**PUBLIC NOTICE**![](media/image1.png){width="0.7388888888888889in"
height="0.7458333333333333in"}

**FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION**

**445 12th STREET, S.W.**

**WASHINGTON, D.C. 20554**

#######  {#section .unnumbered}

####### DA 00-43 {#da-00-43 .unnumbered}

January 10, 2000

AUCTION OF LICENSES IN THE 747--762 AND 777-792 MHz BANDS SCHEDULED FOR
MAY 10, 2000

**COMMENT SOUGHT**

**ON RESERVE PRICES OR MINIMUM OPENING BIDS AND**

###### OTHER AUCTION PROCEDURAL ISSUES {#other-auction-procedural-issues .unnumbered}

**Report No. AUC‑99-31-A (Auction No. 31)**

# Introduction

By this public notice, the Wireless Telecommunications Bureau
(\"Bureau\") announces the auction of licenses for Fixed, Mobile, and
Broadcasting services in the 747-762 and 777-792 MHz bands (\"Auction
No. 31\"), scheduled to commence on May 10, 2000.[^1] Auction No. 31
will consist of 12 licenses in the 747-762 and 777-792 MHz bands. One 20
megahertz license (consisting of paired 10 megahertz blocks) and one 10
megahertz license (consisting of paired 5 megahertz blocks) will be
offered in each of six regions to be known as the 700 MHz band economic
area groupings (700 MHz band EAGs).

The following table contains the Block / Frequency Band Limits Cross
Reference List for each region in Auction No. 31:

#########  {#section-1 .unnumbered}

######### 747-762 and 777-792 MHz Allocations  {#and-777-792-mhz-allocations .unnumbered}

  ------------------ ----------------------------------------------------
  License Suffix     Frequencies

  C                  747 -- 752, 777 -- 782

  D                  752 -- 762, 782 -- 792
  ------------------ ----------------------------------------------------

The Balanced Budget Act of 1997 requires the Commission to \"ensure
that, in the scheduling of any competitive bidding under this
subsection, an adequate period is allowed . . . before issuance of
bidding rules, to permit notice and comment on proposed auction
procedures . . . .\"[^2] Consistent with the provisions of the Balanced
Budget Act and to ensure that potential bidders have adequate time to
familiarize themselves with the specific rules that will govern the
day-to-day conduct of an auction, the Commission directed the Bureau,
under its existing delegated authority,[^3] to seek comment on a variety
of auction-specific procedures prior to the start of each auction.[^4]
We therefore seek comment on the following issues relating to Auction
No. 31.

# Auction Structure

## Simultaneous Multiple Round Auction Design

We propose to award the licenses in a single, simultaneous
multiple-round auction to allow bidders to take advantage of any
synergies that exist among licenses.[^5] We seek comment on this
proposal.

## Upfront Payments and Initial Maximum Eligibility 

The Bureau has delegated authority and discretion to determine an
appropriate upfront payment for each license being auctioned.[^6]
Upfront payments related to the specific spectrum subject to auction
protect against frivolous or insincere bidding and provide the
Commission with a source of funds from which to collect payments owed at
the close of the auction.[^7] In this case, we have information
available in the form of a Congressional estimate of the value of the
spectrum. Accordingly, we list all licenses, including the related
populations and proposed upfront payments, in Attachment A. We seek
comment on this proposal.

We further propose that the amount of the upfront payment submitted by a
bidder will determine the initial maximum eligibility (as measured in
bidding units) for each bidder. Upfront payments will not be attributed
to specific licenses, but instead will be translated into bidding units
to define a bidder\'s initial maximum eligibility, which cannot be
increased during the auction. The maximum eligibility will determine the
licenses on which a bidder may bid in each round of the auction. Thus,
in calculating its upfront payment amount, an applicant must determine
the *maximum* number of bidding units it may wish to bid on (or hold
high bids on) in any single round, and submit an upfront payment
covering that number of bidding units. We seek comment on this proposal.

## Activity Rules

In order to ensure that the auction closes within a reasonable period of
time, an activity rule requires bidders to bid actively on a percentage
of their maximum bidding eligibility during each round of the auction
rather than waiting until the end to participate. A bidder that does not
satisfy the activity rule will either lose bidding eligibility in the
next round or use an activity rule waiver.

We propose to divide the auction into three stages: Stage One, Stage Two
and Stage Three, each characterized by an increased activity
requirement. The auction will start in Stage One. We propose that the
auction will generally advance to the next stage (*i.e.*, from Stage One
to Stage Two, and from Stage Two to Stage Three) when the auction
activity level, as measured by the percentage of bidding units receiving
new high bids, is approximately ten percent or below for three
consecutive rounds of bidding in each stage. However, we further propose
that the Bureau retain the discretion to change stages unilaterally by
announcement during the auction. In exercising this discretion, the
Bureau will consider a variety of measures of bidder activity,
including, but not limited to, the auction activity level, the
percentage of licenses (as measured in bidding units) on which there are
new bids, the number of new bids, and the percentage increase in
revenue. We seek comment on these proposals.

We propose that in each round of Stage One, a bidder desiring to
maintain its current eligibility be required to be active on licenses
encompassing at least 50 percent of its current bidding eligibility.
Failure to maintain the requisite activity level will result in a
reduction in the bidder\'s bidding eligibility in the next round of
bidding (unless an activity rule waiver is used). During Stage One,
reduced eligibility for the next round will be calculated by multiplying
the current round activity by two. In each round of the second stage of
the auction, a bidder desiring to maintain its current eligibility is
required to be active on at least 80 percent of its current bidding
eligibility. During Stage Two, reduced eligibility for the next round
will be calculated by multiplying the current round activity by
five-fourths (5/4). In each round of Stage Three, a bidder desiring to
maintain its current eligibility is required to be active on 100 percent
of its current bidding eligibility. In this final stage, reduced
eligibility for the next round will be set at current round activity. We
seek comment on these proposals.

## Activity Rule Waivers and Reducing Eligibility

Use of an activity rule waiver preserves the bidder\'s current bidding
eligibility despite the bidder\'s activity in the current round being
below the required minimum level. An activity rule waiver applies to an
entire round of bidding and not to a particular license. Activity
waivers are principally a mechanism for auction participants to avoid
the loss of auction eligibility in the event that exigent circumstances
prevent them from placing a bid in a particular round.

The FCC auction system assumes that bidders with insufficient activity
would prefer to use an activity rule waiver (if available) rather than
lose bidding eligibility. Therefore, the system will automatically apply
a waiver (known as an \"automatic waiver\") at the end of any bidding
period where a bidder\'s activity level is below the minimum required
unless: (1) there are no activity rule waivers available; or (2) the
bidder overrides the automatic application of a waiver by reducing
eligibility, thereby meeting the minimum requirements.

A bidder with insufficient activity may wish to reduce its bidding
eligibility rather than use an activity rule waiver. If so, the bidder
must affirmatively override the automatic waiver mechanism during the
bidding period by using the reduce eligibility function in the software.
In this case, the bidder\'s eligibility is permanently reduced to bring
the bidder into compliance with the activity rules as described above.
Once eligibility has been reduced, a bidder will not be permitted to
regain its lost bidding eligibility.

A bidder may proactively use an activity rule waiver as a means to keep
the auction open without placing a bid. If a bidder submits a proactive
waiver (using the proactive waiver function in the bidding software)
during a bidding period in which no bids are submitted, the auction will
remain open and the bidder\'s eligibility will be preserved. An
automatic waiver invoked in a round in which there are no new valid bids
will not keep the auction open.

We propose that each bidder in Auction No. 31 be provided with five
activity rule waivers that may be used at the bidder's discretion during
the course of the auction as set forth above. We seek comment on this
proposal.

## Information Relating to Auction Delay, Suspension or Cancellation

For Auction No. 31, we propose that, by public notice or by announcement
during the auction, the Bureau may delay, suspend or cancel the auction
in the event of natural disaster, technical obstacle, evidence of an
auction security breach, unlawful bidding activity, administrative or
weather necessity, or for any other reason that affects the fair and
competitive conduct of competitive bidding.[^8] In such cases, the
Bureau, in its sole discretion, may elect to: resume the auction
starting from the beginning of the current round; resume the auction
starting from some previous round; or cancel the auction in its
entirety. Network interruption may cause the Bureau to delay or suspend
the auction. We emphasize that exercise of this authority is solely
within the discretion of the Bureau, and its use is not intended to be a
substitute for situations in which bidders may wish to apply their
activity rule waivers. We seek comment on this proposal.

# Bidding Procedures

##  Round Structure

The Commission will use its Automated Auction System to conduct the
electronic simultaneous multiple round auction format for auction No.
31. The initial bidding schedule will be announced in a public notice to
be released at least one week before the start of the auction, and will
be included in the registration mailings. The simultaneous multiple
round format will consist of sequential bidding rounds, each followed by
the release of round results. Details regarding the location and format
of round results will be included in the same public notice.

The Bureau has discretion to change the bidding schedule in order to
foster an auction pace that reasonably balances speed with the bidders'
need to study round results and adjust their bidding strategies. The
Bureau may increase or decrease the amount of time for the bidding
rounds and review periods, or the number of rounds per day, depending
upon the bidding activity level and other factors. We seek comment on
this proposal.

## Reserve Price or Minimum Opening Bid

The Balanced Budget Act calls upon the Commission to prescribe methods
by which a reasonable reserve price will be required or a minimum
opening bid established when FCC licenses are subject to auction
(*i.e.*, because the Commission has accepted mutually exclusive
applications for those licenses), unless the Commission determines that
a reserve price or minimum bid is not in the public interest.[^9]
Consistent with this mandate, the Commission has directed the Bureau to
seek comment on the use of a minimum opening bid and/or reserve price
prior to the start of each auction.[^10]

Normally, a reserve price is an absolute minimum price below which an
item will not be sold in a given auction. Reserve prices can be either
published or unpublished. A minimum opening bid, on the other hand, is
the minimum bid price set at the beginning of the auction below which
*no bids* are accepted. It is generally used to accelerate the
competitive bidding process. Also, in a minimum opening bid scenario,
the auctioneer generally has the discretion to lower the amount later in
the auction. It is also possible for the minimum opening bid and the
reserve price to be the same amount.

In light of the Balanced Budget Act, the Bureau proposes to establish
minimum opening bids for Auction No. 31. The Bureau believes a minimum
opening bid, which has been utilized in other auctions, is an effective
bidding tool.[^11] A minimum opening bid, rather than a reserve price,
will help to regulate the pace of the auction and provides flexibility.

For Auction No. 31, we have information available in the form of a
Congressional estimate of the value of the spectrum. Accordingly, we
list all licenses, including the related populations and proposed
minimum opening bids, in Attachment A. We seek comment on this proposal.

If commenters believe that these minimum opening bids will result in
substantial numbers of unsold licenses, or is not a reasonable amount,
or should instead operate as a reserve price, they should explain why
this is so, and comment on the desirability of an alternative approach.
Commenters are advised to support their claims with valuation analyses
and suggested reserve prices or minimum opening bid levels or formulas.
In establishing the minimum opening bids, we particularly seek comment
on such factors as, among other things, the amount of spectrum being
auctioned, levels of incumbency, the availability of technology to
provide service, the size of the geographic service areas, issues of
interference with other spectrum bands and any other relevant factors
that could reasonably have an impact on valuation of the 747--762 and
777-792 MHz bands. Alternatively, comment is sought on whether,
consistent with the Balanced Budget Act, the public interest would be
served by having no minimum opening bid or reserve price.

## Minimum Accepted Bids and Bid Increments 

Once there is a standing high bid on a license, a bid increment will be
applied to that license to establish a minimum acceptable bid for the
following round. For Auction No. 31, we propose to use a smoothing
methodology to calculate bid increments, as we have done in several
other auctions. The Bureau retains the discretion to change the minimum
bid increment if it determines that circumstances so dictate. The Bureau
will do so by announcement in the Automated Auction System. We seek
comment on these proposals.

The exponential smoothing formula calculates the bid increment for each
license based on a weighted average of the activity received on each
license in all previous rounds. This methodology will tailor the bid
increment for each license based on activity, rather than setting a
global increment for all licenses. For every license that receives a
bid, the bid increment for the next round for that license will be
established using the exponential smoothing formula.

The calculation of the percentage bid increment for each license in a
given round is made at the end of the previous round. The computation is
based on an activity index, which is calculated as the weighted average
of the activity in that round and the activity index from the prior
round. The activity index at the start of the auction (round 0) will be
set at 0. The current activity index is equal to a weighting factor
times the number of new bids received on the license in the most recent
bidding round plus one minus the weighting factor times the activity
index from the prior round. The activity index is then used to calculate
a percentage increment by multiplying a minimum percentage increment by
one plus the activity index with that result being subject to a maximum
percentage increment. The Commission will initially set the weighting
factor at 0.5, the minimum percentage increment at 0.1, and the maximum
percentage increment at 0.2.

######## Equations {#equations .unnumbered}

A~i~ = (C \* B~i~) + ( (1-C) \* A~i-1~)

I~i+1~ = smaller of ( (1 + A~i~) \* N) and M

where,

A~i~ = activity index for the current round (round i)

C = activity weight factor

B~i~ = number of bids in the current round (round i)

A~i-1~ = activity index from previous round (round i-1), A~0~ is 0

I~i+1~ = percentage bid increment for the next round (round i+1)

N = minimum percentage increment or bid increment floor

M = maximum percentage increment or bid increment ceiling

Under the exponential smoothing methodology, once a bid has been
received on a license, the minimum acceptable bid for that license in
the following round will be the new high bid plus the dollar amount
associated with the percentage increment (variable I~i+1~ from above
times the high bid). This result will be rounded to the nearest thousand
if it is over ten thousand or to the nearest hundred if it is under ten
thousand.

######## Examples {#examples .unnumbered}

License 1

C=0.5, N = 0.1, M = 0.2

[Round 1 (2 new bids, high bid = \$1,000,000)]{.underline}

1\. Calculation of percentage increment for round 2 using exponential
smoothing:

A~1~ = (0.5 \* 2) + (0.5 \* 0) = 1

The smaller of I~2~ = (1 + 1) \* 0.1 = 0.2 or 0.2 (the maximum
percentage increment)

2\. Minimum bid increment for round 2 using the percentage increment
(I~2~ from above)

0.2 \* \$1,000,000 = \$200,000

3\. Minimum acceptable bid for round 2 = 1,200,000

[Round 2 (3 new bids, high bid = 2,000,000)]{.underline}

1\. Calculation of percentage increment for round 3 using exponential
smoothing:

A~2~ = (0.5 \* 3) + (0.5 \* 1) = 2

The smaller of I~3~ = (1 + 2) \* 0.1 = 0.3 or 0.2 (the maximum
percentage increment)

2\. Minimum bid increment for round 3 using the percentage increment
(I~3~ from above)

0.2 \* \$2,000,000 = \$400,000

3\. Minimum acceptable bid for round 3 = 2,400,000

[Round 3 (1 new bid, high bid = 2,400,000)]{.underline}

1\. Calculation of percentage increment for round 4 using exponential
smoothing:

A~3~ = (0.5 \* 1) + (0.5 \* 2) = 1.5

The smaller of I~4~ = (1 + 1.5) \* 0.1 = 0.25 or 0.2 (the maximum
percentage

increment)

2\. Minimum bid increment for round 4 using the percentage increment
(I~4~ from above)

0.2 \* \$2,400,000 = \$480,000

3\. Minimum acceptable bid for round 4 = 2,880,000

## Information Regarding Bid Withdrawal and Bid Removal

### General Bid Withdrawal Procedures

For Auction No. 31, we propose the following bid removal and bid
withdrawal procedures. Before the close of a bidding period, a bidder
has the option of removing any bids placed in that round. By using the
remove bid function in the software, a bidder may effectively
\"unsubmit\" any bid placed within that round. A bidder removing a bid
placed in the same round is not subject to withdrawal payments.

Once a round closes, a bidder may no longer remove a bid. However, in
the next round, a bidder may withdraw standing high bids from previous
rounds using the withdraw bid function. A high bidder that withdraws its
standing high bid from a previous round is subject to the bid withdrawal
payment provisions.[^12] We seek comment on these bid removal and bid
withdrawal procedures.

In the *Part 1 Third Report and Order*, the Commission explained that
allowing bid withdrawals facilitates efficient aggregation of licenses
and the pursuit of efficient backup strategies as information becomes
available during the course of an auction. The Commission noted,
however, that, in some instances, bidders may seek to withdraw bids for
improper reasons. The Bureau, therefore, has discretion, in managing the
auction, to limit the number of withdrawals to prevent any bidding
abuses. The Commission stated that the Bureau should assertively
exercise its discretion, consider limiting the number of rounds in which
bidders may withdraw bids, and prevent bidders from bidding on a
particular market if the Bureau finds that a bidder is abusing the
Commission\'s bid withdrawal procedures.[^13]

Applying this reasoning, we propose to limit each bidder in Auction No.
31 to withdraw standing high bids in no more than two rounds during the
course of the auction. To permit a bidder to withdraw bids in more than
two rounds would likely encourage insincere bidding or the use of
withdrawals for anti-competitive strategic purposes. The two rounds in
which withdrawals are utilized will be at the bidder\'s discretion;
withdrawals otherwise must be in accordance with the Commission\'s
rules. There is no limit on the number of standing high bids that may be
withdrawn in either of the rounds in which withdrawals are utilized.
Withdrawals will remain subject to the bid withdrawal payment provisions
specified in the Commission\'s rules. We seek comment on this proposal.

### Special 30 MHz Nationwide Bid Withdrawal Procedure

#### Nationwide Bidders

Additionally, for the licenses being offered in Auction No. 31, we
recognize that there may be entities whose business plans are such that
they may not wish to acquire any licenses if they are unable to
aggregate them all. Our current rules are designed to facilitate the
aggregation of licenses, and we believe they are adequate to facilitate
the aggregation of all the 10 MHz or all 20 MHz licenses or any subset
thereof. The bid withdrawal provisions of our Part 1 rules could,
however, potentially discourage bidders from attempting a 30 MHz
nationwide aggregation in an auction where there are divergent business
plans. This is because, were such an aggregation attempt ultimately to
fail, a bidder might be left with a subset of licenses for which its
bids exceeded the value it places on that subset absent the complete
aggregation. The bidder would then be forced to withdraw any high bids
it holds and pay a bid withdrawal payment, or perhaps retain licenses
for which it cannot recoup the price paid. We therefore propose a
nationwide bid withdrawal procedure for the 747-762 MHz and 777-792 MHz
bands to limit the exposure of bidders seeking a 30 MHz nationwide
aggregation.

Bidders may still aggregate licenses subject to our standard bid
withdrawal provisions.[^14] The following proposed procedure would be
available, however, to limit the exposure associated with bid withdrawal
for those seeking a 30 MHz nationwide aggregation, while still
discouraging insincere bidding. Under this approach, an applicant would
be required to declare on its short-form application whether it is
seeking a 30 MHz nationwide aggregation and wishes to be subject to the
nationwide bid withdrawal provisions. **An applicant that chooses to be
such a nationwide bidder would not be allowed to bid on anything other
than all licenses comprising the 30 MHz nationwide aggregation, and must
win either this nationwide aggregation or no licenses at all.**
(However, in any given round, the bidder would not be required to place
new bids on any licenses for which it is the standing high bidder.)
**Thus, once such a nationwide bidder withdraws from a market, it must
withdraw from all markets and will be ineligible to continue bidding for
any licenses.**

The bid withdrawal payment for a 30 MHz nationwide bidder that withdraws
from the auction would be calculated as the difference between the sum
of the withdrawn bids and the sum of the subsequent high bids on the
withdrawn licenses. Calculating the payment this way may result in a
payment that is lower than a payment calculated on a license-by-license
basis. In addition, nationwide bid withdrawal payments would be limited
to 5 percent of the aggregate withdrawn bids. The withdrawn licenses
would be offered in the next round at the second highest bid price,
which may be less than, or equal to, the amount of the withdrawn bid,
without any bid increment. The FCC would serve as the \"place holder\"
on the license until a new acceptable bid is submitted.

#### Eligibility Restoration

If a 30 MHz nationwide bidder were to withdraw, eligibility and waivers
for all other bidders would be restored to beginning auction levels,
except for those nationwide bidders that have withdrawn from the auction
by withdrawing their high bids. Without this restoration, few bidders
would likely be eligible to bid on licenses withdrawn late in the
auction.[^15] Finally, if the Bureau implements the bid withdrawal
procedure outlined here, it will suspend the Part 1 bid withdrawal rule
for those applicants that choose to become 30 MHz nationwide bidders. We
seek comment on this proposal.

## Stopping Rule

For Auction No. 31, the Bureau proposes to employ a simultaneous
stopping rule approach. The Bureau has discretion \"to establish
stopping rules before or during multiple round auctions in order to
terminate the auction within a reasonable time.\"[^16] A simultaneous
stopping rule means that all licenses remain open until the first round
in which no new acceptable bids, proactive waivers or withdrawals are
received. After the first such round, bidding closes simultaneously on
all licenses. Thus, unless circumstances dictate otherwise, bidding
would remain open on all licenses until bidding stops on every license.

The Bureau seeks comment on a modified version of the simultaneous
stopping rule. The modified stopping rule would close the auction for
all licenses after the first round in which no bidder submits a
proactive waiver, a withdrawal, or a new bid on any license on which it
is not the standing high bidder. Thus, absent any other bidding
activity, a bidder placing a new bid on a license for which it is the
standing high bidder would not keep the auction open under this modified
stopping rule. The Bureau further seeks comment on whether this modified
stopping rule should be used unilaterally or only in stage three of the
auction.

We propose that the Bureau retain the discretion to keep an auction open
even if no new acceptable bids or proactive waivers are submitted and no
previous high bids are withdrawn. In this event, the effect will be the
same as if a bidder had submitted a proactive waiver. The activity rule,
therefore, will apply as usual, and a bidder with insufficient activity
will either lose bidding eligibility or use a remaining activity rule
waiver.

Finally, we propose that the Bureau reserve the right to declare that
the auction will end after a specified number of additional rounds
(\"special stopping rule\"). If the Bureau invokes this special stopping
rule, it will accept bids in the final round(s) only for licenses on
which the high bid increased in at least one of the preceding specified
number of rounds. The Bureau proposes to exercise this option only in
certain circumstances, such as, for example, where the auction is
proceeding very slowly, there is minimal overall bidding activity, or it
appears likely that the auction will not close within a reasonable
period of time. Before exercising this option, the Bureau is likely to
attempt to increase the pace of the auction by, for example, moving the
auction into the next stage (where bidders would be required to maintain
a higher level of bidding activity), increasing the number of bidding
rounds per day, and/or increasing the amount of the minimum bid
increments for the limited number of licenses where there is still a
high level of bidding activity. We seek comment on these proposals.

# Conclusion

Comments are due on or before January 24, 2000, and reply comments are
due on or before January 31, 2000. An original and four copies of all
pleadings must be filed with the Commission\'s Secretary, Magalie Roman
Salas, Office of the Secretary, Federal Communications Commission, 445
Twelfth Street, S.W., TW-A325, Washington, DC 20054, in accordance with
Section 1.51(c) of the Commission\'s rules. See 47 C.F.R. § 1.51(c). In
addition, one copy of each pleading must be delivered to each of the
following locations: (1) the Commission\'s duplicating contractor,
International Transcription Service, Inc. (ITS), 1231 20th Street, N.W.,
Washington, DC 20036; (2) Office of Media Relations, Public Reference
Center, 445 Twelfth Street, S.W., Suite CY-A257, Washington, DC 20554;
(3) Amy Zoslov, Chief, Auctions and Industry Analysis Division, Wireless
Telecommunications Bureau, 445 Twelfth Street, Suite 4-A760, Washington,
DC 20554. Comments and reply comments will be available for public
inspection during regular business hours in the FCC Public Reference
Room, Room CY-A257, 445 12th Street S.W., Washington, D.C. 20554.

For further information concerning this proceeding, contact the Auctions
and Industry Analysis Division, Wireless Telecommunications Bureau,
Howard Davenport, Auctions Attorney, or Craig Bomberger, Auctions
Analyst, at (202) 418-0660; or Kathy Garland, Project Manager, at (717)
338-2888.

-- FCC

[^1]: *See* Service Rules for the 746-764 and 776-794 MHz Bands, and
    Revisions to Part 27 of the Commission's Rules, WT Docket No.
    99-168, *First Report and Order*, FCC 00-5 (rel. January 7, 2000)
    (\"*700 MHz First Report and Order*\").

[^2]: Section 3002(a)(E)(i), Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L.
    105-33, 111 Stat. 251 (1997) (\"Balanced Budget Act\").

[^3]: *See* Amendment of Part 1 of the Commission\'s Rules---Competitive
    Bidding Proceeding, WT Docket No. 97-82, *Order, Memorandum Opinion
    and Order, and Notice of Proposed Rule Making*, 12 FCC Rcd 5686,
    5697, ¶ 16 (1997) (\"*Part 1 Order*\") (\"We also clarify that
    pursuant to Section 0.131 of our rules, the Chief, Wireless
    Telecommunications Bureau, has delegated authority to implement all
    of the Commission\'s rules pertaining to auctions procedures\").

[^4]: *See* Amendment of Part 1 of the Commission\'s Rules \--
    Competitive Bidding Procedures, Allocation of Spectrum Below 5 GHz
    Transferred from Federal Government Use, 4660-4685 MHz, WT Docket
    No. 97-82, ET Docket No. 94-32, *Third Report and Order and Second
    Further Notice of Proposed Rule Making*, 13 FCC Rcd 374, 448, ¶ 124
    (1998) (\"*Part 1 Third Report and Order*\"). The Commission
    directed the Bureau to seek comment on specific mechanisms related
    to day-to-day auction conduct including, for example, the structure
    of bidding rounds and stages, establishment of minimum opening bids
    or reserve prices, minimum accepted bids, initial maximum
    eligibility for each bidder, activity requirements for each stage of
    the auction, activity rule waivers, criteria for determining
    reductions in eligibility, information regarding bid withdrawal and
    bid removal, stopping rules, and information relating to auction
    delay, suspension or cancellation. *Id.* at ¶ 125.

[^5]: *See 700 MHz First Report and Order* at ¶¶ 31, 39.

[^6]: *See Part 1 Order,* 12 FCC Rcd at 5697-98, ¶ 16 (1997).

[^7]: *See* Implementation of Section 309(j) of the Communications Act -
    Competitive Bidding, PP Docket No. 93-253, *Second Report and
    Order*, 9 FCC Rcd 2348, 2378-79, ¶¶ 171-176 (1994).

[^8]: See 47 C.F.R. § 1.2104(i).

[^9]: *See* Balanced Budget Act, Section 3002(a). The Commission\'s
    authority to establish a reserve price or minimum opening bid is set
    forth in 47 C.F.R. § 1.2104(c) and (d).

[^10]: *See* *Part 1 Third Report and Order,* 13 FCC Rcd at 454-455, ¶
    141 (1998).

[^11]: *S*e*e*, *e.g.*, Auction of 800 MHz SMR Upper 10 MHz Band,
    Minimum Opening Bids or Reserve Prices, DA 97-2147, *Order*, 12 FCC
    Rcd 16354 (1997); Auction of the Phase II 220 MHz Service Licenses,
    Auction Notice and Filing Requirements for 908 Licenses Consisting
    of Economic Area (EA), Economic Area Grouping (EAG), and Nationwide
    Licenses, Scheduled for September 15, 1998, Minimum Opening Bids and
    Other Procedural Issues, *Public Notice*, 13 FCC Rcd 16445 (1998).

[^12]: *See* 47 C.F.R. §§ 1.2104(g); 1.2109.

[^13]: *Part 1 Third Report and Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 460, ¶ 150.

[^14]: 47 C.F.R. § 1.2104(g).

[^15]: We adopted a similar rule for the General Wireless Communications
    Service. *See* Allocation of Spectrum Below 5 GHz Transferred from
    Federal Government Use, ET Docket No. 94-32, *Second Report and
    Order*, 11 FCC Rcd 624, 652-53, ¶¶ 71-73 (1995).

[^16]: 47 C.F.R. § 1.2104(e).