<table>
<colgroup>
<col style="width: 7%" />
<col style="width: 5%" />
<col style="width: 13%" />
<col style="width: 4%" />
<col style="width: 5%" />
<col style="width: 13%" />
<col style="width: 13%" />
<col style="width: 8%" />
<col style="width: 9%" />
<col style="width: 10%" />
<col style="width: 5%" />
<col style="width: 2%" />
</colgroup>
<thead>
<tr class="header">
<th colspan="8"><h1 id="payload-flight-hazard-report">PAYLOAD FLIGHT
HAZARD REPORT</h1></th>
<th>a. NO:</th>
<th colspan="3">AMS-02-F17</th>
</tr>
<tr class="odd">
<th colspan="2">b. PAYLOAD</th>
<th colspan="6">Alpha Magnetic Spectrometer-02 (AMS-02)</th>
<th>c. PHASE:</th>
<th colspan="3">II</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr class="odd">
<td colspan="2">d. SUBSYSTEM:</td>
<td colspan="3">Avionics</td>
<td>e. HAZARD GROUP:</td>
<td colspan="2">Injury, Damage to critical systems</td>
<td>f. DATE:</td>
<td colspan="3">May 25, 2007</td>
</tr>
<tr class="even">
<td colspan="2" rowspan="2">g. HAZARD TITLE:</td>
<td colspan="6" rowspan="2">Electrical Power Distribution Damage</td>
<td>i. HAZARD</td>
<td colspan="2">CATASTROPHIC</td>
<td><strong>X</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr class="odd">
<td>CATEGORY:</td>
<td colspan="2">CRITICAL</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr class="even">
<td colspan="4">h. APPLICABLE SAFETY REQUIREMENTS:</td>
<td colspan="8">NSTS 1700.7B and ISS Addendum: 201.3, 207, 213.1</td>
</tr>
<tr class="odd">
<td colspan="4">j. DESCRIPTION OF HAZARD:</td>
<td colspan="8">Damage to electrical power distribution circuitry can
lead to damage to shuttle and ISS wiring, loss of critical circuitry and
loss of power source.</td>
</tr>
<tr class="even">
<td>k. CAUSES</td>
<td colspan="11" rowspan="2"><blockquote>
<p>1. Short circuit or load failures induce over-current condition in
vehicle wiring.</p>
<p>2. Cross strapping of power sources damages vehicle circuitry.</p>
</blockquote></td>
</tr>
<tr class="odd">
<td><em>(list)</em></td>
</tr>
<tr class="even">
<td colspan="12"></td>
</tr>
<tr class="odd">
<td colspan="3">o. APPROVAL</td>
<td colspan="4">PAYLOAD ORGANIZATION</td>
<td colspan="5">SSP/ISS</td>
</tr>
<tr class="even">
<td colspan="3">PHASE I</td>
<td colspan="4"></td>
<td colspan="5"></td>
</tr>
<tr class="odd">
<td colspan="3">PHASE II</td>
<td colspan="4"></td>
<td colspan="5"></td>
</tr>
<tr class="even">
<td colspan="3">PHASE III</td>
<td colspan="4"></td>
<td colspan="5"></td>
</tr>
<tr class="odd">
<td colspan="12"></td>
</tr>
<tr class="even">
<td colspan="10">l. HAZARD CONTROL (CONTROL), m. SAFETY VERIFICATION
METHODS (SVM), n. STATUS OF VERIFICATIONS (STATUS)</td>
<td colspan="2">OPS CONTROL</td>
</tr>
<tr class="odd">
<td colspan="10">1. CAUSE: Short circuit or load failures induce
over-current condition in vehicle wiring.</td>
<td colspan="2"></td>
</tr>
<tr class="even">
<td colspan="10"><p>1.1 CONTROL: Wire gauge and insulation for
integration cabling have been selected to meet NSTS 1700.7B, "Safety
Policy and Requirements For Payloads Using the Space Transportation
System", NSTS 1700.7B ISS Addendum, "Safety Policy and Requirements For
Payloads Using the International Space Station", and NASA Technical
Memorandum #TM 102179, "Selection of Wires and Circuit Protection
Devices for NSTS Orbiter Vehicle Payload Electrical Circuits" including
proper wire bundle derating.</p>
<p>1.1.1 SVM: Review of Design</p>
<p>1.1.2 SVM: Inspection of As Built Design</p>
<p>1.1.1 STATUS: Open</p>
<p>1.1.2 STATUS: Open</p></td>
<td colspan="2"></td>
</tr>
<tr class="odd">
<td colspan="10"><p>1.2 CONTROL: Circuit protection devices are sized to
protect wiring and systems to meet NSTS 1700.7B, "Safety Policy and
Requirements For Payloads Using the Space Transportation System", NSTS
1700.7B ISS Addendum, "Safety Policy and Requirements For Payloads Using
the International Space Station", and NASA Technical Memorandum #TM
102179, "Selection of Wires and Circuit Protection Devices for NSTS
Orbiter Vehicle Payload Electrical Circuits". Specifically the SSRMS
wiring will implement a circuit protection device to be incorporated
upon the AMS-02 side of the interface to protect the SSRMS wiring as the
ISS side of the interface protects to 25 amps, but the SSRMS power
wiring supplying the AMS-02 must be protected to 16.7 Amps.</p>
<p>1.2.1 SVM: Review of Design</p>
<p>1.2.2 SVM: Inspection of as built design</p>
<p>1.2.1 STATUS: Open</p>
<p>1.2.2 STATUS: Open</p></td>
<td colspan="2"></td>
</tr>
<tr class="even">
<td colspan="10"><p>1.3 CONTROL: Wiring and connectors coming from the
ISS, Orbiter APCU, T-0 and PVGF continue the wire rating of the
supplying source to the location of circuit protection devices within
the Power Distribution System and the Cryomagnet Avionics Box. Failures
within these systems will not propagate and damage vehicle systems.</p>
<p>1.3.1 SVM: Review of design</p>
<p>1.3.2 SVM: Inspection of as build design</p>
<p>1.3.1 STATUS: Open</p>
<p>1.3.2 STATUS: Open</p></td>
<td colspan="2"></td>
</tr>
<tr class="odd">
<td colspan="10">2. CAUSE: Cross strapping of power sources damages
vehicle circuitry.</td>
<td colspan="2"></td>
</tr>
<tr class="even">
<td colspan="10"><p>2.1 CONTROL: Diodes in the power supply circuit from
the ROEU and from the ISS SSRMS preclude power from the ISS and the
SSRMS from being present at the ROEU connector. Diodes also preclude ISS
UMA supplied power from being present at the SSRMS grapple fixture
connector.</p>
<p>2.1.1 SVM: Review of design for proper use of diode protection</p>
<p>2.1.2 SVM: Inspection of design to assure proper installation of
diode protection</p>
<p>2.1.3 SVM: Testing of AMS-02 power interfaces to assure that diode
protection is functioning.</p>
<p>2.1.1 STATUS: Open</p>
<p>2.1.2 STATUS: Open</p>
<p>2.1.3 STATUS: Open</p></td>
<td colspan="2"></td>
</tr>
<tr class="odd">
<td colspan="10"><p>2.2 CONTROL: The UPS can not feed power directly to
the vehicle power supply. The only interface to vehicle supplied power
from the UPS is through the battery management system (BMS) and through
Quench Detection System in the Cryomagnet Avionics Box.</p>
<p>2.2.1 SVM: Review of Design to assure no interconnection between UPS
power circuitry and Vehicle power circuitry.</p>
<p>2.2.2 SVM: Testing of AMS-02 Flight interfaces to establish that no
UPS power is present.</p>
<p>2.2.1 STATUS: Open</p>
<p>2.2.2 STATUS: Open</p></td>
<td colspan="2"></td>
</tr>
<tr class="even">
<td colspan="10"><p>2.3 CONTROL: The two ISS power feeds are maintained
within separate circuitry within the AMS-02 and are not “combined” until
after the 120VDC power has been processed through independent DC to DC
converters. There is no nominal or component fault that will cause the
two ISS power feeds to be interconnected. (See Control 2.4 for
Exception)</p>
<p>2.3.1 SVM: Review of Design</p>
<p>2.3.2 SVM: Functional testing of AMS-02 for isolation between A and B
buses at flight power interfaces.</p>
<p>2.3.1 STATUS: Open</p>
<p>2.3.2 STATUS: Open</p></td>
<td colspan="2"></td>
</tr>
<tr class="odd">
<td colspan="10"><p>2.4 CONTROL: During robotic operation involving the
AMS-02 while it is connected to the truss berthing location, the
electrical source (RPCM) of the SSRMS and the electrical source (RPCM)
of the UMA will be different, per SSP 57003 these two sources may not be
interconnected. To avoid this condition the procedure for engaging the
AMS-02’s power while on the truss will require that the UMA be
disconnected when grappled by the SSRMS. This separation of connectors
will preclude any interconnection of the power sources. In addition to
this operational control of separation, the power of the two systems
will not be operationally enabled at the same time.) (See AMS-02-F12
Control 1.5.1)</p>
<p>2.4.1 SVM: Requirement to physically separate SSRMS power path to the
AMS-02 prior to engaging the UMA power connection to AMS-02 accepted by
MOD through and OCAD.</p>
<p>2.4.1 STATUS: Open</p></td>
<td colspan="2">I</td>
</tr>
<tr class="even">
<td colspan="10">Notes:</td>
<td colspan="2"></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

  -----------------------------------------------------------------------
  ACRONYMS                           
  ---------------------------------- ------------------------------------
  A -- Amperes                       ROEU -- Remotely Operated Electrical
                                     Umbilical

  ACC -- Anticoincidence Counter     RP -- Ram side port

  AMS-02 -- Alpha Magnetic           RS -- Rams side starboard
  Spectrometer - 02                  

  APCU -- Auxillary Power Control    SFHe -- Superfluid Helium
  Unit                               

  BMS -- Battery Management System   SFHe -- Superfluid Helium

  CAB -- Cryomagnet Avionics Box     SSRMS -- Space Station Remote
                                     Manipulator System

  CCEB -- Cryocooler Electronics Box Starb. -- Starboard

  CCS -- Cyromagnet Current Source   SVM -- Safety Verification Method

  DC -- Direct Current               TOF -- Time of Flight

  DC-DC -- Direct Current to Direct  TRD -- Transition Radiation Detector
  Current (converter)                

  DTS -- Dallas Temperature Sensor   TTCB -- TTCS Control Box

  ECAL -- Electromagnetic            TTCS -- Tracker Thermal Control
  Calorimeter                        System

  EMI -- Electromagnetic             UMA -- Umbilical Mating/Mechanism
  Interference                       Assembly

  EVA -- Extravehicular Activity     UPS -- Uninterruptible Power Supply

  HRDL -- High Rate Data Link        USS -- Unique Support Structure

  LRDL -- Low Rate Data Link         VC -- Vacuum Case

  Mainf -- Manifold                  VDC -- Volts Direct Current

  PAS -- Payload Attach Site         W -- Watt

  PVGF -- Power Video Grapple        WP -- Wake side port
  Fixture                            

  RICH -- Ring Imaging Cherenkov     WS -- Wake side starboard
  (detector)                         
  -----------------------------------------------------------------------

  ---------------------------------- ------------------------------------
  **DECODING Electronic Boxes and    
  Nomenclature:**                    

  FIRST Character(s)                 Following Designator

  E - ECAL                           PD -- Power Distribution

  J -- Main Data Computers (MDC) and HV -- High Voltage
  Command & Data Handling interfaces 

  JT -- Trigger and central data     Crate -- Electronics box or crate
  acquisition                        

  M -- Monitoring                    

  R -- RICH                          Numerical designators follow.

  S -- Time of Flight (TOF) and      
  Anti-Coincidence Counter (ACC)     

  T -- Tracker                       

  TT -- Tracker Thermal              

  U -- Transition Radiation Detector 
  (TRD)                              

  UG -- TRD Gas                      
  ---------------------------------- ------------------------------------

![](media/image1.png){width="9.0in" height="6.506944444444445in"}

![](media/image2.png){width="8.926388888888889in"
height="6.492361111111111in"}

**Vehicle Current Limitations and Circuit Protection**

  -------------- ------------------ -------------- -------------- --------------
  **SOURCE**     **Wire/Cabling**   **Maximum      **Lowest       **Voltage**
                                    Current        Current        
                                    Provided       Limitation     
                                    Nominally**    Level**        

  STS T0 Power   4 x AWG 12         14.7 A         22A            120 V

  STS APCU       3 x AWG 8          14.7 A         22 A           120 V

  ITS S3 PAS 2   3 x AWG 8          25 A           27.5 A         120 V

  PVGF           4 x AWG 12         15 A           27.5 A         120 V

  STS SSP        20 AWG             5 A (SSP       4 A (AMS-02    28 V
                                    Circuit        Fuse)          
                                    Breaker)                      
  -------------- ------------------ -------------- -------------- --------------

  -----------------------------------------------------------------------
  ![](media/image3.png){width="8.247222222222222in" height="5.64375in"}

  **AMS-02 Interface Diagram to T-0 Line**

  ![](media/image4.png){width="8.984722222222222in"
  height="5.459027777777778in"}

  **AMS-02 Interface Diagram to STS**

  ![](media/image5.png){width="8.998611111111112in"
  height="5.805555555555555in"}

  **AMS-02 Interface Diagram to ISS SSRMS**

  ![](media/image6.png){width="8.996527777777779in"
  height="5.815277777777778in"}

  **AMS-02 Interface Diagram to ISS at PAS Location S3**
  -----------------------------------------------------------------------

**AMS-02 Integration Cabling De-Rating Information**

**Cable numbers available on preceding schematics**

![](media/image7.wmf){width="8.874305555555555in"
height="4.836805555555555in"}

![](media/image8.wmf){width="8.93125in" height="4.624305555555556in"}

![](media/image9.wmf){width="8.874305555555555in"
height="4.344444444444444in"}