**United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit**

99-7137

RONALD G. MEEKS,

Claimant‑Appellant,

v\.

TOGO D. WEST, JR., Secretary of Veterans Affairs,

Respondent‑Appellee.

[Jeffrey Wood]{.underline}, of York, Pennsylvania, argued for
claimant-appellant.

[Michael S. Dufault]{.underline}, Trial Attorney, Commercial Litigation
Branch, Civil Division, Department of Justice, of Washington, DC, argued
for respondent-appellee. With him on the brief were [David W.
Ogden]{.underline}, Acting Assistant Attorney General; [David M.
Cohen]{.underline}, Director; and [James M. Kinsella]{.underline},
Deputy Director. Of counsel on the brief were [Richard J.]{.underline}
[Hipolit]{.underline}, Acting Assistant General Counsel; and [Michael J.
Timinski]{.underline}, Attorney.

Appealed from: United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims

Chief Judge Frank Q. Nebeker

**United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit**

99-7137

RONALD G. MEEKS,

> Claimant-Appellant,

v\.

TOGO D. WEST, JR., Secretary of Veterans Affairs,

Respondent-Appellee.

\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

DECIDED: June 27, 2000

\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

Before MAYER, [Chief Judge]{.underline}, SCHALL, and BRYSON, [Circuit
Judges]{.underline}.

MAYER, [Chief Judge]{.underline}.

Ronald G. Meeks appeals from a judgment of the United States Court of
Appeals for Veterans Claims, [Meeks v. West]{.underline}, No. 97-791
(CAVC May 3, 1999), affirming the decision of the Board of Veterans'
Appeals which denied entitlement to an effective date earlier than
January 16, 1985, for a 100% rating for service-connected choroidal
gyrate atrophy. We affirm.

[Background]{.underline}

Meeks served on active duty in the United States Army from April 1966 to
December 1969. In November 1970, within one year of his separation from
service, he applied for disability compensation for choroidal gyrate
atrophy, a progressive eye condition that gradually narrows one's field
of vision. Due to incomplete service records, a VA Regional Office
("RO") denied his claim, informing him that it would consider his claim
further when it received all of his medical records. No further action
was taken until Meeks again sought benefits in 1985. On August 15, 1988,
the Board of Veterans Appeals granted service connection for his eye
condition. For the period December 10, 1969, Meeks' date of discharge,
through January 16, 1985, the date his reopened claim was received, the
RO assigned a 70% provisional rating pending a response to a request for
an advisory opinion by the Director of the VA Compensation and Pension
Service on the percent evaluation to which he determined Meeks was
entitled. Pursuant to the Director's recommendation, in August 1989, the
RO assigned a 0% rating effective from Meeks' date of discharge to the
date of the 1985 filing, and a 100% rating effective from January 1985.
However, in April 1991, the board denied Meeks' claim for a compensable
rating from 1969 to 1985.

Meeks appealed to the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, which held
that the 1970 claim remained pending, vacated the board's 1991 decision,
and remanded the case for readjudication. Upon remand, the RO assigned a
"staged rating" reflecting the changes in the severity of Meeks'
disability.[^1] Specifically, the RO granted a 50% evaluation effective
December 1969; a 60% evaluation effective June 1973; a 70% evaluation
effective December 1974; and a 100% evaluation effective January 1985.

Rejecting Meeks' argument that he was entitled to a 100% rating
effective from his date of discharge, the board affirmed the staged
rating and determined that Meeks could not prove 100% entitlement before
November 1986. The board held that the RO's error of assigning a rating
of 100% effective January 1985 was "non-prejudicial" and left the
earlier date undisturbed.

Meeks again appealed to the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims,
arguing that because his 1970 claim remained pending, and a 100% rating
was eventually awarded, he was entitled to 100% compensation from his
date of discharge. Acknowledging that 38 U.S.C. § 5110(b)(1) (1994) is
an exception to the general rule in section 5110(a) that an award of
compensation shall "not be earlier than the date of receipt of
application therefor," the Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims affirmed
the board's retroactive award of a staged rating, holding that the
"facts found" do not support a retroactive award of a 100% rating. This
appeal followed.

[Discussion]{.underline}

We have limited jurisdiction to review the decisions of the Court of
Appeals for Veterans Claims. Our authority is limited to deciding
relevant questions of law, including statutory interpretation. 38 U.S.C.
§ 7292(d)(1) (1994). We will set aside a regulation or interpretation of
a regulation relied upon by the Veterans Court we find to be "(1)
arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with law; (2) contrary to constitutional right, privilege, or
immunity; (3) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority or
limitation, or in violation of a statutory right; or (4) without
observance of procedure required by law." [Id.]{.underline} Legal
determinations are reviewed [de]{.underline} [novo]{.underline}.
[See]{.underline} [Dittrich v. West]{.underline}, 163 F.3d 1349, 1351
(Fed. Cir. 1998) (citing [Prenzler v.]{.underline}
[Derwinski]{.underline}, 928 F.2d 392, 393 (Fed. Cir. 1991)). Factual
determinations or the application of law to facts are beyond the scope
of our review. [See]{.underline} 38 U.S.C. § 7292(d)(2).

In construing a statute or regulation, we begin by inspecting its
language for plain meaning. [See]{.underline} [Bazalo v.
West]{.underline}, 150 F.3d 1380, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 1998). If the words
are unambiguous, it is likely that no further inquiry is required.
[See]{.underline} [Cox v. West]{.underline}, 149 F.3d 1360, 1363 (Fed.
Cir. 1998). If a statute is silent or ambiguous about a matter, the
court gives deference to interpretations of the agency charged with the
duty to administer it. [See]{.underline} [Nationsbank v. Variable
Annuity Life Ins. Co.]{.underline}, 513 U.S. 251, 256 (1995) ("\[I\]t is
settled that courts give great weight to any reasonable construction of
a regulatory statute adopted by the agency charged with the enforcement
of that statute.") (internal citations omitted).

At issue on appeal is the interplay between subsections (a) and (b) of
38 U.S.C. § 5110 (1994), which determines the effective date from which
a veteran is entitled to benefits. Section 5110(a) provides in relevant
part: "[Unless specifically provided otherwise in this chapter, the
effective date of an award]{.underline} based on an original claim, a
claim reopened after final adjudication, . . . [shall be fixed in
accordance with the facts found]{.underline}, but shall not be earlier
than the date of receipt of application therefor." Section 5110(b)(1)
provides: "[The effective date]{.underline} of an award of disability
compensation to a veteran [shall be the day following the date of the
veteran's discharge or release if application therefor is received
within one year from such date of discharge or release]{.underline}." 38
U.S.C. § 5110(a) and (b) (emphasis added). As the plain language makes
clear, subsection (b) provides a limited exception to the rule found in
subsection (a), governing the effective date of an award.

Meeks conflates what are in fact two distinct issues, involving separate
inquiries: the determination of the date from which an award is
effective, and the quantum of the award to which a veteran is entitled.
As for the effective date of Meeks' award, it is undisputed that his
claim falls under subsection (b), thereby entitling him to compensation
from his date of discharge. But he takes issue with the refusal to
retroactively apply his 100% rating to his date of discharge, because
the "facts found" did not justify such an award. Specifically, Meeks
argues that because he applied for benefits within a year of his
discharge and the status of his claim remained pending until he
reapplied and received a 100% rating, he is entitled to compensation for
100% disability from his date of discharge. In other words, he argues
that the court erred by importing the "facts found" limitation of
subsection (a) into subsection (b); unless we read subsection (b) in
isolation, without regard to the "facts found" limitation of subsection
(a), the phrase "\[u\]nless specifically provided otherwise in this
chapter," found in subsection (a), would be rendered superfluous.
However, statutory interpretation is a holistic endeavor that requires
consideration of a statutory scheme in its entirety. [See]{.underline}
[United States Nat. Bank of Oregon v. Independent Ins. Agents of Am.,
Inc.]{.underline}, 508 U.S. 439, 454-55 (1993). "\[A\] statute is to be
construed in a way which gives meaning and effect to all of its parts,"
[Saunders v. Secretary of the Dep't of Health & Human
Servs.]{.underline}, 25 F.3d 1031, 1035 (Fed. Cir. 1994), and the
Supreme Court has repeatedly stressed that "\[i\]n expounding a statute,
we \[must\] not be guided by a single sentence or member of a sentence,
but look to the provisions of the whole law, and to its object and
policy." [Massachusetts v. Morash]{.underline}, 490 U.S. 107, 115
(1989).

Because the object of section 5110 is only to determine the date from
which compensation shall be awarded, not to determine the rating or
level of compensation that will apply from the time an award is deemed
effective, Meeks' argument challenging the Court of Appeals for Veterans
Claims' refusal to retroactively apply his 100% rating must fail. From
the record it is clear that by referencing the "facts found" limitation
found in subsection (a), the court did not deprive Meeks of anything he
would otherwise be entitled to. The facts showed that his claim fell
within the ambit of subsection (b), and the court accordingly determined
that he was entitled to compensation from his date of discharge. But the
"date of award" inquiry has nothing to do with the amount of
compensation a claimant will receive, or the date from which a rating
will apply. Nothing in the plain language of the disputed provisions
suggests that a particular rating should apply retroactively, without
regard to the facts surrounding a veteran's claim and whether the
evidence would support such an award. The duty to assist veterans does
not include granting benefits that cannot be supported in law and by the
facts of a particular case. [See]{.underline} [Collaro v.
West]{.underline}, 136 F.3d 1304, 1308 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (discussing the
balance struck between assisting veterans and protecting the interests
of the government).

[Conclusion]{.underline}

Accordingly, the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for
Veterans Claims is affirmed.

[AFFIRMED]{.underline}

[^1]: \* 38 C.F.R. § 4.1 (1999) in pertinent part provides:

    > Over a period of many years, a veteran\'s disability claim may
    > require reratings in accordance with changes in laws, medical
    > knowledge and his or her physical or mental condition. It is thus
    > essential, both in the examination and in the evaluation of
    > disability, that each disability be viewed in relation to its
    > history.