# External Relations and Africa

**The views expressed in this and other papers associated with the NIC
2020 project**

**are those of individual participants. They are posted for discussion
purposes**

**only and do not represent the views of the US Government.**

# External Relations and Africa

# The Global Context

In a world of globalisation and with the passing of the stark
ideological differences that defined the Cold War, a number of different
trends are emerging. Eight are highlighted below:

First, power structures between states have altered reflecting changes
in the external environment, notably from the end of the Cold War where
states are no longer propped up in spite of their internal politics and
policies, and are today no longer able to hide behind ideological walls.
There is also an increasing awareness of the value of self-determination
in international relations, which has broad implications for the
construction of African states.

Second, the power relationship between states and markets has changed,
where markets are increasingly important in evaluating their success (or
not). Markets can bring down rulers (Suharto in Indonesia for example).
Financial markets are arguably a better friend and a tougher opponent in
today's world than military allies or foes.

Third, related to this last point, there is no longer an assumption that
big states are necessarily better states. In Africa, for example, the
more important states are not necessarily the bigger ones. Indeed,
Ghana, Uganda, Mauritius and Botswana have been steady if imperfect
recent performers. States are no longer valued in terms of territorial
or population size, but rather their economic health. Who, for example,
would claim that the DRC is more important than Singapore? And indeed,
it may well be that smaller is often better in Africa, in particular,
given the difficulties in extending governance capacity and
consolidating rule.

Fourth, the balance between people and states has also altered, where
the current technological and communication system gives more power to
individuals to influence both markets and nation-states (both positively
through trade; and negatively through terrorism and crime). Individuals
are able to assume a position of relative strength through the media and
NGOs, and also through the spread of democratic values and systems.
Globalisation has been described in this respect as an "incredible
force-multiplier" for individuals.[^1] This is why Al-Queda can mount
the sort of operations it has done with relatively little money; or how
a single individual can establish an e-mail campaign to set in motion a
global ban on landmines; or how single traders can wield enormous power
and influence in global markets instantly.

Fifth, although everyone in the world is directly or indirectly affected
by globalisation, and it is clear that it has benefited most, clearly
some are benefiting faster than others. Because of the vagaries in the
way in which states have responded to globalisation and its challenges
and opportunities, we today live in a world of extreme (and widening)
inequality, where Africa is stagnating. In 1820, the United Nations
reminds us, Western Europe's per capita income was 2.9 times that of
Africa; in 1992, this had widened to 13.2 times. "Almost across the
board", the UNDP says, sub-Saharan Africa "is being left behind".
"Economies have not grown, half of Africans live in extreme poverty and
one-third in hunger, and about one-sixth of children die before age five
-- the same as a decade ago".[^2] Moreover, because of population
increases, the number of people in poverty in Africa actually increased
substantially in the 1990s.

Simply, those that can trade more will benefit more. And those that are
able to trade more are generally those with a formula of deregulation,
privatisation, and improving productivity (which relates to health
systems, education, labour laws and so on). Of course, the fact that
some are benefiting more than others has produced a backlash, notably at
international summits such as those of the World Trade Organisation
(WTO) and G-8.

Sixth, paradoxically, the worm is turning in terms of the balance of
power with regard to international trade arrangements between the
developing world and developed societies. The developing world
(including India and China) has more clout at the international trade
table. Also, post-9/11 there is a widespread sentiment of the need to
improve the opportunity and dignity of those in the developing world,
reducing the political as well as economic divides between the haves and
have-nots. Trade is seen as an important element in drawing countries
more deeply into a global web of capitalism and democracy, without which
the international community, and the West and the US in particular, runs
the risk of alienation and radicalism and their effects.

Seventh, globalisation and the success in particular of Asian economies
shows that there is no cultural or geographic reason why countries
cannot succeed. South Korea, for example, like Malaysia, was always held
up as a basket case for the international community in terms of
development. Ghana, the first British African colonial state to acquire
independence in 1957, then had a higher GNP per capita than South Korea:
today the average income of Koreans is around 20 times that of
Ghanaians. When Malaysia gained independence in 1957, it had a per
capita income less than that of Haiti. Whereas Haiti was, at the end of
the 20^th^ century, the poorest (and probably the most unstable) country
in the Americas, Malaysia has a standard of living higher than that of
any major economy in that region save for the US and Canada. And despite
the 1997 crisis, regional economic growth has quickly recovered in East
Asia, with most countries proving more resilient and adaptable than many
expected. With average GDP growth rates in the five percent margin for
Malaysia and Thailand, and touching 10% for South Korea, the East Asian
success story is not a mirage but a reality, if an imperfect one, and
one that Africa can take heart from as it searches its own formula for
growth and success.

Eighth, finally, there is greater stress today on regional organisation
as a way of improving trade and deepening integration between states.
The trend has been of increasing intra-regional trade as a percentage of
both world trade and regions' overall trade. There are a number of
explicit advantages to regional groupings, including increasing market
access of third parties, improved labour and skills mobility, the
promotion of domestic deregulation, increased bargaining power in
international negotiations, and regional conflict resolution.

Since 1970, free trade areas have increased from four to more than 160,
of which the North American (NAFTA), Mercosur in Latin America, Asian
(AFTA), EU, and South Asian (SAPTA) are among the better-known
multilateral initiatives, and the SA-EU, EU-Mexico, EU-Israel,
Singapore-US, Japan-Singapore, Singapore-New Zealand, US-Chile and
EU-Morocco examples of the burgeoning number of bilateral agreements.

These developments have a number of implications:

-   One this puts more weight on local leadership to determine and shape
    their own future. For example, in Africa, there is an awareness now,
    as the creation of the New Partnership for Africa's Development
    (NEPAD) illustrates, of the need for Africans not only develop their
    own programmes, but also to police them in terms of peer review,
    setting examples, and also in terms of African peacekeeping efforts.

-   Second, this stresses the alternative ways in which states create
    and maintain their international relations, and the bodies that they
    seek to employ in this regard and to link up with. The latter
    obviously calls for a focus of government relations, both within and
    without states, on business; the techniques that they employ to
    achieve this, using diasporas, modern communications technologies
    and so on.

-   Finally, this should not be taken as meaning that states are by any
    means less important. Indeed, there is a body of literature
    illustrating how important a strong state is for development. And
    the role of states in ensuring security has been given prominence
    recently by the events following 9/11, which has strengthened
    sovereignty in terms of the need for states to provide security for
    their citizens.

# Past and Current Trends in External Engagement

Five sets of issues stand out apropos external relations with Africa in
the post-Cold War context:

First, aid has been less than successful in spite of the volumes of aid
transferred to the continent (around US\$13 billion in ODA was
transferred to sub-Saharan Africa in 2001). The fact that Africans are
poorer on average today than 30 years ago is an indictment of the aid
regimes that have been pursued, and of the scale of the African
challenge.

Second, while there remains high concern over the number and scale of
African conflicts, international peacekeeping efforts have shifted in
scale and nature from the extent of involvement of the mid-1990s when
there were 78,700 deployed at the 1993 peak to 43,500 troops, military
observers and police at the end of 2003. Of these, by the end of 2003,
about 30,600 are in Africa alone -- in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Western Sahara and on the border between
Ethiopia and Eritrea. This reflects both a change of heart (and lack of
fortune) especially following the Somali mission, but also a recognition
that external peacekeeping does little to solve core problems and
address problems of African capacity. Hence today's so-called
'resurgent' stage of peacekeeping, which focuses more on self-help
peacekeeping missions (especially in Africa), informed more about the
challenges of peace-building, reflecting, for example, the outcome of
the Brahimi report) and commencing with the Nigerian-led ECOMG operation
in Liberia.

Third, the perception and the cost of doing business in Africa remains
high -- too high to address the funding gap between current levels of
saving and foreign investment and aid and the level required for 7-8%
growth, a gap of around US\$30 billion annually. Much investment tends
to remain in energy/commodity and tourism sectors where Africa has a
dramatic or unique competitive advantage. Currently the US, for example,
imports two-thirds of its oil needs, and 15% of this comes from Africa.
This figure could increase to 25% by 2015. Angola is at the centre of
the oil boom, with its output increasing from 722,000 barrels a day in
2001 to 930,000 in 2003. By 2020 it is expected to reach 3,28 million
barrels a day. Nigeria\'s out will double to 4.4 million barrels a day
by 2020. Today's minor oil producers -- such as Equatorial Guinea, Chad
and Sudan -- could more than treble their output given this demand.

Fourth, while trade access is recognised both internally and externally
as critical to addressing poverty, with continued focus on preferential
(African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) I, II and, potentially, III;
Lomé/Cotonou) and asymmetric free trade regimes.

Fifth, military engagement has shifted from direct support of proxy
regimes or movements during the Cold War to a combination of
capacity-building and, especially post-9/11, direct American military
involvement in basing areas such as Djibouti. There are concerns about
terror networks especially in Eastern Africa and along Saharan routes
linking Arab nations in North and West Africa.

# Future Trends in External Engagement with Africa?

In the light of the above, ten emergent trends in terms of external
engagement with Africa can be identified:

-   First, an increasing external concern with failed, failing, weak
    African states as sources of insecurity, and a related concern over
    the rise of Islamic fundamentalism given the large number (250m) of
    African Muslims and their living conditions.

-   Second, an increasing external willingness to listen to African
    assessments of their development and security challenge (such as at
    the G-8 meetings), but which is not matched by a concomitant
    increase in aid disbursements.

-   Third, a more focused aid regime on issue-specific areas
    (governance, HIV-Aids, capacity-building). Related to this, there
    remains a focus on debt relief in exchange for poverty-alleviation
    'good governance' strategies. Africa's external debt stands at
    US\$300 billion. Over 80% of the heavily indebted poor countries
    (HIPC) are in the region, and the continent's total debt service
    ratio in 1999 (debt as a percentage of exports of goods and
    services) was 13.9%, uncomfortably close to the 15-20% mark that is
    considered unsustainable. Around US\$40 billion in debt has already
    been forgiven under the HIPC initiative. Paradoxically, Africa has
    lost an estimated US\$150 billion in capital flight, with around 40%
    of private wealth held outside the continent, a higher percentage
    than in any other region

-   Fourth, increasing military engagement by external powers -- partly
    driven by 9/11, partly by the Rwandan genocide, and partly (Sierra
    Leone) by personal and colonial (Cote d'Ivoire) connections.

-   Fifth, the increasing importance of the oil sector in especially but
    not exclusively US policy calculations on Africa. Importantly, most
    of Africa\'s oil producers are not OPEC members -- notably Angola,
    Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, Congo-Brazzaville and Cameroon.

-   Sixth, the rise of other powers such as China, which has both
    positive and negative implications for Africa in terms of the
    draw-card effect of China on global FDI and the impact of its
    manufacturing sector on Africa's, and more positively as a
    destination for African commodity exports.

-   Seventh, while trade access remains preferential and asymmetrical
    (i.e. that the developed world opens up faster than Africa is
    required to do so), there is a move towards greater reciprocity,
    such as through the various free trade agreements (EU-SA,
    US-Morocco, SA-US) and the European Union's regional economic
    partnership arrangement scheme.

-   Eighth, a focus on so-called 'pivotal' states in the hope that these
    countries might be able to influence their regions in a positive
    manner. The need to stabilise Sudan and the DRC is often mentioned
    in this respect given their potential as African growth 'poles'.
    However, the reality is rather that these states, far from being
    sources of dynamic regional integration, have long been reasons for
    regional insulation from their problems. The smaller states in
    Africa have done comparatively well in per capita GDP growth terms
    over the past two decades, while it is the larger states including
    Nigeria, the DRC, Ethiopia, Sudan and Angola, that have performed
    comparatively badly with a per capita GDP of under US\$200 less than
    half the continental average. In addition, despite their advantages
    for growth, their sheer size and related complexity has made the
    idea of intervention daunting.

-   Ninth, a focus, too, on support for and capacity-building in various
    African-led initiatives, notably the African Union and the New
    Partnership for Africa's Development.

-   Tenth, an increasing focus on engagement with the African diaspora.
    It is estimated that 60,000 doctors, engineers and university staff
    left Africa between 1985-90, and that since 1990 this figure has
    been 20,000 per year. The gap created by this loss has had to be
    filled by expatriates.

# Likely Drivers 

In summary, a number of drivers stand out in terms of shaping both
Africa's relations with the international community and the continent's
destiny.

-   Aids and disease, including the impact on Africa's militaries.

-   Terrorism, including inter-regional links and counter-terrorism
    strategies, and the linkage with Islamic movements.

-   Regional integration and rationalization.

-   NEPAD and its role in African success.

-   Borders and their potential reconfiguration.

-   Failed/weak states and what to do with them.

-   Urbanisation and urban-rural development inequalities.

-   Water shortages and related regional tensions.

-   Youth expectations and the ability to meet them.

-   Refugee flows and emigrant skills exodus.

-   Commodities, and commodity prices.

-   Organised crime, and the terrorism linkage especially through money
    laundering.

-   Distractions elsewhere (such as the Middle East) and the impact
    especially on aid flows.

-   Trade access, and its impact on poverty alleviation.

There too are a number of 'wild cards', which could fundamentally alter
the nature of the external relationship with Africa. These include:

-   The emergence (and recognition) of new states. Could, for example,
    recognition of Somaliland set a precedent?

-   The impact of increased terrorist links/activities (and external
    intervention to deal with this).

-   The success of NEPAD (and the flow of investment).

### Conclusion: Likely Directions

Overall there are three major external factors that will likely dictate
external terms of engagement with Africa and a number that are Africa
initiated/driven/dependent.

 

-   The threat Africa poses in terms of migration, terrorism and social
    instability, including the ripeness for Islamic fundamentalism
    within Africa.

-   The intensification of a global struggle for scare resources
    including oil, minerals, timber, and gems -- this will likely
    intensify, related to the emergence of the PRC's 'mega-economy' and
    expected economic and industrial development of East European
    countries (who will increase their productive capacity and thus need
    for resources).

-   The ebb and flow of ideological and political weight both in and
    between Washington and Brussels (increasingly, potentially, Beijing)
    and thus "concern" if not commitment to human development issues in
    Africa (and this goes to questions of ODA and, indeed, support for
    multilateral agencies such as the UN, IMF, World Bank etc).

 

Africa does not face military threats from outside the continent. The
security threats faced by African states are by-and-large internal.
Where external grievances exist (i.e. from neighbouring countries),
these are often a product of the failure of governments to extend their
authority and governance to their legal geographic extremities. This
reflects the core insecurity facing Africa today -- a combination of
weak and unresponsive government, limited resources, and political
systems that centre on patronage and hierarchy rather than liberal
free-market competition and bottom-up 'people's power'. Africa has also
been blighted by poor leadership, reluctant until now of taking a firm
stance against fellow leadership, this reflecting, at least, the
personal and polity trauma of colonialism, the failure of post-colonial
regimes and consequent collapse of expectations, and the damage done
from Africa being a proxy playground for the excesses of Soviet Marxism
and its ideological counterpart, US-led anti-communism. Taken together
the resultant paradigm of much of Africa's leadership has been to
simultaneously cock a snook at the West while turning to the external
community for the answers to unlock its depressing cycle of poverty and
instability. This schizophrenia is compounded by the West's hesitance
sometimes to calls things as they are in Africa, with policy positions
too often influenced by direct interests, former colonial connections,
or the need to excuse African leadership's excesses and failings given
the understandable imperative instead to look towards the brighter whole
of African development progress. But in so doing, it may be poisoning
the very well it is trying to bring to life.

 

Yet a major hope for Africa lies paradoxically in a new generation of
pragmatic, ideologically neutral, or broadly liberal democratic African
leader (such as Mbeki, Mogae, Kufuor, and Kibaki) who may be able to
deepen democracy and enhance development. This generation compares
favourably to the ideologues of Verwoerd, Mengistu, Nkrumah, Nyerere and
the last of their generation, Mugabe. One issue critical to their
success is, however, the degree to which Western democracies are
prepared to invest in these countries and governments to enhance their
chances of sustained reform and delivery.

 

In this regard, there will be nothing more powerful for African states,
their leadership and indeed the populace (given the increasing power of
telecommunications in Africa) than the 'global and continental
demonstration effect' of successful African economic 'tigers' or, more
accurately, 'lions'. If NEPAD is to achieve nothing else then it has to
achieve -- or help to achieve -- successful case studies: here SA,
Zimbabwe, Kenya, Egypt, Morocco, Ethiopia, Ghana, Botswana, Senegal, and
Angola stand out as possibles. 

\* \* \* \* \*

[^1]: See Thomas Friedman, *Longitudes and Attitudes*. New York: Anchor,
    2003.

[^2]: UN Development Programme (UNDP), *Human Development Report 2003*.
    New York: UNDP with Oxford University Press, 2003, p.39.