**2. The Quartermaster Corps Develops the Jeep**

The jeep had its origins in a small car designed and built by the Austin
Motor Car Company of Birmingham, England, to address a European market
that was somewhat different from the American market. Population density
in Europe was great and gasoline prices were higher, and that translated
into demand for a smaller automobile than American automakers produced.
In 1929, the company formed a subsidiary, the American Austin Car
Company, which acquired the plant of the Standard Steel Car Company in
Butler, Pennsylvania. Because of the timing and the American market,
however, the Austin car was not very successful, and in 1936 the
American Austin Car Company was acquired by the American Bantam Car
Company.[^1]

Meanwhile, the U.S. Army\'s Quartermaster Corps had begun looking for
small vehicle to replace the motorcycle equipped with a sidecar. The
Army purchased an experimental car from Austin in 1933 for tests at Fort
Benning. The two-seat car was open but otherwise of conventional design.
As the Army tested that car, engineers at the Tank Section of Fort
Benning\'s Infantry School began development of a vehicle called the
Howie machine-gun carrier, intended to be capable of carrying a
machine-gun tripod and two soldiers lying prone. The vehicle had a very
low profile and travelled at a low speed. In 1937, engineers at the
Quartermaster Corps\' Holabird Depot ordered a new experimental version
of a small vehicle from Bantam. The engineers had already developed a
preliminary design, which included what would become the familiar body
shape. They worked out final details with an engineer at Bantam. The
specifications for the vehicle had changed: the soldiers were back in a
seated position, and the vehicle had to be capable of traversing rough
terrain. It still needed to be capable of carrying a machine gun on a
tripod, plus ammunition. The Army wanted the vehicle to be built of
conventional commercial parts. After some tests, the Quartermaster Corps
ordered three more test models in 1938, one each for Fort Benning, Fort
Riley, and the Holabird Depot. While the regular Army tested those three
vehicles, Bantam provided some of its cars to the Pennsylvania National
Guard, in the process learning more about how its vehicles performed in
military situations.[^2]

The next stage in the development of the jeep was a 1940 request for
bids to supply the Army with 70 experimental vehicles for further
testing. This number grew out of an investigation made by a
sub-committee of the Ordnance Department\'s Technical Committee. Because
the prototype Howie machine-gun carrier was considered a combat vehicle,
the Army asked Ordnance to consider the 1/4-ton 4 x 4 experimental truck
as a vehicle that could satisfy the requirements of carrying a machine
gun and crew. Ordnance performed some tests on the earlier Bantam
vehicles and on a Bantam chassis, agreeing that with modifications the
vehicle could serve to carry a machine gun. The sub-committee, Col.
Howie, and Bantam engineers met in June 1940 to draw-up some new
specifications. Ordnance then recommended that the Quartermaster Corps
procure 70 experimental vehicles, 40 to be tested by the infantry, 20 by
the cavalry, and 10 by the artillery. The infantry and cavalry wanted
the new truck to be a vehicle which had all four wheels steering, rather
than the front two wheels only. Although the Quartermaster Corps opposed
this feature because it would require four constant velocity joints
instead of two, placing a further demand on one of the already
recognized bottlenecks in producing the new vehicle, and because it
would make the truck more difficult to maintain in the field, the
Quartermaster General agreed to have eight of the experimental vehicles
built as the four-wheel steer type. Meanwhile, Bantam worked closely
with the Spicer Manufacturing Company of Toledo, Ohio, to develop stout
four-wheel drive axles and transfer case for the light-weight truck, and
Bantam opted for an engine made by Continental Motors that was larger
than its own Bantam engine.[^3]

American Bantam proposed to negotiate a contract with the Quartermaster
Corps to supply the 70 vehicles, but the Corps decided it was time to
start opening the process to other bidders. Only one other company
submitted a bid. The bid of Willys-Overland, Inc., was lower than
Bantam\'s bid, but Bantam received the contract because it was willing
to meet the Army\'s specifications and schedule. Although invited to do
so, Ford did not submit a bid. Rigorous tests of the 70 Bantam vehicles
at Holabird convinced the Army to begin equipping its units with the new
four-wheel drive 1/4-ton truck. In October 1940, the Quartermaster Corps
invited bids and negotiated contracts with American Bantam,
Willys-Overland, and Ford for 500 of the vehicles each, specifying that
all 1,500 axles and transfer cases would be supplied by Spicer. The
Corps decided to enter three contracts, rather than one, because it
wanted to develop production capabilities with several firms in case
many more of the vehicles were needed. Other branches of the Army, as
well as other government agencies, objected, however, to awarding
contracts to Willys and Ford. After heated debate among the various
parties, the Assistant Secretary of War authorized the Quartermaster
Corps to negotiate three contracts of 1,500 vehicles each. Each of the
three companies was supposed to build the vehicles identically so that
Army mechanics in the field would be maintaining completely standardized
vehicles.[^4]

The Army initially referred to the small truck as a Light Command and
Reconnaissance Car, intending that it compete with the standard
motorized three-passenger tricycle and with the motorcycle-and-sidecar
that accompanied the Nazi Panzer tank divisions. This intention was very
obvious in the reports various units of the Army sent back to the
Quartermaster Corps as their soldiers worked with the jeeps in
maneuvers. Among the questions the Quartermaster Corps asked unit
commanders to consider in their reports was how the jeeps performed in
various conditions and circumstances as compared specifically to
motorcycles with sidecars and to motorized tricycles. The Quartermaster
Corps received reports from infantry, calvary, armored, field artillery,
reconnaissance, supply, and other units, commanders of which were
overall very enthusiastic about the jeeps\' performance, nearly always
reporting that the jeeps were superior to the motorcycles and tricycles.
The feedback the Corps received from these units also helped to develop
the final production specifications that were adopted in 1942, as units
offered advice on minor modifications to such items as the canvas top,
the side mirrors, the collapsible seats, windshield wipers, all intended
to make the jeep a more serviceable vehicle in battlefield
conditions.[^5]

The three auto companies did not interpret the Army\'s specifications
identically. The Bantam version, for example, was under the Army\'s
weight limit, while the Willys version was over the limit because it had
a bigger Willys engine. Ford delivered its jeeps with Fordson farm
tractor engines, necessitating a different shape to the hood. Each of
the three had different shapes to the front fenders. All three versions
revealed structural weakness during the tests of 1941. The Army decided
that the Willys model would become the standard, mainly because,
although heavier than the specifications allowed, it performed better
than the other two. The Army next decided to let a contract for 16,000
jeeps, but this time the entire order would go to one company. The
Willys bid was slightly lower than Ford\'s, but the Quartermaster Corps
wanted to award the contract to Ford because it possessed greater
production capabilities. The Office of Production Management, however,
overruled the Quartermaster Corps, so the Army awarded the contract to
Willys. Within a few months, though, as appropriations for ordnance
procurement continued to increase, it became evident that Willys could
not meet the Army\'s needs, so the Quartermaster Corp negotiated an
additional contract with Ford, which was instructed to follow the Willys
drawings and specifications. During the course of the war, Ford built
more than 280,000 jeeps, and Willys built about 350,000, the parts of
both companies\' jeeps being completely interchangeable. Bantam, on the
other hand, received no further contracts to build jeeps because the
Army did not think the company had sufficient production capacity.
Bantam\'s production for the Army thereafter was limited to small
trailers.[^6]

The jeep became a staple of Army units in World War II, even though
there had been considerable wrangling within the Army and between the
Army and the competing auto companies concerning how the vehicle would
be built and who would build it. Parties not participating in the
bidding process also got involved in the controversies. Awarding of the
three contracts for 1,500 vehicles each to Bantam, Ford, and Willys in
1940 generated controversy in the national press, especially because
Ford, which heretofore had not been part of the process, was one of the
companies receiving a contract.[^7] Then Congress investigated the
Quartermaster Corps\' process of contracting for jeeps in 1941. Early
that year, the U.S. Senate created a committee, chaired by Harry S.
Truman, to investigate the national defense program and contracts the
government had entered pursuant to the program. In August 1941, the
Truman Committee heard testimony from the president of American Bantam
and representatives of the Quartermaster Corps and the Office of
Production Management concerning decisions made in awarding jeep
contracts. Later that year, a sub-committee of the House Military
Affairs Committee also investigated the jeep contracts. After thorough
review, neither congressional committee took steps to reverse decisions
made by the Quartermaster Corps.[^8] Although these controversies are an
interesting part of the history of the jeep, they are beyond the scope
of this report.

The new vehicle quickly became very popular among soldiers and the
public alike, who called it the \"jeep\" as a phonetic shortening of the
Army\'s classification for the vehicle, the GPW.[^9] As the war
progressed, Willys began looking to the post-war potential for marketing
jeeps to a civilian population. The company ran advertisements claiming
that its engineers had \"created and perfected the jubilant Jeep.\"
Already resentful that it had lost the Army\'s jeep contracts, Bantam
filed a complaint with the Federal Trade Commission that Willys\'
advertisements were unfair competition. The FTC investigated the history
of the jeep\'s development, ruling in 1948 that Willys\' advertisements
were indeed unfair, ordering Willys to cease and desist. Within the
Army, on the other hand, General Campbell, Chief of Ordnance, was more
gracious. Even though the Ordnance Department had contracted with Willys
and Ford to manufacture hundreds of thousands of jeeps from 1942 onward,
Campbell issued a statement in 1944 that the Quartermaster Corps was
entitled to the credit for having developed the jeep and brought it into
production.[^10]

**3. Ford\'s Production of Jeeps**

As described above, each of the three companies providing experimental
jeeps during 1940-1941 development period engaged in some research and
development to help the Army find a satisfactory design. A Ford report
also indicates that Ford had hoped to build its jeeps using some of its
own parts that were comparable but not identical to those being made or
purchased by Bantam and Willys. The Army, however, was determined that
all the parts of all the jeeps be interchangeable, which forced some
practices upon Ford that company engineers apparently did not relish.
Discussions between engineers of Ford and the Quartermaster Corps
concerning jeep engines are illustrative. During the round of contracts
in which each company supplied the Army with 1500 vehicles, Bantam used
a 112-cubic-inch engine made by the Continental Motor Company, Ford used
its own 119-cubic-inch engine that it made for Ford tractors, and Willys
made its own 139-cubic-inch engine. It was the Willys engine, in part,
that put the Willys jeep over the weight limit for that round of
production, but the Army decided that it preferred the more robust
Willys engine. It therefore decided the Willys engine would be standard
in all jeeps. Shortly thereafter, though, when the Quartermaster Corps
decided it needed to have Ford producing jeeps as well, Ford estimated
it would cost \$4,000,000 to modify its Rouge plant to manufacture the
Willys engine. Ford therefore proposed to use its Ford tractor engine
block with larger cylinder bores. Wanting complete interchangeability in
its jeeps, the Quartermaster Corps nevertheless insisted that Ford
tool-up to make the Willys engines. Willys agreed to provide Ford with
all plans and other documents necessary to produce the engines.[^11]

By the time Ford was ready to start producing jeeps in large numbers,
however, the U.S. was at war, and much of the space at the Rouge plant
was taken producing other ordnance for the war effort. Ford therefore
proposed that the Ordnance Department allow the company to assemble
jeeps at its Chester, Dallas, Louisville, and Richmond branch plants.
According to a Ford analysis, this introduced a certain inefficiency to
the company\'s overall jeep operation. The government was asking Ford to
make 350 jeeps per day. One of those branch plants could have handled
the task, but instead the work was spread among several plants working
at less than capacity. Ford acknowledged, on the other hand, the an
advantage accrued to the government. Most of the jeeps were assembled on
the coasts, so the government incurred less cost shipping finished
vehicles to port facilities.[^12]

Ford\'s Rouge plant produced the first 77 of the company\'s jeeps with
Willys engines in January 1942. The following month, while the Rouge
plant turned-out 1,460 jeeps, Chester, Dallas, Louisville, and Richmond
branches got their jeep assembly lines underway. Chester produced 184
jeeps in February 1942, Dallas produced 197, Louisville 107, and
Richmond 170. In March, all the plants were producing at about their
intended capacity, and the company produced 8,920 jeeps. The following
month, Ford set its overall record of jeeps produced in a single month:
11,159 vehicles. The Chester and Richmond plants also set their
individual plant records in April 1942: 2,425 and 2,000 respectively.
The Rouge plant ceased assembling jeeps in September 1942, with a brief
resumption in mid-1943. Chester ceased producing jeeps in January 1943.
The Edgewater branch assembled 1,333 jeeps in early 1943. The Dallas,
Louisville, and Richmond plants continued assembling the quarter-ton
trucks until the Ford contract ended in July 1945. During that period of
production, Ford manufactured its own Willys engines, as well as axles,
drive shafts, and some of the springs, transmissions, and bodies, at the
Rouge and the Lincoln plants. It made the little bits of trim at the
Highland Park plant. Ford purchased all the other components of the
jeeps it made, including frames, wheels, steering gears, and brakes,
from suppliers who also supplied Willys. The following table shows the
totals for each of the Ford plants that made jeeps during the war:

**Ford Motor Company Jeeps Built in WWII**

**by plant**[^13]

Rouge (includes 4,458 experimental 26,017

vehicles before the GPW contract)

Chester 18,533

Dallas 93,748

Edgewater 1,333

Louisville 93,364

Richmond 49,359

At the Richmond plant, Ford dedicated 142,000 square feet of space on
the first floor to jeep assembly. The functions of the Ordnance
Department\'s tank depot (see below) occupied 105,162 square feet on the
first floor and 71,714 square feet on the second. Ford retained 92,460
square feet on the first floor and 71,411 square feet on the second for
its own operations. Even though American automakers were no longer
allowed to produce civilian autos, the government recognized that it was
important to keep the nation\'s existing fleet of private cars and
trucks in running order to transport workers to and from work and to
transport materials. Therefore, the government allowed the automakers to
keep their service parts networks operating. During the war, the
Richmond plant continued to serve as a distribution point for Ford
parts, not only for Richmond\'s service area but for those of the Long
Beach and Seattle branches as well. In December 1942, about 140 workers
staffed the Service Stock Department at the Richmond branch, and it
handled a volume of parts about twice that of any other Ford service
branch in the U.S. The remaining 16,778 square feet on the first floor
and 8,875 square feet on the second served what Ford classified as mixed
uses. These areas included toilet facilities and general offices that
served the entire building.[^14]

When the Quartermaster Corps granted Ford the contract to assemble jeeps
at Richmond, it transferred George U. McFadden there to supervise the
contract. A civilian, McFadden had been posted at one of the General
Motors plants in Oakland, from where he managed a large Quartermaster
Corps contract with GM for trucks as well as supervising all other
Quartermaster procurement contracts on the West Coast. After the Army
transferred procurement of motor transport vehicles from the
Quartermaster Corps to Ordnance, McFadden transferred to Ordnance as
well. For most of the duration of the war, his title in the Ordnance
hierarchy at Richmond was chief resident inspector.[^15] Richmond\'s
contract to assembly jeeps actually was implemented in several phases:

**Jeeps Assembled at Richmond under Ordnance Contracts**

**by contract no. and date of contract**

W-374-Ord-2734 2-18-42 2,500 jeeps

W-374-Ord-2742 4-10-42 10,941

W-374-Ord-2798 11-10-42 5,410

W-374-Ord-2862 3-10-44 24,951

W-20-018-Ord-4920 2-20-45 4,423 (8,097 in original order)

Total 49,225 jeeps[^16]

As the above table suggests, the last contract was originally for 8,097
jeeps, but when the contract was terminated on 28 July 1945, and the
last several thousand jeeps were cancelled along with the contract. Of
the jeeps assembled at Richmond, roughly 70% were boxed for shipment
overseas and the remainder were delivered to the Army on wheels.[^17]

Assembly of jeeps at Richmond was a fairly simple process. The plant
received most components from Dearborn, including the frames, which had
already received a first coat of paint there. Workers placed a frame on
the assembly-line conveyor and then attached springs and front and rear
axle assemblies. Then they gave the entire chassis a second coat of
paint. Next they installed the engine, steering gear, transmission,
transfer case, battery, wheels, radiator, body, gasoline, oil, and
coolant. A Ford inspector then started the jeep for the first time and
took it for a five-mile test drive, noting deficiencies, which were
rectified upon return to the plant. Then Ford turned the jeep over to
Ordnance for inspection and acceptance. Ordnance inspected every jeep
with at least a one-mile road test. Ten percent of the jeeps received a
five-mile test, and one percent received a 100-mile test. Once accepted,
Ordnance returned each jeep to Ford, which sent it to a screen room for
a radio suppression test under the supervision of an Ordnance inspector.
Then Ford took the jeep to the disassembly line where it was prepared
for boxing. Boxed jeeps were loaded onto railroad cars for shipment to a
Port of Embarkation elsewhere in the country or delivered to the
Stockton Ordnance Depot, where they awaited shipment back to the San
Francisco Port of Embarkation. In April 1944, McFadden received an award
of \$250 from the War Department for suggesting that the Stockton Depot
establish a sub-depot at the Richmond Tank Depot for jeeps eventually
headed to the San Francisco Port, thus obviating a needless shipment of
jeeps to Stockton and back to the Bay. In early 1945, by which time it
was calculated his idea had saved about \$200,000, the War Department
awarded him an additional \$560.[^18]

The *Richmond Independent* and local radio stations reported on 10 May
1945 that the Ford Motor Company\'s contract to produce jeeps would end
July 31st, after which Willys-Overland would be the nation\'s only jeep
manufacturer. Yet the Richmond Tank Depot did not receive official
notice of the contract termination until May 23rd. The last jeep rolled
off the Richmond assembly line on July 26th, it was boxed and ready for
shipment at 3:00 pm on the 28th, at which time Ford\'s jeep assembly
contract with Ordnance terminated. By that time, the reconversion to
civilian production was well underway, and Ford announced it would begin
producing civilian trucks at the Richmond branch on August 1st (see
section on reconversion below). The company intended to produce 1,000
trucks of the same type it had been making when civilian production
ceased on 24 March 1942.[^19]

**D. Tanks and the Richmond Tank Depot**

During the sixteen years prior to 1935, the United States manufactured
33 tanks. Between 1935 and 1940, the nation produced 1,000 tanks. In the
period 1940-1945, the Arsenal of Democracy produced 87,619 tanks, in
addition to tens of thousands of other combat vehicles.[^20] The
Richmond Tank Depot was but a small component of America\'s huge
technological system developed to manufacture fighting vehicles, but it
played an integral role in that critical portion of the system between
the tank factories and the Ports of Embarkation, where the Army loaded
tanks and other ordnance on ships and sent them overseas to U.S. Army
units, U.S. Marine Corps units, and the fighting forces of England, the
Soviet Union, and other Allies. This section describes the Richmond Tank
Depot\'s role in the context of that much larger system for producing
and shipping tanks and other combat vehicles.

To manufacture the combat vehicles it needed, Ordnance contracted with a
wide variety of companies possessing the physical plant required,
include manufacturers of cars and trucks, farm machinery, and railroad
cars and locomotives. The following table lists just a sampling of the
kinds of combat vehicles made and the companies that produced them:

**Manufacturers of Select Combat Vehicles**[^21]

**Combat Vehicle Manufacturers Peacetime**

**Production**

M5 light tank American Car and Foundry railroad cars

Cadillac, Detroit automobiles

Cadillac, Southgate, CA automobiles

Massey-Harris farm tractors

M4 medium tank American Locomotive locomotives

Baldwin Locomotive locomotives

Detroit Tank Arsenal tanks

Fisher Tank car bodies

Ford Motor Company automobiles

Lima Locomotive locomotives

Pacific Car railroad cars

Pullman Standard railroad cars

M2 half track Autocar Co. trucks

White Motor Co. trucks

M3 personnel carrier Autocar Co. trucks

White Motor Co. trucks

Diamond T. Motor trucks

International Harvester trucks & tractors

As the Army began increasing the output of tanks and other combat
vehicles in 1940 and 1941, it recognized a bottleneck in the system.
Manufacturers that had contracted to produce tanks would roll nearly
finished vehicles off their assembly lines, but sometimes the tanks
would sit on lots outside the factories for weeks awaiting accessories,
like radios and small arms, or awaiting shipping orders. The delays were
not the fault of the contractors but rather of Ordnance, which had the
responsibility of supplying the accessories and making sure each tank
was properly outfitted for its particular destination. Such delays
sometimes slowed production, because contractors did not have sufficient
storage space. The delays also depressed morale among factory workers,
who were being asked to speed production to assist the nation\'s war
preparedness only to see tanks sitting idly on the ground. The Ordnance
Department therefore decided to establish tank depots, under the command
of a new Intermediate Storage and Depot Unit, where nearly-finished
tanks would await final outfitting. Ordnance started its first tank
depot in January 1942 in leased shops of the New York Central Railroad
at Toledo, Ohio, contracting with the Electric Auto-Lite Company to
operate it. A few months later it contracted with the Ford Motor Company
to establish tank depots at the branch plants at Chester and Richmond,
the former primarily for processing vehicles to be shipped from the East
Coast and the latter primarily for processing vehicles to be shipped
from the West Coast. In December 1942, Ordnance moved its Ohio tank
depot from Toledo to Lima, and the United Motors Service Division of
General Motors took over the operation. Ordnance also had a depot at
Longe Pointe in Montreal, Quebec, which processed American-made tanks
prior to their shipment to Great Britain under the lend-lease
program.[^22]

To appreciate the role of Richmond and the other tank depots, it is
important to understand their position within the larger Ordnance scheme
for managing the nation\'s production of tanks and other vehicles. The
tank depots were part of the Tank Depot Section, which was one small
unit within the Tank-Automotive Center, Detroit (later renamed Office of
the Chief of Ordnance - Detroit), the creation of which has already been
described. Within the organizational structure of the T-AC, major
organizational components were each divided into two tiers of staff
units and operating units. Staff units had responsibility for various
administrative functions, while operating units managed actual operating
functions at that particular level in the hierarchy. Thus, T-AC, under
the command of the Deputy Chief of Ordnance/Chief of Center, was divided
into several branches. The staff branches were designated Executive,
Control, and Legal, and there were several sections under them, such as
the Policy, Organizational Planning, and Statistics sections under the
Control Branch and the Publications, Security, and Fiscal sections under
the Executive Branch. There were five operating branches: Development,
Engineering, Manufacturing, Supply, and Maintenance. Each operating
branch was in turn divided into two tiers of staff sections and
operating sections. Planning and Control, Statistics, and Inspection
were among the staff sections in the Manufacturing Branch. The Tank
Depot Section was one of six operating sections in the Manufacturing
Branch, the others being Tanks & Combat Vehicles, Transport Vehicles,
Parts & Supplies, Tools & Equipment, and Miscellaneous Products.[^23]

As Ordnance was developing the system of tank depots, it recognized that
it would have to coordinate closely with the Signal Corps, the branch of
the Army responsible for procuring, inspecting, and supplying the
Army\'s fighting units with radios and other communications equipment.
As an organization within the Army, the Signal Corps went back to just
before the Civil War and the work of Albert J. Myer, who developed a
code to be used with flags for transmitting information over distances
beyond earshot. He continued to serve the Army\'s communications needs
during the Civil War and after. In 1880, the Army officially created the
Signal Corps, and Myer become its general. The Signal Corps was
responsible for adapting new communications technologies to military
purposes, including the telegraph, hot-air balloons, the telephone, and
the wireless radio. In the two years prior the establishment of the tank
depots and America\'s entry into the war, the Signal Corps was just
finishing its adaptation for military use of the FM radio equipment
developed for police work by a man named Fred Link. With the help of
Bell Laboratories and Western Electric, the Signal Corps was perfecting
sets of short-range FM transmitters and receivers that allowed voice
communications within and between tanks and other combat vehicles. The
Signal Corps would be responsible for inspecting the installation of
this equipment by workers at the tank depots. Other Signal Corps
equipment installed in tanks by workers at the tank depots included
flashlights and flag sets. Working through the Ordnance Department, the
Signal Corps was also responsible for seeing that manufacturers produced
tanks and other vehicles that were prepared to receive appropriate radio
installations.[^24]

The San Francisco Ordnance District received instructions from the
Office of the Chief of Ordnance in May 1942 to begin the preliminary
work of establishing a tank depot in the Bay Area. By then, the Richmond
branch had been assembling jeeps for several months. A short time later,
an officer in Washington called the Ford Motor Company to inquire about
the availability of the Richmond branch to prepare tanks for shipment
overseas. Ford\'s Richmond plant made an ideal facility because of ample
outdoor space for storing vehicles and good access for shipping by both
rail and sea. On 12 July, the San Francisco Ordnance District received
official notification that the Richmond branch was to serve as a tank
depot and that the Ordnance Department had chosen the military officers
who would supervise the installation. The actual contract no.
W-833-Ord-2676 between the War Department and the Ford Motor Company was
dated 20 July 1942. It was a cost-plus-fixed-fee contract aimed at
handling the equivalent of 250 tanks each month for a year. It stated
that Ford would receive, store, prepare, complete, modify, and pack
vehicles of many kinds, including light, medium, and heavy tanks, tank
destroyers, heavy wrecking trucks, half-track vehicles and personnel
carriers, and scout cars. The Richmond

Tank Depot would also receive spare parts and accessories for those
vehicles and prepare them

for shipping. Destinations for vehicles, parts, and accessories would be
both domestic and foreign. Under the contract, Ford would commit the
entire craneway (40,000 square feet) plus 15,000 square feet of interior
space adjacent to the craneway, 23,400 square feet on the pier, and
77,000 square feet of parking space.[^25]

When the tank-depot contract was signed, the Richmond branch was using
the craneway to box jeeps for shipment abroad. That operation had to be
moved outside immediately. Shortly thereafter, Ford built a boxing shed
along the east side of the plant to facilitate the crating of jeeps and
other vehicles. To make way for Ordnance Department staff, Ford created
offices in the branch showroom. The assembly room was converted into an
employment office (including waiting room and physical examination
room), and an office for the Signal Corps. Ford remodelled the west end
of the oil house for use as Ordnance\'s executive office. By August 8th,
Ordnance had already assigned 400 vehicles to the Richmond Tank Depot.
Shipping orders were in hand for 225 of them, and 121 had actually
arrived. Processing the first vehicles progressed slowly, however,
because Ford workers were still getting used to the new kinds of work,
and there were shortages of parts and equipment such as radios and guns
that were to be installed at Richmond. Ford employees worked eight-hour
days and six-day weeks.[^26]

As Ford\'s managers at Richmond were organizing themselves to supervise
the work of a tank depot, the San Francisco Ordnance District had to
organize its formal presence at the Richmond plant. During August, the
depot\'s first month of operation, three military officers (one from the
Signal Corps and two from Ordnance) and 23 civilian Ordnance employees
organized an office. There was relatively little ordnance being shipped
through Richmond yet, so the new personnel had a chance to get used to
new procedures and help the Ford people do the same. To make security at
the plant easier, Ordnance required that all of its employees wear
identification of the Ford Motor Company\'s workers. The volume of
ordnance arriving at the Richmond Tank Depot increased dramatically in
September and continued to do so thereafter. Part of the increase was
due to tanks being processed for the British. The first official
representative of the British Army, Sgt. H.A. MacKenzie, joined the
staff at the Richmond Tank Depot in September, and a civilian
representative arrived in November, both working in connection with the
Lend-Lease.

Some time later, they were joined by Major G. Alexeev, a liaison officer
representing the Soviet

Government Purchasing Commission. And on 1 October 1942, jurisdiction
for the jeep contract transferred from the Quartermaster Corps to the
Ordnance Department. As a consequence, seven civilians from the
Quartermaster Corps working at the Richmond branch transferred to
Ordnance. The end of 1942 found the staff of the Ordnance Department
struggling to keep up with the volume of work demanded of them at the
Richmond Tank Depot.[^27]

But Richmond was not the only Ordnance installation experiencing
difficulties. With the rapid mobilization of production, manufacturers
found many materials in short supply. There was a nationwide shortage of
the steel alloy needed for tracks, so manufacturers appealed to the War
Production Board for the necessary materials. Meanwhile, early in the
tank depot program, tank manufacturers took advantage of the depots,
shipping them tanks that were still missing parts for which the
contractors were responsible, such as tracks. Tanks at depots in
November 1942 were missing an average of forty specified items. In
January 1943, Gen. Christmas issued an order forbidding factories from
shipping tanks that were not fully equipped with items for which the
producers were responsible. By March, inspections showed that tanks at
depots were missing only three items on average.[^28]

These problems manifested themselves at the Richmond Tank Depot as well.
From the outset, arriving tanks were missing important pieces of
equipment that manufacturers should have provided. Late in September
1942, the Ordnance staff at the Richmond depot received an order from
the Office of the Chief of Ordnance stating, \"Ship no Vehicles from the
Depot until on-vehicle materiel is complete for the vehicles on hand.\"
The depot was not able to ship its first group of fully equipped tanks
until 19 October 1942. Meanwhile, the Tank-Automotive Center, Detroit,
authorized Richmond and the other tank depots to report incomplete tanks
to the Army Inspector of Ordnance at the respective plants from which
the tanks had been shipped. Shortages on tanks decreased gradually
through the fall until December, when Richmond received its first tank
fully equipped by the manufacturer: Cadillac Division, General Motors
Corporation, Southgate, California. Richmond also had difficulty
procuring the equipment it was responsible for placing on the tanks
prior to shipment. Again, the Tank-Automotive Center placed its own
authority at Richmond\'s disposal in helping to secure the needed
supplies. Nevertheless, tank shipments from the Richmond facility grew
monthly through the end of the year.[^29]

The Richmond branch quickly became so adept at receiving, modifying, and
shipping vehicles that by the end of 1942 it had already shipped 1,720
vehicles, or more than half its

expected yearly total. Maj. Reed, the commanding officer of the Richmond
Tank Depot, anticipated that the Ford workers would be able to ship more
than 1,000 vehicles in each of January and February 1943. To maintain
such a delivery schedule, Ford agreed, at the Army\'s request, to
increase to amounts of space at the plant available to the tank-depot
function. Moreover, once the workers had gained their experience, they
were completing work on the tanks and other combat vehicles at about
two-thirds the cost that had been estimated. In light of these
accomplishments, Maj. Reed recommended the Ford Motor Company, Richmond
branch, for an Army and Navy \"E\" Award in January 1943, just six
months into the contract. The Richmond Tank Depot received the award in
July 1943 (see section below on Patriotism).[^30]

A year into its operation, the Richmond Tank Depot under the command of
Major Dick R. Reed had an Ordnance Department staff of five military
officers (including Reed) and some 60 Civil Service employees. Reed
headed the Executive Office, which also included an executive assistant
and two secretaries. Captain M.L. Taylor was in charge of the Inspection
Section, which also included Leo A. Young, chief inspector for Tank
Depot operations, G.U. McFadden, chief inspector for the jeep production
contract, two secretaries, and 16 inspectors, four of whom were women.
Lt. H.H. Josephs was the Property Officer. He headed a Property Section
comprised of one assistant and 15 clerical workers, 14 of whom were
women. Roscoe B. Smith, a civilian, headed the Fiscal Section, which had
a time checker and two accountants, both women. Capt. G.W. Allyn
represented the Field Service, and he was also the Executive Officer in
Reed\'s absence. In addition, the Signal Corps had a contingent of one
officer, Lt. Vincent J. Zumpano, and twelve civilians, four of whom were
women. In October 1943, Zumpano was transferred to Philadelphia and
replaced at the head of the Signal Corps staff by Lt. E.D. Carnes.[^31]

A year after it began operations, the Richmond Tank Depot was receiving
and processing hundreds of vehicles each month. In July 1943, for
example, Richmond received vehicles for processing in the following
numbers:

M3A3 light tanks 862

M5A1 light tanks 134

M4 of several models medium tanks 242

M16 multiple gun motor carriages 50

M8 75-mm howitzer motor carriages 4

M10 3\" howitzer motor carriages 51

M8 armored car 50

M3A1 scout car 250

M2, M3, M5 half-track 217

misc. trucks, tractors, and trailers 522

The Richmond plant received those vehicles from Ordnance Depots and
various manufacturers, including Cadillac, Chevrolet, Ford, Fisher Body,
Pacific Car, Pullman, American Locomotive, Kenworth, White Truck,
Diamond-T, International Harvester, Allis Chalmers, and John Deere.[^32]

Another tally showing the complexity of operations at the Richmond Tank
Depot comes from a report for October 1943, when the facility received
2,528 vehicles and shipped 1,413. Of those shipped, 537 were crated for
overseas delivery to U.S. forces, and 158 were shipped under the
Lend-Lease program. At the end of the month, there were 3,280 vehicles
on the grounds at the tank depot representing 31 different models,
including five kinds of tanks as well as armored cars, several kinds of
half-tracks, motor carriages for assorted large gun configurations
(howitzers, multiple gun arrays, etc.), and numerous tractors, light,
medium, and heavy trucks, cranes and wrecker trucks, and landing
vehicles. That month, the Richmond Tank Depot also embarked on a new
program of repairing and overhauling tanks and half-tracks that had been
damaged during practice exercises at various of the Army\'s training
bases in the western U.S. At the beginning of October, Ford had 672 men
and 248 women working on the tank-depot contract. By the end of the
month, the number of men increased to 753, but the number of women
dropped to 227. Ford also made some physical changes at the facility to
better accommodate rainy weather during the winter months. Construction
crews built a loading dock along the east side of the plant and a
shed-roof over the #2 track, which next to it. Beginning October 12th,
crews at the depot also moved all stored vehicles to a lot across Hall
Avenue so that fill could be added to the storage lot at the Ford branch
and the surface graded to allow improved drainage. During the previous
rainy season much of the operation around the Richmond Tank Depot had
been mired in mud.[^33]

The volume of vehicles that moved through Richmond in October mirrored
activity at the Chester and Lima tank depots as well. That month, the
three depots shipped a total of 13,562 vehicles, and they processed even
more. This was because the nation\'s and the tank depots\' capacity of
production exceeded the capacity of the nation\'s ships and ports of
embarkation to ferry the ordnance to overseas theatres. The total number
of vehicles in inventory at the three tank depots was 10,282 on October
1st. At the end of the month, they collectively held 14,105 vehicles.
With so many vehicles in reserve, the Ordnance Department had the depots
maintain a more level rate of production and eliminate much of the
overtime that had been logged during previous months trying to rush
crucial orders to the front.[^34]

At the end of the war, the Tank Depot Branch of the Engineering &
Manufacturing Division, OCO-D, compared the nature and number of
vehicles processed and shipped by Richmond with those shipped by the
other tank depots as follows:

This Depot has handled primarily West Coast export and domestic
shipments and the volume of vehicles handled to date has not been as
great as for the Chester and Lima Tank Depots. It is also to be noted
that, whereas Chester and Lima Tank Depots handle similar type
vehicles,the Richmond Tank Depot has handled models and types
dis-similar in some respects from other Depots. For instance, this Depot
has handled very few vehicles for lend-lease agencies but has handled
almost 100 per cent of Marine Corps requirements for Ordnance
vehicles.[^35]

As mentioned above, the Richmond Tank Depot processed and shipped 55,904
vehicle units during the war. Chester and Lima processed and shipped
152,300 vehicle units and 91,079 vehicle units, respectively.[^36] The
reason Richmond supplied nearly all of the combat vehicles for the
Marine Corps, by the way, is that the Marines were largely responsible
for amphibious landings used in capturing islands from the Japanese
during the War in the Pacific.

The Richmond Tank Depot had a steady stream of vehicles to process
throughout the war years, but occasionally the War Department made
special requests of the workers at the plant. Once such instance
occurred in spring 1944. Early on the afternoon of Saturday, March 18th,
Maj. W. Delbert Ball, the new commanding officer who had arrived at the
Richmond Tank Depot in January, received a message from the Office of
the Chief of Ordnance - Detroit stating that the Army had an urgent need
for sixty carloads totalling 120 landing vehicles, and those vehicles
had to depart Richmond within 48 hours by special train to New York.
(Could it be that these landing vehicles would be sent from New York to
England in preparation for the D-Day invasion?) The entire workforce,
Ordnance and Ford employees alike, worked long hours through the weekend
and met the 48-hour deadline. Some workers endured a 16-hour workday,
went home for only 4 hours rest, and then returned to help finish the
job. The Richmond Tank Depot had already received Army-Navy \"E\" Awards
for excellence in production for the war effort over long periods (see
section below on Patriotism). For their efforts on that weekend, workers
at Richmond received an immediate telegram from the Office of the Chief
of Ordnance stating, \"Richmond\'s performance in recent urgent shipment
most outstanding accomplishment and great contribution to war
effort.\"[^37]

The Ford management and production workers at the Richmond branch were
judicious in the expenditure of energy, and they were not willing to
exhaust themselves needlessly. That attitude was demonstrated that same
spring when the Richmond Tank Depot received word that the Army needed
hundreds of 2-1/2 ton 6 x 6 trucks to be cut in half and then bolted
back together prior to shipment overseas. The purpose of the exercise
was to prepare the trucks so that they could be shipped to an air field,
unbolted, loaded into transport planes, flown to the battlefront, and
then bolted back together for use in supplying troops. Each truck
modified would be worth 1.7 contractual units. OCO-D told Richmond it
would send modification kits for the job, setting a deadline of April
15th. Trucks began arriving the first week in April, and crews began
modifying a few trucks each day in the absence of kits or instructions.
OCO-D pressured Richmond to get the rate up to 100 trucks per day. By
authorizing overtime and instituting other emergency measures, the Tank
Depot got its rate up to 50 trucks per day by April 20th. Even as OCO-D
was urging greater output, Maj. Ball contacted the ports and found that
there were no shipping orders for the trucks he was readying. Despite
the pressure from above, he therefore maintained output at 50 truck per
day, continuing to authorize overtime to meet that rate. The Richmond
Tank Depot completed the order on May 10th, but then the crated trucks
sat on the lot for more than a month, occupying valuable storage and
work space. After the episode, Ball reported to his superiors that the
experience had demoralized both the management and the union at the
Richmond plant.[^38]

By the spring of 1943, the U.S. government had spent \$250,000,000
paying contractors to build and equip sixteen factories for producing
tanks at an aggregate capacity of 7,705 vehicles per month. The
companies were producing tanks at a rate of about 4,000 per month, and
output was starting to meet the demand. Recognizing that it had built
surplus capacity for the production of tanks, Ordnance began to
discontinue some of the sixteen contracts for tanks. Four were
terminated in October 1943 and four more the following year. That
brought the capacity to make tanks down to about 4,000 per month, but by
then output had dropped to about 2,000 per month. These changes yielded
some improvements in the overall system, however, as labor and
machine-tool shortages in the tank industry were largely alleviated.
Shortages of tanks on the battlefront continued, though, because
commanders wanted ever more of the newer units. In 1944 and early 1945,
Ordnance again tried to increase production, but shortages in tools,
capacity, and labor precluded the output meeting demand. As an
alternative to building new tanks, Ordnance embarked on a program of
remanufacturing tanks and other combat vehicles. This involved
reconditioning units that had been used for training troops in the U.S.
before they were shipped overseas. These vehicles, which tended to be
older, were sent to manufacturers to have their engines overhauled, worn
tracks replaced, and guns reconditioned. Then after a new coat of paint,
the remanufactured combat vehicles were ready to battle, at about half
the cost of building a comparable new vehicle.[^39]

The Richmond Tank Depot was also involved in some of the remanufacture
programs, beginning in 1943. In subsequent years, Richmond continued to
participate in the program. In 1944, for example, Ordnance had 300 light
tanks stored at Yermo, California, that had originally been consigned to
the Chinese government. The British had a greater need for the tanks and
convinced Ordnance to repossess them, requesting that the Richmond Tank
Depot modify them to meet British specifications. Richmond began
shipping the modified tanks by rail to the New York Port of Embarkation
in July.[^40]

Richmond\'s record of performance reflected the national manufacturing
trend, although Richmond\'s peak of production came, not surprisingly,
some months later than tank manufacturers\' peak of production, since
Richmond was processing vehicles already shipped from factories
elsewhere. Richmond\'s peak month for vehicles shipped was May 1944,
when the depot shipped more than 2,800 tanks and trucks. Richmond\'s
peak month for contractual units shipped was June 1944, when the depot
shipped more than 2,400 units (that being the month when the depot
modified a large number of the 2-1/2-ton trucks worth 1.7 units each).
During the second half of 1943 and the first half of 1944, Richmond\'s
production had been fairly steady at about 1,600 vehicles worth about
1,200 units. After the peaks in 1944, production at Richmond dropped of
to less than 1,000 contractual units per month for August through
December. Responding to the drop in demand, Ford laid-off about 500
workers in October, roughly one-third of the total work force. Then in
1945, production picked-up again, rising to a

second peak of nearly 2,000 units in March. Production remained above
1,000 units for the duration of the war.[^41]

In August 1944, the Army had seven officers and 69 civilians working at
the Richmond Tank Depot. The following table shows the employment levels
Ford had at the depot that month:

**Employment at the Richmond Tank Depot**

**August 1944**

Executive and Administrative personnel 15

Office and Clerical Employees 124

Engineering 3

Custodial 94

Guards 85

Shop Foremen 109

Inspectors 41

Production Workers: male female

1st shift (10:30 pm - 6:30 am) 189 73 262

2nd shift (6:30 am - 2:30 pm) 647 172 819

3rd shift (2:30 pm - 10:30 pm) 344 124 468

In addition, the Ford Motor Company had 412 men and 114 women working
during the 2nd shift either in the stock parts department or on the
payrolls of sub-contractors in jeep production, which made a total of
2075 production workers in the Richmond Tank Depot.[^42]

During the peak production in 1944, so many vehicles had arrived that
the Richmond Tank Depot filled the parking space available on the Ford
property and secured a nearby island from the Maritime Commission, where
LTVs (landing vehicle tracked) could be parked. The vehicles had to be
driven through about 400 yards of water to get to the island for
parking. In October, Ordnance leased land at Lathrop, in the San Joaquin
Valley south of Stockton, and moved the vehicles there, because the
rainy season was coming and the island, built of silt, was expected to
become too muddy to be serviceable. By the end of the war, Ordnance had
leased four separate parcels of land near the Ford property, including
ground owned by the Parr-Richmond Terminal Corporation and Filice &
Perrelli Canning Company, to store vehicles for which there was
insufficient space on the Ford lot.[^43] Some vehicles sat on the
various lots so long that in December Ordnance directed Ford to
establish a program for inspecting vehicles\' fuel systems to determine
whether they needed to be degummed. Enough vehicles were in need of such
remedial action that Ordnance authorized Ford inspect and degum pilot
models of fourteen distinct vehicles so that the contract could be
modified to specify a price for inspecting and removing gum from each
kind of vehicle. Ordnance also began shipping vehicles from other depots
to Richmond for degumming.[^44]

The fluctuations in production were frustrating for the Ford Motor
Company and the Ordnance commanding officer. Both parties were trying to
keep the unit cost as low as possible, which meant that employment
levels had to match demand. Yet it was hard for both Richmond and OCO-D
in general to predict demand because situations on the various fronts of
the war were nearly impossible to predict. If Ford maintained an
employment level that was higher than needed to meet demand, then unit
costs rose. If Ford released employees because predicted demand was
down, and then the depot received a sudden emergency order for
production, the remaining employees would have to work overtime, thus
raising the unit costs.[^45]

Because the nation was at war, security at the Richmond Plant Depot was
a high priority. According to Maj. Ball, however, this entailed little
change from the Ford Motor Company\'s practices during peacetime. Ford
had a department at the Richmond branch called Plant Protection, and the
guards who worked for that department changed their practices little on
account of the war-production contracts. In addition to securing the
property and building, the employees of Plant Protection enforced all of
the company\'s rules and procedures on the premises. This included
monitoring time cards and accounting for all materials received and
shipped. Plant Protection\'s duties also extended to enforcing rules
like the ban on smoking everywhere on the 43-acre property except the
cafeteria. According to Ball, military inspectors who visit the Richmond
Tank Depot routinely reported favorably on the Ford\'s security
organization.[^46]

Because of the high degree of security imposed on the Richmond Tank
Depot\'s operations, the military shielded the plant from public view,
and that included the view of newspaper reporters. The Ordnance
Department finally opened the plant to reporters in early July 1943,
when Col. Harmon of the San Francisco Ordnance District and Capt. Reed,
commanding officer of the tank depot, hosted a tour by journalists and
photographers representing Bay Area new organizations. Nearly every Bay
Area paper featured a prominent article describing the lifting of
secrecy at the plant, the kinds of tanks and other combat vehicles being
processed, the assembly of jeeps, the large numbers of women working
there, and the tasks involved in preparing vehicles for shipment
overseas.[^47] A story run in *The Labor Herald* (the newspaper of the
Congress of Industrial Organizations, or CIO, for northern California)
provides an interesting insight into the extent of secrecy prior to the
July 8th tour. Just as Ordnance was hosting the tour, *The Labor Herald*
ran an article about Soviet soldiers fighting the Nazis near Odessa. One
of the Soviet soldiers\' battle cries was, \"Remember Workers in
California,\" because the soldiers knew their tanks came from a city in
California, but *The Labor Herald* could not reveal the name of the
city. The paper could only write that CIO members worked on tanks there.
Following the tour, however, *The Labor Herald* was able to publish a
follow-up story revealing that those Soviet tanks came from the Richmond
Tank Depot.[^48]

W.A. Abbott was Ford\'s plant superintendent during the entire war. Maj.
W. Delbert Ball was the commanding officer through October 1944. The
following month, Capt. George A. Spiker took charge as commanding
officer when Ball was transferred to San Francisco to take charge of
Ordnance District\'s Tank-Automotive Branch.[^49]

During the course of the tank-depot contract, Ford sub-contracted some
of the work to other companies. W.A. Bechtel in Oakland, as well as
Moore Equipment Company, Allison Steel Manufacturing Company, and
Stewart & Stevenson, sub-contracted to recondition some GPW units. These
were jeeps that had been remanufactured by others, sent to the Richmond
Tank Depot for processing and boxing, and then rejected during
inspection because of mechanical deficiencies. The sub-contractors were
to repair the deficiencies. This was apparently a troublesome process,
because numerous vehicles returned to the Richmond Tank Depot were still
deficient after inspection. K&D Industries of Sacramento and Harris
Manufacturing of Stockton had sub-contracts worth \$83,236.24 and
\$31,040.48, respectively, to prepare vehicles to be stored at Lathrop
Holding and Reconsignment Point, one of the extra plots of land leased
to store excess vehicles.[^50]

As the processing of combat vehicles began to decrease in the spring of
1945, operations at the Richmond Tank Depot were seriously interrupted
on May 2nd, when the partially outfitted *SS Drexel Victory* side-swiped
the waterfront loading dock of the Ford plant as the ship was being
tugged from Kaiser\'s Richmond shipyard no. 2, severely damaging the
gantry crane that served the Ford dock. The collapsing gantry crane
damaged the brick wall of the plant, which in turn damaged one of the
interior overhead cranes in the craneway. The accident also damaged five
military vehicles that had been stacked nearby.[^51]

Another accident had occurred the previous month that reflected a
different sort of laxity as the war drew to a close. On April 14th, two
Ford workers took an amphibian jeep for an unauthorized cruise in the
bay while a group of the vehicles was being prepared for shipment.
Ordnance and Ford managers had received instructions not to test the
amphibians because they were not yet ready for travel in water, but the
workers evidently had not heard or heeded the instructions. The
amphibian jeep sank about 100 feet from shore in 30 feet of water. One
worker swam to shore, but the other had to be rescued by some nearby
Signal Corpsmen. The depot had to hire a barge and diver to locate and
retrieve the jeep.[^52]

Immediately after V-J Day, the government terminated most contracts for
the production of ordnance and other items needed for the war effort.
Ford\'s contract to operate the Richmond Tank Depot was not, however,
one of those immediately ended, although within a few days the steady
stream of vehicles arriving at the depot for processing ceased. Some
vehicles already en route to Richmond did arrive in the days immediately
following V-J Day. In September, only 240 vehicles, representing odds
and ends from vehicle manufacturers around the country, arrived at
Richmond. The last vehicles received by the Richmond Tank Depot were two
heavy tanks, which arrived during the first week of October. Meanwhile,
more than 4,000 vehicles on the lots in Richmond still had to be
processed to make them usable by the Army. One of the main changes in
processing after V-J Day was that workers no longer prepared vehicles
for shipment overseas, although some of the vehicles already under order
for shipment abroad were still shipped after Japan surrendered. After
mid-August, most vehicles were prepared for long-term storage at
domestic Army depots in Utah and elsewhere in California.[^53]

During the first week in September, the Richmond Tank Depot was shipping
about 30 vehicles per day. On the 10th, Ford transferred 200 workers to
Ordnance work and increased the rate to about 75 vehicles daily. Ford
put workers on a 48-hour week on the 15th to increase output further. On
28 September 1945, the Richmond Tank Depot finally received notice that
Ford\'s contract would terminate on October 31st. The depot also
received the last of many change orders, no. 95, stating that Ford was
to provide all labor and materials necessary for dismantling and
preparing for shipment all government-owned equipment and other
property. The termination notice included an exception for change order
no. 95, recognizing that dismantling the government\'s operation would
not be complete by the end of October.[^54]

At the beginning of September, there were still more than 1,000 vehicles
being stored at the Lathrop facility, and Harris Manufacturing was still
engaged in its sub-contract for \"preservative maintenance\" of the
vehicles. Shortly thereafter, the Richmond Tank Depot received orders to
ship all those vehicles directly to the Tooele Ordnance Depot in Utah,
by-passing Richmond. Ordnance therefore terminated its contract with
Harris Manufacturing and took bids from three companies, including
Harris, to simply prepare the vehicles for shipment to Tooele. K&D
Industries of Sacramento was the low bidder and received the contract,
work to be completed by October 24th (later amended to November 13th).
In the end about 250 of the vehicles stored at Lathrop were sent to
Richmond before being shipped to their final destinations.[^55] By the
end of September, the Richmond Tank Depot had shipped enough vehicles
that it was able to vacate all the nearby leased lots except the one
being leased from the Parr-Richmond Terminal. Ordnance vacated that last
leased lot by the end of October.[^56]

The Richmond Tank Depot met its deadline, shipping the last of its
vehicles on October 31st. Some of the vehicles stored at Lathrop were
not shipped, however, until mid-November. By the end of October, the
force of Ordnance employees dropped to 40. Most of them received notices
that their employment would end November 17th, with a few remaining to
complete the paperwork of terminating the contract with Ford. One
Ordnance employee, Mary Ambrosio, resigned her Ordnance position in the
Property Branch to go to work for Ford.[^57]

**E. Patriotism**

During World War II, there were many ways individuals and groups could
demonstrate their patriotic commitment to their nation\'s war efforts.
The most direct participation, of course, was through military service,
especially on the front lines with the Army, Navy, Marines, and Army Air
Force. Others, such as the men and women who worked at the Richmond Tank
Depot, set aside their normal pursuits to work long hours producing the
materiel needed by the military to prevail over the Axis powers in the
war. Citizens who did not undertake either of those direct kinds of
participation in the war effort, nevertheless had other means to
contribute to the cause. One was through the purchase of War Bonds. A
program the Army devised to instill in citizens a more tangible
contribution to the war was to allow groups who bought War Bonds to
designate their purchases of bonds towards the cost of specific
vehicles. In November 1944, the Richmond Tank Depot received a shipment
of plaques from OCO-D, engraved with the names of organizations
presenting vehicles to the Army by purchasing War Bonds. For example,
the students of Garfield Heights High School in Ohio purchased enough
bonds to present the Army with a light tank; the Ladies Auxiliary of
Lodge No. 9, Brotherhood Protective Order of the Elks, St. Louis,
presented a heavy tank; the Commercial Telephone Employees of
Alexandria, Virginia, presented a half-track personnel carrier; the
Abraham and Chaia Rosenblum Foundation presented a scout car; the Class
of 1944 at Overbrook High School in Philadelphia presented two scout
cars and a half-track personnel carrier, and other organizations made
like presentations.[^58]

The practice continued into 1945, although simple decals replaced the
plaques as the means of naming the organization that was presenting a
particular vehicle to the Army. In March 1945, the Northern California
War Finance Committee sent the Richmond Tank Depot 143 decals, each
decal naming a school or other organization, representing the like
number of vehicles school children purchased for the Army through War
Bonds. Most of the schools were in California, but other western states
were represented as well. Eleven Richmond schools purchased a total of
fifteen vehicles, and some of the Richmond students and teachers were
able to tour the depot and watch workers affix the decals to their
vehicles.[^59]

Workers at ordnance facilities throughout the nation worked long days
and weeks at often tedious jobs supplying soldiers, sailors, and airmen
with the weapons, ammunition, and equipment they needed to wage war
against the Axis powers. Companies operating the plants had huge orders
to meet while facing chronic shortages of labor and materials.
Absenteeism and labor turnover were high in many industries.
Nevertheless, many of the workers were driven by a tremendous sense of
patriotism, that they were doing their bit to help win the war. And many
of those workers also sought to help foster that sense of patriotism
throughout their workplaces through formally and informally instituted
practices.

One practice entailed the circulation of stories portraying the mutual
goodwill exhibited by Americans on the homefront as they worked together
with the military to win the war. Two stories broadcast by the Lima Tank
Depot are illustrative. During August 1943, there was a tremendous
volume of tanks and other vehicles being prepared for shipment overseas,
and the bottleneck in the system was in the crating department, where
each vehicle was placed in its own wooden box. There were not enough
workers to maintain the pace of crating that was required for the depot
to meet its shipping deadline. Near week\'s end, the top Ordnance
officer posted signs around the plant stating, \"Nailers Wanted. 16 to
60 Years. Please Help.\" Workers at the plant carried the message home,
and over the weekend some 700 townsfolk, representing

professions from farmers and butchers to doctors and lawyers, came to
the plant to lend a hand. Thanks to the weekend \"Commandos,\" the Lima
Tank Depot met its August deadlines.[^60]

In another Lima story, a worker had lost his wallet one day while
processing a medium tank. After looking everywhere he could, he had
concluded he would never find it again. Sometime later, though, he
received the wallet in the mail, accompanied by a note from the soldier
in North Africa who had found it. The wallet still held all of the Lima
worker\'s money and identification papers, and the note thanked the
worker for the job he was doing and begged that he keep it up.[^61]

To reward firms that excelled in production for the war effort and to
publicize those good efforts in furtherance of national purpose, the
military awarded firms the \"E\" Award. The Richmond branch received
four such awards, the first on 31 July 1943. The ceremony at which the
Richmond branch actually received the award took place on 24 August
outside the plant. Richmond civic leader Fred Parr served as master of
ceremonies, introducing Col. K.B. Harmon, chief of the San Francisco
Ordnance District; Navy Capt. (ret.) Harvey Delano, War Plans Officer
for the Twelfth Naval District; J.R. Davis, the Ford Motor Company\'s
Western regional manager; and W.A. Abbott, superintendent of the
Richmond branch. The award included a special flag that the Richmond
branch could hoist on its flagpole below the flag of the United States.
Employees also received special \"E\" pins. Following the ceremony,
employees and their families and friends were able to walk along the
roadway west of the plant, which was lined with dozens of examples of
the vehicles the Richmond Tank Depot was processing. This was one of the
first times people who did not work at the Richmond branch had been able
to see what was happening there and the kinds of vehicles the Army was
sending overseas to support the troops. The other \"E\" awards followed
on 29 January and 14 October 1944 and 5 May 1945. Rather than new flags,
the subsequent awards each entailed a new star that the Richmond branch
could add to its \"E\" Award pennant.[^62]

In January 1946, Gen. L.H. Campbell, Chief of Ordnance, sent Col. K.B.
Harmon, Chief of the San Francisco Ordnance District, a letter
requesting a list of \"outstanding\" prime contractors in the San
Francisco District, contractors which excelled in meeting the following
criteria:[^63]

**Criteria for selecting "outstanding\" prime contractors:**

a\. getting into production in an unusually short time

b\. distinction in quality of their production

c\. unusual contribution to development, testing, or engineering

d\. unusual reduction in cost

e\. outstanding performance on spare parts deliveries

f\. outstanding performance in handling engineering changes

g\. special distinction in cooperating with Ordnance

h\. high performance in meeting schedules

i\. special managerial skill in using sub-contractors and avoiding
excessive new facilities

Harmon responded with a list of 47 contractors whose record he and his
staff considered outstanding. Of those, he highlighted 21 as being
especially outstanding. The Ford Motor Company was one of the especially
outstanding prime contractors for its operation of the Richmond Tank
Depot. Other Richmond firms on the list were: the Chemurgic Corporation,
which developed pyrotechnic materials; American Radiator and Standard
Sanitary Company, which produced hand grenades; and Rheem Manufacturing
Company, the Richmond plant of which made M13 cartridge storage cases.
Companies in the San Francisco Ordnance District receiving Army-Navy
\"E\" Awards, in addition to Ford\'s Richmond plant, were: Columbia
Electric & Manufacturing Company of Spokane, which made artillery
shells; Yuba Manufacturing Company of San Francisco, which produced
155mm howitzers (five of its sub-contractors in the Bay Area also
received the Army-Navy \"E\" Award); and Fanger Research & Development
Company of San Francisco, which developed a new manufacturing method for
a split ring used on Yuba Manufacturing\'s 155 howitzer. Ford\'s
Richmond plant was apparently the only one to receive multiple \"E\"
Awards, and Harmon cited the facility for never missing a production
deadline.[^64]

One thing private firms like Ford were not allowed to do during the
early part of the war was advertise the contributions they were making
to war production. The War Department prohibited announcements of any
contracts received for production of ordnance. Richmond and the other
Ford branches received instructions from Dearborn that the Ford News
Bureau would make any such announcements on behalf of the company, but
only when significant percentages of contracts had been delivered to the
Army and then only after any announcement had been cleared with the War
Department. It was in this context of secrecy during the early part of
the war that the Richmond Tank Depot had been closed to the eyes of the
public until reporters were allowed to view operations in July 1943
(described above), shortly before the August 1943 \"E\" Award
ceremony.[^65]

Workers at the Richmond branch did more to support the troops in the
field than simply do excellent work in preparing tanks and other combat
vehicles for shipment abroad. They also undertook a special project
aimed at bolstering the morale of soldiers on the front lines, far from
home. Under the leadership of Frank Vivian, an engineer in the boiler
room, members of UAW Local 560 who called themselves the \"boilerhouse
gang\" collected current magazines and newspapers from members of the
community, wrapped them in packages, and placed a package in each
completed jeep or tank before it was sealed for shipment. By November
1944, workers at the Richmond Tank Depot had sent 40 tons of magazines,
bundled and stowed in vehicles, to the troops in the theatres of war.
The Ford Motor Company allowed its employees to conduct the project on
company time and provided work space for the packages to be assembled.
Vivian also used his own wages to purchase small American flags so that
a flag would adorn each vehicle that left the Richmond Tank Depot. He
estimated that by September 1944 he had purchased 18,000 flags.[^66] The
bundles of periodicals each carried a copy of a letter, of which the
following are a few of the lines being sent in September 1944:

For over two years, we old engineers at the Ford Motor Company
Powerhouse at Richmond, California, Ford Plant, which is now known as
the Richmond Tank & Motor Vehicle Depot, have been placing bundles of
periodicals and magazines in export jeep crates, tanks, and other
battle-wagons\--where there is spare space to stow them.

The \'honeys\' who now work in the plant bring them into the powerhouse
and we engineers in our spare time bundle them up\--for you!

The boys and the gals\--at the Ford Richmond Tank Depot\--will relax no
effort until this job is done\--we promise you.[^67]

Vivian tried to think of other ways to boost morale for soldiers
fighting overseas and convey to them the patriotic spirit of the
ordnance workers on homefront. Whenever he saw that the Richmond Tank
Depot was processing a group of tanks or other vehicles under a
\"deadline\" order, he suspected that the tanks were bound for a beach
landing. He would find a location in one of the vehicles to place an
American flag of standard size, accompanied by a note saying, \"HI
\'BUDDIE,\' PUT THIS GRAND OLD FLAG UP ON THE HIGHEST PEAK, MOUNTAIN OR
HILL ON WHATEVER ATOLL IT HAPPENS TO LAND ON. GOOD LUCK AND GOD-BLESS
YOU\'ALL, Signed- VIV.\" He claimed to have received a letter from Iwo
Jima, accompanied by prints of Jack Rosenthal\'s famous photograph for
the Associated Press, stating that the flag planted by Marines atop
Mount Suribachi was one of the flags Vivian had placed in a piece of
ordnance equipment at the Richmond Tank Depot.[^68]

And Vivian also tried to boost the morale of his fellow workers in
Richmond by writing notes to accompany the bundles of periodicals and
asking the soldiers and service-women who found the notes to write back.
Then he would distribute the letters he received. Here\'s a sample
recorded in one of Capt. Spiker\'s monthly histories:

One of the bundles of magazines which you sent overseas is being put to
good use in our club here in Australia. Men on leave from New Guinea,
and nurses too, are reading the magazines\....Keep up the good work.
*Margaret Griffin, American Red Cross*

Magazines received. A thousand thanks from happy Yanks. *Cpl. I. Horning
from the Pacific*

These bundles were distributed by us to the Red Cross installation and
Army and Navy hospitals in this area. The boys are so hungry for home
town news and American magazines of any kind, that our office has been
flooded by servicemen, both Army and Navy and even men from the American
Transport Service, who have found that they are here and have tried to
borrow them. As far as they go, we have filled all requests\....I want
to thank each and every one of you for the fine spirit displayed in
doing this service for the fighting forces\....I also want to add that
good services like this are too few. Yours is one of the first that I
have run across in my two years of overseas service and since I have
been in all the forward areas, as well as the bases in the rear, I am
speaking from experience and sincerely express my gratitude for this
type of service\... *Lee Morrow, Area Director of Recreation, American
National Red Cross, South Pacific and Southwest Pacific*

If you\'ve ever been alone, and out of no where a friend came in,
you\'ll know how the books were received here in the bush of Australia.
*\"Yanks down under\"*

Were you here to see the faces of our nurses when your magazines were
delivered, you would feel amply repaid for the effort put forth in
procuring same. For the majority of us it was the first opportunity we
have had to read, yes, even see a Good Housekeeping, McCalls,
Cosmopolitan or Ladies\' Home Journal for many long months. Needless to
say, they were snatched up very eagerly and they will pass through many
hands, I assure you. *Chief nurse of a service hospital in France*

You\'ll never know just how pleasant was the surprise that the men of
this installation had upon opening a water-proofed Armored Car M-8
yesterday and finding your bundle of magazines. *An Ordnance gang of
twenty men in Italy*[^69]

The last of the letters bore the date 29 September 1944 and referred to
a bundle bearing the date 21 July 1944. The fact that only two months
separated placing the bundle in a vehicle and a group of soldiers
writing a letter back to Richmond is testimony to how quickly vehicles
were shipped overseas to the theatres of the war once they had been
readied for shipment at Richmond.

Those who received the bundles were not only appreciative of the
periodicals, as the following quote demonstrates:

We can safely say that RTD \[Richmond Tank Depot\] has a much better
record for equipment arriving in good shape than any other Depot we\'ve
received equipment from; and don\'t think that isn\'t very vital when
time is very short. *Somewhere in the Pacific*[^70]

Some of the letters Vivian and his crew received were from servicemen
who were also members of UAW Local No. 560, which represented the Ford
workers at the Richmond Tank Depot. Those servicemen were also
appreciative of the fact that the local sent them issues of the Richmond
plant\'s shop paper. One soldier thanked the local for sending him the
paper, which \"keeps us informed of the home front we are fighting to
defend.\"[^71]

In July 1945, Vivian and his boilerhouse gang folded the 8-foot by
12-foot American flag that had flown over the Richmond Tank Depot for
3-1/2 years and placed it, accompanied by a letter and a poem, in an M8
armored car bound for the Pacific theatre. The letter explained to
whoever unpacked the flag how much the Ford workers at the Richmond Tank
Depot loved it, that it represented their \"high-spirited efforts in
helping to win this terrible war,\" and that the Richmond workers hoped
that the victorious American soldiers and Marines would be able to fly
that particular flag atop the tallest flagpole in Tokyo. The poem
expressed in verse Vivian\'s and his fellow workers\' patriotism and
their commitment to the cause for which the U.S. fought in the war.[^72]

Frank Vivian was the member of UAW Local 560 with the most seniority at
the Richmond branch, having started with the Ford Motor Company in 1913.
Ford put him in charge of the assembly line at the Panama Pacific
Exposition in 1915 (see history of Ford\'s San Francisco branch plant in
Chapter II). He continued with Ford at its San Francisco branch until
the company opened its Richmond branch 1939, and Vivian moved there with
the company. He again participated in Ford\'s exhibit at the 1939-1940
Golden Gate International Exposition, located on Treasure Island in the
San Francisco Bay. The landscaping there inspired Vivian to develop
gardens around the power plant at the Richmond plant. During the war, he
converted those gardens to Victory Gardens, planting vegetables instead
of flowers. Ever the loyal Ford employee, he also wrote a March 1944
letter to Admiral Emory S. Land of the Maritime Commission recommending
that one of the Liberty ships being built at the nearby Kaiser shipyards
in Richmond be named for Edsel Ford, who had recently died while
president of the Ford Motor Company. Land responded to Vivian, writing
that the Maritime Commission had intended to give Edsel Ford\'s name to
a Liberty ship built at Savannah, Georgia, because the Ford family had a
country home nearby, but the Ford family asked that a ship not be named
for him. For his enthusiastic efforts on a variety of fronts, Vivian was
a frequent subject of newspaper articles and favorable reports by Army
officers.[^73]

The Richmond Tank Depot also mounted periodic War Bond Drives. In
November 1944, the plant held its sixth drive, dividing Ford personnel
into seven groups and setting a quota for each, with the total for the
plant set at \$124,950. Within three days, the employees in every group
had exceeded their quotas, and UAW Local 560 purchased an additional
\$1,075 in War Bonds. Total collected at the plant for that drive was
\$142,185. Enthusiasm for War Bonds was not always high, however. During
the seventh drive in June 1945, the Richmond plant barely exceeded its
quota, and not until after considerable cajoling by Ordnance staff. One
explanation for the difficulty in meeting the quota was that many
employees, who might otherwise have purchased bonds, quit before the
drive, while new hires had already purchased bonds as individuals.[^74]

President Franklin D. Roosevelt died on 12 April 1945, a Thursday. His
successor, Harry S. Truman, asked that all plants engaged in war
production continue full work schedules, holding any commemorative
services either Saturday or Sunday. Workers at the Richmond Tank Depot
paused for five minutes of silence twice on Saturday the 14th, once
during the day shift at 10:00 am and once during the evening shift at
5:00 pm, to honor their fallen President.[^75]

May 8th was V-E Day. The news was broadcast at 6:00 am Pacific time.
Most of the day-shift production workers at the Richmond Tank Depot did
not hear the news immediately because they were in transit to work,
which began at 6:30 am. V-E Day evolved as a normal work day, because
there was still a war to be won in the Pacific. Ordnance and Ford
employees expressed any jubilation they may have felt without taking
time off from work. By early August, Japan\'s surrender appeared
imminent. To avoid any celebratory damage to property owned by the
government or the Ford Motor Company, Ordnance and Ford management
posted notices on a plant bulletin board that a plant holiday would
begin as soon as news of the end of hostilities arrived. In an August
10th telegram, Col. Harmon of the San Francisco Ordnance District
authorized the Richmond Tank Depot to pay all workers sent home on the
anticipated V-J Day for a full shift. There were 379 workers at the
Richmond Tank Depot during the night shift of August 14th, when news of
Japan\'s surrender arrived, at which time those workers were sent home.
All 1,138 employees working on Ordnance contracts then received a
two-day holiday.[^76]

[^1]: ^?^E.P. Hogan, \"The Story of the Quarter-Ton: The Army\'s
    Smallest Car Known as a \'Jeep\',\" unpublished historical report
    dated 15 July 1941 in NARA, Records of the Office of the Chief of
    Ordnance, RG-156, Entry 646A, box A711, p. 1; Herbert R. Rifkind,
    \"The Jeep - Its Development and Procurement under the Quartermaster
    Corps, 1940-1942,\" unpublished historical report dated 1943 in
    NARA, Records of the Quartermaster Corps, RG-92, Entry 2116N, box 2,
    p. 6.

[^2]: ^?^There is a nice summary of the Quartermaster Corps\'
    development of the jeep in Risch, *The Quartermaster Corps:
    Organization, Supply, and Services*, 139-141. See also Hogan, \"The
    Story of the Jeep,\" 1-4; Francis H. Fenn (president of American
    Bantam Car Corporation), testimony given 6 August 1941 to the Truman
    Committee Investigating National Defense, HFM Acc. No. 435, box 30,
    Mass Jeep Shipped folder, p. 1; Rifkind, \"The Jeep - Its
    Development and Procurement under the Quartermaster Corps,
    1940-1942,\" 6-12.

[^3]: ^?^Rifkind, \"The Jeep - Its Development and Procurement under the
    Quartermaster Corps, 1940-1942,\" 21-27.

[^4]: ^?^Hogan, \"The Story of the Jeep,\" 4-8; Fenn testimony, 2; Lt.
    Col. Edward S. Van Dusen (Quartermaster Corps), testimony given 13
    August 1941 to the Truman Committee Investigating National Defense,
    HFM Acc. No. 435, box 30, Mass Jeep Shipped folder; Rifkind, \"The
    Jeep - Its Development and Procurement under the Quartermaster
    Corps, 1940-1942,\" 27-34, 55-74; \"Ford Motor Company Operations
    under GPW Reconnaissance Car Contract and GPA Amphibian Contract,\"
    unpublished report (n.d.). in HFM Acc. No. 435, box 7, FMC
    Operations under GPW Contract folder, pp. 1-2

    Sources from the period provide inconsistent accounts of the numbers
    involved in the contracts for 1500 jeeps. \"Ford Motor Company
    Operations under GPW Reconnaissance Car Contract and GPA Amphibian
    Contract\" and Col. Van Dusen\'s testimony suggest that the total
    number was 1500 jeeps, with each of the three companies producing
    500. Hogan\'s report, Bigger\'s testimony, and the Thomson and Mayo
    history indicate that each company contracted to make 1500 units.
    The latter number seems to be corroborated by the \"Statistical Work
    Sheets, to 1 August 1945,\" in NARA, RG-156, Entry 936, box L181, p.
    155, which shows that American Bantam supplied the Army with a total
    of 2,642 jeeps during and prior to the war.

[^5]: ^?^Rifkind, \"The Jeep - Its Development and Procurement under the
    Quartermaster Corps, 1940-1942,\" 34. The reports, typed on
    standardized forms, from units stationed throughout the U.S. are in
    NARA, RG-92, Entry 1890A, boxes 477, 478, and 479.

[^6]: ^?^Fenn testimony, 2; Rifkind, \"The Jeep - Its Development and
    Procurement under the Quartermaster Corps, 1940-1942,\" 95-112,
    143-159; John D. Biggers (Office of Production Management),
    testimony given 13 August 1941 to the Truman Committee Investigating
    National Defense, HFM Acc. No. 435, box 30, Mass Jeep Shipped
    folder; Nelson, *Arsenal of Democracy*, 177-178; Harry C. Thomson
    and Lida Mayo, *The Ordnance Department: Procurement and Supply*
    (Washington, DC: Washington, DC: 1960), 276-278; \"Statistical Work
    Sheets, to 1 August 1945,\" in NARA, RG156, Entry 936, box L181, p.
    155.

[^7]: ^?^Ford Motor Company was singled out for criticism because it was
    seen as a giant corporation intruding on a specialty market
    developed by a small company, American Bantam, and because of Ford
    still had a poor record in negotiating with organized labor (see
    section on labor in this report below). There was also concern that
    Ford was trying to use its contract to get the contract for
    four-wheel-drive axles taken from Spicer. I.F. Stone was especially
    prominent in his journalistic attacks; see I.F. Stone, \"Behind the
    Ford Contract,\" *PM* (14 December 1940); Stone, \"Ford Still Gets
    the Breaks Even if It Does Jam Defense,\" appearing in both *The
    Nation* (30 December 1940) and *PM* (30 December 1940); Stone,
    \"Army Alters \'Midget\' Car to Please Henry Ford,\" *PM* (19
    January 1941); Stone, \"Ford Contract Inquiry Urged,\" *PM* (24
    January 1941). Stone was also critical of the Willys contract; see
    Stone, \"Willys-Overland Gets Army Favor on Midget Cars,\" *PM* (16
    February 1941). The controversy is summarized in Rifkind, \"The
    Jeep - Its Development and Procurement under the Quartermaster
    Corps, 1940-1942,\" 76-84 and 84-95.

[^8]: ^?^Rifkind, \"The Jeep - Its Development and Procurement under the
    Quartermaster Corps, 1940-1942,\" 112-128. Testimony before the
    Truman Committee is cited elsewhere in this report and may be found
    in HFM Acc. No. 435, box 30.

[^9]: ^?^Although other authorities attribute the name \"jeep\" to the
    phonetic contraction of G.P., Rifkind offers a more complex history
    in the first footnote of his \"The Jeep - Its Development and
    Procurement under the Quartermaster Corps, 1940-1942.\" He reports
    that prior to application of the name to the \"truck, 1/4 ton, 4 x
    4,\" the 1-2-ton 4 x 4 truck was also called a jeep. During 1941
    maneuvers when the Army was testing the 1/4-ton truck, it was
    variously called \"jeep,\" \"baby jeep,\" and \"peep.\" Other names
    included \"jeepie,\" \"son-of-a-jeep,\" \"blitz-buggy,\" \"bantam,\"
    and \"puddle jumper.\" A variant of the spelling was \"geep.\" By
    February 1942, soldiers and mechanics applied the name \"jeep\"
    solely to the 1-4-ton truck as the 1/2-ton 4 x 4 truck was replaced
    by a 3/4-ton model. \"Jeep\" did not attain official military status
    as a name.

[^10]: ^?^Thomson and Mayo, *The Ordnance Department: Procurement and
    Supply*, 279.

[^11]: ^?^Col. Van Dusen testimony, 5; \"Ford Motor Company Operations
    under GPW Reconnaissance Car Contract,\" 1-2; Rifkind, \"The Jeep -
    Its Development and Procurement under the Quartermaster Corps,
    1940-1942,\" 128-143. Rifkind provides numerous details concerning
    the Corps\' negotiations leading to the contracts with Ford to make
    jeeps. For example, he describes the process by which, for the first
    time in the United States\' mobilization of industry in support of
    the war effort, the government was able include in the contract with
    Ford the stipulation \"that all special dies, jigs, fixtures, and
    other tools to be acquired for the production of these vehicles will
    become the property of the United States.\" (p. 141-142)

[^12]: ^?^\"Ford Motor Company Operations under GPW Reconnaissance Car
    Contract,\" 2-4.

[^13]: ^?^\"Ford Motor Company Operations under GPW Reconnaissance Car
    Contract,\" 15-16A. Note that the July 1945 report by the commanding
    officer at the Richmond Tank Depot, \"Richmond Tank Depot, Vol. V, 1
    July to 30 September 1945,\" 16, states that Richmond assembled
    49,361 jeeps and not 49,359.

[^14]: ^?^\"Richmond Branch Operations under Contract W-883-ORD-2676,\"
    HFM Acc. No. 672, box 2, Defense Production - Richmond Branch
    folder, 8-9; Superintendent\'s Office to W.A. Abbott and Abbott to
    Supt\'s Office, memoranda dated 18 and 28 December 1942, HFM Acc.
    No. 371, box 16, folder 4.

[^15]: ^?^\"Richmond Tank Depot, Vol. II, part 1, 1 October to 31
    December 1944,\" 49-50. McFadden was transferred to the San
    Francisco Ordnance District, Tank-Automotive Branch, as Chief
    Inspector in January 1945; see \"Richmond Tank Depot, Vol. III, 1
    January to 31 March 1945,\" NARA, RG-156, Entry 646, box A600, 10.

[^16]: ^?^\"Richmond Tank Depot, Vol. II, part 1, 1 October to 31
    December 1944,\" 49-52, 75; \"Richmond Tank Depot, Vol. V, 1 July to
    30 September 1945,\" 16-17. Note that there is a discrepancy between
    the total shown in this table and the total presented in a previous
    table for jeeps produced at the various Ford plants. The total shown
    here is the arithmetic total of the numbers of jeeps produced under
    the various contracts, according to the Ordnance sources cited.
    Other Ordnance sources, however, show different totals. It is not
    known at present which is the accurate figure.

[^17]: ^?^\"Richmond Tank Depot, Vol. II, part 1, 1 October to 31
    December 1944,\" 75; \"Richmond Tank Depot, Vol. V, 1 July to 30
    September 1945,\" 17.

[^18]: ^?^\"Richmond Tank Depot, Vol. II, part 1, 1 October to 31
    December 1944,\" 51-52; \"Richmond Tank Depot, Vol. III, 1 January
    to 31 March 1945,\" 10.

[^19]: ^?^*Richmond Independent* (10 May, 13 July 1945); \"Richmond Tank
    Depot, Vol. IV, 1 April to 30 June 1945,\" 95, 139; \"Richmond Tank
    Depot, Vol. V, 1 July to 30 September 1945,\" NARA, RG-156, Entry
    646, box A601, pp 3, 16, 27.

[^20]: ^?^Campbell, *The Industry-Ordnance Team*, 219.

[^21]: ^?^\"Statistical Work Sheets,\" Vol. 41, to 1 August 1945,
    unpublished report in NARA, RG-156, Entry 936, box L181.

[^22]: ^?^\"History - Tank Depot Section,\" unpublished report in NARA,
    RG-156, Entry 646, box A272, OCO-D file, Engineering-Manufacturing,
    Vol. I, Tank Depot Section, pp. 1-3, 6; \"Industrial Service Tank
    Depot Operations (Final Issue), January 1942 thru December 1945,\"
    unpublished report in NARA, RG-156, Entry 962, box L303, pp. 1-18;
    Harry C. Thomson and Lida Mayo, *The Ordnance Department:
    Procurement and Supply* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office,
    1960), 254.

[^23]: ^?^\"Organization of the Ordnance Department, 1940-1945,\"
    unpublished historical report in NARA RG-156, Entry 948, box L239,
    organization chart between pp. 54 & 55.

[^24]: ^?^\"History - Tank Depot Section,\" 18-20; \"Industrial Service
    Tank Depot Operations (Final Issue), January 1942 thru December
    1945,\" 6-7; Dulany Terrett, *The Signal Corps: The Emergency*
    (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1956), 3-21; George
    Raynor Thompson, Dixie R. Harris, Pauline M. Oakes, and Dulany
    Terrett, *The Signal Corps: The Test* (Washington, DC: Government
    Printing Office, 1957), 70-72. For a summary of continuing
    developments in tank communications equipment during the war, see
    George Raynor Thompson and Dixie R. Harris, *The Signal Corps: The
    Outcome* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1957),
    118-122.

[^25]: ^?^\"San Francisco Ordnance District History, 1939-1942,\"
    unpublished historical report in NARA RG-156, Entry 646, box A576,
    San Francisco Ordnance District, Vol I, Part 3, pp. 118-119;
    \"Richmond Branch Operations under Contract W-883-ORD-2676,\"
    unpublished historical report in HFM Acc. No. 672, box 2, p. 1.

    There is little evidence that many combat vehicles were shipped from
    the Richmond Tank Depot via ships that docked at the plant. One
    document, \"Industrial Service Tank Depot Operations (Final Issue),
    January 1942 thru December 1945,\" unpublished report in NARA,
    RG-156, Entry 962, box L303, p. 16, had this to say in 1945: \"The
    property is located on San Francisco Bay and has wharf and dock
    space available, permitting direct loading on ships. Advantage has
    been taken of this asset on all occasions in which circumstances
    permitted.\"

[^26]: ^?^\"Richmond Branch Operations under Contract W-883-ORD-2676,\"
    1-3.

[^27]: ^?^\"San Francisco Ordnance District History, 1939-1942,\" Vol I,
    Part 4, p. 119-121; \"History of the Richmond Tank Depot, Contract
    W-883-ORD-2676, Richmond, California (October 1943),\" unpublished
    historical report in NARA RG-156, Entry 646, box A273, Office of the
    Chief of Ordnance - Detroit, Engineering-Manufacturing, Vol. IV,
    Part 1, October 1943, Tank Depot Section, p. 1-2.

[^28]: ^?^Thomson and Mayo, *The Ordnance Department: Procurement and
    Supply*, 255.

[^29]: ^?^\"San Francisco Ordnance District History, 1939-1942,\" Vol I,
    Part 4, p. 121-123.

[^30]: ^?^\"Richmond Branch Operations under Contract W-883-ORD-2676,\"
    7; Dick R. Reed to Co. K.B. Harmon, letter dated 11 January 1943,
    appended to \"Richmond Branch Operations under Contract
    W-883-ORD-2676.\" A table in NARA, RG-156, Entry 646, box A272,
    OCO-D file, Engineering-Manufacturing, Vol. I, Tank Depot Section,
    shows vehicle units received and shipped by the Richmond Tank Depot
    as of 28 December 1942. Total units shipped is 1,607, which differs
    from Capt. Reed\'s figure of 1,720 vehicles, but that may be because
    Reed reported vehicles, and the table reported vehicle units.

[^31]: ^?^\"History of the Richmond Tank Depot, Contract W-883-ORD-2676,
    Richmond, California (October 1943),\" unpublished historical report
    in NARA RG-156, Entry 646, box A273, Office of the Chief of
    Ordnance - Detroit, Engineering-Manufacturing, Vol. IV, Part 1,
    October 1943, Tank Depot Section, p. 1-2.

[^32]: ^?^\"Office of the Chief of Ordnance - Detroit, Engineering -
    Manufacturing, Vol. III, July-September 1943,\" unpublished
    historical report in NARA RG-156, Entry 646, box A273, tables for
    Richmond Tank Depot at the end of Chapter VIII, Tank Depot Section.

[^33]: ^?^\"History of the Richmond Tank Depot, Contract
    W-883-ORD-2676,\" 3-5; see also photos appended to the report
    showing vehicles in the mud. Photographs of the overhauled M2
    half-tracks are presented in a subsequent report, \"Richmond Tank
    Depot,\" Vol. II, part 2, December 1944, NARA, RG-156, Entry 646,
    Post-WWI Division Services and Other Units, Executive Division
    Historical Branch, Histories of Ordnance Installations & Activities,
    1940-1945, San Francisco Ordnance District, box A600.

[^34]: ^?^\"Office of the Chief of Ordnance - Detroit, Engineering -
    Manufacturing, Vol IV, Part 1, October 1943,\" unpublished
    historical report in NARA RG-156, Entry 646, box A273, p. 37.

[^35]: ^?^\"Industrial Service Tank Depot Operations (Final Issue),
    January 1942 thru December 1945,\" 17.

[^36]: ^?^\"Industrial Service Tank Depot Operations (Final Issue),
    January 1942 thru December 1945,\" tables p. 2.

[^37]: ^?^Delbert Ball to All Personnel - Richmond Tank Depot,
    memorandum dated 21 March 1944, copy appended to \"Richmond Branch
    Operations under Contract W-883-ORD-2676,\" 7; \"Richmond Tank
    Depot, Vol. I, 1 January to 30 September 1944,\" unpublished
    historical report in NARA RG-156, Entry 646, box A599, p. 8.

    An article in the April 1943 of *American Magazine*, \"American
    Workers Licked Rommel!\" by Don Eddy, tells another dramatic story
    of the tremendous effort workers at the Chester Tank Depot made to
    process tanks and prepare them for shipment to North Africa in time
    for the British Army to defeat Field Marshal Rommel\'s tank corps. A
    typescript of the article is appended to one of the copies of
    \"History - Tank Depot Unit.\"

[^38]: ^?^\"Richmond Tank Depot, Vol. I, 1 January to 30 September
    1944,\" 6-8; \"Richmond Tank Depot, Vol. II, part 1, 1 October to 31
    December 1944,\" RG-156, Entry 646, box A599, p. 2.

[^39]: ^?^Thomson and Mayo, *The Ordnance Department: Procurement and
    Supply*, 255-259.

[^40]: ^?^\"Richmond Tank Depot,\" Vol. I, 1 January to 30 September
    1944, NARA, RG-156, Entry 646, box A599, 8-9.

[^41]: ^?^\"Richmond Tank Depot, Vol. II, part 1, 1 October to 31
    December 1944,\" 2, 10, 17; \"Richmond Tank Depot, Vol. V, 1 July to
    3 September 1945,\" RG-156, Entry 646, box A601, pp. 101-102.

[^42]: ^?^\"Richmond Tank Depot, Vol. I, 1 January to 30 September
    1944,\" 26-27.

[^43]: ^?^\"Richmond Tank Depot, Vol. I, 1 January to 30 September
    1944,\" 9; \"Richmond Tank Depot, Vol. II, part 1, 1 October to 31
    December 1944,\" 112-113; \"Richmond Tank Depot, Vol. V, 1 July to
    30 September 1945,\" 85.

[^44]: ^?^\"Richmond Tank Depot, Vol. III, 1 January to 31 March 1945,\"
    NARA, RG-156, Entry 646, box A600, 2-3.

[^45]: ^?^\"Richmond Tank Depot, Vol. II, part 1, 1 October to 31
    December 1944,\" 2-3, 18.

[^46]: ^?^\"Richmond Tank Depot, Vol. II, part 1, 1 October to 31
    December 1944,\" 8-9.

[^47]: ^?^\"Ford Plant Here Main Coast Tank Depot,\" *Richmond
    Independent* (8 July 1943): 1; \"Richmond Ford Plant Now Is Huge
    Army Tank Arsenal,\" *The San Francisco News* (8 July 1943): 2;
    \"Women on Assembly Line Turn Out More Daily Than Pershing Had in
    1918,\" *The Call Bulletin* (San Francisco, 8 July 1943): 11; \"Ford
    Plant Lifts Veil of Secrecy,\" *Oakland Tribune* (8 July 1943): 1;
    \"\'Flivver\' Plant Becomes Huge Army Depot,\" *San Francisco
    Examiner* (9 July 1943): 9; \"Army Lifts Veil and Shows How Bay Tank
    Depot Works,\" *San Francisco Chronicle* (9 July 1943): 5.

[^48]: ^?^\"Tanks from U.S.A.,\" *The Labor Herald* (9 July 1943): 2;
    \"Richmond Auto Workers Made Russ Hero\'s Tank,\" *The Labor Herald*
    23 July 1943): 7.

[^49]: ^?^\"Richmond Tank Depot, Vol. II, part 1, 1 October to 31
    December 1944,\" 21, 45.

[^50]: ^?^\"Richmond Branch Operations under Contract W-883-ORD-2676,\"
    5; \"Richmond Tank Depot, Vol. III, 1 January to 31 March 1945,\"
    72-73, 185-187; \"Richmond Tank Depot, Vol. V, 1 July to 30
    September 1945,\" 86-87, 145.

[^51]: ^?^*Richmond Independent* (3 May 1945); \"Richmond Tank Depot,
    Vol. IV, 1 April to 30 June 1945,\" 99-100, 153-158.

[^52]: ^?^\"Richmond Tank Depot, Vol. IV, 1 April to 30 June 1945,\"
    21-23; \"Richmond Tank Depot, Vol. V, 1 July to 30 September 1945,\"
    7.

[^53]: ^?^*Richmond Independent* (16 August 1945): 1, 15 and (22 August
    1945): 1-2; \"Richmond Tank Depot, Vol. V, 1 July to 30 September
    1945,\" 88-92, 132-133, 157.

[^54]: ^?^\"Richmond Tank Depot, Vol. V, 1 July to 30 September 1945,\"
    141, 155-156.

[^55]: ^?^\"Richmond Tank Depot, Vol. V, 1 July to 30 September 1945,\"
    144-148; \"Richmond Tank Depot, Vol. VI, October 1945,\" 1, 6.

[^56]: ^?^\"Richmond Tank Depot, Vol. V, 1 July to 30 September 1945,\"
    152; \"Richmond Tank Depot, Vol. VI, October 1945,\" 7.

[^57]: ^?^\"Richmond Tank Depot, Vol. VI, October 1945,\" 1-2.

[^58]: ^?^\"Richmond Tank Depot, Vol. II, part 1, 1 October to 31
    December 1944,\" 47, 70.

[^59]: ^?^\"Richmond Tank Depot, Vol. III, 1 January to 31 March 1945,\"
    178-179, 202-204.

[^60]: ^?^\"Office of the Chief of Ordnance - Detroit, Engineering -
    Manufacturing, Vol. III, July-September 1943,\" unpublished
    historical report in NARA RG-156, Entry 646, box A273, p. 26.

[^61]: ^?^\"Office of the Chief of Ordnance - Detroit, Engineering -
    Manufacturing, Vol. III, July-September 1943,\" 26.

[^62]: ^?^\"Richmond Branch Operations under Contract W-883-ORD-2676\"
    (HFM), 7; \"Richmond (Cal.) Branch Receives Army-Navy \'E\',\" *Ford
    Times* (17 September 1943): 5; *Richmond Independent* (2, 23, 24, &
    25 August 1943, 15 June 1945); \"Richmond Tank Depot, Vol. IV, 1
    April to 30 June 1945,\" 102, 227-229.

[^63]: ^?^Gen Campbell to Col. Harmon, letter received 5 January 1946,
    NARA, RG-156, Entry 654J, box 21, publications & reports, 1941-1945.

[^64]: ^?^\"List of Ordnance Contractors,\" list attached to Col. Harmon
    to Gen. Campbell, letter dated 5 January 1945, NARA, RG-156, Entry
    654J, box 21, publications & reports, 1941-1945.

[^65]: ^?^Superintendent\'s Office to J.R. Davis and W.A. Abbott,
    memorandum dated 18 September 1942, HFM Acc. No. 371, box 16, folder
    4.

[^66]: ^?^\"\'GI Bundles\' - Richmond Tank Builders Keep South Pacific
    Servicemen Happy,\" *The Labor Herald* (San Francisco, 22 September
    1944): 2; \"Richmond Branch Employee Places Flags on Tanks at Coast
    Depot,\" *Ford Times* (28 May 1943): 6; \"Richmond Tank Depot, Vol.
    II, part 1, 1 October to 31 December 1944,\" 59-60, 89.

    A photograph in HFM Acc. no. 89, box 1, Richmond Branch WWII Photos
    folder, show one of the bundles of periodicals as it was found in
    the engine compartment of a jeep sent to the Studebaker Proving
    Ground. An accompanying photograph shows the periodicals, displayed
    on a table. They included: *Life*, *Collier\'s*, *Hollywood*,
    *Movieland*, *Screen Romances*, *Photoplay*, *San Francisco
    Examiner*, and *Oakland Tribune*.

[^67]: ^?^Letter quoted in \"\'GI Bundles\'\--Richmond Tank Builders
    Keep South Pacific Servicemen Happy,\" *The Labor Herald* 22
    September 1944): 2.

[^68]: ^?^Frank Vivian to Gen. Levin H. Campbell, Jr., letter dated 30
    September 1945, HFM Acc. no. 89, box 1, Richmond Branch WWII Awards
    & Correspondence folder.

[^69]: ^?^\"Richmond Tank Depot, Vol. II, part 1, 1 October to 31
    December 1944,\" 89-91.

[^70]: ^?^\"Richmond Tank Depot, Vol. III, 1 January to 31 March 1945,\"
    198.

[^71]: ^?^\"\'GI Bundles\'\--Richmond Tank Builders Keep South Pacific
    Servicemen Happy,\" *The Labor Herald* 22 September 1944): 2.

[^72]: ^?^\"Richmond Tank Depot, Vol. V, 1 July to 30 September 1945,\"
    22-23, 68-71. Text of the letter and the poem are exhibits to the
    report on pp. 68-70; a photo of Vivian and some of the women who
    comprised the boilerhouse gang appears on p. 71.

[^73]: ^?^\"GI Bundles,\" 2; \"Richmond Branch Employee\", 6; Robert H.
    Wall, \"He Keeps Them Flying,\" ms dated 25 March 1943 and attached
    to Maj. Dick R. Reed to District Chief, letter dated 27 March 1943;
    Frank Vivian to Emory S. Land, letter dated March 1944; Land to
    Vivian, letter dated 7 April 1944, all items in HFM Acc. no. 89, box
    1, Richmond Branch WWII Awards & Correspondence folder.

[^74]: ^?^\"Richmond Tank Depot, Vol. II, part 1, 1 October to 31
    December 1944,\" 59; \"Richmond Tank Depot, Vol. IV, 1 April to 30
    June 1945,\" 171-172.

[^75]: ^?^\"Richmond Tank Depot, Vol. IV, 1 April to 30 June 1945,\"
    NARA, RG-156, Entry 646, box A601, p 6.

[^76]: ^?^\"Richmond Tank Depot, Vol. IV, 1 April to 30 June 1945,\" 83,
    102-103; \"Richmond Tank Depot, Vol. V, 1 July to 30 September
    1945,\" 93-94, 106; Harmon to Commanding Officer, Richmond Tank
    Depot, telegram dated 10 August 1945, exhibit Ha, p 106 of vol V.