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**Statement of**

**Clyde D. Miller**

**Director, Corporate Security**

**BASF Corporation**

**before the**

**United States House of Representatives**

**Committee on Homeland Security**

**Subcommittee on Transportation Security and Infrastructure
Protection**

**"Chemical Security: The Implementation of the Chemical Facility
Anti-Terrorism Standards and the Road Ahead"**

**December 12, 2007**

Good morning, Chairwoman Jackson-Lee, Ranking Member Lungren, and
Members of the Subcommittee. My name is Clyde D. Miller, and I am the
director of corporate security for BASF Corporation. At BASF, I am
responsible for all security functions at our chemical facilities in the
United States, a number of which fall under the Chemical Facility
Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS) issued by the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS). I appreciate the opportunity to appear before the
Subcommittee this morning to provide feedback on DHS's performance thus
far, and to ask that the current program be given a chance to work.

BASF Corporation is the North American affiliate of BASF AG,
Ludwigshafen, Germany. BASF is the world's leading chemical company:
*The Chemical Company*. Our portfolio ranges from chemicals, plastics,
performance products, agricultural products and fine chemicals to crude
oil and natural gas. As a reliable partner to virtually all industries,
BASF's high-value products and intelligent system solutions help its
customers to be more successful. BASF develops new technologies and uses
them to meet the challenges of the future and open up additional market
opportunities. We combine economic success with environmental protection
and social responsibility, thus contributing to a better future. BASF
presently operates facilities, including manufacturing sites, research
facilities, and distribution centers, in more than half of the fifty
states.

For BASF and the chemical industry as a whole, there is no greater
priority than the safety and security of our employees and the
communities that surround our sites. It is in this vein that we have
striven to work within our trade associations[^1] and government at all
levels to safeguard our facilities from attack and to develop procedures
that allow us to respond quickly and efficiently to emergencies should
they occur. As my statement explains:

-   Chemical facilities in the United States are moving quickly to
    implement the regulatory program authorized last year by Congress
    and subsequently created by DHS.

-   There are ways to improve implementation of the program, and
    Congress can help by, for example, increasing funding for DHS and
    allowing enough time for the program to be implemented.

-   The discussion draft legislation now under consideration would only
    hinder the progress made thus far and cause unnecessary duplication.
    We recommend that, before Congress proposes significant changes, it
    determine exactly what, if anything, is lacking in the existing
    program.

-   We further recommend against mandating inherently safer technology,
    because process safety experts at chemical facilities -- working in
    conjunction with security experts -- are in the best position to
    weigh all options and decide on the best approach to maximize safety
    and security.

**I. DHS Has Acted Aggressively to Establish a Comprehensive
Regulatory**

**Program from Scratch. Facilities Are Now Moving Quickly to Comply.**

After six years of debate, last October Congress finally enacted Section
550 of the FY07 DHS Appropriations Act,[^2] the law that authorized the
new CFATS rules.[^3] Under an intense spotlight of public scrutiny and
Congressional oversight, DHS and chemical facilities are acting swiftly
to implement a groundbreaking program -- the first national chemical
security regulatory program anywhere in the world. While this program
shares elements with the programs established by several states -- most
notably New Jersey -- the CFATS program is, by far, more comprehensive
and demanding than any of them. So, even though BASF and the 2000 other
American Chemistry Council (ACC) member company facilities have already
invested more than \$5 billion to enhance security through the ACC
Responsible Care® Security Code, the DHS rules leave little doubt that
more action will be required of those facilities that are deemed to be
high risk under those rules. In fact, DHS anticipates over \$8 billion
of implementation costs during the first eight years of its program --
costs we will certainly bear in addition to those we have already
incurred. Keeping security measures innovative and staying a step ahead
of terrorists is the right thing to do. Beyond ACC members, thousands of
others facilities nationwide will also have to step up efforts to meet
these stringent requirements.

In just over a year, DHS has successfully completed the issuance of
comprehensive security regulations that will, by January 2008, require
over 50,000 facilities nationwide to complete a DHS screening assessment
known as "Top-Screen." Using risk-based methods, DHS will then be able
to quickly determine which of these facilities would pose a high risk if
subjected to a terror attack, and thus warrant action. Through informed
decisions based upon Top-Screen, DHS will designate thousands of
facilities as being high-risk and thus subject to regulation under
CFATS.

Throughout 2008, these thousands of high risk facilities will be
required to assess their vulnerabilities, develop site security plans
and, with close DHS scrutiny, minimize the risks they pose by
implementing layered security measures. Layered security -- based upon
the site's risk tier and the vulnerabilities its assessment has
identified -- will require consideration and implementation of varied
measures that in combination will reduce the threat of an attack or
mitigate an attack that might occur. These measures include: perimeter
security enhancements; surveillance and monitoring; security officers;
secured gates; restricted access; employee, contractor and visitor
background checks; specific protection against both inside and outside
threats of theft and diversion; cyber-security; inspections of
incoming/outgoing shipments; customer screening; training; drills; and
emergency response. DHS will inspect every regulated facility and
evaluate these security enhancements against 19 stringent performance
based standards. Fines and facility shutdowns will await those who do
not comply.

**II. What Could DHS Do Better, and How Could Congress Help?**

While DHS has gotten off to an impressive start, the new CFATS program
is not without its problems. Congress could help in several ways.

A. DHS Needs to Better Coordinate Its Own Programs

DHS's eagerness to show progress has already clashed with the new CFATS
program. Just this fall, as many of our companies were already working
closely with the regulatory staff to accelerate implementation of CFATS,
another component of DHS initiated the "Enhanced Critical Infrastructure
Plan" (ECIP), an outreach effort to encourage facilities to voluntarily
take additional security action. While well intended, the ECIP staff
often are going to the same sites that are already implementing the
regulatory program. Unfortunately, the ECIP program is based upon a
different tiering system and uses a different vulnerability assessment
methodology and different levels of information protection. This
conflict has created significant confusion among, and placed competing
demands on, facility security personnel. This is the sort of duplication
scenario that must be avoided.

B. Making Information Protection More Workable

Clearly, security-related information needs to be carefully protected
from public release. And yet, company staffs have to be able to do their
jobs, and security is part of the job description of an increasing
number of our staff. Thus, information protection requires a careful
balance.

Section 550(c) instructed DHS to give sensitive information protections
"consistent with" the "Sensitive Security Information" or "SSI" rules
that DHS uses now to protect information about transportation
security.[^4] DHS responded in CFATS by creating a new category of
protected information that DHS has labeled "Chemical-terrorism
Vulnerability Information" or "CVI." In most respects, we think DHS got
it right with CVI, at least in the rules. But this summer, DHS released
a CVI Procedural Manual that goes far beyond what is necessary.[^5] The
manual requires company staff with access to CVI to go through web-based
training and to sign a nondisclosure agreement (NDA) that is more
restrictive even than the NDA that is required to have access to
national security *classified* information. Chain of custody
recordkeeping is also required. And all this applies even when people
are only getting access to their own company's information. This means
that if my CEO asks specific questions about security measures we have
enacted at a particular facility, I cannot answer his questions without
him having to take this training and sign the NDA, a totally unnecessary
process. In its facility security program, the Coast Guard simply
"assumed that the owner/operator's security interest in this information
will be sufficient to prevent unauthorized disclosure."[^6] DHS should
adopt the same approach. It could do this by amending the SSI rules to
apply to land-based security information. Congress could help here by
revising Section 550(c) to speak of "identical" protections.

C. Congress Needs to Provide Adequate Funding to

> Support Full Implementation of the CFATS Requirements

While CFATS requires considerable action from chemical facilities in a
short period of time, it also will place enormous burdens on DHS to
implement the rules. DHS personnel will be required to conduct reviews
of site-specific vulnerability information and site security plans, and
to make site visits at each regulated facility. This will include
assessing how each facility has addressed the applicable risk-based
performance standards for facilities in its risk tier -- a complex,
site-specific, judgmental task.

With DHS's own estimates of at least 5,000 regulated facilities, its
30-person inspection staff will be sorely tested. We think
implementation of CFATS requirements necessitates a significant increase
of staffing resources -- certainly well beyond what can be reasonably
expected from the current situation. While DHS staff has demonstrated
outstanding commitment and effort to date, they clearly will need more
resources. We urge Congress to provide DHS with the necessary resources
to handle the workload and to ensure that chemical facility security is
properly implemented in a timely manner.

D. Allow DHS Enough Time to Do the Job Congress Has Given It

In the short period of time since CFATS was finalized, a steady stream
of misguided criticism has been directed at the rule and our industry.
Arguments have been wide ranging -- some have said the rule does not go
far enough, while other sectors have sought exemptions for themselves,
arguing that the rule went too far.[^7] Some say that few states have
taken action, while others say the rule undermines states' rights. And
the discussion draft seems to indicate that some believe wholesale
replacement of the rule is needed even as it is being implemented. I can
assure you that the program that is currently in place establishes
considerable demands on companies to comply.

It is important to note that BASF and all ACC members did not hesitate
to act, and we continue to lead by example. The business of chemistry
has been implementing security measures for years. We have assessed our
vulnerabilities, prioritized the risks and significantly tightened
security at our facilities. We also asked Congress for legislation that
empowered DHS to issue and implement tough regulations -- and that has
happened. Now, we respectfully ask that Congress give DHS sufficient
time to put the program in place.

Within the next six months, thousands of facilities will be conducting
detailed vulnerability assessments required by CFATS. These sites will
use these assessments to draft site security plans that describe
security enhancements, which very likely will require an increase in
capital improvements. Those plans should all be submitted to DHS before
the end of next year. The current requirements provide a clear path of
action, the timing for completing the steps of the program, including
inspections, and a review process that requires sites to revisit their
situation and assess whether any changes to their security systems are
needed.

I respect this Subcommittee's oversight responsibility and understand
that the legislation enacted last year has a three year sunset
provision. But I also hope Members will agree that our first priority
should be to enhance security at sites nationwide as soon as
practicable. CFATS is meeting this priority. Give DHS and the industry
enough time to implement the program and then determine what gaps
remain. Congress will have the assurance that nationwide, the security
at chemical facilities will have been significantly upgraded during the
process. Members will also have the benefit of seeing what works in the
program and whether anything will need to be adjusted.

**III. The Discussion Draft Legislation Would Only Hinder Progress**

A. Build on the Solid Accomplishments of the Past Year

BASF has had limited time to review the discussion draft, but we are
concerned that it seems to make no reference to Section 550, except to
repeal it on page 50. The draft appears not to acknowledge that the
CFATS rules have been issued, or that tens of thousands of facilities
are hard at work starting to comply. For example, while the bill refers
to how DHS should evaluate the efforts of facilities under "other
provisions of law" such as the Maritime Transportation Security Act
(MTSA) or the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) (pp. 19-20), that paragraph
does not mention Section 550, even though that statute is more demanding
than either the MTSA or SDWA.

As noted above, we would prefer Congress give more time for the existing
program to be implemented before making changes. Certainly, though, any
proposal must adequately acknowledge all that has happened over the past
year. While it is unusually short by modern standards, Section 550
clearly meets the nation's security needs, and DHS has for the most part
used its discretion appropriately to flesh it out. When considering
surgery on the existing program, Congress should follow the Hippocratic
Oath: *First, do no harm*. On that score, the discussion draft could,
indeed, be harmful.

First, if enacted, the draft would slow down the ambitious timetable
that DHS has established and that facilities are racing to meet. DHS
estimates that billions of dollars will be spent to comply with the new
rule as companies procure funding from management for significant
capital improvement projects to meet CFATS's performance standards. This
funding of projects will begin in 2008. Companies need to know that the
requirements are not going to be changing in mid-stream. Completely
rewriting those requirements will create massive uncertainty and could
delay security enhancements.

Second, passing a wholly new law would also divert DHS from the focus it
very much needs to meet its own deadlines. Passing a major new bill
could paralyze DHS as the agency shifts what is already an overstretched
staff to rewriting its rules to match the new law's terminology and
definitions.

Third, and most frustrating, the draft would require companies like BASF
to do everything all over again. Under the CFATS timetable established
under Section 550 (which this bill would leave in place until October
2009), we expect to be submitting site security plans to DHS for
approval by the end of 2008. We would then hear from DHS around February
2009, and would spend the rest of that year finishing implementation of
any long-term security measures and being inspected. Under this bill, by
October 2009, DHS would unveil its new regulations, and we would then
have six short months to submit new vulnerability assessments and site
security plans (for top-tier facilities). Once those documents were
finalized, we could well start spending more money redoing all the work
that had just been approved. This is not a fair or productive use of
private or governmental resources.

Again, before Congress proposes significant changes, it should determine
exactly what, if anything, is lacking in the CFATS program, and then fix
those targeted areas. In doing so, it should, wherever possible, use the
concepts and terminology already written into law by DHS, to retain the
benefits of existing work and minimize any unnecessary transition
problems.[^8]

B. The Discussion Draft's IST Mandate Is Bad Policy

If considerations of inherent safety drove all Congressional action,
this hearing would be held in a bunker or some other safe and
undisclosed location outside Washington. Congress and the Capitol
building are icons of America that remain attractive targets for
terrorists. Yet six years after 9/11, Congress understandably continues
to maintain a high profile in the nation's capital. Clearly removing
that risk by relocating Congress out of Washington would be safer for
Congress, and for the surrounding DC community, but it would have
serious public policy ramifications for the nation.

Yet we all agree that protective steps have been taken to lower the risk
and improve the security of this body. Measures to prevent an attack
have been stepped up and mitigation measures in the event of an attack
have also been substantially improved. Ultimately, an attack could still
be attempted, but risk-based measures have been implemented to reduce
the probability of a successful attack, and these measures are
constantly being reviewed and improved.

This is the same approach used every day in the chemical industry.
Inherently safer approaches have long been a core element of process
safety, plant design, continuous improvement and sound business
practices. Like other leading chemical companies, BASF considers
inherently safer approaches continuously, and has for years. Inherently
safer approaches, somewhat misleadingly referred to as "inherently safer
technology" (IST), involve designing processes that avoid hazards,
rather than trying to control them. It has four elements:

-   [Minimization/Intensification]{.underline} \-- Using smaller
    quantities of hazardous substances;

-   [Substitution]{.underline} \-- Replacing a particular material with
    a less hazardous material;

-   [Moderation/Attenuation]{.underline} \-- Lowering operating
    temperatures or pressures that provide less hazardous conditions;
    and

-   [Simplification/Error Tolerance]{.underline} \-- System designs that
    eliminate or tolerate operating errors, making the plant more
    user-friendly and reliable.

While these statements are clear and straightforward, like most things
in life, the devil is in the details. IST just is not that simple in
actual application. For example, it is almost always easier to select an
inherently safer approach when designing a process than to apply it to
an existing process. In lay terms, you cannot simply begin using diesel
fuel in a car that runs on gasoline, but you can design a car to run on
diesel. As another example, reducing inventories of a chemical on site
might appear to be inherently safer. Yet security protection is
typically at its greatest within a facility, whereas reducing
inventories may mean that more of the chemical has to be in transit,
where securing it is more complex. Improving the layers of security
where the products are made and stored may provide the best means of
reducing potential risks.

The current regulations provide incentives to consider inherently safer
approaches where feasible. CFATS will help drive implementation of
inherent safety across the nation's chemical sector, because a facility
that lowers its risk profile through process changes can move itself to
a lower risk tier, and then become subject to less demanding (and less
expensive) security performance standards. I can assure you that BASF
has made process changes to minimize its vulnerabilities.

But in Section 550, Congress wisely chose not to allow DHS to mandate
IST -- or any other specific security measure. No single security
measure is the only right one and Congress recognized that fact. IST is
complex and full of risk-risk tradeoffs and unintended consequences.
Rather than making those decisions from an office in Washington, BASF
believes process safety experts at chemical facilities -- working in
conjunction with security experts -- are in the best position to weigh
all options and decide on the best approach that will maximize safety
and security.

The discussion draft, by contrast, would require all high-risk
facilities to conduct an IST assessment and implement inherently safer
methods when four conditions are met.[^9] While those conditions might
seem to protect companies from unwarranted or fiscally ruinous mandates,
we foresee long and complicated debates about exactly what is "necessary
for the facility to meet \[its\] security performance requirements,"
what "can feasibly be incorporated into the operation of the facility,"
and what "would not significantly and demonstrably impair \[our\]
ability . . . to continue the business of the facility."[^10] And would
any of these conditions apply if the proposed mandate would prevent BASF
from making the particular product produced at a facility? (The change
might be feasibly incorporated, and might not shut down the plant, but
yet might spell the end of a product.)[^11]

Even a requirement to consider IST, as in New Jersey, could be
problematic. BASF recognizes that New Jersey's Prescriptive Order
requires covered facilities to consider IST as a means of reducing their
vulnerability.[^12] However, while BASF believes we have an effective,
constructive relationship with the State of New Jersey, our experience
with its process has shown that IST discussions regularly take up a vast
majority of the total review time of the inspectors, who frequently
barely look at security measures that have been implemented. Isolating a
single type of security measure for such intense focus at the expense of
all the others is not good security practice. Rather, facilities and DHS
should be considering the full range of security measures. We are also
concerned that a mandate to consider IST will convert the DHS security
program into a largely, but intensive, paper exercise. Simply put, does
Congress want DHS staff reviewing three-ring binders, or out in the
field inspecting actual security measures being implemented at
facilities?

C. The Discussion Draft Would Cause Unnecessary Duplication

BASF supports a risk-based program that applies even-handedly across the
board. We did not seek or support any special carve-outs under CFATS for
our facilities or our products, or anyone else's. Rather, we have
consistently called on Congress, and DHS, to issue comprehensive
security requirements that would apply nationwide and would raise the
security protections across all high risk sites. We support the CFATS
approach of screening over 50,000 individual facilities, from small
research facilities to large state of the art chemical manufacturing
facilities. This approach will minimize the chance that DHS has
overlooked any potential high risk sites. This also meets our shared
goal of focusing the resources where they are most needed.

We know some have questioned whether Congress was correct in Section 550
to exclude certain categories of facilities. A prime example from BASF's
perspective is facilities currently regulated by the Coast Guard under
the Maritime Transportation Security Act (MTSA) -- since we have four
such sites. While we believe the MTSA is effective, its application is
dependent upon a facility's physical location and whether it conducts
commerce on a navigable waterway, rather than the chemicals it has on
site.

Congress will ultimately need to come to its own conclusion regarding
the adequacy of the MTSA program vs. CFATS. Our overriding request is
that, if Congress decides to apply CFATS to MTSA-regulated facilities,
then it should clearly exempt those facilities from the MTSA. Congress
should not impose, or allow DHS to impose, CFATS obligations *on top of*
the MTSA program -- which is exactly what we fear the discussion draft
would do. Facilities cannot comply with two different, inconsistent,
overlapping programs. In addition, the integration of the different
programs under the draft would take place on a facility-by-facility
basis, rather than on a programmatic basis. And, as noted earlier, no
deference to prior work under CFATS is even mentioned in the draft.

Site security must not be regulated by multiple agencies or programs.
Rather, a broad and comprehensive program for security, managed at the
Federal level by a single agency component, has the best hope of
providing the certainty facilities need about their obligations and the
best protection for the nation.

D. Miscellaneous Issues

Based on our limited review of the draft, we invite the Subcommittee's
attention to the following additional items:

-   **Red-team exercises** (p. 15). While we would appreciate a clearer
    understanding of what the draft envisions, we are concerned that
    even if these exercises were single-day events, they necessarily
    would require weeks of advance planning, as well as subsequent work
    to distill any lessons learned. Requiring on-site exercises with DHS
    personnel at all high-risk sites -- assuming there were 6,000 such
    facilities, and phasing that obligation in over 6 years -- would
    require four exercises per business day, every day for the next six
    years.

-   **Linkage of SSPs to VA approval**. In CFATS, DHS has made clear
    that the deadline to submit a site security plan is not triggered
    until the facility receives notice that DHS has approved its
    vulnerability assessment. If both the VA and SSP were due at the
    same time, the SSP would likely turn out to be inadequate, cause
    unapproved and costly measures to be implemented, and require
    further work. But the bill does not indicate any intent to stagger
    these submission requirements as CFATS has done.

**IV. Conclusion**

The discussion draft does contain a number of provisions that would be
improvements over Section 550 and CFATS. Most important, it would
confirm that the federal program would preempt state programs where the
latter "conflicted with the purposes of this title" (p. 31). Such
'conflict preemption' is very important to facilities, and yet gives
state and local government broad leeway to craft non-conflicting
programs. As an example of why this is needed, several states last year
tried to prevent facility owners from restricting employees from
bringing firearms onto company property. One state is currently
considering language which would prohibit companies from conducting
inspections of entering vehicles. Vehicle screening is a fundamental
security measure that could not be implemented under that proposed
statute. As you can see, therefore, preemption can be essential to
assuring security.

Another valuable feature of the discussion draft is its requirement that
DHS give a facility the reasons why it was assigned to a particular risk
tier (p. 7). It is not clear that DHS will do this under CFATS.

If the discussion draft is merely a vehicle for identifying issues like
these, then it will have served a useful purpose. But BASF is concerned
that the Subcommittee intends to seek enactment of the bill or something
close to it. We had understood that Congress wanted prompt action after
so many years of delay. BASF certainly does. We ask you not to stop the
progress that DHS has achieved in the last year. Instead, please support
DHS with more resources so that it can get the job done, and support us
by backing implementation of CFATS and not changing course in
mid-stream.

Thank you again for the opportunity to appear before you. I look forward
to answering any questions you may have.

[^1]: BASF is a member of a number of trade associations that consider
    site security to be a top priority, including the American Chemistry
    Council, the Consumer Specialty Products Association, CropLife
    America, the National Petrochemical and Refiners Association, and
    others. These groups have worked closely together and with
    government agencies in support of chemical plant security
    legislation and regulation.

[^2]: Pub. L. No. 109-295, § 550 (2006).

[^3]: 6 C.F.R. Part 27, 72 Fed. Reg. 17688 (April 9, 2007), 65396 (Nov.
    20, 2007).

[^4]: Pub. L. No. 109-295, § 550(c).

[^5]: DHS, *Procedural Manual: Safeguarding Information Designated as
    Chemical-Terrorism Vulnerability Information (CVI)* (June 2007),
    available at
    http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/chemsec_cvi_proceduresmanual.pdf.

[^6]: U.S. Coast Guard, *Navigation and Vessel Inspection Circular No.
    10-04*, Encl. (3), § 4.b (Aug. 20, 2004), available at
    http://www.uscg.mil/hq/gm/mp/pdf/NVIC_10-04.pdf.

[^7]: While we cannot respond to every criticism of the rule, BASF would
    like to point out that critics of CFATS Appendix A are frequently
    wrong. For example, 1-ton chlorine canisters are *not* exempted;
    chlorine contained in transportation packaging (e.g., 1-ton
    canisters) is covered at 500 lbs -- *less* than what DHS originally
    proposed and *lower* than the EPA RMP threshold. Also, DHS was right
    to use the RMP thresholds for release chemicals (not 75% of the
    thresholds, as proposed) because the consequences of a release are
    the same regardless of the cause. Coverage is still greater under
    CFATS than under the RMP rule because, unlike RMP, CFATS does not
    focus only on the single process with the greatest potential offsite
    consequences from a release.

[^8]: Most important, Congress should use the same definitions of
    security measures and the same risk-based performance standards as
    CFATS, unless Congress has identified problems with them. In these
    and many other respects, CFATS is actually superior to the draft
    bill. For example, in CFATS (and under MTSA), DHS has recognized
    that personnel surety screens need to encompass contractors and
    visitors, not just employees. But the bill just repeats the phrase
    "employee background checks" used in previous legislation (p. 3).
    Also, CFATS recognizes that chemicals might be stolen or diverted to
    make chemical weapons or IEDs, not just be "released," yet the
    latter is the only basis for listing a chemical under the discussion
    draft (p. 4).

[^9]: Facilities must implement IST if it:

    is "necessary for the facility to meet the security performance
    requirements for the facility's risk tier";

    "would significantly reduce the risk of death, injury, or serious
    adverse effects to human health or the environment" from a terrorist
    release;

    "can feasibly be incorporated into the operation of the facility";
    and

    "would not significantly and demonstrably impair the ability of the
    owner or operator of the facility to continue the business of the
    facility."

    Discussion draft at 43-44 (new 6 U.S.C. § 2110(c)).

[^10]: *Id*.

[^11]: Speaking of protecting important products, we are also concerned
    that inherently safer approaches that also happen to be valuable
    trade secrets would have to be disclosed by DHS under the draft.
    Neither new Section 2110(d)(4) nor new Section 2108 identifies trade
    secrecy or business confidentiality as a basis for not providing
    information under new Section 2110(d).

[^12]: State of New Jersey Domestic Security Preparedness Task Force,
    *Domestic Security Preparedness Best Practices at TCPA/DPCC Chemical
    Sector Facilities*, ¶ 5 (Nov. 21, 2005), available at
    http://www.acutech-consulting.com/acutech-news/2005/BestPracticesStandarsActonChemicalPlantSecurityNov212005.pdf.