***Facilitators Field Reference***

***for the***

***1977 Cart Creek Fire Staff Ride***

December 2005

**STAFF RIDE DIFFICULTY RATING:**

**[Physical]{.underline}**

Moderate -- Most walking segments are relatively flat with an average
slope of 8%. The land tops upward gradually for the last 800 feet with a
slope of 17% just above the fire origin and 45% just below the bluffs.
Average elevation for the area is approximately 6,400 feet

Bottom elevation: 6,076 feet (Cart Creek Foot Bridge).

Top elevation: 6,672 feet (Stand 5 Hodgkinson site).

From the parking area at the trail head to Stands 2, 3, 4, and 5 is
approximately 3.6 miles round trip.

**[Logistics]{.underline}**

Moderate -- The Firefighters Memorial (Stand 1) is located in the
Firefighters Memorial Campground off U.S. Hwy 191 approximately 3 miles
east of the junction of Hwy 191 and Utah Hwy 44. The campground is 38
miles from the center of Vernal, Utah. Vernal has ample overnight
accommodations. The campground could be utilized going through the
reservation process. Access to the site is seasonal and dependent upon
snow. **NOTE: In heavy snow years the trail up to the fire site may not
clear until late April.**

**[Hazards]{.underline}**

Low -- Normal wildland hazards (possible bees, etc.). Lightning is very
frequent with thunderstorms. Be prepared for all types of weather and
check forecasts prior to your trip.

NOTE TO FACILITATORS: THIS IS A SUGGESTED FORMAT. DO NOT FEEL LIMITED BY
THE IDENTIFIED STANDS OR DISCUSSION ITEMS. IT IS PROVIDED AS A WORD
DOCUMENT SO THAT USERS MAY ADAPT AND REVISE IT TO FIT THEIR SPECIFIC
AUDIENCE AND TIME DEMANDS.

**Stand 1 -- Firefighters Memorial Campground**

**[Maps]{.underline}**

Travel orientation map

Cart Creek Staff Ride map

**[Access]{.underline}**

Stand 1: Firefighters Memorial Campground

40˚ 53.585\' N, 109˚ 27.005\' W

Driving Directions to Stand 1: From Vernal, Utah, take Highway 191, 38
miles north towards Flaming Gorge National Recreation Area.

Turn Right into Firefighters Memorial Campground. Follow the signs to
the Firefighters Memorial. Note: Visitors to the Firefighters Memorial
are not required to pay an entrance fee to the campground.

**[Terrain Orientation]{.underline}**

Campground on bluff, steep canyons

**[Events to Describe]{.underline}**

Memorial site

Weather summary

Activity of crew members

**[Discussion Topics]{.underline}**

-   Historically, the Ashley NF averages 26 fires/year (19 lightning and
    7 person caused) and burns 1,721 acres/year.

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-   This memorial is in honor of Gene Campbell, Dwight Emery Hodgkinson,
    and David Kay Noel who lost their lives July 16, 1977 on the Cart
    Creek Fire. The memorial was erected by contributions of money and
    physical effort by friends and families of the three deceased men.
    It is located at Firefighters Memorial Campground (formerly Bootleg
    Campground) on Ashley National Forest.

-   The Cart Creek Fire occurred almost 30 years ago. Most of the
    men/women wore jeans, fire resistant shirts, hard hats, and none
    carried fire shelters. Few of the fire fighters and not all overhead
    met qualifications for fire assignments, 18 of the 25 people had the
    required training.

-   The July 16, 1977 weather forecast for the area called for partly
    cloudy with scattered afternoon showers and thunderstorms. Winds
    were forecasted to be "light and variable at all levels, mostly
    controlled by topography, with gustiness near showers and
    thunderstorms." This forecast was essentially correct, but the
    cumulus buildups began slightly earlier than expected.

-   Many District personnel were attending the rodeo at Manila, UT, 30
    miles away. The District Office contacted the rodeo site and a call
    was made over the loudspeaker system for all District personnel to
    report to the gate. Most of the firefighters had to stop by their
    homes to change clothes and gather equipment.

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-   The fire began about noon Saturday, July 16 from a lightning strike
    on a bench south of the confluence of Cart Creek and Spruce Creek.
    The District FMO, Dennis Hatch, spotted the fire and drove as close
    as possible. He estimated the fire to be about one-half acre. He
    called for the helitack crew based at Dutch John Helibase, 3 ½ miles
    northeast, to initial attack the fire.

-   Fuels over the entire fire area can be characterized as extremely
    flashy grass-sage with scattered Junipers, Ponderosa Pines, clumps
    of Bitterbrush, Curly-Leaf Mahogany in the swales and pockets of
    deeper soil. Fuel volumes increased with elevation. During the
    winter of 1976-1977, the Western United States had experienced an
    extreme drought. Dead downed and live fuels were exceptionally dry
    during the summer.

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-   The helicopter placed a two-man initial attack crew near the fire
    at 1235. The two men were instructed to wait until additional help
    arrived before beginning initial attack. The fire was about 1 ½
    acres in size.

**Handout Tactical Decision Game #1 or Strategic Discussion Point #1
prior to leaving Stand 1. Conduct these at Cedar Springs Lagoon open
parking area.**

NOTE TO FACILITATORS: THE TACTICAL DECISION GAMES ARE A GOOD METHOD TO
GENERATE GROUP INTERACTION IF PARTICIPANTS HAVE PREDOMINATELY FIRELINE
OPERATIONS BACKGROUNDS (FOR EXAMPLE FIREFIGHTER TYPE 1, SINGLE RESOURCE
BOSSES, STRIKE TEAM/TASK FORCE LEADERS, OR DIVISION SUPERVISORS). THE
STRATEGIC DISCUSSION POINTS ARE A GOOD METHOD TO USE FOR GENERATING
GROUP INTERACTION IF THE PARTICIPANTS HAVE INCIDENT MANAGEMENT OR
PROGRAM MANAGEMENT BACKGROUNDS (FOR EXAMPLE FIRE MANAGEMENT OFFICERS,
IMT COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF, OR AGENCY ADMINISTRATORS).

**Handout Tactical Decision Game #2 or Strategic Discussion Point #2
prior to crossing the Cart Creek Foot Bridge.**

Tell participants to have their responses ready when they arrive at
Stand 2.

**Stand 2 -- The Ponderosa Pine**

**[Maps]{.underline}**

Cart Creek Staff Ride map

**[Access]{.underline}**

Stand 2: The Ponderosa Pine

40˚ 53.446\' N, 109˚ 26.355\' W

Driving directions to Stand 2: From Stand 1 drive north on Highway 191
approximately 2.5 miles to the locked gate (40º 54.219\' N, 109º
26.372\' W) located on the right side of the highway. Accessing the two
track dirt road through the gate will require a Forest Service key.
Continue approximately ¼ mile on the two track road to the open area
suitable for parking. Leave vehicles at this point and walk along the
two track trail to the south approximately 0.5 miles to the foot bridge
across Cart Creek (40° 53.818\' N, 109° 26.303\' W). Cross the foot
bridge and follow the foot trail and ascend uphill south to the Stand 2
marker located at the large Ponderosa Pine tree.

If you do not have a Forest Service key, access may be obtained by
calling the Ashley National Forest Supervisors Office, (435)789-1181,
and ask for one of the following, Forest FMO, Flaming Gorge District
Ranger, or North Zone FMO. If you don't have a Forest Service key, and
no Forest representative is available, you will have to park at the gate
and walk in from there.

**[Terrain Orientation]{.underline}**

Gentle slope, rocky, Sagebrush and grass fuels.

**[Events to describe]{.underline}**

Strategy and tactics

Location of resources

Expectation of an insignificant fire

**Conduct Tactical Decision Game #2 or Strategic Discussion Point #2
upon arrival at Stand 2.**

**[Discussion Topics]{.underline}**

-   The helicopter went to Cedar Springs Lagoon, picked up Hatch and
    firefighter Rich Harned, made an aerial reconnaissance of the fire,
    and placed Hatch and Harned on the ground with Miner and Dumas at
    H-1. Hatch recognized the small squad could not control the fire
    promptly and radioed for a retardant drop and 20 additional
    firefighters.

-   The fire was spreading slowly westerly with the terrain and easterly
    and northerly with the wind. Experienced firefighters felt the fire
    could easily be controlled with the available resources. Hatch took
    two of the firefighters with him and walked partway up the slope to
    a point near the origin of the fire, and began building a direct
    line uphill to the south and west. One helitack was left at H-1 to
    receive personnel and Helitack Foreman Black returned to Cedar
    Springs Lagoon to set up a helibase.

-   Tom Plasky and Dave Strantz joined Hatch's squad at 1300. The
    strategy was to build a line along the south flank of the fire
    uphill and cut it off before the fire reached the ridge to the west.

-   At 1340 Sheakley and Uphoff arrived at the fire, established voice
    contact with Fire Boss Hatch and discussed a plan. Sheakley and
    Uphoff began to build a section of indirect and unanchored line
    along the ridge line. Hatch sent 2 firefighters to assist Sheakley.

-   At 1350 Coleman, Jenkins, and Hodgkinson unloaded at H-2 and began
    walking uphill to join Hatch's squad.

**Handout Tactical Decision Game #3 or Strategic Discussion Point #3
prior to leaving Stand 2.**

Tell participants to have their responses ready when they arrive at
Stand 3.

**Stand 3 -- Helispot 3**

**[Maps]{.underline}**

Cart Creek Staff Ride map

**[Access]{.underline}**

40º 53.432\' N, 109º 26.251\' W

Walking directions: From Stand 2, walk east southeast (bearing 105˚)
approximately 870 feet to the Stand 3 marker.

**[Terrain Orientation]{.underline}**

Flat, rocky, Sagebrush and grass fuels.

**[Events to Describe]{.underline}**

Firefighters arriving at fire

Organizing firefighters into squads

Moving of helispot due to fire moving faster than expected

Plan of attack

Expected fire behavior

**Conduct Tactical Decision Game #3 or Strategic Discussion Point #3
upon arrival at Stand 3.**

**[Discussion Topics]{.underline}**

-   Around 1400, a DC -- 6 airtanker made several runs dropping
    retardant on along the ridge line and on hot spots along the west
    edge of Spruce Creek.

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-   Three more firefighters arrived on the line to join Hatch's squad,
    Jenkins, Coleman, and Hodgkinson. Hatch felt they were needed in
    Sheakley's squad, so they were sent up on top to tie in with him.

-   Sheakley had a total of 6 people plus himself. Shortly, it was
    necessary to return Plasky and Strantz back to Hatch's squad due to
    the fire activity being more than Hatch and two people could handle.

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-   Dave Noel, YCC Camp Director, arrived at Cedar Spring's helispot
    along with others, and began organizing crews.

-   From the two loads of crews, J. Martin drew a four-man squad,
    Crevelt, Searfoss, Simpson, and himself. Noel directed him to
    proceed from H-2 up the slope to a point east of the initial attack
    point, but on another ridge.

-   During the interval since first attack, the fire had burned east and
    west outflanking Hatch's line.

-   Martin's squad was to begin building a third section of unanchored
    line uphill and then cut off that segment of the fire by tying into
    Hatch's line.

-   Helispot H-2 was moved 65 yards south away from the edge of the
    fire. This is now referred to in the report as H-3 but firefighters
    on the ground were unaware of the name change. In effect, H-1, H-2
    and H-3 were not designated helispots, they were merely locations
    where crewmembers were off loaded. Each successive helispot was
    moved south as the fire continued to grow.

-   Next load came into H-3 consisting of Ray Ruble, Val Norman, Gene
    Campbell, and Annette Rogers. Purdy was the leader of the squad with
    Val Norman as a line scout. Purdy was given instructions from Noel
    to begin at the low end of Martin's line and build line downhill.
    Purdy's squad walked in single file towards the fire.

-   Noel and Campbell followed 20 yards behind the last member of
    Purdy's squad. They had stepped out of line to retrieve a tool that
    someone had left leaning against a tree.

**Handout Tactical Decision Game #4 or Strategic Discussion Point #4
prior to leaving Stand 3**

Tell participants to have their responses ready when they arrive at
Stand 4.

**Stand #4 -- Campbell and Noel Fatality Site**

**[Maps]{.underline}**

Cart Creek Staff Ride map

**[Access]{.underline}**

40º 53.407\' N, 109º 26.270\' W

Walking directions: From Stand 3, walk west (bearing 269˚) approximately
480 feet to the Stand 4 marker.

**[Terrain Orientation]{.underline}**

Gentle slope, rocky, Sagebrush and grass.

**[Events to Describe]{.underline}**

Change in fire behavior

Campbell and Noel cut off from squad

Campbell and Noel's route

**Conduct Tactical Decision Game #4 or Strategic Discussion Point #4
upon arrival at Stand 4.**

**[Discussion Topics]{.underline}**

-   Helicopter Foreman, Black recognized a change in fire behavior and
    notified those with radios.

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-   Hatch had noted the change in fire behavior as it moved into heavier
    fuels and radioed a message to Sheakley to tie their two lines
    together and cut off the head of the fire.

-   Martin's squad also recognized the change and began to move into the
    safety of the burned area.

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-   Purdy and his squad were beginning their assent up to Sheakley's
    line when Purdy looked back behind him and onto the flat, all he
    could see was a wall of fire. Purdy yelled for his squad to move
    ahead rapidly into the burned out area.

-   Campbell and Noel were last seen about 15 to 20 yards behind the
    last person in Purdy's squad. No one in Purdy's squad saw Campbell
    or Noel, only a wall of flame that was 10 to 30 feet high.

-   Campbell and Noel were cut off from Purdy's escape route and turned
    southeast up a low stony ridge and attempted to outrun the fire.
    Best estimates on their escape were after they reached about 50
    yards up the stony ridge they turned south, perhaps intending to
    then run east toward the helispot.

-   Martin observed Campbell and Noel running toward the east and saw
    them fall at about the same time.

**Stop between Stand 4 and Stand 5: Dave Noel Fatality Site**

Walking directions: From Stand 4, walk west (bearing 270˚) approximately
95 feet to the Dave Noel Fatality Site. 40º 53.409\' N, 109º 26.287\' W

**Handout Tactical Decision Game #5 or Strategic Discussion Point #5
prior to leaving Dave Noel fatality site.**

Tell participants to have their responses ready when they arrive at
Stand 5.

**Stand #5 -- Hodgkinson Fatality Site**

**[Maps]{.underline}**

Cart Creek Staff Ride map

**[Access]{.underline}**

40º 53.345\' N, 109º 26.474\' W

Walking directions: From the Dave Noel Fatality Site, walk west
southwest (bearing 249˚) approximately 960 feet to the Stand 5 marker.

**[Terrain Orientation]{.underline}**

Steep rocky with Pinyon-Juniper and Sagebrush fuels.

**[Events to Describe]{.underline}**

Change in fire behavior.

Confusion resulting from unexpected fire behavior.

Situational awareness of escape routes.

**Conduct Tactical Decision Game #5 or Strategic Discussion Point #5
upon arrival at Stand 5.**

**[Discussion Topics]{.underline}**

-   Sheakley noticed the fire behavior change and instructed his squad
    to drop back off the line and head for the safety of the black and
    rejoin the rest of the crew.

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-   The squad moves down the ridge to the east. Sheakley became
    separated from his squad by a rocky bluff. Sheakley called
    instructions for the squad and they proceeded in an orderly fashion.

-   Within a few seconds, it was realized that there was a substantial
    increase in fire behavior.

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-   The squad ran along the bluff for several hundred feet to a point
    where they could come down through the rocks. As they came down the
    order was: Uphoff, Coleman, Hodgkinson, and Jenkins. Hodgkinson
    stepped aside and let Jenkins go ahead, and then followed Jenkins
    down the rocky slope.

-   Word was passed to drop their tools and run. As the squad came down
    the rocky slope, they ran toward an opening in the fire created by
    Hatch's line and into the black.

-   Hodgkinson was the last person in line and did not come through into
    the burned out area. Squad members began calling his name out.

-   Meanwhile, the helicopter had moved over head and observed
    Hodgkinson running behind Jenkins, when a juniper flared. Hodgkinson
    stopped for a moment and turned around and began to run back to the
    point where he had come from, up the ridge.

-   As Hodgkinson struggled up the slope, he apparently became
    disoriented and may have tried to run back up to the ridge line
    before the fire overcame him.

**Appendix A -- Fire Organization and Staffing**

###### July 16, 1977

**Fire Boss** -- Dennis Hatch Ashley N.F.

**Resources:**

-   Squad 1 - Dennis Hatch -- squad boss

    1.  Chuck Miner

    2.  Rich Harned

    3.  Tom Plasky

    4.  Dave Stantz

-   Squad 2 -- John Martin -- squad boss

1.  Pat Crevelt

2.  Geary Searfoss

3.  Dave Simpson

-   Squad 3 -- Ray Purdy -- squad boss

    1.  Ray Ruble

    2.  Carel Jackson

    3.  Val Norman

    4.  Annette Rogers

-   Squad 4 -- Barry Sheakley -- squad boss

1.  John Uphoff

2.  Karen Coleman

3.  Yolanda Jenkins

4.  Dwight Hodgkinson

    -   Helicopter -

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1.  Rick Inskeep -- Helicopter Pilot

2.  Don Black -- Helicopter Foreman

3.  Dave Dumas -- Assistant Helicopter Foreman

**No Specific Assignment:**

> 1 Dave Noel -- Assignment unknown
>
> 2 Gene Campbell -- Assignment unknown
>
> 3 Rick Martin -- Unassigned firefighter

A total of 24 people had been delivered to the fire by helicopter when
the fatalities occurred. The available personal were organized into four
squads with two people managing the helicopter. The exact assignment for
Noel and Campbell are unknown, however, both Martin and Purdy recognized
Noel as their supervisor or crew boss.