United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued March 15, 2001 Decided August 21, 2001

No. 00-1204

Global Crossing Telecommunications, Inc.,

Petitioner

v\.

Federal Communications Commission and

United States of America,

Respondents

Bell Atlantic-Delaware, Inc., et al.,

Intervenors

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Federal Communications Commission

Michael J. Shortley, III argued the cause for petitioner. With him on
the briefs were Danny E. Adams and Steven A. Augustino.

Rodger D. Citron, Counsel, Federal Communications Commission, argued the
cause for respondent. On the brief were Christopher J. Wright, General
Counsel, John E. Ingle, Deputy Associate General Counsel, Laurel R.
Bergold, Counsel, A. Douglas Melamed, Acting Assistant Attorney General,
U.S. Department of Justice, and Catherine G. O\'Sullivan and Andrea
Limmer, Attorneys.

Michael E. Glover, Edward Shakin, Gilbert E. Geldon and John M. Goodman
were on the brief for intervenors Verizon Telephone Companies.

Before: Sentelle, Tatel, and Garland, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge Garland.

Garland, Circuit Judge: Global Crossing Telecommunications, Inc.
petitions for review of an order of the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC), requiring Global Crossing to pay Verizon Telephone
Companies compensation for payphone calls originating from Verizon
payphones and routed over Global Crossing\'s network.[^1] Finding the
FCC\'s decision consistent with the statutory scheme and neither
arbitrary nor capricious, we deny the petition for review.

I

In § 276 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996,[^2] Congress directed
the FCC to:

prescribe regulations that\--

\(A\) establish a per call compensation plan to ensure that all payphone
service providers are fairly compensated for each and every completed
intrastate and interstate call using their payphone \...; \[and\]

\(B\) discontinue \... all intrastate and interstate payphone subsidies
from basic exchange and exchange access revenues, in favor of a
compensation plan as specified in subparagraph (A).

47 U.S.C. § 276(b)(1)(A), (B).[^3] Pursuant to Congress\' direction, the
FCC issued orders in 1996 that implemented the provisions of § 276,
including paragraphs (A) and (B). See Report and Order, Implementation
of the Pay Telephone Reclassification and Compensation Provisions of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, 11 FCC Rcd 20,541 (1996); Order on
Reconsideration, 11 FCC Rcd 21,233 (1996), aff\'d in part and remanded
in part sub nom. Illinois Pub. Telecomm. Ass\'n, 117 F.3d 555 (D.C. Cir.
1997) (collectively, Payphone Orders).

With respect to paragraph (A), the FCC required interexchange carriers
(IXCs) that carry calls originating from payphones to compensate the
payphone service provider (PSP).[^4] See 47 C.F.R. § 64.1300(a)
(\"\[E\]very carrier to whom a completed call from a payphone is routed
shall compensate the payphone service provider for the call at a rate
agreed upon by the parties by contract.\"); Report and Order, Payphone
Orders, 11 FCC Rcd at 20,566, p 48; id. at 20,584, p 83. Previously,
PSPs had received no revenue for originating certain calls (such as
subscriber 800 and other toll-free number calls) and were prohibited
from blocking callers from making some of those calls (such as access
code calls). See Bell Atlantic-Delaware v. Frontier Communications
Servs., Inc., 14 FCC Rcd 16,050, 16,053-54, p 5 (Com. Car. Bur. 1999)
(hereinafter \"Bureau Order\"). The Commission concluded that PSPs must
be compensated for all such calls, and determined that IXCs, as the
primary beneficiaries of those calls, should be responsible for
providing that compensation. See id. at 16,054, p 5; Report and Order,
Payphone Orders, 11 FCC Rcd at 20,584, p 83.

To implement paragraph (B), the FCC ruled that in order to receive
compensation for completed calls originating from its payphones, a PSP
that is also a local exchange carrier (LEC PSP), see supra note 4,
\"must be able to certify\" that it has complied with several
requirements, including the institution of \"effective intrastate
tariffs reflecting the removal of charges that recover the costs of
payphones and any intrastate \[payphone\] subsidies.\" Order on
Reconsideration, Payphone Orders, 11 FCC Rcd at 21,293, p 131. The FCC
delegated to its Common Carrier Bureau the authority to make \"any
necessary determination as to whether a LEC has complied with all
requirements\" for compensation. Id. at 21,294, p 132.

Verizon is a LEC PSP that offers local exchange and payphone services in
the northeast and mid-Atlantic states. Global Crossing is an IXC that
provides both interstate and intrastate telephone toll service. Since
October 1997, when the per call compensation requirement became
effective, Verizon has delivered calls from its payphones to Global
Crossing.

In June 1997, in order to obtain compensation for calls originating from
Verizon\'s payphones and carried by Global Crossing, Verizon presented
Global Crossing with signed letters attesting that it had complied with
all of the conditions for receiving compensation, including the
elimination of intrastate subsidies. Global Crossing replied that it
would not pay compensation until Verizon provided additional
information, specified by Global Crossing, establishing that Verizon had
in fact satisfied the compensation eligibility
prerequisites\--particularly the removal of those subsidies. In June
1998, representatives of Verizon and Global Crossing met with staff of
the Common Carrier Bureau, who advised that under the FCC\'s rules and
orders, \"IXCs must compensate a LEC payphone service provider upon
receipt of the LEC\'s certification of eligibility without further
inquiry or requirements.\" Bureau Order, 14 FCC Rcd at 16,058, p 10.
Nonetheless, Global Crossing continued to refuse to pay, and, on July
15, 1998, Verizon filed a formal complaint with the FCC pursuant to 47
U.S.C. § 208.[^5] The complaint alleged that Global Crossing had
violated 47 U.S.C. § 276, as well as 47 C.F.R. § 64.1300, by failing to
compensate Verizon for more than 11,200,000 calls. Complaint pp 33-35.

In September 1999, the Common Carrier Bureau held that Verizon had
adequately certified its compliance with the prerequisites for receiving
compensation and ordered Global Crossing to pay Verizon for applicable
past and future calls. Bureau Order, 14 FCC Rcd at 16,052, p 3. The
Bureau determined that \"\[t\]he term \'certification\' \... does not
mandate that a LEC payphone service provider prove to the IXC payor that
it has satisfied each compensation eligibility prerequisite,\" but
rather requires that a LEC \"attest\[ \] authori-tatively to an IXC
payor that such LEC payphone service provider has satisfied each
prerequisite.\" Id. (emphasis added). The Bureau found that
interpretation to be consistent with prior Commission orders, and
permissible under the language of § 276. Id. at 16,063-65, pp 18-19, 22.
And it held that if Global Crossing (or any other IXC) wished to
question \"the veracity of a LEC\'s certification,\" it was obliged to
do so by filing its own complaint with the Commission, rather than by
simply refusing to make payment. Id. at 16,068, p 27.

The FCC affirmed the Bureau\'s decision in all respects. Order on
Review, Bell Atlantic-Delaware v. Frontier Communications Servs., Inc.,
15 FCC Rcd 7475, 7480, p 11 (2000) (hereinafter \"FCC Order\"). The
Commission also refused to consider Global Crossing\'s \"affirmative
defense\" that Verizon \"in fact, had not qualified for payphone
compensation.\" Id. at 7479, p 9. The Commission held that this
\"so-called \'affirmative defense\' \" was \"irrelevant to evaluating
\[Global Crossing\'s\] obligation to pay upon receiving certification,\"
and \"was not properly before the Bureau in the context of\" a complaint
filed by a LEC PSP. Id. \"\[T\]he proper way for an IXC to challenge a
LEC\'s failure to remove unlawful subsidies,\" the FCC declared, \"is to
initiate a Section 208 proceeding at the Commission.\" Id. at 7479-80, p
9.

II

Global Crossing contends that the FCC\'s determination, that an IXC must
pay a LEC PSP compensation merely upon certification that the LEC has
discontinued subsidizing its payphone service, is neither consistent
with § 276 of the Telecommunications Act nor the product of reasoned
decisionmaking. We consider these two arguments below.

A

In addressing Global Crossing\'s statutory argument, we apply the
two-step framework of Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).[^6] We first ask \"whether Congress
has directly spoken to the precise question at issue,\" in which case we
\"must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.\"
Id. at 842-43. If, however, the \"statute is silent or ambiguous with
respect to the specific issue,\" we move to the second step and defer to
the agency\'s interpretation as long as it is \"based on a permissible
construction of the statute,\" id. at 843, and is \"reasonable in light
of the Act\'s text, legislative history, and purpose,\" Southern Cal.
Edison Co. v. FERC, 116 F.3d 507, 511 (D.C. Cir. 1997).

Global Crossing asserts that permitting Verizon to receive compensation
merely upon its certification that it has discontinued subsidies is
inconsistent with the express language of § 276, which requires the
Commission to promulgate regulations that \"discontinue \... all
intrastate and interstate payphone subsidies \... in favor of a
compensation plan.\" 47 U.S.C. § 276(b)(1)(B). That language, Global
Crossing argues, \"ties the timing of the receipt of compensation to the
removal of the subsidies,\" rendering Verizon unqualified to receive
compensation until it first removes all of its subsidies. Reply Br. at
10. By allowing Verizon to rely on certification alone, petitioner
continues, the FCC permitted the LEC PSP to receive per call
compensation without regard to whether it had in fact discontinued its
payphone subsidies.

The FCC does not disagree that § 276 requires Verizon to discontinue
subsidies before it may receive compensation. Indeed, the Bureau\'s
decision \"emphasize\[s\] that a LEC\'s certification letter does not
substitute for the LEC\'s obligation to comply\" with the requirements
for compensation, and that \"LECs must satisfy the requirements \... to
be eligible to receive compensation.\" Bureau Order, 14 FCC Rcd at
16,068, p 28. The Commission rightly notes, however, that the statute is
silent regarding the mechanism the FCC should adopt to ensure that the
statute\'s requirements are carried out. See id. at 16,065, p 22. That
being so, the only question for us is whether, under Chevron step two,
the FCC\'s interpretation \"is based on a reasonable construction of the
statutory term\[s\].\" Chevron, 467 U.S. at 840. And we see nothing
unreasonable about the FCC\'s conclusion that the statute permits it to
adopt a certification regime.

Global Crossing contends that by relying upon certification\--upon
nothing more than the word of the LEC PSP\--the FCC cannot ensure that
subsidies have been discontinued \"in favor of\" compensation, and hence
cannot ensure compliance with that statutory requirement. But the FCC
does not rely solely upon certification; certification is merely the
initial step in the Commission\'s enforcement scheme. If an IXC believes
that a LEC PSP\'s certification is false or otherwise unsupported, the
IXC may file a complaint under § 208 of the Communications Act and, if
correct, will recover damages, including its payments and interest
thereon. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 206-09. Moreover, if a LEC PSP is found to
have certified falsely, it faces additional penalties, including fines
and forfeitures, in an enforcement action brought by the Commission. See
47 U.S.C. §§ 501-04. Taken together, these procedural mechanisms appear
reasonably calculated to accomplish the congressional purpose.

Although the enforcement regime chosen by the Commission may not be the
only one possible, we must uphold it as long as it is a reasonable means
of implementing the statutory requirements. See New England Tel. & Tel.
Co. v. FCC, 826 F.2d 1101, 1107-08 (D.C. Cir. 1987). Certification is
the mechanism the FCC employs for a broad range of its other statutory
functions.[^7] There is nothing about the language or purpose of § 276
to indicate that certification is an inappropriate method of fulfilling
the payphone requirements of the Telecommunications Act as well.

B

In addition to its statutory argument, Global Crossing advances two
further arguments that are best characterized as claims that the FCC\'s
certification policy does not represent reasoned decisionmaking. As to
these claims, we apply the deferential standard of the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA), and will uphold the Commission\'s policy judgments
as long as they are not \"arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion,
or otherwise not in accordance with law.\" 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). To
satisfy that standard, an agency must \"examine the relevant data and
articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action including a
\'rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.\' \"
Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass\'n of United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (quoting Burlington Truck Lines,
Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 (1962)).

In an argument that largely overlaps with its claims under Chevron step
two, Global Crossing asserts that the FCC failed to articulate any
reasoned basis for relying on a policy of certification. We are not
persuaded. As discussed in Part II.A, the Commission reasonably
concluded that certification of compliance, coupled with provisions for
complaint and enforcement proceedings, will accomplish the statutory
purpose of discontinuing payphone subsidies. At the same time, the FCC
reasonably determined that requiring IXCs to pay immediately upon
certification for calls routed over their networks will promote
certainty in the achievement of Congress\' other purpose: \"
\'ensur\[ing\] that all payphone service providers are fairly
compensated for each and every \... call.\' \" Bureau Order, 14 FCC Rcd
at 16,064, p 20 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 276(b)(1)(A)). Global Crossing may
be correct in arguing that certainty of compensation can also be ensured
by permitting an IXC to decide whether a LEC PSP\'s proof of compliance
is sufficient, and then requiring the LEC to file a complaint with the
Commission if it is dissatisfied. But Congress has delegated the
authority to make the choice between such alternatives to the FCC, and
our only responsibility is to ensure that the choice the FCC has made is
a reasonable one.

Global Crossing also contends that, in requiring payment upon mere
certification, the FCC departed from its prior orders and precedents
without explanation. It is true that \"an agency changing its course by
rescinding a rule\" or departing from precedent \"is obligated to supply
a reasoned analysis for the change.\" State Farm, 463 U.S. at 42; see
Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 852 (D.C. Cir.
1970). But it is also true that we must defer to an agency\'s reading of
its own regulations unless that reading is \"plainly erroneous or
inconsistent with the regulation\[s\],\" Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452,
461 (1997), and that we must accord deference to an agency\'s reasonable
interpretation of its own precedents, see Cassell v. FCC, 154 F.3d 478,
483 (D.C. Cir. 1998). We perceive no unexplained departure from the
agency\'s prior policies here.

To implement § 276(b)(1)(B), the FCC issued an order providing that a
LEC PSP \"must be able to certify\" that it has, inter alia, removed
intrastate subsidies before it may receive compensation for calls
originating from its payphones. Order on Reconsideration, Payphone
Orders, 11 FCC Rcd at 21,293, p 131. The Commission\'s order did not
specify the requirements for such certification, but instead delegated
to the Common Carrier Bureau the authority to make \"any necessary
determination as to whether a LEC has complied with all requirements\"
for compensation. Id. at 21,294, p 132. Global Crossing maintains that
\"to certify\" means more than merely to attest to compliance; rather,
it requires the LEC PSP to provide the IXC with full proof that it has
satisfied all regulatory conditions. The Bureau, however, interpreted
the phrase as requiring only attestation, and the FCC confirmed that as
the correct construction of the Commission\'s own language. FCC Order,
15 FCC Rcd at 7479, p 7.

The Bureau\'s interpretation of the Commission\'s order is a reasonable
one. The Bureau relied upon \"the ordinary meaning of the term \'to
certify,\' \" defined by Black\'s Law Dictionary as \"the formal
assertion in writing of some fact,\" and by Webster\'s as \"to attest as
being true.\" Bureau Order, 14 FCC Rcd at 16,062, p 16 (citing Black\'s
Law Dictionary 227 (6th ed. 1990); Webster\'s Ninth New Collegiate
Dictionary 223 (1989)). It also noted that the Commission has used this
meaning of \"certify\" in other contexts. Id. at 16,062-63, p 17 (citing
47 C.F.R. § 1.734(c) (providing that the signature of a party on a
pleading \"shall be a certificate that \... to the best of his or her
knowledge \[the pleading\] is well grounded in fact\")); see also CHM
Broad. Ltd. P\'ship v. FCC, 24 F.3d 1453, 1455 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (noting
that an applicant for an FM radio license \"certifies\" that it has
sufficient assets to construct and operate a station by checking \"yes\"
on an FCC form).

The Bureau further observed, correctly, that this interpretation of \"to
certify\" is consistent with decisions issued by the FCC and the Bureau
since the promulgation of the initial 1996 Payphone Orders. The Bureau
pointed out, for example, that the Commission had ruled that LEC PSPs
are not required to file a certification with any state or federal
regulatory agency, or to obtain a formal certification of compliance
from either the states or the FCC, in order to be eligible to receive
compensation. Bureau Order, 14 FCC Rcd at 16,054-55, p 6 (citing Second
Report and Order, 13 FCC Rcd at 1780, p 1 n.9). The Bureau also noted
that, in its Intrastate Tariffing Waiver Order, it specifically refused
AT&T\'s request to declare that \"a LEC is not eligible for payphone
compensation \'until it has provided proof of state action verifying the
LEC\'s compliance with section 276.\' \" Id. at 16,063, p 18 (quoting 12
FCC Rcd at 21,377, p 16). Instead, the Bureau \"reiterated that the
Commission\'s previous orders required only that a LEC \'be able to
certify\' compliance with the payphone compensation prerequisites.\" Id.
(quoting 12 FCC Rcd at 21,380, p 22). And in two further orders, the
Bureau declared that \"LECs that have certified to the IXC that they
comply with the requirements of the Payphone Orders must receive
per-call compensation.\" Implementation of the Pay Telephone
Reclassification and Compensation Provisions of the Telecommunications
Act of 1996, 13 FCC Rcd 4998, 5002, p 4 (Com. Car. Bur. 1998) (emphasis
added); see also Implementation of the Pay Telephone Reclassification
and Compensation Provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 13
FCC Rcd 10,893, 10,899, p 12 (Com. Car. Bur. 1998).

In sum, the agency order at issue in this case reflects neither a
failure to articulate a reasonable basis for decision, nor a departure
from FCC policy and precedent. We therefore find it to be consistent
with the APA\'s standards for reasoned decisionmaking.

III

Global Crossing also challenges the Commission\'s determination that an
IXC seeking to contest the veracity of a LEC PSP\'s certification must
file its own complaint for damages under 47 U.S.C. § 208, and may not
assert lack of compliance as an \"affirmative defense\" to a complaint
brought by a LEC PSP. Petitioner contends that by directing it to pay
Verizon without considering its defense of noncompliance, the Commission
abdicated its \"duty to adjudicate issues raised in complaint
proceedings.\" Global Crossing Br. at 12. Citing our opinion in American
Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. FCC, 978 F.2d 727 (D.C. Cir. 1992), Global
Crossing argues that by refusing to address its affirmative defense, the
FCC breached its duty to consider Global Crossing\'s claim on the
merits.

We do not agree. First, as the FCC points out, there was no failure to
consider an \"affirmative defense\" here because the FCC has not
designated noncompliance as an affirmative defense; rather, it is part
of the case-in-chief that an IXC must initiate on its own. Second, this
approach is not contrary to our ruling in American Telephone. In that
case, the Commission relied on the validity of an earlier FCC order in
dismissing a complaint brought by AT&T against a competitor\--without
adjudicating AT&T\'s claim that the order was unlawful. The Commission
said that it would instead consider the validity of the order in a new
rulemaking. We held that the Commission could not postpone a question
concerning the application of existing law by declaring its intent to
consider a future change in that law. The Commission, we said, appeared
to be trying to \"avoid judicial review\" of its order by engaging in
\"a sort of administrative law shell game.\" American Tel. & Tel., 978
F.2d at 731-32; see id. at 729, 731-32.

Here, however, there is no shell game, because the FCC has made quite
clear under which shell the pea lies. The Commission has advised Global
Crossing several times that if it wishes to contest Verizon\'s
qualifications for payphone compensation, it should bring a separate
action under § 208. And the Commission has also made clear that if
Global Crossing brings such an action, it will decide the matter in that
forum. Although the Commission does have an obligation to adjudicate
claims raised by a party filing a complaint, see American Tel. & Tel.,
978 F.2d at 732, it will fulfill that obligation by considering Global
Crossing\'s allegations when they are properly filed.[^8]

Nor has Global Crossing been able to articulate how it is disadvantaged
by the Commission\'s requirement that it be a complainant rather than a
respondent. As petitioner conceded at oral argument, there is no
difference in the allocation of the burden of proof: Although the party
that brings a § 208 complaint bears the burden, see Hi-Tech Furnace
Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 224 F.3d 781, 787 (D.C. Cir. 2000), so does a party
that asserts an affirmative defense to such a complaint, see AT&T v.
Business Telecom, Inc., FCC 01-185, 2001 WL 575527, at p 46 (rel. May
30, 2001). At oral argument, Global Crossing also denied that it would
derive any economic benefit from being a respondent rather than a
complainant: It noted that because it would recover its payments with
interest if it prevailed on a § 208 complaint, there was no difference
between asserting noncompliance as an affirmative defense to nonpayment,
and paying upon demand and then filing a complaint to recover. Indeed,
Global Crossing even denied that cash-flow considerations made the
position of respondent preferable. But if Global Crossing truly has
nothing to gain from the alternative for which it presses, and hence
suffers no disadvantage from the procedural posture to which the FCC has
assigned it, then it would appear to have little basis for complaining
about the FCC\'s decision.

It is well-settled that the Commission \"enjoys wide discretion in
fashioning its own procedures.\" City of Angels Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 745
F.2d 656, 664 (D.C. Cir. 1984). Section 208 authorizes the FCC to
investigate a complaint \"in such manner and by such means as it shall
deem proper.\" 47 U.S.C. § 208. More generally, 47 U.S.C. § 154(j)
provides that \"\[t\]he Commission may conduct its proceedings in such
manner as will best conduce to the proper dispatch of business and to
the ends of justice.\" Although Global Crossing contends that
designation of an issue as part of an affirmative case rather than as an
affirmative defense is a matter of substance, not procedure, we
disagree. The Supreme Court has interpreted § 154(j) \"as explicitly and
by implication delegating to the Commission power to resolve subordinate
questions of procedure such as the scope of the inquiry, whether
applications should be heard contemporaneously or successively, whether
parties should be allowed to intervene in one another\'s proceedings,
and similar questions.\" FCC v. Schreiber, 381 U.S. 279, 289 (1965)
(internal quotations omitted). The question of whether an issue is
properly designated as an affirmative defense falls well within that
rubric. Cf. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c) (designating certain issues as
\"affirmative defenses\" rather than \"counterclaims\"); AT&T, 220 F.3d
607, 630 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (according deference, in a proceeding under 47
U.S.C. § 271, to the FCC\'s decision to bar a collateral challenge to a
prior FCC order and instead to require the filing of a separate petition
for review). And because there is nothing arbitrary about the FCC\'s
decision to require Global Crossing to raise its claim of noncompliance
by separate complaint, the Commission\'s decision \"may not be impeached
merely because reasonable minds might differ on the wisdom thereof.\"
Id. at 292.

IV

For the foregoing reasons, Global Crossing\'s petition for review is
denied and the FCC\'s order on review is

Affirmed.

[^1]: At the time of the proceedings below, Global Crossing was known as
    Frontier Communications Services, Inc., and Verizon was known as
    Bell Atlantic.

[^2]: Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996) (codified in scattered
    sections of 47 U.S.C.).

[^3]: For background regarding § 276, see American Pub. Communications
    Council v. FCC, 215 F.3d 51, 53 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Illinois Pub.
    Telecomm. Ass\'n v. FCC, 117 F.3d 555, 558-61 (D.C. Cir. 1997).

[^4]: \"Long-distance telephone traffic is ordinarily transmitted by a
    local exchange carrier (\'LEC\') from its origin to a long-distance
    carrier (or interexchange carrier or \'IXC\'). The IXC carries the
    traffic to its region of destination and hands it off to the LEC
    there.\" U.S. Tel. Ass\'n v. FCC, 188 F.3d 521, 523-24 (D.C. Cir.
    1999).

[^5]: Section 208, entitled \"Complaints to Commission,\" states:

    a\) Any person \... complaining of anything done or omitted to be
    done by any common carrier subject to this chapter, in contravention
    of the provisions thereof, may apply to said Commission by
    petition\.... If such carrier \... shall not satisfy the complaint
    within the time specified or there shall appear to be any reasonable
    ground for investigating said complaint, it shall be the duty of the
    Commission to investigate the matters complained of in such manner
    and by such means as it shall deem proper.

    47 U.S.C. § 208.

[^6]: In United States v. Mead Corp., the Supreme Court confirmed the
    applicability of the Chevron test to a case like this one, where
    \"Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules
    carrying the force of law, and \... the agency interpretation
    claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of that
    authority.\" 121 S.Ct. 2164, 2171 (2001).

[^7]: See, e.g., Cellular Phone Taskforce v. FCC, 205 F.3d 82, 92-93
    (D.C. Cir. 2000) (rejecting a challenge to the FCC\'s decision to
    allow undocumented self-certification of compliance with
    environmental guidelines by FCC license applicants); CHM Broad. Ltd.
    P\'ship v. FCC, 24 F.3d 1453, 1455-56 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (noting that
    the FCC uses self-certification to implement the statutory
    requirement that applicants for radio station licenses demonstrate
    their financial qualifications); Supplemental Order Clarification,
    Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions of the
    Telecommunications Act of 1996, 15 FCC Rcd 9587, 9602-03, p 29
    (2000) (clarifying that \"incumbent LECs must allow requesting
    carriers to self-certify\" that they meet certain requirements, and
    noting that \"a letter sent to the incumbent LEC by a requesting
    carrier is a practical method of certification\").

[^8]: See AT&T v. FCC, 220 F.3d 607, 631 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (holding that
    the FCC may, consistent with American Telephone, bar collateral
    challenges to other FCC orders in proceedings brought to adjudicate
    applications to provide in-region long distance service).