tap into
"cultural narratives" of a host population, gain their support, and
grow. Our challenge is to understand this dynamic and learn to counter
it. We need a better approach to human terrain mapping.

As the citizens of Afghanistan begin to build a strong new sense of
\"national identity\" -- one that trumps the appeal of violent
transnational extremists -- our goal is to help them achieve that
vision. Our ability to assist rests on our ability to understand -- at a
cultural level -- the factors influencing their struggle. I am told that
our Dutch colleagues, for example, have recognized this and have made
some progress in incorporating cultural awareness modules in their
pre-deployment training curricula.

Our intelligence processes and education and training systems must adapt
to the need to obtain, analyze, and disseminate cultural knowledge. And
by dissemination, I mean to everyone who needs it. It does no good for
one country's military or anyone else to collect information if they do
not share it with their allies as well as their interagency, coalition,
private, and non-governmental partners.

These four observations from history are only a start. There are surely
more lessons to be learned from a careful examination of our past
experience.\
In the time I have left I want to move to the present and say a few
words about the nature of the challenge we face today.

**NEW STRATEGY AND TOOLS FOR THE GLOBAL INSURGENCY**

The effort to learn from the past is relevant not only to Afghanistan,
but also to the global challenge we face more broadly. Although much
progress has been made in crippling the leadership of the Al-Qaeda
network, it would be premature to declare victory and simply come home
as some have suggested.

It would also be unwise to assume that in order to defeat this enemy we
will not need new tools. A number of scholars have asserted that today's
terror networks have evolved. For instance, today's enemy is highly
adaptive, trans-nationally connected, media-savvy, and networked. In
this environment, we cannot blindly graft old methods onto new
strategies. Evolution by the enemy requires that we exercise extreme
care in our application of COIN principles learned from past experience.

In his recent article "Counterinsurgency Redux," David Kilcullen warns
that "classical theory is necessary, but not sufficient, for
contemporary counterinsurgency. Mastering it may require new mental
models." I agree.

He proposes, for instance, that modern COIN may not be 80% political, as
David Galula suggests, but rather 100% political due to the nature of
the global media and the increased relevance of public perception and
political outcomes vs. battlefield victories. Every combat action sends
a political message -- nearly instantaneously -- in this new
environment. This places increased emphasis on the integration of
military and civilian operations with strategic communications. I think
this observation has special force with regard to the situation in
Afghanistan where the Taliban has shown its comparative advantage in
this area through its use of night letters and other mechanisms.

Strategic communications -- or the ability to counter the enemy's
messages through words and deeds -- has historically been a monumental
challenge in counterinsurgency. Commenting on his experience in Algeria
in the 1950's, Galula asserted that "If there was a field in which we
were definitely and infinitely more stupid than our opponents, it was
propaganda." I think many of us believe that statement continues to
apply, perhaps with even greater force, today.

Ironically, crafting an interagency or "comprehensive" strategic
communications approach for today's threat is both enabled and
complicated by new technologies in the internet age. Traditionally, our
comparative advantage in warfare has been technology. Communications
technology has enabled a network-centric approach to warfare that gives
us greater battlefield awareness than ever before. At the high end of
the conflict spectrum it has enabled us to win spectacular victories on
the battlefield.

On the other hand, the enemy is also enabled by technology. At this
lower end of the conflict spectrum the advantage in use of these
technologies may shift to our enemies. As a global movement, Al Qaeda
uses the internet as a "virtual sanctuary" where it promotes its
ideological vision, raises funds, recruits and trains new members around
the globe. Audrey Cronin has observed that the internet is facilitating
a "cyber-enabled mass mobilization" of such enemies. According to
Cronin, this "cyber-mobilization" is the 21st century version of the
French levee en masse, which revolutionized warfare in the 19th century
by allowing a nation-state to raise nationally-based armies with a
common sense of commitment. Today's "levee en masse" looks much
different, as it is global, non-territorial, and disconnected from the
nation-state. Yet it may be no less revolutionary. Our ability to
understand this phenomenon and to use our own technological advantages
to counter it will be a key enabler of victory in our current struggle.

In sum, today's conflicts, particularly Afghanistan, require careful
consideration of our past experience and prudent application of
historical lessons learned, but also adaptation. From methods of
organization to fund raising and the use of media and technology,
today's adaptive enemy has learned from the past and has evolved. As he
learns and adapts, so must we.

**U.S. CAPACITIES AND TOOLS**

We in the United States have some successful new tools, thanks to close
interagency cooperation and support from our legislature: The
Commander's Emergency Response Program, or "CERP," lets U.S. forces
target funds to quickly meet the needs of the local population. Other
laws allow the Department of Defense to shift resources to the State
Department for urgent stabilization missions; and to more quickly train
and equip partners when the need arises.

More strategic processes are also taking root. In our State Department,
Ambassador Tobias is leading the transformation of foreign assistance;
Ambassador Herbst is continuing the development of a new office for
Reconstruction and Stabilization. The Department of Defense is
implementing roadmaps for Irregular Warfare, Strategic Communications,
and Building Partnership Capacity. With leadership and vision, such
efforts can provide a solid foundation for more sweeping changes to
foreign and security assistance that will give us more tools for
integrating our efforts and meet the challenges of global insurgency.

**NATO CAPACITIES AND TOOLS**

These programs are a start -- but all our nations, including mine,
should examine what else can be done to foster "whole of government"
approaches within our national capitals. Then, much more needs to be
done -- and can be done -- to bring such capabilities together within
NATO.

In Riga last Fall our Heads of State and Government explicitly
recognized the multidimensional nature of the challenge and tasked NATO
with developing a "comprehensive approach" to crisis management
missions.

A few key elements will help NATO deliver a complete set of
stabilization and reconstruction tools, including capabilities that
generally reside with civilians.

**Externally --** NATO must expand its liaison, coordination, and
information-sharing with other international organizations and partners,
at all levels and from the earliest pre-crisis warning and planning, so
we reinforce each others' actions.

**Internally --** NATO must refocus ACT's unique capacities, to
broadcast lessons learned, doctrine and training that combine civil and
military elements. Also, NATO should consider funding mechanisms like
the U.S. CERP, so it can quickly and efficiently finance projects that
place local populations on a trajectory of stable and sustainable peace.
Finally, NATO should expand its capacity to call upon extensive civilian
contributions from Allied nations, with structures and staffing to
ensure that this civilian expertise, in rebuilding infrastructure,
re-establishing basic services, restarting communications, and
protecting local population, must be synchronized with the security
effort.

Any capacities NATO has internally should be available to share with
other institutions externally.

**CONCLUSION**

What is important to remember as we strive for the institutional changes
I have described, is a sense of urgency: we still need to bring
stability to Afghanistan while bullets are flying. We face a brutal and
savvy enemy.

As I have described, the Taliban is systematically targeting every
effort the international community has made to bring development and
human security to the people of Afghanistan. We need only look as far as
the Kajaki Dam project for evidence:

The Kajaki Dam is the primary provider of electricity to Southern
Afghanistan and Khandahar City. Bringing the Dam to full capacity will
provide electricity to millions of Afghans and will serve as a tangible
and significant success for the Government of Afghanistan in providing
basic services to its people. The Taliban know this, and have actively
sought to halt the repairs by attacking the project engineers.

We cannot -- and will not - allow the Taliban to succeed in their
campaign of terror.

Your presence here today reflects a dedication to the men and women our
countries have in harm's way. This dedication will ensure the continued
success of the Alliance. Together we can bring stability and the
prospect of a better life to the people of Afghanistan. We will also be
helping to build a more secure future for our own children.