Comments on "The Illusion of Conscious Will" by Daniel. M. Wegner.

\[M.I.T. Press, 2002\] \[Wegner is Professor of Psychology at Harvard\]

Wegner's begins Chapter **1** with the statement:

"It usually seems that we consciously will our voluntary actions, but
this is an illusion."

That assertion appears to be a clear statement of what Wegner intends to
demonstrate.

The questions in need of addressing are: Does the empirical evidence
cited by Wegner entail that a person's stream of consciousness cannot
causally influence that person's physical actions? Do Wegner's
arguments, or the empirical evidence upon which they are based, create
any difficulties for the von Neumann's formulation of quantum theory,
which provides a mechanism that allows a person's "experiences of
conscious willing" to influence that person's physical actions?

The answers to these two questions are 'No' and 'No.'

One of Wegner's main arguments is based on his Theory of Apparent Mental
Causation, which says:

"People experience conscious will when they interpret their own thought
as the cause of their action."

Granting that this is true we may ask: Does this effect entail, or
strongly support, the conclusion that conscious will is non-efficacious?

The answer is 'No.'

Only if experiences ARE efficacious is there a good reason for the
Theory of Apparent Mental Causation to hold!

If our experiences ***do*** causally influence our actions in the way
that they seem to do then these experiences are surely needed for
successful living. But how do we learn how to USE this power of our
conscious will to affect our actions?

Look at any healthy alert infant and you see the answer: incessant
struggle to find out 'which effort does what.' Success in this venture
requires the capacity to recognize those relationships between efforts
and feedbacks that *could be* *consequences of those efforts*. The
validity of the Theory of Apparent Mental Causation has, therefore,
positive survival value IF the experience of conscious will actually has
causal efficacy, but has no survival value if the experience of
conscious will has no causal efficacy. So I would argue, on the basis of
the theory of evolution, that the evidence accumulated by Wegner (and
Wheatly) for the validity of the Theory of Apparent Mental Causation is
evidence IN FAVOR OF True Mental Causation, contrary to the converse
interpretation suggested by Wegner. A process that makes 'efforts that
COULD have experiential causal feedbacks' *seem* effective can help us
to discover, by trial and error, those particular efforts that ACTUALLY
DO have experiential causal feedbacks.

The other chief "difficulties" that Wegner finds with the idea that "we
consciously will our voluntary actions" are, first, the Libet data,
which are beautifully accounted for by quantum theory, and, second, the
fact that most actions occur automatically, without the causal
intervention of conscious willing. That feature is also well
accommodated by quantum theory, which, nevertheless, explains how
conscious will *can* cause bodily action.

The "problem" with the Libet data is that when an action is 'willed'--
such as 'willing' a finger to rise-- a readiness potential (RP) appears
*before* the experience of 'willing' appears. Libet explains this by
saying the conscious choice to perform this action does not occur until
the state of readiness is in place: the conscious choice is simply a
choice either to "Veto" or "Allow" a specified action, whose physical
'template for action' is already in place, imbedded in the structure of
a particular pattern of neural activity. \[I have slightly elaborated
here upon Libet's more cautious and less detailed explanation.\]

To understand how the von Neumann/Stapp (vN/S) explanation of 'will'
works in general it will be illuminating to see how it works in this
Libet experiment.

Quantum theory is based on Heisenberg's seminal discovery that the
empirical facts (many of which are logically incompatible with the basic
precepts of classical physics) can be described by a new theory, quantum
theory, which can be constructed by replacing the "numbers" in classical
physics by "actions" (operators). \[The ordering of the *numbers* in a
product does not matter, but the order in which *actions/operations* are
performed does matter.\]

In vN/S theory the dynamics of a conscious brain depends critically upon
an essential correspondence between certain actions/operators in the
mathematical structure and associated human experiences. Each such
action is represented by a "projection operator" P, which satisfies
PP=P. \[The double action PP of a projection operator P has the same
effect as a single action P.\] If the experience is labeled by 'e' then
the associated projection operator is represented by P(e). In von
Neumann's formulation of quantum theory this operator P(e) acts upon the
state of the brain of the observer/participant/agent and specifies the
neural correlate of the experience 'e.' The mappings P(e) specify a
mind-to-matter correspondence that plays a key role in the dynamics of
the brain of a conscious agent.

Any adequate theory of the connection between the stream of
consciousness and the brain processes of the conscious agent must
involve connections between conscious events and associated patterns of
brain/neural activity. These are the so-called "neural correlates of
consciousness," the NCC's. But technical differences between classical
theory and quantum theory render the dynamical roles of the NCC's very
different in these two theories. In classical theory the conscious
events are either (perhaps "emergent") causally inert by-products of
brain activity that have no influence on the physical process. or they
are redundant manifestations of certain aspects of brain activity, in
which case they are still epiphenomenal, in the sense that the
physically described process completely determines itself, without
regard to how the mappings between the psychologically described and
physically described realms go. But within quantum theory the physical
process is influenced by our choices about what we 'will', and these
choices are not themselves fixed by the physical process: these choices
enter contemporary orthodox quantum theory as free variables.

Here is how quantum theory works!

The (quantum) state S of a system is an action/operator, called "the
statistical operator" \[or "the density matrix."\] It specifies the
statistical weight \[probability\] of every projection operator P
associated with that system. The formula for the statistical weight of P
in the state S is:

\<P\> = Trace PSP/Trace S.

\[If A is an action/operator then, by definition, Trace A is the number
generated by letting A act back around on itself, like a snake biting
its own tail. The connection of the mathematical formulas to measurable
numbers is always given by this Trace operation.\]

Quantum dynamics is built upon these operators P(e) and S, and on *two
kinds of choices*. The first kind of choice is made by the
experimenter/observer/participant. It is called "Process **1**" by von
Neumann. I have also called it "The Heisenberg Choice," because its
crucial role in quantum theory was strongly emphasized by Heisenberg.

The other kind of choice was called by Dirac "a choice on the part of
nature." I have called it "The Dirac Choice." I also call it "Process
**3**" to distinguish it from von Neumann's Process **1** and Process
**2**. \[Process **2** is the quantum analog of Newton's classical
equation's of motion, and is obtained by replacing classical numbers by
corresponding quantum operators.\]

In classical physics there is just one dynamical process, namely the
classical approximation to the quantum Process **2**. But quantum theory
has two additional processes, one involving a choice made by a conscious
participant/agent/observer about how he will act, and one made by nature
about how she will respond to the agent's choice.

The contemporary orthodox quantum theory does not specify what the
agents's choice will be. In atomic physics the agent's choice is treated
as a free variable that is fixed by the aims of the
experimenter/participant. These aims are considered to lie outside the
realm of atomic physics. They are to be covered by neuro-psychology, and
are presumably determined by some combination of the
neurological-physical and psychological-experiential processes that
enter into quantum neurodynamics.

Figuring out exactly what this combination is, from a detailed analysis
of the psycho-neurological data, is the task of neuroscience,
psychology, and physics, working together. Only the general overall
quantum dynamical framework was provided by von Neumann.

To provide to a preliminary general orientation, I have proposed a
simple model for the agent's choice.

The state S(t) of the participant's body-brain is defined by taking the
"partial trace (over all ***other*** degrees of freedom in the
universe)" of the state of the universe at time t (in the rest frame of
the cosmic background radiation.)

Then the projection operator P(t) is defined to be that operator in the
set {P(e)} that maximizes

Trace P(e)S(t)P(e)/Trace S(t).

This special P(t) is the P(e) that has at time t the greatest
statistical weight.

As a first guess, I propose that a Process **1** event associated with
P(t) occurs whenever Trace P(t)S(t)P(t)/Trace S(t) reaches a local (in
time) maximum. This Process **1** puts to Nature the question: Does the
quantum jump to the state P(t)S(t)P(t) occur?

Notice that the timing and form of this event is then determined jointly
by the physical side, from S(t), and by the psychological side from
P(e). But it is determined, nevertheless, by a mathematical law: it is
not coming from "out of the blue." The Process **1** event changes S(t)
to S'(t) = P(e)S(t)P(e) + P'(e)S(t)P'(e), where P' = (1-P).

Then Nature's choice, Process **3**, occurs. It is a "quantum jump." The
State S'(t) is reduced to P(e)S(t)P(e) with probability Trace
P(e)S(t)P(e)/Trace S(t) or to P'(e)S(t)P'(e) with probability Trace
P'(e)S(t)P'(e)/Trace S(t). If the chosen state is P(e)S(t)P(e), then
experience 'e' occurs: otherwise no experience occurs in conjunction
with this event.

This "experience" occurs essentially automatically, if Nature's Process
3 answer is 'Yes'. The occurrence of the experience is a consequence of
these partly deterministic and partly statistically deterministic
equations. Consciousness enters only indirectly, by virtue of the
condition on the set of all P(e)'s, which enters into the definition of
P(t).

Conscious Will comes in if the experience 'e' associated with a 'Yes'
choice on the part of Nature, or the new quantum state, leads to a
"conscious choice to exert effort," and this "conscious choice"
activates a sustained rapid sequence of Process **1** events with almost
constant P(t). If the rapidity of these Process **1** events is
sufficient then this sequence will activate the Quantum Zeno Effect,
which will tend to hold the state S(t) in the subspace defined by the
almost-constant P(t). That near-constancy can produce a large behavioral
effect: the finger will be raised by the dynamical consequences of the
sustained-by-willful-effort existence of the "template of action" (a
pattern of neural activity) that produces this physical action.

This completes a quick review of the basic elements of vN/S theory. It
will now be applied to the Libet experiment.

The original commitment by the subject to, say, "raise my finger within
the next minute" will condition his brain to bring forth a succession
potential RP's, distributed over the next minute. When the probability
for any one of the potential RP's in this sequence peaks the associated
Process **1** question "shall the experience of raising my finger occur
now" is asked. Because the commitment is spread over a minute the
probability that Nature's answer will be 'Yes' will be very small for
each individual RP in the sequence. Hence most of the possible RP's in
the sequence will not be actualized: they will be tossed out by the "No"
answer on the part of Nature. But for some one of these Process **1**
events Nature will say "Yes," and the associated experience 'e' will
occur. If, in the light of the feelings actualized by the experience
'e', the agent then "chooses to exert the effort needed to raise the
finger", then a sufficiently rapid sequence of Process **1** events will
be actualized, and this will cause the finger to rise.

The conscious choice to exert the needed effort that causes the finger
to rise occurs, therefore, *after* the beginning of the build-up of the
associated readiness potential, just as Libet says. This readiness
potential is actualized by Nature's first 'Yes' answer. None of the
"potential readiness potentials" associated with the 'No' answers to the
earlier Process **1** events will have been actualized. So the physical
situation actualized by the 'Yes' answer at some time T will actualize a
physical situation that includes a readiness potential that has already
begun its build up before time T, and peaked at time T. But the mental
decision to consent, not veto, comes after T, and only if this consent
is given will the Quantum Zeno Effect kick in and hold persistently in
place the "template of action" needed to consciously raise the finger.

It might seem that this occurrence of the build up of the readiness
potential *before* *the conscious choice that triggers the raising of
the finger* would violate causality requirements. But the computations
of orthodox quantum theory show that this kind of precursor activity
*cannot be controlled* in such a way as to, say, send a specified
message backward in time. It is controlled in this case by **Nature's
choice** to say 'Yes' at time T, not before. *Given* this 'Yes" choice
*on the part of Nature* the (human) agent is given the choice to consent
or veto the rapid sequence that will cause the finger actually rise.
This human choice to consent or veto, on the basis of his feelings, is
treated in quantum theory as a free variable. But one must take into
account the fact that if the consent is given then Nature must choose,
*with specified statistical weights*, between the 'Yes' and 'No' answers
to each of Process 1 questions in the ensuing rapid sequence. The result
is that the granting of the consent can directly and strongly influence
whether or not the finger will rise, but will have no effect, on the
average, on whether or not the precursor readiness potential appears:
the fact that that this RP appears was fixed already by the 'Yes' answer
given at time T. Consequently, the occurrence of the RP is not
controlled by the subsequent "free choice of whether or not to exert the
needed effort, and there is no conflict with the stringent causal
requirements of the theory of relativity, which forbids sending
controlled messages except via physical transfers of momentum energy.
There can no such transfer backward in time (or outside the forward
light cone) and hence no violation of the requirements of the theory of
relativity, even though the readiness potential appears before the
conscious choice that actually *causes* the finger to rise.

The conclusion is that within vN/S quantum theory the Libet data are
perfectly compatible with the idea that our conscious will can strongly
influence our physical actions. Hence those data provide no support for
the idea that the causal efficacy of conscious will is an illusion.
Rather, those data lend support to the quantum approach to
consciousness, which is fundamentally an interactionistic dualistic
approach, rather than the epiphenomenal one that seems to be entailed by
classical physical theory\*\*\*.

\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\--

The projection operators P(e) are necessarily nonlocal operators: they
grasp in a unified way an informational structure that can extend over a
large part of the body-brain of the participant. This brings into the
dynamics holistic features that are in principle beyond the reach of
systems that operate according to the mechanical principles of classical
physics. These holistic features are in line with our perception and
conception of ourselves as creatures that can consciously grasp complex
informational structures as wholes, and can choose to act efficaciously
on the basis of those graspings.

It seems more rational to abandon the unsatisfactory\*\* notion of
epiphenomenalism, and the known-to-be-false classical physical theory
that implies, or at least suggests, epiphenomenalism, than to deny the
validity of contemporary physical theory and the natural explanation it
provides for the causal efficacy of our conscious will.

\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\--

\*\*

William James (1890: 138) argued against the possibility of
epiphenomenal consciousness, by observing that "*The particulars of the
distribution of consciousness*, so far as we know them, *points to its
being efficacious.*" He noted that consciousness seems to be "an organ,
superadded to the other organs which maintain the animal in its struggle
for existence; and the presumption of course is that it helps him in
some way in this struggle, just as they do. But it cannot help him
without being in some way efficacious and influencing the course of his
bodily history." James said that the study described in his book "will
show us that consciousness is at all times primarily a *selecting
agency*." It is present when choices must be made between different
possible courses of action. He further mentioned that "It is to my mind
quite inconceivable that consciousness should have *nothing to do* with
a business to which it so faithfully attends."(1890: 136)

If consciousness has no effect upon the physical world then what keeps a
person's mental world aligned with his physical situation: what keeps
his pleasures in general alignment with actions that benefit him, and
pains in general correspondence with things that damage him, if pleasure
and pain have no effect at all upon his actions?

Searle says \[in the J. of Conscious Studies\] that psychological
indeterminism with neurobiological determinism\-\--

"is intellectually unsatisfying because it is a modified form of
epiphenomenalism. It says that the psychological processes of decision
making really do not matter. The entire process is deterministic at the
bottom level, and the idea that the top level has an element of freedom
is simply a systematic illusion. ... The bodily movements would be
exactly the same regardless of how these processes occurred.

"Maybe that is how it will turn out, but if so the hypothesis seems to
me to run against everything we know about evolution. It would have the
consequence that the incredibly elaborate, complex, sensitive and
\-\--above all\-\--biologically expensive system of human and animal
conscious rational decision-making would actually make no difference
whatever to the life and survival of the organism. Epiphenomenalism is a
possible thesis, but it is absolutely incredible, and if we seriously
accept it, it would make a change in our world view, that is, in our
conception of our relations to the world, more radical than any previous
change, including the Copernican Revolution, Einsteinian relativity
theory and quantum theory."

\*\*\*

Rivas and vanDongen \[www.emergentmind.org/rivas-vandongen.htm\]

give an argument (which they attribute to themselves and independently
to three other authors: Michael Watkins, Daniel Dennett, and John
Foster.) I would put it thusly: "There is no rational reason to assert
that experience E exists if the experience E' of E is held not to be
caused or influenced by E: epiphenomenalism is self-defeating, hence
inconsistent"

This leaves, besides interactive dualism, identity theory. But if mind
(i.e. consciousness) is exactly a property of a classically describable
brain, then what kind of property is it? Neither a strictly mathematical
nor functional property will do, because neither of these entails,
starting from classical concepts, the defining characteristic of
consciousness: its experiential quality. But contemporary orthodox
quantum theory is an interactive dualism. It may evolve into an
information-based (rather than matter-based) dual-aspect monism.