**STATEMENT OF**

**CHAIRMAN MICHAEL K. POWELL**

*Re: 2002 Biennial Regulatory Review -- Review of the Commission's
Broadcast Ownership Rules and Other Rules Adopted Pursuant to Section
202 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996.*

***I. INTRODUCTION***

The *Order* we adopt today represents the culmination of a twenty month
process that was required by the framework Congress crafted in the 1996
Telecommunications Act.[^1] In the now infamous section 202(h), Congress
ordered the Commission to review its broadcast ownership regulations
every two years to "determine whether any of such rules are necessary in
the public interest *as a result of competition*." Further, we must
"repeal or modify any regulation" we determine no longer serves the
public interest in its current form.[^2]

Against this statutory mandate, the Commission has been working
tirelessly towards achieving three critically important goals: (1)
Reinstating legally enforceable broadcast ownership limits that promote
diversity, localism and competition (replacing those that have been
struck down by the courts); (2) Building modern rules that take proper
account of the explosion of new media outlets for news, information and
entertainment, rather than perpetuate the graying rules of a bygone
black and white era; and (3) Striking a careful balance that does not
unduly limit transactions that promote the public interest, while
ensuring that no company can monopolize the medium. I am confident we
achieved these goals in the *Order* we adopt today.

I must punctuate one irreducible point: Keeping the rules exactly as
they are, as some so stridently suggest, was not a viable option.
Without today's surgery, the rules would assuredly have met a swift
death. As the only member of the Commission here during the last
biennial review, I watched first hand as the Commission bent to
political pressure and left many rules unchanged. Nearly all were
rejected by the court because of our failure to apply the statute
faithfully. I have been committed to not repeating that error, for I
believe the stakes are perilously high. Leaving things unaltered,
regardless of changes in the competitive landscape, is a course that
only Congress can legitimately chart.

***II. STATUTORY MANDATE AND COURT DECISIONS***

Critical to understanding our actions, is an understanding of the
court's view of Congress' charge to the Commission in the 1996
Telecommunications Act. In *Fox*, the D.C. Circuit held that *"Congress
set in motion a process to deregulate the structure of the broadcast and
cable television industries*."[^3]

It noted in support that in the 1996 Act, Congress:

-   Repealed the statutory telephone/cable cross-ownership ban;

-   Repealed the statutory cable/broadcast cross-ownership ban;

-   Repealed the limits on cable/network cross-ownership;

-   Eliminated the national ownership restrictions in radio;

-   Relaxed the local ownership restrictions in radio;

-   Eased the "Dual Network" rule;

-   Directed the Commission to eliminate the national cap upon the
    number of television stations any one entity may own; and

-   Directed the Commission to increase the national television
    ownership cap from 25 percent to 35 percent.[^4]

As to the biennial review provision, the court stated clearly that the
Commission was required by Congress "*to continue the process of
deregulation"* by reviewing each of the Commission's ownership rules
every two years.[^5] It is this Congressional framework that guides the
Commission's work, and it was the prior Commission's attempt to maintain
rules in their current form and not heed the Congressional direction
that led to so many of our broadcast rules being struck down, or
remanded. As an administrative agency, the Commission is
constitutionally bound to comply with Congress' direction, as expressed
by the text of the statute.[^6]

Recent court decisions have established a high hurdle for the Commission
to maintain a given broadcast ownership regulation. As interpreted by
the D. C. Circuit in the 2002 *Fox* and *Sinclair* cases, Section 202(h)
requires the Commission to study and report on the *current* status of
competition.[^7] Indeed, the court's guidance suggests that the survival
of any prospective broadcast ownership rule depends on this
Commission\'s ability to justify those rules adequately with record
evidence in light of the current competitive landscape, and to ensure
that the rules are analytically consistent with each other. The
implications of the court decisions were clear---failure to justify the
necessity of any broadcast ownership rule will result in the rule being
struck down.

Given the court's requirement that we consider the current competitive
market, keeping all of the rules in their current form simply could not
be justified as "*necessary in the public interest."* Those rules failed
to account for the dramatic changes in the media landscape over the last
several decades, and suffered from inconsistency and incoherency that
could not be squared with the statute or the court decisions without
modification.

***III. FCC PROCEDURAL ACTION***

The court admonitions demonstrated the need to rebuild our decaying
broadcast ownership regulations from the ground up. Like any
reconstruction project, our task began with the need to lay a solid
foundation to support our structural regulations. Our cement was not the
blind intuitions of generations past---but facts that would lay the
foundation for a sustainable set of broadcast ownership regulations
built around, and for, today\'s media marketplace.

Because of the critically important nature of this proceeding, we set
out to lay this foundation by embarking on an exhaustive review, indeed
the most comprehensive in the agency\'s history. It began in earnest 20
months ago when I created the Media Ownership Working Group, which
commissioned twelve studies, examining how Americans use the media for
different purposes and how media markets function. This was the first
time the agency actually sought out the American people to see how they
access news. The group\'s work formed the initial foundation of our
review. More importantly, those studies signaled that this review,
unlike prior ones, would be rigorous, analytically consistent and based
on record evidence.

For the first time, we took on the challenge of updating and reconciling
years of piecemeal, decades old, ownership regulations in a rigorous and
comprehensive way. We put out five *Notices of Proposed Rulemakings* and
*Public Notices*[^8] during that time and gave the public over fifteen
months of open comment time to assist the Commission in its
fact-gathering efforts. Approximately ten public fora were held on the
subject, thanks in large measure to the efforts of Commissioners Copps
and Adelstein, who could then bring those perspectives to the
Commission's internal deliberations.

I am enormously pleased the public accepted our challenge. The record in
this proceeding is deeper and more insightful than any I have seen in my
six years of service at the Commission. I take pride in the fact that
our decisions rest on an extraordinarily strong empirical record. For
the agency charged with preserving the free flow of information in our
democracy, the public should expect no less from us.

***IV. THE MODERN MEDIA MARKETPLACE***

Our fact-gathering effort demonstrated that today\'s media marketplace
is marked by abundance. Since 1960 there has been an explosion of media
outlets throughout the country. Even in small towns like Burlington,
Vermont, the number of voices---including cable, satellite radio, TV
stations and newspapers has increased over 250 percent during the last
40 years. Independent ownership of those outlets is also far more
diverse, with 140 percent more owners today than in 1960.[^9]

In 1960---the \"Golden Age of Television\"---if you missed the ½ hour
evening newscast, you were out of luck. In 1980, it was no different.
But today, news and public affairs programming---the fuel of our
democratic society---is overflowing. There used to be three broadcast
networks, each with 30 minutes of news daily. Today, there are *three 24
hour all-news networks*, seven broadcast networks, and over 300 cable
networks. And local broadcasters are bringing the American public more
local news than at any point in history.

What does this abundance mean for the American people? It means more
programming, more choice and more control in the hands of citizens. At
any given moment our citizens have access to scores of TV networks
devoted to movies, dramatic series, sports, news and educational
programming, both for adults and children. In short, niche programming
to satisfy almost any of our citizens\' diverse tastes. Americans are
clearly responding to this plethora of choice, as over 85 percent of
television households now pay for either cable or direct broadcast
satellite service providers.[^10] This dramatic shift is evidenced by
the fact that in 2000, for the first time in history, cable TV
programming exceeded the prime time viewing of broadcast television, and
in 2002 \-- another first \-- cable viewing exceeded 50 percent of the
prime time audience.[^11]

The Internet is also having a profound impact on the ever-increasing
desire of our citizenry to inform themselves and to do so using a wide
variety of sources. Google news service (http://news.google.com) brings
information from 4,500 news sources to one\'s finger tips from around
the world, all with the click of a mouse. As demonstrated by this
proceeding, diverse and antagonistic voices use the Internet daily to
reach the American people. Whether it is the *New York Times* editorial
page, Slate Magazine (http://slate.msn.com), or Joe Citizen using email
to let his views be known to the Commission, or the use by organizations
such as MoveOn.org[^12] to perform outreach to citizens, the Internet is
putting the tools of democracy in the hands of speakers and listeners
more and more each day.

I have not cited cable television and the Internet by accident. Their
contribution to the marketplace of ideas is not linear, it is
exponential. Cable and the Internet explode the model for viewpoint
diversity in the media. Diversity-by-appointment has vanished. Now, the
media makes itself available on *our* schedule, as much or as little as
we want, when we want. In sum, citizens have more choice and more
control over what they see, hear or read, than at any other time in
history. Indeed, the greatest challenge for speakers is getting the
attention of an increasingly fragmented audience of viewers and
listeners. This is a powerful paradigm shift in the American media
system, and it is having a tremendous impact on our democracy.

V.  ***THE PUBLIC INTEREST REMAINS PROTECTED***

The marketplace changes mentioned above were only the beginning, not the
end of our inquiry. In this *Order,* the Commission has, for the first
time, more precisely defined our policy goals and developed metrics to
actually measure market responsiveness to those goals. We adopted a more
sophisticated way to measure the competitiveness of media markets; the
robustness of the marketplace of ideas; and the responsiveness of
broadcasters to local needs. The new broadcast ownership limits adopted
today, are carefully balanced to foster a vibrant marketplace of ideas,
promote vigorous competition and ensure that broadcasters continue to
serve the interests of their local communities.

The most important public interest benefit, however, is that we have
reinstated meaningful limits that are once again enforceable - the
existing rules largely having been taken out of action, suffering from
their judicially-delivered wounds. And, I believe we faithfully
implemented the Congressional scheme.

***A. Protecting Viewpoint Diversity***

Today, we strongly reaffirm our core value of limiting broadcast
ownership to promote viewpoint diversity. The Commission, recognizing
that \"the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and
antagonistic sources is essential to the welfare of the public,\"
continues to rely on the preservation of multiple independent owners as
the best way to ensure a robust exchange of news, information and ideas
among Americans.[^13]

As discussed in detail below, we developed a "Diversity Index" to more
precisely define viewpoint diversity. The Index is "consumer centric,"
in that it is built on data about how Americans use different media to
obtain news and information. Thus, while recognizing that viewpoint
diversity is as elusive as it is cherished, we have developed this
methodological tool to more coherently and systematically analyze the
marketplace of ideas.

***B. Enhancing Competition***

Our new broadcast ownership regulations reaffirm our long standing
commitment to promoting competition by ensuring pro-competitive market
structures. Although the primary concern of antitrust analysis is
ensuring economic efficiency through the operation of a competitive
market structure, we found the Commission's public interest standard
brings a closer focus to the American public. Thus, we have a public
interest responsibility to ensure that broadcasting markets remain
competitive so that the benefits of competition, including lower prices,
innovation and improved service are made available to Americans.

To measure the competitiveness of the media market, we recognize that
cable and satellite TV compete with traditional over-the-air
broadcasting. We also found that pro-competitive ownership limits must
account for the fact that broadcast TV revenue relies exclusively on
advertising; whereas cable and satellite TV services have both
advertising and subscription revenue streams.

***C. Localism Affirmed as Important Policy Goal***

We again affirm the goal of promoting localism through limits on
ownership of broadcast outlets. We sought to promote localism to the
greatest extent possible through broadcast ownership limits that are
aligned with stations' incentives to serve the needs and interests of
their local communities.

To analyze localism in broadcasting markets, we relied on two measures;
local stations' selection of programming that is responsive to local
needs and interests, and local news quantity and quality. Program
selection is an important function of broadcast television licensees and
the record contains data on how different types of station owners
perform. A second measure of localism is the quantity and quality of
local news and public affairs programming by different types of
television station owners.

***D. Importance of Promoting Minority and Female Ownership***

We embrace our longstanding objective of encouraging greater ownership
of broadcast stations by women and minorities. We further this objective
by creating greater opportunities for new entrants in the broadcasting
industry by carving out special transactional opportunities for small
businesses, many of which are owned by minorities and women.

In addition, Minority Media Telecommunications Council made a number of
creative and thoughtful proposals to advance minority and female
ownership. These recommendations warrant a more thorough exploration;
thus, I am pleased we have referred them for a Further Notice of
Proposed Rule Making and to the Advisory Committee on Diversity to
recommend policies that will withstand judicial scrutiny.

***VI. LOCAL AND NATIONAL REGULATORY FRAMEWORK WILL PROMOTE DIVERSITY,
COMPETITION, AND LOCALISM***

The modified ownership rules we adopt today provide a new comprehensive
national and local regulatory framework that will serve the public
interest by promoting diversity, localism and competition. The local
character of broadcast stations is a hallmark of the American media
system. The *Order* modifies the local television ownership rule;
strengthens the local radio ownership rule by modifying the local radio
market definition; adopts a set of cross-media limits to replace the
newspaper/broadcast and radio/television cross ownership rules; modifies
the national television ownership rule; and retains the dual network
rule.

***A. Local TV and Radio Limits Enhance Competition and Preserve
Viewpoint Diversity***

Our new local television and local radio limits, for example, are both
premised on well-established competition theory and are intended to
preserve healthy and robust competition among broadcasters in each
service. The rules rest on the antitrust principle that six independent,
equally-sized firms in a market generally will protect competition. In
smaller markets, we recognize the need to strike a different balance
that permits somewhat greater consolidation among radio and television
stations.

We determined that our prior local television multiple ownership rule
could not be justified as necessary to promote competition because it
failed to reflect the significant competition now faced by local
broadcasters from cable and satellite TV services. Our revised local
television limit is the *first* TV ownership rule to acknowledge that
competition. This new rule will enhance competition in local markets by
allowing broadcast television stations to compete more effectively not
only against other broadcast stations, but also against cable and/or
satellite channels in that local market. In addition, the record
demonstrates that these same market combinations will serve the public
interest through improved or expanded services such as local news and
public affairs programming and facilitating the transition to digital
television.

Because of the enduring competitive strength of the top four stations in
virtually all markets, we prohibited mergers among stations ranked in
the top four. Importantly, this ban will also promote viewpoint
diversity by preventing mergers among those local stations that
typically produce news in local markets.

We also found that our current limits on local radio ownership continue
to be necessary to promote competition among local radio stations and we
reaffirm the caps set forth by Congress in the 1996 Telecommunications
Act. The *Order* tightens the radio rules in one important respect---we
concluded that the current method for defining radio markets was not in
the public interest and thus needed to be modified. We found the current
definition for radio markets which relies on the signal contour of the
commonly owned stations, is unsound and produces anomalous and
irrational results, undermining the purpose of the rule. We therefore
adopted a geographic based market definition, which is a more rational
means for protecting competition in local markets. For example, we fixed
the vaunted case of Minot, North Dakota. The number of stations in Minot
will be reduced by 65% under our reformed market definition, thereby
limiting the number any single entity can own.

By promoting competition through the local television and radio rules,
the Commission recognized that the rules may result in a number of
situations where current ownership arrangements exceed ownership limits.
In such cases we made a limited exception to permit sales of
grandfathered station combinations to small businesses, many of which
are minority or female owned.

Finally, by ensuring that numerous competitors remain within each of the
radio and television services, we also ensure that multiple
independently owned outlets for viewpoint diversity will remain in every
local market. Because local TV and radio ownership limits cannot protect
against losses in diversity that might result from combinations of
different media, we adopt the cross-media limits discussed below.

***B. Cross Media Limits Promote Diversity and Localism***

The agency's most challenging consistency issue in this proceeding was
viewpoint diversity. The *Sinclair* court criticized as facially
inconsistent the Commission's two separate "voice" tests for two
different broadcast ownership rules.[^14] Under the Local Television
Rule, the Commission considered only other television stations to be
"voices," whereas the TV-Radio Cross-Ownership Rule considered
television stations, radio stations, the local cable system, and each
daily newspaper to be a "voice."[^15] The court directed the Commission
to reconcile the inconsistency between the two "voice" tests.[^16]

The Commission has sought to do this by developing and applying a
Diversity Index (DI) to its broadcast ownership rules. The DI is modeled
on the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) used by antitrust authorities to
measure the degree of concentration in a given economic market. The DI
seeks to measure concentration in local media markets using many of the
same principles as the HHI -- identifying market participants, assigning
market shares, and squaring those market shares to arrive at a measure
of concentration.

The principal shortcoming of our prior diversity analysis was the
failure to capture in a reasonable way the relative importance of
different outlets for purposes of viewpoint diversity. For example, the
television-radio cross ownership rule considered each outlet in a city
to be exactly equal, while the local TV ownership rule looked only to
the number of television stations in the local market. Both formulations
are clearly flawed - one equates the viewpoint impact of a small AM
station in Washington, DC with the viewpoint impact of the *Washington
Post*. The other blinds itself to all sources of diversity other than
local broadcast television stations.

Our Diversity Index dramatically improves upon those frameworks by
assigning weights to different outlet types. The weights are based on
the results of an agency-commissioned survey of 3,000 Americans
regarding the relative importance of different outlets for news.[^17]
Beyond that, the Index counts the number of each type of outlet in the
market in calculating the extent of viewpoint "concentration" in a
market. It does not attempt to capture the specific viewpoint impact of
different outlet types by looking to the outlet's content, which can
fluctuate in type and popularity from year to year. Instead it seeks
only to distinguish between the relative speech power of different
classes of media -- radio, newspapers, broadcast television stations,
the Internet, etc. In weighting different outlets according to their
relative value to citizens, the DI provides the Commission with a far
more consistent and rational metric for evaluating each ownership limit
and, where necessary, establishing new limits.

Using the DI, we concluded that neither the blanket ban on
newspaper-broadcast combinations nor the radio-television
cross-ownership prohibition could be justified as necessary in the
public interest in light of the abundance of diverse sources available
to citizens for their news consumption. Furthermore, the clear public
interest benefits of these combinations were revealed by evidence in the
record. We found that greater participation by newspaper publishers in
the television and radio business would actually enhance, not harm,
diversity and localism. The record demonstrated that where
newspaper-broadcast television combinations were allowed, those
televisions stations have produced dramatically better news coverage in
terms of quantity (over 50 percent more news) and quality (outpacing
non-newspaper owned television stations in news awards).[^18]

Therefore, we replaced the television-radio and newspaper-broadcast
rules with a set of Cross-Media Limits. These limits are designed to
protect viewpoint diversity by ensuring that no company, or group of
companies, can control an inordinate share of media outlets in a local
market. We established these limits by using the DI to measure the
availability of key media outlets in markets of various sizes. We
concluded that there were three tiers of markets in terms of "viewpoint
diversity" concentration, each warranting different regulatory
treatment.

***C. The Modified National Cap Protects Localism and the Dual Network
Prohibition Protects Localism and Competition***

We found that a national TV ownership limit on the percentage of
potential TV households the networks may reach continues to be necessary
to promote localism. We determined that a national ownership cap serves
localism by preserving a balance of bargaining power between the
networks and their affiliates; ensuring the affiliates play a meaningful
role in the selection of programming that serves the interests of their
local audiences. Although the record supports retention of a national
ownership limit, it does not support a cap of 35 percent.

Record data showed the 35 percent limit did not have any meaningful
effect on the negotiating power between individual networks and their
affiliates with respect to program-by-program preemption levels. The
record revealed that affiliates of the largest network-owners (CBS and
Fox, at 39 percent and 38 percent national reach respectively) preempt
to an equal or greater extent than do affiliates of ABC, with a national
reach of only 23 percent.[^19] Thus, networks with the greatest station
reach possess no greater bargaining power with regard to preemption than
the network with the smallest station reach.

The record also indicates that the national cap at its current level has
other drawbacks as well. We found the national cap restrains the
networks from serving additional communities with more local news and
public affairs programming. Network owned-and-operated stations served
their local communities better with respect to news production, as those
stations aired more local news programming than the affiliates.[^20]
Furthermore, we concluded that permitting the networks a modest amount
of growth will enable them to compete more effectively with cable and
satellite TV operators and may reduce the migration of expensive
programming to their cable networks.

In balancing these competing interests, we concluded that the national
ownership limit should be raised from 35 percent to a 45 percent limit.
In reaching this decision, we attempted to balance the record evidence
which demonstrates the affiliates apply positive pressure to the
networks, making them more responsive on a local level, against the
network owned stations' documented contribution to local news, as well
as the public interest benefit of keeping high quality programming on
free over the air TV. The court has recognized that setting caps is
inherently a line drawing exercise and held that "the Commission 'has
wide discretion to determine where to draw administrative lines,' and,
therefore, the court will reverse that choice only for abuse of
discretion.\"[^21] We draw the line at 45 percent, as it approximates an
equal measure of potential audience reach between networks and
affiliates.

We also decided to maintain the "UHF Discount" when calculating a
company's national reach because it currently serves the public
interest.  First, more than 40 million Americans still access only free,
over-the-air television. Second, evidence in the record demonstrates
that UHF stations have a smaller signal reach of approximately 44 miles;
whereas VHF stations have a reach between 72 and 76 miles.[^22] This has
a very real impact on UHF stations\' ability to compete. The VHF
stations' competitive advantage is also evidenced by the fact that VHF
affiliates of the top four broadcast networks have approximately 50
percent higher ratings than UHF affiliates of the top four
networks.[^23] Third, the UHF Discount has promoted the entry of new
broadcast networks into the market.  These new networks have improved
consumer choice and program diversity for all Americans, including those
with and without cable and satellite TV service.  We concluded though,
that when the transition to digital television is complete, the UHF
discount will be eliminated for the stations owned by the four largest
broadcast networks.   We will determine, in a future biennial review,
whether to include any other networks and station group owners in the
UHF discount sunset.  We drew this distinction to ensure that the
resolution of the UHF discount issue will properly account for the goal
of encouraging the formation of new, over-the-air broadcast networks.

We also found the existing dual network prohibition continues to be
necessary to promote competition in the national television advertising
and program acquisition markets. The rule also promotes localism by
preserving the balance of negotiating power between networks and
affiliates. In addition, an aspect of bargaining power is the ability of
an affiliate to switch affiliation if its needs are not being met by the
network. A merger of two or more networks would reduce the opportunity
for affiliates to go elsewhere.

***VII. CONCLUSION***

This critical review has been an exhaustive one. The Commission has
struggled with a difficult conundrum; building an adequate record,
satisfying the administrative burden of the Section 202(h) mandate, and
ultimately justifying its rules before the courts that have expressed
growing impatience with irrational and indefensible ownership rules.
Five years ago, at the outset of the last completed biennial review, I
stated \"\[i\]t is indeed time to take a sober and realistic look at our
broadcast ownership rules in light of the current competitive
communications environment.\"[^24] This was an exceedingly difficult
charge and I am proud that we have finally met this challenge head on.

I recognize, too, that by doing so we have forced an important debate
about media regulation and the role of media in our society, a debate I
welcome and encourage. I note, however, that much of the discussion (and
hyperbole) has focused almost exclusively on content, not the structural
broadcast ownership rules that are the subject of this proceeding. Much
has been made about violent television, sexually explicit content, and
"bland" or "coarse" programming. All of this anxiety about TV fare has
been rolled into this proceeding as an indictment against media
companies. Apparently, the notion seems to be that if we don't like the
programming being aired, we can cure the problem by regulating the size
and structure of broadcast television and radio. This, in my view, is
not only a mistaken assumption, but is dangerously offensive to the
principles of the First Amendment. As public officials we are not, nor
should we be, empowered to adopt "must watch regulation."

It is easy to ridicule what we see on television and hear on the radio
(or pine for what is absent) as the drivel dished out by corporate
titans. It is less palatable to do so when one peers through this
portrait and sees instead an indictment of the freely made program
selections of our citizens. Put simply, a television company makes money
by putting on programming that attracts the largest audience share
possible. This is the inherent nature of the "mass media." We have heard
much about five media companies controlling virtually everything we
watch, hear and read. If this were true, I too would be alarmed. This
statistic, however, has been purposely misstated to create hysteria
around this proceeding. The truth is the "Big Five" control only 25
percent of the *channel capacity*, or an average of five percent each.
These companies' alleged

assault against the public interest is that they happen to produce the
majority of programming that people like to watch. Apparently though,
this is the same programming that some find objectionable and prefer we
not see. In my view, popular freely chosen programming is not a policy
question and the American public would undoubtedly find it deeply
troubling that unelected government officials would want to make these
decisions on their behalf.

The government has a legitimate interest in promoting a wide range of
viewpoints from which to choose, but it strays illegitimately if it
endeavors to regulate out of distaste for the viewpoints, or programs
around which the populace has chosen to congregate. To urge the
Commission to do so, as many at bottom have, would re-awaken King
George. This would surely disturb the slumber of our forefathers.

[^1]: Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996).

[^2]: *Id.* at Section 202(h).

[^3]: *Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC*, 280 F.3d 1027, 1033 (D.C.
    Cir. 2002).

[^4]: *Id.*

[^5]: *Id.* (emphasis added)

[^6]: *See Bowen v. Georgetown University Hospital*, 488 U.S. 204, 208
    (1988).

[^7]: See *Fox Television Stations, Inc.*, 280 F.3d 1027 (D.C. Cir.
    2002); *See also* *Sinclair Broadcast Group, Inc. v. FCC*, 284 F.3d
    148 (D.C. Cir. 2002).

[^8]: *Rules and Policies Concerning Multiple Ownership of Radio
    Broadcast Stations in Local Markets*, 16 FCC Rcd 19861 (2001). 47
    C.F.R. § 73.3555(a); *Cross-Ownership of Broadcast Stations and
    Newspapers*, 16 FCC Rcd 17283 (2001). 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555(d); *2002
    Biennial Regulatory Review---Review of the Commission's Broadcast
    Ownership Rules and Other Rules Adopted Pursuant to Section 202 of
    the Telecommunications Act of 1996*, 17 FCC Rcd 26294 (2002); *FCC
    Seeks Comment on Ownership Studies Released by Media Ownership
    Working Group and Establishes Comment Deadlines for 2002 Biennial
    Regulatory Review of Commission's Ownership Rules,* 17 FCC Rcd 19140
    (2002); *FCC Media Bureau Adopts Procedures for Public Access to
    Data Underlying Media Ownership Studies and Extends Comment
    Deadlines for 2002 Biennial Regulatory Review of Commission's Media
    Ownership Rules*, 17 FCC Rcd 22172 (2002).

[^9]: See Scott Roberts, Jane Frenette and Dione Sterns, Federal
    Communications Commission (Media Ownership Working Group Study \#
    1), *A Comparison of Media Outlets and Owners for Ten Selected
    Markets: 1960, 1980, 2000*, Sept. 2002.

[^10]: *Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in the Market for
    the Delivery of Video Programming[, ]{.smallcaps}*17 FCC Rcd. 26,901
    (2002) at 3.

[^11]: *Id.* at 5.

[^12]: "MoveOn is a catalyst for a new kind of grassroots involvement,
    supporting busy but concerned citizens in finding their political
    voice. Our international network of more than 2,000,000 online
    activists is one of the most effective and responsive outlets for
    democratic participation available today." (visited June 18, 2003)
    \<http://www.moveon.org/about/#s1\>.

[^13]: *Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC*, 512 U.S. 622, 663-64
    (1994).

[^14]: *See Sinclair Broadcast Group, Inc.*, 284 F.3d at 164.

[^15]: *See* *1998 Biennial Regulatory Review*, Biennial Review Report,
    15 FCC Rcd 11058 (2000).

[^16]: *See Sinclair Broadcast Group, Inc.*, 284 F.3d at 164.

[^17]: *See* Federal Communications Commission (Media Ownership Working
    Group Study \# 8), *Consumer Survey on Media Usage*, Sept. 2002.

[^18]: See Thomas C. Spavins, Loretta Dennison, Jane Frenette and Scott
    Roberts, Federal Communications Commission (Media Ownership Working
    Group Study \# 7), *The Measurement of Local Television News* and
    *Public Affairs Programs*, Sept. 2002.

[^19]: *2002* *Biennial Regulatory Review---Review of the Commission's
    Broadcast Ownership Rules and Other Rules Adopted Pursuant to
    Section 202 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, National
    Ownership Rules*, adopted June 2, 2003 at ¶ 583.

[^20]: *Id.* at ¶ ¶ 565-566.

[^21]: *Sinclair Broadcasting Group, Inc.*, 284 F.3d at 162 (citing *AT&
    T Corp. v. FCC*, 220 F.3d 607, 627 (D.C. Cir. 2000)).

[^22]: *2002 Biennial Regulatory Review*, *supra* note 19, ¶ 586.

[^23]: Letter from John Feore, Counsel for Paxson Communications
    Corporation, to Marlene Dortch, Secretary, FCC (May 7, 2003), Att.
    at 9 (stating that VHF-based affiliates received a 9.6 prime time
    rating compared to UHF affiliates' 6.4 rating).

[^24]: Separate statement from Michael Powell, *Federal Communications
    Commission*, regarding the *1998 Biennial Regulatory Review---Review
    of the Commission's Broadcast Ownership Rules and other Rules
    Adopted Pursuant to Section 202 of the Telecommunications Act of
    1996* (Mar. 12, 1998)
    \<http://www.fcc.gov/commissioners/powell/mkp_statements_1998.html\>.