Chapter 6: Communication

# 

# Chapter Outline

1.  Introduction of topics and concepts to be discussed in the chapter.

    a.  Mission

    b.  Principles

        i.  Customer Focus

        ii. Leadership Commitment

        iii. Inclusion of Communications in Planning and Operations

        iv. Information Collection, Analysis and Dissemination

        v.  Media Partnership

    c.  Conclusion

2.  Case Studies

    a.  Risk Communication During the Washington D.C. Sniper Crisis

    b.  The Homeland Security Advisory System

    c.  A Comparison of Leadership Between Two Outbreaks of Smallpox in
        the United States: New York City, 1947, and Milwaukee, 1894

3.  Additional Sources of Information

4.  Glossary of Terms

5.  Acronyms

6.  Discussion Questions

    a.  General

    b.  Washington, DC Sniper

    c.  Homeland Security Advisory System

    d.  Smallpox Outbreaks

7.  Suggested Out of Class Exercises

# Introduction

Communications has become an increasingly critical function in emergency
management. The dissemination of timely and accurate information to the
general public, elected and community officials and the media plays a
major role in the effective management of disaster response and recovery
activities. Communicating preparedness, prevention and mitigation
information promotes actions that reduce the risk of future disasters.
Communicating policies, goals and priorities to staff, partners and
participants enhances support and promotes a more efficient disaster
management operation.

# Mission

The mission of an effective disaster communications strategy is to
provide timely and accurate information to the public in all four phases
of emergency management: mitigation, preparedness, response and recovery

-   Mitigation -- to promote implementation of strategies, technologies
    and actions that will reduce the loss of lives and property in
    future disasters.

-   Preparedness -- to communicate preparedness messages that encourages
    and educates the public in anticipation of disaster events.

-   Response -- to provide to the pubic notification, warning,
    evacuation and situation reports on an ongoing disaster.

-   Recovery -- to provide individuals and communities impacted by a
    disaster with information on how to register for and receive
    disaster relief.

# Principles

The foundation of an effective disaster communications strategy is built
on the five critical principles:

-   Customer Focus

-   Leadership Commitment

-   Inclusion of Communications in Planning and Operations

-   Information Collection, Analysis and Dissemination

-   Media Partnership

Customer Focus

An essential element of any effective emergency management system is a
focus on customers and customer service. This philosophy should guide
all communications with the public and with all partners in emergency
management. A customer service approach includes placing the needs and
interests of individuals and communities first, being responsive and
informative, and managing expectations. The FEMA emergency information
field guide published in 1998 illustrates the agency's focus on customer
service and its strategy of getting messages out to the public as
directly as possible. The introduction to the guide states the
following:

> "As members of the Emergency Information and Media Affairs team, you
> are part of the frontline for the agency in times of disaster. We
> count on you to be ready and able to respond and perform effectively
> on short notice. Disaster victims need to know their government is
> working. They need to know where and how to get help. They need to
> know what to expect and what not to expect. Getting these messages out
> quickly is your responsibility as members of the Emergency Information
> and Media Affairs team."

The guide's Mission Statement reinforces this point further:

> To contribute to the well-being of the community following a disaster
> by ensuring the dissemination of information that:

-   Is timely, accurate, consistent, and easy to understand.

-   Explains what people can expect from their government

-   Demonstrates clearly that FEMA and other Federal, State, local and
    voluntary agencies are working together to provide the services
    needed to rebuild communities and restore lives.

# The customers for emergency management are diverse. In order to effectively communicate disaster information, emergency managers must clearly identify their various audiences and customers. Included in many of these audiences are both partners and stakeholders. Basic emergency management audiences include:

-   General Public -- the largest audience of which there are many
    subgroups such as the elderly, the disabled, minority, low income,
    youth, etc. and all are potential customers.

-   Disaster Victims -- those individuals impacted by a specific
    disaster event.

-   Business Community -- often ignored by emergency managers but
    critical to disaster recovery, preparedness and mitigation
    activities.

-   Media -- an audience and a partner critical to effectively
    communicating with the public.

-   Elected Officials -- Governors, Mayors, County Executives, State
    Legislators and Members of Congress.

-   Community Officials -- City/County Managers, public works,
    department heads.

-   First Responders -- Police, fire and emergency medical.

-   Volunteer Groups -- American Red Cross, Salvation Army, the
    Mennonites, etc. who are critical to first response to an event.

Communications strategies, plans and operations should be developed to
meet the information needs of each of these customers and staffed and
funded accordingly.

Leadership Commitment

Good communications starts with a commitment by the leadership of the
emergency management organization to sharing and disseminating
information both internally and externally. The director or
administrator of any emergency management organization must openly
endorse and promote open lines of communications among the
organization's staff, partners and publics in order to effectively
communicate. This leader must model this behavior in order to clearly
illustrate that communications is valued function of the organization.

In the 1990's, FEMA Director James Lee Witt embodied FEMA's commitment
to communicating with the FEMA staff and partners, the public and the
media. Director Witt was a very strong advocate for keeping FEMA staff
informed of Agency plans, priorities and operations. Director Witt
characterized a proactive approach in communicating with FEMA's
constituents. His accessibility to the media was a significant departure
from previous FEMA personnel. Director Witt exhibited his commitment to
effective communications in many ways:

-   He held weekly staff meetings with FEMA's senior managers and
    required that his senior managers hold regular staff meetings with
    their employees.

-   He published an internal newsletter to employees entitled
    "Director's Weekly Update" that was distributed to all FEMA
    employees in hard copy and on the Agency electronic bulletin board
    that updated employees on Agency activities.

-   He made himself and his senior staff available to the media on a
    regular basis, especially during a disaster response, to answer
    questions and to provide information.

-   During a disaster response, he held daily sometimes 2-3 times a day,
    media briefings. He would hold special meetings with victims and
    their families.

-   He led the daily briefings among FEMA partners during a disaster
    response.

-   He devoted considerable time to communicating with members of
    Congress, Governors, Mayors and other elected officials both during
    disaster and non-disaster times.

-   He gave speeches all over this country and around the world to
    promote better understanding of emergency management and disaster
    mitigation.

Through his leadership and commitment to communications, FEMA became an
Agency with a positive image and reputation. Communications led to
increased success in molding public opinion and garnering support for
the Agency's initiatives in disaster mitigation.

Inclusion of Communications in Planning and Operations

The most important part of leadership's commitment to communications is
inclusion of communications in all planning and operations. This means
that a communications specialist is included in the senior management
team of the emergency management organization. It means that
communications issues are considered in the decision-making processes
and that a communications element is included in all organizational
activities, plans and operations.

In the past, communicating with external audiences, or customers, and in
many cases internal customers, was not valued nor considered critical to
a successful emergency management operation. Technology has changed the
equation. In today's world of 24-hours television and radio news and the
Internet, the demand for information is never ending especially in an
emergency response situation. Emergency managers must be able to
communicate critical information in a timely manner to their staff,
partners, the public and the media.

To do so, the information needs of the various customers and how best to
communicate with these customers must be considered at the same time
that planning and operational decisions are being made. For example, a
decision process on how to remove debris from a disaster area must
include discussion of how to communicate information on the debris
removal operation to community officials, the public and the media.

During the many major disasters that occurred in the 1990's, FEMA
Director Witt assembled a small group of his senior managers who
traveled with him to the sites of disasters and worked closely with him
in managing FEMA's efforts. This group always included FEMA's Director
of Public Affairs. Similarly, when planning FEMA's preparedness and
mitigation initiatives, Director Witt always included staff from Public
Affairs in the planning and implementation phases. Every FEMA policy,
initiative or operation undertaken during this time included
consideration of the information needs of the identified customers and a
communications strategy to address these needs was developed.

Information Collection, Analysis and Dissemination

The success of any communications effort is determined to a great extent
by the timeliness and accuracy of the information being provided to the
customers/audiences. Ensuring that timely and accurate information is
collected, analyzed and effectively disseminated to the target audiences
requires a commitment of trained staff and coordination with Federal,
State and local government agencies and the private and non-profit
sectors.

During an emergency response, information comes from a variety of
sources and that information must be collected, analyzed and
disseminated in a systematic way. At FEMA in the 1990's a special unit
in the Response and Recovery Directorate was formed whose sole purpose
was to collect information about upcoming, current and past disaster
events, analyze this information and provide concise situation reports
that were used in planning response and recovery efforts and in
providing timely information to the public and FEMA partners.

This information was also used to prepare daily updates to the President
on existing and potential disaster situations. During a disaster event
as many as 3-4 of these White House updates were forwarded to the
President to keep him and the White House staff informed.

Media Partnership

The media plays a primary role in communicating with the public. No
government emergency management organization could ever hope to develop
a communications network comparable to those networks already
established and maintained by television, radio, and newspaper outlets
across the country. To effectively provide timely disaster information
to the public, emergency managers must establish a partnership with
their local media outlets.

The goal of a media partnership is to provide accurate and timely
information to the public in both disaster and non-disaster situations.
The partnership requires a commitment by both the emergency manager and
the media to work together and it requires a level of trust between both
parties.

Traditionally, the relationship between emergency managers and the media
has been tenuous. There has often been a conflict between the need of
the emergency manager to respond quickly and the need of the media to
obtain information on the response so it can report it just as quickly.
This conflict sometimes resulted in inaccurate reporting and tension
between the emergency manager and the media. The loser in this conflict
is always the public, which relies on the media for its information.

It is important for emergency managers to understand the needs of the
media and the value they bring to facilitating response operations. An
effective media partnership provides the emergency manager with a
communications network to reach the public with vital information. Such
a partnership provides the media with access to the disaster site,
access to emergency managers and their staff and access to critical
information for the public that informs and ensures the accuracy of
their reporting.

An effective media partnership helps to define the roles of the
emergency management organizations, to manage public expectations and to
boost the morale of the relief workers and the disaster victims. All of
these factors can speed the recovery of a community from a disaster
event and promote preparedness and mitigation efforts designed to reduce
the loss of life and property from the next disaster event.

**Conclusion**

The three case studies included in this chapter provide excellent
examples of the critical role these five principles play in the
successful design and implementation of an effective communications
strategy and how ignoring these principles can hinder and frustrate a
disaster response or risk communication effort.

## Case Study 6.1: Risk Communication During the Washington D.C. Sniper Crisis

# 

# Background

Washington, DC metropolitan area residents were confronted with a
heightened sense of vulnerability in the year leading up to the Sniper
crisis. On September 11^th^, 2001, during the worst terrorist attack to
take place on American soil, the city became the target of two hijacked
airplanes. Three weeks later, anthrax-laced letters mailed to federal
government offices arrived, resulting in building closures, mass
prophylaxis, and the death of several postal workers. Ever increasing
security became the norm, including disruptive street closures and
military vehicles with mounted machine guns. Meanwhile, the media
continued to report that despite these measures, Washington, DC's
emergency response capabilities would be severely deficient should a
mass casualty event occur in the near future (Ward 2001).

It was easy to surmise that Washington, DC was a likely target to both
international and 'homegrown' terrorists. Several polls in September of
2001 indicated that stress among area residents was much higher than
those observed throughout the rest of the country (Diaz and O'Rourke
2002). Thus, by the time the Snipers announced their presence on the
morning of October 3^rd^ by killing four people, Washingtonians had
already been pushed to the limits of their psychological stress
tolerance.

####### Reactions and Actions

To study this case, we must first examine the actions of the authorities
(police and other government officials), the media, and the public.
These three groups were intimately linked by the dearth of information
available. As illustrated in the Information Flow Diagram presented as
Figure 6.1.1, the authorities gathered and analyzed the information, the
media broadcast the information, and the public received the information
and acted upon it. The following sections provide a broader
understanding of each of these groups' actions in order to offer insight
into why each may have acted as they did.

# 

# The Authorities

The 'authorities' include the local, state, and federal government
officials involved in the various aspects of the Sniper crisis response.
Because this was primarily a law enforcement response to an event
involving conventional weapons only, local police assumed lead-agency
status. These authorities, as displayed above, were the sole source of
credible information during the crisis.

The Montgomery County Police Department (MCPD) was the first involved in
the crisis on the morning of October 3^rd^, as the first attacks
occurred in their jurisdiction. MCPD put forth Chief Charles Moose as
media spokesperson. Although Moose could provide only basic information,
such as the victims' characteristics and shooting locations, he was
immediately recognized by the media and the public as the crisis leader.
In fact, even though FBI agents ultimately apprehended the suspects,
outside MCPD's jurisdiction, it was Chief Moose who officially announced
the arrest.

Chief Moose had never assumed as challenging a public relations role
(Stockwell, Ruane, and White 2002). The crisis quickly gained
international attention, and he became the one man to whom the world
turned for information. However, Moose faced a major problem in that he
often had little information to give, and what information he had
required confidentiality to prevent jeopardizing the investigation.

Chief Moose provided little risk-specific information. While he
regularly assured the public that police were doing their best, focusing
most of their resources on solving the case, Moose could not inform
people about their personal vulnerability (even stating once, "we\'ve
not been able to assure anyone their safety in regards to this
situation."(Ruane and Stockwell 2002)). Meanwhile, the Washington, D.C.
Metropolitan Police Department (MPD) issued 'Tips for Staying Safe',
advising residents to keep moving, walk in rapid zigzag patterns, and
avoid bright, open spaces, adding, "remember that a sniper with the
right equipment can shoot accurately from about 500 yards, the
equivalent of five football fields."(Hurdle, 2002) This list did not,
however, inform residents of their actual risk levels. While some
followed MPD's advice, it is arguable that the lack of Chief Moose's
endorsement of the tips prevented any widespread observation.

School administrators were also instrumental to the response. Several
Richmond schools closed after a letter threatening children was found
there. Other Virginia and Maryland schools closed as well, though no
specific threats had been received; these closings were said to have
been based upon administrators' liability fears (Economist 2002) rather
than evidence. Administrators claimed, "there was no other way to
guarantee students' safety,"(Gettleman 2002), but not one of the schools
closed during the Sniper crisis was closed after the 9/11 attacks, or
after any other unsolved area murders (Reel 2002). One Superintendent
stated, "The decision was not based on any specific threats, but on "the
volume of concern"(Gettleman 2002), strengthening arguments that such
actions were in reaction to fear rather than the risk itself. The
closings gained media attention and undoubtedly affected the public's
opinion of personal safety.

Politicians chimed in, increasing media attention and even using the
events to promote their agendas. Kathleen Kennedy Townsend, in her
gubernatorial campaign, attacked her opponent's opposition to a federal
assault weapons ban stating that the ban would answer voters' sniper
fears (Fineman 2002). Congresswoman Connie Morella, campaigning for
reelection, made a point of walking outside, knocking on doors, and
claimed it was safe to be outside (Barker 2002).

Finally, the unnamed authorities that leaked information to the media
deserve mention. It is important to stress both the detriment and
opportunities presented by these insider 'leaks'. In numerous instances,
the media were given information embargoed or never to be shared at all,
broadcasting it to Moose's obvious dismay. While leaks often increased
tensions between the Sniper Task Force and the media, they also
ultimately led to the suspects' capture.

# The Media

The media was the only bridge between the authorities and the public
(see Figure 6.1.1). Media agencies gleaned data from myriad sources, but
credible information came almost exclusively from Moose. Even leaks
ultimately required Moose's confirmation or denial. Media coverage, with
regards to airtime, was extensive when the crisis began and rose to
successively higher levels after each shooting. News programs became
engrossed, if not obsessed with the topic, and 'special reports'
featuring 'related' information appeared with regularity.

Coverage of the crisis spanned the globe as a growing international
media gained presence. The number of national and international articles
surged to new heights with each shooting, peaking the day after Muhammad
and Malvo's capture. Actual daily article counts, from 47 major national
and international newspapers, are displayed as Figure 6.1.2.

As the sole conduit of information, the media had particularly strong
influence. As events were extremely rare (statistically), and there were
few actual victims, there were startlingly few people outside of
victims' social circles who had any personal contact with 'sniping'
events. The public, therefore, received over 99% of crisis information
from media sources. This statistic becomes significant when compared to
an L.A. Times poll which found "feelings about crime" there were based
65% upon on media, and 21% on experience (Walsh 1996, p9).

Media agencies often sought alternate information sources to gain a
competitive edge. It was not uncommon to see 'Serial Killer' or
'Geographic Profiling' experts speaking on talk shows, (most notably
after Chief Moose announced that MCPD was using geographic profilers.)
However, as Figure 6.1.1 illustrates, these alternate sources could only
provide analysis to the public, as they depended upon the same media
sources as the public for information.

A fact that must be noted for its unique nature is that the media was
utilized by the police as a direct mode of communication with the
Sniper. Chief Moose would 'speak' to the Sniper using cryptic messages
at regularly scheduled press conferences without giving the media any
prior indication he would be doing this. Despite an initial rift with
the media (Shales, 2002), Moose acknowledged the important role played
by the media; one they were obviously willing to fulfill.

# The Public

This group includes the citizens of the Washington, D.C. and Richmond,
VA Metropolitan Areas, and constitutes the *vulnerable* group -- the
Snipers' targets. Public demand for information fueled the media frenzy,
while their fear drove many of the rational and irrational decisions
made by authorities. While obviously the target of the media's and the
authorities' information, and of the Sniper's aggression, they also
served as a source of information and action. The public was perpetually
integral to the hunt for the Sniper, ultimately participating in the
Sniper's capture.

Public reaction and behavior became the subject of many of stories
detailing 'newsworthy' actions performed in the name of safety. Examples
of such actions, followed by percentages of people admitting to them (if
available), include:

-   Used different gas stations than one normally used (Morin and
    Deane 2002) - 36%

-   Avoided stores/shopping centers close to highways (Morin and
    Deane 2002) - 32%

-   Crouched down while pumping gas (Ropeik 2 2002)

-   Ran or weaved through parking lots (Walker 2002)

-   Avoided outdoor activities (Irvin and Mattingly 2002) - 44%

-   Kept constant movement in public places (Eccleston 2002)

-   Stayed at home except when absolutely necessary (Johnson and
    Finer 2002) - 13%

-   Drove when one would normally have taken Metro (Washington Post
    2 2002) - 11%

-   Watched or listened to the news more than usual (Washington Post
    2 2002) - 71%

The public was a responsible recipient of the flood of risk
communication, and generally followed behavioral advice. They learned
terms like "Code Blue" and "Code Red", how to identify .223-caliber
assault rifles, box trucks, AstroVans, and ladder racks (the suspected
equipment of the Sniper). The public was given an FBI tip line, and by
the end of the crisis over 90,000 calls were placed to this number
(Whitlock 2002).

What the public did not do, however, was panic. While the media wrote
stories detailing the average man's 'paralyzing fear,' life did go on
with civility. Even after shootings, for example, there were no reports
of people pushing each other over to get to 'safety'. The public was
fearful but intelligent, receptive to advice, and able to process
information well enough to locate the Sniper within twenty-four hours of
learning the Sniper's car and license plate information.

#### So Why Was Everyone So Afraid?

In their article *Rating the Risks*, Paul Slovic, Baruch Fischhoff and
Sarah Lichtenstein begin "People respond to the hazards they perceive."
(Slovic, Fischhoff, and Lichtenstein 1979). The exhibited responses to
the Sniper crisis at personal, local, regional, and even federal levels
would indicate that sources influencing risk perception existed at
prolific levels. In this section, the Sniper crisis will be compared to
models developed through recent and historical research in order to
better explain the peculiar public risk behavior observed. This
examination will be structured according to the four 'Risk Perception
Fallibility' conclusions established by Slovic, Fischhoff, and
Lichtenstein.

[Risk Perception Fallibility Conclusion 1]{.underline}: *"Cognitive
limitations, coupled with the anxieties generated by facing life as a
gamble, cause uncertainty to be denied, risks to be distorted and
statements of fact to be believed with unwarranted confidence."*

People tend to fear hazards less as they gain knowledge about their
associated risks. That knowledge, however, will almost never be complete
because the likelihood and consequence of most risks cannot be
quantified for individuals (Ropeik 2002). Conversely, the greater a
risk's uncertainty, the more it is feared. The Sniper, who struck
anyone, anywhere, at any time, presented citizens in the Washington, DC
metropolitan area with extreme uncertainty.

Facing uncertainty, people make personal judgments based upon very
imperfect information to establish individual risk (Slovic, et al, 1979)
often causing them to *overstate* reality. People knew that police were
working with little information, as the Sniper was leaving few clues at
crime scenes (Patrick 2002). The public could not know how the Sniper
threat compared to other public safety threats regularly handled by
police, because such statistics were not provided. Considering the
resources dedicated to it, that threat *appeared* greater than anything
the area had ever faced, and considering the ineffectiveness of police
actions (such as roadblocks), people generally assumed the police were
powerless to combat this threat. Many other external factors reinforced
this impression: media 'experts' would state that that the Sniper would
likely not strike in place X or at time Y, and the Sniper would strike
in that place or at that time; the fleet of white vans in general
circulation that resembled the Sniper's purported vehicle gave the
impression Snipers were everywhere; schools were being closed, outdoor
activities were regularly cancelled, the government was talking of
bringing in the national guard, and the New York-based Guardian Angels
were in the area pumping gas. Talk that the Sniper may be a terrorist
propagated the idea that more Snipers would follow even if this one was
caught. In a survey asking Washington, D.C. Metropolitan Area citizens
how concerned they were of personally becoming a Sniper victim, 19% said
*a great deal* and 31% said *somewhat scared* -- a total of 50%
(Washington Post 2 2002).

**[Risk Perception Fallibility Conclusion 2]{.underline}: "*Perceived
risk is influenced (and sometimes biased) by the imaginability and
memorability of the hazard. People may, therefore, not have valid
perceptions even for familiar risks."***

People are more afraid of things they easily imagine, remember, or hear
about repetitively, thereby overestimating the likelihood of these
so-called *available* risks. This phenomenon is referred to as the
Availability **Heuristic**. This perception bias can be correct when
considering events that are, in fact, frequent, such as automobile
accidents. However, when an uncommon but spectacular risk receives
constant media attention, such as the 1990 Columbine attack, people
often wrongly assume similar events are likely. In the case of the
Sniper, where television, radio, internet, and newspaper coverage was
constant, people likely exaggerated personal risk. The omnipresence of
white vans and box-trucks, reported by police to be associated with the
Sniper, provided further reminders. Government decisions to close
schools, restrict students' movement, and cancel outdoor activities,
only reinforced such feelings. News reports describing victims as being
'regular' people, doing 'regular' things, made it very easy for people
to imagine themselves succumbing to a similar fate.

Slovic and his colleagues described how events that are "out of sight
\[are\] effectively out of mind." (Slovic, Fischhoff, and Lichtenstein.
1979). It would follow that the opposite was true of the Sniper; that
which is always in sight is always on people's minds. An October 13^th^,
2002 Washington Post poll asking participants to rank the threat of the
Sniper, anthrax, or the September 11^th^ attacks found that 44%
responded the Sniper, 29% responded the September 11^th^ attacks, and
13% responded anthrax (Washington Post 2 2002).

**[Risk Perception Fallibility Conclusion 3]{.underline}: *"\[Risk
Management\] Experts' risk perceptions correspond closely to statistical
frequencies of death. Laypeople's risk perceptions \[are\] based in part
on frequencies of death, but there \[are\] some striking discrepancies.
It appears that for laypeople, the concept of risk includes qualitative
aspects such as dread and the likelihood of a mishap being fatal.
Laypeople's risk perceptions were also affected by catastrophic
potential."***

It is often difficult to understand statistics, and even more difficult
to conceptualize how they apply personally, even among experts (Jardine
and Hrudley 1997). Numbers are not the sole influence on public risk
perception, as people generally rely more on *qualitative* factors in
ranking their risks than on the quantitative likelihood or consequence
(Slovic, et al, 1979).

It is important to examine statistics provided by the media for their
quality and usefulness. While nearly everyone knew the number of Sniper
victims, few knew the total affected population, or the 'normal' murder
rate within that same area. Lacking complete information, statistics can
be misleading, causing people to assume their vulnerability was much
greater. Economists have classified this overestimation of unknown or
unclear risks "risk-ambiguity aversion" (Economist 2002).

Slovic, Fischhoff, and Lichtenstein, in their article *Facts and Fears:
Understanding Perceived Risk*, proposed that eighteen risk
characteristics influence risk perception. These qualitative measures
have helped to explain what risk attributes cause public fear. Using
their measures, the Sniper risk ranks among the most feared, as it is
dreaded, new, not easily reduced, uncontrollable, and has fatal
consequences, among others. The Sniper risk, not surprisingly, is
similar to terrorism and crime on their ranking of risks' ability to
elicit fear.

**[Risk Perception Fallibility Conclusion 4]{.underline}:
*"Disagreements about risk should not be expected to evaporate in the
presence of 'evidence'. Definitive evidence, particularly about rare
hazards, is difficult to obtain. Weaker information is likely to be
interpreted in a way that reinforces existing beliefs." ***

The Sniper announced his presence with a genuine spree-murder event that
garnered widespread attention. By the first day's end police had
uncovered little, diminishing hopes of the Sniper's timely capture. The
public quickly learned that they were dealing with a grave threat. Due
to psychological factors described in the previous three Risk Perception
Fallibility Conclusions, people were made to believe they were facing a
high risk in regards to both consequence and likelihood. This initial
frame of reference in which the public defined their personal
vulnerability was to become one that was difficult to alter.

The crisis continued for three weeks. Several articles appeared that
sought to enlighten residents about actual personal risk, even providing
statistical data at times; however, these articles not only found
frequent front page placement, but they also competed against a great
many more articles indicating that lives were in constant danger. Fear
mongering and sensational articles were given priority coverage by
newspapers and television networks, and as a result, appeared most
credible. Considering Slovic, Fischhoff, and Lichtenstein's research
conclusions, this is not surprising. They state that, "people's beliefs
change slowly and are extraordinarily persistent in the face of contrary
evidence. New evidence appears reliable and informative if it is
consistent with one's initial belief; contrary evidence is dismissed as
unreliable, erroneous, or unrepresentative." They add that, "Convincing
people that the catastrophe they fear is extremely unlikely is difficult
under the best conditions. Any mishap could be seen as proof of high
risk, whereas demonstrating safety would require a massive amount of
evidence" (Slovic, et al, 1979).

The 'Overconfidence Heuristic', which states that people believe with
overwhelming confidence that their knowledge is correct, reinforced
these inaccurate personal risk analyses. People are often unaware of how
little they understand a risk, believing they know much more than they
actually do. Such errors were understandable in this case considering
the nature of the media coverage. 'Expert' profilers giving descriptions
of the 'most likely' demographics of the killer as being a lone young,
white male, for instance, explains so many people's surprise the
'culprit' turned out to be two African-American males (Fears and
Thomas-Lester 2002). Considering that no confirmed suspect descriptions
were revealed prior to the arrests, their identity should have been a
surprise to nobody.

Oftentimes, only time can change people's opinions about risk. One
reason people are more scared about new risks than old ones is that they
have yet to gather enough information to calibrate their initial
impression. Through time, when their victimization expectations are not
realized for themselves or any acquaintances, they begin to question
their views. Had the Sniper not been caught, the public would have
gained a more accurate appreciation of how small their chance of
becoming a victim was, much in the manner that people are no longer as
concerned about the child abductions that seemed to plague the United
States during 2001. Fortunately, the Sniper was apprehended before this
hypothesis could be tested.

# Statistics Related to the Sniper Crisis

> *"Of all the grim facts surrounding \[the\] Oklahoma City \[bombing\],
> perhaps the grimmest is the one nobody talks about: against the
> backdrop of everyday American tragedy, 167 deaths is not many.... In a
> typical year, guns kill 38,000 Americans and about that many die on
> our roads. These numbers routinely go up or down 2 percent or 3
> percent -- half a dozen Oklahoma bombings -- without making the front
> page."* (Political Commentator Robert Wright, Time Magazine May 1995
> -- From Walsh 1996, P 18)

In the three weeks that the Sniper terrorized over five million people,
shooting thirteen and killing ten, 'routine' crime continued unnoticed.
In Washington, DC alone there were 239 assaults with a deadly weapon, 32
people shot, and 22 people murdered (Barger 2002). As this accounts for
just 10% of the total area affected it must be assumed there were far
more 'routine' murders than 22. Not one of these crimes merited
front-page newspaper coverage.

To understand risk perception, it was necessary to put aside statistics,
but to determine the real risk people faced during those fearful weeks
compared to 'unnoticed' everyday risks, the statistics must be analyzed.
To calculate the statistical risk faced by Metropolitan Washington DC
residents, the population of the Sniper's operational area must be
calculated. These statistics will be imperfect in that they cannot
account for the ever-increasing zone in which the Sniper operated
(Economist 2002). Additionally, they will not account for the unequal
distribution of murders across the total area (Montgomery County was the
location of seven of these murders, for example). However, these
statistics will be more accurate in terms of personal risk because the
random selection of victims performing a wide range of activities brings
the population and personal risk almost to equality.

To acquire this personal risk estimate, one might simply consider the
number of victims, divided into total affected population, spread over
time. This would not, however, be accurate in projecting future risk,
because the Sniper's operational environment changed that first morning.
With police unaware of his presence, the Sniper was able to attack
repeatedly within a brief time period. Shortly thereafter, with his
presence officially recognized, the Sniper's attacks required more time
(presumably for planning.) Therefore, it is necessary to estimate how
the murders would have progressed over time in a *post-awareness*
context. Under this assumption, the four murders that occurred the
morning of October 3^rd^ would have likely been only *one* murder had
the police been on alert for the Sniper. The adjusted statistics,
therefore, are as follows:

> Number of people shot (adjusted for *post-awareness*) 10
>
> Number of people killed: (adjusted for *post-awareness*): 7

Population, Washington, D.C. Metropolitan Area: 4,922,152

(83.16% of total Sniper-area population)

> Population, Richmond-Petersburg Metropolitan Area: 996,512
>
> (16.84% of total Sniper-area population)

Population, total affected area: 5,919,152

> Number of days the Sniper operated (10/2/02-10/24/02): 23
>
> Multiplier (to find 365-day average): 15.870
>
> National Murder Rate: 5.5 / 100,000
>
> Washington, D.C. Metropolitan Area Murder Rate: 7.4 / 100,000
>
> Richmond-Petersburg Metropolitan Area Murder Rate: 11.1 / 100,000

Using this data, the following population risk factors can be derived:

> Chance of being shot by the Sniper (over 12 months): 2.7 / 100,000

Or 1 / 37,297

Chance of being killed by the Sniper (over 12 months): 1.9 / 100,000

Or 1 / 53,325

Comparing these figures against the risks that people face in their
daily lives with little or no concern introduces statistical perspective
to the real risk from the Sniper. The following table lists the
likelihood of death from various causes, listed in order of *decreasing*
risk:

+-------------------------------------------+------------+------------+
| ##### Hazard                              | #### A     | **Lifetime |
|                                           | nnual Risk | Risk**     |
+-------------------------------------------+------------+------------+
| 2000 Murder Rate: Sniper area (weighted)  | 1 / 12,870 | 1 / 167    |
+-------------------------------------------+------------+------------+
| 2000 Murder Rate: National                | 1 / 18,182 | 1 / 236    |
+-------------------------------------------+------------+------------+
| Car Accident                              | 1 / 18,752 | 1 / 244    |
+-------------------------------------------+------------+------------+
| Accidental Fall                           | 1 / 20,728 | 1 / 270    |
+-------------------------------------------+------------+------------+
| Accidental Poisoning                      | 1 / 22,388 | 1 / 292    |
+-------------------------------------------+------------+------------+
| Murdered With a Gun                       | 1 / 25,196 | 1 / 328    |
+-------------------------------------------+------------+------------+
| **Shot by Sniper**                        | 1 / 37,297 | 1 / 484    |
+-------------------------------------------+------------+------------+
| Hit by Car While Walking                  | 1 / 45,117 | 1 / 588    |
+-------------------------------------------+------------+------------+
| **Killed by Sniper**                      | 1 / 53,325 | 1 / 693    |
+-------------------------------------------+------------+------------+
| Drowning (Accidental)                     | 1 / 77,308 | 1 / 1,008  |
+-------------------------------------------+------------+------------+
| Fire/Smoke Inhalation                     | 1 / 81,487 | 1 / 1,062  |
+-------------------------------------------+------------+------------+
| Lightning                                 | 1 /        | 1 / 55,578 |
|                                           | 4,262,813  |            |
+-------------------------------------------+------------+------------+

According to these figures, a person was more likely to be accidentally
poisoned, or die in a car accident, then to be shot and possibly killed
by the Sniper. As previously noted, the other risks have higher variance
between individual and population risk, as more can be done on the
personal level to mitigate them (like wearing a seatbelt or wearing a
life preserver, for example), but the fact remains that for the
*average* of all people these statistics are accurate.

# Lessons Learned and Future Implications

Having compared the Sniper Crisis to risk perception models, and having
calculated population risk, one can now ask, "*Should the public have
been so deeply fearful during the Sniper crisis?*" The answer, according
to these established models is, *yes*, they definitely *should* have
been, *considering the factors they were confronted with in regards to
the information they received*. However, according to the statistical
data and risk comparison, they did not *need* to be so afraid, and there
are ways in which the media, emergency responders, and other Federal,
State and local government officials can limit this type of fear in the
future. Such abilities will be crucial if and when future terrorist
events occur.

1\. Respond separately to the event and to the fear.

The authorities, namely the police and the government officials,
dedicated vast resources to the Sniper crisis more due to high levels of
public fear and concern than any disproportionate public safety threat.
Conversely, they did little, if anything, to treat the fear itself. When
emergency management agencies respond this way, they can actually
amplify anxiety by justifying public fear, and increase risk by moving
police and emergency management resources away from routine but
necessary public safety work. People's susceptibility to other
health-related risks is increased because freedom of movement becomes
self-restricted and because fear- induced stress can result in other
damaging physiological effects.

Police and government officials should, in the future, treat the event
and the fear of the event as two separate problems that need to be
individually addressed. This is a need that has already been recognized
in past crime and terrorism crises (Warr 2000). A separate function of
emergency management - a 'Fear Management Team', consisting of members
with backgrounds in sociology, psychology, emergency management, public
education, and public relations, among others, should be created. This
team would have several sub functions, as follows:

-   **Measure levels of public fear** - There are established means by
    which real-time fear can be measured, including surveys, recognizing
    behavioral indicators (fear avoidance actions -- i.e., changes in
    routine), and establishing recognition-triggers for "transient
    public episodes of fear" (how a population acts in response to fear
    -- i.e., drop in public transportation use) (Warr 2000). Emergency
    management can only respond to a high level of fear if they know it
    exists. Not all events will be as obvious as the Sniper crisis.

-   **Develop informed, educational public relations message** - As a
    part of regular emergency management operations, a trusted leader
    with decision-making power must be identified and put forth to
    communicate with the public through the media. The Fear Management
    Team would process information culled from monitoring public fear to
    create communications (through the trusted official) that adequately
    and accurately addresses public fear. They would develop mental
    models that give emergency responders a clear idea of what exactly
    the public does or does not understand, and what they believe
    emergency responders are doing and/or are able to do to ensure their
    security. Working directly with the emergency response team, they
    would provide exact information concerning what is needed by the
    public to correct or adjust their beliefs. They would work with
    government officials as well, helping them to inform the public
    through reinforcement of the messages given by the emergency
    response spokesperson.

-   **Address public fear directly** - The Fear Management Team would
    coordinate the services of mental health specialists in an effort to
    further reduce public fear. Public health officials would address
    the public directly through media outlets or through community
    groups. Having information directly related to the crisis, they
    would be able to make accurate and informed communications through
    the media (unlike the un-informed 'experts' that were prevalent in
    the Sniper crisis, who did not have access to secure information).
    Information would not be compromised, because it would not be
    necessary to share specific details - however, as trusted public
    health officials, the public would recognize that they were making
    informed decisions and would more likely weigh their opinions more
    heavily in adjusting their perceptions.

-   **Assist Local Government/Community Authorities in
    Decision-making** - Local government and community groups must
    respond to crises, and their actions affect the public directly.
    School superintendents need guidance about when it is appropriate to
    cancel school, and community groups need to know when public events
    must be postponed. Without direction from emergency response (the
    most 'informed' source of information), they will act without
    consistency and likely send mixed messages to the public. In
    addition, the overreaction by one influential government or
    community leader can lead to secondary responses from other less
    organized or less informed groups. This Fear Management Team would
    serve as an advisory board for government and community groups,
    ensuring that their leaders are able to make decisions based upon
    the most complete and current information, and allowing the groups
    to work in consensus rather than as separate entities.

2\. Increase responsible reporting by the media.

The media has a responsibility to ensure that during crisis events,
public safety information reaches a wide audience in a timely and
accurate manner; a duty they are recognizing and embracing more each
year (Moore 2002). However, most newspaper and television news employees
have no idea how to successfully fulfill this role, as they have never
received crisis communications training. The media is a business entity
and is therefore motivated primarily by the ratings and
viewer/reader-ship that ensure steady income generation. As such, they
cannot be expected to cease provisions of blanket coverage during
extreme events like the Sniper crisis.

The media is adroit at using scare tactics and fear mongering to harness
public attention, and often does little to calm nerves once that
attention is grabbed. These agencies must learn as an industry that they
can contribute to public safety by providing accurate, responsible, and
useful information, while maintaining these traditional 'shock' methods
to attract viewers, thus preserving a competitive edge without
sacrificing integrity. For the media to participate in a crisis response
constructively, they need to add to the glut of sensationalism a balance
of rationality - a reality check for the public to process information
and judge individual risk. If they broadcast a message that says *"Four
of the victims have been shot while pumping gas at local gas stations,"*
for example, they need to qualify this statement by adding, *"however,
there have been approximately 10.5 million gas transactions made at over
1000 gas stations in the affected area during the crisis so far"*
(Memmott 2 2000).

The media should recognize and act upon the public's tendency to
**anchor and adjust** in their forming of perceptions on risk. *This
cannot be denied*. If a story informs citizens that, "This is the
greatest number of law enforcement officers ever dedicated to a criminal
investigation in county history," a person may incorrectly imply that
their life is at greater risk than ever before, and all future
information will be processed within this context. If they are later
told in an article *that is given* *proportional emphasis*, for
instance, that, "although ten people have been killed by the Sniper in
the past three weeks, there are an average of thirty-eight people killed
in traffic accidents alone during the same time period in the Washington
D.C. Metropolitan Area," (Memmott 2, 2002) they will be able to rank
their personal risk more appropriately.

The media are not villainous. Quite the contrary, they are a vital
component to emergency management that without which risk communication
would be nearly impossible. Also, not all of today's media reporting is
misinformed or irresponsible. There are several news agencies that
employ reporters trained and/or knowledgeable in crisis communications
and risk perception, and who regularly practice the suggestions made
above, and the knowledge and experience of reporters like this must be
shared across the industry. The journalist's goal is to provide the
public with timely information; the extent to which that information is
both accurate *and* effective depends largely upon the level of
cooperation provided by emergency management.

3\. Establish public risk perception and risk communication training
standards for emergency management, government officials, and the media.

The federal government requires both emergency responders and public
officials to complete training and prove competencies in performing many
of the tasks associated with their job duties. While many first
responders who communicate directly with the public are trained in
public relations and communications, they are often not trained in
crisis communications, risk perception or risk communication. An ATF
agent who described probable injuries from a .223 bullet, or the MPD
safety tip reminding citizens that snipers can hit from 500 yards
neither provide useful information nor control fear.

If risk perception and communication training is required for emergency
management public relations staff, fear management would become
organizationally routine. The existence of a Fear Management Team, as
proposed, would likewise be better understood and utilized across all
emergency management agencies. Industry acceptance would be more likely
if federal or state governments covered applicable costs for this
training as they do for many other law enforcement and public safety
programs.

Chief Moose did an outstanding job as a crisis manager, and as a leader,
but he did little to combat fear directly. Considering the lack of
emergency response experience with terrorism in the United States, it is
unlikely that many emergency managers would be prepared for such a
difficult task. If the threat of terrorism is growing, as the FBI and
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) claim that it is, then the
need for such training should be mandated.

# 

# Conclusion

Fear is irrational only if a person has enough information about a
hazard to perform a personal risk analysis, finds that the likelihood of
the hazard affecting them is smaller than or equal to risks they face on
a daily basis with little or no thought, and is *still* afraid. When
there are little or no means for people to gather information to make
informed personal risk analyses, they tend to overestimate personal
vulnerability due to incomplete and often incorrect information. Only
information can combat fear, and only government and public safety
officials (in partnership with the media) can provide for that need .

On November 7^th^, 2002, two people in New York City were hospitalized
and confirmed to be infected with bubonic plague - the first cases in
that city in over 100 years. Bubonic plague is a disease that is
historically one of the greatest killers of man, decimating over a third
of the population of Europe during the Middle Ages. To the people of New
York City, this disease was dreaded, new, fatal, globally catastrophic,
involuntary, and historically hard to control. Why did fear not reign in
New York when this information hit the newsstands? The answer lies in
the way the information was first reported by Dr. Thomas Frieden, the
health commissioner of New York City (a city that has in recent years
experienced two great health crises - the first U.S. outbreak of West
Nile Virus and the 2001 Anthrax letters). After announcing the two cases
of the disease, Dr. Frieden added,

> "Bubonic Plague does not spread from person to person. There is no
> risk to New Yorkers from the two individuals who are being evaluated
> for plague. Those patients became ill within 48 hours of arriving in
> New York City. Therefore, we are confident that their exposure
> occurred in New Mexico. More than half of the plague cases in the
> United States are in New Mexico. A wood rat and fleas from the rodent
> that were found on the couple's property in Santa Fe, New Mexico,
> tested positive in July for plague. Bubonic plague is a bacterial
> disease in rodents transmitted to humans through the bites of infected
> fleas..." (CNN 2002)

The story barely lasted a week.

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**Figure 6.1.1: Diagram of Information Flow during the Washington D.C.
Sniper Crisis.**

![](media/image1.wmf)

Source: Coppola, 2005.

**Figure 6.1.2: Number of Articles Related to the Sniper Crisis
Appearing in 47 Major**

**International Newspapers**

![](media/image2.wmf)

Source: Coppola, 2005.

## **Sidebar 6.1.1: The 3-Week Sniper Crisis**

(The crimes of the Sniper crisis were committed by two people, John
Muhammad and James Lee Malvo. However, they will together be referred to
as 'the Sniper' throughout this sidebar.)

## 

## Local media barely mentioned the murder of James Martin, who was randomly shot while walking through a shopping center parking lot on the evening of October 2^nd^. Forty-five minutes earlier and just a few miles away, a bullet had pierced the front window of a Michaels Craft Store, but that event had been dismissed as a prank. Police had virtually no indication that particular evening that Martin was not only the seventh person shot and fifth killed by an odd pair of transients (who began their journey together almost two years earlier in Antigua), but the first person killed in a regional mass-murder spree that would officially commence in less than 14 hours.

The morning of October 3^rd^ presented the Montgomery County (Maryland)
Police Department (MCPD) with a scenario it had never experienced. In
just one hour and thirty-nine minutes, four people had been killed in a
shooting rampage that appeared to target victims at random. Using
ballistics evidence, investigators quickly liked the previous night's
shootings to the same gun, bringing the death toll to five over a
sixteen-hour period. The media immediately responded to the developing
story, and the first emergency press conference of the Sniper crisis was
called.

MCPD Chief Charles Allen Moose, thrust unexpectedly into the
international spotlight, could only report details surrounding shooting
of the victims; their locations, point of entry of the bullets into
their bodies, the victims' last actions, and so forth. There was little
information known about the shooter, other than that police were looking
for a 'skilled, single-shot gunman' (Houston Chronicle 2002) that had
apparently escaped unseen, and there were no obvious connections between
the victims. Chief Moose stated that the police could offer no warnings
to the public other than to be on guard, adding that the FBI and other
federal agencies were helping to find the Sniper. Moose began his plea,
which continued throughout the three-week crisis, for people with any
information to call the police.

The night of October 3^rd^, Pascal Charlot was shot and killed while
waiting for a bus in Washington, DC, and the following afternoon a woman
was shot and wounded 50 miles south of Montgomery County in Spotsylvania
County, Virginia. A blue Chevy Caprice was seen leaving the scene of the
shooting in Washington, D.C. Citing ballistics tests, police reported on
October 5^th^ that the Washington, D.C. shooting was linked to the other
five in Montgomery County. Other than the fact that the Virginia
shooting occurred in a Michaels Craft Store parking lot, it was not
immediately linked to the Sniper. For the first time, Chief Moose began
to ask citizens to look for a white box-truck, but stressed that "the
white-truck scenario may be one of many that could emerge as fresh
evidence is sought."(Clines 2002) Moose displayed a .223 caliber bullet
familiarize the public with the weaponry being used in case they knew of
a person in possession of such that may be involved. An ATF agent
explained that although a .223 bullet is extremely small, it causes
extensive tissue damage due to high its velocity, and said that a sniper
could hit a victim from 500 yards (Clines 2002).

By October 6^th^, the shooting in Virginia had been linked to the
Sniper's weapon. Police still had no clues other than that two people
had been seen leaving the scene of some of the shootings in a box truck
with black or purple lettering on its sides. (Dishneau 2002). On October
6^th^, with no credible leads and no new information, Chief Moose
announced that at least 100 Montgomery County investigators, almost
fifty ATF agents, and several FBI agents were involved in the
investigation. The MCPD had at that point received approximately 4,000
calls and '800 credible leads'. (Kovaleski and Ruane 2002). Chief Moose
added that the MCPD was using criminal profilers in an attempt to focus
the investigation towards the most likely type of suspects, but gave no
indication of what those suspect descriptions might be. The media
subsequently displayed several 'expert' profilers, not associated with
the case, who presented such profiles as "a remorseless, egocentric
killer whose victims are simply targets to be acquired" and "two people,
one driving, one shooting, both probably white and with previous scrapes
with the law."

The morning of October 7^th^ began with the shooting of a thirteen
year-old boy in front of a middle school in Bowie, MD. Chief Moose, in a
press conference following the shooting (that did not kill the boy),
stated that the Sniper was "stepping over the line, shooting a kid", and
that it was "getting to be really, really personal now." (Watson 2002).
This was the first time that Moose appeared publicly shaken in the
crisis. In a testament to the rapid escalation of the crisis, both
President Bush and Homeland Security Director Ridge publicly called the
shootings 'cowardly' (Kovaleski and Ruane 2 2002). After the Bowie
shooting is linked to the Sniper, Chief Moose announced that he has sent
a letter to the Department of Justice to appeal for federal assistance
under the Serial Killings law. There were still no credible witnesses
who saw the killer or killers, but a white truck or van was apparently
spotted driving away from the middle school immediately after the event
occurred.

In the woods near the school where the thirteen year-old was shot,
police found a bullet casing and a tarot card with the words "Dear
Policeman, I am God," written on it. This information was kept from the
media for over twenty-four hours, until unnamed police officials leaked
it to reporters. Chief Moose reacted angrily to the media in response to
the tarot card information leak, stating, "such disclosures threatened
to impede one of the biggest criminal manhunts in the region\'s history"
(Stockwell, Ruane, and White 2002). Profilers not associated with the
investigation commented to the media on the tarot card, one stating
that, "the sniper probably feels surges of omnipotence because of his
life-or-death control of his victims\' fates" (Stockwell, Ruane, and
White 2002).

At 8:20 in the evening on October 9^th^, a man was killed while pumping
gas in Manassas, Virginia. By the afternoon of October 10^th^ the
shooting was linked to the Sniper with ballistics evidence. A white
mini-van was spotted quickly leaving the scene of the Manassas shooting
by several witnesses. The shooting took place close to the on-ramp of a
major highway, a trend that was recognized after highway proximity was
observed in many of the previous events.

Just thirty-six hours later, another man was shot while pumping gas in a
Spotsylvania County, Virginia gas station. For the first time in the
case, police used a rapidly deployed system of roadblocks to search all
traffic leaving the scene of the shooting. Several people reported
seeing white vans leaving the site where the shooting occurred, but no
suspects were apprehended. Chief Moose reiterated his plea for people to
avoid concentrating just on white trucks and vans (Morello and White
2002), but no alternative vehicle types were mentioned. By October
13^th^, the Spotsylvania County shooting was linked by ballistics
evidence to the other Sniper events. Police released composite pictures
of the box truck and a Chevrolet AstroVan to the media (Morello and
Stockwell 2002).

At 8:00pm on October 14^th^, a woman was shot in the head and killed in
a shopping center parking lot. A witness reported to police that he saw
a cream-colored Chevy AstroVan with a broken left rear taillight and a
ladder rack, and he gave a detailed description of the Sniper. This
account, seen as an important break for investigators, later turns out
to be fabricated. There is also a "dark, late model Chevrolet or
Chrysler" seen leaving the scene of the shooting (Clines 2 2002), but
its presence is largely disregarded considering the focus on white vans
seen by witnesses in this incident and in many earlier shootings.
Comments were made by police officials from several of the responding
police departments, and from the office of Virginia Governor Mark
Warner, concerning the progress of the investigation, much of it
speculative. However, Chief Moose states only that, "police have
stronger leads and evidence to work with than has been made public."
(Clines 2 2002). On October 17^th^, the Sniper told police in a phone
call, \"Don\'t you know who you\'re dealing with? Just check out the
murder-robbery in Montgomery if you don\'t believe me!\"(Lichtblau and
van Natta 2002). This information, which was kept private, meant little
to the police at the time but later led to the arrest of the two Sniper
suspects.

For five days there were no Sniper-linked shootings. The U.S. Army
announced that it was committing several surveillance planes to assist
in the search for the Sniper (The Australian 2002). Then, on the evening
of October 19^th^, a man was shot leaving a restaurant just outside of
Richmond, Virginia. There were no witnesses who could recall seeing
either a shooter or a vehicle leaving the scene, including the wife of
the victim who was standing just a few feet away (Connor and Kennedy
2002). The system of roadblocks, used in previous attacks, again did not
net any suspects (Timberg and Shear 2002). Speculation surfaced that the
Sniper may have targeted the victim on the weekend because police
officials had speculated he operated only during the week.

Police department leaks to the media indicated that there was a letter
found at the scene of the Richmond shooting that gave investigators
instructions to deposit money into a stolen, inactivated credit card
account. The letter also stated that, "Your Children are not safe
anywhere at any time" (Ruane and Stockwell 2002). This threat, shared
with local school administrators, prompted the indefinite closing of
several Richmond area schools. Soon after, Chief Moose began to hold a
dialogue through the media with the Sniper. Chief Moose did not explain
the cryptic messages he would announce during press meetings, but did
publicly give his appreciation to the media for relaying the messages
for him (Pienciak and Kennedy 2002). At some point during the week of
October 13^th^ the Sniper contacted two priests and told them to contact
the police about a robbery-murder in Montgomery, Alabama; police later
traced the calls to the priests (who dismissed the Sniper calls as
pranks) and interviewed them (Lichtblau and van Natta 2002).
Investigation into an unsolved Alabama shooting led to the discovery of
fingerprints on a shell casing matching Lee Malvo. At the same time, two
men were arrested in a white van in Richmond, prompting hopes that the
Sniper had been caught. The two men, having been found to have no
connection to the Sniper investigation, were deported for unrelated
immigration violations (de Morales 2002).

On the morning of October 22^nd^, just before 6am, a bus driver was
killed while standing on the top step of the commuter bus he drove in
Montgomery County, Maryland. A system of roadblocks again failed to
catch the Sniper, and before long, ballistics tests confirmed that the
shooting was linked to the others. Chief Moose issued a statement to the
press that same day that, "We have not been able to assure anyone, any
age, any gender, any race \-- we\'ve not been able to assure anyone
their safety in regards to this situation."(Ruane and Stockwell 2002).

On October 23^rd^, police released the names of John Allen Muhammad and
Lee Malvo as people they would like to question in relation to the
Sniper. Chief Moose proclaimed that the two are not suspects in the
Sniper case (Miga and Rothstein 2002). However, police had at this
point, through fingerprints left at an Alabama robbery-murder, among
other discoveries, linked the two to the Sniper killings. Information
was leaked to the press that police were looking for two cars -- a blue
1990 Chevy Caprice with New Jersey license plates (NDA-21Z) and a white
1989 Chevy Celebrity with Maryland license plates. Television, internet
and radio news networks began airing images of the two car types and of
computer-generated license plate pictures (Kurtz 2002). Officials in
Tacoma, Washington, removed a stump from a former residence of Muhammad
that contained bullet fragments reportedly fired by Muhammad (Kennedy,
Mbugua, and Pienciak 2002).

Muhammad and Malvo were arrested while sleeping in their car at a truck
stop in Maryland on the morning of October 24, following a tip received
by police from a truck driver who had spotted the car. A search of their
car uncovered the gun used in all of the killings from October 2^nd^
until October 22^nd^. Police also discovered a three-inch hole drilled
into the trunk of the Chevy Caprice that was used, in conjunction with a
'sniper platform,' to shoot victims while remaining out of sight (Miga 2
2002). Again citing ballistics evidence, Chief Moose proclaimed that the
weapon was undeniably used in several, if not all of the Sniper
shootings, and that Muhammad and Malvo would be charged for the
killings. Moose stated, "We have not given in to the terror. Yes, we\'ve
all experienced anxiety. But in the end, resiliency has won
out."(Morello, Davenport, and Harris 2002). Police around the country
began announcing links discovered between the Sniper and other crimes
committed prior to the October 2^nd^ shootings.

## **Sidebar 6.1.2: Pre-Crisis Events are Linked to the Sniper**

Once the suspects were in custody, detectives had the time to examine
past crimes for connections to the Washington, DC murders. With the
identity of Muhammad and Malvo known, they were able to trace their
movements in the months leading up to the present, and determine if any
similar, unsolved crimes had taken place in locations where the two had
traveled. They discovered a series of killings that began almost eight
months earlier, increasing in intensity during the two weeks prior to
the start of the crisis.

Using eyewitness accounts, interviews with acquaintances, accomplices,
and neighbors, as well as forensics evidence found in several states,
police were able to link the pair to seven shootings in the states of
Washington, Louisiana, Alabama, Georgia, and Maryland, that resulted in
five people killed and two wounded.

## 

## **Sidebar 6.1.3: Chronology of Events During the Washington D.C. Sniper Crisis**

The following is a brief chronology depicts the criminal acts of John
Muhammad and Lee Malvo during the nine months preceding their capture.

**[Events Occurring Before the Sniper Crisis is Officially
Recognized]{.underline}**

2/16/02 Keenya Cook is killed at her home in Tacoma, WA, with a handgun
linked to Muhammad (CBS 2002). **1 KILLED**

5/1-4/02 Bullets are fired into Temple Beth El synagogue in Tacoma, WA.
Nobody is injured. The bullets are linked to the gun used in the 2/26/02
murder of Keenya Cook (Anderson 2002). **NO INJURIES**

9/14/02 Rupinder Oberoi is shot and wounded outside a Silver Spring, MD
liquor store. Bullet fragments could not be tested, but the suspects'
blue caprice was seen leaving the scene of the shooting (CBS 2002). **1
WOUNDED**

9/21/02 An unnamed person was murdered outside of a liquor store in
Atlanta, GA with a gun linked to the suspects (CBS 2002). **1 KILLED**

Kellie Adams is killed and Claudine Parker is wounded in a Montgomery,
AL shooting linked to the rifle used in the Sniper attacks. Malvo's
fingerprints were found at the scene, and both Muhammad and Malvo were
sighted by witnesses (CBS 2002). **1 KILLED, 1 WOUNDED**

9/23/02 Hong Im Ballenger is killed in the parking lot of a Baton Rouge,
LA beauty supply shop with a bullet linked to the rifle used in the
Sniper attacks (CBS 2002). **1 KILLED**

10/02/02 5:20pm -- The window of a Michaels craft store is hit by a
bullet in Montgomery County, MD (Higham 2002).

6:04pm -- James D. Martin is killed in a Montgomery County, MD parking
lot (Higham 2002). **1 KILLED**

### Events Occurring After the Sniper Crisis is Officially Recognized

10/03/02 7:41am -- James L. Buchanan is killed while mowing grass at an
auto dealership in Montgomery County, MD (Higham 2002). **1 KILLED**

8:12am -- Premkumar A. Walekar is killed while pumping gas at a
Montgomery County, MD Mobil station (Higham 2002). **1 KILLED**

8:37am -- Sarah Ramos is killed while waiting for a bus in Montgomery
County, MD (Higham 2002). **1 KILLED**

9:58am -- Lori Lewis Rivera is killed while vacuuming her car at a
Montgomery County, MD Shell station (Higham 2002). **1 KILLED**

9:20pm -- Pascal Charlot is killed while waiting for a bus in
Washington, DC (Higham 2002). **1 KILLED**

10/04/02 2:30pm -- Unnamed woman is shot and wounded in the parking lot
of a Spotsylvania County, VA Michaels craft store (Higham 2002).

**1 WOUNDED**

10/07/02 8:08am -- Unnamed boy is shot and wounded in front of Benjamin
Tasker Middle School in Bowie, MD (Higham 2002). **1 WOUNDED**

10/09/02 8:20pm -- Dean Harold Meyers is killed while pumping gas at a
Manassas, VA Sunoco station (Higham 2002). **1 KILLED**

10/11/02 9:30am -- Kenneth Bridges is killed while pumping gas at a
Spotsylvania County, VA Exxon station (Higham 2002). **1 KILLED**

10/14/02 9:15pm -- Linda Franklin is killed in the parking lot of a
Fairfax County, VA Home Depot parking lot (Higham 2002). **1 KILLED**

10/19/02 8:00pm - Unnamed man is shot and wounded in the parking lot of
an Ashland, VA Ponderosa restaurant (Higham 2002). **1 WOUNDED**

10/22/02 5:56am - Conrad Johnson is killed while standing on the top
step of the Ride On bus he drove in Montgomery County, MD (Higham 2002).
**1 KILLED**

10/24/02 3:30am - Muhammad and Malvo are arrested in a Myersville, MD
rest stop (Higham 2002).

## Case Study 6.2: The Homeland Security Advisory System

# 

# Introduction

The Homeland Security Advisory System (HSAS) is a color-coded rating
system consisting of five threat levels, administered by the Department
of Homeland Security (DHS), that indicates a nation-wide risk level for
the threat of terrorist attack. A change in threat level prompts the
implementation of protective measures by government agencies and public
safety officials to reduce the likelihood or impact of an attack.

The purpose of this case study is to provide an understanding of the
history and components of the Homeland Security Advisory system and to
examine certain shortcomings of the system in an effort to provide
suggestions for improvement. This case study details the evolution of
the HSAS including the history of the assigned national threat levels;
the process for changing the current threat level; and HSAS notification
procedures. This study also examines public awareness of the HSAS and
adaptation of the private and public sector to the system.

# 

# History and Background

Following the September 11^th^, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United
States, the need for terrorism mitigation and preparedness mechanisms
moved to the forefront of the policy agenda. The creation of the Office
of Homeland Security (OHS), the subsequent Department of Homeland
Security (DHS), and the Homeland Security Advisory System (HSAS), were
the primary steps made by the Federal government to address the nation's
immediate needs.

As noted in Objective 1.4 of the DHS Strategic Plan,

> "Securing the homeland is a joint effort of the Federal Government;
> state, local and tribal governments; the private sector; our
> international partners; and the public. Therefore we will work to
> empower those partners by disseminating relevant intelligence and
> threat information to them accurately and as quickly as possible. We
> will work with our partners to remove roadblocks to information
> sharing. We will administer the Homeland Security Advisory System,
> including the issuance of public advisories and coordination of
> warning information with other agencies. We will deploy and operate
> tools and secure communications channels to analyze and disseminate
> information to relevant agencies as quickly and efficiently as
> possible. "

[]{.mark}

In March 2002, President George W. Bush issued Homeland Security
Presidential Directive-3 (HSPD-3), thereby mandating the creation of the
Homeland Security Advisory System. The implementation of the HSAS was an
effort to develop a "comprehensive and effective means to disseminate
information regarding the risk of terrorist acts to Federal, State and
local authorities and to the American people," as stated in the
directive. The presidential directive also declared that the a primary
purpose of the system is to ensure more widespread adoption of a "common
vocabulary, context, and structure for an ongoing national discussion
about the nature of the threats that confront the Homeland and
appropriate measures that should be taken in response."

Under HSPD-3, the responsibility for raising and lowering the threat
level was originally assigned to the Unites States Attorney General. In
November 2002, however, when Congress passed the Homeland Security Act
of 2002 (thereby establishing the Department of Homeland Security), the
responsibility of the HSAS was transferred to the DHS Undersecretary for
Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection (IAIP). Homeland
Security Presidential Directive 5 (HSPD-5), announced in February of
2003, further amended HSPD-3 by (among other things) designating
authority for assigning threat conditions to the Secretary of Homeland
Security, where the authority resides today.

**Communicating Threat Information to the American People**

There are three components of the system, which is designed to combine
threat information with vulnerability assessments and provide
communications to public safety officials and the public. They are as
follows:

 

-   **Homeland Security Threat Advisories** - contain actionable
    information about an incident involving, or a threat targeting,
    critical national networks or infrastructures or key assets.  They
    could, for example, relay newly developed procedures that, when
    implemented, would significantly improve security or protection.
     They could also suggest a change in readiness posture, protective
    actions, or response. This category includes products formerly named
    alerts, advisories, and sector notifications.  Advisories are
    targeted to Federal, state, and local governments, private sector
    organizations, and international partners.  

-   **Homeland Security Information Bulletins** - communicate
    information of interest to the nation's critical infrastructures
    that do not meet the timeliness, specificity, or significance
    thresholds of warning messages.  Such information may include
    statistical reports, periodic summaries, incident response or
    reporting guidelines, common vulnerabilities and patches, and
    configuration standards or tools.  It also may include preliminary
    requests for information.  Bulletins are targeted to Federal, state,
    and local governments, private sector organizations, and
    international partners.

-   **Color-coded Threat Level System** *-* used to communicate with
    public safety officials and the public at-large through a
    threat-based, color-coded system so that protective measures can be
    implemented to reduce the likelihood or impact of an attack.
     Raising the threat condition has economic, physical, and
    psychological effects on the nation; so, the Homeland Security
    Advisory System can  place specific geographic regions or industry
    sectors on a higher alert status than other regions or industries,
    based on specific threat information.  

# Threat Advisory Levels

The HSAS is comprised of five color-coded threat conditions that
represent the level of "risk" related to a potential terrorist attack
(see Figure 6.2.1). HSPD-3 defines risk as the probability of an attack
occurring and its potential significance. Depending upon the specificity
of the threat information that is used to formulate the risk advisory,
the HSAS can place the entire country or only certain geographical
regions or industrial sectors on higher alert status. Threat levels are
signified by color:

-   Red (severe)

-   Orange (high)

-   Yellow (elevated)

-   Blue (guarded), and

-   Green (low).

As alerts move through the color scheme from green to red, the
associated threat condition related to terrorist attack increases.
According to HSPD-3:

-   A Low condition (green) is declared when there is a low risk of
    terrorist attacks;

-   A guarded condition (blue) is declared when there is a general risk
    of terrorist attacks

-   An Elevated Condition (yellow) is declared when there is a
    significant risk of terrorist attacks

-   A High Condition (orange) is declared when there is a high risk of
    terrorist attacks; and

-   A Severe Condition (red) reflects a severe risk of terrorist
    attacks.

#### Process for changing the threat level

The Department of Homeland Security monitors intelligence information
that is collected and analyzed by the CIA, FBI and Terrorist Threat
Integration Center (TTIC). The DHS Information Analysis and
Infrastructure Protection division and Homeland Security Operations
Center (HSOC) monitor and assess threat information daily. Criteria for
determining whether to raise the threat level is established in HSPD-3
and includes:

-   Credibility of information

-   Whether the information is corroborated

-   The degree to which the threat is specific and/or imminent; and

-   The significance of the potential consequences of the threat.

When intelligence information provides sufficient and credible evidence
of terror activity, the IAIP recommends that the DHS Secretary raise the
threat advisory level.

After a rise in threat level has occurred, DHS will regularly review
intelligence information pertaining to the threat to ascertain whether
the timeframe for the reported threat has passed, or if implemented
protected measures have mitigated the threat from occurring. If
conditions are favorable, the threat advisory level will be lowered. The
Secretary of Homeland Security is required to consult with the Attorney
General and the Homeland Security Counsel, which consists of:

-   The Attorney General

-   FEMA Director

-   Central Intelligence Agency Director

-   Federal Bureau of Investigation Director

-   Secretary of Defense

-   Secretary of Health and Human Services

-   Secretary of Homeland Security

-   Secretary of Transportation

-   Secretary of the Treasury

-   Director of Office of Management and Budget (OMB)

-   Chief of Staff to the President

-   Chief of Staff to the Vice President

Together, the Counsel determines whether the national threat level
should be changed. If an agreement on whether to change the threat level
cannot be reached, the President makes the final decision.

#### Notifying the public

Once a decision has been made to change the threat advisory level, DHS
begins its notification process to the government, private sector and
the public. Threat advisories are issued that contain warning
information and general guidance on appropriate protective actions and
countermeasures. Several methods are used to communicate the impending
threat such as:

-   Email to federal, state and local agencies from HSOC

-   HSOC's Joint Regional Information Exchange System and FBI's National
    Law Enforcement Telecommunications System;

-   Conference call with top business and industry leaders through
    Business Roundtable's Critical Emergency Operations Communications
    Link;

-   Conference calls with state governors and critical infrastructure;

-   Press conferences with media who report to the public and private
    sector; and

-   Posting a general advisory on DHS website.

#### Recommended Actions

# Federal Departments and Agencies

The Department of Homeland Security, as stipulated in HSPD-3, recommends
the following actions be taken by Federal departments and agencies at
each level of alert:

-   **Low Condition (Green) -** Federal departments and agencies should
    consider the following general measures in addition to the
    agency-specific Protective Measures they develop and implement:
    Refining and exercising as appropriate preplanned Protective
    Measures; Ensuring personnel receive proper training on the Homeland
    Security Advisory System and specific preplanned department or
    agency Protective Measures; and Institutionalizing a process to
    assure that all facilities and regulated sectors are regularly
    assessed for vulnerabilities to terrorist attacks, and all
    reasonable measures are taken to mitigate these vulnerabilities.

-   **Guarded Condition (Blue)**. In addition to the Protective Measures
    taken in the previous Threat Condition, Federal departments and
    agencies should consider the following general measures: Checking
    communications with designated emergency response or command
    locations; Reviewing and updating emergency response procedures; and
    Providing the public with any information that would strengthen its
    ability to act appropriately.

-   **Elevated Condition (Yellow)**. In addition to the Protective
    Measures taken in the previous Threat Conditions, Federal
    departments and agencies should consider the following general
    measures: Increasing surveillance of critical locations;
    Coordinating emergency plans as appropriate with nearby
    jurisdictions; Assessing whether the precise characteristics of the
    threat require the further refinement of preplanned Protective
    Measures; and Implementing, as appropriate, contingency and
    emergency response plans.

-   **High Condition (Orange)**. In addition to the Protective Measures
    taken in the previous Threat Conditions, Federal departments and
    agencies should consider the following general measures:
    Coordinating necessary security efforts with Federal, State, and
    local law enforcement agencies or any National Guard or other
    appropriate armed forces organizations; Taking additional
    precautions at public events and possibly considering alternative
    venues or even cancellation; Preparing to execute contingency
    procedures, such as moving to an alternate site or dispersing their
    workforce; and Restricting threatened facility access to essential
    personnel only.

-   **Severe Condition (Red)**. Under most circumstances, the Protective
    Measures for a Severe Condition are not intended to be sustained for
    substantial periods of time. In addition to the Protective Measures
    in the previous Threat Conditions, Federal departments and agencies
    also should consider the following general measures: Increasing or
    redirecting personnel to address critical emergency needs; Assigning
    emergency response personnel and pre-positioning and mobilizing
    specially trained teams or resources; Monitoring, redirecting, or
    constraining transportation systems; and Closing public and
    government facilities.

Federal entities are required to develop their own customized protective
measures building on the general measures established by DHS in HSPD-3
and incorporate them into their continuity plans. State governors,
mayors, and the private sector are not required, but are encouraged to
develop their own protective measures for each threat level. The United
States military is excluded from conforming to the system because it
operates under a unified threat system specific to forces at home and
abroad.

The Department of Homeland Security and other government and public
organizations have developed educational materials to assist states,
local government, citizens and the private sector with developing their
own protective measures. For instance, DHS in coordination with Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) has developed "Citizen Guidance on
the Homeland Security Advisory System" that provides recommended actions
for citizens. FEMA's "Are you Ready? A Guide to Citizen Preparedness"
provides additional guidance to citizens for actions to take at each
threat level. The American Red Cross has created suggested activities
for each threat level for: individuals, families, neighborhoods, schools
and businesses, several of which will be detailed below.

# Citizens

In response to a general sense of confusion felt by U.S. citizens
following changes in the HSAS, primarily concerning a lack of direction
for actions that they could take to prepare for terrorist attacks at
each level, the American Red Cross developed a fact sheet entitled
"Citizen Guidance on the Homeland Security Advisory System." Like the
guidance that the Department of Homeland Security gave to Federal
departments and agencies, this guide followed the color-coded convention
defined by the HSAS. The recommended actions at each level, for
citizens, are (see Figure 6.2.2):

-   **Low Condition (Green)**

    -   Develop a family emergency plan. Share it with family and
        friends, and practice the plan.

    -   Visit www.Ready.gov for help creating a plan.

    -   Create an "Emergency Supply Kit" for your household.

    -   Be informed. Visit www.Ready.gov or obtain a copy of "Preparing
        Makes Sense, Get Ready Now" by calling 1-800-BE-READY.

    -   Know how to shelter-in-place and how to turn off utilities
        (power, gas, and water) to your home.

    -   Examine volunteer opportunities in your community, such as
        Citizen Corps, Volunteers in Police Service, Neighborhood Watch
        or others, and donate your time.

    -   Consider completing an American Red Cross first aid or CPR
        course, or Community Emergency Response Team (CERT) course .

-   **Guarded Risk (Yellow)**

    -   Complete recommended steps at level green.

    -   Review stored disaster supplies and replace items that are
        outdated.

    -   Be alert to suspicious activity and report it to proper
        authorities.

-   **Elevated Condition (Green)**

    -   Complete recommended steps at levels green and blue.

    -   Ensure disaster supply kit is stocked and ready.

    -   Check telephone numbers in family emergency plan and update as
        necessary.

    -   Develop alternate routes to/from work or school and practice
        them.

    -   Continue to be alert for suspicious activity and report it to
        authorities.

#### 

#### High Condition (Orange)

-   Complete recommended steps at lower levels.

-   Exercise caution when traveling, pay attention to travel advisories.

-   Review your family emergency plan and make sure all family members
    know what to do.

-   Be Patient. Expect some delays, baggage searches and restrictions at
    public buildings.

-   Check on neighbors or others that might need assistance in an
    emergency.

    -   **Severe Condition (Red)**

        -   Complete all recommended actions at lower levels.

        -   Listen to local emergency management officials.

        -   Stay tuned to TV or radio for current
            information/instructions.

        -   Be prepared to shelter-in-place or evacuate, as instructed.

        -   Expect traffic delays and restrictions.

        -   Provide volunteer services only as requested.

        -   Contact your school/business to determine status of work
            day.

#### 

# Schools and Businesses

The American Red Cross also developed a set of recommendations for
schools and businesses to take in case of changes in the HSAS threat
level. These actions for schools are as follows (see Figure 6.2.3):

-   **Low Condition (Green)**

    -   Use Red Cross Emergency Management Guide for Business and
        Industry
        (<http://www.redcross.org/services/disaster/beprepared/busi_industry.html#fema>)
        to develop written emergency plans to address all hazards
        including plans to maintain the safety of students, staff, and
        faculty, as well as an emergency communication plan to notify
        parents in times of emergency. Disseminate relevant information
        to families of children, staff and faculty.

    -   Initiate offering "Masters of Disaster" curriculum for grades
        K-8 regarding emergency preparedness for natural disasters

    -   Ensure selected staff members take a Red Cross CPR/AED and first
        aid course

-   **Guarded Risk (Yellow)**

    -   Complete recommended actions at lower level

    -   Be alert to suspicious activity and report it to proper
        authorities

    -   Conduct safety training/emergency drills following the school's
        written emergency plan for all grades

    -   Ensure emergency communication plan updated and needed equipment
        is purchased

    -   Continue offering lessons from 'Masters of Disaster" curriculum
        for grades K-8 regarding emergency preparedness for natural
        disasters

-   **Elevated Condition (Green)**

    -   Complete recommended actions at lower levels

    -   Be alert to suspicious activity and report it to the proper
        authorities

    -   Ensure all emergency supplies stocked and ready

    -   Obtain copies of Terrorism: Preparing for the Unexpected
        (<http://www.redcross.org/services/disaster/keepsafe/terrorism.pdf>)
        brochure from your local Red Cross chapter and send it home with
        students in grades K-12, staff and faculty

#### 

#### High Condition (Orange)

-   Complete recommended actions at lower levels

-   Be alert to suspicious activity and report it to proper authorities

-   Review emergency plans

-   Offer Masters of Disaster "Facing Fear: Helping Young People Deal
    with Terrorism and Tragic Events" lessons in grades K-12

-   Prepare to handle inquiries from anxious parents and media

-   Discuss children's fears concerning possible terrorist attacks

    -   **Severe Condition (Red)**

        -   Complete recommended actions at lower levels

        -   Listen to radio/TV for current information/instructions

        -   Be alert to suspicious activity and report it to proper
            authorities immediately

        -   Close school if recommended to do so by appropriate
            authorities

        -   100% identification check (i.e.-driver's license retained at
            front office) and escort of anyone entering school other
            than students, staff and faculty

        -   Continue offering lessons from Masters of Disaster "Facing
            Fear: Helping Young People Deal with Terrorism and Tragic
            Events" curriculum

        -   Ensure mental health counselors available for students,
            staff and faculty

# The actions for businesses to take are as follows (see Figure 6.2.4):

-   **Low Condition (Green)**

    -   Use Red Cross Emergency Management Guide for Business and
        Industry
        (<http://www.redcross.org/services/disaster/beprepared/busi_industry.html#fema>)
        to develop written emergency plans to address all hazards.
        Include an emergency communication plan to notify employees of
        activities; designate an off-site 'report to' location in case
        of evacuation.

    -   Develop continuity of operations plan to include designating
        alternate work facility/location for business

    -   Arrange for staff to take a Red Cross CPR/AED and first aid
        course

    -   Obtain copies of Terrorism: Preparing for the Unexpected
        (<http://www.redcross.org/services/disaster/keepsafe/terrorism.pdf>)
        and Preparing Your Business for the Unthinkable
        (<http://www.redcross.org/services/disaster/beprepared/unthinkable2.pdf>)
        brochures from your local Red Cross chapter for distribution to
        all employees/management as appropriate.

-   **Guarded Risk (Yellow)**

    -   Complete recommended actions at lower level

    -   Be alert to suspicious activity and report it to proper
        authorities

    -   Dialogue with community leaders, emergency management,
        government agencies, community organizations and utilities about
        disaster preparedness

    -   Ensure emergency communication plan updated to include purchase
        of needed equipment.

    -   Ask the local Red Cross chapter to provide a "Terrorism:
        Preparing for the Unexpected" presentation at your workplace for
        employees

-   **Elevated Condition (Green)**

    -   Complete recommended actions at lower levels

    -   Be alert to suspicious activity and report it to proper
        authorities

    -   Contact private security firm for security risk assessment and
        to determine availability of support/reinforcement

    -   Contact voluntary organizations you support to determine how you
        can provide assistance in case of emergency

#### 

#### High Condition (Orange)

-   Complete recommended actions at lower levels

-   Be alert to suspicious activity and report it to proper authorities

-   Review emergency plans to include continuity of operations and media
    materials on hand

-   Determine need to restrict access to business or provide private
    security firm support/reinforcement

-   Contact vendors/suppliers to confirm their emergency response plan
    procedures

-   If a need is announced, contact nearest blood collection agency and
    offer to organize a blood drive

    -   **Severe Condition (Red)**

        -   Complete recommended actions at lower levels

        -   Listen to radio/TV for current information/instructions

        -   Be alert to suspicious activity and report it to proper
            authorities immediately

        -   Work with local community leaders, emergency management,
            government agencies, community organizations, and utilities
            to meet immediate needs of the community

        -   Determine need to close business based on circumstances and
            in accordance with written emergency plan

        -   Be prepared to work with a dispersed or smaller work force

        -   Ensure mental health counselors available for employees

#### Threat Level History

Since the inception of the HSAS in March 2002, the national color-coded
threat level has remained predominantly at the yellow (elevated) level,
except for the following periods of time, when the level was raised to
orange (high):

-   September 11-24, 2002 (high) due to concern over the anniversary of
    the September 11, 2001 attacks.

-   February 7-27, 2003 (high) due to intelligence suggesting Al-Qaeda
    was planning attacks on United States 'soft' targets.

-   March 17- April 11, 2003 (high) due to intelligence chatter
    following President Bush mandating Saddam Hussein to leave Iraq.

-   May 20-30, 2003 (high) due to intelligence chatter following
    bombings in Saudi Arabia and Morocco that suggested terrorists may
    be planning attacks on the U.S.

-   December 21, 2003- January 9, 2004 (high) intelligence chatter
    suggests a new terror strike within the United States more
    devastating than the September 11, 2001 attacks.

-   August 1- November 10 2004 (high) in place for the financial
    services sectors in New York City, Northern New Jersey and
    Washington DC only. The rest of the nation remained at a level
    yellow/elevated.

-   May 11, 2005 -- (severe) -- raised for less than one hour in
    Washington, DC, after an unidentified single-engine aircraft entered
    restricted airspace.

To date, the threat advisory level has never been designated as Red
(severe), Blue (Guarded) or Low (Green) on a national level.

# 

# Concerns with the Advisory System

# 

The Homeland Security Advisory System has been openly criticized by the
Federal, state, and local governments, citizens and the media. Foremost,
the issued threat advisories have been considered too general in nature,
and have not provided the granularity of information for government
entities and the public to implement specific protective measures for
the impending threat. The communication process the DHS uses to notify
entities of a change in threat level has not been formally documented.
Private sector companies, including critical infrastructure, and public
school systems have not fully adapted the HSAS threat level into their
own crisis management and continuity plans; and the general public does
not have an acceptable awareness of the system and what its threat
levels mean.

# DHS notification process is not formalized

Three General Accounting Office (GAO) reports published since 2004 have
indicated that the Department of Homeland Security has not formally
documented its policies and procedures for communicating threat
information and guidance to federal agencies, states and the public and
private sector. Since there is no set expectation, federal and state
agencies have been continually unsatisfied with the method, timeliness
and breadth of threat information provided. Established communications
protocols would provide recipients of the information with clear
expectations of what, when and how they would receive threat
information. As noted in the GAO Standards for Internal Control in the
Federal Government, entities must have relevant, reliable and timely
information relating to internal and external events in order to control
its operations.

Federal and state agencies that responded to GAO inquiries reported that
in certain cases, they were notified of a change in threat level by the
media before being notified by the HSAS communications process. Some
agencies have reported receiving inquiries from media about protective
actions they intended to implement when they had not yet received
specific threat information or guidance from DHS. In addition, agencies
reported receiving threat advisory information from multiple sources
each time the threat level was raised to orange; however the sources of
information were not consistent each time. It was unclear to these
agencies from whom and when they should expect to receive the official
threat advisory.

DHS official have acknowledged this issue, noting that they have not yet
been able to develop protocols that will provide sufficient scalability
and flexibility for sharing information under various threat scenarios.

# Granularity of information provided

GAO issued several reports in 2004 that cited the dissatisfaction of
Federal, state and local agencies concerning the detail of information
provided by DHS in threat advisories. Public warnings have not
consistently contained specific information on region, sectors, sites,
timeframes and the nature of the event that may take place. Guidance
provided on actions that should be taken in response to terror threats
has not contained explicit actions that should be taken to mitigate or
prepare for the incident. To date, only one threat advisory has been
tailored to a specific sector or region, when the threat level was
raised to orange for the financial sector in Washington DC, New York
City and Northern New Jersey.

Federal agencies have explained that the lack of details and guidance in
threat advisories hinders their ability to determine appropriate
protective measures to implement. State agencies are sometimes unable to
ascertain from threat advisories whether the threat would affect them at
all. States note that information pertaining to the nature of the threat
(against certain facilities, structures, etc) would have been helpful in
determine where to focus resources instead of implementing stronger
general security measures state-wide.

# HSAS Adaptation 

The Department of Homeland Security has only developed protective
measures for Federal agencies. Other levels of government, the private
sector and general public are left responsible for developing their own
protective measures with limited guidance.

The private sector may be unprepared to implement its own protective
measures following a rise in threat level. Unlike the Federal
government, the private sector is not required to have continuity plans
in place. A study by the American Management Association (AMA) reveals
that only 64% of businesses have documented crisis plans in place, 45%
have plans in place that address security threats, and only 42% of
companies test and drill their plans. The United States critical
infrastructure including energy, telecommunications and the financial
sector is 85% operated by the private sector. It is vital that critical
infrastructure entities establish preparedness and response mechanisms
that address different threat levels or warnings. These entities are
prime terrorists targets and will be essential to the nation's response
and recovery following an attack.

The United States Public School System is regularly involved in
emergency planning activities with state and local agencies. However,
there rarely exist the mandates to ensure all entities adopt developed
policies. For instance, the State of New York has created "New York
State Homeland Security System for Schools", specific guidelines that
schools should follow for each HSAS threat level, but a survey of school
police officers reveals that 50% of schools do not have formal
guidelines or plans in place to respond to a change in the national
threat level. In addition, only one in four officers feels their school
has sufficient plans in place to respond to a terrorist attack at or
near their location. Many schools cite a lack of funding and confusion
about what a change in threat level means for them as why they have not
adapted their emergency plans to include changes in national threat
level.

# Public awareness of the HSAS

Although the Department of Homeland Security has implemented its
"Ready.gov" website and "America Prepared" campaign to educate
businesses and citizens on terrorism preparedness and national
emergencies, a lack of knowledge pertaining to the HSAS still exists. A
study was performed in the spring of 2004 to determine the level of
understanding American citizens possessed concerning the HSAS. The
results of the survey conducted on Arkansas residents age 18 or older
revealed: only 49.5% were aware of the HSAS by its formal name; 21% were
aware of how many threat levels comprised the HSAS; and only 37% were
able to correctly identify the current national threat level. These
numbers should be considered regarded as alarming, since the HSAS is the
communications mechanism the United States implemented to convey the
nation's risk of terror threat with the public. If the warning
information is not being effectively communicated with the general
public, there is a greater likelihood they will be less prepared in the
event of an attack.

#### **Conclusion**

The Homeland Security Advisory System was implemented to provide a
consistent means for communicating the risk of credible terror threats
to government entities, businesses and citizens. It has been widely
scrutinized by federal, state, local governments and the general public
for its lack of perceived value and the level of information provided
with each threat advisory. Government agencies, citizens and private
sector continue to struggle on how to adapt their own security
activities to reflect changes in the HSAS due to a lack of guidance.

However, Congress and the Department of Homeland Security are constantly
addressing the possibility of changes to the HSAS and proposing means to
do so. They face a considerable challenge on how to do this, however,
because they are torn between the conflicting goals of alerting the
public and protecting confidential information. A major step in the
right direction came on April 27^th^, 2005, when the Subcommittee on
Intelligence, Information-Sharing and Terrorism Risk Assessment of the
Committee on Homeland Security unanimously approved the Homeland
Security Information Sharing and Analysis Enhancement Act of 2005. This
act is designed to strengthen and improve terrorist threat analysis and
address the effectiveness of the HSAS, including using target specific
information (facilities, regions, states, localities, or private sector
industries, for example.) (Wireless News, 2005)

The HSAS is based upon the concept that information can both help to
prepare the nation and avert unnecessary fear and/or panic.
Unfortunately, it has yet to accomplish either of those goals. Clearly,
without a full revamp of the system, as has been prescribed by Congress,
those goals will never be met.

# 

# [References]{.underline}

Argon, Joe. 2004. *"*Editor's Focus: The Color of Safety." *American
School & University.* February 1.

Cherkasky, Michael. 2003. *Forewarned: Why the Government is Failing to
Protect Us-and What We Must Do.* Ballantine Books. 1st edition.

CNN. 2004. "Security Watch." CNN Website Feature.
<http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/2004/fighting.terror/security.watch/>

CNN. N/D." Threats and Alert Explainer: Alert system."
<http://www.cnn.com/interactive/us/0205/terror.warning/frameset.exclude.html>

DHS. N/D. "Citizen Guidance on the Homeland Security Advisory System."
<http://www.dhs.gov/interweb/assetlibrary/CitizenGuidanceHSAS2.pdf>

DHS. N/D. "Homeland Security Advisories and Information Bulletins"
<http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/interapp/editorial/editorial_0335.xml>

DHS. N/D. "Homeland Security Advisory System\--Guidance for Federal
Departments and Agencies."
<http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/interapp/press_release/press_release_0046.xml>

DHS. 2004. "Threats and Protection: Homeland Security Advisory System."
<http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?theme=29>

DHS. N/D. Ready.gov Website. <http://www.ready.gov/>

GAO. 2004. "*9/11 Commission Report Reorganization, Transformation, and
Information Sharing.*" Testimony before the Committee on Government
Reform, House of Representatives, Statement of the Honorable David M.
Walker. GAO-04-1033T. August 3.
<http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d041033t.pdf>

GAO. 2004. "*HOMELAND SECURITY: Communication Protocols and Risk
Communication Principles Can Assist in Refining the Advisory System.*"
The Honorable Christopher Cox Chairman, The Honorable Jim Turner. GAO
-04-682. June 25. <http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04682.pdf>

GAO. 2005. "*HOMELAND SECURITY: Agency Plans, Implementation, and
Challenges Regarding the National Strategy for Homeland Security.*" The
Honorable Christopher Shays. GAO-05-33. January 14.
<http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0533.pdf>

GAO. 2004. "*Homeland Security Advisory System: Preliminary Observations
Regarding Threat Level Increases from Yellow to Orange Established in
March 2002.*" The Honorable Christopher Cox Chairman, The Honorable Jim
Turner. GAO-04-453R. February 26.
<http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04453r.pdf>

Knight, Andrew. 2005. "Alert Status Red: Awareness, Knowledge and
Reaction to the Threat Advisory System." *Journal of Homeland Security
and Emergency Management.* January. V.2, No.1.

Schmidt, Donald. 2004. "From Green to Seeing Red." *Access Control &
Security Systems.* August 1.

Toppo, Greg. 2003. "An F in Terror Threat Response." *USA Today.* August
19.

White House. 2002. "Homeland Security Presidential Directive-3."
President George W. Bush.
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/03/20020312-5.html>

White House. 2003. "Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-5."
President George W. Bush.
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/20030228-9.html>

Wireless News. 2005. "Homeland Security Legislation Passes
Subcommittee." April 27. M2 Communications, Ltd.

**Image 6.2.1: The Homeland Security Advisory System**

![](media/image3.png){width="2.3402777777777777in"
height="3.4902777777777776in"}

Source: www.DHS.Gov

**Image 6.2.2: Citizen Guidance on the Homeland Security Advisory
System**

![](media/image4.wmf){width="6.480555555555555in"
height="8.371527777777779in"}Source: [www.DHS.Gov](http://www.DHS.Gov/)

**Figure 6.2.3: School Guidance on the Homeland Security Advisory
System**

![](media/image5.png){width="6.188888888888889in"
height="6.685416666666667in"}

Source: The American Red Cross

Figure 6.2.4: Business Guidance on the Homeland Security Advisory System

![](media/image6.wmf){width="6.141666666666667in"
height="6.672916666666667in"}

Source: The American Red Cross

## Case Study 6.: A Comparison of Leadership Between Two Outbreaks of Smallpox in the United States: New York City, 1947, and Milwaukee, 1894 

# 

# Introduction

Epidemics, whether the result of natural or intentional (terrorist)
origin, are frightening events. Historically, **epidemics** and
**pandemics** have proven to be the most devastating of all disasters,
as illustrated by the staggering mortality figures from the 1918
Influenza Pandemic. During the single year that the pandemic lasted,
between 20 and 40 million people died of the illness -- more than all
those killed in World War I. Furthermore, unlike natural disasters,
technological disasters, or even chemical terrorist attacks, there is
little indication that an epidemic is occurring until after many people
are infected, making these events all the more difficult to predict and
identify.

Unlike many other kinds of disasters, however, epidemics are preventable
once they have begun, through effective public health activities. At the
forefront of these activities is communication. Only information, and
solid communication mechanisms, can control an outbreak of disease and
reign in public panic and fear. This case highlights two outbreaks of
the same deadly disease. Both of these outbreaks had catastrophic
potential in regards to the number of people that may have been killed.
Only one led to an epidemic. Clearly, through comparison of the two
cases, strong leadership emerges as the cornerstone to effectively
managing the emergency.

### Background - Smallpox

Smallpox is one of the world's most dreaded diseases, even decades after
its eradication. It is a highly contagious disease that has no known
treatment, and a mortality rate as high as 40% in children and 20% in
adults (giving an average mortality rate of 30%) (Sepkowitz, 2004).
Those who do survive are severely disfigured by the sores that appear on
their body and face during infection. The protection against the disease
is vaccination, which must be repeated periodically throughout life to
maintain immunity.

Smallpox occurs in two distinct forms -- Variola Major and Variola
Minor. Variola Major is divided into four specific types ranging from
ordinary (90% of all cases -- a mild infection) to hemorrhagic (very
high mortality rates associated). Variola minor, which occurs much less
frequently, has a mortality rate of less than 1%.

Transmission of the disease occurs after face to face contact with an
infected person, or through contact with bodily fluids or infected
materials (like the intentionally-infected bedding given to American
Indians that caused a famous smallpox epidemic in pre-colonial America).
On rare occasions, the disease has been spread through particles
suspended in the air (and this form of transmission has become a major
concern for officials who have been engineering bioterrorism
preparedness measures.) An infected person normally becomes infectious
to others only after the telltale rash appears on their body. However,
on rare occasions transmission has been known to have occurred in the
early stages of infection when a fever is present but a rash has not yet
appeared.

Following exposure, infected individuals experience an 'incubation
period', lasting approximately two weeks, where no symptoms will be
evident. Generally, people cannot transmit the virus during this time.
Following the incubation period, a high-grade fever will appear, and the
individual will feel lethargic and possibly achy or nauseas. This
period, which lasts approximately two to four days, is followed by the
onset of the rash. The smallpox rash first appears on the tongue and /
or throughout the mouth. When the sores ulcerate, the virus spreads
throughout the mouth and throat, and the person becomes highly
contagious to others. At the same time, a rash appears over the expanse
of the body, covering all parts within about 24 hours (especially on the
face and the limbs -- unlike chickenpox, which appears most densely on
the trunk). Over two or three weeks, the rash will turn to **pustules**,
then burst and scab over, and eventually the scabs will fall off leaving
behind a scar. The period from the date of exposure to the end of
infection generally lasts about 36 to 40 days (CDC, 2004).

The disease is known to have existed for thousands of years, and has
appeared throughout recorded history during times when epidemics and
pandemics emerged. A global vaccination campaign has effectively
eradicated the disease, with the last known (naturally occurring) case
of the disease having occurred in Somalia in 1977 (the last known case
in the United States was recorded in 1949). In the early 1970's,
vaccination was ended in the United States after it was determined that
the risk of falling ill from the vaccine was greater than the risk of
contracting the disease.

### Outbreak Case 1: Milwaukee, WI, 1894

In 1894, an outbreak of smallpox occurred in Milwaukee, Wisconsin. The
outbreak spread rapidly, reaching every ward within the city before a
major effort to contain it was launched. Because of the widespread
occurrence of the disease, all socioeconomic and ethnic groups were
affected.

Milwaukee, which was and still is a large metropolitan city, had an
effective Public Health Department, and had previously eradicated the
disease in the city through a policy of vaccination and control.
However, when the 1894 outbreak was emerging, a new city health
commissioner, Walter Kempster, had just assumed his post. Kempster had
already gained notoriety due to his aversion to granting political
favors, and was clearly unpopular within the city government.

Health Commissioner Kempster addressed the smallpox outbreak from the
outset as he should have. His measures included introducing a
mass-vaccination campaign, the establishment of an isolation hospital
dedicated to infectious patients, and a system of home quarantines.
However, he did not institute these measures uniformly across the city's
populace. For the middle and wealthy classes, for instance, the option
of home quarantine was offered, under his assumption that these members
of society could be trusted to isolate themselves without enforcement.
However, for the poor, largely immigrant population, Kempster had sick
patients forcibly removed from their homes and placed under imposed
restriction within the isolation hospital.

The discrimination was blatant and immediately evident, especially to
the immigrants and the poor. Having watched neighbors or family members
literally dragged from their homes into the isolation wagons that took
them to the isolation hospitals, they began to heavily resist
containment measures. Other issues compounded the problem. The following
list illustrates several of these problems:

-   The uniforms worn by the health officials who came to enforce the
    isolation measures were considered a poor choice in light of the
    sensitive nature of what they were being worn to do. These uniforms
    were especially frightening to immigrants and the poor, who already
    had a deep mistrust of the government, and the reaction that
    resulted was a fear of the response that equaled or exceeded a fear
    of the disease itself.

-   Internally, Kempster experienced resistance within his own and other
    government agencies due to his previous actions.

-   A group of people, called 'anti-vaccinationists', who were against
    all forms of vaccine, were competing in the public education arena
    by spreading misinformation about the dangers and benefits of
    vaccines. Approximately one third of physicians in the city at that
    time belonged to this group, resulting in a mixed message from the
    medical community. Traditionally, informal communications mechanisms
    are more effective in poor and immigrant populations than form
    government campaigns, so the anti-vaccine message was heard more
    loudly and clearly in the absence of any effort by Kempster to use
    more informal education or communication methods.

-   The poor (justifiably) believed they were being discriminated
    against, and resisted all cooperation out of mistrust. They were
    often referred in the media by public officials as 'The Scum of
    Milwaukee,' further entrenching this mistrust.

-   Kempster was seen as insensitive to the plight of the poor. His
    public statements were inflammatory and confrontational. At one
    point he stated "I am here to enforce the laws, and I shall enforce
    them, if I have to break heads to do it. The question of the
    inhumanity of the laws I have nothing to do with" (Leavitt, 2003).

Residents, in response to this perceived (and apparent) disparity in
treatment, began what turned into a month of anti-government rioting.
Mobs of people, armed with crude weapons (such as bats, clubs, knives,
etc.) attacked the government health inspectors as they passed through
their wards, and destroyed the isolation vans if they saw them. There
were several reported cases of boiling water being thrown onto the
horses that pulled the isolation vans. Immigrants also reacted by
failing to report infections as they occurred, compromising the
government containment operation by limiting their tracking abilities.
Because of the perceived mistreatment by public health officials,
victims would be hid from the health inspectors who went door to door in
search of the sick.

Because of Kempster's inability to provide leadership, the crisis took
much too long to contain, and the result was the infection of over one
thousand people and the death of almost 250. Kempster was ultimately
held accountable for his poor leadership and inability to control the
crisis, and he was impeached and removed from office (although he was
reinstated the following year after the crisis ended). Additionally,
laws were changed in order to weaken the power of the city's health
department, ending forcible isolation, for instance (University of
Pittsburgh, 2004).

### 

### Outbreak Case 2: New York City, NY, 1947

At the end of a six-year period of living in Mexico, Eugene Le Bar was
unknowingly exposed to smallpox and subsequently infected. Still within
the two-week incubation period of the disease, he and his wife (with
whom he was traveling) embarked upon a bus trip from Mexico to their
home state, Maine. When the Le Bars reached New York City, Eugene was
not feeling well so they decided to stop for a few days in the city.

The Le Bars checked into a hotel, and spent some time exploring the city
despite Eugene's fever and malaise. However, after two days, a rash
appeared all over his body, and his condition began to deteriorate
rapidly. He was transferred to Bellevue Hospital and placed in a
dermatology ward (as there had not been a case of smallpox in decades
within the city, the disease was not initially suspected). When his rash
worsened, he was transferred to a Manhattan infectious diseases
facility, Willard Parker Hospital. Though smallpox was considered as a
possible cause of infection, Eugene denied exposure to any infected
individuals and had what he and physicians believed to be an active
immunity to the disease from vaccination just five years earlier.

Two days later, Le Bar died of complications associated with the
disease, and upon autopsy, it was confirmed that he had died of smallpox
infection. Within 9 days, two other patients in the hospital who had had
contact with Le Bar but had been released, were readmitted with a
generalized rash like Le Bar had experienced. Both were immediately
suspected of having chickenpox, but smallpox was considered as a
possible alternative explanation.

Israel Weinstein was New York City Commissioner of Health at the time.
Weinstein immediately began a process of 'case tracing', where all
exposures to the infected person were investigated, as were all
exposures to those people, and so on. This began with all the employees
at the two hospitals where Le Bar had been admitted, and extended into
the community. He sent out a fact-finding team of hundreds of doctors,
nurses, and other volunteers to determine the source of the outbreak,
and to vaccinate and observe anyone who was known to have had contact
with either Le Bar or Le Bar's direct contacts. In addition, he
recommended that the nation's public health department track down and
investigate all the locations where Le Bar's bus had stopped on its
journey north (Weinstein, 1947).

Despite these efforts, more people began to present themselves to
hospitals with suspected smallpox symptoms. Weinstein decided upon
notification of these cases that a full-scale vaccination program was
needed to contain a widespread epidemic. His first step was to ask for
emergency funding from the Mayor, who immediately complied with the
request by granting \$500,000 in funding for both the vaccine materials
and the associated campaign.

Within one day of learning that Le Bar's autopsy confirmed the presence
of the smallpox virus, Weinstein personally appealed to New York City
citizens, through the media, to inform them of the autopsy results and
to announce the vaccination campaign. In an praiseworthy move that set
the tone for what became a resoundingly successful campaign, Mayor
William O'Dwyer received the first dose of vaccine, by Weinstein
himself, in front of the media.

Because of Weinstein's visible concern, and a recognition of the
government's willingness to help, the public granted a considerable
amount of trust in the city government as a whole. Information was being
provided through multiple outlets, to reach multiple and diverse
audiences, and so it was felt by all socioeconomic, cultural, and racial
groups alike that the concern was universal. Mass public education and
social marketing, through both formal and informal means, were provided
to teach residents about both the dangers of the disease and its modes
of transmission, and the benefits of vaccination weighed against the
risks. The campaign slogan, "Be sure. Be Safe. Get vaccinated" became
quickly known, encouraged, and propagated, to the extent that it was
common to see citizens wearing pins bearing that phrase. Additionally,
recognized and trusted groups, like the American Red Cross, various
teachers' and women's groups, among other voluntary groups, were tapped
to assist in the campaign, thus furthering the impression that this was
a community campaign, not strictly a product of the government.

The public trust was maintained through daily press conferences and
radio interviews held by either Weinstein or the Mayor -- or both.
During these interviews, Weinstein not only gave information about the
disease and the vaccination, but provided citizens with statistics on
current infections and the status of patients and their laboratory tests
so that they felt a part of the operation. Weinstein was, essentially,
informing citizens about what they needed to do, voluntarily, to help
avert the crisis -- and they listened. Citizens felt that the government
was being completely open with them, and, as result, there was little if
any resistance to Weinstein's efforts (Garrett, 2001). People not only
traveled to the vaccination centers, but often waited in lines for
hours, and even came back on subsequent days when daily stocks ran out
(see figure 6.3.1).

In what is still considered nothing short of a miracle, Weinstein and
his team of public health experts averted a major public health
disaster. In total, only 12 people became infected with the disease
(including Mr. Le Bar, who was not infected in New York), and of these,
only 2 died. Israel Weinstein's ability to communicate with the public
and internally within his government have even been hailed as a model
for possible cases of bioterrorism response that may be required in the
future should a virulent agent such as smallpox be intentionally
dispersed.

### Conclusion

In considering the response to the outbreak in Milwaukee, one can
observe that the following characteristics were present:

-   A strong public health department

-   Moderate State health department cooperation

-   The use of forceful, "strong-arm" tactics with the public

-   Discriminatory policies

-   The provision of limited information

-   Mixed messages

-   No citizen participation

In New York City, however, the case was as follows:

-   A strong public health department

-   Strong State and Federal cooperation

-   Respect for all people shown at every stage of the response

-   Policies reflecting equality for all racial and socioeconomic groups

-   Strong media cooperation and support

-   Clear messages

-   The use of citizen groups to conduct the campaign

Although not it cannot be said that all other conditions were equal, it
is clear that these differences in leadership style played the greatest
role in creating the disparity that exists between the success rates of
the two government responses examined. Through critique of these two
leaders' actions according to modern teachings and standards of
leadership, it becomes obvious that Weinstein's approach was somewhat
revolutionary -- while Kempster's was archaic and rigid.

Through successful communications, New York City Health Commissioner
Israel Weinstein organized and conducted the largest voluntary
mass-vaccination campaign in the history of the country. Communications
is the area where Weinstein excelled as a leader. Weinstein appreciated
the value of the press in communicating with the public, and he
personally met with newspaper editors in order to better educate them
about the importance of vaccination, as well as to help them to
understand the best ways to communicate these issues effectively. He was
personally involved with citizens throughout the crisis, and understood
the importance of sharing information with these people he considered
not only stakeholders but partners.

Most importantly, Weinstein maintained the public's trust throughout the
emergency. He accomplished this through both the sharing of relevant
information and the transparency and credibility of his actions. Despite
that the Health Department had the ability to conduct forcible
vaccinations, for instance, Weinstein never chose to do so -- opting
instead to appeal to the civic duty of citizens to participate. And
because of his high regard within the government he had the ability to
not only secure funds from the mayor to ensure that the vaccinations
could be given free of charge, but he was able to work with the Federal
Public Health system to ensure that no other outbreaks resulted from Le
Bar's travels in other cities. He was able to ensure that ample
vaccinations were secured from cities and military bases throughout the
country through his friendly and trusted ties with the Federal
government (New York City had less than one million doses when the
crisis began,) and was even able to get sitting president Truman to
receive the vaccination and visit the city during the heat of the
crisis.

Weinstein's mass vaccination campaign was the largest in history at that
time, and still has yet to be equaled in magnitude. In just two weeks,
five million of the seven million New York City residents were
vaccinated (500,000 in one day alone). By the fourth week, there were
6,350,000 vaccinations given total, and by the seventh week the number
reached 6.5 million.

In an article written by Israel Weinstein in the aftermath of the
response, he describes what could have happened had the response not
been effective. He writes,

> "The introduction of virulent smallpox into a community, especially a
> large cosmopolitan city with rail, ship, and air connections with the
> rest of the nation and many parts of the world, could be a major
> catastrophe. For example, in 1945 in the Puget Sound area around
> Seattle, there were 65 cases of smallpox and 20 deaths. These cases
> were all attributable to a soldier stationed in Japan who had
> developed smallpox aboard ship en route to Seattle.
>
> "During the period 1900 to 1929, epidemics of virulent smallpox were
> reported throughout the United States. Notable among these were the
> outbreaks in 1921 in Denver and Kansas City, when the former city
> reported 924 cases and 37 deaths, and the latter 943 cases and 160
> deaths. In 1924, Detroit reported 1,510 cases and 163 deaths. In 1901,
> an epidemic of smallpox in New York City resulted in 1,959 cases and
> 410 deaths. Had the same rate prevailed in the 1947 outbreak, there
> would have been 4,310 cases and 902 deaths.
>
> "All of the cases of smallpox that occurred in New York in April,
> 1947, were of the virulent type which usually had a fatality rate of
> 40 percent in children and 20 percent in adults. Because of the
> virulence of the disease and its high communicability, it is little
> short of remarkable that there were only 12 cases in the entire
> outbreak" (Weinstein, 1947).

He adds,

> "Just as soon as a case of smallpox is suspected in a community, every
> effort must be made to have everyone vaccinated without delay"
> (Weinstein, 1947).

As previously stated, it was clearly Weinstein's leadership that allowed
such a campaign to be not only voluntary, but successful. The case in
Milwaukee, on the other hand, highlights the negative consequences of an
absence of such leadership. Weinstein's actions were so successful, in
fact, that both his leadership style and vaccination campaign are today
being heralded as the best course of action to emulate should a
terrorist release smallpox into a large urban center. To many experts,
Weinstein's success provides us with the hope that the worst-case
scenario can be averted.

**[References]{.underline}**

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). 2004. "Smallpox
Disease Overview." CDC Fact Sheet.
<http://www.bt.cdc.gov/agent/smallpox/overview/disease-facts.asp>

Garrett, Laurie. 2001. "Understanding Media's Response To Epidemics."
Public Health Reports. V.116, No.2. Pp. 87-91.
[http://www.publichealthreports.org/userfiles/116_SUP2/116087sup.pdf](http://64.233.161.104/search?q=cache:s5v04eJXOL8J:www.publichealthreports.org/userfiles/116_SUP2/116087sup.pdf+public+relations+1947+smallpox+outbreak+new+york+city&hl=en)

Kahn, Laura. 2003. "A Prescription for Change: The Need for Qualified
Physician Leadership In Public Health." *Health Affairs.* V.22, No.4.
Pp.241-248. <http://content.healthaffairs.org/cgi/content/full/22/4/241>

Leavitt, Judith W. 2003. "Public Resistance or Cooperation? Historical
Experiences with Smallpox." University of Wisconsin Medical School. The
Public as an Asset, Not a Problem: A Summit on Leadership During
Bioterrorism.

Sepkowitz, Kent A. 2004. "The 1947 Smallpox Vaccination Campaign in New
York City, Revisited." *Emerging Infectious Diseases*. V.10, No.5. Pp.
960-961. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC).
<http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/eid/vol10no5/pdfs/03-0973.pdf>

University of Illinois at Urbana Champaign. 2000. "Notes on an epidemic
of smallpox in New York City - 1947 and the ensuing mass vaccination."
<http://www.med.uiuc.edu/m2/epidemiology/smallpox.htm>

University of Pittsburgh Medical Center. 2004. "How to Lead During
Bioattacks with the Public's Trust and Help." Online Manual for Mayors,
Governors and Top Health Officials.
[http://www.upmc-biosecurity.org/pages/resources/leadership/executive/case_studies/case_study_24.html](http://64.233.161.104/search?q=cache:nNzvPfSz-9cJ:www.upmc-biosecurity.org/pages/resources/leadership/leadership_presentation.ppt+leadership+1947+smallpox+outbreak+new+york+city&hl=en)

Weinstein, Israel. 1947. "An Outbreak of Smallpox in New York City."
*American Journal of Public Health*.
<http://www.homelandsecurity.org/journal/articles/OutbreakinNYC1947.htm>

**Figure 6.3.1: NYC Residents line up for Smallpox vaccinations, 1947**

![](media/image7.png){width="4.750694444444444in"
height="3.685416666666667in"}

Source: www.cdc.gov

**Sidebar 6.3.1: Select Events During the 1947 New York City Smallpox
Outbreak**

***April 5, 1947***\
Commissioner Weinstein reports on 3 cases, 1 death in 1st NYC incidence
since 1939; says disease, brought from Mexico by 1st victim, was
contacted by 2 others in hospital where he died. Health department joins
US Public Health Service in search for other contacts; vaccinates staff
of Bellevue and Willard Parker Hospitals; urges New Yorkers to use free
vaccination service.

***April 6, 1947\
***Weinstein reports NYC vaccination progress; 2 cases recovering; NYC
and NY State Health Departments and USPHS tracing 1st victims\'
contacts; \[officials\] ask hospitals to maintain 24-hr vaccination
service.

***April 8, 1947\
***2 new suspected cases in Willard Parker Hospital; Commissioner
Weinstein distributes free vaccine to NYC doctors and hospitals.

***April 11,1947\
***NYC health authorities check with officials at towns where E La Bar
stopped on way from Mexico. Vaccinations continue.

***April 12, 1947\
***1st case reported in Milbrook, New York.

***April 13, 1947\
***2 new cases reported at Cardinal Hayes Convalescent Home for
Children, Milbrook, N.Y.

***April 15, 1947\
***8th case discovered in New York City. Weinstein reports all known and
suspected cases isolated. NYC gets extra units from Army & Navy; buys 2
million more. Swedish authorities report vaccinating travelers from US.\
Westchester County Health commissioner reports vain efforts to secure
vaccine; claims NYC cornered supply.

***April 16,1947\
***Vaccine shortage interrupts NYC drive. Mayor and Commissioner report
no health hazard. Federal government allows drug manufacturers to
package vaccine in 50-dose tubes to speed aid.

**April 17,1947\
**NYC police charge S. C. Steinberg with illegal medical practice for
posing as nurse to vaccinate 500 persons with *water;* seek to contact
her victims.

***April 18, 1947*\
**500,000 vaccinated in 1 day; Commissioner estimates total immunized at
2 million. Smallpox death reported in Camden, NJ.\
S.C. Steinberg sent to Bellevue Hospital for observation.

***April 21, 1947,\
***President Truman vaccinated on eve of NYC visit. Medical teams start
vaccination drive in NYC high schools, plan to continue drive in
elementary schools.

***April 22, 1947\
***Diagnosis of Staten Island death changed from smallpox to other
causes; false rumor causes vaccination rush on SI.

**April 24, 1947\
**Westchester County Health Commissioner scores lack of cooperation
among doctors in certain area of county. NYC vaccination drive reach 4
1/2 million.

***April 26, 1947\
***Commissioner Weinstein reports threatened epidemic effectively
curbed; compares total of 12 cases, 2 deaths in Milbrook and NYC to
probable incidence without vaccination drive. States that without prompt
vaccination drive, **\"**the hospitals would have been filled to
overflowing.**\"**

***May 3, 1947\
***Weinstein reports outbreak finished; free vaccination ended;
estimates 6,350,000 NYC residents immunized**.**

Source: University of Illinois at Urbana Champaign. 2000.

**Additional Sources of Information on the Washington D.C. Sniper:**

Answers.Com Sniper Information Page -
<http://www.answers.com/topic/beltway-sniper-attacks>

Leadership Speech by Chief Moose -
<http://www2.acc.af.mil/accnews/feb03/03042.html>

PBS Sniper Information Page -
<http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/law/sniper/>

Psychological Profile of the Sniper -
<http://www.csbsju.edu/uspp/Research/Sniper.html>

Washington Post Sniper Information Page -
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/metro/specials/shootings/2002/>

**Additional Sources of Information on the Homeland Security Advisory
System:**

DHS HSAS Page - <http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?theme=29>

National Terror Alert.com HSAS Page -
<http://www.nationalterroralert.com/overview.htm>

Red Cross HSAS Page - <http://www.nationalterroralert.com/overview.htm>

Whitehouse HSPD-3 Page -
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/03/20020312-5.html>

**Additional Sources of Information on Smallpox:**

CDC Smallpox Information Page -
<http://www.bt.cdc.gov/agent/smallpox/index.asp>

CDC Smallpox Vaccination Page -
<http://www.bt.cdc.gov/agent/smallpox/vaccination/facts.asp>

HHS Smallpox Information Page - <http://www.hhs.gov/smallpox/>

A History on the First Vaccination -
<http://www.thedorsetpage.com/history/smallpox/smallpox.htm>

Whitehouse Smallpox Vaccination Page -
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/12/20021213-1.html>

World Health Organization (WHO) Smallpox Information Page -
<http://www.who.int/emc/diseases/smallpox/factsheet.html>

**Glossary of Terms:**

Anchor and adjust -- the tendency that people have of forming an
impression based upon their first experience, and then adjusting that
impression based upon the first impression.

Epidemic - The occurrence of more cases of disease than expected in a
given area or among a specific group of people over a particular period
of time.

Heuristic -- A commonsense rule, or 'rule of thumb'. A discovery process
based upon experience.

Pandemic -- An epidemic occurring over a very wide area (several
countries or continents) and usually affecting a large proportion of the
population.

Pustules - A small raised bump on the skin filled with pus, which is
usually composed of inflammatory cells.

**Acronyms:**

AMA -- American Management Association

ATF -- Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms

CDC -- Centers for Disease Control and Prevention

CERT -- Community Emergency Response Team

CIA -- Central Intelligence Agency

CPR -- Cardiovascular Pulmonary Resuscitation

DHS -- Department of Homeland Security

FBI -- Federal Bureau of Investigation

FEMA -- Federal Emergency Management Agency

GAO -- General Accounting Office

HHS -- Department of Health and Human Services

HSAS -- Homeland Security Advisory System

HSOC -- Homeland Security Operations Center

HSPD -- Homeland Security Presidential Directive

IAIP -- DHS Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection
Directorate

MCPD -- Montgomery (MD) County Police Department

MPD -- Metropolitan Washington, DC Police Department

OHS -- Office of Homeland Security

OMB -- Office of Management and Budget

TTIC -- Terrorist Threat Integration Center

USPHS -- United States Public Health Service

**Discussion Questions**

####### General

1.  What are the typical qualities exhibited by a good leader? Name a
    good leader and describe why you feel they are effective.

2.  How did Director James Lee Witt's "Customer Focus" improve the way
    FEMA operated?

3.  Explain both the positive and negative aspects of media involvement
    in emergency management. Overall, do you believe the media helps or
    hurts the work of emergency managers?

4.  Is social marketing alone enough to ensure that citizens are taking
    preparedness measures for hazards? How else can levels of
    preparedness among citizens be increased?

5.  What benefits are there for involving communications in the planning
    phase and the operational phase of the management of emergencies?

####### Washington D.C. Sniper

1.  Was Chief Moose an effective leader? Why or why not?

2.  Do you tend to use statistical analysis or other methods to
    determine your personal risk from the hazards you face in daily
    life? Do you feel that these methods are effective?

3.  Are American citizens 'too afraid' of terrorism right now? Explain
    your answer, providing examples.

4.  What does the word 'safe' mean to you. Is it possible to be
    completely safe? What is 'safe enough'?

5.  Can the media combat fear, or will they always seek to propagate
    fear to draw more viewers? Is it possible to ease fears while still
    drawing people's attention? Explain your answers.

**Homeland Security Advisory System**

1.  Is the Homeland Security Advisory System an effective way to
    communicate with the public the risk they face from terrorism? Why
    or why not?

2.  If you could change the HSAS in any way, how would you change it?

3.  Does movement either up or down on the HSAS affect the way you
    prepare for terrorism? If so, how does it affect you?

4.  Can the HSAS ever be moved to Green (Low Threat)? Explain your
    answer.

5.  Each time that the HSAS is raised and then lowered without an attack
    materializing, are they at risk of being accused of 'crying wolf',
    or do people tend to assume that the threat was real and the attack
    was averted?

# Smallpox Outbreaks

1.  In light of the risk of a bioterrorist attack involving smallpox, do
    you think it would be a good or a bad idea to vaccinate everyone in
    the United States or in the world? Explain your answer.

2.  Was Israel Weinstein a good leader, or just very lucky? Explain with
    examples.

3.  After reading this case, are your more or less fearful of the
    effects a smallpox attack would have on the nation? Do you feel that
    the government would be able to adequately contain an outbreak like
    it did in 1947?

4.  Is there any communications technology or methodology that exists
    today that would have made Kempster and Weinstein's jobs easier?
    Give examples.

5.  Was there any risk in Weinstein being so honest with the public
    about infection rates or with any other information he provided? Do
    you believe that the same honesty would cause panic in today's
    post-9/11 climate? Explain your answers.

**Suggested Out Of Class Exercises**

1.  Research the risks posed by the smallpox vaccine. Teach your
    classmates both the benefits and the risks posed by the vaccine, and
    ask after your presentation how many people would elect to receive
    it both with and without evidence of an outbreak.

2.  Examine three different articles about a past disaster. Do the
    authors of these articles provide accurate information that is
    useful to the reader, or do they only contain interesting
    information? Do any of them appear to unnecessarily incite fear?

3.  Contact your local emergency management office, and interview an
    emergency management official to find out what kind of systems they
    have set up to communicate with the public in times of emergency.
    Report your findings to the class.

4.  Learn how to use the interoperable radio systems used by police and
    fire departments. Make a presentation about these systems to the
    class.

5.  Take the FEMA independent study course IS 242 -- Effective
    Communication.