Session No. 2

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**Course Title: Homeland Security and Emergency Management**

**Session Title: Policy and Organizational Context**

**Prepared by: William C. Nicholson, Esq.**

**Assistant Professor**

**Department of Criminal Justice**

**North Carolina Central University**

**Time: 3 hours**

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**Objectives:** At the conclusion of this session, the students should
be able to:

1.  Discuss the history of counter-terrorism policy and programs in the
    United States prior to September 11, 2001 in general terms.

2.  Discuss major counter-terrorism legislation enacted since September
    11, 2002.

3.  Discuss major executive actions undertaken since September 11, 2002,
    including the progression from Presidential Decision Directive 39
    through the series of Homeland Security Presidential Directives
    (HSPDs) including HSPD 5, 6, 7, and 8.

4.  Discuss major national strategies undertaken since September 11,
    2001.

5.  Talk about the major paradigm shift that has taken place in the
    national approach to terrorism, including the establishment of the
    Department of Homeland Security and creation of the National
    Response Plan (NRP) and National Incident Management System (NIMS).

6.  Discuss the mandates placed on state and local governments by newly
    created federal initiatives.

7.  Talk about state and local counterterrorism enactments, including
    mandates for Local Emergency Planning Committees (LEPCs) and state
    and local homeland security organizations.

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**Scope**

> This session discusses the policies underlying our national homeland
> security efforts and post-September 11, 2001 organizational changes
> undertaken to address the situation.

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**Readings:**

1.  **Required readings for students:**

> William C. Nicholson, "The New (?) Federal Approach to Emergencies,"
> *Homeland Protection Professional*, Volume 2, No. 6 (August 2003).
>
> William C. Nicholson, "The New Federalism in Homeland Security"
> *Homeland Protection Professional*, Volume 2, No. 9 (November/December
> 2003).

William C. Nicholson, "An Interview About NIMS and the NRP" A Dialogue
with Bob Stephan, Assistant to Secretary Tom Ridge, *Homeland Protection
Professional,* Volume 3, No. 3 (April 2004).

> William L. Waugh, Jr., "The 'All-Hazards' Approach Must be Continued"
> *Journal of Emergency Management* Vol. 1, No. 4, 11 (Fall 2003).
>
> "Terrorism Time Line: Major Focusing Events and U.S . Outcomes (1993 -
> 2003)" Claire B. Rubin, M.A., William R. Cumming, J.D., & Irmak
> Renda-Tanali, D.Sc., found on line at
> http://www.disaster-timeline.com/TTLJune1204Irmak_smaller.pdf

2.  **Readings for instructors:**

> William Cumming, Esq. and Richard Sylves, Ph.D. "The Evolution of
> Emergency Management: From FEMA to the Department of Homeland
> Security - The HAZMAT Chronicle", Chapter 2; "FEMA's Changing
> Priorities Since September 11, 2001" Chapter 3 in William C.
> Nicholson, Editor *Homeland Security Law and Policy*, Charles C.
> Thomas Publisher, Ltd., Springfield, IL. (2005)
>
> William C. Nicholson, "FEMA's Changing Priorities Since September 11,
> 2001" Chapter 3 in William C. Nicholson, Editor *Homeland Security Law
> and Policy*, Charles C. Thomas Publisher, Ltd., Springfield, IL.
> (2005)
>
> William C. Nicholson, "Seeking Consensus on Homeland Security
> Standards: Adopting the National Response Plan and the National
> Incident Management System" *Widener Law Review*, Vol. 11, No. 2
> (2006).

3.  **Background readings for instructors (optional):**

> William C. Nicholson, *Emergency Response and Emergency Management
> Law: Cases and Materials*, Charles C. Thomas Publisher, Ltd.,
> Springfield, IL. (2003).
>
> William C. Nicholson, "Legal Issues in Emergency Response to Terrorism
> Incidents Involving Hazardous Materials: The Hazardous Waste
> Operations and Emergency Response ("HAZWOPER") Standard, Standard
> Operating Procedures, Mutual Aid and the Incident Command System"
> *Widener Symposium Law Journal*, Volume 9, Number 2, 295 (2003).
>
> William L. Waugh, Jr., "Informing Policy and Administration: A
> Comparative Perspective on Terrorism," *International Journal of
> Public Administration* 12 (1989): 477-99.

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**Remarks**

This session is designed to provide a broad perspective on the national
policy and programmatic reaction to the terrorist violence committed
against the United States on September 11, 2001. The session outlines
the background of US policy and programs before the September 11, 2001
attacks. Next, federal legal and policy reactions are considered,
including legislation, executive actions, and national strategies. The
way in which counter-terrorism has taken center stage in our national
preparedness efforts is detailed, with discussion of the creation of the
Department of Homeland Security and the process of drafting the National
Response Plan (NRP) and National Incident Management System (NIMS), as
well as their content. The way in which the NRP and NIMS were created,
reactions by newly-regulated communities, and federal reaction to
criticisms provide an interesting perspective into the evolving
relationships among national partners. Mandates given to state and local
units of government are considered, as are initiatives undertaken by
those groups. The effect on existing frameworks, including emergency
management and Local Emergency Planning Committees, provides a
perspective on the effect of our national re-prioritizing. The creation
of state and local homeland security organizations illustrates the
pervasiveness of security as a national priority. Consideration of the
traditional emergency management "all hazards" approach and changing
views on its importance may point the way for future developments.

> Students may be reluctant to view the evolution of homeland security
> law and policy from a critical perspective, perhaps finding such a
> questioning approach to be unpatriotic. Still, in order to understand
> where we are heading as a nation, it is vital to understand where our
> roots lie, how policy is made, and the factors that will affect future
> developments in homeland security.

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**Objective 2.1**

**Discuss the history of counter-terrorism policy and programs in the
United States prior to September 11, 2001 in general terms**

> Since the 1960's, the United States has been afflicted by terrorist
> attacks by two types of **non-state actors**. These include **domestic
> terrorists**, who may be affiliated with violent groups such as the
> Aryan Brotherhood and lone attackers, such as the Unabomber. By far
> the most violent and destructive terrorists, however, have been
> **transnational terrorists**, non-state foreign actors who apply
> violence against nations and groups. Sometimes, transnational groups
> are supported by foreign governments, as with the **Taliban**
> government in Afghanistan backing and providing a haven for Osama bin
> Laden's murderous **al Quaeda** organization. Even after losing the
> sanctuary of Afghanistan, al Quaeda continues to attack American and
> allied interests worldwide.
>
> Transnational groups in the United States have utilized bombings,
> assassinations, kidnappings, assaults, and other types of violence
> beginning during the 1980s and 1990s. The most memorable such attacks,
> of course, took place on September 11, 2001, when hijacked airliners
> were crashed into the World Trade Center in New York, the Pentagon in
> Washington, DC, and a field in western Pennsylvania
>
> Well before September 11, 2001, however, the United States signed on
> to international agreements and enacted domestic measures whose goals
> were **prevention** of terrorism, **preparedness** for terrorism, and
> **increased penalties** for terrorists.
>
> The adoption of **international anti-skyjacking** **conventions**
> helped lower their occurrence.
>
> The **Tokyo Convention of 1963** made illegal acts of violence on
> civilian aircraft. The **Hague Convention of 1970** and the **Montreal
> Convention of 1971** addressed jurisdiction over attacks on aviation
> and confirmed the policy of "prosecute or extradite." requiring
> signatory nations to apprehend skyjackers and either try them or
> extradite them to a nation that would try them.

Other international agreements also were directed against terrorism.

Domestically, several laws and policies were put into place.

> In the U.S., the **Anti-Hijacking Act of 1974** mandated that airlines
> provide security. At US airports and international airports with US
> flights, the Federal Aviation Administration and federal law
> enforcement agencies monitor security pursuant to this statute.
>
> The **Posse Comitatus Act,** 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (2002) (This reference
> is the current publication of a law passed in the aftermath of the
> Civil War.), prohibits the use of the Army or the Air Force for law
> enforcement purposes, except as otherwise authorized by the
> Constitution or statute. This prohibition applies to Navy and Marine
> Corps personnel as a matter of DOD policy.
>
> Exceptions to the Posse Comitatus Act are found in the **Insurrection
> Act,** 10 U.S.C. §§ 331-335 (2002). Recognizing that the primary
> responsibility for protecting life and property and maintaining law
> and order in the civilian community is vested in State and local
> governments, the Insurrection Statutes authorize the President to
> direct the armed forces to enforce the law to suppress insurrections
> and domestic violence. Military forces may be used to restore order,
> prevent looting, and engage in other law enforcement activities.
>
> The **Communications Act of 1934,** 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-615b (2002),
> provides the authority to grant special temporary authority on an
> expedited basis to operate radio frequency devices. It would serve as
> the basis for obtaining a temporary permit to establish a radio
> station to be run by a Federal agency and broadcast public service
> announcements during the immediate aftermath of an emergency or major
> disaster. 47 U.S.C. § 606 (2002) provides the authority for the NCS to
> engage in emergency response, restoration, and recovery of the
> telecommunications infrastructure.
>
> The **Public Health Service Act,** 42 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq. provides
> that the
>
> Secretary of HHS may declare a public health emergency under certain
> circumstances and authorizes development and implementation of a plan
> under which the personnel, equipment, medical supplies, and other
> resources of the Department may be effectively used to control
> epidemics of any disease or condition and to meet other health
> emergencies and problems. The Public Health Service Act authorizes the
> Secretary to declare a public health emergency and to prepare for and
> respond to public health emergencies. The Secretary is further
> empowered to extend temporary assistance to States or localities to
> meet health emergencies.
>
> The **Atomic Energy Act of 1954,** 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2297 (2003), and
> the **Energy Reorganization Act of 1974,** 5 U.S.C. §§ 5313-5316, 42
> U.S.C. §§ 5801-
>
> 5891 (2002), provide the statutory authority for both the Department
> of Energy and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission(NRC), and the
> foundation for NRC regulation of the Nation's civilian nuclear
> materials to ensure adequate protection of public health and safety,
> to promote the common defense and security, and to protect the
> environment.
>
> **Disaster Relief Act of 1974 (PL 93-288)** clarified responsibilities
> for disaster events. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
> was established in 1978 pursuant to Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1978.
> **Executive Order (EO) 12148** (1979) assigned FEMA lead
> responsibility for response to consequence of terrorism.
>
> The **Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA)**
> authorized monitoring and investigation of foreign agents in the
> United States. This statute originated in worries about foreign spies,
> but also applies to foreign terrorists.
>
> **Presidential National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 30,**
> "Managing Terrorism Incidents," was signed on April 10, 1982. This was
> a major effort by NSC staff to assign responsibilities for functions
> and activities needed to prepare for and respond to terrorist attacks
> on U.S. citizens or assets. It developed the lead agency concept
> carried out in later Presidential directives. The Department of State,
> Justice, FAA (DOT), and FEMA were tasked with special
> responsibilities.
>
> **NSDD 138,** Preemptive Strikes Against Terrorists was issued
> possibly on April 3, 1984. The directive is mostly classified, but
> clearly it is the start of the path down the road of significant
> anti-terrorism effort. The directive clearly separated so-called
> state-sponsored terrorism from that of sub-state organized actors.
>
> **NSDD 179,** Task Force on Combating Terrorism came out on July 20,
> 1985. This Confidential directive created a Task Force on Combating
> Terrorism headed by Vice President George Bush. The Task Force was to
> review and evaluate the effectiveness of current U.S. policy and
> programs on combating terrorism.
>
> **NSDD 207**, National Program for Combating Terrorism came out on
> January 20, 1986. It focuses on administrative measures to implement
> policies earlier reflected in NSDD 138, and details administrative
> tasks to be accomplished.

In 1988, **Pan Am Flight 103** was blasted from the sky by a terrorist
bomb over Lockerbie, Scotland. That year, Congress passed the **Robert
T. Stafford Disaster and Emergency Assistance Act** (42 USC Section
5121, et seq.) This statute codified the responsibilities of federal
agencies in disaster events.

> Also in 1988, **EO 12656** Assignment of Emergency Preparedness
> Responsibilities and **EO 12657** Emergency Preparedness Planning at
> Commercial Nuclear Power Plants were promulgated. President Reagan
> signed EO 12656 on November 18, 1988 (53 Fed. Reg. 47491). EO 12656's
> purpose was to assign to departments and agencies on a functional
> basis the federal government's emergency preparedness
> responsibilities. (Amended twice, most substantively by Section 9 of
> E.O. 13228 on October 8, 2001, recognizing the Office of Homeland
> Security and the Homeland Security Council.)
>
> The **Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
> Liability Act,** 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (2002), and the **Federal
> Water Pollution Control Act (Clean Water Act),** 33 U.S.C. 80 §§
> 1251-1387 (2002), established broad Federal authority to respond to
> releases or threats of releases of hazardous substances and pollutants
> or contaminants that may present an imminent and substantial danger to
> public health or welfare and to discharges of oil. The Exxon Valdez
> oil spill also occurred in 1988, at which time the **National
> Contingency Plan** (NCP), authorized by the Clean Water Act (33USC.
> § 1321), was triggered. FEMA did not respond under the Stafford Act.
>
> Executive Order 12656 of November 18, 1988, "Assignment of Emergency
> Preparedness Responsibilities," 3 CFR, 1988 comp. p. 585.
>
> In 1989, **EO 12673** assigned Stafford Act authority to the Director
> of FEMA.
>
> **EO 12686** of 1989 established the President's Commission on
> Aviation Security and Terrorism (3 CFR, 1989 Comp., p. 232). A
> response to the destruction on December 21, 1988, of Pan American
> World Airways Flight 103, the Commission was tasked with conducting a
> comprehensive study and appraisal of the practices and policy options
> for terrorist acts involving aviation and handling terrorist threats,
> including prior public notification. Also required was a report on
> policies and laws affecting treatment of families of victims of
> terrorist acts.
>
> The **Oil Pollution Act of 1990** (PL 101-380) 40 CFR Part 300 was a
> direct Congressional response to the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill that
> occurred in 1988. This law specified enhanced HAZMAT response
> capabilities and increased oil tanker safety.
>
> **National Security Directive 42 National Policy for the Security of
> National Security Telecommunications and Information Systems**, July
> 5, 1990. This directive establishes initial objectives of policies,
> and an organizational structure to guide the conduct of activities to
> secure national security systems from exploitation; establishes a
> mechanism for policy development and dissemination; and assigns
> responsibilities for implementation.
>
> In 1992, the **Federal Response Plan** was adopted. This document
> created a central plan for federal support in response to disasters,
> including those caused by terrorist events.

**NSD 66, March 16, 1992** Civil Defense came out on March 16, 1992. It
rescinded National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 259 of February 4,
1989. President Bush used the term NSD and President Regan used the term
NSDD. Both Presidents actually signed approval on these Directives.

> NSD 66 was the last in a succession of Directives that attempted to
> reconcile the nation's civil defense and strategic nuclear policy. The
> theory was that some degree of protection (survivability) of the
> civilian population could affect both Soviet and United States
> decision-makers in developing and if ever required implementing
> strategic nuclear strike doctrine. Political calculations while not
> formally included in the SIOP (Strategic Integrated Operations Plan)
> were always part of its design.
>
> Starting with NSDD 23, 26, and 259 and ending with NSD 66, the efforts
> of both President Regan and Bush ended as labeling civil defense as
> something other than integral to the strategic balance and only part
> of the nation's efforts to build a domestic all-hazards response
> system.
>
> The failure to develop a coherent rationale or theory of civil defense
> led to the outright repeal of the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950,
> Pub.L. 81-920, by Pub. L. 107-337.
>
> The **bombing of the World Trade Center towers in New York City in
> 1993** was the most significant act of terrorism until that time by
> foreign terrorists on US soil. The bombing killed six. The terrorists'
> intention was to topple one or both of the office towers. They were
> captured, tried, and imprisoned. Some observers believe that our
> nation did not fully learn the lessons of the 1992 bombing, with
> tragic results on September 11, 2001.

On November 30, 1993, President Clinton signed **Pub.L. 103-160** (107
Stat. 1655). Section 1704 of this Joint Resolution of Congress provided
that:

> > It is the sense of Congress that the President should strengthen
> > Federal interagency emergency planning by the Federal Emergency
> > Management Agency and other appropriate Federal, State, and local
> > agencies for development of a capability for early detection and
> > warning of and response to:
>
> \(1\) potential terrorist use of chemical or biological agents or
> weapons; and
>
> > \(2\) emergencies or natural disasters involving industrial
> > chemicals or the widespread outbreak of disease.
>
> When the **Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950** was repealed in 1994,
> some portions were incorporated in the Robert T. Stafford Disaster
> Relief and Emergency Assistance Act as a new Title IV.
>
> **Presidential Decision Directives (PDD) 39** signed on June 21,1995
> and **62** signed on May 22, 1998. PDD 39 set up a national pattern
> for response to terrorism events, appointing FEMA to run Consequence
> Management and the FBI to be in charge of Crisis Management, or the
> immediate aftermath of a terrorism event. These directives responded
> to the Murrah Building bombing in Oklahoma City. **PDD 62** created
> more systematic approach to fighting the terrorist threat. It
> reinforced the mission of the many U.S. agencies charged with roles in
> defeating terrorism. It also clarified their activities in the wide
> range of U.S. counter-terrorism programs. These have been superseded
> by subsequent Bush administration acts.
>
> The Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996, Pub.L.
> 104-201, was enacted on September 23, 1996. It is also known as the
> **Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Act**. The Act provided significant funding for
> training and equipment for first responders to terrorism events.
> Originally, this support was provided through the Department of
> Defense, but in 1999 the Department of Justice took over the program
> through its **Office of State and Local Domestic Preparedness**
> (OSLDP). Both FEMA and OSLDP were incorporated into the **Department
> of Homeland Security** created by Pub.L. 107-296.
>
> The **Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996** (Pub.L
> 104-132) was enacted on April 24, 1996. it addressed a variety of
> anti-terrorism concerns, including: justice for victims; designation
> of foreign organizations as terrorist organizations and prohibiting
> assistance to so-called terrorist states; deportation and procedural
> modifications for handling criminal aliens; nuclear, biological and
> chemical weapon restrictions and increased penalties;; implementation
> of plastic explosive convention; increases in criminal penalties for
> terrorism; assistance to law enforcement, including training; and
> grants through FEMA for firefighter training and equipment, with \$8
> million authorized for fiscal year 1997, the AEDPA's first year.
>
> **PDD/NSC-63** was signed on May 22, 1998. PDD 63 concerns critical
> infrastructure protection. It contains many mandates, including a
> requirement that each department and agency develop a plan for
> protecting its own critical infrastructure. Also required was an
> analysis of interdepartmental and inter-governmental dependencies. A
> National Infrastructure Assurance Plan with milestones was mandated.
>
> **PDD 67** came out on October 21, 1998, entitled Ensuring
> Constitutional Government and Continuity of Government Operations.
> FEMA issued two Federal Preparedness Circulars (FPC's) to implement
> this directive.
>
> Although **Y2K** was a major threat but ultimately not a disaster, the
> planning and preparedness efforts did influence later anti-terrorism
> organizational arrangements. Several GAO reports were issued soon
> after Sept. 11, for details and copies go to:
> [www.gao.gov](http://www.gao.gov/)
>
> The **Airport Security Improvement Act of 2000** (Pub.L. 106-528) went
> into effect on November 22, 2000. This law requires background
> investigations for airport staff, but it was not fully put into
> practice by September 11, 2001.

In 1994 FEMA decided that the Stafford Act did not contain authority for
pre-disaster mitigation. As a result, the **Disaster Mitigation Act of
2000 (DMA)** (Pub.L. 106-390) was enacted on October 30, 2000. Although
the DMA required statewide mitigation plans, these have generally not
been put in place, and their enforcement has been delayed.

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**Questions to ask students:**

1.  How well do you believe America was prepared for terrorism before
    September 11, 2001 as regards the legal enactments and structure?

> Some students will believe that the successful September 11, 2001
> attacks demonstrate conclusively that all preparedness was inadequate.
>
> Others will identify other causes for the attacks' success beyond the
> legal structure. It may be helpful to point out the shortcomings
> identified in the 9-11 Commission Report, specifically intelligence
> failures.

2.  How did the legal structure support or not support intelligence and
    other failures that resulted in the failure to prevent the September
    11, 2001 attacks?

> This is one justification for enactment of the laws put in place after
> the attacks.

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**Objective 2.2**

**Discuss major counter-terrorism legislation enacted since September
11, 2001.**

> The September 11, 2001 attacks changed our perception of the crime
> known as **skyjacking**, as well as our understanding of the nature of
> international threats. Previously, particularly during the 1960s and
> 1970s, terrorist organizations forceably commandeered aircraft in
> flight or on the ground and held the passengers and crew hostage for
> political and/or criminal purposes. For the most part, these previous
> events ended peaceably.
>
> Old-style skyjackings often were used by political groups to
> accomplish political objectives. Skyjackers typically demanded
> political concessions or money in return for the peaceable end to
> their activity. They always wanted to survive the experience to
> celebrate their political victory or spend the funds they extorted
> from their victims. Typically, 90% of passengers and crew survived
> hijackings in which they obeyed the orders of skyjackers. In response,
> guidelines for aircrew and passengers prior to September 11, 2001
> emphasized the need to remain calm and not confront hijackers.
>
> The September 11, 2001 attackers understood this mind-set and took
> advantage of it. On one flight where a skyjacker apparently
> incorrectly toggled a switch connecting his microphone to air traffic
> control rather than the aircraft's intercom, a message to remain calm
> and seated from the "captain" was received and recorded. The message
> further promised safe passage to a landing after which the terrorists
> would make their demands. Of course, the aircraft never landed.
>
> As a nation, we reacted rapidly to the changed circumstances. Aboard
> the hijacked aircraft over western Pennsylvania, passengers talking to
> friends and family members on the ground learned of the attacks in New
> York and Washington, DC and took matters into their own hands. They
> rejected the established guidelines calling for passive compliance
> with skyjackers and attempted to re-take the aircraft. Although their
> efforts were doomed to failure and resulted in the aircraft crashing
> into a field, they saved a target, reportedly either the White House
> or the Capitol, from possible destruction. As described below,
> Congress also acted to significantly modify the approved approach to
> skyjacking after the 9/11 attacks.
>
> Congress reacted quickly to the September 11, 2001 attacks, enacting
> the **Uniting and Strengthening America By Providing Appropriate Tools
> Required To Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act (USA Patriot Act)**
> of 2001 (Pub.L 107-56) on October 26, 2001. Much of the Act originated
> in the Department of Justice's "wish list" which had been created
> prior to September 11, 2001. Some segments relate to the war on
> terrorism in a tangential manner, if at all.

Section 411 redefines terrorism, affecting the admissibility of persons
seeking legal resident alien or citizenship status. Asking for funds for
terrorist activity is a new barrier to temporary or permanent
immigration. A widened definition of "terrorist organization" and
association with them triggers immigration bans. New investigation and
tracking systems are authorized by implication to enforce these limits.
See also the **Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of
2002** (Pub.L 107-173) signed May 14, 2002. Section 412 of the USA
PATRIOT Act concerns mandatory detention of suspected terrorist and has
been the subject of many articles in the press. Title VI discusses
victim compensation. This has been the subject of news coverage,
particularly the requirement to lower awards from the DOJ supervised
fund by the amount of life insurance and pensions. The Act contains many
amendments to the United States Code (Title 18-Crime).

The USA PATRIOT Act's Title III, the **International Money Laundering
Abatement and Anti-Terrorism Financing Act of 2001**, creates
significant impediments to persons wishing to conceal their support of
terrorist organizations. It requires financial institutions to file
Suspicious Activity Reports with the Financial Crimes Enforcement
Network. The threshold for reporting such events is low, and the result
is reportedly that major sources of support for terrorism have dried up.

The Act created a Victim Compensation Fund for compensating dead and
injured parties and their survivors. A Special Master, who evaluates
claims and assigns values, administers the Fund. Those electing to
receive money from the Fund must agree not to sue the airlines or World
Trade Center for their losses.

Section 817 expands the prohibitions on possession or use of certain
biologic agents. See also the **Public Health Security and Bioterrorism
Preparedness and Response Act of 2002** (Pub.L. 107-188) enacted on June
12, 2002. Section 1013 of the U.S.A. Patriot Act lists extensive Senate
findings on bioterrorism issues. Congressional findings indicate that
the entire public health system must be reconstructed to effectively
deal with bioterrorism.

> Section 1005 of the USA PATRIOT Act is called the **First Responder
> Assistance Act** and authorizes "Terrorism Prevention Grants." These
> grants fund equipment, technical assistance, materials, and training.
> This is the largest federal first responder grant program ever
> created. FEMA provides similar funds through the Emergency Management
> Performance Grants, and grants through the United States Fire
> Administration to the fire community. The FEMA-funded programs are
> much smaller. For the medical community, HHS may rival these
> organizations in total outlays for First Responders.
>
> Section 1014-**Grant Program for State and Local Domestic
> Preparedness** authorizes a grant to each state to prepare for and
> respond to terrorist acts involving weapons of mass destruction
> (WMD's) and biological, nuclear, radiological, chemical, and explosive
> devices.
>
> Section 1012 tightens up security for obtaining **HAZMAT
> transportation licenses**, requiring a risk determination. This is
> left to the discretion of the Executive Branch.

Section 1016 involves **Critical Infrastructure Protection**. The
Defense Threat Reduction Agency (successor to the former Defense Nuclear
Agency) is funded for some functions now being transferred to the new
Department of Homeland Security.

The USA PATRIOT Act, in Sections 224 and 303, contains mandatory review
or **sunset provisions**. By December 31, 2005, a few portions of the
statute will expire. Foreign Intelligence Investigations begun prior to
that date will be allowed to continue.

> Section 225 gives **immunity** from suit in to people who cooperate
> with the government on FISA (Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of
> 1978) wiretaps. Although there theoretically can be no immunity for
> violations of an individual's Constitutionally protected rights, the
> Supreme Court has indicated that, in times of national emergency, such
> rights lose their primacy when national survival is at stake.
>
> The Act contains some **controversial sections**.
>
> • It permits the Attorney General to incarcerate or detain
> non-citizens based on mere suspicion, and to deny re-admission to the
> United States of non-citizens (including legal, long-term permanent
> residents) for engaging in speech protected by the First Amendment.
>
> • It minimizes the power of the courts to prevent law enforcement
> authorities from illegally abusing telephone and Internet surveillance
> in both anti-terrorism investigations *and* ordinary criminal
> investigations of American citizens.
>
> • It expands the authority of the government in both terrorism and
> non-terror investigations to conduct so-called "sneak and peek" or
> "black bag" secret searches, which do not require notification of the
> subject of the search.
>
> • It grants the FBI -- and, under new information sharing provisions,
> many other law enforcement and intelligence agencies -- broad access
> to highly personal medical, financial, mental health and student
> records with only the most minimal judicial oversight.
>
> • It permits law enforcement agents to investigate American citizens
> for criminal matters without establishing probable cause based on an
> assertion that the investigation is for "intelligence purposes."
>
> • It puts the CIA firmly back in the historically abusive business of
> spying on Americans by giving the Director of Central Intelligence
> broad authority to target intelligence surveillance in the United
> States.4
>
> • It contains an overbroad definition of "domestic terrorism." The new
> definition is so vague that the government could designate lawful
> advocacy groups -- such as Operation Rescue or Greenpeace -- as
> terrorists and subject them to invasive surveillance, wiretapping, and
> harassment and then criminally penalize them for what had been
> constitutionally protected political advocacy.
>
> The Act modernizes **wiretap** rules, authorizing monitoring
> communications of a person, rather than a particular telephone number.
> This is a vital tool for law enforcement in an age of disposable
> cellular telephones.
>
> The US PATRIOT Act's true meaning awaits final judicial construction,
> which may take years.
>
> Congress passed the **Emergency Supplemental Appropriations-Response
> To Terrorist Attack on September 11, 2001** (Pub.L.107-38) on
> September 18, 2001, only one week after the attacks. This uniquely
> rapid response to a disaster created a \$40 billion fund to deal with
> its consequences.
>
> **EO 13228** of October 8, 2001 established the Office of Homeland
> Security in the Executive Office of the President and the Homeland
> Security Council (3 CFR, 2001 Comp., p.796). This was the first
> organization change in response to the events of September 11, 2001.
> The new organization developed the "National Strategy for Homeland
> Security," which was issued in July 2002.
>
> **EO 13231** was signed on October 16, 2001, and addresses "Critical
> Infrastructure Protection in the Information Age" (3 CFR, 2001 Com.,
> p. 805).

The **Aviation and Transportation Security (ATS) Act of 2002**
(Pub.L.107-71) was enacted on November 7, 2001, with purpose of
federalizing the airport security screening of passengers and baggage.
The ATS Act established the Transportation Security Administration (TSA)
in the Department of Transportation, headed by a new Undersecretary for
Transportation Security. (The TSA was made part of the new Department of
Homeland Security by Pub.L. 107-296, signed November 25, 2002.) The TSA,
during a declared National Emergency, has the power to (1) coordinate
domestic transport, (2) coordinate and oversee other departments' and
agencies' transportation related activities, and (3) provide notice of
threats to the transportation system, whether by land, air, or sea. The
**final rule for civil aviation security** was issued as a joint FAA and
TSA regulation on February 22, 2002 (14 CFR Parts 91 and 49 CFR Part
1500). This was the most substantive rule issued by any federal
department or agency in the year after the attacks.

> The Congress also passed the **Air Transportation Safety and System
> Stabilization Act** (Pub.L. 107-42), which was signed into law on
> September 22, 2001, in response to the terrorist attacks. Section 101
> of that Act provided aviation disaster relief, including federal
> payment of increased insurance expenses for the first year after
> September 11, 2001. It also created the Air Transport Stabilization
> Board to provide emergency funding to the airlines. Title V created a
> victim compensation fund for families of aircrew and passengers on the
> aircraft seized by the terrorists. This account was in addition to the
> victim compensation fund established in the USA Patriot Act.
>
> President Bush signed the **Homeland Security Act of 2002** (HS Act)
> (Pub.L. 107-296) into law on November 25, 2002. The HS Act changes the
> national approach to terrorism and all other emergency events. The HS
> Act's most visible effect was creation of the Department of Homeland
> Security (DHS) by joining 180,000 Federal workers from 22 agencies
> into a single organization. DHS' mission in the HS Act revolves around
> terrorism. The Act mandates adoption of a National Incident Management
> System.
>
> The **Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and
> Response Act of 2002,** Pub. L. No. 107-188, 116 Stat. 294 (2002)
> (codified in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., 21 U.S.C., 29
> U.S.C., 38 U.S.C., 42 U.S.C., and 47 U.S.C. (2002)), is designed to
> improve the ability of the United States to prevent, prepare for, and
> respond to bioterrorism and other public health emergencies. Key
> provisions of the act, 42 U.S.C. § 247d and § 300hh among others,
> address the development of a national preparedness plan by HHS
> designed to provide effective assistance to State and local
>
> governments in the event of bioterrorism or other public health
> emergencies; operation of the National Disaster Medical System to
> mobilize and address public health emergencies; grant programs for the
> education and training of public health professionals
>
> and improving State, local, and hospital preparedness for and response
> to bioterrorism and other public health emergencies; streamlining and
> clarifying communicable disease quarantine provisions; enhancing
> controls on dangerous biological agents and toxins; and protecting the
> safety and security of food and drug supplies.
>
> The **Defense Production Act of 1950,** 64 Stat. 798 (1950) (codified
> as amended by the **Defense Production Act Reauthorization of 2003,**
> Pub. L. 108-195, 117 Stat. 2892 (2003) at 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2061-2170
> (2002)), ensures the timely availability of resources for national
> defense and civil emergency preparedness and response. Among other
> things, the DPA authorizes the President to demand that companies
> accept and give priority to government contracts that the President
> "deems necessary or appropriate to promote the national defense."
>
> The **Economy Act,** 31 U.S.C. §§ 1535-1536 (2002), authorizes Federal
> agencies to provide goods or services on a reimbursable basis to other
> Federal agencies when more specific statutory authority to do so does
> not exist.
>
> The **National Emergencies Act,** 50 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1651 (2003),
> establishes procedures for Presidential declaration and termination of
> national emergencies. The act requires the President to identify the
> specific provision of law under which he or she will act in
>
> dealing with a declared national emergency and contains a sunset
> provision requiring the President to renew a declaration of national
> emergency to prevent its automatic expiration. The Presidential
> declaration of a national emergency under the act is a prerequisite to
> exercising any special or extraordinary powers authorized by statute
> for use in the event of national emergency.
>
> The **Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act,** 50 U.S.C. §§
> 2301-2368 (2003), was enacted to enhance the capability of the Federal
> Government to prevent and respond to terrorist incidents involving
> WMD. Congress directed DOD to provide
>
> expert advice to Federal, State, and local agencies with regard to
> WMD, to include domestic terrorism rapid response teams, training in
> emergency response to the use or threat of use of WMD, and a program
> of testing and improving the response of civil agencies to biological
> and chemical emergencies.
>
> **Emergencies Involving Chemical or Biological Weapons.** Pursuant to
> 10 U.S.C. § 382 (2002), in response to an emergency involving
> biological or chemical WMD that is beyond the capabilities of civilian
> authorities to handle, the Attorney General may request DOD assistance
> directly. Assistance that may be provided includes identifying,
> monitoring, containing, disabling, and disposing of the weapon.
>
> **Emergencies Involving Nuclear Materials.** In emergencies involving
> nuclear materials, 18 U.S.C. § 831(e)(2002) authorizes the Attorney
> General to request DOD law enforcement assistance---including the
> authority to arrest and conduct searches, without
>
> violating the Posse Comitatus Act---when both the Attorney General and
> Secretary of Defense agree that an "emergency situation" exists and
> the Secretary of Defense determines that the requested assistance will
> not impede military readiness.
>
> The **Veterans Affairs Emergency Preparedness Act of 2002,** Pub. L.
> No. 107-287, 116 Stat. 2024 (2002) (amending and codifying various
> sections of 38 U.S.C.). 38 U.S.C. § 1785 (2003), if funded, directs
> the VA and DOD to develop training programs for
>
> current health-care personnel and those emergency/medical personnel in
> training in the containment of nuclear, biological, and chemical
> attacks and treatment of casualties.
>
> **Furnishing of Health-Care Services to Members of the Armed Forces
> during a War or National Emergency,** 38 U.S.C. § 8111A (2002). During
> and immediately following a period of war, or a period of national
> emergency declared by the President or Congress that involves the use
> of the Armed Forces in armed conflict, the Secretary of Veterans
>
> Affairs may furnish hospital care, nursing home care, and medical
> services to members of the Armed Forces on active duty.
>
> The **Maritime Transportation Security Act,** Pub. L. No. 107-295, 116
> Stat. 2064 (2002) requires sectors of the maritime industry to
> implement measures designed to protect America's ports and waterways
> from a terrorist attack.
>
> **Transportation of Hazardous Material,** 49 U.S.C. §§ 5101-5127
> (2002). This law improves the regulatory and enforcement authority of
> the Secretary of Transportation to provide adequate protection against
> the risks to life and property inherent in the transportation of
> hazardous material in commerce.
>
> The **Immigration Emergency Fund (IEF)** was created by section
> 404(b)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. The IEF can be drawn
> upon to increase INS's enforcement activities, and to reimburse States
> and localities in providing assistance
>
> as requested by the Secretary of the DHS.
>
> The **Animal Health Protection Act of 2002,** 7 U.S.C. 8310,
> consolidates all of the animal quarantine and related laws and
> replaces them with one flexible statutory framework. This act allows
> APHIS Veterinary Services to act swiftly and decisively to protect
> U.S. animal health from a foreign pest or disease. This includes
> protection from terrorists importing diseases such as hoof and mouth
> that could endanger food supplies.

\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

**Questions to ask students:**

1.  Do we need all the laws put in place after the September 11, 2001
    attacks? Which are the most important, and why?

> Discuss the direct effect of these changes on individual Americans,
> emergency responders, and emergency managers.

2.  What is your opinion of the USA PATRIOT Act? How does the USA
    PATRIOT Act make our nation safer? In what ways does it put our
    nation at risk?

> Opinion: Students either do or do not believe that limits on their
> civil liberties are justified in pursuit of the higher goal of
> apprehending terrorists and preventing attacks. They often do not see
> any direct linkage between the Act and their own lives.
>
> Safer: We are more likely to catch terrorists with additional law
> enforcement tools in the Act. Have the students list these tools and
> articulate how they assist law enforcement.
>
> At Risk: When one person's civil liberties are taken away, all members
> of society are put at risk.

**\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_**

## Objective 2.3 

**Discuss major executive actions undertaken since September 11, 2001,
including the progression from Presidential Decision Directive 39
through the series of Homeland Security Presidential Directives (HSPDs)
including HSPD 5, 7 and 8.**

**Executive Order 13224 of September 23, 2001, "Blocking Property and
Prohibiting Transactions with Persons Who Commit, Threaten to Commit or
Support," 3 CFR, 2001, Comp. p. 786.**

The purpose of the E.O., among other things, is to list those
individuals or organizations subject to the Order's proscriptions*.*
Section 3(d) defined "terrorism" as activities that: (i) involve a
violent act or an act dangerous to human life; (ii) appear to be
intended (a) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (b)
influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion, or (c)
affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination,
kidnapping, or hostage-taking.

For an example of a civil statue addressing a related issue, see the
Victims of Terrorism Tax Relief Act of 2001 (p. 107-134), signed January
23, 2002.

> As one of the many organizations that dealt with terrorism in the past
> few years, the National Commission on Terrorism 2000, called the
> Bremer Commission, developed it own definitions.
> ([http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/commission.html](http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/commission.html ).)
>
> For the related subject of so-called **"weapons of mass
> destruction,"** see Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act,
> Title XIV of Public Law 104-201, the so-called Nunn-Lugar-Domenici
> Act, codified in the USC at 50 U.S.C., Sections 2301-2367 (suppl.
> 1999)*.* 50 U.S. C. 2302 defines a weapon of mass destruction as "any
> weapon or devise that is intended, or has the capability to cause
> death or serious bodily injury to a significant number of people
> through the release, transmission, or impact of (a) a toxic or
> poisonous chemical or their precursors (b) a disease organism; or (c)
> radiation or radioactivity
>
> Executive Order 13228 of October 8, 2001, "Establishing the Office of
> Homeland Security and the Homeland Security Council," 3 CFR, 2001
> Comp., p.796.
>
> Representing the first and most important initial organization change
> in response to the events of September 11, 2001, President Bush
> established the new Office of Homeland Security (OHS) in the Executive
> Office of the President. The new organization's mission was to develop
> a national strategy to secure the United States from terrorist threats
> or attacks. This "National Strategy for Homeland Security" was issued
> in July 2002.
>
> OHS eventually reached a staffing level of over one hundred personnel
> that largely was consumed not with developing a strategy but
> individual policy papers. Perhaps most importantly, the OHS
> recommended opposition to a proposed Department of Homeland Security
> consistently until President Bush changed to supporting the new
> Department on June 6, 2002. The Administration on June 18, 2002
> submitted its own proposal for departmental legislation on June 18,
> 2002, largely drafted over the space of a week by the President's
> Chief of Staff, Andrew Card; White House General Counsel Gonzales; OMB
> Director Mitch Daniels; and Tom Ridge, Director of OHS, and Assistant
> to the President for Homeland Security.
>
> The Executive Order addressed detection, preparedness, prevention,
> protection, response and recovery, incident management, continuity of
> government, public affairs, cooperation with State and local
> governments and private entities, and review of legal authorities and
> development of legislative proposals, and budget review.

The Order also established a Homeland Security Council as an advisory
body to the President. Efforts to show that it had importance and had
met to deliberate on issues consumed valuable time until finally the
White House Press Office argued that meetings of Tom Ridge with the
President and other cabinet officials on homeland security issues were
[de]{.underline} [facto]{.underline} meetings of the Council.

> Of more significance than the Homeland Security Council, is the little
> noticed section 9 of E.O. 13228 that amends E.O. 12656. E.O. 12656 was
> the most recent effort (1988) to comprehensively assign national
> security emergency preparedness responsibilities to the civil
> departments and agencies. Only indirectly relating to terrorism, E.O.
> 12656, as amended, could short-cut much bureaucratic infighting and
> dispute over roles.
>
> Executive Order 13231 of October 16, 2001, "Critical Infrastructure
> Protection in the Information Age," 3 CFR, 2001 Com., p. 805.
>
> This E.O. revoked E.O. 13130 (July 1999). A comprehensive,
> well-drafted Executive Order that essentially supersedes
> **Presidential Decision Directive 63**, this Order promises to become
> a milestone administrative event over the next decade.
>
> The background of the order is extremely important*.* Senator Jon Kyle
> had become interested in issues related to critical life-style support
> systems when the so-called Y2K issue surfaced*.* Leading eventually,
> to a Senate Select Committee on Y2K Issues, Senator Kyl had been in
> the forefront of the creation of a Presidential Commission on Critical
> Infrastructure Protection (PCCIP) \[sometimes known as the Marsh
> Commission since it was headed by a retired four star Air Force
> General Tom Marsh). The report issued in 1997 was titled "Critical
> Foundations-Protecting America's Infrastructure." The report can be
> found at <http://www.ciao.gov/pccip/pccip-report.pdf>. The response of
> the Clinton administration was the issuance of PDD 63 as an
> unclassified document.
>
> Returning to E.O. 13231, the Order created a number of organizational
> entities. These include the President's **Critical Infrastructure
> Protection Board** that issued its first draft of a **National
> Strategy to Secure Cyberspace** on September 18, 2002 in draft for
> comment. A final draft may be found at:
> <http://www.whitehouse.gov/pcipb/>.
>
> A number of standing committees were created by the Order. The Order
> also sets up coordination with the NCS (National Communications
> System) operating under E.O. 12472 (and part of the new DHS) and the
> NSTAC (National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee)
> established by **Executive Order 12382** of September 13, 1982. The
> Board also includes coordination with the National Infrastructure
> Advisory Council NIAC).
>
> Executive Order 13234 of November 9, 2001, "Presidential Task Force on
> Citizen Preparedness in the War on Terrorism," 3 CFR, 2002 Comp., p.
> 819.
>
> This Order established a Task Force that was to report within 40 days
> to the President identifying was the American public could prepare in
> their homes, neighborhoods, schools, places of worship, workplaces,
> and public places for the potential consequences of any terrorist
> attack. The Task Force was also to identify ways the American public
> could assist State and local public health and safety engaged in the
> effort to prevent, prepare for, and respond to any possible terrorist
> attacks within the United States. This order was a response to
> complaints that no effort had been made to involve the public, which
> wanted to participate, in the war on terrorism.
>
> In October 2001, the White House created a new category of directive,
> called the **Homeland Security Presidential Directive** (HSPD). Two
> were issued during 2001, HSPD 1, which put in place the Homeland
> Security Council, and HSPD 2, Combating Terrorism Through Immigration
> Policies.
>
> **HSPD 1: Establishing the Homeland Security Council** (HSC) to ensure
> coordination of all homeland security-related activities among
> executive departments and agencies and promote the effective
> development and implementation of all homeland security policies. It
> also created the Homeland Security Council Principals Committee
> (HSC/PC) to act as the senior interagency forum under the HSC for
> homeland security issues. Also put in place were various lesser groups
> to perform the work directed by the HSC.
>
> **HSPD 2**: **Combating Terrorism Through Immigration Policies**. This
> directive mandates that, by November 1, 2001, the Attorney General
> shall create the Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force. The Task Force
> shall ensure that, to the maximum extent permitted by law, Federal
> agencies coordinate programs to accomplish the following: 1) deny
> entry into the United States of aliens associated with, suspected of
>
> being engaged in, or supporting terrorist activity; and 2) locate,
> detain, prosecute, or deport any such aliens already present in the
> United States.
>
> **HSPS 3: Homeland Security Advisory System**, Mar. 11, 2002. This
> directive establishes policy for the creation of a Homeland Security
> Advisory System, which was established using the well-known "color
> coded" levels of terrorism attack.
>
> **HSPD 4: National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction**,
> Dec. 2002. Sets forth the National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass
> Destruction based on three principal pillars: (1) Counterproliferation
> to Combat WMD Use, (2) Strengthened Nonproliferation to Combat WMD
> Proliferation, and (3) Consequence Management to
>
> Respond to WMD Use.
>
> **HSPD 5: Management of Domestic Incidents.** On February 28, 2003
> President Bush issued **HSPD 5**. HSPD 5 instructed all Federal
> agencies to take specific steps for planning and incident management.
> HSPD 5's major goal is making certain that all levels of government
> work together effectively. It requires use of a single, comprehensive
> approach to domestic incident management. HSPD 5 treats crisis
> management and consequence management as a single, integrated task
> rather than as two separate functions, thus repealing **PDD 39**. HSPD
> 5 commands that DHS create and enforce standards for emergency
> responders. HSPD 5 specifies loss of preparedness funding those
> responders who do not comply with federal regulation of their
> activities beginning in Federal Fiscal Year 2005. It mandates creation
> of the **National Response Plan** and the **National Incident
> Management System**.
>
> **HSPD 6: Integration and Use of Screening Information**, was issued
> on September 16, 2003. The Directive provides a pattern for gathering
> and disseminating information on potential terrorists. Pursuant to the
> Directive, the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC) was put in place to
> consolidate terrorist watchlists and provide operational support for
> thousands of federal screeners across the country and around the
> world. The Center's goal was to ensure that government investigators,
> screeners and agents work off the same unified, comprehensive set of
> anti-terrorist information - and that they have access to information
> and expertise that will allow them to act quickly when a suspected
> terrorist is screened or stopped.
>
> **HSPD 7: Critical Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization, and
> Protection** was issued on December 17, 2003. The Directive
> established a national policy for Federal departments and agencies to
> identify and prioritize United States critical infrastructure and key
> resources and to protect them from terrorist attacks. The DHS
> Secretary was tasked with coordinating protection activities for each
> of the following critical infrastructure sectors: information
> technology; telecommunications; chemical; transportation systems,
> including mass transit, aviation, maritime, ground/surface, and rail
> and pipeline systems; emergency services; and postal and shipping, as
> well as coordinating with others to protect other key resources
> including dams, government facilities, and commercial facilities. In
> addition, in its role as overall cross-sector coordinator, DHS will
> evaluate the need for and coordinate the coverage of additional
> critical infrastructure and key resources categories over time, as
> appropriate. This is a massive task, given that the vast majority of
> critical infrastructure is in private hands.
>
> **HSPD 8: National Preparedness**, also came out on December 17, 2003.
> It requires a national domestic all-hazards preparedness goal,
> establishing mechanisms for improved delivery of Federal preparedness
> assistance to State and local governments, and outlining actions to
> strengthen preparedness capabilities of Federal, State, and local
> entities. It defines "first responder" to include the traditional
> groups, like fire, EMS, and law enforcement, and also adds emergency
> management, public health, clinical care, public works, and other
> skilled support personnel (such as equipment operators) that provide
> immediate support services during prevention, response, and recovery
> operations to that list. HSPD 8 is a companion to HSPD-5, which
> identifies steps for improved coordination in response to incidents.
> HSPD 8 describes the way Federal departments and agencies will prepare
> for such a response, including prevention activities during the early
> stages of a terrorism incident. The DHS Secretary is instructed to
> create a national domestic all-hazards preparedness goal and establish
> a single point of contact for access to federal preparedness grants
> and information. HSPD 8 specifies that awards shall flow through
> grants to the states, similar to the structure of the Emergency
> Management Performance Grant program. It also mandates rapidly setting
> equipment, training, and exercise standards. The Directive requires an
> annual status report of national preparedness, including state
> capabilities, the readiness of federal civil response assets, the
> utilization of mutual aid, and an assessment of how the federal first
> responder preparedness assistance programs support the national
> preparedness goal
>
> **HSPD 9: Defense of United States Agriculture and Food** was issued
> February 3, 2004. The Directive establishes a national policy to
> defend the agriculture and food system against terrorist attacks,
> major disasters, and other emergencies. It requires food safety
> consistent with HSPD 7. It requires identifying and prioritizing
> sector-critical infrastructure and key resources for establishing
> protection requirements; developing awareness and early warning
> capabilities to recognize threats; mitigating vulnerabilities at
> critical production and processing nodes; enhancing screening
> procedures for domestic and imported products; and enhancing response
> and recovery procedures.
>
> **HSPD 10: Biodefense for the 21st Century**, April 28, 2004. This
> directive provides a comprehensive framework for the Nation's
> biodefense and, among other things, delineates the roles and
> responsibilities of Federal agencies and departments in continuing
> their work in this area.
>
> **HSPD 11: Comprehensive Terrorist-Related Screening Procedures** came
> out August 27, 2004. It enhances terrorist-related screening through
> comprehensive, coordinated procedures that detect, identify, track,
> and interdict people, cargo, conveyances, and other entities and
> objects that pose a threat to homeland security.
>
> **HSPD 12: Policy for a Common Identification Standard for Federal
> Employees and Contractors** also came out August 27, 2004. This
> Directive's goal is to enhance security, increase Government
> efficiency, reduce identity fraud, and protect personal privacy by
> establishing a mandatory, Government-wide standard for secure and
> reliable forms of identification issued by the Federal Government to
> its employees and contractors (including contractor employees).

**\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_**

**Questions to ask students:**

1.  Discuss the progression of executive orders addressing terrorism.
    What trends are revealed over the years in the national approach to
    terrorism?

> The approach appears to be a progression from a more general
> appreciation of the issue to much more specific concentration on
> foreign terrorists.

2.  To what extent do you believe that the executive approach to
    terrorism reflects a reaction based on public perceptions?

> Some may see the government's reaction as based on public relations,
> others may emphasize the importance of reassuring a frightened
> population.

3.  To what extent have these major executive actions succeeded in
    creating a robust national structure for response to terrorism? What
    else is needed from the executive branch?

> The structure is a conceptual whole, but as the Hurricane Katrina
> response illustrates, the reality may be less than the theory.
>
> Additional needs may include: decentralizing the emergency response
> structure; adding more central control to the structure; other
> antiterrorism challenges that have not been followed through on to s
> sufficient extent, such as mass transit security and port security.
>
> **\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_**

**Objective 2.4**

**Discuss major national strategies undertaken since September 11,
2001.**

> The **National Drug Control Strategy** was issued in February 2002. It
> recognized drug trafficking as a major source of funds for terrorist
> groups, and offered examples, including the Taliban, of terror
> organizations using this method for financing.
>
> The **National Strategy for Homeland Security** came out in July 2002.
> Its goal was to help to prepare the nation by providing direction to
> the federal government departments and agencies that have a role in
> homeland security, suggesting steps that state and local governments,
> private companies and organizations, and individual Americans can take
> to improve homeland security and offered incentives for them to do so.
> It recommended supportive actions to the Congress. It set out a
> framework for securing the nation. The document established strategic
> objectives, including prevention of terrorist attacks within the
> United States; reducing America's vulnerability to terrorism; and
> minimizing the damage and recover from attacks that do occur. It
> posited six critical mission areas: intelligence and warning, border
> and transportation security, domestic counterterrorism, protecting
> critical infrastructure, defending against

catastrophic terrorism, and emergency preparedness and response. The
Strategy has four foundations: unique strengths that cut across all of
the mission areas, across all levels of government, and across all
sectors of our society. These foundations --- law, science and
technology, information sharing and systems, and

> international cooperation --- offer a useful framework for evaluating
> our homeland security investments across the federal government.
>
> The **National Money Laundering Strategy** was issued in September
> 2001. It concentrated on the criminals who utilize money laundering to
> hide their ill-gotten gains. The Strategy also recommended
> aggressively utilizing the Office of Foreign Assets Control's Foreign
> Terrorist and Narcotics Sanctions Program.
>
> The **National Money Laundering Strategy** was issued in July 2002, as
> an upodate on a similar document issued in 2001. It established an
> imperative for the federal government to pursue a national strategy to
> attack the financial underpinnings of crime, including the financing
> of terrorist groups. By working cooperatively together, the financial
> sector and government were to act under this Strategy to cut off the
> financial lifeblood of terrorists. One measure of the changes between
> the two documents: the word "terrorist" appears 11 times in the 2001
> Strategy, while it occurs 293 times in the 2002 document.
>
> The **National Security Strategy of the United States** came out in
> September 2002. It is found at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf>
> The document sums up US national security strategy as being based on a
> distinctly American internationalism that reflects the union of our
> values and our national interests. The goals are the following:
> political and economic freedom, peaceful relations with other states,
> and respect for human dignity. To achieve these goals, the United
> States will: champion aspirations for human dignity; strengthen
> alliances to defeat global terrorism and work to prevent attacks
> against us and our friends; work with others to defuse regional
> conflicts; prevent our enemies from threatening us, our allies, and
> our friends, with weapons of mass destruction; ignite a new era of
> global economic growth through free markets and free trade; expand the
> circle of development by opening societies and building the
> infrastructure of democracy; develop agendas for cooperative action
> with other main centers of global power; and transform America's
> national security institutions to meet the challenges and
> opportunities of the twenty-first century. Some observers might
> question how the war in Iraq fits in with a "distinctly American
> internationalism."
>
> The **National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism** was
> issued in October 2002. It is a classified document, and thus is not
> available for public inspection.
>
> The **National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction** came
> out in December 2002. It can be found at:
> <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/12/WMDStrategy.pdf> The
> National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction has three
> principal pillars: Counterproliferation to Combat WMD Use;
> Strengthened Nonproliferation to Combat WMD Proliferation; and
> Consequence Management to Respond to WMD Use. It is critical that the
> U.S. military and appropriate civilian agencies be prepared to deter
> and defend against the full range of possible WMD employment
> scenarios. The US must ensure compliance with relevant international
> agreements, including the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty
>
> (NPT), the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), and the Biological
> Weapons Convention (BWC). A key goal is working with other countries
> to improve their capability to prevent unauthorized transfers of WMD
> and missile technology, expertise, and material. Another ambition is
> to identify and pursue new methods of prevention, such as national
> criminalization of proliferation activities and expanded safety and
> security measures. Also to be developed is an increased ability to
> respond to WMD use.
>
> The US Coast Guard issued the **Maritime Strategy for Homeland
> Security** in December 2002. This document was issued in response to
> the National Security Strategy of the United States and the National
> Strategy for Homeland Security. it defines the Coast Guard\'s homeland
> security roles, serving as the lead federal agency for Maritime
> Homeland Security when responses require civil authorities, as a
> supporting agency to another designated lead federal agency for
> specific events, or as a supporting or supported commander for
> military operations. The strategic approach places a premium on
> identifying and intercepting threats well before they reach US shores
> by conducting layered, multi-agency, maritime security operations and
> by strengthening the port security posture of strategic economic and
> military ports. The Maritime Strategy also supports the Coast Guard\'s
> multimission responsibilities regarding the array of other dangerous
> threats in the U.S. Maritime Domain -- drug smuggling, illegal
> migration, international organized crime, resource exploitation,
> infections diseases, and
>
> environmental degradation.
>
> In February 2003, the **National Strategy for the Physical Protection
> of Critical Infrastructure and Key Assets** came out. It is found at:
> [http://www.whitehouse.gov/pcipb/physical_strategy.pdf]{.underline}
> Key objectives identified include: identifying and assuring the
> protection of those infrastructures and assets that we deem most
> critical in terms of national-level public health and safety,
> governance, economic and national security, and public confidence
> consequences; providing timely warning and assuring the protection of
> those infrastructures and assets that face a specific, imminent
> threat; and assuring the protection of other infrastructures and
> assets that may become terrorist targets over time by pursuing
> specific initiatives and enabling a collaborative environment in which
> federal, state, and local governments and the private sector can
> better protect the infrastructures and assets they control. The
> Strategy calls for a new national paradigm in which the private
> sector, due to its ownership of most relevant assets, must take a key
> part.
>
> The **National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace** came out in April 2003.
> It may be accessed at:
> <http://www.whitehouse.gov/pcipb/cyberspace_strategy.pdf> The nation
> relies heavily on an interdependent network of information technology
> infrastructures called cyberspace. The policy of the United States is
> to protect against disruption of information systems for critical
> infrastructures and, thereby, help to protect the people, economy, and
> national security of the United States. The Strategy's goals include
> reducing national vulnerabilities to these threats before they can be
> exploited to damage the cyber systems supporting critical
> infrastructures and ensure that such disruptions of cyberspace are
> infrequent, of minimal duration, manageable, and cause the least
> damage possible. This is a very difficult strategic challenge that
> requires a coordinated and focused effort from all aspects of
> society---the federal government, state and local governments, the
> private sector, and the American people. The role of public-private
> engagement is crucial in this effort. The strategic objectives are:
> prevent cyber attacks against America's critical infrastructures;
> reduce national vulnerability to cyber attacks; and minimize damage
> and recovery time from cyber attacks that do occur.
>
> In May 2003, the **National Strategy for Integrated Public Warning**
> was issued by the Partnership for Public Warning, a 503(c) entity
> including the private sector, academia, and government entities at the
> local, state and Federal level. The group's goal was development of
> consensus on a national vision and specific goals for improving
> all-hazard warning systems at the Federal, state and local levels. The
> existing system was seen as having multiple shortcomings, including
> reaching the wrong people, inflexibility, and a dearth of accepted
> standards and protocols. Our national warning capability needs to be
> focused on the people at risk at any location and at any hour, be
> universally accessible, safe, easy to use, resilient, reliable, and
> timely. Numerous technologies exist to do this and in many ways
> technology is the easiest part of the solution. The bigger challenges
> are to provide accurate, understandable, specific, and informative
> warnings and to develop procedures and processes for collecting and
> disseminating those warnings in standard and secure ways. Stakeholders
> should assess current warning capability, carry out appropriate
> research, and develop the following: a common terminology for natural
> and man-made hazards; a standard message protocol; national metrics
> and standards; national backbone systems for securely collecting and
> disseminating warnings from all available official sources; pilot
> projects to test concepts and approaches; training and event
> simulation programs; and a national multi-media education and outreach
> campaign.

**\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_**

**Questions to ask students:**

1.  What is the most important national strategy discussed here, and
    why?

> This should arouse some good debate. If there is unanimity of opinion,
> assign each student a different strategy and require him or her to
> defend its importance in total scheme.

2.  What are the most important common elements in the strategies? Where
    and why might more uniformity be needed?

> A good opportunity to explore the nature of such documents and how
> they may work together or not.
>
> **\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_**

### Objective 2.5

Talk about the major paradigm shift that has taken place in the national
approach to terrorism, including the establishment of the Department of
Homeland Security and creation of the National Response Plan (NRP) and
National Incident Management System (NIMS).

> Terrorism is a weapon that has been used for many years by weak groups
> to attack established governments that would be too entrenched for
> traditional military confrontations to be successful. Our founding
> fathers destroyed property as a political protest when they dumped tea
> into Boston harbor. Prior to the American Civil War, extremists on
> both sides of the slavery issue murdered their political opponents and
> burned their homes in "bloody Kansas."
>
> In more modern times, terrorism was often resorted to by local groups
> that wished to throw off the yoke of their colonial masters. The
> Israelis fought the British through bombings and assassinations in
> Palestine. The Mau Maus conducted terror raids in Kenya. Eventually,
> the colonial overlords found the burden of terrorism too much to bear,
> and freed their possessions, hastening a process that the ruling
> powers insisted they had intended all along.
>
> The United States has been concerned about potential terrorist attacks
> for many years. The first modern terrorist attacks to directly affect
> Americans were skyjackings, which began in the 1960's. Their goal was
> usually political asylum. For example, American radicals skyjacked
> many aircraft to Cuba. When the Cuban Government decided to imprison
> skyjackers, these attacks were significantly reduced.
>
> By the beginning of the1970s, more dramatic and violent skyjackings
> became the rule. From straightforward captures accompanied by demands,
> they evolved into sometimes lengthy events with aircraft flying to
> several airports in a variety of nations. These events typically took
> place in the Middle East, and were some of the first visible actions
> of opponents of the United States and our alliance with Israel, who
> were often identified with the Palestinian Liberation Organization
> (PLO). When the PLO directed its members to cease skyjackings in 1972,
> their number appreciably lessened.
>
> In the United States, an apparent skyjacking for simple monetary
> motives was the D.B. Cooper case. In that matter, a skyjacker
> parachuted from an aircraft and vanished with ransom money into the
> heavy woods of the Pacific Northwest.
>
> The adoption of international anti-skyjacking agreements also played a
> part in the decline of takeovers.
>
> The **Tokyo Convention of 1963** outlawed attacks on civilian aircraft
> and the **Hague Convention of 1970** and the **Montreal Convention of
> 1971** spelled out jurisdiction over attacks on aviation and confirmed
> the policy of "prosecute or extradite." This policy mandated signatory
> nations to arrest and either try or extradite skyjackers.
>
> In the U.S., the **Anti-Hijacking Act of 1974** made airlines
> accountable for providing security. Since then, the Federal Aviation
> Administration and federal law enforcement agencies have overseer
> security at US airports and international airports with US flights.
>
> Military operations against skyjackers succeeded in **Entebbe**,
> Uganda, in 1976 and in **Mogadishu**, Somalia, in 1977. Later rescue
> attempts often failed and hostages and rescuers died because the
> conditions were quite dissimilar to those in Entebbe and Mogadishu.
>
> The dramatic **TWA skyjacking in 1985** caused security measures to be
> tightened at U.S. airports. As well, security measures increased at
> foreign airports. In fact, skyjackings of flights from major
> international airports are unusual.
>
> Skyjackings still occur, although prior to September 11, 2001 American
> aircraft and passengers were rarely targeted in recent years.
>
> Two events in particular, the first World Trade Center attack in 1993
> and the bombing of the Murrah federal building in Oklahoma City in
> 1995, focused national attention on the potential for terrorist acts
> in the United States. In response to these events, beginning in the
> 1990's FEMA mandated that state and local governments wishing to
> benefit from Emergency Management Preparedness Grants (EMPGs) must
> include terrorism preparedness in their planning, training, and
> exercising.
>
> Prior to the attacks of September 11, 2001, the explosion of a
> **bomb** in the basement levels of **World Trade Center towers in New
> York City in 1993** was the most noteworthy action by foreign
> terrorists directed against Americans within our borders. The bombing
> resulted in the deaths of six individuals. Unfortunate though this
> was, the intended damage would have been far worse. The terrorists
> intended to bring down one or both of the office towers. After the
> attack, the perpetrators were captured, tried, and imprisoned
> following guilty verdicts. In a promise -- and a warning - one of the
> attackers left a message that would later be found by investigators,
> stating, "Next time, it will be very precise."
>
> Terrorism did not originate solely from beyond U.S. borders. From both
> extremes of the political spectrum, domestic groups also made their
> mark with numerous violent attacks. Ultra-right wing groups involved
> included **Posse Comitatus**, the **Order**, the **Ku Klux Klan**, the
> **American Nazi movement**, as well as "skinheads" during the 1980s
> and 1990s. From the far left, **Animal Liberation Front (ALF) and the
> Earth Liberation Front (ALF)** members committed violent acts against
> property that have been characterized as "ecoterrorism." Law
> enforcement authorities increased their scrutiny of these groups. In
> both training and anti-government activities, police saw a growing
> trend toward cooperation among groups with others espousing similar
> causes.
>
> In 1995, the **Murrah federal Building in Oklahoma City was bombed by
> domestic terrorists.** The event's casualties included168 people. The
> links between the bombers and right-wing militia groups resulted in
> these organizations losing supporters who did not embrace the
> murderous nature of this violent protest.
>
> **Anti-abortion groups** attacked women's clinics and health care
> providers during the 1980s and 1990s. Arson, bombings, and
> assassinations have been used to intimidate doctors, nurses, and other
> clinic staff, as well as patients.
>
> There have also been terrorist attacks by individuals with
> psychological disorders and political motivations.
>
> Theodore J. Kaczynski, known as the "**Unabomber**," either mailed
> bombs or deposited them to be discovered. During 18 years, Kaczynski
> committed 16 bombings during which 23 people were injured and 3 died.
> Eventually his brother recognized language in the Unabomber's
> published "manifesto" against technology and turned him in.
>
> Right- wing extremist **Eric Rudolf**, believed to be a member of a
> white supremacist religion, exploded bombs at abortion clinics and a
> gay bar as well as the **bombing of Centennial Olympic Park in Atlanta
> during the 1996 Olympics**, killing two people. Rudolf planted
> secondary devices intended to kill or injure emergency responders. He
> also listened to news coverage after his attacks, which led to his
> changing placement of a secondary device when it was reported that he
> had planted an earlier one incorrectly.
>
> Domestic terrorism continues in the aftermath of the September 11,
> 2001 attacks, even as the nation focuses its might on foreign
> opponents. **Animal Liberation Front (ALF) and the Earth Liberation
> Front (ALF)** members in July 2006 pled guilty to a five-state arson
> spree.
>
> After the skyjackings and subsequent **attacks on the World Trade
> Center and the Pentagon, stopping international terrorism** became the
> **major focus** of **United States foreign and domestic policy.**
>
> As outlined above, numerous laws and Executive Orders addressed
> terrorism. Before September 11, 2004, **Presidential Decision
> Directive (PDD) 39** signed on June 21,1995 and **PDD 62** signed on
> May 22, 1998 set out national policy for dealing with terrorist
> events. PDD 39 created a national pattern for response to terrorism
> events, appointing FEMA to be in charge of Consequence Management and
> the FBI to run Crisis Management, or the immediate aftermath of a
> terrorism event. These directives were issued in response to the
> Murrah Building bombing in Oklahoma City. **PDD 62** established a
> more orderly method for fighting the terrorist threat. It reinforced
> the mission of the many U.S. agencies charged with roles in defeating
> terrorism. PDD 62 also illuminated their activities in the wide range
> of U.S. counter-terrorism programs.
>
> Following the attacks, the executive and legislative branches took
> **immediate action to address terrorism** concerns.
>
> Almost immediately, Congress enacted the **USA PATRIOT Act**,
> discussed in more detail above. The national sense of urgency to take
> concrete steps to address terrorism led to passage of a huge bill that
> none of those voting had read in its entirety.

The **Homeland Security Act of 2002** Public Law 107-296 (HS Act) is the
cornerstone of the nation's post-September 11 response to terrorism. The
HS Act was signed into law by President Bush on November 25, 2002, and
it significantly reworks the national system to terrorism and all other
emergency events. The HS Act's most obvious effect was **creation of the
Department of Homeland Security** (DHS), which united 180,000 Federal
workers from 22 agencies into a single organization. As written, the
mission of DHS in the HS Act revolves around terrorism.

> HS Act §101.
>
> SEC. 101. EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT; MISSION.
>
> \(a\) Establishment. There is established a Department of Homeland
>
> Security, as an executive department of the United States within the
> meaning
>
> of title 5, United States Code.
>
> \(b\) Mission. (1) **The primary mission of the Department is to\--**
>
> **(A) prevent terrorist attacks** within the United States;
>
> \(B\) reduce the vulnerability of the United States to terrorism; and
>
> \(C\) minimize the damage, and assist in the recovery, from

terrorist attacks that do occur within the United States.

Some onlookers worried that formation of a super agency like DHS might
result in a **bureaucratic nightmare**. The new concern, some thought,
might create rampant infighting, be inflexible, and only respond to
events very slowly. Emergency responders thought that DHS would likely
focus on law enforcement requirements. This would, of course be
consistent, with the agency's Congressional mandate.

> The law created a significant challenge: how to combine the work of
> DHS with governments at the state and local levels as well as
> emergency responders to form a truly national system for emergency
> preparedness and response. Congress answered that question by
> requiring in the HS Act § 501 (5) "\[b\]uilding a **comprehensive
> incident management system with Federal, state, and local government
> personnel, agencies, and authorities**, to respond to. . .
> \[terrorist\] attacks and disasters."
>
> On February 28, 2003 President Bush the way that the federal
> government would implement the HS Act's requirements for creating a
> comprehensive system. On that date, he issued **Homeland Security
> Presidential Directive 5 (HSPD 5)**.
>
> Among the agencies **incorporated in DHS is the Federal Emergency
> Management Agency (FEMA).** Traditionally, **emergency management**
> has been described as comprising **four phases -- mitigation,
> preparedness, response and recovery**. While the four-phase sequence
> is not absolutely ideal, it does offer a comprehensive methodology for
> dealing with disasters and a shared vocabulary for emergency
> management and government leaders. The NRP has added a **fifth phase
> -- awareness**. The addition of awareness reflects the law enforcement
> focus of DHS as it emphasizes the prevention and response to
> terrorism, as mandated in the HS Act.
>
> Given the HS Act's concentration on terrorism, many were concerned
> that the **traditional focus on an all-hazards comprehensive approach
> to emergency management** might be submerged beneath the concentration
> on one hazard -- terrorism. Perhaps to anticipate the objections of
> the emergency management community, **HSPD 5 mandates addressing all
> hazards,** requiring that "\[The NRP\] shall integrate Federal
> Government domestic prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery
> plans into one all-discipline, all-hazards plan. . .The Secretary will
> also provide assistance to State and local governments to develop
> all-hazards plans and capabilities, including those of greatest
> importance to the security of the United States, and will ensure that
> State, local, and Federal plans are compatible."

Despite HSPD 5's attention to all hazards, apprehension led to almost
immediate calls from some in the emergency management community to
**restore FEMA to independent cabinet-level status**. Such calls were
accompanied by **dire warnings of the danger in failing to adequately
prepare for the most likely events** -- natural disasters like floods,
earthquakes, and hurricanes. The inadequate response by federal, state,
and local governments to **Hurricane Katrina in 2005** is now being
cited by advocates in Congress of **restoring FEMA's status** as leader
of national preparedness efforts, either within or independent of DHS.

> HSPD 5 commands all **Federal agencies to perform planning and
> incident management tasks**.
>
> HSPD 5 also mandates creating **national emergency responder
> performance benchmarks** and establishes **sanctions for responders**
> who do not live up to those standards. Those failing to comply with
> the NRP and NIMS by given dates were threatened with **loss of all
> federal preparedness and grant funds to the extent permitted by law**.
>
> HSPD 5's major purpose is to ensure that all levels of government will
> operate together efficiently and effectively, utilizing a single,
> comprehensive approach to domestic incident management. To achieve
> this aim, HSPD 5 regards crisis management and consequence management
> as a single, integrated task rather than as two separate functions. As
> a result, the approach contained in **PDD 39 has been superseded**.
>
> HSPD 5 directs all Federal agencies to collaborate with DHS to
> **institute a National Response Plan (NRP) and a National Incident
> Management System (NIMS)** and establishes a timetable to accomplish
> this goal. In this way, authority for creation of the NRP and NIMS
> descends from the HS Act through HSPD 5 to DHS.
>
> HSPD 5 mandates the Secretary of DHS to "integrate Federal Government
> domestic prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery plans into
> one all-discipline, all-hazards plan." The NRP must use NIMS to
> "provide the structure and mechanisms for national level policy and
> operational direction for Federal support to State and local incident
> managers and exercise of direct Federal authorities."
>
> HSPD 5 contains **specific requirements for the content of the NRP and
> NIMS**. Included are:

-   protocols for operating under different threat levels;

-   incorporation of existing Federal plans such as the National Oil and
    Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan -- usually referred
    to as the National Contingency Plan (NCP) (which is the Federal
    approach to hazardous materials response);

-   the Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan (FREP);

-   development of other plans as needed;

-   a consistent approach to information gathering and reporting as well
    as for providing recommendations to senior Federal officials; and

-   "rigorous requirements" for ongoing improvements from testing,
    exercising, incident experience, and new information and
    technologies.

> HSPD 5 identifies the lead agencies for terrorism events and other
> major disasters.
>
> The process of **creating the NRP and NIMS** was not without
> controversy. DHS hired a contractor with no emergency response or
> emergency management experience to create the first draft, which ended
> up being a false start. After re-drafting the documents and going
> through several versions with stakeholder input, however, the end
> product has been generally well accepted.
>
> Federal, state, and local officials caught considerable criticism in
> the **aftermath of the response to Hurricane Katrina during August
> 2005**. The **NRP and NIMS** have also received critical evaluations
> following the hurricane. Specifically, pre-Katrina emergency **plans
> were alleged to be insufficient**. This focus has led to increased
> prominence for planning efforts at all levels of government.
>
> In response to recognized inadequacies in Katrina plans, DHS conducted
> a national assessment of the country's catastrophic planning
> capabilities. DHS released the results of the **National Plan Review**
> on June 16, 2006. The Review looked at existing emergency operations
> plans for states and urban areas and assess their sufficiency for
> managing a catastrophic event. The Review deduced that, although
> America's states and localities are generally well-prepared for
> typical "garden variety" emergencies, larger catastrophic events are
> typically beyond the capacity of existing emergency operations plans.
> The Review indicates that the nation still has far to go in fully
> implementing the planning requirements contained in NIMS.
>
> Further, the post-Katrina discussion has resulted in significant
> momentum for those who criticized the creation of DHS and FEMA's
> reduced responsibilities within the organization.

**\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_**

**Questions to ask students:**

1.  How has the national approach to emergency response and emergency
    management changed in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001
    attacks?

> More unified approach. National standards.

2.  What are the advantages and disadvantages of unifying national
    emergency response standards?

> Advantages: Common approaches at large events. Responder safety. Most
> efficient use of resources.
>
> Disadvantages: May stifle originality and innovation, which may most
> often take place locally. Rural responders may be incapable of
> complying. Possible loss of volunteers due to additional training
> requirements.

3.  To what extent has Hurricane Katrina changed your opinion of
    emergency management on the federal, state, and local levels, and
    why?

> A good opportunity to explore the realities behind the new standards
> and the extent to which they really work. IMS has been posited by some
> to be a matter of faith rather than a scientifically documented "best
> practice" that actually delivers all that it promises.
>
> **\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_**

**Objective 2.6**

**Discuss the mandates placed on state and local governments by newly
created federal initiatives.**

> As mentioned above, **HSPD 5 creates penalties** for emergency
> managers and emergency responders **at the state and local levels who
> do not comply with its mandates**. The penalties include "to the
> extent permitted by law. . . \[loss of\] Federal preparedness
> assistance through grants, contracts, or other activities." Those not
> wishing to lose this support are mandated to comply with NIMS and the
> NRP.
>
> NIMS and the NRP set up significant compliance requirements. Although
> DHS had the goal of impacting the existing state and local structure
> as little as possible in the NRP, in fact it creates significant
> responsibilities. The reason for this is that **state and local plans
> typically reflect and, where possible, mirror federal structures in
> order to facilitate incorporating federal resources at an event**.
>
> The **Base Plan** describes a national approach to domestic incident
> management designed to incorporate the efforts and resources of
> federal, state, local, tribal, private sector, and nongovernmental
> organizations. The Base Plan comprises planning assumptions, roles and
> responsibilities, concept of operations, preparedness guidelines, and
> plan maintenance instructions.
>
> **Appendixes** provide other relevant, more detailed supporting
> information, including terms, definitions, acronyms, authorities, and
> a compendium of national interagency plans. They include:
>
> ■ Glossary of Key Terms
>
> ■ List of Acronyms
>
> ■ Authorities and References
>
> ■ Compendium of National/International Interagency Plans
>
> ■ Overview of Initial Federal Involvement Under the Stafford Act
>
> ■ Overview of Federal-to-Federal Support in Non-Stafford Act
> Situations
>
> The **Emergency Support Function (ESF) Annexes** specify the missions,
> policies, structures, and responsibilities of federal agencies for
> managing resource and program support to states and federal agencies
> or other entities during Incidents of National Significance. The ESF
> Annexes consist of:
>
> **ESF #1 - Transportation**
>
> ■ Federal and civil transportation support
>
> ■ Transportation safety
>
> ■ Restoration/recovery of transportation infrastructure
>
> ■ Movement restrictions
>
> ■ Damage and impact assessment
>
> **ESF #2 - Communications**
>
> ■ Coordination with telecommunications industry
>
> ■ Restoration/repair of telecommunications infrastructure
>
> ■ Protection, restoration, and sustainment of national cyber and
> information technology resources
>
> **ESF #3 - Public Works and Engineering**
>
> ■ Infrastructure protection and emergency repair
>
> ■ Infrastructure restoration
>
> ■ Engineering services, construction management
>
> ■ Critical infrastructure liaison
>
> **ESF #4 - Firefighting**
>
> ■ Firefighting activities on Federal lands
>
> ■ Resource support to rural and urban firefighting operations
>
> **ESF #5 - Emergency Management**
>
> ■ Coordination of incident management efforts
>
> ■ Issuance of mission assignments
>
> ■ Resource and human capital
>
> ■ Incident action planning
>
> ■ Financial management
>
> **ESF #6 - Mass Care, Housing, and Human Services**
>
> ■ Mass care
>
> ■ Disaster housing
>
> ■ Human services
>
> **ESF #7 - Resource Support**
>
> ■ Resource support (facility space, office equipment and supplies,
> contracting services, etc.)
>
> **ESF #8 - Public Health and Medical Services**
>
> ■ Public health
>
> ■ Medical
>
> ■ Mental health services
>
> ■ Mortuary services
>
> **ESF #9 -- Urban Search and Rescue**
>
> ■ Life-saving assistance
>
> ■ Urban search and rescue
>
> **ESF #10 - Oil and Hazardous Materials Response**
>
> ■ Oil and hazardous materials (chemical, biological, radiological,
> etc.) response
>
> ■ Environmental safety and short- and long-term cleanup
>
> **ESF #11 - Agriculture and Natural Resources**
>
> ■ Nutrition assistance
>
> ■ Animal and plant disease/pest response
>
> ■ Food safety and security
>
> ■ Natural and cultural resources and historic properties protection
> and restoration
>
> **ESF #12 - Energy**
>
> ■ Energy infrastructure assessment, repair, and restoration
>
> ■ Energy industry utilities coordination
>
> ■ Energy forecast
>
> **ESF #13 - Public Safety and Security**
>
> ■ Facility and resource security
>
> ■ Security planning and technical and resource assistance
>
> ■ Public safety/security support
>
> ■ Support to access, traffic, and crowd control
>
> **ESF #14 - Long-term Community Recovery and Mitigation**
>
> ■ Social and economic community impact assessment
>
> ■ Long-term community recovery assistance to States, local
> governments, and the private sector
>
> ■ Mitigation analysis and program implementation
>
> **ESF #15 - External Affairs**
>
> ■ Emergency public information and protective action guidance
>
> ■ Media and community relations
>
> ■ Congressional and international affairs
>
> ■ Tribal and insular affairs
>
> The **Support Annexes** provide guidance and describe the methods and
> administrative obligations needed to assure efficient and effective
> achievement of NRP incident management objectives. The Support Annexes
> are described below.
>
> **Support Annexes**
>
> ■ **Financial Management** provides guidance for NRP implementation to
> ensure that incident-related funds are provided expeditiously and that
> financial management activities are conducted in accordance with
> established law, policies, regulations, and standards.
>
> ■ **International Coordination** provides guidance for carrying out
> responsibilities regarding international coordination in support of
> the Federal response to domestic Incidents of National Significance.
>
> ■ **Logistics Management** describes the framework within which the
> overall NRP logistics management function operates. It also outlines
> logistics management responsibilities and mechanisms for integrating
> Federal, State, local, and tribal resource providers.
>
> ■ **Private-Sector Coordination** outlines processes to ensure
> effective incident management coordination and integration with the
> private sector, including representatives of the Nation's Critical
> Infrastructure/Key Resources (CI/KR) sectors and other industries.
>
> ■ **Public Affairs** describes interagency incident communications
> procedures designed to enable the coordination and dissemination of
> timely public information during Incidents of National Significance.
>
> ■ **Science and Technology** provides guidance and mechanisms to
> ensure that all levels of government can leverage the Nation's science
> and technology resources efficiently and effectively in the management
> of Incidents of National Significance.
>
> ■ **Tribal Relations** describes the policies, responsibilities, and
> concept of operations for effective coordination and interaction with
> tribal governments and communities during Incidents of National
> Significance.
>
> ■ **Volunteer and Donations Management** provides guidance on
> volunteer and donations management functions related to Incidents of
> National Significance.
>
> ■ **Worker Safety and Health** details processes to ensure
> coordinated, comprehensive efforts to identify responder safety and
> health risks and implement procedures to minimize or eliminate illness
> or injuries during incident management and emergency response
> activities.
>
> The **Incident Annexes** address contingency or hazard situations
> requiring specialized application of the NRP. The Incident Annexes
> describe the missions, policies, responsibilities, and coordination
> processes that govern the interaction of public and private entities
> engaged in incident management and emergency response operations
> across a spectrum of potential hazards. These annexes are typically
> augmented by a variety of supporting plans and operational
> supplements. The Incident Annexes are new to the adopted NRP, and
> should provide much-needed guidance for state and local responders in
> their responses to the referenced types of event. The Incident Annexes
> are described below.

#### Incident Annexes

> ■ The **Biological Incident Annex** describes incident management
> activities related to a biological terrorism event, pandemic, emerging
> infectious disease, or novel pathogen outbreak.
>
> ■ The **Catastrophic Incident Annex** establishes the strategy for
> implementing and coordinating an accelerated national response to a
> catastrophic incident.
>
> ■ The **Cyber Incident Annex** establishes procedures for a
> multidisciplinary, broad-based approach to prepare for, remediate, and
> recover from catastrophic cyber events impacting critical national
> processes and the national economy.
>
> ■ The **Food and Agriculture Incident Annex** describes incident
> management activities related to a terrorist attack, major disaster,
> or other emergency involving the Nation's agriculture and food
> systems.
>
> (To be published in a subsequent version of the NRP.)
>
> ■ The **Nuclear/Radiological Incident Annex** describes incident
> management activities related to nuclear/radiological incidents.
>
> ■ The **Oil and Hazardous Materials Incident Annex** describes
> incident management activities related to certain nationally
> significant oil and hazardous materials pollution incidents.
>
> ■ The **Terrorism Incident Law Enforcement and Investigation Annex**
> describes law enforcement and criminal investigation coordinating
> structures and processes in response to a terrorist event.
>
> In keeping with its status as a "national" plan, the **NRP requires
> incident management and emergency response plans to incorporate its
> approach to their subject matter**. Specifically, they **must
> include**, to the extent authorized by law:
>
> ■ **Principles and terminology of the NIMS**;
>
> ■ Reporting requirements of the NRP;
>
> ■ Linkages to key NRP organizational elements (such as the Interagency
> Incident Management Group (IIMG), National Response Coordination
> Center (NRCC), Regional Response Coordination Center (RRCC), Joint
> Field Office (JFO), etc.); and
>
> ■ Procedures for transitioning from localized incidents to Incidents
> of National Significance.

**NIMS**' Chapter III -- Preparedness lays out a **"preparedness
cycle"** that includes:

1\. planning;

2\. training;

3\. equipping;

4\. exercising;

5\. evaluating; and

> 6\. taking action to correct or mitigate.
>
> NIMS acknowledge the reality that different jurisdictions have created
> different preparedness organizations. It requires, however, that when
> preparedness must take place across jurisdictions, groups must be
> **multijurisdictional** in nature. This declaration fits together with
> NIMS' strong emphasis on mutual aid agreements.
>
> **Preparedness organizations and the nature of preparedness programs
> have their roles detailed fairly extensively**. Plans must address the
> elements of the preparedness cycle mentioned above. A number of plans
> must be created and maintained, including emergency operations plans,
> procedures for implementing the plans, preparedness plans (including
> training and exercising), mitigation plans, and recovery plans.
> Training and exercises (to federal benchmarks) must take place to
> assure ongoing improvement in all-hazards incident management across
> the nation. To facilitate integration of different entities, personnel
> qualifications and equipment must be standardized. For every part of
> preparedness, publications management is a key element, as it
> establishes and documents consistent standards and encourages
> interoperability.
>
> **NIMS requires "establishing guidelines, protocols, and standards for
> planning, training and exercises, personnel qualification and
> certification, equipment certification, and publication management."**
> Nationwide preparedness standards will be "maintained and managed"
> through a multijurisdictional, multidisciplinary center, using a
> collaborative process. To accomplish this goal, the adopted NIMS sets
> up a **NIMS Integration Center** (NIC). A variety of groups, including
> local, state, tribal, federal, private sector, and professional
> organizations may suggest changes in NIMS standards and other
> corrective actions. However, ultimate authority for modification of
> NIMS standards rests with the Secretary of DHS.

**\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_**

**Questions to ask students:**

1.  What are the additional burdens on state and local governments
    imposed by new federal standards?

> More planning, training, exercising to federal standards. Additional
> costs. Loss of control to NIMS Center and Secretary of DHS.

2.  To what extent do you believe that the additional burdens on state
    and local governments imposed by the NRP and NIMS are worth the
    funds required to implement them?

> Should stimulate discussion of local vs. federal control and the
> benefits of each. Discuss nature of unfunded mandates and the
> opportunities that state and local governments must forego in order to
> comply with them.

3.  How is the approach to terrorism in HSPD 5 different from that in
    PDD 39? Which is better and why?

> Is HSPD 5 change for change's sake? Is the actual event controlled in
> any different way under HSPD 5 in the field?
>
> **\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_**

**Objective 2.8**

**Talk about state and local counterterrorism enactments, including
mandates for Local Emergency Planning Committees (LEPCs) and state and
local homeland security organizations.**

> Following the September 11 attacks, **state and local governments also
> wished to take positive step**s to reassure the populace that they
> were being vigilant in protecting against possible terrorism attacks.
>
> To this end, they **reexamined their statutes and governmental
> structures**. The goal of ensuring greater terrorism protection was
> pursued in several ways. **Every state appointed a "counterterrorism
> czar"** to work together with DHS and facilitate and maximize the flow
> of **massive federal counterterrorism appropriations** into their
> jurisdictions.
>
> Prior to September 11, 2001, the **location of emergency management
> responsibilities within state government** carried greatly, from being
> stand alone agenies to operating under another entity's control,
> usually the State Adjutant General or State Police. Following the
> attacks, some states reorganized their executive branches to put
> emergency management under one of the afore-mentioned entities or else
> created **new state Departments of Homeland Security** on the federal
> model.
>
> This approach was **sometimes mirrored on the local level** as well.
> However, the trend was mitigated to an extent by the fiscal reality
> that many local emergency managers are part-time employees whose main
> responsibility is to another agency (usually fire or law enforcement).
>
> Some states and locals that had not previously done so passed laws
> specifically mandating that **terrorism planning must be part of the
> emergency plan**. Some mandated terrorism planning in specific
> contexts, such as for **schools or hospitals**.
>
> Pre-existing organizations were sometimes given additional
> responsibilities related to terrorism. **Local Emergency Planning
> Committees (LEPCs)** are mandated to create plans for dealing with
> releases of **extremely hazardous substances (EHS plans)** by the
> **Emergency Planning & Community Right to Know Act (EPCRA)** 42 U.S.C.
> 11001 et seq. (1986) (also known as SARA Title III). EPCRA is based on
> the idea that **keeping the public informed** about the nature of
> hazards facing them will lead to better self-protection. In the wake
> of the September 11 attacks, however, this **approach was called into
> question**. Many believed that **terrorists would access this public
> information** on the whereabouts of hazardous substances and use them
> to create chemical releases that would result in deaths and injuries.
> Therefore, some states mandated that some or all of the information be
> kept secret from the public. In other cases, LEPCs acted of their own
> volition in either creating separate lists of the most dangerous
> substances or keeping their exact location within a facility a secret.
>
> Additionally, some states assigned additional tasks to their LEPCs and
> State **Emergency Response Commissions (SERCs)**, the state-level
> entity that oversees LEPCs. They were given additional antiterrorism
> planning responsibilities. This approach further splinters the "all
> hazards" nature of comprehensive emergency management, forcing
> emergency managers to incorporate yet another plan into their own
> overall emergency operations plans.

**\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_**

**Questions to ask students:**

1.  What additional burdens have state and local governments imposed
    upon themselves in the aftermath of the of the September 11 attacks?

> Additional structures. New antiterrorism czars. More burdens on
> already overburdened local organizations.

2.  What is your opinion of the changes in responsibilities for LEPCs
    and SERCs?

> More work for their members, who are volunteers for the most part.
> Less of the centralized "all hazards" approach to emergency planning.
> More meetings for officials who do not have time to attend. Loss of
> public access to important safety information.
>
> **\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_**
>
> **References:**
>
> Martin Edwin Andersen, "Local Responders Howl at DHS Emergency
> Management Plan" *Congressional Quarterly Homeland Security -- Local
> Response* (August 8, 2003).
>
> Scott Baltic, "ICS For Everyone" 3 *Homeland Preparedness
> Professional* No. 1, 22 (January/February 2004).
>
> Keith Bea, "Overview of Components of the National Response Plan and
> Selected Issues," *CRS Report for Congress* (December 24, 2003).
>
> George D. Haddow and Jane A. Bullock, *Introduction to Emergency
> Management* (2003).
>
> Elishia L. Krauss, "Building a Bigger Bureaucracy: What the Department
> of Homeland Security Won\'t Do; Views You Can Use" *The Public
> Manager*, No. 1, Vol. 32, 57 (March 22, 2003).
>
> Paul M. Maniscalco & Hank T. Christen, *Understanding Terrorism and
> Managing the Consequences* (2001).
>
> National Incident Management System web page found on line at
> http://www.fema.gov/emergency/nims/index.shtm
>
> National Plan Review found on line at
> <http://www.dhs.gov/interweb/assetlibrary/Prep_NationwidePlanReview.pdf>
>
> Larry Neumeister, "Trade Center Bomber\'s Threat Foreshadowed
> September Terrorist Attacks" *Associated Press* (September 30, 2001).
>
> William C. Nicholson, "Seeking Consensus on Homeland Security
> Standards: Adopting the National Response Plan and the National
> Incident Management System" *Widener Law Review*, Vol. 11, No. 2
> (2006).
>
> William C. Nicholson, "The Role of the Incident Command System,"
> *Journal of Emergency Management*, Vol.4, No. 1 (January/February
> 2006).
>
> William C. Nicholson, Editor *Homeland Security Law and Policy*,
> Charles C. Thomas Publisher, Ltd., Springfield, IL. (2005)
>
> William C. Nicholson, "Mutual Aid Agreements," *Journal of Emergency
> Management*, Vol.3, No. 5 (September/October, 2005).
>
> William C. Nicholson, "Sources of Emergency Management Law: An
> Overview," *Journal of Emergency Management*, Vol.2, No. 4 (Fall,
> 2004).
>
> William C. Nicholson, "National Incident Management System (NIMS)
> Basics: What Managers Need to Know," *Best Practices in Emergency
> Services*, Vol. 7, No. 7, 76 (July 2004).

William C. Nicholson, "An Interview About NIMS and the NRP" A Dialogue
with Bob Stephan, Assistant to Secretary Tom Ridge, *Homeland Protection
Professional,* Volume 3, No. 3 (April 2004).

> William C. Nicholson, Editor *Emergency Response and Emergency
> Management Law: Cases and Materials*, Charles C. Thomas Publisher,
> Ltd., Springfield, IL. 345 pages (2003)
>
> William C. Nicholson, "The New Federalism in Homeland Security"
> *Homeland Protection Professional*, Volume 2, No. 9 (November/December
> 2003).
>
> William C. Nicholson, "Integrating Local, State and Federal Responders
> and Emergency Management: New Packaging and New Controls," *Journal of
> Emergency Management*, Vol.1, No. 4 (Fall, 2003).
>
> William C. Nicholson, "The New (?) Federal Approach to Emergencies,"
> *Homeland Protection Professional*, Volume 2, No. 6 (August 2003).
>
> William C. Nicholson, "Legal Issues in Emergency Response to Terrorism
> Incidents Involving Hazardous Materials: The Hazardous Waste
> Operations and Emergency Response ("HAZWOPER") Standard, Standard
> Operating Procedures, Mutual Aid and the Incident Management System,"
> *Widener Symposium Law Journal*, Vol. 9, No. 2, 295 (2003).
>
> William C. Nicholson, "The Legal Response to Terrorism: The USA
> PATRIOT Act of 2001 and Civil Rights," *Widener University School of
> Law Alumni Magazine*, Vol. 9 No. 1, pp. 10-13 (Winter 2001).
>
> William C. Nicholson, "Terrorism: Legal Issues for Emergency
> Responders," *Merginet* e-magazine, found on the World Wide Web at
> [http://www.merginet.com]{.underline}/, October 3, 2001.
>
> Note, "Responding To Terrorism: Crime, Punishment, and War" 115
> *Harvard Law Review* 1217 (2002).
>
> *President Marks Homeland Security\'s Accomplishments at Year One,*
> White House Press Release (March 2, 2004) found on the web at
> <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/03/20040302-2.html>
>
> Principles of Emergency Management, FEMA on-line course Number IS 230
> Chapter 3: The Emergency Management Cycle at 3.1-3.2, found on the web
> at <http://training.fema.gov/EMIWeb/IS/is230lst.asp>
>
> William L. Waugh, Jr., *Terrorism and Emergency Management* (New York:
> Marcel Dekker Publishers, 1990).
>
> William L. Waugh, Jr., "Informing Policy and Administration: A
> Comparative Perspective on Terrorism," *International Journal of
> Public Administration* 12 (1989): 477-99
>
> William L. Waugh, Jr., "The 'All-Hazards' Approach Must be Continued"
> *Journal of Emergency Management* Vol. 1, No. 4, 11 (Fall 2003).
>
> Pat West, Senior Editor, *NIMS: The Last Word on Incident Command?*
> Fire Chief on Line (March 5, 2004) Found at:
> <http://firechief.com/ar/firefighting_nics_last_word/index.htm>
>
> 9/11 Commission [Staff Statement No. 3: The Aviation Security System
> and the 9/11
> Attacks](http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/terrorism/911comm-ss3.pdf)
> (Jan. 27, 2004) found on line at
> <http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/terrorism/911comm-ss3.pdf>
>
> 9/11 Commission [Staff Statement No. 4: The Four
> Flights](http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/terrorism/911comm-ss3.pdf)
> (Jan. 27, 2004) found on line at
> <http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/terrorism/911comm-ss4.pdf>