Before the

**Federal Communications Commission**

**Washington, D.C. 20554**

+----------------------------------+---+------------------------------+
| In the Matter of                 | * | WT Docket No. 97-82          |
|                                  | * |                              |
| Amendment of the Commission's    | ) |                              |
| Rules                            | * |                              |
|                                  | * |                              |
| Regarding Installment Payment    |   |                              |
| Financing for                    | * |                              |
|                                  | * |                              |
| Personal Communications Services | ) |                              |
| (PCS)                            | * |                              |
|                                  | * |                              |
| Licensees                        |   |                              |
|                                  | * |                              |
|                                  | * |                              |
|                                  | ) |                              |
|                                  | * |                              |
|                                  | * |                              |
|                                  |   |                              |
|                                  | * |                              |
|                                  | * |                              |
|                                  | ) |                              |
|                                  | * |                              |
|                                  | * |                              |
|                                  |   |                              |
|                                  | * |                              |
|                                  | * |                              |
|                                  | ) |                              |
|                                  | * |                              |
|                                  | * |                              |
|                                  |   |                              |
|                                  | * |                              |
|                                  | * |                              |
|                                  | ) |                              |
|                                  | * |                              |
|                                  | * |                              |
|                                  |   |                              |
|                                  | * |                              |
|                                  | * |                              |
|                                  | ) |                              |
|                                  | * |                              |
|                                  | * |                              |
|                                  |   |                              |
|                                  | * |                              |
|                                  | * |                              |
|                                  | ) |                              |
|                                  | * |                              |
|                                  | * |                              |
|                                  |   |                              |
|                                  | * |                              |
|                                  | * |                              |
|                                  | ) |                              |
|                                  | * |                              |
|                                  | * |                              |
+----------------------------------+---+------------------------------+

**ORDER ON RECONSIDERATION**

**Adopted:** January 16, 2001 **Released:** January 18, 2001

By the Commission:

Table of Contents

Heading Paragraph \#

I. INTRODUCTION 1

II\. Background 2

III\. DISCUSSION 6

A. Reconfiguration of C Block Spectrum License Size 6

B. Eligibility Restrictions Under a Tiered Approach 9

C. Competitive Bidding Design 16

D. Bidding Credits 19

E. Transfer Requirements 23

IV\. Ordering Clause 27

V. APPENDIX A

# INTRODUCTION

1.  In this Order on Reconsideration ("*Order on Reconsideration*"), we
    address five petitions for reconsideration ("Petitions") of the
    Commission's *Sixth Report and Order*[^1] in WT Docket No. 97-82
    ("*C/F Block* *Sixth* *Report and Order"*), in which we modified the
    auction and service rules for C and F block broadband Personal
    Communications Services (PCS) licenses. For the reasons set forth
    below, we deny these Petitions and affirm our findings in the *C/F
    Block Sixth Report and Order*.

# Background

2.  The Commission outlined the original framework for C and F block
    auctions in the 1994 *Competitive Bidding Fifth Report and Order*,
    establishing the C and F blocks as "set-aside" licenses for
    "entrepreneurs" in which eligibility would be restricted to entities
    below a specified financial threshold.[^2] These provisions were
    consistent with Congress' mandate to promote participation of small
    businesses, rural telephone companies, and businesses owned by
    members of minority groups and women (collectively "designated
    entities") in the provision of spectrum-based services.[^3] In
    addition, the Commission adopted special provisions for the C and F
    blocks to assist designated entities.[^4]

3.  Section 309(j)(4) of the Communications Act directs the Commission,
    in prescribing regulations to implement the objectives of Section
    309(j)(3), to, *inter alia*: (1) establish performance requirements
    to ensure prompt delivery of service to rural areas and prevent
    warehousing of spectrum by licensees; (2) prescribe area
    designations and bandwidth assignments that promote an equitable
    geographic distribution of licenses and services, economic
    opportunity for a wide variety of applicants, including designated
    entities, and rapid deployment of services; and (3) ensure that
    designated entities are given the opportunity to participate in the
    provision of spectrum-based services, and, for such purposes,
    consider using bidding preferences and other procedures.[^5]

4.  The Commission has held four entrepreneurs' block broadband PCS
    auctions to date. The initial C block licenses were awarded through
    two auctions, Auction No. 5, which ended on May 6, 1996, and Auction
    No. 10, which concluded on July 16, 1996. Auction No. 11, the
    initial F block auction, ended on January 14, 1997, and also
    included D and E block licenses. Auction No. 22, which concluded on
    April 15, 1999, made available C and F block licenses that had been
    returned to, or reclaimed by, the Commission.[^6] The inventory for
    Auction No. 35, which began on December 12, 2000, includes 422
    licenses covering 195 various Basic Trading Areas (BTAs). The 422
    licenses include 312 C block 10 MHz licenses, 43 C block 15 MHz
    licenses, and 67 F block 10 MHz licenses.[^7]

5.  On June 7, 2000, we released a Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
    ("*Further Notice*") which set forth tentative conclusions and
    proposals concerning the C and F block rules.[^8] On August 29,
    2000, we released the *C/F Block Sixth Report and Order,*[^9] which
    resolved the issues raised in the *Further Notice* and revised the
    service and auction rules for the auction of C and F block broadband
    PCS licenses in furtherance of the various goals of Section 309(j)
    of the Communications Act.[^10] The *C/F Block Sixth Report and
    Order*, among a number of other modifications to the Commission's
    rules, reconfigured the size of C block spectrum license size;
    removed the entrepreneur eligibility restrictions (permitted "open"
    bidding)[^11] for some, but not all, licenses available in Auction
    No. 35 and in future C and F block auctions; eliminated bidding
    credits in closed bidding; and modified the transfer restrictions
    for C and F block licenses.[^12] As addressed more fully below,
    Petitioners challenge a number of the modifications to the C and F
    block service and auction rules adopted in the *C/F Block Sixth
    Report and Order*.

#  DISCUSSION

## Reconfiguration of C Block Spectrum License Size

6.  **[Background]{.underline}.** In the *C/F Block Sixth Report* *and
    Order*, we reconfigured each 30 MHz C block license available in
    Auction No. 35, or any subsequent auction, into three 10 MHz C block
    licenses.[^13]

7.  **[Discussion]{.underline}.** All five of the petitioners object to
    the Commission's decision to split the 30 MHz C block licenses into
    three 10 MHz licenses.[^14] Petitioners argue that a 10 MHz license
    is insufficient to provide advanced mobile services.[^15] We
    considered and rejected similar arguments in the *C/F Block Sixth
    Report and Order*.[^16] As explained below, we decline to further
    reconfigure the available C block licenses and we affirm our
    decision to provide for three 10 MHz C block licenses.

8.  As the petitioners have not provided any new rationale to justify
    deviating from our conclusion in the *C/F Block Sixth Report and
    Order*, we decline to reconsider our decision to divide each
    available 30 MHz C block license into three 10 MHz licenses.
    Historically 10 MHz has been one of the principal license sizes used
    in broadband PCS.[^17] In the *C/F Block Sixth Report and Order*, we
    found that 10 MHz is a viable minimum license size.[^18] Moreover,
    we note that our rules permit aggregation, subject to the spectrum
    cap, and a 10 MHz license allows bidders to acquire additional
    spectrum in particular markets.[^19] Further, we believe dividing
    the spectrum into three 10 MHz C block licenses should promote a
    wider dissemination of licenses, provide bidders with more
    flexibility to adapt their bidding strategies to meet their business
    plans, and should make licenses more affordable, especially for
    entrepreneurs.[^20] As we noted in establishing both 20 MHz and 10
    MHz licenses for wireless use in the 700 MHz service, 10 MHz
    wireless licenses "should prove of interest to parties in the record
    who desire spectrum to deploy innovative wireless technologies,
    including high-speed Internet access, that do not require as much
    spectrum."[^21] Thus, we continue to believe that this
    reconfiguration, along with the other rule modifications adopted in
    the *C/F Block Sixth Report and Order*, meets the diverse needs of
    both large and small carriers seeking to participate in the next C
    and F block auction.[^22] The reconfiguration ensures the most
    efficient use of spectrum through the competitive bidding process
    while at the same time promoting wider auction participation and
    license distribution in accordance with the goals of Section 309(j)
    of the Communications Act.[^23] Lastly, as explained below, we note
    that we have retained entrepreneur eligibility restrictions for some
    C block licenses to ensure that entrepreneurs are provided greater
    opportunities to acquire spectrum to fulfill their business
    needs.[^24]

## Eligibility Restrictions Under a Tiered Approach

9.  **[Background]{.underline}.** In the *C/F Block Sixth Report and
    Order*, we divided the BTAs into two categories, "Tier 1" BTAs and
    "Tier 2" BTAs. Tier 1 comprises BTAs with populations that,
    according to the 1990 census, are equal to or greater than 2.5
    million; and Tier 2 comprises the remaining BTAs.[^25] We decided to
    establish open bidding (bidding without entrepreneur eligibility
    restrictions) for two of the three newly reconfigured 10 MHz C block
    licenses in Tier 1 and for one of the three newly reconfigured 10
    MHz C block licenses in Tier 2.[^26] We also adopted open bidding
    for all F block licenses available in Auction No. 35 and in all
    future auctions.[^27]

10. **[Discussion]{.underline}. *Tiers*.** Northcoast urges the
    Commission to reconsider and simplify its tiering and eligibility
    restrictions by eliminating all tiering and by allowing open bidding
    only for a single 10 MHz C block license in all markets.[^28]
    Northcoast asserts that, under the new tiering rule, it will be
    unable to meet its business plans because it will not be able to
    competitively bid for available C block spectrum in markets with a
    population above 2.5 million.[^29] We considered and rejected
    similar arguments in the *C/F Block Sixth Report and Order*.[^30] We
    continue to believe that this approach is, in conjunction with the
    other modifications to the entrepreneur eligibility restrictions,
    the most effective method of accommodating the various business
    plans of both small and larger carriers and is fully consistent with
    the statutory goals for competitive bidding. This approach, in
    conjunction with the changes in entrepreneur eligibility
    restrictions, makes more spectrum available for "open" bidding in
    the most populous markets where the demand for spectrum by existing
    CMRS carriers is the greatest and the prospects of a spectrum
    shortage for these carriers is the most acute.[^31] At the same
    time, this approach keeps most of the C block spectrum (i.e. 20 MHz)
    closed in all but the very largest markets, while also retaining
    restricted eligibility for some spectrum (i.e. 10 MHz) even in those
    latter cases.[^32] Thus, under our new rules, entrepreneurs will
    have an opportunity to acquire additional spectrum on a set-aside
    basis in all available C block markets, which should assist them in
    achieving their business goals and objectives. At the same time, our
    new rules also take into account the need of many large carriers to
    acquire additional spectrum. In adopting this approach, we have also
    taken into account Section 309(j)(3) of the Communications Act which
    requires us to promote a variety of objectives, including but not
    limited to, the promotion of economic opportunity and competition,
    and the dissemination of licenses among a wide variety of
    applicants, in order to serve the needs of the public.[^33] We
    continue to believe that "our decision to establish two tiers with
    2.5 million population demarcation represents the most reasonable
    balancing of the various competing public interest factors that bear
    on this issue."[^34] For the foregoing reasons, we affirm our
    decision in the *C/F Block Sixth Report and Order* to utilize a
    tiered approach, limiting non-entrepreneurs participation to certain
    markets.

11. ***30 MHz and 15 MHz C block licenses*.** Alpine maintains that the
    Commission, in eliminating some of the entrepreneur eligibility
    restrictions, failed to consider the 309(j)(3) statutory objectives,
    particularly the objective to avoid the excessive concentration of
    licenses.[^35] Additionally, several petitioners state that the
    record does not support the Commission's decision to eliminate some
    of the entrepreneur eligibility restrictions.[^36] These petitioners
    assert that the majority of the commenters favored maintaining the
    entrepreneur eligibility restrictions.[^37] As discussed below, by
    eliminating some, but not all, of the C block entrepreneur
    eligibility restrictions, we give effect to, and reasonably balance,
    as many of the Section 309(j) objectives as possible.

12. Section 309(j)(3) directs the Commission to seek to promote a
    variety of objectives, including economic opportunity, competition,
    and the rapid deployment of new technologies and services by, *inter
    alia*, disseminating licenses among a wide variety of
    applicants.[^38] In certain instances, these objectives conflict,
    thus requiring the Commission to balance the competing objectives.
    Section 309(j) does not require the Commission to seek to promote
    the participation of small businesses in PCS auctions at the expense
    of other enumerated 309(j)(3) objectives nor does it give one
    objective greater weight than another objective.[^39] In balancing
    the 309(j)(3) objectives, including the avoidance of the excessive
    concentration of licenses, we reviewed the record before us and have
    taken into account the needs of both large and small carriers to
    acquire additional spectrum to provide services and/or to satisfy
    their business plans. In the *C/F Block Sixth Report and Order*, we
    concluded that it was fair and appropriate to apportion the spectrum
    to accommodate the interests of large carriers to obtain additional
    spectrum to "fill out" regional or national service areas.[^40] At
    the same time, we decided to maintain a significant set-aside of C
    block spectrum for entrepreneurs.[^41] As previously explained,
    section 309(j) does not mandate the use of set-asides or any other
    method to promote the participation of small businesses in spectrum
    auctions, particularly in light of changed circumstances.[^42]

13. Three petitioners argue that the record provides no justification
    for providing large carriers with additional spectrum. [^43]
    Specifically, they point to recent general statements in news
    articles where two large carriers asserted that they have a
    sufficient amount of spectrum. [^44] Therefore, petitioners argue
    that the record provides no justification for providing them with an
    opportunity to acquire additional spectrum. [^45] As we previously
    discussed, circumstances in the industry have changed dramatically,
    and continue to change, since the implementation of our rules in
    1994.[^46] The introduction of wireless Internet, advanced data, and
    3G services, as well as global competition within these services,
    has created a shortage of suitable available spectrum.[^47] The
    statement of two large carriers, as reported in two recent news
    articles, does not undermine the record as a whole, particularly
    where other large carriers claim that they need additional spectrum
    to provide advanced services or to fulfill their business
    plans.[^48] We believe that apportioning the spectrum as described
    above promotes the further development of CMRS competition and
    innovation, especially in large markets.[^49] For these reasons, we
    affirm our position in the *C/F Block Sixth Report and Order* to
    remove the eligibility restrictions for some, but not all, of the
    available C block spectrum.

14. ***F block licenses.*** Four petitioners requested that the
    Commission retain entrepreneur eligibility requirements for F block
    licenses.[^50] These petitioners argue that the Commission failed to
    provide support for eliminating the F block set-aside, particularly
    in light of the success of F block licensees.[^51] For instance,
    Northcoast argues that since entrepreneurs are in the process of
    building out their systems and service has not been delayed to the
    public, the entrepreneur eligibility requirement should be
    maintained.[^52] These petitioners have not provided any new
    rationale to justify the preservation of the F block set-aside. We
    considered arguments such as Northcoast's when we reached our
    decision in the *C/F Block Sixth Report and Order*. As we stated
    there, the need for additional open spectrum that exists in the C
    block markets also extends to the F block markets.[^53]
    Additionally, open bidding for F block licenses may lead to more
    expeditious provision of wireless services to the public.[^54] The C
    and F blocks have been subject to different regulatory requirements,
    reflecting the different bidding and marketplace histories of the
    two blocks as well as the corresponding different equity and
    reliance concerns applicable to bidders and licensees in each of the
    blocks.[^55] Taking into account the divergent history of F block,
    we decided to remove the entrepreneur eligibility restrictions and
    to allow open bidding for all available F block licenses in Auction
    No. 35 and in future auctions. This determination was informed by
    the fact that almost every market with an available F block license
    already has a significant 30 MHz C block entrepreneur presence.[^56]
    Thus, we found that we could modify the F block eligibility rules
    while preserving the diversity of opportunity and service that are
    goals of Section 309(j).[^57] For these reasons, we affirm our
    position in the *C/F Block Sixth Report and Order* to allow open
    bidding and eliminate the F block entrepreneur eligibility
    restrictions.

15. ***Unsold set-aside licenses.*** For Auction No. 35, in the *C/F
    Block Sixth Report and Order*, we eliminated entrepreneur
    eligibility requirements for all C block licenses that were
    available but not sold in Auction No. 22.[^58] We also decided to
    eliminate the set-aside for *any* C and F block license that was
    available, but not sold, in any subsequent auction.[^59] RTG and
    OPASTCO urge the Commission not to eliminate entrepreneur
    eligibility requirements for licenses unsold in Auction No. 22, but
    rather provide entrepreneurs with one more opportunity to bid on
    such licenses on a closed basis as well as on future unsold licenses
    under a set-aside approach.[^60] We previously considered RTG and
    OPASTCO's position and determined that closed bidding for this
    spectrum will not result in the acquisition and construction of
    these licenses.[^61] The failure of certain 15 MHz C block licenses
    to sell in Auction No. 22 indicates that closed bidding for these
    licenses will not expeditiously result in the acquisition and
    construction of these licenses and in service to the public.[^62] By
    lifting the eligibility restrictions for these unsold licenses, we
    seek to prevent additional delays in their utilization. For these
    reasons, we affirm our decision in the *C/F Block Sixth Report and
    Order* and will provide all bidders with an opportunity to acquire
    previously unsold set-aside licenses.

## Competitive Bidding Design

16. **[Background]{.underline}.** In the *C/F Block Sixth Report and
    Order,* we rejected Nextel Communications, Inc.'s ("Nextel") bulk
    bid proposal.[^63] We concluded that Nextel's proposal would exclude
    all but a very few competitors.[^64] We also left to the Bureau,
    under its existing delegated authority, the final selection of a
    competitive bidding design and methodology for Auction No. 35,
    including the decision whether to implement a combinatorial
    (package) bidding design for the auction.[^65] On September 6, 2000,
    the Bureau released the *Comment Public Notice*, which invited
    public comment on its auction procedures for the C and F block
    auction, including the proposal to adopt a simultaneous multiple
    round bidding methodology.[^66] On October 5, 2000, the Bureau
    released the *Procedures Public Notice* in which, *inter alia*, it
    determined to utilize a simultaneous multiple round bidding design
    for Auction No. 35.[^67] Subsequently, on November 6, 2000, Nextel
    filed a petition seeking to change the Auction No. 35 design to
    allow package bidding.[^68] The Bureau denied Nextel's
    Petition.[^69]

17. **[Discussion]{.underline}.** As an alternative to the Commission
    reserving at least 20 MHz of spectrum for entrepreneurs, RTG and
    OPASTCO have requested that the Commission provide entities with a
    means of combinatorial bidding on the disaggregated licenses.[^70]
    We reject this alternative because, as the Bureau previously
    explained in response to Nextel's request for combinatorial bidding,
    the public interest would not be served by implementing package
    bidding for Auction No. 35. [^71] Implementation of a package
    bidding design would have necessitated a notice and comment period
    due to the unique auction and service rules applicable to Auction
    No. 35.[^72] The public had ample opportunity to request an
    alternative bidding design prior to the start of Auction No. 35.
    First, we sought comment, in the *Further Notice,* on possible ways
    for bidders to efficiently aggregate licenses in Auction No.
    35.[^73] The Bureau also invited public comment on its proposal to
    adopt simultaneous multiple round bidding.[^74] No party filed
    comments contesting this bidding methodology. [^75] In denying
    Nextel's Petition, the Bureau found that establishing combinatorial
    bidding, after the short-form application filing deadline, would
    impose delay on auction participants that would not be in the public
    interest.[^76]

18. Moreover, the Commission has not yet conducted an auction utilizing
    combinatorial bidding due to the complexity of implementing such a
    bidding design. Although the Bureau has adopted package bidding
    procedures for the auction of the 747-762 and 777-792 MHz bands
    (Auction No. 31), the package bidding procedures established for
    Auction No. 31 were not designed with Auction No. 35 in mind.
    Accordingly, absent significant modification, such a design would
    have been complex and impractical to implement for Auction No. 35,
    particularly in light of the large number of licenses involved.[^77]
    Further, applicants prepared business plans based on the Bureau's
    bidding methodology announced in the *Procedure Public Notice*. As
    noted, parties that need additional spectrum have the ability to
    aggregate licenses, subject to the CMRS spectrum cap.[^78] For these
    reasons, we affirm that the final selection of a bidding design is
    within the Bureau's delegated authority and we will not disturb the
    Bureau's final selection of a simultaneous multiple round bidding
    design for Auction No. 35.

## Bidding Credits 

19. **[Background]{.underline}.** In the *C/F Block Sixth Report and
    Order*, we decided to maintain existing small and very small
    business bidding credits (15 percent and 25 percent, respectively)
    for licenses won in open bidding and to eliminate bidding credits
    for licenses won in closed bidding.[^79] With respect to open
    bidding, we concluded that bidding credits of 15 and 25 percent will
    allow effective competition by small businesses.[^80] With respect
    to closed bidding, we concluded that the continued use of bidding
    credits in restricted auctions would not serve its intended
    purpose.[^81]

20. **[Discussion]{.underline}. *Open Bidding. ***We received petitions
    from Northcoast, RTG and OPASTCO requesting an increase in bidding
    credits in open auctions.[^82] Northcoast argues that retaining the
    existing levels of bidding credits (15 and 25 percent) in open
    bidding will not permit effective competition by small
    businesses.[^83] Similarly, RTG and OPASTCO argue that the
    Commission should increase bidding credits in open auctions to
    ensure that entrepreneurs have an opportunity to participate.[^84]
    We considered and rejected these arguments in the *C/F Block Sixth
    Report and Order*.[^85] We noted that in our Specialized Mobile
    Radio (SMR) 900 MHz auction -- using bidding credits of 10 percent
    and 15 percent -- 75 percent of the winning bidders were small
    businesses, winning 26 percent of the licenses.[^86] Moreover, in
    Auction No. 11, the auction of D, E, and F block licenses, small and
    very small business were the high bidders for 141 of the 986 D and E
    block licenses won in that auction, even though bidding credits were
    not available for D and E block licenses.[^87] Thus, small
    businesses have proven to be competitive in auctions even where we
    have provided for lower bidding credits than what we have adopted
    for Auction No. 35. Northcoast, RTG and OPASTCO have not provided
    any new rationale to justify increasing the level of bidding credits
    for licenses subject to open bidding. Therefore, for open licenses,
    we will maintain the current level of bidding credits for small and
    very small businesses.

21. ***Closed Bidding.*** With respect to closed bidding, four
    petitioners object to the Commission's decision to eliminate bidding
    credits in closed auctions.[^88] These petitioners argue that by
    eliminating the bidding credits in closed auctions, the Commission
    has violated the congressional mandate pursuant to Section 309(j) to
    provide small and very small businesses with a meaningful
    opportunity to compete in spectrum auctions.[^89] Specifically,
    Northcoast, NTCA, and RTG and OPASTCO are concerned that, without
    bidding credits, small and very small businesses will be unable to
    compete against "grandfathered"[^90] entities that are generating
    millions of dollars in gross revenues.[^91]

22. We considered and rejected this argument in the *C/F Block Sixth
    Report and Order*.[^92] We noted that two groups are included among
    those entities eligible to participate in the entrepreneurs' block
    auctions.[^93] One group consists of well-capitalized new entities
    with small gross revenues.[^94] Another group consists of older
    companies with small total assets and net revenues, but high gross
    revenues.[^95] As we explained, this situation creates an anomaly
    because the first group, the well-capitalized new entities, may
    qualify for bidding credits, while the second group, the older
    companies, may not qualify for bidding credits.[^96] If we were to
    retain bidding credits in closed bidding, it may skew these auctions
    in favor of well-capitalized new entities that are uniquely
    structured to protect large investors from attribution.[^97]
    Moreover, although there may be a number of "grandfathered" entities
    participating in Auction No. 35, we have found that small and very
    small businesses have been previously successful in open auctions
    without bidding credits.[^98] As we are not persuaded that small and
    very small businesses will be unable to effectively compete against
    "grandfathered" entities, and as we do not want to undermine the
    "grandfather" exception, we reject petitioners' request to provide
    bidding credits in closed auctions. We continue to believe that
    small and very small businesses will have a meaningful opportunity
    to compete in Auction No. 35 and in future spectrum auctions.[^99]
    For this reason, we affirm our decision in the *C/F Block Sixth
    Report and Order* to eliminate bidding credits in closed auctions.

## Transfer Requirements

23. **[Background.]{.underline}** In the *C/F Block* *Sixth Report and
    Order,* we modified the transfer restrictions for C and F block
    licenses.[^100] Specifically, we concluded that C and F block
    spectrum licenses won pursuant to open bidding would not be subject
    to a five-year holding and limited transfer rule.[^101] With respect
    to closed bidding, we concluded that a licensee would be allowed to
    assign or transfer a license to a non-entrepreneur as soon as the
    licensee completed its first construction benchmark.[^102]
    Additionally, we eliminated unjust enrichment payments for licenses
    won in Auction No. 5 and Auction No. 10, but retained unjust
    enrichment payments for licenses that were acquired in Auction No.
    11 and Auction No. 22.[^103] Despite requests from commenters, we
    decided not to allow a carrier to exchange or transfer restricted C
    or F block licenses during the holding period where the carrier
    could demonstrate "substantial service" throughout its system, but
    not in the particular market that would be affected by the
    transfer.[^104]

24. **[Discussion]{.underline}.** On August 9, 2000, fourteen days
    before adoption of the *C/F Block Sixth Report and Order*, Congress
    adopted legislation that grants qualifying Alaska Native regional
    corporations relief from the entrepreneur transfer restrictions and
    unjust enrichment payment requirements. To qualify, the corporation
    (or an affiliate thereof) must be organized pursuant to the Alaska
    Native Claims Settlement Act, hold a PCS license as of the date of
    the enactment of the legislation, and either have paid for the
    license in full or have complied with the payment schedules for the
    license.[^105] Cook Inlet Region, Inc. ("CIRI") is an Alaska Native
    regional corporation and meets the requirements of the statute.
    Thus, this legislation allows CIRI to transfer or assign a license
    to a non-entrepreneur without paying any unjust enrichment
    penalties.[^106] Alpine requests that the Commission, in light of
    this legislation, revise its transfer rules so as to apply the same
    relief afforded CIRI in a uniform manner to all entrepreneurs.[^107]
    Alpine argues that if relief from the unjust enrichment penalty
    requirements is not applied to all entrepreneurs, then this will
    result in discriminatory application of the Commission's rule.[^108]
    In the alternative, Alpine asks the Commission to amend its rules to
    exclude CIRI from Auction No. 35 if all entrepreneurs cannot be
    afforded the same relief.[^109] CIRI and VoiceStream Wireless
    Corporation ("VoiceStream") both oppose Alpine's request to exclude
    CIRI from Auction No. 35.[^110] Although CIRI and VoiceStream do not
    oppose the elimination of all transfer restrictions for
    entrepreneurs, both parties object to Alpine's attempt to utilize a
    rulemaking proceeding to decide CIRI's eligibility to participate in
    Auction No. 35.[^111] Verizon opposes Alpine's request to remove all
    transfer restrictions on licenses won in closed bidding.[^112]
    Verizon states that, absent the Commission's transfer restrictions,
    entrepreneurs could purchase licenses and immediately sell the
    licenses to non-entrepreneurs.[^113]

25. As stated above, we have made several modifications to the C and F
    block transfer restrictions. In modifying the transfer restrictions,
    we have attempted to level the playing field for entrepreneurs with
    respect to other licensees, making it easier for entrepreneurs to
    restructure their spectrum holdings, provide additional access to
    capital, and to increase effective competition by entrepreneurs. The
    relief accorded CIRI under the statute was specifically authorized
    by Congress and narrowly tailored. The legislation, therefore, does
    not change the Commission's application of its transfer requirements
    to all other entrepreneurs. As a matter of legislative initiative,
    Congress determined to exempt companies like CIRI from the economic
    consequences of the application of the unjust enrichment provisions.
    Congress could have provided the same relief to all applicants, but
    instead Congress chose to narrowly tailor the specific relief.
    Notably, Congress left intact the statutory directive of Section
    309(j)(4)(E), which requires the Commission to "require such
    transfer disclosures and antitrafficking restrictions and payment
    schedules as may be necessary to prevent unjust enrichment as a
    result of the methods employed to issue licenses and permits."[^114]
    Therefore, Congress' determination to create an exemption that
    applies to CIRI does not show legislative intent to exempt all
    applicants from the antitrafficking and unjust enrichment
    provisions. Nor does Congress' action negate the statutory purpose
    served by the transfer restrictions. Providing all applicants with
    the specific relief provided to CIRI would circumvent the underlying
    purpose of retaining a set-aside in that entrepreneurs could acquire
    a license in a closed auction and immediately sell the newly
    acquired license on the open market at windfall prices without
    paying any penalties. We think that such a result is neither
    consistent with making licenses available for closed bidding by
    entrepreneurs,[^115] in furtherance of Section
    309(j)(4)(D)(requiring the Commission to ensure that small
    businesses, *inter alia*, are given the opportunity to participate
    in the provision of spectrum-based services, and, for such purposes,
    consider the use of bidding preferences and other procedures) nor,
    as indicated above, with the directives of Section 309(j)(4)(E)
    (requiring various measures to prevent unjust enrichment).

26. Moreover, the legislation that provides CIRI with this relief does
    not at the same time, in and of itself, render CIRI ineligible for
    entrepreneur status in Auction No. 35, or in any future auction.
    CIRI's eligibility to participate in Auction No. 35 as an
    entrepreneur is dependent on CIRI satisfying our entrepreneur
    eligibility restrictions.[^116] The instant rulemaking proceeding is
    not the proper forum to challenge congressional legislation or to
    determine CIRI's entrepreneur status for Auction No. 35. After the
    Commission by public notice announces that long-form applications
    have been accepted for filing, Alpine and/or any other applicant, if
    they choose to do so, will have an opportunity to challenge CIRI's
    entrepreneurial status by way of a petition to deny filed with the
    Commission.[^117] For these reasons, we will not further revise its
    transfer rules or amend its rules to exclude CIRI from Auction No.
    35.

# Ordering Clause

27. Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED THAT, pursuant to Sections 4(i), 5(b),
    5(c)(1), 303(r), and 309(j) of the Communications Act of 1934, as
    amended, 47 U.S.C. Sections 154(i), 155(b), 156(c)(1), 303(r), and
    309(j), the Petitions filed by Alpine PCS, Inc, National Telephone
    Cooperative Association, Northcoast Communications, LLC, Office of
    Advocacy of the United States Small Business Administration, and The
    Rural Telecommunications Group and the Organization for the
    Promotion and Advancement of Small Telecommunications Companies
    filed in response to the *C/F Block Sixth Report and Order* are
    DENIED.

    FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

    Magalie Roman Salas

    Secretary

# APPENDIX A

**LIST OF PLEADINGS**

**[Petitions for Reconsideration]{.underline}**

1.  Alpine, PCS, Inc. ("Alpine")

2.  National Telephone Cooperative Association ("NTCA")

3.  Northcoast Communications, LLC ("Northcoast")

4.  Office of Advocacy of the Unites States Small Business
    Administration ("Advocacy")

5.  The Rural Telecommunications Group ("RTG") and the Organization for
    the Promotion and Advancement of Small Telecommunications Companies
    ("OPASTCO")

    **[Oppositions]{.underline}**

```{=html}
<!-- -->
```
1.  Cook Inlet Region, Inc. ("CIRI")

2.  Verizon Wireless ("Verizon")

3.  VoiceStream Wireless Corporation ("VoiceStream")

    **[Notice of *Ex Parte* Meetings]{.underline}**

```{=html}
<!-- -->
```
1.  The Rural Telecommunications Group ("RTG")

2.  The Rural Telecommunications Group ("RTG"), National Telephone
    Cooperative Association ("NTCA"), Organization for the Promotion and
    Advancement of Small Telecommunications Companies ("OPASTCO"), and
    Office of Advocacy, U.S. Small Business Administration ("Advocacy")

[^1]: Amendment of the Commission's Rules Regarding Installment Payment
    Financing for Personal Communications Services (PCS) Licensees, WT
    Docket No. 97-82, *Sixth Report and Order and Order on
    Reconsideration*, FCC 00-313 (rel. August 29, 2000) ("*C/F Block
    Sixth Report and Order*"). A list of pleadings is included as
    Appendix A.

[^2]: The Commission required that in order to be eligible to bid, an
    applicant, including attributable investors and affiliates, must
    have gross revenues of less than \$125 million in each of the last
    two years and less than \$500 million in total assets. *See*
    Implementation of Section 309(j) of the Communications Act --
    Competitive Bidding, PP Docket 93-253, *Fifth Report and Order*, 9
    FCC Rcd 5532, at 5581-82, ¶ 115 (1994) ("*Competitive Bidding Fifth
    Report and Order*"). These applicants are called "entrepreneurs" and
    the licenses that they are eligible to bid on are "set-asides". But
    note that, under the Commission's "grandfathering" exception, any
    entity that was eligible for, and participated in, either of the
    first two C block auctions (Auction No. 5 or Auction No. 10), will
    be eligible to bid in C block spectrum auctions that begin within
    two years of the start of Auction No. 22, March 23, 1999. An entity
    that qualifies under this exception is called a "grandfathered"
    entity. 47 C.F.R. § 24.709(b)(9)(i); *see also* Amendment of the
    Commission's Rules Regarding Installment Payment Financing for
    Personal Communications Services (PCS) Licenses, WT Docket No.
    97-82, *Fourth Report and Order*, 13 FCC Rcd 15, 743, at 15,751-52
    ¶¶ 13, 15 (1998) ("*C Block* *Fourth Report and Order*").

[^3]: *See* 47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(4)(D), 47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(4)(D).

[^4]: *See* *Competitive Bidding Fifth Report and Order*, 9 FCC Rcd
    5532; Implementation of Section 309(j) of the Communications Act --
    Competitive Bidding, PP Docket 93-253*, Fifth Memorandum Opinion and
    Order*, 100 FCC Rcd 403 (1994) ("*Competitive Bidding Fifth*
    *Memorandum Opinion and Order").*

[^5]: 47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(4).

[^6]: E block licenses were also included in Auction No. 22.

[^7]: *See* "C and F Block Broadband PCS Spectrum Auction Scheduled for
    December 12, 2000," *Public Notice*, DA 00-2259 (rel. October 5,
    2000).

[^8]: *See* Amendment of the Commission's Rules Regarding Installment
    Payment Financing for Personal Communications Services (PCS)
    Licensees, WT Docket No. 97-82, *Further Notice of Proposed
    Rulemaking*, 15 FCC Rcd 9773 (2000) ("*Further Notice*").

[^9]: *See* *C/F Block Sixth Report and Order*.

[^10]: *See* Section 309(j) of the Communications Act of 1934, as
    amended ("Communications Act"), 47 U.S.C. § 309(j).

[^11]: *See C/F Block Sixth Report and Order*; *see* *generally* 24
    C.F.R. §§ 24.712(b) and 24.717(b). Both entrepreneurs and
    non-entrepreneurs can bid on licenses in "open" bidding. Only
    entrepreneurs can bid on licenses in "closed" bidding.

[^12]: *Id*.

[^13]: *C/F Block Sixth Report and Order* at ¶ 12.

[^14]: The Office of Advocacy of the United States Small Business
    Administration ("Advocacy"), Alpine, PCS, Inc. ("Alpine"),
    Northcoast Communications, LLC ("Northcoast"), The Rural
    Telecommunications Group and the Organization for the Promotion and
    Advancement of Small Telecommunications Companies ("RTG and
    OPASTO"), National Telephone Cooperative Association ("NTCA")
    (collectively "Petitioners").

[^15]: *See* Alpine Petition at 6-7, Northcoast Petition at 2, RTG and
    OPASTCO Petition at 13-16, 18-20, NTCA NTCA Petition at 2-3,
    Advocacy Petition at 1-3; *see also* RTG *Ex Parte* and RTG, NTCA,
    OPASTCO, and Advocacy *Ex Parte* at 1-2.

[^16]: *See* *C/F Block Sixth Report and Order* at ¶¶ 13-15.

[^17]: *C/F Block Sixth Report and Order* ¶ 14.

[^18]: *Id*.; *see also* *Further Notice* at 9784, ¶ 16 (where we
    tentatively concluded that a 10 MHz C block license is a viable
    minimum size for voice and some data services).

[^19]: *See Further Notice* at 9784, ¶ 16.

[^20]: *See C/F Block Sixth Report and Order* at ¶¶ 13-14.

[^21]: In the Matter of Service Rules for 746-764 MHz and 776-794 MHz
    Bands, and Revisions to Part 27 of the Commission's Rules, WT Docket
    No. 99-168, *First Report and Order*, 15 FCC Rcd at 478, ¶ 3 (2000)
    ("*700 MHz* *First Report and Order*").

[^22]: *See* *C/F Block Sixth Report and Order* at ¶ 15.

[^23]: *Id*.

[^24]: *Id*.

[^25]: *Id*. at ¶ 18.

[^26]: *Id*. at ¶ 20.

[^27]: *Id*. at ¶ 24.

[^28]: Northcoast Petition at 7-8. *See generally* Advocacy at 1-3.

[^29]: Northcoast Petition at 7-8.

[^30]: *See C/F Block Sixth Report and Order* at ¶¶ 18-23.

[^31]: *Id*. at ¶ 19.

[^32]: *Id*.

[^33]: 47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(3).

[^34]: *C/F Block Sixth Report and Order* at ¶ 19.

[^35]: Alpine Petition at 2-5.

[^36]: *See* Advocacy Petition at 1-3; Alpine Petition at 6-7; RTG and
    OPASTCO Petition at 9-17; *see also* RTG *Ex Parte* and RTG, NTCA,
    OPASTCO and Advocacy *Ex Parte* at 1.

[^37]: *See* Advocacy Petition at 1-3; Alpine Petition at 6-7; RTG and
    OPASTCO Petition at 9-17; *see also* RTG *Ex Parte* and RTG, NTCA,
    OPASTCO and Advocacy *Ex Parte* at 1.

[^38]: 47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(3).

[^39]: 47 U.S.C. § 309(j); *see also* 47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(4) (requires
    the Commission to ensure that small businesses and others "are given
    the opportunity to participate in the provision of spectrum based
    services" and directs the Commission to consider the use of
    mechanisms that will further that end.)

[^40]: *C/F Block Sixth Report and Order* at ¶ 23.

[^41]: *Id*. at ¶ 23.

[^42]: *See C/F Block Sixth Report and Order* at ¶ 22; 47 U.S.C. §
    309(j).

[^43]: *See* Alpine Petition at 7-8; Northcoast Petition at 5-7; RTG and
    OPASTCO Petition at 11.

[^44]: *See* Alpine Petition at 7-8; Northcoast Petition at 5-7; RTG and
    OPASTCO Petition at 11 (citing "Nextel's Lost Narrrow, Subscriber
    List Grows", *Washington Post*, Jul 19, 2000, at E1-E2; "No Spectrum
    Worries for Sprint," *Wireless Review*, September 15, 2000, at 9).

[^45]: *See* Alpine Petition at 7-8; Northcoast Petition at 5-7; RTG and
    OPASTCO Petition at 11.

[^46]: *C/F Block Sixth Report and Order* at ¶ 23 (citing *Further
    Notice*, 15 FCC Rcd at 9788, ¶ 25).

[^47]: *See, e.g.,* Jill Carroll and Leslie Cauley, *Demand for Airwaves
    May Create Shortage*, *The Wall Street* *Journal*, Aug. 2, 2000, at
    A2 (The explosion in wireless communications and the emergence of 3G
    technology have resulted in a shortage of spectrum to satisfy the
    huge demand.); Susan Schmidt and Peter S. Goodman, *Spectrum Up for
    Grabs*, *The Washington Post*, July 11, 2000, at E1 ("\[T\]he 21^st^
    --century battle over the spectrum is a scramble for a highly
    valuable resource in increasingly short supply."); Implementation of
    Section 6002(b) of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993;
    Annual Report and Analysis of Competitive Market Conditions With
    Respect to Commercial Mobile Services, *Fifth Report*, FCC-00289, at
    Part II.A.1.h (rel. August 18, 2000).

[^48]: *See, e.g*., SBC Petition at 3, 11, 15; *see also, e.g.,* the
    following comments and reply comments to the SBC and Nextel
    Petitions: AT & T Comments at 2-4; Bell Atlantic Comments at 9-10;
    SBC Comments at 12-13.

[^49]: *C/F Block Sixth Report and Order* at ¶ 23.

[^50]: *See* Advocacy Petition at 5-6, Alpine Petition at 10-11,
    Northcoast Petition at 8-9, RTG and OPASTCO Petition at 20-21; *see
    also* NTCA Petition at 2-3; RTG *Ex Parte* and RTG, NTCA, OPASTCO
    and Advocacy *Ex Parte* at 2. *But see* Verizon Opposition at 5-6.

[^51]: *See* Advocacy Petition at 5-6, Alpine Petition at 10-11,
    Northcoast Petition at 8-9, RTG and OPASTCO Petition at 20-21; *see
    also* RTG *Ex Parte*.

[^52]: *See* Northcoast Petition at 8-9.

[^53]: *C/F Block Sixth Report and Order* at ¶ 26.

[^54]: *Id*.

[^55]: *See Id*.; *see also* *Further Notice* at 9785-86, ¶ 19, 9788, ¶
    25, 9790, ¶ 31; Amendment of the Commission's Rules Regarding
    Installment Payment Financing for Personal Communications Services
    (PCS) Licensees, WT Docket No. 97-82, *Order on Reconsideration of
    the Second* *Report and Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 8377-78, ¶¶ 75-76
    (1998) ("*C Block Reconsideration Order*"); Amendment of the
    Commission's Rules Regarding Installment Payment Financing for
    Personal Communications Services (PCS) Licensees, WT Docket No.
    97-82, *Second Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rule
    Making*, 12 FCC Rcd at 16,446, ¶ 20 (1997) ("*C Block Second Report
    and Order*").

[^56]: *See* *Further Notice* at 9790, ¶ 31.

[^57]: *See* *C/F Block Sixth Report and Order* at ¶ 26.

[^58]: *C/F Block Sixth Report and Order* at ¶ 27. These licenses
    include both 15 MHz C block licenses and 10 MHz C block licenses
    that have been reconfigured from the 30 MHz C block licenses that
    were available but not sold in Auction No. 22.

[^59]: *Id*.

[^60]: RTG and OPASTCO Petition at 21-22; *see also* RTG, NTCA, OPASTCO,
    and Advocacy *Ex* *Parte* at 2.

[^61]: *See* *C/F Block Sixth Report and Order* at ¶ 29.

[^62]: *Id*.

[^63]: *C/F Block Sixth Report and Order* at ¶ 36. Presently, the
    Commission has before us a Petition for Expedited Action to Modify
    the Auction Design for Auction No. 35, the C and F Block Reauction
    filed by Nextel Communications, Inc. ("Nextel") on November 6, 2000.

[^64]: *See Id*. at ¶ 34.

[^65]: *C/F Block Sixth Report and Order* at ¶ 36.

[^66]: "C and F Block Broadband PCS Spectrum Auction Schedule for
    November 29, 2000 Rescheduled for December 12, 2000; Revised List of
    Available Licenses, Comment Sought on Reserve Prices or Minimum
    Opening Bids and Other Procedural Issues," *Public Notice*, DA
    00-2038 at 7 (rel. September 6, 2000) ("*Comment Public* *Notice*").

[^67]: "C and F Block Broadband PCS Spectrum Auction Scheduled for
    December 12, 2000; Notice and Filing Requirements for 422 Licenses
    in the C and F Block Broadband PCS Spectrum Auction, Minimum Opening
    Bids, Upfront Payments and Other Procedural Issues for Final Auction
    Inventory," *Public Notice*, DA 00-2259 at 9 (rel. October 5, 2000)
    ("*Procedures Public Notice*").

[^68]: *See* Petition for Expedited Action to Modify the Auction Design
    for Auction No. 35, the C and F Block Reauction filed by Nextel
    Communications, Inc. (filed November 6, 2000) ("Petition").

[^69]: In the Matter of Nextel Communications Inc.'s Petition for
    Expedited Action to Modify the Auction Design for Auction No. 35,
    the C and F Block Reauction, *Order*, DA 00-2825 at ¶¶ 11-12 (rel.
    December 14, 2000) ("*Order*").

[^70]: RTG and OPASTCO Petition at 3, 20.

[^71]: *Order* at ¶¶ 11-12.

[^72]: *See* *Order*. Section 309(j)(3)(E) of the Communications Act
    provides that the Commission must provide a notice and comment
    period before the issuance of bidding rules, and after the issuance
    of bidding rules, provide an adequate period of time to allow
    interested parties to develop their business plans. 47 U.S.C. §
    309(j)(3)(E).

[^73]: *See Further Notice* at 9785, ¶ 17.

[^74]: *Comment Public* *Notice* at 7. (seeking comment from the public
    on the proposed bidding methodology for Auction No. 35).

[^75]: Comments were filed by AT & T Wireless, Inc., BellSouth
    Corporation and SBC Communications, Inc., and Verizon Wireless.
    Reply comments were filed by AT & T Wireless Services, Inc., and
    BellSouth Corporation and SBC Communications, Inc.

[^76]: *Order* at ¶ 12.

[^77]: *See* *Order.*

[^78]: *C/F Block Sixth Report and Order* at ¶ 14.

[^79]: *See Id*. at ¶ 44.

[^80]: *Id*. at ¶ 44.

[^81]: *Id*. at ¶ 45.

[^82]: *See* Northcoast Petition at 9-11 and RTG and OPASTCO Petition at
    22-25; *see also* RTG, NTCA, OPASTCO and Advocacy *Ex Parte* at 2.

[^83]: *See* Northcoast Petition at 9-11.

[^84]: *See* RTG and OPASTCO Petition at 22-25 and RTG *Ex Parte*.

[^85]: *See* *C/F Block Sixth Report and Order* at ¶ 44.

[^86]: *C/F Block Sixth Report and Order* at ¶ 44.

[^87]: *Id*.

[^88]: *See* Alpine Petition at 9-10, Northcoast Petition at 9-11, RTG
    and OPASTCO Petition at 22-25, NTCA Petition at 3-6; *see also* RTG
    *Ex Parte* and RTG, NTCA, OPASTCO and Advocacy *Ex Parte* at 2-3
    (also requesting the Commission to revise its generic auction rules
    to incorporate a "total assets" test as proposed in the FNPRM in the
    Part 1 proceeding. *See* Amendment of Part 1 of the Commission's
    Rules - Competitive Bidding Procedures, *Order on Reconsideration of
    the Third Report and Order, Fifth Report and Order, and Fourth
    Notice of Proposed Rule Making*, WT Docket No. 97-82, FCC 00-274
    (rel. August 14, 2000)). The "total assets" test is currently part
    of a FNPRM in the Part 1 proceeding; thus, is not a subject of this
    rulemaking proceeding.

[^89]: *See* Alpine Petition at 9-10, Northcoast Petition at 9-11, RTG
    and OPASTCO Petition at 22-25, NTCA Petition at 3-6; *see also* RTG
    *Ex Parte*.

[^90]: *See* 47 C.F.R. § 24.709(b)(9)(i). A "grandfathered" entity is a
    qualified applicant that was eligible for and participated in
    Auction No. 5 or 10; thus, permitted to bid on closed C block
    licenses in any auction that begins on or before March 23, 2001.

[^91]: *See* Northcoast Petition at 9-11, RTG and OPASTCO Petition at
    22-25, NTCA Petition at 3-6; *see also* RTG, NTCA, OPASTCO and
    Advocacy *Ex Parte* at 2.

[^92]: *See* *C/F Block Sixth Report and Order* at ¶ 45.

[^93]: *Id*.

[^94]: *Id*.

[^95]: *Id*.

[^96]: *Id*.

[^97]: *Id*.; *see also* Dobson Comments at 13-16 and Dobson Reply at
    5-6.

[^98]: *See* *C/F Block Sixth Report and Order* at ¶¶ 44-45.

[^99]: *Id*. at ¶ 45.

[^100]: *Id*. at ¶¶ 46-53.

[^101]: *C/F Block Sixth Report and Order* at ¶ 47.

[^102]: *Id*. at ¶ 49. (The decision to transfer a restricted license to
    a non-entrepreneur before the end of the five-year holding period in
    this manner must be made by those in control of the entrepreneur).

[^103]: *See C/F Block Sixth Report and Order* at ¶ 51.

[^104]: *C/F Block Sixth Report and Order* at ¶ 53.

[^105]: Department of Defense Appropriations of 2001, Public Law
    106-259, § 8149, 114 Stat. 656 (Aug. 9, 2000). Section 8149
    provides:

    > Licenses Held By Alaska Native Regional Corporation -- An Alaska
    > Native regional corporation organized pursuant to the Alaska
    > Native Claims Settlement Act, or affiliate thereof, that holds a
    > Federal Communications Commission license in the personal
    > communications service as of the date of enactment of this section
    > and has either paid for such license in full or has complied with
    > the payment schedules for such license shall be permitted to
    > transfer and assign without penalty such license to any transferee
    > or assignee. No economic penalties shall apply to any transfer or
    > assignment authorized under this section. Any amounts owed to the
    > United States for the initial grant of such licenses shall become
    > immediately due and payable upon the consummation of any such
    > transfer or assignment. Any application for such a transfer or
    > assignment shall be deemed granted if not denied by the Commission
    > within 90 days of the date on which it was initially filed. Any
    > provision of law or regulation to the contrary is hereby amended.

[^106]: *See* Department of Defense Appropriations of 2001, Public Law
    106-259, § 8149, 114 Stat. 656 (Aug. 9, 2000).

[^107]: Alpine Petition at 12.

[^108]: *Id*.

[^109]: *Id*.

[^110]: CIRI Opposition at 1-5 and VoiceStream Opposition at 1, 3-4.

[^111]: *See Id*.

[^112]: Verizon Opposition at 6-7.

[^113]: Verizon Opposition at 7 (Verizon also argues that Alpine's
    request to remove all transfer restrictions illuminates its
    arguments to maintain the C and F block set-asides).

[^114]: 47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(4)(E).

[^115]: *See C/F Block Sixth Report and Order* at ¶ 53.

[^116]: *See* 47 C.F.R. § 24.709.

[^117]: *See* 47 C.F.R. § 1. 2108.