# GLR-IN-069 Safety Briefing for January, 2003 

Subj (General topic): Driving in Fog

(Aviation topic): Review of a Recent CAP Aircraft Accident

**General Topic: Driving in Fog** Ref: Iowa WG Safety Briefing Book
(http://www.iawg.cap.gov/)

Fog can occur in the winter due to abundance of moisture from melted
snow, and the cool temperatures. Driving in thick fog is dangerous. If
you have a choice, the best bet is DON\'T. But, if you find yourself
\"in the soup,\" think about the following tips:

1\. [Slow down gradually]{.underline}. Don\'t let your slowing down be a
surprise to the driver behind you. And, watch out for the taillights
that pop up suddenly ahead of you; your reaction will be to brake
heavily.

2\. [Do not tailgate.]{.underline} The driver ahead may not follow the
above rule, and [you]{.underline} may not have time to stop. Space
between you and other cars is your friend.

3\. [Use low beams.]{.underline} High beams just reflect back, and
don\'t really light much of the road surface.

4\. [Roll down window and turn off radio.]{.underline} Listen for things
you may not be able to see.

5\. [Be conservative.]{.underline} Avoid tricky and sudden maneuvers,
and unnecessary passing. Consider stopping and waiting it out if
possible. If pulling off the road, pull [way]{.underline} off, and turn
on emergency flashers.

**Aviation Topic: Poor Judgement Chain** Ref: NTSB Info C-182R, N5419E
Accident

1\. Poor Judgement Chain

> \- A series of mistakes (i.e. **[poor decisions]{.underline}** made by
> a pilot) or **[circumstances]{.underline}** which can lead to an
> accident.

\- Often, if any one of the decisions can be made a good decision, or if
a particular circumstance

had been different, the chain will be \"broken,\" and the accident will
be avoided.

2\. Read the following accident description, and identify each \"link\"
in the chain. Identify it as a [pilot decision]{.underline}, or a
[circumstance]{.underline}.

*According to a written statement by the pilot, when he checked the a/c
prior to departure, the right brake had been listed as inoperative in
the a/c logbook. There was no maintenance available at the airport. The
pilot checked the a/c further, and found that he could hold it in place
with the engine running by using the left brake.*

*He telephoned CAP personnel and discussed the logbook write-up, and his
findings. The pilot, with concurrence from other CAP personnel, agreed
to take the a/c to Elizabethtown for maintenance.*

*The pilot did not report any problems with the departure, enroute and
approach phases of the flight. When he departed from Ft. Knox, the winds
were from 280 at 10.* (Note: Doesn\'t say if this was the departure or
destination airport.) *He initially planned to land on r/w 23, but
decided that with the wind and bad brake on the right side, he would
land on r/w 5.*

*The pilot intentionally performed the approach with no flaps, and a
faster airspeed to minimize any crosswind controllability problems. He
touched down 500 feet past the approach end of the r/w at 70 kts. Each
time he applied the brakes, the a/c swerved to the left. He would then
release the brakes, and bring the a/c back to the r/w centerline.*

*About 1000 feet prior to reaching the departure end of the r/w, he
accepted the left swerve, and increased braking pressure. The a/c had
slowed, but still departed the left edge of the r/w, at about 10 kts.*

*The terrain sloped down, with a ditch at the bottom, and a corn field
beyond the ditch. The a/c accelerated*

*as it went downhill, and the nose landing gear was sheared off as it
went through the ditch. The a/c came to rest inverted in the corn
field.*

*According to information from the FAA, r/w 5 was 5001 ft. long, 100 ft.
wide, with an asphalt surface. FAA records showed the pilot\'s total
flight experience was in excess of 5000 hrs.*

3\. Questions to ponder:

\- He landed apparently with a wind from the left. Would a wind from the
right have been better?

\- He would have had about a 7 kt. tailwind component. How much shorter
a ground roll would a

7 kt. headwind component have been?

Estimate based on our C172 Supplement, Sect. V, Landing Distance Table:

\- A 9 kt headwind reduces distance about 10%. Therefore, est. 8% for 7
kts.

\- For tailwind, add 10% for each 2 kts. (up to 10 kts.) Therefore, 35%
for 7 kts.

\- Therefore, est. 43% difference.

NOTE: Tailwind has more significance than an equivalent headwind!!!

\- Would landing [with]{.underline} flaps have been better?

\- Pilot was an ATP with 5000+ hrs. How much experience would you need
in order to not have

an accident?

Code word: Lucky

A. Cecere

GLR-IN-069 Safety Officer

# Safety Brief Pilot Initial Sheet: January, 2003 

Subj: General topic: Driving in Fog

Aviation topic: Poor Judgement Chain

> ***All members must attend this safety brief OR read this material and
> notify the Safety***

***Officer, with the code word OR submit a report on the latest \"The
Sentinel\"***

***per CAPR 62-2 INWG Supp. 1***

***[Pilots may not act as PIC unless this has been done.]{.underline}***

B. Bledsoe\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ R. Chance\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ R. Myers
\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ M. Smith \_\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ J. Neher \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ R. Webb
\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

A. Cecere\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ R. Duncan\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ D.
Ouellette\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ M. Wright\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

Nan. Chance\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ D. Koiro \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ L. Pinney
\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ D. Reid\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

\_

Norm. Chance\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ E. Lange \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ J.
Scandlin\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_C. Gray\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_