The Chinese People's Liberation Army In 2020

**Dr. David M. Finkelstein**

26 May 2004

**The views expressed in this and other papers associated with the NIC
2020 project**

**are those of individual participants. They are posted for discussion
purposes**

**only and do not represent the views of the US Government.**

The Chinese People's Liberation Army In 2020

**Dr. David M. Finkelstein**

Presented to the Conference on\
"The Changing Nature of Warfare --- Global Trends 2020"

26 May 2004

**I. Introduction --- Some Historical Context**

The Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) is currently engaged in a
period of deliberate and focused reform that began in the early 1990s.
The objective, to grossly over simplify, is to become a more
professional force and a more operationally capable force.

This in itself is not news. Since the founding of the People's Republic
of China in 1949 the PLA has undergone various intense periods during
which it strove to achieve higher levels of modernization, enhanced
operational capabilities, and increased levels of professional
competence.

What *is* new in this latest attempt is the larger domestic and
international context against which military modernization is taking
place---and it augurs well for the aspirations of the PLA.

The first three decades of the existence of the PRC were simply not
conducive to a program of focused and sustained military modernization
due to self-inflicted circumstances at home and developments abroad. The
prospects for a sustained program of military modernization during this
period were derailed by:

-   The debilitating impact of the Korean War on the PLA

-   Mao Zedong's purge of key military modernizers such as Peng Dehuai

-   An economy devastated by the "Great Leap Forward" and other
    ill-founded economic policies

-   Over-dependence on Soviet military assistance which ceased abruptly

-   The specter of total and nuclear war with those same former allies

-   The ideological madness of the Cultural Revolution that worshipped
    those who were "Red" and reviled those who were "Expert"

-   China's choice for autarky, cutting itself off from the developed
    world, and

-   Leadership instability in the wake of Mao's death (1976)

Today, by contrast, the PLA enjoys a very different domestic and
international context:

-   Secure land borders and no prospect of invasion

-   A prolonged period of unprecedented peace that began in the
    mid-1980s

-   An especially unprecedented period of economic prosperity that
    continues

-   Relative leadership stability and unity of purpose

-   The reconciliation of pragmatism and ideology

-   Integration into the larger world on multiple levels, and

-   The respectability of technical expertise and professional
    competence

The PLA, with the blessings of the central leadership, has been taking
maximum advantage of this remarkable period in modern Chinese history to
retool and transform itself. Two decades from now, If the PLA is
successful in much of what it seeks to achieve (by no means a
certainty), then historians will likely look back and see the roots of
that success in the programs begun in the late 1980s and especially the
decade of the 1990s.

This paper begins with a brief section that *speculates* about the
general characteristics of the PLA in 2020 (see section II below). The
majority of this paper provides an overview of some of the key programs,
policies, and reforms currently underway in the PLA that could result in
the notional PLA of 2020 actually coming into being.

**II. Bottom Lines Up Front --- Whither "PLA 2020"?**

The exact size, the precise organization, and---most importantly---the
real (as opposed to aspirational) operational capabilities of the
Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) in the year 2020 are impossible
at this point to detail with precision. But there are six general
characteristics about this constantly evolving defense establishment in
the year 2020 that I am willing venture some guesses on.

-   First, by 2020, the PLA (which is term that includes all of the
    services) will certainly be a more professional force in the
    corporate and institutional sense and a more operationally capable
    and *sustainable* military force in the war fighting sense than it
    is today.

-   Second, the PLA of 2020 will still likely be a force tooled for
    sustainable *regional* force projection (sustainability currently
    open to question); not *global* force projection.

-   Third, the PLA of 2020 will still probably be a large organization
    in terms of numbers---larger than it needs to be or would prefer to
    be---with most units of uneven quality (in terms of equipment and
    trained personnel) but with a relatively small core of highly
    trained and well equipped units that will make the PLA one of the
    premier regional military forces in Asia.[^1]

-   Fourth, although the PLA is today only at currently at the incipient
    stages of its road toward joint-ness, by 2020 the "color" of the PLA
    will likely be much more "purple" than it is today. This implies
    more capabilities in the maritime and aerospace battle space
    dimensions and new command and control relationships.

-   Fifth, by 2020 the PLA will almost certainly have enhanced
    space-based C4ISR capabilities---certainly for new architectures to
    enable new command and control relationships, and probably for
    enhanced battle space awareness.

-   Finally, and sixth, while no nation's military modernization
    programs have static end-states, by 2020 the leadership of the PLA
    will aspire to have a military that is:

> \(1\) Capable enough to fight and defeat other regional militaries on
> its periphery, and
>
> \(2\) A military that is credible enough to deter outside military
> intervention in potential conflicts with regional adversaries on
> China's periphery.

**III. Aspirations versus Capabilities**

The characteristics of "PLA 2020" cited above are derived from long-term
analysis of the PLA's current and impressive reform and modernization
efforts, a careful reading of Chinese professional military literature,
the statements of key Chinese civilian and military leaders, and a
subjective sense of the future geo-strategic environment that Chinese
military and civilian strategists foresee for the PRC in the next two
decades.

All of the characteristics listed above, then, are where the PLA would
*like* to be in 2020. They represent a best assessment of the PLA's
aspirations.

It is not entirely clear, certain, or inevitable that the PLA will be
successful. There are a host of formidable systemic problems endemic
within the PLA, challenges from within greater Chinese society, and many
unknown domestic problems and wild card events in the international
environment that could preclude this massive defense establishment from
achieving its objectives.

Yet, in the past few years the PLA has proven that it is a "learning
organization" (to borrow from the jargon of the field of Organizational
Effectiveness). It understands what is broken, and understands what must
be fixed and changed. This in itself is impressive. There is today no
greater critic of the PLA than the leadership of the PLA. What is not
yet clear is how much "adaptive capacity" this organization has on the
ground as opposed to on the blackboards. Those who look at the PLA from
afar are likely not going to be in a position to adjudge levels of
progress.

**IV. Onward To The Future --- The "Two Transformations"**

The future PLA that the Chinese leadership aspires to field in the next
two decades most definitely has its roots in the early 1990s.

To be sure, since the early 1980s, Chinese military analysts had been
carefully studying developments in world military affairs and their
implications for the PLA. For example, PLA assessments of the lessons of
the Falklands War were extensive and those lessons and assessments are
recounted even today in a variety of PLA's professional military
literature.

But it was the first Gulf War in particular that had a galvanizing
effect upon the PLA---much as the 1973 Arab-Israeli War had upon the
U.S. Armed Forces. *Operation Desert Storm* forced the PLA leadership to
confront the fact that it was already 20 years behind most developed
militaries and would fall even further behind if it did not attempt to
enact a serious and long-term reform and modernization effort.

Acting upon its own assessments of the rapidly changing nature of modern
warfare in the wake of Desert Storm---and new assessments of China's
changing security situation---Beijing's military leadership came to the
conclusion that the armed forces of China were ill-suited to cope with
its future defense-related challenges. Starting in the decade of the
1990s, therefore, the PLA put into motion an ambitious reform and
modernization program that continues today.

In late1995, at an enlarged meeting of the Central Military Commission,
Jiang Zemin put forth the overarching concept for the reform and
modernization program that provided the imprimatur to move forward.

Known as the "Two Transformations," the program calls for the Chinese
armed forces to undergo a metamorphosis:

-   From an army preparing to fight local wars under ordinary conditions
    to an army preparing to fight and win Local Wars Under Modern
    High-Tech Conditions, and

-   From an army based on quantity to an army based on quality.

A corollary that usually accompanies the articulation of the "Two
Transformations" is that the PLA must also transform itself from an army
that is personnel intensive to an army that is science and technology
intensive.

Deceptively simple in its articulation, the call to enable the "Two
Transformations" is intended to cut across just about every aspect of
professional activity within the Chinese armed forces. Overall, there is
simply no roadmap or precedent in the PLA's past for what China's
military leaders are seeking to achieve for its future. This is
transformation with a capitol "T."

The totality of what the PLA leadership hopes to achieve through its
reform and modernization program is ambitious on two accounts: scope and
scale.

[Scope]{.underline}. The scope of reforms that the Chinese defense
establishment hopes to achieve cuts across every conceivable facet of
activity within the PLA---

-   The development of new operational concepts and war fighting
    techniques;

-   The modernization of weapons;

-   The accrual and integration of state-of-the-art technologies;

-   Rethinking command-and-control relationships and enabling
    architectures;

-   The rectification of the armaments R&D and procurement system;

-   Changes to personnel recruitment, retention, and management;

-   New standards for training; the enhancement of the professional
    military education system;

-   Adjustments to administrative procedures; force structure
    adjustments; and enhancements to the logistics system, to name just
    a few of the many areas of focus.

[Scale]{.underline}. This latest attempt at wholesale reform is also
ambitious in terms of scale. The PLA is a massive organization. By its
own public statements the PLA today has about 2.5 million personnel
under arms---even after about a 1.5-million-man reduction since 1985.

But the scale of what China's top military leadership hopes to achieve
is not measured just in numbers. It is measured as well in terms of the
intellectual, corporate professional, and conceptual "leaps" that this
massive defense establishment is being asked to make.

In effect, the officers and soldiers of the PLA are being told that
business as usual will not suffice, that many of the old paradigms are
bankrupt, and that entrenched local interests and parochial equities
must be cast aside in order to move the PLA into the 21^st^ century.

**V. The Drivers**

Two basic types of strategic assessments utilized by many other
militaries are driving the PLA's current efforts at wholesale
reform---namely, capabilities-based assessments and contingency-based
assessments. Let's briefly consider each.

**A. First, Capabilities-Based Assessment**

As mentioned earlier, the PLA's assessments of a decade's worth of
foreign military operations, especially the U.S. experience, forced its
strategic analysts to rethink the most likely type of war China might
have to fight in the future and the generic capabilities that would be
required to fight future wars. This included the emergence of new
operational doctrines as well as newly fielded and emerging high-end
foreign military technologies.

The PLA describes such future military confrontations as "Local Wars
Under Modern, High-tech Conditions." This type of conflict can be
briefly described as having the following characteristics:

-   It is fought for limited political objectives.

-   It is limited geographic scope. In other words, it is not "total war
    and nuclear war" (which described the most likely type of war Mao
    Zedong had told the PLA to prepare to fight).

-   It is short in duration but decisive in strategic (political)
    outcome. A single campaign may decide the entire war.

-   It demands a high-intensity operational tempo based on mobility,
    speed, and deep reach.

-   It employs high-lethality, high technology weapons causing high
    levels of destruction.

-   It is logistics-intensive with high resource-consumption rates.
    Success will be as much a function of combat sustainability as the
    ability to inflict damage upon the enemy.

-   It is information-intensive and critically dependent upon C4ISR and
    near-total battle space awareness.

-   It will entail simultaneous fighting in all of the battle space
    dimensions, to include outer space and the electro-magnetic
    spectrum, and it will be fought on non-linear battle lines with
    highly vulnerable deep rear areas.

-   And, notably, it will be characterized by joint service offensive
    campaigns.

Even if there were no Taiwan issue to focus PLA attention, one could
advance the argument that the PLA would *still* be on the same reform
and modernization vector it is on today simply due to the basic
requirements that this capabilities-based assessment demands.

But these capabilities-based requirements were, and continue to be, most
definitely reinforced by the second type of assessment the PLA has
made---their contingency-based assessment. This speaks to Beijing's
analysis of the threats it perceives it might face in the near-term and
the future, and the likely conflict scenarios that drive operational
planning and out-year modernization requirements. So let us briefly
consider the Chinese contingency-based assessment.

**B. Contingency-Based Assessment**

[Taiwan]{.underline}: First and foremost, is the issue of
Taiwan---likely the current focus of PLA planning. As long as the PRC
refuses to renounce the use of force against Taiwan, the PLA must
continue to acquire capabilities and develop operational plans beyond
mere demonstrations of force. This contingency is complicated by the
assumed prospect of U.S. military intervention.

[Japan]{.underline}: China remains distrustful of the future of Japan as
regards Tokyo's aspirations for a larger military role in the region.
Distrust has been furled by---

-   Enhancements to Japan's military capabilities,

-   The recent forays of the JSDF beyond the home islands in support of
    the Global War On Terrorism,

-   Tokyo's ties to Taiwan,

-   The terms of the US-Japan Revised Guidelines for Defense Cooperation
    (and the nebulous phrase, "The areas surronding Japan..."

-   Japanese support of U.S. research on Ballistic Missile Defense
    systems.

[India]{.underline}: The nuclear issue notwithstanding, India is viewed
by the Chinese as a perpetual nemesis that is growing in technological
prowess and whose navy, the Chinese believe, has expansive aspirations
in the Indian Ocean in the future---astride the SLOCs upon which China
will increasingly depend for its imported oil.

[The South China Sea]{.underline}: Where China is one of several
claimants to islands, atolls, and resources. We are all aware of the
South China Sea as a locus of military incidents in the past. (China,
Vietnam, the Philippines).

Of note, all of these aforementioned contingencies are maritime and
maritime-aerospace focused, and most entail the possibility of
confronting a relatively developed or highly developed modern military.

[Shift in China's Economic Center of Gravity]{.underline}: After more
than 2 decades of "reform & opening up" China's economic center of
gravity has shifted from deep in the interior---where it was intended to
be protected from a potential Soviet land invasion during the 1960s and
1970s---to the eastern seaboard. From Dalian in the north to Hainan in
the south, China's "gold coast" represents the real center of gravity of
China's strong suit in potential national strength---its economy. But
what this also means is that Beijing today faces, and into the future
will continue to face, a littoral and maritime defense problem that it
has likely not had to grapple with since the Qing Dynasty. And China's
maritime-air defense challenges are the ones the PLA is currently
*least* able to address. Consequently, the PLA will probably continue to
pay great attention to enhancing its naval and air power---which makes
sense as well in the context of the other contingencies that are on its
table---especially Taiwan.

**VI. The "Three Pillars" of Reform**

For the purposes of analytic simplicity, one could parse the PLA's
overarching modernization and reform program into what can be described
as the "Three Pillars." They are:

[Pillar I]{.underline}: The development, procurement, acquisition, and
fielding of new weapons systems, technologies, and combat capabilities.

[Pillar II]{.underline}: The development of new operational concepts and
war fighting doctrines for the employment of the new capabilities

[Pillar III]{.underline}: The vast array of institutional and systemic
reforms necessary to support the first two.

Of the 3 pillars of PLA modernization, it is Pillar I (weapons, systems,
and technologies) that receives the lion's share of analysis and
attention. It is also the pillar that gets almost all the domestic and
foreign media attention and that plays into domestic politics both in
Taipei and in Washington.

Compared to analyses of the other two pillars---doctrine and
institutions---studying the PLA weapons acquisitions is much more
feasible and analytically satisfying. Once a weapon system is identified
there is not a lot of guesswork involved in understanding its inherent
capabilities. Moreover, a good deal of data is available in English.
China's foreign military acquisitions reach the public domain sooner or
later. Moreover, the Chinese themselves often herald the fielding of new
indigenous systems. International arms and technology shows usually have
a Chinese presence showcasing Beijing's latest developments in weapons
systems or other military-related technologies.

Additionally, for a variety of reasons, the international media consider
new Chinese weapons acquisitions inherently newsworthy
events---especially the media in Taiwan, Hong Kong, and in some quarters
of the US. Therefore, there is no dearth of articles about new Chinese
acquisitions, and no shortage of highly qualified experts commenting in
those articles about the capabilities or implications of the PLA's new
aircraft, destroyers, submarines, enhanced missiles, etc. This is not
just the case in journals that specialize in international military
developments, but in mainstream news weekly's and daily newspapers in
the West.

Without question, tracking this first key pillar is critical and
necessary work if one hopes to see where the PLA is headed in the near
term. However, the weapons systems by themselves will not tell us much
about *how* those new capabilities will be employed or *by whom* in the
future. There simply is no straight line from the acquisition of a new
weapon system to new war fighting capabilities. Therefore, a more
holistic approach to assessments of the PLA in the out years is
necessary.

Without a firm understanding of the new operational doctrines that are
being developed by the PLA to prosecute campaign-level operations, and
without the ability to identify and track progress in systemic and
institutional reform in the Chinese armed forces, assessments of the PLA
are going to be driven solely by the new weapons systems that can be
identified. This approach will lead not only to sustaining the widely
divergent views that are held on the state of the PLA, but possibly to
very incorrect net assessments of where the PLA actually is on the road
to achieving the objectives it has set for itself.

The PLA of the future, therefore, will be defined as much by the
systemic and doctrinal changes it undergoes as the systems its hopes to
acquire and field. The remaining sections of this paper will highlight
some of the interesting reforms underway today that will shape the PLA
of tomorrow. Clearly, this can only be done in broad brush fashion
within the constraints of space for this event.

**VII. Institutional Reforms --- The Heart of the Matter**

Institutional reforms of the PLA are among the most public and
transparent aspect of the larger reform program underway.

The PLA's determination to standardize, codify, and enforce procedures
has resulted in the promulgation of an unending stream of new defense
laws, military regulations, and statutes. Many were objectives set for
accomplishment under the 9^th^ Five-Year Plan (1996-2000). Hence, the
year 1999 was particularly rich in the issuance of new laws and
regulations and I often refer to 1999 as "The Year of Regulations."

Almost all of these new regulations have been publicly announced
inasmuch as the PLA has used its own press and the state-controlled
media to inform the troops of the new changes and explain the rationale
behind them. Consequently, if one has been reading Jiefangjun Bao---the
official newspaper of the PLA[^2]---and professional journals of the PLA
on a regular basis, most of what has been going on is easily
discernible. In other words, it is no secret.

**A. Personnel Reforms**

The PLA leadership correctly understands that personnel reforms are the
cornerstone of its transformation. It is also one of its greater
challenges. Consequently, over the past several years, the PLA's
personnel system has undergone shifts in several key areas that will
build a base today for the war fighters of the future.

-   **Officer Accession**

The PLA recognizes that in order to develop officers capable of
successfully prosecuting a future Local War Under Modern High-Tech
Conditions, it will need to select from a larger, more diverse pool of
candidates that are knowledgeable and skilled in a wide variety of
areas, including advanced technologies, engineering, and social
sciences. In an effort to meet this need, the PLA is:

--- Developing a more formal, widespread officer recruitment program at
civilian universities across the country, seeking both undergraduates
and individuals completing masters and doctoral programs

--- Establishing on-campus officer recruitment offices at institutions
of higher education

-   Managing a National Defense Scholarship program to recruit young,
    potential PLA officers before they begin their college studies

    -   **Changes to the Officer Personnel Management System**

Three notable reforms are underway in this area: (1) increased mandatory
training for commanding officers, (2) efforts to stabilize assignments
as well as to standardize the qualification criteria for assignments,
and (3) setting maximum terms on tours of duty in a given assignment*.*

--- The Active-Service Officers Law (promulgated in December 2000) has
increased the frequency of pre-command training. Prior to this change,
officers slotted for command were required to undergo training prior to
assignment at only three command levels: company, regimental, and army.
The new law now requires training prior to command at every level:
platoon through military region. Moreover, pre-command training is now
required for officers who serve in command-equivalent billets in all
four of the PLA's career tracks---combat, political, logistic, and
armament---not just those in the combat career track.

--- In an effort to ensure that qualified officers fill critical unit
billets and that there is a degree of stabilization in those billets,
the PLA now has regulations that codify the qualifications an officer
must possess to assume different types of field billets. Factors
considered include job experience, years of service, education level,
school training, and health, in addition to political qualifications.
Moreover, to ensure stability in key billets, the PLA has established
minimum periods of time that an officer is required to serve in an
assignment before being permitted to seek a transfer.

--- Balanced against the need to stabilize key billets is the PLA's
ongoing desire to ensure that officers do not stay in place too long.
Therefore, there are now "maximum terms of peacetime service" in billets
after which an officer must rotate. This is a break from past practices
where officers tended to stay in a billet indefinitely. The rationale
for this change was twofold: to preclude corruption and nepotism that
sometimes resulted (known as "mountaintop-ism" in the PLA), and to
encourage officers to seek a broader range of professional experience.

-   **Professional Military Education System (PME)**

The PLA is engaged in an ambitious program to modernize its PME system
and correct long-acknowledged weaknesses. This entails:

-   The search for economies of scale through the creation of large
    "comprehensive universities," plans to disestablish many redundant
    academies, and the decision to consolidate a good number of military
    academies

--- Increased cooperation between military academies and civilian
universities to enrich the curricula and teaching staffs and initiating
some degree of officer training and education at civilian institutions.

-   **Creating a Professional Corps of Noncommissioned Officers (NCOs)**

The PLA has put into motion a serious attempt to create a professional
corps of technically and professionally competent NCOs who will have
full military careers. This corps will replace the previous system of
voluntary extensions for conscripts and is intended to compensate for
the recent decision to decrease the length of mandatory conscript
service to 24 months for all of the services*.* [^3]

-   To support this effort, the PLA has promulgated regulations to
    address perceived weaknesses in its existing NCO system and
    formulate a consistent, enforceable administration scheme.

-   This has included codifying basic practices such as: assignment and
    appointment; selection and recruitment; training; education; daily
    management; evaluation; remuneration and rewards; and retirement.

-   Moreover the General Staff Department (GSD) will centrally manage
    and approve the allocation of NCO billets through a system of quotas
    based on a prioritization of the needs of key units and
    organizations.

--- While conscripts will likely continue to be large part of the PLA's
overall make-up, the incipient NCO program underway augurs the
possibility of a small, but increasingly capable core of soldiers,
airmen, and sailors that may form the nucleus of the PLA's best equipped
and trained units of the future.

**B. Force Structure and Command & Control Reforms**

Force structure reforms encompass changes size and composition of
operational units---driven mostly by adjustments to missions, equipment,
and manpower requirements. Command and Control reforms refer to new
architectures for the prosecution of campaign-level operations.

--- Previously, many of the PLA's force structure reforms at the
tactical level were driven by the need to conduct combined-arms
positional warfare. More recently (beginning in the late-1990s) the
PLA's desire to prosecute joint service mobile warfare appears to be
driving force structure changes at the tactical level.

--- At the operational level, the PLA continues to work out the details
of the command and control and staffing arrangements for standing up
"War Zones" (war time operational theaters) as opposed to relying on the
traditional peacetime Military Regions to prosecute campaigns.

-   Also at the operational level, new doctrinal thinking in the PLA
    augurs an enhanced future operational role for the PLA Navy (PLAN),
    Air Force (PLAAF), and Second Artillery Corps within the PLA's
    ground-force-dominated military structure.

**VIII. Sustainability Reforms --- Logistics is the Key**

Logistics and combat sustainability is a historically weak link in PLA
operations. Consequently, high priority is being accorded to modernizing
and improving combat service support functions that comport with new
operational concepts. In assessing future operations, sustainability is
now considered by the PLA to one of the "four key pillars" upon which
campaigns will be decided.

In order to prosecute future Local Wars Under Modern High-Tech
Conditions joint logistics, rather than service-focused logistics, is
now viewed as essential. Toward this end:

-   The PLA is moving toward creating joint logistics departments in the
    military regions.

-   There is discussion of creating a corps of PLA "joint logisticians"
    akin to Joint Duty Officers ("purple suiters") in the U.S. military,
    who are trained to think about logistics in joint, rather than
    service-specific, terms.

-   Anecdotal evidence from the PLA press suggests that peacetime
    administrative of efforts aimed at making certain support functions
    such as fueling and transportation standardized throughout the PLA,
    PLAN, and PLAAF has already begun in some Military Regions.

-   The PLA apparently expects to consume vast quantities of materiel in
    any future war. To handle such logistics requirements, the PLA is
    attempting to restructure its battlefield logistics systems. One of
    the steps that the PLA has expressed interest in implementing
    includes the creation a more mobile logistics force, rather than
    relying primarily on fixed depots and supply points. Senior PLA
    leaders have mentioned the need for "emergency" logistics teams for
    deployment to the field. In at least a few cases, the PLA has
    apparently created some small, cross-disciplined logistics teams.

**IX. Doctrinal Reform --- The Jewel in the Crown?**

One of the more significant reform initiatives undertaken by the PLA in
the past few years is a sweeping change to its operational doctrine. The
rethinking of how it will fight its future wars, how it will employ its
future weapons systems, and the new operational concepts that the rising
generation of officers are being schooled in at the higher levels of PME
likely has the greatest potential to shape the future Chinese armed
forces more than any other issue listed thus far.

**A. Operational Guidance Adjusted In 1999**

In 1999, after years of study and extensive experimentation, the entire
body of official doctrinal literature that provided authoritative
guidance to the PLA at the operational (campaign) and tactical levels of
warfare was reissued. The "First Generation Operations Regulations"
dating from the mid-1980s was retired, and an apparently large corpus of
materials---operations manuals and regulations---were issued that is
collectively referred to as "The New Generation Operations Regulations."

The degree to which the PLA is looking to its new doctrine to carry it
into the future is discerned by the commentary in the PLA press that
heralded its issuance in 1999. At the time it was declared that the new
operational guidance:

-   Conforms with the "Two Transformations" army-building program that
    focuses on fighting "Local Wars Under Modern High-Tech Conditions"

-   Reflects operational adjustments to the changing nature of warfare,
    changes in "combat tasks" and "combat conditions," and are keyed to
    the Gulf War as well as changes to the military strategies of other
    major powers since the Gulf War

-   Applies to all the services and branches of the greater PLA

-   Is based on new "combat theories" and recent "new experiences" in
    training

-   Is aimed at "unifying" and "standardizing" operational thinking
    across the PLA

-   Applies to the "various levels" of combat

-   Provides new campaign principles and operational principles while at
    the same time updating previous principles

-   Provides for new campaign command and control "principles" and
    "mechanisms" for joint campaigns

-   Calls for new logistics and maintenance support procedures and
    addresses issues related to information warfare and electronic
    counter-measures, air defense, and other measures

-   Serves as a guide to training within the major services and among
    them

-   Is geared to "future wars"

In the words (1999) of former PLA Chief of the General Staff Fu Quanyou,
the new operational guidance:

-   Will be "the foundation of our army's war fighting training"

-   Will standardize and unify the PLA war fighting thinking

-   Will guide the PLA to become a joint force

-   Will enhance the C2 procedures of the PLA at all levels of combat
    and enable the goal of fighting as a joint force

**B. What is the Essence of the New Operational Guidance?**

Likely the most important construct at the operational level of war to
come out of the new operational directives is what known in the PLA as
"The Campaign Basic Guiding Concept" that calls for "Integrated
Operations and Key Point Strikes."

"[Integrated Operations]{.underline}" speaks to the need to integrate:
(1) all services (joint operations to include reserves and militia), (2)
fighting in all battle space dimensions (to include the electromagnetic
spectrum), (3) all campaign phases to focus on the main operational
objective, (4) the newest capabilities to focus on the most important
enemy targets, (5) all modes of operations (simultaneous offensive and
defensive operations, and front and rear operations), and (6) mobile and
static operations.

"[Key Point Strikes]{.underline}" is the operational expression of
integrated operations. It calls for the concentration of the PLA's most
powerful capabilities to destroy or degrade the enemy's best
capabilities to level the technological playing field at the inception
of hostilities, and disrupt the enemy's campaign before it can achieve
operational momentum. Doctrinally, the PLA's approach rests upon (1) the
correct selection of "enemy vital targets" and (2) "key point
application of force." In a change from past doctrine, in which the PLA
focused on concentration of forces against weak enemy sectors, the new
doctrine calls for the PLA to concentrate its best *capabilities*
against the vital capabilities that most enable the enemy to prosecute
its campaign. In other words, the PLA has shifted to a new concept of
what constitutes the enemy's operational center of gravity. This
includes the enemy's C4ISR architectures, its most lethal weapons
systems, and its combat sustainment capabilities.

In sum, emerging PLA doctrine has shifted from a traditional emphasis of
"campaigns of annihilation" (a traditional PLA expression) that focused
on force-on-force attrition, to campaigns of paralysis (author's
assessment) in which offensive and preemptive strikes at the operational
level of war deny the technologically superior (and technologically
dependant) enemy the ability to conduct its campaign. Disrupting the
enemy's campaign is acceptable if defeating the enemy's campaign head-on
is not possible.

X. Concluding Comments

As mentioned in the beginning of this paper, the shape of "PLA 2020" has
its roots in the mid-1990s. The programs that have been underway for the
past few years are remarkable in their scale and scope. Those who
appreciate the difficulties in moving large defense establishments along
new paths cannot help but be absolutely amazed at the ambitious nature
of the efforts that are being made.

Clearly the PLA will find a need to readjust it programs as
circumstances in world military developments change. Otherwise it will
find that it spent the 1990s and the first decade of the 21^st^ Century
preparing to fight the wars of the last century once again.

And as mentioned earlier, there is no guarantee that all of the PLA's
aspirations will bear fruit. There are incalculable and unknowable
problems that they will face along the road to transformation. And it
will take time and it will take constant infusions of money. It will
especially take time. It is always worth pointing out that it took the
US military from the mid-1970s to 1990 to be able to fight Desert Storm.

But the PLA is a learning organization and it is on the right path.
While it would be a mistake to overestimate the ability of the PLA to
achieve all of its aspirations in the near-term, it would be equally
mistaken to dismiss what is going on.

[^1]: The socio-political challenge to the government in Beijing
    associated with the demobilization of massive numbers of soldiers is
    a regime stability issue that is handled with great care. Since 1985
    the PLA has downsized by cutting more than 1.5 million troops.
    Another 200,000-person reduction is underway. The economic burdens
    on local governments of placing demobilized troops and their
    families back into the civilian sector is likely the greatest factor
    that inhibits the PLA from scaling down to a much leaner
    military---one that can be evenly trained and equipped for
    excellence across the board.

[^2]: Online on the Internet in both Chinese and English.

[^3]: Prior to the change to the national conscription law in 1999,
    conscripts for the ground forces served three years, and conscripts
    for the navy, air force, and strategic rocket forces served four
    years. Under the new law all conscripts for all services and
    branches serve only twenty-four months.