Before the

Federal Communications Commission

Washington, D.C. 20554

+----------------------------------+---+------------------------------+
| In the Matter of                 | * | CC Docket No. 01-9           |
|                                  | * |                              |
| Application of Verizon New       | ) |                              |
| England Inc., Bell Atlantic      | * |                              |
| Communications, Inc. (d/b/a      | * |                              |
| Verizon Long Distance), NYNEX    |   |                              |
| Long Distance Company (d/b/a     | * |                              |
| Verizon Enterprise Solutions)    | * |                              |
| And Verizon Global Networks      | ) |                              |
| Inc.,                            | * |                              |
|                                  | * |                              |
| For Authorization to Provide     |   |                              |
| In-Region, InterLATA Services in | * |                              |
| Massachusetts                    | * |                              |
|                                  | ) |                              |
|                                  | * |                              |
|                                  | * |                              |
|                                  |   |                              |
|                                  | * |                              |
|                                  | * |                              |
|                                  | ) |                              |
|                                  | * |                              |
|                                  | * |                              |
|                                  |   |                              |
|                                  | * |                              |
|                                  | * |                              |
|                                  | ) |                              |
|                                  | * |                              |
|                                  | * |                              |
|                                  |   |                              |
|                                  | * |                              |
|                                  | * |                              |
|                                  | ) |                              |
|                                  | * |                              |
|                                  | * |                              |
|                                  |   |                              |
|                                  | * |                              |
|                                  | * |                              |
|                                  | ) |                              |
|                                  | * |                              |
|                                  | * |                              |
|                                  |   |                              |
|                                  | * |                              |
|                                  | * |                              |
|                                  | ) |                              |
|                                  | * |                              |
|                                  | * |                              |
|                                  |   |                              |
|                                  | * |                              |
|                                  | * |                              |
|                                  | ) |                              |
|                                  | * |                              |
|                                  | * |                              |
+----------------------------------+---+------------------------------+

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

**Adopted:** April 16, 2001 **Released:** April 16, 2001

By the Commission: Chairman Powell and Commissioner Ness issuing
separate statements; Commissioner Furchtgott-Roth concurring and issuing
a statement; and Commissioner Tristani dissenting and issuing a
statement.

**TABLE OF CONTENTS**

Paragraph

I. INTRODUCTION 1

II\. BACKGROUND 4

A. History of this Application 4

B. Evaluations of Massachusetts Department and Department of Justice 8

III\. PROCEDURAL AND ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 10

IV\. PRIMARY ISSUES IN DISPUTE 15

A. Checklist Item 2 -- Unbundled Network Elements 16

1\. Pricing of Network Elements 16

2\. Access to Operations Support Systems 43

3\. UNE Combinations 117

B. Checklist Item 4 -- Unbundled Local Loops 121

1\. Background 121

2\. Discussion 124

V. OTHER CHECKLIST ITEMS 182

A. Checklist Item 1 -- Interconnection 182

1\. Interconnection Trunking 183

2\. Collocation 194

3\. Technically Feasible Points of Interconnection 197

4\. Pricing of Interconnection 198

B. Checklist Item 3 -- Poles, Ducts, Conduits and Rights of Way 205

1\. Background 205

2\. Discussion 206

C. Checklist Item 5 -- Unbundled Local Transport 207

D. Checklist Item 13 -- Reciprocal Compensation 213

E. Checklist Item 14 -- Resale 217

F. Remaining Checklist Items (6-12) 222

VI\. COMPLIANCE WITH SECTION 271(C)(1)(a) 223

A. Background 223

B. Discussion 224

VII\. SECTION 272 COMPLIANCE 226

A. Background 226

B. Discussion 227

1\. Unchallenged Sections 228

2\. Challenged Sections 229

VIII\. PUBLIC INTEREST ANALYSIS 232

A. Competition in Local Exchange and Long Distance Markets 234

B. Assurance of Future Compliance 236

1\. Performance Assurance Plan 237

2\. Key Elements of the Performance Assurance Plan 240

C. Other Issues 249

IX\. SECTION 271(d)(6) enforcement authority 250

X. CONCLUSION 253

XI\. Ordering Clauses 254

APPENDIX A -- List of Commenters

Appendix B -- Statutory Requirements -- Checklist Items 6-12

# INTRODUCTION

1.  On January 16, 2001, Verizon New England Inc., Bell Atlantic
    Communications, Inc. (d/b/a Verizon Long Distance), NYNEX Long
    Distance Company (d/b/a Verizon Enterprise Solutions), and Verizon
    Global Networks Inc. (Verizon) filed this application pursuant to
    section 271 of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended,[^1] for
    authority to provide in-region, interLATA service originating in the
    state of Massachusetts.[^2] We grant this application in this Order
    based on our conclusion that Verizon has taken the statutorily
    required steps to open its local exchange markets to competition in
    Massachusetts.

2.  In approving this application, we wish to recognize the hard work of
    the Massachusetts Department of Telecommunications and Energy
    (Massachusetts Department) in laying the foundation for approval of
    this application. The Massachusetts Department has conducted
    critically important proceedings concerning Verizon's section 271
    compliance open to participation by all interested parties. The
    Massachusetts Department and Verizon also provided for third-party
    testing of Verizon's operations support systems (OSS) offering. In
    addition, the Massachusetts Department adopted a broad range of
    performance measures and standards and a Performance Assurance Plan
    designed to create a financial incentive for post-entry compliance
    with section 271. State proceedings such as these serve a vitally
    important role in the overall section 271 approval process.

3.  We also commend Verizon for all of the work that it has undertaken
    to open its local exchange market to competition in Massachusetts.
    For example, Verizon states that competitive local exchange carriers
    (competitive LECs) serve more than 513,000 lines on a facilities
    basis in Massachusetts, with Verizon providing more than 333,000
    interconnection trunks and 1,700 collocation nodes to competitive
    LECs. Verizon also states that it provides more than 93,000
    unbundled local loops, including more than 69,000 stand-alone
    unbundled local loops and more than 23,000 unbundled loops provided
    as part of an unbundled network element platform (UNE-P). There is
    also an active resale market in Massachusetts. Verizon states that
    it provides more than 268,000 resold local exchange lines, including
    238,000 business lines and 30,000 residential lines. These results
    bear out the fact that Verizon has made extensive efforts to open
    its local markets in compliance with the requirements of the
    Act.[^3]

# BACKGROUND

## History of this Application

4.  In the 1996 amendments to the Communications Act, Congress required
    that the Bell Operating Companies (BOCs) demonstrate compliance with
    certain market opening requirements contained in section 271 of the
    Act prior to entering the in-region, interLATA market. Congress also
    provided for Commission review of BOC applications to provide such
    services in consultation with the affected state and the Attorney
    General. The Commission has summarized the applicable statutory
    framework in a number of prior orders and need not repeat this
    material here.[^4]

5.  On May 24, 1999, Verizon filed a draft section 271 application with
    the Massachusetts Department.[^5] The Massachusetts Department
    conducted a sixteen-month investigation of Verizon's compliance with
    section 271. These proceedings were open to full participation by
    all interested parties. This process included: a comprehensive
    third-party test of Verizon's OSS; numerous technical sessions with
    the Department's staff, Verizon and many competitive LECs; a series
    of public hearings and oral arguments; and hundreds of information
    requests.

6.  In August of 1999, the Massachusetts Department contracted with KPMG
    consulting, L.L.C. to perform a third-party test of Verizon's OSS
    performance. In January 2000, the Massachusetts Department adopted
    the performance metrics developed in the New York carrier-to-carrier
    proceeding as the metrics to be used and replicated by KPMG in
    evaluating Verizon's performance in Massachusetts.[^6] On September
    7, 2000, KPMG issued its final report, which found that Verizon
    satisfied 800 of 804 test points relating to its review of Verizon's
    OSS.[^7]

7.  Verizon filed its initial application for section 271 authority for
    the state of Massachusetts (the Massachusetts I Application) on
    September 22, 2000,[^8] but later chose to withdraw it.[^9] Verizon
    filed another application for Massachusetts (the Massachusetts II
    Application) on January 16, 2001.[^10] The Massachusetts II
    Application incorporates the material in the original application by
    reference to demonstrate compliance with most of the section 271
    requirements. It also provides additional information concerning
    Verizon's provision of DSL-capable local loops, the availability of
    loop make-up information and line sharing. In addition, competitive
    LECs now have access to Verizon's carrier specific performance
    data.[^11]

## Evaluations of Massachusetts Department and Department of Justice

8.  The Massachusetts Department supports Verizon's application to
    provide in-region, interLATA long distance service originating in
    Massachusetts. Specifically, it concluded that Verizon had met the
    requirements of section 271, and urged the Commission to approve
    Verizon's in-region, interLATA entry in both its October 16, 2000
    evaluation of the Massachusetts I Application,[^12] and its February
    6, 2001 evaluation of the Massachusetts II Application.[^13]

9.  The Department of Justice filed its evaluation of Verizon's
    Massachusetts I Application on October 27, 2000.[^14] It recommended
    that the Commission not approve the application until Verizon had
    demonstrated that it provides nondiscriminatory access to
    DSL-capable loops and established suitable performance measures with
    unambiguous benchmarks for DSL-capable loops.[^15] The Department of
    Justice submitted an evaluation of Verizon's Massachusetts II
    Application on February 21, 2001.[^16] It recognized that a "number
    of changes have taken place" since it filed its evaluation of the
    Massachusetts I Application and acknowledged that the second Verizon
    application "shows improvement in some aspects of Verizon's
    performance in providing access to DSL loops," although it
    highlighted several remaining disputed issues related to the
    provision of nondiscriminatory access to DSL-capable loops.[^17] The
    Department of Justice stated that it was unable to resolve those
    remaining issues based on the record on file at the time of its
    evaluation.[^18] As a result, it stated that it could not find at
    that stage of the proceeding that Verizon had adequately
    demonstrated its ability to provide nondiscriminatory access to
    DSL-capable loops.[^19] Recognizing that its evaluation reflected
    only the evidence in the record at the time of its evaluation,
    however, the Department of Justice urged the Commission to consider
    the full record \-- as it developed in reply comments and *ex parte*
    submissions \-- in its final determination.[^20]

# PROCEDURAL AND ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

10. To determine whether a BOC applicant has met the prerequisites for
    entry into the long distance market, we evaluate its compliance with
    the competitive checklist, as developed in our local competition
    rules and orders in effect at the time the application was filed.
    Despite the comprehensiveness of our rules, there will inevitably
    be, in any section 271 proceeding, disputes over an incumbent LEC's
    precise obligations to its competitors that our rules have not
    addressed and that do not involve *per se* violations of
    self-executing requirements of the Act. As the Commission has
    explained in prior orders, the section 271 process simply could not
    function as Congress intended if we resolved all such disputes as a
    precondition to granting a section 271 application.[^21] In prior
    orders, the Commission has explained the procedural rules it has
    developed to facilitate the review process.[^22] Here we describe
    how we consider the evidence of compliance that Verizon has
    presented to us in this proceeding.

11. As part of our determination that a BOC has satisfied the
    requirements of section 271, we consider whether the BOC has fully
    implemented the competitive checklist in subsection (c)(2)(B). The
    BOC at all times bears the burden of proof of compliance with
    section 271, even if no party challenges its compliance with a
    particular requirement. In demonstrating its compliance, a BOC must
    show that it has a concrete and specific legal obligation to furnish
    the item upon request pursuant to state-approved interconnection
    agreements that set forth prices and other terms and conditions for
    each checklist item, and that it is currently furnishing, or is
    ready to furnish, the checklist items in quantities that competitors
    may reasonably demand and at an acceptable level of quality.[^23] In
    particular, the BOC must demonstrate that it is offering
    interconnection and access to network elements on a
    nondiscriminatory basis.[^24] Previous Commission orders addressing
    section 271 applications have elaborated on this statutory
    standard.[^25] First, for those functions the BOC provides to
    competing carriers that are analogous to the functions a BOC
    provides to itself in connection with its own retail service
    offerings, the BOC must provide access to competing carriers in
    "substantially the same time and manner" as it provides to
    itself.[^26] For those functions that have no retail analogue, the
    BOC must demonstrate that the access it provides to competing
    carriers would offer an efficient carrier a "meaningful opportunity
    to compete."[^27]

12. In past orders, the Commission has found that the most probative
    evidence of nondiscriminatory access to interconnection and UNEs is
    actual commercial usage, and "\[p\]erformance measures are an
    especially effective means of providing us with evidence of the
    quality and timeliness of the access provided by a BOC to requesting
    carriers."[^28] We expect that, in its prima facie case in the
    initial application, a BOC relying on performance data will:

```{=html}
<!-- -->
```
a)  provide sufficient performance data to support its contention that
    the statutory requirements are satisfied;

b)  identify the facial disparities between the applicant's performance
    for itself and its performance for competitors;

c)  explain why those facial disparities are anomalous, caused by forces
    beyond the applicant's control (*e.g.*, competing carrier-caused
    errors), or have no meaningful adverse impact on a competing
    carrier's ability to obtain and serve customers; and

d)  provide the underlying data, analysis, and methodologies necessary
    to enable the Commission and commenters meaningfully to evaluate and
    contest the validity of the applicant's explanations for performance
    disparities, including, for example, carrier specific
    carrier-to-carrier performance data.

```{=html}
<!-- -->
```
13. The Massachusetts Department has adopted the performance metrics and
    standards established by the New York Commission. Under this
    framework, for functions with retail analogues, Verizon provides a
    figure indicating the degree of statistical significance for any
    differences in performance for competitors as compared to
    performance for its retail operations. For functions with a
    performance benchmark, Verizon provides data on its performance,
    which are then compared to the benchmark. The Commission has
    explained in prior orders that parity and benchmark standards
    established by state commissions do not represent absolute maximum
    or minimum levels of performance necessary to satisfy the
    competitive checklist. Rather, where, as here, these standards are
    developed through open proceedings with input from both the
    incumbent and competing carriers, these standards can represent
    informed and reliable attempts to objectively approximate whether
    competing carriers are being served by the incumbent in
    substantially the same time and manner, or in a way that provides
    them a meaningful opportunity to compete.[^29] Thus, to the extent
    there is no statistically significant difference between Verizon's
    provision of service to competing carriers and its own retail
    customers, we generally need not look any further. Likewise, if
    Verizon's provision of service to competing carriers satisfies the
    performance benchmark, our analysis is usually done. Otherwise, we
    will examine the evidence further to make a determination whether
    the statutory nondiscrimination requirements are met.[^30] Thus, we
    will examine the explanations that Verizon and others provide about
    whether these data accurately depict the quality of Verizon's
    performance. We also may examine how many months a variation in
    performance has existed and what the recent trend has been. We may
    find that statistically significant differences exist, but conclude
    that such differences have little or no competitive significance in
    the marketplace. In such cases, we may conclude that the differences
    are not meaningful in terms of statutory compliance. Ultimately, the
    determination of whether a BOC's performance meets the statutory
    requirements necessarily is a contextual decision based on the
    totality of the circumstances and information before us.

14. In this application, we examine performance data as reported in
    carrier-to-carrier reports reflecting service in the most recent
    full months before filing (*i.e.*, from September through December
    2000). We also examine Verizon's January performance data in a few
    instances for the limited purpose of confirming the acceptable
    performance or a trend of improvement shown in earlier months' data.
    Verizon has asserted that some of these data are affected by a
    workers' strike that took place in August 2000. We address the
    relevance of the strike and Verizon's explanations of its impact on
    the data below in our discussions of specific aspects of Verizon's
    performance.

# PRIMARY ISSUES IN DISPUTE

15. In this Order, we assess all aspects of compliance with section 271,
    but we focus primarily on the most controversial checklist
    compliance issues as the Commission did in the recent *SWBT
    Kansas/Oklahoma Order*.[^31] First, we address checklist item 2,
    which encompasses access to unbundled network elements, including
    issues related to OSS and combinations of network elements as well
    as pricing. We then discuss checklist item 4, access to unbundled
    local loops. The remaining checklist requirements are then discussed
    briefly because commenting parties did not comment as extensively,
    or at all, on them, and our own review of the record leads us to
    conclude that Verizon has satisfied these requirements. We then
    address Verizon's showing of compliance with the requirements of
    Track A in Massachusetts. Finally, we discuss issues concerning
    compliance with section 272 and the public interest requirement, and
    our section 271(d)(6) enforcement authority. It is our hope that
    this approach will serve to focus attention on the section 271
    requirements commenting parties address most extensively, while
    streamlining the discussion of the other less or noncontroversial
    requirements.

## Checklist Item 2 -- Unbundled Network Elements

### Pricing of Network Elements

#### Background

16. Checklist item 2 of section 271 states that a BOC must provide
    "\[n\]ondiscriminatory access to network elements in accordance with
    the requirements of sections 251(c)(3) and 252(d)(1)" of the
    Act.[^32] Section 251(c)(3) requires LECs to provide
    "nondiscriminatory access to network elements on an unbundled basis
    at any technically feasible point on rates, terms, and conditions
    that are just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory. . . ."[^33]
    Section 252(d)(1) requires that a state commission's determination
    of the just and reasonable rates for network elements shall be based
    on the cost of providing the network elements, shall be
    nondiscriminatory, and may include a reasonable profit.[^34]
    Pursuant to this statutory mandate, the Commission has determined
    that prices for unbundled network elements (UNEs) must be based on
    the total element long run incremental cost (TELRIC) of providing
    those elements.[^35]

17. Although the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
    stayed the Commission's pricing rules in 1996,[^36] the Supreme
    Court restored the Commission's pricing authority on January 25,
    1999, and remanded to the Eighth Circuit for consideration of the
    merits of the challenged rules.[^37] On remand from the Supreme
    Court, the Eighth Circuit concluded that while TELRIC is an
    acceptable method for determining costs, certain specific rules
    contained within the Commission's pricing rules were contrary to
    Congressional intent.[^38] The Eighth Circuit has stayed the
    issuance of its mandate pending review by the Supreme Court.[^39]
    Accordingly, the Commission's rules remain in effect for purposes of
    this application.

18. The Massachusetts Department established its prices for UNEs in an
    extensive proceeding beginning when several carriers requested
    arbitration of interconnection agreements with Verizon in July
    1996.[^40] In Phase 4 of its *Consolidated Arbitrations* proceeding,
    the Massachusetts Department examined cost studies submitted by
    Verizon and the competitive LECs that purported to apply the
    Commission's TELRIC pricing methodology.[^41] The Massachusetts
    Department accepted, for the most part, Verizon's submitted cost
    model and ordered it to determine the cost of UNEs based on that
    model.[^42] The interim rates adopted in the *Massachusetts DTE
    Phase 4 Order* were made permanent by the Massachusetts Department
    on March 19, 1999.[^43] From the start of the *Consolidated
    Arbitrations* proceeding through the filing of Verizon's section 271
    applications, commenters have been challenging Verizon's UNE rates
    in Massachusetts.[^44] On July 24, 2000, the Massachusetts
    Department approved lower, promotional residential UNE switching
    rates in an interconnection agreement between Verizon and one
    carrier, Z-Tel.[^45] These promotional rates were negotiated at the
    request of the Massachusetts Department and were made available to
    similarly situated carriers.[^46] In a tariff filing submitted to
    and approved by the Massachusetts Department on October 13, 2000,
    during the pendency of Verizon's Massachusetts I Application,
    Verizon further lowered its UNE rates for switching, transport and
    switch ports to rates equivalent to those that it currently has in
    effect in New York.[^47] In filing these October 13^th^ rates with
    the Massachusetts Department, Verizon explained that the lower rates
    were intended to "eliminate pricing issues particularly regarding
    local switching in its Section 271 application now pending before
    the FCC."[^48]

19. On January 12, 2001, the Massachusetts Department opened its
    scheduled five-year review of UNE rates.[^49] The Massachusetts
    Department intends to conclude its investigation and have new UNE
    rates in place by the end of this calendar year.[^50] The
    Massachusetts Department asserts that the UNE rates currently in
    effect are permanent, not interim, despite the fact that the
    Massachusetts Department is now conducting its regular review of UNE
    rates.[^51]

#### Discussion

20. Based on the evidence in the record, we find that Verizon's charges
    for UNEs made available in Massachusetts to other telecommunications
    carriers are just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory in compliance
    with checklist item 2. Verizon states that it provides UNEs at
    TELRIC-based rates.[^52] The Massachusetts Department concludes that
    Verizon has satisfied the requirements of this checklist item.[^53]
    The Commission has previously held that it will not conduct a *de
    novo* review of a state's pricing determinations and will reject an
    application only if "basic TELRIC principles are violated or the
    state commission makes clear errors in factual findings on matters
    so substantial that the end result falls outside the range that the
    reasonable application of TELRIC principles would produce."[^54] In
    reviewing Verizon's Massachusetts pricing, we find that the
    Massachusetts Department generally followed basic TELRIC principles,
    though adherence to such basic principles, if other key inputs or
    methodologies are not reasonable, does not ensure that the rates
    adopted are TELRIC-complaint.[^55]

21. Verizon's Massachusetts II Application relies on voluntarily-adopted
    rates that are equivalent to those currently in place in New
    York.[^56] In the *Bell Atlantic New York Order*, over a year ago in
    1999, the Commission found that these rates complied with the
    requirements of checklist item 2 for purposes of Verizon's section
    271 application.[^57] This decision was affirmed by the United
    States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.[^58]
    We note, however, that these rates are at present under active
    review by the New York Commission.

22. Commenters have raised several objections to Verizon's October
    13^th^ UNE switching rates. Specifically, commenters claim that
    Verizon has not submitted evidence demonstrating that these rates
    are cost-based.[^59] As the Commission noted in the *SWBT
    Kansas/Oklahoma Order*, under appropriate circumstances, a BOC's UNE
    rates will be entitled to a presumption of TELRIC compliance if they
    are adopted in whole from another state whose rates have been found
    to comply with TELRIC, and if costs are demonstrated to be at or
    above the costs in the state whose rates were adopted.[^60] Under
    this standard, Verizon's October 13^th^ rates will be found to be
    TELRIC-compliant if Verizon can demonstrate that its switching costs
    in Massachusetts are the same or higher than in New York. In the
    *SWBT Kansas/Oklahoma Order*, the Commission also determined that
    the USF cost model provides a reasonable basis for comparing cost
    differences between states.[^61]

23. We find that Verizon's Massachusetts rates at the filing of the
    application meet the TELRIC-presumption test set forth in the *SWBT
    Kansas/Oklahoma Order*. An analysis of relative switch costs using
    our USF model supports this conclusion. In the USF cost model, the
    Commission estimated forward-looking switch costs by adopting a
    fixed cost for host and stand-alone switches, and a separate fixed
    cost for remote switches.[^62] The switch costs in the USF model
    vary based primarily on the number of lines per switch. The results
    of regression analysis developed by the Commission through the USF
    model to estimate switching costs indicate that switching costs per
    line decrease as the number of lines increases because the fixed
    cost of switching is spread over a larger number of lines. The
    results also indicate that switching cost per line decreases as the
    relative number of remotes in the network increases because the
    fixed cost for a remote switch is less than that for a host or a
    stand-alone switch.

24. Here, evidence indicates that the number of lines per switch is no
    greater in Massachusetts than in New York, and it is reasonable to
    conclude that switch costs would not be lower in Massachusetts than
    in New York.[^63] The data used with the Commission's model to
    estimate switching costs indicate that in Massachusetts Verizon has
    16,585 lines per wire center and that in New York it has 20,865
    lines per wire center. These data show that in Massachusetts,
    Verizon's host and stand-alone switches account for 58 percent of
    the total number of switches and its remote switches account for the
    remaining 42 percent. The data also show that in New York, Verizon's
    host and stand-alone switches account for 54 percent of the total
    number of switches and its remote switches account for the remaining
    46 percent. These data underlie the less than two percent higher
    estimate obtained from the Commission's model of switching cost per
    line for Massachusetts than for New York.

25. Our finding that Verizon may rely on New York rates is also
    supported by a comparison of Verizon's costs to Verizon's actual
    rates. A weighted average of Verizon's voluntarily-discounted
    Massachusetts rates (switching, transport, and switch ports) and
    corresponding rates in New York shows that rates in Massachusetts
    are roughly 5 percent lower than those in New York.[^64] A
    comparison based on the Commission's USF model of costs in Verizon's
    study areas in Massachusetts and New York for these same elements
    indicates that the costs in Massachusetts are roughly the same as
    the costs in New York.[^65] Because of the rate structure
    differences between Massachusetts and New York that recover more of
    the switching costs through the flat-rated port charge in New York,
    we believe this aggregate comparison is most appropriate. In
    comparing each of the non-loop elements separately, application of
    the USF cost model indicates that costs for unbundled switching are
    almost the same in Massachusetts and New York, with costs in
    Massachusetts only 1 percent higher. Verizon's per-minute rates for
    unbundled switching are slightly higher in Massachusetts than in New
    York, but this is offset by its unbundled switch port rates, which
    are lower in Massachusetts than in New York. Signaling and transport
    costs are lower in Massachusetts than in New York, according to the
    model, and the Massachusetts rates for these elements are
    correspondingly lower.

26. In addition to our analysis of the switching element costs based on
    the USF cost model, Verizon has submitted evidence demonstrating
    that its switching costs in Massachusetts are the same as or higher
    than its switching costs in New York.[^66] According to Verizon,
    cost studies based on the same assumptions were conducted for
    Massachusetts and New York, and these studies demonstrated higher
    costs in Massachusetts than in New York for all switching elements,
    including local switch usage, common transport, tandem usage, and
    line ports.[^67]

27. We therefore conclude that Verizon's switching rates in
    Massachusetts are at present within the range that a reasonable
    application of TELRIC principles would produce, although we
    recognize that rates may need to evolve over time to take into
    account updated information on cost inputs and new technologies. The
    Commission has previously found Verizon's switching rates that, at
    present, are still in effect in New York to be within a range of
    TELRIC-based rates.[^68]

28. We disagree with AT&T's assertion that New York rates should not be
    used as the benchmark for measuring whether Verizon's UNE rates are
    TELRIC-based in Massachusetts. AT&T would like the Commission to use
    rates found to be TELRIC-based in the SWBT states of Texas, Kansas,
    or Oklahoma for comparison.[^69] We find that it is permissible to
    rely on the New York rates in this application because they meet the
    criteria the Commission established in the *SWBT Kansas/Oklahoma
    Order*. In the *SWBT Kansas/Oklahoma Order*, to determine whether
    Oklahoma rates were within the range of what a reasonable
    application of what TELRIC would produce, the Commission compared
    SWBT's rates in Oklahoma to its rates in Texas. The Commission
    stated this was permissible because: 1) they have a common BOC and
    geographic similarities; 2) they have similar, although not
    identical, rate structures for comparison purposes; and 3) the
    Commission had already found the rates in Texas to be
    reasonable.[^70] Applying this standard to Verizon's Massachusetts
    rates, we find that New York is a permissible state for UNE rate
    comparison purposes. The states are adjoining, they have similar
    rate structures, the Commission has found the New York rates are
    within a zone that is consistent with TELRIC based on current
    information in the record, and it is the same BOC in both states.

29. We note, however, that the New York Commission is actively
    investigating UNE rates and may modify those rates to reflect
    changed market conditions, technologies, and information. If the New
    York Commission adopts modified UNE rates, future section 271
    applicants could no longer demonstrate TELRIC compliance by showing
    that their rates in the applicant states are equivalent to or based
    on the current New York rates, which will have been superceded.

30. Moreover, because Verizon would have us rely on switching rates from
    the New York proceeding, a decision by the New York Commission to
    modify these UNE rates may undermine Verizon's reliance on those
    rates in Massachusetts and its compliance with the requirements of
    section 271, depending on the New York Commission's
    conclusions.[^71] We note that the Massachusetts Department has
    undertaken a review of UNE rates in Massachusetts and is endeavoring
    to reset UNE rates, consistent with the Act and our rules. We
    observe that in any context in which prices are not set in
    accordance with our rules and the Act, we retain the ability going
    forward to take appropriate enforcement action, including action
    pursuant to section 271(d)(6).[^72]

31. We disagree with those commenters who take issue with the current
    New York rates, arguing that they are not TELRIC-based.[^73] As
    evidence, the commenters point to the on-going review of the UNE
    rates being conducted by the New York Commission.[^74] It was
    reasonable for Verizon to rely on New York's current switching rates
    because these rates have been found to be TELRIC-compliant by the
    New York Commission in an extensive rate-making proceeding,[^75] and
    by this Commission in the *Bell Atlantic New York Order*,[^76] as
    affirmed by the D.C. Circuit,[^77] and are at present still in
    effect. It would be unreasonable to preclude incumbent LECs from
    relying on appropriate rates that have been found to be
    TELRIC-compliant merely because these rates are under some form of
    challenge or review where there has not been a determination that
    those rates are not TELRIC-compliant.[^78] As the D.C. Court of
    Appeals stated:

\[W\]e suspect that rates may often need adjustment to reflect newly
discovered information, like that about Bell Atlantic's future
discounts. If new information automatically required rejection of
section 271 applications, we cannot imagine how such applications could
ever be approved in this context of rapid regulatory and technological
change.[^79]

32. We also reject AT&T's contention that New York and Massachusetts
    switching rates are significantly higher than the switching rates
    our cost model generates and, therefore, are not
    TELRIC-compliant.[^80] The Commission has never used the USF cost
    model to determine rates for a particular element, nor was it
    designed to perform such a task. The model was designed to determine
    relative cost differences among different states, not actual costs.
    That is the purpose for which the Commission has used the model in
    the universal service proceeding and that is the purpose for which
    the Commission used it the *SWBT Kansas/Oklahoma Order* and in this
    Order.[^81]

33. Additionally, AT&T's and WorldCom's assertions that New York rates
    should not be relied on because Verizon applied an incorrect switch
    discount in New York does not change our conclusion. The commenters
    argue that Verizon applied a smaller switch discount offered by
    vendors for expanding existing switches rather than the larger
    discounts it received for bulk purchases of new switches, based on
    Verizon's erroneous assertion that the larger discounts were no
    longer available.[^82] Commenters raised this identical issue,
    however, during the course of the New York section 271 proceeding,
    and the Commission addressed it in the *Bell Atlantic New York
    Order*. The Commission found that the New York Commission had
    substantially reduced Verizon's originally-proposed switch rates and
    had "appropriately exercised its flexibility to set prices within a
    range of TELRIC-based rates."[^83] Although the New York Commission
    had initiated a second UNE rate case in which it is reexamining the
    switch discount issue, this Commission held that the switching rates
    were "no less TELRIC-compliant on that account,"[^84] and noted the
    New York Commission's position that correcting the level of switch
    discounts involved complex adjustments.[^85] The Massachusetts
    Department has opened a new investigation into the UNE rates where
    this issue will be addressed. In the meantime, the switching rates
    are equivalent to those the Commission found to be TELRIC-compliant
    in New York. AT&T's and WorldCom's attack on the switching discount
    used in establishing New York rates was considered and rejected in
    the New York section 271 proceeding. As noted above, however, the
    outcome of the ongoing New York UNE rate proceeding could affect
    Verizon's future section 271 compliance in Massachusetts.

34. The fact that the New York Commission adopted a true-up mechanism
    for the switching rates pending the outcome of its UNE cost
    proceeding, while Massachusetts rates are not subject to true-up,
    does not at present mean that Verizon fails this checklist
    item.[^86] Although we agree that implementation of such a true-up
    mechanism pending the outcome of the Massachusetts Department's
    current UNE cost proceeding could help to ensure that competitive
    LECs pay cost-based rates, we do not fail Verizon on this checklist
    item merely because such a mechanism is lacking in Massachusetts.
    The Commission did not rely on the existence of the true-up
    mechanism in finding the New York switching rates to be
    TELRIC-compliant,[^87] although we recognize that in certain
    circumstances such measures could be appropriate.

35. Although questions have been raised regarding whether the
    Massachusetts Department will adopt TELRIC-based pricing on a
    going-forward basis, we note that Massachusetts' permanent UNE rates
    were adopted by the Massachusetts Department shortly after the
    passage of the 1996 Act and our rules implementing it.[^88] Since
    that time, there has been significant guidance on what constitutes
    TELRIC-based rates from this Commission, other state commissions,
    and the courts. States may benefit from the experiences of other
    states that have undertaken extensive pricing analyses.
    Additionally, circumstances have changed since Massachusetts prices
    were originally set in late 1996. New developments, technologies,
    and information, including information as to the kind of switch
    discounts that would be available if a carrier were building an
    entire network, have become available since that time. As always, we
    presume that the Massachusetts Department, like other state
    commissions, will examine these issues during the course of its
    ongoing rate case and set rates within the range of what a
    reasonable application of what TELRIC would produce.

36. We find the concerns of the commenters regarding the pending UNE
    cost proceeding before the Massachusetts Department to be
    unwarranted.[^89] As discussed above, the fact that a state may
    conduct a rate investigation and change the rates in the future does
    not cause an applicant to fail the checklist item at this time.
    Indeed, rates may well evolve over time to reflect new information
    on cost inputs and changes in technology or market conditions. The
    Massachusetts Department has expended an extraordinary amount of
    effort in its *Consolidated Arbitrations* and other rate-making
    proceedings. We applaud the Massachusetts Department for the
    tremendous amount of work it has done, and we expect that it will
    adopt appropriate cost-based UNE rates in its current proceeding.
    The Massachusetts Department has committed to conclude its
    proceeding and implement new UNE rates before the end of this
    calendar year.[^90]

37. Additionally, we find the Massachusetts loop rates to be within the
    range that the reasonable application of TELRIC principles would
    produce. Commenters contend that Verizon's UNE-loop rates are not
    TELRIC-based.[^91] The Commission has made clear that it will not
    overturn a state's pricing decision in the context of a section 271
    proceeding where isolated factual findings might differ from what we
    would find if we were arbitrating the case. Instead, we will reject
    an application "only if basic TELRIC principles are violated or the
    state commission makes clear errors in factual findings on matters
    so substantial that the end result falls outside the range that the
    reasonable application of TELRIC principles would produce."[^92]

38. Commenters have raised legitimate concerns regarding some of the
    inputs used by Massachusetts in calculating its loop rates. In
    particular, we note that the Massachusetts Department utilized a
    cost of capital of 12.16 percent.[^93] This is higher than the cost
    of capital that the Massachusetts Department has used in setting
    Verizon's local rates[^94] and substantially higher than the cost of
    capital employed by any of the other states in Verizon's region.
    AT&T questions whether there is any reason to believe that offering
    UNEs on a wholesale basis, where Verizon faces no competition, is
    riskier than offering retail service, where it now has
    competition.[^95] We question whether this relatively high cost of
    capital is sufficiently justified by state-specific factors. We
    note, however, that the Massachusetts Department is reviewing this
    input as part of its current rate case, and, as discussed below, we
    find that Verizon's loop rates fall within a reasonable TELRIC
    range.

39. In addition, commenters have pointed out that Massachusetts used
    substantially lower fill factors[^96] in calculating its UNE-loop
    rates than this Commission has used in its USF cost model.[^97] For
    copper distribution cable, which affects loop rates, Verizon used a
    fill factor of 40 percent for metro, urban, and suburban zones.[^98]
    In the *SWBT Kansas/Oklahoma Order*, the Commission found that a
    fill factor of 30 percent for distribution cable was too low because
    it assumed that too large a percentage of capacity would be idle for
    an indefinite time, contrary to TELRIC's presumption of an efficient
    network.[^99] The Commission noted that it adopted fill factors
    ranging from 50 to 75 percent for the USF cost model, that the
    Kansas Commission adopted a 53 percent distribution cable fill
    factor, and that the New York Commission adopted a 50 percent
    distribution cable fill factor.[^100] We question whether the low
    fill factor used in Massachusetts is appropriate without a
    state-specific justification. We note, however, that the
    Massachusetts Department is reviewing this input as part of its
    current rate case, and, as discussed below, we find that Verizon's
    rates fall within a reasonable TELRIC range.[^101]

40. Despite our concerns, we conclude that any errors made by the
    Massachusetts Department in establishing loop rates were not so
    great as to render the resulting rates outside the range that a
    reasonable application of TELRIC principles would produce. In
    reaching this conclusion, we have compared the differences between
    Verizon's Massachusetts and New York loop rates with the relative
    cost differences between the two states using the USF cost
    model.[^102] According to the USF cost model, average loop costs in
    Verizon's Massachusetts study area are 8 percent higher than average
    loop costs in Verizon's New York study area.[^103] Yet loop rates in
    Massachusetts are only 6 percent higher than in New York.[^104] The
    Commission has already determined that the New York loop rates are
    TELRIC-compliant.[^105] Based on this analysis, we conclude that the
    loop rates in Massachusetts are also within the reasonable range
    that application of TELRIC principles would produce.

41. Finally, we do not accept WorldCom's assertion that competitors lack
    a sufficient profit margin between Verizon's retail and wholesale
    rates to allow local residential competition over the UNE-P, which
    indicates that the UNE rates are not TELRIC-based.[^106] WorldCom
    asserts that Verizon's UNE rates do not provide a "viable path to
    entry" because the rates do not provide a "gross margin" of profit
    that is "economically viable."[^107] In the *SWBT Kansas/Oklahoma
    Order*, the Commission held that this profitability argument is not
    part of the section 271 evaluation of whether an applicant's rates
    are TELRIC-based.[^108] The Act requires that we review whether the
    rates are cost-based, not whether a competitor can make a profit by
    entering the market. Conducting a profitability analysis would
    require us to consider the level of a state's retail rates, because
    such an analysis requires a comparison between the UNE rates and the
    state's retail rates. Retail rate levels, however, are within the
    state's jurisdictional authority, not the Commission's.[^109]
    Conducting such an analysis would further require a determination of
    what a "sufficient profit margin" is. We are hesitant to engage in
    such a determination.[^110] Moreover, competition currently exists
    in Massachusetts through the use of the UNE-P.[^111] The number of
    UNE-P lines in use in Massachusetts has significantly increased
    since Verizon's adoption of the October 13^th^ rates.[^112]

42. We do not accept AT&T's contention that its inability to make a
    profit by entering the Massachusetts market proves that it is not
    permitted an "efficient entry," which is contrary to the
    Commission's prior determination.[^113] AT&T's misinterpretation of
    the Commission's prior holding appears to be based on its equating
    \"efficient entry\" with the guarantee of a profit that would induce
    competitors to enter the market.[^114] The Commission, in a prior
    section 271 case, rejected Ameritech's section 271 application
    because it failed to demonstrate compliance with non-pricing
    checklist items.[^115] The Commission did not analyze whether
    Ameritech complied with the checklist's pricing requirements. It
    did, however, set forth "general concerns about pricing" with the
    goal of providing "guidance as to what showing is required in future
    applications." The Commission concluded that a BOC is not in
    compliance with section 271's pricing requirements unless it
    demonstrates that its costs are "based on forward-looking economic
    costs."[^116] The Commission determined that new entrants "should
    make their decisions whether to purchase unbundled elements . . .
    based on the relative economic costs of these options," and that
    such competitors would not be able to make such decisions
    "efficiently" unless the BOC was offering UNEs based on
    forward-looking economic costs. The Commission equated "efficient
    entry" with the availability of UNEs at forward-looking economic
    costs, which "replicates . . . the conditions of a competitive
    market."[^117] "Efficient entry" simply means that competitors
    seeking entry will face the same sorts of costs they would face in a
    fully competitive market, that is, TELRIC-based UNE rates. The
    Commission's use of TELRIC was designed to prevent \"inefficient
    entry\" conditions, a situation in which competitors would have to
    bear unreasonably higher costs than incumbents. Contrary to AT&T's
    assertion, the concept of \"efficient entry\" does not guarantee
    that any competitors will necessarily enter the market. Even if
    competitors can gain \"efficient entry\" to a market through the
    availability of TELRIC-based UNE rates, they may still decide not to
    enter based on their independent determinations that they cannot
    turn a sufficient profit in the market. As long as UNE rates are
    cost-based under TELRIC, however, a BOC has satisfied its
    obligations under sections 251 and 252. We thus find that AT&T has
    misinterpreted the Commission's determinations in the *Ameritech
    Michigan* *Order* and that its assertion does not cause Verizon to
    fail this checklist item.

### Access to Operations Support Systems

#### Background

43. The Commission has defined OSS as the various systems, databases,
    and personnel used by incumbent LECs to provide service to their
    customers,[^118] and consistently has found that nondiscriminatory
    access to OSS is a prerequisite to the development of meaningful
    local competition.[^119] Our discussion of Verizon's Operations
    Support Systems (OSS) begins by outlining our general approach to
    analyzing the adequacy of an applicant's OSS. Next, we describe the
    analytical roadmap we use in reviewing the results of independent
    third-party OSS testing in the applicant's state. Also, because
    Verizon contends that its line sharing OSS in Massachusetts is the
    same as its line sharing OSS in New York, we also describe the
    roadmap we use in reviewing the BOC's reliance on its performance
    and OSS in another state where substantially greater volumes of
    commercial data exist to demonstrate the adequacy of its OSS in the
    applicant state. We then individually analyze Verizon's performance
    in providing access to the five critical OSS functions: pre-ordering
    (which includes access to loop qualification information), ordering,
    provisioning, maintenance and repair, and billing. Finally, we
    address Verizon's change management process and the technical
    assistance that Verizon offers to competing carriers seeking to use
    its OSS. Because the Commission has described its two-step analysis
    of OSS in previous orders, we do not repeat that analytical approach
    here.[^120] We instead proceed to evaluate the adequacy of Verizon's
    Massachusetts OSS consistent with the analysis the Commission has
    applied previously.

#### Third-Party Testing

44. *KPMG's Independent Third-Party Testing.* The Massachusetts
    Department retained KPMG to conduct an independent, third-party test
    of the readiness of Verizon's OSS, interfaces, documentation and
    processes.[^121] KPMG's test was broad in scope.[^122] All stages of
    the relationship between Verizon and competing carriers were
    considered, from establishing the initial relationship, to
    performing daily operations, to maintaining the relationship.
    Resale, UNE-loops, UNE-P, and combinations were all included in the
    test. In addition, both the application-to-application electronic
    data interchange (EDI) and the terminal-type web-based graphical
    user interface (GUI) were tested.[^123] KPMG performed pre-ordering,
    ordering, provisioning, maintenance and repair, billing, and
    relationship management and infrastructure tests to evaluate
    functional capabilities and determine whether competing carriers
    receive a level of service comparable to Verizon retail
    service.[^124] To fully test these systems, orders were submitted
    with known error conditions, canceled, and supplemented.[^125] To
    perform these transaction-driven tests, KPMG combined efforts with
    Hewlett Packard.[^126] Documentation was evaluated for usefulness,
    correctness, and completeness.[^127] KPMG also performed stress
    volume tests of Verizon systems and identified specific bottlenecks
    for wholesale customers.[^128]

45. In performing these tests, KPMG adopted a military-style test
    standard.[^129] Thus, when situations arose where testing revealed
    that a Verizon process, document, or system did not meet
    expectations, Verizon would formally respond by providing a
    clarification or describing its intended fix for the problem, and
    KPMG would retest the process, document, or system as
    required.[^130] Furthermore, to the greatest extent possible, the
    KPMG test was both independent and blind.[^131] Although it was
    virtually impossible for the KPMG transactions to be truly blind,
    KPMG instituted certain procedures to ensure that both KPMG and
    Hewlett Packard would not receive preferential treatment.[^132] For
    example, KPMG required that all documents provided to them were
    generally available to all competing carriers.[^133]

46. The persuasiveness of a third-party review depends upon the
    conditions and scope of the review.[^134] The scope and depth of
    KPMG's review, and the conditions surrounding it, including KPMG's
    independence, military-style test philosophy, efforts to place
    itself in the position of an actual market entrant, and efforts to
    maintain blindness when possible, lead us to treat the conclusions
    in the KPMG Final Report as persuasive evidence of Verizon's OSS
    readiness.

47. *PricewaterhouseCoopers Review.* After filing its initial
    application, but before refiling, Verizon engaged
    PricewaterhouseCoopers ("PwC") to review certain aspects of its
    performance metrics data and OSS to supplement the KPMG review.
    Among other things, PwC: (1) replicated certain DSL performance
    metrics for Massachusetts and certain line sharing metrics for
    Massachusetts and New York to assess whether Verizon calculates
    measures according to the prescribed business rules;[^135] and (2)
    reviewed the processes, systems, and procedures used for line
    sharing by Verizon in Massachusetts to assess whether they are
    comparable to those used in New York.[^136]

48. We conclude that Verizon, through the PwC review and other aspects
    of its application, provides sufficient evidence that the line
    sharing OSS in New York are relevant and should be considered in our
    evaluation of Verizon's Massachusetts OSS. This showing thus enables
    us to rely, for limited purposes, on New York performance data as an
    indication of Verizon's line sharing OSS readiness in Massachusetts
    in addition to the limited Massachusetts specific performance
    evidence in Verizon's Massachusetts carrier-to-carrier reports. We
    find that this showing is adequate, in these circumstances, because
    we are merely considering it as evidence to supplement the limited
    commercial line sharing performance available in Massachusetts. We
    also note that our finding rests in part on the fact that no party
    asserts that the New York and Massachusetts line sharing OSS are
    different or that we should not consider Verizon's New York line
    sharing performance in this application.[^137] Indeed, at least one
    commenter concedes the comparability issue.[^138]

49. The record indicates that Verizon's line sharing OSS in New York and
    Massachusetts use the same systems and offer the same
    functionality.[^139] PwC's review included a step-by-step
    "walkthrough" of 957 OSS transactions. PwC tracked both New York and
    Massachusetts transactions forward from the competing carrier
    interfaces to Verizon's service order processor to determine if the
    process is the same in both states. PwC also sampled pending service
    orders in the Service Order Processor and traced their history back
    to Verizon's front-end systems. PwC supplemented the walkthroughs by
    examining programming code, reviewing documentation related to
    systems architecture and process flow, and interviewing Verizon
    employees.[^140] PwC concluded, based upon its review, that there
    are "no significant differences in the systems and processes used to
    provide ordering, provisioning, or maintenance and repair of line
    sharing in New York and Massachusetts." In addition to PwC's review,
    the record indicates that Verizon's Massachusetts OSS for
    pre-ordering functions does not distinguish queries related to line
    sharing from those for stand alone xDSL-capable loops.[^141] As we
    conclude below, Verizon has shown that its pre-ordering OSS for
    xDSL-capable loops is adequate.[^142] Accordingly, we shall consider
    Verizon's commercial line sharing performance in New York as a
    supplement to Verizon's limited commercial line sharing performance
    in Massachusetts.

#### Pre-Ordering

50. Based on the evidence in the record, we conclude that Verizon
    demonstrates that it provides nondiscriminatory access to its OSS
    pre-ordering functions. Specifically, we find that Verizon
    demonstrates that: (i) Verizon's pre-ordering systems allow
    competing carriers to successfully build and use
    application-to-application interfaces to perform pre-ordering
    functions, allow competitors to integrate pre-ordering and ordering
    interfaces, provide reasonably prompt response times, and are
    consistently available in a manner that affords competitors a
    meaningful opportunity to compete; and (ii) Verizon offers
    nondiscriminatory access to OSS pre-ordering functions associated
    with determining whether a loop is capable of supporting xDSL
    advanced technologies.

51. The pre-ordering phase of OSS generally includes those activities
    that a carrier undertakes to gather and verify the information
    necessary to place an order.[^143] Most of the pre-ordering
    activities undertaken by a competing carrier to order resale
    services and UNEs from the incumbent are analogous to the activities
    a BOC must accomplish to furnish service to its own customers. For
    example, in this proceeding and in accordance with the *UNE Remand
    Order*, we require Verizon to provide competing carriers with access
    at the pre-ordering stage to the same detailed information Verizon
    makes available to itself concerning loop make-up information so
    that competitors may make fully informed judgments about whether to
    provision xDSL service to end users.[^144] In prior orders, the
    Commission has emphasized that providing pre-ordering functionality
    through an application-to-application interface is essential in
    enabling carriers to conduct real-time processing and to integrate
    pre-ordering and ordering functions in the same manner as the
    BOC.[^145]

##### Pre-Ordering Functionality, Integration, Response Times and Availability

52. Verizon's pre-ordering systems allow competing carriers to
    successfully build and use application-to-application interfaces to
    perform pre-ordering functions, allow competitors to integrate
    pre-ordering and ordering interfaces, provide reasonably prompt
    response times, and are consistently available in a manner that
    affords competitors a meaningful opportunity to compete. Verizon
    offers requesting carriers in Massachusetts access to an EDI
    application-to-application interface.[^146] We find that the EDI
    interface allows competing carriers to perform the same full range
    of pre-ordering functions for both resale services and UNEs that
    Verizon provides to itself.[^147] We note that no commenter alleges
    that Verizon fails or refuses to offer any of these specific
    pre-ordering functions. Verizon also demonstrates that competing
    carriers can successfully build and use application-to-application
    interfaces. We base our conclusion on the ability of the third-party
    tester to construct and extensively test the EDI interface for
    pre-ordering functions.[^148] KPMG successfully conducted a
    functional evaluation and volume and stress tests of the EDI
    interface, which confirm Verizon's ability to provide the requisite
    pre-ordering functionality.[^149] We also find that Verizon has
    shown that it allows competing carriers to integrate successfully
    pre-ordering information into Verizon's ordering interface and the
    carriers' back office systems.[^150] As part of its functional
    evaluation of the EDI interface, KPMG used pre-order response
    information to populate subsequent service requests. KPMG found that
    the pre-order and order field names and formats were compatible,
    allowing carriers to integrate pre-ordering and ordering interfaces
    and integrate pre-ordering information into their back office
    systems.[^151] In addition, although we do not rely on Verizon's
    common object request broker architecture interface (CORBA) in
    reaching our conclusion, we take note that Verizon provides
    competing carriers with this additional application-to-application
    interface for pre-order functions.[^152]

53. Verizon demonstrates that it provides access to pre-ordering
    functionality in a manner that allows an efficient competitor a
    meaningful opportunity to compete. The Commission has held
    previously that an interface that provides responses in a prompt
    timeframe and is stable and reliable is necessary for competing
    carriers to market their services and serve their customers as
    efficiently and at the same level of quality as Verizon serves its
    own customers.[^153] Verizon's performance data demonstrate that
    Verizon's EDI interface has met or exceeded the relevant benchmarks
    for interface response time and availability in each of the last
    four months, with only a few scattered exceptions of negligible
    competitive impact.[^154] KPMG's functional and volume tests of
    Verizon's LSOG 2 EDI pre-order interface provide additional
    confirmation of Verizon's satisfactory performance with respect to
    the availability and response times of its pre-order
    functionality.[^155] We therefore conclude that Verizon's interfaces
    are available in a stable and consistent manner and afford an
    efficient competitor a meaningful opportunity to compete.

##### Access to Loop Qualification Information

54. *Background*. As the Commission required of SWBT in the recent *SWBT
    Kansas/Oklahoma Order*,[^156] we require Verizon to demonstrate that
    it provides access to loop qualification information in a manner
    consistent with the requirements of the *UNE Remand Order*.[^157] In
    particular, we require Verizon to provide access to loop
    qualification information as part of the pre-ordering functionality
    of OSS. In the *UNE Remand Order*, the Commission required incumbent
    carriers to provide competitors with access to all of the same
    detailed information about the loop available to themselves, and in
    the same time frame as any of their personnel could obtain it, so
    that a requesting carrier could make an independent judgment at the
    pre-ordering stage about whether a requested end user loop is
    capable of supporting the advanced services equipment the requesting
    carrier intends to install. Under the *UNE Remand Order*, Verizon
    must provide carriers with the same underlying information that it
    has in any of its own databases or internal records.[^158] The
    relevant inquiry as required by the *UNE Remand Order* is not
    whether Verizon's retail arm or advanced services affiliate has
    access to such underlying information but whether such information
    exists anywhere in Verizon's back office and can be accessed by any
    of Verizon's personnel.[^159] Moreover, Verizon may not "filter or
    digest" the underlying information and may not provide only
    information that is useful in the provision of a particular type of
    xDSL that Verizon offers.[^160] Verizon must provide loop
    qualification information based, for example, on an individual
    address or zip code of the end users in a particular wire center,
    NXX code or on any other basis that Verizon provides such
    information to itself. Verizon must also provide access for
    competing carriers to the loop qualifying information that Verizon
    can itself access manually or electronically. Finally, Verizon must
    provide access to loop qualification information to competitors
    "within the same time frame that any incumbent personnel are able to
    obtain such information," including any personnel in its advanced
    services affiliate, Verizon Advanced Data, Inc. (VADI).[^161]

55. Currently, Verizon provides four ways for competing carriers to
    obtain loop make-up information: (1) mechanized loop qualification
    based on information in its LiveWire database; (2) access to loop
    make-up information in its Loop Facility Assignment and Control
    System (LFACS) database; (3) manual loop qualification; and (4)
    engineering record requests. As we discuss in more detail below,
    competitors can request loop make-up information from the LFACS and
    LiveWire databases, or can request that Verizon perform a manual
    search of its paper records to determine whether a loop is capable
    of supporting advanced technologies.[^162]

56. Verizon's mechanized loop qualification database, known as LiveWire,
    provides real-time access on a pre-order basis to the loop
    qualification information VADI's retail personnel use to qualify an
    end-user customer's line for VADI's ADSL service.[^163] Competing
    carriers are able to access the LiveWire mechanized database via the
    Web GUI, CORBA and EDI interfaces. Verizon states that LiveWire
    provides information on whether a loop is qualified for ADSL
    service, the length of the loop and, if the loop does not qualify
    for ADSL service, data on why the loop does not qualify (*e.g.*,
    presence of Digital Loop Carrier, T-1 in the binder group, or load
    coils).[^164] The information contained in the LiveWire database is
    "theoretical" or "sampled" loop information, *i.e.*, information
    about a test sample of loops in a given distribution terminal that
    is attributed to the rest of the loops in the same terminal.[^165]
    According to Verizon, as of July 2000, the mechanized database
    included information about loops in 93 percent of Verizon's central
    offices in Massachusetts with collocation arrangements in place,
    which covered 98 percent of the access lines in Massachusetts with
    collocation.[^166]

57. Competing carriers are also able to use an interim pre-order process
    to access any loop make-up information stored in Verizon's LFACS
    database.[^167] The loop make-up information contained in LFACS
    includes actual, loop-specific information.[^168] Within 24 hours of
    a competitive carrier querying LFACS for loop make-up information,
    Verizon returns all of the LFACS information on the loop in the
    remarks field of the pre-order interface used to make the
    query.[^169] In addition, through its change management process,
    Verizon has begun implementing a permanent process for providing
    this information in real-time and in electronically parsed form
    through its LSOG 4 and LSOG 5 pre-order interfaces, with
    availability expected by October 2001.[^170]

58. Verizon also provides a manual loop qualification process. According
    to Verizon, this manual process provides competing carriers with the
    same types of information ordinarily available through the
    mechanized loop qualification process.[^171] To conduct a manual
    loop qualification, Verizon's Loop Qualification Center (LQC) first
    examines information from the LiveWire and LFACS databases, and
    performs a mechanized line test (MLT) on the loop to verify the
    actual loop length.[^172] If this information is inconclusive,
    engineers in Verizon's Facilities Management Center examine paper
    records to determine the loop length, whether or not the loop is
    qualified and, if it is not, the reasons why.[^173] Unlike loop
    qualification through the "real time" LiveWire mechanized database,
    which is designed to return loop qualification information within
    seconds when queried, the manual qualification process has a
    standard completion interval of three business days between
    submission of a request for manual loop qualification and the return
    of the requested loop information to the competing carrier.[^174]
    Currently, competing carriers request manual loop qualification as
    part of the OSS ordering function by ordering an xDSL loop and
    indicating in the Local Service Request (LSR) order form that a
    manual qualification is required. Verizon has begun implementing
    access to manual loop qualification as a pre-order function.
    Detailed specifics for this pre-order transaction are being
    addressed in Verizon's change management process, with complete
    implementation expected in October 2001.[^175]

59. Finally, Verizon, through an engineering record request, provides
    additional types of loop make-up information not returned through
    the mechanized and manual loop qualification processes. Verizon
    indicates that competitors may request this engineering query on a
    pre-order basis.[^176] To conduct this engineering query, Verizon's
    Facilities Management Center conducts a search of loop inventory and
    paper records. The additional information provided through an
    engineering query includes the exact locations of load coils, the
    exact locations and lengths of bridge taps, as well as actual cable
    gauges and the length of each gauge.[^177] According to Verizon,
    this information is more detailed than the information returned in
    response to a manual loop qualification request.[^178] Furthermore,
    the engineering query provides loop make-up information for loops
    not in the LFACS database.[^179] The engineering query carries a
    standard interval of 72 hours for performing the engineering record
    review.[^180] These queries appear to be seldom requested; Verizon
    performed only 15 engineering queries in Massachusetts between
    January and June 2000, whereas it performed approximately 11,700
    manual loop qualifications in the same period.[^181]

60. *Discussion*. Based on this evidence, we conclude that Verizon
    demonstrates that it offers nondiscriminatory access to OSS
    pre-ordering functions associated with determining whether a loop is
    capable of supporting xDSL advanced technologies. We reject
    commenters' various assertions that Verizon's loop make-up
    information processes do not comply with its *UNE Remand*
    obligations. These complaints fall into three categories. First,
    Covad complains that deficiencies in the interim LFACS process
    render Verizon's loop information processes noncompliant with the
    checklist. Second, Rhythms and Covad complain that Verizon's manual
    loop qualification process is not part of the pre-ordering stage,
    contrary to the requirements of the *UNE Remand Order*. Finally,
    several commenters advance various other complaints that
    deficiencies in Verizon's loop information processes warrant a
    finding of noncompliance. For the reasons discussed below, we reject
    these claims.

61. *Interim LFACS Process*. We conclude, contrary to Covad's
    assertions, that Verizon's offering for LFACS loop make-up
    information complies with the checklist. Our conclusion is based on
    both the nature of Verizon's interim process for access to LFACS
    information coupled with its work in the formal change management
    process implementing enhanced permanent loop qualification
    processes.[^182] In addition, we are encouraged by Verizon's current
    plans to develop a permanent fix for loop qualification OSS by
    October 2001. With respect to the nature of the interim process, we
    find that Verizon is currently providing useful, detailed
    information to competing carriers concerning the ability of loops to
    support xDSL services and is doing so in reasonable time frames.
    Specifically, although Verizon states that it will return all
    queries for loop qualification information within 24 hours of
    receiving a request, in actuality, competitors are generally
    receiving this information within 2 hours.[^183] Moreover, we find
    it significant that Verizon's interim loop qualification process is
    largely automated. For example, competitors are able to submit their
    loop information queries and receive responses to these queries
    through Verizon's electronic pre-order interfaces.[^184]

62. With respect to Verizon's work in the change management process, we
    find that Verizon has begun actively implementing enhancements to
    its loop qualification processes under a proposal that is detailed,
    well-developed, and subject to a prioritized time frame.[^185]
    Extensive software development is required of both Verizon and
    competing carriers to implement Verizon's change management
    proposals for LFACS access. Importantly, we find that Verizon has
    initiated concrete and irreversible steps to implement these changes
    through its formal change management process. This is not a case,
    for example, where only a skeletal plan is being submitted to change
    management. Verizon's proposals provide competitors with
    comprehensive detail about the business rules and field format
    requirements of its new loop information processes. Implementation
    of these processes at a minimum requires extensive software
    development in Verizon's interface systems (Web GUI, EDI and CORBA),
    the Request Manager gateway system, the underlying systems (LFACS,
    LiveWire), and the data exchange between these systems.[^186]
    Moreover, we recognize that change management is an appropriate and
    important step in implementing systems enhancements where, as here,
    such enhancements may substantially impact competing carriers'
    OSS.[^187] In reaching our conclusion, we rely on the nature of
    Verizon's formal change management process in Massachusetts, which
    provides for substantial competing carrier input and participation
    and for oversight by the Massachusetts Department.[^188] We also
    rely on the fact that Verizon has introduced its proposals as
    regulatory changes, subject to the prioritized implementation
    process for regulatory requirements.[^189] Finally, we note that
    Verizon has established October 2001 as the expected completion date
    for its system enhancements.[^190]

63. Under these circumstances, we reject Covad's claim that checklist
    compliance is not met until the completion of the change management
    process.[^191] To find such would perversely incent competing
    carriers to delay implementation of improved OSS and BOCs to
    circumvent the change management process. Given these specific
    circumstances, we find that Verizon's processes for access to LFACS
    comply with the checklist. Verizon has an interim process for LFACS
    access in place, and is actively using the change management process
    in implementing a proposal that is detailed, well-developed, subject
    to a prioritized time frame and firm completion date, and carries
    substantial implications for competitors' OSS.

64. We also reject Covad's other arguments that Verizon's LFACS process
    fails to satisfy its *UNE Remand* obligations for the following
    reasons. Covad objects that competing carriers must wait 24 hours to
    receive LFACS loop make-up information under the interim process,
    whereas Verizon's personnel are able to access this information
    electronically "in an instant."[^192] As already explained, however,
    requesting carriers generally receive LFACS information through the
    interim process within 2 hours.[^193] Covad also objects that the
    interim process does not provide loop information in electronically
    parsed form, to allow for integration between pre-ordering and
    ordering interfaces.[^194] Verizon's interim process does, however,
    allow competitors to submit queries for and obtain LFACS loop
    information through Verizon's electronic pre-order interfaces.[^195]
    Furthermore, with respect to both of these objections to the interim
    process, our finding of checklist compliance does not rely on
    Verizon's interim processes alone. Rather, as explained above, our
    conclusion rests on the nature of Verizon's interim processes for
    access to LFACS coupled with its work in change management enhancing
    this process. The permanent process for LFACS access will provide
    the functionality and features Covad seeks.[^196] Until this
    permanent system enhancement is in place, Verizon has provided
    competing carriers with an adequate process for obtaining LFACS loop
    information quickly and electronically. Finally, Covad objects that
    Verizon does not return working telephone number or serving address
    information with the LFACS information it returns, making it more
    difficult for competitors to associate the information with a
    particular loop.[^197] We find, however, that requesting carriers
    are able to associate LFACS loop information with working telephone
    numbers or serving area addresses, contrary to Covad's
    assertions.[^198]

65. *Manual Loop Qualification*. We also reject Rhythms' and Covad's
    complaints that Verizon has so far failed to develop a pre-ordering
    interface for manual loop qualification.[^199] We find that this is
    insufficient to render Verizon's loop information offering to
    competitors noncompliant with the requirements of the *UNE Remand
    Order*. For the most part, the information returned through the
    manual loop qualification process is already provided to competitors
    through other loop qualification processes that are available at the
    pre-ordering stage.[^200] The only information returned through
    manual loop qualification not otherwise available at the
    pre-ordering stage is the result of a loop-specific MLT test.[^201]
    MLT information is merely a small subset of the information returned
    through the manual loop qualification process. We find that, given
    the totality of the circumstances, the inability of competitors to
    access this subset of information on a pre-order basis is not fatal
    to Verizon's application. Moreover, we rely on Verizon's work in the
    change management process to implement pre-order access to manual
    loop qualification, including MLT test results, through its LSOG 4
    and LSOG 5 pre-order interfaces.[^202]

66. *Other Arguments*. Finally, commenters make various other claims
    alleging that Verizon's provision of loop make-up information is
    discriminatory and violates the requirements of the *UNE Remand
    Order*, which we reject for the following reasons. For example, ALTS
    and Covad claim that Verizon's mechanized loop make-up information
    database \-- LiveWire \-- fails to meet *UNE Remand* requirements
    because it sometimes contains inaccurate and incomplete information,
    hampering competing carriers' ability to order xDSL loops.[^203] As
    we noted above, the LiveWire database Verizon makes available to
    competing carriers is the same database used by Verizon's retail
    affiliate to qualify loops.[^204] Thus, any inaccuracies or
    omissions in Verizon's LiveWire database are not discriminatory,
    because they are provided in the exact same form to both Verizon's
    affiliate and competing carriers.[^205]

67. We also reject Covad's assertion that Verizon's inclusion of
    information in its LiveWire database regarding whether a loop
    qualifies for VADI's retail ADSL service violates the *UNE Remand
    Order*.[^206] Covad contends that Verizon's use of this information
    denies competing carriers access to more detailed loop information
    and does not allow carriers to identify the physical attributes of
    the loop to make a more informed judgment about the possibility of
    offering service. We reject this contention because we find that
    this information is provided to competitors *in addition* to the
    other loop make-up information required by the *UNE Remand Order*,
    and not *instead of* required information. Verizon's designation of
    whether or not a loop qualifies for VADI's retail ADSL service is a
    summary of the loop make-up information contained in LiveWire and an
    alternative way to provide help in determining whether the loop is
    adequate for providing advanced services.[^207] It does not replace
    the loop make-up information contained in LiveWire that is also
    returned with each query. In addition to the loop make-up
    information contained in LiveWire, competing carriers can also
    access actual loop make-up information from Verizon's LFACS database
    to the extent it is available and, upon request, Verizon will
    perform an engineering search of its paper records to determine the
    actual make-up of the loop. We therefore find that Verizon's
    designation of whether a loop qualifies for VADI's retail ADSL
    service merely supplements the other loop make-up information
    Verizon provides.

68. Moreover, we reject ALTS' argument that Verizon's current loop
    qualification processes, including its interim process for allowing
    competitors access to LFACS, fail to satisfy *UNE Remand*
    obligations because portions of these processes are manual rather
    than electronic. Specifically, ALTS asserts that "the only truly
    competitive way for \[competing carriers\] to receive \[loop
    information\] is electronically."[^208] The Commission specifically
    rejected such an assertion in the *UNE Remand Order*. That order
    makes clear that, to the extent an incumbent has not compiled loop
    information for itself, it is not required to "conduct a plant
    inventory and construct a database on behalf of requesting
    carriers." Instead, the incumbent is obligated to provide requesting
    competitors with nondiscriminatory access to loop information within
    the same time frame whether it is accessed manually or
    electronically.[^209]

69. We also reject Sprint's contention that Verizon fails to meet its
    obligations under the *UNE Remand Order* because it fails to provide
    unfiltered access to information about its digital loop carrier
    (DLC) facilities. Specifically, Sprint contends that Verizon only
    offers information about DLC on a line-by-line basis, rather than
    also on the basis of "zip code of the end users in a particular wire
    center, NXX code, or on any other basis that the incumbent provides
    such information to itself," as stated in the *UNE Remand
    Order*.[^210] The *UNE Remand Order*, however, does not require that
    Verizon provide loop information on the basis of zip code and NXX
    code if none of Verizon's personnel are able to access loop
    information on those bases. Rather, the *UNE Remand Order* sets
    forth a standard of nondiscrimination, requiring incumbents to
    provide loop information on any basis that any incumbent personnel
    may obtain that information.[^211] Verizon indicates that, through
    both its interim and long-term LFACS access processes, it will
    provide: (1) an indication that DLC equipment is present on the
    facility for which loop make-up has been requested; and (2) the type
    of DLC equipment present.[^212] The record does not contain any
    evidence that DLC information is available to any Verizon personnel
    in any form other than on a line-by-line basis, nor is there
    information on the record that any Verizon personnel have access to
    DLC information beyond the information returned through an LFACS
    query. Without more than Sprint's allegations to the contrary, we
    decline to find that Verizon fails to provide competitors with
    nondiscriminatory access to its loop information systems, including
    information about DLC facilities.

#### Ordering 

70. In this section, we address Verizon's ability to provide competing
    carriers with access to the OSS functions necessary for placing
    wholesale orders. We find that Verizon demonstrates \-- with
    performance data, the results of its third-party test, and other
    evidence \-- that it provides competing carriers with access to OSS
    ordering functions in a manner that allows these carriers a
    meaningful opportunity to compete or in the same time and manner as
    it provides those functions to its retail operations. First, in
    subparts (i) through (iv), we address those same elements of
    ordering as have been probative in past section 271 orders:[^213]
    confirmation notices, rejection notices, flow-through, completion
    notices, and jeopardy information. Then in subpart (v) we address
    commenters' concerns that Verizon's ordering OSS is susceptible to
    the same problems that led to a Consent Decree between Verizon (then
    Bell Atlantic) and the Commission after the company's section 271
    application was approved in New York.

##### Order Confirmation Notices

71. Using the same analysis and looking to similar performance
    measurements as in prior orders, we find that Verizon provides order
    confirmation notices in a manner that affords competitors a
    meaningful opportunity to compete.[^214] Data indicate that for
    orders that flow through[^215] its systems without manual handling,
    Verizon consistently exceeds the Massachusetts Department's
    benchmark of returning 95 percent of confirmation notices within two
    hours.[^216] For orders that require some amount of manual
    processing (*e.g.*, complex orders, orders for nine or more loops),
    Verizon generally exceeds the Massachusetts Department's benchmark,
    with scattered exceptions relating to resale two-wire digital
    services, resale special services of ten or more lines, and UNE DS-1
    and DS-3 orders. The disparities for two-wire digital services and
    resale special services were minimal.[^217] Although the disparities
    for UNE DS-1 and DS-3 order confirmations were more
    significant,[^218] confirmations for these orders made up less than
    one percent of all confirmations from September through
    December.[^219] Absent evidence of discrimination or competitive
    harm, we find that this disparity has little competitive impact in
    light of the small number of those orders. We also find that
    Verizon's confirmation notices accurately reflect competing
    carriers' orders.[^220]

72. Our conclusion that Verizon's performance is acceptable is further
    supported by the results of KPMG's examination of Verizon's order
    confirmation process and performance. KPMG found that Verizon timely
    returns confirmations for flow-through orders and non-flow-through
    orders upwards of 96 percent of the time.[^221] The Massachusetts
    Department likewise concluded that Verizon provides timely
    confirmation notices.[^222]

73. We reject commenters' arguments that Verizon fails to provide
    confirmation notices adequately. ASCENT (on behalf of its members)
    and OnSite assert without support that they experience problems with
    confirmation timeliness and accuracy.[^223] We decline to find that
    these vague assertions overcome Verizon's specific evidence showing
    that it provides confirmation notices in a manner that affords
    competing carriers a meaningful opportunity to compete.[^224]

##### Order Rejection Notices and Order Rejections

74. We agree with the Massachusetts Department that Verizon provides
    competing carriers with order rejection notices in a manner that
    allows them a meaningful opportunity to compete.[^225] Verizon's
    performance data demonstrate that it returns order rejection notices
    in a timely manner over both EDI and the web GUI. From September
    through December, Verizon returned rejection notices for orders that
    flow through its system within two hours more than 97 percent of the
    time.[^226] In the same period, for orders that require some manual
    processing, Verizon returns rejection notices within the number of
    hours required for each particular service, with minor
    exceptions.[^227] Furthermore, KPMG found that Verizon timely and
    appropriately returns rejection messages.[^228] Absent any clear
    evidence of discrimination or competitive harm, we find that this
    performance demonstrates compliance with our requirements.

75. We recognize, however, that on average for all carriers combined,
    Verizon rejects a substantial number of orders. From September
    through December, Verizon rejected approximately 43 to 49 percent of
    resale orders and 21 to 25 percent of UNE orders.[^229] The
    Commission does not, however, hold a BOC accountable for rejects
    that occur for reasons within a competing carrier's control. As in
    the *SWBT Kansas/Oklahoma Order*, *SWBT Texas Order*, and *Bell
    Atlantic New York Order*,[^230] rejections in this instance vary
    widely by individual competing carrier: among carriers submitting
    the most orders in May, June, or July, rejection rates varied from
    about 5 to 83 percent.[^231] Because all competing carriers
    interface with the same Verizon system, we find, on this record,
    that it would not be appropriate to attribute this wide range of
    results entirely to Verizon. The Massachusetts Department likewise
    determined that "the efforts put forth by the \[competing carriers\]
    in submitting accurate \[local service requests\] are very strongly
    tied to the overall order reject rates reported by VZ-MA."[^232] In
    light of this variation, we conclude that the overall reject rates
    experienced by competing carriers in this instance do not indicate
    flaws in Verizon's OSS.

76. Two commenters, OnSite and ASCENT (on behalf of its members), allege
    that they have problems receiving timely rejection notices.[^233]
    Their assertions are not supported, however, by any specific
    evidence. Absent such evidence, these assertions are insufficient to
    rebut Verizon's evidence of compliance with this checklist item. We
    also disagree with Rhythms' assertion that Verizon's rejection
    performance does not satisfy our standards for section 271 approval
    because Verizon was rejecting its orders for "defective characters"
    and has not performed a root cause analysis on this problem.[^234]
    We are not able to conclude based on the evidence that Rhythms
    provides that this is a problem with Verizon's OSS and not Rhythms'.
    Finally, ALTS points to a KPMG observation regarding inappropriate
    rejections of ISDN resale orders.[^235] This observation was
    successfully closed, and in the absence of further evidence we
    believe the issue is resolved.[^236]

##### Order Flow-Through Rate

77. We agree with the Massachusetts Department that Verizon's OSS are
    capable of flowing through orders in a manner that affords competing
    carriers a meaningful opportunity to compete.[^237] In recent
    section 271 orders, the Commission has examined flow-through
    rates[^238] largely for their potential to indicate problems
    elsewhere in a BOC's OSS. In particular, low flow-through rates,
    combined with other independent record evidence, can be indicators
    of: (1) failure to provision orders in a timely manner; (2) failure
    to provide competing carriers with complete, up-to-date business
    rules and ordering codes; (3) lack of integration between
    pre-ordering and ordering functions; (4) failure to provide order
    status notices electronically; and (5) inability to process
    competing carriers' orders at reasonably foreseeable commercial
    volumes in a nondiscriminatory manner.[^239] Flow-through rates,
    therefore, are not so much an end in themselves, but a tool used to
    indicate a wide range of possible deficiencies in a BOC's OSS that
    may deny an efficient competitor a meaningful opportunity to compete
    in the local market. As discussed elsewhere in this Order, these
    specific deficiencies are not present here.[^240] As a result, we
    use flow-through here not as a "conclusive measure of
    nondiscriminatory access to ordering functions,"[^241] but as one
    indicium among many of the performance of Verizon's OSS.

78. Although Verizon's commercial data show low *average* total
    flow-through rates \-- ranging from about 46 to 49 percent for
    resale orders and 51 to 55 percent for UNE orders from September
    through December[^242] \-- we conclude, as the Massachusetts
    Department did,[^243] that Verizon's OSS is *capable* of flowing
    through competing carriers' orders in substantially the same time
    and manner as Verizon's own orders. Some competing carriers are
    achieving much higher flow-through rates than others. Data regarding
    resale orders show that carriers that placed the most orders in July
    2000 had total flow-through rates for resale orders varying from 0
    to 90.09 percent; data regarding UNE-P orders similarly show that
    carriers that placed the most orders in July 2000 had total
    flow-through rates for such orders varying from 66.10 to 70.59
    percent.[^244] Because all competing carriers interface with the
    same Verizon system, we find, on this record, that it would not be
    appropriate to attribute this wide range of results entirely to
    Verizon. The Commission has consistently stated that a BOC is not
    accountable for orders that fail to flow through due to competing
    carrier-caused errors.[^245] Moreover, our conclusion that Verizon's
    systems are capable of achieving high overall levels of order
    flow-through is reinforced by KPMG's testing. When KPMG submitted
    test orders, it achieved a flow-through rate of 100 percent for both
    resale and UNE-L orders that are designed to flow through Verizon's
    systems.[^246] We expect that Verizon's flow-through rates will
    improve over time as individual carriers gain experience with the
    OSS and as Verizon conducts monthly workshops for competing carriers
    to help them improve their order submissions.[^247]

79. We disagree with commenters that we should reject Verizon's
    application based on its average flow-through rates or because some
    kinds of orders are not designed to flow through.[^248]
    Specifically, WorldCom first argues that Verizon's flow-through
    rates are too low. It points out that Verizon's Massachusetts rates
    are below the rates in New York at the time of section 271 approval
    there, and it argues that Verizon should be reporting on achieved
    flow-through, as it does in New York. WorldCom also disagrees that
    Verizon should be permitted to rely on UNE-P flow-through rates to
    show that competing carrier orders can flow through.[^249] Second,
    WorldCom argues that KPMG's test revealed problems with Verizon's
    flow-through in Massachusetts. It points out that KPMG's commercial
    test shows a less than 60 percent achieved flow-through rate and
    that four orders that flowed through for Verizon did not flow
    through in the wholesale environment.

80. As we explain above, Verizon has shown that its OSS is *capable* of
    flowing competing carrier orders through. The commercial data,
    particularly the individual carrier reports, demonstrate that some
    carriers are capable of achieving high flow-through rates. Verizon's
    showing that some carriers achieve high UNE-P flow-through rates is
    not its sole showing that its OSS can flow through orders, but is
    incremental evidence that some carriers are achieving high
    flow-through. We do not specifically need Verizon's achieved
    flow-through figures in order to determine that Verizon's OSS are
    capable of offering high flow-through. The commercial data are the
    most probative evidence that Verizon provides nondiscriminatory
    access to its OSS. KPMG's functionality test, which showed good
    flow-through, supports our determination. While its commercial test
    does not, KPMG itself discounted its commercial test, and the
    Massachusetts Department concurred that the commercial test was not
    as probative as the functionality test. Finally, the Massachusetts
    Department has added a special provision on flow-through to the
    Performance Assurance Plan (PAP); Verizon must report there both
    achieved and total flow-through.[^250] This addition will provide a
    substantial disincentive to discriminate against competing carriers
    with regard to flow-through.

81. We also agree with the Massachusetts Department that Verizon is
    timely and accurately processing orders that do not flow
    through,[^251] and that Verizon's ordering systems are sufficiently
    scalable to handle reasonably foreseeable commercial volumes of
    orders in a nondiscriminatory manner.[^252] Verizon has been able to
    maintain or improve upon its performance while order volumes have
    generally increased.[^253] KPMG also concluded that Verizon's
    systems are scalable.[^254]

82. Some commenters have expressed concern that low levels of
    flow-through, the commensurate higher levels of manual processing,
    or other inadequacies limit the scalability of Verizon's OSS.[^255]
    In particular, the Department of Justice expressed concern in its
    first evaluation that Verizon has not shown its OSS to be scalable,
    because KPMG's test was less rigorous than its test in New York and
    because the Massachusetts PAP had less deterrent force than the New
    York plan.[^256] The Department of Justice did not raise this
    concern in its Massachusetts II Application comments, and we believe
    that these concerns are addressed by the more recent Massachusetts
    PAP.[^257]

##### Order Completion Notices and Jeopardy Information

83. We conclude that Verizon provides billing and provisioning
    completion notifiers and jeopardy information in a manner that
    affords competing carriers a meaningful opportunity to compete.
    After provisioning an order that requires physical work, Verizon
    updates its Service Order Processor to reflect that the work has
    been done; if an order requires no physical work (*e.g.*, feature
    changes), the Service Order Processor is automatically updated
    during overnight processing. The Service Order Processor then
    communicates with the appropriate Verizon gateway to send a
    provisioning completion notice to the competing carrier. The Service
    Order Processor also communicates to Verizon's billing system that
    the work has been completed. Verizon's billing records are updated
    overnight, and Verizon sends a billing completion notice to the
    competing carrier the next day.[^258]

84. Verizon's commercial performance indicates that it provides
    completion notices in a nondiscriminatory fashion. Verizon
    consistently meets the benchmark set by the Massachusetts Department
    for timely delivery of both provisioning completion notices and
    billing completion notices.[^259] Verizon has begun reporting on new
    measures designed to track how long it takes to update its billing
    systems after performing the relevant work. While these are "parity"
    measures, Verizon has not yet begun reporting the data for its
    retail operations. Nonetheless, the data regarding its wholesale
    performance generally show that it is updating its billing systems
    on average in less than a day.[^260] The Massachusetts Department
    also found that Verizon's current performance is satisfactory,[^261]
    and we are encouraged by the Massachusetts Department's recent
    decision to add new measures to the PAP, which we discuss below.

85. We agree with the Massachusetts Department[^262] that the order
    status and jeopardy information system created by Verizon for
    wholesale orders is nondiscriminatory because it allows competing
    carriers to access order status and jeopardy information, to the
    extent that it is available, in substantially the same time and
    manner as Verizon's retail representatives can access such
    information. Verizon makes jeopardy information available to its
    retail representatives and to competing carriers in the manner
    described in the *Bell Atlantic New York Order*.[^263] Verizon does
    not actively provide jeopardy notices, except that it follows the
    same hot cut procedures it first developed and implemented in New
    York.[^264]

86. WorldCom asserts that because of "systems problems on Verizon's
    side," it has been unable to access its jeopardy reports for some
    days in December 2000 and January 2001.[^265] Verizon responds that
    it investigated and found a problem with the back-office OSS that
    formats the reports; pending implementation of a fix, Verizon is
    formatting the reports manually.[^266] We find that the reports are
    being provided in a nondiscriminatory manner pending the fix, and
    that any disruption has not had a competitive impact.

##### Ordering Notifiers and the New York Consent Decree

87. We disagree with commenters' assertions that there is a systemic
    problem with ordering notifiers in Massachusetts similar to the
    problem that led to the Commission issuing a Consent Decree
    following section 271 approval in New York. After the Commission
    approved Bell Atlantic's \-- now Verizon's \-- entry into the
    interLATA service market in New York, it became clear that Bell
    Atlantic was having "problems associated with lost or mishandled
    orders for unbundled network elements electronically submitted by
    its local service competitors" over EDI.[^267] The Commission began
    to investigate Bell Atlantic's performance as a possible violation
    of section 271, and "\[e\]vidence submitted by Bell Atlantic in this
    investigation suggest\[ed\] that Bell Atlantic's performance in
    providing order acknowledgements, confirmation and rejection
    notices, and order completion notices for UNE-P local service orders
    deteriorated following Bell Atlantic's entry into the New York long
    distance market."[^268] The investigation terminated in the *Consent
    Decree* between the Commission and Bell Atlantic. The *Consent
    Decree* required Bell Atlantic to begin reporting using several new
    measures: percent missing notifier trouble ticket PONs cleared
    within three business days; percent order confirmations/rejects sent
    within three business days; percent SOP to bill completion within
    three business days; percent confirmation timeliness \-- total local
    service requests; and percent resubmission rejection.[^269] After
    the parties entered into the *Consent Decree*, Bell Atlantic's
    performance improved. Therefore, the Commission terminated the
    *Consent Decree*.[^270]

88. We reject the assertions of WorldCom and others[^271] that there is
    a systemic problem with notifiers in Massachusetts.[^272] First,
    WorldCom points to KPMG's findings that Verizon failed to return two
    to three percent of completion notifiers.[^273] There is no evidence
    in the record, however, that KPMG's findings involving this limited
    number of notifiers would have any competitive impact. Second,
    WorldCom asserts that KPMG's test revealed problems with late
    billing completion notifiers, and some billing completion notifiers
    contained information not in accordance with Verizon's business
    rules.[^274] We are unable to compare KPMG's results against the
    commercial data that Verizon provided, however, because KPMG did not
    explain adequately how it measured the timeliness of completion
    notifiers.[^275] With regard to the contents of the billing
    completion notifiers, KPMG found there was sufficient information to
    permit it to engage in its billing activities.[^276] Finally,
    WorldCom asserts that carrier-to-carrier business rules underlying
    the commercial data Verizon provided are inadequate to reveal
    problems with late or missing notifiers. Specifically, WorldCom
    asserts that Verizon should have reported data under the measures
    developed in the *Consent Decree*, which capture how long it takes
    Verizon to send out billing completion notifiers after completing
    the relevant work.[^277] In our discussion of completion notifiers
    above, however, we explain that Verizon has begun reporting how long
    it takes an order to enter Verizon's billing systems after the
    relevant provisioning work is completed.[^278] Those data show that
    Verizon updates its billing systems on average in less than a day,
    and that Verizon takes more than four days to do so for less than
    five percent of orders.[^279] In combination with the data that show
    that Verizon sends out billing completion notifiers on time after
    updating its billing systems,[^280] these data show that Verizon
    updates its billing systems promptly after completing orders, and
    sends out billing completion notifiers promptly after updating its
    billing systems.

89. We also note that the Massachusetts Department has adopted new
    performance measures in the Massachusetts PAP to track this area:
    percent missing notifier trouble ticket PONs cleared within three
    business days, percent resubmission rejection, and percent SOP to
    bill completion within three business days.[^281] These measures
    will inform carriers, the Massachusetts Department, and the
    Commission about Verizon's notifier performance going forward, and
    the special provision of the PAP will give Verizon a substantial
    disincentive for performance like that that occurred in New
    York.[^282]

#### Provisioning

90. We conclude that Verizon provisions competing carriers' orders for
    resale and UNE-P services in substantially the same time and manner
    as it provisions orders for its own retail customers.[^283]
    Consistent with the Commission's approach in prior section 271
    orders, we examine the procedures Verizon follows when provisioning
    competitors' orders, its performance with respect to provisioning
    timeliness and its provisioning quality.[^284] Based on the results
    of KPMG's Massachusetts testing and Verizon's performance data, we
    find that Verizon demonstrates that it provides nondiscriminatory
    access to its provisioning processes. KPMG's test of Verizon's
    Massachusetts OSS demonstrates that Verizon makes available in
    Massachusetts the same set of standard intervals and SMARTS clock
    intervals[^285] for both competing carriers and its retail
    personnel.[^286] KPMG's test also demonstrates that, in its
    provisioning systems, methods and processes, Verizon provides parity
    between competitors' orders and its retail orders.[^287] As
    discussed below, Verizon's performance data for resale services and
    UNE-P demonstrate that Verizon provides parity in provisioning
    competitors' orders as compared to its retail orders.

##### Resale Orders

91. We conclude that Verizon provisions orders for resale "POTS" and
    "specials" to competitors in substantially the same time that it
    provisions equivalent orders to itself.[^288] As in previous section
    271 orders, we review Verizon's performance data to determine
    whether it provisions resale service at parity with its analogous
    retail services.[^289] For this application we review performance
    data measuring how Verizon performs in meeting competitors' due
    dates for service installation as a reliable indicator of whether
    Verizon is providing nondiscriminatory service. The data indicate
    that Verizon satisfied parity standards for meeting competitors'
    resale POTS and specials due dates from September through December
    2000 in Massachusetts, with a few limited exceptions.[^290] We find
    that the limited exceptions to Verizon's satisfactory performance
    are not competitively significant.[^291]

92. We also examine performance data measuring average completed
    intervals for competing carriers' resale orders, but find that these
    data are not an accurate indicator of Verizon's performance in
    provisioning these orders. As it did for its section 271 application
    in New York, Verizon offers unrebutted evidence that the disparity
    in the performance data between average completed intervals for
    competing carriers' resale orders and Verizon's retail orders in
    Massachusetts is substantially caused by several factors outside of
    Verizon's control.[^292] Therefore, consistent with the Commission's
    findings in the *Bell Atlantic New York Order*, we accord little
    weight here to performance data evidencing the average intervals in
    which Verizon completes resale orders in Massachusetts.[^293]
    Instead, as discussed above, we rely on the performance data
    measuring Verizon's performance in meeting competitors' due dates
    for resale service installation.[^294]

93. Verizon also demonstrates that the quality of resale installations
    provided to competitors' customers is generally the same as, or
    better than, similar work performed for its own retail customers.
    The data demonstrate that Verizon generally receives trouble reports
    from competitors' resale customers at the same rate as from its own
    retail customers, and in some cases demonstrate that Verizon
    receives trouble reports from competitors' customers at a lower
    rate.[^295] We find that the limited exceptions to Verizon's parity
    performance are not competitively significant.[^296]

##### UNE-P Orders

94. Based on a review of performance data for UNE-P service, we conclude
    that Verizon provisions competing carrier orders for these network
    combinations in the same time as it provisions equivalent retail
    services and at the same level of quality (*i.e.*, with a comparably
    low level of troubles reported within the first ten days after
    installation). Verizon's performance data demonstrate that, from
    September through December 2000 in Massachusetts, Verizon
    provisioned UNE-P orders in substantially the same time that it
    provisioned similar orders for itself.[^297] Verizon's data also
    indicate that, over this time period, it provisioned UNE-P orders in
    substantially the same manner (*i.e.*, quality) as it provisioned
    comparable retail orders for itself in Massachusetts.[^298] While
    there are disparities with respect to some measurements of UNE-P
    provisioning performance, these disparities do not appear to be
    competitively significant.[^299] Taken as a whole, we find this
    performance to be acceptable.

#### Maintenance and Repair

95. *Functionality.* We conclude that Verizon offers maintenance and
    repair interfaces and systems that enable a requesting carrier to
    access all the same functions that are available to Verizon's retail
    representatives. Verizon provides competing carriers with several
    options for requesting maintenance and reporting troubles. Competing
    carriers may electronically access Verizon's maintenance and repair
    functions for UNE-Loop, UNE-P, and resale through the GUI Repair
    Trouble Administration System (RETAS) interface or the
    application-to-application Electronic Bonding Interface (EBI).[^300]
    Both the RETAS and EBI interfaces flow directly into Verizon's
    back-end OSS and enable competing carriers to perform the same
    functions, in the same manner, as Verizon's retail operations.[^301]
    Although the EBI interface does not support every maintenance and
    repair function supported by RETAS,[^302] the Commission has not in
    the past required applicants to provide an integratable,
    application-to-application interface for maintenance and
    repair.[^303] Furthermore, Verizon's performance data indicate that
    its RETAS maintenance and repair interface is available in a manner
    that affords an efficient competitor a meaningful opportunity to
    compete.[^304] KPMG's functional testing of Verizon's RETAS
    maintenance and repair interface confirms the satisfactory
    performance demonstrated by Verizon's performance data.[^305] Based
    on the evidence before us, we conclude that Verizon satisfies its
    obligation of providing maintenance and repair functionality to
    competitors in substantially the same manner that it provides such
    functionality to itself. Finally, we note that no commenter has
    provided evidence to suggest that Verizon's systems and processes
    are inadequate in this area.

96. *Interface Response Times, Time to Restore and Quality of Work
    Performed*. We conclude that Verizon has demonstrated that it
    provides nondiscriminatory access to its maintenance and repair
    systems and processes. In previous section 271 applications, the
    Commission reviewed performance data reflecting the timeliness of
    the BOC's interfaces used for maintenance and repair functions, the
    timeliness of its repair work, and the quality of the repair work.
    Verizon's performance data indicate satisfactory performance in each
    of these areas. The performance data show that Verizon's maintenance
    and repair interfaces and systems process trouble inquiries from
    competing carriers in substantially the same, if not less, time as
    Verizon processes inquiries concerning its own retail
    customers.[^306] The data also show that Verizon repairs troubles
    for competing LECs' customers in substantially the same time as it
    repairs its own retail customers' troubles,[^307] and meets
    substantially the same percentage of repair commitments for troubles
    on competing carriers' lines as it does for comparable retail repair
    commitments.[^308] Finally, the data reveal that competing carriers'
    customers that receive service via resale or UNE-P generally
    reported the same rate of trouble reports,[^309] and the same rate
    of repeat trouble reports,[^310] as Verizon's retail customers.
    KPMG's testing of Verizon's maintenance and repair performance for
    competitors confirms the satisfactory performance evidenced by
    Verizon's performance data.[^311] Finally, we note that no commenter
    has provided evidence to suggest that Verizon's systems and
    processes are inadequate in this area.

#### Billing

97. We agree with the Massachusetts Department that Verizon provides
    nondiscriminatory access to its billing functions.[^312] As the
    Commission has required in prior section 271 orders, a BOC must
    provide competing carriers with complete and accurate reports on the
    service usage of competing carriers' customers in substantially the
    same time and manner that it provides such information to itself,
    and wholesale bills in a manner that gives competing carriers a
    meaningful opportunity to compete.[^313] Verizon provides competing
    carriers with billing information through Daily Usage Files (DUFs),
    which itemize the daily usage of competing carrier customers, and
    through carrier bills, which are monthly invoices incorporating
    charges for all products and services Verizon provides to a
    competing carrier.[^314] These are the same mechanisms that Verizon
    uses to provide billing information to its retail operations.[^315]

98. The performance data demonstrate Verizon's ability to provide
    competing carriers with DUFs in substantially the same time and
    manner that Verizon provides such information to itself, and carrier
    bills in a manner that gives competing carriers a meaningful
    opportunity to compete. Verizon met or came close to meeting the
    Massachusetts Department's benchmarks for timeliness in sending out
    DUFs and carrier bills, and for bill accuracy.[^316] The exception
    was not competitively significant. KPMG found Verizon's billing
    system to be accurate and reliable.[^317] Although KPMG initially
    opened a few billing related exceptions on bills for UNE products,
    it closed those exceptions after Verizon implemented fixes,
    including changes to software and handbooks. We find that these
    fixes resolved KPMG's concerns and that Verizon's billing OSS
    provide competing carriers a meaningful opportunity to compete.

99. We reject WorldCom's and Winstar's complaints over observations and
    exceptions in the KPMG test because, as the Massachusetts Department
    confirmed, they were successfully closed after retesting or
    evaluation and confirmation of Verizon's explanations.[^318] ASCENT
    argues that its members frequently complain about inaccuracy of
    billing data from Verizon, overuse of paper bills, problems with
    electronic bill transmission, and problems getting Verizon to credit
    competing carrier payments and resolving billing disputes.[^319]
    Absent support, however, these concerns do not overcome the showing
    that Verizon has made through its performance data and the KPMG
    analysis that its billing systems are accurate and prompt, providing
    competing carriers a meaningful opportunity to compete.

100. *Line Loss Reports.* We reject commenters' claims that Verizon
     fails to provide timely or accurate "line loss reports," which
     signal competing carriers that a customer has migrated to another
     LEC.[^320] Competing carriers require line loss notifications in
     order to know that a customer has in fact migrated and should no
     longer be billed for service.[^321] Commenters have not provided
     evidence of a systemic problem: ASCENT does not provide details
     about its members' problems with line loss notifications, and
     WorldCom describes problems occurring outside of Massachusetts.
     Therefore, we reject their assertions.

101. *Suspension for Non Payment*. We decline to address WorldCom's
     complaint that Verizon is disconnecting (SNPing or snipping)
     WorldCom customers for nonpayment of charges that accrued while the
     customers were still Verizon customers.[^322] WorldCom provides
     evidence of snipped customers in states other than Massachusetts.
     For the reasons explained above,[^323] we do not address complaints
     arising outside of Massachusetts.

#### Change Management and Technical Assistance

102. We conclude that Verizon has shown that it "'has deployed the
     necessary systems and personnel to provide sufficient access to
     each of the necessary OSS functions and . . . is adequately
     assisting competing carriers to understand how to implement and use
     all of the OSS functions available to them.'"[^324] Specifically,
     Verizon has shown that it has an adequate change management process
     in place in Massachusetts; has adhered to that change management
     process over time; and provides adequate technical assistance,
     training, documentation, and help desk support to competing
     carriers.[^325] We concur with the Massachusetts Department that
     Verizon "has satisfied its requirements in the offering of
     nondiscriminatory access to its OSS functions with respect to
     Change Management and Technical Assistance."[^326]

##### Change Management Process

103. In evaluating whether a BOC's change management process affords an
     efficient competitor a meaningful opportunity to compete, we first
     assess whether the change management plan as stated is adequate. To
     make that assessment, we examine whether the evidence
     demonstrates: (1) that information relating to the change
     management process is clearly organized and readily accessible to
     competing carriers; (2) that competing carriers had substantial
     input in the design and continued operation of the change
     management process; (3) that the change management plan defines a
     procedure for the timely resolution of change management
     disputes; (4) the availability of an adequate testing environment;
     and (5) the efficacy of the documentation the BOC makes available
     for the purpose of building an electronic gateway. We also evaluate
     whether the BOC has demonstrated a pattern of compliance with its
     change management process.[^327]

104. *Change Management Plan*. We concur with the Massachusetts
     Department that Verizon's "defined Change Management process is
     sufficient to meet the needs of \[competing carriers\]."[^328] The
     plan is memorialized in Verizon's Telecom Industry Services Change
     Management Process (Change Agreement).[^329] The Change Agreement
     is clearly organized, divided into sections that describe the
     processes for different types of changes, such as those initiated
     by Verizon, those initiated by competing carriers, those required
     by regulators, and emergency changes. The Change Agreement includes
     flow charts that describe the change process from conceptualization
     of a change to implementation, specifies time frames for Verizon's
     provision of specifications to competing carriers for each type of
     change, and specifies time frames for competing carrier comment on
     those specifications. The Change Agreement is available to
     competing carriers at Verizon's website.

105. We agree with the Massachusetts Department that Verizon "has
     adhered to its Change Management process over time."[^330] Verizon
     has implemented performance metrics to measure whether it provides
     change management notices to competing carriers in compliance with
     the Change Agreement. The performance data show that Verizon
     consistently issues its notices according to the schedule set forth
     in the Change Agreement.[^331] We therefore find that Verizon
     carries out the activities set forth in the Change Agreement in a
     reasonable and timely manner.

106. WorldCom asserts that Verizon has failed to comply with the Change
     Agreement with regard to the rollout of a new billing OSS,
     expressTRAK. Specifically, WorldCom asserts that Verizon has begun
     implementation of expressTRAK in some states but has not provided a
     detailed rollout schedule or specifications.[^332] Verizon responds
     it is not rolling out expressTRAK in Massachusetts before the end
     of 2001, and that expressTRAK is a "back-office" OSS and is
     therefore not subject to the same business rule and specification
     requirements as interface software releases.[^333] Based on
     Verizon's explanation of its timing, we conclude that Verizon is
     not rolling out expressTRAK in Massachusetts in violation of the
     Change Agreement. ALTS points to a KPMG observation regarding
     timing and completeness of change management notices.[^334] As
     discussed above, current data, however, show good performance with
     regard to the timing of notices, and we do not believe absent
     further evidence that KPMG's finding with regard to completeness of
     change management notices has a competitive impact. In general, we
     note that the Massachusetts Department found that "each of the
     Observations raised by KPMG was satisfactorily resolved prior to
     the conclusion of the test."[^335]

107. *Competing Carrier Input and Participation.* Competing carriers had
     substantial input in the design of the Change Agreement[^336] and
     continue to participate meaningfully in its operation; we agree
     with the Massachusetts Department that "\[competing carriers\] have
     substantial input in \[the change management\] process."[^337]
     Competing carriers participate in monthly change management
     meetings with Verizon, at which all parties discuss new change
     requests and vote on priorities. Competing carriers also initiate
     change proposals, comment on change proposals, participate in the
     development of the change schedule, and test new software before it
     is finalized.[^338] We note that Verizon employs "versioning,"
     meaning that it maintains a prior version of a software release for
     some time after implementing a new version, so that competing
     carriers need not switch to the newer version immediately.[^339]
     The Commission has previously found versioning very useful to a
     BOC's demonstration that its change management process affords
     competing carriers a meaningful opportunity to compete, because it
     "ensur\[es\] that system changes and enhancements do not adversely
     affect a carrier's ability to access the BOC's OSS."[^340]

108. *Separate Dispute Resolution Forum.* The record also reflects that
     Verizon provides a separate dispute resolution forum for change
     management issues: Competing carriers may escalate change
     management problems to Verizon's Change Management Director, and,
     if needed, to a Verizon Vice President. They may also bring
     disputes to the attention of the Massachusetts Department.[^341]
     The Massachusetts Department noted that competing carriers invoked
     the change management dispute resolution forum successfully to
     defer the retirement of the Phase II GUI.[^342]

109. *Testing Environment.* We find that Verizon's change management
     process provides for an adequate testing environment. In past
     section 271 orders, the Commission has found it useful to determine
     whether the record demonstrates that the BOC's testing environment
     is stable,[^343] adequately mirrors the production environment,
     affords competing carriers an opportunity to develop test decks of
     representative pre-ordering and ordering transactions, and offers
     the extended testing period that competing carriers need for EDI
     implementation and new release testing.[^344] We analyze these
     factors and determine that Verizon's test environment affords
     competing carriers adequate testing opportunities.

110. Verizon has established the "CLEC Test Environment," or "CTE,"
     which is a testing environment that is physically separate from but
     matches the actual production environment. In the CTE, competing
     carriers can test their own software to be sure it is compatible
     with Verizon's OSS, and they can test new Verizon software
     releases.[^345] First, we find that Verizon's provision of the CTE
     satisfies its requirement to provide a stable testing environment.
     Verizon's "CLEC Handbook" specifies that "Bell Atlantic will not
     make any changes to the CLEC Test Environment while \[competing
     carriers\] are testing the new release."[^346] KPMG found
     improvement in the stability of the CTE in the June 2000 release as
     compared with the February 2000 release.[^347] Moreover, the CLEC
     Handbook calls for Verizon to complete its internal testing before
     competing carrier testing begins.[^348] Second, we find that the
     test environment adequately mirrors production.[^349] Third, the
     Change Agreement time frames before and during testing are long
     enough to permit competing carriers to develop their own test
     decks; Verizon provides dedicated test coordinators to help
     competing carriers develop, execute, and evaluate their test
     decks;[^350] and Verizon makes its own test deck available on its
     website.[^351] Finally, Verizon offers sufficiently long testing
     periods to permit adequate testing.[^352]

111. We disagree with commenters' assertions that Verizon fails to
     provide an adequately stable testing environment. WorldCom points
     to KPMG's analysis and argues that Verizon's poor documentation and
     coding errors require Verizon and competing carriers to make
     changes to their interfaces during testing, which changes make the
     testing environment unstable.[^353] We note that KPMG found
     improvement, however, in the stability of Verizon's testing
     environment; moreover, the Massachusetts Department notes that KPMG
     was able to complete its interface testing during the established
     new release test period.[^354] We also note that KPMG closed its
     exception regarding problems with Verizon's test deck after
     successful retesting.[^355] We believe in the absence of further
     evidence to the contrary that Verizon's testing environment is
     adequately stable.

112. *Documentation.* The record supports our finding and the
     Massachusetts Department's finding that Verizon makes available
     sufficiently detailed interface design specifications and
     documentation to enable competing carriers to modify or design
     their systems in a manner that enables them to communicate with
     Verizon's systems and any relevant interfaces.[^356] Verizon
     publishes an "Electronic Interface Guide" as part of its CLEC
     Handbook series, and it provides technical documentation to enable
     competing carriers to program their own systems to communicate with
     Verizon's OSS.[^357] The adequacy of Verizon's documentation is
     demonstrated most forcefully by the fact that several competing
     carriers have constructed and are using EDI interfaces in a
     commercial environment. The fact that several of these carriers are
     placing commercial volumes of orders via EDI with relatively few
     rejects significantly undermines the assertion that poor
     documentation prevents competing carriers from successfully
     implementing EDI.[^358] Furthermore, KPMG/Hewlett Packard also
     successfully used Verizon's documentation to build an EDI
     interface.[^359] KPMG's evaluation of documentation issued in
     anticipation of the June 2000 release revealed some errors and
     inconsistencies, which Verizon corrected over the summer.[^360]
     KPMG overall found that the documentation was satisfactory.[^361]
     Based on all these facts, we determine that the EDI implementation
     and design specifications that Verizon makes available afford an
     efficient competitor a meaningful opportunity to compete.

113. In their comments, WorldCom and ALTS repeat KPMG's findings with
     regard to errors in Verizon's documentation. WorldCom notes that
     the errors were corrected, but points out that "the poor quality of
     Verizon's documentation when it is first released imposes
     significant costs on \[competing carriers\]."[^362] WorldCom
     further states that when Verizon issues corrections to its
     documentation, those corrections often contain errors as well, and
     that Verizon takes too long to issue documentation.[^363] ASCENT
     also commented that its members report "persistent flaws" in
     documentation, and noted that KPMG failed to perform a root cause
     analysis.[^364] We recognize that it would be better if Verizon's
     documentation were 100 percent correct from the beginning. However,
     we believe that Verizon's actions to correct documentation once
     errors are brought to its attention are further evidence that the
     change management process is effective and that competing carriers
     have meaningful participation in it.[^365] Furthermore, we do not
     believe that the relatively small number of errors[^366] in this
     large amount of documentation poses a barrier to competing
     carriers' ability to use Verizon's OSS.

##### Training, Technical Assistance, and Help Desk Support

114. We conclude that Verizon demonstrates that it provides the
     technical assistance and help desk support necessary to give
     competing carriers nondiscriminatory access to its OSS. Verizon
     publishes on its website many documents to assist competing
     carriers in using its OSS, including a three volume handbook series
     for resellers, a three volume handbook series for purchasers of
     UNEs, technical documentation to enable competing carriers to
     program their systems to communicate with Verizon's systems,
     business rules and EDI and CORBA specifications, and several other
     guides on a variety of topics. Verizon also provides training for
     resellers and for purchasers of UNEs in a "hands on" classroom.
     Verizon will provide training at competing carriers' premises on
     request as scheduling permits. Finally, Verizon's help desk, known
     now as the Wholesale Customer Care Center (WCCC), provides a single
     point of contact for all competing carrier reports of system
     issues.[^367] We find that, on the whole, Verizon provides
     technical assistance and help desk support adequate to permit
     competitors to use Verizon's OSS effectively. The Massachusetts
     Department likewise found that Verizon "provides \[competing
     carriers\] with a significant level of technical assistance and
     help desk support through its training programs, published
     documentation, and the WCCC."[^368]

115. We reject commenters' assertions that Verizon's help desk is
     inadequate. ASCENT, Rhythms, and WorldCom argue that WCCC staff is
     not knowledgeable and does not follow through on problems
     promptly.[^369] In support of its argument, WorldCom points to
     KPMG's findings that the help desk sometimes takes several days to
     respond to even critical issues.[^370] And OnSite believes that
     frequent personnel changes at Verizon's help desk cause poorer
     service.[^371] Except for pointing to KPMG's findings, the
     commenters do not provide any evidence of a problem with Verizon's
     help desk. KPMG's findings do not compel the conclusion that the
     commenters suggest. KPMG tested Verizon's former help desk, the
     Bell Atlantic System Support (BASS) Help Desk.[^372] Verizon has
     since consolidated its help desk functions in the new WCCC;[^373]
     therefore, KPMG's findings carry less weight than they otherwise
     would. While KPMG did find that 38 percent of critical trouble
     tickets and 38 percent of all trouble tickets took longer than one
     day to close, it also found that some delays were caused by
     competing carriers' not closing trouble tickets after the issue is
     actually resolved or by problems traced back to competing carriers'
     OSS.[^374] Verizon notes that KPMG's test evaluated data through
     April 2000, and that after April 2000 its time to resolve trouble
     tickets improved: the number of tickets open for two days or more
     dropped from 38 to 18 percent.[^375] We conclude that the bulk of
     the evidence shows that Verizon's help desk provides competing
     carriers with the technical assistance necessary for a meaningful
     opportunity to compete.

116. We also reject commenters' suggestions for enhancements. WorldCom
     says that Verizon should report on the timeliness of resolving
     trouble tickets and otherwise track its own help desk
     performance.[^376] Covad and Rhythms argue that Verizon should
     expand the hours of the TISOC.[^377] While these suggestions for
     improvement may have merit, they do not affect our conclusion that
     Verizon currently provides technical assistance adequate to permit
     competing carriers a meaningful opportunity to compete.

### UNE Combinations

117. In this section, we conclude that Verizon provides
     nondiscriminatory access to combinations of UNEs.[^378] The record
     indicates first that Verizon provides access to UNE combinations,
     and second that it provides access to UNEs in a manner that allows
     requesting carriers to combine those elements.[^379] We base our
     conclusion on evidence of actual commercial usage, and also on
     Verizon's legal obligation to provide such access as established in
     its Massachusetts tariff and interconnection agreements.

118. First, the record indicates that Verizon has an obligation to
     provide access to UNE combinations in compliance with our UNE
     rules.[^380] Verizon has a legal obligation, under its tariff,
     interconnection agreements, and our rules to provide access to UNE
     combinations, including the loop-switch port platform combination
     (UNE-P) and the loop-transport facilities combination (Enhanced
     Extended Link, or EEL).[^381] Verizon also makes available a
     "switch sub-platform," which is local switching combined with other
     shared elements such as shared transport, shared tandem switching,
     operator services, directory assistance, and SS7 signaling.[^382]
     The evidence of actual commercial usage demonstrates that Verizon
     is currently providing access at acceptable levels of quantity and
     quality. Verizon has provisioned 23,000 UNE-P orders as of January
     2001.[^383] The Massachusetts Department determined that Verizon
     provides access to UNE combinations in compliance with our UNE
     rules and the Massachusetts Department's own requirements.[^384] No
     commenter has raised an issue with regard to Verizon's provision of
     combinations.

119. The record also indicates that Verizon provides access to UNEs in a
     manner that allows competing carriers to combine such elements for
     themselves.[^385] Verizon provides a variety of methods that allow
     competing carriers to combine UNEs. In addition to standard
     physical and virtual collocation arrangements, Verizon provides
     alternative collocation arrangements such as smaller physical
     collocation cages and cageless collocation arrangements, any of
     which may be used by competing carriers to combine UNEs.[^386]
     Where space for collocation is not available, Verizon also permits
     competing carriers to collocate their equipment in adjacent
     controlled environmental vaults.[^387] The record also indicates
     that Verizon satisfies its obligation to make noncollocation
     options available for the combination of unbundled network
     elements. Under the Commission's rules, Verizon must "provide . . .
     any technically feasible method of obtaining . . . access to
     unbundled network elements\[, which is\] not limited to . . .
     physical collocation and virtual collocation."[^388] In at least
     one interconnection agreement, Verizon offers "any technically
     feasible method to access unbundled \[n\]etwork
     \[e\]lements."[^389] Although Verizon has not provided evidence of
     a standardized offering for noncollocation methods of combining
     UNEs,[^390] this commitment in an interconnection agreement
     satisfies the obligation to make available noncollocation options
     for competing carriers wanting to combine UNEs.

120. We reject as irrelevant Sprint's argument that volumes of UNE
     combinations in Massachusetts will not continue to increase.[^391]
     Sprint points to a statement Verizon made that it might reconsider
     its provision of UNE combinations if its legal obligation to do so
     changes.[^392] This argument does not suggest that Verizon is not
     in compliance with current UNE requirements, and therefore is not
     relevant to our inquiry.

## Checklist Item 4 -- Unbundled Local Loops

### Background

121. Section 271(c)(2)(B)(iv) of the Act, item 4 of the competitive
     checklist, requires that a BOC provide "\[l\]ocal loop transmission
     from the central office to the customer's premises, unbundled from
     local switching or other services."[^393] A BOC has an obligation
     to provision different types of loops, including "two-wire and
     four-wire analog voice-grade loops, and two-wire and four-wire
     loops that are conditioned to transmit the digital signals needed
     to provide service such as ISDN, ADSL, HDSL, and DS1-level
     signals."[^394]

122. In evaluating Verizon's overall performance in providing unbundled
     local loops in Massachusetts, we examine Verizon's performance in
     the aggregate (*i.e.*, by all loop types) as well as its
     performance for specific loop types (*i.e.*, by voice grade,
     xDSL-capable, line-shared and DS-1 types).[^395] In doing so, we
     are looking for patterns of systemic performance disparities that
     have resulted in competitive harm or otherwise denied competing
     carriers a meaningful opportunity to compete.[^396] As the
     Commission has noted in previous section 271 orders, we examine the
     data for all the various loop performance measurements, as well as
     the factors surrounding the development of these measures. Verizon
     demonstrates that for xDSL loops, it is performing at acceptable
     levels for all of the measures the Commission has considered in
     previous section 271 orders. Isolated cases of performance
     disparity, especially when the margin of disparity or the number of
     instances measured is small, will generally not result in findings
     of checklist noncompliance. Finally, we evaluate the information
     Verizon provided describing its processes for installing and
     maintaining loops, the capabilities of its workforce, and employee
     training to show that it provisions and maintains unbundled loops.

123. We focus our analysis in this section on the issues in controversy
     under this checklist item, beginning with the pre-ordering,
     ordering, provisioning and maintenance and repair of stand-alone
     xDSL-capable loops. We also address voice-grade loops provisioned
     as new loops and hot cut loops as well as Verizon's subloop
     unbundling offering. Finally, we address line sharing and line
     splitting at the end of this discussion.

### Discussion

124. Based on the record before us, we conclude that Verizon has
     adequately demonstrated that it provides unbundled local loops as
     required by section 271 and our rules. First, as described above,
     we find that Verizon provides access to loop make-up information in
     compliance with the *UNE Remand Order*. Second, we find that
     Verizon provides nondiscriminatory access to stand alone
     xDSL-capable loops and high-capacity loops. Third, we find that
     Verizon provides voice grade loops, both as new loops and through
     hot-cut conversions, in a nondiscriminatory manner. Finally, we
     find that Verizon has demonstrated that it has a line-sharing and
     line-splitting provisioning process that affords competitors
     nondiscriminatory access to these facilities. In so doing, we
     acknowledge that the Massachusetts Department also concludes that
     Verizon complies with this checklist item.[^397]

125. When all types of loops are considered, Verizon shows that it
     performs at an acceptable level, generally meeting the parity
     standards in the four month period leading up to its application.
     Verizon demonstrates that it has put in place a process to deliver
     xDSL-capable loops in a timely manner and at acceptable levels of
     quality to allow competitors to meet the significant demand for
     high-speed services in Massachusetts. Furthermore, Verizon
     demonstrates that it has adapted its provisioning methods and
     procedures to accommodate competitive carrier requests for
     line-shared loops -- loops that are recognized as an important
     element in providing high-speed service to residential subscribers.
     One commenter, Rhythms, initially opposed Verizon's application on
     the basis of its xDSL loop performance, but now states that Verizon
     has taken steps to resolve its difficulties and has withdrawn its
     opposition.[^398] We find that Verizon's overall performance meets
     the checklist requirements, even though some performance
     measurements indicate isolated and marginal problems. As explained
     below, we believe that the marginal disparities in some
     measurements are not competitively significant and do not show
     signs of systemic discrimination.

126. As described above, the New York Commission developed Verizon's
     performance measurements, business rules and standards in a
     collaborative state proceeding with input from competing
     carriers.[^399] The Massachusetts Department has adopted these
     performance measures, business rules and standards. When possible,
     the New York Commission elected to compare Verizon's service to
     competing carriers using unbundled loops directly to the level of
     service provided to Verizon's retail operations.[^400] Where,
     however, the New York Commission determined that no comparable
     retail function exists, the level of service Verizon provided to
     competing carriers in Massachusetts is tested against benchmarks
     developed in New York.[^401] Because the New York Commission
     adopted the performance measures through an open and collaborative
     process, and no commenter specifically criticizes the New York
     Commission's process, we defer to the reasonable standards it set
     for these measurements as a basis for analyzing Verizon's
     Massachusetts application.[^402]

#### Overview of Performance Data

127. In our analysis we rely primarily on Massachusetts performance data
     collected and submitted by Verizon under the state-adopted
     carrier-to-carrier standards. Where the data displays facial
     disparities in performance between the manner in which Verizon
     provisions loops for itself vis-à-vis its competitors, Verizon
     proposes explanations for statistical disparities and offers
     studies that recalculate measures according to various exclusions
     which are discussed below. In such instances, we look to the
     availability of data reconciled under the auspices of the
     Massachusetts Department and specific evidence presented by
     commenters to determine the appropriate weight to accord the
     challenged data. In evaluating the probity of Verizon's
     explanations and studies, we consider among other things, whether
     third parties had access to the underlying data and whether the
     challenged data were reconciled by the Massachusetts Department.

128. Although KPMG conducted a review of other Verizon performance
     metrics in Massachusetts, it did not separately evaluate the xDSL
     metrics because they were implemented by Verizon after the initial
     testing period.[^403] In its supplemental filing, however, Verizon
     describes its engagement of PwC to "validate its DSL and line
     sharing measures" and notes that PwC performed its work under the
     same standards as KPMG did during its third party OSS
     testing.[^404] PwC replicated a total of 159 measures and matched
     Verizon's calculations for 136 of 159 measures. Verizon asserts
     that for the remaining 23, the number of observations were
     identical and the reported performance was within one percent of
     the results replicated by PwC.[^405] In addition to replicating the
     carrier-to-carrier data, PwC examined the additional special
     studies Verizon performed with respect to certain DSL
     measures.[^406]

129. Several commenters challenge the validity of Verizon's adjustment
     to official carrier-to-carrier performance data.[^407] Where
     commenters challenge the comprehensiveness of a third-party
     evaluation of underlying data or a BOC-applicant's adjustment to
     carrier-to-carrier measures, carrier-specific carrier-to-carrier
     data become an important tool for the Commission to evaluate a
     BOC's compliance with section 271. Carrier-specific data underlying
     the carrier-to-carrier reports are important to this Commission's
     section 271 process because they allow competing carriers to
     compare carrier-to-carrier results or BOC-applicants' explanations
     to their own experiences and thus provide us with as complete a
     record as possible on which to make our decision.[^408] Likewise,
     where there is no comprehensive third-party evaluation of
     particular metrics, we strongly suggest that state commissions and
     applicants enable all parties to have access to the data used to
     calculate special studies of the BOC's performance. We find
     evidence that has been scrutinized in this manner is most
     persuasive. Accordingly, BOC-applicants may facilitate the
     development of a full record upon which they may rely to
     demonstrate compliance with section 271.[^409] In this case,
     Verizon has provided carrier-specific data underlying
     carrier-to-carrier measures and the underlying data used to
     generate reformulated measures of performance.[^410] We discuss
     competitor challenges to Verizon's performance based on
     carrier-specific data where relevant below.

#### xDSL-Capable Loops

130. We find that Verizon demonstrates that it is providing xDSL-capable
     loops in accordance with the requirements of checklist item 4. In
     analyzing Verizon's showing, we rely primarily on the performance
     measures and performance data described in prior section 271
     orders. We review Verizon's xDSL-capable loop order processing
     timeliness, the timeliness of Verizon's xDSL-capable loop
     installation and percentage of Verizon-caused missed installation
     appointments, the quality of the xDSL-capable loops Verizon
     installs, and the timeliness and quality of the maintenance and
     repair functions Verizon provides to competing carrier xDSL-capable
     loops. We note, however, that we do not rely on data reflecting
     Verizon's provision of xDSL loops to its separate affiliate to
     reach our conclusions because Verizon demonstrates checklist
     compliance with an evidentiary showing of performance to its
     wholesale xDSL customers.[^411]

131. Verizon has a concrete and specific legal obligation to provide
     unbundled xDSL-capable loops to competing carriers.[^412] Verizon
     makes available unbundled xDSL-capable loops (including all
     technically feasible features, functions and capabilities) in
     Massachusetts through interconnection agreements and pursuant to
     tariffs approved by the Massachusetts Department.[^413]

##### Order Processing Timeliness

132. To determine whether Verizon is processing orders in a timely
     fashion, we examine whether it provides competitors with
     nondiscriminatory access to loop information in a timely manner and
     whether it returns timely firm order confirmations (FOCs) to
     competitors.[^414]

133. *Timely Access to Loop Information.* As described above, we find
     that Verizon has demonstrated that its pre-ordering OSS provides
     competitors with access to the same underlying loop information
     available to Verizon's retail and back office personnel.[^415] We
     also find that Verizon appears to be providing that information
     within the required time frames.

134. Verizon's performance data reflect that it provides responses to
     competing carrier requests for loop information in substantially
     the same time and manner as for itself.[^416] The
     carrier-to-carrier reports contain four pre-ordering metrics that
     measure Verizon's performance in providing competitors with
     pre-order access to loop information.[^417] Under two of these
     metrics, Verizon provides performance data for September through
     December 2000 showing that Verizon is providing timely responses to
     competitors' pre-order mechanized loop database queries submitted
     via Verizon's EDI and CORBA interfaces.[^418] Verizon, however, has
     not reported carrier-to-carrier performance data measuring its
     average response times in conducting pre-order manual loop
     qualifications and engineering record requests.[^419] Instead,
     Verizon provides data for manual loop qualifications conducted from
     September through November 2000 under Verizon's existing process
     through its ordering OSS, showing that between 97 percent and 99
     percent of manual loop qualifications were completed within 48
     hours.[^420] Although these data have not been submitted under the
     auspices of the Massachusetts carrier-to-carrier reports prepared
     in accordance with business rules developed collaboratively by
     Verizon and competitive carriers, we accept them here because they
     have not been challenged.[^421] Finally, Verizon provides evidence
     that it is consistently meeting its target of returning loop
     make-up information to competitors within 24 hours under its
     interim LFACS process.[^422] Verizon also states that competitors
     generally receive this information within 2 hours.[^423]

135. *Timely Return of Firm Order Confirmations*. We conclude that
     Verizon's reported performance metrics indicate that it
     consistently provides timely confirmation notices to competing LECs
     in Massachusetts for xDSL unbundled loop orders.[^424] We encourage
     Verizon to work in the collaborative process to adopt disaggregated
     performance metrics for xDSL and digital loops, whether
     pre-qualified or manually qualified.[^425] As the Commission
     explained in the *Bell Atlantic New York Order*, the "need for
     unambiguous \[xDSL\] performance standards and measures has been
     reinforced by the disputes in \[that\] record regarding . . . what
     performance is being measured."[^426]

##### Provisioning Timeliness

136. We find that Verizon demonstrates that it provisions xDSL-capable
     loops for competing carriers in substantially the same time and
     manner that it installs xDSL-capable loops for its own retail
     operations. In analyzing Verizon's provisioning performance for
     checklist compliance, we continue to rely primarily upon the
     performance measurements identified in the *Bell Atlantic New York
     Order* and *SWBT Texas Order*, *i.e*., missed installation
     appointments and average completion intervals.[^427]

137. *Percent Missed Installation Appointments.* Recent performance data
     show that Verizon's missed appointment measure demonstrates parity
     performance for competitive LECs.[^428] Although past performance
     indicates some statistically significant disparities, the trend in
     Massachusetts has improved significantly and, in the months of
     September, October, November and December, Verizon's performance
     moved to within approximately two percentage points of Verizon's
     retail missed appointment rate.[^429] Thus, the record shows that
     whatever performance disparities may have existed in the past, they
     have been narrowed to a small margin.[^430]

138. We find no basis in the record to support NAS' contention that
     Verizon grants preferential installation appointments to its retail
     affiliate.[^431] Verizon states that it offers nondiscriminatory
     access to shorter appointment windows for competitive LECs and
     Verizon alike. [^432] Given Verizon's representation that it offers
     identical installation appointment windows to customers of both
     competitors and its retail affiliate that have "extenuating
     circumstances," we emphasize that Verizon is required to apply this
     policy consistently.[^433]

139. *Average Completion Interval.* We find that Verizon's average
     completion interval data for the period September through December
     show nondiscriminatory treatment. During this period, the average
     completion interval for orders requiring a dispatch, which captures
     the vast majority of competing carrier orders, indicates a trend of
     improving performance and shows that retail performance is, on
     average, within approximately one-half a day of Verizon's retail
     affiliate and approximately one and one-half days longer than the
     standard six-day interval established by the Massachusetts
     Department.[^434] The average completion interval for Verizon
     retail during the period September through December is also
     approximately one day longer than the standard interval.[^435]
     Verizon argues that these results show nondiscriminatory treatment
     and any average completion interval disparities that remain should
     be discounted because these results are skewed by competing carrier
     behavior. Specifically, Verizon asserts that orders which were not
     prequalified (which have a 9-day interval) and orders which request
     installation dates outside of the standard interval skew the
     carrier-to-carrier results.[^436]

140. Although we recognize that the average completion interval as
     reported by the carrier-to-carrier measure slightly exceeds the
     standard interval adopted by the Massachusetts Department, we note
     that Verizon's performance has improved over the period September
     through December while the number of competitor orders has remained
     consistent.[^437] This improving trend and the competitively
     insignificant disparity between competitor and Verizon completion
     intervals persuades us that Verizon's technicians have gained
     sufficient expertise and operational readiness to adjust to the
     growth of competition in Massachusetts.[^438] To evaluate Verizon's
     provisioning timeliness, we look to the totality of the evidence
     presented to us. It is based on this totality and specifically, the
     measures the Commission has relied upon in the past, that we
     conclude that Verizon's provisioning timeliness performance offers
     competitors a meaningful opportunity to compete.

141. Although Verizon and some commenters urge us to rely on other
     measures, we need not do so in this case because Verizon has
     demonstrated compliance with this aspect of our loops analysis on
     the basis of the measures the Commission has relied upon in
     previous section 271 orders. We decline to rely upon the percent
     on-time measure supplied by Verizon[^439] or percent completed
     within 6 days measures supplied by competitors,[^440] because we do
     not have enough data or experience with them for determining a
     BOC's compliance with section 271.[^441] Moreover, commenters have
     offered no persuasive reason to depart from Commission practice of
     placing primary reliance upon the percent missed appointment or the
     average completion interval measures. Accordingly, we view the
     on-time measures cited by Verizon and the percent completed within
     6 days measure cited by competitors as additional diagnostic data
     to evaluate Verizon's contention that it provides xDSL-capable
     loops in a timely manner.[^442] We find that these measures support
     rather than refute the measures the Commission relied upon in the
     past and confirm our view that the missed appointment and average
     completion interval measures provide an accurate description of
     Verizon's performance for competitors.

##### Provisioning Quality

142. We conclude that Verizon provides xDSL loops to competing carriers
     at a level of loop installation quality that meets the requirements
     of checklist item 4. In analyzing installation quality we continue
     to rely primarily upon the measure identified in the *Bell Atlantic
     New York Order* and *SWBT Texas Order* -- percent installation
     troubles within 30 days.[^443] Assessing the quality of loop
     installation is important because advanced services customers that
     experience substantial troubles in the period following
     installation of an xDSL-capable loop are unlikely to remain with a
     competing carrier.[^444]

143. As an initial matter, we reject Verizon's request that we depart
     from relying upon certain metrics the Commission has relied upon in
     the past. We conclude that Verizon's use of the total DSL trouble
     report rate as a substitute for the percent trouble within 30 days
     does not measure the quality of Verizon's installation
     performance.[^445] In fact, it is not even classified in the
     carrier-to-carrier reports or the Commission's past orders as a
     provisioning metric, but rather, as a measure of maintenance and
     repair activities. Verizon has not persuaded us that the metric for
     trouble reports within 30 days of installation is any less
     probative of installation quality in the factual context of this
     application than it was in the previous applications wherein the
     Commission relied on this metric. Specifically, we find that the
     percent troubles within 30 days measure is more probative of
     installation quality than the total trouble report rate which
     measures all xDSL-lines in service throughout Verizon's network,
     not lines recently installed.[^446]

144. During this proceeding, the New York Commission and the
     Massachusetts Department accepted a consensus revision to the
     trouble report within 30 days measure to control for certain
     carrier business practices.[^447] Under the new consensus measure,
     the metric will include only trouble reports that are submitted
     within 30 days of installation by competitors that participate in
     acceptance testing.[^448] The revised definition reflects the fact
     that properly conducted acceptance testing could identify some
     installation quality problems that could be resolved at the time
     the competitive LEC and Verizon conduct the acceptance test. When
     Verizon presents data that control for the exclusions adopted by
     the consensus revision, the performance dissimilarities are reduced
     or eliminated entirely.[^449] Competitive LECs question whether
     Verizon may appropriately exclude some of these trouble reports and
     have used carrier-specific data supplied by Verizon to argue that
     Verizon does not provide loops at an acceptable level of
     quality.[^450]

145. We agree with the Department of Justice that Verizon's adjustments
     to the data are justified if an inference could reliably be made
     when the type of trouble reported: (1) could not occur
     post-acceptance, but rather must have existed at acceptance;
     and (2) would consistently be detected by the joint testing methods
     employed.[^451] The issue of whether competing carriers can
     consistently detect loop quality problems is disputed by Covad,
     Rhythms and NAS.[^452] Covad argues that carrier-specific data show
     that it experiences installation quality troubles which are over
     four times higher for its orders compared to Verizon retail.[^453]
     Verizon responds that when an adjustment is made for Covad's
     failure to properly conduct acceptance testing its I-code rate
     falls to below retail.[^454] Verizon forwards similar
     carrier-specific responses to Rhythms and NAS.[^455]

146. We find that Verizon is making loops available at substantially the
     same level of quality as Verizon provides to itself. In reaching
     this conclusion we rely upon data that are adjusted to comply with
     the recently-adopted consensus revision to the troubles with 30
     days measure.[^456] During the period September through November
     2000, competitive LECs experienced installation quality troubles at
     a rate of 7.0 percent compared to 2.3 percent for Verizon
     retail.[^457] Thus, the adjusted data narrow the facial disparity
     between Verizon's performance to its competitors compared to
     itself. Moreover, we also note that recent performance shows that
     Verizon has improved its ability to provide competitors with
     xDSL-capable loops at acceptable levels of quality.[^458] We find,
     therefore, that the adjusted data coupled with the improving trend
     in Verizon's performance are sufficient for us to conclude that
     Verizon is installing loops in a nondiscriminatory manner.

147. We are unable to quantify exactly the effect of Verizon and
     competitor adjustments to the data because of limited factual
     disputes.[^459] We note however, that the Massachusetts Department
     has conducted a comprehensive and detailed factual reconciliation
     of I-codes for the month of November 2000 with the participation of
     Covad and Verizon.[^460] This inquiry has yielded several process
     improvements that are designed to improve Verizon's installation
     quality results.[^461] We welcome the Massachusetts Department's
     participation in addressing Verizon's acceptance testing process
     and are encouraged by the improvements to this process.[^462] We
     encourage carriers to bring issues such as these to the attention
     of state commissions so that factual disputes can be resolved
     before a BOC applicant files a section 271 application with this
     Commission.

148. We find that recent carrier-to-carrier installation quality
     measures show that Verizon has improved significantly its ability
     to provide competitors with xDSL-capable loops at acceptable levels
     of quality.[^463] Moreover, we find that Verizon's remedial efforts
     to improve the stand-alone xDSL loop provisioning and acceptance
     testing process, in addition to those agreed to in the context of
     the Massachusetts Department's reconciliation proceeding, are
     likely to reduce competitive LEC installation quality impairments
     in the future. Starting in January 2001, Verizon will tag DSL loops
     at both the NID and the cross-connection box with special services
     markers to indicate to Verizon technicians that the loop is in use
     for data services and should not be used to serve another
     customer.[^464] Verizon is also engaged in on-site visits to
     competitive LEC testing centers to discover ways to improve the
     acceptance testing process.[^465] Verizon has committed to
     providing competitive LECs with detailed information on their
     I-codes to diagnose acceptance testing issues and reconcile
     data.[^466] Verizon has also agreed to a trial of "sync" testing to
     enable Verizon technicians, at the time of testing, to determine
     whether the competitive LEC can synchronize its DSLAM with customer
     premises modems.[^467] Finally, Verizon is working with a
     competitive LEC to make access to its testing equipment available
     to Verizon through a voice response unit.[^468] We emphasize that
     Verizon's installation quality performance is minimally acceptable
     \-- even under our flexible approach of reviewing Verizon's
     performance in light of the totality of the circumstances.[^469]

##### Maintenance and Repair

149. We agree with the Massachusetts Department that Verizon
     demonstrates that it provides maintenance and repair functions for
     competing carrier xDSL-capable loops in a manner sufficient to meet
     the requirements of checklist item 4.[^470] In analyzing Verizon's
     maintenance and repair functions we continue to rely primarily upon
     the mean time to repair and repeat trouble rate measures identified
     in the *Bell Atlantic New York* and *SWBT Texas Orders*.

150. *Mean Time to Repair.* Like the Massachusetts Department, we find
     that Verizon offers nondiscriminatory access to maintenance and
     repair functions. During the period from September through
     December, the mean time to repair competing carrier troubles on
     xDSL loops was 29.4 hours while the comparable number for Verizon
     was 21.59 hours, an approximately 8 hour difference. Although this
     disparity is statistically significant, we note that, in December,
     Verizon repaired competitive LEC lines in 19.1 hours compared to
     17.8 hours for its retail affiliate, bringing Verizon into near
     facial parity with its retail operation. [^471] Accordingly, the
     most recent month we consider indicates that Verizon has virtually
     eliminated this performance disparity.[^472] We do not find,
     therefore, any systematic discrimination in Verizon's maintenance
     and repair functions offered to competitors.[^473]

151. Verizon contends that the data reflecting the measurement of mean
     time to repair for xDSL loops provide a misleading indication of
     its performance and thus the Commission should look behind the
     measures for additional evidence of nondiscrimination. Verizon
     claims that it is much more likely to be unable to access competing
     carriers customers' premises to repair xDSL loops than access to
     the premises of its own retail customers[^474] and that competing
     carriers are less willing to schedule weekend appointments than are
     Verizon's retail customers.[^475] Both of these factors, Verizon
     claims, lengthens the time needed to repair competing carrier xDSL
     loops. Covad and Rhythms specifically deny that they avoid weekend
     repair appointments and otherwise criticize Verizon's maintenance
     and repair functions.[^476]

152. We exercise our discretion to afford Verizon's adjusted mean time
     to repair data little weight.[^477] Because the official
     carrier-to-carrier data provide sufficient evidence for the
     Commission to conclude that Verizon provides nondiscriminatory
     access to maintenance and repair functions, we need not resolve the
     factual dispute presented by commenters regarding refused weekend
     repair appointments. We recognize and encourage BOCs to conduct
     root cause analysis of their performance and will appropriately
     credit explanations of disparities in the performance measures. We
     believe, however, that such explanations are best used to improve
     processes and carrier-to-carrier reporting and that they are most
     useful when surfaced in state proceedings. We note that the
     development of performance measures is an iterative process and we
     encourage competitive LECs and Verizon to continue to specifically
     improve the mean time to repair measure to provide a more accurate
     indicator of performance.[^478]

153. *Repeat Trouble Rate.* We conclude that Verizon provides
     competitors with maintenance and repair services at an acceptable
     level of quality. Verizon's repeat trouble report data show that
     competing carriers infrequently experience problems after a repair
     visit for a trouble on DSL loops. This measure shows that competing
     carriers experience fewer repeat troubles than Verizon's retail
     affiliate.[^479] For the period September through December,
     competing carriers experienced 16.3 percent repeat trouble report
     rates compared to 21.5 percent for Verizon.[^480] Thus, during the
     four recent months we consider, Verizon provides better service to
     competitors in this area than it does for its retail
     affiliate.[^481]

#### Subloops

154. We find that Verizon provides nondiscriminatory access to subloops
     consistent with the requirements of section 271 and the *UNE Remand
     Order*.[^482] The Commission's *UNE Remand Order* requires
     incumbent LECs to provide competitors access to subloop elements at
     any technically feasible point to ensure that "requesting carriers
     \[have\] maximum flexibility to interconnect their own facilities"
     with those of the incumbent LEC.[^483] Competitors take issue with
     Verizon's subloop offering claiming that Verizon limits subloops to
     "metallic distribution pairs/facilities;" restricts competitor
     subloop access to interconnection at the feeder distribution
     interface (FDI); and refuses to allow competitors to collocate
     equipment inside remote terminals for purposes of accessing
     subloops.[^484]

155. We find that, consistent with our rules, Verizon allows collocation
     inside remote terminals on a space-available basis.[^485] Where
     space is unavailable, competitive LECs may deploy an adjacent
     cabinet to access subloops through an interconnecting cable.[^486]
     Furthermore, Verizon does not limit competitive LEC access to
     subloops to only metallic distribution facilities. Rather, Verizon
     allows requesting carrier to obtain access to subloop facilities
     regardless of the transmission medium.[^487] Finally, Verizon has
     demonstrated that competitive LECs may gain access to subloops at
     technically feasible points of interconnection other than the
     FDI.[^488] For these reasons, we cannot agree with the commenters'
     claims that Verizon limits access to subloop unbundled network
     elements in violation of the requirements of section 271.

#### High Capacity Loop Performance

156. We find that Verizon's performance for high capacity loops does not
     result in a finding of noncompliance with checklist item four. We
     look to the totality of the circumstances in evaluating Verizon's
     performance in providing loops in accordance with the checklist
     requirements. [^489] During the period September through November,
     although volumes are low, carrier-to-carrier data show that Verizon
     misses a comparable number of installation appointments for
     competitors and retail alike.[^490] Verizon's performance data for
     its maintenance and repair functions for high capacity loops show
     parity.[^491] Like other types of loops we consider, Verizon states
     that competing carrier behavior skews its high capacity loop
     performance.[^492] We recognize that Verizon's performance on other
     measures with respect to provisioning high capacity loops has been
     poor in Massachusetts.[^493] High capacity loops in Massachusetts
     represent only approximately 0.8 percent of all unbundled loops
     provisioned to competitors.[^494] Verizon performs at an acceptable
     level for most types of unbundled local loops. Given the low
     volumes of orders for high capacity loops in Massachusetts we
     cannot find that Verizon's performance for high capacity loops
     results in a finding of noncompliance for all loop types.[^495]

#### Voice Grade Loops

157. We agree with the Massachusetts Department that Verizon
     demonstrates that it provides voice grade unbundled loops in a
     nondiscriminatory manner.[^496] This category includes hot cut
     loops and new stand-alone loops. We discuss each of these
     categories separately below.

##### Hot Cut Loop Provisioning 

158. *Hot Cut Process.* Verizon's hot cut process is designed to move a
     loop that is in service from Verizon's switch to a competitor's
     switch. Competitors can request that Verizon complete the hot cut
     within a specific appointment window and Verizon has committed to
     ensuring that the customer will not be out of service for more than
     five minutes during the hot cut.[^497] Verizon's hot cut process
     includes a number of steps that Verizon and competitors must take
     during the days preceding the hot cut. These steps include
     pre-wiring a cross-connection from the competitor's collocation
     arrangement to Verizon's main distribution frame prior to the
     committed date and time of the hot cut, setting the appropriate
     Local Number Portability triggers and confirming with the
     competitor that the loop is to be cut over to a competitor's
     switch.[^498]

159. *Hot Cut Timeliness and Quality.* We find that Verizon demonstrates
     that it provides hot cuts in Massachusetts in accordance with
     checklist item 4 because it provides hot cuts in a timely manner,
     at an acceptable level of quality, with minimal service disruption,
     and with a minimum number of troubles following installation.[^499]
     Verizon reports data on the percentage of hot cut orders completed
     within the cut-over window specified by the requesting competing
     carriers on an LSR.

160. In the instant application, Verizon demonstrates that its hot cut
     performance has returned to acceptable pre-strike levels which
     afford a competitor a meaningful opportunity to compete.[^500]
     During October and November 2000, Verizon completed on average 96
     percent of hot cut orders on time. During the same time period,
     less than 0.8 of the hot cut lines experienced installation
     troubles within 7 days.[^501] The Massachusetts Department engaged
     in a reconciliation of various Verizon self-reported hot cut
     performance measurement data in the context of the state section
     271 proceeding.[^502] Relying upon the results of its
     carrier-specific data reconciliation, the Massachusetts Department
     concluded that "there is no need for further data reconciliation"
     and concluded that Verizon provides sufficient on-time hot cut
     performance to meet the requirements of checklist item 4.[^503]
     Because the Massachusetts Department performed a searching and
     specific data reconciliation of Verizon's hot cut performance, we
     accord its resolution of this issue substantial weight. We note
     that no commenter challenges Verizon's hot-cut conversion
     performance in this phase of the proceeding. We thus conclude that
     the record demonstrates that the hot cut performance Verizon makes
     available to competing carriers in Massachusetts minimizes service
     disruptions and affords a competitor a meaningful opportunity to
     compete.

##### New Stand-Alone Loop Provisioning

161. We agree with the Massachusetts Department that Verizon
     demonstrates that it provisions new unbundled stand-alone voice
     grade loops in accordance with the requirements of checklist item
     4.[^504] When Verizon does not presently service the customer on
     the line in question, a hot cut loop is not required. In such
     instances, a competing carrier obtains a new stand-alone loop from
     Verizon which dispatches a technician to the customer's premises to
     complete the installation. We find that Verizon demonstrates that
     it provisions and maintains new stand-alone voice grade loops for
     competing carriers in substantially the same time and manner that
     it installs new voice grade loops for its own retail operations.

162. *Provisioning Timeliness and Quality, Maintenance and Repair.*
     Verizon demonstrates that it delivers new voice grade loops in a
     timely manner and at acceptable levels of quality. Verizon also
     demonstrates that it provides maintenance and repair functions for
     such loops in a nondiscriminatory manner. No party specifically
     criticizes Verizon's new, stand-alone loop provisioning
     performance. As in previous section 271 orders, in reviewing
     Verizon's performance we examine the average completion interval,
     missed installation appointments, trouble reports within 7 days and
     mean time to repair measures. Specifically, Verizon's performance
     results for the months of September, October, November and December
     2000 also demonstrate parity for the average completion interval
     for new loop orders of 1-5 lines measure.[^505] During the same
     period, Verizon's missed installation appointment rate for new
     voice loops also demonstrated parity.[^506] Furthermore, Verizon
     appears to be providing new voice grade loops to competitors at an
     acceptable level of quality. Based on the trouble report within 7
     days measure, Verizon provided installation at the same level of
     quality for competitive LECs compared to retail during the months
     of September, October, November and December 2000.[^507] Verizon's
     mean time to repair measures show that it is providing maintenance
     and repair functions for new loops to competitors in a
     nondiscriminatory manner.[^508]

#### Line Sharing 

##### Background

163. On December 9, 1999 the Commission released the *Line Sharing
     Order* that, among other things, defined the high-frequency portion
     of local loops as a UNE that must be provided to requesting
     carriers on a nondiscriminatory basis pursuant to section 251(c)(3)
     of the Act and, thus, checklist items 2 and 4 of section 271.[^509]
     In the *Line Sharing Order* the Commission acknowledged that it
     could take as long as 180 days from the release date for incumbent
     LECs to develop and deploy the modifications necessary to implement
     this new requirement. This 180 day period concluded on June 6,
     2000, approximately six months before Verizon filed its
     Massachusetts II application. In the *SWBT Kansas/Oklahoma Order*,
     the Commission provided BOC-applicants guidance concerning the
     required section 271 line sharing showing necessary to meet a BOC's
     burden of proof. Specifically, the Commission stated that "a
     successful BOC-applicant should provide evidence that its central
     offices are operationally ready to handle commercial volumes of
     line sharing and that it provides competing carriers with
     nondiscriminatory access to the pre-ordering and ordering OSS
     functions associated with the provision of line shared loops,
     including access to loop qualification information and
     databases."[^510] The Commission also held that "to the extent that
     a BOC applicant relies upon commercial data from another state to
     establish that it is providing nondiscriminatory access to line
     shared loops in a state where it requests section 271 authority, it
     should provide evidence that the OSS and provisioning processes are
     identical.[^511] Verizon must demonstrate, therefore, that it
     provides nondiscriminatory access to the unbundled high-frequency
     portion of the loop to gain section 271 approval in Massachusetts.

164. Verizon proposes to demonstrate compliance with its line sharing
     obligation with evidence that it has signed nine interconnection
     agreements in Massachusetts with line sharing provisions. Verizon
     also notes that the Massachusetts Department recently approved its
     line sharing tariffs, with only minor amendments.[^512] It further
     states that it is able to handle "considerable volumes of line
     sharing orders" by utilizing its successful New York provisioning
     methods and procedures in Massachusetts.[^513] Finally, through the
     New York DSL collaborative, it has worked with competing carriers
     to identify and resolve various technical and operational issues
     associated with line sharing in Massachusetts.[^514] Competing
     carriers contest Verizon's operational readiness to offer line
     sharing and Verizon's ability to offer line sharing on a
     nondiscriminatory basis.[^515]

##### Discussion

165. We find that Verizon demonstrates that it provides
     nondiscriminatory access to the high-frequency portion of the loop.
     Specifically, the most probative evidence that Verizon submits to
     support this point is actual commercial usage.[^516] The Commission
     stated in the *SWBT Kansas/Oklahoma Order* that "a successful BOC
     applicant could provide evidence of BOC-caused missed installation
     due dates, average installation intervals, trouble reports within
     30 days of installation, mean time to repair, trouble report rates
     and repeat trouble report rates."[^517] Our approach in this case
     is to rely primarily on the limited commercial data Verizon has
     submitted from its Massachusetts operations. Because line sharing
     volumes in Massachusetts have escalated only recently, however, we
     look to Verizon's line sharing performance in New York as well,
     where line sharing volumes are larger for additional evidence that
     Verizon is providing nondiscriminatory access to line
     sharing.[^518] As discussed above, we conclude that Verizon's line
     sharing OSS in New York and Massachusetts uses the same systems and
     offers the same functionality.[^519] Accordingly, we shall consider
     Verizon's commercial line sharing performance in New York as a
     supplement to Verizon's limited commercial line sharing performance
     in Massachusetts.

166. *Operational Readiness.* Competitive LECs take issue with Verizon's
     ability to wire adequately central offices to offer line
     sharing.[^520] Covad specifically contests Verizon's representation
     that it was operationally ready to provision line sharing for all
     splitter collocation arrangements in place as of December 1,
     2000.[^521] In response, Verizon states that it recognized central
     office wiring problems that delayed the readiness of certain
     offices and committed to reinspections of all line-sharing related
     central office work beginning in December 2000.[^522] The
     Department of Justice recognizes that "Verizon is making efforts to
     resolve its line sharing implementation difficulties" and the
     Massachusetts Department urges us to find that Verizon provides
     nondiscriminatory access to the high frequency portion of the
     loop.[^523]

167. Verizon has now completed all the quality inspections and has
     "taken the necessary corrective action for all of the line
     sharing-related collocation arrangements that were in place as of
     December 1, 2000 . . . in both Massachusetts and New York."[^524]
     Verizon has also agreed to implement the elements of its quality
     inspection process into the normal collocation inspection process
     and thus, new line sharing-related collocation arrangements will be
     subject to this inspection process as well.[^525] It therefore
     appears that Verizon instituted its quality inspection process and
     completed any necessary corrective action as it became aware of
     central office wiring issues described by competitive LECs.[^526]

168. *Line Sharing Performance Data.* Verizon has supplied a limited
     amount of Massachusetts commercial data for the period September
     through November 2000 in support of its line sharing showing.[^527]
     To show that the data are reliable, Verizon engaged PwC to
     replicate its carrier-to-carrier results and 34 line sharing
     measures for the period September through November, the results of
     which, according to PwC, largely confirm the results presented by
     Verizon.[^528] We recognize the Department of Justice's concerns
     that some of the line sharing completion interval data may be
     inaccurate.[^529] Like the Massachusetts Department, however, we
     conclude that the data adequately show that Verizon has met its
     line sharing obligation.[^530] The New York Commission only
     recently directed Verizon to capture its xDSL performance in
     disaggregated line sharing measures. In this case, we decline to
     hold isolated inaccuracies against Verizon where the method of
     reporting and collecting data is new and the underlying cause of
     the distortion has been addressed by Verizon.[^531] In this
     context, we believe it is appropriate to credit Verizon's
     submission of Massachusetts commercial line sharing data,
     supplemented by data from New York, when making our determination
     that Verizon provides nondiscriminatory access to the
     high-frequency portion of the loop. Specifically, we are convinced
     that the flawed timeliness measures provide evidence of the time it
     takes Verizon to provision line shared loops.

169. *Provisioning Timeliness.* Overall, Verizon adequately demonstrates
     that it provisions line sharing to competitors in substantially the
     same time as it does for itself. We note at the outset that we give
     no decisional weight to Verizon's missed appointment data for line
     sharing in New York and Massachusetts. Although the data on their
     face show that Verizon meets the parity standard[^532] we agree
     with the Department of Justice, the Massachusetts Department and
     even Verizon itself, that the measure may be flawed.[^533]
     Specifically, Verizon states that this measure may not have
     captured those instances where a Verizon technician performed the
     central office work typically required for xDSL loops but failed to
     confirm that a splitter was functioning on the line.[^534] Parties
     criticizing the completion measures appear to argue that because a
     Verizon technician did not test for a functioning splitter, the
     quality -- rather than the timeliness -- of Verizon's installation
     work is unacceptable.[^535] While we recognize that performing the
     additional work required to test whether a splitter was functioning
     on the line could have an impact on the completion measures, we
     find that the data provided by Verizon are probative of the time it
     takes Verizon's technicians to install line-shared service.[^536]
     We are therefore not prepared to dismiss all of the evidence of
     commercial usage as USISPA suggests because the inaccuracies appear
     to be limited to the completion measures and are not so pervasive
     as to render Verizon's line sharing data completely
     untrustworthy.[^537] Furthermore, as Verizon became aware of this
     problem, it addressed this data integrity issue by properly
     instructing its installation personnel to code orders as complete
     after properly functioning splitters are working on a given line,
     implementing its quality inspections for line sharing-related
     collocation work and performing a splitter signature test to ensure
     that the quality of its installation work was acceptable. Indeed,
     the record shows that during the period of time not affected by the
     distortion, Verizon's timeliness performance demonstrates
     parity.[^538]

170. The average completion interval data for line sharing show
     parity.[^539] While Verizon has supplied no retail information as a
     basis for comparison during the months of September and October for
     Massachusetts data, the average completion interval measure in
     November shows that Verizon required slightly more than six days to
     provision line-shared loops to competitors compared to over seven
     days for itself.[^540] In New York, for the months of September and
     November, performance for competitive LECs is superior to that
     provided to VADI.[^541] Although these data show that Verizon is
     performing at parity we note that Verizon's performance is
     generally above the 5-day interval established by the Massachusetts
     Department even as the current interval is scheduled to be reduced
     to four days in the near future.[^542] It is encouraging that
     Verizon is moving toward meeting this state-approved provisioning
     interval while it gains additional experience provisioning
     commercial volumes of line shared orders.

171. *Installation Quality & Maintenance and Repair.* Based on the
     commercial data presented in Massachusetts, Verizon appears to be
     providing line shared loops at acceptable levels of quality.
     Although VADI did not submit any trouble reports within thirty days
     of installation in the month of November, the competitive LEC rate
     was 1 percent and in September and October 2000, competitive LECs
     did not report any troubles on line-shared loops captured by the
     measures.[^543] In New York, from September through November, the
     weighted average of installation troubles for competitive LECs was
     1.70 percent compared to less than one percent for VADI.[^544]

172. With respect to maintenance and repair, Verizon repairs loops for
     competitors in less time than it takes to repair retail line-shared
     loops. In November, the only month for which Verizon provided such
     data in Massachusetts, Verizon repaired competing carrier
     line-shared loops in just over three hours. [^545] Verizon
     represents that it took significantly longer to repair loops for
     VADI -- over 25 hours.[^546] In New York, Verizon shows that the
     mean time to repair is comparable to stand-alone xDSL loop repair
     times and offers competitors nondiscriminatory access to
     maintenance and repair functions.[^547] Verizon also shows that its
     repair services are performed at acceptable levels of
     quality.[^548] Thus we find that the data suggest that Verizon is
     providing line-shared loops at an acceptable level of quality and
     repairing these facilities in a nondiscriminatory manner.

173. Although we have some concerns with the accuracy of Verizon's
     performance results and the limited volume of competitive LEC
     orders captured by the measures, we base our decision on measures
     not affected by such inaccuracies, the replication of other
     measures by PwC and Verizon's efforts in addressing the central
     office wiring issues that have impaired the ability of competitive
     LECs to submit commercial volumes of line sharing orders. Recent
     efforts by Verizon have substantially, if not completely, addressed
     the initial central office wiring implementation issues experienced
     by competitive LECs in Massachusetts.[^549] Furthermore, we also
     note that Verizon has designed a process to address line sharing
     implementation difficulties going forward.[^550]

#### Line Splitting

##### Background

174. In the *Line Sharing Order on Reconsideration*, the Commission made
     clear that line splitting is an existing legal obligation and that
     incumbent LECs must allow competitors to order line splitting
     immediately, whether or not a fully electronic interface is in
     place.[^551] The Commission further stated that "we expect Bell
     Operating Companies to demonstrate, in the context of section 271
     applications, that they permit line splitting, by providing access
     to network elements necessary for competing carriers to provide
     line-split services."[^552] We discuss below the steps Verizon has
     taken to offer line splitting capabilities consistent with the
     *Line Sharing Order on Reconsideration*.[^553]

175. Verizon states that it currently offers the unbundled network
     elements that would allow line-split services.[^554] On February
     14, 2001, Verizon issued a statement of policy to accommodate line
     splitting.[^555] Additionally, Verizon has incorporated line
     splitting contract language reflecting this policy into its Model
     Interconnection Agreement which it will make immediately available
     to any carrier who wishes to offer line-split services.[^556]
     Verizon has also demonstrated that it offers competitors
     nondiscriminatory access to the individual network elements
     necessary to provide line-split services and that nothing prevent
     competitors from offering voice and data services over a single
     unbundled loop.[^557] Several competitors contest the adequacy of
     this language and argue that Verizon is currently not in compliance
     with the Commission's line sharing and line splitting
     requirements.[^558] These carriers further contend that Verizon has
     engaged in a pattern of recalcitrant behavior with regard to
     implementing line sharing and line splitting requirements and the
     Commission should not credit its promises of future
     compliance.[^559]

##### Discussion

176. Verizon demonstrates that it makes it possible for competing
     carriers to provide voice and data service over a single loop --
     *i.e.*, to engage in "line splitting."[^560] Specifically, Verizon
     demonstrates that it has concrete and specific legal obligation to
     provide line splitting through rates, terms and conditions in
     interconnection agreements. As a result, a competing carrier may,
     for instance, provide voice service using UNE-P and, either alone
     or in conjunction with another carrier, provide xDSL service on
     that same line.

177. Our recent *Line Sharing Reconsideration Order* is clear: Verizon
     must permit competing LECs to offer both voice and data services
     over a single unbundled loop in a line splitting
     configuration.[^561] The Commission also stated that incumbents
     must make necessary network modifications including access to OSS
     necessary for the "pre-ordering, ordering, provisioning,
     maintenance and repair and billing for loops used in line splitting
     arrangements."[^562] As carriers identify operational issues
     associated with line splitting, the Commission recognized that
     state collaboratives and change management processes could be used
     by "incumbent LECs and competing carriers to work together to
     develop processes and systems to support competing carrier ordering
     and provisioning of unbundled loops and switching necessary for
     line splitting."[^563]

178. We disagree with WorldCom's contention that Verizon's
     line-splitting interconnection agreement language limits line
     splitting to carriers who are collocated in Verizon central offices
     or that Verizon is taking the position that the UNE-P providers may
     not line split unless they are collocated.[^564] Verizon's contract
     language, which includes a reference to "collocator to collocator"
     connections, does not require UNE-P providers to be collocated in
     Verizon central offices to offer line split services.[^565] Rather,
     UNE-P providers need not obtain collocation in Verizon central
     offices to offer the voice component of line-split services.

179. Verizon's interconnection agreement amendment is also consistent
     with our *Line Sharing Reconsideration Order*, which requires that
     incumbent LECs minimize service disruptions to existing voice
     customers undergoing a transition to line-splitting.[^566] For
     example, where competitive LECs provide data service to existing
     end user customers and Verizon provides voice service to that
     customer there is no need to "rearrange" network facilities to
     provide line-split services.[^567] Because no central office wiring
     changes are necessary in such a conversion from line sharing to
     line splitting, Verizon is required under our *Line Sharing
     Reconsideration Order* to develop a streamlined ordering processes
     for formerly line sharing competitive LECs to enable migrations
     between line sharing and line splitting that avoid voice and data
     service disruption and make use of the existing xDSL-capable
     loop.[^568] Such a transition from line sharing to line splitting
     should occur subject only to charges consistent with the
     Commission's cost methodology as articulated in the *Local
     Competition First Report and Order*.[^569]

180. We disagree with WorldCom's claim that Verizon's OSS does not
     comply with our *Line Sharing Reconsideration Order* in other
     respects.[^570] The *Line Sharing Reconsideration Order* does not
     require Verizon to have implemented an electronic OSS functionality
     to permit line splitting. Rather, the Commission's *Line Sharing
     Reconsideration Order* recognizes that a state-sponsored xDSL
     collaboratives is the appropriate place for Verizon to evaluate how
     best to develop this functionality.[^571] For example, Verizon has
     represented that it is actively working on developing the OSS
     upgrades necessary to provide for electronic ordering of line-split
     services in the context of the New York Commission's xDSL
     collaborative.[^572] We recognize that Verizon has not, to date,
     implemented the OSS upgrades necessary to electronically process
     line-splitting orders in a manner that is minimally disruptive to
     existing voice customers; but that such functionality may require
     significant software upgrades and testing. It is undisputed that
     the parties in the New York DSL collaborative commenced discussion
     of line splitting over a year ago; that in April 2000 Verizon
     formally posed numerous questions to competitors concerning their
     business rules for line splitting; and that in August 2000,
     competitive LECs submitted their initial detailed business rules to
     Verizon.[^573] Thus it appears that Verizon has the necessary
     information to implement the necessary OSS upgrades. Verizon has
     been able to provide its customers line-shared DSL service for
     approximately two years. Our *Line Sharing Reconsideration Order*
     is fulfilled by Verizon's adoption of an implementation schedule
     for line splitting as directed by the New York Commission that will
     afford competitors the same opportunities.

181. We note that in response to WorldCom's concerns, Verizon has agreed
     upon an implementation schedule to offer line splitting-specific
     OSS capabilities under the supervision of the New York
     Commission.[^574] In June of this year we expect that Verizon will
     conduct a preliminary OSS implementation in New York using new OSS
     functionality to add data service to an existing UNE-P customer. In
     October, Verizon has committed to implement, in the Verizon East
     territory including Massachusetts, the new OSS capability necessary
     to support migrations from line sharing to line splitting
     arrangements consistent with the business processes defined in the
     New York DSL collaborative.[^575] Consistent with their plans and
     with the guidance of the New York DSL collaborative, Verizon plans
     to offer OSS capability necessary to support UNE-P migrations to
     line splitting by October 2001.

# OTHER CHECKLIST ITEMS

## Checklist Item 1 -- Interconnection

182. We conclude, as described below, that Verizon demonstrates that it
     provides equal-in-quality interconnection on terms and conditions
     that are just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory in accordance with
     the requirements of sections 251(c)(2) and as specified in section
     271 and applied in the Commission's prior orders.[^576] We further
     find that Verizon proves that it designs its interconnection
     facilities to meet "'the same technical criteria and service
     standards' that are used for the interoffice trunks within \[its
     own\] network."[^577] We also find that Verizon makes
     interconnection available at any technically feasible point,
     including the option to interconnect at only one technically
     feasible point within a LATA,[^578] and that it is providing
     collocation in Massachusetts in accordance with the Commission's
     rules.[^579] We note that the Massachusetts Department found that
     Verizon has satisfied all aspects of this checklist item.[^580]

### Interconnection Trunking

183. Based on our review of the record, we are persuaded that Verizon
     provides competing carriers with interconnection trunking in
     Massachusetts that is equal in quality to the interconnection
     Verizon provides to its own retail operations, and on terms and
     conditions that are just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory.[^581]
     Verizon makes interconnection available in Massachusetts through
     interconnection agreements and through its state approved wholesale
     tariff.[^582] Verizon receives orders for interconnection trunks
     through the Access Service Request (ASR) process, and accepts ASRs
     through an electronic application-to-application interface, its GUI
     and manual orders.[^583] Verizon provides affidavit evidence to
     demonstrate compliance with checklist item 1 in Massachusetts, as
     well as performance data to measure the quality of interconnection
     service provided to competing carriers.[^584] Several commenting
     parties raise concerns about interconnection trunking, and we
     address these issues below.

184. *Interconnection Quality.* We conclude that Verizon provides
     interconnection trunking to competitive LECs that is equal in
     quality to the interconnection Verizon provides to its own retail
     operations. Although the performance metric that we analyze to
     evaluate interconnection quality, Percent Final Trunk Group
     Blockage,[^585] demonstrates facial disparity between Verizon's
     performance for competitive LECs as compared to its own retail
     operations,[^586] we find, based on the totality of the
     circumstances, that such a disparity is not competitively
     significant.[^587]

185. We reach this conclusion based on the following factors. First, the
     extent of call blocking for all trunks, including competitive LEC
     trunks, is low in absolute terms. The blocking standard employed by
     the carrier-to-carrier guidelines permits only one out of two
     hundred calls to be blocked during the busy hour, and the
     percentage of competitive LEC trunk groups exceeding this blocking
     standard is small. Specifically, in the aggregate, less than two
     percent[^588] of competitive LEC trunk groups exceeded the blocking
     standard due to insufficient trunking from September through
     December 2000. Stated another way, Verizon met the trunk blocking
     standard approximately 98 percent of the time during these four
     months. Moreover, the difference between the percentage of
     competitive LEC trunk groups and the percentage of Verizon trunk
     groups exceeding the blocking standard is also small, with a
     difference of only 1.64 percentage points between the competitive
     LEC and Verizon four-month averages for September through December
     2000.[^589] Second, as discussed below, other data used to evaluate
     Verizon's interconnection trunking performance demonstrate, on
     their face, that Verizon is providing interconnection in a manner
     that complies with this checklist item.[^590] Finally we note that
     no commenter has complained about trunk blockage in this
     proceeding.[^591] If the rate of competitive LEC trunks exceeding
     the blocking standard were competitively significant, we would
     expect the commenting parties to address this issue, particularly
     when competitive LECs have been provided with carrier-specific data
     showing their individual rates for trunk groups exceeding the
     blocking standard.

186. *Interconnection Timeliness*. Other aspects of Verizon's
     performance data further indicate it is providing nondiscriminatory
     interconnection trunking in Massachusetts. In previous section 271
     applications, the Commission has evaluated missed installation
     appointments and average installation intervals to gauge trunk
     provisioning timeliness.[^592] Verizon demonstrates satisfactory
     performance in both of these areas in Massachusetts. Verizon's
     performance data concerning the percentage of missed installation
     appointments for provisioning of interconnection trunks show that,
     in recent months, Verizon's provisioning performance for
     competitors in Massachusetts was as good as that provided to
     interexchange carriers. In Massachusetts, from September to
     December 2000 in the aggregate, Verizon-caused missed trunk
     installations averaged 4.44 percent for competitive LECs, and 4.43
     percent for interexchange carriers.[^593] These figures indicate
     that, in general, Verizon provided parity or better performance for
     competitive LECs in Massachusetts for trunk installations.

187. *Average Installation Intervals*. Verizon's performance data
     measuring the average time for installation of interconnection
     trunks in Massachusetts also show that Verizon's installation
     performance for competitors was as good as or better than that
     provided to interexchange carriers. For example, Verizon's
     performance data show that the average time to install
     interconnection trunks for competitive LECs for the months of
     September through December 2000 was 27 days, and 49 days for
     interexchange carriers.[^594]

188. *Issues Raised by Commenting Parties*. CompTel, on behalf of ICG,
     and Winstar raise issues concerning Verizon's interconnection
     trunking performance. In particular, they have raised provisioning
     timeliness as an issue. Winstar also raises issues concerning
     service outages on interconnection trunks, and argues that the
     current performance data do not accurately reflect Verizon's
     performance.

189. Winstar alleges that Verizon caused ordering and provisioning
     delays and provided untimely or otherwise inadequate FOCs for
     interconnection trunks. We do not find these allegations
     persuasive. As an initial matter, we note that a number of the
     provisioning delays cited by Winstar appear to have occurred in the
     first half of 2000 or earlier.[^595] Accordingly, those contentions
     have little bearing on Verizon's performance in recent months and
     its current checklist compliance. Moreover, we find that those
     allegations, as well as Winstar's claims relating to more recent
     performance,[^596] are not supported by affidavit. Given the fact
     that Verizon's responses to these issues *are* supported by
     affidavit and are much more factually detailed, we find that
     Verizon satisfactorily refutes Winstar's claims.[^597] Winstar also
     cites to the provisioning delays raised by other carriers as
     evidence of endemic provisioning problems. Except for ICG's claims,
     as discussed below, other carriers' claims were only raised before
     the Massachusetts Department and not in this proceeding, and have
     now been resolved.[^598]

190. ICG's allegations[^599] concerning delays in trunk provisioning
     likewise do not warrant a finding of noncompliance with checklist
     item 1. Verizon states that the trunks requested by ICG carry
     traffic from Verizon to ICG and that the number of trunks requested
     was not justified by existing or reasonably anticipated
     traffic,[^600] and that the existing trunks were under-utilized,
     with only a 33 percent overall utilization level.[^601] We find the
     detailed information Verizon provided to support its explanation
     persuasive. Verizon states that the delays in the provisioning of
     entrance facilities cited by ICG were actually caused by ICG.[^602]
     ICG provided no response to Verizon's explanations. In any event,
     to the extent that there may have been delays in the provisioning
     of interconnection trunks to ICG, this appears to have been an
     isolated situation rather than evidence of a widespread
     problem.[^603]

191. Nor do Winstar's claims of service outages on interconnection
     trunks or maintenance and repair problems persuade us that Verizon
     is not currently in compliance with checklist item 1. The outage
     primarily relied on by Winstar in support of these contentions
     occurred in September 1999. Thus, it is not relevant to Verizon's
     recent or current performance for purposes of the instant
     proceeding. The other outages referred to by Winstar do not involve
     interconnection trunking provided by Verizon in
     Massachusetts.[^604] We also note that none of the other commenting
     parties raise concerns relating to service outages.

192. Winstar also alleges that Verizon engages in practices designed to
     distort the performance data and conceal its poor provisioning and
     maintenance and repair of interconnection trunking.[^605] These
     claims by Winstar are not supported by affidavits, and, based on
     the current record, we are unable to determine the extent to which
     Winstar's claims are true.[^606] We also note that no other carrier
     raises similar claims in this proceeding. We emphasize that, as an
     initial matter, competitive LECs should raise issues such as this
     concerning the performance metrics in the relevant state
     proceedings where they can be investigated and properly addressed.
     Further, in the future, if competitive LECs allege that poor
     performance is not being captured by the state-approved performance
     measures, then competitive LECs should provide evidence, such as
     reliable performance data, along with a showing of why the BOC is
     responsible for the performance.[^607]

193. Finally, we reject the contentions of Winstar, CompTel and Global
     Crossing involving the provision of interexchange access services.
     The Commission has held in prior orders that checklist compliance
     is not intended to encompass the provision of these services.[^608]

### Collocation

194. Verizon demonstrates that its collocation offerings in
     Massachusetts satisfy the requirements of sections 251 and 271 of
     the Act. Verizon provides physical and virtual collocation through
     state-approved tariffs. Verizon's Massachusetts physical and
     virtual collocation tariffs are virtually identical to the New York
     physical and virtual collocation tariffs, which the Commission
     found to satisfy checklist item 1 in the *Bell Atlantic New York
     Order*.[^609] In its application, Verizon states that shared,
     cageless, and adjacent collocation options are available in
     Massachusetts, and that it has taken other steps necessary to
     implement the collocation requirements contained in the *Advanced
     Services First Report and Order* and the *Collocation
     Reconsideration Order*.[^610]

195. Verizon's collocation performance data generally indicate that
     Verizon processed collocation requests and provisioned collocation
     arrangements in accordance with the time frames established by the
     Massachusetts Department.[^611] Verizon's performance data show 100
     percent on-time responses to requests for physical and virtual
     collocation for the period September through December 2000.[^612]
     Although Verizon's performance data for average on-time completion
     for both new and augmented orders of physical collocation
     demonstrate some facial disparities, when adjusted for the time
     lost during the August strike, Verizon's performance is at or near
     the established benchmarks.[^613] We conclude that this overall
     level of on-time performance for completion of physical collocation
     arrangements satisfies Verizon's section 271 obligations and allows
     an efficient competitor a meaningful opportunity to compete.

196. Contrary to the assertions made by ALTS,[^614] we conclude that
     Verizon has demonstrated that it has a concrete and specific legal
     obligation to provide remote terminal collocation consistent with
     the *UNE Remand Order*.[^615] We are also not persuaded by Rhythms'
     and ALTS' contentions[^616] that Verizon attempts to limit the
     Remote Terminal Equipment Enclosures (RTEEs) at which it will
     provide remote terminal collocation through its definition of
     RTEEs.[^617] In particular, we accept Verizon's explanation that
     the definition of RTEEs is intended to expand the remote locations
     encompassed by the definition, not limit them.[^618] We also
     conclude that Verizon is not required to permit in-place conversion
     of virtual to physical collocation in Massachusetts for purposes of
     section 271[^619] despite the contentions of Rhythms and
     ALTS.[^620] Nor do we believe that the concern raised by ALTS about
     the ability of competitive LECs to obtain POTS lines in their
     collocation cages raises issues of section 271 compliance.[^621]

### Technically Feasible Points of Interconnection

197. We conclude that Verizon provides interconnection at all
     technically feasible points, including a single point of
     interconnection,[^622] and therefore demonstrates compliance with
     the checklist item. Verizon demonstrates that it has state-approved
     interconnection agreements that set forth readily available points
     of interconnection, and provide a process for competitive LECs to
     request interconnection at additional, technically feasible
     points.[^623] Verizon further shows that, for purposes of
     interconnection to exchange local traffic, a competitive LEC may
     choose a single, technically feasible point of interconnection
     within a LATA.[^624] In addition, the Verizon revised Massachusetts
     Collocation Tariff complies with Commission rules by allowing
     competing carriers to choose a single technically feasible
     point.[^625]

### Pricing of Interconnection

198. Checklist item 1 requires a BOC to provide "interconnection in
     accordance with the requirements of sections 251(c)(2) and
     252(d)(1)."[^626] Section 251(c)(2) requires incumbent LECs to
     provide interconnection "at any technically feasible point within
     the carrier's network . . . on rates, terms, and conditions that
     are just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory."[^627] Section
     252(d)(1) requires state determinations regarding the rates, terms,
     and conditions of interconnection to be based on cost and to be
     nondiscriminatory, and allows the rates to include a reasonable
     profit.[^628] The Commission's pricing rules require, among other
     things, that in order to comply with its collocation obligations,
     an incumbent LEC provide collocation based on TELRIC.[^629]

199. Based on the evidence in the record, we find that Verizon offers
     interconnection in Massachusetts to other telecommunications
     carriers at just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory rates, in
     compliance with checklist item 1. The Massachusetts Department
     concludes that Verizon currently provides collocation under
     approved interconnection agreements and tariffs, consistent with
     Commission and Massachusetts Department orders.[^630]

200. We find that the collocation pricing issues raised by commenters
     that are currently before the Massachusetts Department do not cause
     Verizon to fail this checklist item. First, commenters contend that
     Verizon improperly charges for the number of amps fused, rather
     than the number of drained amps actually requested and used by
     competitive LECs.[^631] Prior to refiling its Massachusetts II
     Application with the Commission, Verizon amended its tariff to
     apply collocation power charges on a per-load amp requested basis,
     rather than on a per-fused amp basis.[^632] AT&T and Covad filed a
     petition with the Massachusetts Department requesting an
     investigation of this tariff revision.[^633] When the Massachusetts
     Department declined to investigate the tariff revision, the parties
     filed a reconsideration motion, asserting that Verizon is
     improperly charging them on a per-fused amp basis.[^634] In its
     response to the Massachusetts Department, Verizon responds that its
     tariff revision addresses these parties' concerns by charging them
     on a per-load amp basis and that such tariff revision will lead to
     a decrease in power charges.[^635]

201. Second, commenters assert that Verizon is improperly charging
     competitive LECs for collocation power by assessing an additional
     power charge for each redundant feed requested by the competitive
     LEC.[^636] According to these commenters, a redundant feed runs
     only between the power distribution bay and the competitive LEC's
     collocation point. They assert that Verizon is charging an
     additional power charge that recovers the cost of every piece of
     equipment in the collocation power configuration, regardless of
     whether or not it is utilized for the redundant feed.[^637] ALTS
     contends that most competitive LECs configure their equipment to
     use either the A or B feed as the power source, but not both.
     Verizon should not charge the full amount for power for both the
     main and redundant feeds because the backup feed is only used when
     the original feed fails.[^638] According to the commenters,
     competitive LECs would use only the amount of amps requested to
     operate their equipment, and not double that amount simply because
     they have back-up feeds. AT&T and Covad also raise this issue in
     their tariff investigation reconsideration motion before the
     Massachusetts Department.[^639]

202. Verizon responds that it provides competitive LECs with a means of
     purchasing only the power they want. Verizon disputes ALTS'
     assertion that most competitive LECs configure their equipment to
     use either the A or B feed, but not both.[^640] Verizon contends
     that most competitive LECs have collocation equipment that is
     designed to draw power from two feeds simultaneously.[^641] To
     support this statement, Verizon asserts that it surveyed over 1,000
     power feeds at collocation arrangements in Massachusetts and found
     that over 97 percent of them were drawing power on both
     feeds.[^642] Verizon also asserts that it does not require
     competitive LECs to take a second backup feed, nor does it specify
     the load that a competitive LEC must place on a given feed.[^643]
     If, for instance, a competitive LEC has a piece of equipment that
     draws 40 amps and wants to order and pay for only 40 amps of power,
     Verizon asserts that it can order two power feeds with 20 load amps
     on each feed.[^644]

203. These disputes are currently before the Massachusetts Department.
     As we noted in the *SWBT Texas Order*, the Act authorizes the state
     commissions to resolve specific carrier-to-carrier disputes arising
     under the local competition provisions, and it authorizes the
     federal district courts to ensure that the results of the state
     arbitration process are consistent with federal law.[^645] Although
     we have an independent obligation to ensure compliance with the
     checklist, section 271 does not compel us to preempt the orderly
     disposition of intercarrier disputes by the state commissions,
     particularly now that the Supreme Court has restored our pricing
     jurisdiction and has thereby directed the state commissions to
     follow our pricing rules in their disposition of those disputes.
     Here, we have confidence in the Massachusetts Department's ability
     to resolve these matters consistent with our rules. Verizon amended
     its collocation tariff in January 12, 2001 to address the concerns
     of the parties, and parties have presented no evidence that Verizon
     is not fully cooperating with the efforts of the Massachusetts
     Department to resolve these issues. We note that progress is being
     made in this regard.[^646] We therefore find that these disputes do
     not cause Verizon to fail this checklist item.

204. We are not persuaded by ALTS' assertion that Verizon charges more
     for power in its Massachusetts tariff for cageless collocation than
     it charges for power in its federal tariff, in which there is no
     cageless collocation offering.[^647] According to ALTS, there is no
     cost justification for the difference in collocation power
     charges.[^648] Verizon claims that its federal power rate is based
     on outdated information from 1991 and greatly understates its power
     costs. Differences between the federal tariff and the state tariff
     are not enough, by themselves, to support a finding that the state
     tariff is unlawful. The power rates in the Massachusetts tariff are
     based on more recent cost studies and have been approved by the
     Massachusetts Department, and we find no basis for rejecting
     them.[^649]

## Checklist Item 3 -- Poles, Ducts, Conduits and Rights of Way

### Background

205. Section 271(c)(2)(B)(iii) requires BOCs to provide
     "\[n\]ondiscriminatory access to the poles, ducts, conduits, and
     rights-of-way owned or controlled by the \[BOC\] at just and
     reasonable rates in accordance with the requirements of section
     224."[^650] Section 224(b)(1) states that the Commission shall
     regulate the rates, terms, and conditions governing pole
     attachments to ensure that they are "just and reasonable."[^651]
     Notwithstanding this general grant of authority, section 224(c)(1)
     states that where such matters are regulated by a state nothing in
     the section shall be construed to apply to, or to give the
     Commission jurisdiction with respect to the rates, terms, and
     conditions, or access to poles, ducts, conduits and
     rights-of-way.[^652] Massachusetts has certified to this Commission
     that it regulates the rates, terms, and conditions for pole
     attachments in that state.[^653]

### Discussion 

206. Based on the evidence in the record, we conclude, as the
     Massachusetts Department does,[^654] that Verizon demonstrates that
     it provides nondiscriminatory access to its poles, ducts, conduits,
     and rights-of-way at just and reasonable rates in accordance with
     section 271(c)(2)(B)(iii).[^655] We reject commenters' requests to
     find that Verizon's pole attachment policies and practices in
     Massachusetts are discriminatory.[^656] As we explain above, the
     Massachusetts Department is certified by this Commission to
     regulate pole attachments in that state. The Massachusetts
     Department has established a process for complaints of
     discriminatory access to poles.[^657] Therefore, any claim
     regarding discriminatory access to poles is a matter for the
     Massachusetts Department to consider.[^658] The record does not
     indicate that anyone, including any of the commenters, has filed a
     discriminatory access complaint with the Massachusetts
     Department.[^659]

## Checklist Item 5 -- Unbundled Local Transport

207. Section 271(c)(2)(B)(v) of the competitive checklist requires a BOC
     to provide "\[l\]ocal transport from the trunk side of a wireline
     local exchange carrier switch unbundled from switching or other
     services."[^660] The Commission has required that BOCs provide both
     dedicated and shared transport to requesting carriers.[^661]
     Dedicated transport consists of BOC transmission facilities
     dedicated to a particular customer or carrier that provide
     telecommunications between wire centers owned by BOCs or requesting
     telecommunications carriers, or between switches owned by BOCs or
     requesting telecommunications carriers.[^662] Shared transport
     consists of transmission facilities shared by more than one
     carrier, including the BOC, between end office switches, between
     end office switches and tandem switches, and between tandem
     switches, in the BOC's network.[^663]

208. We conclude, based upon the evidence in the record, that Verizon
     demonstrates that it provides both shared and dedicated transport
     in compliance with the requirements of checklist item 5.[^664] The
     Massachusetts Department also finds that Verizon is in compliance
     with this checklist item.[^665]

209. In prior orders the Commission has reviewed the missed appointment
     rates for the provision of interoffice facilities to competitive
     LECs to determine compliance with checklist item 5.[^666] On first
     examination, the carrier-to-carrier missed appointment rate
     performance appears to depict a significant difference in the
     provision of interoffice facilities for competitive LECs compared
     to the retail analogue described in the carrier-to-carrier
     guidelines in place prior to January 2001.[^667] We place little
     weight on this performance disparity, however, given the revised
     retail analogue developed by the carrier-to-carrier working group
     and adopted by the New York Commission and Massachusetts Department
     in December 2000, which paints a more accurate picture of Verizon's
     transport provisioning performance. As explained below, when
     Verizon's provision of unbundled transport is compared to the
     revised retail analogue, its performance is better for competing
     LECs than it is for its own retail customers.

210. Under the carrier-to-carrier guidelines in place prior to January
     2001 for the missed appointments metric, the provisioning of
     competitive LEC interoffice facility transport was compared to
     Verizon's provisioning of retail "special services."[^668]
     According to Verizon, retail special services are "predominately at
     the voice grade level."[^669] The carrier-to-carrier working
     group[^670] agreed to change the guidelines as of January 2001,
     however, to reflect a revised retail analogue for this performance
     measure using provisioning of retail DS-3s instead of retail
     special services because the unbundled interoffice facilities
     Verizon provides to competitive LECs are predominately at the DS-3
     level, rather than the voice grade level.[^671] We find that the
     revised retail analogue appears to be more appropriate and
     represents a better indicator of whether Verizon is providing the
     same quality of service to competitive LECs as to its own customers
     for transport than the comparison in place prior to January
     2001.[^672] We further find that the missed appointment data, using
     the revised carrier-to-carrier retail analogue, provides sufficient
     evidence that Verizon is providing unbundled transport to
     competitive LECs in a nondiscriminatory manner.[^673]

211. We reject OnSite's assertion that Verizon has repeatedly failed to
     provide transport circuits in violation of checklist item 5[^674]
     because the record indicates OnSite orders the those circuits out
     of Verizon's special access tariff.[^675] The Commission previously
     determined in the *Bell Atlantic New York Order* that checklist
     compliance is not intended to encompass provision of tariffed
     interstate services simply because these services use some of the
     same physical facilities as a checklist item.[^676] We note,
     however, that to the extent parties are experiencing delays in the
     provisioning of special access services ordered from Verizon's
     federal tariffs, these issues are appropriately addressed in the
     Commission's section 208 complaint process.

212. We also disagree with Digital Broadband's assertions that Verizon
     has failed to satisfy checklist item 5. Through comments filed by
     ALTS, Digital Broadband states that it has experienced difficulties
     with ordering and provisioning DS-3s during April through
     September 2000. Specifically, Digital Broadband complains about
     orders not completed by the committed due date, repeated
     postponements of the committed due dates and newly installed
     circuits that do not function properly.[^677] Even though Digital
     Broadband may have experienced some problems during that time
     period, performance data from that period have little bearing on
     Verizon's performance in recent months and, consequently, its
     current checklist compliance. Moreover, no commenter complains of
     *recent* problems with ordering or provisioning of unbundled
     transport.

## Checklist Item 13 -- Reciprocal Compensation

213. Section 271(c)(2)(B)(xiii) of the Act requires that a BOC enter
     into "\[r\]eciprocal compensation arrangements in accordance with
     the requirements of section 252(d)(2)."[^678] In turn, pursuant to
     section 252(d)(2)(A), "a state commission shall not consider the
     terms and conditions for reciprocal compensation to be just and
     reasonable unless (i) such terms and conditions provide for the
     mutual and reciprocal recovery by each carrier of costs associated
     with the transport and termination on each carrier\'s network
     facilities of calls that originate on the network facilities of the
     other carrier; and (ii) such terms and conditions determine such
     costs on the basis of a reasonable approximation of the additional
     costs of terminating such calls."[^679]

214. Based on the evidence in the record, we conclude that Verizon
     demonstrates that it has entered into reciprocal compensation
     arrangements in accordance with the requirements of section
     252(d)(2), and thus satisfies the requirements of checklist
     item 13. Verizon demonstrates that it: (1) has in place reciprocal
     compensation arrangements in accordance with section
     252(d)(2),[^680] and (2) is making all required payments in a
     timely fashion.[^681] The Massachusetts Department has concluded
     that Verizon complies with the reciprocal compensation requirements
     in checklist item 13.[^682]

215. Several commenters allege that Verizon is failing to pay reciprocal
     compensation for ISP-bound traffic.[^683] We find that the issues
     raised by the commenters do not evidence Verizon's failure to
     satisfy checklist item 13. Under a prior Commission order,
     ISP-bound traffic is not subject to the reciprocal compensation
     provisions of section 251(b)(5) and 252(d)(2);[^684] therefore, as
     the Commission stated in the *Bell Atlantic New York Order*,
     whether a carrier pays such compensation is "irrelevant to
     checklist item 13."[^685] The United States Court of Appeals for
     the District of Columbia Circuit vacated and remanded the
     Commission's order, and the Commission is now reconsidering the
     matter.[^686] Given that the Commission has not yet determined the
     status of ISP-bound traffic, refusal to pay reciprocal compensation
     for ISP-bound traffic does not violate checklist item 13's
     requirements at this time. As we have stated, "\[i\]n the absence"
     of a Commission rule on reciprocal compensation, "parties may
     voluntarily include this traffic within the scope of their
     interconnection agreements . . . \[and\] they are bound by those
     agreements, as interpreted and enforced by the state
     commissions."[^687] At this time, therefore, provided that a
     carrier follows states' interpretations and requirements
     promulgated under their interpretation of interconnection
     agreements, including states' requirements concerning ISP-bound
     traffic, such carrier has satisfied checklist item 13.

216. The Massachusetts Department has created a rebuttable presumption
     that the minutes of traffic to a competitive LEC will be presumed
     local (*i.e.*, non-ISP) and subject to reciprocal compensation up
     to an amount that is twice the amount of traffic from the
     competitive LEC to Verizon.[^688] Verizon states that it will make
     reciprocal compensation payments in excess of the 2:1 ratio if a
     competitive LEC provides evidence that its "local" traffic exceeds
     this ratio, and as of July 2000, one competitive LEC had made such
     a showing and was receiving reciprocal compensation payments in
     excess of the 2:1 ratio.[^689] The Massachusetts Department has
     verified that Verizon "is providing reciprocal compensation under
     the obligations in its Department-approved interconnection
     agreements and tariffs, as well as relevant Department
     Orders."[^690] Therefore, we find that Verizon is in compliance
     with checklist item 13.

## Checklist Item 14 -- Resale 

217. Section 271(c)(2)(B)(xiv) of the Act requires a BOC to make
     "telecommunications services . . . available for resale in
     accordance with the requirements of sections 251(c)(4) and
     252(d)(3)."[^691] Based on the evidence in the record, we conclude
     that Verizon demonstrates that it makes telecommunications services
     available in Massachusetts for resale in accordance with sections
     251(c)(4) and 252(d)(3), and thus satisfies the requirements of
     checklist item 14. Verizon states that it is in compliance with the
     requirements of this checklist item,[^692] and the Massachusetts
     Department agrees.[^693] Verizon says that it commits in its
     interconnection agreements and tariffs to making its retail
     services available to competing carriers at wholesale rates.[^694]
     In its *Consolidated Arbitrations* proceeding, conducted after the
     1996 Act was implemented, the Massachusetts Department used an
     avoided-cost calculation method consistent with the Commission's
     pricing rules to establish interim resale discount rates of 24.99
     percent for lines with Verizon's operator services and directory
     assistance, and 29.47 percent for lines without these
     features.[^695] These interim rates were adopted as permanent rates
     by the Massachusetts Department in 1999.[^696] Verizon applies the
     wholesale discount to customer specific arrangements (CSAs),
     grandfathered services, and promotional offerings in effect more
     than 90 days. For promotional offerings of 90 days or less,
     competing carriers may elect to have Verizon apply the wholesale
     discount to the retail price of telecommunications services offered
     in the promotional offering, or to pay the promotional offering
     rate.[^697] Competing carriers may purchase at the wholesale
     discount CSAs to resell to new customers.[^698] Verizon permits
     competing carriers that resell CSAs to meet minimum volume
     requirements by aggregating the traffic of multiple end-user
     customers, provided that those customers are similarly situated to
     the customer(s) of Verizon's original contract.[^699]

218. Verizon also states that it makes its retail telecommunications
     services available for resale without unreasonable or
     discriminatory conditions or limitations.[^700] The Massachusetts
     Department agrees.[^701] According to Verizon, it provides for
     resale all of the telecommunications services that it provides at
     retail to subscribers that are not telecommunications
     carriers.[^702] Verizon demonstrates that it provides its retail
     telecommunications services for resale in a nondiscriminatory and
     timely manner.[^703]

219. We reject commenters' contentions that Verizon fails this checklist
     item because its separate advanced services affiliate was not
     providing DSL and other advanced services at resale discounts in
     accordance with the *ASCENT v. FCC* decision.[^704] The mandate in
     that decision had not issued when Verizon filed the instant
     application.[^705] Accordingly, we find the *ASCENT* decision is
     not relevant to our analysis of checklist compliance in the context
     of this proceeding.[^706]

220. We find unpersuasive Allegiance's claim that the Commission should
     adopt a "fresh look" policy.[^707] Allegiance asserts that the
     Commission should allow customers in long-term contracts with
     Verizon for local exchange and intraLATA service to switch to
     competing telecommunications carriers before the expiration of
     their Verizon contracts without incurring termination penalties. We
     note that a similar issue has been raised by KMC Telecom in a
     Petition for Declaratory Ruling, which is currently pending.[^708]
     We find, as we did in prior orders, that this issue is best
     addressed in the context of that pending petition, and we decline
     to resolve the issue here.[^709]

221. Based on evidence in the record, we also find that Verizon
     satisfies the provisioning requirements of checklist item 14. As
     discussed above, Verizon is provisioning competitive LECs' orders
     for resale in substantially the same time and manner as for its
     retail customers.[^710]

## Remaining Checklist Items (6-12)

222. An applicant under section 271 must demonstrate that it complies
     with checklist item 6 (unbundled local switching),[^711] item 7
     (911/E911 access and directory assistance/operator services),[^712]
     item 8 (white page directory listings),[^713] item 9 (numbering
     administration),[^714] item 10 (databases and associated
     signaling),[^715] item 11 (number portability),[^716] and item 12
     (local dialing parity).[^717] Based on the evidence in the record,
     and in accordance with Commission rules and orders concerning
     compliance with section 271 of the Act, we conclude that Verizon
     demonstrates that it is in compliance with checklist items 6, 7, 8,
     9, 10, 11 and 12 in Massachusetts.[^718] The Massachusetts
     Department also concludes that Verizon complies with the
     requirement of each of these checklist items.[^719] Moreover, no
     commenter raised allegations challenging Verizon's compliance with
     these checklist items.

# COMPLIANCE WITH SECTION 271(C)(1)(a)

## Background

223. In order for the Commission to approve a BOC's application to
     provide in-region, interLATA services, a BOC must first demonstrate
     that it satisfies the requirements of either section 271(c)(1)(A)
     (Track A) or 271(c)(1)(B) (Track B).[^720] To qualify for Track A,
     a BOC must have interconnection agreements with one or more
     competing providers of "telephone exchange service . . . to
     residential and business subscribers."[^721] The Act states that
     "such telephone service may be offered . . . either exclusively
     over \[the competitor's\] own telephone exchange service facilities
     or predominantly over \[the competitor's\] own telephone exchange
     facilities in combination with the resale of the telecommunications
     services of another carrier."[^722] The Commission concluded in the
     *Ameritech Michigan Order* that section 271(c)(1)(A) is satisfied
     if one or more competing providers collectively serve residential
     and business subscribers.[^723]

## Discussion

224. We conclude, as did the Massachusetts Department, that Verizon
     demonstrates that it satisfies the requirements of Track A based on
     the interconnection agreements it has implemented with competing
     carriers in Massachusetts.[^724] The Massachusetts Department has
     approved a substantial number of binding interconnection agreements
     between Verizon and competing providers of telephone exchange
     service.[^725] The record demonstrates that the three largest
     competing carriers in Massachusetts \-- AT&T, WorldCom, and RCN \--
     collectively provide telephone exchange service predominantly over
     their own facilities to residential and business subscribers.[^726]
     Verizon also asserts that six other competitive LECs provide
     business and/or residential service through some mix of their own
     facilities, UNEs, UNE-P, and resale.[^727]

225. Although AT&T and WorldCom have challenged some of Verizon's
     estimates of the number of residential customers served over
     competitors' own facilities, those carriers have not challenged
     Verizon's claim that a sufficient number of residential customers
     are being served by competing LECs using their own facilities to
     demonstrate that there is an "actual commercial alternative" to
     Verizon in Massachusetts for purposes of a Track A showing.[^728]
     Specifically, both AT&T and WorldCom complain that Verizon's method
     of estimation overstates the current level of residential telephony
     competition in Massachusetts.[^729] Even if we credited such
     claims, however, Verizon has shown that facilities-based competing
     carriers serve more than a *de minimis* number of residential
     customers in Massachusetts. AT&T and WorldCom do not challenge this
     claim.[^730] Moreover, no carrier has challenged Verizon's evidence
     with regard to the level of facilities-based business competition.
     Accordingly, we conclude that Verizon has met the requirements for
     a Track A showing.

# SECTION 272 COMPLIANCE 

## Background

226. Section 271(d)(3)(B) requires that the Commission shall not approve
     a BOC's application to provide interLATA services unless the BOC
     demonstrates that the "requested authorization will be carried out
     in accordance with the requirements of section 272."[^731] The
     Commission set standards for compliance with section 272 in the
     *Accounting Safeguards Order* and the *Non-Accounting Safeguards
     Order*.[^732] Together, these safeguards discourage and facilitate
     the detection of improper cost allocation and cross-subsidization
     between the BOC and its section 272 affiliate.[^733] In addition,
     these safeguards ensure that BOCs do not discriminate in favor of
     their section 272 affiliates.[^734] As the Commission stated in
     prior section 271 orders, compliance with section 272 is "of
     crucial importance" because the structural, transactional, and
     nondiscrimination safeguards of section 272 seek to ensure that
     BOCs compete on a level playing field.[^735]

## Discussion

227. Based on the record, we conclude that Verizon has demonstrated that
     it complies with the requirements of section 272. Significantly,
     Verizon provides evidence that it maintains the same structural
     separation and nondiscrimination safeguards in Massachusetts as it
     does in New York, a state in which Verizon has already received
     section 271 authority.[^736] With the exception of Verizon's
     provisioning of special access services, no party challenges
     Verizon's section 272 showing. We address each section 272
     requirement below.

### Unchallenged Sections

228. We find, based on the evidence in the record, that Verizon's
     Massachusetts section 272 structure and compliance controls are the
     same as those the Commission reviewed for New York.[^737]
     Specifically, we conclude that Verizon demonstrates it will operate
     in accordance with the following elements of section 272: 1)
     section 272(a), which requires the BOC and its local exchange
     carrier affiliates that are subject to section 251(c) to provide
     certain competitive services through structurally separate
     affiliates; 2) section 272(b), which requires the BOC to
     demonstrate that its section 272 affiliates will operate
     independently, maintain separate books, records, and accounts,
     maintain separate officers, directors and employees, comply with
     certain credit requirements, and comply with the Commission's arm's
     length and public disclosure requirements; 3) section 272(c), which
     requires the BOC to account for all transactions with section 272
     affiliates in accordance with the accounting principles designated
     or approved by the Commission and prohibits discrimination in favor
     of the section 272 affiliates in the "provision or procurement of
     goods, services, facilities, and information, or in the
     establishment of standards;" 4) section 272(d), which requires an
     independent audit of the BOC's compliance with section 272 after
     receiving interLATA authorization; and 5) section 272(g), which
     requires that the BOC comply with that section's joint marketing
     provisions and affiliate services requirements.[^738]

### Challenged Sections

229. *Section 272(e) -- Fulfillment of Certain Requests.* Based on the
     evidence in the record, we conclude that Verizon will comply with
     section 272(e).[^739] Specifically, section 272(e) requires the BOC
     to fulfill requests for, among other things, telephone exchange and
     exchange access services from unaffiliated entities within the same
     time period the BOC fulfills such requests for its own retail
     operations.[^740] In addition, section 272(e) also provides that a
     BOC "shall not provide any facilities, services, or information
     concerning its provision of exchange access to the \[section 272
     affiliate\] unless such facilities, services or information are
     made available to other providers of interLATA services in that
     market on the same terms and conditions."[^741] Finally, section
     272(e) places certain accounting and nondiscrimination requirements
     on BOCs with respect to exchange access and facilities or services
     provided to their section 272 affiliates.[^742]

230. Several parties complain that the quality of Verizon's provisioning
     of special access services is poor.[^743] These comments do not
     undermine our finding that Verizon complies with section 272. As
     the Commission stated in the *Bell Atlantic New York Order* and the
     *SWBT Texas Order*, we do not consider the provision of special
     access services pursuant to a tariff for purposes of Verizon's
     section 272 showing.[^744] In addition, our section 272 analysis
     does not focus on Verizon's provisioning of special access services
     because Verizon does not currently have an operational section 272
     affiliate in Massachusetts. Consequently, we do not, nor could we,
     inquire whether Verizon provides competitors special access on a
     nondiscriminatory basis, as compared to Verizon's section 272
     affiliates. Our review, instead, focuses upon whether, after it
     receives section 271 authority, Verizon will maintain records
     tracking the quality of service to its section 272 affiliate for
     telephone exchange and exchange access services.[^745] While the
     Commission has not prescribed a reporting format, Verizon will
     provide exchange access service quality as described in its
     application.[^746] Because Verizon's special access performance
     will be included in these reports, [^747] we expect that any such
     discrimination will be detectable.

231. Finally, we note that Verizon reports to the Commission its special
     access performance pursuant to the *Bell Atlantic/GTE Merger
     Conditions*[^748] and, to the extent that parties are experiencing
     problems in the provisioning of special access services ordered
     from Verizon's federal tariffs, we note that these issues are
     appropriately addressed in the Commission's section 208 complaint
     process.

# PUBLIC INTEREST ANALYSIS 

232. Separate from determining whether a BOC satisfies the competitive
     checklist and will comply with section 272, Congress directed the
     Commission to assess whether the requested authorization would be
     consistent with the public interest, convenience, and
     necessity.[^749] We conclude that approval of this application is
     consistent with the public interest.

233. We view the public interest requirement as an opportunity to review
     the circumstances presented by the application to ensure that no
     other relevant factors exist that would frustrate the congressional
     intent that markets be open, as required by the competitive
     checklist, and that entry will therefore serve the public interest
     as Congress expected. Among other things, we may review the local
     and long distance markets to ensure that there are not unusual
     circumstances that would make entry contrary to the public interest
     under the particular circumstances of this application.[^750]
     Another factor that could be relevant to our analysis is whether we
     have sufficient assurance that markets will remain open after grant
     of the application. While no one factor is dispositive in this
     analysis, our overriding goal is to ensure that nothing undermines
     our conclusion, based on our analysis of checklist compliance, that
     this market is open to competition.

## Competition in Local Exchange and Long Distance Markets

234. As set forth below, we conclude that approval of this application
     is consistent with promoting competition in the local and long
     distance telecommunications markets in Massachusetts. Consistent
     with our extensive review of the competitive checklist, which
     embodies the critical elements of market entry under the Act, we
     find that barriers to competitive entry in the local markets have
     been removed and the local exchange markets today are open to
     competition. We further find that the record confirms our view, as
     noted in prior section 271 orders, that BOC entry into the long
     distance market will benefit consumers and competition if the
     relevant local exchange market is open to competition consistent
     with the competitive checklist.[^751]

235. Several commenters argue that the public interest would be
     disserved by granting Verizon's application because the local
     market in Massachusetts has not yet truly been opened to
     competition.[^752] We disagree. Commenters cite an array of
     evidence which, they argue, demonstrates that the local
     telecommunications market is not open and that competition has not
     sufficiently taken hold in Massachusetts. For example, several
     commenters suggest that the state of competition for residential
     services in Massachusetts indicates that this market is not yet
     truly open.[^753] Given an affirmative showing that a market is
     open and the competitive checklist has been satisfied, low customer
     volumes in and of themselves do not undermine that showing. Factors
     beyond a BOC\'s control, such as individual competitive LEC entry
     strategies, might explain a low residential customer base. We note
     that Congress specifically declined to adopt a market share or
     other similar test for BOC entry into long distance, and we have no
     intention of establishing one here.[^754]

## Assurance of Future Compliance

236. Verizon's Performance Assurance Plan (or PAP) for Massachusetts
     provides additional assurance that the local market will remain
     open after Verizon receives section 271 authorization. The
     Commission previously has explained that one factor it may consider
     as part of its public interest analysis is whether a BOC would
     continue to satisfy the requirements of section 271 after entering
     the long distance market.[^755] Although the Commission strongly
     encourages state performance monitoring and post-entry enforcement,
     it has never required BOC applicants to demonstrate that they are
     subject to such mechanisms as a condition of section 271
     approval.[^756] The Commission has stated that the fact that a BOC
     will be subject to performance monitoring and enforcement
     mechanisms would constitute probative evidence that the BOC will
     continue to meet its section 271 obligations and that its entry
     would be consistent with the public interest.[^757] Indeed,
     performance monitoring and enforcement mechanisms administered by
     state commissions can be critical complements to this Commission's
     section 271(d)(6) authority given the state commissions' historical
     role in regulating local exchange services. We note that in all the
     applications that have been granted to date, each contained an
     enforcement plan to protect against backsliding after entry into
     the long-distance market.[^758]

### Performance Assurance Plan

237. The Massachusetts Department has ordered Verizon to report
     performance data, on a monthly basis, using a wide range of
     performance measurements or metrics.[^759] These measurements were
     developed through the "Carrier-to-Carrier Service Quality"
     proceeding before the New York Commission.[^760] The measurements
     track Verizon's performance on functions essential to an open,
     competitive local market: pre-ordering, ordering, provisioning,
     maintenance and repair, network performance (interconnection
     trunks), collocation, billing and operator services. Associated
     with most of these measurements are standards \-- either benchmarks
     or retail analogues \-- also developed through the
     carrier-to-carrier proceeding.[^761]

238. The Massachusetts Department also required Verizon to submit a
     comprehensive performance enforcement mechanism, which would become
     effective upon Verizon receiving authority to provide interLATA
     services under section 271.[^762] The PAP is modeled on the New
     York plan the Commission reviewed in the *Bell Atlantic New York
     Order*. The PAP establishes an automatic process under which
     affected competitors receive bill credits if Verizon fails to
     satisfy pre-determined performance standards on a sub-set of the
     carrier-to-carrier reporting metrics.[^763]

239. The PAP has undergone several changes since Verizon's first
     Massachusetts filing. After that filing, the Massachusetts
     Department responded to competitive LECs' complaints by ordering
     Verizon, *inter alia*, to increase the amount of bill credits
     available for payment and to add DSL and Line Sharing
     metrics.[^764]

### Key Elements of the Performance Assurance Plan

240. The PAP in Massachusetts provides incentives to foster post-entry
     checklist compliance. Plans may vary in their strengths and
     weaknesses, and there is no one way to demonstrate assurance.[^765]
     In the *Bell Atlantic New York Order*, the Commission predicted
     that the enforcement mechanisms developed in New York would be
     effective in practice.[^766] The carrier-to-carrier guidelines were
     developed through a collaborative process involving the New York
     Commission, Verizon, and competitive LECs. The collaborative
     efforts yielded workable measures to sufficiently capture Verizon's
     wholesale performance.[^767] As explained below, the Massachusetts
     Department established a PAP that discourages anti-competitive
     behavior by setting the damages and penalties at a level above the
     simple cost of doing business.

241. *Total Liability At Risk.* The Massachusetts PAP places a total of
     \$155 million in potential bill credits placed at risk, on an
     annual basis, under all components of the PAP.[^768] The PAP
     adopted by the Massachusetts Department does not represent the only
     means of ensuring that Verizon continues to provide
     nondiscriminatory service to competing carriers. In addition to the
     \$155 million at stake under this plan, Verizon faces other
     consequences if it fails to sustain a high level of service to
     competing carriers, including: federal enforcement action pursuant
     to section 271(d)(6) and remedies associated with antitrust and
     other legal actions.[^769]

242. We reject commenters' assertions that the PAP limitations on the
     damages available to competitive LECs to the *higher* of PAP bill
     credits or damages under their individual interconnection
     agreements dilutes the PAP's value as an anti-backsliding
     safeguard.[^770] We also note that in previous section 271 orders
     the Commission has seen public interest benefits in liquidated
     contract damages to supplement enforcement plan damages.[^771] The
     Massachusetts Department concludes, however, that the
     interconnection agreements here provide damages more like a
     comprehensive PAP than the limited contract damages available to
     competitive LECs in New York.[^772] In addition, the Massachusetts
     Department has found that requiring Verizon to pay cumulative
     damages would result in double counting.[^773] Finally, the
     Massachusetts Department can increase the amount of bill credits
     available to competitive LECs under the PAP should it decide that
     the current amount is inadequate to compensate competitive LECs and
     penalize Verizon.[^774] Given this, the PAP, with the Massachusetts
     Department's ongoing oversight, will deter backsliding and serve
     the public interest.

243. *Performance Measurements and Standards.* Each performance metric
     developed through the carrier-to-carrier proceeding has a
     clearly-articulated definition, or "business rule," which sets
     forth the manner in which the data are to be collected by Verizon,
     lists any relevant exclusions, and states the applicable
     performance standards.[^775] The clarity provided by these business
     rules will help to ensure that the reporting mechanism provides a
     "benchmark against which new entrants and regulators can measure
     performance over time to detect and correct any degradation of
     service rendered to new entrants."[^776]

244. We note that commenters in the first Massachusetts application
     complained that the PAP lacked sufficient DSL and Line Sharing
     measurements to deter backsliding in these important areas.[^777]
     Since that filing, these concerns have been addressed.
     Specifically, Verizon has added DSL as its own Mode of Entry
     category and added DSL metrics to the Critical Measures.[^778]
     Verizon also imported EDI notifier metrics from the New York PAP to
     the Massachusetts plan (including additional damages).[^779]
     Although commenters raise a handful of additional concerns about
     specific metrics in the PAP,[^780] none of these arguments
     demonstrate that the PAP is contrary to the public interest or
     insufficient to prevent backsliding in light of the substantial
     progress Verizon and the Massachusetts Department have made
     strengthening the plan since the first application.

245. *Structural Elements of the PAP.* The structural elements of the
     PAP are designed to detect and sanction poor performance when it
     occurs. The PAP sets forth, in great detail, the processes by which
     Verizon's performance is measured and evaluated, the method for
     determining compliance and noncompliance with respect to individual
     metrics, and the manner in which noncompliance with individual
     metrics will translate into bill credits.[^781]

246. *Self-executing mechanism.* The PAP's performance monitoring and
     enforcement mechanisms are reasonably self-executing and comparable
     to those the Commission reviewed in the *Bell Atlantic New York
     Order*, the *SWBT Texas Order*, and the *SWBT Kansas/Oklahoma
     Order*.[^782] We reject commenters' claims that the PAP's waiver
     provisions allow Verizon to escape liability too easily.[^783] In
     this case, Verizon may ask for a waiver for "unusual" competitive
     LEC behavior.[^784] When it seeks a waiver, Verizon must provide
     detailed documentation as to why competitive LEC behavior
     necessitates the waiver. Verizon, moreover, must prove its case
     with clear and convincing evidence and provide competitive LECs an
     opportunity to respond to Verizon's petition. We disagree with
     commenters, therefore, that the absence of a deadline to act on
     waivers detracts from the effectiveness of the PAP or undermines
     its public interest value.

247. *Data Validation and Audit Procedures.* The PAP includes review and
     monitoring mechanisms that assure the data will be reported in a
     consistent and reliable manner. The Massachusetts Department has
     ordered Verizon to obtain an independent audit of Verizon's data
     and reporting on an annual basis.[^785] The Massachusetts
     Department will select the auditor and the audit will be subject to
     the Massachusetts Department's review.[^786] The Massachusetts
     Department will also conduct an annual review to determine whether
     changes should be made to improve the PAP.[^787]

248. *Accounting Requirements*. Consistent with our accounting rules
     with respect to antitrust damages and certain other penalties paid
     by carriers,[^788] Verizon should not reflect any portion of market
     adjustments as expenses under the revenue requirement for
     interstate services of the Verizon incumbent LEC. Such accounting
     treatment ensures that ratepayers do not bear, in the form of
     increased rates, the cost of market adjustments under the
     enforcement plan in the event Verizon fails to provide adequate
     service quality to competitive LECs.[^789]

## Other Issues

249. ALTS and Sprint allege that Verizon mismanaged its responsibility
     when it was the local numbering administrator and, therefore,
     granting the application would be in violation of the public
     interest.[^790] These allegations do not convince us that a grant
     of this application would be inconsistent with the public interest.
     Specifically, even assuming these allegations are true, they do not
     undermine our confidence that Verizon's local market is open to
     competition and will remain so after it receives interLATA
     authority.[^791]

# SECTION 271(d)(6) enforcement authority

250. Section 271(d)(6) of the Act requires Verizon to continue to
     satisfy the "conditions required for . . . approval" of its section
     271 application after the Commission approves its
     application.[^792] As the Commission has already described the
     post-approval enforcement framework and its various section
     271(d)(6) enforcement powers in detail in prior orders, it is
     unnecessary to do so again in this Order.[^793] Working in concert
     with the Massachusetts Department, we intend to monitor closely
     Verizon's post-approval compliance for Massachusetts to ensure that
     Verizon does not "cease\[ \] to meet any of the conditions required
     for \[section 271\] approval."[^794] We stand ready to exercise our
     various statutory enforcement powers quickly and decisively in
     appropriate circumstances to ensure that the local market remains
     open in Massachusetts. For example, we expect that Verizon's
     proposed new processes for LFACS access and pre-order manual loop
     qualifications will enhance competitors' ability to access loop
     make-up information in a nondiscriminatory fashion. As stated
     above, we note that Verizon has established October 2001 as the
     expected completion date for its system enhancements. We stress
     that we are prepared to use our authority under section 271(d)(6)
     if evidence surfaces at a later date that Verizon's OSS have fallen
     out of compliance with the requirements of the *UNE Remand Order*.

251. The Commission has a responsibility to not only ensure that Verizon
     is in compliance with section 271 today, but also that it remains
     in compliance in the future. The Commission will not hesitate to
     use its enforcement authority after section 271 authority has been
     granted. In this regard, the Commission will pay particular
     attention to section 271 checklist items where Verizon's
     performance was most marginal. For example, like many commenters in
     this proceeding[^795] and the Department of Justice,[^796] we have
     serious concerns that repetition of some of the assumptions
     incorporated into the original Massachusetts Department-approved
     UNE switching rates may result in rates outside the range that the
     reasonable application of TELRIC principles would produce. We note
     that these original rates were significantly higher than those of
     any other state of comparable population and teledensity,[^797] and
     there does not appear to have been any justification for such
     significant differences based on Massachusetts-specific
     technological, environmental, regulatory, and economic conditions.
     The original cost study used to set those rates has a number of
     potential flaws that, if repeated without justification, could
     result in UNE rates that warrant enforcement action. These include
     the size of switch discounts that it assumed would be available
     from vendors, the use of an installation factor (the cost to
     install a switch) that was based on installation costs relative to
     discounted switches but applied to undiscounted switches, a cost of
     capital in excess of the authorized rate of return in Massachusetts
     and higher than any other state in Verizon's territory with nothing
     on the record to justify a Massachusetts-specific difference, and
     an inappropriate busy hour conversion factor.[^798] Because states
     have considerable flexibility in setting UNE rates, certain flaws
     in a cost study, by themselves, may not result in rates that are
     outside the reasonable range that a correct application of our
     TELRIC rules would produce. Collectively, however, the number of
     possible flaws in the original cost study, if repeated without
     adequate state-specific justification, may well result in prices
     outside the reasonable range of what TELRIC would produce. The
     Massachusetts Department is currently examining all UNE prices in
     its five-year UNE rate review. We presume, as we do with all state
     commissions, that the Massachusetts Department will set UNE rates
     within the range of what a reasonable application of what TELRIC
     would produce. We observe that in any context in which prices are
     not set in accordance with our rules and the Act, we retain the
     ability to take appropriate enforcement action, including action
     pursuant to section 271(d)(6), and will not hesitate to do
     so.[^799]

252. Consistent with prior section 271 orders, we require Verizon to
     report to the Commission all Massachusetts carrier-to-carrier
     performance metrics results and Performance Assurance Plan monthly
     reports beginning with the first full month after the effective
     date of this Order, and for each month thereafter for one year
     unless extended by the Commission or Chief of the Enforcement
     Bureau. These results and reports will allow us to review, on an
     on-going basis, Verizon's performance to ensure continued
     compliance with the statutory requirements. We are confident that
     cooperative state and federal oversight and enforcement can address
     any backsliding that may arise with respect to Verizon's entry into
     the Massachusetts long distance market.[^800]

# CONCLUSION

253. For the reasons discussed above, we grant Verizon's application for
     authorization under section 271 of the Act to provide in-region,
     interLATA services in the state of Massachusetts.

# Ordering Clauses

254. Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that, pursuant to sections 4(i), 4(j),
     and 271 of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, 47 U.S.C. §§
     154(i), 154(j) and 271, Verizon's application to provide in-region,
     interLATA service in the state of Massachusetts, filed on January
     16, 2001, IS GRANTED.

255. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this Order SHALL BECOME EFFECTIVE April
     26, 2001.

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

Magalie Roman Salas,

Secretary

APPENDIX A

List of Commenters

**Verizon New England Inc., et al., Section 271 Application to**

**Provide In-Region InterLATA Services in Massachusetts**

**CC Docket No. 01-9**

**Comments**

Commenters:

A.R.C. Networks, Inc.

Association for Local Telecommunications Services (ALTS); XO
Communications, Inc., & Focal Communications Corporation (filing
jointly)

Association of Communications Enterprises

AT&T Corp.

Commercial Internet Exchange Association

Competitive Telecommunications Association (CompTel)

Conversent Communications of Massachusetts, L.L.C.

Covad Communications Company

Fiber Technologies

Global Crossing North America, Inc.

Global NAPS, Inc.

Massachusetts Attorney General

Massachusetts Coalition for Competitive Phone Service

Network Access Solutions

New England Public Communications Council, Inc.

NOBLE (North of Boston Library Exchange, Inc.)

RCN BecoCom, L.L.C.

Rhythms Netconnections Inc.

Sprint Communications Company L.P.

Telecommunications Advocacy Project

Winstar Communications, Inc.

WorldCom, Inc.

**Verizon New England Inc., et al., Section 271 Application to**

**Provide In-Region InterLATA Services in Massachusetts**

**CC Docket No. 01-9**

**Reply Comments**

Commenters:

AT&T Corp.

Commercial Internet Exchange Association

Competition Policy Institute

Covad Communications Company

Massachusetts Attorney General's Office

Massachusetts Department of Telecommunications & Energy

Network Access Solutions

United States Internet Provider Alliance

Verizon New England

Winstar Communications, Inc.

WorldCom, Inc.

**Verizon New England Inc., et al., Section 271 Application to**

**Provide In-Region InterLATA Services in Massachusetts**

**CC Docket No. 00-176**

**Comments**

Commenters:

Affiliated Chambers of Commerce of Greater Springfield, Inc.

Alliance for Education

Alliance for Public Technology

Arts Boston

Association of Communications Enterprises

Association for Local Telecommunications Services (ALTS)

AT & T Corp.

BCNC (Business in Partnership with the Community)

Blackstone valley Vocational Regional School District

Boston Partners in Education

Boston Private Industry Council

Boston Public Schools

Bristol Workforce Investment Board

Cape and Islands United Way

Cape Cod Technology Council, Inc.

Century 21

Chinatown Business Association

Chemetal

City of Boston, MA, Office of the Mayor

City of Brockton, MA, Office of the Mayor

City of Chelsea, MA

City of Fall River, MA

City of Haverhill, Haverhill, MA

City of Marlborough, MA, Office of the Mayor

City of Melrose, MA, Office of the Mayor

City of New Bedford, Office of the Mayor

City of Taunton, MA, Office of the Mayor

City of Taunton, MA, Mayor's Office of Economic Development

Communica

Competitive Telecommunications Association

CONQUEST, Inc.

Consulado General de la Republica Dominicana

Covad

Diane Davis Associates

Florence Paint & Decorating Center, Inc.

Frank M. Hynes, State Representative

Greater New Bedford Workforce investment Board, Inc.

Haddad Electronic Supply Inc.

Hispanic-American Chamber of Commerce

Immigrant Learning Center

Just a Start Corporation

Keep America Connected, et al.

League of Latin American Citizens

Lynn Area Chamber of Commerce

Martin L. King, Jr. Business Empowerment Center

Massachusetts Attorney General

Massachusetts House of Representatives

Massachusetts Department of Telecommunications & Energy

Massachusetts Rural Development Council, Inc.

MATP Center (Massachusetts Assistive Technology Partnership Center)

Mentor

Merrimack Valley Economic Development Council, Inc.

MetroWest Chamber of Commerce

National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, Washington
Bureau

National Association of Partners in Education

National Black Chamber of Commerce, et al.

National Congress for Puerto Rican Rights

NECLEC, LLC

Network Access Solutions Corporation

New Networks Institute

Northern Essex Community College

Onsite Access Local, L.L.C.

Organizations Concerned About Rural Education (OCRE)

Plymouth Area Chamber of Commerce

Puerto Rican Cultural Center

Puerto Rico Federal Affairs Administration

Public Schools of Springfield, MA

Rainbow Push Coalition

RCN BecoCom, L.L.C.

RNK Inc. d/b/a RNK Telecom

Regional Employment Board of Hampden County, Inc.

Rhythms Netconnections Inc.

Saunders Hotel Group

Shepley Wood Products, Inc.

Southern Essex Workforce Investment Board

Springfield Bilingual Veteran's Outreach Center

Sprint Communications Company L.P.

Stanton Insurance Agency, Inc.

Stik-II Products

Telecommunications Insight Group

Telecommunications Research and Action Center (TRAC)

The October Company, Inc.

The Lowell Plan

Thomas J. O'Brien, State Representative

Town of Braintree, MA

Town of Burlington, MA

Town of Cohasset, MA

Town of Randolph, MA

Town of Scituate, MA

United Seniors Health Cooperative

University of Massachusetts, Boston

Urban League of Eastern Massachusetts Inc.

Vinny deMacedo, State Representative

Waltham West Suburban Chamber of Commerce

Wellesley Chamber of Commerce, Inc.

Winstar Communications, Inc.

Worcester Area Chamber of Commerce

WorldCom, Inc.

World Institute on Disability, et al.

Z-Tel Communications, Inc.

**Verizon New England Inc., et al., Section 271 Application to**

**Provide In-Region InterLATA Services in Massachusetts**

**CC Docket No. 00-176**

**Reply Comments**

Commenters:

Alliance for Public Technology

Allegiance Telecom of Massachusetts, Inc.

AT&T Corp.

Covad

Digital Broadband Communications, Inc.

Fiber Technologies, Inc.

Keep America Connected, et al.

Massachusetts Attorney General

Massachusetts Department of Telecommunications & Energy

National Consumers League

RCN BecoCom

Rhythms NetConnections Inc.

Telecommunications Research & Action Center (TRAC)

Verizon

Winstar Communications, Inc.

WorldCom, Inc.

Appendix B

Statutory Requirements -- Checklist Items 6-12

1.  *Checklist Item 6 -- Unbundled Local Switching.* Section
    271(c)(2)(B)(ix) requires BOCs to provide "\[l\]ocal switching
    unbundled from transport, local loop transmission, or other
    services."[^801] To satisfy its obligations under this subsection,
    an applicant must demonstrate compliance with the Commission rules
    effective as of the date of the application relating to unbundled
    local switching, must of which are set forth in detail in our prior
    section 271 orders.[^802] The Commission revised these rules in the
    *UNE Remand Order*, which was released on November 5, 1999. That
    order generally retained the unbundling obligations for local
    switching while narrowing the scope of obligation for certain
    geographic areas.[^803] In the *UNE Remand Order*, the Commission
    required that incumbent LECs need not provide access on an unbundled
    basis to packet switching except in certain limited
    situations.[^804]

```{=html}
<!-- -->
```
256. *Checklist Item 7* -- *911/E911 Access and Directory
     Assistance/Operator Services*. Section 271(c)(2)(B)(vii) of the Act
     requires a BOC to provide "\[n\]ondiscriminatory access to -- (I)
     911 and E911 services."[^805] In the *Ameritech Michigan Order*,
     the Commission found that "section 271 requires a BOC to provide
     competitors access to its 911 and E911 services in the same manner
     that a BOC obtains such access, *i.e.*, at parity."[^806]
     Specifically, the Commission found that a BOC "must maintain the
     911 database entries for competing LECs with the same accuracy and
     reliability that it maintains the database entries for its own
     customers."[^807] For facilities-based carriers, the BOC must
     provide "unbundled access to \[its\] 911 database and 911
     interconnection, including the provision of dedicated trunks from
     the requesting carrier's switching facilities to the 911 control
     office at parity with what \[the BOC\] provides to itself."[^808]
     Section 271(c)(2)(B)(vii)(II) and section 271(c)(2)(B)(vii)(III)
     require a BOC to provide nondiscriminatory access to "directory
     assistance services to allow the other carrier's customers to
     obtain telephone numbers" and "operator call completion services,"
     respectively.[^809] Section 251(b)(3) of the Act imposes on each
     LEC "the duty to permit all \[competing providers of telephone
     exchange service and telephone toll service\] to have
     nondiscriminatory access to . . . operator services, directory
     assistance, and directory listing, with no unreasonable dialing
     delays."[^810] The Commission concluded in the *Second BellSouth
     Louisiana Order* that a BOC must be in compliance with the
     regulations implementing section 251(b)(3) to satisfy the
     requirements of sections 271(c)(2)(B)(vii)(II) and
     271(c)(2)(B)(vii)(III).[^811] In the *Local Competition Second
     Report and Order*, the Commission held that the phrase
     "nondiscriminatory access to directory assistance and directory
     listings" means that "the customers of all telecommunications
     service providers should be able to access each LEC's directory
     assistance service and obtain a directory listing on a
     nondiscriminatory basis, notwithstanding: (1) the identity of a
     requesting customer's local telephone service provider; or (2) the
     identity of the telephone service provider for a customer whose
     directory listing is requested."[^812] The Commission concluded
     that nondiscriminatory access to the dialing patterns of 4-1-1 and
     5-5-5-1-2-1-2 to access directory assistance were technically
     feasible, and would continue.[^813] The Commission specifically
     held that the phrase \"nondiscriminatory access to operator
     services\" means that ". . . a telephone service customer,
     regardless of the identity of his or her local telephone service
     provider, must be able to connect to a local operator by dialing
     '0,' or '0 plus' the desired telephone number."[^814]

257. Competing carriers may provide operator services and directory
     assistance by either reselling the BOC's services or by using their
     own personnel and facilities to provide these services. Our rules
     require BOCs to permit competitive LECs wishing to resell the BOC's
     operator services and directory assistance to request the BOC to
     brand their calls.[^815] Competing carriers wishing to provide
     operator services or directory assistance using their own
     facilities and personnel must be able to obtain directory listings
     *either* by obtaining directory information on a "read only" or
     "per dip" basis from the BOC's directory assistance database, or by
     creating their own directory assistance database by obtaining the
     subscriber listing information in the BOC's database.[^816]
     Although the Commission originally concluded that BOCs must provide
     directory assistance and operator services on an unbundled basis
     pursuant to sections 251 and 252, the Commission removed directory
     assistance and operator services from the list of required
     unbundled network elements in the *Local Competition Third Report
     and Order*.[^817] Checklist item obligations that do not fall
     within a BOC's obligations to provide unbundled network elements
     are not subject to the requirements of sections 251 and 252,
     including the requirement that rates be based on forward-looking
     economic costs.[^818] Checklist item obligations that do not fall
     within a BOC's UNE obligations, however, still must be provided in
     accordance with sections 201(b) and 202(a), which require that
     rates and conditions be just and reasonable, and not unreasonably
     discriminatory.[^819]

258. *Checklist Item 8 -- White Pages Directory Listing.* Section
     271(c)(2)(B)(viii) of the Act requires a BOC to provide "\[w\]hite
     pages directory listings for customers of the other carrier's
     telephone exchange service."[^820] Section 251(b)(3) of the Act
     obligates all LECs to permit competitive *providers* of telephone
     exchange service and telephone toll service to have
     nondiscriminatory access to directory listings.[^821] In the
     *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, the Commission found that a BOC
     satisfies the requirements of checklist item 8 by demonstrating
     that it: (1) provided nondiscriminatory appearance and integration
     of white page directory listings to competitive LEC's customers;
     and (2) provided white page listings for competitors' customers
     with the same accuracy and reliability that it provides its own
     customers.[^822]

259. *Checklist Item 9 -- Numbering Administration*. Section
     271(c)(2)(B)(ix) of the Act requires a BOC to provide
     "nondiscriminatory access to telephone numbers for assignment to
     the other carrier's telephone *exchange* service customers," until
     "the date by which telecommunications numbering administration,
     guidelines, plan, or rules are established."[^823] The checklist
     mandates compliance with "such guidelines, plan, or rules" after
     they have been established.[^824] A BOC must demonstrate that it
     adheres to industry numbering administration guidelines and
     Commission rules.[^825]

260. *Checklist Item 10 -- Databases and Associated Signaling*. Section
     271(c)(2)(B)(x) of the Act requires a BOC to provide
     "nondiscriminatory access to databases and associated signaling
     necessary for call routing and completion."[^826] In the *Second
     BellSouth Louisiana Order*, the Commission required BellSouth to
     demonstrate that it provided requesting carriers with
     nondiscriminatory access to: "(1) signaling networks, including
     signaling links and signaling transfer points; (2) certain
     call-related databases necessary for call routing and completion,
     or in the alternative, a means of physical access to the signaling
     transfer point linked to the unbundled database; and (3) Service
     Management Systems (SMS)." [^827] The Commission also required
     BellSouth to design, create, test, and deploy Advanced Intelligent
     Network (AIN) based services at the SMS through a Service Creation
     Environment (SCE).[^828] In the *Local Competition First Report and
     Order*, the Commission defined call-related databases as databases,
     other than operations support systems, that are used in signaling
     networks for billing and collection or the transmission, routing,
     or other provision of telecommunications service.[^829] At that
     time the Commission required incumbent LECs to provide unbundled
     access to their call-related databases, including but not limited
     to: the Line Information Database (LIDB), the Toll Free Calling
     database, the Local Number Portability database, and Advanced
     Intelligent Network databases.[^830] In the *UNE Remand Order*, the
     Commission clarified that the definition of call-related databases
     "includes, but is not limited to, the calling name (CNAM) database,
     as well as the 911 and E911 databases."[^831]

261. *Checklist Item 11 -- Number Portability*. Section 271(c)(2)(B) of
     the Act requires a BOC to comply with the number portability
     regulations adopted by the Commission pursuant to section
     251.[^832] Section 251(b)(2) requires all LECs "to provide, to the
     extent technically feasible, number portability in accordance with
     requirements prescribed by the Commission."[^833] The Act defines
     number portability as "the ability of users of telecommunications
     services to retain, at the same location, existing
     telecommunications numbers without *impairment* of quality,
     reliability, or convenience when switching from one
     telecommunications carrier to another."[^834] In order to prevent
     the cost of number portability from thwarting local competition,
     Congress enacted section 251(e)(2), which requires that "\[t\]he
     cost of establishing telecommunications numbering administration
     arrangements and number portability shall be borne by all
     telecommunications carriers on a competitively neutral basis as
     determined by the Commission."[^835] Pursuant to these statutory
     provisions, the Commission requires LECs to offer interim number
     portability "to the extent technically feasible."[^836] The
     Commission also requires LECs to gradually replace interim number
     portability with permanent number portability.[^837] The Commission
     has established guidelines for states to follow in mandating a
     competitively neutral cost-recovery mechanism for interim number
     portability,[^838] and created a competitively neural cost-recovery
     mechanism for long-term number portability.[^839]

262. *Checklist Item 12 -- Local Dialing Parity*. Section
     271(c)(2)(B)(xii) requires a BOC to provide "\[n\]ondiscriminatory
     access to such services or information as are necessary to allow
     the requesting carrier to implement *local* dialing parity in
     accordance with the requirements of section 251(b)(3)."[^840]
     Section 251(b)(3) imposes upon all LECs "\[t\]he duty to provide
     dialing parity to competing providers of telephone exchange service
     and telephone toll service with no unreasonable dialing
     delays."[^841] Section 153(15) of the Act defines "dialing parity"
     as follows:

\[A\] person that is not an affiliate of a local exchange carrier is
able to provide telecommunications services in such a manner that
customers have the ability to route automatically, without the use of
any access code, their telecommunications to the telecommunications
services provider of the customer's designation . . . .[^842]

263. Our rules implementing section 251(b)(3) provide that customers of
     competing carriers must be able to dial the same number of digits
     the BOC's customers dial to complete a local telephone call.[^843]
     Moreover, customers of competing carriers must not otherwise suffer
     inferior quality service, such as unreasonable dialing delays,
     compared to the BOC's customers.[^844]

**SEPARATE STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN MICHAEL K. POWELL**

*Re: Application of Verizon New England Inc., Bell Atlantic
Communications, Inc. (d/b/a Verizon Long Distance), NYNEX Long Distance
Company (d/b/a Verizon Enterprise Solutions) and Verizon Global Networks
Inc., for Authorization to Provide In-Region, InterLATA Services in
Massachusetts (CC Docket No. 01-9)*

I write separately to explain the bases upon which I support this
*Order,* which approves an application by Verizon to provide in-region,
interLATA service in Massachusetts, pursuant to section 271 of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996.

There was a time when the Commission's interpretation of section 271 was
so fluid that it was difficult to ascertain precisely what was required
of a Bell Company to enable it to attain approval to enter the long
distance market. The Commission was criticized for "hiding the ball" in
that, in the face of undeniably weak applications, we declined to
provide guidance regarding what we would find to be a persuasive showing
of compliance with the statutory "competitive checklist."

Under the stewardship of the previous Chairman, however, the Commission
concertedly labored to provide more detailed guidance, notwithstanding
the strict limitations imposed on our deliberations by the 90-day
statutory deadline for approving or rejecting section 271 applications.
The fruits of this effort have been that, of the more than five years in
which we have been responsible for implementing section 271, we have
adopted all five approval orders only in the last 16 months. This
cluster of recent approvals (which were supported by all of my present
colleagues) is, in my view, the result of simple logic: without a clear
explanation of what they needed to do to gain section 271 approval, Bell
Companies lacked adequate incentives and ability to do what this
provision intended, namely, open local markets in exchange for entry
into the in-region, interLATA telecommunications market.

But future applicants and other interested parties are admonished that,
even after more than a year of applying a standard that provides section
271 applicants the guidance they need to succeed, the Commission will
continue to apply the same rigor it always has to these questions. It is
not overstating matters to point out that the legal and policy questions
encompassed by these proceedings are extraordinarily complex and, most
often, close questions must be resolved. As such, there still will be
times when the Commission receives an application that either fails to
meet the demanding standard outlined in our precedent, or fails based on
questions that surface for the first time.

With respect to the application before us, though it has some
weaknesses, I believe it is consistent with our precedent and merits
approval. The central concern with this application is the rate Verizon
offers for switching. It is clearly higher than those we have seen in
some other states. Our task under the checklist, however, is to ensure
that whatever rates are offered are "cost-based" and the product of a
forward-looking methodology (*i.e.,* TELRIC). In evaluating section 271
applications, the Commission does not conduct completely independent
rate proceedings. Thus, we are left to examine whether a state
commission demonstrates intent and some ability to use the appropriate
methodology, and whether the rates ultimately relied on in the
application are within the range that a reasonable application of TELRIC
principles would produce.

Here, Verizon relies on a switching rate lower than that set by the
Massachusetts Department, recognizing the Commission's concern that the
state-set rate might not be appropriately cost-based. Verizon chose
simply to offer a switching rate similar to that we approved in New
York. In the *Bell Atlantic New York Order,* we found this rate to be
consistent with the cost-based methods we require. Given that, I believe
we are constrained to approve the rate unless we find it unquestionably
clear that the rate is not built on the proper TELRIC foundation. In
contrast, opponents of this application argue that we should not rely on
the New York rate, because the New York Commission is on the verge of
revising it, having found an arguable input error in its previous
methodology. It is alleged that this revision will result in a
substantially lower rate and thus we should not endorse the current rate
for Massachusetts.

This is not an idle concern, for we recognize the importance of
cost-based rates to new entrants hoping to enter the incumbent's local
market. I must conclude, however, that we cannot properly reject an
application from one state that is consistent with precedent, on the
basis of speculation regarding the outcome of another state's future
rate proceeding. We cannot know with sufficient certainty what will be
the full impact on the rates of that future proceeding, even if it is
generally accepted that the rate is likely to be lower. Nor can we, on
this record and within the constraints of this 90-day proceeding,
conduct our own *de novo* evaluation of these switching rates, so as to
revise our prior decision. Moreover, I cannot agree that we should, as a
prior condition of approving this application, compel Verizon (through
formal or informal means) to mirror its Massachusetts rates with any
revisions that occur in New York. Taking such action now, as a condition
of approval, would impermissibly subject the Massachusetts Department to
the regulatory actions of another state and might well interfere with
the Department's ongoing ratemaking proceedings.

That said, approval today does not forever insulate the switching rate
Verizon has successfully proferred in this application. If New York in
fact revises its rates downward after concluding that its prior
determinations were not soundly cost-based, neither Verizon nor anyone
else could properly rely in future applications on the rates we approved
in the *Bell Atlantic New York Order* without new substantiation.
Furthermore, depending on the scope of the New York Commission's
upcoming decision on rates, this Commission might determine that Verizon
has subsequently "ceased to meet \[one\] of the conditions required for
\[section 271\] approval," thereby empowering us to take remedial action
under section 271(d)(6). Thus, there may be situations after the New
York Commission rules in which I would support taking action that would
have the practical effect of requiring Verizon to find a new cost-based
rate for switching for a few months until the Massachusetts Department
resets its rates. I have full confidence that the Massachusetts
Department will take account of New York's experience, as well as
carefully ensure that any rates it chooses are based on sound TELRIC
methodology, as described in this and prior Commission orders.

For these reasons and with these caveats, I support adoption of this
section 271 application. I wish to thank, in particular, the
Massachusetts Department, the Department of Justice and our tireless
Common Carrier Bureau staff for their exemplary skill, drive and stamina
in bringing this *Order* to fruition.

**SEPARATE STATEMENT OF**

**COMMISSIONER SUSAN NESS**

*Re: Application of Verizon New England Inc., Bell Atlantic
Communications, Inc. (d/b/a Verizon Long Distance), NYNEX Long Distance
Company (d/b/a Verizon Enterprise Solutions) and Verizon Global Networks
Inc., for Authorization to Provide In-Region, InterLATA Services in
Massachusetts (CC Docket No. 01-9)*

Notwithstanding serious reservations about Verizon New England's pricing
of unbundled network elements, I vote to approve this application to
provide long-distance services in Massachusetts. On balance, I believe
that Massachusetts consumers will benefit from heightened competition in
both the long distance and local markets. Although I vote for this order
with some trepidation, I am optimistic that this Commission and the
Massachusetts Department of Telecommunications and Energy (DTE) will
maintain vigilance to ensure that the market-opening requirements
mandated by Congress continue to be met.

Enduring competition in the local market will only take root and thrive
if we and our state colleagues rigorously pursue cost-based pricing.
Indeed, pricing is at the very core of the statutory framework Congress
constructed to eliminate economic barriers to entry in all
telecommunications markets. The use of a forward-looking methodology \--
with a reasonable risk-adjusted return to incumbents \-- promotes fair
and efficient competition.

Since the earliest 271 applications, the Commission has made clear that
we must make an independent determination that the rates are based on
forward-looking costs \-- a statutory responsibility that the Commission
diligently undertook in the recent *SWBT Kansas/Oklahoma Order*.[^845]
Today's decision squarely reaffirms this obligation.

Our independent evaluation shows that the original switching rates
adopted by the Massachusetts DTE were substantially higher than other
states and not within a range of prices that would be consistent with
forward-looking principles. With average consumer usage, the per month
costs for switching, transport, and signaling would have been \$21.68 in
Massachusetts -- more than double the rate in New York and more than 300
percent above the rates in numerous other states in Verizon's territory
and across the country. I would not have approved an application that
was based upon such rates absent compelling evidence that switching
costs in Massachusetts should differ so extraordinarily from those in
other states.

The order permits Verizon to rely on current switching rates from New
York \-- a neighboring state with similar cost characteristics \-- to
prove compliance with the statutory requirements. I have significant
misgivings about this approach. The rates adopted in New York are
several years old and are under active review by the New York Commission
with a true-up after it completes its review. As noted above, since our
approval of Verizon's New York application, other states have adopted
switching rates that are significantly lower than those in New York.
Reluctantly, I am compelled to support the decision to grant this
application because the rates that were approved by the New York
Commission \-- and evaluated by this Commission \-- are presently in
effect and there is insufficient evidence in the record *at this time*
to determine that those rates are inconsistent with forward-looking
principles.

Today's order correctly recognizes, however, that rates will evolve over
time to reflect changed market conditions, new technologies, and updated
information on cost inputs. Parties should be forewarned that they
should not rely on outdated rates in future applications. Moreover,
depending on the New York Commission's decision, Verizon's reliance on
the present rates to demonstrate continuing compliance in Massachusetts
may be undermined. If the New York Commission orders lower rates after
determining that the present rates are not cost-based and Verizon does
not revise its rates in Massachusetts, the FCC should use its section
271(d)(6) authority to suspend or revoke Verizon's long-distance
authorization in Massachusetts until the DTE completes its cost
proceeding.

I am also troubled by the cost inputs used to set the loop rates in
Massachusetts. In particular, the fill factor used is exceptionally low.
In addition, the designated cost of capital exceeds the figure used to
set retail rates in Massachusetts and is substantially higher than the
percentages used in the other Verizon states. I have every confidence
that the Massachusetts DTE will address any flaws in the inputs through
its pending cost proceeding.

As we have consistently noted, opening a local market to competition
does not end with the grant of a 271 application. Indeed, the Commission
and state commissions must be even more vigilant in ensuring that
incumbents live up to their statutory obligations once long-distance
authorization is granted.

This application demonstrates the importance of each state commission
undertaking an evaluation of forward-looking costs as it establishes
rates within its borders. It also demonstrates that, although a
forward-looking methodology provides latitude in setting rates, pricing
decisions in other states can serve as a benchmark by which a state
commission can evaluate the appropriateness of its rates. I encourage
state commissions to undertake a pro-active dialogue on pricing with
each other and with this Commission so that the benefits of effective
competition reach consumers throughout the entire country as quickly as
possible.

After this fifth grant of an application to provide long-distance
services, there should no longer be any question about *getting to yes*;
rather the focus must be on *getting it right.*

CONCURRING STATEMENT OF

COMMISSIONER HAROLD FURCHTGOTT-ROTH

*Re: Application of Verizon New England Inc., Bell Atlantic
Communications, Inc. (d/b/a Verizon Long Distance), NYNEX Long Distance
Company (d/b/a Verizon Enterprise Solutions) and Verizon Global Networks
Inc., for Authorization to Provide In-Region, InterLATA Services in
Massachusetts (CC Docket No. 01-9)*

I support today's decision to grant Verizon Section 271 authority in
Massachusetts. While I continue to have doubts about the Commission's
overall approach to these proceedings, I believe today's approval is a
first step towards a more statutorily-constrained approach to Section
271 applications.

There are a number of hopeful signs in today's Order. First, the
Commission has resisted the temptation to condition its approval on some
future event or approve entry based on some new information submitted
after the filing date.[^846] The only relevant consideration should be a
carrier's section 271 performance [at the time the application is
filed]{.underline}. Section 271 is intended to be a snapshot of what
actually prevailed in the market 90 days ago not a crystal-ball-gazing
speculation about a parade of horribles that may -- or may not -- happen
in the future. When speculation prevails, 11^th^ hour "dealmaking" is
not far behind.

Second, today's decision is less intrusive into the province of state
commissions. I have long advocated a more deferential approach to state
commission decisions, on compliance with the checklist generally and
particularly on pricing issues. Today's order moves productively in that
direction. Similarly the Commission has refrained from the detailed
second-guessing of state commission determinations that once typified
these orders.

Finally, today's order more clearly limits our consideration to those
items actually in the statutory checklist. Prior decisions seemed at
least implicitly to expand that checklist -- by "encouraging" and
"expecting" companies and commissions to take additional steps that
reflected the policy priorities of the erstwhile majority. That practice
has now been largely eliminated. Although these are all positive trends,
I hope that future commissions will continue down this road.

Nonetheless some aspects of today's Order are not consistent with my
overall view of the FCC's role. As I have stated in prior Section 271
decisions, I believe that Section 271 primarily requires the Commission
to determine whether a Bell operating company has fulfilled its
obligations under Sections 251 and 252, and these are specified in the
interconnection agreements into which it has entered.[^847] In this
regard, an essential element in my review is whether any complaints have
been filed at the FCC or with the relevant state commission alleging
non-compliance with section 251 generally and section 252 agreements in
particular. In the absence of such complaints, I take a highly skeptical
view of allegations that are aired for the first time in the Section 271
application process. Section 271 does not create an opportunity to
circumvent the statutory dispute resolution process created by Sections
251 and 252. Although today's order does emphasize the utility of
complaint processes and the role of the states, it nonetheless indulges
new and novel concerns unreviewed elsewhere in far more detail than I
would have.

I also wish to emphasize that the FCC's job does not end with approval
of Verizon's application. Section 271 (d)(6) sets forth a clear role for
the Commission to ensure that Bell operating companies continue to meet
the statutory checklist. I share Chairman Powell's commitment to swift
and sure enforcement action when licensees violate our rules. Thus we
will closely monitor the situation in Massachusetts in order to be
certain that Verizon remains in full compliance with Section 271.

DISSENTING STATEMENT OF COMMISSIONER GLORIA TRISTANI

*Re: Application of Verizon New England Inc., Bell Atlantic
Communications, Inc. (d/b/a Verizon Long Distance), NYNEX Long Distance
Company (d/b/a Verizon Enterprise Solutions) and Verizon Global Networks
Inc., for Authorization to Provide In-Region, InterLATA Services in
Massachusetts (CC Docket No. 01-9)*

With the stakes so high, the Commission cannot afford to let Verizon
into the Massachusetts long distance market before the company has fully
demonstrated compliance with the market opening requirements of section
271. The availability of unbundled network elements (UNEs) at cost-based
rates is an essential ingredient of a primary strategy for entering the
residential market in Massachusetts. Accordingly, I must dissent,
because the Commission should not permit Verizon to enter the in-state
long distance market without more rigorous support for its unbundled
switching rates in Massachusetts.

Based on the evidence in the record, I cannot conclude that Verizon has
demonstrated that its switching rates are based on the forward-looking,
total element long run incremental cost (TELRIC) of providing that
network element. Prior to filing its second 271 application for
Massachusetts, Verizon elected not to rely on the unbundled switching
rates set by the Massachusetts Department of Telecommunications and
Energy (Massachusetts Department). Instead Verizon chose to rely on
voluntarily-adopted rates equivalent to those currently in effect in New
York, without providing any further evidence that those rates are TELRIC
compliant for Massachusetts.

By allowing Verizon simply to mirror rate levels set four years ago in
another state and subject to imminent revision, the Commission has
undermined the rigor of its 271 process. Indeed the majority has sent a
signal that it will allow reliance on previously approved rates,
irrespective of the amount of time passed or pricing information
gathered since those rates were last before us. In a declining cost
industry characterized by rapid technological innovation, such an
approach is inconsistent with our statutory mandate. Nor can the
majority's threats of future enforcement action \-- particularly with
regard to "section 271 checklist items where Verizon's performance was
most marginal," such as the pricing of unbundled elements[^848] \--
substitute for a requirement that Verizon demonstrate full checklist
compliance before winning long distance authority.

The record that supported Verizon's New York 271 application in 1999,
based on a pricing docket completed in 1997, is not adequate to support
Verizon's case in Massachusetts today. The New York Public Service
Commission (NYPSC) is expected to revise the New York rates this summer,
after it completes its review of additional information regarding the
cost of unbundled switching. The NYPSC adopted the current rates at a
time when there was comparatively little experience with TELRIC pricing.
Since the New York application was adopted, however, the Commission has
acquired additional information about the pricing of switching in
particular. The applications that the Commission has approved since that
time reflected rates for the per-line, per-month cost for switching,
transport, and signaling that \-- based on WorldCom's usage assumptions
\-- are roughly half of New York's rates.[^849] Such rate disparities
suggest there is a good chance that the NYPSC may revise its rates
significantly. At a minimum, such comparisons support the need for
additional information to ensure that the Massachusetts switching rate
is within the range that reasonable application of TELRIC principles
would produce.

In any case, Verizon did not adopt the New York rates for unbundled
switching in their entirety. The New York rates, unlike the fixed rates
on which Verizon relies, are subject to true-up and potential refund.
Moreover, although the NYPSC is expected to complete its pricing
proceeding shortly, Verizon did not commit to adopt the resulting rates,
which will be based on more complete and updated cost information.

Finally, when we approved Verizon's New York 271 application, we placed
"great weight on the New York Commission's active review and
modification of Bell Atlantic's proposed unbundled network element
prices, its commitment to TELRIC-based rates, and its detailed
supporting comments concerning its extensive, multi-phased network
elements rate case."[^850] We do not have the same record in
Massachusetts. As the majority describes, significant errors appear to
have been made in establishing the original UNE switching rates in
Massachusetts. Like the majority, I expect that the Massachusetts
Department will examine these issues during the course of its on-going
rate case and set rates within the range that a reasonable application
of TELRIC principles would produce. But, based on the record currently
before me, I cannot conclude that the unbundled switching rates on which
Verizon relies are within that range and accordingly must dissent.

[^1]: In 1996, Congress amended the Communications Act of 1934 to foster
    the development of local exchange competition, among other things.
    The Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat.
    56 (1996). We refer to the Communications Act of 1934, as amended by
    the Telecommunications Act of 1996, as the Communications Act or the
    Act.

[^2]: Supplemental Filing of Verizon New England, CC Docket No. 01-9
    (filed Jan. 16, 2001) (Verizon Massachusetts II Application).

[^3]: *See id*. Attach. A.

[^4]: *See, e.g.*, *Joint Application by SBC Communications Inc.,
    Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., and Southwestern Bell Communications
    Services, Inc., d/b/a Southwestern Bell Long Distance for Provision
    of In-Region, InterLATA Services in Kansas and Oklahoma*, Memorandum
    Opinion and Order, FCC 01-29, CC Docket No. 00-217, paras. 7-10
    (rel. Jan. 22, 2001) (*SWBT Kansas/Oklahoma Order*); *Application by
    SBC Communications Inc., Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., and
    Southwestern Bell Communications Services, Inc. d/b/a Southwestern
    Bell Long Distance Pursuant to Section 271 of the Telecommunications
    Act of 1996 To Provide In-Region, InterLATA Services in Texas*,
    Memorandum Opinion and Order, 15 FCC Rcd 18354, 18359-61, paras.
    8-11 (2000) (*SWBT Texas Order*); *Application by Bell Atlantic New
    York for Authorization Under Section 271 of the Communications Act
    To Provide In-Region, InterLATA Service in the State of New York*,
    Memorandum Opinion and Order, 15 FCC Rcd 3953, 3961-63, paras. 17-20
    (1999) (*Bell Atlantic New York Order*).

[^5]: *See* Verizon Massachusetts I Application App. B, Vol. 1a-aa, Tab
    2 (Massachusetts DTE, D.T.E. 99-271, *Inquiry by the Department of
    Telecommunications and Energy pursuant to Section 271 of the
    Telecommunications Act of 1996 into the Compliance Filing of New
    England Telephone and Telegraph Company d/b/a Bell
    Atlantic-Massachusetts as part of its application to the Federal
    Communications Commission for entry into the in-region interLATA
    (long distance) telephone market*).

[^6]: *See* Verizon Massachusetts I Application App. B, Vol. 24, Tab 282
    (Massachusetts DTE, D.P.U. 99-271, *Evaluation of Bell
    Atlantic-Massachusetts Operations Support Systems: Final Attachment
    A to 11/19/99 Letter Order on Final Master Test Plan* (Jan. 14,
    2000)).

[^7]: *See generally* Verizon Massachusetts I Application App. I, Vol.
    1a-b (KPMG Final Report).

[^8]: Application by Verizon New England for Authorization to Provide
    In-Region, InterLATA Services in Massachusetts, CC Docket No. 00-176
    (filed Sept. 22, 2000) (Verizon Massachusetts I Application).

[^9]: *See* Letter from Michael E. Glover, Senior Vice President &
    Deputy General Counsel, Verizon, to Magalie Roman Salas, Secretary,
    Federal Communications Commission, CC Docket No. 00-176 (filed Dec.
    18, 2000).

[^10]: Verizon Massachusetts II Application.

[^11]: The availability of this information plays a critical role in the
    ability of competitive LECs to participate in the section 271
    application review process.

[^12]: Evaluation of the Massachusetts Department of Telecommunications
    and Energy, CC Docket No. 00-176 (filed October 16, 2000)
    (Massachusetts Department Massachusetts I Comments). On November 3,
    2000, the Massachusetts Department filed its reply (Massachusetts
    Department Massachusetts I Reply).

[^13]: Evaluation of the Massachusetts Department of Telecommunications
    and Energy, CC Docket No. 01-9 (filed February 6, 2001)
    (Massachusetts Department Massachusetts II Comments). On February
    28, 2001, the Massachusetts Department filed its second reply
    (Massachusetts Department Massachusetts II Reply).

[^14]: Evaluation of the United States Department of Justice, CC Docket
    No. 00-176 (filed October 27, 2000) (Department of Justice
    Massachusetts I Evaluation).

[^15]: *See* Department of Justice Massachusetts I Evaluation at 2. The
    Department of Justice found that, "although Verizon has satisfied
    this standard in most respects, important issues remain inadequately
    addressed." *Id.* It noted that the principal issue on which Verizon
    had failed to develop an adequate record was its provision of
    DSL-capable loops. *See id.* The Department concluded that Verizon
    had not yet demonstrated that it provides nondiscriminatory access
    to DSL-capable loops, including line sharing, or that adequate
    performance mechanisms were in place to deter backsliding. *See id.*
    at 24. The Department of Justice recommended that we not permit
    Verizon to offer interLATA services in Massachusetts until Verizon
    demonstrated that it has resolved these shortcomings. *See id.* at
    3.

[^16]: Evaluation of the United States Department of Justice, CC Docket
    No. 00-176 (filed February 21, 2001) (Department of Justice
    Massachusetts II Evaluation).

[^17]: Department of Justice Massachusetts II Evaluation at 2-3. For
    example, the Department of Justice noted, among other things, that:
    (1) Verizon and the competing carriers modified, and the
    Massachusetts Department adopted, the carrier-to-carrier measures
    for DSL-capable loop performance and created a set of measures for
    line sharing; (2) Verizon submitted to the Massachusetts Department
    changes to its performance assurance plan, proposing to add
    additional DSL-capable loop and line sharing measurements and make
    DSL a separate mode of entry; (3) Verizon's separate data affiliate,
    Verizon Advanced Data, Inc. (VADI), became fully operational in
    Massachusetts; (4) Verizon agreed to proceed with the development
    and deployment of a mechanism to provide competing carriers with
    electronic access to loop make-up information; and (5) Verizon
    conducted re-inspections of line sharing related collocation work,
    enabled some line sharing orders to flow through its systems without
    manual intervention, and established a wholesale service center
    dedicated to DSL-capable loops and line sharing. *See id.*

[^18]: *See* Department of Justice Massachusetts II Evaluation at 3, 14;
    *see* *also* *id.* at 7-14 (describing issues in dispute).

[^19]: *See id.* at 14.

[^20]: *See id.* at 15 & n.61.

[^21]: *See SWBT Kansas/Oklahoma Order* at para. 19; *see also American
    Tel. & Tel. Co. v. FCC*, 220 F.3d 607, 631 (D.C. Cir. 2000).

[^22]: *See, e.g.*, *SWBT Kansas/Oklahoma Order* at paras. 21-27; *SWBT
    Texas Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 18370-73, paras. 34-42; *Bell Atlantic
    New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 3968-71, paras. 32-42.

[^23]: *See Bell Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 3973-74, para.
    52.

[^24]: *See* 47 U.S.C. § 271(c)(2)(B)(i), (ii).

[^25]: *See SWBT Kansas/Oklahoma Order* at paras. 28-29; *Bell Atlantic
    New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 3971-72, paras. 44-46.

[^26]: *SWBT Texas Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 18373, para. 44; *Bell Atlantic
    New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 3971, para. 44.

[^27]: *Bell Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 3971, para. 44;
    *Application of Ameritech Michigan Pursuant to Section 271 of the
    Communications Act of 1934, as amended, To Provide In-Region,
    InterLATA Services in Michigan*, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 12
    FCC Rcd 20543, 20618-19, para. 141 (1997) (*Ameritech Michigan
    Order*).

[^28]: *Bell Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 3969, para. 53.

[^29]: *See SWBT Kansas/Oklahoma Order* at para. 31; *SWBT Texas Order*,
    15 FCC Rcd at 18377, para. 55 & n.102.

[^30]: *See Bell Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 3970, para. 59.

[^31]: *See SWBT Kansas/Oklahoma Order* at para. 39.

[^32]: 47 U.S.C. § 271(B)(ii).

[^33]: *Id*. § 251(c)(3).

[^34]: *Id*. § 252(d)(1).

[^35]: *See* *Local Competition First Report and Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at
    15844-47, paras. 672-78; 47 C.F.R. §§ 51.501 *et seq.* (1999); *see
    also Line Sharing Order*, 14 FCC Rcd at 20973-81, paras. 131-57
    (concluding that states should set the prices for line sharing as a
    new network element in the same manner as the states set prices for
    other UNEs).

[^36]: *See* *Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC*, 109 F.3d 418 (8^th^ Cir. 1996),
    120 F.3d 753, 800, 804-06 (8^th^ Cir. 1997), *aff'd in part, rev'd
    in part sub nom. AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd.*, 525 U.S. 366
    (1999).

[^37]: *AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd.*, 525 U.S. at 397.

[^38]: *Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC*, 219 F.3d 744 (8^th^ Cir. 2000), *cert.
    granted sub nom.* *Verizon Communications, Inc. v. FCC*, 121 S. Ct.
    877 (2001).

[^39]: *Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC*, No. 96-3321 *et al.* (8^th^ Cir., Sept.
    25, 2000).

[^40]: *See* Verizon Massachusetts I Application App. H, Vol. 27, Tab
    162, *Consolidated Petitions of New England Telephone and Telegraph
    Company d/b/a NYNEX, Teleport Communications Group, Inc., Brooks
    Fiber Communications, AT&T Communications of New England, Inc., MCI
    Communications Company, and Sprint Communications Company, L.P.,
    Pursuant to Section 252(b) of the Telecommunications Act of 1996,
    for Arbitration of Interconnection Agreements Between NYNEX and the
    Aforementioned Companies* D.P.U. 96-73/74, 96-75, 96-80/81, 96-83,
    96-94---Phase 4 (Dec. 4, 1996) (*Massachusetts DTE Phase 4 Order*).

[^41]: *See* *Massachusetts DTE Phase 4 Order* at 6, 8-9.

[^42]: *See Massachusetts DTE Phase 4 Order* at 12-17, 71.

[^43]: *See* Verizon Massachusetts I Application App. F, Vol. 8, Tab
    157, *Investigation by the Department on Its Own Motion into the
    Propriety of the Resale Tariff of New England Telephone and
    Telegraph Company d/b/a Bell Atlantic-Massachusetts, Filed with the
    Department on January 16, 1998, to Become Effective February 14,
    1998,* D.T.E. 98-15 (Phases II, III) at 16 (Mar. 19, 1999).

[^44]: *See* Verizon Massachusetts I Application App. H, Vol. 29, Tab
    175, *Motion of MCI Telecommunications Corp. for Reconsideration and
    Clarification of Phase 3 and Phase 4 Orders,* D.P.U. 96-73/74,
    96-75, 96-80/81, 96-83, 96-94 (Dec. 31, 1996); Verizon Massachusetts
    I Application App. F, Vol. 1, Tab 12, *Motion by AT&T Communications
    of New England, Inc., to Establish Permanent Recurring Rates for
    Unbundled Network Elements*, D.T.E. 98-15 (Mar. 27, 1998); Verizon
    Massachusetts I Application App. F, Vol. 7, Tab 126, *Initial Brief
    of MCI WorldCom, Inc. on the Methodology for Permanent Pricing of
    Unbundled Network Elements*, D.T.E. 98-15 (Oct. 14, 1998); Verizon
    Massachusetts I Application App. B, Vol. 37, Tab 455, Letter from
    Christopher J. McDonald, Senior Attorney, MCI WorldCom, to Mary L.
    Cottrell, Secretary, Massachusetts Department of Telecommunications
    and Energy (May 18, 2000); Verizon Massachusetts I Application App.
    B, Vol. 38, Tab 457, Comments of the Attorney General on Bell
    Atlantic's May 26, 2000 Supplemental Filing, D.T.E. 99-271 at 17-18
    (July 18, 2000).

[^45]: *See* Verizon Massachusetts I Application App. A, Tab 7,
    Declaration of W. Robert Mudge Attach. A, Amendment No. 2 to the
    Interconnection Agreement between Bell Atlantic-Massachusetts and
    Z-Tel Communications, Inc. (June 29, 2000); *see also* Massachusetts
    Department Massachusetts I Comments at 221-22.

[^46]: *See* Massachusetts Department Massachusetts I Comments at
    221-22.

[^47]: Massachusetts Department Massachusetts I Comments at 222-23;
    Letter from Gordon R. Evans, VP Federal Regulatory, Verizon, to
    Magalie Roman Salas, Secretary, Federal Communications Commission,
    CC Docket No. 00-176 (Oct. 13, 2000) (Verizon October 13^th^ UNE
    Rate Filing); Verizon Massachusetts I Reply App., Tab 8, Reply
    Declaration of Steven E. Collins Attach. B, Letter from John L.
    Conroy, Director Regulatory-Massachusetts, Verizon, to Mary
    Cottrell, Secretary, Massachusetts Department of Telecommunications
    and Energy, correcting a typographical error in October 13^th^
    filing for unbundled telephone company reciprocal compensation rates
    (Oct. 18, 2000).

[^48]: Verizon October 13^th^ UNE Rate Filing at 2.

[^49]: *See* Verizon Massachusetts II Application App. B, Vol. 3, Tab 4,
    Subtab D, *Investigation by the Department of Telecommunications and
    Energy on its own Motion into the Appropriate Pricing, Based upon
    Total Element Long-Run Incremental Costs, for Unbundled Network
    Elements and Combination of Unbundled Network Elements, and the
    Appropriate Avoided Cost Discount for Verizon New England, Inc.
    d/b/a Verizon Massachusetts' Resale Services in the Commonwealth of
    Massachusetts,* D.T.E. 01-20 (Jan. 12, 2001) (*Massachusetts DTE UNE
    Rate Investigation Order*).

[^50]: *See* *Massachusetts DTE UNE Rate Investigation Order* at 5.

[^51]: *See* Massachusetts Department Massachusetts I Reply at 50-52;
    *see also* Massachusetts Department Massachusetts I Comments at 205,
    216.

[^52]: *See* Verizon Massachusetts II Application at 40.

[^53]: *See* Massachusetts Department Massachusetts II Comments at
    19-20.

[^54]: *Bell Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 4084, para. 244;
    *SWBT Kansas/Oklahoma Order* at para. 59.

[^55]: For a discussion of the rates set by the Massachusetts
    Department, *see infra* Part IX.

[^56]: *See* Verizon Massachusetts II Application at 37-38; Verizon
    Massachusetts II Reply at 31-32. New York's UNE rates were not
    adopted in whole because minor adjustments were made to account for
    rate structure differences. Based on our own analysis, we find that
    the rates Verizon adopted on October 13, 2000 are equivalent to
    those approved in New York for those elements, when one accounts for
    the rate structure differences (*e.g*. lower port prices and higher
    per-minute prices in Massachusetts). Comparisons depend on
    assumption of switch usage, but even with high estimates of switch
    usage, the Massachusetts rates for ports and switches are only 2
    percent more than those in New York. We find that AT&T's assertion
    that Verizon's voluntarily discounted rates in Massachusetts are not
    the equivalent of corresponding New York rates is unsubstantiated
    and without merit, and we agree with the Massachusetts Department
    that Massachusetts rates are "effectively the same" as the
    corresponding rates in New York. *See* AT&T Massachusetts II
    Comments at 8; *see also* Letter from Charles E. Griffin, Government
    Affairs Director, AT&T, to Magalie Roman Salas, Secretary, Federal
    Communications Commission, CC Docket No. 01-9 at 3-4 (filed March
    21, 2001) (AT&T March 21 *Ex Parte* Letter); Massachusetts
    Department Massachusetts I Reply at 52-53; Massachusetts Department
    Massachusetts I Comments at 222-23; Massachusetts Department
    Massachusetts II Comments at 20-21.

[^57]: *Bell Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 4081, para. 238.

[^58]: *AT&T Corp. v. FCC*, 220 F.3d 607, 617-18 (D.C. Cir. 2000).

[^59]: WorldCom Massachusetts I Comments at 7-9; ASCENT Massachusetts II
    Comments at 15; WorldCom Massachusetts II Comments at 12.

[^60]: *SWBT Kansas/Oklahoma Order* at para. 82 n.244.

[^61]: *Id*. at para. 84.

[^62]: *Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service, Forward-Looking
    Mechanism for High Cost Support for Non-Rural LECs*, CC Docket Nos.
    96-45, 97-160, Tenth Report and Order, 14 FCC Rcd 20156, 20281,
    para. 296 (1999) (*USF Tenth Report and Order*). The Commission also
    adopted an additional cost per line for remote, host, and
    stand-alone switches. The determination of host and remote switches
    in the USF model was based on the Local Exchange Routing Guide
    (LERG). *See id*.

[^63]: *See* Letter from Keith L. Seat, Senior Counsel, Federal Law and
    Public Policy, MCI Communications Corporation, to Magalie Roman
    Salas, Secretary, Federal Communications Commission, CC Docket No.
    00-176 at 26 (Oct. 3, 2000) (chart showing cumulative distribution
    of lines by wire center size in Massachusetts and New York).

[^64]: This analysis assumed 1200 originating and 1200 terminating local
    minutes of use per line per month with 25 percent of the minutes
    intraswitch. The two states' rates remain close using a wide range
    of assumptions.

[^65]: *See* http://www.fcc.gov/ccb/apd/hcpm. We note that AT&T
    conducted a similar analysis with similar results. Specifically,
    according to AT&T, rates for the non-loop elements are approximately
    7 percent lower in Massachusetts than in New York, and costs for the
    non-loop elements are 6 percent lower in Massachusetts than in New
    York. *See* AT&T Massachusetts II Comments Attach. 4.

[^66]: *See* Verizon Feb. 23 UNE Costs *Ex Parte* Letter at 1. AT&T
    concurs that switching costs in Massachusetts are the same as those
    in New York. *See* AT&T March 21 *Ex Parte* at 2.

[^67]: *See* Verizon Feb. 23 UNE Costs *Ex Parte* Letter at 1, 3.

[^68]: *See* *Bell Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 4084-85,
    para. 245.

[^69]: *See* AT&T Massachusetts II Comments at 20-21. AT&T asserts that
    Verizon resists comparisons to switching rates in other states
    because switching rates in Massachusetts and New York are
    substantially higher than those in effect in most other states.
    *See* *id*. at n.25.

[^70]: *SWBT Kansas/Oklahoma Order* at para. 82.

[^71]: *See infra* Part IX.

[^72]: *See* 47 U.S.C. § 271(d)(6).

[^73]: *See* ASCENT Massachusetts II Comments at 13-14; AT&T
    Massachusetts II Comments at 9-11; Sprint Massachusetts II Comments
    at 9-10.

[^74]: *See* AT&T Massachusetts II Comments at 18; WorldCom
    Massachusetts II Comments at 13, 16-18.

[^75]: *See Bell Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 4081-83, 4084,
    paras. 238-40, 242.

[^76]: *Id*. at 4083, para. 242.

[^77]: *AT&T Corp. v. FCC*, 20 F.3d at 617-18.

[^78]: As discussed above, however, the ongoing New York UNE rate
    proceeding could result in Verizon falling out of section 271
    compliance in Massachusetts.

[^79]: *AT&T Corp. v. FCC*, 20 F.3d at 617-18.

[^80]: *See* AT&T March 21 *Ex Parte* at 3-4.

[^81]: *SWBT Kansas/Oklahoma Order* at para. 84 (*citing* *Federal-State
    Joint Board on Universal Service*, CC Docket No. 96-45, Ninth Report
    and Order and Eighteenth Order on Reconsideration, 14 FCC Rcd 20432,
    20455-56, paras. 41-42 (1999)).

[^82]: *See* WorldCom Massachusetts I Comments at 13; AT&T Massachusetts
    I Reply at 23; WorldCom Massachusetts I Reply at 8-9; AT&T
    Massachusetts I Reply at 28-29; WorldCom Massachusetts I Reply at
    20; ASCENT Massachusetts II Comments at 13-14; AT&T Massachusetts II
    Comments at 7, 9 n.13; Sprint Massachusetts II Comments at 9-10;
    WorldCom Massachusetts II Comments at 17; AT&T Massachusetts II
    Reply at 7; WorldCom Massachusetts II Reply at 5.

[^83]: *See Bell Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 4085, paras.
    245-46.

[^84]: *Id*. at 4086, para. 247.

[^85]: AT&T incorrectly asserts that the Commission never concluded in
    the *Bell Atlantic New York Order* that Verizon's switching rates
    were "TELRIC-compliant." AT&T March 21 *Ex Parte* at 2 n.1. In the
    *Bell Atlantic New York Order*, the Commission concluded that
    Verizon's "prices for switches and loops offered as unbundled
    network elements are priced pursuant to a forward-looking, long-run
    incremental cost methodology," and that Verizon offered "a full
    suite of TELRIC rates" for its unbundled network elements. *Bell
    Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 4081, para. 238, 4083, para.
    242.

[^86]: *See* AT&T Massachusetts I Reply at 28-30; Massachusetts Attorney
    General's Massachusetts I Reply at 9; AT&T Massachusetts II Comments
    at 4; AT&T March 21 *Ex Parte* at 2; Massachusetts Attorney
    General's Massachusetts II Comments at 3, 5-6.

[^87]: *See* *Bell Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 4085-86,
    para. 247. The Commission did cite favorably the true-up mechanism
    adopted by the New York Commission in setting rates for the
    conditioning of xDSL-capable loops, but these rates were interim at
    the time of the section 271 filing. *See id.* at 4091, para. 259.
    Verizon's October 13^th^ switching rates, like its New York
    switching rates, are not interim.

[^88]: *See* Massachusetts Department Massachusetts I Comments at
    204-06. As noted above, commenters have repeatedly challenged
    Verizon's rates in Massachusetts, but the Massachusetts Department
    has not changed UNE rates since it set them in 1996. *See, e.g*.,
    WorldCom Massachusetts I Comments at 34-37; AT&T Massachusetts II
    Comments at 10. Additionally, as noted above, Verizon voluntarily
    adopted New York switching rates in Massachusetts.

[^89]: *See* ASCENT Massachusetts II Comments at 14; AT&T Massachusetts
    II Comments at 10; Massachusetts Attorney General's Massachusetts II
    Comments at 6 n.12.

[^90]: *See* *Massachusetts UNE Rate Investigation Order* at 5;
    Massachusetts Department Massachusetts II Comments at 22.

[^91]: *See* WorldCom Massachusetts I Comments at 30-31; AT&T
    Massachusetts I Reply at 32-33, Attach. B at 2; WorldCom
    Massachusetts I Reply at 10-13; AT&T Massachusetts II Comments at
    21-24; Sprint Massachusetts II Comments at 9; WorldCom Massachusetts
    II Comments at 18-19.

[^92]: *Bell Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 4084, para. 244.

[^93]: *See* AT&T Massachusetts II Comments at 21-22; Sprint
    Massachusetts II Comments at 10-11; WorldCom Massachusetts II
    Comments at 19-22.

[^94]: The Massachusetts Department considered whether Verizon's rates
    set under the last year of rate of return regulation were a
    reasonable starting point for rates established under price cap
    regulation and determined that a 9.63 percent rate of return was
    reasonable for Verizon. The 9.63 percent rate of return reflects an
    11.5 percent cost of equity, a 7.16 percent cost of debt, and a
    capital structure with 41 percent and 59 percent equity. *See*
    *Petition of New England Telephone and Telegraph Company d/b/a/
    NYNEX for an Alternative Regulatory Plan for the Company's
    Massachusetts Intrastate Telecommunications Services*, 1995 WL
    386802 (Mass. D.P.U. 1995) at 455-516, 528.

[^95]: *See* AT&T Massachusetts I Reply at 17-18; AT&T Massachusetts II
    Comments at 6-8. The cost of capital used by the Massachusetts
    Department to set UNE rates is also significantly higher than the
    11.25 percent cost of capital used by this Commission, and is more
    heavily weighted towards equity (76 percent) than is the
    Commission's capital structure (55.8 percent equity, 44.2 percent
    debt). *See* WorldCom Massachusetts I Comments at 22; AT&T
    Massachusetts II Comments at 21-22; Sprint Massachusetts II Comments
    at 10-11; WorldCom Massachusetts II Comments at 19-22.

[^96]: A fill factor is the estimate of the proportion of a facility
    that will be used.

[^97]: *See* AT&T Massachusetts II Comments at 21-22; Sprint
    Massachusetts II Comments at 10-11; WorldCom Massachusetts II
    Comments at 19-22.

[^98]: *See* Verizon Massachusetts I Application App. H, Vol. 31, Tab
    198, *NYNEX Phase 2 and Phase 4 Compliance Filing*, Workpapers Part
    A at 11 (Feb. 14, 1997); *see also* WorldCom Massachusetts II
    Frentrup Decl. at para. 21.

[^99]: *SWBT Kansas/Oklahoma Order* at para. 80.

[^100]: *Id*.

[^101]: The commenters point to various other inputs to the cost model
    used to calculate the Massachusetts loop rates that they assert are
    incorrect. These inputs include: 1) unrealistically long drop
    lengths in urban and suburban areas; 2) excessive spare conduit
    capacity; 3) unreasonably high pole cost assumptions; 4)
    unreasonably high cost per NID; and 6) unreasonably high cost of
    cables. *See* AT&T Massachusetts II Comments at 21-22; Sprint
    Massachusetts II Comments at 10-11; WorldCom Massachusetts II
    Comments at 19-22. We do not make any specific finding with regard
    to these inputs, but expect that the Massachusetts Department will
    address these inputs in its pending UNE rate proceeding.

[^102]: As explained above, the New York rates are an appropriate point
    of comparison because New York and Massachusetts are adjacent
    states, have similar rate structures, and the New York rates have
    been found to be TELRIC-compliant.

[^103]: *See* http://www.fcc.gov/ccb/apd/hcpm.

[^104]: AT&T conducted a similar analysis with similar results.
    Specifically, according to AT&T, loop costs are approximately 10
    percent higher in Massachusetts than in New York, while the
    Massachusetts loop rates exceed the New York loop rates by only 5
    percent. *See* AT&T Massachusetts II Comments Attach. 4.

[^105]: *See Bell Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 4087, para.
    249.

[^106]: *See* WorldCom Massachusetts II Comments at 2, 6-7, 14, 23; *see
    also* AT&T Massachusetts I Comments at 7 n.11; AT&T Massachusetts I
    Reply at 33-35, 41; AT&T Massachusetts II Comments at 12-14.

[^107]: WorldCom Massachusetts II Comments App. B, Joint Declaration of
    Paul Bobeczko and Vijetha Huffman at paras. 9-10 (WorldCom
    Massachusetts II Bobeczko/Huffman Decl.).

[^108]: *SWBT Kansas/Oklahoma Order* at paras. 65, 92.

[^109]: *See SWBT Kansas/Oklahoma Order* at paras. 65, 92; *see also
    Local Competition First Report and Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at 15922,
    para. 848 (declining to implement an imputation rule that would
    prevent price squeezes because doing so would impose substantial
    burdens on states to rebalance their retail rates).

[^110]: A profitability analysis would also require projections of
    penetration rates for various services and minutes of use. We are
    hesitant to engage in those endeavors as well.

[^111]: *See* Z-Tel Massachusetts I Comments at 3-4.

[^112]: *See* Verizon Massachusetts II Application Attach. B (chart
    showing the number of competitive LEC platforms at 12,000 in
    September 2000, and at 23,000 in November 2000). As of December
    2000, approximately 35 percent of the total UNE-Ps in Massachusetts
    were used for residential service. *See* Letter from Dee May,
    Executive Director Federal Regulatory, Verizon, to Magalie Roman
    Salas, Secretary, Federal Communications Commission, CC Docket No.
    01-9 at 6 (filed Feb. 15, 2001).

[^113]: AT&T Massachusetts I Reply at 40-41.

[^114]: *Id.*; *see also* AT&T Massachusetts II Comments Tab 2, Letter
    from Richard Rubin, Senior Attorney, AT&T to Magalie Roman Salas,
    Secretary, Federal Communications Commission, CC Docket No. 00-176
    at 2 (Nov. 30, 2000).

[^115]: *Ameritech Michigan Order*, 12 FCC Rcd at 20694, para. 281.

[^116]: *Id*. at 20697-98, para. 289.

[^117]: *Id.*

[^118]: *See Bell Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 3989-90, para.
    83; *Application of BellSouth Corporation, et al., Pursuant to
    Section 271 of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, to
    Provide In-Region, InterLATA Services in South Carolina*, CC Docket
    No. 97-208, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 13 FCC Rcd 539, 585
    (*BellSouth South Carolina Order*); *SWBT Texas* Order, 15 FCC Rcd
    at 18396-97, para. 92.

[^119]: *See Bell Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 3990, para.
    83; *Application by BellSouth Corporation, et al., Pursuant to
    Section 271 of the Communications Act of 1934, as Amended, to
    Provide In-Region, InterLATA Services in Louisiana*, CC Docket No.
    98-121, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 13 FCC Rcd 20599, 20653
    (*Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*); *BellSouth South Carolina
    Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 547-48, 585.

[^120]: *See, e.g.*, *Bell Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at
    3991-92, paras. 85-86; *SWBT Kansas/Oklahoma Order* at paras.
    104-05.

[^121]: Massachusetts Department Massachusetts I Comments at 44; Verizon
    Massachusetts I Application at 9.

[^122]: KPMG indicates that its Massachusetts evaluation was designed as
    a validation of the shared components of the Massachusetts and New
    York OSS, as well as a full evaluation of the OSS elements unique to
    Massachusetts. *See* KPMG Final Report at 10. Despite this
    characterization, KPMG's test was not an evaluation of the
    comparability of Verizon's Massachusetts and New York OSS, and was
    therefore unlike the Ernst and Young audit attestation relied upon
    by the Commission in approving SWBT's application for section 271
    authorization in Kansas and Oklahoma. *See SWBT Kansas/Oklahoma
    Order* at paras. 106-18. Rather, KPMG's test in Massachusetts was in
    essence a full independent third-party test of Verizon's
    Massachusetts OSS, including functional and volume testing
    specifically of the Massachusetts OSS. Aside from
    PricewaterhouseCoopers' line sharing study discussed below, Verizon
    has not submitted the type of evidence that we require in order to
    consider the performance of its OSS in another state in evaluating
    its Massachusetts OSS. *See id*. For this reason, except as
    described below (*infra* at paras. 47-49), we do not consider the
    performance of Verizon's OSS in other states in reaching our
    conclusions, nor do we address commenters' criticisms of Verizon's
    OSS in other states.

[^123]: *See* KPMG Final Report at 6.

[^124]: In addition, KPMG evaluated the integrity of Verizon's internal
    handling of raw source data and validated Verizon's calculation of
    results for a series of metrics measuring Verizon's performance of
    pre-ordering, ordering, provisioning, maintenance and repair,
    billing, network performance and operator services functions. *See
    id*. at 631.

[^125]: *See, e.g.*, *id.* at 15.

[^126]: *See id.* at 7.

[^127]: *See, e.g.*, *id* at 129-50, 315-36, and 403-10.

[^128]: *See, e.g.*, *id.* at 44-45 (testing the EDI interface at 150
    percent of Verizon's normal hourly order volume).

[^129]: *See id.* at 8-9.

[^130]: *See id.*

[^131]: *See id.* at 9.

[^132]: For example, blindness was impossible because transactions
    arrive on dedicated circuits, the owners of which are known by
    Verizon. *Id.*

[^133]: *Id.*

[^134]: *Ameritech Michigan Order*, 12 FCC Rcd at 20659.

[^135]: *See* *infra* Part IV.B.2.a.

[^136]: *See* Verizon Massachusetts II Application App. A, Vol. 2, Joint
    Supp. Declaration of Russell J. Sapienza and Gerard J. Mulcahy, Tab
    2 at 3-4, para. 9 (Verizon Massachusetts II Sapienza/Mulcahy Decl.).
    PwC also assessed whether Verizon's separate data affiliate, Verizon
    Advanced Data, Inc. ("VADI") used the same interfaces as
    non-affiliates and whether Verizon treats VADI transactions the same
    as non-affiliate transactions and reviewed the accuracy and
    consistency of several Verizon studies of the Massachusetts DSL
    performance data. *Id.* We note in the relevant discussions below
    the extent to which we rely on these findings.

[^137]: We cannot say, however, that we would find similar evidence
    persuasive proof that OSS from one state is relevant in our
    consideration of another state's OSS if such evidence were
    challenged or were not merely intended to supplement actual, though
    limited, commercial evidence in the primary state (as we have here).

[^138]: *See* Covad Massachusetts II Comments at 20.

[^139]: Verizon Massachusetts II Sapienza/Mulcahy Decl. at 6-26, paras.
    14-48.

[^140]: PwC did note two exceptions to its overall conclusion. First, a
    Verizon operations center processes line sharing orders for VADI's
    New York operations but not other competitive LECs or VADI's
    Massachusetts operations. PwC did find, however, that the operations
    center uses the same methods and procedures as the operations center
    that processes other line sharing orders. Second, one "code module"
    in the New York Service Order Processor did not exist in the
    Massachusetts Service Order Processor. Verizon explained that the
    code module was inactive and had been renamed for archiving, and
    immediately deleted it.

[^141]: *See* Verizon Massachusetts II Application App. A, Vol. 1,
    Declaration of Paul A. Lacouture and Virginia P. Ruesterholz at 12,
    para. 27 (Verizon Massachusetts II Lacouture/Ruesterholz Decl.).

[^142]: *See infra* Parts IV.A.2.c(ii) & IV.B.2.c.

[^143]: *See SWBT Texas Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 18426, para. 148; *Bell
    Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 4014, para. 129. In prior
    orders, the Commission has identified the following five pre-order
    functions: (1) customer service record (CSR) information; (2)
    address validation; (3) telephone number information; (4) due date
    information; (5) services and feature information. *See id.*, 15 FCC
    Rcd at 4015, para. 132. In addition, the Commission determined in
    the *UNE Remand Order* "that the pre-ordering function includes
    access to loop qualification information." *See Implementation of
    the Local Competition Provisions of the Telecommunications Act of
    1996*, CC Docket No. 96-98, Third Report and Order, 15 FCC Rcd 3696,
    3885, para. 426 (*UNE Remand Order*).

[^144]: As the Commission has explained in prior orders, because
    characteristics of a loop, such as its length and the presence of
    various impediments to digital transmission, can hinder certain
    advanced services technologies, carriers often seek to "pre-qualify"
    a loop by accessing basic loop make-up information that will assist
    carriers in ascertaining whether the loop, either with or without
    the removal of the impediments, can support a particular advanced
    service. *See* *Bell Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 4021,
    para. 140.

[^145]: *SWBT Texas Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 18426, para. 148; *Bell
    Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 4014, para. 130; *Second
    BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20661-67, para. 105.

[^146]: *See* Verizon Massachusetts I Application App. A, Vol. 2,
    Declaration of Kathleen McLean and Raymond Wierzbicki at 9-10, para.
    21 (Verizon Massachusetts I McLean/Wierzbicki Decl.).

[^147]: *See* Verizon Massachusetts I McLean/Wierzbicki Decl*.* at para.
    18. *See also SWBT Texas Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 18427, para. 149;
    *Bell Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 4014, para. 130.

[^148]: *See* *infra* Part IV.A.2.h(i).

[^149]: *See* KPMG Final Report at 15-69 (providing the results of the
    LSOG 2 EDI functional evaluation and volume performance test).
    Specifically, KPMG concluded that Verizon's OSS provided the
    pre-order functionality Verizon is required to provide (Test
    POP-1-2-2). KPMG also concluded that Verizon's pre-order systems
    provided clear, accurate and complete responses and error messages
    (POP-1-6-1, POP-1-6-2).

[^150]: *See* Verizon Massachusetts I McLean/Wierzbicki Decl. at para.
    27.

[^151]: *See* KPMG Final Report at 60 (Test POP-1-7-1). Although KPMG
    found an inconsistency in the manner Verizon returned one field of
    directory listing information, this inconsistency appears to have
    had minimal competitive impact; KPMG concluded that the pre-order
    response information returned in this field adequately fulfilled
    order form input requirements. *See id.* Of course, to the extent
    Verizon becomes aware of any inconsistencies in field names or
    formats that would impede a carrier's ability to integrate
    pre-ordering and ordering functions, we expect that Verizon promptly
    will design and deploy a software correction or provide the
    necessary technical assistance to competing carriers in the
    interface integration. *See Bell Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC
    Rcd at 4021, para. 139.

[^152]: *See* Verizon Massachusetts I McLean/Wierzbicki Decl. at para.
    25.

[^153]: *See Bell Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 4025, para.
    145, and 4029, para. 154.

[^154]: *See* Verizon Carrier-to-Carrier Performance Standards and
    Reports, September 2000 -- December 2000. The PO 1 series of metrics
    measures the response times of Verizon's OSS in performing a number
    of pre-order transactions. Verizon's EDI performance under this
    series of metrics met or exceeded the applicable benchmark in all
    four months, with the following exception. In October 2000,
    Verizon's average response time to reject EDI pre-order queries was
    0.68 seconds longer than the applicable benchmark (PO 1-07). We do
    not deem this delay in response time of less than one second in one
    month's performance to be competitively significant. The PO 2 series
    of metrics measures the availability of Verizon's OSS interfaces.
    While Verizon may not have met the benchmark standard of 100
    percent, 24 hour availability for some of the PO 2 metrics measuring
    EDI pre-order interface availability from September through December
    2000, Verizon's performance data under these metrics show no lower
    than 99.88 percent availability of its EDI interface during this
    four-month period. We do not consider the 0.12 percent
    unavailability of Verizon's interface to be competitively
    significant.

[^155]: *See* KPMG Final Report at 47-55. Specifically, KPMG concluded
    that LSOG 2 EDI pre-order interface capability was consistently
    available during 100 percent of scheduled hours of operation (Test
    POP-1-1-1). KPMG found that, following system and documentation
    enhancements, 98 percent of pre-order transactions submitted as part
    of its functional test received responses (POP-1-2-1). For its
    volume test, 99.9 percent of pre-order transactions received
    responses (POP-1-3-1). For pre-order transactions for which Verizon
    retail analogue data were available, average response times for
    transactions submitted by KPMG as part of its functional evaluation
    met the associated carrier-to-carrier benchmarks, with the exception
    of pre-order product and service availability (PSA) transactions.
    However, 95 percent of KPMG's total PSA transactions during its
    functional evaluation and 99 percent of such transactions during its
    volume test received responses within 10 seconds (POP-1-4-2,
    POP-1-4-3, POP-1-5-2). *See* *also* KPMG Final Report at 69 (Table
    1-18) (volume evaluation of LSOG 2 EDI pre-order response
    timeliness).

[^156]: SWBT's section 271 application for Kansas and Oklahoma was the
    first such application reviewed for its compliance with the *UNE
    Remand Order* requirements for nondiscriminatory access to loop
    qualification information. *See SWBT Kansas/Oklahoma Order* at
    paras. 121-29.

[^157]: *See UNE Remand Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 3885-87, paras. 427-31.

[^158]: *See id.* at 3885, para. 427. For example, to the extent Verizon
    personnel may access any such information, Verizon must provide
    competitors with information regarding: (1) the composition of the
    loop material, including both fiber and copper; (2) the existence,
    location and type of any electronic or other equipment on the loop,
    including but not limited to, digital loop carrier or other remote
    concentration devices, feeder/distribution interfaces, bridge taps,
    load coils, pair-gain devices, disturbers in the same or adjacent
    binder groups; (3) the loop length, including the length and
    location of each type of transmission media; (4) the wire gauge(s)
    of the loop; and (5) the electrical parameters of the loop, which
    may determine the suitability of the loop for various technologies.
    *See id.*

[^159]: *See id.* at 3886, para. 430.

[^160]: *See id.* at 3886, para. 428. For example, an incumbent LEC may
    not provide a "green, yellow, or red" indicator of whether a loop
    qualifies for its particular xDSL offering in lieu of underlying
    loop make-up information in its possession. *See id.*; *see also
    infra* at para. 67.

[^161]: *See UNE Remand Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 3885-87, paras. 427-31.

[^162]: *See SWBT Kansas/Oklahoma Order* at para. 122.

[^163]: *See* Verizon Massachusetts I Application App. A, Vol. 1,
    Declaration of Paul A. Lacouture and Virginia P. Ruesterholz at
    para. 108 (Verizon Massachusetts I Lacouture/Ruesterholz Decl.).
    *See also* Verizon Massachusetts I McLean/Wierzbicki Decl. at para.
    20.

[^164]: *See* Verizon Massachusetts I Lacouture/Ruesterholz Decl. at
    para. 108.

[^165]: *See* Letter from Dolores May, Executive Director Federal
    Regulatory, Verizon, to Magalie Roman Salas, Secretary, Federal
    Communications Commission, CC Docket No. 00-176 (filed November 3,
    2000) (Verizon November 3 *Ex Parte* Letter). Verizon tested a
    minimum of 10 pairs per hundred pairs in a terminal, or a fraction
    of 100 pairs if less than a 100 pairs were in the terminal tested.
    *See id.*

[^166]: *See* Verizon Massachusetts I Lacouture/Ruesterholz Decl. at
    para. 108. As an alternative to mechanized loop qualification
    through the LiveWire database, Verizon states that it also provides
    competitors with access to a server containing files indicating the
    working telephone numbers in end offices that have been qualified
    for Verizon's retail ADSL product. Verizon states that it plans to
    add loop length information to the files in February 2001. *See*
    Verizon Massachusetts II Lacouture/Ruesterholz Decl. at para. 33.

[^167]: According to Verizon, LFACS contains loop make-up information
    for about 10 percent of Verizon's Massachusetts terminal locations.
    *See* Verizon Massachusetts I Reply at 37. Verizon has not provided
    specific information about the terminals for which LFACS does
    contain information. Thus, to the extent those terminals serve a
    greater number of loops (for example, terminals in densely populated
    urban areas), the 10 percent of terminals for which Verizon has
    stated LFACS contains loop make-up information could actually
    reflect a significantly higher proportion of Verizon's loops in
    Massachusetts than 10 percent. *See* Verizon November 3 *Ex Parte*
    Letter (indicating that terminals vary greatly in the number of
    loops they serve).

[^168]: LFACS contains loop-specific information including: segment
    length by gauge; bridge tap location; bridge tap length; loop
    composition (*e.g.*, copper or fiber); existence of digital single
    subscriber carrier; the existence, spacing, type and quantity of
    load coils; and the presence of DLC. *See* Letter from Dolores May,
    Executive Director Federal Regulatory, Verizon, to Magalie Roman
    Salas, Secretary, Federal Communications Commission, CC Docket No.
    01-9, Attach. D, at 6 (filed February 2, 2001) (Verizon February 2
    *Ex Parte* Letter).

[^169]: *See* Verizon February 2 *Ex Parte* Letter at 3-4. Verizon
    provides evidence that it is consistently meeting its target of
    returning LFACS loop make-up information within 24 hours. *See*
    Verizon Massachusetts II Reply, App. A, Tab 1, Attach. C (showing
    100 percent of LFACS queries receiving responses within 24 hours for
    February 2001). As described below, requesting carriers generally
    receive LFACS loop information within 2 hours of submitting a
    request. *See* *infra* at para. 61, n.Error: Reference source not
    found.

[^170]: *See* Verizon February 2 *Ex Parte* Letter at 8. Verizon's
    change management proposal for this new transaction treats it as a
    "Type 2" or regulatory change. *See* Verizon Massachusetts II
    Application at 14-15.

[^171]: *See* Verizon Massachusetts I Lacouture/Ruesterholz Decl. at
    para. 109. *See also* Letter from Dolores May, Executive Director
    Federal Regulatory, Verizon, to Eric Einhorn, Common Carrier Bureau,
    Federal Communications Commission, CC Docket No. 00-176 at 2 (filed
    October 17, 2000) (Verizon October 17 *Ex Parte* Letter).

[^172]: The loop lengths returned by the MLT in the manual qualification
    process correspond to the actual metallic loop lengths of discrete
    cable pairs to end users, as opposed to the theoretical loop lengths
    returned by LiveWire. Loop lengths in LiveWire are based on binder
    group sampling, for which Verizon has conducted MLT tests on a
    sample of loops serving a given distribution terminal. *See* Verizon
    November 3 *Ex Parte* Letter. *See also* Letter from Jason Oxman,
    Senior Government Affairs Counsel, Covad Communications Company, to
    Magalie Roman Salas, Secretary, Federal Communications Commission,
    CC Docket No. 00-176 at 7, n.11 (filed October 26, 2000) (Covad
    October 26 *Ex Parte* Letter).

[^173]: *See* Verizon October 17 *Ex Parte* Letter at 3-4 (describing
    Verizon's manual loop qualification process). This paper records
    search performed as part of the manual loop qualification process
    yields a more limited set of loop information than the engineering
    query discussed below. *See infra* n.Error: Reference source not
    found and para. 59.

[^174]: *See* Verizon Massachusetts I Lacouture/Ruesterholz Decl. at
    para. 109. *See also* Verizon Massachusetts I Application App. A,
    Vol. 3, Declaration of Elaine M. Guerard and Julie A. Canny at para.
    78 (Verizon Massachusetts I Guerard/Canny Decl.). If the manual
    process indicates a loop is qualified for the requested service,
    Verizon provides loop-specific information about the length of the
    line based on MLT, the presence of load coils or bridge tap, and the
    presence of T-1 in the binder group. If the loop is not qualified,
    Verizon returns a "query" notice indicating why the loop is not
    qualified for the requested service. *See* Verizon October 17 *Ex
    Parte* Letter at 3-4 (describing Verizon's manual loop qualification
    process).

[^175]: *See* Verizon February 2 *Ex Parte* Letter at 4-8. Verizon's
    change management proposal for this new transaction treats it as a
    "Type 2" or regulatory change. *See* Verizon Massachusetts II
    Application at 14-15.

[^176]: Verizon indicates that, using a manually submitted form,
    competitors may conduct engineering record requests on a pre-order
    basis. *See* Letter from Dee May, Executive Director Federal
    Regulatory, Verizon, to Magalie Roman Salas, Secretary, Federal
    Communications Commission, CC Docket No. 01-9 (filed March 16,
    2001); *see also* "Engineering Query Process Description," at
    http://128.11.40.241/east/wholesale/html/pdfs/engineering_queryrequest.pdf.

[^177]: *See* Verizon Massachusetts I Lacouture/Ruesterholz Decl. at
    para. 110. *See also* Verizon October 17 *Ex Parte* Letter at 4.

[^178]: *See* Verizon October 17 *Ex Parte* Letter at 4.

[^179]: *See supra* n.Error: Reference source not found.

[^180]: *See* Massachusetts Department Massachusetts I Comments at 293.

[^181]: *See* Verizon Massachusetts I Application App. B., Vol. 34a-b,
    Tab 443 at 657 (Verizon response to DTE-WCOM-4-11 information
    request). One commenter indicates that the engineering query is
    seldom requested due to its high cost, at \$123 per query. *See*
    Rhythms Massachusetts I Reply App. A, Declaration of Robert Williams
    at para. 13 (Rhythms Massachusetts I Williams Reply Decl.).

[^182]: We note, for future applications, that not all interim processes
    and change management proposals may be sufficient to warrant a
    finding of checklist compliance.

[^183]: *See* Letter from Dee May, Executive Director Federal
    Regulatory, Verizon, to Magalie Roman Salas, Secretary, Federal
    Communications Commission, CC Docket No. 01-9 (filed April 3, 2001).

[^184]: *See* Verizon February 2 *Ex Parte* Letter at 3.

[^185]: Verizon states that these system enhancements will be complete
    by October 2001. *See* Verizon February 2 *Ex Parte* Letter at 8.

[^186]: *See* Verizon February 2 *Ex Parte* Letter at 5.

[^187]: As the Commission has previously recognized, "\[c\]ompeting
    carriers need information about and specifications for an
    incumbent's systems and interfaces in order to develop and modify
    their systems and procedures to access the incumbent's OSS
    functions." *See Bell Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 3999,
    para. 102. For competing carriers to successfully interface with and
    make use of Verizon's new loop information processes, they will need
    to conduct extensive development with respect to their own systems
    and interfaces. *See* Verizon February 2 *Ex Parte* Letter at 5. The
    Commission has recognized that the existence of an adequate change
    management process and evidence that the BOC has adhered to this
    process over time demonstrates that the BOC is adequately assisting
    competing carriers to use available OSS functions. *See Bell
    Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 4000, para. 102. As
    discussed below, we find Verizon's change management processes in
    Massachusetts to be satisfactory. *See infra* Part IV.A.2.h.

[^188]: *See infra* Part IV.A.2.h(i).

[^189]: *See* Verizon Massachusetts II Application at 14-15; *see also*
    Verizon Massachusetts I McLean/Wierzbicki Decl., Attach. S at 18,
    36-39, 71-77 (timeline, process flow, and description of regulatory
    change process).

[^190]: We note that, while our analysis of Verizon's compliance relies
    in part on the enhancements discussed in Verizon's application, this
    Order does not address whether Verizon was in compliance with the
    requirements of the *UNE Remand Order* prior to adopting its interim
    process for access to LFACS and implementing additional enhancements
    through its change management process.

[^191]: *See* Covad Massachusetts II Reply at 27.

[^192]: *See* Covad Massachusetts II Comments at 33.

[^193]: *See* *supra* at para. 61, n.Error: Reference source not found.

[^194]: *See* Covad Massachusetts II Comments at 33*.*

[^195]: *See* Verizon February 2 *Ex Parte* Letter at 3.

[^196]: *See supra* at paras. 60-63; *see also* Verizon February 2 *Ex
    Parte* Letter at 4-5 and Attach. D. Verizon states that these system
    enhancements will be complete by October 2001, a schedule to which
    we expect Verizon to adhere. *See* Verizon February 2 *Ex Parte*
    Letter at 8.

[^197]: *See* Covad Massachusetts II Reply at 27.

[^198]: Verizon states that, if a competitive carrier's representative
    uses the end user's telephone number to identify the loop for which
    information is being sought, the LFACS loop information returned
    will be associated with that telephone number on that
    representative's "work list." Verizon also states that, if the
    representative uses the end user's address to identify the loop,
    Verizon will include that address along with the LFACS loop make-up
    information returned in the "remarks" field of the pre-order
    interface. *See* Letter from Dee May, Executive Director Federal
    Regulatory, Verizon, to Magalie Roman Salas, Secretary, Federal
    Communications Commission, CC Docket No. 01-9 (filed April 4, 2001).

[^199]: *See* Rhythms Massachusetts I Comments at 33-34; Covad
    Massachusetts I Reply at 10.

[^200]: *See* *supra* at para. 58. For example, competitors currently
    have pre-order access to loop information stored in the LiveWire and
    LFACS databases, separate and apart from information from those
    databases returned through the manual loop qualification process.
    *See supra* at paras. 56-57. Competitors may also obtain pre-order
    access to loop information in Verizon's paper records through an
    engineering query. *See supra* at para. 59.

[^201]: *See supra* at para. 58 & n.Error: Reference source not found.

[^202]: *See supra* at para. 58. *See also* Verizon February 2 *Ex
    Parte* Letter at 4-5, and Attach. D.

[^203]: *See* ALTS Massachusetts I Comments at 27-28; ALTS Massachusetts
    II Comments at 18-19; Covad Massachusetts II Reply at 27-28.

[^204]: *See supra* n.Error: Reference source not found.

[^205]: The Commission came to the same conclusion regarding similar
    allegations of inaccuracies in SWBT's loop make-up information
    database, which was also used both by retail personnel in SWBT's
    separate data affiliate and competitors. *See* *SWBT Kansas/Oklahoma
    Order* at para. 126. We note that a change to LiveWire is currently
    in change management. When this change is implemented, LiveWire will
    indicate when its does not contain loop qualification data for a
    particular service address or telephone number, and indicate that a
    manual loop qualification should be requested. Verizon states that
    this change will follow the change management timeline for a June
    2001 release. *See* Verizon Massachusetts II Lacouture/Ruesterholz
    Reply Decl. at para. 22.

[^206]: *See* Covad Massachusetts I Reply at 9-10.

[^207]: *See* Verizon Massachusetts I Lacouture/Ruesterholz Decl. at
    para. 108.

[^208]: *See* ALTS Massachusetts II Comments at 18.

[^209]: *See UNE Remand Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 3886, para. 429.

[^210]: *See* Sprint Massachusetts II Comments at 5 (citing *UNE Remand
    Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 3885, para. 427).

[^211]: *See UNE Remand Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 3885, para. 427.

[^212]: *See* Letter from Dee May, Verizon, to Magalie Roman Salas,
    Secretary, Federal Communications Commission, CC Docket No. 01-9
    (filed February 26, 2001) (Verizon February 26 *Ex Parte* Letter).

[^213]: *See SWBT Kansas/Oklahoma Order* at para. 135; *Bell Atlantic
    New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 4035, para. 163.

[^214]: *See SWBT Texas Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 18438-40, paras. 171-73;
    *Bell Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 4035-37, para. 164,
    4047-48, para. 180.

[^215]: *See infra* Part A.(iii) (discussing order flow-through in
    detail).

[^216]: For orders that flow through, Verizon returned such notices
    96.56 to 99.89 percent of the time in the period from September
    through December 2000. *See* OR 1-02 (percent on time local service
    request confirmation, flow-through).

[^217]: For resale orders for two-wire digital services, Verizon
    returned 94.64, 92.30, 94.87, and 92.11 percent of confirmation
    notices within 72 hours for September through December respectively.
    This performance is just under the benchmark and does not appear to
    be consistently deteriorating. *See* OR 1-04 (percent on time local
    service request confirmation \< 10 lines, no flow-through). For
    resale orders for special services of ten or more lines, Verizon
    returned confirmations on time 88.88 percent of the time in
    September, increasing through December when Verizon returned
    confirmations on time 100 percent of the time. *See* OR 1-06
    (percent on time local service request confirmation, no
    flow-through, electronically submitted).

[^218]: For UNE DS-1 and DS-3 orders of less than ten lines, Verizon
    fell well below the benchmark from September through December,
    achieving no more than a 50 percent on time rate. *See* OR 1-04
    (percent on time local service request confirmation \< 10 lines, no
    flow-through). For further discussion of Verizon's performance with
    regard to DS-1s and DS-3s, see *infra* Parts IV.B & V.C.

[^219]: See total confirmations as calculated from Verizon September
    through December Performance Data.

[^220]: Each month, Verizon examines a sample of confirmation notices
    from manually processed orders for accuracy. In every month from
    September through December, Verizon exceeded the Massachusetts
    Department's benchmark of 95 percent error-free confirmations, with
    the exception of November when 94.05 percent and December when 92.75
    percent of the sample of manually processed UNE-L orders was
    error-free. We find this disparity to be isolated and slight. *See*
    OR 6-03 (percent accuracy). We do not address WorldCom's complaints
    regarding July data for order accuracy because more recent data show
    acceptable performance. *See* WorldCom Massachusetts I
    Kwapniewski/Lichtenberg Decl. at para. 28.

[^221]: *See* KPMG Final Report at 50-51 (Test POP-1-4-4 and -1-4-5
    (EDI)), 102 (Test POP-2-4-1 and -2-4-2 (GUI)).

[^222]: *See* Massachusetts Department Massachusetts I Comments at 147.

[^223]: *See* ASCENT Massachusetts I Comments at 10; OnSite
    Massachusetts I Comments at 8, 18; ASCENT Massachusetts II Comments
    at 20.

[^224]: We decline to address commenters' assertions about data from
    before September 2000 when later data are available. *See, e.g.*,
    Winstar Massachusetts I Comments at 22.

[^225]: *See* Massachusetts Department Massachusetts I Comments at 147.

[^226]: *See* OR 2-02 (Percent On Time LSR Reject, Flow-Through).

[^227]: *See* OR 2-04 (Percent On Time LSR Reject \< 10 Lines); OR 2-06
    (Percent On Time LSR Reject \>= 10 Lines). The exceptions were
    isolated and slight. In September, Verizon returned rejections for
    resale POTS and prequalified complex orders on time 94.73 percent of
    the time. *See* OR 2-04. Also, Verizon returned rejections for UNE
    special services orders on time 91.37 percent of the time in
    November and 93.62 percent of the time in December. *See* OR 2-04.
    Finally, for UNE orders of less than 10 lines that were faxed in
    (rather than submitted electronically), Verizon returned rejections
    on time in October 79.55 percent of the time, in November 90.63
    percent of the time, and in December 92.31 percent of the time.
    *See* OR 2-08 (percent on time LSR reject \< 10 lines). This
    performance is steadily improving and in recent months has been only
    slightly below the 95 percent benchmark. We do not address comments
    based on March through July data because more recent data are
    available. *See, e.g.*, WorldCom Massachusetts I
    Kwapniewski/Lichtenberg Decl. at para. 28.

[^228]: *See* KPMG Final Report at 52-53 (Tests POP-1-4-6 & POP-1-4-7
    (EDI)), 105 (Test POP-2-6-5 (GUI)).

[^229]: *See* OR 3-01 (Percent Orders Rejected).

[^230]: *See SWBT Kansas/Oklahoma Order* at para. 143; *SWBT Texas
    Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 18442, para. 176; *Bell Atlantic New York
    Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 4045, para. 175, 4050, para. 183.

[^231]: *See* Verizon Massachusetts I McLean/Wierzbicki Decl. Attach. I.

[^232]: Massachusetts Department Massachusetts I Comments at 113.

[^233]: *See* ASCENT Massachusetts I Comments at 10; OnSite
    Massachusetts I Comments at 8; ASCENT Massachusetts II Comments at
    20. WorldCom points to commercial data from March through June 2000;
    we do not generally address commenters' claims regarding old data
    when more recent data are available.

[^234]: Rhythms Massachusetts I Comments at 22.

[^235]: *See* ALTS Massachusetts I Comments at 23.

[^236]: *See* Massachusetts Department Massachusetts I Reply at 22.

[^237]: *See* Massachusetts Department Massachusetts I Comments at 107
    (finding that "VZ-MA's systems are quite capable of allowing
    \[competing carriers\] and resellers to attain high levels of order
    flow-through and of sustaining future commercial volumes"), 147-48.

[^238]: Competing carriers' orders "flow through" if they are submitted
    electronically and pass through Verizon's ordering OSS into its back
    office systems without manual intervention.

[^239]: *See Bell Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 4034, para.
    162; *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20671, para.
    108.

[^240]: *See infra* Part IV.A.2.e (provisioning); *infra* Part A.(i)
    (documentation); *supra* Part IV.A.2.c (integration); *supra* Parts
    A.(i), A.(ii), and *infra* Part A.(iv) (ordering notifiers); *infra*
    para. 81 (scalability).

[^241]: *Bell Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 4034, para. 161.

[^242]: *See* OR 5-01 (Percent Flow-Through Total).

[^243]: *See supra* n.Error: Reference source not found.

[^244]: *See* Verizon Massachusetts I McLean/Wierzbicki Decl. Attach. H.

[^245]: *See Bell Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 4039-40, para.
    167, 4049, para. 181; *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd
    at 20674, para. 111.

[^246]: *See* KPMG Final Report at 123-24 (Tests POP-3-1, POP-3-2,
    POP-3-3) (results after correcting Verizon's documentation). In its
    "commercial flow-through test," KPMG examined a sample of the New
    York and Massachusetts orders of two competing carriers to determine
    the rate of flow-through for flow-through eligible orders (achieved
    flow-through) and the overall rate of flow-through (total
    flow-through) for those carriers over a two week period. *See id.*
    at 116 & n.70. Achieved flow-through was 59 percent and total
    flow-through was 35 percent. *See id.* at 126. KPMG discounted the
    results of this test, because its "primary assessment methodology"
    was the testing of KPMG orders described in the text above. *Id.*
    The Massachusetts Department also discounted the results of KPMG's
    commercial test, particularly because the test examined orders
    placed in New York as well as Massachusetts, and at a time when
    Verizon was addressing order processing errors in New York. *See*
    Massachusetts Department Massachusetts I Comments at 143. Without
    knowing whether the two carriers KPMG selected for its commercial
    test were representative of competing carriers in general, and for
    the reasons stated by the Massachusetts Department, we are not
    persuaded that the results of KPMG's commercial test show
    discrimination.

[^247]: *See* Verizon Massachusetts I McLean/Wierzbicki Decl. at para.
    53. We also note that the Massachusetts Department has added a
    special provision on flow-through to the Massachusetts PAP. *See
    infra* n.Error: Reference source not found.

[^248]: *See* ASCENT Massachusetts I Comments at 11; OnSite
    Massachusetts I Comments at 18; Rhythms Massachusetts I Comments at
    22-23; Winstar Massachusetts I Comments at 16, 21; ASCENT
    Massachusetts II Comments at 21. We do not address commenters'
    claims regarding data from early 2000 when more recent data are
    available.

[^249]: WorldCom Massachusetts I Comments at 47, 52; WorldCom
    Massachusetts I Kwapniewski/Lichtenberg Decl. at paras. 155-64;
    WorldCom Massachusetts I Kinard Decl. at para. 8; WorldCom
    Massachusetts I Reply at 39; WorldCom Massachusetts I
    Kwapniewski/Lichtenberg Reply Decl. at paras. 23-24.

[^250]: *See* Verizon Jan. 30 *Ex Parte* Letter Attach. at 14.

[^251]: *See* Massachusetts Department Massachusetts I Comments at 148;
    *supra* para. 71 (confirmation timeliness for non-flow-through
    orders); *supra* para. 74 (rejection notice timeliness for
    non-flow-through orders); *supra* para. 71 & n.Error: Reference
    source not found (confirmation accuracy for manually processed
    orders). From September through December, Verizon processed these
    orders with 90 to 99 percent accuracy (with the exceptions of resale
    orders in September, for which only 82.74 percent of orders were
    manually processed without error, UNE-P orders in December, for
    which 89.62 percent were without error, and UNE-L orders in
    December, for which 88.86 percent were without error). *See* OR 6-01
    (Percent Accuracy, Orders); OR 6-02 (Percent Accuracy,
    Opportunities). We do not address complaints about data for months
    before September 2000 as more recent data are available.

[^252]: *See* Massachusetts Department Massachusetts I Comments at 148.

[^253]: The total number of PONs increased from 31,987 in May to 44,368
    in December. *See* OR 3-01 (Percent Orders Rejected, competing
    carrier aggregate observances).

[^254]: KPMG found in its Capacity Management Evaluation that Verizon's
    OSS are designed "in a manner that would allow them to scale to meet
    increases in demand." KPMG Final Report at 238 (Test POP-8-1-14).

[^255]: *See* ALTS Massachusetts I Comments at 24; OnSite Massachusetts
    I Comments at 18; Winstar Massachusetts I Comments at 17, 21, 23;
    WorldCom Massachusetts I Comments at 48; WorldCom Massachusetts I
    Reply at 39; WorldCom Massachusetts I Kwapniewski/Lichtenberg Reply
    Decl. at para. 25.

[^256]: *See* Department of Justice Massachusetts I Evaluation at 22.

[^257]: *See infra* para. 88 and Part VIII.B.1. The Massachusetts PAP
    contains a special provision on flow-through: Verizon must achieve
    80 percent total flow-through and 95 percent achieved flow-through
    for UNE orders. *See* Verizon Jan. 30 *Ex Parte* Letter Attach. at
    14.

[^258]: *See* Verizon Massachusetts I McLean/Wierzbicki Decl. at paras.
    75-76.

[^259]: According to data for September through December, Verizon
    returned provisioning and billing completion notices on time (by
    noon the next business day) 97 to 100 percent of the time for both
    resale and UNE orders. *See* OR 4-02 (completion notice - percent on
    time); OR 4-05 (work completion notice - percent on time). KPMG's
    test results are inconsistent with the data reflecting actual
    commercial usage. KPMG found that 92.9 percent of provisioning
    completion notices and 74.7 percent of billing completion notices
    were delivered over EDI by noon the next business day; and that 2.3
    percent of the billing completion notices and 3.3 percent of the
    provisioning completion notices it expected to receive never
    arrived. *See* KPMG Final Report at 53-54 (Tests POP-1-4-8,
    POP-1-4-9). However, because KPMG did not evaluate the timeliness of
    completion notifiers using the same business rules as set out by the
    carrier-to-carrier working group, *see id.*, we cannot directly
    compare KPMG's test results against the commercial data Verizon
    provided, and we decline to find noncompliance on the basis of these
    test results.

[^260]: *See* OR 4-06 (Average duration - work completion (SOP) to bill
    completion). In addition, from September through December, Verizon
    took more than one business day to update the billing systems for
    13.99, 12.84, 15.29, and 11.99 percent of resale orders; and 9.94,
    8.38, 10.66, and 5.38 percent of UNE orders. *See* OR 4-08 (percent
    SOP to bill completion \> 1 business day). Also, in the same time
    period, Verizon took more than four business days to update its
    billing systems for only 1.56, 1.07, 1.95, and 0.38 percent of
    resale orders; and 4.06, 3.61, 2.35, and 0.23 percent of UNE orders.
    *See* OR 4-07 (percent SOP to Bill Completion \>= 5 business days).

[^261]: *See* Massachusetts Department Massachusetts I Comments at 147.

[^262]: *See id*.

[^263]: *See Bell Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 4051, para.
    184.

[^264]: *See* Verizon Massachusetts I McLean/Wierzbicki Decl. at para.
    74. Although Verizon's implementation of a system of active jeopardy
    notices likely will provide additional benefit to carriers, it is
    not relevant to our determination here that its current system is
    nondiscriminatory. Therefore we reject WorldCom's complaint that
    this new jeopardy system is flawed. *See* WorldCom Massachusetts II
    Comments at 33.

[^265]: WorldCom Massachusetts II Lichtenberg/Chapman Decl. at para. 20.

[^266]: *See* Verizon Massachusetts II McLean/Wierzbicki Reply Decl. at
    para. 20.

[^267]: *Bell Atlantic-New York Authorization Under Section 271 of the
    Communications Act To Provide In-Region, InterLATA Service in the
    State of New York*, Order, 15 FCC Rcd 5413 Attach. (2000) ("*Consent
    Decree*")

[^268]: *Id.* at 5418, para. 7.

[^269]: *Id.* at 5425-26.

[^270]: *See* Letter from David H. Solomon, Chief, Enforcement Bureau,
    Federal Communications Commission, to Edward D. Young, III, Senior
    Vice President-Regulatory, Bell Atlantic (June 20, 2000).
    Specifically, Bell Atlantic's aggregate performance under the new
    measurements exceeded 95 percent for four consecutive weeks. *See
    id.*

[^271]: *See* ALTS Massachusetts I Comments at 22; ASCENT Massachusetts
    I Comments at 10-11; OnSite Massachusetts I Comments at 8-9; Winstar
    Massachusetts I Comments at 22-23; ASCENT Massachusetts II Comments
    at 20. These commenters did not support their claims with specific
    evidence. We do not address other commenters' claims about AT&T's
    experiences with Verizon's OSS as AT&T did not raise these claims
    itself in this proceeding. *See, e.g.*, Winstar Massachusetts I
    Comments at 22.

[^272]: We generally do not examine commenters' complaints that rely on
    data or experiences from states other than Massachusetts. With
    specific regard to New York, the proper vehicle for complaints that
    Verizon's performance has deteriorated is section 271(d)(6), not
    opposition to this application.

[^273]: *See* WorldCom Massachusetts I Comments at 42; WorldCom
    Massachusetts I Kwapniewski/Lichtenberg Decl. at para. 41; WorldCom
    Massachusetts I Kwapniewski/Lichtenberg Reply Decl. at para. 5.

[^274]: *See* WorldCom Massachusetts I Comments at 42-43; WorldCom
    Massachusetts I Kinard Decl. at para. 12; WorldCom Massachusetts I
    Kwapniewski/Lichtenberg Decl. at paras. 40-44, 54; WorldCom
    Massachusetts I Kwapniewski/Lichtenberg Reply Decl. at para. 5.

[^275]: *See* KPMG Final Report at 53-54.

[^276]: *See id.* at 60.

[^277]: *See* WorldCom Massachusetts I Comments at 43, 54; WorldCom
    Massachusetts I Kinard Decl. at para. 12; WorldCom Massachusetts I
    Kwapniewski/Lichtenberg Decl. at paras. 42-43; WorldCom
    Massachusetts I Reply at 36; WorldCom Massachusetts I
    Kwapniewski/Lichtenberg Reply Decl. paras. 9-10.

[^278]: *See supra* Part A.(iv).

[^279]: *See supra* n.Error: Reference source not found.

[^280]: *See supra* n.Error: Reference source not found.

[^281]: *See* Verizon Jan. 30 *Ex Parte* Letter Attach. at 16-17 & App.
    H. These additions resolve concerns that the original PAP lacked
    such a provision. *See* ALTS Massachusetts I Comments at 57;
    Department of Justice Massachusetts I Evaluation at 23 n.77;
    WorldCom Massachusetts I Kinard Decl. at para. 12.

[^282]: As in the New York situation, we are prepared to take
    appropriate enforcement action under section 271(d)(6) if we find
    evidence of a systemic and widespread failure of Verizon to deliver
    ordering notifiers reliably and on time. *See infra* Part IX.

[^283]: We discuss loop provisioning below. *See* *infra* Part IV.B.

[^284]: *See* *Bell Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 4058, para.
    196. For provisioning timeliness, we look to missed due dates and
    average installation intervals and for provisioning quality, we look
    to service problems experienced at the provisioning stage.

[^285]: Verizon offers provisioning intervals either based on standard
    product-specific intervals or based on its SMARTS Clock system where
    no specific interval is set, which assigns available appointment
    dates for orders requiring dispatch. *See* Verizon Massachusetts I
    Guerard/Canny Decl. at para. 61. *See also* *Bell Atlantic New York
    Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 4058, para. 197 and n.629 & 631.

[^286]: *See* Massachusetts Department Massachusetts I Comments at
    157-59 (citing KPMG Final Report at 58, 63, 105, 108 (Tests
    POP-1-6-4, POP-1-9-4, POP-2-6-4, POP-2-8-4)). Although KPMG reported
    findings of "Not Satisfied" for its test of Verizon's offered due
    dates over the LSOG-4 EDI interface, these findings were associated
    with Verizon's systems incorrectly giving competitive LECs different
    due dates for ISDN orders than were given to Verizon's retail
    customers. *See* KPMG Final Report at 63, 108 (Tests POP-1-9-4,
    Tests POP-2-8-4); *see also* KPMG Final Report at Exception Report
    #16. Subsequent to the conclusion of KPMG's testing, the
    Massachusetts Department oversaw Verizon's implementation of system
    fixes to correct these problems, and continues to monitor Verizon's
    ISDN performance to ensure that this issue has been resolved. *See*
    Massachusetts Department Massachusetts I Comments at 159; Verizon
    Massachusetts I Application App. B, Tab 545 at 3077-3079 (transcript
    of technical session held August 28, 2000).

[^287]: *See* Massachusetts Department Massachusetts I Comments at
    159-160 (citing KPMG Final Report at 195-204). KPMG concluded that
    Verizon satisfied every test element in its evaluation of parity in
    Verizon's provisioning processes. KPMG found that, in most cases,
    there is no distinction between the systems, methods, or execution
    of processes between wholesale and retail orders. Where parts of the
    retail and wholesale order provisioning processes are handled by
    different organizations within Verizon, the same processes are
    followed for both competitors' orders and Verizon's retail orders.
    *See id.*

[^288]: Verizon's resale "specials" include orders for resold DS-0,
    DS-1, and DS-3 services. *See* Verizon Massachusetts I Guerard/Canny
    Decl. at para. 64. Resale "POTS" service is resold voice telephone
    service.

[^289]: *See SWBT Texas Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 18452, para. 194.

[^290]: *See* Metric PR 4 (resale missed appointments). The performance
    data for the PR 4 series of metrics generally show no statistically
    significant disparities in Verizon's performance in meeting
    competitors' due dates for resale POTS provisioning.

[^291]: Two PR 4 submetrics, PR 4-02 (average delay days-total) and PR
    4-05 (missed non-dispatch due dates), indicate some statistically
    significant disparities in Verizon's performance in meeting
    competitors' due dates for resale POTS provisioning in September and
    October 2000. In September 2000, competitors experienced an average
    of 9.05 provisioning delay days for resale POTS, as compared to 4.64
    delay days for Verizon retail customers, and in October competitors
    experienced an average of 5.84 provisioning delay days for resale
    POTS, as compared to 3.64 delay days for Verizon retail customers
    (PR 4-02). Also, in September, Verizon missed 0.20 percent of
    competitors' non-dispatch due dates for resale POTS as compared to
    0.11 percent of non-dispatch due dates for its retail customers, and
    in October Verizon missed 0.12 percent of competitors' non-dispatch
    due dates for resale POTS as compared to 0.04 percent of
    non-dispatch due dates for its retail customers, differences of 0.09
    and 0.08 percent in September and October respectively (PR 4-05). We
    conclude that these disparities alone do not warrant a finding of
    noncompliance. Our finding is underscored by the lack of
    statistically significant disparities in performance under these
    metrics in November and December 2000. *See id*. Because of
    Verizon's satisfactory performance during this latest two month
    period, we conclude that Verizon's previous performance does not
    warrant a finding of noncompliance. Furthermore, although Verizon's
    performance under PR 4-02 (average delay days-total) for resale
    specials seems to show a disparity between retail and wholesale
    performance in December 2000 (29.67 competitor delay days versus
    12.10 for Verizon), we conclude that these data alone fail to show a
    lack of parity in Verizon's treatment of competitors' resale
    specials orders, due to the fact that only three competing carrier
    observations were used to calculate these data. *See* Metric PR 4-02
    (average delay days-total for resale specials, listing 3 competing
    carrier observations).

[^292]: In the *Bell Atlantic New York Order*, the Commission concluded
    that the disparity between average completed intervals for competing
    carriers and Bell Atlantic was substantially caused by several
    factors outside of Bell Atlantic's control, including competing
    carriers choosing longer installation dates without proper
    date-coding (the "W-coding" problem) and ordering products and
    services with long standard intervals (the "order mix" problem).
    *See Bell Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 4061-62, para.
    203. Verizon offers evidence here demonstrating that, under the LSOG
    2 interface, competing carriers can and do choose longer than
    standard installation dates for resale services without proper
    date-coding, and are ordering a relatively larger share of products
    and services with longer standard intervals than Verizon. *See*
    Verizon Massachusetts I Guerard/Canny Decl. at paras. 66-77. Based
    on this unrebutted evidence, we conclude that the disparity in
    Massachusetts between average completion intervals for competing
    carriers' resale orders and Verizon's retail orders is caused by
    factors outside of Verizon's control, and renders its performance
    data on resale average completed intervals unreliable. We note for
    future applications, however, that Verizon's LSOG 4 ordering
    interface corrects the problem of incorrect installation date coding
    (the "W-coding" problem). We therefore expect that, over time,
    competing carriers' selection of longer installation dates should
    have a diminished effect on the reliability of performance data for
    average completed intervals. *See* Verizon Massachusetts I
    Guerard/Canny Decl. at para. 76.

[^293]: *See* *Bell Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 4061-66,
    paras. 202-10.

[^294]: *See supra* at para. 91.

[^295]: *See* Metric PR 6 (installation quality for resale services).
    From September 2000 through December 2000, Verizon's performance
    data under the PR 6 series of metrics generally show no
    statistically significant disparities in installation quality for
    competitors offering resale services as compared to Verizon's retail
    service.

[^296]: Three PR 6 submetrics measuring installation quality for resale
    services show some statistically significant disparities between
    Verizon's provisioning performance for itself and for competitors in
    September and December 2000. In September 2000, the percentage of
    installation troubles reported within 30 days for 2-wire xDSL
    services (PR 6-01) was 6.90 percent for competing carriers versus
    1.93 percent for VADI, a difference of 4.97 percent; these data,
    however, were based on 29 competing carrier orders. Due to the low
    volume of competitors' orders, a handful of trouble reports can
    cause seemingly large variations in the monthly trouble reports.
    *See, e.g.,* Letter from Dee May, Executive Director Federal
    Regulatory, Verizon, to Magalie Roman Salas, Secretary, Federal
    Communications Commission, CC Docket No. 01-9 (filed March 13, 2001)
    (Verizon March 13 *Ex Parte* Letter). A 4 month average of Verizon's
    data for resold 2-wire xDSL under the PR 6-01 submetric from
    September through December 2000 reduces the disparity to 1.10
    percent, which is not competitively significant. In December 2000,
    the percentage of installation troubles reported within 30 days for
    2-wire digital services (not including xDSL services) where no
    trouble was found on the network (PR 6-03) was 4.74 percent for
    competing carriers versus 2.06 percent for VADI; the overall trouble
    report rate within 30 days (PR 6-01) for the same services in that
    month, however, was much lower for competing carriers (0.43) than
    for VADI (1.24). Finally, also in December 2000, the percentage of
    installation troubles reported within 30 days (PR 6-01) for resold
    special services was 0.71 percent for competing carriers versus 0.47
    for Verizon; the difference between the two numbers, however,
    amounts to 0.24 percent, and no commenter has complained about
    Verizon's performance under this measure. We conclude that these
    disparities alone are not competitively significant, and do not
    warrant a finding of noncompliance in Verizon's provision of resale
    services to competitors. Verizon's performance under the PR 6
    metrics for digital services, *i.e.*, resale xDSL, is also relevant
    to our review of its compliance with its resale obligations under
    checklist item 14. *See infra* Part V.E.

[^297]: *See* Metrics PR 2-01, PR 2-03, PR 2-04, and PR 2-05 (average
    interval completed for platform orders), and Metrics PR 4-04 and PR
    4-05 (missed appointments for platform orders).

[^298]: Verizon's performance data demonstrate that, from September 2000
    through December 2000, competitors consistently reported a lower
    percentage of installation troubles within the first 30 days of
    installation of UNE-P than Verizon's retail POTS customers. *See*
    Metric PR 6-01 (for POTS -- Provisioning -- Other). In a letter,
    Verizon explains that this measure captures only UNE-P orders. *See*
    Verizon March 13 *Ex Parte* Letter.

[^299]: Two provisioning submetrics show some statistically significant
    disparities in Verizon's provisioning performance with respect to
    UNE-P dispatch (Metric PR 4-04) and UNE-P non-dispatch (Metric PR
    2-01) orders. For the reasons discussed here, we find these
    disparities do not warrant a finding of noncompliance. Verizon
    missed a higher percentage of competitors' due dates for UNE-P
    dispatch orders than for its own retail POTS service in September
    and October 2000 (19.05 versus 8.70 percent and 15.28 versus 7.83
    percent, respectively) (Metric PR 4-04 for platform dispatch
    orders). These data, however, are based on low competitor order
    volumes (42 UNE-P dispatch orders in September and 72 in October).
    Due to the low volume of competitors' orders, a handful of missed
    due dates can cause seemingly large variations in the monthly
    trouble reports. *See, e.g.*, Verizon March 13 *Ex Parte* Letter.
    While these September and October 2000 data respectively show
    disparities of 10.35 and 7.45 percent between the rate Verizon
    misses POTS dispatch provisioning due dates for itself as compared
    to UNE-P competitors, a 4 month average of Verizon's data from
    September through December 2000 reduces that disparity to 4.35
    percent. Furthermore, Verizon's November and December 2000
    performance data do not show any statistically significant
    disparities under this submetric, and the data show a clear downward
    trend towards parity from September through December. *See* Metric
    PR 4-04 (missed due dates for platform dispatch order). With respect
    to non-dispatch UNE-P orders, although Verizon's October 2000
    performance data show a disparity between the intervals in which
    competitors' UNE-P orders are completed as compared to Verizon's
    retail POTS orders (1.77 days vs. 1.26 days) (Metric PR 2-01),
    Verizon's other average completed interval measures for UNE-P show
    no statistically significant disparities in that month, nor do any
    of its average completed interval measures for UNE-P in November and
    December 2000. Furthermore, the performance data show that Verizon
    consistently misses a lower percentage of competitors' due dates for
    UNE-P non-dispatch orders than for its own retail POTS service
    (Metric PR 4-05). *See* Metrics PR 2-01, PR 2-03, PR 2-04, and PR
    2-05 (average interval completed for platform orders), and PR 4-04
    and PR 4-05 (missed appointments for platform orders).

[^300]: *See* Verizon Massachusetts I McLean/Wierzbicki Decl. at paras.
    82-84.

[^301]: *See* Verizon Massachusetts I McLean/Wierzbicki Decl. at paras.
    83-91. The RETAS interface enables carriers to perform the same
    maintenance and repair functions as Verizon's retail operations,
    including: (1) testing resale POTS and UNE-P lines, as well as
    special service lines at DS-0 and lower; (2) creating trouble
    tickets; (3) obtaining trouble status; (4) modifying trouble
    tickets; (5) canceling trouble tickets; (6) requesting trouble
    report histories; and (7) trouble ticket service recovery. Although
    it supports all other maintenance and repair functions for UNE
    loops, the RETAS interface does not support testing of UNE loops,
    because these loops are not connected to a Verizon switch. Instead,
    competing carriers must test UNE loops through their own switches.
    *See id*. at para. 83.

[^302]: Verizon's EBI interface offers similar functionality to the
    RETAS interface, with the exceptions of: (1) automatic feature
    updates to switches through Verizon's StarMem system for features
    ordered by customers but not yet active; and (2) testing special
    service lines. Verizon indicates that it has implemented EBI in
    Massachusetts to support local services and local service circuits
    consistent with industry standards, where they exist. *See id*. at
    paras. 83-84 and Attach. O.

[^303]: *See* *Bell Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 4069, para.
    215.

[^304]: *See* Metrics PO 2-01, PO 2-02, and PO 2-03 (OSS availability
    for Maint. Web GUI (RETAS)). Verizon's performance data show that
    its RETAS interface was generally available during more than 99.5
    percent of scheduled hours of availability from September through
    December 2000; although non-prime time RETAS availability was 99.25
    percent in December, we do not find this deviation from the
    benchmark to be competitively significant.

[^305]: KPMG found that Verizon satisfied every test element of its
    functional evaluation of Verizon's maintenance and repair functions.
    *See* KPMG Final Report at 247-59. KPMG's functional test evaluated
    RETAS both for its conformance with Verizon documentation and for
    its comparative functionality to Verizon's retail trouble
    administration systems. *See id.* at 239. For its functional
    evaluation of the RETAS interface, KPMG evaluated the following
    functions: (1) mechanized loop test; (2) switched access remote
    test; (3) create trouble ticket; (4) modify trouble ticket; (5)
    obtain trouble ticket status; (6) close trouble ticket; (7) perform
    service recovery; (8) request trouble ticket history; and (9)
    request extended trouble ticket history. *See* KPMG Final Report at
    246.

[^306]: *See* Metric MR 1 (maintenance OSS response times). The MR 1
    series of metrics measures Verizon's response times in allowing
    competitors to create trouble tickets, obtain trouble ticket status
    reports, modify trouble tickets, cancel trouble tickets, obtain
    trouble report histories, and test POTS lines. From September
    through December 2000, Verizon performed these functions for
    competitors within the benchmark response times, and in most cases
    provided competitors with faster service than it provided to itself.

[^307]: *See* Metric MR 4 (trouble durations for resale and UNE-P). The
    performance data for the MR 4 series of metrics show no
    statistically significant disparities in trouble durations
    experienced by competitors providing resold services or UNE-P as
    compared to Verizon's retail services, with the exception of one
    submetric for resale special lines in November 2000. To the
    contrary, these data for the most part indicate that Verizon is
    repairing troubles for competitors within shorter time frames than
    for its retail customers. In November 2000, however, 67.74 percent
    of resold special service lines experiencing troubles were out of
    service for longer than 4 hours, as compared to 55.66 percent of
    Verizon's retail special service lines (MR 4-06 for resale special
    service lines). These data, however, were based on a volume of 82
    trouble reports by competitors. Due to the low volume of
    competitors' trouble reports, a handful of troubles can cause
    seemingly large variations in the monthly performance data. *See,
    e.g.*, Verizon March 13 *Ex Parte* Letter. We note that, while the
    November 2000 resale specials data for this submetric shows a
    disparity of 12.08 percent, a 4 month average of Verizon's data from
    September through December 2000 reduces the disparity under this
    submetric to 8.22 percent (62.26 percent for Verizon versus 70.48
    percent for competitors). We are encouraged by Verizon's improved
    performance under this measure in December 2000, which does not
    reflect any statistically significant disparity between Verizon's
    performance for itself as compared to competitors. We do not find
    that the disparity in November 2000 under this one submetric
    warrants a finding of checklist noncompliance.

[^308]: *See* Metric MR 3 (missed repair appointments for resale and
    UNE-P). From September through December 2000, Verizon exhibited no
    statistically significant disparities in the percentage of
    maintenance and repair appointments it missed for competitors
    providing resale services or UNE-P as compared to its own retail
    services.

[^309]: *See* Metric MR 2 (trouble report rate for resale and UNE-P). In
    some instances, the performance data for the MR 2 series of metrics
    for resale and UNE-P show statistically significant disparities in
    the rate at which network troubles are reported by competitors as
    compared to Verizon's retail customers. These disparities, however,
    are very small. In September 2000, the trouble report rate for
    central office network troubles (MR 2-03) for competitors providing
    UNE-P services was 0.24 percent, as compared to 0.12 percent for
    Verizon's retail customers, a difference of 0.12 percent. In October
    2000, the trouble report rate for network troubles (MR 2-01) for
    competitors providing resold special services was 0.38 percent, as
    compared to 0.28 percent for Verizon's retail customers, a
    difference of 0.10 percent. In the same month, the trouble report
    rate for central office network troubles (MR 2-03) for competitors
    providing UNE-P services was 0.52 percent, as compared to 0.09
    percent for Verizon's retail customers, a difference of 0.43
    percent. In November 2000, the trouble report rate for central
    office network troubles (MR 2-03) for competitors providing UNE-P
    services was 0.15 percent, as compared to 0.08 percent for Verizon's
    retail customers, a difference of 0.07 percent. In December 2000,
    the network trouble report rate (MR 2-01) for competitors providing
    resale special services was 0.35 percent, as compared to 0.23
    percent for Verizon's retail customers, a difference of 0.12
    percent. In the same month, the trouble report rate for central
    office network troubles (MR 2-03) for competitors providing UNE-P
    services was 0.35 percent, as compared to 0.08 percent for Verizon's
    retail customers. Because these disparities are so small, the
    performance differential does not appear to be competitively
    significant and does not warrant a finding that Verizon fails to
    provide nondiscriminatory access to maintenance and repair OSS
    functions.

[^310]: *See* Metric MR 5 (repeat trouble report rate for resale and
    UNE-P). Verizon's performance data from September through December
    2000 for the most part indicate no statistically significant
    disparities in the percentage of repeat trouble reports made by
    competitors providing resale services or UNE-P as compared to
    Verizon's retail customers. In many instances, the data show that
    competitors report a smaller percentage of repeat troubles for these
    services than Verizon's retail customers. In December 2000, however,
    the percentage of repeat troubles within 30 days (MR 5-01) reported
    by competitors providing resold special services was 28.28 percent,
    as compared to 19.72 percent for Verizon's retail customers. Due to
    the low volumes of competitor orders recorded under this metric, a
    handful of trouble reports can cause seemingly large variations in
    the monthly trouble reports. *See* Verizon March 13 *Ex Parte*
    Letter. We also note that, while the December 2000 resale specials
    data for MR 5-01 shows a disparity of 8.56 percent, the disparity
    shown by a 4 month average of Verizon's data from September through
    December 2000 is only 1.85 percent, which is not competitively
    significant. We do not find, based solely on one month's performance
    measuring a low volume of orders, that Verizon fails to provide
    nondiscriminatory access to maintenance and repair OSS functions.
    *See* Metric MR 5-01 (repeat trouble reports within 30 days for
    resale specials, listing 99 competitor observations in December).

[^311]: KPMG found that Verizon satisfied every test element of its
    performance (volume) evaluation of Verizon's maintenance and repair
    functions. *See* KPMG Final Report at 278-84. KPMG's volume test
    evaluated the performance of the RETAS interface under normal load
    (projected September and December 2000 normal hour loads), peak hour
    load (150 percent of normal load) and stress load (240 percent of
    normal load) conditions, examining the performance of the RETAS
    interface for statistically significant degradation under these
    conditions. *See* KPMG Final Report at 270 (Table 2-4) and 278-84.
    For its volume testing of the RETAS interface, KPMG evaluated
    Verizon's ability to perform all nine functions tested in its
    functional evaluation. *See* KPMG Final Report at 261 and *supra* at
    n.Error: Reference source not found.

[^312]: *See* Massachusetts Department Massachusetts I Comments at
    195-96.

[^313]: *See SWBT Kansas/Oklahoma Order* at para. 163.

[^314]: *See Bell Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 4075, para.
    226.

[^315]: *See* Verizon Massachusetts I Application at 52; Verizon
    Massachusetts I McLean/Wierzbicki Decl. at para. 92.

[^316]: The Massachusetts Department has established a benchmark of
    sending out 95 percent of DUFs in four business days, and 98 percent
    of carrier bills in ten business days. In September through
    December, Verizon consistently met the benchmark for timeliness in
    sending out DUFs, *see* BI 1-02 (percent DUF in 4 business days) and
    achieved billing accuracy close to or surpassing parity, *see* BI
    3-01 (percent Billing Adjustments-Dollars Adjusted); BI 3-02
    (Percent Billing Adjustments-Number of Adjustments). Verizon also
    met the benchmark for timeliness in sending out wholesale bills
    except in November, when Verizon sent out only 94 percent of carrier
    bills on time. By December that figure was back up to 100 percent.
    *See* BI 2-01 (Timeliness of Carrier Bill).

[^317]: *See* KPMG Final Report at 450-82 (Tests BLG-5 and -6). We also
    find that Verizon's billing OSS is sufficiently scalable to
    accommodate reasonably foreseeable commercial demand. We base this
    finding on Verizon's continued good performance in the face of
    higher order volumes, *see supra* n.Error: Reference source not
    found, and on KPMG's conclusion that Verizon's billing systems are
    "designed in a manner that would allow them to scale to meet
    increases in demand," KPMG Final Report at 494 (Test BLG-7-1-14).

[^318]: *See* Massachusetts Department Massachusetts I Reply at 43;
    WorldCom Massachusetts I Kwapniewski/Lichtenberg Decl. at paras.
    172-73; Winstar Massachusetts I Comments at 26; Verizon
    Massachusetts I Application App. I, Tab 2 at Exceptions 6, 11. We do
    not generally address carriers' claims arising out of their
    experiences with Verizon's OSS in other states, or claims about
    other carriers' experiences when those carriers did not raise those
    claims themselves in this proceeding.

[^319]: *See* ASCENT Massachusetts I Comments at 11; ASCENT
    Massachusetts II Comments at 21.

[^320]: *See id.*; WorldCom Massachusetts I Kwapniewski/Lichtenberg
    Decl. at paras. 147-51; WorldCom Massachusetts II Comments at 31;
    WorldCom Massachusetts II Lichtenberg/Chapman Decl. at para. 16.

[^321]: *See SWBT Texas Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 18452, para. 193 (noting
    importance of loss notification).

[^322]: *See* WorldCom Massachusetts I Comments at 41 n.67; WorldCom
    Massachusetts I Kwapniewski/Lichtenberg Decl. at paras. 152-53.

[^323]: *See supra* Part IV.A.2.b.

[^324]: *See Bell Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 3999, para.
    102 (quoting *Ameritech Michigan Order*, 12 FCC Rcd at 20616, para.
    136).

[^325]: The "change management process" refers to the methods and
    procedures that the BOC employs to communicate with competing
    carriers regarding the performance of, and changes in, the BOC's
    OSS. *See SWBT Texas Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 18403-04, para. 107
    (describing importance of change management).

[^326]: Massachusetts Department Massachusetts I Comments at 78. We are
    encouraged by the Massachusetts Department's decision to adopt a
    Change Control Assurance Plan, which will encourage strong
    performance going forward. *See infra* Part VIII.B.1.

[^327]: *See SWBT Texas Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 18404, para. 108.

[^328]: Massachusetts Department Massachusetts I Comments at 78.

[^329]: *See* Verizon Massachusetts I McLean/Wierzbicki Decl. Attach. S.

[^330]: Massachusetts Department Massachusetts I Comments at 78.

[^331]: From September through December, Verizon sent all notices on
    time. *See* PO 4-01 (Percent Notices Sent On Time).

[^332]: *See* WorldCom Massachusetts I Comments at 46; WorldCom
    Massachusetts I Kwapniewski/Lichtenberg Decl. at paras. 102-15;
    WorldCom Massachusetts I Reply at 38; WorldCom Massachusetts II
    Comments at 30; WorldCom Massachusetts II Lichtenberg/Chapman Decl.
    at para. 15.

[^333]: *See* Verizon Massachusetts I Reply at 48; Verizon Massachusetts
    I McLean/Wierzbicki Reply Decl. at para. 37; *cf.* Verizon
    Massachusetts I McLean/Wierzbicki Decl. Attach. S at 6-7 (defining
    types of "change\[s\] affecting interfaces between the \[competing
    carrier's\] and Bell Atlantic's operational support systems").

[^334]: *See* ALTS Massachusetts I Comments at 24.

[^335]: Massachusetts Department Massachusetts I Reply at 22.

[^336]: *See* Verizon Massachusetts I McLean/Wierzbicki Decl. at para.
    101.

[^337]: Massachusetts Department Massachusetts I Comments at 78.

[^338]: *See* Verizon Massachusetts I McLean/Wierzbicki Decl. at paras.
    101-05.

[^339]: *See id.* at para. 104.

[^340]: *SWBT Texas Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 18408, para. 115.

[^341]: *See* Massachusetts Department Massachusetts I Comments at 53.

[^342]: *See id.*

[^343]: A stable testing environment is one in which the BOC makes no
    changes to the proposed release during the test period. *See SWBT
    Texas Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 18419, para. 132 & n.350 (explaining
    importance of stable testing environment).

[^344]: *See id.*, 15 FCC Rcd at 18420, para. 134.

[^345]: *See* Verizon Massachusetts I McLean/Wierzbicki Decl. at para.
    108.

[^346]: *See id.* Attach. T at 3 (CLEC Handbook). The CLEC Handbook is
    available in its entirety on Verizon's website at
    http://www.bell-atl.com/wholesale/html/customer_doc.htm.

[^347]: *See* KPMG Final Report at 532 (Test RMI-2-9); *see also*
    Verizon Massachusetts I Application App. I Tab 2 at Exception 7
    (KPMG report on disposition of exception regarding CTE stability).

[^348]: *See* Verizon Massachusetts I McLean/Wierzbicki Decl. Attach. T
    at 1-2.

[^349]: *See* Massachusetts Department Massachusetts I Comments at 54.

[^350]: *See* Verizon Massachusetts I McLean/Wierzbicki Decl. at para.
    110.

[^351]: *See id.* at para. 109. KPMG noted that Verizon's test deck for
    its February 2000 software release had quality problems, but that
    the June 2000 release showed improvement. *See* KPMG Final Report at
    527 (Test RMI-2-2).

[^352]: *See* Massachusetts Department Massachusetts I Comments at 54.

[^353]: *See* WorldCom Massachusetts I Comments at 45; WorldCom
    Massachusetts I Kwapniewski/Lichtenberg Decl. at paras. 85, 89;
    WorldCom Massachusetts I Kwapniewski/Lichtenberg Reply Decl. at
    para. 15. We do not address WorldCom's complaints arising out if its
    testing experiences in states other than Massachusetts.

[^354]: *See* Massachusetts Department Massachusetts I Reply at 28.

[^355]: *See* Verizon Massachusetts I Application App. I, Tab 2 at
    Exception 7.

[^356]: *See SWBT Texas Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 18411, para. 119;
    Massachusetts Department Massachusetts I Comments at 78.

[^357]: *See* Verizon Massachusetts I McLean/Wierzbicki Decl. at paras.
    113-14. Examples of Verizon's technical documentation include a
    Pre-Order EDI Guide, a Pre-Order CORBA Guide, the Combined Pre-Order
    Documentation (EDI User Guide with Business Rules), the Order EDI
    Guide, and Specifications for Access Service Request. *See id.*

[^358]: *See* Verizon Nov. 15 *Ex Parte* Letter Attach. (showing reject
    rates by individual carrier). As of September 2000, fifteen
    competing carriers were using EDI and seven more were in the process
    of being certified. *See* Verizon Massachusetts I McLean/Wierzbicki
    Decl. at para. 40.

[^359]: *See* KPMG Final Report at 8.

[^360]: *See* Verizon Massachusetts I McLean/Wierzbicki Decl. at para.
    119.

[^361]: *See* KPMG Final Report at 147-50 (Tests POP-4-17 to -4-24).

[^362]: WorldCom Massachusetts I Comments at 45; *see* WorldCom
    Massachusetts I Kwapniewski/Lichtenberg Decl. at paras. 73-93; ALTS
    Massachusetts I Comments at 23; WorldCom Massachusetts I Reply at
    37; WorldCom Massachusetts II Comments at 30; WorldCom Massachusetts
    II Lichtenberg/Chapman Decl. at para. 13. We do not address
    WorldCom's claims arising from data or experiences in states other
    than Massachusetts.

[^363]: *See* WorldCom Massachusetts I Kwapniewski/Lichtenberg Decl. at
    paras. 95-99.

[^364]: ASCENT Massachusetts I Comments at 10; ASCENT Massachusetts II
    Comments at 20.

[^365]: *See* Verizon Massachusetts I McLean/Wierzbicki Decl. at para.
    118.

[^366]: Verizon states that the documentation for its June and October
    software releases had error rates of 0.4 percent and 0.13 percent,
    respectively. *See* Verizon Massachusetts II Reply at 48; Verizon
    Massachusetts II McLean/Wierzbicki Reply Decl. at para. 29.

[^367]: *See* Verizon Massachusetts I McLean/Wierzbicki Decl. at paras.
    113-15, 120-22, 125.

[^368]: Massachusetts Department Massachusetts I Comments at 78.

[^369]: *See* ASCENT Massachusetts I Comments at 8-9; Rhythms
    Massachusetts I Comments at 24-25; WorldCom Massachusetts I Comments
    at 43-44, 46; WorldCom Massachusetts I Kwapniewski/Lichtenberg Decl.
    at paras. 116-28; ASCENT Massachusetts II Comments at 19. We do not
    address WorldCom's complaints regarding help desk problems it has
    experienced in other states. *See* WorldCom Massachusetts I
    Kwapniewski/Lichtenberg Decl. at paras. 116-26.

[^370]: *See* KPMG Final Report at 609; WorldCom Massachusetts I
    Comments at 44; WorldCom Massachusetts I Kwapniewski/Lichtenberg
    Decl. at para. 118; WorldCom Massachusetts I Reply at 37.

[^371]: *See* OnSite Massachusetts I Comments Kriss Stmt. at 7.

[^372]: *See* KPMG Final Report at 605.

[^373]: *See* Verizon Massachusetts I McLean/Wierzbicki Reply Decl. at
    para. 41.

[^374]: *See* KPMG Final Report at 609.

[^375]: *See* Verizon Massachusetts I McLean/Wierzbicki Reply Decl. at
    para. 41.

[^376]: *See* WorldCom Massachusetts I Kwapniewski/Lichtenberg Decl. at
    para. 55.

[^377]: *See* Rhythms Massachusetts I Comments at 23; Covad
    Massachusetts I Comments at 48; Rhythms Massachusetts I Reply at 9.

[^378]: In order to comply with the requirements of checklist item 2, a
    BOC must show that it is offering "\[n\]ondiscriminatory access to
    network elements in accordance with the requirements of section\[\]
    251(c)(3)." 47 U.S.C. § 271(c)(2)(B)(ii). Section 251(c)(3) requires
    an incumbent LEC to "provide, to any requesting telecommunications
    carrier . . . nondiscriminatory access to network elements on an
    unbundled basis at any technically feasible point on rates, terms,
    and conditions that are just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory."
    *Id.* § 251(c)(3). Section 251(c)(3) of the Act also requires
    incumbent LECs to provide UNEs in a manner that allows requesting
    carriers to combine such elements in order to provide a
    telecommunications service.

[^379]: In previous section 271 orders, the Commission has emphasized
    that the ability of requesting carriers to use UNEs, as well as
    combinations of UNEs, is integral to achieving Congress' objective
    of promoting competition in local telecommunications markets. *See
    SWBT Kansas/Oklahoma Order* at para. 171 n.487; *Bell Atlantic New
    York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 4077-78, para. 230.

[^380]: *See* Verizon Massachusetts I Application at 33; Verizon
    Massachusetts I Lacouture/Ruesterholz Decl. at paras. 180-84;
    Massachusetts Department Massachusetts I Comments at 199.

[^381]: *See* Verizon Massachusetts I Application at 33; Verizon
    Massachusetts I Lacouture/Ruesterholz Decl. at paras. 181, 184;
    Verizon Massachusetts II Application App. B, Vol. 2, Tab 3C (D.T.E.
    Tariff No. 17, Part B, §§ 13.1.1.A, 15.1.1.A) (D.T.E. Tariff No.
    17); Verizon Massachusetts I Application App. J, Vol. 3, Tab 12,
    Part II § 3.1 (*Agreement between New England Telephone and
    Telegraph Company d/b/a BA and AT&T Communications of New England,
    Inc.* (Apr. 13, 1998)); Verizon Massachusetts I Application App. J,
    vol. 7, Tab 22, Attach. III (*Interconnection Agreement by and
    between New England Telephone and Telegraph Company d/b/a Bell
    Atlantic - Massachusetts and MCImetro Access Transmission Services,
    Inc.* (Sept. 29, 1998)). The Commission has an ongoing proceeding
    regarding the requirements for requesting carriers to use EELs to
    provide exchange access service. *See Implementation of the Local
    Competition Provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996*, CC
    Docket No. 96-98, Third Report and Order and Fourth Further Notice
    of Proposed Rulemaking, 15 FCC Rcd 3696, 3913-15, paras. 489, 492-96
    (1999); *Supplemental Order*, 15 FCC Rcd 1760, 1761, para. 4 (1999);
    *Supplemental Order Clarification*, 15 FCC Rcd 9587, 9592, para. 8
    (2000) (*Supplemental Order Clarification*). At present, the
    Commission conditions the use of EELs for exchange access to those
    carriers that provide a "significant amount" of local exchange
    service to a particular user. *Id*. Verizon is legally obligated to
    convert special access arrangements to EELs if a competing carrier
    certifies that it provides a "significant amount" of local exchange
    service to the particular end user in accordance with the
    *Supplemental Order Clarification*. Verizon Massachusetts I
    Lacouture/Ruesterholz Decl. at para. 184; D.T.E. Tariff No. 17, Part
    B, § 13.1.1.D; *see also* *SWBT Kansas/Oklahoma Order* at paras.
    175-76. We find based on the evidence in the record that Verizon is
    in compliance with Commission orders on the subject.

[^382]: *See* Verizon Massachusetts I Application at 33; Verizon
    Massachusetts I Lacouture/Ruesterholz Decl. at para. 183; D.T.E.
    Tariff No. 17, Part B, § 14.1.1.B.; Verizon Massachusetts I
    Application App. J, Vol. 3, Tab 12, Part II § 3.1 (*Agreement
    between New England Telephone and Telegraph Company d/b/a BA and
    AT&T Communications of New England, Inc* (Apr. 13, 1998)); Verizon
    Massachusetts I Application App. J, vol. 7, Tab 22, Attach. III
    (*Interconnection Agreement by and between New England Telephone and
    Telegraph Company d/b/a Bell Atlantic - Massachusetts and MCImetro
    Access Transmission Services, Inc.* (Sept. 28, 1998)).

[^383]: *See* Verizon Massachusetts II Application Attach. A. This is
    nearly twice as many UNE-Ps as were provisioned at the time of
    Verizon's first Massachusetts section 271 application in September
    2000. *See* Verizon Massachusetts I Application Attach. A, Tab 1
    (approximately 12,000 UNE-Ps).

[^384]: *See* Massachusetts Department Massachusetts I Comments at 199.

[^385]: *See* Verizon Massachusetts I Application at 33-34; Verizon
    Massachusetts I Lacouture/Ruesterholz Decl. at paras. 176-79.

[^386]: *See* Verizon Massachusetts I Lacouture/Ruesterholz Decl. at
    paras. 31-62, 177-78; *see also infra* Part V.A.2 (discussing the
    terms and conditions for access to UNEs through physical and virtual
    collocation arrangements).

[^387]: *See* Verizon Massachusetts I Lacouture/Ruesterholz Decl. at
    para. 55; *infra* Part V.A.2.

[^388]: 47 C.F.R. § 51.321(a), (b); *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*,
    13 FCC Rcd at 20706, para. 170; *see also Local Competition First
    Report and Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at 15780-81, para. 553.

[^389]: Verizon Massachusetts I Application App. J, vol. 7, Tab 22,
    Attach. III, at 2 (*Interconnection Agreement by and between New
    England Telephone and Telegraph Company d/b/a Bell Atlantic -
    Massachusetts and MCImetro Access Transmission Services, Inc.*);
    *see also* Verizon Massachusetts I Lacouture/Ruesterholz Decl. at
    para. 180 (Verizon provides "all technically feasible methods for
    \[competing carriers\] to combine individual network elements.").

[^390]: While it provided assembly rooms and assembly points in New York
    for this purpose, it states that "\[o\]nly one \[competing carrier\]
    made any use of this offering in New York, and that use . . . has
    been discontinued." Verizon Massachusetts I Lacouture/Ruesterholz
    Decl. at para. 179.

[^391]: *See* Sprint Massachusetts I Comments at 26-28.

[^392]: Sprint points to a statement Verizon made in the course of an
    interconnection proceeding, to the effect that Verizon "will
    voluntarily provide \[UNE-P\] even where the loop and local
    switching elements comprising the UNE-P do not already exist in
    combined form for a specific customer in its network," but "that it
    reserves the right to review this voluntary commitment based on
    judicial action by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals concerning
    \[47 C.F.R. §\] 51.315(c)-(f)." *Id.* at 27 (quoting *Consolidated
    Petitions for Arbitration of Interconnection Agreements*, DTE/DPU
    Dkt. Nos. 96-73/74, 96-75, 96-80/81, 96-83, 96-94, Phase 4-P Order
    at 6 (Jan. 10, 2000)
    \<http://www.state.ma.us/dpu/telecom/96-73/UneProvi.htm\>) (emphasis
    omitted).

[^393]: 47 U.S.C. § 271(c)(2)(B)(iv). The Commission has defined the
    loop as a transmission facility between a distribution frame, or its
    equivalent, in an incumbent LEC central office, and the demarcation
    point at the customer premises. *See* *Local Competition First
    Report and Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at 15691, para. 380; *UNE Remand
    Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 3772-73, paras. 166-167, n.301 (retaining
    definition of the local loop from the *Local Competition First
    Report and Order*, but replacing the phrase "network interconnection
    device" with "demarcation point," and making explicit that dark
    fiber and loop conditioning are among the features, functions and
    capabilities of the loop).

[^394]: *Local Competition First Report and Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at 15691,
    para. 380; *UNE Remand Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 3772-73, paras. 166-67.

[^395]: Competing carriers in Massachusetts rely principally on three
    types of unbundled stand-alone loops that support high-speed
    services: the xDSL loop, the Digital loop and the high-capacity or
    DS-1 loop. The Massachusetts Department has adopted the New York
    Commission's separate loop-type performance measurement categories
    for xDSL loops (including, but not limited to, loops provisioned for
    ADSL, HDSL, and SDSL services); Digital loops, which are used by
    competing carriers to provide xDSL, IDSL or ISDN-like services and
    high-capacity or DS-1 loops. Commenters in this proceeding do not
    specifically criticize Verizon's performance with regard to Digital
    loops which are a decreasing proportion of all xDSL-capable loops
    requested by competing LECs. For example, in November of 2000, the
    measure of missed installation appointments, PR 4-04, captured 1292
    xDSL loops compared to 276 Digital loops. The carrier-to-carrier
    reports also suggest that Verizon's performance for xDSL loops is
    similar to its performance for Digital loops. We analyze
    high-capacity or DS-1 loops separately at the end of this section.

[^396]: *See* Updated Filling Requirements for Bell Operating Company
    Applications Under Section 271 of the Communications Act, *Public
    Notice*, DA 01-734, (rel. March 23, 2001) at 6 (encouraging
    BOC-applicants to explain why factual anomalies may have no
    meaningful adverse impact on a competing carrier's ability to obtain
    and serve customers).

[^397]: *See* Massachusetts Department Massachusetts II Comments at 24.

[^398]: *See* Letter from Kimberly Scardino, Assistant General Counsel,
    Rhythms, to Magalie Roman Salas, Secretary, Federal Communications
    Commission, CC Docket No. 01-9 (filed March 14, 2001).

[^399]: *See* Massachusetts Department Massachusetts I Comments at 7.

[^400]: Where the New York Commission determined that a retail analogue
    is appropriate and the Massachusetts Department uses this analogue
    in its evaluation, we examine Verizon's Massachusetts performance by
    determining whether it provides unbundled local loops to competing
    carriers in substantially the same time and manner as it does to its
    retail customers. *See* *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC
    Rcd at 20655, para. 87; *see also Bell Atlantic New York Order*, 15
    FCC Rcd at 4098, para. 279.

[^401]: In these instances, we examine Verizon's service to competing
    carriers in terms of whether its performance affords competitors a
    meaningful opportunity to compete. *See generally Bell Atlantic New
    York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 4098, para. 279.

[^402]: *See* *Petition of New York Telephone Company for Approval of
    its Statement of Generally Available Terms and Conditions Pursuant
    to Section 252 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 and Draft
    Filing of Petition for InterLATA Entry Pursuant to Section 271 of
    the Telecommunications Act of 1996*, Order Amending Performance
    Assurance Plan, Case 97-C-0271 (NY PSC Mar. 9, 2000); *see also Bell
    Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 3974-76, paras. 54-60.

[^403]: *See* Department of Justice Massachusetts I Evaluation at 15;
    Rhythms Massachusetts I Comments at 29-30 (quoting KPMG Technical
    Session Tr. 5185-89). As part of its more general process
    evaluation, Covad suggests that KPMG observed the installation of 45
    xDSL loops. *See* Covad Massachusetts I Comments at 35.

[^404]: Verizon Massachusetts II Ruesterholz/Lacouture Decl. at para.
    20; *see also* *supra* at para. 47.

[^405]: *See* Verizon Massachusetts II Ruesterholz/Lacouture Decl. at
    para. 20.

[^406]: PwC used the carrier-to-carrier guidelines and Verizon's raw
    data to replicate Verizon's DSL performance results in Massachusetts
    for October. PwC undertook a similar process with Verizon's October
    line sharing performance results for New York and Massachusetts
    based on the January 16^th^ corrected guidelines filed with the New
    York Commission in compliance with its December 15 order approving
    the new carrier-to-carrier working group consensus.

[^407]: *See* Rhythms Massachusetts II Comments at 7; Covad
    Massachusetts II Comments at 7-8; Rhythms Massachusetts I Comments
    at 29; Covad Massachusetts I Comments at 13; ALTS Massachusetts I
    Comments at 32; NAS Massachusetts I Comments at 5.

[^408]: During the Massachusetts I application, Verizon began the
    process of submitting carrier-specific data to the Commission.

[^409]: In addition, we note that carrier-specific data aided the
    Massachusetts Department in concluding that Verizon provides
    nondiscriminatory access to hot cut loops. *See* Massachusetts
    Department Massachusetts I Comments at 290. The availability of
    carrier-specific data was an important factor in the Commission's
    prior section 271 approvals. In New York, the Commission relied upon
    carrier-specific data to find that Bell Atlantic provided
    nondiscriminatory access to OSS*. See Bell Atlantic New York Order*,
    15 FCC Rcd at paras. 166, 175, 181.

[^410]: Verizon states that it has provided carrier-specific reports
    beginning in May 2000 to competitors operating in Massachusetts that
    have requested them. *See* Verizon Massachusetts II
    Lacouture/Ruesterholz Decl. at para. 17. Verizon has included
    carrier-specific reports for September, October and November 2000 in
    its application. *See* Verizon Massachusetts II
    Lacouture/Ruesterholz Decl. App. C. Going forward Verizon has
    represented that it will provide carrier-specific reports to those
    competitors that have requested them by the 25^th^ day of the
    following month. Further, Verizon is in the process of establishing
    a secure Website through which competitors will be able to obtain
    the aggregate performance results and their own individual reports
    and their Performance Plan reports, along with the underlying data
    in the first half of 2001. *See* Verizon Massachusetts II
    Lacouture/Ruesterholz Decl. at para. 17.

[^411]: Verizon's separate affiliate has not been purchasing the same
    inputs to provide advanced services as unaffiliated competing
    carriers. Specifically, Verizon's separate affiliate purchases line
    sharing to provide ADSL service while competing carriers in
    Massachusetts continue to purchase stand alone, xDSL-capable loops
    and have only recently begun purchasing line sharing. As a result,
    Verizon's advanced services separate affiliate is not useful in
    making a presumption of nondiscriminatory performance.

[^412]: *See* Verizon Massachusetts I Lacouture/Ruesterholz Decl. at
    paras. 63, 114.

[^413]: *See* Verizon Massachusetts I Lacouture/Ruesterholz Decl. at
    Exh. B (citing D.T.E. Tariff No. 17, Part B, Section 5).

[^414]: *See* *SWBT Texas Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 18499-18501, paras.
    286-90.

[^415]: *See supra* Part V.A.2.c(ii).

[^416]: *See* PO-1-06 (Facility Availability, Loop Qualification, EDI
    and CORBA).

[^417]: The first two metrics are "PO-1-06 Facility Availability (Loop
    Qualification) -- EDI" and "PO-1-06 Facility Availability (Loop
    Qualification) -- CORBA," both of which measure the timeliness of
    Verizon's responses to mechanized loop database queries. The second
    two metrics are "PO-8-01 Average Response Time -- Manual Loop
    Qualification" and "PO-8-02 Average Response Time -- Engineering
    Record Request," which measure the timeliness of Verizon's responses
    to manual loop qualification and engineering record requests. *See*
    Verizon Massachusetts I Guerard/Canny Decl. Tab B at 9, 18.

[^418]: *See* PO-1-06 for EDI. The performance data for these months
    show that Verizon consistently responds faster to queries for loop
    qualification information from the mechanized LiveWire database
    placed from competitors' application-to-application interfaces than
    to similar queries placed from VADI's retail pre-ordering
    interfaces. From October through December 2000, competitors received
    mechanized loop qualification responses on average within 3.11,
    2.92, and 3.02 seconds respectively, as compared to 4.72, 17.26,
    11.85 seconds for VADI's retail personnel.

[^419]: In its reply comments, Verizon explains that it has not reported
    data for the PO-8-01 and PO-8-02 metrics measuring the timeliness of
    its responses to pre-order manual loop qualification and engineering
    record requests, because there are currently no electronic
    pre-ordering OSS functions for manual loop qualification and
    engineering record requests. *See* Verizon Massachusetts I
    Guerard/Canny Reply Decl. at 13.

[^420]: *See* Verizon Massachusetts II Lacouture/Ruesterholz Decl. Tab
    J. As discussed below, Verizon's performance data also show that it
    returns to competitors ordering xDSL loops timely firm order
    confirmations and rejects, which under Verizon's current manual loop
    qualification process contain the results of manual loop
    qualifications. *See* *id.* at Tab K and Tab L (summarizing
    Verizon's performance data for September through November 2000 for
    DSL order confirmation and reject timeliness); *see also* *infra* at
    para. 135.

[^421]: We note that Verizon has been ordered to begin reporting on
    these two pre-ordering metrics, in accordance with the guidelines
    adopted in the carrier-to-carrier working group. As stated above,
    the availability of carrier-to-carrier reports permits competitors
    to fully analyze Verizon's performance and evaluate it against the
    performance data they have collected themselves.

[^422]: *See* Verizon Massachusetts II Reply, App. A, Tab 1, Attach. C
    (showing 100 percent of LFACS queries receiving responses within 24
    hours for February 2001).

[^423]: *See* Letter from Dee May, Executive Director Federal
    Regulatory, Verizon, to Magalie Roman Salas, Secretary, Federal
    Communications Commission, CC Docket No. 01-9 (filed April 3, 2001).

[^424]: As the Massachusetts Department concluded, "although \[Verizon\]
    includes xDSL orders with other loop orders in the denominator of
    the relevant metric, based upon our review of \[Verizon's\]
    performance data, it appears that \[Verizon\] returns \[xDSL
    confirmation notices\] within the stated interval almost all of the
    time." Massachusetts Department Massachusetts I Comments at 298. For
    example, from September through December 2000, respectively, for
    "Loop/Pre-qualified Complex/LNP" orders, Verizon timely returned
    99.68, 99.82, 99.48, and 99.79 percent of confirmation notices for
    flow-through orders within 2 hours; 97.35, 97.35, 97.27, and 97.88
    percent of confirmation notices for orders of less than 10 lines
    within 24 hours; and 96.90, 99.73, 100.00, and 99.74 percent of
    confirmation notices for orders equal to or more than 10 lines
    within 72 hours. Verizon likewise exceeded the 95 percent benchmark
    for timely return of reject notices during this period. *See*
    OR-1-02, OR-1-04, OR-1-06, OR-2-02, OR-2-04, OR-2-06. "Pre-qualified
    Complex" orders encompass orders for pre-qualified xDSL-capable
    loops, and include specifically orders for pre-qualified 2-wire xDSL
    and 2-wire digital loops. *See* Verizon Massachusetts I
    Guerard/Canny Decl. Attach. B at 100. Verizon also appears to have
    exceeded the 95 percent benchmark for timely return of confirmation
    and reject notices with respect to manually qualified, 2-wire xDSL
    loop orders. For example, from September through December 2000,
    respectively, for "2 Wire xDSL Service" orders, Verizon timely
    returned 98.75, 98.67, 99.25, and 96.77 percent of confirmation
    notices, and 98.80, 98.92, 99.38, 97.75 percent of reject notices,
    for orders of less than 10 lines within 72 hours. *See* OR-1-04 and
    OR-2-04.

[^425]: In Texas, for example, SBC disaggregated its order confirmation
    timeliness performance data into separate categories for stand-alone
    loops, loops ordered with a ported number, digital loops, and xDSL
    loops. *See id*. at paras. 172, 288. SBC's disaggregated data arose
    from a Texas Commission proceeding and involved joint efforts by
    SBC, interested competitive LECs, and the Texas Commission. *See
    id*. at paras. 286-90. In Massachusetts, beginning with its August
    2000 carrier-to-carrier metrics, Verizon has disaggregated
    manually-qualified, 2-wire xDSL loop ordering performance measures
    from manually qualified, 2-wire digital loop ordering performance
    measures. *See* Verizon Massachusetts I Guerard/Canny Reply Decl.
    Attach. D at 7, 22 (metrics OR-1-03-06 and OR-2-03-06). Furthermore,
    one of the "consensus items" from the New York carrier-to-carrier
    working group, whose results are likewise to be implemented in
    Massachusetts shortly, *see, e.g.*, Verizon Guerard/Canny Decl. at
    para. 15, calls for Verizon to disaggregate further its 2-wire xDSL
    services ordering metrics into separate measures pertaining to
    2-wire xDSL loops and DSL line sharing. *See* Verizon Guerard/Canny
    Decl. Attach. A at 2, 7-8 (discussing further disaggregation to line
    sharing order confirmation and reject timeliness metrics,
    specifically OR-1-03-06 and OR-2-03-06). Such disaggregation
    likewise should apply to performance data on reject notice
    timeliness, as captured in the OR-2 metrics.

[^426]: *Bell Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 4123, para. 334.

[^427]: The New York Commission and Massachusetts Department established
    Verizon's provisioning of 2-Wire xDSL services as the appropriate
    retail analogue for competing carrier xDSL loops in the performance
    measurement for missed installation appointments. Verizon notes,
    however, that, for purposes of one xDSL measure, the Percent
    Completed in 6 Days measure, PR 3-10, the retail analogue has been
    changed to Verizon's installation of POTS second lines. *See*
    Verizon Massachusetts II Lacouture/Ruesterholz Decl. at para. 94.

[^428]: This performance metric is disaggregated to divide Verizon's
    missed installation appointments between those requiring dispatch of
    a technician and those not requiring dispatch. A "dispatch"
    typically involves sending a Verizon technician "in" to a Verizon
    central office to provision a particular UNE or "out" into the field
    to work in the outside plant. To date, competing carriers generally
    request stand-alone xDSL-capable loops and thus request "dispatch"
    xDSL loops which require a Verizon technician to perform field work
    to provision an xDSL-capable loop. Verizon's retail xDSL
    provisioning is overwhelmingly "no-dispatch" because its ADSL
    services are provided through line sharing arrangements. Since
    filing its original application, Verizon has amended its
    carrier-to-carrier performance reports to include both dispatch and
    no-dispatch information in the missed appointments measure. During
    the initial phase of this proceeding, Verizon was unable to resolve
    the discrepancy between the average completion interval and percent
    missed appointments measures for competing carrier no dispatch
    orders. On December 3, 2000, Verizon offered an explanation for this
    discrepancy. Verizon "discovered that performance for all unbundled
    xDSL loops was aggregated in the reported results for PR 4-04,
    whether or not the orders required a dispatch." *See* Letter from
    Dee May, Executive Director Federal Regulatory, Verizon to Eric
    Einhorn, Policy and Program Planning Division, Common Carrier
    Bureau, Federal Communications Commission, CC Docket No. 00-176
    (filed Dec. 3, 2000). Since then, Verizon has reported both dispatch
    and no-dispatch volumes in the percent missed appointment measure
    for the months of September, October, November and December.
    Accordingly, the Commission can now rely upon competing carrier
    carrier-to-carrier data when examining the percent missed
    appointments metrics to obtain a more accurate dispatch-to-dispatch
    comparison and therefore a more reliable picture of Verizon's
    performance.

[^429]: The four month average (September -- December) for competing
    carrier missed appointment rates, for dispatch services was 6.4
    percent compared to 4.6 percent for Verizon. Indeed, in November,
    Verizon provided better service to competitors than its retail
    affiliate. In the months of October, November and December, the
    missed appointment rate for dispatch xDSL services for competitors
    was 3.67, 2.40 and 4.19 percent and the retail rate was 3.18, 4.21
    and 2.13 percent, respectively. Verizon's performance in September
    showed some disparities, which Verizon attributes to the lingering
    effect of a strike it experienced in August. For September, Verizon
    missed 12.75 percent of its dispatch installation appointments for
    competitors compared to 7.13 percent for itself. *See* PR 4-04
    (Provisioning , Two Wire xDSL Services, percent Missed Appointment,
    Verizon, Dispatch). Verizon responds that its September results were
    adversely affected by the work stoppage, because orders missed in
    August but completed in September were recorded as missed
    appointments in the September performance reports. Verizon performed
    a study which excludes orders not originally due during the strike,
    which shows that the adjusted missed appointment rate of 3.79
    percent for September is comparable to its October and November
    results. *See* Verizon Massachusetts II Lacouture/Ruesterholz Decl.
    at para. 72 and Attach. V.

[^430]: While the Department of Justice takes issue with isolated xDSL
    performance measures and the manner in which those measures report
    Verizon's wholesale performance, it does not specifically criticize
    the percent missed appointments measure for stand-alone xDSL loops.
    *See generally* Department of Justice Massachusetts I Evaluation at
    8.

[^431]: *See* NAS Massachusetts II Comments at 5; *but see*
    Massachusetts Department Massachusetts I Reply at 86.

[^432]: Verizon states that if a retail customer has "extenuating
    circumstances and requests a shorter installation appointment
    window, Verizon will schedule either a morning or afternoon
    appointment window. Verizon will also schedule a morning or
    afternoon appointment for a competing LEC customer with extenuating
    circumstances." Verizon Massachusetts II Lacouture/Ruesterholz Reply
    Decl. at para. 38.

[^433]: Failure to provide nondiscriminatory access to installation
    appointments at identical windows could subject Verizon to a
    targeted enforcement action or carrier-initiated complaint. *See
    infra* Part IX.

[^434]: The 4 month (September -- December) average for competing
    carrier dispatch orders was 7.3 days compared to 6.94 days for
    Verizon. In the months of September, October, November and December
    Verizon completed no-dispatch competing carrier orders in 9.7, 7.75,
    7.3 and 6.7 days compared to 11.4, 7.63, 5.2 and 6.3 days for
    Verizon. *See* PR 2-02 (Provisioning , Two Wire xDSL Services,
    Average Interval Completed, Total Dispatch). While the September
    results for this measure appear to be affected by the strike,
    Verizon states that during the period September through November
    2000, the average completion interval to provision DSL loops for
    competitors where a dispatch was required averaged 8.32 days, while
    Verizon's retail ADSL orders that likewise required a dispatch were
    provisioned within an average of 8.48 days. Verizon avers that
    consistent with the relevant business rules, this measure reports
    the time from Verizon's receipt of a valid service order to actual
    work completion, and uses the same measurement points for both
    retail and wholesale orders. *See* Verizon Massachusetts II
    Guerard/Canny Decl. Attach. B, at para. 42; Verizon Massachusetts II
    Lacouture/Ruesterholz Decl. at para. 75.

[^435]: *See* PR 2-02 (Provisioning, Two Wire xDSL Services, Average
    Interval Completed, Total Dispatch).

[^436]: *See* Verizon Massachusetts II Lacouture/Ruesterholz Decl. at
    para. 75. In its original application, Verizon argued that its
    recalculated results - which exclude manually qualified loops - for
    average completion interval also show parity. *See* Verizon
    Massachusetts I Guerard/Canny Decl. at para. 79 and Attach. K.
    Approximately half of the orders, according to Verizon, were
    pre-qualified, while the remainder required manual loop
    qualification. The results of this study show that "\[t\]he average
    interval completed for pre-qualified xDSL loops was 6.46 days
    compared to 6.69 days for retail in June and 5.40 days compared to
    5.93 days for retail in July." *See* Verizon Massachusetts I
    Lacouture/Ruesterholz Decl. at para. 101. Covad responded to
    Verizon's study questioning its methodology and results. *See*
    Letter from Jason Oxman, Senior Governmental Affairs Counsel to
    Magalie Roman Salas, Secretary, Federal Communications Commission,
    CC Docket No. 00-176 (filed November 7, 2000) (Covad Nov. 7 *Ex
    Parte* Letter).

[^437]: Competitor order volumes captured in the average completion
    interval, PR 2-01/2-02 peaked in October 2000 with 934 orders and
    have remained well-above 600 orders per month for the last four
    months. *See* PR 2-01/2-02 (Provisioning, 2-Wire xDSL Services,
    Average Interval Completed, Total Dispatch, Total No-Dispatch).
    Rhythms argues that Verizon's contention that VADI also receives
    service outside the standard interval is no response to Verizon's
    late wholesale performance for unaffiliated competitive LECs.
    Rhythms states that "it makes no difference to Rhythms that it
    received "parity" with Verizon's retail service when "parity" means
    that Rhythms received its loops two days later than the standard
    interval, an interval Rhythms notes is already an unnecessarily long
    period of time. *See* Rhythms Massachusetts II Comments at 11-12 and
    Williams Supplemental Declaration at para. 21. CIX argues that the
    Massachusetts Department's six-day interval was defined through a
    "long and thorough regulatory process" and Verizon should be
    accountable for failing to meet that interval for competitive LEC
    orders. CIX Massachusetts II Comments at 22.

[^438]: The Department of Justice recognizes that Verizon's on-time
    performance is "improving" but notes that it falls short of the 95
    percent on-time benchmark. Department of Justice Massachusetts II
    Evaluation at 9.

[^439]: Verizon supplements its affirmative showing by arguing that it
    provides xDSL loops when competing carriers request them and asks us
    to consider, in addition to the average completion interval,
    Verizon's performance under a different metric which measures
    percent "on-time" installation. *See* Verizon Massachusetts II
    Lacouture/Ruesterholz Decl. at para. 66. Verizon claims that when
    facility misses are included in the results, Verizon's performance,
    when adjusted to remove the impact of the strike, is approximately
    85 percent on-time in October and in November it is approximately 90
    percent on-time. Verizon's removal of strike-affected orders from
    these measures for September and October 2000 improves Verizon's
    reported performance somewhat (from 75.7 to 86.6 percent). *See*
    Verizon Massachusetts II Lacouture/Ruesterholz Decl. at para. 69 and
    Attach. S. Verizon's final data presentation of the revised on-time
    measure, which excludes orders for which Verizon cannot provide a
    loop and adjusts for strike-affected orders, shows on-time
    performance that exceeds the 95 percent standard in November 2000.
    *See* Verizon Massachusetts II Lacouture/Ruesterholz Decl. at para.
    66 and Attach. R.

[^440]: Competing carriers contest Verizon's claim that it provides
    xDSL-capable loops on time and point to yet another measure of
    on-time performance, the percentage of xDSL loops completed within
    the standard interval of 6 days. *See* PR 3-10 (Provisioning, 2-Wire
    xDSL Services, percent Completed in 6 Days). In September, October,
    November and December Verizon completed 62.1, 64.6, 63.4 and 72.9
    percent of competing carrier xDSL loops within 6 days. In the same
    months, Verizon completed 65.5, 82.3, 87.8, and 87.2 percent of xDSL
    loops within 6 days for itself. *See* Rhythms Massachusetts I
    Comments at 28; Department of Justice Massachusetts II Evaluation at
    9 n.2; CIX Massachusetts II Comments at 22. USIAPA argues that the
    real provisioning interval is, on average, 25 days between the first
    FOC and actual installation because some 24 percent of orders in
    Massachusetts receive sliding FOCs. *See* USISPA Massachusetts II
    Reply at 8. During Verizon's original proceeding, Verizon and
    competing carriers reached consensus to eliminate the retail
    analogue and instead set a 95 percent benchmark standard for the
    percent completed within 6 days measure. Consensus was also reached
    to exclude orders that were not pre-qualified, orders requesting
    intervals outside of the standard interval and orders missed for
    lack of facilities. *See* Verizon Massachusetts II
    Lacouture/Ruesterholz Reply. Decl. at paras. 77-80. Verizon engaged
    a consultant, Lexecon, to recalculate the reported results for this
    measure consistent with the exclusions discussed above and to adjust
    this measure for orders affected by the strike. When Verizon's
    performance for this measure is calculated in accordance with the
    new business rules, Verizon argues it provides 84 percent of xDSL
    loops between September and November with six days. This study shows
    that during the September through November period, 95 percent of the
    competitor orders not completed within the standard six day
    installation interval are completed within 7 days. The Lexecon study
    shows that under the revised PR 3-10 measure, in September, 89.12
    percent of competitive LEC orders were completed within 6 days;
    80.00 percent were completed within 6 days in October and 82.24
    percent were completed within 6 days in November. Reply Appendix,
    Tab 4, Joint Reply Declaration of Robert H. Gertner and Gustavo E.
    Bamberger. *See* Verizon Massachusetts II Lacouture/Ruesterholz
    Decl. at para. 82. Competitors respond that even Verizon's
    recalculated results show that that a substantial number of orders
    are completed outside the standard interval. Rhythms Massachusetts
    II Comments at 11-12; CIX Massachusetts II Comments at 22.

[^441]: Furthermore, by some estimates, 83.77 percent of all DSL orders
    are excluded from the percent completed within 6 days measure. *See*
    Verizon Massachusetts II Lacouture/Ruesterholz Decl. at para. 84. We
    note that the Commission has not previously relied upon either the
    on-time measure cited by Verizon nor the percent completed within 6
    days metric cited by competing carriers. Data supporting the 6-day
    measure became available for the first time in July 2000 and data
    supporting the on-time measure became available in June. The
    Massachusetts Department did not initially evaluate the percent
    completed on time measure relied upon by Verizon and also did not
    evaluate the percent completed with 6 day measure cited by competing
    carriers.

[^442]: For example, when the percent completed within 6 days results
    are examined in conjunction with the average completion interval, it
    is not surprising that approximately 80 percent of orders are
    completed within six days because the average completion interval is
    slightly more than 6 days.

[^443]: The Commission stated in the *SWBT* *Texas Order*, that we
    consider trouble reports within 30 days as "indicative of the
    quality of network components supplied by the incumbent LEC." *SWBT*
    *Texas Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 18504-05, para. 299.

[^444]: *SWBT* *Texas Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 18504-05, para. 299.

[^445]: *See* Verizon Massachusetts II Lacouture/Ruesterholz Reply Decl.
    at para. 86.

[^446]: *See* Letter from Dee May, Executive Director Federal
    Regulatory, Verizon, to Magalie Roman Salas, Secretary, Federal
    Communications Commission, CC Docket No. 00-176 (filed Nov. 14,
    2000); *see also* Letter from Edward D. Young, III, Verizon, to
    William E. Kennard, Chairman, Federal Communications Commission, CC
    Docket No. 00-176 (filed Dec. 1, 2000).

[^447]: The New York Commission adjusted the retail analogue to compare
    Verizon's performance for competitors with Verizon's own retail POTS
    service rather than its DSL service because Verizon's DSL service is
    almost always provided over a loop that is already working and
    delivering dial tone, whereas retail POTS will involve providing
    service over a loop that is not already working. Thus, because
    stand-alone loops better approximate the manner in which Verizon
    provisions stand alone xDSL-capable loops to competitors, it was
    selected as the appropriate retail analogue.

[^448]: Acceptance testing is a joint project whereby after
    installation, Verizon contacts competitors so the loop can be tested
    for improper voltages, or other impediments to xDSL service, such as
    ringers and load coils. Under established acceptance testing
    procedures, Verizon "shorts" a loop enabling competitors to verify
    continuity length and to ensure that the loop meets a competitor's
    requirements. Competitors then provide to Verizon a confirmation
    indicating a loop is in working order, or, in the alternative,
    reject the loop as non-working.

[^449]: Verizon engaged Lexecon to recompute the I-code rate (trouble
    reports within 30 days) presented in the official carrier-to-carrier
    data, for September through November 2000 using the new consensus
    method. Lexecon found that the performance disparity between
    competitive LEC and retail I-code rate was eliminated in September
    and substantially reduced -- by 51 percent in October (from 8.2 to
    4.34 percentage points); and by 74 percent in November (from 4.96 to
    1.29 percentage points). Verizon contends that the "weighted average
    I-code rate under the new consensus rules for September through
    November 2000 was 4.78 for \[competing carriers\] and 3.3 for
    Verizon's retail customers." Verizon Massachusetts II
    Lacouture/Ruesterholz Decl. at para. 94. Verizon goes on to adjust
    its performance results to include troubles that could have been
    discovered by a properly conducted acceptance test. Under this
    adjustment the competitive LEC I-code rate was 3.12 percent in
    September 2000; 6.08 percent for October 2000, and 4.19 percent for
    November 2000. *See* Verizon Massachusetts II Lacouture/Ruesterholz
    Decl. at para. 95 Attach. Z. The weighted average for this period is
    4.28 percent for competitive LECs and 3.30 percent for Verizon
    retail. *Id.* Verizon performs a third level of analysis: after
    quantifying the I-code rate under the revised measure recently
    approved by the New York Commission, and then excluding those
    I-codes that could have been discovered by a properly conducted
    acceptance test, Verizon shows that the gap between competitive LECs
    and retail I-code rate in September and November 2000 is eliminated
    and reduced to less than one percent in October 2000. The adjusted
    rate is 1.43 percent for September 2000, 4.04 percent for October
    2000 and 1.94 percent for November 2000 compared to the weighted
    average during this period of 2.36 percent for competitive LECs and
    3.30 percent for Verizon. *See* Verizon Massachusetts II
    Lacouture/Ruesterholz Decl. at para. 96 and Attach. AA.

[^450]: *See* Rhythms Massachusetts II Williams Decl. para. 26; Covad
    Clancy Decl. para. 10-23; *see also* USISPA Massachusetts II Reply
    at 8. The Department of Justice questions the validity of the
    performance data and contends that Verizon's exclusion methodology
    infers improper acceptance testing from the nature of the trouble
    reported. *See* Department of Justice Massachusetts II Evaluation at
    10 n.39. The Massachusetts Department discounts this measure
    entirely and questions whether the measure accurately captures
    Verizon's ability to provision quality loops. Massachusetts
    Department Massachusetts II Evaluation at 30. We agree with the
    Department of Justice that the calculation of the revised measure
    appears to be flawed. While trouble reports from carriers that do
    not conduct acceptance tests are excluded from the numerator of this
    measure, orders from such carriers are not excluded from the
    denominator. The result is to inappropriately skew the trouble
    report rate. When these orders are excluded from the denominator,
    the reported trouble rate is higher for October and November 2000
    under the revised measure than as reported under the original
    carrier-to-carrier measure. The Department of Justice has
    recalculated PR 6-01 to control for this anomaly. Pursuant to this
    recalculation, for the period September to November, competitive
    LECs experienced 6.99 percent troubles within 30 days. *See*
    Department of Justice Evaluation at 10-11, Exh. 1.

[^451]: *See* Department of Justice Massachusetts II Evaluation at 11
    n.39. Verizon responds that "while it is possible for a DSL loop to
    break after the loop is installed, that is a rare occurrence."
    Verizon Massachusetts II Lacouture/Ruesterholz Decl. at para. 100.

[^452]: *See* Covad Massachusetts II Comments at 11; NAS Massachusetts
    II Comments at 11; Rhythms Massachusetts II Comments at 18.

[^453]: In its comments, Covad reviewed 8 trouble tickets in the month
    of November to refute Verizon's argument that Covad knowingly
    accepted non-working loops. Covad contends that these loops were
    accepted because: (1) the Verizon technician was not at the NID when
    the test was performed; (2) Verizon failed to provision the loop to
    the appropriate NID; or (3) the loops became non-working after Covad
    accepted it. *See* Covad Massachusetts II Reply at 9. On reply Covad
    surveyed its acceptance testing logs for all of the I-codes reported
    in November. This survey showed that of the 25 I-codes which Verizon
    excluded from its adjusted performance measure, none of the
    installation quality troubles could have been discovered at the time
    of acceptance and all of these installation quality troubles were
    properly addressed as maintenance and repair issues. Covad argues
    that in many cases its records show that loops were much shorter at
    the time of acceptance testing than when repaired by Verizon,
    demonstrating that Verizon did not test the full loop length during
    acceptance testing. *See* Covad Massachusetts II Reply at 10.
    Verizon responds to Covad's initial survey of I-codes by showing
    that in two cases, Covad's test equipment was not available to
    perform an acceptance test and in two other instances, Covad's
    acceptance test failed to identify the presence of a load coil and
    half ringer. *See* Verizon Massachusetts II Lacouture/Ruesterholz
    Reply Decl. at para. 91. In three other instances, Verizon states
    that Covad tested and accepted a loop that Verizon identified as
    defective; Covad's technician went to the wrong demarcation point
    and finally, Covad could not locate the acceptance testing data on
    the loop in question in its database. *See id*.

[^454]: When Verizon controls for installation quality issues that could
    have been discovered during acceptance testing Covad's rate is at
    parity for the period September through November. *Id*. at para. 83.

[^455]: Rhythms claims that it reviewed the list of I-codes excluded by
    Verizon for acceptance testing reasons and states that "its records
    did not match Verizon's." Rhythms Massachusetts II Comments at 18.
    Verizon states that Rhythms did not provide any information for a
    number of the Rhythms I-codes excluded by Verizon. Verizon shows
    that some of the I-codes contested by Rhythms were not excluded by
    Verizon, therefore no downward adjustment to the competitive LEC
    I-code rate was taken. Finally, of the remaining I-codes submitted
    by Rhythms, Verizon's records show that these loops had ringers on
    the lines and should have been discovered during acceptance testing;
    these records contain inconclusive information or contained no
    relevant data or finally, the I-code was not related to Rhythms'
    failure to properly perform acceptance testing. See Verizon
    Massachusetts II Lacouture/Ruesterholz Reply Decl. at para. 94.
    Verizon performed a similar analysis for NAS adjusting its I-code
    rate to below retail in the period September through November. *See*
    *id.* at paras. 84-85.

[^456]: We also agree with the Department of Justice that Verizon's
    practice of excluding trouble reports from carriers that do not
    conduct acceptance testing from the numerator but not the
    denominator is inappropriate and will result in inappropriately low
    trouble report rates. *See* Department of Justice Evaluation at 10.
    In this circumstance, where the carriers have agreed to revise a
    measure going forward, we believe it is reasonable to include the
    results of the revised measure to adjust Verizon's performance as
    officially reported.

[^457]: *See* Department of Justice Massachusetts II Evaluation at 10,
    Attach. 1.

[^458]: The individual results for competitive LECs performing
    acceptance testing for September, October and November were 4.13
    percent, 11.18 and 8.22 percent compared to 1.93 percent, 2.09
    percent and 2.81 percent for Verizon retail over the same period.
    *See id*. The unrevised carrier-to-carrier data confirm this
    positive trend. Even as volumes have remained substantial, the
    percent trouble within 30 days measure as originally reported moved
    from a high in October 2000 of 11.1 percent to 7.8 percent in
    November and 5.8 percent in December, reducing the disparity to
    approximately 3 percent in the most recent month we consider. In
    September, competitive LEC trouble reports within 30 days were 5.4
    percent. The comparable numbers for Verizon retail were 1.93, 2.09,
    2.81 and 2.79 percent in September, October, November and December
    respectively. *See* PR 6-01 (Provisioning, 2-Wire xDSL Services,
    percent Installation Troubles Reported Within 30 Days). The four
    month (September -- December) average for competitive LEC trouble
    reports within 30 days, according to the unrevised
    carrier-to-carrier reports filed with the application, was 7.3
    percent compared to 2.4 percent for Verizon.

[^459]: We note that Verizon's adjustment to the data lower the I-code
    rate to less than 7 percent and competitive LEC challenges to
    Verizon's adjustment raise the I-code rate; but in no case do
    competitor challenges to Verizon's adjustment raise the I-code rate
    above the 7 percent level presented by the revised
    carrier-to-carrier measure as calculated by the Department of
    Justice. *See* Letter from Paul Afonso, General Counsel,
    Massachusetts Department of Telecommunications and Energy to Magalie
    Roman Salas, Secretary, Federal Communications Commission, CC Docket
    No. 01-9 (filed March 21, 2001) (*Massachusetts Department
    Reconciliation Letter*).

[^460]: On March 15 2001, at the request of the Commission's staff, the
    Massachusetts Department, together with Covad and Verizon, undertook
    a review of the disputed Covad orders. After conducting its review,
    the Massachusetts Department submitted a list of process
    improvements developed by Verizon and Covad during this review.

[^461]: Under the auspices of the Massachusetts Department, Covad and
    Verizon have agreed to several modifications or additions to the
    existing acceptance testing process. Verizon has agreed to implement
    a process requirement that its technicians will "cut down" xDSL
    loops at the NID before the final cooperative test is performed.
    Additionally, Covad has agreed to insert into its acceptance testing
    script a question to determine whether the Verizon technician is
    testing through the network interface device. Second, to reduce
    technician confusion about where in Verizon's outside plant the
    cooperative test was performed, the carriers have agreed to enhance
    the demarcation point information procedures by establishing a
    three-fold process whereby the Covad technician can: (1) verify
    before dispatch, that the loop was located and tagged by the Verizon
    technician during cooperative testing; (2) access Verizon's
    demarcation information electronically before dispatching to the
    filed; and (3) call Verizon from the field if the technician cannot
    locate the demarcation point. Third, Verizon has committed to make
    it clear to its technicians that they should remove all half ringers
    on stand-alone xDSL loops. Fourth, Covad and Verizon have agreed to
    implement a process for obtaining a final acceptance test when an
    earlier acceptance test has failed and to educate their technicians
    about interim loop testing versus final acceptance testing. *See*
    Massachusetts Department Reconciliation Letter at 8.

[^462]: We note that the Department of Justice did not have the benefit
    of the Massachusetts Department's reconciliation of Verizon's
    I-codes. *See* Department of Justice Massachusetts II Evaluation at
    15 n.61 (noting that the Department of Justice's evaluation is
    "necessarily based solely on the evidence in Verizon's application"
    and stating that "\[r\]eply comments and *ex parte* submissions
    undoubtedly will provide additional evidence concerning the
    questions that have been raised about Verizon's pre-application DSL
    performance.").

[^463]: We therefore rely upon the Massachusetts Department's conclusion
    that "the information contained in VZ-MA's supplemental application
    only affirms our earlier conclusion that VZ-MA provides \[competing
    carriers\] an installation quality sufficient to afford them a
    meaningful opportunity to compete." Massachusetts Department
    Massachusetts II Comments at 29-30; *see also SWBT Kansas/Oklahoma
    Order* at para. 191 (finding that SWBT generally met 6 percent
    installation quality benchmark and noting improved performance
    trend).

[^464]: *See* Verizon Massachusetts II Lacouture/Ruesterholz Decl at
    para. 110.

[^465]: *See* *id*. at para. 110.

[^466]: *See* *id*. at para. 109.

[^467]: *See* *id*. at para. 118.

[^468]: *See* *id*. at para. 109.

[^469]: Any future evidence of significant and sustained deterioration
    may result in a targeted enforcement action or carrier-initiated
    complaint under the Act. *See also* *infra* Part IX.

[^470]: *See* Massachusetts Department Massachusetts II Comments at 31.

[^471]: Verizon's missed repair appointment performance is likewise at
    parity. During September through November 2000, Verizon met
    approximately 85 percent of repair appointments for competitive LECs
    compared to approximately 86 percent for retail. MR 3-01
    (Maintenance and Repair, 2-wire xDSL Services, percent Missed Repair
    Appointment -- Loop); *see also* Verizon Massachusetts II
    Lacouture/Ruesterholz Decl. Attach. EE. Verizon concludes that
    during September through November 2000, nearly 58 percent of
    troubles reported within 30 days of the installation of a DSL loop
    were closed with no trouble found. *See* *id*. at para. 105 and
    Attach. BB. This number is consistent with Verizon's analysis for
    the period May through July. *See* Verizon Massachusetts I
    Lacouture/Ruesterholz Decl. at para. 78, 104 & Attach. I (discussing
    the effect of failure to isolate troubles on UNE POTS repair
    metrics).

[^472]: Indeed, we take additional comfort in Verizon's January
    performance which indicates that this trend has continued. In fact,
    Verizon performs better for competitive LECs than for itself in
    January. The January mean time to repair competitive LEC xDSL loops
    was 20.82 hrs compared to 23.80 hrs. for Verizon. *See* MR 4-02
    (Maintenance, 2-Wire xDSL Services, Mean Time to Repair -- Loop
    Trouble).

[^473]: Should Verizon's future performance reverse this positive trend,
    Verizon risks a targeted enforcement action or carrier-initiated
    complaint under the Act. *See infra* Part IX.

[^474]: Verizon Massachusetts II Application at 25; Verizon
    Massachusetts II Lacouture/Ruesterholz Decl at para. 106. During
    April, May, June and July 2000, Verizon claims that competing
    carriers provided only "limited access' to end users for 58.9
    percent of competing carrier Complex loop repair requests, compared
    to 3.4 percent on Verizon's Complex loop retail repair requests.
    *Id*. at para. 106 & Attach. N.

[^475]: Verizon contends that a relatively small disparity in the mean
    time to repair measure exists during September, October and November
    and that there is some variation among competitive LECs regarding
    the rate at which they accept weekend repair appointments. *See*
    Verizon Massachusetts II Lacouture/Ruesterholz Decl. at para. 119
    Attach. GG. Verizon performed an analysis of the weekend repair
    appointment exclusion and concluded that the rejection of weekend
    repair appointments added approximately 4.35 hours to the average
    repair interval for competitive LEC loops, reducing the 9 hour
    difference to approximately 4-5 hours of disparity, an amount
    Verizon contends, that is not competitively significant; *See also*
    Verizon Massachusetts II Lacouture/Ruesterholz Decl. at para 119
    Attach. GG. *See also* Verizon Massachusetts I Lacouture/Ruesterholz
    Decl. at 73-74 & Attach. G (discussing the effect of not accepting
    weekend repair appointments on the UNE POTS repair metrics.)

[^476]: *See* Rhythms Massachusetts I Comments at 31-32; *See* Letter
    from Dhruv Khana, Executive Vice President and General Counsel,
    Covad to Magalie Roman Salas, Secretary, Federal Communications
    Commission, CC Docket No. 00-176, at 8 (filed Dec. 5, 2000); *see
    also* Covad Massachusetts I Comments at 20-22 (stating that Verizon
    adds to the "no access" problem by assigning "all day" appointment
    windows); Network Access Solutions Massachusetts I Comments at 3-4
    (same). Rhythms Massachusetts I Comments at 32. Covad specifically
    notes that an apparent increase in competing carrier "no access"
    situations is explained by the fact that Verizon's schedules retail
    repair appointments in smaller windows than for competing carriers.
    The Massachusetts Department was unable to comment on Covad's
    alleged unsuccessful attempt to shorten repair windows offered by
    Verizon to competing carriers. *See* Massachusetts Department
    Massachusetts I Reply at 86. On reply, Verizon states that it will
    grant morning or afternoon appointments for retail customers if they
    have extenuating circumstances and it will do the same for competing
    carriers. Verizon Massachusetts I Lacouture/Ruesterholz Reply Decl.
    at 33 (emphasis added).

[^477]: *See* Verizon Massachusetts II Lacouture/Ruesterholz Decl. at
    para 119 Attach. GG.

[^478]: The Department of Justice notes that the mean time to repair
    measure is likely to be disputed in the future and, if the measure
    is left unrevised, it may create an analysis that is biased toward
    finding parity. "Excluding observations involving competitive LEC
    refusals of weekend appointments makes Verizon's performance for
    competitive LECs look stronger, moving the apparent balance toward
    parity. Excluding observations involving refused weekday
    appointments -- an adjustment Verizon did not make -- could make
    Verizon's performance as to its retail unit or separate affiliate
    look better, moving the apparent balance away from parity."
    Department of Justice Massachusetts II Evaluation at 12.

[^479]: The Percent Repeat Trouble Reports metric, MR 5-01 shows that
    the 4-month (September -- December) average for competing carriers
    is 16.3 percent and 21.5 percent for Verizon. For the months of
    September, October, November and December, competing carrier repeat
    trouble rates were 19.3, 15.4, 16.1 and 13.4 percent. For the same
    months, Verizon repeat trouble rate was 22.7, 20.3, 22.6 and 16.5
    percent. *See* MR 5-01 (Maintenance, 2-Wire DSL Services, percent
    Repeat Trouble Reports within 30 Days).

[^480]: *See* *id.*

[^481]: The average repeat trouble report rate for the period September
    through December is 16.3 for competing LECs compared to 21.5 for
    Verizon retail. *See* MR 5-01 (Maintenance, 2-Wire DSL Services,
    percent Repeat Trouble Reports within 30 Days). We take additional
    comfort in Verizon's network trouble report rates for DSL loops in
    Massachusetts. These results further support our conclusion that
    Verizon provides competing carriers with maintenance and repair
    service in substantially the same time and manner as Verizon's own
    retail operations. Competing carriers experienced a trouble report
    rate of 1.9 percent for the months of September through December
    2000 while Verizon experienced trouble report rates at a comparable
    1.3 percent rate. *See* MR 2-02/2-03 (Maintenance, 2-Wire xDSL
    Services, Network Trouble Report Rate, Loop; Network Trouble Report
    Rate, Central Office).

[^482]: Although nondiscriminatory access to subloops technically falls
    under checklist item 2, we treat subloops in this section because it
    is logically related to the provision of unbundled loops.

[^483]: *UNE Remand Order* at para. 206. The Commission held that
    technically feasible points of interconnection near a customer
    premises could include poles or pedestals, the NID or the minimum
    point of entry (MPOE), the feeder distribution interface (FDI) or a
    remote terminal or environmentally controlled vault. *Id*.

[^484]: Rhythms Massachusetts I Comments at 12; ALTS Massachusetts I
    Comments at 16-17; Covad Massachusetts I Comments at 25-28.

[^485]: *See* Verizon Massachusetts I Lacouture/Ruesterholz Reply Decl.
    at para. 44.

[^486]: *Id*.

[^487]: Verizon offers "feeder subloops over DS1 or DS3 transmission
    paths which may be either fiber or copper depending upon facilities
    availability." *See* Verizon Massachusetts I Lacouture/Ruesterholz
    Reply Decl. at para. 137. *Id*. at Attach. P (stating that a 'Feeder
    Sub-Loop' means a DS1-DS3 transmission path over a feeder facility
    in Verizon's network).

[^488]: Verizon specifically identifies the NID and the MPOE as possible
    alternative points for competing LECs to obtain access to subloops.
    *See* Verizon Massachusetts I Lacouture/Ruesterholz Reply Decl. at
    para. 138.

[^489]: In so doing, we do not consider Verizon's special access
    services performance. OnSite Access specifically criticizes
    Verizon's performance in provisioning high capacity "loops" in New
    York and Massachusetts. *See also* On Site Access Massachusetts I
    Comments at 20-21 (citing Leonard Kriss Decl. at 2-6). CompTel
    lodges a related complaint alleging that Verizon has not
    demonstrated that it can comply with the competitive checklist at
    the same time it meets its obligation to provision access services
    and operate its long distance affiliate consistent with section
    272's nondiscrimination requirements. *See* CompTel Massachusetts II
    Comments at 1-3. Criticisms of Verizon's provisioning of special
    access service are not relevant to compliance with checklist item
    four. As we held in the *SWBT Texas* and *Bell Atlantic New York
    Orders*, we do not consider the provision of special access services
    pursuant to tariffs for purposes of determining checklist
    compliance. *SWBT Texas Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 18504, para. 335;
    *Bell Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 4126-27, para. 340.
    Checklist item 4 does not address itself to retail services Verizon
    provides to competitors such as special access services.

[^490]: *See* PR 4-01 (UNE POTS/Special Services, percent Missed
    Appointments -- Verizon -- Total). In September and October, Verizon
    did not miss any installation appointments for high-capacity loops
    and missed 18.39 percent of its installation appointments in
    November. In November, the number of observations in this metric is
    310 competitive LEC installations. However, this measure aggregates
    EEL and interoffice facilities installations. The comparable numbers
    over the same period for Verizon retail were 2.78, 1.90 and 1.43
    percent. *See* *id.*

[^491]: For the period September through January, the Mean Time to
    Repair measure shows that Verizon troubles are resolved in 8.38
    hours compared to 8.40 hours for competitive LECs during the same
    period. *See* MR 4-01 (Maintenance, UNE POTS, Special Services, Mean
    Time to Repair, Total).

[^492]: Verizon examined a sample of the January orders that were
    included in the Average Interval Offered measure (PR 1-07) and
    discovered that the vast majority of the orders should have been "X"
    coded because the competitive LEC asked for an interval longer than
    the standard interval. Because the orders were incorrectly "W"
    coded, Verizon states that they were included in the results and
    skewed the reported results. *See* Letter from Dee May, Executive
    Director Federal Regulatory, Verizon to Magalie Roman Salas,
    Secretary, Federal Communications Commission, CC Docket No. 01-09
    (filed February 28, 2001) (*Verizon Feb. 28 Ex Parte Letter*).

[^493]: *See* *e.g.*, PR 2-07 (Special Services -- Provisioning, Av.
    Interval Completed -- DS-1); PR 6-01 (Special Services --
    Provisioning, percent Installation Troubles reported within 30
    Days).

[^494]: Verizon states that during the period September through January,
    observations for PR 2-07 totaled 176 loops. Verizon notes that the
    high-capacity loop volumes the Commission considered in the *SWBT
    Kansas/Oklahoma Order* was even higher over the four month period
    the Commission considered in that proceeding. *See* *Verizon Feb. 28
    Ex Parte Letter*. Letter from Dee May, Executive Director Federal
    Regulatory, Verizon to Magalie Roman Salas, Secretary, Federal
    Communications Commission, CC Docket No. 01-09 (filed February 28,
    2001). In the period July through October, SWBT received 210 orders
    for DS-1 loops in Oklahoma. *SWBT Kansas/Oklahoma Order* at para.
    213 n.616.

[^495]: Although we recognize specific performance problems for high
    capacity loops, we do not find that these disparities in and of
    themselves are enough to render a finding of checklist noncompliance
    because of the small numbers of DS-1 loops requested by competing
    carriers. We stress, however, that we will be actively monitoring
    Verizon's performance in this area and we will take swift and
    appropriate enforcement action in the event that Verizon's
    provisioning performance for high capacity loops deteriorates. *See
    infra* Part IX.

[^496]: *See* Massachusetts Department Massachusetts I Comments at 279.

[^497]: *See* Verizon Massachusetts I Lacouture/Ruesterholz Decl. at
    para. 81.

[^498]: *Id*. at Attach. J.

[^499]: We evaluate the PR 9-01 (Provisioning, POTS, percent On-Time
    Performance -- Hot Cut); PR 6-02 (Provisioning, POTS, percent
    Installation Troubles reported within 7 Days -- Hot Cut Loop)
    measures in Massachusetts.

[^500]: *See* Verizon Massachusetts I Guerard/Canny Decl. at Attach. E;
    PR 9-01 (Provisioning POTS, percent On Time Performance -- Hot
    Cuts). For May, PR 9-01 showed 98.45 percent on time performance,
    for June, PR 9-01 showed 99.63 percent on time performance and for
    July, PR 9-01 showed 99.19 percent on time performance. KPMG
    reviewed Verizon's hot cut performance between October 1999 and
    January 2000 and found that 98 percent of hot cuts were completed
    on-time. *See* Verizon Massachusetts I Lacouture/Ruesterholz Decl.
    at para. 83 (citing KPMG Report at 198-99 (POP-6-2-6). The
    Massachusetts Department characterizes Verizon's hot cut timeliness
    performance as "excellent" and notes that unlike Verizon's
    performance in New York prior to filing its application with this
    Commission, Verizon bettered the 95 percent "on time" benchmark in
    Massachusetts every month from January through July 2000. *See*
    Massachusetts Department Comments at 284-85.

[^501]: *See* Verizon Massachusetts II Lacouture/Ruesterholz Decl. at
    para. 5.

[^502]: In response to criticism from one carrier, AT&T, regarding the
    accuracy of Verizon's hot cut data, the Massachusetts Department
    engaged in a reconciliation of various Verizon self-reported hot cut
    performance measurement data in the context of the state section 271
    proceeding. Massachusetts Department Massachusetts I Comments at
    288. AT&T does not criticize Verizon's hot cut performance in this
    proceeding.

[^503]: Massachusetts Department Massachusetts I Comments at 288.

[^504]: *See* *id*. at 256.

[^505]: In September, Verizon completed POTS loop orders of 1-5 lines in
    8.82 for Verizon retail and 8.53 for competitors. The comparable
    numbers for October were 5.81 for Verizon retail affiliate and 9.22
    and 5.45 for Verizon retail and 4.86 for competitors in December.
    *See* PR 2-03 (Provisioning, Average Completed Interval, Dispatch
    1-5 lines -- Loop).

[^506]: *See* Verizon Massachusetts II Lacouture/Ruesterholz Decl. at
    Attach. A. The September to November missed appointment rate, PR
    4-04, is 8.13 percent for Verizon and 7.09 percent for \[competing
    carriers\]. The December rate was 6.96 for Verizon and 10.31 for
    competing LECs. *See* PR 4-04 (Provisioning, POTS, percent Missed
    Appointments, Verizon, Dispatch, Loop -- New).

[^507]: The percentage of installation troubles reported on voice grade
    loops for competitors were 1.13 percent in September, .98 percent in
    October, .80 percent in November and .74 in December. The comparable
    numbers for Verizon were 2.39 in September, 1.87 in October, 1.77 in
    November and 1.60 in December. *See* PR 6-02 (Provisioning, POTS,
    percent Installation Troubles reported within 7 Days -- Loop).

[^508]: Results for the mean time to repair measure, Mean Time to Repair
    -- Total, in the months of September, October, November and December
    show parity. Competitor troubles were repaired in 19.77 hours in
    September, 18.52 hours in October, 19.00 hours in November and 15.38
    hrs in December. Verizon's troubles were repaired in 21.63 hours in
    September, 17.68 hours in October, 17.95 hours in November and 16.98
    hrs in December. *See* MR 4-01 (Maintenance, POTS Loop, Mean Time to
    Repair -- Total).

[^509]: *See* *Deployment of Wireline Services Offering Advanced
    Telecommunications Capabilities and Implementation of the Local
    Competition Provisions of the Telecommunications Act of1996*, Third
    Report and Order, CC Docket No. 98-147, Fourth Report and Order, CC
    Docket No. 96-98, 14 FCC Rcd 20912 (1999) (*Line Sharing Order*)
    (*pet. for rehearing pending sub nom*. *USTA v. FCC*, DC Cir. No.
    00-102 (filed Jan 18, 2000)).

[^510]: *SWBT Kansas/Oklahoma Order* at para. 215.

[^511]: *SWBT Kansas/Oklahoma Order* at para. 215. The Commission
    further stated that to "the extent its OSS provisioning processes
    are not identical, a BOC applicant bears the burden of showing that
    whatever differences are present are not material." *Id.*

[^512]: Verizon offers competing carriers two arrangements for line
    sharing pursuant to its interconnection agreements and line sharing
    tariff. The first arrangement provides a competing carrier with the
    ability to install, own and maintain the splitter in the competing
    carrier's own collocation arrangement. In the second arrangement, a
    competitive LEC-owned splitter is located in Verizon's central
    office space and is maintained by Verizon. *See* Verizon
    Massachusetts I Ruesterholz/Lacouture Decl. at para. 118. As part of
    its *Phase III* proceeding, the Massachusetts Department has
    directed Verizon to implement OSS enhancements to support line
    sharing by April 1, 2001. The Massachusetts Department, however,
    found that the fact that line sharing orders currently require
    manual processing does not prevent it from finding that Verizon
    satisfies its nondiscrimination obligation. *See* Massachusetts
    Department Massachusetts I Comments at 328. Covad contests Verizon's
    showing that it offers line sharing capability over fiber-fed loops.
    Covad Massachusetts II Comments at 35. Verizon responds that it
    satisfies the Commission's requirements through remote terminal
    collocation and unbundled subloop offerings. *See* Verizon
    Massachusetts II Lacouture/Ruesterholz Reply Decl. at paras. 160-65.
    We note that the issue of line sharing over fiber-fed loops is the
    subject of a *Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking* at the
    Commission. *See* Line Sharing Reconsideration Order at para. 12;
    *see also* *accompanying*, Third Further Notice of Proposed
    Rulemaking in CC Docket No. 98-147, Sixth Further Notice of Proposed
    Rulemaking in CC Docket No. 96-98.

[^513]: Verizon Massachusetts I Ruesterholz/Lacouture Decl. at para.
    114. In its initial application Verizon stated that it has
    provisioned over 7,000 line sharing orders in New York, the majority
    of which were for its own data affiliate*. See id.* Verizon's
    Massachusetts II application shows that Verizon has processed
    roughly 10 times the number of line sharing orders for its retail
    affiliate compared to line sharing orders processed for unaffiliated
    competing LECs.

[^514]: Verizon Massachusetts I Ruesterholz/Lacouture Decl. at para.
    115. For example, Verizon asked competing carriers to identify their
    priority wire centers throughout Massachusetts by March 13, 2000 so
    that Verizon could prioritize the central office wiring work
    necessary to accommodate line sharing requests. *Id.* at 127.

[^515]: *See* Covad Massachusetts II Comments at 7-8; Rhythms
    Massachusetts II Comments at 6; CIX Massachusetts II Comments at 7;
    USISPA Massachusetts II Reply at 9; AT&T Massachusetts II Reply at
    25; Covad Massachusetts I Comments at 28; WorldCom Massachusetts I
    Comments at 62; Rhythms Massachusetts I Reply at 18; ALTS
    Massachusetts I Reply at 36. On March 14, 2001, Verizon filed an *ex
    parte* letter in this proceeding stating that Verizon has "taken
    steps to address the outstanding issues" between Rhythms and Verizon
    and accordingly, Rhythms "no longer opposes Verizon's Application
    for section 271 authority in Massachusetts." Letter from Kimberly A.
    Scardino, Assistant General Counsel, Rhythms to Magalie Roman Salas,
    Secretary, Federal Communications Commission, CC Docket No. 01-9
    (filed March 14, 2001). Rhythms had argued that where Verizon
    completed pre-wiring collocation work, in some instances it was
    wired incorrectly or the cable and pair assignment were not entered
    into Verizon's inventory system. *See* Rhythms Massachusetts II
    Comments, Williams Decl. at para. 39. Covad claims that Verizon
    cannot "provision a single line shared order in a central office
    while at the same time Verizon was shutting off line-sharing ready
    central offices for its own retail service because orders are
    flowing through beyond capacity." Letter from Jason D. Oxman, Senior
    Government Affairs Counsel, Covad to Magalie Roman Salas, Secretary,
    Federal Communications Commission, CC Docket No. 00-176 at 1 (filed
    Feb. 21, 2000); *see also* Letter from Jason D. Oxman, Senior
    Government Affairs Counsel, Covad to Magalie Roman Salas, Secretary,
    Federal Communications Commission, CC Docket No. 00-176 at 1 (filed
    Nov. 28, 2000) (arguing that walkthroughs of Verizon central offices
    showed incomplete splitter installations as of the week of November
    20, 2000). Verizon responds that Covad and Rhythms are the only
    competing carriers that submitted their line sharing plans to
    Verizon's project management plan and that installation of splitters
    was performed on a timely basis. Verizon Massachusetts I
    Lacouture/Ruesterholz Decl. at paras. 112-13. The Massachusetts
    Department found that whatever delays resulted from splitter
    installation were attributable to competing carriers, specifically
    Covad. Massachusetts Department Massachusetts I Comments at 327.

[^516]: *See* *supra* Part II.A.

[^517]: *See SWBT Kansas/Oklahoma Order* at para. 215.

[^518]: From September 2000 through January 2001, Verizon has provided a
    total of approximately 51,000 line shared loops in Massachusetts
    including those for VADI. During December and January, Verizon
    completed nearly 500 line shared loops for competitors in
    Massachusetts. *See* Verizon Massachusetts II Lacouture/Ruesterholz
    Reply Decl. at para. 103. In New York, Verizon has processed 110,000
    line shared orders including those provided to VADI. *See* *id* at
    para. 28.

[^519]: *See supra* Part IV.A.2.b. The Massachusetts Department
    concluded that the "systems and processes in Massachusetts are
    comparable to, indeed the very same as, those found in New York."
    Massachusetts Department Massachusetts II Comments at 35; s*ee*
    *also* Verizon Massachusetts II Sapienza/Mulcahy Decl. App. A,
    Attach. B. PwC also investigated whether VADI has the same interface
    options as unaffiliated competitive LECs and whether Verizon treats
    transactions it receives from VADI the same as transactions it
    receives from unaffiliated competitive LECs. PwC confirmed that VADI
    offers DSL service using line sharing purchased from Verizon using
    the same interfaces that are available to other unaffiliated
    competitive LECs. VADI generally uses CORBA for pre-ordering, EDI
    for ordering and the Web GUI for maintenance and repair. In
    addition, PwC confirmed that once Verizon receives the orders over
    the interface, it provisions a VADI order using the same systems and
    processes as it uses to provision an order for any other competitive
    LEC. Likewise, PwC reports that VADI's maintenance and repair
    requests are handled by Verizon in the same manner as a request from
    an unaffiliated competitive LEC. *See* Verizon Massachusetts II
    Lacouture/Ruesterholz Decl at para. 143. Verizon does, however,
    reveal that a "small percentage" of VADI's New York line sharing
    orders are distributed by a team leader in the Boston xDSL/Line
    Sharing Center to a group of approximately 35 temporary service
    order representatives located in New York. Verizon contends that it
    retained these temporary representatives to clear a backlog of
    retail DSL orders in New York that existed before VADI was
    operational. Verizon Massachusetts II Lacouture/Ruesterholz Supp.
    Decl. at para. 154. This slight difference in OSS functionality does
    not alter our conclusion that the OSS in New York and Massachusetts
    are identical for purposes of the Commission's consideration of New
    York line sharing commercial data.

[^520]: *See* Covad Massachusetts II Comments at 6; Rhythms
    Massachusetts II Comments at 8. Rhythms contends that Verizon's
    explanation of defective splitter installation could not apply to it
    because Rhythms has elected to place splitter in Rhythms collocation
    spaces and the only remaining central office wiring work to be done
    is the re-termination of existing 200 cable and pair, a process that
    Rhythms claims is simple and accomplished quickly. Rhythms
    Massachusetts II Comments at 8.

[^521]: Covad argues that it requested that 55 central offices in
    Massachusetts offer line sharing capability. As of February 21,
    2000, Covad has successfully provisioned line sharing in 44 of those
    55 offices and it has provided the CLLI codes for those offices
    where Covad has pending orders. *See* Covad Massachusetts II Reply
    at 19; *see also* Rhythms Massachusetts II Comments at 8. Verizon
    responds that only two of the offices Covad initially complained of
    are in Massachusetts and of these two, it has provisioned Covad
    orders in a number of the central offices which are relevant to this
    application. *See* Verizon Massachusetts II Lacouture/Ruesterholz
    Reply Decl. at para. 131. As to the status of contested offices in
    New York, Verizon responds that Covad's claim that its "Failed
    Dispatch Report" shows discrimination is misplaced because joint
    investigations at these central offices show that the orders have
    failed due to operational and other problems on Covad's part. *Id.*
    at 133-35. Covad concedes that for some of its collocation
    arrangements, it is possible that "Covad has not yet installed DSLAM
    cards in a particular office to support line sharing capability" to
    conserve scarce resources but nonetheless argues that regardless of
    whether such equipment is installed, Verizon has an obligation to
    ensure that the office is line-sharing ready. Covad Massachusetts II
    Reply at 20 n.35. Verizon offers a similar response to Rhythm's
    allegations that several Massachusetts central offices are not line
    sharing ready. Verizon contends that the central offices in question
    have been re-examined and it has not found any wiring problems.
    Verizon further responds that its records show that of the LSRs
    submitted by Rhythms only a small proportion of the central offices
    in Massachusetts are at issue. Of these offices, Verizon claims that
    it has completed line sharing orders for Rhythms in nearly all of
    the central offices at issue in Massachusetts. *See* Verizon
    Massachusetts II Lacouture/Ruesterholz Reply Decl. at paras.
    143-145.

[^522]: Verizon Massachusetts II Lacouture/Ruesterholz Decl. at para.
    138.

[^523]: Massachusetts Department Massachusetts II Comments at 36-38;
    Department of Justice Massachusetts II Evaluation at 14.

[^524]: *See* Verizon Massachusetts II Lacouture/Ruesterholz Reply Decl.
    at para 126; s*ee also* Letter from Dee May, Executive Director
    Federal Regulatory, Verizon, to Magalie Roman Salas, Secretary,
    Federal Communications Commission, CC Docket No. 01-9 (filed
    February 23, 2001). Covad represents that it submitted "every single
    one of its linesharing collocation applications in Massachusetts in
    April 2000." Covad Massachusetts II Reply at 22.

[^525]: *See* Letter from Dee May, Executive Director Federal
    Regulatory, Verizon to Magalie Roman Salas, Secretary, Federal
    Communications Commission, CC Docket No. 01-9 (filed February 22,
    2001). Rhythms argues that Verizon did not institute its quality
    inspection audit process soon enough. *See* Rhythms Massachusetts II
    Comments at 8. Verizon responds that its "implemented the inspection
    process as soon as it became aware of the start-up issues." Verizon
    Massachusetts II Lacouture/Ruesterholz Reply Decl. at para. 37.

[^526]: *See* Verizon Massachusetts II Lacouture/Ruesterholz. Reply
    Decl. at para. 137. Verizon has continued to address these issues,
    particularly with Covad. Recent reports suggest that Verizon has
    largely, if not completely, resolved central office wiring issues
    that have affected the deployment of line-shared services by
    competing carriers. *See* Letter from Jason Oxman, Senior Counsel,
    Covad to Magalie Roman Salas, Secretary, Federal Communications
    Commission, CC Docket No. 01-9, (filed April 6, 2001) (stating that
    "Covad verified, in Massachusetts, that Verizon honored its
    commitment to clear all infrastructure related troubles, throughout
    the former Bell Atlantic footprint, by February 15, 2001").

[^527]: *See* Verizon Massachusetts II Sapienza/Mulcahy Decl. at para.
    13.

[^528]: *See* *id.* (finding that for the majority of the line sharing
    measurements, PwC's numbers matched Verizon's and that for the
    remaining measurements, the number of observations was consistent
    and Verizon's reported performance was within one percent).

[^529]: While PwC confirmed that Verizon accurately calculated the
    missed appointment rates under the terms of the new consensus
    measurements, the reported results may overstate Verizon's
    performance. Verizon's technicians may have marked some competitive
    LEC orders as completed after they had tested the line and received
    a working dialtone, even though the splitter to enable DSL serve on
    that line may not initially have been installed correctly. Verizon
    however has committed to adopt additional testing procedures to
    ensure that line sharing orders are not marked completed unless
    working splitters are in place. *See* Verizon Massachusetts II
    Application at 30 n.25. The Department of Justice states that this
    problem "affected those performance measures calculated using the
    provisioning completion date: PR-2 (average interval completed); PR
    3-10 (percent completed within x days); and PR-4 (missed
    appointments)." Department of Justice Massachusetts II Evaluation at
    13 n.54. Competing carriers also contest Verizon's line sharing
    showing and argue that the current record is insufficient to support
    a finding of nondiscrimination. *See* Covad Massachusetts II
    Comments at 8; Rhythms Massachusetts II Comments at 6; CIX
    Massachusetts II Comments at 24.

[^530]: The Massachusetts Department notes that Verizon states that for
    the percent missed appointments -- dispatch measure, PR 4-05,
    "Verizon may not have included those instances where Verizon's
    technician performed the central office work typically required for
    xDSL loops but failed to confirm that a splitter . . . was
    functioning on the line." Massachusetts Department Massachusetts II
    Comments at 37. The Massachusetts Department found that Verizon's
    manual processing of line sharing orders "will be short-lived and,
    even absent complete line sharing order flow-through" Verizon can
    meet foreseeable demand for line sharing. Massachusetts Department
    Massachusetts I Comments at 327.

[^531]: Verizon now performs a "splitter signature test" which is used
    "to determine whether the splitter, which is necessary for line
    sharing, is functioning on the line." Verizon Massachusetts II Reply
    at 23.

[^532]: In September, October, and November in Massachusetts, Verizon
    did not miss any competitive LEC line sharing appointments. In
    December, Verizon missed approximately one percent of competitive
    LEC appointments. Verizon has supplied provisioning information for
    its separate data affiliate, VADI, only for the month of November.
    In November, these results demonstrate parity. *See* Verizon
    Massachusetts II Lacouture/Ruesterholz Decl. at Attach. JJ.

[^533]: Verizon Massachusetts II Application at 30 n.25. The
    Massachusetts Department believes that the measure is sufficiently
    flawed to merit exclusion of this information as evidence that
    Verizon is providing nondiscriminatory access to line sharing.
    Massachusetts Department Massachusetts II Comments at 37. The
    Department of Justice agrees and characterizes the measure as
    "substantially undermined" by the inaccuracies captured in the
    measure. *Id*. at 13.

[^534]: Verizon Massachusetts II Brief at 30 n.25. Without such testing,
    even though technicians have confirmed dial-tone to and from the
    splitter, Verizon is unable to confirm that a splitter is properly
    functioning on a line.

[^535]: *See* Covad Massachusetts II Comments at 8; *see also*
    Department of Justice Massachusetts II Evaluation at 13.

[^536]: Even with the miscoding, the measures describe accurately the
    amount of time Verizon technicians required to install line-shared
    service without the added task of performing a splitter signature
    test. Because failure to install a functioning splitter on a line
    could prevent line-shared service, the lack of a splitter test
    suggests that the quality of the work, rather than its timeliness,
    was affected.

[^537]: We disagree with USISPA that the line sharing "measurements
    simply do not exist." USISPA Massachusetts II Reply at 6.

[^538]: Verizon remedied this miscoding problem by December 15, 2000. In
    Massachusetts, the missed appointment measure in January shows that
    Verizon missed only one percent of competitive LEC line sharing
    installation appointments. Verizon argues that the January results
    show that "the impact on the performance measures caused by the lack
    of the splitter signature test was minimal." Letter from Dee May,
    Executive Director Federal Regulatory, Verizon to Magalie Roman
    Salas, Secretary, Federal Communications Commission, CC Docket No.
    01-9 (filed March 19, 2001). The December results also show that
    Verizon misses less than one percent of installation appointments
    for competing carrier line sharing orders. *See* *id*.

[^539]: We acknowledge that the failure of Verizon's technicians to test
    whether a splitter was functioning on the line may also have
    affected the average completion interval. As discussed above,
    Verizon has addressed this data integrity issue going forward and
    has instituted a quality inspection program to ensure that
    competitive LECs receive acceptable installation quality
    performance.

[^540]: The Massachusetts average completion interval in November was
    6.37 days for competitive LECs compared to 7.53 days for VADI. In
    September, Verizon completed competitive LEC line sharing orders in
    6.47 days and 6.29 days in October. *See* Verizon Massachusetts II
    Lacouture/Ruesterholz Decl. at para. 159 & Attach. NN. Verizon has
    also presented data for another interval measure, the percent
    completed within 6 days measure. In New York, from September through
    November, Verizon completed 74.87 percent of competitive LEC orders
    and 71.60 percent of VADI orders within six days, where a six day
    interval was requested. *See* Verizon Massachusetts II
    Lacouture/Ruesterholz Decl. at para. 159 & Attach. OO. Verizon
    contends that a majority of the competitive LEC orders not completed
    within six days are completed within seven days. In Massachusetts,
    over 93 percent of the competitive LEC line sharing orders in the
    period September through November were completed within seven days*.
    See id.*

[^541]: For the months of September, October and November, the average
    completion interval for competitive LECs in New York was 5.59, 6.4,
    and 6.42 days compared to 9.15, 6.2, 6.02 days for VADI. *See*
    Verizon Massachusetts II Lacouture/Ruesterholz Decl. at 159, Attach.
    MM.

[^542]: Verizon has introduced flow through capability for line-shared
    ADSL orders and will accomplish line sharing provisioning for most
    orders without the time necessary to dispatch a technician to
    install service. Given the fact that line sharing provisioning is
    largely accomplished without manual intervention, the Massachusetts
    Department ordered Verizon to reduce its line sharing interval from
    6 days to five days effective November 27, 2000. Massachusetts
    Department Massachusetts I Comments at 36 n.110; *see also* CIX
    Massachusetts I Comments at 25. Verizon states that its 5-day
    interval tariff for line sharing orders of 1-9 lines went into
    effect on November 27, 2000 and Verizon "is now complying with the
    new interval." *See* D.T.E. Tariff No. 17, Part A, Section 3.2.10.
    Additionally, Verizon has committed to file, as required by the
    Massachusetts Department, a tariff reducing the provisioning
    interval by an additional business day after the April 1^st^
    deadline for fully implementing certain OSS upgrades. *See* Verizon
    Massachusetts I Lacouture/Ruesterholz Decl. at para. 164.

[^543]: Massachusetts Department Massachusetts II Comments at 36. We are
    mindful that, because Verizon has committed to resolving line
    sharing troubles through a coordinated process, it addresses some
    number of line sharing troubles "without the receipt of a trouble
    ticket" and concedes that the "small number of maintenance and
    repair requests reported is likely attributable to that interim
    process." *See* Verizon Massachusetts II Lacouture/Ruesterholz Supp.
    Decl. at para. 156.

[^544]: Verizon Massachusetts II Lacouture/Ruesterholz Decl. at para.
    166 & Attach. SS. Covad argues that Verizon's line sharing I-code
    data are skewed because Verizon classifies troubles associated with
    splitter wiring as "CPE troubles" which show up in the performance
    measure as competitive LEC-caused troubles. Covad Massachusetts II
    Reply at 15. Verizon responds that Covad mistakenly assumes that
    Verizon's trouble designation codes are designed to assign blame for
    a trouble ticket to Verizon or a competitive LEC. *See* Verizon
    Massachusetts II Lacouture/Ruesterholz Reply Decl. at para. 119. The
    codes at issue are designed to indicate whether the trouble is
    caused by an item in the Verizon or competitive LEC network. Because
    splitters are not part of Verizon's network Verizon codes splitter
    troubles accordingly.

[^545]: *See* Verizon Massachusetts II Lacouture/Ruesterholz Decl. at
    para. 71.

[^546]: *Id.*

[^547]: During September through November, the mean time to repair for
    competitive LECs was 16 hours compared to slightly longer than 10
    hours for VADI. Verizon Massachusetts II Lacouture/Ruesterholz Decl.
    at para. 172. In New York, from September through November, Verizon
    met more than 92 percent of the repair appointments that did not
    require a dispatch for both VADI and competitors. Verizon
    Massachusetts II Lacouture/Ruesterholz Decl. at para. 170 & Attach.
    TT.

[^548]: Verizon also provided the percentage of repeat trouble reports
    for both competitors and VADI. These data demonstrate that Verizon
    provides superior service to competitors compared to itself. *See*
    MR 5-01 (Line Sharing, percent Repeat Troubles w/30 Days).

[^549]: *See* Letter from Kimberly A. Scardino, Rhythms to Magalie Roman
    Salas, Secretary, Federal Communications Commission, CC Docket No.
    01-09 (filed March 2, 2001).

[^550]: Verizon has designated a single point of contact for each
    competitive LEC to address line sharing ordering or provisioning
    processes regardless of whether they arise in Verizon's TISOC, CLPC
    or RCMC. Verizon is participating in the Commission's "Line Sharing
    Summit" and is engaged in a dialogue with competitive LECs to
    further improve the line sharing process. Verizon has also
    introduced flow through capability on line sharing orders for
    connections requiring less than three lines. Verizon has also
    accompanied Covad on site visits of several Massachusetts central
    offices to address what it terms are several "minor
    collocation-related issues." *See* Verizon Massachusetts II
    Lacouture/Ruesterholz Decl. at para. 139.

[^551]: Third Report and Order and Order on Reconsideration, CC Docket
    No. 98-147; Fourth Report and Order on Reconsideration, CC Docket
    No. 96-98; Third Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking; CC Docket
    No. 98-147; Sixth Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking; CC Docket
    No. 96-98 (rel. Jan. 19, 2001) at para. 20 n.36.

[^552]: *Id*.

[^553]: The Massachusetts Department recognizes that Verizon is required
    to offer line splitting but requests that the Commission "take into
    account the recent nature of both its and the Department's
    clarifying Orders on line splitting when reviewing" Verizon's
    section 271 application. Massachusetts Department Massachusetts II
    Comments at 41.

[^554]: *See* Verizon Massachusetts II Lacouture/Ruesterholz Reply Decl.
    at 149.

[^555]: Verizon issued its statement of policy on February 14, 2001,
    approximately three weeks after this Commission issued the *Line
    Sharing Reconsideration Order*. *See* Verizon Massachusetts II
    Lacouture/Ruesterholz Reply. Decl. at 154. AT&T argues that Verizon
    must at least demonstrate it has a nondiscriminatory process in
    place to support line-split services. AT&T Massachusetts II Reply at
    24; *see also* USISPA Massachusetts II Reply at 5; CompTel
    Massachusetts II Comments at 3-5.

[^556]: In its line splitting amendment, Verizon commits to offer line
    splitting consistent with the Commission's *Line Sharing
    Reconsideration Order* by utilizing Verizon's OSS to order the
    unbundled network elements necessary to provide line-split services.
    With regard to migrations of UNE-P customers to line splitting,
    Verizon commits to follow the implementation schedules, terms,
    conditions and guidelines established in the ongoing DSL
    collaborative at the New York Public Service Commission. Verizon
    Massachusetts II Lacouture/Ruesterholz Reply Decl. at 154, Attach.
    Q.

[^557]: *See* Verizon Massachusetts II Lacouture/Ruesterholz Reply Decl.
    at para. 149-58. Verizon further argues that the Commission has
    already held that Verizon can provide unbundled network elements in
    combination, and line splitting can be achieved through the
    combination of unbundled network elements. *See id*. at para. 158.

[^558]: *See* AT&T Massachusetts II Reply 24; WorldCom Massachusetts II
    Reply at 12-13; Covad Massachusetts II Reply at 5-6.

[^559]: AT&T Massachusetts II Reply 24; WorldCom Massachusetts II Reply
    at 12-13; Covad Massachusetts II Reply at 5-6.

[^560]: *Line Sharing Reconsideration Order* at para*.* 14-25; *SWBT
    Texas Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 18515-17, paras. 323-329 (describing
    line splitting); 47 C.F.R. § 51.703(c) (requiring that incumbent
    LECs provide competing carriers with access to unbundled loops in a
    manner that allows competing carriers "to provide any
    telecommunications service that can be offered by means of that
    network element").

[^561]: *Line Sharing Reconsideration Order* at para. 18.

[^562]: *Id.* at paras. 18-20.

[^563]: *Id.* at para. 21.

[^564]: *See* WorldCom Massachusetts II Reply at 13.

[^565]: *See* Letter from Dee May, Executive Director Federal
    Regulatory, Verizon, to Magalie Roman Salas, Secretary, Federal
    Communications Commission, CC Docket No. 01-9 (filed March 23, 2001)
    (clarifying that voice providers in line splitting arrangements are
    not required to be collocated). We note that where a competitive LEC
    purchases an unbundled xDSL-capable loop terminated to its
    collocation arrangement to provide data service, it may partner with
    another competitive LEC to provide voice service. In this situation,
    the data provider may require a connection to the voice provider's
    collocation arrangement.

[^566]: Verizon's line splitting amendment refers to "existing
    supporting OSS to order and combine" unbundled network elements
    necessary for line-split services. *Line Sharing Reconsideration
    Order* at para. 22. WorldCom likewise asserts that Verizon's
    contract language suggests that it intends to charge a series of
    non-recurring charges associated with each unbundled network element
    to its line-splitting customers that it does not charge to its UNE-P
    customers. *See* WorldCom Massachusetts II Reply at 13.

[^567]: In the *Line Sharing Reconsideration Order*, the Commission held
    that "no central office wiring changes are necessary in a conversion
    from line sharing to line splitting." *Line Sharing Reconsideration
    Order* at para. 22. Verizon suggests that when competitive LEC serve
    customers with existing voice service, they may order new unbundled
    xDSL-capable loops and UNE-P arrangements and then issue a
    disconnect of the existing voice service to provide line split
    services. *See* Verizon Massachusetts II Lacouture/Ruesterholz Reply
    Decl. at para. 157. Disconnecting a customer's currently-established
    voice service to enable the transition from line sharing to line
    splitting would require some disruption of dial tone and may require
    a change in the voice customers telephone number, a result that is
    inconsistent with our *Line Sharing Reconsideration Order. See Line
    Sharing Reconsideration Order* at para. 22.

[^568]: *Line Sharing Reconsideration Order* at para. 22.

[^569]: *See Local Competition First Report and Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at
    15814-84, paras. 625-771. For example, we would expect Verizon to
    demonstrate why non-recurring charges in addition to those assessed
    when a competitive LEC orders a UNE-P arrangement are necessary. We
    cannot agree with Verizon when it states that "if Covad wants to
    engage in a line splitting arrangement with a voice \[competing
    carrier\], it may do so by working with the voice \[competing
    carrier\] to order the individual network elements" if such a
    process would impose unnecessary charges that are not cost-based or
    would otherwise require disruption of an end user's voice service in
    the context of a migration from line sharing to line splitting.
    Verizon Massachusetts II Lacouture/Ruesterholz Reply Decl. at para.
    159.

[^570]: WorldCom Massachusetts II Comments at 27.

[^571]: *Line Sharing Reconsideration Order* at para. 22 n.41 ("We also
    encourage participants in state collaboratives and change management
    processes to develop specific ordering procedures associated with a
    variety" of line splitting scenarios.)

[^572]: Verizon Massachusetts II Lacouture/Ruesterholz Reply Decl. at
    para. 157.

[^573]: *See* New York PSC, Order Granting Clarification, Granting
    Reconsideration in Part and Denying Reconsideration in Part and
    Adopting Schedule, Case 00-C-0127 (Issued and Effective January 29,
    2001).

[^574]: *See* Verizon Massachusetts II Reply at 30.

[^575]: *See* Verizon Massachusetts II Lacouture/Ruesterholz Reply Decl.
    at paras. 157.

[^576]: *See SWBT Texas Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 18379-81, paras. 61-64;
    *Bell Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 3977-86, paras. 63-76.

[^577]: *SWBT Texas Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 18380, para. 62 (quoting
    *Local Competition First Report and Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at 15613-15,
    paras. 221-25).

[^578]: *See SWBT Texas Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 18390, para. 78.

[^579]: *See generally Deployment of Wireline Services Offering Advanced
    Telecommunications Capability*, Order on Reconsideration and Second
    Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in CC Docket No. 98-147 and
    Fifth Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in CC Docket No. 96-98,
    15 FCC Rcd 17806 (2000), *recon. pending* (*Collocation
    Reconsideration Order*).

[^580]: *See* Massachusetts Department Massachusetts I Comments at
    19-41; Massachusetts Department Massachusetts II Comments at 1.

[^581]: In the *Local Competition First Report and Order*, the
    Commission identified trunk group blockage and transmission
    standards as indicators of an incumbent LEC's technical criteria and
    service standards. *See Local Competition First Report and Order*,
    11 FCC Rcd at 15614-15, paras. 224-25. In prior section 271
    applications, the Commission concluded that disparities in trunk
    group blockage may indicate a failure to provide interconnection to
    competing carriers equal in quality to the interconnection the BOC
    provided to its own retail operations. *See SWBT Texas Order*, 15
    FCC Rcd at 18380, para. 62.

[^582]: *See* Massachusetts Department Massachusetts I Comments at 20;
    D.T.E. Tariff No. 17.

[^583]: *See* Verizon Massachusetts I Lacouture/Ruesterholz Decl. at
    para. 8; *see also* Verizon Massachusetts II Application App. B,
    Vol. 1, Tab 1A at 18; CLEC Handbook, [Vol]{.smallcaps}. III,
    § 4.2.3.2.

[^584]: *See* Verizon Massachusetts II Lacouture/Ruesterholz Decl. at
    paras. 37-38, 187; Verizon Massachusetts II Application App. B, Vol.
    1, Tab 2. Verizon has implemented a number of performance measures
    relating to interconnection, including measures that compare
    blockage on Verizon common trunk groups with blockage on dedicated
    trunk groups serving competitive LECs (NP 1-01); measures that
    capture missed appointments for trunk installations (PR 4-01); and
    measures that provide data on average installation intervals (PR
    2-09), and percent troubles within 30 days of installation (PR
    6-01).

[^585]: The metric NP 1-01, Percent Final Trunk Group Blockage, compares
    the proportion of dedicated final trunk groups carrying traffic from
    the Verizon access tandem to a competitive LEC that exceed the
    blocking design threshold (generally B.005) with the proportion of
    Verizon common final trunk groups carrying Verizon local traffic
    between offices that exceed this blocking threshold. *See* Verizon
    Massachusetts II Sapienza/Mulcahy Decl. Attach. A.

[^586]: *See* NP 1-01 (Percent Final Trunk Groups Exceeding Blocking
    Standard). The percent of competitive LEC trunk groups exceeding the
    blocking standard was 1.43 percent, 2.14 percent, 4.21 percent (2.11
    percent with adjustment), and 2.06 percent for September through
    December, respectively. *See infra* n.Error: Reference source not
    found. The portion of Verizon trunk groups exceeding the standard
    was 0.30 percent, 0.30 percent, 0.00 percent, and 0.60 percent for
    these months, respectively.

[^587]: This review standard is consistent with the Commission's
    approach in previous section 271 orders. *See, e.g.*, *Bell Atlantic
    New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 3976, paras. 59-60 ("Finally, in some
    instances, we may find that statistically significant differences in
    measured performance may exist, but that such differences have
    little or no competitive significance in the marketplace. As such,
    we may deem such differences non-cognizable under the statutory
    standard.").

[^588]: This calculation includes an adjusted figure of 2.11 percent for
    November. The percentage of competitive LEC trunk groups exceeding
    the blocking standard rose in November to 4.21 percent. Verizon has
    explained that this spike in the rate was due to a brief equipment
    failure that affected six of the twelve competitive LEC final trunk
    groups that exceeded the design threshold in November. Excluding
    those trunk groups, only six competitive LEC trunk groups exceeded
    the design threshold because of insufficient trunking, or 2.11
    percent. *See* Letter from Dee May, Executive Director Federal
    Regulatory, Verizon, to Magalie Roman Salas, Secretary, Federal
    Communications Commission, CC Docket No. 01-9 at 1 (filed March 27,
    2001) (Verizon March 27 *Ex Parte* Letter).

[^589]: This difference was calculated using the adjusted figure for
    November discussed *supra* n.Error: Reference source not found. The
    proportion of final trunk groups that were blocked due to
    insufficient trunking for the period September through December was
    1.94 percent for dedicated competitive LEC interconnection trunk
    groups and 0.30 percent for Verizon common final trunk groups.

[^590]: *See infra* paras. 186-192.

[^591]: RNK briefly notes that it has experienced inward trunk blockage,
    but supports Verizon's application for section 271 authorization in
    Massachusetts. *See* RNK Massachusetts I Comments at 2-3.

[^592]: Pursuant to the metrics approved by the Massachusetts
    Department, Verizon's interconnection trunking performance for
    competitive LECs is measured against its performance for
    interexchange carriers (except for trunk blockage, which is measured
    against Verizon common final trunks). *See*, *e.g.*, Verizon
    Massachusetts II Application App. B, Vol. 1, Tab B, at 53, 82.

[^593]: These four-month averages are weighted to reflect the number of
    trunk installation appointments each month. Verizon's rates of
    missed trunk installation appointments for competitive LECs in
    Massachusetts were 9.3 percent , 6.0 percent, 2.3 percent, and 0.0
    percent for the months of September through December, respectively.
    Verizon's rates of missed trunk installation appointments for
    interexchange carriers were 12.0 percent, 7.0 percent, 2.9 percent,
    and 0.0 percent respectively for the same four months. *See* PR 4-01
    (Percent Missed Appointments -- Trunks).

[^594]: *See* PR 2-09 (Average Completed Interval Trunks). The average
    completed installation interval for trunks for competitive LECs for
    September was 27 days. There were no orders shown for this measure
    for competitive LECs for October through December. The average
    monthly installation intervals for interexchange carriers for
    September through December were approximately 54, 40, 21, and 66
    days, respectively.

[^595]: *See* Winstar Massachusetts I Comments at 4.

[^596]: For example, Winstar raises issues concerning the provision of
    64 Kbps Clear Channel interconnection trunks and two-way trunks.

[^597]: *See* Verizon Massachusetts I Lacouture/Ruesterholz Reply Decl.
    at paras. 12-13, 23; Verizon Massachusetts I Lacouture/Ruesterholz
    Reply Decl. at paras. 25-29; Verizon Massachusetts II
    Lacouture/Ruesterholz Reply Decl. at paras. 177, 180, 183-85.

[^598]: Winstar also cites claims of trunk provisioning delays made by
    AT&T, NECLEC and RNK in the proceedings before the Massachusetts
    Department. AT&T has not raised these claims in its filings before
    the Commission in either the Massachusetts I or II Applications.
    *See* Verizon Massachusetts I Lacouture/Ruesterholz Reply Decl. at
    para. 24. NECLEC and RNK both stated that they had experienced
    provisioning problems, but concluded that Verizon was making
    improvements and filed in support of the Massachusetts I
    Application. *See* NECLEC Massachusetts I Comments at 2; RNK
    Massachusetts I Comments at 2-3.

[^599]: *See* CompTel Massachusetts I Comments at 15-18 and Attach.
    (Washington Affidavit).

[^600]: Verizon states that ICG forecasted that Verizon should provision
    over 24,000 trunks to deliver traffic from Verizon to ICG (the
    equivalent of 120 trunks from Verizon to ICG for every one trunk
    from ICG to Verizon). Verizon further states that the number of
    trunks ICG requested amounts to nearly 8 percent of all the local
    interconnection trunks Verizon installed during the last four and a
    half years to serve all competitive LECs, and is more trunks than
    Verizon typically installs for all competitive LECs in a two-month
    period. *See* Verizon Massachusetts I Lacouture/Ruesterholz Reply
    Decl. at paras. 27-31.

[^601]: *See* Verizon Massachusetts I Lacouture/Ruesterholz Decl. at
    paras. 36-45.

[^602]: *See* Verizon Massachusetts I Lacouture/Ruesterholz Reply Decl.
    at paras. 42-44.

[^603]: The record does not contain persuasive evidence of significant
    ongoing trunk provisioning delays. An isolated example of poor
    performance by a BOC, absent special circumstances, does not warrant
    denial of a section 271 application if the performance data do not
    indicate a broader problem. *See, e.g.*, *SWBT Kansas/Oklahoma
    Order* at para. 138.

[^604]: *See* Verizon Massachusetts II Lacouture/Ruesterholz Reply Decl.
    at paras. 174-75.

[^605]: *See* Winstar Massachusetts II Reply at 4-13.

[^606]: *See* Verizon Massachusetts I Lacouture/Ruesterholz Decl. at
    para. 22; Verizon Massachusetts I Lacouture/Ruesterholz Reply Decl.
    at para. 33.

[^607]: *See SWBT Texas Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 18383-84, para. 69.

[^608]: *See Bell Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 4126-27, para.
    340; *SWBT Texas Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 18520, para. 335. The
    provisioning of special access services is not relevant for the
    purposes of determining section 271 checklist compliance. Therefore,
    although Winstar, Global Crossing, and CompTel filed comments
    alleging Verizon's inadequate performance in providing special
    access, this is not a factor in determining Verizon's compliance
    with checklist item 1. *See* Winstar Massachusetts I Comments at 12;
    Global Crossing Massachusetts I Comments at 2-5; CompTel
    Massachusetts I Comments at 2-3.

[^609]: *See* Verizon Massachusetts I Application at 12, 14. Verizon
    states that it has provided 1,700 collocation arrangements in
    central offices that serve 96 percent of Verizon's business access
    lines and 94.5 percent of its residential lines in Massachusetts.
    *See* Verizon Massachusetts I Lacouture/Ruesterholz Decl. at para.
    34; Verizon Massachusetts II Reply at 44.

[^610]: *See* Verizon Massachusetts I Application at 14, n.16; Verizon
    Massachusetts I Reply at 31-32; *Deployment of Wireline Services
    Offering Advanced Telecommunications Capability*, CC Docket No.
    98-147, First Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed
    Rulemaking, 14 FCC Rcd 4761 (1999) (*Advanced Services First Report
    and Order*), *aff'd in part and remanded in part sub nom. GTE
    Service Corp. v. FCC*, 205 F.3d 416 (D.C. Cir. 2000), *on recon.*,
    *Collocation Reconsideration Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 17806.

[^611]: The timeframe is generally 76 business days. This time period
    can be extended up to 15 days in the case of complex orders. *See*
    Verizon Massachusetts I Lacouture/Ruesterholz Decl. at para. 37.

[^612]: *See* NP 2-01; Verizon Massachusetts II Lacouture/Ruesterholz
    Reply Decl. Attach. A.

[^613]: We find that the adjustments made by Verizon to account for the
    August strike are reasonable, and that the adjusted data present a
    more accurate picture of Verizon's performance in this area. The
    data were adjusted by extending the due dates for collocation
    arrangements by fifteen business days to offset the time lost during
    the strike. *See* Verizon Massachusetts II Lacouture/Ruesterholz
    Decl. at para. 182. The adjustment here is very simple and does not
    involve complex statistical adjustments that are difficult to verify
    and analyze.

    In the case of new orders for physical collocation, the
    strike-adjusted data show an average 95.18 percent on-time
    completion rate for new physical collocation requests for the period
    September to November 2000. *See* Verizon Massachusetts II
    Lacouture/Ruesterholz Decl. Attach. UU at 3. The strike-adjusted
    data also show an average rate of 90.64 percent on-time completions
    for physical collocation augmentations for the period September to
    November 2000. *See id*. Strike-adjusted data for December show an
    on-time completion rate of 100 percent for new physical collocation
    arrangements and an on-time completion rate of 98.7 percent for
    augmentations. *See* Verizon Massachusetts II Lacouture/Ruesterholz
    Decl. at 71. The data for January 2001 show a return to pre-strike
    performance, with Verizon completing 95 percent of new physical
    collocation arrangements on time and 95.52 percent of augments on
    time, without any adjustment. *See id.* at para. 187.

[^614]: *See* ALTS Massachusetts I Comments at 16-17.

[^615]: *See* Verizon Massachusetts I Reply at 31-32; Verizon
    Massachusetts II Lacouture/Ruesterholz Decl. at 16.

[^616]: *See* Rhythms Massachusetts I Comments at 12; ALTS Massachusetts
    I Comments at 16-17.

[^617]: *See* Verizon Massachusetts I Application at 14-15 n.16.

[^618]: Verizon specifically states that Rhythms' concern "that the
    CRTEE tariff precludes \[competing LECs\] from collocating in
    manholes or other non-building structures reflects a
    misinterpretation of the tariff." Verizon Massachusetts I Reply at
    32 n.43. Verizon's remote collocation tariff states that a CRTEE
    "provides an arrangement in which \[competing LEC\] equipment can be
    placed in Telephone Company remote terminal equipment enclosures
    (RTEEs)." D.T.E. Tariff No. 17, Part E, Section 11.1.1.A.1.1.A. The
    language complained of by Rhythms merely expands the scope of the
    offering to additional enclosures not owned by Verizon. As Verizon
    states, "\[a\]lthough the tariff indicates that remote equipment
    enclosures *include* enclosures that are 'in buildings' not owned by
    Verizon, it does not limit remote collocation to *only* such
    'in-building' structures." Verizon Massachusetts I Reply at 32 n.43
    (emphasis in original). Moreover, Verizon states "that \[competing\]
    LECs are free to remotely collocate in non-building structures as
    well where space is available." *Id*.; Verizon Massachusetts II
    Lacouture/Ruesterholz Decl. at para. 139.

[^619]: Neither the Commission's collocation rules nor the requirements
    adopted by Massachusetts require in-place conversion from virtual to
    physical collocation. *See* Verizon Massachusetts I Reply at 30-31.

[^620]: *See* Rhythms Massachusetts I Comments at 15-18; ALTS
    Massachusetts I Comments at 14-16.

[^621]: *See* ALTS Massachusetts I Comments Attach. (Landers Decl.) at 7
    (stating that competitive LECs may want POTS lines in their
    collocation space to facilitate communications by their technicians
    since Verizon bars the use of mobile telephones in these areas).

[^622]: *See* Verizon Massachusetts I Application at 12; Verizon
    Massachusetts I Lacouture/Ruesterholz Decl. at paras. 8, 258
    (describing available points of access to each of Verizon's standard
    methods of interconnection).

[^623]: *See* Verizon Massachusetts I Application, App. J, Tab 22,
    Attach. IV at IV-2 (*Interconnection Agreement Dated as of September
    28, 1998 by and between New England Telephone and Telegraph Company
    d/b/a Bell Atlantic-Massachusetts and MCImetro*). The agreement
    defines "technically feasible" point as described in the FCC Rules
    and regulation. *Id.* Part B at B-13. It also states that
    \[Verizon\] "will interconnect with MCIm at any technically feasible
    point." *Id.* Attach. IV at IV-2.

[^624]: Any competing LEC may request the same terms and conditions as
    those contained in existing interconnection agreements which allow
    interconnection at only one technically feasible point within a
    LATA. For example, Qwest based its interconnection agreement of
    March 19, 1999 on MCIMetro's agreement with Verizon. *See* Verizon
    Massachusetts I Application, App. J, Tab 37 (*Interconnection
    Agreement Dated as of March 19, 1999 by and between New England
    Telephone and Telegraph Company d/b/a Bell Atlantic-Massachusetts
    and Qwest Communications Company*).

[^625]: *See* Verizon Massachusetts II Lacouture/Ruesterholz Decl. at
    para. 139.

[^626]: 47 U.S.C. § 271(c)(2)(B)(i).

[^627]: *Id*. § 251(c)(2).

[^628]: *Id*. § 252(d)(1).

[^629]: *See* 47 C.F.R. §§ 51.501-07, 51.509(g); *Local Competition
    First Report and Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at 15812-16, 15844-61, 15874-76,
    15912, paras. 618-29, 674-712, 743-51, 826.

[^630]: Massachusetts Department Massachusetts I Comments at 35-37.

[^631]: *See* ALTS Massachusetts I Comments at 14, 18-20; Covad
    Massachusetts I Comments at 44-47; Rhythms Massachusetts I Comments
    at 18-20; Rhythms Massachusetts I Reply at 8-9; ALTS Massachusetts
    II Comments at 6, 11-14; Covad Massachusetts II Comments at 36-39.

[^632]: *See* Verizon Massachusetts II Application App. B, Vol. 3, Tab
    3, Subtab M, Letter from Robert Mudge, President-Massachusetts,
    Verizon, to Department of Telecommunications & Energy (Jan. 12,
    2001) (Verizon January 12^th^ Tariff Revision).

[^633]: *See* Letter from Charles E. Griffin, Government Affairs
    Director, AT&T, to Magalie Roman Salas, Secretary, Federal
    Communications Commission, CC Docket No. 01-9 (filed March 29, 2001)
    (AT&T March 29 Collocation *Ex Parte* Letter) at Attach. 2
    (*Petition of AT&T Communications of New England, Inc. and Covad
    Communications Company to Investigate Certain Provisions of January
    12, 2001 Tariff Filing and Suspend and Investigate Certain Other
    Provisions,* DTE 98-57 (Feb. 1, 2001)) (*AT&T/Covad Tariff
    Suspension Request Ex Parte*).

[^634]: *See* AT&T March 29 Collocation *Ex Parte* Letter at Attach. 4
    (*Motion of AT&T Communications of New England, Inc. and Covad
    Communications Company for Reconsideration and for Extension of the
    Judicial Appeal Period*, DTE 98-57 (March 7, 2001)) (*AT&T/Covad
    Tariff Reconsideration Motion Ex Parte*).

[^635]: *See* Letter from Dee May, Executive Director, Federal
    Regulatory, Verizon, to Magalie Roman Salas, Secretary, Federal
    Communications Commission, CC Docket No. 01-9 (filed March 28, 2001)
    (Verizon March 28 Collocation *Ex Parte* Letter) at Attach. 1
    (*Opposition of Verizon Massachusetts*, DTE 98-57 (March 15, 2001))
    (*Verizon Tariff Opposition Ex Parte*).

[^636]: *See* ALTS Massachusetts I Comments at 14, 18-19; Covad
    Massachusetts I Comments at 44-47; Rhythms Massachusetts I Comments
    at 19; Rhythms Massachusetts I Reply at 8-9; ALTS Massachusetts II
    Comments at 11-13; Covad Massachusetts II Comments at 36-37.

[^637]: *See* Covad Massachusetts I Comments at 46-47.

[^638]: *See* ALTS Massachusetts II Comments at 12.

[^639]: *AT&T/Covad Tariff Reconsideration Motion Ex Parte* at 7.

[^640]: Verizon Massachusetts II Reply at 45; *see also* Verizon March
    28 Collocation *Ex Parte* Letter at Attach. 2, *Answer of Verizon
    Massachusetts*, DTE 98-57 at 8-11 (March 15, 2001) (*Verizon Tariff
    Reconsideration Answer Ex Parte*).

[^641]: *See* Verizon Massachusetts II Reply at 45.

[^642]: *See id.*

[^643]: *See id.*; *see also Verizon Tariff Reconsideration Answer Ex
    Parte* at 8-12.

[^644]: *See* Verizon Massachusetts II Reply at 45.

[^645]: *See SWBT Texas Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 18541, para. 383; *see
    also* 47 U.S.C. §§ 252(c), (e)(6); *AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd*.,
    525 U.S. 366 (1999).

[^646]: *See* Letter from Kenneth Rust, Director, Federal Regulatory,
    Verizon, to Magalie Roman Salas, Secretary, Federal Comminations
    Commission, CC Docket No. 01-09 at 1-2 (filed April 3, 2001)
    (Verizon April 3 Collocation *Ex Parte* Letter) (Verizon letter
    informing competitive LECs of new methods for billing power in
    collocation arrangements in New York and Massachusetts. Verizon now
    bills competitive LECs for collocation power on the basis of the
    total number of load amps requested, on a per-load-amp basis, and
    permits competitive LECs to request a fuse size of up to 2.5 times
    the load amp requested.).

[^647]: *See* ALTS Massachusetts II Comments at 14.

[^648]: *See id.*

[^649]: *See* Verizon Massachusetts II Reply at 45; *see also* ALTS
    Massachusetts II Comments at Ex. B.

[^650]: 47 U.S.C. § 271(c)(2)(B)(iii). As originally enacted, section
    224 was intended to address obstacles that cable operators
    encountered in obtaining access to poles, ducts, conduits, or
    rights-of-way owned or controlled by utilities. The 1996 Act amended
    section 224 in several important respects to ensure that
    telecommunications carriers as well as cable operators have access
    to poles, ducts, conduits, or rights-of-way owned or controlled by
    utility companies, including LECs. *See Second BellSouth Louisiana
    Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20706, para. 171 n.574.

[^651]: 47 U.S.C. § 224(b)(1).

[^652]: 47 U.S.C. § 224(c)(1). The 1996 Act extended the Commission's
    authority to include not just rates, terms, and conditions, but also
    the authority to regulate nondiscriminatory access to poles, ducts,
    conduits, and rights-of-way. *See Local Competition First Report and
    Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at 16104, para. 1232; 47 U.S.C. § 224(f). Absent
    state regulation of terms and conditions of nondiscriminatory
    attachment access, the Commission retains jurisdiction. *See Local
    Competition First Report and Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at 16104, para.
    1232; 47 U.S.C. § 224(c)(1); *see also Bell Atlantic New York
    Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 4093, para. 264*.*

[^653]: *See States That Have Certified That They Regulate Pole
    Attachments*, Public Notice, 7 FCC Rcd 1498 (1992); Implementation
    of the Local Competition Provisions in the Telecommunications Act of
    1996, CC Docket No. 96-98; Interconnection between Local Exchange
    Carriers and Commercial Mobile Radio Service Providers, CC Docket
    No. 95-185, Order on Reconsideration, 14 FCC Rcd at 18089, para. 115
    (1999) (stating that "\[o\]ur rule does not require . . .
    \[previously certified\] . . . states to formally re-certify in
    order to assert their jurisdiction over access); 47 U.S.C. § 224(c).

[^654]: *See* Massachusetts Department Massachusetts I Comments at
    223-49; Massachusetts Department Massachusetts I Reply at 54-61.

[^655]: Verizon Massachusetts I Application at 34-35; Verizon
    Massachusetts I Lacouture/Ruesterholz Decl. at paras. 187-202;
    Verizon Massachusetts I Lacouture/Ruesterholz Reply Decl. at paras.
    151-66; Verizon Massachusetts II Lacouture/Ruesterholz Reply Decl.
    at paras. 201-03.

[^656]: *See* RCN Massachusetts I Comments; RCN Massachusetts I Reply;
    RCN Massachusetts I Supplementary Reply; RCN Massachusetts II
    Comments; Fiber Technologies Massachusetts I Comments at 5; Fiber
    Technologies Massachusetts I Reply at 7; ALTS Massachusetts I
    Comments 43-48; Massachusetts Attorney General Massachusetts I
    Comments at 6-7.

[^657]: Massachusetts Department Massachusetts I Comments at 224-25.

[^658]: *See* 47 U.S.C. § 224(c); *see also* Verizon Massachusetts I
    Reply at 39-40.

[^659]: *See* Massachusetts Department Massachusetts I Comments at 224.
    Although we recognize that commenters raised these claims in the
    section 271 proceeding before the Massachusetts Department, the
    record does not indicate that such claims were also raised through
    the complaint and enforcement process established by the
    Massachusetts Department. The Massachusetts Department concluded
    that, based upon the evidence presented in its section 271
    proceeding, Verizon is providing nondiscriminatory access to its
    poles. *See* Massachusetts Department Massachusetts I Comments at
    249. The Department further noted, however, that its "rules permit
    any party to raise claims of discriminatory treatment" and that its
    findings in the context of the section 271 proceeding "shall in no
    way be considered precedential in any proceedings" under its rules.
    *Id.*

[^660]: 47 U.S.C. § 271(c)(2)(B)(v).

[^661]: *See Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20719,
    para. 201.

[^662]: *See, e.g.*, *id.*; *SWBT Texas Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 18518,
    para. 331 n.920.

[^663]: *See, e.g.*, *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at
    20719-20, para. 201 nn.650 & 652*.*

[^664]: *See* Verizon Massachusetts I Application at 30; Verizon
    Massachusetts I Lacouture/Ruesterholz Decl. at paras. 159-66 & App.
    B; Verizon Massachusetts II Reply at 38.

[^665]: *See* Massachusetts Department Massachusetts I Comments at
    338-39.

[^666]: *See Bell Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 4126, para.
    339; *SWBT Texas Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 1851, para. 333.

[^667]: Using the carrier-to-carrier numbers provided with the
    application, the four month (September through December 2000)
    average for competitive LECs was 12.1 percent, compared to 2.1
    percent for Verizon's retail "special services" provisioning. *See*
    PR-4-01 (Provisioning of POTS/Special Services - Missed
    Appointments). Specifically, the competitive LEC missed appointment
    rates for September through December 2000 were 10.71 percent, 2.76
    percent, 15.21 percent, and 21.25 percent, respectively. Verizon's
    performance for its own retail special services for the same period
    was 2.78 percent, 1.90 percent, 1.43 percent, and 2.04 percent,
    respectively.

[^668]: Letter from Dolores A. May, Executive Director Federal
    Regulatory, Verizon, to Magalie Roman Salas, Secretary, Federal
    Communications Commission (March 29, 2001) (Verizon March 29 *Ex
    Parte* Letter) at 1; Verizon Massachusetts I Guerard/Canny Decl.
    Attach. B at 49. "Special services" are services that require
    engineering design intervention. Verizon Massachusetts I
    Guerard/Canny Decl. Attach. B at 101. These include such services as
    primary rate ISDN, 4 wire xDSL services, digital services, private
    line or foreign served services, as well as high capacity services
    such as DS-1 and DS-3 circuits. *See id.*

[^669]: *Id.*

[^670]: The carrier-to-carrier working group is an industry group,
    comprised of Verizon and all interested competitive LECs, that
    addresses the performance measures that should apply to the
    provision of service to competitive LECs and the appropriate
    performance standards associated with those measures. *See* Verizon
    Massachusetts I Application Guerard/Canny Decl. at 5.

[^671]: *See id.*; *see* Verizon Massachusetts II Application App. B,
    Tab 1B, at 53 (reflecting new retail analogue).

[^672]: Using the revised DS-3 retail analogue, Verizon missed about 63
    percent, 25 percent, 43 percent, and 40 percent of its retail DS-3
    appointments in September through December, respectively. *See id.*
    at 2. Because the number of orders for each of these months are
    relatively small \-- ranging between 10 and 27 orders per month \--
    we rely on an average of those four months in reaching our finding.
    The average rate over the four-month period was 47.62 percent. This
    compares favorably with the four month average of the missed
    appointment rate for provisioning unbundled transport to competitive
    LECs, which was 12.13 percent.

[^673]: Although the carrier-to-carrier collaborative chose DS-3s as the
    retail analogue, it might have chosen to combine the missed
    appointment rate for DS-1s and DS-3s because both are used by
    competitive LECs for transport. Using both DS-1s and DS-3s, Verizon
    missed appointments for its retail customers about 12.33 percent on
    average for September through December, which compares favorably
    with the average missed appointment rate for providing competitive
    LECs with unbundled local transport for the same period: 12.13
    percent. *See* Verizon March 29 *Ex Parte* Letter at 2. This
    analysis gives us additional confidence in our conclusion.

[^674]: *See* OnSite Massachusetts I Comments at 20-21 & Kriss Decl. at
    2-6; *see also* Global Crossing Massachusetts II Comments at 3-5
    (complaining of poor special access provisioning); CompTel
    Massachusetts II Comments at 3 (same). We discuss the Commission's
    oversight of the provision of special access in our discussion of
    section 272 below. *See infra* Part VII.B.2.

[^675]: *See* Verizon Massachusetts I Reply at 54.

[^676]: *See Bell Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd 4126-27, para.
    340.

[^677]: *See* ALTS Massachusetts I Comments at 29 & Landers Decl. at
    para. 12; *see also* Digital Broadband Massachusetts I Reply at
    8-10. Digital Broadband also complains about orders that were
    incorrectly recorded as ticketed as "customer not ready."

[^678]: 47 U.S.C. § 271(c)(2)(B)(xiii).

[^679]: *Id*. § 252(d)(2)(A).

[^680]: Verizon provides reciprocal compensation to competing carriers
    for the termination of local calls from Verizon customers under
    approved interconnection agreements and tariffs. *See* Verizon
    Massachusetts I Application at 41; Verizon Massachusetts I
    Lacouture/Ruesterholz Decl. at para. 292.

[^681]: *See* Verizon Massachusetts I Application at 41; Verizon
    Massachusetts I Lacouture/Ruesterholz Decl. at paras. 293-94.

[^682]: *See* Massachusetts Department Massachusetts I Comments at 390.

[^683]: *See* Sprint Massachusetts I Comments at 23-26; WorldCom
    Massachusetts I Reply at 41-44; Conversent Massachusetts II Comments
    at 1-6; Global NAPS Massachusetts II Comments at 3-9.

[^684]: *See Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the
    Telecommunications Act of 1996: Inter-Carrier Compensation for
    ISP-Bound Traffic*, Declaratory Ruling in CC Docket No. 96-98 and
    Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in CC Docket No. 96-98, 14 FCC Rcd
    3689 at 3706, para. 26 n.87 (1999) (*Reciprocal Compensation
    Declaratory Ruling*), *rev'd and remanded sub nom.* *Bell Atlantic
    Tel. Cos. v. FCC*, 206 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2000).

[^685]: *Bell Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 4142, para. 377.

[^686]: *See Bell Atlantic Tel. Cos. v. FCC*, 206 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir.
    2000); *Comment Sought on Remand of the Commission's Reciprocal
    Compensation Declaratory Ruling by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
    D.C. Circuit*, CC Docket Nos. 96-98, 99-68, Public Notice, 15 FCC
    Rcd 11311 (2000).

[^687]: *Reciprocal Compensation Declaratory Ruling*, 15 FCC Rcd at
    3703, para. 22.

[^688]: Verizon Massachusetts I Application App. G, Vol. 5, Tab 108,
    *Complaint of MCI WorldCom, Inc. Against New England Telephone and
    Telegraph Company d/b/a Bell Atlantic-Massachusetts for Breach of
    Interconnection Terms Entered into Under Sections 251 and 252 of the
    Telecommunications Act of 1996*, DTE 97-116-C at 19-31 (May 19,
    1999).

[^689]: Verizon Massachusetts I Lacouture/Ruesterholz Decl. at para.
    294.

[^690]: Massachusetts Department Massachusetts I Comments at 390.

[^691]: 47 U.S.C. § 271(c)(2)(B)(xiv).

[^692]: *See* Verizon Massachusetts I Application at 41-43; Verizon
    Massachusetts I Lacouture/Ruesterholz Decl. at paras. 295-308.

[^693]: *See* Massachusetts Department Massachusetts I Comments at
    396-97.

[^694]: *See* Verizon Massachusetts I Lacouture/Ruesterholz Decl. at
    paras. 295-96.

[^695]: Verizon Massachusetts I Lacouture/Ruesterholz Decl. at para.
    295; *Consolidated Petitions of New England Telephone and Telegraph
    Company d/b/a NYNEX, Teleport Communications Group, Inc., Brooks
    Fiber Communications, AT&T Communications of New England, Inc., MCI
    Communications Company, and Sprint Communications Company, L.P.,
    Pursuant to Section 252(b) of the Telecommunications Act of 1996,
    for Arbitration of Interconnection Agreements Between NYNEX and the
    Aforementioned Companies,* D.P.U. 96-73/74, 96-75, 96-80/81, 96-83,
    96-94 \-- Phase 2 (Dec. 2, 1996) (*Massachusetts DTE Phase 2
    Order*); Massachusetts Department Massachusetts I Comments at 393.
    We note that the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth
    Circuit issued an order vacating and remanding the Commission's
    pricing rule regarding the determination of avoided retail costs.
    *Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC*, 219 F.3d 744 (8^th^ Cir. 2000).

[^696]: *See* Verizon Massachusetts I Application App. F, Vol. 8, Tab
    157, *Investigation by the Department on Its Own Motion Into the
    Propriety of the Resale Tariff of New England Telephone and
    Telegraph Company d/b/a Bell Atlantic-Massachusetts, Filed with the
    Department on January 16, 1998, to Become Effective February 14,
    1998,* DTE 98-15 (Phases II and III) at 11-17 (Mar. 19, 1999). The
    Massachusetts Department recently initiated an investigation to
    review the avoided cost discount for Verizon's resale services.
    *See* Verizon Massachusetts II Application App. B, Tab 4, Subtab D,
    *Investigation by the Department of Telecommunications and Energy on
    its own Motion into the Appropriate Pricing, Based upon Total
    Element Long-Run Incremental Costs, for Unbundled Network Elements
    and Combination of Unbundled Network Elements, and the Appropriate
    Avoided Cost Discount for Verizon New England, Inc. d/b/a Verizon
    Massachusetts' Resale Services in the Commonwealth of
    Massachusetts*, DTE 01-20 (Jan. 12, 2001).

[^697]: *See* Verizon Massachusetts I Lacouture/Ruesterholz Decl. at
    para. 298. Pursuant to Commission rules, incumbent LECs do not need
    to offer for resale short-term promotions of 90 days or less, as
    long as such short-term promotions are not used to evade the
    wholesale rate obligation. *See* 47 C.F.R. § 51.613(a)(2)(ii).

[^698]: *See* Verizon Massachusetts I Lacouture/Ruesterholz Decl. at
    para. 298.

[^699]: *See id*. at para. 299.

[^700]: *See id*. at para. 296.

[^701]: *See* Massachusetts Department Massachusetts I Comments at
    396-97.

[^702]: *See* Verizon Massachusetts I Application at 41; Verizon
    Massachusetts I Lacouture/Ruesterholz Decl. at para. 295.

[^703]: *See* Verizon Massachusetts I Lacouture/Ruesterholz Decl. at
    paras. 304-08.

[^704]: *See* ASCENT Massachusetts II Comments at 3; AT&T Massachusetts
    II Reply at 21 (citing *Association of Communications Enterprises v.
    FCC*, Case No. 99-1441, slip op. (D.C. Cir. Jan 9, 2001) (hereafter
    *ASCENT*). This decision overturned the Commission's determination
    in the *SBC/Ameritech Order* that, because the separate advanced
    services affiliate was not a successor or assign of the BOC, the
    separate advanced services affiliate could avoid the resale
    obligations of 251(c)(4). Because the Commission incorporated by
    reference the successor or assign analysis of the *SBC/Ameritech
    Order* into the *Bell Atlantic/GTE Order*, the D.C. Circuit's
    decision also impacts the Commission's conclusion in the *Bell
    Atlantic/GTE Order*.

[^705]: The D.C. Circuit issued the mandate in *ASCENT* on March 6,
    2001.

[^706]: Verizon should not be faulted for its efforts to comply with a
    Commission order in effect at the time of the application, even
    though portions of that order were subsequently vacated*. See SWBT
    Kansas/Oklahoma Order* at para. 253. As the D.C. Circuit affirmed,
    "compliance with Commission orders cannot serve as a basis for
    rejecting an application." *AT&T v. FCC*, 220 F.3d at 630.

[^707]: Allegiance Massachusetts I Reply at 7-8.

[^708]: *See In re Establishment of Rules to Prohibit the Imposition of
    Unjust, Onerous Termination Penalties on Customers Choosing to
    Partake of the Benefits of Local Exchange Telecommunications
    Competition*, Petition for Declaratory Ruling, CC Docket No. 99-142
    (Apr. 26, 1999) (requesting that the Commission declare unlawful
    termination penalties imposed by incumbent LECs, prohibit
    enforcement of incumbent LEC termination penalties, and require the
    removal of incumbent LEC termination penalties from state tariffs
    until more competition develops).

[^709]: *See Bell Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 4148, para.
    391; *SWBT Texas Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 18547-48, para. 391; *SWBT
    Kansas/Oklahoma Order* at para. 253.

[^710]: *See* *supra* Part IV(A)(2).

[^711]: 47 U.S.C. § 271(c)(2)(B)(vi). We discuss the statutory
    requirements of checklist items 6-12 in Appendix B to this Order.

[^712]: *Id.* § 271(c)(2)(B)(vii).

[^713]: *Id.* § 271(c)(2)(B)(viii).

[^714]: *Id.* § 271(c)(2)(B)(ix). ALTS and Sprint allege that Verizon
    mismanaged its responsibility when it was the local numbering
    administrator. *See* ALTS Massachusetts I Comments at 52; Sprint
    Massachusetts II Comments at 11. Because Verizon is no longer the
    administrator, however, these parties do not claim that Verizon has
    failed to satisfy checklist item 9. Rather, they raise this issue as
    a public interest concern. Accordingly, we discuss these claims in
    the Public Interest section below. *See* *infra* Part VIII.C.

[^715]: 47 U.S.C. § 271(c)(2)(B)(x).

[^716]: *Id.* § 271(c)(2)(B)(xi).

[^717]: *Id.* § 271(c)(2)(B)(xii).

[^718]: *See* Verizon Massachusetts I Application at 30-31 (checklist
    item 6), 35-37 (checklist item 7), 37-38 (checklist item 8), 38
    (checklist item 9), 38-39 (checklist item 10), and 40 (checklist
    items 11 and 12); Verizon Massachusetts I Lacouture/Ruesterholz
    Decl. at paras. 145-58 (checklist item 6), 203-34 (checklist item
    7), 235-51 (checklist item 8), 252-56 (checklist item 9), 257-82
    (checklist item 10), 283-86 (checklist item 11), and 287-91
    (checklist item 12); Verizon Massachusetts I Reply at 42 (checklist
    item 9).

[^719]: *See* Massachusetts Department Massachusetts I Comments at
    340-48 (checklist item 6), 348-57 (checklist item 7), 357-63
    (checklist item 8), 363-66 (checklist item 9), 366-71 (checklist
    item 10), 371-81 (checklist item 11), and 381-84 (checklist item
    12).

[^720]: *See* 47 U.S.C. § 271(d)(3)(A).

[^721]: *Id*.

[^722]: *Id*.

[^723]: *See Ameritech Michigan Order*, 12 FCC Rcd at 20589, para. 85;
    *see also Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20633-35,
    paras. 46-48.

[^724]: *See* Massachusetts Department Massachusetts I Comments at 18;
    *see also* Department of Justice Massachusetts I Evaluation at 3-5
    (describing level of residential and business telephone exchange
    service competition in Massachusetts).

[^725]: *See* Massachusetts Department Massachusetts I Comments at
    17-18. The Massachusetts Department has approved, pursuant to
    section 252 of the Act, more than 70 interconnection agreements
    between Verizon and various competing carriers. *See* *id*. at 17;
    *see also* Verizon Massachusetts I Taylor Decl. Attach. A at paras.
    16-36.

[^726]: *See* Verizon Massachusetts I Application at 5; *see also*
    Massachusetts Department Massachusetts I Comments at 17-18.

[^727]: *See* Verizon Massachusetts I Taylor Decl. Attach. A at paras.
    16-36. The six competitive LECs are: Allegiance, Network Plus Corp.,
    ChoiceOne Communications, Global Crossing, PaeTec Communications and
    NEXTLINK. See also the updated totals in Verizon Massachusetts II
    Application Attach. B.

[^728]: *Application by SBC Communications Inc., Pursuant to Section 271
    of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, To Provide In-Region,
    InterLATA Services in Oklahoma*, 12 FCC Rcd 8685, 8695, para. 14
    (construing section 271(c)(1)(A) as requiring that "there must be an
    actual commercial alternative to the BOC in order to satisfy" Track
    A). The D.C. Circuit affirmed this reading of Track A. *See SBC
    Communications v. FCC*, 138 F.3d 410, 416-17 (D.C. Cir. 1998).

[^729]: *See* WorldCom Massachusetts I Comments at 70-72; AT&T
    Massachusetts I Reply at 8.

[^730]: AT&T and WorldCom do assert, however, that approving this
    application at the current level of residential competition in
    Massachusetts would be contrary to the public interest. *See infra*
    Part VIII.A.

[^731]: 47 U.S.C. § 271(d)(3)(B).

[^732]: *See Implementation of the Accounting Safeguards Under the
    Telecommunications Act of 1996*, CC Docket No. 96-150, Report and
    Order, 11 FCC Rcd 17539 (1996) (*Accounting Safeguards Order*),
    Second Order On Reconsideration, FCC 00-9 (rel. Jan. 18, 2000);
    *Implementation of the Non-Accounting Safeguards of Sections 271 and
    272 of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended*, CC Docket No.
    96-149, First Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed
    Rulemaking, 11 FCC Rcd 21905 (1996) (*Non-Accounting Safeguards
    Order*); First Order on Reconsideration, 12 FCC Rcd 2297 (1997),
    Second Order on Reconsideration, 12 FCC Rcd 8653 (1997), *aff'd sub
    nom. Bell Atlantic Tel. Cos. v. FCC*, 131 F.3d 1044 (D.C. Cir.
    1997), Third Order on Reconsideration, FCC 99-242 (rel. Oct. 4,
    1999).

[^733]: *See Non-Accounting Safeguards Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at 21914;
    *Accounting Safeguards Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at 17550; *Ameritech
    Michigan Order*, 12 FCC Rcd at 20725.

[^734]: *See Non-Accounting Safeguards Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at 21914,
    paras. 15-16; *Ameritech Michigan Order*, 12 FCC Rcd at 20725, para.
    346.

[^735]: *Ameritech Michigan Order*, 12 FCC Rcd at 20725; *see SWBT Texas
    Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 18549, para. 395.

[^736]: *See* Verizon Massachusetts I Application at 55-56; *Bell
    Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 4153, para. 403.

[^737]: *See* Verizon Massachusetts I Application at 55-59; Verizon
    Massachusetts I Application App. A, Vol. 4, Declaration of Susan C.
    Browning at para. 9 (Verizon Massachusetts I Browning Decl.)
    (Massachusetts "structural and transactional safeguards are the same
    as those that the Commission approved in granting Verizon section
    271 authority for New York."); *see also* *Bell Atlantic New York
    Order***,** 15 FCC Rcd at 4154-58, paras. 406-14. In addition,
    Verizon proffers unchallenged evidence that the same section 272
    internal controls the Commission reviewed for New York are in place
    in Massachusetts. *See* Verizon Massachusetts I Application at
    55-58; Verizon Massachusetts I Browning Decl. at paras. 7, 10(b),
    10(c), 11, 12(a), 12(b), 12(c), 13, 14, 22-26, 29 & Attachs. B, D,
    F, G, H, K, J, M, P, Z.

[^738]: Verizon Massachusetts I Application at paras. 55-58; Verizon
    Massachusetts I Browning Decl. at paras. 7, 10(b), 10(c), 11, 12(a),
    12(b), 12(c), 13, 14, 22-26, 29 & Attach. B, D, F, G, H, K, J, M, P,
    Z; *see also Bell Atlantic New York Order***,** 15 FCC Rcd at
    4154-58, paras. 406-14.

[^739]: *See* Verizon Massachusetts I Application at 57-58; Verizon
    Massachusetts I Browning Decl. at paras. 18-21 & Attachs. O, P.
    Verizon demonstrates that it will provide accurate data regarding
    actual service intervals so that unaffiliated parties can evaluate
    the performance Verizon provides itself and its affiliates and
    compare such performance to the service quality Verizon provides to
    competing carriers. *See also* Verizon Massachusetts I
    Lacouture/Ruesterholz Decl. at para. 23.

[^740]: 47 U.S.C. § 272(e)(1); *Non-Accounting Safeguards Order*, 11 FCC
    Rcd at 22018-22, paras. 239-45; *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*,
    13 FCC Rcd at 20800-01, paras. 348-50; *see* Verizon Massachusetts I
    Application at 57-58; Verizon Massachusetts I Browning Decl. at
    para. 18.

[^741]: 47 U.S.C. § 272(e)(2).

[^742]: *See id.* § 272(e)(3), (e)(4); *Second BellSouth Louisiana
    Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20802-03, paras. 353-55; *see* Verizon
    Massachusetts I Application at 57-58; Verizon Massachusetts I
    Browning Decl. at para. 18.

[^743]: *See, e.g.*, CompTel Massachusetts I Comments at 9-15; AT&T
    Massachusetts II Reply at 28-33.

[^744]: *See Bell Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 4126-27, para.
    340; *SWBT Texas Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 18520, para. 335; *see also*
    *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20800-01.

[^745]: *See Non-Accounting Safeguards Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at 22018-22,
    paras. 239-45.

[^746]: *See* Verizon Massachusetts I Browning Decl. at para. 18 &
    Attach. Q (providing performance metrics reporting format and
    business rules).

[^747]: *See, e.g.*, *Deployment of Wireline Services Offering Advanced
    Telecommunications Capability*, CC Docket No. 98-147, Order on
    Remand, 15 FCC Rcd 385, 406, para. 45 (1999) (stating that special
    access services are included within the broader category of exchange
    access services).

[^748]: *See Applications of GTE Corporation, Transferor, and Bell
    Atlantic Corporation, Transferee, For Consent to Transfer Control of
    Domestic and International Sections 214 and 310 Authorizations and
    Application to Transfer Control of a Submarine Cable Landing
    License*, CC Docket No. 98-184, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 15 FCC
    Rcd 14032, App. D, at para. 53 (2000).

[^749]: *See* 47 U.S.C. § 271(d)(3)(C).

[^750]: *See Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20805-06,
    para. 360 (the public interest analysis may include consideration of
    "whether approval . . . will foster competition in all relevant
    telecommunications markets").

[^751]: *See SWBT Texas Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 18558-59, para. 419.

[^752]: *See, e.g.*, Sprint Massachusetts I Comments at 68; AT&T
    Massachusetts II Comments at 24-29.

[^753]: *See, e.g.*, WorldCom Massachusetts I Comments at 65-73; AT&T
    Massachusetts II Comments at 24. The commenters generally attribute
    the lack of competition to Verizon's UNE pricing. As noted above,
    however, Verizon has made a sufficient showing on this issue. *See
    supra* Part VI.A.1.

[^754]: *See* *Ameritech Michigan Order*, 12 FCC Rcd at 20585, para. 77.

[^755]: *See, e.g.*, *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at
    20806, paras. 363-64; *see Ameritech Michigan Order*, 12 FCC Rcd at
    20747, para. 390.

[^756]: These mechanisms are generally administered by state commissions
    and derive from authority the states have under state law or under
    the federal Act. As such, these mechanisms can serve as critical
    complements to the Commission's authority to preserve checklist
    compliance pursuant to section 271(d)(6). Moreover, in this
    instance, we find that the collaborative process by which these
    mechanisms were developed in New York and adapted in Massachusetts
    has itself helped to bring Verizon into checklist compliance.

[^757]: *See SWBT Kansas/Oklahoma Order* at para. 269.

[^758]: *See, e.g.*, *id*. at paras. 270-80.

[^759]: *See* Verizon Massachusetts I Guerard/Canny Decl. at para. 16;
    Massachusetts Department of Telecommunications and Energy,
    *Evaluation of Bell Atlantic-Massachusetts Operation Support
    Systems: Final Attachment A to 11/19/99 Letter Order on Final Master
    Test Plan*, Verizon Massachusetts I Application App. B, Vol. 24, Tab
    282 (adopting in Massachusetts the carrier-to-carrier guidelines
    established by the New York Commission); Verizon Massachusetts II
    Application App. B, Vol. 1, Subtabs A & B (current
    carrier-to-carrier guidelines).

[^760]: *See* Verizon Massachusetts I Guerard/Canny Decl. at paras.
    13-16. Verizon must notify the Massachusetts Department of changes
    to the New York PAP. Verizon must file the notification within 10
    days of the New York Commission's order. The Massachusetts
    Department will then decide whether the changes should be made to
    the Massachusetts PAP. *See* Massachusetts Department of
    Telecommunications and Energy, *Order on Motions for Clarification
    and Reconsideration of Performance Assurance Plan*, D.T.E. 99-271,
    Verizon Massachusetts II Application App. B, Vol. 3, Tab 4, Subtab B
    at 14 (*Massachusetts DTE November 21^st^ Order*).

[^761]: Wherever possible, the carrier-to-carrier guidelines establish
    "parity" standards (a performance level which is the same for
    competitors as it is for Verizon's retail operations). *See* Verizon
    Massachusetts I Guerard/Canny Decl. at para. 20. For wholesale
    functions that do not have retail analogues, the carrier-to-carrier
    guidelines establish absolute standards, usually a fixed percentage
    or a fixed period of time. *See id.*

[^762]: *See* Letter from Dee May, Executive Director -- Federal
    Regulatory, Verizon, to Magalie Roman Salas, Secretary, FCC (Feb. 3,
    2001) (*Verizon January 30^th^ PAP*). This PAP was adopted by the
    Massachusetts Department on February 23, 2001. *See* Massachusetts
    Department Massachusetts II Reply App. C.

[^763]: The procedures and requirements of the PAP are described
    generally in Verizon's application, submissions made to the
    Massachusetts Department, and the Massachusetts Department's orders.
    *See, e.g.*, *Verizon January 30^th^ PAP*.

[^764]: *See Massachusetts DTE November 21^st^ Order*; *Verizon January
    30^th^ PAP*.

[^765]: *See Ameritech Michigan* *Order*, 12 FCC Rcd at 20741-51, para.
    393.

[^766]: *See Bell Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 4166-67, para.
    433. This prediction was based on five characteristics*:* potential
    liability that provides a meaningful and significant incentive to
    comply with the designated performance standards;
    clearly-articulated, pre-determined measures and standards, which
    encompass a comprehensive range of carrier-to-carrier performance; a
    reasonable structure that is designed to detect and sanction poor
    performance when it occurs; a self-executing mechanism that does not
    leave the door open unreasonably to litigation and appeal; and
    reasonable assurances that the reported data are accurate. *See id*.
    at 433.

[^767]: *See* Verizon Massachusetts II Application App. B, Vol. 1, Tab
    1, Subtabs A and B (current carrier-to-carrier guidelines).

[^768]: *See* *Verizon January 30^th^ PAP* at 4. We reach this number by
    adding the following components*:* \$39.68 million (Mode of Entry
    (MOE)); \$39.68 million (MOE "doubling" provisions); \$42.85 million
    (Critical Measures); \$27.51 million (Special Provisions); and
    \$5.28 million (Change Control Assurance Plan). *See id*. In the
    *Bell Atlantic New York*, *SWBT Texas*, and *SWBT Kansas/Oklahoma
    Orders* the Commission reviewed plans that subjected 36 percent of
    the applicant's Net Return to liability for sub-par service quality.
    *See Bell Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 4168, para. 436
    n.1332; *SWBT Texas Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 18561, para. 424 n.1235;
    *SWBT Kansas/Oklahoma Order* at para. 274 n.837. The \$155 million
    at risk here represents 39 percent of Verizon's Net Return. *See*
    Massachusetts Department Massachusetts II Reply App. C.

[^769]: *See* Verizon Massachusetts I Application at 74. *See also*
    *Bell Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 4165, para. 430
    (stating that the BOC "risks liability through antitrust and other
    private causes of action if it performs in an unlawfully
    discriminatory manner") (footnote omitted); *SWBT Texas Order*, 15
    FCC Rcd at 18560, para. 421 (same).

[^770]: *See, e.g.*, ALTS Massachusetts I Comments at iii, 58; WorldCom
    Massachusetts I Kinard Decl. at paras. 32-33; WorldCom Massachusetts
    I Reply at 33.

[^771]: *See, e.g.*, *SWBT Texas Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 18562, para. 424;
    *Bell Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 4168, para. 435.

[^772]: *See* *Massachusetts DTE November 21^st^ Order* at 12-13;
    Massachusetts Department Massachusetts II Reply at Attach. C; *see
    also* Verizon Massachusetts I Reply at 56; Verizon Massachusetts I
    Guerard/Canny Joint Reply Decl. at para. 35.

[^773]: *See* Massachusetts Department of Telecommunications and Energy,
    *Order Adopting Performance Assurance Plan*, D.T.E. 99-271, Verizon
    Massachusetts I Application App. B, Vol. 47, Tab 559 at 29-30
    (*Massachusetts DTE September 5^th^ Order*); *Massachusetts DTE
    November 21^st^ Order* at 12-13 ("the contract liability \[for
    Verizon\] in Massachusetts is significantly greater than
    \[Verizon's\] contract liability in New York").

[^774]: *See, e.g.*, *Massachusetts DTE November 21^st^ Order* at 6
    (ordering Verizon to increase the amount of total bill credits
    available under the PAP to account for the addition of DSL and Line
    Sharing metrics).

[^775]: *See* Verizon Massachusetts II Application App. B, Vol. 1, Tab
    1, Subtabs A & B (current carrier-to-carrier guidelines).

[^776]: *SWBT Kansas/Oklahoma Order* at para. 275.

[^777]: *See, e.g.*, ALTS Massachusetts I Comments at iv, 6, 49-51;
    Covad Massachusetts I Comments at 47-48; Massachusetts I Department
    of Justice Evaluation at 16 n.58.

[^778]: *See* *Verizon January 30^th^ PAP* at 12-14. MOE categories
    comprise an element of the PAP designed to gauge Verizon's
    performance in broad areas of competitive LEC entry, *e.g.*, UNE,
    and resale. *See* Verizon Massachusetts I Guerard/Canny Decl. at
    58-59. MOE categories contain a variety of metrics related to that
    mode of entry and associated bill credits that are paid to all
    competitive LECs using that mode. The Critical Measurements, on the
    other hand, consist of 12 groups of metrics that represent key
    aspects of service, *e.g.,* performance of OSS interfaces and hot
    cut completions. *See* *Verizon January 30^th^ PAP* App. B. If
    Verizon misses the relevant performance standard for any of the 12
    groups, it must provide bill credits the competitive LECs who
    received sub-standard performance. *See id.* at 12-13.

[^779]: *See Verizon January 30^th^ PAP* at App. H, 4-7.

[^780]: *See, e.g.*, ALTS Massachusetts I Comments at 57 (criticizing
    plan for not including resale flow-through metrics); WorldCom
    Massachusetts I Comments at 54 (stating that trunking metrics are
    flawed in definition and weight); WorldCom Massachusetts I Kinard
    Decl. at 17 (stating that answering time metrics are not useful);
    WorldCom Massachusetts I Comments at 54 (stating that Average
    Interval Offered and Completed metrics should be further
    disaggregated); WorldCom Massachusetts I Comments at 54 (Trouble
    Duration should be further disaggregated).

[^781]: *See generally Verizon January 30^th^ PAP*.

[^782]: *See Bell Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 4171, para.
    441; *SWBT Texas Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 18563-64, para. 427; *SWBT
    Kansas/Oklahoma Order* at para. 277.

[^783]: *See, e.g.*, ALTS Massachusetts I Comments at 57 (waiver
    standard for competitive LEC behavior is too broad); WorldCom
    Massachusetts I Comments at 56 (no deadline for Massachusetts
    Department to act on waiver petition and PAP not explicit that
    Verizon will provide bill credits during pendency of waiver).

[^784]: *Verizon January 30^th^ PAP* at 22.

[^785]: *See* *Verizon January 30^th^ PAP* at 25. The first audit will
    begin six months after Verizon enters the long-distance market in
    Massachusetts. *See id*.

[^786]: *See id*.

[^787]: *Verizon January 30^th^ PAP* at 24.

[^788]: *See* *Accounting for Judgments and Other Costs Associated with
    Litigation*, CC Docket No. 93-240, Report and Order, 12 FCC Rcd 5112
    (1997); 47 C.F.R. § 32.7370(d). As a general matter, a carrier's
    operating expenses recovered through its rates must be legitimate
    costs of providing adequate service to ratepayers. *See, e.g.*,
    *West Ohio Gas Co. v. PUC*, 294 U.S. 63, 74 (1935); *Mountain States
    Tel. and Tel. Co. v. FCC*, 939 F.2d 1035, 1044 (D.C. Cir. 1991).

[^789]: *See SWBT Kansas/Oklahoma Order* at para. 280. Although the PAP
    does not explicitly prohibit Verizon from including
    performance-related damages in its state price cap calculation, the
    Massachusetts Department states that it will monitor Verizon's
    accounting of such damages. *See Massachusetts DTE September 5^th^
    Order* at 34.

[^790]: *See* ALTS Massachusetts I Comments at 52; Sprint Massachusetts
    II Comments at 11 (stating that Verizon inadequately forecasted the
    need for area codes and did not optimize the use of numbering
    resources). Verizon is no longer the numbering administrator. *See*
    *In the Matter of Request of Lockheed Martin Corporation and
    Warburg, Pincus & Co. for Review of the Transfer of the Lockheed
    Martin Communications Industry Services Business*, CC Docket No.
    92-237, Order, 14 FCC Rcd 19792 (1999).

[^791]: We emphasize that grant of this application *does not* reflect
    any conclusion that Verizon's conduct in the individual instances
    cited by commenters is nondiscriminatory and complies with the
    company's obligations under the Communications Act.

[^792]: 47 U.S.C. § 271(d)(6).

[^793]: *Bell Atlantic New York Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 4174-77, paras.
    446-53; *SWBT Texas Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 18567-68, paras. 434-36;
    *SWBT Kansas/Oklahoma Order* at paras. 283-85.

[^794]: 47 U.S.C. § 271(d)(6)(A).

[^795]: *See* ASCENT Massachusetts I Comments at 3-6; AT&T Massachusetts
    I Comments at 2-4; CompTel Massachusetts I Comments at 8-9;
    Massachusetts Attorney General's Massachusetts I Comments at 3-8;
    RNK Massachusetts I Comments at 2-3; WorldCom Massachusetts I
    Comments at 9-25, 28-33; AT&T Massachusetts I Reply at 8-23;
    Massachusetts Attorney General's Massachusetts I Reply at 7;
    WorldCom Massachusetts I Reply at 5-10. WorldCom and AT&T questioned
    specific inputs used in the cost studies to set UNE rates in
    Massachusetts, including whether Verizon misrepresented the discount
    it receives from vendors for new switches, and whether an inflated
    cost of capital was used. *See* WorldCom Massachusetts I Comments at
    12-25; WorldCom Massachusetts II Comments at 15-18; WorldCom
    Massachusetts II Frentrup Decl. at paras. 2-28; AT&T Massachusetts I
    Reply at 12-24; AT&T Massachusetts II Comments at 6-11.

[^796]: In its evaluation of Verizon's Massachusetts I Application, the
    Department of Justice expressed concern over UNE prices, saying that
    "there are reasons to suspect that in some cases \[certain UNE\]
    prices have not been based on the relevant costs of the network
    elements." Department of Justice Massachusetts I Evaluation at 19.

[^797]: Based on WorldCom's usage assumptions, Verizon's original rate
    in Massachusetts for the per-line, per-month cost for switching
    (excluding the line port cost), transport, and signaling, was
    \$21.68. By comparison, Verizon\'s state-approved rates in New York
    and Pennsylvania and state-approved rates in Texas, Kansas,
    Oklahoma, and Michigan are \$10.60 in New York, \$5.02 in
    Pennsylvania, \$4.17 in Texas, \$4.23 in Kansas, \$5.47 in Oklahoma,
    and \$1.97 in Michigan. Verizon's original Massachusetts rates thus
    exceeded the rates for these elements by 105 percent in New York,
    332 percent in Pennsylvania, 420 percent in Texas, 413 percent in
    Kansas, 296 percent in Oklahoma, and 1,001 percent in Michigan.
    *See* Letter from Keith L. Seat, Senior Counsel, Federal Law and
    Public Policy, WorldCom, to Magalie Roman Salas, Secretary, Federal
    Communications Commission, CC Docket No. 01-9 at 13 (Jan. 31, 2001)
    (WorldCom Jan. 31 UNE Pricing Ex Parte Letter); *see also* WorldCom
    Massachusetts I Comments at 27-28, App. A, Joint Declaration of
    Patricia Proferes, John Nolan, Paul Bobeczko, and Thomas Graham at
    paras. 27-29 and Attach. 2.

[^798]: *See* WorldCom Massachusetts I Comments at 12-25; AT&T
    Massachusetts I Reply at 12-23; AT&T Massachusetts II Comments at
    9-11; AT&T Massachusetts II Reply at 4-5; WorldCom Massachusetts II
    Frentrup Decl. at 3-15.

[^799]: *See* 47 U.S.C. § 271(d)(6).

[^800]: *See, e.g.*, *Bell Atlantic-New York, Authorization Under
    Section 271 of the Communications Act to Provide In-Region,
    InterLATA Service in the State of New York, File No. EB-00-IH-0085*,
    Order, 15 FCC Rcd 5413 (2000) (adopting consent decree between
    Commission and Bell Atlantic that included provisions for Bell
    Atlantic to make a voluntary payment of \$3,000,000 to the United
    States Treasury, additional payments if Bell Atlantic failed to meet
    specified performance standards, and weekly reporting requirements
    to gauge Bell Atlantic's performance in correcting the problems
    associated with its electronic ordering systems).

[^801]: 47 U.S.C. § 271(c)(2)(B)(vi); *see also SWBT Texas order*, 15
    FCC Rcd at 18520, para. 336; *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13
    FCC Rcd at 20722.

[^802]: *See SWBT Texas* Order, 15 FCC Rcd at 18520-22, paras. 336-38;
    *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20772, para. 207.

[^803]: *UNE Remand Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 3822-32, paras. 276-99
    (limiting an incumbent LEC's general duty to unbundle circuit
    switching when a requesting telecommunications carrier serves end
    users in the top 50 MSAs, in Density Zone, with four or more voice
    grade lines, provided that such LEC provides access to EELs)

[^804]: *UNE Remand Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 3838-3919.

[^805]: 47 U.S.C. § 271(c)(2)(B)(vii).

[^806]: *Ameritech Michigan Order*, 12 FCC Rcd at 20679, para. 256.

[^807]: *Id.*

[^808]: *Id.*

[^809]: 47 U.S.C. §§ 271(c)(2)(B)(vii)(II), (III).

[^810]: 47 U.S.C. § 251(b)(3). The Commission implemented section
    251(b)(3) in the *Local Competition Second Report and Order*. 47
    C.F.R. § 51.217; *In re Implementation of the Local Competition
    Provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996*, Second Report and
    Order and Memorandum Opinion and Order, 11 FCC Rcd 19392 (1996)
    (*Local Competition Second Report and Order*) *vacated in part,
    People of the State of California v. FCC*, 124 F.3d 934 (8th Cir.
    1997), *overruled in part, AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd.*, 119 S.
    Ct. 721 (1999); *see also Implementation of the Telecommunications
    Act of 1996: Provision of Directory Listings Information under the
    Telecommunications Act of 1934*, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 14
    FCC Rcd 15550 (1999) (*Directory Listings Information NPRM*).

[^811]: While both sections 251(b)(3) and 271(c)(2)(B)(vii)(II) refer to
    nondiscriminatory access to "directory assistance," section
    251(b)(3) refers to nondiscriminatory access to "operator services,"
    while section 271(c)(2)(B)(vii)(III) refers to nondiscriminatory
    access to "operator call completion services." 47 U.S.C. §§
    251(b)(3), 271(c)(2)(B)(vii)(III). The term "operator call
    completion services" is not defined in the Act, nor has the
    Commission previously defined the term. However, for section
    251(b)(3) purposes, the term "operator services" was defined as
    meaning "any automatic or live assistance to a consumer to arrange
    for billing or completion, or both, of a telephone call." *Local
    Competition Second Report and Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at 19448, para.
    110. In the same order the Commission concluded that busy line
    verification, emergency interrupt, and operator-assisted directory
    assistance are forms of "operator services," because they assist
    customers in arranging for the billing or completion (or both) of a
    telephone call. *Id.* at 19449, para. 111. All of these services may
    be needed or used to place a call. For example, if a customer tries
    to direct dial a telephone number and constantly receives a busy
    signal, the customer may contact the operator to attempt to complete
    the call. Since billing is a necessary part of call completion, and
    busy line verification, emergency interrupt, and operator-assisted
    directory assistance can all be used when an operator completes a
    call, the Commission concluded in the *Second BellSouth Louisiana
    Order* that for checklist compliance purposes, "operator call
    completion services" is a subset of or equivalent to "operator
    service." *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20740,
    n.763. As a result, we use the nondiscriminatory standards
    established for operator services to determine whether
    nondiscriminatory access is provided.

[^812]: 47 C.F.R. § 51.217(c)(3); *Local Competition Second Report and
    Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at 19456-58, paras. 130-35. The *Local
    Competition Second Report and Order's* interpretation of section
    251(b)(3) is limited "to access to each LEC's directory assistance
    service." *Id.* at 19456, para. 135. However, section
    271(c)(2)(B)(vii) is not limited to the LEC's systems but requires
    "nondiscriminatory access to . . . directory assistance to allow the
    other carrier's customers to obtain telephone numbers." 47 U.S.C. §
    271(c)(2)(B)(vii). Combined with the Commission's conclusion that
    "incumbent LECs must unbundle the facilities and functionalities
    providing operator services and directory assistance from resold
    services and other unbundled network elements to the extent
    technically feasible," *Local Competition First Report and Order*,
    11 FCC Rcd at 15772-73, paras. 535-37, section 271(c)(2)(B)(vii)'s
    requirement should be understood to require the BOCs to provide
    nondiscriminatory access to the directory assistance service
    provider selected by the customer's local service provider,
    regardless of whether the competitor; provides such services itself;
    selects the BOC to provide such services; or chooses a third party
    to provide such services. *See Directory Listings Information NPRM*.

[^813]: *Local Competition Second Report and Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at
    19464, para. 151.

[^814]: *Id*. at para. 112.

[^815]: 47 C.F.R. § 51.217(d); *Local Competition Second Report and
    Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at 19463, para. 148. For example, when customers
    call the operator or calls for directory assistance, they typically
    hear a message, such as "thank you for using XYZ Telephone Company."
    Competing carriers may use the BOC's brand, request the BOC to brand
    the call with the competitive carriers name or request that the BOC
    not brand the call at all. 47 C.F.R. § 51.217(d).

[^816]: 47 C.F.R. § 51.217(C)(3)(ii); *Local Competition Second Report
    and Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at 19460-61, paras. 141-44.

[^817]: *UNE Remand Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 3891-92, paras. 441-42.

[^818]: *Local Competition Third Report and Order* at para. 470. *See
    generally* 47 U.S.C. §§ 251-52; *see also* 47 U.S.C. §
    252(d)(1)(A)(i) (requiring UNE rates to be "based on the cost
    (determined without reference to a rate-of-return or other
    rate-based proceeding) of providing the ... network element").

[^819]: *Local Competition Third Report and Order* at paras. 470-73;
    *see also* 47 U.S.C. §§ 201(b), 202(a).

[^820]: 47 U.S.C. § 271(c)(2)(B)(viii).

[^821]: 47 U.S.C. § 251(b)(3). In the *Second BellSouth Louisiana
    Order*, the Commission concluded that, "consistent with the
    Commission's interpretation of 'directory listing' as used in
    section 251(b)(3), the term 'white pages' in section
    271(c)(2)(B)(viii) refers to the local alphabetical directory that
    includes the residential and business listings of the customers of
    the local exchange providers." *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*,
    13 FCC Rcd at 20748, para. 255. The Commission further concluded,
    "the term 'directory listing,' as used in this section, includes, at
    a minimum the subscriber's name, address, telephone number, or any
    combination thereof." *Id.*

[^822]: *Id.*

[^823]: 47 U.S.C. § 271(c)(2)(B)(ix).

[^824]: *Id.*

[^825]: *See Second Bell South Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20752;
    *see also* *Numbering Resource Optimization*, Report and Order and
    Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 15 FCC Rcd 7574 (2000);
    *Numbering Resource Optimization*, Second Report and Order, Order on
    Reconsideration in CC Docket No. 99-200 and Second Further Notice of
    Proposed Rulemaking in CC Docket No. 99-200, CC Docket Nos. 96-98;
    99-200 (rel. Dec. 29, 2000).

[^826]: 47 U.S.C. § 271(c)(2)(B)(x).

[^827]: *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20753, para.
    267.

[^828]: *Id.* at 20755-56, para. 272.

[^829]: *Local Competition First Report and Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at 15741,
    n.1126; *UNE Remand Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 3875, para. 403.

[^830]: *Local Competition First Report and Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at
    15741-42, para. 484.

[^831]: *UNE Remand Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 3875, para. 403.

[^832]: 47 U.S.C. § 271(c)(2)(B)(xii).

[^833]: *Id.* § 251(b)(2).

[^834]: *Id.* § 153(30).

[^835]: *Id.* § 251(e)(2); *see also Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*,
    13 FCC Rcd at 20757, para. 274; *In the Matter of Telephone Number
    Portability*, Third Report and Order, 13 FCC Rcd 11701, 11702-04
    (1998) (*Third Number Portability Order*); *In the Matter of
    Telephone Number Portability*, Fourth Memorandum Opinion and Order
    on Reconsideration, CC Docket No. 95-116, at paras. 1, 6-9 (Jun. 23,
    1999) (*Fourth Number Portability Order*).

[^836]: *Fourth Number Portability Order* at para. 10; *In re Telephone
    Number Portability*, First Report and Order and Further Notice of
    Proposed Rulemaking, 11 FCC Rcd 8352, 8409-12, paras. 110-116 (1996)
    (*First Number Portability Order*); *see also* 47 U.S.C. §
    251(b)(2).

[^837]: *See* 47 C.F.R. §§ 52.3(b)-(f); *Second BellSouth Louisiana
    Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20758, para. 275; *First Number Portability
    Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at 8355 and 8399-8404, paras. 3 and 91; *Third
    Number Portability Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 11708-12, paras. 12-16.

[^838]: *See* 47 C.F.R. § 52.29; *Second BellSouth Louisiana Order*, 13
    FCC Rcd at 20758, para. 275; *First Number Portability Order*, 11
    FCC Rcd at 8417-24, paras. 127-140.

[^839]: *See* 47 C.F.R. §§ 52.32, 52.33; *Second BellSouth Louisiana
    Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 20758, para. 275; *Third Number Portability
    Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 11706-07, para. 8; *Fourth Number Portability
    Order* at para. 9.

[^840]: Based on the Commission's view that section 251(b)(3) does not
    limit the duty to provide dialing parity to any particular form of
    dialing parity (*i.e*., international, interstate, intrastate, or
    local), the Commission adopted rules in August 1996 to implement
    broad guidelines and minimum nationwide standards for dialing
    parity. *Local Competition Second Report and Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at
    19407; *Interconnection Between Local Exchange Carriers and
    Commercial Mobile Radio Service Providers*, CC Docket No. 95-185,
    Further Order On Reconsideration, FCC 99-170 (rel. July 19, 1999).

[^841]: 47 U.S.C. § 251(b)(3).

[^842]: *Id.* at § 153(15).

[^843]: 47 C.F.R §§ 51.205, 51.207.

[^844]: *See* 47 C.F.R. § 51.207 (requiring same number of digits to be
    dialed); *Local Competition Second Report and Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at
    19400, 19403.

[^845]: *See, e.g., Ameritech Michigan Order*, 12 FCC Rcd 20543,
    20694-701; *SWBT Kansas/Oklahoma Order* at paras. 47-102.

[^846]: Unfortunately the Kansas and Oklahoma Order suffered from both
    of these deficiencies.

[^847]: *See* Concurring Statement of Commissioner Harold W.
    Furchtgott-Roth, *In the Matter of Application by Verizon Under
    Section 271 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 To Provide
    In-Region, InterLATA Services in New York*, 15 FCC Rcd 3953 (1999)
    Concurring Statement of Commissioner Harold W. Furchtgott-Roth, *In
    the Matter of Application by SBC Communications Inc., Southwestern
    Bell Telephone Company, and Southwestern Bell Communications
    Services, Inc. d/b/a Southwestern Bell Long Distance Pursuant to
    Section 271 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 To Provide
    In-Region, InterLATA Services in Texas*, 15 FCC Rcd 18354 (2000);
    see also Concurring Statement of Commissioner Harold W.
    Furchtgott-Roth, *In the Matter of Application by SBC Communications
    Inc., Southwestern Bell Telephone Company, and Southwestern Bell
    Communications Services, Inc. d/b/a Southwestern Bell Long Distance
    Pursuant to Section 271 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 To
    Provide In-Region, InterLATA Services in Kansas and Oklahoma,* CC
    Docket 00-217 (Jan. 22, 2001)*.*

[^848]: *Order* at ¶ 251.

[^849]: *Id.* at n.798.

[^850]: *Application by Bell Atlantic New York for Authorization Under
    Section 271 of the Communications Act to Provide In-region,
    InterLATA Service in the State of New York,* Memorandum Opinion and
    Order, 15 FCC Rcd 3953, 4081-4082 (1999).