Session No. 12

Course Title: Theory, Principles and Fundamentals of Hazards, Disasters,
and U.S.

Emergency Management

Session Title: Approaches to Emergency Management

Time: 1 Hour

**Objectives:**

12.1 To define the stereotypical emergency manager and contrast the
stereotype with the emergency manager of today.

12.2 To define the two predominant approaches to emergency management in
the United States and determine the possible implications of each.

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**Scope:**

To begin this session, the professor relates the two models of emergency
management that were discussed in the prior session to possible
approaches that an emergency manager may take to accomplishing his or
her duties. The focus turns to the degree of professionalism of the
manager and its implications, regardless of which model is followed. The
students discuss the stereotypes that have applied to the role of
emergency managers in the past and contrast the stereotypes to the
current evolution toward professionalism in the field. The discussion
includes the characteristics and some of the abilities of "today's
emergency manager." The professor concludes this section by making the
point that a professional emergency manager is one who seeks a balance
between the social vulnerability and technocratic approaches to
emergency management. The students then seek to define these two
predominant approaches by contrasting their characteristics. The
professor points out the implications of both approaches, and the
session concludes with a discussion of the value of the vulnerability
approach and how emergency managers may begin to implement this
approach.
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**Suggested Student Homework Reading Assignment:**

Blanchard, B. Wayne, PhD, CEM. "The new role of higher education in
emergency management," *Journal of Emergency Management*. Vol. 1., No.
2, Summer, 2003.

Blanchard, B. Wayne, PhD, CEM. *Higher Education Project* (PowerPoint
slide presentation). Department of Homeland Security, Emergency
Management Institute. August 14, 2003.
<http://training.fema.gov/emiweb/downloads/highedbrief_course2.ppt>

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**Instructor Reading:**

Drabek, Thomas E. 2003. Social Dimensions of Disaster, 2^nd^ Edition.
Session 27: Disaster Inequalities. Emmitsburg, Maryland: Emergency
Management Institute, Federal Emergency Management Agency.
[http://training.fema.gov/emiweb/edu/SocialDD.asp.]{.underline}

Enarson, Elaine, with Cheryl Childers, Betty Hearn Morrow, Deborah
Thomas, and Ben Wisner. 2003. *A Social Vulnerability Approach to
Disasters*. Emmitsburg, Maryland: Emergency Management Institute,
Federal Emergency Management Agency.
[http://training.fema.gov/emiweb/edu/completeCourses.asp]{.underline}.

Morrow, Betty Hearn and Elaine Enarson. 1996. "Hurricane Andrew Through
Women's Eyes: Issues and Recommendations." *International Journal of
Mass Emergencies and Disasters* 14 (1): 1-22.

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#### General Requirements:

PowerPoint slides have been prepared to support this session. The
session is not dependent upon the utilization of these visual aids. They
are provided as a tool that the professor is free to use as PowerPoints
or overhead transparencies.

Objective 12.1 To define the stereotypical emergency manager and
contrast the stereotype with the emergency manager of today.

*You may wish to introduce this session by reminding the class briefly
about the Emergency Services Model and the Public Administration Model
of emergency management that were discussed in the previous session. Ask
the students if they think that operating in either model (or a model
somewhere in between) determines the emergency manager's approach or
affects the way the job is done. What might have more influence than a
particular model on the approach that one takes toward emergency
management?*

-   Regardless of which model of emergency management is operating,
    **the degree of professionalism** of today's emergency managers can
    influence the approach one takes and how the approach best serves
    the community overall.

-   To understand how the profession itself is evolving toward that end,
    it is useful to look at the emergency manager stereotype---the way
    of the past. The following are some of the characteristics of that
    type of emergency manager:

+---------------------------------+------------------------------------+
| **Emergency Manager             |                                    |
| Stereotype:**                   |                                    |
|                                 |                                    |
| **The Way of the Past**         |                                    |
+---------------------------------+------------------------------------+
| -   Not college educated (no    | -   Has minimal access to top      |
|     4-year degree)              |     decision-makers                |
+---------------------------------+------------------------------------+
| -   White middle- to            | -   Has not done a:                |
|     late-middle aged            |                                    |
+---------------------------------+------------------------------------+
| -   EM is second or third       | -   Risk assessment                |
|     career                      |                                    |
+---------------------------------+------------------------------------+
| -   Bureaucratic                | -   Mitigation plan                |
+---------------------------------+------------------------------------+
| -   Isolated from community     | -   Strategic plan                 |
|     served                      |                                    |
+---------------------------------+------------------------------------+
| -   Job was obtained other than | -   Does not read disaster         |
|     with EM competencies        |     research literature            |
+---------------------------------+------------------------------------+
| -   EM career in spent in one   | -   Is neither well paid nor well  |
|     jurisdiction                |                                    |
|                                 |     funded                         |
+---------------------------------+------------------------------------+
| -   Disaster response planning  | -   Operates with a knowledge base |
|     orientation:                |     that is:                       |
+---------------------------------+------------------------------------+
| -   Reactive                    | -   Experiential (learns on the    |
|                                 |     job)                           |
| -   Command and control style   |                                    |
|                                 | -   By consensus (with others who  |
| -   Works primarily with        |     learned on the job)            |
|     emergency services          |                                    |
|                                 | -   Based primarily on past        |
|                                 |     practice                       |
+---------------------------------+------------------------------------+
| -   Plans *for* (not            | -   Has not joined an EM           |
|     cooperatively *with*) peers |     professional association       |
|     in jurisdiction:            |                                    |
+---------------------------------+------------------------------------+
| -   Plans are primarily         | -   Is resistant to change         |
|     disaster-response oriented  |                                    |
+---------------------------------+------------------------------------+

*Adapted from Blanchard, 2002.*

-   The good news, however, is that the world is in the midst of an
    emergency management evolution.

    "The field of emergency management is finding new tools to manage
    hazards and to deal with disasters; it is professionalizing and
    promises to become one of the most challenging occupations in
    government." (Stanley and Waugh, 2001)[^1]

-   In contrast to the stereotype of the past, then, the new generation
    emergency managers will have characteristics such as those below:

+----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+
| **New Generation Emergency       |                                   |
| Managers**                       |                                   |
+----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+
| -   College educated, many with  | -   Emphasizes social             |
|     EM degrees                   |     vulnerability reduction       |
+----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+
| -   More professional and        | -   Programmatically rooted in EM |
|     knowledgeable                |     fundamentals:                 |
+----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+
| -   Knowledge base: Science and  | -   Comprehensive Emergency       |
|     research                     |     Management (i.e., all         |
|                                  |     hazards)                      |
+----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+
| -   Technologically more capable | -   Works on all 4 phases of      |
|     and adept                    |     Disaster Life Cycle           |
+----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+
| -   More diverse and more        | -   Pursues Integrated Emergency  |
|     culturally sensitive         |     Management                    |
+----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+
| -   Younger, proactive, more     | -   Life-long learner, reads      |
|     diverse and culturally       |     disaster literature           |
|     sensitive                    |                                   |
+----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+
| -   EM is career of first choice | -   Joins professional            |
|                                  |     organizations                 |
+----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+
| -   Risk-based approach to       | -   Executive manager,            |
|     emergency management         |     facilitator, networker,       |
|                                  |     partner                       |
+----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+
| -   Focus on building disaster   | -   Plans with jurisdictional     |
|     resilient communities:       |     stakeholders by partnering    |
|                                  |     and networking                |
+----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+
| -   Catalyst for a safer America | -   Does strategic planning       |
+----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+
| -   Better paid                  | -   Upwardly/geographically       |
|                                  |     mobile                        |
+----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+
| -   Better funding for EM        | -   Broader range of working      |
|     programs                     |     contacts                      |
+----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+

*Adapted from Blanchard, 2002.*

-   The professional emergency manager must be able to **make an
    articulate, persuasive case** to local decision-makers on making
    appropriate decisions that relate to hazards and development within
    their communities. The professional must be able to **assess and
    evaluate programs, policies, and approaches**.

-   Mileti states:

> **"Wringing our hands that the public does not support what we want to
> do, we rarely take stock of how we're doing, much less build in
> feedback loops to modify what we do."**[^2]

-   Professional emergency managers **recognize, and are qualified to
    address**, the needs of today and to anticipate and plan for the
    needs of the future.

-   Dr. Thomas Drabek writes:

> "**Disasters are a unique type of social problem**. The values and
> ethical dimensions implicit in the emergency management profession
> require **leadership that defines and publicly articulates the
> distributions of risk and vulnerability**. This articulation must
> reflect a broadening of context wherein disaster is juxtaposed with
> other social problems and their attendant risks and vulnerabilities.
> Through such efforts **this profession can more proactively pursue the
> establishment of a more just society in an increasingly hazardous
> world."**[^3]

-   In addition, a professional emergency manager is one who understands
    the dominant view of hazards, but **seeks a balance between the
    social vulnerability and technocratic approaches** to emergency
    management.

-   This **balance will vary** from one community to another because
    each community has its own set of hazards, social makeup, and
    structure.

    **Objective 12.2 To define the two predominant approaches to
    emergency management in the United States and determine the possible
    implications of each.**

**Technocratic vs. Vulnerability Approach to Emergency Management**

*Introduce the main differences between these two approaches:*

*You may wish to elicit class discussion by asking the students, if
their knowledge and/or experience permit them to do so, to elaborate on
their perception of these differences. Then, illustrate by using the
following comparison:*

+-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+
| **Technocratic Approach**         | **Vulnerability Approach**        |
+-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+
| **Focus:**                        | **Focus:**                        |
|                                   |                                   |
| -   Physical processes            | -   Social processes              |
|                                   |                                   |
| -   Reduce damage                 | -   Reduce people's vulnerability |
|                                   |                                   |
| **Style---Managerial:**           | **Style---Collegial:**            |
|                                   |                                   |
| -   Hierarchical                  | -   Decentralized                 |
|                                   |                                   |
| -   Key individuals and           | -   Community approach to         |
|     organizations solve problems  |     understanding problems        |
|                                   |                                   |
| -   Apply technology,             | -   Apply creativity,             |
|     engineering, and money        |     imagination, and pressure     |
|                                   |                                   |
| **Philosophical Orientation:**    | **Philosophical Orientation:**    |
|                                   |                                   |
| -   Utilitarian                   | -   Egalitarian                   |
|                                   |                                   |
| -   Conquer nature                | -   Live with nature              |
|                                   |                                   |
| **Method:**                       | **Method:**                       |
|                                   |                                   |
| -   Deconstructionist             | -   Holistic                      |
+-----------------------------------+-----------------------------------+

-   For some, including some emergency managers, hazards are:

> "**technical problems** suitable for a combination of engineering,
> planning, and specialized managerial solutions, and **people, if they
> are mentioned at all, are seen largely as impediments to carrying out
> the technocratic solutions**, because **they fail to see the risks**
> they face (e.g., Mileti and Fitzpatrick 1993).[^4]

-   Geographer Ben Wisner writes that in the dominant view---the
    technocratic approach---people have neither enough information nor
    adequate ability to make decisions for themselves. He cites Burton,
    et al.:

> ". . . \[I\]t is **rare indeed that individuals have access to full
> information** in appraising either natural events or alternative
> courses of action. Even if they were to have such information, **they
> would have trouble processing it,** and in many instances they would
> have goals quite different than maximizing the expected utility. The
> bounds on rational choice in dealing with natural hazards, as with all
> human decisions, are numerous." (Burton et al. 1978:52)[^5]

-   He cites Alexander on the dominant view that people need to be
    "instructed and led."

> "The traditional model of hazard mitigation proceeds from large-scale
> overall planning to detailed efforts at particular local scales, where
> the **results tend to be imposed upon local communities**." (Alexander
> 2000:27)

-   Wisner goes on to state that in this view, extreme events in nature
    are the primary causes of disasters, **and nature and extreme events
    in nature are viewed as being external to society**. **"Disasters
    are seen as 'accidents' and 'freak events.'"**[^6]

-   People, however, need to be a key focus. Russell R. Dynes writes:

> "Most disaster plans assume that **'victims' are dependent, rather
> than people who may have their own plans and also may make intelligent
> adaptations.** When people take individual and independent actions,
> government officials often claim that the plan would have been
> effective it if had just been followed. But **if a plan is not
> 'followed,' that is a result of the plan, not the people."**[^7]
>
> "Unfortunately, **much of the planning activity around the world, and
> the materials that are generated to support it**, elaborate with
> considerable detail on the **characteristics of certain disaster
> agents**, followed by **prescriptive details about what everyone
> should do and who should be able to tell others what to do**. Reading
> such prescriptions conveys the impression that **'people' are the
> major problem**, and **that social life, as it was constituted prior
> to the disaster, will become threatened unless strong authority is
> emphasized."**[^8]

-   Tierney writes:

> "The **'command and control' approach, which never was appropriate for
> managing disasters, represents a thoroughly outdated way of thinking**
> about crisis response. **Instead, policies and plans should
> conceptualize disaster response as a loosely-coupled set of activities
> carried out by a highly diverse set of entities**: official
> crisis-relevant organizations, voluntary groups, community-based
> organizations, emergent citizen groups, and the public at large."[^9]

-   An extreme of the technocratic approach is what Dynes calls the
    "military model" of emergency planning.

> "It is predicated on the notion that disasters create 'chaos' and such
> chaos only can be eliminated by establishing 'command and control.' It
> is based on the assumption that **military organizations can deal
> effectively with threat, and civilian organizations cannot**."[^10]

-   In contrast, Dynes posits that a "problem-solving" model is more
    effective:

> "The problem-solving model **assumes social continuity, coordination,
> and cooperation**. . . It **does not assume that a top-down, rigidly
> controlled, and highly centralized pattern of social organization is
> needed** to solve the problems, **but rather the development of social
> mechanisms**."[^11]

-   Dynes concludes:

> "Discussions about disaster reduction are usually fixated on
> increasing knowledge about the physical or the technological agents,
> as if that knowledge would somehow reduce disasters. However,
> **disaster is the result of social processes and is neither natural
> nor technological**."[^12]

-   On the role of science and technology:

> "Science and technology play key roles in monitoring hazards and
> vulnerabilities, developing an understanding of their continually
> changing patterns and in developing tools and methodologies for
> disaster risk reduction. **The dissemination and application of new
> strategies and measures to protect lives, livelihoods and property
> within societies experiencing dynamic change are key areas of work for
> the scientific and technical communities.**
>
> "However, the **limitations of science and technology** in responding
> to the fundamental problems of people and political processes in
> identifying **and** managing risk factors **need to be carefully
> considered**. **An over-concentration on technical abilities at the
> expense of being able to motivate the human aspects that compose the
> economic, social and political dimensions of societies will continue
> to provide disappointing results in effective or sustained commitments
> to risk reduction.**"[^13]

-   A concurring opinion by Tierney:

> "A belief in the efficacy of technology is another important cultural
> value that guides U.S. hazard management policy. For years,
> **Americans have acted as if risks can be completely overcome by
> massive engineered works such as the dams and levees used to control
> floods and the aqueducts employed to reduce drought vulnerability**.
> In fact. . . **American reliance on engineering 'solutions' has been a
> major factor contributing to the nation's escalating disaster
> losses**."[^14]

-   Ben Wisner suggests:

> "\[O\]ne **cannot 'fix' disaster risk with technology alone**. It is
> also a matter of enacting and enforcing laws, building and maintaining
> institutions that are accountable, and producing an environment of
> mutual respect and trust between government and the population."[^15]

-   Specifically, he cites the "widespread destruction" that technology
    failed to prevent during these notable disasters in the United
    States between the late 1980s and early 1990s:

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-   Hurricane Hugo in 1989

-   Loma Prieta, California earthquake in 1989

-   Hurricane Andrew in 1992

-   Mississippi floods in 1993

-   Northridge, California earthquake in 1994[^16]

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-   In terms of the "bottom-up" versus "top-down," approaches, a panel
    of the National Academy of Public Administration recommends that the
    Federal government not be perceived as "the nation's '911' first
    responder."

> "The nation's constitutional structure, rooted in the values of
> federalism, is fundamentally "bottom-heavy." Although the federal role
> has expanded over two centuries, governing in America generally occurs
> within the broad, general 'police' powers reserved to the states by
> the Constitution and delegated, in turn, to local governments. There
> are tens of thousands of emergencies each year. **Most
> emergencies---even most disasters---are met by state and local
> governments**. This layered system of disaster response can be
> improved without altering federalism."[^17]

-   And Tierney suggests that efforts should be tailored to the needs
    and capabilities of those being served:

> **"Households, organizations, and communities vary markedly both in
> their hazard vulnerability** and in their capacity to mitigate,
> prepare, respond, and recover from disasters. Recognizing these
> differences in vulnerability and capacity, all hazard management
> **policies and programs should be adapted to needs of specific groups
> and community settings** rather than being uniformly applied to all
> target audiences and service recipients. Perhaps the best way to
> address the needs of an increasingly diverse population is to involve
> community residents more directly in program development and service
> provision."[^18]

-   In discussing the major U.S. disasters in which technology was
    insufficient, Wisner concludes that:

> **"Issues of race, class, age, disability, and to some extent, gender
> came up more and more in the context of these and other disasters.
> FEMA and other authorities were criticized for not taking the
> diversity of the affected populations into account in relief and
> recovery work.**[^19]

-   Another example is the perception of residents during the cleanup
    after the Buffalo Creek Flood in West Virginia:

> "**Most of the work** of rescue **was done by outsiders following
> plans and initiatives issued from distant headquarters. They were
> strangers, many of them in uniform**, and they **cleaned up the
> wreckage without consulting the owners, sealed off the residents from
> their own homes**, and generally **acted more like an army of
> occupation than a local disaster team."**[^20]

*At this point, you may wish to ask the class to recall the Emergency
Services and Public Administration models of emergency management that
were discussed in the last session. Reinforce the concept of how these
models evolved, and remind the group of the connection between the
Emergency Services model with civil defense and law enforcement, with
the inherent notions of command and control.*

-   Drabek points out that:

> "The "dominate model" (Dynes 1994) or "Civil Defense Model" (Neal and
> Phillips 1995) has its roots in military planning and other
> bureaucratic theories. . . **Regardless of the name used, these models
> reflect a "command and control myth**."[^21]

-   According to Drabek, the myth assumes command and control by
    emergency managers, successfully applying bureaucratic theory,
    leading to a standardized product and rapid training. However:

> "When applied to the turbulence of disaster response and the massive
> participation by the mix of agencies that arrive to assist, **the
> command and control model fails**."[^22]

-   Citing Dynes (1994, p. 150), Drabek writes:

> **"Instead of command, the emphasis should be on *coordination*.
> Instead of control, the emphasis within should be on
> *cooperation*.**"[^23]

-   On controlling vs. cooperating with nature:

> "Traditionally, **engineering practice and engineering education have
> been based on the paradigm of control of nature rather than
> cooperation with nature**. In this paradigm, **humans and the natural
> world are divided**. As a result, past engineering achievements have
> often been developed without considering their social, economic, and
> environmental impacts on natural systems. A worldwide **transition to
> a more holistic approach to engineering requires a major paradigm
> shift from control of nature to participation with nature."**[^24]
>
> "Many engineering decisions cannot be made independently of the
> surrounding natural and human-made systems **because modern
> engineering systems have the power to significantly affect the
> environment far into the future.**
>
> "The traditional approach that engineering is only a process to devise
> and implement a chosen solution amid several purely technical options
> must be challenged. A **more holistic approach** to engineering
> **requires an understanding of interactions between engineered and
> non-engineered systems, inclusion of non-technical issues and a system
> approach**. . . to simulate and comprehend such interactions."[^25]

**A Vulnerability Approach Is Needed**

-   According to Bolin and Stanford (1998, 20), the **value** of the
    vulnerability approach lies in its openness to:

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-   Cultural specificity

-   Social variability.

-   Diversity.

-   Contingency.

-   Local agency.

> **"It is the local struggles and strategies that can provide lessons
> for dealing with disaster across a range of societal contexts.**
>
> **"Too often disaster research proceeds with the 'view from above.'"**
> (1998-20)

-   Bolin and Stanford provide this example of the **implications** of
    one's approach:

> "A **key issue** confronted by federal and state responders was
> dealing with a **culturally and socioeconomically diverse 'victim'
> population** within the constraints of a **highly bureaucratized
> assistance system**." (1998, 23)

-   Drabek writes about a failure (Neal and Phillips 1995) of the
    inappropriateness of bureaucratic theory, as applied during the Loma
    Prieta earthquake:

> "The National Guard erected a **fence around one tent city, creating
> the impression of Central American prisons and death squads** to some
> immigrants. Some victims chose to stay away from the official tent
> city due to culturally-based misunderstanding. The ARC \[American Red
> Cross\] tried to **reduce such cultural problems by hiring a
> tri-lingual caseworker to work specifically with Latinos.**"[^26]

-   The vulnerability approach also incorporates the concept of
    "**disaster inequalities**." Today's professional emergency manager
    will be knowledgeable about, and able to plan inclusively in regard
    to, the differing needs of diverse elements of the population.

-   Wisner cites Blaikie et al. (1994, 9):

> "Some groups in society are more prone than others to damage, loss,
> and suffering in the context of differing hazards. Key characteristics
> of these variations of impact include **class, caste, ethnicity,
> gender, disability, age, or seniority**."[^27]

-   Elaine Enarson suggests that, in working with a diverse population:

> "**Sensitivity to gender, class, ethnicity, and other power
> relations** affecting the practice of emergency management is needed
> in emergency managers working **from a vulnerability
> perspective**."[^28]

-   She suggests (Enarson, et al. 2003, pp. 7-9) some ways in which to
    accomplish this:

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-   Be more gender-aware and guided by gender equity goals.

-   Develop more race-conscious practices to identify possible sources
    of racial or ethnic bias.

-   Recognize and critique class-bias.[^29]

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-   She, along with Betty Hearn Morrow, describe what happens when such
    sensitivity is not a part of the equation:

> "Morrow and Enarson (1996) pointed out the gender bias
> institutionalized by bureaucratic agencies such as FEMA. For example,
> assuming a male-headed nuclear family, or even a single-family
> household, in the distribution of relief funds after hurricane Andrew
> did not fit the circumstances of many of Miami's most recent
> immigrants residing in some of the worst-hit neighborhoods."[^30]

-   Lindell and Prater, in a study of seismic hazards, offer this
    conclusion:

> ". . . **emergency managers \[should\] get to know the residents of
> their communities** to identify the ways in which potential
> implementation barriers affect different segments of the population**.
> Frequent, personally delivered communications** about inexpensive
> hazard adjustments that are **targeted to specific segments of the
> risk area population may be the most effective means of reducing
> community vulnerability** to earthquake hazard."[^31]

-   In his description of the historical development of a vulnerability
    approach toward emergency management, Ben Wisner suggests the
    possibility of a shift away from this approach:

> "It is too early to tell, but **some institutional changes may cause
> decline in utilization of the vulnerability approach**. These include:

-   **Absorption of FEMA into the new Department of Homeland Security.**

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-   **Elimination of Project Impact.**

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-   **New budget priorities focused on terrorism."**[^32]

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-   Enarson echoes this suggestion:

> "For example, **some observers suggest that emergency managers working
> or studying today represent 'a new generation of emergency planners
> who are less burdened with the earlier scenarios of enemy attack**.'
> (Dynes 1994: 156) and top-down management styles associated with them.
> However, this shift **may be countered by the 9/11 attacks and
> subsequent emphasis in and beyond FEMA on counter-terrorism**."[^33]

*It may be helpful at this point to engage the class in a brief
discussion about how the vulnerability approach complements
technological know-how in dealing with disasters and how today's
emergency manager can seek to maintain the necessary balance.*

**References**

Amadei, Bernard, et al. *Global Blueprints for Change*. "A Note on Ways
to Increase Understanding of the Interactions Between the Built
Environment and Natural Systems." Prepared in conjunction with the
International Workshop on Disaster Reduction convened on August 19-22,
2001.

Blanchard, B. Wayne, PhD, CEM. *Higher Education Project* (PowerPoint
slide presentation). Department of Homeland Security, Emergency
Management Institute. August 14, 2003.
<http://training.fema.gov/emiweb/downloads/highedbrief_course2.ppt>

Blanchard, B. Wayne. 2000. Higher Education Project Presentation at
Emergency Management Institute, Emmitsburg, MD (July).

Blanchard, B. Wayne. "The new role of higher education in emergency
management," *Journal of Emergency Management*. Vol. 1., No. 2, Summer,
2003.

Blaikie, Piers, et al. 1994. *At Risk*. London: Routledge.

Burton, I., R. Kates, and G. White. 1978. *The Environment as Hazard*.
New York: Oxford University Press.

Drabek, Thomas E. 2003. Social Dimensions of Disaster, 2^nd^ Edition.
Session 27: Disaster Inequalities. Emmitsburg, Maryland: Emergency
Management Institute, Federal Emergency Management Agency.
[http://training.fema.gov/emiweb/edu/SocialDD.asp.]{.underline}

Drabek, Thomas E. *Strategies for Coordinating Disaster Responses*.
Program on Environment and Behavior Monograph No. 61. Institute of
Behavioral Science, University of Colorado. 2003.

Dynes, Russell R*. Disaster Reduction: The Importance of Adequate
Assumptions About Social Organization*. Sociological Spectrum,
13:175-1932. Taylor & Francis, 1993.

Dynes, Russell R. 1994. "Community Emergency Planning: False Assumptions
and Inappropriate Analogies." *International Journal of Mass Emergencies
and Disasters* 12:141-158.

Enarson, Elaine, with Cheryl Childers, Betty Hearn Morrow, and Deborah
Thomas, and Ben Wisner. 2003. *A Social Vulnerability Approach to
Disasters*. Emmitsburg, Maryland: Emergency Management Institute,
Federal Emergency Management Agency.
[http://www.training.fema.gov/emiweb/edu/completeCourses.asp]{.underline}.

Erikson, Kai T. *Everything in Its Path: Destruction of Community in the
Buffalo Creek Flood*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1976. p. 201

International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. *World
Disasters Report 2002*. Chapter 1, "Risk reduction: challenges and
opportunities."
[www.ifrc.org/publicat/wdr2002/chapter1.asp](http://www.ifrc.org/publicat/wdr2002/chapter1.asp).

International Strategy for Disaster Reduction Secretariat. *Living with
Risk. A global review of disaster reduction initiatives*. Geneva, July
2002.

Lindell, Michael K. and Carla S. Prater. 2000. "Household Adoption of
Seismic Hazard Adjustments: A Comparison of Residents in Two States."
*International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters*, Vol. 18, No.
2, p. 236

Mileti, Dennis, and C. Fitzpatrick. *The Great Earthquake Experiment*.
Boulder CO: Westview Press, 1993.

Morrow, Betty Hearn and Elaine Enarson. 1996. "Hurricane Andrew Through
Women's Eyes: Issues and Recommendations." *International Journal of
Mass Emergencies and Disasters* 14 (1): 1-22.

National Academy of Public Administration, Philip A. Odeen, Panel Chair.
*Coping With Catastrophe: Building an Emergency management System to
Meet People's needs in Natural and Manmade Disasters*. February, 1993.

Neal, David M. and Brenda D. Phillips. 1995. "Effective Emergency
Management: Reconsidering the Bureaucratic Approach*." Disasters: The
Journal of Disaster Studies and Management* 19:327-337.

Tierney, Kathleen J., et al. *Facing the Unexpected: Disaster
Preparedness and Response in the United States.* Joseph Henry Press,
2001.

[^1]: B. Wayne Blanchard. "The new role of higher education in emergency
    management," *Journal of Emergency Management*. Vol. 1., No. 2,
    Summer, 2003. p. 32

[^2]: Mileti, 2001.

[^3]: Thomas E. Drabek. *Strategies for Coordinating Disaster
    Responses*. Program on Environment and Behavior Monograph No. 61.
    Institute of Behavioral Science, University of Colorado. 2003. p.
    xix

[^4]: Dennis Mileti and C. Fitzpatrick. *The Great Earthquake
    Experiment*. Boulder CO: Westview Press, 1993.

[^5]: Elaine Enarson, Cheryl Childers, Betty Hearn Morrow, Deborah
    Thomas, and Ben Wisner. 2003. Session 2: Development of Social
    Vulnerability Analysis. *A Social Vulnerability Approach to
    Disasters*. Emmitsburg, Maryland: Emergency Management Institute,
    Federal Emergency Management Agency.
    ([http://www.training.fema.gov/emiweb/edu/completeCourses.asp]{.underline}).
    pp. 2-3

[^6]: *Ibid.*

[^7]: Russell R. Dynes*. Disaster Reduction: The Importance of Adequate
    Assumptions About Social Organization*. Sociological Spectrum,
    13:175-1932. Taylor & Francis, 1993. p. 180.

[^8]: Dynes 1993. p. 182

[^9]: Kathleen J. Tierney, *Facing the Unexpected: Disaster Preparedness
    and Response in the United States.* "Where Do We Go From Here?"
    Joseph Henry Press, 2001. p. 259

[^10]: Dynes 1993. p. 183

[^11]: *Ibid*.

[^12]: Dynes 1993. p. 191

[^13]: International Strategy for Disaster Reduction Secretariat.
    *Living with Risk. A global review of disaster reduction
    initiatives*. Geneva, July 2002. p. 17

[^14]: Kathleen J. Tierney, et al. *Facing the Unexpected: Disaster
    Preparedness and Response in the United States.* "Societal Factors
    Influencing Emergency Management Policy and Practice. Joseph Henry
    Press, 2001. p. 213

[^15]: International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies.
    *World Disasters Report 2002*. Chapter 1, "Risk reduction:
    challenges and opportunities."
    [www.ifrc.org/publicat/wdr2002/chapter1.asp](http://www.ifrc.org/publicat/wdr2002/chapter1.asp).

[^16]: Enarson, et al., 2003. Session 2: Development of Social
    Vulnerability Analysis. p. 14

[^17]: National Academy of Public Administration, Philip A. Odeen, Panel
    Chair. *Coping With Catastrophe: Building an Emergency management
    System to Meet People's needs in Natural and Manmade Disasters*.
    February, 1993. p. xi.

[^18]: Tierney, 2001. p. 260

[^19]: Enarson, et al., 2003. p. 14

[^20]: Kai T. Erikson. *Everything in Its Path: Destruction of Community
    in the Buffalo Creek Flood*. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1976. p.
    201

[^21]: Thomas Drabek, 2003. Session 31: Disaster Planning Myths. *Social
    Dimensions of Disaster, 2^nd^ Edition*. Emmitsburg, Maryland:
    Emergency Management Institute, Federal Emergency Management Agency.
    ([http://www.training.fema.gov/emiweb/edu/completeCourses.asp]{.underline}).
    pp. 6-7

[^22]: *Ibid*.

[^23]: Drabek, 2003. p. 10

[^24]: Bernard Amadei, et al. *Global Blueprints for Change*. "A Note on
    Ways to Increase Understanding of the Interactions Between the Built
    Environment and Natural Systems." Prepared in conjunction with the
    International Workshop on Disaster Reduction convened on August
    19-22, 2001. p. 4

[^25]: Amadei, et al. 2001. p. 3

[^26]: Drabek 2003. p. 8

[^27]: Enarson, et al. Session 2, Development of a Social Vulnerability
    Analysis. 2003. p. 15

[^28]: Elaine Enarson, Cheryl Childers, Betty Hearn Morrow, Deborah
    Thomas, and Ben Wisner. 2003. Session 31: New Skills for
    Practitioners. *A Social Vulnerability Approach to Disasters*.
    Emmitsburg, Maryland: Emergency Management Institute, Federal
    Emergency Management Agency.
    ([http://www.training.fema.gov/emiweb/edu/completeCourses.asp]{.underline}).
    p. 7

[^29]: Enarson, et al. Session 31, pp. 7-8.

[^30]: Elaine Enarson, Cheryl Childers, Betty Hearn Morrow, Deborah
    Thomas, and Ben Wisner. 2003. Session 30: New Ideas About Disasters.
    *A Social Vulnerability Approach to Disasters*. Emmitsburg,
    Maryland: Emergency Management Institute, Federal Emergency
    Management Agency.
    ([http://www.training.fema.gov/emiweb/edu/completeCourses.asp]{.underline}).
    p. 8

[^31]: Michael K. Lindell and Carla S. Prater. 2000. "Household Adoption
    of Seismic Hazard Adjustments: A Comparison of Residents in Two
    States." *International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters*,
    Vol. 18, No. 2, p. 236

[^32]: Enarson, et al. Session 2: Development of a Social Vulnerability
    Analysis. 2003. p. 12

[^33]: Enarson, et al. Session 31: New Skills for Practitioners. 2003,
    p. 11