Before the

**Federal Communications Commission**

**Washington, D.C. 20554**

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| In the Matter of                 | * | CC Docket No. 01-324         |
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| Application by Verizon New       | ) |                              |
| England Inc., Bell Atlantic      | * |                              |
| Communications, Inc. (d/b/a      | * |                              |
| Verizon Long Distance), NYNEX    |   |                              |
| Long Distance Company (d/b/a     | * |                              |
| Verizon Enterprise Solutions),   | * |                              |
| Verizon Global Networks Inc.,    | ) |                              |
| and Verizon Select Services      | * |                              |
| Inc., for Authorization To       | * |                              |
| Provide In-Region, InterLATA     |   |                              |
| Services in Rhode Island         | * |                              |
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+----------------------------------+---+------------------------------+

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

**Adopted:** February 22, 2002 **Released:** February 22, 2002

By the Commission: Commissioner Copps concurring and issuing a
statement; Commissioner Martin approving in part, concurring in part,
and issuing a statement.

**Paragraph**

**I. introduction 1**

**II. Background 4**

**III. checklist compliance 18**

[A. Checklist Item 2 -- Unbundled Network Elements 20]{.smallcaps}

1\. Pricing of Network Elements 20

2\. Operations Support Systems 58

3\. UNE Combinations 72

[B. Other Items 73]{.smallcaps}

1\. Checklist Item 1 -- Interconnection 73

2\. Checklist Item 4 -- Unbundled Local Loops 76

3\. Checklist Item 5 -- Transport 91

4\. Checklist Item 14 -- Resale 94

[C. Remaining Checklist Items (3, 6-13) 97]{.smallcaps}

**IV. compliance with section 271(c)(1)(A) 98**

**V. SECTION 272 COMPLIANCE 101**

**VI. public interest analysis 102**

[A. Price Squeeze Arguments 107]{.smallcaps}

[B. Assurance of Future Compliance 108]{.smallcaps}

**VII. section 271(d)(6) enforcement authority 111**

**VIII. conclusion 114**

**IX. ordering clauses 115**

**APPENDIX A: LIST OF COMMENTERS**

**APPENDIX B: RHODE ISLAND PERFORMANCE DATA**

# APPENDIX C: MASSACHUSETTS PERFORMANCE DATA {#appendix-c-massachusetts-performance-data .Appendix-Heading}

APPENDIX D: STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS

# introduction

1.  On November 26, 2001, Verizon New England Inc., Bell Atlantic
    Communications, Inc. (d/b/a Verizon Long Distance), NYNEX Long
    Distance Company (d/b/a Verizon Enterprise Solutions), Verizon
    Global Networks Inc., and Verizon Select Services Inc. (Verizon)
    filed this application pursuant to section 271 of the Communications
    Act of 1934, as amended,[^1] for authority to provide in-region,
    interLATA service originating in the State of Rhode Island and
    Providence Plantations (Rhode Island). We grant the application in
    this Order based on our conclusion that Verizon has taken the
    statutorily required steps to open its local exchange markets in
    Rhode Island to competition.

2.  According to Verizon, competing carriers in Rhode Island serve
    approximately 119,000 lines (counting competitive lines served by
    resale, unbundled network elements, and competitive LEC facilities),
    or nearly 16 percent of the total access lines in the state.[^2]
    Across the state, competitors serve approximately 94,000 lines using
    unbundled network elements or their own facilities, and
    approximately 25,000 lines through resale.[^3] Almost 38 percent of
    competitors' lines are residential.[^4]

3.  In granting this application, we wish to recognize the hard work of
    the Rhode Island Public Utilities Commission (Rhode Island
    Commission) in laying the foundation for approval of this
    application. The Rhode Island Commission has conducted proceedings
    concerning Verizon's section 271 compliance, which have been open to
    participation by all interested parties. In addition, the Rhode
    Island Commission has adopted a broad range of performance measures
    and standards as well as a Performance Assurance Plan designed to
    create a financial incentive for post-entry compliance with
    section 271. As the Commission has recognized previously, state
    proceedings such as these serve a vitally important role in the
    section 271 process.

# Background

4.  In the 1996 amendments to the Communications Act, Congress required
    that the BOCs demonstrate compliance with certain market-opening
    requirements contained in section 271 of the Act before providing
    in-region, interLATA long distance service. Congress provided for
    Commission review of BOC applications to provide such service in
    consultation with the affected state and the Attorney General.[^5]

5.  We rely heavily in our examination of this application on the work
    completed by the Rhode Island Commission. Beginning in 1997, the
    Rhode Island Commission began what would become a four and one-half
    year series of proceedings to set rates for unbundled network
    elements (UNEs).[^6] The Rhode Island Commission also conducted an
    extensive proceeding, which was open to participation by all
    interested parties, to facilitate competition in local exchange
    markets, starting with a docket opened in September of 2000 to
    establish carrier-to-carrier wholesale performance measurements
    standards.[^7] In that proceeding, the Rhode Island Commission
    adopted a Performance Assurance Plan (PAP) modeled on the plan in
    use in New York, and also adopted performance measures based on the
    measures in use in New York.[^8] On July 25, 2001, Verizon made a
    compliance filing for section 271 approval with the Rhode Island
    Commission.[^9] On December 14, 2001, the Rhode Island Commission
    recommended that the Federal Communications Commission (the
    Commission) grant Verizon's application for authorization to provide
    in-region, interLATA services in Rhode Island.[^10] Specifically,
    the Rhode Island Commission found that Verizon met the requirements
    of each of the 14 competitive checklist items contained in section
    271 of the Act.[^11] Additionally, the Rhode Island Commission found
    that Verizon complied with section 271(c)(1)(A) because Verizon has
    entered into over 100 binding interconnection agreements with
    unaffiliated competitive LECs and local exchange service is being
    provided to both business and residential customers by at least one
    unaffiliated competitive LEC.[^12] Finally, the Rhode Island
    Commission found that approval of Verizon's section 271 application
    by the Commission is in the public interest.[^13]

6.  The Department of Justice recommends approval of Verizon's
    application for section 271 authority in Rhode Island, stating that:

> While there is significantly less competition to serve customers by
> means of the UNE-platform, the Department does not believe there are
> any material non-price obstacles to competition in Rhode Island.
> Verizon has submitted evidence to show that its \[operations support
> systems\] in Rhode Island are the same as those in Massachusetts, and
> that aspects of its \[operations support systems\] that were not
> tested in Massachusetts are generally satisfactory in Rhode Island.
> Moreover, there have been few complaints regarding Verizon's Rhode
> Island \[operations support systems\].[^14]

While the Department of Justice does not believe that there exist
non-price obstacles to competition in Rhode Island, it notes that
several commenters raised issues about pricing in Rhode Island and
"urges the Commission to look carefully at these comments in determining
whether Verizon's prices are cost-based."[^15] The Department
"recommends approval of Verizon's application for Section 271 authority
in Rhode Island, subject to the Commission satisfying itself as to . . .
pricing issues."[^16] We give "substantial weight" to the Department's
evaluation, as required by section 271(d)(2)(A).[^17]

7.  Before evaluating Verizon's compliance with the requirements of
    section 271, however, we discuss why we accord evidentiary weight to
    rate reductions that Verizon filed on day 80. The Commission
    maintains certain procedural requirements governing BOC section 271
    applications.[^18] In particular, the "complete-as-filed"
    requirement provides that when an applicant files new information
    after the comment date, the Commission reserves the right to start
    the 90-day review period again or to accord such information no
    weight in determining section 271 compliance.[^19] We maintain this
    requirement to afford interested parties a fair opportunity to
    comment on the BOC's application, to ensure that the Attorney
    General and the state commission can fulfill their statutory
    consultative roles, and to afford the Commission adequate time to
    evaluate the record.[^20] The Commission can waive its procedural
    rules, however, "if special circumstances warrant a deviation from
    the general rule and such deviation will serve the public
    interest."[^21]

8.  We waive the complete-as-filed requirement on our own motion
    pursuant to section 1.3 of the Commission's rules[^22] to the extent
    necessary to consider rate reductions filed by Verizon on day 80 of
    the 90-day period for Commission review of the Rhode Island
    application.[^23] We conclude that the special circumstances before
    us here warrant a deviation from the general rules for consideration
    of late-filed information or developments that take place during the
    application review period. In particular, as we discuss below, we
    find that the interests our normal procedural requirements are
    designed to protect are not affected by our consideration of these
    late-filed rate reductions. In addition, we also conclude that
    consideration of the rate reductions will serve the public interest.
    We will continue to enforce our procedural requirements in future
    section 271 applications, however, in the absence of such special
    circumstances, in order to ensure a fair and orderly process for the
    consideration of section 271 applications within the 90-day
    statutory deadline.

9.  There are special circumstances here that satisfy the first element
    of the test for grant of a waiver described above. Indeed, the
    circumstances are unique, and, based on our experience in reviewing
    over a dozen section 271 applications, we expect that they will not
    recur. First, at the time Verizon filed its application with us on
    November 26, 2001, the UNE rates that were in effect in New York
    served as a legitimate benchmark comparison by which Verizon might
    demonstrate that its Rhode Island rates were TELRIC-compliant.[^24]
    Yet on January 28, 2002 -- day 63 of our review of Verizon's Rhode
    Island application -- the New York Public Service Commission (New
    York Commission) resolved a long-standing dispute by lowering
    Verizon's switching rates in that state by approximately 50
    percent.[^25] Commenters asserted that the old New York rates could
    no longer serve as a benchmark from which to judge whether Verizon's
    rates in Rhode Island were TELRIC-compliant.[^26] Indeed, AT&T
    suggested in an *ex parte* presentation on February 1, 2002, that
    this Commission could only grant Verizon's Rhode Island application
    if Verizon lowered its rates in Rhode Island to New York
    levels.[^27] In response, Verizon filed reduced rates with the Rhode
    Island Commission, and filed with us evidence that it had done
    so.[^28] This unique change in circumstances -- the New York
    Commission's long-awaited decision to modify Verizon's switching
    rate -- was not within Verizon's control. Verizon could not have
    known either when the New York Commission would lower rates in that
    state or the exact rates that the New York Commission would adopt.
    Thus, this is not a situation where a BOC has attempted to maintain
    high rates only to lower them voluntarily at the eleventh hour in
    order to gain section 271 approval. Rather, this is a situation
    where a core element of the BOC's evidence in support of its section
    271 filing changed outside of its control, and the BOC promptly took
    affirmative steps to adjust its showing to demonstrate compliance
    with section 271.

10. Second, the rate changes at issue are limited. Verizon lowered only
    its port and switching usage rates.[^29] Verizon has not modified
    the rate structure or implemented a combination of decreases and
    increases. As a result, addressing the effect of this rate reduction
    placed a limited additional analytical burden on the Commission
    staff and commenting parties, in contrast to the burden that would
    have been caused by the consideration of more complex rate
    revisions. Moreover, Verizon's rate reductions have already taken
    effect,[^30] so there is no concern that the Commission is approving
    a "promise\[\] of future performance."[^31] Nor is this a situation
    where the BOC implements measures (such as changes to its OSS)
    designed to achieve nondiscriminatory performance in the applicant's
    provision of service to competitive LECs, the effectiveness of which
    would be difficult to measure in advance.

11. Third, interested parties have had an opportunity to evaluate the
    new rates and to comment. Numerous parties had already commented or
    made *ex parte* filings regarding Verizon's Rhode Island rates as
    compared with existing and proposed New York rates, and then on the
    effect of the New York Commission's reduction of rates, even prior
    to Verizon's filing of its new rates in Rhode Island.[^32] Thus, it
    was not unduly burdensome for commenters to respond to Verizon's
    actual reduction of a limited number of rates in a relatively short
    period of time. Moreover, the very limited nature of these rate
    changes has permitted the Commission staff to evaluate the change
    within the 90-day review period. In addition, the Rhode Island
    Commission approved the new rates expeditiously and made them
    effective February 20, 2002.[^33] The Department of Justice did not
    comment on the rates, but in its initial comments states that
    "'\[b\]ecause of the Commission's experience and expertise in
    rate-making issues . . . the Department will not attempt to make its
    own independent determination whether prices are appropriately
    cost-based.'"[^34] Because the Commission and commenters have had
    sufficient time and information to evaluate Verizon's application,
    we see no need to restart the 90-day clock.[^35]

12. Finally, in this instance Verizon has responded to criticism in the
    record by taking positive action that will foster the development of
    competition. This is very different from the situation in which
    late-filed material consists of additional arguments or information
    concerning whether current performance or pricing satisfies the
    requirements of section 271. In addition, this application is
    otherwise persuasive and demonstrates a commitment to opening local
    markets to competition as required by the 1996 Act.

13. We also conclude that grant of this waiver will serve the public
    interest and thus satisfy the second element of the waiver standard
    described above. In particular, grant of this waiver permits the
    Commission to act on this section 271 application quickly and
    efficiently without the delays inherent in restarting the 90-day
    clock. Grant of this waiver also serves to credit Verizon's decision
    to respond positively to criticism in the record concerning its rate
    levels by making pro-competitive rate reductions. Given that
    interested parties have had an opportunity to comment on these rate
    reductions, we do not believe that the public interest would be
    served in this instance by strict adherence to our procedural rules.
    Nor do we need to delay the effectiveness of this Order, as we did
    in the *SWBT Kansas/Oklahoma Order*.[^36] In contrast to that
    situation, here the New York Commission dictated the timing by its
    resolution of the long-pending rate proceeding. As we have made
    clear above, however, we do not intend to allow a pattern of
    late-filed changes to threaten the Commission's ability to maintain
    a fair and orderly process for consideration of section 271
    applications.

14. Under the unique circumstances presented in this application, we
    cannot agree with the commenting parties -- AT&T and ASCENT -- that
    urge us to decline to consider these rate revisions or to treat
    these revisions as a new filing that starts a new 90-day review
    period.[^37] First, we note that neither commenter even suggested
    that Verizon's modified switching rates for Rhode Island do not
    benchmark favorably against the new New York rates, or that the new
    New York rates are not TELRIC-compliant. To the contrary, AT&T has
    urged the Commission to do exactly what it is doing -- benchmarking
    Verizon's Rhode Island rates against the new New York rates.[^38]
    Rather than address the outcome on this point, parties' comments
    focused on the process the Commission ought to use in conducting its
    proceeding.

15. With respect to the parties' process arguments, we disagree that
    consideration of these rate reductions permits Verizon to game the
    process, and benefit by delaying the opening of its local market in
    Rhode Island to UNE-based competition.[^39] As explained above, we
    do not hold Verizon responsible for the timing of the New York
    Commission's order lowering rates, and note that Verizon responded
    very quickly to seek a corresponding rate reduction in Rhode Island.
    Moreover, we disagree with ASCENT's suggestion that the Commission
    must deny this waiver request to allow time to measure the impact of
    the new rates on competition.[^40] The statute simply does not
    require such an analysis, or require that a BOC demonstrate that it
    has been in compliance with section 271 for any period of time
    before it files a section 271 application.[^41]

16. Second, we disagree that the Commission and interested parties had
    too little time to analyze Verizon's reduced switching rates, and
    that parties had too little time to prepare comments.[^42] As
    explained above, Verizon's rate reductions were limited and
    straightforward, and required only to be compared with the new
    switching rates for New York. Indeed, parties had already made a
    preliminary comparison in their earlier comments and *ex parte*
    presentations.[^43] Moreover, no party has asserted that, given more
    time, it would even seek to demonstrate that Verizon's switching
    rates in New York or Rhode Island are not TELRIC-compliant.[^44] We
    also disagree with AT&T that it could not file meaningful comments
    without more analysis of, or information about, the derivation of
    Verizon's lowered rates.[^45] As explained in more detail below, our
    benchmark analysis is a comparison of costs and rates in two states
    and does not require more than what Verizon placed in the record on
    February 14.[^46]

17. Finally, we share, to some extent, commenters' concerns that
    incentives may exist for applicants to withhold rate reductions
    until the eleventh hour.[^47] As noted above, however, granting this
    waiver does not encourage further late filings because the unique
    circumstance present here resulted from the New York Commission's
    order modifying Verizon's switching rates. Moreover, notwithstanding
    the Commission's decision occasionally to waive its general
    procedural rules governing section 271 applications, where
    warranted, we believe that our procedural requirements have led to
    the filing of applications that contain a tremendous amount of
    detail and are largely complete. The vast amount of evidence that
    BOCs submit on the day of filing dwarfs the relatively small amount
    of subsequent evidence we have considered pursuant to waiver.

# checklist compliance

18. As in recent section 271 orders, we will not repeat here the
    analytical framework and particular legal showing required to
    establish compliance with every checklist item. Rather, we rely on
    the legal and analytical precedent established in prior section 271
    orders, and we attach comprehensive appendices containing
    performance data and the statutory framework for evaluating section
    271 applications.[^48] Our conclusions in this Order are based on
    performance data as reported in carrier-to-carrier reports
    reflecting service in the most recent four months before filing
    (July through October 2001). Verizon has also submitted November
    performance data for our review. We elect in this proceeding only to
    examine November data in a few instances for the limited purpose of
    supplementing our findings concerning Verizon's performance that is
    demonstrated by performance data from earlier months. We generally
    limit our review to performance data filed with the initial
    application or shortly thereafter, in accordance with our procedural
    rules for reviewing section 271 applications, although we have
    considered an additional later month of data in certain
    circumstances.[^49] Limiting our review in this way presents
    commenters a fuller opportunity to comment on the evidence that the
    company relies on for its showing, and is administratively more
    convenient for the Commission.

19. We focus in this Order on the issues in controversy in the record.
    Accordingly, we begin by addressing checklist item two -- access to
    unbundled network elements. Next, we address checklist items one
    (interconnection), four (unbundled local loops), five (unbundled
    transport), and fourteen (resale). The remaining checklist items are
    discussed briefly. We find, based on our review of the evidence in
    the record, that Verizon satisfies all checklist requirements.

## Checklist Item 2 -- Unbundled Network Elements

### Pricing of Unbundled Network Elements

#### Background

20. Section 252(d)(1) requires state determinations regarding the rates,
    terms, and conditions for unbundled network elements to be based on
    cost and nondiscriminatory, and allows the rates to include a
    reasonable profit.[^50] The Commission's pricing rules require,
    among other things, that an incumbent LEC provide unbundled network
    elements based on the TELRIC pricing methodology.[^51] Although the
    United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit stayed the
    Commission's pricing rules in 1996,[^52] the Supreme Court restored
    the Commission's pricing authority on January 25, 1999, and remanded
    to the Eighth Circuit for consideration of the merits of the
    challenged rules.[^53] On remand from the Supreme Court, the Eighth
    Circuit concluded that, while TELRIC is an acceptable method for
    determining costs, certain of the Commission's pricing rules were
    contrary to congressional intent.[^54] The Eighth Circuit has stayed
    the issuance of its mandate[^55] pending appeal before the Supreme
    Court, which has granted *certiorari* and recently heard oral
    argument in the case.[^56] Accordingly, the Commission's rules
    remain in effect for purposes of this application.

21. On November 24, 1997, the Rhode Island Commission began what would
    become a four and one-half year series of proceedings to set rates
    for unbundled network elements (UNEs). In these proceedings, the
    Rhode Island Division of Public Utilities and Carriers (Rhode Island
    Division), the entity responsible for executing all laws and
    regulations pertaining to public utilities and carriers, represented
    Rhode Island ratepayers. A variety of parties participated in the
    proceedings.[^57] Verizon and AT&T filed separate cost studies based
    on different models in the proceedings.[^58] On August 18, 1999, the
    Rhode Island Commission adopted stipulated, interim rates, that "for
    the most part reflected the \[Rhode Island Division's\] position in
    the . . . proceedings."[^59] In general, the Division-recommended,
    interim rates were lower than the rates Verizon proposed at the
    beginning of the proceedings. For example, the interim statewide
    average rate for a two-wire analog loop was \$15.00, while Verizon's
    proposed rate was \$21.69.[^60]

22. On April 11, 2001, the Rhode Island Commission adopted these interim
    rates as permanent rates, simultaneously ordering that the rates
    incorporate a 7.11 percent across-the-board reduction to account for
    savings from Verizon mergers and process re-engineering occurring
    since the rate proceeding had begun.[^61] In adopting the rates, the
    Rhode Island Commission found that they were "consistent with the
    \[Commission's\] TELRIC methodology and, therefore, will facilitate
    the development of local telephone exchange competition in Rhode
    Island."[^62] The Rhode Island Commission also ordered Verizon to
    file new cost studies using certain specific assumptions as part of
    a new UNE rate proceeding which is scheduled to begin no later than
    May 1, 2002, and in which the Rhode Island Commission expects to
    adopt new UNE rates by the end of 2002.[^63] The Rhode Island
    Commission has indicated that it required these new cost studies
    because it "wanted to receive and review more recent evidence."[^64]
    The Rhode Island Commission has stated that the new rate proceeding
    will "in no way affect our conclusion that \[Verizon's\] currently
    effective UNE rates are TELRIC-compliant."[^65]

23. On November 15, 2001, in a separate proceeding, the Rhode Island
    Commission adopted discounted switching rates that Verizon had
    voluntarily proposed in seeking the Rhode Island Commission's
    approval of its section 271 application.[^66] The discounted rates
    are similar to rates proposed by Verizon in an ongoing Massachusetts
    rate proceeding and are based on new Verizon cost studies supporting
    the proposed Massachusetts rates.[^67] The Rhode Island Commission
    reviewed the discounted switching rates and found that, when
    aggregate UNE rates in Rhode Island were compared to aggregate UNE
    rates in Massachusetts, the aggregate Rhode Island rates fell within
    a reasonable TELRIC range.[^68] The Rhode Island Commission noted
    that the discounted rates "are not only lower than Rhode Island's
    current UNE rates, but also lower than Massachusetts's comparable
    UNE rates in April 2001 when the \[Commission\] approved
    Massachusetts's Section 271 application."[^69] The Rhode Island
    Commission also relied on a showing by AT&T that the new rates would
    result in a wholesale cost of \$25.45 for the UNE-Platform, which is
    lower than the \$28.95 price of Verizon's Unlimited Local Calling
    Offer.[^70]

24. On November 15, 2001, the Rhode Island Commission also adopted
    permanent rates for sixteen additional elements identified as UNEs
    in our *UNE Remand Order*.[^71] Verizon had proposed these rates on
    September 29, 2000, and revised them on May 24, 2001 to reflect the
    modified, TELRIC-compliant assumptions and 7.11 percent reduction
    mandated by the Rhode Island Commission on April 11, 2001.[^72]
    After discovery and testimony, the Rhode Island Commission reviewed
    the rates and found them to be within a reasonable range of rates
    that a correct application of TELRIC principles would produce.[^73]
    These rates are not contested in this proceeding.

25. On January 28, 2002, the New York Public Service Commission (New
    York Commission) concluded a complex TELRIC rate proceeding begun
    even before the Commission granted Verizon's application for section
    271 approval in New York.[^74] The New York Commission adopted
    significantly reduced UNE rates, including switching rates
    approximately half of Verizon's prior switching rates in effect when
    the Commission granted Verizon's petition for section 271 approval
    in New York.[^75] This action significantly affects our conclusions
    in this proceeding, and is discussed in detail below.

26. On February 21, 2002, also as part of its review of Verizon's
    section 271 application, the Rhode Island Commission adopted further
    discounted switching rates voluntarily proposed by Verizon.[^76]
    Verizon proposed these new, lower rates to respond to commenters'
    criticism of its reliance on rates superseded by the New York
    Commission's January 28, 2002 to demonstrate that its Rhode Island
    non-loop rates were within a reasonable TELRIC range. The Rhode
    Island Commission reviewed the further discounted switching rates
    and found that they fell within a reasonable TELRIC range.

#### Discussion

27. Based on the evidence in the record, we find that Verizon's Rhode
    Island UNE rates are just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory in
    compliance with checklist item two. The Commission has previously
    held that it will not conduct a *de novo* review of a state's
    pricing determinations and will reject an application only if either
    "basic TELRIC principles are violated or the state commission makes
    clear errors in factual findings on matters so substantial that the
    end result falls outside the range that the reasonable application
    of TELRIC principles would produce."[^77] The Rhode Island
    Commission concluded that Verizon's UNE rates satisfied the
    requirements of checklist item two.[^78] While we have not conducted
    a *de novo* review of the Rhode Island Commission's pricing
    determinations, we have followed the urging of the Department of
    Justice that we look carefully at commenters' complaints regarding
    UNE pricing.[^79] Certain flaws in the Rhode Island Commission's
    initial TELRIC proceeding preclude us from concluding that Verizon's
    original, April 11, 2001, UNE rates fall within the reasonable range
    that correct application of TELRIC principles would produce.
    Nonetheless, after reviewing Verizon's more recent UNE rates, we
    conclude that Verizon's Rhode Island UNE rates fall within the
    reasonable range that correct application of TELRIC principles would
    produce.

28. We commend the Rhode Island Commission for its prodigious effort to
    establish TELRIC-compliant rates and note that its orders in the UNE
    rate proceeding demonstrate a commitment to basic TELRIC principles.
    After two and one-half years of discovery, briefings, and hearings,
    which included the examination of competing cost studies filed by
    Verizon and AT&T, the Rhode Island Commission adopted interim rates
    that incorporated many of the TELRIC-compliant assumptions
    recommended by its own Division of Utilities and Carriers.[^80]
    Subsequently it adopted these interim rates as permanent rates,[^81]
    and twice adjusted the permanent switching rates downward in
    response to criticism that they were too high to be
    TELRIC-based.[^82] Finally, the Rhode Island Commission adopted
    rates for the sixteen additional elements required by our *UNE
    Remand Order,* and the TELRIC-compliance of these rates is not
    contested here.[^83]

29. To understand our analysis, it is important to distinguish the
    various rates adopted over time by the Rhode Island Commission and
    how we are considering each of them. First, on April 11, 2001, the
    Rhode Island Commission adopted overall UNE rates after a lengthy
    proceeding.[^84] Verizon contends, and the Rhode Island Commission
    agrees, that the switching rates contained in these UNE rates,
    referred to as Verizon's April 11 switching rates, are
    TELRIC-compliant.[^85] Subsequently, Verizon twice voluntarily
    discounted its switching rates in seeking approval of its section
    271 application.[^86] The Rhode Island Commission adopted the first
    discounted switching rates, referred to as the November 15 switching
    rates, on November 15, 2001.[^87] Most recently, the Rhode Island
    Commission adopted further discounted switching rates, referred to
    as the February 21 switching rates, on February 21, 2002.[^88]
    Although contending that its April 11 rates are TELRIC compliant,
    Verizon now alternatively relies on these February 21 switching
    rates in seeking the Commission's approval of its 271 application in
    this proceeding. Because Verizon asserts in this proceeding that its
    April 11 rates were TELRIC-compliant, and because the Rhode Island
    Commission relied upon its own finding that the April 11 switching
    rates were TELRIC-compliant in subsequently adopting Verizon's
    November 15 switching rates,[^89] we review certain contested
    decisions the Rhode Island Commission made regarding the April 11
    switching rates. Because the Rhode Island Commission adopted
    Verizon's February 21 switching rates without a rate proceeding and
    a thorough record that would allow us to determine whether the
    faulty assumptions underlying its original rates were corrected, we
    review the February 21 rates using our benchmark analysis.[^90]

30. We find that the Rhode Island Commission properly applied the TELRIC
    methodology with respect to several issues disputed by the parties.
    Both AT&T and WorldCom assert that UNE rates in Rhode Island are not
    TELRIC compliant because they fail to incorporate the specific
    assumptions mandated by the Rhode Island Commission on April 11,
    2001.[^91] This assertion is incorrect. For example, the April 11
    rates incorporate Commission-prescribed depreciation lives and a 9.5
    percent cost of capital.[^92] These Rhode Island
    Division-recommended assumptions are consistent with assumptions the
    Commission has found to comply with TELRIC principles in reviewing
    other section 271 applications.[^93] Loop rates also incorporate
    assumptions regarding fill factors that the Division recommended and
    the Commission has found to be consistent with TELRIC
    principles.[^94] No party has presented arguments or facts in this
    proceeding which would cause us to find that these assumptions are
    inconsistent with TELRIC principles as applied to Verizon in Rhode
    Island.

31. We disagree with claims by AT&T and WorldCom that Verizon's UNE
    rates are not TELRIC compliant because the Rhode Island Commission
    will soon begin a new rate proceeding in which it will reconsider
    certain assumptions underlying the rates.[^95] The fact that the
    Rhode Island Commission has scheduled a rate proceeding to update
    existing rates does not, in itself, prove that existing rates are
    not TELRIC compliant. Indeed, the Commission has recognized that
    rates may well evolve over time to reflect new information on cost
    study assumptions and changes in technology, engineering practices,
    or market conditions.[^96] The United States Court of Appeals for
    the D. C. Circuit agrees:

> \[W\]e suspect that rates may often need adjustment to reflect newly
> discovered information, like that about Bell Atlantic's future
> discounts. If new information automatically required rejection of
> section 271 applications, we cannot imagine how such applications
> could ever be approved in this context of rapid regulatory and
> technological change.[^97]

32. Despite the fact that the Rhode Island Commission has demonstrated a
    commitment to basic TELRIC principles and has correctly applied
    these principles in many instances, for the reasons discussed below,
    we cannot find that Verizon has proven that its UNE rates were
    adopted through a proceeding which correctly applied TELRIC
    principles in all instances. Therefore, we evaluate Verizon's
    current Rhode Island UNE rates based upon our benchmark analysis. As
    discussed below, Verizon's Rhode Island UNE rates pass our benchmark
    test, and, therefore, satisfy the requirements of checklist item
    two.

##### Switching Rates

33. As discussed above, the Rhode Island Commission adopted UNE rates,
    including switching rates that it found to be TELRIC compliant, on
    April 11, 2001 after a lengthy rate proceeding. Subsequently, on
    November 15, 2001, and February 21, 2002, the Rhode Island
    Commission adopted reduced switching rates that Verizon had
    voluntarily discounted in seeking approval of its section 271
    application. AT&T and WorldCom criticize specific assumptions
    underlying the April 11 switching rates, and the switching rates
    adopted November 15, 2001. AT&T and WorldCom's criticisms of these
    rates prompt us to consider both the Rhode Island rate proceeding
    underlying the April 11 switching rates, and the Rhode Island
    Commission's actions in subsequently adopting discounted switching
    rates.

34. A central issue contested by the parties is the appropriate discount
    for Verizon's switches. Verizon's Rhode Island switching rates are
    based on the assumption that it will not replace any switches in
    Rhode Island, but only expand switch capacity through growth
    additions to existing switches. Typically, vendors provide greater
    discounts for new, replacement switches than for growth additions to
    existing switches. AT&T and WorldCom contend that Verizon's
    assumption of no new, replacement switches and only growth additions
    is inconsistent with TELRIC principles.[^98] While the Commission
    has not to date specified an appropriate split between new,
    replacement switches and growth additions, we strongly question an
    assumption of only growth additions, as proposed by Verizon and
    incorporated in the April 11 rates adopted by the Rhode Island
    Commission. Even if some growth additions may be used in a
    forward-looking network, the absence of any new switches is
    inconsistent with the assumption in TELRIC pricing of a
    forward-looking network built from scratch, given the location of
    the existing wire centers.[^99] Although an efficient competitor
    might anticipate some growth additions over the long run, rates
    based on an assumption of all growth additions and no new switches
    do not comply with TELRIC principles. We also note that the Rhode
    Island Commission determined that Verizon's assumptions for switch
    cost recovery in the new UNE rate proceeding will be based on a
    rebuttable presumption of 90 percent new switches to 10 percent
    growth additions.[^100]

35. We also agree with AT&T and WorldCom that Verizon used a
    questionable installation factor for its switches. The installation
    factor is the percentage amount of the original switch price added
    to the switch price to recover the costs of installation.
    Specifically, AT&T and WorldCom claim that Verizon's installation
    factor of more than 60 percent of the switch cost is inflated.[^101]
    Verizon derives this factor from the cost of installing the switch
    itself rather than having the switch installed by the vendor.[^102]
    The Rhode Island Commission expressed concern regarding Verizon's
    installation factor, but, because it found the record before it
    insufficient to establish a new factor, deferred a specific
    determination to the new rate proceeding.[^103] Specifically, the
    Rhode Island Commission stated: "\[T\]he Commission is concerned
    that \[Verizon\] may not be as efficient in \[installing switches\]
    as it could be: perhaps Verizon should consider letting the switch
    manufacturer install the switch, as do most Bell companies."[^104]
    The Rhode Island Commission further required Verizon to submit
    substantial additional evidence on its installation costs in the
    upcoming rate proceeding.[^105] Again, although the Rhode Island
    Commission found that the rates it ultimately adopted were TELRIC
    compliant, its decision does not provide us with sufficient evidence
    to conclude that this installation factor accurately reflects cost
    recovery of an efficient, forward-looking network pursuant to TELRIC
    principles. We also note that because the installation factor is a
    multiplier, its application to the switch price magnifies the effect
    of any other problematic assumptions underlying switching rates,
    such as inaccurate assumptions for new versus growth switch
    discounts.

36. As discussed above, parties raised serious questions about whether
    Verizon's April 11 switching rates are TELRIC compliant. Verizon
    contends that these rates are TELRIC-compliant, but does not rely on
    them in this proceeding. Rather, Verizon first relied on the
    voluntarily discounted switching rates adopted by the Rhode Island
    Commission on November 15, 2001, and now relies on the voluntarily
    discounted switching rates adopted by the Rhode Island Commission on
    February 21, 2002. Therefore, because we base our determination of
    compliance with checklist item two on the February 21 rates, we need
    not decide the question of whether Verizon's April 11 switching
    rates are TELRIC compliant here. Verizon's subsequent adoption of
    discounted switching rates did not result from a rate proceeding
    with a thorough record that would allow us to determine whether the
    faulty assumptions underlying its original rates were corrected. We
    therefore review the switching rates Verizon now relies on to
    satisfy checklist item two, the February 21 switching rates, using
    our benchmark analysis.

##### Benchmark Analysis

37. States have considerable flexibility in setting UNE rates, and
    certain flaws in a cost study, by themselves, may not result in
    rates that are outside the reasonable range that a correct
    application of our TELRIC rules would produce. Given our findings
    concerning the assumptions for new versus growth switch discounts
    and the installation factor underlying Verizon's switching rates, we
    must determine whether Verizon can show that its voluntarily reduced
    switching rates nonetheless fall within the range that reasonable
    application of TELRIC principles would produce by applying our
    benchmark test.

38. The Commission has stated that, when a state commission does not
    apply TELRIC principles or does so improperly (e.g., the state
    commission made a major methodological mistake or used an incorrect
    input or several smaller mistakes or incorrect inputs that
    collectively could render rates outside the reasonable range that
    TELRIC would permit), then we will look to rates in other section
    271-approved states to see if the rates nonetheless fall within the
    range that a reasonable TELRIC-based rate proceeding would
    produce.[^106] To determine whether a comparison is reasonable, the
    Commission will consider whether the two states have a common BOC;
    whether the two states have geographic similarities; whether the two
    states have similar, although not necessarily identical, rate
    structures for comparison purposes; and whether the Commission has
    already found the rates in the comparison state to be
    TELRIC-compliant.[^107]

39. Verizon here chooses to rely on a benchmark comparison of its rates
    in Rhode Island to its rates in New York. While we accept Verizon's
    reliance on New York rates for purposes of this application, we note
    that in future applications, Verizon and other BOCs are free to rely
    on benchmark comparisons to rates in other appropriate, section
    271-approved states, as described in the preceding paragraph, as
    evidence that rates in the applicant state satisfy checklist item
    two. Of course, Verizon and other BOCs may also demonstrate in
    future applications that their rates result from a state rate
    proceeding correctly applying TELRIC principles without regard to
    any benchmark analysis.

40. We consider the reasonableness of loop and non-loop rates
    separately.[^108] Where the Commission finds that the state
    commission correctly applied TELRIC principles for one category of
    rates, it will use a benchmark analysis to evaluate the rates of the
    other category. If, however, there are problems with the application
    of TELRIC for both loop and non-loop rates, then the same benchmark
    state must be used for all rate comparisons to prevent an incumbent
    LEC from choosing for its comparisons the highest approved rates for
    both loop and non-loop UNEs.[^109] In addition, we combine
    per-minute switching with other non-loop rates such as port,
    signaling, and transport rates because competing LECs most often
    purchase them together rather than separately, and because state
    commissions often differ in determining how to recover certain
    costs. For example, in some states shared trunk port costs are
    recovered through a separate rate, while in other states these costs
    are recovered as part of switching rates.

41. The New York Commission's recent adoption of substantially reduced
    switching rates[^110] has generated some question in this proceeding
    about which rates to use in performing our benchmark analysis.
    Verizon claimed at the outset of this proceeding that its November
    15 switching rates satisfied checklist item two because they passed
    a benchmark comparison to its original switching rates in New York
    and to its Massachusetts switching rates, which are based on its
    original New York switching rates.[^111] When the New York
    Commission adopted new rates superseding the rates Verizon had
    relied on, commenters contended that Verizon's reliance on the
    superseded New York rates had become unreasonable.[^112] Verizon
    then filed the February 21 switching rate reductions with the Rhode
    Island Commission to address commenters' contentions.

42. First, we find Verizon's reliance on Massachusetts rates for a
    benchmark comparison to be inappropriate. The Commission found that
    Verizon's Massachusetts rates satisfied checklist item two based on
    a benchmark analysis comparing Massachusetts rates to New York
    rates.[^113] To allow section 271 applicants to use
    benchmark-approved rates in performing a subsequent benchmark
    analysis would compound any variations from rates in the state found
    to have correctly applied TELRIC principles in a full rate
    proceeding. Verizon's reliance on Massachusetts rates is
    particularly inappropriate when the Commission found that
    Massachusetts rates satisfied checklist item two based on a
    benchmark comparison to New York rates that have now been
    superseded.

43. On December 22, 1999, the Commission granted Verizon's section 271
    application in New York, deferring to the New York Commission on the
    issue of switch discounts and finding that the New York switching
    rates fell within the reasonable range that a correct application of
    TELRIC principles would produce.[^114] The Commission noted that the
    New York Commission was reexamining switching prices and would be
    revising them.[^115] The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
    agreed with the Commission's analysis, noting both that the New York
    Commission "has said it will reexamine switching discounts, ordering
    refunds if appropriate" and that requiring rejection of section 271
    applications due to ongoing rate proceedings would cripple the
    section 271 process.[^116]

44. At the time Verizon applied for section 271 approval in
    Massachusetts, the New York Commission had not yet concluded its
    reexamination of switching prices. The Commission approved the
    Massachusetts application, finding that the Massachusetts rates were
    comparable to New York rates and passed a benchmark analysis.[^117]
    The Commission rejected parties' arguments that the New York
    switching rates were defective and subject to a reexamination
    proceeding and, therefore, could not be relied on for a benchmark
    analysis.[^118] The order stated, however, that, depending on the
    New York Commission's final conclusions, Verizon might be precluded
    from relying on New York switching rates as a basis for a future
    benchmark comparison:

> If the New York Commission adopts modified UNE rates, future section
> 271 applicants could no longer demonstrate TELRIC compliance by
> showing that their rates in the applicant state are equivalent to or
> based on the current New York rates, which will have been superseded.
> Moreover, because Verizon would have us rely on switching rates from
> the New York proceeding, a decision by the New York Commission to
> modify these UNE rates may undermine Verizon's reliance on those rates
> in Massachusetts and its compliance with the requirements of section
> 271, depending on the New York Commission's conclusions.[^119]

45. In an order issued January 28, 2002, the New York Commission
    completed its reexamination of switching rates, adopting many
    recommendations of an ALJ who conducted hearings on the issues, and
    rejecting many exceptions to the ALJ's Recommended Decision.[^120]
    Regarding the contested issue of new versus growth discounts for
    switches, the New York Commission found that, although switching
    costs should not be predicated exclusively on new switch discounts,
    "it has been clear since \[early 1999\] that relatively deep new
    switch discounts are not limited to full-scale switch replacements,
    and there is no basis for agreeing with Verizon that incremental
    replacement of the system over time would entail growth discounts
    only."[^121] On February 19, 2002, Verizon filed new rates to comply
    with the New York Commission's order that are approximately 50
    percent lower than the original New York switching rates.[^122]

46. Given these findings by the New York Commission, AT&T and WorldCom
    assert that Verizon cannot rely on a benchmark comparison to
    superseded New York switching rates to establish that its current
    Rhode Island switching rates are within a reasonable TELRIC
    range.[^123] The Commission previously has held that the existence
    of a new cost proceeding is insufficient reason to find that a
    state's existing rates do not satisfy TELRIC principles.[^124] We
    also believe that the existence of a new rate proceeding is
    insufficient reason to disallow a state's rates for benchmarking
    purposes. As the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit has
    recognized, rates require continual adjustment to reflect changing
    information, and section 271 applications would never be granted if
    such adjustment required denial.[^125] The need for such continual
    adjustment, however, also requires us to consider carefully any
    reliance on benchmarking to rates that have been superseded by order
    of a state commission. To do otherwise would be to forever freeze
    TELRIC ratemaking to the first TELRIC rate proceeding and *de facto*
    fail to recognize increased sophistication in modeling or newly
    available evidence that could produce different, more precise TELRIC
    refinements that result in increased or decreased wholesale prices
    for UNEs. This requirement is particularly compelling here, where
    parties questioned Verizon's New York switching rates during the
    section 271 proceeding and the New York Commission expressly
    rejected Verizon's discredited claim of no further new switch
    discounts.[^126] We must also consider the experience we have gained
    in approving additional section 271 applications. We note that
    Verizon's superseded New York switching rates are considerably
    higher than other switching rates that the Commission has found to
    be TELRIC compliant in approving other section 271 applications. For
    example, Verizon's superseded New York switching rates are
    significantly higher than switching rates in Texas, Kansas,
    Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Missouri and Arkansas.[^127] Thus, we
    conclude that it would be inappropriate to evaluate Verizon's Rhode
    Island rates based on a benchmark comparison to superseded New York
    rates.

47. As noted above, in response to criticism of Verizon's use of
    superseded New York switching rates as evidence that its Rhode
    Island switching rates fell within a reasonable TELRIC range,
    Verizon filed new, lower switching rates with the Rhode Island
    Commission on February 14, 2002.[^128] The Rhode Island Commission
    adopted these new, lower switching rates on February 21, 2002.[^129]
    Verizon maintains that its old Rhode Island switching rates were
    TELRIC compliant and that its new, lower switching rates are "well
    below the level that any reasonable measure of TELRIC costs would
    produce."[^130] Verizon's February 21 Rhode Island switching rates
    compare favorably with the new New York switching rates when
    evaluated using our benchmark analysis. We consider, therefore,
    whether the new New York switching rates are an appropriate
    benchmark for determining whether Verizon's February 21 Rhode Island
    switching rates fall within a reasonable TELRIC range.

48. We find that the new rates adopted by the New York Commission are
    appropriate comparison rates in this instance. Several facts unique
    to this application permit us to use the new New York rates in our
    benchmark analysis.

49. First, although Verizon did not introduce the deliberations of the
    New York Commission into the record in this proceeding when it
    initially filed its Rhode Island section 271 application, the
    Commission has been aware of the existence of the New York rate
    proceeding since it first granted Verizon section 271 approval in
    New York.[^131] Further, AT&T and WorldCom were cognizant of the New
    York Commission's impending action, as they argued that a
    significant reduction in New York switching rates was imminent and
    should be used in a benchmark comparison in this proceeding.[^132]
    Finally, AT&T, WorldCom, and Verizon notified us of the New York
    Commission's new rate determinations shortly after release of the
    New York Commission's order.[^133] In fact, AT&T now contends that
    the new New York rates are the only evidence Verizon can rely on to
    demonstrate that its Rhode Island rates satisfy checklist item
    two.[^134] Therefore, we, along with parties to this proceeding,
    have been well aware of the outcome and impact of the New York rate
    proceeding since late January 2002, and have had an opportunity to
    review the new rates.

50. We commend the New York Commission's efforts in conducting a
    detailed and lengthy rate review in which many of the issues debated
    by the parties here were thoroughly evaluated.[^135] The rate review
    began in February 2000, involved the filing of testimony, responsive
    testimony or rebuttal testimony by almost a dozen parties, including
    AT&T and WorldCom, seven days of hearings and several conferences,
    and hundreds of pages of briefs. This process resulted in a
    Recommended Decision by ALJ Linsider on May 16, 2001. Thereafter,
    for eight months, the New York Commission considered the Recommended
    Decision as well as exceptions filed by nearly a dozen parties,
    again including AT&T and WorldCom, with accompanying briefs and
    reply briefs. On January 28, 2002, in a detailed, 162-page order,
    the New York Commission reached a final determination regarding the
    numerous UNE rate issues it considered. In this order, the New York
    Commission made a reasonable, downward adjustment to switching rates
    in response to criticism of the superseded New York switching rates
    that were at issue in the New York Commission's original UNE rate
    proceeding, the Commission's New York section 271 proceeding, and
    the subsequent Massachusetts section 271 proceeding.[^136]
    Specifically, the New York Commission reduced the switching rates
    after considering new evidence that Verizon continues to receive
    deep discounts on its new switches.[^137] In adopting the lower
    rates, the New York Commission expressly provided for possible
    refunds to competing LECs who had paid the superseded (and
    discredited) interim rates.[^138] Indeed, Verizon and other parties
    to the New York rate proceedings recently filed a settlement
    agreement providing for such refunds.[^139]

51. In considering whether the new New York rates are an appropriate
    benchmark to demonstrate TELRIC compliance, we place significant
    weight on the input of commenters on this issue. In particular, as
    noted above, even before the New York Commission adopted the new
    rates, AT&T and WorldCom advocated both to the Rhode Island
    Commission and in this proceeding that the rates proposed by the New
    York ALJ more than nine months ago were the appropriate benchmark
    rates.[^140] In fact, WorldCom asserted in this proceeding that
    "Verizon should adopt in Rhode Island the revised UNE rates of the
    New York ALJ . . . as a suitable proxy for TELRIC rates."[^141]
    Immediately upon the New York Commission's adoption of the ALJ's
    recommendation, moreover, AT&T reiterated to this Commission that
    only by lowering the Rhode Island rates to meet a benchmark
    comparison to the new New York rates could Verizon satisfy checklist
    item two.[^142] Further, when we sought comment on the question of
    using new New York rates as a benchmark,[^143] no party suggested
    that the new New York rates are not TELRIC-compliant or are an
    inappropriate benchmark.

52. The New York Commission has demonstrated an admirable commitment to
    accurate, cost-based rate making both in the recent rate case and in
    the proceedings that the Commission and the United States Court of
    Appeals for the D.C. Circuit evaluated in granting and reviewing the
    decision to grant section 271 approval in New York. This conclusion
    is buttressed by the fact that Verizon's new New York switching
    rates are approximately half of the superseded rates and much closer
    to switching rates in states where section 271 approval has been
    granted more recently than in New York. Verizon's new New York
    non-loop rates more closely compare to non-loop rate levels in
    Texas, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, and Missouri.

53. In sum, we base our conclusion to use the new New York rates as a
    benchmark in this proceeding on four factors. First, we rely on our
    previous conclusion that the New York Commission had conducted a
    TELRIC compliant proceeding when it set Bell Atlantic's original UNE
    rates and our affirmative finding that the resulting rates fell
    within a reasonable TELRIC range -- a finding affirmed by the D.C.
    Circuit.[^144] Second, we rely on the fact that, in a proceeding
    that spanned two years, included nearly a dozen parties, and
    generated almost 5000 pages of transcript, the New York Commission
    specifically addressed, among numerous TELRIC questions, the precise
    issue that was heavily debated in our initial consideration of
    Verizon's superseded New York rates. Third, we rely on the fact that
    no commenter has asserted, or submitted any evidence to indicate,
    that when the New York Commission adopted the new New York rates, it
    violated "basic TELRIC principles \[or made\] clear errors in
    factual findings on matters so substantial that the end result falls
    outside the range that the reasonable application of TELRIC
    principles would produce."[^145] In fact, to the contrary,
    commenters asserted that the new New York rates should serve as a
    benchmark in this proceeding.[^146] Finally, we rely on the fact
    that the new New York rates are both lower and more in line with the
    rates we have approved in considering other section 271
    applications. Under these circumstances, we find that, on the record
    before us, Verizon's new New York rates fall within a reasonable
    TELRIC range and are, therefore, an appropriate benchmark for Rhode
    Island.

54. We also note that Verizon's February 21 Rhode Island switching
    rates, which are much closer to its new New York switching rates,
    will soon be subjected to the additional scrutiny of the Rhode
    Island Commission. Although this additional scrutiny is not a basis
    for our decision, it demonstrates that commission's significant
    commitment to TELRIC principles. The Rhode Island Commission also
    has indicated a commitment to complete its new rate case
    expeditiously, with an expectation of adopting permanent rates by
    the end of 2002.[^147]

55. As discussed at part II, above, we waive our "complete when filed"
    rule in the unique circumstances presented by this application to
    consider Verizon's February 21 Rhode Island switching rates as
    evidence of compliance with checklist item two.[^148] Having
    determined that the new New York rates are appropriate rates for our
    benchmark comparison, we now compare Verizon's Rhode Island non-loop
    rates to new New York non-loop rates using our benchmark analysis.
    In taking a weighted average of non-loop rates in Rhode Island and
    New York, we find that Rhode Island's non-loop rates are roughly
    three percent lower than New York non-loop rates.[^149] Taking a
    weighted average of Rhode Island and New York costs, we also find
    that Rhode Island non-loop costs are roughly three percent lower
    than New York non-loop costs. We conclude, therefore, that Verizon's
    Rhode Island non-loop rates compare favorably to its New York
    non-loop rates, and, therefore, satisfy our benchmark analysis and
    the requirements of checklist item two.

##### Loop Rates

56. We now evaluate the TELRIC compliance of Verizon's Rhode Island loop
    rates. Only WorldCom criticizes Verizon's loop rates, claiming that
    they are not TELRIC-compliant because they are based on cost studies
    with flawed assumptions.[^150] We reject several of WorldCom's
    claims. Specifically, WorldCom objects to Verizon's assumptions
    regarding fill factors, fiber feed, structure-sharing, and use of
    more efficient integrated digital loop carrier. The Rhode Island
    Commission considered all of WorldCom's claims in its lengthy UNE
    rate proceeding. First, Verizon's loop rates incorporate fill
    factors -- 75 percent for feeder, 50 percent for distribution, and
    60 percent for interoffice transport -- recommended by the Rhode
    Island Division[^151] and which the Commission has found to be
    TELRIC-compliant in approving 271 applications in other
    states.[^152] Second, based on the Rhode Island Division's
    recommendation, the Rhode Island Commission accepted an assumption
    that Verizon would use 100 percent fiber feeder, finding that "on a
    forward-looking basis, the industry is moving toward increased and
    exclusive use of fiber-optic feeder cables. . . ."[^153] This
    assumption is consistent with Commission findings in approving
    section 271 applications in other states, which have been upheld in
    federal court.[^154] We find that WorldCom presents no new arguments
    or facts in this proceeding which would cause us to find that these
    assumptions are inconsistent with TELRIC principles as applied to
    Verizon in Rhode Island.

57. We note that WorldCom alleges additional specific TELRIC violations
    not addressed above.[^155] Assuming *arguendo* that WorldCom's other
    claims regarding flawed assumptions are valid, we conclude that the
    alleged errors do not result in rates outside the reasonable range
    that a correct application of TELRIC principles would produce.
    Applying our benchmark analysis to New York and Rhode Island loop
    rates, we conclude that Rhode Island loop rates fall within the
    range that a TELRIC-based rate proceeding would produce. This result
    occurs whether we use Verizon's superseded New York loop rates or
    its new New York loop rates in our benchmark comparison.[^156]
    Specifically, in taking a weighted average in New York and Rhode
    Island, we find that Verizon's Rhode Island loop rates are roughly
    the same as its superseded New York loop rates, even though the USF
    cost model suggests that loop costs in Rhode Island are 28.42
    percent higher than New York. [^157] We also find that Verizon's
    Rhode Island weighted average loop rates are roughly 22 percent
    higher than the new New York weighted average loop rates, even
    though Rhode Island weighted average loop costs are roughly 28.45
    percent higher than New York weighted average loop costs. We
    conclude that Verizon's Rhode Island loop rates pass our benchmark
    comparison to both superseded and new New York loop rates, and
    satisfy checklist item two.

### Operations Support Systems

58. We find, as did the Rhode Island Commission, that Verizon provides
    nondiscriminatory access to its Operations Support Systems (OSS) in
    Rhode Island.[^158] Consistent with more recent Commission orders,
    we do not address each OSS element in detail where our review of the
    record satisfies us that there is little or no dispute that Verizon
    meets the nondiscrimination requirements.[^159] In this case,
    commenters have raised no concerns with any aspect of Verizon Rhode
    Island's OSS. Nonetheless, because Verizon argues that it employs
    the same OSS in Rhode Island that the Commission reviewed in the
    *Verizon Massachusetts Order*, we address those aspects of its OSS
    that have changed since the time of that order -- primarily
    Verizon's loop qualification functions. We also address those
    aspects of Verizon's Rhode Island OSS involving minor performance
    discrepancies or otherwise requiring explanation: order rejection
    notices, electronic jeopardies, UNE-Platform provisioning, and
    billing.

#### OSS Testing and Relevance of Massachusetts Performance

59. Consistent with our precedent, Verizon relies in this application on
    evidence that its Rhode Island and Massachusetts OSS are the
    same.[^160] Specifically, Verizon asserts that it provides the same
    OSS to competing carriers in Massachusetts and Rhode Island.[^161]
    To support its claim, Verizon submits reports from two third-party
    consultants.[^162] In the first instance, Pricewaterhouse Coopers
    (PwC) evaluated the five OSS functions that provide competing LECs
    access to Verizon's systems and found them to be "identical" in
    Rhode Island and Massachusetts.[^163] In the second instance, KPMG
    concluded that the systems or interfaces, processes, personnel,
    facilities, management structures, and performance measures were the
    same for both Rhode Island and Massachusetts.[^164] The Rhode Island
    Commission also engaged KPMG to conduct three stand-alone tests in
    connection with Verizon's OSS, reviewing electronic jeopardies, line
    loss reports, and line sharing.[^165] The Rhode Island Commission
    also concluded that Verizon uses a common OSS in both states.[^166]

60. We conclude that Verizon, through the PwC report, its declaratory
    evidence, and the KPMG report, demonstrates that the OSS in
    Massachusetts are the same as the OSS in Rhode Island and,
    therefore, evidence concerning its OSS in Massachusetts is relevant
    and should be considered in our evaluation of Verizon's OSS in Rhode
    Island. Verizon's showing enables us to rely, for instance, on
    findings relating to Verizon's OSS from the *Verizon Massachusetts
    Order* in our analysis of Verizon's OSS in Rhode Island. In
    addition, because the OSS are the same in both states, where low
    volumes in Verizon's performance data in Rhode Island yield only
    inconclusive and inconsistent statistical findings concerning
    Verizon's compliance with the competitive checklist, we will examine
    data reflecting Verizon's performance in Massachusetts.

#### Verizon's Loop Qualification Process

61. Based on the evidence in the record, we find, as the Rhode Island
    Commission did, that Verizon provides access to loop qualification
    information in a manner consistent with the requirements of the *UNE
    Remand Order*.[^167] Specifically, we find that Verizon provides
    competitors with access to all of the same detailed information
    about the loop that is available to itself, and in the same time
    frame as any of its personnel could obtain it.[^168] Verizon
    provides four ways for competing carriers to obtain loop make-up
    information: (1) access to loop make-up information in its Loop
    Facility Assignment and Control System (LFACS) database; (2) manual
    loop qualification; (3) mechanized loop qualification based on
    information in its LiveWire database; and (4) engineering record
    requests. We evaluate all four of these methods below, and we pay
    particular attention to the permanent OSS Verizon has implemented
    since the time of the *Verizon Massachusetts Order* to enhance the
    first two aspects of the OSS described above: access to loop make-up
    information in LFACS and manual loop qualification.[^169] No
    commenter has raised concerns with regard to any aspect of Verizon's
    loop qualification OSS.

62. *Access to LFACS.* Since the adoption of the *Verizon Massachusetts
    Order*, Verizon has implemented a transaction by which competing
    LECs can obtain access to the loop make-up information contained in
    Verizon's LFACS database.[^170] Verizon now returns loop make-up
    information in LFACS to requestors in a parsed format, which permits
    competing LECs to integrate the information between the pre-ordering
    and ordering systems. Verizon also now responds to requests for
    information from LFACS in real time.[^171] We commend Verizon for
    making these improvements to its loop qualification OSS, and we find
    that Verizon satisfies this element of checklist item two.

63. *Manual Loop Qualification.* Since the time of the *Verizon
    Massachusetts Order*, Verizon has implemented a pre-order
    transaction by which competing LECs can request that Verizon perform
    a manual loop qualification.[^172] Using this transaction, competing
    LECs can request manual loop qualification prior to actually placing
    their orders for the loops.[^173] Verizon consistently responds to
    manual loop qualification requests within the 48-hour benchmark in
    Rhode Island.[^174] We commend Verizon for implementing these
    enhancements, and we find that Verizon's manual loop qualification
    process complies with the requirements of this checklist item.

64. *Mechanized Loop Qualification.* We find that Verizon continues to
    provide competing LECs with timely and nondiscriminatory access to
    the mechanized loop qualification information contained in its
    LiveWire database.[^175] Verizon also continues to provide competing
    LECs with the ability to obtain loop pre-qualification information
    "in bulk," by downloading files from Verizon's server that contain
    information on all pre-qualified loops served by a single central
    office.[^176] Thus, we find that this process complies with the
    requirements of the *UNE Remand Order* and section 271.

65. *Engineering Record Requests.* We find that Verizon continues to
    offer competing LECs nondiscriminatory access to engineering record
    requests, as it did at the time of the *Verizon Massachusetts
    Order*.[^177] Accordingly, we find Verizon complies with section 271
    in regards to access to engineering records.

#### Ordering Issues

##### Order Rejection Notices and Order Rejections

66. We find, as the Rhode Island Commission did,[^178] that Verizon
    provides competing carriers with order rejection notices in a manner
    that allows them a meaningful opportunity to compete. We recognize
    that, at first glance, Verizon's performance data do not demonstrate
    that it notifies competing LECs promptly on rejecting their
    orders.[^179] Verizon explains that, in fact, it has consistently
    sent rejection notices in a timely fashion, but its data do not
    reflect this performance because of a software problem that affected
    how Verizon's OSS captured its performance data under this metric.
    Specifically, Verizon incorrectly included some orders for six or
    more lines (which have a 72-hour benchmark) in the metric for orders
    of one to five lines (which have a 24-hour benchmark).[^180] Verizon
    states that it corrected this data capture problem in October; the
    correction is borne out by the fact that Verizon's November
    performance consistently satisfies the relevant benchmarks.[^181] No
    commenter has raised any concern regarding Verizon's rejection
    notices.

##### Jeopardy Information 

67. We find that Verizon provides "jeopardy" information to competing
    LECs -- that is, notification that an order may not be provisioned
    on the designated due date -- in substantially the same time and
    manner as it makes this information available to its retail
    operations. Verizon provided competing LECs with manual access to
    jeopardy notices at the time of the Massachusetts filing, but has
    recently begun also providing active jeopardy notices to competing
    LECs.[^182] Notwithstanding the availability of this new process,
    Verizon still provides competing LECs with manual access to jeopardy
    information in Rhode Island. We base our finding of checklist
    compliance in this instance, as did the Rhode Island Commission, on
    Verizon's manual jeopardy process.[^183] We do not rely on Verizon's
    electronic process in reaching this conclusion, as the evidence
    provided by Verizon does not allow us to determine that its
    electronic process provides competing LECs with sufficient and
    reliable jeopardy notices. We note that KPMG tested Verizon's new
    electronic jeopardy process, but found that the results were
    inconclusive.[^184] Verizon does not provide performance data or
    other evidence to support its claims regarding its electronic
    jeopardy process.

68. At this time, we conclude that Verizon complies with this checklist
    item with regard to electronic jeopardies because of Verizon's past
    compliance in this area and the absence of any record evidence to
    the contrary. We certainly encourage BOC innovation in bringing new
    OSS features to competitive LECs. We also expect, however, that any
    such changes will operate in a manner that enhances, rather than
    impairs, competitive LECs' ability to compete. We will continue to
    monitor this issue and its effect on competitive LECs.

#### Provisioning Issues

69. *Average Interval Completed Metrics.* Based on the evidence in the
    record, we find that Verizon provisions competitive LEC orders for
    UNE-Platform and resale services in a nondiscriminatory manner. We
    note that Verizon has demonstrated that the provisioning systems and
    processes used in Rhode Island for UNE and resale service orders are
    the same as those the Commission reviewed in the Massachusetts
    section 271 proceeding. In order to make our determination that
    Verizon's performance reflects parity, we review performance
    measures comparable to those we have relied upon in prior section
    271 orders.[^185]

70. We recognize that Verizon's performance with respect to one specific
    performance metric, which measures the time it takes Verizon to
    complete competing LEC orders for UNE-Platform service,[^186]
    appears to be out of parity in Rhode Island for several recent
    months. We find, however, that Verizon's performance with regard to
    this metric does not warrant a finding of checklist non-compliance.
    First, we note that Verizon's performance reflected by another
    metric measuring provisioning -- the "missed appointments" metric --
    reflects parity performance with respect to UNE-Platform orders for
    the relevant months.[^187] The Commission has given substantial
    weight to this metric in previous section 271 applications. Second,
    we note that the "average completed interval" metric, because of the
    way it is designed, may not be an accurate indicator of Verizon's
    provisioning performance. Verizon has explained that, while retail
    and wholesale orders are provisioned according to the same list of
    "standard intervals," these intervals vary from product to
    product.[^188] Accordingly, this metric could suggest unequal
    treatment simply because a competing LEC orders a disproportionate
    share of products with a longer-than-average standard provisioning
    interval.[^189] Significantly, the Commission has discounted the
    relevance of this metric in prior section 271 orders where there is
    evidence of this "order mix" concern.[^190] We also take note of the
    fact that the Carrier Working Group in New York has decided to
    eliminate the "average interval completed" series of metrics.[^191]
    Finally, even setting aside the questions about the accuracy of this
    metric, we find that the performance differences reported under this
    metric are relatively slight and do not appear to be competitively
    significant to competing LECs.[^192] Indeed, no commenter has
    indicated that UNE-Platform provisioning is a problem in Rhode
    Island. As the Commission has stated in the past, isolated cases of
    performance disparity, especially when the margin of disparity is
    small, generally will not result in a finding of checklist
    noncompliance.[^193]

#### Billing

71. We find, as did the Rhode Island Commission, that Verizon provides
    nondiscriminatory access to the functionality of its billing systems
    in Rhode Island.[^194] Verizon provides competing LECs with usage
    information necessary to bill their end users, and it provides
    competing carriers with wholesale bills.[^195] Verizon also
    demonstrates, through the PwC report, the KPMG report, and its
    declarations, that its billing systems in Rhode Island are the same
    as its Massachusetts systems, which the Commission found to comply
    with the requirements of this checklist item.[^196] Verizon explains
    in this proceeding that its billing system in Rhode Island is
    different from the billing system in Pennsylvania because the
    relevant aspects of its Rhode Island and Pennsylvania billing
    systems evolved separately after divestiture in 1984.[^197] No
    commenter has raised concerns with Verizon's billing OSS in this
    proceeding.[^198]

### UNE Combinations

72. In order to comply with checklist item two, a BOC also must
    demonstrate that it provides nondiscriminatory access to network
    elements in a manner that allows requesting carriers to combine such
    elements and that the BOC does not separate already-combined
    elements, except at the specific request of the competitive
    carrier.[^199] Based upon the evidence in the record, we conclude,
    as did the Rhode Island Commission, that Verizon demonstrates that
    it provides nondiscriminatory access to network element combinations
    as required by the Act and our rules.[^200] Additionally, no
    commenter raised any concerns with Verizon providing
    nondiscriminatory access to UNE combinations.

## Other Items

### Checklist Item 1 -- Interconnection

73. Section 271(c)(2)(B)(i) requires the BOC to provide equal-in-quality
    interconnection on terms and conditions that are just, reasonable
    and nondiscriminatory in accordance with the requirements of
    sections 251 and 252.[^201] Based on our review of the record, we
    conclude, as did the Rhode Island Commission,[^202] that Verizon
    complies with the requirements of this checklist item. In reaching
    this conclusion, we have examined Verizon's performance with respect
    to collocation and interconnection trunks, as we have done in prior
    section 271 proceedings.[^203] We find that Verizon's performance
    generally satisfies the applicable benchmark or retail comparison
    standards.[^204] As described below, we also examine Verizon's
    compliance with the Commission's more recent *Collocation Remand
    Order*.[^205] Finally, we note that no commenter raises issues
    concerning Verizon's interconnection offering.

74. On August 8, 2001, the Commission released its *Collocation Remand
    Order*, which changed the collocation obligations of incumbent LECs
    in response to the D.C. Circuit's remand of certain aspects of the
    Commission's earlier collocation order.[^206] In particular, the
    Commission established the criteria for equipment that is "necessary
    for interconnection or access" under section 251(c)(6); required
    incumbents to provide cross-connects between collocated carriers;
    and established principles for physical collocation space and
    configuration.[^207] Verizon states that it has modified its Rhode
    Island collocation offering to comply with the order, and has filed
    amendments to both its federal and state collocation tariffs to
    reflect the new order -- both of which have gone into effect.[^208]
    Based on the record in this proceeding, we find that Verizon's
    collocation offerings in Rhode Island satisfy the new requirements
    set forth in the *Collocation Remand Order*.

75. Verizon also states that its collocation offering meets the
    requirements of its September 14, 2001 consent decree with the
    Commission to assure that Verizon complies with the information
    posting requirements of the Commission's collocation rules.[^209] We
    note that the Bell Atlantic-GTE auditing process will assure that
    Verizon does, and will continue to, fulfill the consent decree and
    meet the requirements of checklist item one.[^210]

### Checklist Item 4 -- Unbundled Local Loops

76. Section 271(c)(2)(B)(iv) of the Act requires that a BOC provide
    "\[l\]ocal loop transmission from the central office to the
    customer's premises, unbundled from local switching or other
    services."[^211] Based on the evidence in the record, we conclude,
    as did the Rhode Island Commission, that Verizon provides unbundled
    local loops in accordance with the requirements of section 271 and
    our rules.[^212] Our conclusion is based on our review of Verizon's
    performance for all loop types, which include, as in past section
    271 orders, voice grade loops (including hot cut provisioning),
    xDSL-capable loops, digital loops, and high capacity loops, and our
    review of Verizon's processes for line sharing and line splitting.
    As of September 2001, competitors have acquired and placed into use
    over 28,000 stand-alone loops (including DSL loops) from Verizon in
    Rhode Island.[^213] Finally, we note that commenters have not raised
    any issues with respect to any aspect of Verizon's loop performance.

77. Consistent with prior section 271 orders, we do not address every
    aspect of Verizon's loop performance where our review of the record
    satisfies us that Verizon's performance is in compliance with the
    parity and benchmark measures established in Rhode Island.[^214]
    Instead, we focus our discussion on those areas where the record
    indicates minor discrepancies in performance between Verizon and its
    competitors. As in past section 271 proceedings, in the course of
    our review, we look for patterns of systemic performance disparities
    that have resulted in competitive harm or that have otherwise denied
    new entrants a meaningful opportunity to compete.[^215] Isolated
    cases of performance disparity, especially when the margin of
    disparity is small, generally will not result in a finding of
    checklist noncompliance.[^216] We note that, when reviewing
    Verizon's performance with respect to a certain category of loop in
    a given month, the volume of orders may be too low to provide a
    meaningful result. Because we find that Verizon uses the same
    provisioning and maintenance and repair processes in Massachusetts
    and Rhode Island, we may look to Verizon's performance in
    Massachusetts to inform our analysis.[^217]

78. *xDSL-Capable Loops*. Based on the evidence in the record, we find,
    as did the Rhode Island Commission, that Verizon demonstrates that
    it provides stand-alone xDSL-capable loops in accordance with the
    requirements of checklist item four.[^218] Verizon makes available
    xDSL-capable loops in Rhode Island through interconnection
    agreements and pursuant to tariffs approved by the Rhode Island
    Commission.[^219] In analyzing Verizon's showing, we review
    performance measures comparable to those the Commission has relied
    upon in prior section 271 orders: order processing timeliness,
    installation timeliness, missed installation appointments,
    installation quality, and the timeliness and quality of the
    maintenance and repair functions.[^220] Based on our analysis of
    Verizon's performance under these measures, we conclude that
    Verizon's performance for competitive LECs has generally met the
    benchmark and parity standards established in Rhode Island.[^221]

79. Upon initial review, the overall level of trouble reports for
    stand-alone xDSL-capable loops in Rhode Island appears to be out of
    parity.[^222] The current version of the relevant performance metric
    used in Rhode Island compares competitive LEC troubles to those
    experienced by Verizon's advanced services affiliate. However, the
    New York Commission recently established retail POTS service as the
    applicable comparison group.[^223] As described above, the New York
    Commission developed Verizon's performance measurements, business
    rules and standards in a collaborative state proceeding with input
    from competing carriers, and the Rhode Island Commission has adopted
    these performance measures, business rules and standards.[^224]
    Accordingly, we agree that retail POTS service appears to be a more
    probative comparison in this context.[^225] Verizon has calculated
    its performance using the revised analogue, and it is in
    parity.[^226]

80. *Digital Loops*. Based on the evidence in the record, we find, as
    did the Rhode Island Commission, that Verizon's performance with
    respect to digital loops complies with checklist item four.[^227]
    For the relevant four month period, Verizon provisioned, on average,
    only 14.5 digital loops per month in Rhode Island.[^228] Because
    these volumes are insufficient upon which to make a finding, we look
    at Massachusetts data, which show that Verizon's performance with
    respect to digital loops continues to meet the requirements of
    checklist item four.[^229] We reach this conclusion despite the fact
    that the measures for Installation Trouble[^230] and Repeat Trouble
    Reports[^231] show Verizon's performance to be out of parity for
    almost every month reported.

81. According to Verizon, however, the disparate performance results are
    not the result of discriminatory conduct, but rather the result of a
    flawed metric. Verizon argues that the Installation Trouble measure
    may not be an accurate indicator of Verizon's performance because
    the retail comparison group for this metric (Verizon retail) does
    not provide an "apples-to-apples" comparison.[^232] For example,
    Verizon explains that most of the competitor LEC 2-wire digital
    loops are provisioned using fiber, while most of the orders in the
    retail comparison group are provisioned using copper.[^233] Verizon
    also explains that competitive LEC loops are predominantly used for
    data transmission (IDSL), while the retail comparison group loops
    are predominantly used for voice transmission (either POTS or
    ISDN).[^234] Accordingly, we agree with Verizon that this metric may
    appear to suggest unequal treatment simply because of the comparison
    group used. In addition, we find that Verizon's disparate
    performance under the Repeat Trouble Report metric apparently is the
    result of a flawed measurement. First, as explained above, for the
    MR-2 through MR-5 metrics, the New York Commission recently
    established retail POTS service as the applicable comparison group
    for 2-Wire digital and xDSL-capable loops.[^235] Second, as
    explained in more detail below, the New York Commission has also
    further revised the MR-5 measure (the Repeat Trouble Report metric)
    for all loop types to exclude misdirected dispatches in order to
    more accurately capture performance for which Verizon is
    responsible.[^236] We believe that these revisions reasonably
    demonstrate that the current version of the Repeat Trouble Report
    metric is flawed, which likely accounts for some of the performance
    disparities.

82. Moreover, given Verizon's generally acceptable performance for all
    other categories of loops, and recognizing that digital loops
    represent only a small percentage of overall loop orders in Rhode
    Island,[^237] we do not believe that the uncertain performance for
    digital loops discussed above merits a finding of checklist
    noncompliance. Commenters in this proceeding do not criticize
    Verizon's performance with regard to digital loops.

83. *Hot Cut Activity*. Based on the evidence in the record, we find, as
    did the Rhode Island Commission, that Verizon is providing voice
    grade loops through hot-cuts in Rhode Island in accordance with the
    requirements of checklist item four.[^238] Verizon has satisfied its
    benchmark for on-time performance for hot-cuts for the relevant four
    month period,[^239] and Verizon indicates that trouble reports
    received within seven days of installation have been fewer than one
    percent.[^240] In addition, Verizon indicates that during July,
    August and September 2001, it completed hot-cuts in Rhode Island
    within, on average, 5.19 days, which is just slightly longer than
    the standard five day interval for orders of one to nine
    lines.[^241] We note, however, that the performance metric that
    captures Verizon's performance includes orders for both one to nine
    lines (which have a five day standard provisioning interval) as well
    as orders for ten or greater lines (which have a negotiated
    provisioning interval).[^242] Accordingly, we find that the
    difference between Verizon's overall hot-cut performance and the
    five day benchmark is not competitively significant in these
    circumstances. No commenter has raised concerns with Verizon's
    hot-cut provisioning.

84. *Voice Grade Loops*. Based on the evidence in the record, we find,
    as did the Rhode Island Commission, that Verizon provisions voice
    grade loops in a nondiscriminatory manner.[^243] In order to
    determine that Verizon's performance reflects parity, we review
    performance measures comparable to those we have relied upon in
    prior section 271 orders.[^244] We note that no commenter has raised
    an issue relating to provisioning of voice grade loops.

85. We recognize that Verizon's performance with respect to two specific
    performance metrics appears to be out of parity in Rhode Island for
    several recent months. We find, however, that this performance does
    not warrant a finding of checklist noncompliance. First, upon
    initial review, Verizon's performance with respect to a maintenance
    and repair measure **--** the repeat trouble report rate **--**
    appears to be out of parity in two of the last four months.[^245]
    According to Verizon, however, when its performance under this
    metric is recalculated under the new guidelines adopted by the New
    York Commission, its performance under this measure is at
    parity.[^246] Verizon explains that the New York Commission has
    recently revised the repeat trouble report rate to account for
    misdirected dispatches that skew performance results by overstating
    repeat troubles.[^247] We agree that the revised metric will more
    accurately reflect Verizon's performance. [^248]

86. Second, Verizon's performance with respect to a provisioning
    timeliness metric -- the average completed interval metric --
    appears to be out of parity in Rhode Island for several recent
    months.[^249] We note, however, that Verizon's performance reflected
    by another provisioning timeliness metric -- the "missed
    appointment" metric -- satisfies the benchmark for all relevant
    months.[^250] Next, as explained in more detail above, this metric,
    because of the way it is designed, may not be an accurate indicator
    of Verizon's performance.[^251] Furthermore, the Carrier Working
    Group in New York, working through the collaborative process, has
    agreed to the deletion of this provisioning timeliness metric.[^252]
    Finally, even setting aside the questions about the accuracy of this
    metric, we find that the performance differences reported under this
    metric are relatively slight and do not appear to be competitively
    significant to competing LECs.[^253] Indeed, no commenter has
    indicated that the provisioning of voice grade loops is a problem in
    Rhode Island. As the Commission has stated in the past, isolated
    cases of performance disparity, especially when the margin of
    disparity is small, generally will not result in a finding of
    checklist noncompliance.[^254]

87. *High Capacity Loops*. Based on the record, we find, as did the
    Rhode Island Commission, that Verizon's performance complies with
    the requirements for checklist item four.[^255] From July through
    September, Verizon provisioned approximately ten DS-1 loops in Rhode
    Island.[^256] Because these volumes are insufficient upon which to
    make a finding, we look at Massachusetts data, which show that
    Verizon's performance with respect to high capacity loops meets the
    requirements of checklist item four.

88. We note that Verizon's performance in Massachusetts with respect to
    high capacity loops has generally improved since grant of section
    271 authority in Massachusetts.[^257] While the installation
    troubles reported and network trouble report rate in Massachusetts
    have been out of parity for competitive LECs for almost all reported
    months, we find that these disparities are slight and thus not
    competitively significant.[^258] Moreover, given Verizon's generally
    acceptable performance for all other categories of loops, and
    recognizing that high capacity loops represent only a small
    percentage of overall loop orders in Rhode Island and Verizon's
    improved performance in regard to high capacity loops, we find that
    Verizon's performance is in compliance with checklist item four. We
    note that commenters in this proceeding do not criticize Verizon's
    performance with regard to high capacity loops.

89. *Line Sharing*. Based on the evidence in the record, we find, as did
    the Rhode Island Commission,[^259] that Verizon demonstrates that it
    provides nondiscriminatory access to the high frequency portion of
    the loop.[^260] Through September 2001, Verizon had completed
    approximately four line sharing orders in Rhode Island for
    unaffiliated competitive LECs [^261] and the Rhode Island
    performance data show almost no competitive LEC activity for line
    shared DSL services in September and October.[^262] Although there
    has been very little ordering activity in Rhode Island for line
    sharing for the months reported, there has been much ordering
    activity in Massachusetts during the same period of time.[^263]
    Verizon's Massachusetts performance data demonstrate that it is
    provisioning line shared DSL loops to competitors at parity with its
    own retail provisioning, and that its maintenance and repair
    performance is also acceptable.[^264]

90. *Line Splitting*. Based on the evidence in the record, we find, as
    did the Rhode Island Commission,[^265] that Verizon complies with
    its line-splitting obligations and provides access to network
    elements necessary for competing carriers to provide line
    splitting.[^266] Verizon provides access to the same pre-ordering
    capabilities to carriers that purchase line splitting as it does to
    carriers that purchase unbundled DSL loops or line sharing.[^267] In
    addition, working with the competitive LECs through the New York DSL
    Collaborative, Verizon implemented a permanent OSS process for line
    splitting throughout the Verizon East territory, including Rhode
    Island, on October 20, 2001.[^268] Thus, Verizon has met its goal to
    implement permanent OSS by October 2001.[^269] Competitive LECs have
    raised no complaints about this new process. We find, therefore,
    given the record before us, that Verizon's process for
    line-splitting orders is in compliance with the requirements of this
    checklist item at this time.[^270] As competing LEC needs continue
    to evolve, however, we may revisit Verizon's line splitting OSS in a
    future section 271 proceeding that includes more or different
    evidence in the record.

### Checklist Item 5 -- Transport

91. Section 271(c)(2)(B)(v) of the competitive checklist requires a BOC
    to provide "\[l\]ocal transport from the trunk side of a wireline
    local exchange carrier switch unbundled from switching or other
    services."[^271] Based on our review of the record,[^272] we
    conclude, as did the Rhode Island Commission,[^273] that Verizon
    complies with the requirements of this checklist item.

92. In past orders, the Commission has relied on the missed appointment
    rate to determine whether a BOC is provisioning transport to its
    competitors in a nondiscriminatory fashion.[^274] The volume of
    transport orders in Rhode Island is extremely low,[^275] but
    Verizon's performance for this metric in Massachusetts during July
    through October shows that Verizon missed fewer appointments
    provisioning transport to its competitors than for its own retail
    customers.[^276]

93. We disagree with CTC's argument that Verizon's dark fiber offering
    does not comply with the requirements of this checklist item. CTC
    argues that we should condition Verizon's section 271 authority on
    Verizon's compliance with a recent Rhode Island Commission order
    that requires Verizon "to splice dark fiber at any technically
    feasible point so as to make dark fiber continuous through one or
    more intermediate central offices without requiring a CLEC to be
    collocated at any such intermediate office."[^277] We reject CTC's
    claim. Verizon has amended its tariff in Rhode Island to accommodate
    these new requirements effective February 1, 2002,[^278] and the
    time to appeal the order in Rhode Island has elapsed.[^279] CTC also
    argues generally that Verizon's dark fiber offering does not satisfy
    section 251(c)(3).[^280] CTC does not, however, support its
    assertions with references to our rules or precedent. We will not
    find noncompliance based on such vague assertions.

### Checklist Item 14 -- Resale

94. Section 271(c)(2)(B)(xiv) of the Act requires that a BOC make
    "\[t\]elecommunications services . . . available for resale in
    accordance with the requirements of section 251(c)(4) and section
    252(d)(3).[^281] Based on the record in this proceeding, we
    conclude, as did the Rhode Island Commission, [^282] that Verizon
    satisfies the requirements of this checklist item in Rhode
    Island.[^283] Importantly, none of the commenting parties questions
    Verizon's showing of compliance with the requirements of this
    checklist item, including the area of resale of Verizon Advanced
    Data Inc.'s (VADI) retail DSL-based telecommunications service
    offering (DSL resale).[^284]

95. We conclude that Verizon demonstrates current compliance with the
    checklist requirements with regard to DSL resale as articulated in
    our recent section 271 orders.[^285] First, Verizon already offers
    the resale of DSL services when Verizon provides voice services on
    the line involved.[^286] Second, in accordance with the United
    States Court of Appeals decision in *ASCENT v. FCC*, VADI has made
    enhancements to its federal tariff. Specifically, VADI has made
    resold DSL over resold voice lines, Verizon's expanded DSL resale
    offering, available in Rhode Island.[^287] This offering became
    effective November 21, 2001 and is the same as that in Connecticut
    and Pennsylvania except for certain implementation details.[^288]
    Verizon has also implemented OSS changes that enable Verizon to
    receive VADI's expanded DSL resale orders via the EDI interface and
    to track those orders through the provisioning process.[^289]

96. We also conclude that Verizon has appropriate resold DSL order
    processing procedures in place. In the *Verizon Connecticut Order*,
    the Commission indicated that several aspects of Verizon's expanded
    DSL resale OSS should be revised as Verizon develops permanent order
    processing procedures.[^290] Verizon addresses each of these issues,
    but concedes that its permanent ordering procedures continue to
    evolve.[^291] As a result, it has not yet developed permanent
    ordering procedures that fully satisfy all three expectations in
    Rhode Island. Because no carrier has placed an order for resold DSL
    in Rhode Island, however, and no carrier commented on this issue in
    this proceeding, we have no basis for evaluating whether the absence
    of these changes has any impact on competition. Moreover, as
    explained below, we accept Verizon's explanation regarding why it
    has not fully implemented these changes, for the purpose of this
    proceeding. In particular, the Commission expected that Verizon's
    performance in providing an expanded DSL resale offering would be
    reflected in its performance data.[^292] Verizon indicates that it
    has implemented enhancements to its systems to allow it to capture
    performance data for its resold DSL over resold voice lines
    offering, and it will begin reporting data after performance
    measures are developed by the states.[^293] The Commission also
    expected that permanent ordering procedures would eliminate
    Verizon's requirement that it disconnect resold DSL service if the
    customer switches from the reseller back to Verizon as the
    underlying voice provider.[^294] Verizon indicates that, to date, it
    has not received any such requests, but it confirms that it will
    work to avoid any disconnection when it begins receiving
    orders.[^295] Lastly, the Commission expected that permanent order
    processing procedures would eliminate Verizon's requirement that the
    reseller must already be the voice provider on the line involved
    before Verizon can process orders for DSL resale.[^296] According to
    Verizon, however, the voice service must be established first
    because the data provider is considered a "sub-tenant" on the line
    involved.[^297] Verizon indicates that this is true whether Verizon,
    a competitive LEC, or a reseller is the voice provider.[^298]

## Remaining Checklist Items (3, 6-13)

97. In addition to showing that it is in compliance with the
    requirements discussed above, an applicant under section 271 must
    demonstrate that it complies with checklist item 3 (access to poles,
    ducts, and conduits),[^299] item 6 (unbundled local
    switching),[^300] item 7 (911/E911 access and directory
    assistance/operator services),[^301] item 8 (white pages directory
    listings),[^302] item 9 (numbering administration),[^303] item 10
    (databases and associated signaling),[^304] item 11 (number
    portability),[^305] item 12 (local dialing parity), [^306] and item
    13 (reciprocal compensation).[^307] Based on the evidence in the
    record, we conclude that Verizon demonstrates that it is in
    compliance with these checklist items in Rhode Island.[^308] We also
    note that the Rhode Island Commission concludes that Verizon
    complies with the requirements of each of these checklist
    items.[^309] None of the commenting parties challenges Verizon's
    compliance with these checklist items.

# compliance with section 271(c)(1)(A)

98. In order for the Commission to approve a BOC's application to
    provide in-region, interLATA services, a BOC must first demonstrate
    that it satisfies the requirements of either section 271(c)(1)(A)
    (Track A) or section 271(c)(1)(B) (Track B).[^310] To qualify for
    Track A, a BOC must have interconnection agreements with one or more
    competing providers of "telephone exchange service . . . to
    residential and business customers."[^311]

99. We conclude, as the Rhode Island Commission did,[^312] that Verizon
    satisfies the requirements of Track A in Rhode Island. We base this
    decision on interconnection agreements Verizon has with Cox
    Communications, Inc. (Cox), Network Plus, Choice One, WorldCom,
    Conversent, and AT&T.[^313] Cox and Network Plus provide telephone
    exchange service to a substantial number of residential and business
    subscribers in Rhode Island predominantly over their own
    facilities.[^314] Choice One, WorldCom, Conversent, and AT&T serve
    business customers.

100. We conclude that a sufficient number of residential and business
     customers are being served by competing LECs through the use of
     their own facilities to demonstrate that there is an actual
     commercial alternative in Rhode Island. Verizon has shown that
     facilities-based carriers serve more than a *de minimis* number of
     residential and business customers in Rhode Island.[^315] No
     commenter has challenged Verizon's assertion that it satisfies the
     requirements for Track A in Rhode Island.

# SECTION 272 COMPLIANCE

101. Section 271(d)(3)(B) provides that the Commission shall not approve
     a BOC's application to provide interLATA services unless the BOC
     demonstrates that the "requested authorization will be carried out
     in accordance with the requirements of section 272."[^316] Based on
     the record, we conclude that Verizon has demonstrated that it will
     comply with the requirements of section 272.[^317] Significantly,
     Verizon provides evidence that it maintains the same structural
     separation and nondiscrimination safeguards in Rhode Island as it
     does in Pennsylvania, New York, Connecticut, and Massachusetts
     **--** states in which Verizon has already received section 271
     authority.[^318] No party challenges Verizon's section 272
     showing.[^319]

# public interest analysis

102. Apart from determining whether a BOC satisfies the competitive
     checklist and will comply with section 272, Congress directed the
     Commission to assess whether the requested authorization would be
     consistent with the public interest, convenience, and
     necessity.[^320] At the same time, section 271(d)(4) of the Act
     states in full that "\[t\]he Commission may not, by rule or
     otherwise, limit or extend the terms used in the competitive
     checklist set forth in subsection (c)(2)(B)."[^321] Accordingly,
     although the Commission must make a separate determination that
     approval of a section 271 application is "consistent with the
     public interest, convenience, and necessity," it may neither limit
     nor extend the terms of the competitive checklist of section
     271(c)(2)(B). Thus, the Commission views the public interest
     requirement as an opportunity to review the circumstances presented
     by the application to ensure that no other relevant factors exist
     that would frustrate the congressional intent that markets be open,
     as required by the competitive checklist, and that entry will serve
     the public interest as Congress expected.

103. We conclude that approval of this application is consistent with
     the public interest. From our extensive review of the competitive
     checklist, which embodies the critical elements of market entry
     under the Act, we find that barriers to competitive entry in the
     local exchange markets have been removed and the local exchange
     markets today are open to competition. We further find that the
     record confirms our view, as noted in prior section 271 orders,
     that BOC entry into the long distance market will benefit consumers
     and competition if the relevant local exchange market is open to
     competition consistent with the competitive checklist.[^322]

104. We disagree with commenters that assert that under our public
     interest standard, we must consider the market share of each entry
     strategy for each type of service. Sprint argues that low levels of
     residential UNE and resale service in Rhode Island indicate that
     meaningful competition does not exist in Rhode Island. [^323] Given
     an affirmative showing that the competitive checklist has been
     satisfied, low customer volumes in any one particular mode of entry
     or in general do not necessarily undermine that showing. As the
     Commission has said in previous section 271 orders, factors beyond
     the control of the BOC, such as individual competitive LEC entry
     strategies, might explain a low residential customer base.[^324]

105. We also disagree with Sprint's argument that Cox does not provide
     meaningful competition with respect to customers who do not
     subscribe to Cox's cable or data services, since the price for
     cable telephony to those customers exceeds Verizon's price for
     local service.[^325] Sprint notes that Cox currently offers cable
     telephony at a low price for its cable or data subscribers.[^326]
     Customers who want cable telephony without Cox's cable or data
     offering pay a higher price for this service.[^327] We are not
     persuaded by Sprint's argument. Cox has the capability to provide
     cable telephony service to 75 to 95 percent of Rhode Island
     customers, and a substantial number of those potential customers
     have in fact chosen Cox as their local telephone carrier.[^328] The
     fact that a substantial number of residential customers have chosen
     Cox to provide their local phone service provides us with assurance
     that Cox is a meaningful competitor to Verizon.[^329]

106. Sprint also argues that the fact that the BOCs have generally
     chosen not to compete against each other out of region
     (particularly against Verizon in Rhode Island) and the continuing
     bankruptcy of competitive LECs mean that the public interest is not
     served by granting Verizon section 271 approval in Rhode
     Island.[^330] We reject these arguments. Factors beyond the control
     of the applicant, such as a weak economy, individual competing LEC
     and out-of-region BOC business plans, or poor business planning by
     potential competitors can explain the lack of entry into a
     particular market.

## Price Squeeze Arguments

107. Given Verizon's substantial voluntary reduction of its Rhode Island
     switching rates, we find that AT&T, WorldCom, and ASCENT have not
     established the existence of a price squeeze in Rhode Island such
     that grant of Verizon's application would violate section 271's
     public interest requirement.[^331] In *Sprint Communications Co.
     L.P. v. FCC,*[^332] the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
     remanded to the Commission for further consideration how
     allegations of a price squeeze by a BOC should be examined as part
     of a section 271 application's public interest analysis. In the
     Commission's *SWBT Kansas/Oklahoma Order,* the Commission declined
     to consider allegations that a section 271 applicant should fail
     the 14-point checklist because competitors are unable to make a
     profit in the residential market via the UNE-Platform.[^333] We
     need not address the issues raised in these proceedings in this
     order. We have examined AT&T and WorldCom's price squeeze
     claims[^334] and, determined that, even if we accept their
     assertion that a price squeeze analysis is mandated by section
     271's public interest requirement and their framework for
     determining whether a price squeeze exists, there is no price
     squeeze in Rhode Island. Using AT&T and WorldCom's calculation of
     anticipated profit margins on UNE-Platform-based, residential
     service in Rhode Island, these profit margins are significantly
     higher when recalculated using the new Rhode Island rates. Neither
     AT&T, WorldCom, nor ASCENT argued that there was a price squeeze in
     Rhode Island when the Rhode Island Commission adopted Verizon's
     February 21 switching rates. Therefore, we conclude that Verizon's
     Rhode Island UNE rates do not create a price squeeze such that
     grant of its section 271 application would not be in the public
     interest.

## Assurance of Future Compliance

108. As set forth below, we find that the performance assurance plan
     ("PAP") currently in place in Rhode Island will provide assurance
     that the local market will remain open after Verizon receives
     section 271 authorization.[^335] We have examined certain key
     aspects of Verizon's PAP and we find that the plan falls within a
     zone of reasonableness and is likely to provide incentives that are
     sufficient to foster post-entry checklist compliance. The Rhode
     Island Commission adopted a self-executing PAP, modeled on the PAP
     adopted in Massachusetts and New York, that exposes Verizon to the
     same level of liability as in Massachusetts.[^336] While the
     Massachusetts and New York PAPs form the basis for the Rhode Island
     PAP, the Rhode Island PAP differs from those PAPs in certain
     details to reflect the specific concerns of competitive LECs doing
     business in Rhode Island.[^337] The Rhode Island Commission decided
     to distribute penalty amounts differently among the metrics,
     including placing penalties on missed critical billing metrics and
     doubling the penalty amount allocated to UNE flow through.
     Additionally, the Rhode Island Commission ordered the creation of
     several new metrics including a critical measure for 2-wire digital
     loops and 2-wire xDSL loops. Also, the Rhode Island PAP has created
     small sample size tables for benchmark metrics with standards of 80
     percent, 85 percent, 90 percent, and 95 percent, while the other
     PAPs only include such a table for metrics with a benchmark
     standard of 95 percent. We conclude that the Rhode Island
     modifications appear reasonable and do not detract from the overall
     effectiveness of the plan. The Rhode Island Commission also has the
     authority to reallocate the monthly distribution of bill credits
     among any provisions of the PAP and adopt new metrics if there is a
     specific concern to Rhode Island competitive LECs.[^338]

109. As in prior section 271 orders, our conclusions are based on a
     review of several key elements in any performance remedy plan:
     total liability at risk in the plan; performance measurement and
     standards definitions; structure of the plan; self-executing nature
     of remedies in the plan; data validation and audit procedures in
     the plan; and accounting requirements.[^339] We discuss only those
     elements that commenters have raised in the record before us.

110. We disagree with AT&T that the Rhode Island Commission's PAP does
     not adequately address the issue of small samples. Specifically,
     AT&T is concerned that Verizon is temporarily using less accurate
     statistical tests (t tests and binomial tests) that are easier to
     administer, rather than the permutation test, which is
     computationally more difficult but is more accurate.[^340]
     Additionally, AT&T questions why permutation tests are not being
     done in Rhode Island, given that AT&T believes that Verizon is
     currently doing permutation tests in an automated fashion in other
     states.[^341] In its reply, Verizon clarifies that it is not
     currently using an automated permutation test in New York or any
     other former Bell Atlantic state.[^342] Verizon further clarifies
     that it currently uses permutation tests in a manual, or
     case-by-case basis, when appropriate.[^343] Verizon plans to
     automate the permutation test by the end of 2002.[^344] Moreover,
     there is an exception provision in the Rhode Island PAP that
     "allows a CLEC to raise issues relating to a metric with a small
     sample size."[^345] And we are reassured by the Rhode Island
     Commission's determination that it "will accept Verizon's proposed
     statistical methodology but reserves the right to modify it in the
     future."[^346]

# section 271(d)(6) enforcement authority

111. Section 271(d)(6) of the Act requires Verizon to continue to
     satisfy the "conditions required for . . . approval" of its section
     271 application after the Commission approves its
     application.[^347] Thus, the Commission has a responsibility not
     only to ensure that Verizon is in compliance with section 271
     today, but also that it remains in compliance in the future. As the
     Commission has already described the post-approval enforcement
     framework and its section 271(d)(6) enforcement powers in detail in
     prior orders, it is unnecessary to do so again here.[^348]

112. Working in concert with the Rhode Island Commission, we intend to
     monitor closely Verizon's post-approval compliance for Rhode Island
     to ensure that Verizon does not "cease\[\] to meet any of the
     conditions required for \[section 271\] approval."[^349] We stand
     ready to exercise our various statutory enforcement powers quickly
     and decisively in appropriate circumstances to ensure that the
     local market remains open in Rhode Island. We are prepared to use
     our authority under section 271(d)(6) if evidence shows market
     opening conditions have not been maintained.

113. We require Verizon to report to the Commission all Rhode Island
     carrier-to-carrier performance metrics results and Performance
     Assurance Plan monthly reports beginning with the first full month
     after the effective date of this Order, and for each month
     thereafter for one year unless extended by the Commission. These
     results and reports will allow us to review, on an ongoing basis,
     Verizon's performance to ensure continued compliance with the
     statutory requirements. We are confident that cooperative state and
     federal oversight and enforcement can address any backsliding that
     may arise with respect to Verizon's entry into the Rhode Island
     long distance market.[^350]

# conclusion

114. For the reasons discussed above, we GRANT Verizon's application for
     authorization under section 271 of the Act to provide in-region,
     interLATA services in the State of Rhode Island and Providence
     Plantations.

# ordering clauses

115. Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that, pursuant to sections 4(i), 4(j),
     and 271 of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, 47 U.S.C. §§
     154(i), 154(j), and 271, Verizon's application to provide
     in-region, interLATA service in the State of Rhode Island and
     Providence Plantations, filed on November 26, 2001, IS GRANTED.

116. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this Order SHALL BECOME EFFECTIVE March
     4, 2002.

> FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION
>
> William F. Caton
>
> Acting Secretary

Appendix A

**Commenters in CC Docket No. 01-324**

**[Comments]{.underline}** **[Abbreviation]{.underline}**

Association of Communications Enterprises ASCENT

AT&T AT&T

CTC Communications Corporation CTC

Department of Justice Department of Justice

Rhode Island Public Utilities Commission Rhode Island Commission

Sprint Communications Company Sprint

WorldCom WorldCom

Letter Commenters in CC Docket No. 01-324

Rhode Island Urban-League

Honorable Patrick J. Kennedy, Congressman

Honorable Lincoln Almond, Governor of the State of Rhode Island

Honorable Charles J. Fogarty, Lieutenant Governor of Rhode Island

Sheldon Whitehouse, Attorney General of the State of Rhode Island

Reply Commenters

**[Replies]{.underline}**

AT&T AT&T

Rhode Island Public Utilities Commission Rhode Island Commission

Verizon Verizon

WorldCom WorldCom

Supplemental Reply Comments

AT&T AT&T

Association of Communications Enterprises ASCENT

Appendix B

**Rhode Island Performance Data**

Appendix C

**Massachusetts Performance Data**

Appendix D

Statutory Requirements

# STATUTORY FRAMEWORK

1.  The 1996 Act conditions BOC entry into the market for provision of
    in-region interLATA services on compliance with certain provisions
    of section 271.[^351] BOCs must apply to the Federal Communications
    Commission (Commission or FCC) for authorization to provide
    interLATA services originating in any in-region state.[^352] The
    Commission must issue a written determination on each application no
    later than 90 days after receiving such application.[^353] Section
    271(d)(2)(A) requires the Commission to consult with the Attorney
    General before making any determination approving or denying a
    section 271 application. The Attorney General is entitled to
    evaluate the application "using any standard the Attorney General
    considers appropriate," and the Commission is required to "give
    substantial weight to the Attorney General's evaluation."[^354]

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117. In addition, the Commission must consult with the relevant state
     commission to verify that the BOC has one or more state-approved
     interconnection agreements with a facilities-based competitor, or a
     Statement of Generally Available Terms and Conditions (SGAT), and
     that either the agreement(s) or general statement satisfy the
     "competitive checklist."[^355] Because the Act does not prescribe
     any standard for the consideration of a state commission's
     verification under section 271(d)(2)(B), the Commission has
     discretion in each section 271 proceeding to determine the amount
     of weight to accord the state commission's verification.[^356] The
     Commission has held that, although it will consider carefully state
     determinations of fact that are supported by a detailed and
     extensive record, it is the FCC's role to determine whether the
     factual record supports the conclusion that particular requirements
     of section 271 have been met.[^357]

118. Section 271 requires the Commission to make various findings before
     approving BOC entry. In order for the Commission to approve a BOC's
     application to provide in-region, interLATA services, a BOC must
     first demonstrate, with respect to each state for which it seeks
     authorization, that it satisfies the requirements of either section
     271(c)(1)(A) (Track A) or 271(c)(1)(B) (Track B).[^358] In order to
     obtain authorization under section 271, the BOC must also show
     that: (1) it has "fully implemented the competitive checklist"
     contained in section 271(c)(2)(B);[^359] (2) the requested
     authorization will be carried out in accordance with the
     requirements of section 272;[^360] and (3) the BOC's entry into the
     in-region interLATA market is "consistent with the public interest,
     convenience, and necessity."[^361] The statute specifies that,
     unless the Commission finds that these criteria have been
     satisfied, the Commission "shall not approve" the requested
     authorization.[^362]

# PROCEDURAL AND ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

119. To determine whether a BOC applicant has met the prerequisites for
     entry into the long distance market, the Commission evaluates its
     compliance with the competitive checklist, as developed in the
     FCC's local competition rules and orders in effect at the time the
     application was filed. Despite the comprehensiveness of these
     rules, there will inevitably be, in any section 271 proceeding,
     disputes over an incumbent LEC's precise obligations to its
     competitors that FCC rules have not addressed and that do not
     involve *per se* violations of self-executing requirements of the
     Act. As explained in prior orders, the section 271 process simply
     could not function as Congress intended if the Commission were
     required to resolve all such disputes as a precondition to granting
     a section 271 application.[^363] In the context of section 271's
     adjudicatory framework, the Commission has established certain
     procedural rules governing BOC section 271 applications.[^364] The
     Commission has explained in prior orders the procedural rules it
     has developed to facilitate the review process.[^365] Here we
     describe how the Commission considers the evidence of compliance
     that the BOC presents in its application.

120. As part of the determination that a BOC has satisfied the
     requirements of section 271, the Commission considers whether the
     BOC has fully implemented the competitive checklist in subsection
     (c)(2)(B). The BOC at all times bears the burden of proof of
     compliance with section 271, even if no party challenges its
     compliance with a particular requirement.[^366] In demonstrating
     its compliance, a BOC must show that it has a concrete and specific
     legal obligation to furnish the item upon request pursuant to
     state-approved interconnection agreements that set forth prices and
     other terms and conditions for each checklist item, and that it is
     currently furnishing, or is ready to furnish, the checklist items
     in quantities that competitors may reasonably demand and at an
     acceptable level of quality.[^367] In particular, the BOC must
     demonstrate that it is offering interconnection and access to
     network elements on a nondiscriminatory basis.[^368] Previous
     Commission orders addressing section 271 applications have
     elaborated on this statutory standard.[^369] First, for those
     functions the BOC provides to competing carriers that are analogous
     to the functions a BOC provides to itself in connection with its
     own retail service offerings, the BOC must provide access to
     competing carriers in "substantially the same time and manner" as
     it provides to itself.[^370] Thus, where a retail analogue exists,
     a BOC must provide access that is equal to (i.e., substantially the
     same as) the level of access that the BOC provides itself, its
     customers, or its affiliates, in terms of quality, accuracy, and
     timeliness.[^371] For those functions that have no retail analogue,
     the BOC must demonstrate that the access it provides to competing
     carriers would offer an efficient carrier a "meaningful opportunity
     to compete."[^372]

121. The determination of whether the statutory standard is met is
     ultimately a judgment the Commission must make based on its
     expertise in promoting competition in local markets and in
     telecommunications regulation generally.[^373] The Commission has
     not established, nor does it believe it appropriate to establish,
     specific objective criteria for what constitutes "substantially the
     same time and manner" or a "meaningful opportunity to
     compete."[^374] Whether this legal standard is met can only be
     decided based on an analysis of specific facts and circumstances.
     Therefore, the Commission looks at each application on a
     case-by-case basis and considers the totality of the circumstances,
     including the origin and quality of the information in the record,
     to determine whether the nondiscrimination requirements of the Act
     are met.

## Performance Data

122. As established in prior section 271 orders, the Commission has
     found that performance measurements provide valuable evidence
     regarding a BOC's compliance or noncompliance with individual
     checklist items. The Commission expects that, in its *prima facie*
     case in the initial application, a BOC relying on performance data
     will:

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a)  provide sufficient performance data to support its contention that
    the statutory requirements are satisfied;

b)  identify the facial disparities between the applicant's performance
    for itself and its performance for competitors;

c)  explain why those facial disparities are anomalous, caused by forces
    beyond the applicant's control (e.g., competing carrier-caused
    errors), or have no meaningful adverse impact on a competing
    carrier's ability to obtain and serve customers; and

d)  provide the underlying data, analysis, and methodologies necessary
    to enable the Commission and commenters meaningfully to evaluate and
    contest the validity of the applicant's explanations for performance
    disparities, including, for example, carrier specific
    carrier-to-carrier performance data.

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123. The Commission has explained in prior orders that parity and
     benchmark standards established by state commissions do not
     represent absolute maximum or minimum levels of performance
     necessary to satisfy the competitive checklist. Rather, where these
     standards are developed through open proceedings with input from
     both the incumbent and competing carriers, these standards can
     represent informed and reliable attempts to objectively approximate
     whether competing carriers are being served by the incumbent in
     substantially the same time and manner, or in a way that provides
     them a meaningful opportunity to compete.[^375] Thus, to the extent
     there is no statistically significant difference between a BOC's
     provision of service to competing carriers and its own retail
     customers, the Commission generally need not look any further.
     Likewise, if a BOC's provision of service to competing carriers
     satisfies the performance benchmark, the analysis is usually done.
     Otherwise, the Commission will examine the evidence further to make
     a determination whether the statutory nondiscrimination
     requirements are met.[^376] Thus, the Commission will examine the
     explanations that a BOC and others provide about whether these data
     accurately depict the quality of the BOC's performance. The
     Commission also may examine how many months a variation in
     performance has existed and what the recent trend has been. The
     Commission may find that statistically significant differences
     exist, but conclude that such differences have little or no
     competitive significance in the marketplace. In such cases, the
     Commission may conclude that the differences are not meaningful in
     terms of statutory compliance. Ultimately, the determination of
     whether a BOC's performance meets the statutory requirements
     necessarily is a contextual decision based on the totality of the
     circumstances and information before the Commission.

124. Where there are multiple performance measures associated with a
     particular checklist item, the Commission would consider the
     performance demonstrated by all the measurements as a whole.
     Accordingly, a disparity in performance for one measure, by itself,
     may not provide a basis for finding noncompliance with the
     checklist. The Commission may also find that the reported
     performance data are affected by factors beyond a BOC's control, a
     finding that would make it less likely to hold the BOC wholly
     accountable for the disparity. This is not to say, however, that
     performance discrepancies on a single performance metric are
     unimportant. Indeed, under certain circumstances, disparity with
     respect to one performance measurement may support a finding of
     statutory noncompliance, particularly if the disparity is
     substantial or has endured for a long time, or if it is accompanied
     by other evidence of discriminatory conduct or evidence that
     competing carriers have been denied a meaningful opportunity to
     compete.

125. In sum, the Commission does not use performance measurements as a
     substitute for the 14-point competitive checklist. Rather, it uses
     performance measurements as valuable evidence with which to inform
     the judgment as to whether a BOC has complied with the checklist
     requirements. Although performance measurements add necessary
     objectivity and predictability to the review, they cannot wholly
     replace the Commission's own judgment as to whether a BOC has
     complied with the competitive checklist.

## Relevance of Previous Section 271 Approvals

126. In some section 271 applications, the volumes of the BOC's
     commercial orders may be significantly lower than they were in
     prior proceedings. In certain instances, volumes may be so low as
     to render the performance data inconsistent and inconclusive.[^377]
     Performance data based on low volumes of orders or other
     transactions are not as reliable an indicator of checklist
     compliance as performance based on larger numbers of observations.
     Indeed, where performance data are based on a low number of
     observations, small variations in performance may produce wide
     swings in the reported performance data. It is thus not possible to
     place the same evidentiary weight upon -- and to draw the same
     types of conclusions from -- performance data where volumes are
     low, as for data based on more robust activity.

127. In such cases, findings in prior, related section 271 proceedings
     may be a relevant factor in the Commission's analysis. Where a BOC
     provides evidence that a particular system reviewed and approved in
     a prior section 271 proceeding is also used in the proceeding at
     hand, the Commission's review of the same system in the current
     proceeding will be informed by the findings in the prior one.
     Indeed, to the extent that issues have already been briefed,
     reviewed and resolved in a prior section 271 proceeding, and absent
     new evidence or changed circumstances, an application for a related
     state should not be a forum for re-litigating and reconsidering
     those issues. Appropriately employed, such a practice can give us a
     fuller picture of the BOC's compliance with the section 271
     requirements while avoiding, for all parties involved in the
     section 271 process, the delay and expense associated with
     redundant and unnecessary proceedings and submissions.

128. However, the statute requires the Commission to make a separate
     determination of checklist compliance for each state and,
     accordingly, we do not consider any finding from previous section
     271 orders to be dispositive of checklist compliance in current
     proceedings. While the Commission's review may be informed by prior
     findings, the Commission will consider all relevant evidence in the
     record, including state-specific factors identified by commenting
     parties, the states, the Department of Justice. However, the
     Commission has always held that an applicant's performance towards
     competing carriers in an actual commercial environment is the best
     evidence of nondiscriminatory access to OSS and other network
     elements.[^378] Thus, the BOC's actual performance in the applicant
     state may be relevant to the analysis and determinations with
     respect to the 14 checklist items. Evidence of satisfactory
     performance in another state cannot trump convincing evidence that
     an applicant fails to provide nondiscriminatory access to a network
     element in the applicant state.

129. Moreover, because the Commission's review of a section 271
     application must be based on a snapshot of a BOC's recent
     performance at the time an application is filed, the Commission
     cannot simply rely on findings relating to an applicant's
     performance in an anchor state at the time it issued the
     determination for that state. The performance in that state could
     change due to a multitude of factors, such as increased order
     volumes or shifts in the mix of the types of services or UNEs
     requested by competing carriers. Thus, even when the applicant
     makes a convincing showing of the relevance of anchor state data,
     the Commission must examine how recent performance in that state
     compares to performance at the time it approved that state's
     section 271 application, in order to determine if the systems and
     processes continue to perform at acceptable levels.

# Compliance with entry requirements --- Sections 271(c)(1)(A) & 271(c)(1)(B)

130. As noted above, in order for the Commission to approve a BOC's
     application to provide in-region, interLATA services, a BOC must
     first demonstrate that it satisfies the requirements of either
     section 271(c)(1)(A) (Track A) or 271(c)(1)(B) (Track B).[^379] To
     qualify for Track A, a BOC must have interconnection agreements
     with one or more competing providers of "telephone exchange service
     . . . to residential and business subscribers."[^380] The Act
     states that "such telephone service may be offered . . . either
     exclusively over \[the competitor's\] own telephone exchange
     service facilities or predominantly over \[the competitor's\] own
     telephone exchange facilities in combination with the resale of the
     telecommunications services of another carrier."[^381] The
     Commission concluded in the *Ameritech Michigan Order* that section
     271(c)(1)(A) is satisfied if one or more competing providers
     collectively serve residential and business subscribers.[^382]

131. As an alternative to Track A, Section 271(c)(1)(B) permits BOCs to
     obtain authority to provide in-region, interLATA services if, after
     10 months from the date of enactment, no facilities-based provider,
     as described in subparagraph (A), has requested the access and
     interconnection arrangements described therein (referencing one or
     more binding agreements approved under Section 252), but the state
     has approved an SGAT that satisfies the competitive checklist of
     subsection (c)(2)(B). Under section 271(d)(3)(A)(ii), the
     Commission shall not approve such a request for in-region,
     interLATA service unless the BOC demonstrates that, "with respect
     to access and interconnection generally offered pursuant to \[an
     SGAT\], such statement offers all of the items included in the
     competitive checklist."[^383] Track B, however, is not available to
     a BOC if it has already received a request for access and
     interconnection from a prospective competing provider of telephone
     exchange service.[^384]

# COMPLIANCE WITH The COMPETitive CHECKLIST -- SECTION 271(c)(2)(B)

## Checklist Item 1-- Interconnection

132. Section 271(c)(2)(B)(i) of the Act requires a section 271 applicant
     to provide "\[i\]nterconnection in accordance with the requirements
     of sections 251(c)(2) and 252(d)(1)."[^385] Section 251(c)(2)
     imposes a duty on incumbent LECs "to provide, for the facilities
     and equipment of any requesting telecommunications carrier,
     interconnection with the local exchange carrier's network . . . for
     the transmission and routing of telephone exchange service and
     exchange access."[^386] In the *Local Competition First Report and
     Order*, the Commission concluded that interconnection referred
     "only to the physical linking of two networks for the mutual
     exchange of traffic."[^387] Section 251 contains three requirements
     for the provision of interconnection. First, an incumbent LEC must
     provide interconnection "at any technically feasible point within
     the carrier's network."[^388] Second, an incumbent LEC must provide
     interconnection that is "at least equal in quality to that provided
     by the local exchange carrier to itself."[^389] Finally, the
     incumbent LEC must provide interconnection "on rates, terms, and
     conditions that are just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory, in
     accordance with the terms of the agreement and the requirements of
     \[section 251\] and section 252."[^390]

133. To implement the equal-in-quality requirement in section 251, the
     Commission's rules require an incumbent LEC to design and operate
     its interconnection facilities to meet "the same technical criteria
     and service standards" that are used for the interoffice trunks
     within the incumbent LEC's network.[^391] In the *Local Competition
     First Report and Order*, the Commission identified trunk group
     blockage and transmission standards as indicators of an incumbent
     LEC's technical criteria and service standards.[^392] In prior
     section 271 applications, the Commission concluded that disparities
     in trunk group blockage indicated a failure to provide
     interconnection to competing carriers equal-in-quality to the
     interconnection the BOC provided to its own retail
     operations.[^393]

134. In the *Local Competition First Report and Order*, the Commission
     concluded that the requirement to provide interconnection on terms
     and conditions that are "just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory"
     means that an incumbent LEC must provide interconnection to a
     competitor in a manner no less efficient than the way in which the
     incumbent LEC provides the comparable function to its own retail
     operations.[^394] The Commission's rules interpret this obligation
     to include, among other things, the incumbent LEC's installation
     time for interconnection service[^395] and its provisioning of
     two-way trunking arrangements.[^396] Similarly, repair time for
     troubles affecting interconnection trunks is useful for determining
     whether a BOC provides interconnection service under "terms and
     conditions that are no less favorable than the terms and
     conditions" the BOC provides to its own retail operations.[^397]

135. Competing carriers may choose any method of technically feasible
     interconnection at a particular point on the incumbent LEC's
     network.[^398] Incumbent LEC provision of interconnection trunking
     is one common means of interconnection. Technically feasible
     methods also include, but are not limited to, physical and virtual
     collocation and meet point arrangements.[^399] The provision of
     collocation is an essential prerequisite to demonstrating
     compliance with item 1 of the competitive checklist.[^400] In the
     *Advanced Services First Report and Order*, the Commission revised
     its collocation rules to require incumbent LECs to include shared
     cage and cageless collocation arrangements as part of their
     physical collocation offerings.[^401] In response to a remand from
     the D.C. Circuit, the Commission adopted the *Collocation Remand
     Order*, establishing revised criteria for equipment for which
     incumbent LECs must permit collocation, requiring incumbent LECs to
     provide cross-connects between collocated carriers, and
     establishing principles for physical collocation space and
     configuration.[^402] To show compliance with its collocation
     obligations, a BOC must have processes and procedures in place to
     ensure that all applicable collocation arrangements are available
     on terms and conditions that are "just, reasonable, and
     nondiscriminatory" in accordance with section 251(c)(6) and the
     FCC's implementing rules.[^403] Data showing the quality of
     procedures for processing applications for collocation space, as
     well as the timeliness and efficiency of provisioning collocation
     space, help the Commission evaluate a BOC's compliance with its
     collocation obligations.[^404]

136. As stated above, checklist item 1 requires a BOC to provide
     "interconnection in accordance with the requirements of sections
     251(c)(2) *and* 252(d)(1)."[^405] Section 252(d)(1) requires state
     determinations regarding the rates, terms, and conditions of
     interconnection to be based on cost and to be nondiscriminatory,
     and allows the rates to include a reasonable profit.[^406] The
     Commission's pricing rules require, among other things, that in
     order to comply with its collocation obligations, an incumbent LEC
     provide collocation based on TELRIC.[^407]

137. To the extent pricing disputes arise, the Commission will not
     duplicate the work of the state commissions. As noted in the *SWBT
     Texas Order*, the Act authorizes the state commissions to resolve
     specific carrier-to-carrier disputes arising under the local
     competition provisions, and it authorizes the federal district
     courts to ensure that the results of the state arbitration process
     are consistent with federal law.[^408] Although the Commission has
     an independent statutory obligation to ensure compliance with the
     checklist, section 271 does not compel us to preempt the orderly
     disposition of intercarrier disputes by the state commissions,
     particularly now that the Supreme Court has restored the
     Commission's pricing jurisdiction and has thereby directed the
     state commissions to follow FCC pricing rules in their disposition
     of those disputes.[^409]

138. Consistent with the Commission's precedent, the mere presence of
     interim rates will not generally threaten a section 271 application
     so long as: (1) an interim solution to a particular rate dispute is
     reasonable under the circumstances; (2) the state commission has
     demonstrated its commitment to the Commission's pricing rules;
     and (3) provision is made for refunds or true-ups once permanent
     rates are set.[^410] In addition, the Commission has determined
     that rates contained within an approved section 271 application,
     including those that are interim, are reasonable starting points
     for interim rates for the same carrier in an adjoining state.[^411]

139. Although the Commission has been willing to grant a section 271
     application with a limited number of interim rates where the
     above-mentioned three-part test is met, it is clearly preferable to
     analyze a section 271 application on the basis of rates derived
     from a permanent rate proceeding.[^412] At some point, states will
     have had sufficient time to complete these proceedings. The
     Commission will, therefore, become more reluctant to continue
     approving section 271 applications containing interim rates. It
     would not be sound policy for interim rates to become a substitute
     for completing these significant proceedings.

## Checklist Item 2 -- Unbundled Network Elements

### Access to Operations Support Systems

140. Incumbent LECs use a variety of systems, databases, and personnel
     (collectively referred to as OSS) to provide service to their
     customers.[^413] The Commission consistently has found that
     nondiscriminatory access to OSS is a prerequisite to the
     development of meaningful local competition.[^414] For example, new
     entrants must have access to the functions performed by the
     incumbent's OSS in order to formulate and place orders for network
     elements or resale services, to install service to their customers,
     to maintain and repair network facilities, and to bill
     customers.[^415] The Commission has determined that without
     nondiscriminatory access to the BOC's OSS, a competing carrier
     "will be severely disadvantaged, if not precluded altogether, from
     fairly competing" in the local exchange market.[^416]

141. Section 271 requires the Commission to determine whether a BOC
     offers nondiscriminatory access to OSS functions. Section
     271(c)(2)(B)(ii) requires a BOC to provide "nondiscriminatory
     access to network elements in accordance with the requirements of
     sections 251(c)(3) and 252(d)(1)."[^417] The Commission has
     determined that access to OSS functions falls squarely within an
     incumbent LEC's duty under section 251(c)(3) to provide unbundled
     network elements (UNEs) under terms and conditions that are
     nondiscriminatory and just and reasonable, and its duty under
     section 251(c)(4) to offer resale services without imposing any
     limitations or conditions that are discriminatory or
     unreasonable.[^418] The Commission must therefore examine a BOC's
     OSS performance to evaluate compliance with section
     271(c)(2)(B)(ii) and (xiv).[^419] In addition, the Commission has
     also concluded that the duty to provide nondiscriminatory access to
     OSS functions is embodied in other terms of the competitive
     checklist as well.[^420] Consistent with prior orders, the
     Commission examines a BOC's OSS performance directly under
     checklist items 2 and 14, as well as other checklist terms.[^421]

142. As part of its statutory obligation to provide nondiscriminatory
     access to OSS functions, a BOC must provide access that
     sufficiently supports each of the three modes of competitive entry
     envisioned by the 1996 Act -- competitor-owned facilities, UNEs,
     and resale.[^422] For OSS functions that are analogous to those
     that a BOC provides to itself, its customers or its affiliates, the
     nondiscrimination standard requires the BOC to offer requesting
     carriers access that is equivalent in terms of quality, accuracy,
     and timeliness.[^423] The BOC must provide access that permits
     competing carriers to perform these functions in "substantially the
     same time and manner" as the BOC.[^424] The Commission has
     recognized in prior orders that there may be situations in which a
     BOC contends that, although equivalent access has not been achieved
     for an analogous function, the access that it provides is
     nonetheless nondiscriminatory within the meaning of the
     statute.[^425]

143. For OSS functions that have no retail analogue, the BOC must offer
     access "sufficient to allow an efficient competitor a meaningful
     opportunity to compete."[^426] In assessing whether the quality of
     access affords an efficient competitor a meaningful opportunity to
     compete, the Commission will examine, in the first instance,
     whether specific performance standards exist for those
     functions.[^427] In particular, the Commission will consider
     whether appropriate standards for measuring OSS performance have
     been adopted by the relevant state commission or agreed upon by the
     BOC in an interconnection agreement or during the implementation of
     such an agreement.[^428] If such performance standards exist, the
     Commission will evaluate whether the BOC's performance is
     sufficient to allow an efficient competitor a meaningful
     opportunity to compete.[^429]

144. The Commission analyzes whether a BOC has met the nondiscrimination
     standard for each OSS function using a two-step approach. First,
     the Commission determines "whether the BOC has deployed the
     necessary systems and personnel to provide sufficient access to
     each of the necessary OSS functions and whether the BOC is
     adequately assisting competing carriers to understand how to
     implement and use all of the OSS functions available to
     them."[^430] The Commission next assesses "whether the OSS
     functions that the BOC has deployed are operationally ready, as a
     practical matter."[^431]

145. Under the first inquiry, a BOC must demonstrate that it has
     developed sufficient electronic (for functions that the BOC
     accesses electronically) and manual interfaces to allow competing
     carriers equivalent access to all of the necessary OSS
     functions.[^432] For example, a BOC must provide competing carriers
     with the specifications necessary for carriers to design or modify
     their systems in a manner that will enable them to communicate with
     the BOC's systems and any relevant interfaces.[^433] In addition, a
     BOC must disclose to competing carriers any internal business
     rules[^434] and other formatting information necessary to ensure
     that a carrier's requests and orders are processed
     efficiently.[^435] Finally, a BOC must demonstrate that its OSS is
     designed to accommodate both current demand and projected demand
     for competing carriers' access to OSS functions.[^436] Although not
     a prerequisite, the Commission continues to encourage the use of
     industry standards as an appropriate means of meeting the needs of
     a competitive local exchange market.[^437]

146. Under the second inquiry, the Commission examines performance
     measurements and other evidence of commercial readiness to
     ascertain whether the BOC's OSS is handling current demand and will
     be able to handle reasonably foreseeable future volumes.[^438] The
     most probative evidence that OSS functions are operationally ready
     is actual commercial usage.[^439] Absent sufficient and reliable
     data on commercial usage, the Commission will consider the results
     of carrier-to-carrier testing, independent third-party testing, and
     internal testing in assessing the commercial readiness of a BOC's
     OSS.[^440] Although the Commission does not require OSS testing, a
     persuasive test will provide us with an objective means by which to
     evaluate a BOC's OSS readiness where there is little to no evidence
     of commercial usage, or may otherwise strengthen an application
     where the BOC's evidence of actual commercial usage is weak or is
     otherwise challenged by competitors. The persuasiveness of a
     third-party review, however, is dependent upon the qualifications,
     experience and independence of the third party and the conditions
     and scope of the review itself.[^441] If the review is limited in
     scope or depth or is not independent and blind, the Commission will
     give it minimal weight. As noted above, to the extent the
     Commission reviews performance data, it looks at the totality of
     the circumstances and generally does not view individual
     performance disparities, particularly if they are isolated and
     slight, as dispositive of whether a BOC has satisfied its checklist
     obligations.[^442] Individual performance disparities may,
     nevertheless, result in a finding of checklist noncompliance,
     particularly if the disparity is substantial or has endured for a
     long time, or if it is accompanied by other evidence of
     discriminatory conduct or evidence that competing carriers have
     been denied a meaningful opportunity to compete.

#### Relevance of a BOC's Prior Section 271 Orders

147. The *SWBT Kansas/Oklahoma Order* specifically outlined a
     non-exhaustive evidentiary showing that must be made in the initial
     application when a BOC seeks to rely on evidence presented in
     another application.[^443] First, a BOC's application must explain
     the extent to which the OSS are "the same" -- that is, whether it
     employs the shared use of a single OSS, or the use of systems that
     are identical, but separate.[^444] To satisfy this inquiry, the
     Commission looks to whether the relevant states utilize a common
     set of processes, business rules, interfaces, systems and, in many
     instances, even personnel.[^445] The Commission will also carefully
     examine third party reports that demonstrate that the BOC's OSS are
     the same in each of the relevant states.[^446] Finally, where a BOC
     has discernibly separate OSS, it must demonstrate that its OSS
     reasonably can be expected to behave in the same manner.[^447]
     Second, unless an applicant seeks to establish only that certain
     discrete components of its OSS are the same, an applicant must
     submit evidence relating to *all* aspects of its OSS, including
     those OSS functions performed by BOC personnel.

#### Pre-Ordering

148. A BOC must demonstrate that: (i) it offers nondiscriminatory access
     to OSS pre-ordering functions associated with determining whether a
     loop is capable of supporting xDSL advanced technologies; (ii)
     competing carriers successfully have built and are using
     application-to-application interfaces to perform pre-ordering
     functions and are able to integrate pre-ordering and ordering
     interfaces; [^448] and (iii) its pre-ordering systems provide
     reasonably prompt response times and are consistently available in
     a manner that affords competitors a meaningful opportunity to
     compete.[^449]

149. The pre-ordering phase of OSS generally includes those activities
     that a carrier undertakes to gather and verify the information
     necessary to place an order.[^450] Given that pre-ordering
     represents the first exposure that a prospective customer has to a
     competing carrier, it is critical that a competing carrier is able
     to accomplish pre-ordering activities in a manner no less efficient
     and responsive than the incumbent.[^451] Most of the pre-ordering
     activities that must be undertaken by a competing carrier to order
     resale services and UNEs from the incumbent are analogous to the
     activities a BOC must accomplish to furnish service to its own
     customers. For these pre-ordering functions, a BOC must demonstrate
     that it provides requesting carriers access that enables them to
     perform pre-ordering functions in substantially the same time and
     manner as its retail operations.[^452] For those pre-ordering
     functions that lack a retail analogue, a BOC must provide access
     that affords an efficient competitor a meaningful opportunity to
     compete.[^453] In prior orders, the Commission has emphasized that
     providing pre-ordering functionality through an
     application-to-application interface is essential in enabling
     carriers to conduct real-time processing and to integrate
     pre-ordering and ordering functions in the same manner as the
     BOC.[^454]

##### Access to Loop Qualification Information

150. In accordance with the *UNE Remand Order*,[^455] the Commission
     requires incumbent carriers to provide competitors with access to
     all of the same detailed information about the loop that is
     available to the incumbents,[^456] and in the same time frame, so
     that a competing carrier can make an independent judgment at the
     pre-ordering stage about whether an end user loop is capable of
     supporting the advanced services equipment the competing carrier
     intends to install.[^457] Under the *UNE Remand Order*, the
     relevant inquiry is not whether a BOC's retail arm accesses such
     underlying information but whether such information exists anywhere
     in a BOC's back office and can be accessed by any of a BOC's
     personnel.[^458] Moreover, a BOC may not "filter or digest" the
     underlying information and may not provide only information that is
     useful in provisioning of a particular type of xDSL that a BOC
     offers.[^459] A BOC must also provide loop qualification
     information based, for example, on an individual address or zip
     code of the end users in a particular wire center, NXX code or on
     any other basis that the BOC provides such information to itself.
     Moreover, a BOC must also provide access for competing carriers to
     the loop qualifying information that the BOC can itself access
     manually or electronically. Finally, a BOC must provide access to
     loop qualification information to competitors within the same time
     intervals it is provided to the BOC's retail operations or its
     advanced services affiliate.[^460] As the Commission determined in
     the *UNE Remand Order*, however, "to the extent such information is
     not normally provided to the incumbent's retail personnel, but can
     be obtained by contacting back office personnel, it must be
     provided to requesting carriers within the same time frame that any
     incumbent personnel are able to obtain such information."[^461]

#### Ordering

151. Consistent with section 271(c)(2)(B)(ii), a BOC must demonstrate
     its ability to provide competing carriers with access to the OSS
     functions necessary for placing wholesale orders. For those
     functions of the ordering systems for which there is a retail
     analogue, a BOC must demonstrate, with performance data and other
     evidence, that it provides competing carriers with access to its
     OSS in substantially the same time and manner as it provides to its
     retail operations. For those ordering functions that lack a direct
     retail analogue, a BOC must demonstrate that its systems and
     performance allow an efficient carrier a meaningful opportunity to
     compete. As in prior section 271 orders, the Commission looks
     primarily at the applicant's ability to return order confirmation
     notices, order reject notices, order completion notices and
     jeopardies, and at its order flow-through rate.[^462]

#### Provisioning

152. A BOC must provision competing carriers' orders for resale and
     UNE-P services in substantially the same time and manner as it
     provisions orders for its own retail customers.[^463] Consistent
     with the approach in prior section 271 orders, the Commission
     examines a BOC's provisioning processes, as well as its performance
     with respect to provisioning timeliness (i.e., missed due dates and
     average installation intervals) and provisioning quality (i.e.,
     service problems experienced at the provisioning stage).[^464]

#### Maintenance and Repair

153. A competing carrier that provides service through resale or UNEs
     remains dependent upon the incumbent LEC for maintenance and
     repair. Thus, as part of its obligation to provide
     nondiscriminatory access to OSS functions, a BOC must provide
     requesting carriers with nondiscriminatory access to its
     maintenance and repair systems.[^465] To the extent a BOC performs
     analogous maintenance and repair functions for its retail
     operations, it must provide competing carriers access that enables
     them to perform maintenance and repair functions "in substantially
     the same time and manner" as a BOC provides its retail
     customers.[^466] Equivalent access ensures that competing carriers
     can assist customers experiencing service disruptions using the
     same network information and diagnostic tools that are available to
     BOC personnel.[^467] Without equivalent access, a competing carrier
     would be placed at a significant competitive disadvantage, as its
     customer would perceive a problem with a BOC's network as a problem
     with the competing carrier's own network.[^468]

#### Billing

154. A BOC must provide nondiscriminatory access to its billing
     functions, which is necessary to enable competing carriers to
     provide accurate and timely bills to their customers.[^469] In
     making this determination, the Commission assesses a BOC's billing
     processes and systems, and its performance data. Consistent with
     prior section 271 orders, a BOC must demonstrate that it provides
     competing carriers with complete and accurate reports on the
     service usage of competing carriers' customers in substantially the
     same time and manner that a BOC provides such information to
     itself, and with wholesale bills in a manner that gives competing
     carriers a meaningful opportunity to compete.[^470]

#### Change Management Process

155. Competing carriers need information about, and specifications for,
     an incumbent's systems and interfaces to develop and modify their
     systems and procedures to access the incumbent's OSS
     functions.[^471] Thus, in order to demonstrate that it is providing
     nondiscriminatory access to its OSS, a BOC must first demonstrate
     that it "has deployed the necessary systems and personnel to
     provide sufficient access to each of the necessary OSS functions
     and . . . is adequately assisting competing carriers to understand
     how to implement and use all of the OSS functions available to
     them."[^472] By showing that it adequately assists competing
     carriers to use available OSS functions, a BOC provides evidence
     that it offers an efficient competitor a meaningful opportunity to
     compete.[^473] As part of this demonstration, the Commission will
     give substantial consideration to the existence of an adequate
     change management process and evidence that the BOC has adhered to
     this process over time.[^474]

156. The change management process refers to the methods and procedures
     that the BOC employs to communicate with competing carriers
     regarding the performance of, and changes in, the BOC's OSS.[^475]
     Such changes may include updates to existing functions that impact
     competing carrier interface(s) upon a BOC's release of new
     interface software; technology changes that require competing
     carriers to meet new technical requirements upon a BOC's software
     release date; additional functionality changes that may be used at
     the competing carrier's option, on or after a BOC's release date
     for new interface software; and changes that may be mandated by
     regulatory authorities.[^476] Without a change management process
     in place, a BOC can impose substantial costs on competing carriers
     simply by making changes to its systems and interfaces without
     providing adequate testing opportunities and accurate and timely
     notice and documentation of the changes.[^477] Change management
     problems can impair a competing carrier's ability to obtain
     nondiscriminatory access to UNEs, and hence a BOC's compliance with
     section 271(2)(B)(ii).[^478]

157. In evaluating whether a BOC's change management plan affords an
     efficient competitor a meaningful opportunity to compete, the
     Commission first assesses whether the plan is adequate. In making
     this determination, it assesses whether the evidence demonstrates:
     (1) that information relating to the change management process is
     clearly organized and readily accessible to competing
     carriers;[^479] (2) that competing carriers had substantial input
     in the design and continued operation of the change management
     process;[^480] (3) that the change management plan defines a
     procedure for the timely resolution of change management
     disputes;[^481] (4) the availability of a stable testing
     environment that mirrors production;[^482] and (5) the efficacy of
     the documentation the BOC makes available for the purpose of
     building an electronic gateway.[^483] After determining whether the
     BOC's change management plan is adequate, the Commission evaluates
     whether the BOC has demonstrated a pattern of compliance with this
     plan.[^484]

### UNE Combinations

158. In order to comply with the requirements of checklist item 2, a BOC
     must show that it is offering "\[n\]ondiscriminatory access to
     network elements in accordance with the requirements of section
     251(c)(3)."[^485] Section 251(c)(3) requires an incumbent LEC to
     "provide, to any requesting telecommunications carrier . . .
     nondiscriminatory access to network elements on an unbundled basis
     at any technically feasible point on rates, terms and conditions
     that are just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory."[^486] Section
     251(c)(3) of the Act also requires incumbent LECs to provide UNEs
     in a manner that allows requesting carriers to combine such
     elements in order to provide a telecommunications service.[^487]

159. In the *Ameritech Michigan Order*, the Commission emphasized that
     the ability of requesting carriers to use UNEs, as well as
     combinations of UNEs, is integral to achieving Congress' objective
     of promoting competition in local telecommunications markets.[^488]
     Using combinations of UNEs provides a competitor with the incentive
     and ability to package and market services in ways that differ from
     the BOCs' existing service offerings in order to compete in the
     local telecommunications market.[^489] Moreover, combining the
     incumbent's UNEs with their own facilities encourages
     facilities-based competition and allows competing providers to
     provide a wide array of competitive choices.[^490] Because the use
     of combinations of UNEs is an important strategy for entry into the
     local telecommunications market, as well as an obligation under the
     requirements of section 271, the Commission examines section 271
     applications to determine whether competitive carriers are able to
     combine network elements as required by the Act and the
     Commission's regulations.[^491]

### Pricing of Network Elements

160. Checklist item 2 of section 271 states that a BOC must provide
     "nondiscriminatory access to network elements in accordance with
     sections 251(c)(3) and 252(d)(1)" of the Act.[^492] Section
     251(c)(3) requires incumbent LECs to provide "nondiscriminatory
     access to network elements on an unbundled basis at any technically
     feasible point on rates, terms, and conditions that are just,
     reasonable, and nondiscriminatory."[^493] Section 252(d)(1)
     requires that a state commission's determination of the just and
     reasonable rates for network elements shall be based on the cost of
     providing the network elements, shall be nondiscriminatory, and may
     include a reasonable profit.[^494] Pursuant to this statutory
     mandate, the Commission has determined that prices for UNEs must be
     based on the total element long run incremental cost (TELRIC) of
     providing those elements.[^495] The Commission also promulgated
     rule 51.315(b), which prohibits incumbent LECs from separating
     already combined elements before providing them to competing
     carriers, except on request.[^496] The Commission has previously
     held that it will not conduct a *de novo* review of a state's
     pricing determinations and will reject an application only if
     "basic TELRIC principles are violated or the state commission makes
     clear errors in factual findings on matters so substantial that the
     end result falls outside the range that the reasonable application
     of TELRIC principles would produce."[^497]

161. Although the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit stayed
     the Commission's pricing rules in 1996,[^498] the Supreme Court
     restored the Commission's pricing authority on January 25, 1999,
     and remanded to the Eighth Circuit for consideration of the merits
     of the challenged rules.[^499] On remand from the Supreme Court,
     the Eighth Circuit concluded that while TELRIC is an acceptable
     method for determining costs, certain specific requirements
     contained within the Commission's pricing rules were contrary to
     Congressional intent.[^500] The Eighth Circuit has stayed the
     issuance of its mandate pending review by the Supreme Court.[^501]
     Accordingly, the Commission's pricing rules remain in effect.

## Checklist Item 3 -- Poles, Ducts, Conduits and Rights of Way

162. Section 271(c)(2)(B)(iii) requires BOCs to provide
     "\[n\]ondiscriminatory access to the poles, ducts, conduits, and
     rights-of-way owned or controlled by the \[BOC\] at just and
     reasonable rates in accordance with the requirements of section
     224."[^502] Section 224(f)(1) states that "\[a\] utility shall
     provide a cable television system or any telecommunications carrier
     with nondiscriminatory access to any pole, duct, conduit, or
     right-of-way owned or controlled by it."[^503] Notwithstanding this
     requirement, section 224(f)(2) permits a utility providing electric
     service to deny access to its poles, ducts, conduits, and
     rights-of-way, on a nondiscriminatory basis, "where there is
     insufficient capacity and for reasons of safety, reliability and
     generally applicable engineering purposes."[^504] Section 224 also
     contains two separate provisions governing the maximum rates that a
     utility may charge for "pole attachments."[^505] Section 224(b)(1)
     states that the Commission shall regulate the rates, terms, and
     conditions governing pole attachments to ensure that they are "just
     and reasonable."[^506] Notwithstanding this general grant of
     authority, section 224(c)(1) states that "\[n\]othing in \[section
     224\] shall be construed to apply to, or to give the Commission
     jurisdiction with respect to the rates, terms, and conditions, or
     access to poles, ducts, conduits and rights-of-way as provided in
     \[section 224(f)\], for pole attachments in any case where such
     matters are regulated by a State."[^507] As of 1992, nineteen
     states, including Connecticut, had certified to the Commission that
     they regulated the rates, terms, and conditions for pole
     attachments.[^508]

## Checklist Item 4 -- Unbundled Local Loops

163. Section 271(c)(2)(B)(iv) of the Act, item 4 of the competitive
     checklist, requires that a BOC provide "\[l\]ocal loop transmission
     from the central office to the customer's premises, unbundled from
     local switching or other services."[^509] The Commission has
     defined the loop as a transmission facility between a distribution
     frame, or its equivalent, in an incumbent LEC central office, and
     the demarcation point at the customer premises. This definition
     includes different types of loops, including two-wire and four-wire
     analog voice-grade loops, and two-wire and four-wire loops that are
     conditioned to transmit the digital signals needed to provide
     service such as ISDN, ADSL, HDSL, and DS1-level signals.[^510]

164. In order to establish that it is "providing" unbundled local loops
     in compliance with checklist item 4, a BOC must demonstrate that it
     has a concrete and specific legal obligation to furnish loops and
     that it is currently doing so in the quantities that competitors
     demand and at an acceptable level of quality. A BOC must also
     demonstrate that it provides nondiscriminatory access to unbundled
     loops.[^511] Specifically, the BOC must provide access to any
     functionality of the loop requested by a competing carrier unless
     it is not technically feasible to condition the loop facility to
     support the particular functionality requested. In order to provide
     the requested loop functionality, such as the ability to deliver
     xDSL services, the BOC may be required to take affirmative steps to
     condition existing loop facilities to enable competing carriers to
     provide services not currently provided over the facilities. The
     BOC must provide competitors with access to unbundled loops
     regardless of whether the BOC uses digital loop carrier (DLC)
     technology or similar remote concentration devices for the
     particular loops sought by the competitor.

165. On December 9, 1999, the Commission released the *Line Sharing
     Order*, which introduced new rules requiring BOCs to offer
     requesting carriers unbundled access to the high-frequency portion
     of local loops (HFPL).[^512] HFPL is defined as "the frequency
     above the voiceband on a copper loop facility that is being used to
     carry traditional POTS analog circuit-switched voiceband
     transmissions." This definition applies whether a BOC's voice
     customers are served by cooper or by digital loop carrier
     equipment. Competing carriers should have access to the HFPL at
     either a central office or at a remote terminal. However, the HFPL
     network element is *only* available on a copper loop
     facility.[^513]

166. To determine whether a BOC makes line sharing available consistent
     with Commission rules set out in the *Line Sharing Order*, the
     Commission examines categories of performance measurements
     identified in the Bell Atlantic New York and SWBT Texas Orders.
     Specifically, a successful BOC applicant could provide evidence of
     BOC-caused missed installation due dates, average installation
     intervals, trouble reports within 30 days of installation, mean
     time to repair, trouble report rates, and repeat trouble report
     rates. In addition, a successful BOC applicant should provide
     evidence that its central offices are operationally ready to handle
     commercial volumes of line sharing and that it provides competing
     carriers with nondiscriminatory access to the pre-ordering and
     ordering OSS functions associated with the provision of line shared
     loops, including access to loop qualification information and
     databases.

167. Section 271(c)(2)(B)(iv) also requires that a BOC demonstrate that
     it makes line splitting available to competing carriers so that
     competing carriers may provide voice and data service over a single
     loop.[^514] In addition, a BOC must demonstrate that a competing
     carrier, either alone or in conjunction with another carrier, is
     able to replace an existing UNE-P configuration used to provide
     voice service with an arrangement that enables it to provide voice
     and data service to a customer. To make such a showing, a BOC must
     show that it has a legal obligation to provide line splitting
     through rates, terms, and conditions in interconnection agreements
     and that it offers competing carriers the ability to order an
     unbundled xDSL-capable loop terminated to a collocated splitter and
     DSLAM equipment, and combine it with unbundled switching and shared
     transport.[^515]

## Checklist Item 5 -- Unbundled Local Transport

168. Section 271(c)(2)(B)(v) of the competitive checklist requires a BOC
     to provide "\[l\]ocal transport from the trunk side of a wireline
     local exchange carrier switch unbundled from switching or other
     services."[^516] The Commission has required that BOCs provide both
     dedicated and shared transport to requesting carriers.[^517]
     Dedicated transport consists of BOC transmission facilities
     dedicated to a particular customer or carrier that provide
     telecommunications between wire centers owned by BOCs or requesting
     telecommunications carriers, or between switches owned by BOCs or
     requesting telecommunications carriers.[^518] Shared transport
     consists of transmission facilities shared by more than one
     carrier, including the BOC, between end office switches, between
     end office switches and tandem switches, and between tandem
     switches, in the BOC's network.[^519]

## Checklist Item 6 -- Unbundled Local Switching

169. Section 271(c)(2)(B)(vi) of the 1996 Act requires a BOC to provide
     "\[l\]ocal switching unbundled from transport, local loop
     transmission, or other services."[^520] In the *Second BellSouth
     Louisiana Order*, the Commission required BellSouth to provide
     unbundled local switching that included line-side and trunk-side
     facilities, plus the features, functions, and capabilities of the
     switch.[^521] The features, functions, and capabilities of the
     switch include the basic switching function as well as the same
     basic capabilities that are available to the incumbent LEC's
     customers.[^522] Additionally, local switching includes all
     vertical features that the switch is capable of providing, as well
     as any technically feasible customized routing functions.[^523]

170. Moreover, in the *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, the Commission
     required BellSouth to permit competing carriers to purchase UNEs,
     including unbundled switching, in a manner that permits a competing
     carrier to offer, and bill for, exchange access and the termination
     of local traffic.[^524] The Commission also stated that measuring
     daily customer usage for billing purposes requires essentially the
     same OSS functions for both competing carriers and incumbent LECs,
     and that a BOC must demonstrate that it is providing equivalent
     access to billing information.[^525] Therefore, the ability of a
     BOC to provide billing information necessary for a competitive LEC
     to bill for exchange access and termination of local traffic is an
     aspect of unbundled local switching.[^526] Thus, there is an
     overlap between the provision of unbundled local switching and the
     provision of the OSS billing function.[^527]

171. To comply with the requirements of unbundled local switching, a BOC
     must also make available trunk ports on a shared basis and routing
     tables resident in the BOC's switch, as necessary to provide access
     to shared transport functionality.[^528] In addition, a BOC may not
     limit the ability of competitors to use unbundled local switching
     to provide exchange access by requiring competing carriers to
     purchase a dedicated trunk from an interexchange carrier's point of
     presence to a dedicated trunk port on the local switch.[^529]

## Checklist Item 7 -- 911/E911 Access and Directory Assistance/Operator Services

172. Section 271(c)(2)(B)(vii) of the Act requires a BOC to provide
     "\[n\]ondiscriminatory access to -- (I) 911 and E911
     services."[^530] In the *Ameritech Michigan Order*, the Commission
     found that "section 271 requires a BOC to provide competitors
     access to its 911 and E911 services in the same manner that a BOC
     obtains such access, *i.e.*, at parity."[^531] Specifically, the
     Commission found that a BOC "must maintain the 911 database entries
     for competing LECs with the same accuracy and reliability that it
     maintains the database entries for its own customers."[^532] For
     facilities-based carriers, the BOC must provide "unbundled access
     to \[its\] 911 database and 911 interconnection, including the
     provision of dedicated trunks from the requesting carrier's
     switching facilities to the 911 control office at parity with what
     \[the BOC\] provides to itself."[^533] Section
     271(c)(2)(B)(vii)(II) and section 271(c)(2)(B)(vii)(III) require a
     BOC to provide nondiscriminatory access to "directory assistance
     services to allow the other carrier's customers to obtain telephone
     numbers" and "operator call completion services,"
     respectively.[^534] Section 251(b)(3) of the Act imposes on each
     LEC "the duty to permit all \[competing providers of telephone
     exchange service and telephone toll service\] to have
     nondiscriminatory access to . . . operator services, directory
     assistance, and directory listing, with no unreasonable dialing
     delays."[^535] The Commission concluded in the *Second BellSouth
     Louisiana Order* that a BOC must be in compliance with the
     regulations implementing section 251(b)(3) to satisfy the
     requirements of sections 271(c)(2)(B)(vii)(II) and
     271(c)(2)(B)(vii)(III).[^536] In the *Local Competition Second
     Report and Order*, the Commission held that the phrase
     "nondiscriminatory access to directory assistance and directory
     listings" means that "the customers of all telecommunications
     service providers should be able to access each LEC's directory
     assistance service and obtain a directory listing on a
     nondiscriminatory basis, notwithstanding: (1) the identity of a
     requesting customer's local telephone service provider; or (2) the
     identity of the telephone service provider for a customer whose
     directory listing is requested."[^537] The Commission concluded
     that nondiscriminatory access to the dialing patterns of 4-1-1 and
     5-5-5-1-2-1-2 to access directory assistance were technically
     feasible, and would continue.[^538] The Commission specifically
     held that the phrase "nondiscriminatory access to operator
     services" means that "a telephone service customer, regardless of
     the identity of his or her local telephone service provider, must
     be able to connect to a local operator by dialing '0,' or '0 plus'
     the desired telephone number."[^539]

173. Competing carriers may provide operator services and directory
     assistance by reselling the BOC's services, outsourcing service
     provision to a third-party provider, or using their own personnel
     and facilities. The Commission's rules require BOCs to permit
     competitive LECs wishing to resell the BOC's operator services and
     directory assistance to request the BOC to brand their calls.[^540]
     Competing carriers wishing to provide operator services or
     directory assistance using their own or a third party provider's
     facilities and personnel must be able to obtain directory listings
     either by obtaining directory information on a "read only" or "per
     dip" basis from the BOC's directory assistance database, or by
     creating their own directory assistance database by obtaining the
     subscriber listing information in the BOC's database.[^541]
     Although the Commission originally concluded that BOCs must provide
     directory assistance and operator services on an unbundled basis
     pursuant to sections 251 and 252, the Commission removed directory
     assistance and operator services from the list of required UNEs in
     the *UNE Remand Order*.[^542] Checklist item obligations that do
     not fall within a BOC's obligations under section 251(c)(3) are not
     subject to the requirements of sections 251 and 252 that rates be
     based on forward-looking economic costs.[^543] Checklist item
     obligations that do not fall within a BOC's UNE obligations,
     however, still must be provided in accordance with sections 201(b)
     and 202(a), which require that rates and conditions be just and
     reasonable, and not unreasonably discriminatory.[^544]

## Checklist Item 8 -- White Pages Directory Listings

174. Section 271(c)(2)(B)(viii) of the 1996 Act requires a BOC to
     provide "\[w\]hite pages directory listings for customers of the
     other carrier's telephone exchange service."[^545] Section
     251(b)(3) of the 1996 Act obligates all LECs to permit competitive
     providers of telephone exchange service and telephone toll service
     to have nondiscriminatory access to directory listing.[^546]

175. In the *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, the Commission concluded
     that, "consistent with the Commission's interpretation of
     'directory listing' as used in section 251(b)(3), the term 'white
     pages' in section 271(c)(2)(B)(viii) refers to the local
     alphabetical directory that includes the residential and business
     listings of the customers of the local exchange provider."[^547]
     The Commission further concluded, "the term 'directory listing,' as
     used in this section, includes, at a minimum, the subscriber's
     name, address, telephone number, or any combination thereof."[^548]
     The Commission's *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order* also held that
     a BOC satisfies the requirements of checklist item 8 by
     demonstrating that it: (1) provided nondiscriminatory appearance
     and integration of white page directory listings to competitive
     LECs' customers; and (2) provided white page listings for
     competitors' customers with the same accuracy and reliability that
     it provides its own customers.[^549]

## Checklist Item 9 -- Numbering Administration

176. Section 271(c)(2)(B)(ix) of the 1996 Act requires a BOC to provide
     "nondiscriminatory access to telephone numbers for assignment to
     the other carrier's telephone exchange service customers," until
     "the date by which telecommunications numbering administration,
     guidelines, plan, or rules are established."[^550] The checklist
     mandates compliance with "such guidelines, plan, or rules" after
     they have been established.[^551] A BOC must demonstrate that it
     adheres to industry numbering administration guidelines and
     Commission rules.[^552]

## Checklist Item 10 -- Databases and Associated Signaling

177. Section 271(c)(2)(B)(x) of the 1996 Act requires a BOC to provide
     "nondiscriminatory access to databases and associated signaling
     necessary for call routing and completion."[^553] In the *Second
     BellSouth Louisiana Order*, the Commission required BellSouth to
     demonstrate that it provided requesting carriers with
     nondiscriminatory access to: "(1) signaling networks, including
     signaling links and signaling transfer points; (2) certain
     call-related databases necessary for call routing and completion,
     or in the alternative, a means of physical access to the signaling
     transfer point linked to the unbundled database; and (3) Service
     Management Systems (SMS)." [^554] The Commission also required
     BellSouth to design, create, test, and deploy Advanced Intelligent
     Network (AIN) based services at the SMS through a Service Creation
     Environment (SCE).[^555] In the *Local Competition First Report and
     Order*, the Commission defined call-related databases as databases,
     other than operations support systems, that are used in signaling
     networks for billing and collection or the transmission, routing,
     or other provision of telecommunications service.[^556] At that
     time the Commission required incumbent LECs to provide unbundled
     access to their call-related databases, including but not limited
     to: the Line Information Database (LIDB), the Toll Free Calling
     database, the Local Number Portability database, and Advanced
     Intelligent Network databases.[^557] In the *UNE Remand Order*, the
     Commission clarified that the definition of call-related databases
     "includes, but is not limited to, the calling name (CNAM) database,
     as well as the 911 and E911 databases."[^558]

## Checklist Item 11 -- Number Portability

178. Section 271(c)(2)(B) of the 1996 Act requires a BOC to comply with
     the number portability regulations adopted by the Commission
     pursuant to section 251.[^559] Section 251(b)(2) requires all LECs
     "to provide, to the extent technically feasible, number portability
     in accordance with requirements prescribed by the
     Commission."[^560] The 1996 Act defines number portability as "the
     ability of users of telecommunications services to retain, at the
     same location, existing telecommunications numbers without
     impairment of quality, reliability, or convenience when switching
     from one telecommunications carrier to another."[^561] In order to
     prevent the cost of number portability from thwarting local
     competition, Congress enacted section 251(e)(2), which requires
     that "\[t\]he cost of establishing telecommunications numbering
     administration arrangements and number portability shall be borne
     by all telecommunications carriers on a competitively neutral basis
     as determined by the Commission."[^562] Pursuant to these statutory
     provisions, the Commission requires LECs to offer interim number
     portability "to the extent technically feasible."[^563] The
     Commission also requires LECs to gradually replace interim number
     portability with permanent number portability.[^564] The Commission
     has established guidelines for states to follow in mandating a
     competitively neutral cost-recovery mechanism for interim number
     portability,[^565] and created a competitively neural cost-recovery
     mechanism for long-term number portability.[^566]

## Checklist Item 12 -- Local Dialing Parity

179. Section 271(c)(2)(B)(xii) requires a BOC to provide
     "\[n\]ondiscriminatory access to such services or information as
     are necessary to allow the requesting carrier to implement local
     dialing parity in accordance with the requirements of section
     251(b)(3)."[^567] Section 251(b)(3) imposes upon all LECs "\[t\]he
     duty to provide dialing parity to competing providers of telephone
     exchange service and telephone toll service with no unreasonable
     dialing delays."[^568] Section 153(15) of the Act defines "dialing
     parity" as follows:

\[A\] person that is not an affiliate of a local exchange carrier is
able to provide telecommunications services in such a manner that
customers have the ability to route automatically, without the use of
any access code, their telecommunications to the telecommunications
services provider of the customer's designation.[^569]

180. The rules implementing section 251(b)(3) provide that customers of
     competing carriers must be able to dial the same number of digits
     the BOC's customers dial to complete a local telephone call.[^570]
     Moreover, customers of competing carriers must not otherwise suffer
     inferior quality service, such as unreasonable dialing delays,
     compared to the BOC's customers.[^571]

## Checklist Item 13 -- Reciprocal Compensation

181. Section 271(c)(2)(B)(xiii) of the Act requires that a BOC enter
     into "\[r\]eciprocal compensation arrangements in accordance with
     the requirements of section 252(d)(2)."[^572] In turn, pursuant to
     section 252(d)(2)(A), "a state commission shall not consider the
     terms and conditions for reciprocal compensation to be just and
     reasonable unless (i) such terms and conditions provide for the
     mutual and reciprocal recovery by each carrier of costs associated
     with the transport and termination on each carrier's network
     facilities of calls that originate on the network facilities of the
     other carrier; and (ii) such terms and conditions determine such
     costs on the basis of a reasonable approximation of the additional
     costs of terminating such calls."[^573]

## Checklist Item 14 -- Resale

182. Section 271(c)(2)(B)(xiv) of the Act requires a BOC to make
     "telecommunications services . . . available for resale in
     accordance with the requirements of sections 251(c)(4) and
     252(d)(3)."[^574] Section 251(c)(4)(A) requires incumbent LECs "to
     offer for resale at wholesale rates any telecommunications service
     that the carrier provides at retail to subscribers who are not
     telecommunications carriers."[^575] Section 252(d)(3) requires
     state commissions to "determine wholesale rates on the basis of
     retail rates charged to subscribers for the telecommunications
     service requested, excluding the portion thereof attributable to
     any marketing, billing, collection, and other costs that will be
     avoided by the local exchange carrier."[^576] Section 251(c)(4)(B)
     prohibits "unreasonable or discriminatory conditions or
     limitations" on service resold under section 251(c)(4)(A).[^577]
     Consequently, the Commission concluded in the *Local Competition
     First Report and Order* that resale restrictions are presumed to be
     unreasonable unless the LEC proves to the state commission that the
     restriction is reasonable and nondiscriminatory.[^578] If an
     incumbent LEC makes a service available only to a specific category
     of retail subscribers, however, a state commission may prohibit a
     carrier that obtains the service pursuant to section 251(c)(4)(A)
     from offering the service to a different category of
     subscribers.[^579] If a state creates such a limitation, it must do
     so consistent with requirements established by the Federal
     Communications Commission.[^580] In accordance with sections
     271(c)(2)(B)(ii) and 271(c)(2)(B)(xiv), a BOC must also demonstrate
     that it provides nondiscriminatory access to operations support
     systems for the resale of its retail telecommunications
     services.[^581] The obligations of section 251(c)(4) apply to the
     retail telecommunications services offered by a BOC's advanced
     services affiliate.[^582]

# Compliance with separate affiliate requirements -- section 272

183. Section 271(d)(3)(B) requires that the Commission shall not approve
     a BOC's application to provide interLATA services unless the BOC
     demonstrates that the "requested authorization will be carried out
     in accordance with the requirements of section 272."[^583] The
     Commission set standards for compliance with section 272 in the
     *Accounting Safeguards Order* and the *Non-Accounting Safeguards
     Order*.[^584] Together, these safeguards discourage and facilitate
     the detection of improper cost allocation and cross-subsidization
     between the BOC and its section 272 affiliate.[^585] In addition,
     these safeguards ensure that BOCs do not discriminate in favor of
     their section 272 affiliates.[^586]

184. As the Commission stated in the *Ameritech Michigan Order*,
     compliance with section 272 is "of crucial importance" because the
     structural, transactional, and nondiscrimination safeguards of
     section 272 seek to ensure that BOCs compete on a level playing
     field.[^587] The Commission's findings regarding section 272
     compliance constitute independent grounds for denying an
     application.[^588] Past and present behavior of the BOC applicant
     provides "the best indicator of whether \[the applicant\] will
     carry out the requested authorization in compliance with section
     272."[^589]

# compliance with the Public Interest -- section 271(d)(3)(C)

185. In addition to determining whether a BOC satisfies the competitive
     checklist and will comply with section 272, Congress directed the
     Commission to assess whether the requested authorization would be
     consistent with the public interest, convenience, and
     necessity.[^590] Compliance with the competitive checklist is
     itself a strong indicator that long distance entry is consistent
     with the public interest. This approach reflects the Commission's
     many years of experience with the consumer benefits that flow from
     competition in telecommunications markets.

186. Nonetheless, the public interest analysis is an independent element
     of the statutory checklist and, under normal canons of statutory
     construction, requires an independent determination.[^591] Thus,
     the Commission views the public interest requirement as an
     opportunity to review the circumstances presented by the
     application to ensure that no other relevant factors exist that
     would frustrate the congressional intent that markets be open, as
     required by the competitive checklist, and that entry will
     therefore serve the public interest as Congress expected. Among
     other things, the Commission may review the local and long distance
     markets to ensure that there are not unusual circumstances that
     would make entry contrary to the public interest under the
     particular circumstances of the application at issue.[^592] Another
     factor that could be relevant to the analysis is whether the
     Commission has sufficient assurance that markets will remain open
     after grant of the application. While no one factor is dispositive
     in this analysis, the overriding goal is to ensure that nothing
     undermines the conclusion, based on the Commission's analysis of
     checklist compliance, that markets are open to competition.

**Separate Statement of**

**Commissioner Michael J. Copps,**

**Concurring**

Re: Application by Verizon New England, Inc., Bell Atlantic
Communications, Inc. (d/b/a Verizon Long Distance), NYNEX Long Distance
Company (d/b/a Verizon Enterprise Solutions), Verizon Global Networks,
Inc., and Verizon Select Services Inc., for Authorization to Provide
In-Region InterLATA Services in Rhode Island (CC Docket No. 01-324)

I write separately to explain the reasons that I concur in this Order
granting Verizon's application to provide long-distance services in
Rhode Island. One of the principal objectives of the Telecommunications
Act of 1996 is to promote competition in all telecommunications markets.
At the core of this effort is section 271, pursuant to which Bell
companies could enter the long-distance market, but only after they have
opened their local markets to competition. In my evaluation of section
271 applications, I have voted to grant certain applications and to deny
others, ever mindful of Congress' directive that a Bell company must
meet all the checklist items, and that the grant of an application must
serve the public interest.

Verizon has done a great deal to open its local markets to competition
in Rhode Island. I also commend the Rhode Island Commission for its
significant efforts to ensure competition in its local markets. Indeed,
several problems at issue in prior applications were not raised by
commenters here. The major issue in this proceeding has been the pricing
of network elements. Parties raised serious concerns about both the
original rates adopted in Rhode Island and reduced rates implemented in
November prior to the filing of this application. As the Order
indicates, the Commission "strongly question\[s\]" whether the original
rates complied with the statutory requirements.

This Order, however, grants Verizon a waiver of our rules and accepts
new rate reductions filed by Verizon on day 80 of the 90-day statutory
period. The Order permits Verizon to prove compliance with the checklist
by comparing these reduced rates to those adopted by the New York
Commission on January 28. I am pleased that Verizon reduced its prices
to levels in line with the corrected New York rates. I further support
the clear statement in this Order that "it would be inappropriate to
evaluate Verizon's Rhode Island rates based on a benchmark comparison to
superseded New York rates." As I indicated in my dissent to the *Verizon
Pennsylvania* Order, I do not believe that this Commission should
evaluate rates in one state based on prices in another state -- in that
instance as well, New York \-- that had been called into question by an
Administrative Law Judge and that the state commission was in the
process of revising. Nonetheless, I only concur in this decision,
because these last-minute rate changes might not have been necessary had
the Commission not previously indicated its willingness to allow
comparisons to such outdated rates.

I am further troubled by the waiver of our procedural rules barring
late-filed information. Since the first application, this Commission has
stated, and reiterated numerous times, that an application must be
complete on the date it is filed. This rule is critical to a fair and
orderly process. Reaching a decision within 90 days in a proceeding that
involves an enormous record and numerous complex issues would be
difficult, if not impossible, if we are faced with a moving target. Such
late-filed evidence prejudices the ability of other parties, the
Department of Justice, and the relevant State commission to evaluate an
application. Yet, time and again, this Commission waives this procedural
rule.

Although I am troubled by the extent to which we accept late-filed
information, in this instance, I concur due to the unique circumstances
present here. Verizon lowered its rates in response to a decision in a
neighboring state that occurred during the pendency of the application.
Thus, as the Order indicates, Verizon could not have known the timing of
the New York decision nor the exact rates that would be adopted. This is
different than the situation in which a party withholds evidence to game
the process.

Due to these extenuating circumstances, I concur in the extraordinary
step of granting a waiver. Notwithstanding our limited decision here, I
believe the Commission should state firmly that the strong presumption
is that late-filed information will not be accepted and that the bar for
a waiver will be set high. The section 271 process is central to
Congress' statutory framework. Allowing companies to violate our
procedural rules without penalty is tantamount to shirking our
responsibility to implement the law Congress gave us.

**STATEMENT OF\
COMMISSIONER KEVIN J . MARTIN, APPROVING IN PART AND CONCURRING IN
PART**

*Re: Application by Verizon New England Inc., Bell Atlantic
Communications, Inc. (d/b/a Verizon Long Distance), NYNEX Long Distance
Company (d/b/a Verizon Enterprise Solutions), Verizon Global Networks
Inc., and Verizon Select Services Inc., for Authorization To Provide
In-Region, InterLATA Services in Rhode Island*, Memorandum Opinion and
Order, CC Docket No. 01-324

Today we grant Verizon authority to provide in-region, interLATA service
originating in the State of Rhode Island. I am pleased to support this
Order and commend the Rhode Island Public Utilities Commission, Verizon,
and this Commission's staff for their hard work.

Nevertheless, I concur in this Order because of concerns I have with two
issues: application of our complete-as-filed requirement and
observations concerning the validity of superseded rates that are no
longer at issue in this proceeding.

The complete-as-filed requirement provides that "when an applicant files
new information after the comment date, the Commission reserves the
right to start the 90-day review period again or to accord such
information no weight." *Joint Application by SBC Communications Inc.,
Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., and Southwestern Bell Communications
Services, Inc., d/b/a Southwestern Bell Long Distance for Provision of
In-Region, InterLATA Services in Kansas and Oklahoma*, Memorandum
Opinion and Order, 16 FCC Rcd 6237, 6247 ¶ 21 (2001), *aff'd in part*,
*remanded in part sub nom. Sprint Communications Co. v. FCC*, 274 F.3d
549 (D.C. Cir. 2001). Here, based on truly unique circumstances, we
waive the complete-as-filed requirement and rely on data filed by the
applicant well after the comment date.

The unique circumstances at issue arise because a core element of
Verizon's evidence in support of its section 271 application changed
outside of its control. When Verizon filed its application, it relied on
UNE rates in Rhode Island -- described in the Order as the "April 11
rates" -- that Verizon supported based on a benchmark with rates then in
effect in New York. On day 63 of our review, however, the New York
Public Service Commission altered Verizon's rates, among other things
lowering Verizon's New York switching rate by approximately 50 percent.
Commenters urged Verizon to use the new New York switching rate as a
benchmark, and Verizon submitted new Rhode Island rates that did so.
Commenters were then given an opportunity -- albeit a brief one -- to
comment on Verizon's limited rate changes, which were consistent with
what many of them had advocated.

I wish to emphasize that, absent the kind of extremely unique
circumstances at issue here, the Commission should avoid relying on
late-filed information. We have begun to take such information into
account with more frequency, and I fear that we may be moving in the
wrong direction. In particular, I am concerned that relying on this
information may burden commenters -- particularly those opposing an
application. Commenters need adequate time to evaluate and analyze new
information, especially if it affects significant aspects of an
application. When we accept late-filed information, we create additional
burdens for them.

In my view, we would be better served by emphasizing the importance of
having all of an applicant's supporting information in the record when
the application is filed rather than granting the waivers that have
become more frequent recently. While I acknowledge that any rule will
probably necessitate some exceptions, we can and should make significant
improvements in this area.

Also troubling to me are this Order's observations concerning Verizon's
superseded April 11 rates. As explained above, the Order grants
Verizon's 271 application based on new rates, which we find valid under
a benchmark comparison with the rates recently established by the New
York Public Service Commission. Although this analysis definitively
resolves the issue of the validity of Verizon's rates, the Order also
makes several observations about the validity of the superseded April 11
rates, suggesting that several of them were "questionable."

In my view, this dicta is unnecessary. Once the Commission concludes
that a section 271 application meets the statutory requirements, the
Commission should not offer dicta on a different set of rates no longer
before it. I believe that such observations extend the Commission beyond
a proper adjudicatory role and suggest limitations on states conducting
their own rate proceedings. States should have the opportunity to have
their rate decisions judged on a clean slate, without the burden of such
disapproving dicta.

For these reasons, I concur in this Order.

[^1]: We refer to the Communications Act of 1934, as amended by the
    Telecommunications Act of 1996 and other statutes, as the
    Communications Act, or the Act. *See* 47 U.S.C. §§ 151 *et seq*. We
    refer to the Telecommunications Act of 1996 as the 1996 Act. *See*
    Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56
    (1996).

[^2]: *See* Letter from Clint E. Odom, Director - Federal Regulatory,
    Verizon, to Magalie Roman Salas, Secretary, Federal Communications
    Commission, CC Docket No. 01-324 (filed Dec. 11, 2001) (clarifying
    information contained in Verizon Application, App. A, Vol. 3, Tab F,
    Local Competition in Rhode Island (Verizon Local Competition
    Report)) (Verizon Dec. 11 *Ex Parte* Letter) and Letter from Clint
    E. Odom, Director -- Federal Regulatory, Verizon, to Magalie Roman
    Salas, Secretary, Federal Communications Commission, CC Docket No.
    01-324 (filed Dec. 20, 2001) (providing retail line counts for
    Verizon Rhode Island and clarifying information contained in Verizon
    Local Competition Report) (Verizon Dec. 20 *Ex Parte* Letter)
    (*citing confidential portion*); *see also* Letter from Clint E.
    Odom, Directory - Federal Regulatory, Verizon, to Magalie Roman
    Salas, Secretary, Federal Communications Commission, CC Docket No.
    01-324 (filed Jan. 25, 2002) (attaching Declaration of Paula L.
    Brown).

[^3]: *See* Verizon Dec. 11 *Ex Parte* Letter and Verizon Dec. 20 *Ex
    Parte* Letter.

[^4]: *See* Verizon Dec. 11 *Ex Parte* Letter and Verizon Dec. 20 *Ex
    Parte* Letter.

[^5]: The Commission has summarized the relevant statutory framework in
    prior orders. *See, e.g.*, *Joint Application by SBC Communications
    Inc., Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., and Southwestern Bell
    Communications Services, Inc., d/b/a Southwestern Bell Long Distance
    for Provision of In-Region, InterLATA Services in Kansas and
    Oklahoma*, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 16 FCC Rcd 6237, 6241-42,
    paras. 7-10 (2001) (*SWBT Kansas/Oklahoma Order*), *aff'd in part*,
    *remanded in part sub nom. Sprint Communications Co. v. FCC*, No.
    01-1076 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 28, 2001); *Application by SBC
    Communications Inc., Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., and Southwestern
    Bell Communications Services, Inc. d/b/a Southwestern Bell Long
    Distance pursuant to Section 271 of the Telecommunications Act of
    1996 To Provide In-Region, InterLATA Services in Texas*, Memorandum
    Opinion and Order, 15 FCC Rcd 18354, 18359-61, paras. 8-11 (2000)
    (*SWBT Texas Order*); *Application by Bell Atlantic New York for
    Authorization Under Section 271 of the Communications Act to Provide
    In-Region, InterLATA Service in the State of New York*, Memorandum
    Opinion and Order, 15 FCC Rcd 3953, 3961-63, paras. 17-20 (1999)
    (*Bell Atlantic New York Order*), *aff'd*, *AT&T Corp. v. FCC*, 220
    F.3d 607 (D.C. Cir. 2000).

[^6]: A more detailed history of the UNE pricing proceeding is provided
    below. *See infra* Part III.A.1.a.

[^7]: Rhode Island PUC, *Verizon-Rhode Island's Proposed
    Carrier-to-Carrier Performance Standards and Reports and Performance
    Assurance Plan for Rhode Island*, Report and Order, Docket Nos. 3195
    & 3256 (rel. Dec. 3, 2001) at 1-2 (*Rhode Island PUC C2C and PAP
    Order*).

[^8]: *See id.*; Verizon Application App. A, Vol. 3, Tab C, Joint
    Declaration of Elaine M. Guerard, Julie A. Canny, and Beth A.
    Abesamis at paras. 27-30 (Verizon Guerard/Canny/Abesamis Decl.).

[^9]: The Rhode Island Commission concludes this proceeding with
    comments filed in this docket. *See* Rhode Island Commission
    Comments at 4-8.

[^10]: Rhode Island Commission Comments at 2.

[^11]: *Id.* at 189.

[^12]: *Id.* at 9-10.

[^13]: *Id.* at 189.

[^14]: Department of Justice Evaluation at 6 (footnote omitted).

[^15]: *Id.* at 6.

[^16]: *Id.* at 2.

[^17]: 47 U.S.C. § 271(d)(2)(A).

[^18]: *See Updated Filing Requirements for Bell Operating Company
    Applications Under Section 271 of the Communications Act*, Public
    Notice, DA 01-734 (CCB rel. Mar. 23, 2001) (*Mar. 23, 2001 Public
    Notice*); *Application of Verizon Pennsylvania Inc., Verizon Long
    Distance, Verizon Enterprise Solutions, Verizon Global Networks Inc.
    for Authorization To Provide In-Region, InterLATA Services in
    Pennsylvania*, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 16 FCC Rcd 17419,
    17472-73, para. 98 (2001) (*Verizon Pennsylvania Order*);
    *Application of Verizon New York Inc., Verizon Long Distance,
    Verizon Enterprise Solutions, Verizon Global Networks Inc., for
    Authorization to Provide In-Region, InterLATA Services in
    Connecticut*, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 16 FCC Rcd 14147,
    14163-64, paras. 34-38 (2001) (*Verizon Connecticut Order*); *SWBT
    Kansas/Oklahoma Order*, 16 FCC Rcd at 6247-50, paras. 20-27; *Bell
    Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 3968-69, paras. 32-37;
    *Application of Ameritech Michigan Pursuant to Section 271 of the
    Communications Act of 1934, as amended, To Provide In-Region,
    InterLATA Services in Michigan*, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 12
    FCC Rcd 20543, 20570-76, paras. 49-59 (1997) (*Ameritech Michigan
    Order*).

[^19]: *See SWBT Kansas/Oklahoma Order*, 16 FCC Rcd at 6247, para. 21.

[^20]: *See Ameritech Michigan Order*, 12 FCC Rcd at 20572-73, paras.
    52-54.

[^21]: *Northeast Cellular Tel. Co. v. FCC*, 897 F.2d 1164, 1166 (D.C.
    Cir. 1990); *WAIT Radio v. FCC*, 418 F.2d 1153 (D.C. Cir. 1969);
    *see also* 47 U.S.C. § 154(j); 47 C.F.R. § 1.3.

[^22]: 47 C.F.R. § 1.3.

[^23]: *See* Letter from Dee May, Assistant Vice President - Federal
    Regulatory, Verizon, to William Caton, Acting Secretary, Federal
    Communications Commission, CC Docket No. 01-324 (Feb. 14, 2002)
    (attaching Rhode Island revised tariff filing) (Verizon Feb. 14 *Ex
    Parte* Letter); Public Notice, *Comments Requested in Connection
    with Verizon's Section 271 Application for Rhode Island*, CC Docket
    No. 01-324, DA 02-356 (rel. Feb. 14, 2002) (Feb. 14 Public Notice).

[^24]: As we explain in more detail *infra* part III.A.1.b(ii), when a
    state commission does not apply TELRIC principles or does so
    improperly, then we will look at whether a comparison of the rates
    in the applicant state to rates that were approved in other section
    271 applications nonetheless evidences that the applicant's rates
    fall within the range that a reasonable TELRIC-based rate proceeding
    would produce. *See SWBT Kansas/Oklahoma Order*, 16 FCC Rcd at
    6276-78, paras. 82-84. We note that there was considerable dispute
    in the record regarding whether Verizon's rates as originally filed
    would satisfy a benchmark comparison to the rates in effect in New
    York at that time. Because the New York Commission has modified its
    rates, we need not resolve this dispute with respect to the rates
    that are no longer in effect.

[^25]: New York PSC, *Proceeding on Motion of the Commission to Examine
    New York Telephone Company's Rates for Unbundled Network Elements*,
    Case 98-1357, Order on Unbundled Network Element Rates (rel. Jan 28,
    2002).

[^26]: Letter from Robert W. Quinn, Jr., Vice President, Federal
    Government Affairs, AT&T, to William F. Caton, Acting Secretary,
    Federal Communications Commission, CC Docket No. 01-324 (Feb. 12,
    2002); Letter from Robert W. Quinn, Jr., Vice President, Federal
    Government Affairs, AT&T, to William F. Caton, Acting Secretary,
    Federal Communications Commission, CC Docket No. 01-324 (Feb. 1,
    2002) (AT&T Feb. 1 *Ex Parte* Letter); Letter from Keith L. Seat,
    Senior Counsel, WorldCom, to Magalie Roman Salas, Secretary, Federal
    Communications Commission, CC Docket No. 01-324 (Jan. 31, 2002)
    (WorldCom Jan. 31 *Ex Parte* letter); Letter from Clint E. Odom,
    Director - Federal Regulatory, Verizon, to Commissioner Kathleen Q.
    Abernathy, Federal Communications Commission, CC Docket No. 01-324
    (Feb. 8, 2002) (Verizon Feb. 8 *Ex Parte* Letter).

[^27]: AT&T Feb. 1 *Ex Parte* Letter, at 16 ("Thus, even under Verizon's
    view of the NYPSC decision, the Commission cannot grant an
    application on February 24, 2002 unless it finds that Verizon will
    reduce Rhode Island rates to the New York levels no later than March
    1, 2002.").

[^28]: *See* Verizon Feb. 14 *Ex Parte* Letter.

[^29]: Verizon Feb. 14 *Ex Parte* Letter. The rates for reciprocal
    compensation, which are based on these switching rates, are also
    correspondingly reduced. *See id.* Attach. at 2.

[^30]: *See* Letter from Clint E. Odom, Director - Federal Regulatory,
    Verizon, to William Caton, Acting Secretary, Federal Communications
    Commission, CC Docket No. 01-324 (Feb. 21, 2002) (attaching Rhode
    Island PUC, *Unbundled Local Switching and Analog Line Port Rates -
    Verizon Rhode Island's Section 271 Compliance Filing*, Docket No.
    3363, Order (rel. Feb. 21, 2002) (*Second Rhode Island Switching
    Order*)).

[^31]: *Ameritech Michigan Order*, 12 FCC Rcd at 20573, para. 55
    (emphasis omitted).

[^32]: *See supra* n.Error: Reference source not found; ASCENT Comments
    at 6-9; AT&T Comments at 15; WorldCom Comments at 9-10.

[^33]: *See Second Rhode Island Switching Order* at 3.

[^34]: *See* Department of Justice Evaluation at 6 (quoting Evaluation
    of the Department of Justice, in *Joint Application by SBC
    Communications, Inc. et al. for Provision of In-Region InterLATA
    Services in Kansas and Oklahoma*, CC Docket No. 00-207 (Dec. 4,
    2001)).

[^35]: *See* AT&T Supp. Comments at 2 & n.1, 3 & n.2.

[^36]: *See SWBT Kansas/Oklahoma Order*, 16 FCC Rcd at 6249, para. 26,
    6263, para. 52, 6270, para. 72. We disagree with AT&T that delaying
    the effectiveness of section 271 authorization is an ineffective
    deterrent and remedy for violation of the complete-as-filed rule,
    but we do not invoke that remedy here because, as described above,
    Verizon was not engaging in gamesmanship by resisting rate
    reductions.

[^37]: *See* ASCENT Supp. Comments at 2, 6-14; AT&T Supp. Comments at 2
    & n.1, 3 & n.2.

[^38]: *See* AT&T Feb. 1 *Ex Parte* Letter at 16; *see also* AT&T
    Comments at 15 (comparing Verizon's Rhode Island switching rates to
    rates recommended by ALJ in New York).

[^39]: *See* AT&T Supp. Comments at 2-3; ASCENT Supp. Comments at 8-9.

[^40]: *See* ASCENT Supp. Comments at 10-11.

[^41]: *See SWBT Kansas/Oklahoma Order*, 16 FCC Rcd at 6250, para. 27.

[^42]: *See* AT&T Supp. Comments at 2.

[^43]: *See supra* para. 11 & n.Error: Reference source not found; *see
    also infra* part III.A.1.b(ii).

[^44]: As noted previously, AT&T in an earlier filing urged the
    Commission to benchmark Verizon's Rhode Island rates against its new
    New York rates. *See* AT&T Feb. 1 *Ex Parte* Letter at 16.

[^45]: *See* AT&T Supp. Comments at 2.

[^46]: *See infra* part III.A.1.b(ii).

[^47]: *See* ASCENT Supp. Comments at 10-14; AT&T Supp. Comments at 3.

[^48]: *See In the matter of Joint Application by SBC Communications
    Inc., Southwestern Bell Telephone Company, and Southwestern Bell
    Communications Services, Inc., d/b/a/ Southwestern Bell Long
    Distance Pursuant to Section 271 of the Telecommunications Act of
    1996 To Provide In-Region , InterLATA Services in Arkansas and
    Missouri*, 16 FCC Rcd 20719, 20797-882, Appendices. B, C, and D
    (2001) (*SWBT Arkansas/Missouri Order*); *Verizon Pennsylvania
    Order*, 16 FCC Rcd at 17508-45, Appendices B & C.

[^49]: *See SWBT Texas Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 18372, para. 39
    (considering April 2000 performance data, when application was filed
    on April 5, 2000, and comments on the application were due on April
    26, 2000).

[^50]: 47 U.S.C. § 252(d)(1).

[^51]: *See* 47 C.F.R. §§ 51.501-09.

[^52]: *Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC*, 120 F.3d 753, 800, 804, 805-06 (8^th^
    Cir. 1997).

[^53]: *American Tel. & Tel Co. v. Iowa Utils. Bd.,* 525 U.S. 366 (1999)
    (*AT&T v. Iowa Utils. Bd*.). In reaching its decision, the Court
    acknowledged that section 201(b) "explicitly grants the FCC
    jurisdiction to make rules governing matters to which the 1996 Act
    applies." *Id.* at 380. Furthermore, the Court determined that
    section 251(d) also provides evidence of an express jurisdictional
    grant by requiring that "the Commission \[shall\] complete all
    actions necessary to establish regulations to implement the
    requirements of this section." *Id.* at 382. The Court also held
    that the pricing provisions implemented under the Commission's
    rulemaking authority do not inhibit the establishment of rates by
    the states. The Court concluded that the Commission has jurisdiction
    to design a pricing methodology to facilitate local competition
    under the 1996 Act, including pricing for interconnection and
    unbundled access, as "it is the States that will apply those
    standards and implement that methodology, determining the concrete
    result." *Id*.

[^54]: *Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC*, 219 F.3d 744 (8^th^ Cir. 2000),
    *petition for cert. granted sub nom. Verizon Communications v. FCC*,
    121 S. Ct. 877, 148 L. Ed.2d 788, 69 USLW 3269, 69 USLW 3490, 69
    USLW 3495 (U.S. Jan. 22, 2001).

[^55]: *Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC*, No. 96-3321 *et al.* (8^th^ Cir. Sept.
    25, 2000).

[^56]: *Verizon Communications v. FCC*, 121 S. Ct. 877, 148 L. Ed.2d
    788, 69 USLW 3269, 69 USLW 3490, 69 USLW 3495 (Jan. 22, 2001).

[^57]: Rhode Island PUC, *Review of Bell Atlantic-Rhode Island TELRIC
    Study*, Report and Order at 4, Docket No. 2681 (rel. Nov. 18, 2001)
    (*Rhode Island TELRIC Order*); Rhode Island Commission Comments at
    43; Verizon Application, App. A, Vol. 3, Tab D, Joint Declaration of
    Donna Cupelo, Patrick Garzillo and Michael Anglin (Verizon
    Cupelo/Garzillo/Anglin Decl.) at 5, para. 17.

[^58]: *Rhode Island TELRIC Order* at 4; Verizon Cupelo/Garzillo/Anglin
    Decl. at 6, para. 19

[^59]: Rhode Island Commission Comments at 43.

[^60]: Verizon Cupelo/Garzillo/Anglin Decl. at 7-8, para. 26.

[^61]: *Rhode Island TELRIC Order* at 5.

[^62]: *Id*. at 4.

[^63]: *Id*. at 75-76; Rhode Island Commission Reply at 3.

[^64]: Rhode Island Commission Reply at 3.

[^65]: Rhode Island Commission Comments at 43, n.138; *see also* Rhode
    Island PUC, *Verizon-Rhode Island's TELRIC Studies-UNE Remand*,
    Report and Order at 15, Docket No. 2681 (rel. Dec. 3, 2001) (*Rhode
    Island UNE Remand Order*).

[^66]: Rhode Island PUC, *Unbundled Local Switching Rate Verizon-Rhode
    Island's Section 271 Compliance Filing*, Report and Order at 2,
    Docket No. 3363 (rel. Nov. 28, 2001) (*Rhode Island Switching
    Order*); Rhode Island Commission Comments at 42; Verizon
    Cupelo/Garzillo/Anglin Decl. at 10, para. 37.

[^67]: Rhode Island Commission Comments at 42; Verizon
    Cupelo/Garzillo/Anglin Decl. at 10-11, para. 38.

[^68]: *Rhode Island Switching Order* at 4-5.

[^69]: *Rhode Island Switching Order* at 5; *see also* Rhode Island
    Commission Comments at 42.

[^70]: *Rhode Island Switching Order* at 5-6 (citing Rhode Island PUC,
    *Unbundled Local Switching Rates Verizon-Rhode Island's Section 271
    Compliance Filing*, AT&T Post Hearing Brief at 7-8, Docket No. 3363
    (Nov. 2, 2001)).

[^71]: *Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions of the
    Telecommunications Act of 1996*, CC Docket No. 96-98, Third Report
    and Order and Fourth Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 15 FCC
    Rcd 3696 (1999) (*UNE Remand Order*).

[^72]: *Rhode Island UNE Remand Order* at 4.

[^73]: *Id*. at 15; s*ee also* Verizon Cupelo/Garzillo/Anglin Decl. at
    10, para. 34.

[^74]: New York PSC, *Proceeding on Motion of the Commission to Examine
    New York Telephone Company's Rates for Unbundled Network Elements*,
    Case 98-1357, Order on Unbundled Network Element Rates (rel. Jan.
    28, 2002) (*New York UNE Rate Order*). The New York Commission based
    its order on an Administrative Law Judge's (ALJ's) Recommended
    Decision released on May 16, 2001. Until the New York Commission's
    order, the ALJ's recommendations were not final and subject to
    change.

[^75]: *Id.*

[^76]: Rhode Island PUC, *Unbundled Local Switching Rates Verizon-Rhode
    Island's Section 271 Compliance Filing*, Order at 3, Docket No. 3363
    (rel. Feb. 21, 2002) (*Second* *Rhode Island Switching Order*).

[^77]: *SWBT Kansas/Oklahoma Order,* 16 FCC Rcd at 6266, para. 59; *Bell
    Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 4084, para. 244.

[^78]: *Rhode Island TELRIC Order* at 4; Rhode Island Commission
    Comments at 43.

[^79]: Department of Justice Evaluation at 6.

[^80]: Rhode Island Commission Comments at 42. Based upon this record,
    we reject AT&T's claim that the interim rates were "unlitigated."
    AT&T Comments at 3.

[^81]: *See generally Rhode Island TELRIC Order*.

[^82]: *See Rhode Island Switching Order and Second Rhode Island
    Switching Order*.

[^83]: *See generally Rhode Island UNE Rate Order*.

[^84]: *Rhode Island TELRIC Order* at 5.

[^85]: Verizon Application at 88, Verizon Cupelo/Garzillo/Anglin Decl.
    at 10, para. 38; *Rhode Island TELRIC Order* at 5.

[^86]: Verizon Cupelo/Garzillo/Anglin Decl. at 10, para. 38; Verizon
    Feb. 14 *Ex Parte* Letter.

[^87]: *Rhode Island Switching Order* at 5.

[^88]: *Second* *Rhode Island Switching Order* at 3.

[^89]: *Rhode Island Switching Order* at 5.

[^90]: Where a state has not conducted a TELRIC rate proceeding, its
    rates may nonetheless be found to be TELRIC compliant if they pass
    our benchmark test. *See* *SWBT Missouri/Arkansas Order* at paras.
    67-68.

[^91]: AT&T Comments at 3-4 and 6; WorldCom Comments at 3. The assertion
    by AT&T and WorldCom that the Rhode Island Commission mandated the
    assumptions is incorrect. The Rhode Island Commission adopted
    rebuttable presumptions for its upcoming rate proceeding, many of
    which were recommended by its own Division of Public Utilities and
    Carriers, or the Rhode Island ratepayer advocate*. Rhode Island
    TELRIC Order* at 21, 24, and 35; Rhode Island Commission Comments at
    43, n.139; Rhode Island Reply at 2; Verizon Cupelo/Garzillo/Anglin
    Decl. at 16-17, paras. 49, 50.

[^92]: *Rhode Island* *TELRIC Order* at 24, 21; Rhode Island Commission
    Comments at 43, n.139; Rhode Island Reply at 2; Verizon
    Cupelo/Garzillo/Anglin Decl. at 16-17, paras. 49, 50.

[^93]: *See, e.g*., *Verizon Pennsylvania Order*, 16 FCC Rcd at 17454,
    para. 57.

[^94]: *See, e.g.,* *Verizon Massachusetts Order*, 16 FCC Rcd at 9007,
    para. 39; *SWBT Kansas/Oklahoma Order,* 16 FCC Rcd at 6237, paras.
    79-80.

[^95]: AT&T Comments at 4; WorldCom Comments at 3-4.

[^96]: *Bell Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 4085-86, para. 247.

[^97]: *AT&T Corp. v. FCC,* 22 F.3d 607, 617-18 (D.C. Cir. 2000).

[^98]: AT&T Comments at 8, 12; WorldCom Comments at 5-7.

[^99]: *Local Competition Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at 15848-49, para. 685,
    15845, n.1682; *see also* 47 C.F.R. § 51.505.

[^100]: *Rhode Island TELRIC Order* at 35.

[^101]: AT&T Comments at 42-43; WorldCom Comments at 6-7.

[^102]: *Id*.

[^103]: *Rhode Island TELRIC Order* at 36-37.

[^104]: *Id*. at 36.

[^105]: *Id.* at 37-38.

[^106]: *See SWBT Kansas/Oklahoma Order*, 16 FCC Rcd at 6276, para. 82.

[^107]: *See SWBT Missouri/Arkansas Order* at para. 56; *Verizon
    Pennsylvania Order*, 16 FCC Rcd at 17457, para. 63. We note,
    however, that in the *Verizon Pennsylvania Order*, we found that
    several of these criteria should be treated as indicia of the
    reasonableness of the comparison. *Id*. at para. 64. *See* *also*
    *Verizon Massachusetts Order*, 16 FCC Rcd at 9002, para. 28; *SWBT*
    *Kansas/Oklahoma Order*, 16 FCC Rcd at 6276, para. 82.

[^108]: *See, e.g.,* *Verizon Pennsylvania Order*, 16 FCC Rcd at 17457,
    para. 67; *Verizon Massachusetts Order*, 16 FCC Rcd at 9000-02,
    paras. 23-27. Loop rates consist of charges for the local loop, and
    non-loop rates consist of charges for switching, signaling, and
    transport.

[^109]: *Verizon Pennsylvania Order*, 16 FCC Rcd at 17458, para. 66;
    *SWBT Missouri/Arkansas Order* at para. 58.

[^110]: *See generally* *New York UNE Rate Order*.

[^111]: Verizon Application at 91; Verizon Cupelo/Garzillo/Anglin Decl.
    at 17-19, paras. 51-56.

[^112]: *See* AT&T Feb. 1 *Ex Parte* Letter; WorldCom Jan. 31 *Ex Parte*
    Letter.

[^113]: *Verizon Massachusetts Order*, 16 FCC Rcd at 9000, para 23.

[^114]: *Bell Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 4083-84, para.
    242; 4084-85, para. 245.

[^115]: *Id.* at 4085-86, para. 247.

[^116]: *AT&T Corp. v. FCC*, 220 F.3d at 618.

[^117]: *Verizon Massachusetts Order*, 16 FCC Rcd at 9000, para. 23.

[^118]: *Id*. at 9003, para. 31.

[^119]: *Id.* at 9002-03, paras. 29-30. We note that this Commission
    order was approved by two Commissioners, with one concurrence and
    one dissent. In his separate statement, Chairman Powell explained
    the situation as follows: "If New York in fact revises its rates
    downward after concluding that its prior determinations were not
    soundly cost-based, neither Verizon nor anyone else could properly
    rely in future applications on the rates we approved in the *Bell
    Atlantic New York Order* without new substantiation. Furthermore,
    depending on the scope of the New York Commission's upcoming
    decision on rates, this Commission might determine that Verizon has
    subsequently 'ceased to meet \[one\] of the conditions required for
    \[section 271\] approval,' thereby empowering us to take remedial
    action under section 271(d)(6)." *Id.* at 9143.

[^120]: *See generally* *New York UNE Rate Order*.

[^121]: *Id*. at 28.

[^122]: Among other things, the New York Commission adjusted how much of
    the cost of switching is recovered through the flat-rated port
    charge and how much is recovered through traffic-sensitive
    per-minute charges, raising the portion recovered through flat
    charges and reducing the portion recovered through per-minute
    charges. *Id*. at 36.

[^123]: AT&T Feb. 1 *Ex Parte* Letter; WorldCom Jan. 31 *Ex Parte*
    Letter.

[^124]: *Bell Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 4085-86, para.
    247, *aff'd, AT&T Corp. v. FCC*, 220 F.3d at 617.

[^125]: *AT&T Corp*. *v. FCC*, 22 F.3d at 617-18.

[^126]: *New York UNE Rate Order* at 21.

[^127]: *See SWBT Texas Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 18471-77, paras. 231-242;
    *SWBT Kansas/Oklahoma Order*, 16 FCC Rcd at 6264, para. 55, 6273,
    para. 73, 6274-75, para. 77; *Verizon Pennsylvania Order*, 16 FCC
    Rcd at 17458-59, para. 67; *SWBT Missouri Arkansas Order* at paras
    60, 67.

[^128]: *See* Verizon Feb. 14 *Ex Parte* Letter; Feb. 14 Public Notice.

[^129]: *Second Rhode Island Switching Order* at 3.

[^130]: Verizon Feb. 14 *Ex Parte* Letter at 2.

[^131]: *Bell Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 4085-86, para.
    247.

[^132]: AT&T Comments at 15; WorldCom Comments at 10.

[^133]: AT&T Feb. 1 *Ex Parte* Letter; WorldCom Jan. 31 *Ex Parte*
    Letter; Verizon Feb. 8 *Ex Parte* Letter.

[^134]: AT&T Feb. 1 *Ex Parte* letter at 16.

[^135]: *See New York UNE Rate Order* at 20-33.

[^136]: *Bell Atlantic New York Order,* 15 FCC Rcd at 4085-86, para.
    247; *Verizon Massachusetts Order*, 16 FCC Rcd at 9004, para. 33.

[^137]: *New York UNE Rate Order* at 21.

[^138]: *Id*. at 22; *see also* *Bell Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC
    Rcd at 4085-86, para. 247.

[^139]: AT&T Feb. 12 *Ex Parte* Letter at 3.

[^140]: AT&T Comments at 15; WorldCom Comments at 10.

[^141]: WorldCom Comments at iii. AT&T also stated: "To the extent that
    a benchmark analysis is used in this case, \[the New York ALJ
    recommended rates\] are the appropriate benchmark comparisons for
    Rhode Island at the present time." AT&T Comments at 15.

[^142]: AT&T Feb. 1 *Ex Parte* Letter at 16.

[^143]: *See* Feb. 14 Public Notice.

[^144]: *AT&T Corp. v. FCC*, 220 F.3d 607 (D.C. Cir. 2000)

[^145]: *See, e.g*., *SWBT Kansas/Oklahoma Order*, 16 FCC Rcd at 6266,
    para. 59.

[^146]: See AT&T Feb. 1 *Ex Parte* Letter at 16; AT&T Comments at 15;
    WorldCom Comments at iii.

[^147]: Rhode Island Commission Reply at 3.

[^148]: *See* the discussion of our waiver of our "complete when filed"
    rule *supra* part II.

[^149]: In reaching this conclusion, we used state-specific Dial
    Equipment Minutes (DEM) rather than nationwide data to compute
    minutes of use for the benchmark analysis. We also used data
    submitted by Verizon regarding interswitch versus intraswitch and
    originating versus terminating minutes of use. *See* Letters from
    Clint E. Odom, Director - Federal Regulatory, Verizon to William F.
    Caton, Acting Secretary, Federal Communications Commission, Feb. 19,
    2002, Jan. 18, 2002, and Jan. 16, 2002. We used these data because,
    where available, verifiable, state-specific data provide a more
    valid comparison. We note that our use of this data has a very small
    effect on the outcome of the benchmark comparison. We also note that
    Verizon's new New York non-loop rates contain both a digital and an
    analog port rate. The New York rate structure uses the digital port
    rate of \$2.57 as the rate charged for ports that are purchased as
    part of the UNE-Platform. Therefore, for purposes of our benchmark
    analysis, we have compared Verizon's New York digital port rate of
    \$2.57, rather than the analog port rate of \$4.22, or any blend of
    the two rates, to Verizon's February 21 single Rhode Island port
    rate of \$1.86.

[^150]: WorldCom Comments at 10.

[^151]: *Rhode Island TELRIC Order* at 51-52; Rhode Island Commission
    Comments at 43, n.139; Verizon Cupelo/Garzillo/Anglin Decl. at
    13-14, para. 44.

[^152]: *See, e.g*., *Verizon Massachusetts Order,* 16 FCC Rcd at 9007,
    para. 39; *SWBT Kansas/Oklahoma Order,* 16 FCC Rcd at 6275, paras.
    79, 80.

[^153]: *Rhode Island TELRIC Order* at 40.

[^154]: *Bell Atlantic New York Order,* 15 FCC Rcd at 4087-88, paras.
    248-249; *AT&T Corp. v. FCC*, 220 F.3d at 618-619 (upholding the
    Commission's finding that rates based on an assumption of 100
    percent fiber feeder were consistent with TELRIC principles); *see
    also* *Verizon Pennsylvania Order,* 16 FCC Rcd at 17455, para. 59.

[^155]: Specifically, WorldCom claims that loop rates do not incorporate
    TELRIC-compliant assumptions for structure sharing and use of
    integrated digital loop carrier. WorldCom Comments at 11-12.

[^156]: We note that Verizon's new New York loop rates resulted from the
    same comprehensive UNE rate proceeding described in detail at paras.
    50-53, *supra*.

[^157]: *See Verizon Pennsylvania Order,* 16 FCC Rcd at 17458, n.249;
    *Verizon Massachusetts Order,* 16 FCC Rcd at 9001, n.65, for a
    discussion of what assumptions are made and how costs are compared
    using the USF cost model.

[^158]: Rhode Island Commission Comments at 92.

[^159]: *See Verizon Connecticut Order*, 16 FCC Rcd at 14151, para. 8;
    *see also* *Verizon Pennsylvania Order*, 16 FCC Rcd at 17425, para.
    12.

[^160]: *See* Appendix D at para. 32.

[^161]: Verizon Application at 58; Verizon McLean/Wierzbicki Decl. at
    paras. 23, 50, 86, 90, 102, 115, 134, and Tab 2 at 1, 9, 11.

[^162]: The PwC report explains the similarities among the OSS in the
    Verizon New England states (Massachusetts and Rhode Island, as well
    as Maine, New Hampshire and Vermont). Verizon Application App. B,
    Tab 3, PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP report offered as Verizon's
    response to WorldCom data request 1-5 (PwC Report). The KPMG report
    explains only the similarities of Massachusetts and Rhode Island
    systems and describes three stand-alone tests of Rhode Island OSS
    elements that were not previously evaluated in Massachusetts.
    Verizon Application App. E, Tab 11, KPMG Report (KPMG Report).

[^163]: *See* PwC Report at 9.

[^164]: *See* KPMG Report at 13. Only in a single area, Metrics Change
    Management, did KPMG conclude that there were existing material
    differences. KPMG found that these differences reflected
    enhancements to Verizon's OSS since the time of the Massachusetts
    test. KPMG Report at 13.

[^165]: *Id.* at 5.

[^166]: Rhode Island Commission Comments at 92.

[^167]: *UNE Remand Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 3885-87, paras. 427-31 (1999);
    Rhode Island Commission Comments at 92.

[^168]: *See Verizon Massachusetts Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 9016-17, para.
    54. Additional support can be found in the PwC and KPMG reports.
    *See* PwC Report at 17-18; KPMG Report at 20.

[^169]: The Commission stated in the *Verizon Pennsylvania Order* that
    it intended to evaluate Verizon's permanent loop qualification OSS
    in section 271 applications Verizon filed after October 2001. *See*
    *Verizon Pennsylvania Order*, 16 FCC Rcd at 17447-48, para. 45. This
    is the first such application.

[^170]: *See* Verizon McLean/Wierzbicki Decl. at para. 46.

[^171]: *See* Verizon McLean/Wierzbicki Decl. Tab 2, at 5; Letter from
    Clint Odom, Director, Federal Regulatory, to Magalie Roman Salas,
    Secretary, Federal Communications Commission, CC Docket No. 01-324
    (filed Jan. 11, 2002) (Verizon Jan. 11 *Ex Parte* Letter). There are
    no performance measures to illustrate the timeliness of competitive
    LEC access to the LFACS information. To demonstrate timeliness,
    Verizon conducted a special study of Loop Make-Up transaction
    performance for the months of November and December 2001. During
    this time there were no competitive LEC transactions regarding loop
    make-up in Rhode Island. Additionally, there were no competitive LEC
    requests using the CORBA interface for loop make-up information in
    any area within the former Bell Atlantic footprint. There were 12
    requests using EDI and the average response time was 13.16 seconds.
    There were 544 requests using the Web GUI interface and the average
    response time for these was 15.06 seconds. *See* Verizon Jan. 11 *Ex
    Parte* Letter.

[^172]: *See* Verizon McLean/Wierzbicki Decl. at para. 45. *Cf. Verizon
    Massachusetts Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 9023-24, para. 65.

[^173]: *Cf. Verizon Massachusetts Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 9023-24, para.
    65.

[^174]: *See* Verizon Guerard/Canny/Abesamis Decl. Tab 4.

[^175]: *See* Verizon McLean/Wierzbicki Decl. Tab 2, at 1-3. Verizon's
    Rhode Island performance data demonstrate, in each month for which
    data exist, that it provides access to LiveWire within the timeframe
    adopted by the Rhode Island Commission. *See* PO 1-6-6020 (Facility
    Availability (Loop Qualification) -- EDI), PO 1-6-6030 (Facility
    Availability (Loop Qualification) -- CORBA) (no activity); PO
    1-6-6050 (Facility Availability (Loop Qualification) - Web GUI).
    Because Verizon only began reporting on its EDI interface in Rhode
    Island in October, we look to the Massachusetts data to support our
    finding. In Massachusetts, Verizon met the same standard of timely
    access in all months (July to October). PO-1-6-6020 (Facility
    Availability (Loop Qualification) -- EDI); PO 1-6-6050 (Facility
    Availability (Loop Qualification) - Web GUI); *see also* KPMG Report
    at 25 (POP 1-4-1 Pre-Order Response Timeliness).

[^176]: *See* Verizon McLean/Wierzbicki Decl. Tab 2, at 3.

[^177]: *See Verizon Massachusetts Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 9020, para. 59;
    *see also* Verizon McLean/Wierzbicki Decl. Tab 2, at 6-7. Verizon
    states that it received no requests for engineering records in July,
    August, or September in either Rhode Island or Massachusetts. *See*
    Verizon McLean/Wierzbicki Decl. at para. 49.

[^178]: *See* Rhode Island Commission Comments at 92-95.

[^179]: Specifically, Verizon has not consistently provided 95% of
    reject notices within established timeframes, as required by the
    Rhode Island Commission. *See* OR-2-04-2320 (resale POTS reject
    timeliness -- 1-5 lines) (showing timeliness rates of 92%, 92%, 93%,
    and 92%); OR-2-04-2200 (resale specials reject timeliness) (showing
    timeliness rates of 81%, 100%, 90%, and 90%); OR-2-04-3331 (UNE
    loop/pre-qualified complex/LNP reject timeliness -- 1-5 lines)
    (showing timeliness rates of 89%, 96%, 82%, and 94%).

[^180]: *See* Verizon McLean/Wierzbicki Decl. at para. 72; Verizon
    Guerard/Canny/Abesamis Decl. at para. 37.

[^181]: In November, Verizon satisfied the relevant benchmarks for all
    metrics mentioned *supra* n.Error: Reference source not found.
    Verizon's performance has been inconsistent under two other metrics
    that are not affected by the "data capture" problem identified by
    Verizon. *See* OR-2-06-3331 (UNE loop/pre-qualified complex/LNP
    reject timeliness **--** 6 or more lines) (showing timeliness rates
    of 94%, 92%, 100%, and 91%); *see also* OR-2-04-2200 (resale
    specials reject timeliness) (showing timeliness rates of 81%, 100%,
    90%, and 90%). We find that these performance disparities are
    slight, and note that Verizon's average timeliness rate for the past
    five months has been 95% and 94% respectively for these two
    measurements. Because this average performance meets, or is so close
    to, the 95% benchmark, we do not find Verizon's occasionally late
    performance in sending out rejection notices as reflected in these
    metrics to be competitively significant.

[^182]: *See* Verizon McLean/Wierzbicki Decl. at paras. 76-83. In the
    New York and Massachusetts proceedings, Verizon provided evidence
    that it provided competitive LECs with Open Query System (OQS)
    reports, which notify competitive LECs that a provisioning order or
    maintenance appointment may be in jeopardy, and that this system was
    as good as the system used by Bell Atlantic for its own provisioning
    and maintenance. The Rhode Island Commission found that Verizon
    still has this system in place and therefore passes this checklist
    item. Rhode Island Commission Comments at 68. Electronic jeopardies
    have not been found by the Commission to be necessary for checklist
    compliance*. See Bell Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 4051,
    para. 184; *see also Verizon Massachusetts Order*, 16 FCC Rcd at
    9034, para. 85.

[^183]: As we stated in the *Verizon Massachusetts Order*, although
    Verizon's implementation of a system of active jeopardy notices
    likely will provide additional benefit to carriers, it is not
    relevant to our determination here that its current system is
    nondiscriminatory. *See Verizon Massachusetts Order*, 16 FCC Rcd at
    9034 n.264.

[^184]: The KPMG test analyzed over 400 orders. Only 10 orders required
    jeopardy notices. A jeopardy notice was provided in 6 of those
    instances. Of the four for which a jeopardy notice was not issued,
    Verizon sent a query notice instead of a jeopardy notice three
    times. *See* KPMG Report at 29, POP-1-17-1.

[^185]: *See* Appendix D at para. 37; *see also Verizon Massachusetts
    Order*, 16 FCC Rcd at 9078-79, para. 162.

[^186]: OR 2-1-3140 (Average Completed Interval - Av. Completed
    Interval - Total No Dispatch).

[^187]: PR 4-4-3140 (Provisioning - Missed Appointments - % Missed Appt.
    -- Verizon -- Dispatch).

[^188]: *See* Letter from Clint Odom, Director, Federal Regulatory,
    Verizon, to Magalie Roman Salas, Secretary, Federal Communications
    Commission, CC Docket No. 01-324 at 2 (filed Jan. 8, 2002) (Verizon
    Jan. 8 *Ex Parte* Letter).

[^189]: *See* Verizon Jan. 8 *Ex Parte* Letter at 2.

[^190]: *See Verizon Massachusetts Order*, 16 FCC Rcd at 9038-39, para.
    92; *see also Bell Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 4061-62,
    paras. 203-05.

[^191]: *See infra* para. 86.

[^192]: PR 2-01-3140 differences of .51 to 1.37 days are reported for
    the last four months of data.

[^193]: *See Verizon Massachusetts Order*, 16 FCC Rcd at 9055-56, para.
    122.

[^194]: Rhode Island Commission Comments at 95.

[^195]: Verizon McLean/Wierzbicki Decl. at paras. 103-05.

[^196]: PwC Report at 33-41; KPMG Report at 145-89; Verizon
    McLean/Wierzbicki Decl. at paras. 102-11; Verizon
    Guerard/Canny/Abesamis Decl. at paras. 68-73.

[^197]: *See* Letter from Clint Odom, Director, Federal Regulatory,
    Verizon, to Magalie Roman Salas, Secretary, Federal Communications
    Commission, CC Docket No. 01-324 at 1-3 (filed Jan. 7, 2002)
    (Verizon Jan. 7 *Ex Parte* Letter).

[^198]: We note that although Z-Tel raised the billing concerns with
    regard to Verizon's Pennsylvania section 271 application, the
    Verizon Massachusetts billing systems was applauded. *See* Z-Tel
    Comments on the *Application by Verizon Pennsylvania Inc., Verizon
    Long Distance, Verizon Enterprise Solutions, Verizon Global
    Networks, Inc., and Verizon Select Services Inc., for Authorization
    to Provide In-Region, InterLATA Services in Pennsylvania*, CC Docket
    No. 01-138, at 6 (filed Aug. 6, 2001).

[^199]: 47 U.S.C. § 271(c)(2)(B)(ii); 47 C.F.R. § 51.313(b).

[^200]: Rhode Island Commission Comments at 43.

[^201]: *See* Appendix D at para. 17.

[^202]: Rhode Island Commission Comments at 33.

[^203]: *See, e.g.*, *Verizon Massachusetts Order*, 16 FCC Rcd at
    9092-95, 9098, paras. 183-87, 195.

[^204]: *See* Appendix B.

[^205]: *Deployment of Wireline Services Offering Advanced
    Telecommunications Capability*, Fourth Report and Order, CC Docket
    No. 98-147, 16 FCC Rcd 15435 (rel. Aug. 8, 2001) (*Collocation
    Remand Order*) (on remand from *GTE Service Corp. v. FCC*, 205 F.3d
    416 (D.C. Cir. 2000)); *petition for recon. pending*, *Petition for
    Partial Clarification or Reconsideration of the Association for
    Local Telecommunications Services, et al.*, CC Docket No. 98-147
    (filed Sept. 19, 2001); *petitions for review pending sub nom.*
    *Verizon California Inc., et al. v. FCC*, D.C. Circuit Nos. 01-1371
    *et al.* (filed Aug. 23, 2001). We address Verizon's compliance with
    this order for the first time here, as this is the first section 271
    application Verizon has filed since that order took effect.

[^206]: *See Collocation Remand Order*, 16 FCC Rcd at 15435; *see also
    Deployment of Wireline Services Offering Advanced Telecommunications
    Capability*, CC Docket No. 98-147, First Report and Order and
    Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 14 FCC Rcd 4761, 4773-74,
    paras. 23-24 (1999), *aff\'d in part, vacated and remanded in part
    sub nom. GTE Service Corp. v. FCC*, 205 F.3d 416 (D.C. Cir. 2000),
    *on recon*., *Collocation Reconsideration Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at
    17806-39, paras. 1-69;

[^207]: *Collocation Remand Order*, 16 FCC Rcd at 15436, para. 2.

[^208]: *See* Verizon Application at 23; Lacouture/Ruesterholz Decl. at
    para. 54 and Attach. 7 at 1, 3, 4, 11 (Rhode Island wholesale
    tariff); Tariff F.C.C. No. 11, Part 27.

[^209]: *See* Verizon Application at 23; Verizon Lacouture/Ruesterholz
    Decl. at para. 49; *Verizon Communications Inc.*, Order and Consent
    Decree, File No. EB-01-IH-0236, 16 FCC Rcd 16270 (EB 2001).

[^210]: *See Application of GTE Corp., Transferor, and Bell Atlantic
    Corp., Transferee, for Consent To Transfer Control of Domestic and
    International Sections 214 and 310 Authorizations and Application To
    Transfer Control of a Submarine Cable Landing License*, Order, 15
    FCC Rcd 14032, 14327-28, App. D, para. 56 (2000).

[^211]: 47 U.S.C. § 271(c)(2)(B)(iv); *see* Appendix D at paras. 48-52
    (regarding requirements under checklist item four).

[^212]: *See* Rhode Island Commission Comments at 133-36. The Department
    of Justice concluded that "Verizon has generally succeeded in
    opening its local markets in Rhode Island to competition."
    Department of Justice Evaluation at 6. The Department cites
    Verizon's estimate that using all modes of entry, for business and
    residential customers combined, competitors serve approximately
    119,000 lines in Rhode Island, around 16% of all lines in the state.
    *Id.* at 4.

[^213]: *See* Verizon Lacouture/Ruesterholz Decl. at para. 86. As of
    September, 2001, Verizon had provisioned approximately 28,000
    stand-alone loops (including DSL loops), 300 high capacity DS1
    loops, approximately 58 digital loops (from July-October) and 4 line
    sharing arrangements. *See* Verizon Lacouture/Ruesterholz Decl. at
    paras. 86, 118, and 175; *see also* PR 6-03-3341.

[^214]: *See, e.g.*, *Verizon Connecticut Order*, 16 FCC Rcd at
    14151-52, para. 9.

[^215]: *See Verizon Massachusetts Order*, 16 FCC Rcd at 9055-56, para.
    122.

[^216]: *See id.*

[^217]: KPMG Consulting found that the systems or interfaces, processes,
    personnel, facilities, management structures, and performance
    measures were the same for both Rhode Island and Massachusetts.
    *See* KPMG Report at 13.

[^218]: Rhode Island Commission Comments at 133-36.

[^219]: Verizon Lacouture/Ruesterholz Decl. at para. 131.

[^220]: *See Verizon Pennsylvania Order*, 16 FCC Rcd at 17462-63, para.
    79; *Verizon Connecticut Order*, 16 FCC Rcd at 15153-56, paras.
    15-20; *Verizon Massachusetts Order*, 16 FCC Rcd at 9056, para. 123,
    and 9059, para. 130; *SWBT Kansas/Oklahoma Order*, 16 FCC Rcd at
    6326-27, paras. 181-82. We note that individual states and BOCs may
    define performance measures in different ways. We look to those
    measurements, however, that provide data most similar to data we
    have relied upon in past orders.

[^221]: *See supra* part III.A.2.c(i).

[^222]: *See* MR 2-02-3342 (Network Trouble Report Rate -- Loop). Since
    July, Verizon has not achieved parity. *See also* MR 2-03-3342
    (Network Trouble Report Rate -- Central Office). Verizon missed
    parity in July and September. During the months of July through
    September, 0.56% of DSL loops in Rhode Island reported troubles
    found in either the outside plant (MR-2-02) or the central office
    (MR-2-03), compared to 0.09% for the current retail comparison group
    (VADI).

[^223]: For the MR-2 through MR-5 metrics, the New York Commission
    adjusted the retail analogue to compare Verizon's performance for
    competitors with Verizon's own retail POTS service rather than its
    DSL service because the Carrier Working Group reached consensus that
    retail POTS troubles are more similar (than VADI line sharing
    troubles) to 2-Wire digital and 2-Wire xDSL Loop troubles. *See*
    Verizon Application App. N, Tab 6, State of New York Public Service
    Commission Order Modifying Existing and Establishing Additional
    Inter-Carrier Service Quality Guidelines at Attach. 1, Section E,
    page 29 (Oct. 29, 2001) (New York Commission October Order).

[^224]: *See* *supra* part II.

[^225]: In prior section 271 proceedings, the Commission has given
    deference to business rules developed in a collaborative state
    proceeding. *See Verizon Massachusetts Order*, 16 FCC Rcd at 9057,
    para. 126.

[^226]: During July, August and September, 2001, 1.11% of DSL loops in
    Rhode Island reported troubles found in either the outside plant or
    the central office, compared to 1.24% for the retail comparison
    group (retail POTS service). *See* Verizon Lacouture/Ruesterholz
    Decl. at para. 157, Attach. 38.

[^227]: *See* Rhode Island Commission Comments at 133-36.

[^228]: The number of digital loops provisioned on average for
    July-October was taken from the performance data provided for the PR
    6-03-3341 (Percent Installation Troubles Reported Within 30 Days --
    FOK/TOK/CPE) measure.

[^229]: Verizon's performance for timeliness of order confirmation
    notices in Massachusetts generally meets or exceeds the benchmark
    from July through October. *See* OR 1-02-3331 (Percent On Time LSRC
    -- Flow Through), OR 1-04-3331 (Percent On Time LSRC/ASRC -- No
    Facility Check), and OR 1-06-3331 (Percent On Time LSRC/ASRC --
    Facility Check). Verizon is also provisioning digital loops in a
    timely manner in Massachusetts. For PR 4-04-3341 (Percent Missed
    Appointments -- Dispatch) and PR 4-05-3341 (Percent Missed
    Appointments -- No Dispatch), Verizon's performance is at parity for
    non-dispatch from July through October, and better than parity for
    dispatch for this same period of time. Also, Verizon's performance
    for most maintenance and repair functions for digital loops is
    comparable for Verizon retail customers and competitive LECs. For
    example, the Mean Time to Repair for digital loops exceeded parity
    from July through October. *See* MR 4-01-3341 (Mean Time to Repair
    -- Total). However, between July and October, Network Trouble
    reports for competitive LECs found in either the outside plant or
    the central office were reported slightly more often than for
    Verizon's retail customers, but, on average, still less than 3% of
    the time (1.55% for MR-2-02 and 0.36% for MR-2-03). *See* MR
    2-02-3341 (Network Trouble Report Rate -- Loop) and MR 2-03-3341
    (Network Trouble Report Rate -- Central Office).

[^230]: *See* PR 6-01-3341 (Percent Installation Troubles Within 30
    Days). The July-October average for this measure is 12.85% for
    competitive LECs and 1.28% for Verizon retail.

[^231]: *See* MR 5-01-3341 (Percent Repeat Reports Within 30 Days). The
    July-October average for this measure is 34.46% for competitive LECs
    and 19.69% for Verizon retail. However, as it did with xDSL-capable
    loops, the New York Commission has adjusted the retail analogue for
    digital loops to compare Verizon's performance for competitors with
    Verizon's own retail POTS service. *See supra* n.Error: Reference
    source not found.

[^232]: *See* Letter from Clint Odom, Director, Federal Regulatory,
    Verizon to Magalie Roman Salas, Secretary, Federal Communications
    Commission, CC Docket No. 01-324 at 1 (filed Jan. 17, 2002) and
    Verizon Jan. 8 *Ex Parte* Letter at 6.

[^233]: *Id.*

[^234]: *Id.*

[^235]: *See* *supra* para. 79 and n.Error: Reference source not found.

[^236]: *See infra* para. 85 and n.Error: Reference source not found.

[^237]: In July, Verizon provisioned approximately 28 digital loops for
    competitors; in August, it provisioned approximately 19 digital
    loops; in September, it provisioned approximately 5 digital loops;
    and in October, Verizon provisioned approximately 6 digital loops
    for competitors. *See* PR 6-03-3341.

[^238]: *See* Rhode Island Commission Comments at 133-36.

[^239]: *See* PR 9-01-3520 (Percent On Time Performance -- Hot Cut).

[^240]: *See* Verizon Lacouture/Ruesterholz Decl. at para. 115; *see
    also* PR 6-02-3520 (Percent Installation Troubles Reported Within 7
    Days -- Hot Cut Loop). Verizon's performance exceeds the benchmark
    for hot cuts in Rhode Island for July-October.

[^241]: *See* Verizon Lacouture/Ruesterholz Decl. at para. 113. *See
    also* PR 2-01-3111 (Average Completed Interval-Total No Dispatch --
    Hot Cut Loop).

[^242]: *See* PR 2-01-3111 (Average Completed Interval-Total No Dispatch
    -- Hot Cut Loop).

[^243]: *See* Rhode Island Commission Comments at 133-36.

[^244]: *See* Appendix D at para. 37; *see also* *Verizon Massachusetts
    Order*, 16 FCC Rcd at 9078-79, para. 162.

[^245]: For repeat trouble reports within 30 days, MR 5-01-3550, Verizon
    did not achieve parity in July and October.

[^246]: During July, August, and September 2001, Verizon's repeat
    trouble report rate in Rhode Island under the new business rules was
    16.67% for competitive LECs and 16.63% for the retail comparison
    group. *See* Verizon Lacouture/Ruesterholz Decl. at para. 104 and
    Attach. 21.

[^247]: In its Order, the New York Commission states that the Carrier
    Working Group reached consensus to exclude misdirected dispatches
    from the MR-5 metric to more accurately capture performance for
    which Verizon is responsible. Specifically, the New York Commission
    modified the guidelines for the MR-5 measure to eliminate the
    so-called "double-trouble" phenomenon, which occurs when the
    competitive LEC misdirects Verizon to dispatch a technician either
    inside or outside the central office and no trouble is found.
    Verizon explains that when this occurs, the trouble ticket must be
    closed and the competitive LEC must initiate a second ("double")
    trouble ticket directing dispatch in the opposite direction. *See*
    New York Commission October Order at 4; *see also* Verizon
    Lacouture/Ruesterholz Decl. at para. 104.

[^248]: *See supra* n.Error: Reference source not found.

[^249]: Verizon missed parity from July-October. In July, Verizon
    completed POTS loop orders of 1-5 lines in 2.40 days for Verizon
    retail and 4.55 days for competitors. The comparable numbers for
    August were 2.51 for the Verizon retail affiliate and 6.27 for
    competitors and 4.28 for Verizon retail and 5.48 for competitors in
    September and 3.56 for Verizon retail and 4.84 for competitors in
    October. For November, performance data demonstrate that Verizon
    provisioned voice grade loops to competitors at parity with its own
    retail customers. *See* PR 2-03-3112 (Average Completed Interval --
    Dispatch (1-5 lines) -- Loop).

[^250]: *See* PR 4-04-3113 (Percent Missed Appointment -- Dispatch --
    Loop New). In the *Bell Atlantic New York Order*, the Commission
    found the missed rate of installation appointments to be the most
    accurate indicator of Bell Atlantic's ability to provision unbundled
    loops. *See* *Bell Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 4103,
    para. 288.

[^251]: *See supra* part III.A.2.d.; Verizon Jan. 8 *Ex Parte* Letter at
    2-3.

[^252]: The New York Commission has issued an order eliminating the
    average interval completed PR-2 measures from the Carrier-to-Carrier
    Performance Reports. *See* New York Commission October Order at 3.
    Specifically, the New York Commission indicates that the Carrier
    Working Group agreed to eliminate this metric because other metrics
    capture performance in this area: PR-1 captures the provisioning
    interval offered, while PR-3 Percent Completed Within X Days and
    PR-4 Missed Appointments adequately measure success meeting the
    promised interval. *Id.* In past orders, we have accorded much
    weight to the judgment of collaborative state proceedings and
    encouraged carriers to work together in such fora to resolve metrics
    and other issues. *See Verizon Massachusetts Order*, 16 FCC Rcd at
    9057, para. 126.

[^253]: Verizon explains that the average completed interval for August
    through November in Rhode Island was 5.28 days for competitive LECs
    and 3.54 days for the retail comparison group, a difference of only
    1.74 days. In addition, competitive LECs' average completed
    intervals in Rhode Island have decreased from August-November (6.27,
    5.48, 4.84, and 4.80) even as competitive LEC volumes have generally
    increased (22, 33, 43, and 20). *See* Verizon Jan. 8 *Ex Parte*
    Letter at 4.

[^254]: *See Verizon Massachusetts Order*, 16 FCC Rcd at 9055-56, para.
    122.

[^255]: *See* Rhode Island Commission Comments at 133-36.

[^256]: *See* Verizon Application at 42. High capacity loops in Rhode
    Island represent less than 1% of all unbundled loops provisioned to
    competitors. *See id.*

[^257]: *See Verizon Massachusetts Order*, 16 FCC Rcd at 9075-76, para.
    156.

[^258]: For PR 6-01-3200 (Percent Installation Troubles Within 30 Days),
    Verizon performed slightly better for its own retail affiliate from
    July-September. In October, it performed at parity. For MR 2-01-3200
    (Network Trouble Report Rate), Verizon states that during July,
    August and September, the percentages have generally been under 2%.
    In October, the percentage was under 2% as well. *See also* Verizon
    Lacouture/Ruesterholz Decl. at para. 126.

[^259]: *See* Rhode Island Commission Comments at 133-36.

[^260]: As part of KPMG's stand-alone testing in Rhode Island, KPMG
    evaluated Verizon's line sharing installations in Massachusetts to
    validate that Verizon's technicians performed all of the required
    tasks defined in the line sharing documentation. KMPG examined line
    sharing in Massachusetts rather than in Rhode Island because
    Massachusetts line sharing volumes were greater. *See* Verizon
    Lacouture/Ruesterholz Decl. at para. 176. Verizon received a
    "satisfied" rating based on KPMG Consulting evaluation criteria.
    *See* KPMG Report at 13. Specifically, during 78 ADSL Line Sharing
    installations, KPMG Consulting observed Verizon-MA technicians
    execute 624 installation tasks. Verizon-MA technicians executed 615
    (99%) of these tasks as defined in their documentation. *See* KPMG
    Report at 93. We encourage state commissions and BOCs to engage in
    testing of new or changed aspects of a BOC's OSS. *See also* Verizon
    Lacouture/Ruesterholz Decl. at paras. 165-66.

[^261]: *See* Verizon Lacouture/Ruesterholz Decl. at para. 175.

[^262]: *See* the PR-6 Installation Quality metrics.

[^263]: Through September 2001, Verizon had completed over 3,600 line
    sharing orders for unaffiliated competitive LECs in Massachusetts.
    *See* Verizon Lacouture/Ruesterholz Decl. at para. 175.

[^264]: *See* PR 1-01-3343 (Average Interval Offered -- Total No
    Dispatch) and PR 1-02-3343 (Average Interval Offered -- Total
    Dispatch); PR 2-01-3343 (Average Interval Completed -- Total No
    Dispatch) and PR 2-02-3343 (Average Interval Completed -- Total
    Dispatch); and PR 4-05-3343 (Percent Missed Appointments -- No
    Dispatch). For PR 6-01-3343 (Percent Installation Troubles Reported
    Within 30 Days), Verizon's performance with regard to installation
    troubles reported within 30 days in Massachusetts is out of parity
    for September and October, but from July-October, the rate of such
    installation troubles was less than 2% for both competing LECs and
    Verizon's own affiliate. *See* Verizon Lacouture/Ruesterholz Decl.
    at para. 188; *see also* MR 2-03-3343 (Network Trouble Report Rate
    -- Central Office) and MR 4-03-3343 (Mean Time to Repair -- Central
    Office Trouble).

[^265]: *See* Rhode Island Commission Comments at 133-36.

[^266]: *See Deployment of Wireline Services Offering Advanced
    Telecommunications Capabilities and Implementation of the Local
    Competition Provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996*, Third
    Report and Order on Reconsideration, CC Docket No. 98-147; Fourth
    Report and Order on Reconsideration, CC Docket No. 96-98; Third
    Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, CC Docket No. 98-147; Sixth
    Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, CC Docket No. 96-98, 16 FCC
    Rcd 2101, 2111, para. 20. Verizon states, however, that it is not
    aware of any competitive LECs that are engaging in line splitting in
    Rhode Island or Massachusetts using existing network elements. *See*
    Verizon Lacouture/Ruesterholz Decl. at para. 193.

[^267]: Competitive LECs have a choice of submitting pre-ordering
    queries over either the Web GUI, EDI, or CORBA electronic
    interfaces. *See* Verizon McLean/Wierzbicki Decl. Attach. 2 at 11.

[^268]: Specifically, Verizon began offering new OSS functionality that
    enables a competitor to submit a single Local Service Request (LSR)
    to add DSL capability to a loop in an existing UNE-Platform
    arrangement while re-using the same network elements, including the
    loop, if it is DSL-capable. In addition, Verizon implemented the
    ability for a competitive LEC to convert from line sharing to line
    splitting using a single LSR, or drop data from a line-splitting
    arrangement and revert back to UNE-Platform with a single LSR. *See*
    Verizon Lacouture/Ruesterholz Decl. at para. 202; *see also* Verizon
    McLean/Wierzbicki Decl. Attach. 2 at 12.

[^269]: *See Verizon Massachusetts Order*, 16 FCC Rcd at 9091-92, para.
    181 (Verizon agreed to an implementation schedule to offer line
    splitting-specific OSS capabilities under the supervision of the New
    York Commission in response to concerns raised by WorldCom.).

[^270]: As of November 9, 2001, Verizon had received 10 commercial line
    splitting orders from competitive LECs (utilizing the new line
    splitting OSS capabilities) outside of the pilot. None of these
    orders was submitted in Rhode Island or Massachusetts. *See* Verizon
    Lacouture/Ruesterholz Decl. at para. 202.

[^271]: 47 U.S.C. § 271(c)(2)(B)(v); *see also* Appendix D at para. 53.

[^272]: *See* Verizon Application at 46-47, and Exh. A; Verizon
    Lacouture/Ruesterholz Decl. at paras. 236-47.

[^273]: Rhode Island Commission Comments at 144.

[^274]: *See, e.g.*, *Verizon Massachusetts Order*, 16 FCC Rcd at
    9106-07, para. 210.

[^275]: Verizon provisioned 21 orders to competitors from July through
    October, but only one retail DS3 order -- the accepted retail
    analogue for this metric -- during the same period. *See*
    PR-4-01-3530 (% missed appointments -- Verizon -- Total-IOF). It is
    thus not possible to determine, based on this metric, whether
    Verizon's transport provisioning has been nondiscriminatory. We
    note, however, that Verizon missed only 14% of appointments for
    competitors during this period. *See id.*

[^276]: *See* PR-4-01-3530 (% missed appointments -- Verizon --
    Total-IOF). In July 2001, Verizon missed 50% of its appointments for
    its own customers, but only 3.23% of those for its competitors.
    Figures for August, September and October, 2001, are similar: 66.67%
    vs. 2.38%; 80% vs. no appointments missed; and 66.67% vs. no
    appointments missed, respectively.

[^277]: CTC Comments at 8-9 (quoting Letter from Clint Odom, Director,
    Federal Regulatory, Verizon, to Magalie Roman Salas, Secretary,
    Federal Communications Commission, CC Docket No. 01-324 (filed Dec.
    4, 2001), Attach. at 19 (*Rhode Island PUC Dec. 3 Order*)).

[^278]: *See* Letter from Clint Odom, Director, Federal Regulatory,
    Verizon, to Magalie Roman Salas, Secretary, Federal Communications
    Commission, CC Docket No. 01-324 (filed Dec. 19, 2001) (*Verizon New
    England Inc. Rates and Charges Effective in the State of Rhode
    Island PUC RI No. 18*), at Part 10.2.1.G ("The Telephone Company
    will not require collocation at an intermediate office if it can
    provide intermediate cross connections between fiber distribution
    frames or can splice fibers at any technically feasible point in the
    intermediate office(s).").

[^279]: "We note that the time for VZ-RI to appeal our decision on dark
    fiber has expired pursuant to R.I.G.L. § 39-5-1. In addition, on
    December 14, 2001, VZ-RI made a compliance filing in conformity with
    our order regarding dark fiber." Rhode Island Commission Reply at 4
    (footnotes omitted).

[^280]: *See* CTC Comments at 11.

[^281]: 47 U.S.C. § 271(c)(2)(B)(xiv); *see* Appendix D at para. 67.

[^282]: *See* Rhode Island Commission Comments at 186-88.

[^283]: Verizon has a concrete and specific legal obligation in its
    interconnection agreements and tariffs to make its retail services
    available for resale to competing carriers at wholesale rates. *See*
    Verizon Application at 56, n.52; Verizon Lacouture/Ruesterholz Decl.
    at para. 386.

[^284]: In this proceeding, unlike in the *SWBT Arkansas/Missouri
    Order*, no party, including Verizon, has questioned the
    applicability of § 251(c)(4) to VADI's DSL resale service. *Cf*.
    *SWBT Arkansas/Missouri Order*, 16 FCC Rcd at 20758-59, paras.
    79-81.

[^285]: *See Verizon Pennsylvania Order*, 16 FCC Rcd at 17471, para. 94;
    *Verizon Connecticut Order*, 16 FCC Rcd at 14164-65, para. 39.

[^286]: *See* Verizon F.C.C. Tariff No. 20, Section 5.1.

[^287]: *Association of Communications Enterprises v. FCC*, 235 F.3d 662
    (D.C. Cir. 2000); *see also* Tariff Revision filed by VADI to VADI
    F.C.C. Tariff F.C.C. No. 1 under Transmittal Number 22 (Nov. 20,
    2001).

[^288]: *See* Verizon Lacouture/Ruesterholz Decl. at para. 416. Verizon
    uses the same checklist-compliant processes and procedures to
    provide this new service as it uses in Pennsylvania, except that, in
    Rhode Island, Verizon has not placed any limits on the number of
    orders that Verizon will commit to process each day. *See* Verizon
    Application at 57-58.

[^289]: Verizon Lacouture/Ruesterholz Decl. at para. 417. Despite these
    enhancements in the former Bell Atlantic states where VADI operates,
    no reseller has submitted orders -- other than test orders -- to
    Verizon for resold DSL over resold voice lines service. Only six
    test orders were submitted and they were completed successfully by
    Verizon. *See* Letter from Clint E. Odom, Director, Federal
    Regulatory, Verizon to Magalie Roman Salas, Secretary, Federal
    Communications Commission, CC Docket No. 01-324 at 3 (filed Jan. 7,
    2002) (Verizon Jan. 7 *Ex Parte* Letter).

[^290]: *See Verizon Connecticut Order*, 16 FCC Rcd at 14166, para. 42.

[^291]: *See* Verizon Jan. 7 *Ex Parte* Letter at 3-4.

[^292]: *See Verizon Connecticut Order*, 16 FCC Rcd at 14166, para. 42.

[^293]: *See* Verizon Jan. 7 *Ex Parte* Letter at 4. However, as Verizon
    also notes, performance measures specific to resold DSL over resold
    voice lines have yet to be developed in the state collaboratives.
    *Id.*

[^294]: *See Verizon Connecticut Order*, 16 FCC Rcd at 14166, para. 42.

[^295]: According to Verizon, "\[it\] has not received any orders where
    an end user seeks to switch its voice service back to Verizon while
    retaining the reseller providing DSL service. Nevertheless, if such
    an order were received, Verizon would endeavor to complete the order
    without disconnection of the DSL service." *See* Verizon Jan. 7 *Ex
    Parte* Letter at 4

[^296]: *Id.*

[^297]: According to Verizon, "when voice and data are established on a
    single line, the voice provider controls the line, and the data
    provider is a sub-tenant. As a result, the voice service must be
    established first." *Id.*

[^298]: *Id.*

[^299]: 47 U.S.C. § 271(c)(2)(B)(iii).

[^300]: *Id.* § 271(c)(2)(B)(vi).

[^301]: *Id.* § 271(c)(2)(B)(vii).

[^302]: *Id.* § 271(c)(2)(B)(viii).

[^303]: *Id.* § 271(c)(2)(B)(ix).

[^304]: *Id.* § 271(c)(2)(B)(x).

[^305]: *Id.* § 271(c)(2)(B)(xi).

[^306]: *Id.* § 271(c)(2)(B)(xii).

[^307]: *Id.* § 271(c)(2)(B)(xiii).

[^308]: *See* Verizon Application at 49 (checklist item 3), 45
    (checklist item 6), 49-51 (checklist item 7), 52-53 (checklist item
    8), 53 (checklist item 9), 53-54 (checklist item 10), 54-55
    (checklist item 11), 55 (checklist items 12 and 13);
    Lacouture/Ruesterholz Decl. at paras. 268-91 (checklist item 3),
    paras. 211-35 (checklist item 6), paras. 292-324 (checklist item 7),
    paras. 325-41 (checklist item 8), paras. 342-46 (checklist item 9),
    paras. 347-72 (checklist item 10), paras. 373-76 (checklist item
    11), paras. 378-82 (checklist item 12), paras. 383-86 (checklist
    item 13); *see also* Appendices B and C.

[^309]: *See* Rhode Island Commission Comments at 95-102 (checklist item
    3), 145-54 (checklist item 6), 154-62 (checklist item 7), 162-64
    (checklist item 8), 165-66 (checklist item 9), 166-71 (checklist
    item 10), 172-74 (checklist item 11), 174-77 (checklist item 12),
    177-80 (checklist item 13).

[^310]: 47 U.S.C. § 271(d)(3)(A).

[^311]: 47 U.S.C. § 271(c)(1)(A).

[^312]: Rhode Island Commission Comments at 10.

[^313]: Verizon Application at 7-11; Verizon Local Competition Report
    (*citing confidential portion*) paras. 31-32, 35-44 .

[^314]: *Id.*

[^315]: Verizon Application at 7-11; Verizon Local Competition Report
    (*citing confidential portion*) paras. 31-32, 35-44. *Cf. SWBT
    Oklahoma Order*, 12 FCC Rcd at 8695, para. 14.

[^316]: 47 U.S.C. § 271(d)(3)(B); Appendix D at paras. 68-69.

[^317]: *See* Verizon Application at 73-78; Verizon Application App. A,
    Vol. 3, Tab E, Declaration of Susan C. Browning at para 4. (Verizon
    Browning Decl.).

[^318]: *Verizon Pennsylvania Order*, 16 FCC Rcd at 17486, para. 124;
    *Verizon Connecticut Order*, 16 FCC Rcd at 14179, para. 73; *Verizon
    Massachusetts Order*, 16 FCC Rcd at 9114-17, paras. 226-31; *Bell
    Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 4152-61, paras. 401-21;
    Verizon Application at 73-78; Verizon Browning Decl. at paras. 4-
    17.

[^319]: We recognize that the first independent audit of Verizon's
    section 272 compliance conducted pursuant to section 53.209 of the
    Commission's rules is now complete. *See* Letter from
    PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP to Magalie Roman Salas, Secretary,
    Federal Communications Commission (June 11, 2001) (transmitting
    audit report). While the audit raises issues that may require
    further investigation, the audit results are not a legal
    determination of Verizon's section 272 compliance. Parties were
    required to submit comments on the audit report no later than
    January 24, 2002. *See* *Accounting Safeguards Under the
    Telecommunications Act of 1996*, Order, 16 FCC Rcd 20301 (2001)
    (extending deadline for filing comments). Because the Commission
    will not have had the opportunity to complete its own review of the
    audit results before it is required to issue a decision on this
    section 271 application, and because no party cites the audit
    findings as evidence of noncompliance (or even challenges Verizon's
    showing generally), there is no reason to consider the audit as
    evidence of shortcomings in Verizon's section 272 compliance.

[^320]: 47 U.S.C. § 271(d)(3)(C); Appendix D at paras. 70-71.

[^321]: *Id.* § 271(d)(4).

[^322]: *See SWBT Texas Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 18558-89, para. 419.

[^323]: *See* Sprint Comments at 7-11.

[^324]: *See Verizon Pennsylvania Order*, 16 FCC Rcd at 17487, para.
    126.

[^325]: Sprint Comments at 8-9.

[^326]: *Id.* at 9.

[^327]: *Id.* at 8-9.

[^328]: Verizon Application at 9-10 (citing confidential portions).

[^329]: *See* Verizon Local Competition Report (*citing confidential
    portion*), paras. 31-32.

[^330]: Sprint Comments at 4-7.

[^331]: AT&T Comments at 17, AT&T Reply Comments at 4-9; Letter from
    Peter D. Keisler, Sidley Austin Brown & Wood, LLP, to William F.
    Caton, Acting Secretary, Federal Communications Commission dated
    Feb. 8, 2002 at 2-13 and Supplemental Declaration of Michael
    Lieberman at 2-11, paras. 3-26 and various Exhibits; WorldCom Reply
    Comments at 1-5 and Reply Declaration of Vijetha Huffman at 3-4,
    paras. 7-9 and Attachment 1; ASCENT Comments at 2-4.

[^332]: *Sprint Communications Co. L.P. v. FCC,* 274 F.3d 549 (D.C. Cir.
    2001).

[^333]: *SWBT Kansas/Oklahoma Order*, 16 FCC Rcd at 6269, para. 65 and
    6280-81, para. 92.

[^334]: While ASCENT also raised price squeeze concerns, it did not
    supply specific alleged profit margins that we can evaluate in this
    proceeding.

[^335]: *Ameritech Michigan Order*, 12 FCC Rcd at 20748-50, paras.
    393-98. We note that in all of the previous applications that we
    have granted to date, the applicant was subject to an enforcement
    plan administered by the relevant state commission to protect
    against backsliding after BOC entry into the long-distance market.

[^336]: *Rhode Island PUC C2C and PAP Order* at 35. The Massachusetts
    and Rhode Island PAPs place 39% of Verizon's yearly net income for
    each state at risk.

[^337]: Rhode Island Commission Comments at 189.

[^338]: *Rhode Island PUC C2C and PAP Order* at 10, 44-45.

[^339]: *See, e.g.*, *Verizon Massachusetts Order*, 16 FCC Rcd at
    9121-25, paras. 240-49; *SWBT Kansas/Oklahoma Order*, 16 FCC Rcd at
    6377-81, paras. 273-80.

[^340]: "If the performance is worse for the CLEC than Verizon-RI,
    Verizon RI will use the t distribution or binomial (counted or
    measured) until such time as a permutation test can be run in an
    automated fashion." Letter from Bruce P. Beausejour, Vice President
    and General Counsel -- New England, Verizon, to Luly E. Massaro,
    Commission Clerk, Rhode Island Public Utilities Commission, Docket
    No. 3256 at Appendix D, 2. (filed Dec. 6, 2001) (*RI PAP*).

[^341]: "It is AT&T's understanding that Verizon is currently running
    automated permutation tests for its wholesale operations in New
    York." AT&T Comments at 18.

[^342]: Verizon Reply, App. A, Reply Declaration of Elaine M. Guerard,
    Julie A. Canny, and Beth A. Abesamis at para. 8 (Verizon
    Guerard/Canny/Abesamis Reply Decl.).

[^343]: Verizon Guerard/Canny/Abesamis Reply Decl. at paras. 7-8. And as
    Verizon further explained:

    > If Verizon's performance for the CLECs is worse than Verizon's
    > performance for the retail comparison group, then:
    >
    > • For average measurements (measured variables), Verizon will run
    > a permutation test whenever the sample size for the CLEC
    > observations or the retail comparison group is less than 30
    >
    > • For percentage measurements (counted variables), Verizon will
    > employ Fisher's Exact Test, whenever the result of the equation *n
    > · p*(1-*p*) is less than 5 for either the CLECs or the retail
    > comparison group (where *n* is the number of observations and *p*
    > is the reported percentage).

    Letter from Clint E. Odom, Director, Federal Regulatory, Verizon, to
    Magalie Roman Salas, Secretary, Federal Communications Commission,
    CC Docket No. 01-324 at 2 (filed Jan. 17, 2002).

[^344]: Verizon Guerard/Canny/Abesamis Reply Decl. at para. 9.

[^345]: *Rhode Island PUC C2C and PAP Order* at 43.

[^346]: *Rhode Island PUC C2C and PAP Order* at 43.

[^347]: 47 U.S.C. § 271(d)(6).

[^348]: *See, e.g.*, *SWBT Kansas/Oklahoma Order*, 16 FCC Rcd at
    6382-84, paras. 283-85; *SWBT Texas Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 18567-68,
    paras. 434-36; *Bell Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at
    4174-77, paras. 446-53.

[^349]: 47 U.S.C. § 271(d)(6)(A).

[^350]: *See, e.g.*, *Bell Atlantic-New York, Authorization Under
    Section 271 of the Communications Act To Provide In-Region,
    InterLATA Service in the State of New York*, Order, 15 FCC Rcd
    5413-23 (2000) (adopting consent decree between the Commission and
    Bell Atlantic that included provisions for Bell Atlantic to make a
    voluntary payment of \$3,000,000 to the United States Treasury, with
    additional payments if Bell Atlantic failed to meet specific
    performance standards and weekly reporting requirements to gauge
    Bell Atlantic's performance in correcting the problems associated
    with its electronic ordering systems).

[^351]: For purposes of section 271 proceedings, the Commission uses the
    definition of the term "Bell Operating Company" contained in 47
    U.S.C. § 153(4).

[^352]: 47 U.S.C. § 271(d)(1). For purposes of section 271 proceedings,
    the Commission utilizes the definition of the term "in-region state"
    that is contained in 47 U.S.C. § 271(i)(1). Section 271(j) provides
    that a BOC's in-region services include 800 service, private line
    service, or their equivalents that terminate in an in-region state
    of that BOC and that allow the called party to determine the
    interLATA carrier, even if such services originate out-of-region.
    *Id.* § 271(j). The 1996 Act defines "interLATA services" as
    "telecommunications between a point located in a local access and
    transport area and a point located outside such area." *Id.* §
    153(21). Under the 1996 Act, a "local access and transport area"
    (LATA) is "a contiguous geographic area (A) established before the
    date of enactment of the \[1996 Act\] by a \[BOC\] such that no
    exchange area includes points within more than 1 metropolitan
    statistical area, consolidated metropolitan statistical area, or
    State, except as expressly permitted under the AT&T Consent Decree;
    or (B) established or modified by a \[BOC\] after such date of
    enactment and approved by the Commission." *Id.* § 153(25). LATAs
    were created as part of the Modification of Final Judgment's (MFJ)
    "plan of reorganization." *United States v. Western Elec. Co.*, 569
    F. Supp. 1057 (D.D.C. 1983), *aff'd sub nom.* *California v. United
    States*, 464 U.S. 1013 (1983). Pursuant to the MFJ, "all \[BOC\]
    territory in the continental United States \[was\] divided into
    LATAs, generally centering upon a city or other identifiable
    community of interest." *United States v. Western Elec. Co.*, 569 F.
    Supp. 990, 993-94 (D.D.C. 1983).

[^353]: 47 U.S.C. § 271(d)(3).

[^354]: *Id*. § 271(d)(2)(A).

[^355]: *Id*. § 271(d)(2)(B).

[^356]: *Bell Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 3962, para. 20;
    *Application of Ameritech Michigan Pursuant to Section 271 of the
    Communications Act of 1934, as amended*, CC Docket No. 97-137, 12
    FCC Rcd 20543, 20559-60 (1997) (*Ameritech Michigan Order*). As the
    D.C. Circuit has held, "\[a\]lthough the Commission must consult
    with the state commissions, the statute does not require the
    Commission to give State Commissions' views any particular weight."
    *SBC Communications Inc. v. FCC*, 138 F.3d 410, 416 (D.C. Cir.
    1998).

[^357]: *Ameritech Michigan Order*, 12 FCC Rcd at 20560; *SBC
    Communications v. FCC*, 138 F.3d at 416-17.

[^358]: 47 U.S.C. § 271(d)(3)(A). See Section III, *infra*, for a
    complete discussion of Track A and Track B requirements.

[^359]: *Id.* §§ 271(c)(2)(B), 271(d)(3)(A)(i).

[^360]: *Id.* § 272; *see* *Implementation of the Non-Accounting
    Safeguards of Sections 271 and 272 of the Communications Act of
    1934, as amended*, CC Docket No. 96-149, First Report and Order and
    Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 11 FCC Rcd 21905 (1996)
    (*Non-Accounting Safeguards Order*), *recon.*, Order on
    Reconsideration, 12 FCC Rcd 2297 (1997), *review pending sub nom.*,
    *SBC Communications v. FCC*, No. 97-1118 (D.C. Cir., filed Mar. 6,
    1997) (held in abeyance pursuant to court order filed May 7, 1997),
    *remanded in part sub nom.*, *Bell Atlantic Telephone Companies v.
    FCC*, No. 97-1067 (D.C. Cir., filed Mar. 31, 1997), *on remand*,
    Second Order on Reconsideration, FCC 97-222 (rel. June 24, 1997),
    *petition for review denied sub nom. Bell Atlantic Telephone
    Companies v. FCC*, 113 F.3d 1044 (D.C. Cir. 1997); *Implementation
    of the Telecommunications Act of 1996; Accounting Safeguards Under
    the Telecommunications Act of 1996*, Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd
    17539 (1996)*.*

[^361]: 47 U.S.C. § 271(d)(3)(C).

[^362]: *Id*. § 271(d)(3); *see SBC Communications, Inc. v. FCC*, 138
    F.3d at 416.

[^363]: *See SWBT Kansas/Oklahoma Order*, 16 FCC Rcd at 6246, para. 19;
    *see also American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. FCC*, 220 F.3d 607, 631 (D.C.
    Cir. 2000).

[^364]: *See* *Procedures for Bell Operating Company Applications Under
    New Section 271 of the Communications Act*, Public Notice, 11 FCC
    Rcd 19708, 19711 (1996); *Revised Comment Schedule For Ameritech
    Michigan Application, as amended,* *for Authorization Under Section
    271 of the Communications Act to Provide In-Region, InterLATA
    Services in the State of Michigan*, Public Notice, DA 97-127 (rel.
    Jan. 17, 1997); *Revised Procedures for Bell Operating Company
    Applications Under Section 271 of the Communications Act*, Public
    Notice, 13 FCC Rcd 17457 (1997); *Updated Filing Requirements for
    Bell Operating Company Applications Under Section 271 of the
    Communications Act*, Public Notice, DA 99-1994 (rel. Sept. 28,
    1999); *Updated Filing Requirements for Bell Operating Company
    Applications Under Section 271 of the Communications Act*, Public
    Notice, DA 01-734 (CCB rel. Mar. 23, 2001) (collectively "271
    Procedural Public Notices").

[^365]: *See, e.g.*, *SWBT Kansas/Oklahoma Order* 16 FCC Rcd at 6247-50,
    paras. 21-27; *SWBT Texas Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 18370-73, paras.
    34-42; *Bell Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 3968-71, paras.
    32-42.

[^366]: *See* *SWBT Texas Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 18374, para. 46; *Bell
    Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 3972, para. 46.

[^367]: *See Bell Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 3973-74, para.
    52.

[^368]: *See* 47 U.S.C. § 271(c)(2)(B)(i), (ii).

[^369]: *See SWBT Kansas/Oklahoma Order*, 16 FCC Rcd at 6250-51, paras.
    28-29; *Bell Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 3971-72, paras.
    44-46.

[^370]: *SWBT Texas Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 18373, para. 44; *Bell
    Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 3971, para. 44.

[^371]: *Bell Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 3971, para. 44;
    *Ameritech Michigan Order*, 12 FCC Rcd at 20618-19.

[^372]: *Id.*

[^373]: *SWBT Texas Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 18374, para. 46; *Bell
    Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 3972, para. 46.

[^374]: *Id.*

[^375]: *See SWBT Kansas/Oklahoma Order*, 16 FCC Rcd at 6252, para. 31;
    *SWBT Texas Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 18377, para. 55 & n.102.

[^376]: *See Bell Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 3970, para.
    59.

[^377]: The Commission has never required, however, an applicant to
    demonstrate that it processes and provisions a substantial
    commercial volume of orders, or has achieved a specific market share
    in its service area, as a prerequisite for satisfying the
    competitive checklist. *See Ameritech Michigan Order*, 12 FCC Rcd at
    20585, para. 77 (explaining that Congress had considered and
    rejected language that would have imposed a "market share"
    requirement in section 271(c)(1)(A)).

[^378]: *See* *SWBT Texas Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 18376, para. 53; *Bell
    Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 3974, para. 53.

[^379]: *See* 47 U.S.C. § 271(d)(3)(A).

[^380]: *Id*.

[^381]: *Id*.

[^382]: *See Ameritech Michigan Order*, 12 FCC Rcd at 20589, para. 85;
    *see also Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20633-35,
    paras. 46-48.

[^383]: 47 U.S.C. § 271(d)(3)(A)(ii).

[^384]: *See Ameritech Michigan Order*, 12 FCC Rcd at 20561-62, para.
    34. Nevertheless, the above-mentioned foreclosure of Track B as an
    option is subject to limited exceptions. *See* 47 U.S.C. §
    271(c)(1)(B); *see also* *Ameritech Michigan Order*, 12 FCC Rcd at
    20563-64, paras. 37-38.

[^385]: 47 U.S.C. § 271(c)(2)(B)(i); *see Bell Atlantic New York Order*,
    15 FCC Rcd at 3977-78, para. 63; *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*,
    13 FCC Rcd at 20640, para. 61; *Ameritech Michigan Order*, 12 FCC
    Rcd at 20662, para. 222.

[^386]: 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(2)(A).

[^387]: *Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the
    Telecommunications Act of 1996*, First Report and Order, 11 FCC Rcd
    15499, 15590, para. 176 (1996) (*Local Competition First Report and
    Order*). Transport and termination of traffic are therefore excluded
    from the Commission's definition of interconnection. *See id.*

[^388]: 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(2)(B). In the *Local Competition First Report
    and Order*, the Commission identified a minimum set of technically
    feasible points of interconnection. *See Local Competition First
    Report and Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at 15607-09, paras. 204-11.

[^389]: 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(2)(C).

[^390]: *Id*. § 251(c)(2)(D).

[^391]: *Local Competition First Report and Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at
    15613-15, paras. 221-225; *see* *Bell Atlantic New York Order*, 15
    FCC Rcd at 3978, para. 64; *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13
    FCC Rcd at 20641-42, paras. 63-64.

[^392]: *Local Competition First Report and Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at
    15614-15, paras. 224-25.

[^393]: *See Bell Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 3978, para.
    64; *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20648-50,
    paras. 74-77; *Ameritech Michigan Order*, 12 FCC Rcd at 20671-74,
    paras. 240-45. The Commission has relied on trunk blockage data to
    evaluate a BOC's interconnection performance. Trunk group blockage
    indicates that end users are experiencing difficulty completing or
    receiving calls, which may have a direct impact on the customer's
    perception of a competitive LEC's service quality.

[^394]: *Local Competition First Report and Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at 15612,
    para. 218; *see also Bell Atlantic New York* Order, 15 FCC Rcd at
    3978, para. 65; *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at
    20642, para. 65.

[^395]: 47 C.F.R. § 51.305(a)(5).

[^396]: The Commission's rules require an incumbent LEC to provide
    two-way trunking upon request, wherever two-way trunking
    arrangements are technically feasible. 47 C.F.R. § 51.305(f); *see
    also Bell Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 3978-79, para. 65;
    *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20642, para. 65;
    *Local Competition First Report and Order*, 11 FCC Rcd 15612-13,
    paras. 219-20.

[^397]: 47 C.F.R. § 51.305(a)(5).

[^398]: *Local Competition First Report and Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at 15779,
    paras. 549-50; *see Bell Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at
    3979, para. 66; *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at
    20640-41, para. 61.

[^399]: 47 C.F.R. § 51.321(b); *Local Competition First Report and
    Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at 15779-82, paras. 549-50; *see also Bell
    Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 3979, para. 66; *Second
    BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20640-41, para. 62.

[^400]: 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(6) (requiring incumbent LECs to provide
    physical collocation); *Bell Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at
    3979, para. 66; *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at
    20640-41, paras. 61-62.

[^401]: *Deployment of Wireline Services offering Advanced
    Telecommunications Capability*, First Report and Order and Further
    Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 14 FCC Rcd 4761, 4784-86, paras.
    41-43 (1999), *aff'd in part and vacated and remanded in part sub
    nom. GTE Service Corp. v. FCC*, 205 F.3d 416 (D.C. Cir. 2000), *on
    recon.*, *Collocation Reconsideration Order*, 15 FCC Rcd 17806
    (2000); *on remand*, *Deployment of Wireline Services Offering
    Advanced Telecommunications Capability*, Fourth Report and Order, 16
    FCC Rcd 15435 (2001) (*Collocation Remand Order*), *petition for
    recon. pending*.

[^402]: *See Collocation Remand Order*, 16 FCC Rcd at 15441-42, para.
    12.

[^403]: *Bell Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 3979, para. 66;
    *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20643, para. 66;
    *BellSouth Carolina Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 649-51, para. 62.

[^404]: *Bell Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 3979, para. 66;
    *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20640-41, paras.
    61-62.

[^405]: 47 U.S.C. § 271(c)(2)(B)(i) (emphasis added).

[^406]: *Id*. § 252(d)(1).

[^407]: *See* 47 C.F.R. §§ 51.501-07, 51.509(g); *Local Competition
    First Report and Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at 15812-16, 15844-61, 15874-76,
    15912, paras. 618-29, 674-712, 743-51, 826.

[^408]: *See SWBT Texas Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 18394, para. 88; *see
    also* 47 U.S.C. §§ 252(c), (e)(6); *American Tel. & Tel Co. v. Iowa
    Utils. Bd.*, 525 U.S. 366 (1999) (*AT&T v. Iowa Utils. Bd*.).

[^409]: *SWBT Texas Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 18394, para. 88; *AT&T Corp.
    v. Iowa Utils. Bd*., 525 U.S. at 377-86.

[^410]: *SWBT* *Texas Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 18394, para. 88; *see also
    Bell Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 4091, para. 258
    (explaining the Commission's case-by-case review of interim prices).

[^411]: *SWBT Kansas/Oklahoma Order*, 16 FCC Rcd at 6359-60, para. 239.

[^412]: *See Bell Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 4091, para.
    260.

[^413]: *Id*. at 3989-90, para. 83; *BellSouth South Carolina Order*, 13
    FCC Rcd at 585.

[^414]: *See Bell Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 3990, para.
    83; *BellSouth South Carolina Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 547-48, 585;
    *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20653.

[^415]: *See Bell Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 3990, para.
    83.

[^416]: *Id.*

[^417]: 47 U.S.C. § 271(c)(2)(B)(ii).

[^418]: *Bell Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 3990, para. 84.

[^419]: *Id.*

[^420]: *Id.* As part of a BOC's demonstration that it is "providing" a
    checklist item (*e.g.*, unbundled loops, unbundled local switching,
    resale services), it must demonstrate that it is providing
    nondiscriminatory access to the systems, information, and personnel
    that support that element or service. An examination of a BOC's OSS
    performance is therefore integral to the determination of whether a
    BOC is offering all of the items contained in the competitive
    checklist. *Id*.

[^421]: *Id.* at 3990-91, para. 84.

[^422]: *Id.* at 3991, para. 85.

[^423]: *Id.*

[^424]: *Id.* For example, the Commission would not deem an incumbent
    LEC to be providing nondiscriminatory access to OSS if limitations
    on the processing of information between the interface and the back
    office systems prevented a competitor from performing a specific
    function in substantially the same time and manner as the incumbent
    performs that function for itself.

[^425]: *See id.*

[^426]: *Id.* at 3991, para. 86.

[^427]: *Id.*

[^428]: *Id.* As a general proposition, specific performance standards
    adopted by a state commission in an arbitration decision would be
    more persuasive evidence of commercial reasonableness than a
    standard unilaterally adopted by the BOC outside of its
    interconnection agreement. *Id*. at 20619-20.

[^429]: *See id.* at 3991-92, para. 86.

[^430]: *Id.* at 3992, para. 87; *Ameritech Michigan Order*, 12 FCC Rcd
    at 20616; s*ee also Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at
    20654; *BellSouth South Carolina Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 592-93. In
    making this determination, the Commission "consider\[s\] all of the
    automated and manual processes a BOC has undertaken to provide
    access to OSS functions," including the interface (or gateway) that
    connects the competing carrier's own operations support systems to
    the BOC; any electronic or manual processing link between that
    interface and the BOC's OSS (including all necessary back office
    systems and personnel); and all of the OSS that a BOC uses in
    providing network elements and resale services to a competing
    carrier. *Ameritech Michigan Order*, 12 FCC Rcd at 20615; s*ee also
    Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20654 n.241.

[^431]: *See Bell Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 3992, para.
    88.

[^432]: *Id*. at 3992, para. 87; *see also Ameritech Michigan Order*, 12
    FCC Rcd at 20616, para. 136 (The Commission determines "whether the
    BOC has deployed the necessary systems and personnel to provide
    sufficient access to each of the necessary OSS functions and whether
    the BOC is adequately assisting competing carriers to understand how
    to implement and use all of the OSS functions available to them.").
    For example, a BOC must provide competing carriers the
    specifications necessary to design their systems interfaces and
    business rules necessary to format orders, and demonstrate that
    systems are scalable to handle current and projected demand. *Id.*

[^433]: *Id.*

[^434]: Business rules refer to the protocols that a BOC uses to ensure
    uniformity in the format of orders and include information
    concerning ordering codes such as universal service ordering codes
    (USOCs) and field identifiers (FIDs). *Id.*; *see also Ameritech
    Michigan Order*, 12 FCC Rcd at 20617 n.335.

[^435]: *Bell Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 3992, para. 88.

[^436]: *Id.*

[^437]: *See id.*

[^438]: *Id.* at 3993, para. 89.

[^439]: *Id.*

[^440]: *Id.*

[^441]: *See id.*; *Ameritech Michigan Order*, 12 FCC Rcd at 20659
    (emphasizing that a third-party review should encompass the entire
    obligation of the incumbent LEC to provide nondiscriminatory access,
    and, where applicable, should consider the ability of actual
    competing carriers in the market to operate using the incumbent's
    OSS access).

[^442]: *See SWBT Kansas/Oklahoma Order*, 16 FCC Rcd at 6301-02, para.
    138.

[^443]: *See id*. at 6286-91, paras. 107-18

[^444]: *See id*. at 6288, para. 111.

[^445]: The Commission has consistently held that a BOC's OSS includes
    both mechanized systems and manual processes, and thus the OSS
    functions performed by BOC personnel have been part of the FCC's OSS
    functionality and commercial readiness reviews.

[^446]: *See* *SWBT Kansas/Oklahoma Order*, *id*. at 6287, para. 108.

[^447]: *See id*. at 6288, para. 111.

[^448]: In prior orders, the Commission has emphasized that providing
    pre-ordering functionality through an application-to-application
    interface is essential in enabling carriers to conduct real-time
    processing and to integrate pre-ordering and ordering functions in
    the same manner as the BOC. *SWBT Texas Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 18426,
    para. 148.

[^449]: The Commission has held previously that an interface that
    provides responses in a prompt timeframe and is stable and reliable,
    is necessary for competing carriers to market their services and
    serve their customers as efficiently and at the same level of
    quality as a BOC serves its own customers. *See Bell Atlantic New
    York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 4025 and 4029, paras. 145 and 154.

[^450]: *See Bell Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 4014, para.
    129; *see also Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at
    20660, para. 94 (referring to "pre-ordering and ordering"
    collectively as "the exchange of information between
    telecommunications carriers about current or proposed customer
    products and services or unbundled network elements or some
    combination thereof"). In prior orders, the Commission has
    identified the following five pre-order functions: (1) customer
    service record (CSR) information; (2) address validation;
    (3) telephone number information; (4) due date information; (5)
    services and feature information. *See Bell Atlantic New York
    Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 4015, para. 132; *Second BellSouth Louisiana
    Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20660, para. 94; *BellSouth South Carolina
    Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 619, para. 147.

[^451]: *Bell Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 4014, para. 129.

[^452]: *Id.*; *see also* *BellSouth South Carolina Order*, 13 FCC Rcd
    at 623-29 (concluding that failure to deploy an
    application-to-application interface denies competing carriers
    equivalent access to pre-ordering OSS functions).

[^453]: *Bell Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 4014, para. 129.

[^454]: *See* *id.* at 4014, para. 130; *Second BellSouth Louisiana
    Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20661-67, para. 105.

[^455]: *UNE Remand Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 3885, para. 426 (determining
    "that the pre-ordering function includes access to loop
    qualification information").

[^456]: *See id.* At a minimum, a BOC must provide (1) the composition
    of the loop material, including both fiber and copper; (2) the
    existence, location and type of any electronic or other equipment on
    the loop, including but not limited to, digital loop carrier or
    other remote concentration devices, feeder/distribution interfaces,
    bridge taps, load coils, pair-gain devices, disturbers in the same
    or adjacent binder groups; (3) the loop length, including the length
    and location of each type of transmission media; (4) the wire
    gauge(s) of the loop; and (5) the electrical parameters of the loop,
    which may determine the suitability of the loop for various
    technologies. *Id.*

[^457]: As the Commission has explained in prior proceedings, because
    characteristics of a loop, such as its length and the presence of
    various impediments to digital transmission, can hinder certain
    advanced services technologies, carriers often seek to "pre-qualify"
    a loop by accessing basic loop makeup information that will assist
    carriers in ascertaining whether the loop, either with or without
    the removal of the impediments, can support a particular advanced
    service. *See* *id.*, 15 FCC Rcd at 4021, para. 140.

[^458]: *UNE Remand Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 3885-3887, paras. 427-431
    (noting that "to the extent such information is not normally
    provided to the incumbent's retail personnel, but can be obtained by
    contacting back office personnel, it must be provided to requesting
    carriers within the same time frame that any incumbent personnel are
    able to obtain such information.").

[^459]: *See SWBT Kansas Oklahoma Order*, 16 FCC Rcd at 6292-93, para.
    121.

[^460]: *Id.*

[^461]: *UNE Remand Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 3885-3887, paras. 427-31.

[^462]: *See* *SWBT Texas Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 18438, para. 170; *Bell
    Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 4035-39, paras. 163-66. The
    Commission examines (i) order flow-through rates, (ii) jeopardy
    notices and (iii) order completion notices using the "same time and
    manner" standard. The Commission examines order confirmation notices
    and order rejection notices using the "meaningful opportunity to
    compete" standard.

[^463]: *See* *Bell Atlantic New York*, 15 FCC Rcd at 4058, para. 196.
    For provisioning timeliness, the Commission looks to missed due
    dates and average installation intervals; for provisioning quality,
    the Commission looks to service problems experienced at the
    provisioning stage.

[^464]: *Id.*

[^465]: *Id*. at 4067, para. 212; *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13
    FCC Rcd at 20692; *Ameritech Michigan Order*, 12 FCC Rcd at 20613,
    20660-61.

[^466]: *Bell Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 4058, para. 196;
    *see also Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20692-93.

[^467]: *Bell Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 4058, para. 196.

[^468]: *Id*.

[^469]: *See* *SWBT Texas Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 18461, para. 210.

[^470]: *See id.*; *SWBT Kansas/Oklahoma Order*, 16 FCC Rcd at 6316-17,
    at para. 163.

[^471]: *Bell Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 3999-4000, para.
    102; *First BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 6279 n.197;
    *BellSouth South Carolina Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 625 n.467;
    *Ameritech Michigan Order*, 12 FCC Rcd at 20617 n.334; *Local
    Competition Second Report and Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at 19742.

[^472]: *Bell Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 3999, para. 102.

[^473]: *Id.* at 3999-4000, para. 102

[^474]: *Id.* at 4000, para. 102.

[^475]: *Id.* at 4000, para. 103.

[^476]: *Id.*

[^477]: *Id.* at 4000, para. 103.

[^478]: *Id.*

[^479]: *Id.* at 4002, para. 107.

[^480]: *Id.* at 4000, para. 104.

[^481]: *Id.* at 4002, para. 108.

[^482]: *Id.* at 4002-03, paras. 109-10.

[^483]: *Id.* at 4003-04, para. 110. In the *Bell Atlantic New York
    Order*, the Commission used these factors in determining whether
    Bell Atlantic had an adequate change management process in place.
    *See id.* at 4004, para. 111. The Commission left open the
    possibility, however, that a change management plan different from
    the one implemented by Bell Atlantic may be sufficient to
    demonstrate compliance with the requirements of section 271. *Id.*

[^484]: *Id.* at 3999, para. 101, 4004-05, para. 112.

[^485]: 47 U.S.C. § 271(c)(2)(B)(ii).

[^486]: *Id*. § 251(c)(3).

[^487]: *Id.*

[^488]: *Ameritech Michigan Order*, 12 FCC Rcd at 20718-19; *BellSouth
    South Carolina Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 646.

[^489]: *BellSouth South Carolina Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 646; *see also
    Local Competition First Report and Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at 15666-68.

[^490]: *Bell Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 4077-78, para.
    230.

[^491]: *Id.*

[^492]: 47 U.S.C. § 271(c)(2)(B)(ii).

[^493]: *Id*. § 251(c)(3).

[^494]: 47 U.S.C. § 252(d)(1).

[^495]: *Local Competition First Report and Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at
    15844-46, paras. 674-79; 47 C.F.R. §§ 51.501 *et* *seq*.; *see also
    Deployment of Wireline Services Offering Advanced Telecommunications
    Capability, CC Docket No. 98-147, and Implementation of the Local
    Competition Provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, CC
    Docket No. 96-98*, Third Report and Order and Fourth Report and
    Order, 14 FCC Rcd 20912, 20974, para. 135 (*Line Sharing Order*)
    (concluding that states should set the prices for line sharing as a
    new network element in the same manner as the state sets prices for
    other UNEs).

[^496]: *See* 47 C.F.R. § 51.315(b).

[^497]: *Bell Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 4084, para. 244;
    *SWBT Kansas/Oklahoma Order*, 16 FCC Rcd at 6266, para. 59.

[^498]: *Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC*, 120 F.3d 753, 800, 804, 805-06 (8^th^
    Cir. 1997).

[^499]: *AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd*., 525 U.S. 366 (1999). In
    reaching its decision, the Court acknowledged that section 201(b)
    "explicitly grants the FCC jurisdiction to make rules governing
    matters to which the 1996 Act applies." *Id.* at 380. Furthermore,
    the Court determined that section 251(d) also provides evidence of
    an express jurisdictional grant by requiring that "the Commission
    \[shall\] complete all actions necessary to establish regulations to
    implement the requirements of this section." *Id.* at 382. The Court
    also held that the pricing provisions implemented under the
    Commission's rulemaking authority do not inhibit the establishment
    of rates by the states. The Court concluded that the Commission has
    jurisdiction to design a pricing methodology to facilitate local
    competition under the 1996 Act, including pricing for
    interconnection and unbundled access, as "it is the States that will
    apply those standards and implement that methodology, determining
    the concrete result." *Id*.

[^500]: *Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC*, 219 F.3d 744 (8^th^ Cir. 2000),
    *petition for cert. granted sub nom. Verizon Communications v. FCC*,
    121 S. Ct. 877 (2001).

[^501]: *Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC*, No. 96-3321 *et al.* (8^th^ Cir. Sept.
    25, 2000).

[^502]: 47 U.S.C. § 271(c)(2)(B)(iii). As originally enacted, section
    224 was intended to address obstacles that cable operators
    encountered in obtaining access to poles, ducts, conduits, or
    rights-of-way owned or controlled by utilities. The 1996 Act amended
    section 224 in several important respects to ensure that
    telecommunications carriers as well as cable operators have access
    to poles, ducts, conduits, or rights-of-way owned or controlled by
    utility companies, including LECs. *Second BellSouth Louisiana
    Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20706, n.574.

[^503]: 47 U.S.C. § 224(f)(1). Section 224(a)(1) defines "utility" to
    include any entity, including a LEC, that controls "poles, ducts,
    conduits, or rights-of-way used, in whole or in part, for any wire
    communications." 47 U.S.C. § 224(a)(1).

[^504]: 47 U.S.C. § 224(f)(2). In the *Local Competition First Report
    and Order*, the Commission concluded that, although the statutory
    exception enunciated in section 224(f)(2) appears to be limited to
    utilities providing electrical service, LECs should also be
    permitted to deny access to their poles, ducts, conduits, and
    rights-of-way because of insufficient capacity and for reasons of
    safety, reliability and generally applicable engineering purposes,
    provided the assessment of such factors is done in a
    nondiscriminatory manner. *Local Competition First Report and
    Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at 16080-81, paras. 1175-77.

[^505]: Section 224(a)(4) defines "pole attachment" as "any attachment
    by a cable television system or provider of telecommunications
    service to a pole, duct, conduit, or right-of-way owned or
    controlled by a utility." 47 U.S.C. § 224(a)(4).

[^506]: 47 U.S.C. § 224(b)(1).

[^507]: *Id*. § 224(c)(1). The 1996 Act extended the Commission's
    authority to include not just rates, terms, and conditions, but also
    the authority to regulate nondiscriminatory access to poles, ducts,
    conduits, and rights-of-way. *Local Competition First Report and
    Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at 16104, para. 1232; 47 U.S.C. § 224(f). Absent
    state regulation of terms and conditions of nondiscriminatory
    attachment access, the Commission retains jurisdiction. *Local
    Competition First Report and Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at 16104, para.
    1232; 47 U.S.C. § 224(c)(1); *see also Bell Atlantic New York
    Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 4093, para. 264*.*

[^508]: *See States That Have Certified That They Regulate Pole
    Attachments*, Public Notice, 7 FCC Rcd 1498 (1992); 47 U.S.C.
    § 224(f).

[^509]: 47 U.S.C. § 271(c)(2)(B)(iv).

[^510]: *Local Competition First Report and Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at 15691,
    para. 380; *UNE Remand Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 3772-73, paras. 166-67,
    n.301 (retaining definition of the local loop from the *Local
    Competition First Report and Order*, but replacing the phrase
    "network interconnection device" with "demarcation point," and
    making explicit that dark fiber and loop conditioning are among the
    features, functions and capabilities of the loop).

[^511]: *SWBT Texas Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 18481-81, para. 248; *Bell
    Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 4095, para. 269; *Second
    BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20637, para. 185.

[^512]: *See Line Sharing Order*, 14 FCC Rcd at 20924-27, paras. 20-27.

[^513]: *See Deployment of Wireline Services offering Advanced
    Telecommunications Capability and Implementation of the Local
    Competition Provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996*, Third
    Report and Order on Reconsideration in CC Docket No. 98-147, Fourth
    Report and Order on Reconsideration in CC Docket No. 96-98, 16 FCC
    Rcd 2101, 2106-07, para. 10 (2001).

[^514]: *See generally* *SWBT Texas Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 18515-17,
    paras. 323-329 (describing line splitting); 47 C.F.R. § 51.703(c)
    (requiring that incumbent LECs provide competing carriers with
    access to unbundled loops in a manner that allows competing carriers
    "to provide any telecommunications service that can be offered by
    means of that network element").

[^515]: *See SWBT* *Kansas/Oklahoma Order*, 16 FCC Rcd at 6348, para.
    220.

[^516]: 47 U.S.C. § 271(c)(2)(B)(v).

[^517]: *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20719, para.
    201.

[^518]: *Id.* A BOC has the following obligations with respect to
    dedicated transport: (a) provide unbundled access to dedicated
    transmission facilities between BOC central offices or between such
    offices and serving wire centers (SWCs); between SWCs and
    interexchange carriers points of presence (POPs); between tandem
    switches and SWCs, end offices or tandems of the BOC, and the wire
    centers of BOCs and requesting carriers; (b) provide all technically
    feasible transmission capabilities such as DS1, DS3, and Optical
    Carrier levels that the competing carrier could use to provide
    telecommunications; (c) not limit the facilities to which dedicated
    interoffice transport facilities are connected, provided such
    interconnections are technically feasible, or restrict the use of
    unbundled transport facilities; and (d) to the extent technically
    feasible, provide requesting carriers with access to digital
    cross-connect system functionality in the same manner that the BOC
    offers such capabilities to interexchange carriers that purchase
    transport services. *Id.* at 20719*.*

[^519]: *Id.* at 20719, n.650. The Commission also found that a BOC has
    the following obligations with respect to shared transport: (a)
    provide shared transport in a way that enables the traffic of
    requesting carriers to be carried on the same transport facilities
    that a BOC uses for its own traffic; (b) provide shared transport
    transmission facilities between end office switches, between its end
    office and tandem switches, and between tandem switches in its
    network; (c) permit requesting carriers that purchase unbundled
    shared transport and unbundled switching to use the same routing
    table that is resident in the BOC's switch; and (d) permit
    requesting carriers to use shared (or dedicated) transport as an
    unbundled element to carry originating access traffic from, and
    terminating traffic to, customers to whom the requesting carrier is
    also providing local exchange service. *Id.* at 20720, n.652*.*

[^520]: 47 U.S.C. § 271(c)(2)(B)(vi); *see also Second BellSouth
    Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20722. A switch connects end user
    lines to other end user lines, and connects end user lines to trunks
    used for transporting a call to another central office or to a
    long-distance carrier. Switches can also provide end users with
    "vertical features" such as call waiting, call forwarding, and
    caller ID, and can direct a call to a specific trunk, such as to a
    competing carrier's operator services.

[^521]: *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20722, para.
    207.

[^522]: *Id*.

[^523]: *Id.* at 20722-23, para. 207.

[^524]: *Id.* at 20723, para. 208.

[^525]: *Id.* at 20723, para. 208 (citing *Ameritech Michigan Order*, 12
    FCC Rcd at 20619, para. 140).

[^526]: *Id.*

[^527]: *Id.*

[^528]: *Id.* at 20723, para. 209 (citing the *Ameritech Michigan
    Order*, 12 FCC Rcd at 20705, para. 306).

[^529]: *Id.* (citing the *Ameritech Michigan Order*, 12 FCC Rcd at
    20714-15, paras. 324-25).

[^530]: 47 U.S.C. § 271(c)(2)(B)(vii). 911 and E911 services transmit
    calls from end users to emergency personnel. It is critical that a
    BOC provide competing carriers with accurate and nondiscriminatory
    access to 911/E911 services so that these carriers' customers are
    able to reach emergency assistance. Customers use directory
    assistance and operator services to obtain customer listing
    information and other call completion services.

[^531]: *Ameritech Michigan Order*, 12 FCC Rcd at 20679, para. 256.

[^532]: *Id.*

[^533]: *Id.*

[^534]: 47 U.S.C. §§ 271(c)(2)(B)(vii)(II), (III).

[^535]: *Id*. § 251(b)(3). The Commission implemented section 251(b)(3)
    in the *Local Competition Second Report and Order*. 47 C.F.R. §
    51.217; *Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions of the
    Telecommunications Act of 1996*, Second Report and Order and
    Memorandum Opinion and Order, 11 FCC Rcd 19392 (1996) (*Local
    Competition Second Report and Order*) *vacated in part sub nom.
    People of the State of California v. FCC*, 124 F.3d 934 (8th Cir.
    1997), *overruled in part*, *AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd.*, 525
    U.S. 366 (1999); *see also Implementation of the Telecommunications
    Act of 1996: Provision of Directory Listings Information under the
    Telecommunications Act of 1934*, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 14
    FCC Rcd 15550 (1999) (*Directory Listings Information NPRM*).

[^536]: While both sections 251(b)(3) and 271(c)(2)(B)(vii)(II) refer to
    nondiscriminatory access to "directory assistance," section
    251(b)(3) refers to nondiscriminatory access to "operator services,"
    while section 271(c)(2)(B)(vii)(III) refers to nondiscriminatory
    access to "operator call completion services." 47 U.S.C.
    §§ 251(b)(3), 271(c)(2)(B)(vii)(III). The term "operator call
    completion services" is not defined in the Act, nor has the
    Commission previously defined the term. However, for section
    251(b)(3) purposes, the term "operator services" was defined as
    meaning "any automatic or live assistance to a consumer to arrange
    for billing or completion, or both, of a telephone call." *Local
    Competition Second Report and Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at 19448, para.
    110. In the same order the Commission concluded that busy line
    verification, emergency interrupt, and operator-assisted directory
    assistance are forms of "operator services," because they assist
    customers in arranging for the billing or completion (or both) of a
    telephone call. *Id.* at 19449, para. 111. All of these services may
    be needed or used to place a call. For example, if a customer tries
    to direct dial a telephone number and constantly receives a busy
    signal, the customer may contact the operator to attempt to complete
    the call. Since billing is a necessary part of call completion, and
    busy line verification, emergency interrupt, and operator-assisted
    directory assistance can all be used when an operator completes a
    call, the Commission concluded in the *Second BellSouth Louisiana
    Order* that for checklist compliance purposes, "operator call
    completion services" is a subset of or equivalent to "operator
    service." *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20740,
    n.763. As a result, the Commission uses the nondiscriminatory
    standards established for operator services to determine whether
    nondiscriminatory access is provided.

[^537]: 47 C.F.R. § 51.217(c)(3); *Local Competition Second Report and
    Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at 19456-58, paras. 130-35. The *Local
    Competition Second Report and Order*'*s* interpretation of section
    251(b)(3) is limited "to access to each LEC's directory assistance
    service." *Id.* at 19456, para. 135. However, section
    271(c)(2)(B)(vii) is not limited to the LEC's systems but requires
    "nondiscriminatory access to . . . directory assistance to allow the
    other carrier's customers to obtain telephone numbers." 47 U.S.C. §
    271(c)(2)(B)(vii). Combined with the Commission's conclusion that
    "incumbent LECs must unbundle the facilities and functionalities
    providing operator services and directory assistance from resold
    services and other unbundled network elements to the extent
    technically feasible," *Local Competition First Report and Order*,
    11 FCC Rcd at 15772-73, paras. 535-37, section 271(c)(2)(B)(vii)'s
    requirement should be understood to require the BOCs to provide
    nondiscriminatory access to the directory assistance service
    provider selected by the customer's local service provider,
    regardless of whether the competitor; provides such services itself;
    selects the BOC to provide such services; or chooses a third party
    to provide such services. *See Directory Listings Information NPRM*.

[^538]: *Local Competition Second Report and Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at
    19464, para. 151.

[^539]: *Id*. at 19464, para. 151.

[^540]: 47 C.F.R. § 51.217(d); *Local Competition Second Report and
    Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at 19463, para. 148. For example, when customers
    call the operator or calls for directory assistance, they typically
    hear a message, such as "thank you for using XYZ Telephone Company."
    Competing carriers may use the BOC's brand, request the BOC to brand
    the call with the competitive carriers name or request that the BOC
    not brand the call at all. 47 C.F.R. § 51.217(d).

[^541]: 47 C.F.R. § 51.217(C)(3)(ii); *Local Competition Second Report
    and Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at 19460-61, paras. 141-44; *Implementation
    of the Telecommunications Act of 1996: Telecommunications Carriers'
    Use of Customer Proprietary Network Information and Other Customer
    Information, Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions of
    the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Provision of Directory Listing
    Information Under the Communications Act of 1934, as amended*, Third
    Report and Order, Second Order on Reconsideration, and Notice of
    Proposed Rulemaking, 14 FCC Rcd 15550, 15630-31, paras. 152-54
    (1999); *Provision of Directory Listing Information Under the
    Communications Act of 1934, as amended*, First Report and Order, 16
    FCC Rcd 2736, 2743-51 (2001).

[^542]: *UNE Remand Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 3891-92, paras. 441-42.

[^543]: *UNE Remand Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 3905, para. 470; *see
    generally* 47 U.S.C. §§ 251-52; *see also* 47 U.S.C. §
    252(d)(1)(A)(i) (requiring UNE rates to be "based on the cost
    (determined without reference to a rate-of-return or other
    rate-based proceeding) of providing the ... network element").

[^544]: *UNE Remand Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 3905-06, paras. 470-73; *see
    also* 47 U.S.C. §§ 201(b), 202(a).

[^545]: 47 U.S.C. § 271(c)(2)(B)(viii).

[^546]: *Id*. § 251(b)(3).

[^547]: *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20748, para.
    255.

[^548]: *Id*. In the *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, the Commission
    stated that the definition of "directory listing" was synonymous
    with the definition of "subscriber list information." *Id.* at 20747
    (citing the *Local Competition Second Report and Order*, 11 FCC Rcd
    at 19458-59). However, the Commission's decision in a later
    proceeding obviates this comparison, and supports the definition of
    directory listing delineated above. *See Implementation of the
    Telecommunications Carriers' Use of Customer Proprietary Network
    Information and Other Customer Information*, CC Docket No. 96-115,
    Third Report and Order; *Implementation of the Local Competition
    Provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996*, CC Docket No.
    96-98, Second Order on Reconsideration; *Provision of Directory
    Listing Information under the Telecommunications Act of 1934, As
    Amended*, CC Docket No. 99-273, FCC 99-227, Notice of Proposed
    Rulemaking, para. 160 (rel. Sept. 9, 1999).

[^549]: *Id.*

[^550]: 47 U.S.C. § 271(c)(2)(B)(ix).

[^551]: *Id.*

[^552]: *See Second Bell South Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20752;
    *see also* *Numbering Resource Optimization*, Report and Order and
    Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 15 FCC Rcd 7574 (2000);
    *Numbering Resource Optimization*, Second Report and Order, Order on
    Reconsideration in CC Docket No. 99-200 and Second Further Notice of
    Proposed Rulemaking in CC Docket No. 99-200, CC Docket Nos. 96-98;
    99-200 (rel. Dec. 29, 2000); *Numbering Resource Optimization*,
    Third Report and Order and Second Order on Reconsideration in CC
    Docket No. 96-98 and CC Docket No. 99-200 (rel. Dec. 28, 2001).

[^553]: 47 U.S.C. § 271(c)(2)(B)(x).

[^554]: *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20753, para.
    267.

[^555]: *Id.* at 20755-56, para. 272.

[^556]: *Local Competition First Report and Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at 15741,
    n.1126; *UNE Remand Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 3875, para. 403.

[^557]: *Id*. at 15741-42, para. 484.

[^558]: *UNE Remand Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 3875, para. 403.

[^559]: 47 U.S.C. § 271(c)(2)(B)(xii).

[^560]: *Id.* at § 251(b)(2).

[^561]: *Id.* at § 153(30).

[^562]: *Id.* at § 251(e)(2); *see also Second BellSouth Louisiana
    Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20757, para. 274; *In the Matter of Telephone
    Number Portability*, Third Report and Order, 13 FCC Rcd 11701,
    11702-04 (1998) (*Third Number Portability Order*); *In the Matter
    of Telephone Number Portability*, Fourth Memorandum Opinion and
    Order on Reconsideration, 15 FCC Rcd 16459, 16460, 16462-65, paras.
    1, 6-9 (1999) (*Fourth Number Portability Order*).

[^563]: *Fourth Number Portability Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 16465, para.
    10; *Telephone Number Portability*, First Report and Order and
    Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 11 FCC Rcd 8352, 8409-12,
    paras. 110-16 (1996) (*First Number Portability Order*); *see also*
    47 U.S.C. § 251(b)(2).

[^564]: *See* 47 C.F.R. §§ 52.3(b)-(f); *Second BellSouth Louisiana
    Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20758, para. 275; *First Number Portability
    Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at 8355, 8399-8404, paras. 3, 91; *Third Number
    Portability Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 11708-12, paras. 12-16.

[^565]: *See* 47 C.F.R. § 52.29; *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13
    FCC Rcd at 20758, para. 275; *First Number Portability Order*, 11
    FCC Rcd at 8417-24, paras. 127-40.

[^566]: *See* 47 C.F.R. §§ 52.32, 52.33; *Second BellSouth Louisiana
    Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20758, para. 275; *Third Number Portability
    Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 11706-07, para. 8; *Fourth Number Portability
    Order* at 16464-65, para. 9.

[^567]: Based on the Commission's view that section 251(b)(3) does not
    limit the duty to provide dialing parity to any particular form of
    dialing parity (*i.e*., international, interstate, intrastate, or
    local), the Commission adopted rules in August 1996 to implement
    broad guidelines and minimum nationwide standards for dialing
    parity. *Local Competition Second Report and Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at
    19407; *Interconnection Between Local Exchange Carriers and
    Commercial Mobile Radio Service Providers*, CC Docket No. 95-185,
    Further Order On Reconsideration, FCC 99-170 (rel. July 19, 1999).

[^568]: 47 U.S.C. § 251(b)(3).

[^569]: *Id.* § 153(15).

[^570]: 47 C.F.R §§ 51.205, 51.207.

[^571]: *See* 47 C.F.R. § 51.207 (requiring same number of digits to be
    dialed); *Local Competition Second Report and Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at
    19400, 19403.

[^572]: 47 U.S.C. § 271(c)(2)(B)(xiii).

[^573]: *Id*. § 252(d)(2)(A).

[^574]: *Id*. § 271(c)(2)(B)(xiv).

[^575]: *Id*. § 251(c)(4)(A).

[^576]: *Id*. § 252(d)(3).

[^577]: *Id*. § 251(c)(4)(B).

[^578]: *Local Competition First Report and Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at 15966,
    para. 939; 47 C.F.R. § 51.613(b). The Eighth Circuit acknowledged
    the Commission's authority to promulgate such rules, and
    specifically upheld the sections of the Commission's rules
    concerning resale of promotions and discounts in *Iowa Utilities
    Board*. *Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC*, 120 F.3d at 818-19, *aff'd in part
    and remanded on other grounds*, *AT&T v. Iowa Utils. Bd.*, 525 U.S.
    366 (1999). *See* *also* 47 C.F.R. §§ 51.613-51.617.

[^579]: 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(4)(B).

[^580]: *Id.*

[^581]: *See, e.g.*, *Bell Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at
    4046-48, paras. 178-81 (Bell Atlantic provides nondiscriminatory
    access to its OSS ordering functions for resale services and
    therefore provides efficient competitors a meaningful opportunity to
    compete).

[^582]: *See Verizon Connecticut Order*, 16 FCC Rcd 14147, 14160-63,
    paras. 27-33 (2001); *Association of Communications Enterprises v.
    FCC*, 235 F.3d 662 (D.C. Cir. 2001).

[^583]: 47 U.S.C. § 271(d)(3)(B).

[^584]: *See Implementation of the Accounting Safeguards Under the
    Telecommunications Act of 1996*, CC Docket No. 96-150, Report and
    Order, 11 FCC Rcd 17539 (1996) (*Accounting Safeguards Order*),
    Second Order On Reconsideration, FCC 00-9 (rel. Jan. 18, 2000);
    *Implementation of the Non-Accounting Safeguards of Sections 271 and
    272 of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended*, CC Docket No.
    96-149, First Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed
    Rulemaking, 11 FCC Rcd 21905 (1996) (*Non-Accounting Safeguards
    Order*), *petition for review pending sub nom. SBC Communications v.
    FCC*, No. 97-1118 (filed D.C. Cir. Mar. 6, 1997) (held in abeyance
    May 7, 1997), First Order on Reconsideration, 12 FCC Rcd 2297 (1997)
    (*First Order on Reconsideration*), Second Order on Reconsideration,
    12 FCC Rcd 8653 (1997) (*Second Order on Reconsideration*), *aff'd
    sub nom. Bell Atlantic Telephone Companies v. FCC*, 131 F.3d 1044
    (D.C. Cir. 1997), Third Order on Reconsideration, FCC 99-242 (rel.
    Oct. 4, 1999) (*Third Order on Reconsideration*).

[^585]: *Non-Accounting Safeguards Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at 21914;
    *Accounting Safeguards Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at 17550; *Ameritech
    Michigan Order*, 12 FCC Rcd at 20725.

[^586]: *Non-Accounting Safeguards Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at 21914, paras.
    15-16; *Ameritech Michigan Order*, 12 FCC Rcd at 20725, para. 346.

[^587]: *Ameritech Michigan Order*, 12 FCC Rcd at 20725, para. 346;
    *Bell Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 4153, para. 402.

[^588]: *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20785-86,
    para. 322; *Bell Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 4153, para.
    402.

[^589]: *Bell Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 4153, para. 402.

[^590]: 47 U.S.C. § 271(d)(3)(C).

[^591]: In addition, Congress specifically rejected an amendment that
    would have stipulated that full implementation of the checklist
    necessarily satisfies the public interest criterion. *See Ameritech
    Michigan Order*, 12 FCC Rcd at 20747 at para. 360-66; *see also* 141
    Cong. Rec. S7971, S8043 (June. 8, 1995).

[^592]: *See Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20805-06,
    para. 360 (the public interest analysis may include consideration of
    "whether approval . . . will foster competition in all relevant
    telecommunications markets").