**Chapter 5: Recovery**

**Chapter Outline**

1.  Introduction of topics and concepts to be discussed in the chapter.

    a.  Federal individual and public assistance programs

    b.  Small Business Administration loan programs

    c.  State and local assistance programs

    d.  Roles and responsibilities

    e.  Volunteer groups

    f.  Recovery planning tools

2.  Case Studies

    a.  Federal Government Recovery Efforts following the 1993 Midwest
        Floods

    b.  Housing Reconstruction after the 1994 Northridge Earthquake

    c.  September 11 Philanthropic Recovery Efforts

3.  Additional Sources of Information

4.  Glossary of Terms

5.  Acronyms

6.  Discussion Questions

    a.  General

    b.  1993 Midwest Floods

    c.  Northridge Earthquake

    d.  September 11 Attacks

7.  Suggested Out of Class Exercises

##  **Introduction**

The recovery function or process is characterized by a complex set of
issues and decisions that must be made by individuals and communities.
Recovery involves decisions and actions relative to rebuilding homes;
replacing property; resuming employment; restoring businesses; and
permanently repairing and rebuilding infrastructure. The recovery
process requires balancing the more immediate need to return the
community to normalcy with the longer term goal of reducing future
vulnerability. The recovery process can provide individuals and
communities with opportunities to become more economically secure and
improve the overall safety and quality of life.

Because the recovery function has such long lasting impacts and usually
high costs, the participants in the process are numerous. They include
all levels of government, the business community, political leadership,
community activists and individuals. Each of these groups plays a role
in determining how the recovery will progress. Some of these roles are
regulatory, such as application of State or local building ordinances,
and some, such as the insurance industry, provide financial support. The
goal of an effective recovery is to bring all of the players together to
plan, finance and implement a recovery strategy that will rebuild the
disaster impacted area safer and more secure as quickly as possible.

## The National Response Plan for Disaster Recovery Operations

Issued in 1992, the National Response Plan (NRP), formerly the Federal
Response Plan (FRP) outlines how the Federal Government implements the
Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, as
amended, to assist State and local governments when a major disaster or
emergency overwhelms their ability to respond effectively. The NRP
describes the policies, planning assumptions, concept of operations,
response and recovery actions, and responsibilities of 32 Federal
departments and agencies, including the American Red Cross and the
National Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster, that guide Federal
operations following Presidential declaration of a major disaster or
emergency. .

The NRP describes the structure for organizing, coordinating, and
mobilizing Federal resources for disaster recovery. The Stafford Act
assigns to FEMA the principal coordination function - the interactive
process by which multiple Federal assistance programs are reviewed,
initiated, implemented, and delivered to address the unique needs of a
particular disaster area. 

The fundamental assumption in the NRP is that recovery is a cooperative
effort among Federal, State, local, voluntary agencies and the private
sector in partnership. A Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO) is appointed
by the FEMA Director on behalf of the President and coordinates Federal
activities from the Disaster Field Office (DFO).  The FCO works in
partnership with the State Coordinating Officer (SCO), who is named by
the Governor.  In conjunction with the SCO, the FCO determines the need
for Disaster Recovery Centers (DRCs) in the disaster area.  State and
Federal agencies staff the DRCs with knowledgeable officials who provide
recovery program information, advice, counseling, and technical
assistance.  Voluntary organizations are encouraged to provide
leadership and coordinate with Federal, State and local governments in
recovery planning and program implementation.

Federal disaster assistance available under a major disaster falls into
three general categories: Individual Assistance, Public Assistance and
Hazard Mitigation Assistance. Individual Assistance is aid to
individuals, families and business owners. Public Assistance is aid to
public and certain private non-profit entities for emergency services
and the repair or replacement of disaster-damaged public facilities.
Hazard Mitigation Assistance is funding available for measures designed
to reduce future losses to public and private property. A detailed
description of the first two types of assistance follows. More
information on Hazard Mitigation Assistance can be found in Chapter
Three - Mitigation.

## FEMA's Individual Assistance Recovery Programs

Individual Assistance programs are oriented to individuals, families,
and small businesses, and the programs include temporary housing
assistance, individual and family grants, disaster unemployment
assistance, legal services, and crisis counseling. The disaster victim
must first register for assistance and establish eligibility.

### *Disaster Housing Program*

The Disaster Housing Program assures that people whose homes are damaged
by disaster have a safe place to live until repairs can be completed.
These programs are designed to provide funds for expenses that are not
covered by insurance, and are available to homeowners and renters who
are legal residents of the United States and were displaced by the
disaster.

The Individuals and Households Program (IHP)

The Individuals and Households Program (IHP), formerly called the
Individual and Family Grant (IFG) Program, provides funds for the
necessary expenses and serious needs of disaster victims that cannot be
met through insurance or other forms of disaster assistance. The IHP is
not designed to cover all of a victim's losses (home, personal property,
household goods) that resulted from the disaster, nor is it intended to
restore damaged property to its condition before the disaster. Also, the
IHP does not cover any business-related losses that resulted from the
disaster. By law, the IHP cannot provide any money for losses that are
covered by insurance.

# The following list illustrates the assistance available through the IHP: 

-   **Temporary Housing** (a place to live for a limited period of
    time)**:** Money is available to rent a different place to live, or
    a government provided housing unit when rental properties are not
    available.

-   **Repair:** Money is available to homeowners to repair damage from
    the disaster that is not covered by insurance. The goal is to make
    the damaged home safe, sanitary, and functional.

-   **Replacement:** Money is available to homeowners to replace their
    home destroyed in the disaster that is not covered by insurance. The
    goal is to help the homeowner with the cost of replacing their
    destroyed home.

-   **Permanent Housing Construction:** Direct assistance or money for
    the construction of a home. This type of help occurs only in insular
    areas or remote locations specified by FEMA, where no other type of
    housing assistance is possible.

-   **Other Needs:** Money is available for necessary expenses and
    serious needs caused by the disaster. This includes medical, dental,
    funeral, personal property, transportation, moving and storage, and
    other expenses that are authorized by law.

Disaster Unemployment Assistance

The Disaster Unemployment Assistance (DUA) program provides unemployment
benefits and re-employment services to individuals who have become
unemployed because of major disasters, and who are not eligible for
disaster benefits under regular unemployment insurance programs.

### *Legal Services*

The Young Lawyer's Division of the American Bar Association, through an
agreement with FEMA, provides free legal assistance to low-income
disaster victims. The assistance that the participating lawyers provide
is for insurance claims; counseling on landlord/tenant problems;
assistance in consumer protection matters, remedies and procedures; and
replacement of wills and other important legal documents destroyed in a
major disaster. This assistance is intended for individuals who are
unable to secure legal services adequate to meet their needs as a
consequence of a major disaster.

### *Special Tax Considerations*

Taxpayers who have sustained a casualty loss from a declared disaster
may deduct that loss on the federal income tax return for the year in
which the casualty occurred or through an immediate amendment to the
previous year\'s return. Businesses may file claims with the Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms for payment of Federal excise taxes paid
on alcoholic beverages or tobacco products lost, rendered unmarketable
or condemned by a duly authorized official under various circumstances,
including where a major disaster has been declared by the President.

### *Crisis Counseling*

The Crisis Counseling Assistance and Training Program are designed to
provide short-term crisis counseling services to people affected by a
presidentially declared disaster. The purpose of the crisis counseling
is to help relieve any grieving, stress or mental health problems caused
or aggravated by the disaster or its aftermath. These short-term
services are provided by FEMA as supplemental funds granted to State and
local mental health agencies. The American Red Cross, the Salvation
Army, and other voluntary agencies as well as churches and synagogues
also offer crisis-counseling services.

### *Cora Brown Fund*

Cora C. Brown of Kansas City, Missouri died in 1977 and left a portion
of her estate to the United States to be used as a special fund solely
for the relief of human suffering caused by natural disasters. The funds
are used to assist victims/survivors of presidentially declared major
disasters for disaster-related needs that have not or will not be met by
government agencies or other organizations.

**Small Business Administration (SBA)**

The SBA can provide three types of disaster loans to qualified
homeowners and businesses to repair or replace homes, personal property,
or businesses that sustained damages not covered by insurance.

-   **Home disaster loans** provide funds to homeowners and renters to
    repair or replace disaster-related damages to home or personal
    property.

-   **Business physical disaster loans** provide funds to business
    owners to repair or replace disaster-damaged property, including
    inventory, and supplies.

-   **Economic injury loans** provide capital to small businesses and to
    small agricultural cooperatives to assist them through the disaster
    recovery period. If the SBA determines that the individual is
    ineligible for a loan, or if the loan amount is insufficient to meet
    the individual's needs, then the applicant is referred to the IFG
    program.

**FEMA's Public Assistance Grant Program**

FEMA, under the authority of the Stafford Act, administers the Public
Assistance Program. The Public Assistance Grant Program provides federal
assistance to state and local governments and to certain private
nonprofit (PNP) organizations. These grants allow them to recover from
the impact of disasters and to implement mitigation measures to reduce
the impacts from future disasters. The grants are aimed at governments
and organizations with the final goal to help a community and its
citizens recover from devastating major disasters. The federal share of
assistance is not less than 75% of the eligible cost for emergency
measures and permanent restoration. The State determines how the
non-Federal share is split with the applicants.

Eligible applicants include the States, local governments and any other
political subdivision of the State, Native American tribes, Alaska
Native Villages, and certain PNP organizations. Eligible PNP facilities
include educational, utility, irrigation, emergency, medical,
rehabilitation, temporary or permanent custodial care facilities, and
other PNP facilities that are open to the public and provide essential
services of a governmental nature to the general public. The work must
be required as the result of the disaster, be located within the
designated disaster area, and be the legal responsibility of the
applicant. PNPs that provide critical services such as power, water,
sewer, wastewater treatment, communications or emergency medical care,
may apply directly to FEMA for a disaster grant. All other PNPs must
first apply to the SBA for a disaster loan. If the loan is declined or
does not cover all eligible damages, the applicant may re-apply for FEMA
assistance.

Work that is eligible for supplemental Federal disaster grant assistance
is classified as either emergency work or permanent work.

-   **Emergency work** includes debris removal from public roads and
    rights-of-way as well as from private property when determined to be
    in the public interest. This may also include protective measures
    performed to eliminate or reduce immediate threats to the public,

-   **Permanent work** is defined as work that is required to restore an
    eligible damaged facility to its pre-disaster design. This effort
    can range from minor repairs to replacement. Some categories for
    permanent work include roads, bridges, water control facilities,
    buildings, utility distribution systems, public parks and
    recreational facilities. With extenuating circumstances the
    deadlines for emergency and permanent work may be extended. .

In 1998, FEMA redesigned the Public Assistance program to provide money
to applicants more quickly and to make the application process easier.
The redesigned program was approved for implementation on disasters
declared after October 1, 1998. This redesigned program placed new
emphasis on people, policy, process and performance. The focus of the
program was also modified to provide a higher level of customer service
for disaster recovery applicants and to change the role of FEMA from
inspection and enforcement to an advisory and supportive role.

## **National Voluntary Relief Organizations**

National Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster (NVOAD) coordinates
planning efforts by many voluntary organizations responding to disaster
in order to provide more effective service to people affected by
disaster. Members include 34 national voluntary organizations active in
disaster mitigation and response, 52 State and territorial chapters
(VOAD), and dozens of local organizations. Once a disaster occurs, NVOAD
or an affiliated state VOAD encourages members and other voluntary
agencies to convene on site.

The member organizations provide a wide variety of disaster relief
services including emergency distribution services, mass feeding,
disaster child care, mass or individual shelter, comfort kits,
supplementary medical care, cleaning supplies, emergency communications,
stress management services, disaster assessment, advocacy for disaster
victims, building or repair of homes, debris removal, mitigation, burn
services, guidance in managing spontaneous volunteers, and victim and
supply transportation. NVOAD maintains a close relationship with FEMA
and encourages the State and local affiliates to work closely with the
State and local emergency management agencies.

### *The American Red Cross*

Although the American Red Cross (ARC) is not a government agency, its
authority to provide disaster relief was formalized when, in 1905, the
Red Cross was chartered by Congress to \"carry on a system of national
and international relief in time of peace and apply the same in
mitigating the sufferings caused by pestilence, famine, fire, floods,
and other great national calamities, and to devise and carry on measures
for preventing the same.\"

Red Cross disaster relief focuses on meeting people\'s immediate
emergency disaster-caused needs and provides disaster assistance to
individuals to enable them to resume their normal daily activities
independently. The Red Cross provides shelter, food, and health and
mental health services to address basic human needs. The Red Cross also
feeds emergency workers, handles inquiries from concerned family members
outside the disaster area, provides blood and blood products to disaster
victims, and helps those affected by disaster to access other available
resources.

The Red Cross is one of the nongovernmental organizations mentioned in
the NRP and is the primary agency for ESF #6, Mass Care, Housing, and
Human Services. The ARC functions as a Federal agency in coordinating
the use of Federal mass care resources in a presidentially declared
disaster or emergency, and coordinates Federal assistance in support of
State and local efforts to meet the mass care needs of victims of a
disaster.  This Federal assistance supports the delivery of mass care
services of shelter, feeding, and emergency first aid to disaster
victims; the establishment of systems to provide bulk distribution of
emergency relief supplies to disaster victims; and the collection of
information to operate a Disaster Welfare Information system for the
purpose of reporting victim status and assisting in family
reunification.

**Recovery Planning Tools**

Despite the pressures on politicians and community leaders to return to
a period of normalcy as quickly as possible and because of Federal
incentives, public interest and insurance retractions, more and more
communities are looking at ways to reduce their future vulnerability. As
disasters repeat themselves and the public sees the emotional and
financial benefits of mitigation, communities are making the long term
investment in mitigation. For example the devastating 1993 Midwest
Floods that occurred again in some areas in 1995, had a minimal impact
in those towns where buyout and relocation programs were undertaken
after the 1993 flood. The following is a partial list of policy areas
and tools that should be considered by decision-makers as they develop
their recovery plan. These are:

-   Land use planning techniques including acquisition, easements,
    annexation, stormwater management, environmental reviews;

-   Zoning, including special use permits, historic preservation,
    setbacks, density controls, wetlands protection, floodplain and
    coastal zone management;

-   Building codes including design controls, design review, height and
    type, special study areas( soil stability ratings);

-   Financial including special districts, tax exemptions, special
    bonds, development rights, property transfer or use change fees; and

-   Information and Oversight, including public awareness and education,
    regional approaches and agreements, GIS systems, town hall meetings
    and public hearings.

###### Conclusion

###### The following three case studies provide a clear illustration of the involvement of the Federal government programs in the recovery process in major disasters. State and local recovery roles and responsibilities are detailed. Coordination among Federal, state and local; programs and activities are clearly illustrated. The September 11 case study details the significant role non-government contributions and relief programs played in the recovery from the terrorist attacks.

## **Case Study 5.1: Federal Government Recovery Efforts following the 1993 Midwest Floods** 

# Introduction

The 1993 Midwest Flood developed over a period of more than 12 months,
but outside the Upper Mississippi River Basin, most Americans did not
become aware of the catastrophic potential of these events until the
protracted fight against the rivers had come to a climax. Images of
entire communities submerged beneath seemingly-endless quantities of
water began to dominate the news media -- on television and in the
newspapers -- and the flood captured the hearts of all who saw them. The
damage that lay beneath the newly formed oceans over what was once towns
and cities seemed incomprehensible.

The event was spurred by severe and persistent rainfall that spanned
much of the Mississippi River basin -- an area that encompasses almost
forty percent of the continental United States. The rising rivers
ultimately overcame the holding capacity of a great many of the
flood-protection **levees** that had been placed upon their banks to
mitigate such disasters as was occurring. These flood events, thereafter
referred to as "The Great Flood of 1993," would go on to affect people
and property over such an expansive geographic boundary as had seldom
been seen in the history of the nation. The event tallied up among the
most devastating natural disasters in the United States, resulting in
the loss of dozens of lives and billions of dollars in property damage.
In addition to the losses in crops, infrastructure, and land, over
50,000 homes were destroyed. This case will detail the efforts of the
Federal Government to enable recovery in the affected areas.

# 

# The Mississippi River Basin

To understand this event, it is important that one has a clear
comprehension of both the size and significance of the Mississippi River
Basin. The geographic limits of the basin stretch all the way from the
foothills of the Rocky Mountain range in the west to New York State in
the east. Thirty-two U.S. states and two Canadian provinces are either
fully or partially drained into its vast system of rivers and streams.
In total, 1.25 million square miles -- over 40% of the land area of the
continental United States - falls within its boundaries.

The Mississippi River, the central artery into which all tributaries in
the Basin eventually empty, is one of the world's greatest rivers. It
runs from north to south across the United States, covering 1366 miles
on its course. Its greatest tributary, the Missouri River, runs for 2466
miles, draining 529,000 square miles of land is it travels east towards
the Mississippi River. The upper Mississippi Basin, where most of the
flooding in the 1993 event occurred, is dominated by the Missouri
River's full expanse and the northernmost section of the Mississippi
River, covering an area of 714,000 square miles -- over 57 percent of
the entire basin (Galloway, 1995). Other major tributaries of the
Mississippi River include the Salt, Illinois, Kaskaskia, Meramec, Big
Muddy, St. Francis, Rock, Des Moines, Iowa, Wisconsin, St. Croix, and
Minnesota rivers (USACE, N/D).

These rivers, and many of their tributaries, have played a vital role in
commerce and transportation since the birth of the nation. Over time,
many cities and communities developed upon their shores, and population
surges followed. When the lands on the floodplains were discovered to be
exceptionally fertile, agriculture flourished, and both the importance
and success of the region grew. There always was, however, the issue of
seasonal flooding, which was managed through an extensive system of
flood-control levees constructed on the banks of the Mississippi, the
Missouri, and many of its tributaries. As often occurs behind the
limited protection of a levee structure, a sense of security was
instilled and more houses and other buildings were constructed in land
that before would have been annually flooded and, therefore, never
considered as a development option.

# The Event

Beginning almost a full year before any destruction would be credited to
The Great Flood of 1993, monthly rainfall amounts began to rise
significantly beyond recorded averages. Of the fourteen months leading
up to and including the summer of 1993, in fact, only three failed to
exceed prior averages (with December of 2002 experiencing three times
normal amounts) (see Figure 5.1.1). Heavy cloud coverage and
persistently-cooler temperatures during these preceding months further
exacerbated the drainage rates in the floodplain by limiting the amount
of water that would have otherwise evaporated from the land (thereby
drying it.) And thus, by early June as summer approached, the ground was
already saturated to its holding capacity, and many of the rivers and
streams that serve the Mississippi River were swelled beyond what was
normally observed for that month.

What began in June, and continued through August, was a deluge of
rainfall that broke nearly every precipitation record in the impacted
region (see sidebar 5.1.1). The ground, unable to absorb much if any of
the precipitation, dumped all of its runoff into any brook, stream, or
river that passed nearby. Slowly, the rates of discharge and river
elevations above normal began to rise. By mid-July, 45 of the almost 500
gauging stations in the region measured discharge rates consistent with
a "100-year discharge" -- a rate calculated to have a 1% chance of
occurring in any given year. Astonishing 500-year discharge rates were
being recorded along the Missouri River from southeastern Nebraska to
St. Louis and from southern Iowa to above St. Louis on the Mississippi.

One by one, levees along the banks of these rivers began to breach,
leaving the structures and lives behind them fully vulnerable to the
tide of water that quickly submerged nearly everything in sight. The
first of these levees collapsed on June 7^th^, 1993, but over the next
two months over one thousand of the protection devices would fail. The
result of these catastrophic failures was the flooding of over 6.6
million acres across 419 counties located in the Upper Mississippi River
Basin. Nine states were affected: North Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska,
Kansas, Minnesota, Iowa, Missouri, Wisconsin, and Illinois (FEMA, 2003).

# The Consequences

The consequences resulting from this devastating event place it among
the top-ten most destructive in the history of the nation. Aside from
the loss of life, ranging in number from 40 to 60 people depending upon
the source, there were countless injuries, billions of dollars in damage
to homes, businesses, government buildings, schools, utilities, roads,
rails, agricultural land and equipment, and a large but unquantifiable
cost associated with pollution, loss of work, lost tax revenues, lost
tourism, and other damaging consequences.

The five-month deluge significantly affected nine states, and resulted
in the evacuation of about 74,000 people (USACE, N/D). High water shut
down 12 commercial airports, 388 sewage treatment plants and almost all
bridges over the Missouri and Mississippi rivers between St. Louis,
Kansas City and Davenport, Iowa. Missouri, within which the two great
rivers meet, suffered the greatest amount of damage, with over \$3
billion in registered losses (Galloway, 1995).

The ultimate cost of the flood in dollars has been calculated to have
been somewhere between \$12 and \$16 billion, with the loss of
agriculture (equipment, structures, livestock, crops, etc.) accounting
for over half of these figures (Galloway, 1995). Of the remaining
amount, a significant portion is attributable to the businesses and
homes that were either damaged or destroyed both directly by the
floodwaters or indirectly by basement flooding and sewage system backups
(caused by very high groundwater levels, even in areas outside the
floodplain) or secondary electrical fires.

The housing infrastructure in the affected area suffered a particularly
strong blow. As many of the areas behind the flood protection levees
were residential, whole neighborhoods were wiped out in a matter of
minutes. While the affected areas tended to be patchwork in nature,
affecting individual neighborhoods while completely avoiding others,
there were a total of 75 communities that were entirely submerged
(IAFSM, 2003). Again, estimates vary in the number of houses that were
damaged or destroyed by the floods, but according to FEMA, who had the
unique vantage of individual interaction with the majority of homeowners
affected, there were more than 100,000 residences affected.

The transportation infrastructure, of which the rivers themselves were a
component, suffered heavily. Virtually all forms of transportation on
and across the Mississippi River were interrupted by the flood. Along
the length of the Mississippi River that forms the western boundary of
Illinois, more than 1,000 miles of roads were closed and nine of the 25
non-railroad bridges were shut down (USACE, N/D). During the height of
the flooding over 800 miles of railroad track was submerged. The
saturated soil and erosion-inducing currents combined in what resulted
in a failure of many bridges, culverts, roads, and highways. Among those
that were not damaged, many were unusable because of standing water over
at least a portion of their expanse. Airports, which tend to be
constructed in the floodplain because of the level terrain and proximity
to urban centers, were heavily impacted during the floods. Thirty-three
airports, including the Spirit of St. Louis Airport in St. Louis, MO,
sustained damage and had to temporarily cease operations.

Public utilities, which also tend to be located within the floodplain
(depending upon the utility type), also suffered extensive damage. Water
and wastewater treatment plants, which are often built on the banks of
the rivers for convenience and efficiency, were particularly hard hit.
Two-hundred municipal water systems, as identified by the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA), were damaged as result of the flood events.
Included in this group was the Des Moines Water Works, a utility that
provides safe water to the city of Des Moines, IA, and many of the
surrounding communities. Wastewater treatment plants not only sustained
physical damages to their facilities as a result of onsite flooding, but
environmental hazards were created when raw sewage flowed from the
damaged and inoperable facilities directly into the adjoining waterways.
In total, 388 wastewater treatment facilities were affected (Galloway,
1993). Damages to utilities, including water and wastewater treatment
facilities and storm sewer systems, exceeded \$85 million.

Public buildings, such as government offices, schools, police
departments, fire departments, among others, suffered over \$27 million
in damages. Parks and recreation areas sustained another \$22 million in
damage, and water control facilities an additional \$20 million. In the
private sector, in addition to the great financial losses associated
with business interruption and loss of inventory and equipment, between
35,000 and 45,000 commercial structures were damaged (USACE, N/D).

### Recovery Efforts of the Federal Government

Following the floods, 534 counties across nine states were declared for
Federal disaster aid (see Image 5.1.4). Response and recovery costs
across all federal government agencies totaled more than \$4.2 billion
in direct Federal assistance, \$271 million in payments from the
National Flood Insurance Program, and over \$621 million in Federal
loans to individuals, businesses, and communities. By the time the
recovery period had officially concluded, 168,340 people had registered
with the Federal Government for assistance (FEMA 2004). Of the nine
states, the most severe damage occurred in Iowa, Illinois, and Missouri.
Image 5.1.5 shows the distribution of FEMA funding by state.

On August 12^th^, 1993, President Clinton signed into law the "Emergency
Supplemental Appropriations for Relief From the Major, Widespread
Flooding in the Midwest Act of 1993", or H.R. 2667 ('the Act'). The Act
provided for \$6.3 billion in Federal assistance to the flood's victims
(though some of the funding was earmarked for other disaster-related
projects outside the scope of the 1993 flood).

The primary recipient of relief and recovery funding was the
agricultural industry. Almost \$2.35 billion was provided to farmers
through the **Commodity Credit Corporation**. The act gave
then-Secretary of Agriculture Mike Espy the authority to make payments
for crop losses at a 100-percent payment rate for each eligible claim.

Through FEMA, \$2.0 billion was provided for expenses related to
disaster relief operations, both for the Midwest floods and for other
disasters. The funding provided for the repair of public facilities
(public assistance) and for housing and other assistance to those
affected by the Midwest floods (individual assistance). \$235 million
was provided to the Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) for repairing damage
to Federal and non-Federal levees and other flood control works.

The Small Business Administration (SBA) was given \$389 million for use
in the provision of SBA loans. The low-interest SBA loans were disbursed
primarily to homeowners, renters, and businesses to assist in their
recovery from the physical damages that were caused by the flooding.
Some of the loans, however, were made to firms engaged in
agriculture-related activities that suffered substantial economic losses
due to farm-related damage. An additional \$200 million was provided for
long-term recovery efforts through the **Economic Development
Administration (EDA)**, which were grants provided to State and local
governments for economic recovery strategy, technical assistance, and
public works projects. Also provided was \$10 million for additional SBA
staff in order to facilitate the processing of loan applications.

The Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), which maintains the
Public Health and Social Service Emergency Fund, was provided with \$75
million for the repair and renovation of community health centers and
migrant health centers damaged by the Midwest floods and for social
services for flood victims.

The Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) was given \$200
million for disaster recovery planning in conjunction with State and
local agencies, and for disaster-related community development. This
money was disbursed through the **Community Development Block Grant
(CDBG)** program. HUD was also given \$50 million for the **HOME
Investment Partnerships Program**. This funding provided for a range of
housing activities, including acquisition, rehabilitation, tenant-based
rental assistance, and new construction in areas affected by the
flooding.

The Department of Agriculture (USDA) was provided with \$42 million for
the Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service (which was moved
into the **Farm Service Agency** in 1994). This included \$12 million to
hire temporary employees to accelerate processing of applications for
crop disaster claims, and \$30 million to assist farmers with debris
cleanup and the restoration of damaged farmland. The USDA's watershed
and flood prevention operations program was given \$60 million, for use
in repairing levees, dikes, and other flood-retarding structures and to
open water courses plugged with sediment and debris. In addition,
\$270.5 million was included for rural development and housing loans,
emergency water grants, very low income housing repair grants, and for
the Extension Service.

The Department of Transportation (DOT) was authorized to assist in
highway repair through \$175 million it was given through the Act. Using
this funding, the DOT provided immediate assistance to the States whose
highways and bridges had been damaged by flooding. In addition, \$21
million was provided for local rail assistance to help restore rail
service, and \$10 million was provided for the Coast Guard.

To assist with recovery in the employment sector, the Act provided
\$54.6 million for title III of the **Job Training Partnership Act**,
which authorized assistance to dislocated workers. This funding was made
available for the Secretary of Labor to finance temporary jobs to repair
damage caused by the floods, clean up affected areas, and provide public
safety and health services. Participants not only included workers that
had been dislocated by the floods, but workers displaced for other
reasons, and the long-term unemployed.

As many schools were damaged or destroyed, \$70 million was provided by
the Act for disaster assistance to those schools affected by the floods.
Also provided was \$30 million to supplement Federal Pell Grant awards,
in order for college financial aid officers to adjust student financial
aid to assist students who, due to the flood, lost income.

The Act provided \$1 million to repair and replace National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) facilities and equipment damaged
during the Midwest floods. This included repair and replacement of their
critical weather and flood warning systems that were damaged or
destroyed as result of the deluge.

The Department of the Interior (DOI) received a total of \$41.2 million.
The money was divided between five separate programs: The US Geological
Survey (USGS), The Fish and Wildlife Service, the National Park Service
(NPS), the Historic Preservation Fund, and the Bureau of Indian Affairs
(BIA). Using these funds, DOI was able to repair facilities on Indian
reservations and to rehabilitate national wildlife refuges, fish
hatcheries, dikes, roads, trails, and several national monuments and
historic sites damaged by the Midwest floods.

The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), which handles environmental
damage assessments, and the cleanup of leaking underground tanks and
pesticides, was given \$34 million for their efforts. Other more obscure
relief and recovery programs funded included \$300,000 for the Legal
Services Corporation to assist those harmed by the flood with legal
matters, and \$4 million for State youth and conservation corps programs
involved in disaster cleanup activities (The White House, 1993).

### The Missouri Buyout Program

One particular program, that melded recovery and mitigation, was the
federal buyout program. The concept behind a buyout program is that a
homeowner is given compensation for a property within the floodplain
that has suffered repeat damage from floods, in order to end the
disruptive and expensive cycle or reliance on Federal response and
recovery aid. The property is converted to un-buildable 'green space',
and future floods on the property cause no damage. Over time, the
initial investment to buy the house is paid back in the form of averted
relief and recovery funding. Since the program began, the Federal
government has spent over \$1 billion to buy more than 25,000 flooded
properties nationwide.

Following the floods, across the nine states in the Midwest that
suffered heavily, more than 11,888 homeowners sold their properties
under the buyout program (see Image 5.1.6). Missouri embraced the
program more than any other state, moving more than 4,700 households
permanently out of harm\'s way (Illinois, which was also heavily
involved in the buyout program, bought and demolished about 3,000
flood-prone properties, including all of the structures in one town.)
During the 1993 Midwest Floods, over 37,000 Missourians were displaced
from their homes. Many of these people were primed for buyout and ready
to move once approached by officials working with the program.

Funding for the program came collectively from FEMA\'s Hazard Mitigation
Grant Program (HMGP), the Department of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD) Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) Program, Missouri General
Revenue Funds, and other sources. In all, more than \$100 million was
allocated to the Missouri Buyout Program. In the early days of the
program, in an effort to make the benefits as sustainable and effective
as possible, Missouri Governor Mel Carnahan directed that priority use
for these funds would be to buy out flood-prone properties that are used
as a homeowner's primary residence.

The Missouri State Emergency Management Agency (SEMA) developed the
policies and procedures for allocating buyout funds to Missouri
communities, which at the time managed their own buyout programs.
Keeping in line with the constitutional rights of citizens, and with the
interests of the residents at the heart of the program, it was conducted
on a voluntary basis only. Community officials identified primary
residences within the floodplain that were damaged or destroyed by
flood-waters, and approached the homeowners with the offer of a buyout.
At that point, the homeowner needed merely to accept the government's
offer (which for many, was the obvious option between moving to higher
ground and facing the prospect of future floods).

Once the local government acquired a property, the land was
(theoretically) zoned in such a way as to create green space that would
never be built upon again -- oftentimes converted into wetlands. In
fact, the program's rules stated that no enclosed buildings except
public restrooms could be built on the acquired properties. Each
community that participated in the buyout program decided for itself
what it wanted to do with the acquired land within the parameters of
allowed uses, but these general guidelines persisted.

Since the 1993 Midwest floods, there have been other floods in the
affected areas, but they have significantly-less damage. Much of this is
credited to the Buyout program, which removed many of the most at-risk
structures from the floods' paths. Local governments' efforts to turn
much of the riskiest floodplain into parks and greenways have proven
their worth time and time again. The Buyout Program is already
considered a success, having clearly paid for itself and provided a
positive return on the tax dollars invested. As an example, when the
1995 Flood occurred, over half of the 5,500 properties targeted by the
1993 buyout program were empty and therefore were unaffected when the
flood waters rose again. In St. Charles County, which sits at the
confluence of the Missouri and Mississippi Rivers, the success is
extraordinary. In that county alone, the combined costs of the 1993
flood exceeded \$160 million. The number of potentially occupied
properties there in the 100 year floodplain that were purchased under
the buyout program was 1374 (which included over 560 single family
residences and three mobile home parks with 814 pads.) When the 1995
spring rains hit, causing the third worst flood of record, 1,000 fewer
families (approximately 2,500 people) were out of harm's way as a result
of those efforts in St. Charles County alone.

### Conclusion

The 1993 Midwest floods were unprecedented -- and remain the costliest
floods in U.S. history. They shattered all assumptions about the ability
of human efforts to control rivers by means of engineered levees and
other water retention systems, and caused great financial and physical
suffering. Many communities never recovered, while others remain altered
to this day. Through the passage of the Flood Relief Act, the Federal
government acted quickly to provide much of the funding required to
rebuild the structures, infrastructure, and business losses that
resulted, but officials clearly recognized that merely spending money to
rebuild on the same ground would offer no solution to the long term
problem that existed before the floods occurred. The voluntary Home
Buyout Program is one of many different kinds of projects that combined
recovery with mitigation to make more resilient communities in the long
term. Over a decade later, most of these communities have recovered
thanks to the support of the federal government -- but if history is any
judge for the future, floods will come again, and when they do these
communities should suffer significantly less because of the wise
recovery planning discussed in this case.

**[References:]{.underline}**

11^th^ Hour. 2005. "The Great Midwest Floods of 1993."
<http://www.e11th-hour.org/resources/timelines/floods.1993.html>

FEMA. 2003. The Great Midwest Flood: Voices 10 Years Later." The
National Flood Insurance Program. May.
<http://www.fema.gov/nfip/voices.shtm>

FEMA. 2004. "The Great Midwest Floods of 1993." FEMA Fact Sheet.
<http://www.fema.gov/hazards/floods/mwfld93.shtm>

Galloway, Gerald E. 1995. "Learning from the Mississippi Flood of 1993:
Impacts, Management Issues, and Areas for Research." U.S. -- Italy
Research Workshop on the Hydrometeorology, Impacts, and Management of
Floods. Perugia, Italy, November 1995.

IAFSM. 2003. "10 Years After the Midwest Floods of 1993." The Illinois
Association for Floodplain and Stormwater Management. IAFSM News. Fall
2003.

Johnson, Gary P., Robert Holmes, Lloyd White. 2003. "The Great Flood of
1993 on the Upper Mississippi River -- 10 Years Later." United States
Geological Survey (USGS). <http://il.water.usgs.gov/>

The White House. 1993. "Statement by the President: H.R. 2667". August
12.
<http://www.ibiblio.org/pub/archives/whitehouse-papers/1993/Aug/Statement-on-Flood-Relief-Act-8-12-93>

USACE. N/D. "The Great Flood of 1993 Post Flood Report."
<http://www.mvr.usace.army.mil/PublicAffairsOffice/HistoricArchives/Floodof1993/pafr.htm>

**Figure 5.1.1: Average Rainfall in the months prior to and during the
1993 Midwest Floods.**

![](media/image1.wmf){width="6.497916666666667in" height="3.44375in"}

Source: Johnson, 2003.

##### Figure 5.1.2: The Upper Mississippi River Basin

![](media/image2.png){width="6.123611111111111in"
height="4.053472222222222in"}

Source: Johnson, 2003.

**Figure 5.1.3: Flood Stages Recorded in the 1993 Midwest Flood**.

![](media/image3.wmf){width="4.929166666666666in"
height="7.602083333333334in"}

Source: Johnson, 2003.

**Figure 5.1.4: Declared Counties for the 1993 Midwest Floods**

![](media/image4.wmf){width="6.165972222222222in"
height="7.980555555555555in"}

Source: FEMA.2003

**Image 5.1.5: Total FEMA Expenditures per State**

![](media/image5.wmf){width="6.459722222222222in"
height="8.096527777777778in"}

Source: FEMA, 2003.

**Image 5.1.6: FEMA Program Expenditures per State in the 1993 Midwest
Floods**

![](media/image6.wmf){width="6.590277777777778in"
height="8.342361111111112in"}

Source: FEMA, 2003.

**Image 5.1.6: Hazard Mitigation Projects, June 1993-April 2003, per
county**

![](media/image7.wmf){width="6.503472222222222in" height="8.34375in"}

Source: FEMA, 2003

**Sidebar 5.1.1: Chronology of Storms Contributing to the 1993 Midwest
Floods**

> The following is a chronology of some of the more notable storms that
> occurred over the region from June to August. In June and July, rain
> fell somewhere in the region every day.
>
> **June 16-18**\--Two to seven inches of rain fell throughout southern
> Minnesota, northern Iowa, and southwestern Wisconsin, areas with
> already saturated soils. The heaviest rain fell directly over the
> Minnesota River. These storms caused the flooding on the Minnesota and
> Mississippi rivers in Minnesota and the Chippewa and Black rivers in
> Wisconsin that began the entire Mississippi River flood event. Further
> precipitation during the next few days caused flooding in and near
> Black River Falls, Wis., which led to a partial failure of the dam. It
> also caused flooding in other tributary basins in Wisconsin, namely,
> the Chippewa, Buffalo, Trempealeau, and Wisconsin River basins.
>
> **June 25**\--Additional localized rainfall in central Iowa
> contributed to the runoff at the three Iowa reservoirs\--Saylorville,
> Coralville, and Red Rock.
>
> **June 27**\--Several areas recorded up to 4 inches of rainfall. The
> Iowa River basin below Coralville Lake was one of the areas that
> received heavy precipitation. Three to 5 inches fell over the
> Papillion Creek basin in Omaha, Neb.
>
> **June 28**\--Additional rainfall around Iowa City, Iowa, and the
> upper Mississippi River below Dubuque, Iowa, continued to aggravate
> the situation.
>
> **June 29**\--An additional 2 inches of rain fell on Iowa City and the
> upper Mississippi River during the night. Seven inches of rain
> occurred over the Lake Okoboji and Spirit Lake area in Iowa.
>
> **July 1**\--Near Quincy, Ill., an additional 2 to 5 inches of
> precipitation fell. Flood waters continued to rise along a 300-mile
> stretch of the Mississippi River on July 2. On July 6, the Mississippi
> River crested for the second time at Dubuque. The second crest
> continued downstream to the Quad-Cities, Keithsburg, Ill., and
> Hannibal, Mo., and new records were established.
>
> **July 2-5**\--Five to 7 inches of rain was reported in an area from
> Mitchell to Madison, S.D.
>
> **July 3-9**\--Six to ten inches of rain fell in various locations in
> Iowa, Kansas, and Missouri. Rain on July 3 caused the third episode of
> significant flooding in Marshall, Minn., in two months.
>
> **July 4-5**\--This storm was a significant event, producing a large
> amount of rainfall over southern Iowa. It produced a total of 4 to 8
> inches of rain across a 250-mile long path from Taylor County in
> southwest Iowa, northeastward through Oskaloosa, Marengo, Cedar
> Rapids, and Dubuque.
>
> **July 7-8**\--Additional rainfall occurred on the Des Moines River
> basin. The rivers throughout central Iowa had not receded from the
> storm on July 4 and the three major reservoirs in the area were at
> capacity. Strong thunderstorms moved into central Iowa before sunrise
> on July 8 and rapidly traversed eastward across Iowa and into
> Illinois. A second set of thunderstorms developed over west-central
> Iowa later in the afternoon and slowly moved along the same path as
> the morning storms. By the time these storms weakened on July 9, 3 to
> 9 inches of rain fell in an uninterrupted 275-mile long band from the
> Nebraska border at Onawam eastward through Guttenburg, Iowa. Up to 8.5
> inches of rain fell on the Des Moines River basin at Jefferson, Iowa.
> Marshalltown, Iowa, received up to 3 inches while 1 to 2 inches of
> rain fell over various parts of eastern Iowa and western Illinois. The
> Mississippi River crested for a third time at Camanche, Iowa, and the
> Quad-Cities also crested again. The runoff from the July 4 and July 8
> storms caused record or near-record peak discharges on the Iowa,
> Skunk, Raccoon, and Des Moines River basins. The flood peaks from
> these tributaries entered the Mississippi River at about the same time
> the flood peak from the late June storm in the northern basins reached
> Keokuk, Iowa. The crest approached St. Louis from the north and joined
> high water coming in from the west down the Missouri River, an event
> that has never occurred since record keeping began.
>
> **July 11**\--Moderate to heavy rainfall fell in central Illinois.
>
> **July 13**\--Heavy rainfall occurred in the Des Moines area.
>
> **July 15-16**\--Up to 7 inches of rain fell in eastern North Dakota
> and western Minnesota. These storms caused flooding in the upper
> reaches of the Minnesota River basin in Minnesota and the James River
> basin in North Dakota.
>
> **July 17**\--Two to 5 inches of rain was reported in about a one-hour
> period over the Mill Creek basin near Cherokee, Iowa.
>
> **July 18**\--Light to heavy precipitation occurred across Iowa,
> Wisconsin, and Illinois. Portions of the Cedar River basin received up
> to an additional 5 inches of rainfall. Heavy rains caused flooding on
> the Baraboo River in Wisconsin.
>
> **July 22-25**\--Up to 13 inches of rain fell in parts of Nebraska,
> Kansas, North Dakota, Missouri, Iowa, and Illinois, resulting in peak
> stages along the Missouri River south of Omaha, Neb. On July 24, an
> additional 4 inches of rain fell on southern portions of Iowa and
> Illinois. The Mississippi River began to rise again and the Illinois
> Waterway also went above flood stage. There were unofficial reports of
> up to 16 inches of rainfall in southeast Nebraska.
>
> **July 31**\--Significant precipitation occurred in eastern Iowa. Iowa
> City and areas south reported 2 to 3 inches of additional rain.
>
> **Aug. 10**\--Up to 4 inches of rain fell near Iowa City.
>
> **Aug. 11**\--Additional precipitation occurred throughout the area
> with up to 5 inches falling in the Iowa River and Cedar River basins.
> Flash flooding occurred along the Iowa River near Marshalltown and
> Tama, Iowa, in the same area that experienced flooding previously.
>
> **Aug. 20** \--Six inches of rain occurred in two hours over the
> southern Black Hills of South Dakota.
>
> **Aug. 21**\--Seven to 10 inches of rain fell near Wolf Point, Mont.

Source: USACE, N/D

## 

## **Case Study 5.2: Housing Reconstruction after the 1994 Northridge Earthquake** 

# Introduction

On the morning of January 17th, 1994 at 4:31AM, the residents of Los
Angeles were awakened to the severe ground shaking of a magnitude 6.9
earthquake. The tremor's epicenter was directly under the town of
Northridge, a Los Angeles suburb located in the San Fernando Valley.
Those fateful seconds would prove to be the beginning of the most
expensive natural disaster in the history of the country, causing over
\$15 billion in property damage, as well as the deaths of 57 people and
thousands of injuries. Fortunately, the area was well prepared for the
event, as became evident one year later when the Kobe earthquake, with
an identical magnitude, caused several thousands of fatalities and much
more extensive property damage in comparison. None-the-less, thousands
of homes were damaged or destroyed, and a monumental task of recovery to
the housing infrastructure was required. This case will examine the
earthquake, its consequences, and the federal government efforts to
reconstruct the housing stock damaged as result.

# 

# The Event

The City of Northridge is located approximately 20 miles heading
northwest from the City of Los Angeles. Northridge is located entirely
within the San Fernando Valley -- an area of urban sprawl characterized
by residential neighborhoods, vast apartment complexes, industrial
parks, low-rise office buildings, and several shopping malls. The
well-known San Andreas Fault runs approximately 62 miles to the east and
the north of the San Fernando Valley.

The oval-shaped San Fernando Valley runs approximately 18 miles wide
from east to west, and 10 miles wide from north to south. The valley's
northern border is made up by the Verdugo Mountains, its western border
by the San Gabriel Mountains, by the Simi Hills (made famous by the 2003
Firestorm) and the Santa Susana Mountains to the northwest, and to the
south by the Santa Monica Mountains. The ground composition of the
valley is dominated by thick alluvial fill. Under the alluvium lie miles
of primarily marine-based sediment. Below the sediment lies granite and
metamorphic rock layers.

Prior to January of 1994, there had been three major destructive
earthquakes in California in modern times. In 1906, the San Francisco
Earthquake struck, causing significant damage related to the fires that
raged in the quake's aftermath. In 1971, the magnitude 6.6 Sylmar
Earthquake struck immediately east of where the 1994 quake struck in the
San Fernando Valley, though the epicenter was away from urbanized zones.
In 1989, San Francisco was affected by the magnitude 7.1 Loma Prieta
Earthquake, which was epicentered to the south of the city. California's
diverse system of faults were well known, and intricately mapped.
However, geologists were aware that many unknown faults could lie below
the surface unbeknownst to urban and emergency planners.

On January 17^th^, 1994, at exactly 4:30am, a magnitude 6.7 (also
reported as 6.8 and 6.9, depending upon the monitoring station)
earthquake struck 18km below the surface under the heavily urbanized San
Fernando Valley. At this time, most residents were asleep in their
homes. The quake, which lasted about fifteen seconds, was the first to
occur immediately below an area of such heavy human settlement in the
United States. The cause of the earthquake was identified as movement
which occurred along a **blind** (in that it did not break the ground
surface) **thrust fault**. Because the fault had never broken the
surface (nor did it in this event), and had not caused any significant
seismic activity to date, it had not been identified by geologists.

Within the San Fernando Valley, as is common in most earthquakes, the
severity of shaking varied by location. The strongest shaking occurred
within an area that was about 30 miles in diameter, and which included
southern Ventura and northern Los Angeles counties. Within this zone of
great movement there existed a high number of buildings, both large and
small in size, that were exposed to extreme lateral shaking.

Peak rates of **ground acceleration** for the quake, which, in contrast
to the measurements provided by the Richter Scale, measure how hard the
earth shakes, broke records for the region. Accelerations as great as
1.0g were recorded throughout a vast area within the Valley, rather than
in individual, isolated areas as had been characteristically observed in
previous events. The explanation for these measurements was the
combination of the fact that it was a thrust-type earthquake and that
its epicenter had occurred immediately below the urbanized area (Los
Angeles FD, 1994).

Immediately following the earthquake, the aftershocks began. Of the
thousands of registered aftershocks that occurred in the weeks that
followed, 13 were of magnitude greater than or equal to 4.0 (between the
dates of January 18^th^ and January 28^th^, 1994.) These aftershocks
were of particular importance because many of the buildings that were
damaged but did not collapse were much more vulnerable to shaking than
they had been before the January 17^th^ event, and in many buildings
where inspectors had not yet been able to inspect, such damage often
went unnoticed.

The movement of the plates that caused the Northridge Earthquake, the
parts of the San Fernando Valley rose vertically as much as 70
centimeters, and the entire valley shifted northward towards the city of
Bakersfield, California, by a few centimeters (Los Angeles FD, 1994).

# The Consequences

The Northridge Earthquake, when compared to other major seismic events
that have occurred both within the country and throughout the world,
could only be called moderate in magnitude. However, because of its
epicentral location lying immediately beneath the heavily populated San
Fernando Valley, it resulted in one of the most destructive disasters in
modern US history.

The destruction was spread across all major sectors; housing,
commercial, government, transportation, utilities, and more. Though the
most dramatic pictures broadcast throughout the world by the media were
of collapsed malls, highways, and parking garages, the housing sector
suffered the greatest overall damage in terms of both the number of
structures and financial loss.

The following list summarizes the major destruction that occurred:

-   57 people died, and as many as 9000 were injured

-   7 freeway bridges collapsed

-   170 bridges suffered damages

-   Six major freeways sustained collapses along raised sections

-   450 public buildings, including schools, libraries, recreation
    centers, and offices, suffered significant damage.

-   6000 commercial buildings were damaged

-   9 large parking garages collapsed

-   9 hospitals were closed

-   1 dam suffered major structural damaged (but did not fail)

-   10,200 residential buildings (totaling 49,000 housing units)
    suffered serious structural damage, with an additional 85,000
    structures (containing 388,000 housing units) suffered minor damage.
    (Comiero, 1996)

Building inspectors estimated that, of all the structures deemed unfit
for habitation, 82% were residential in nature. Of this amount, 77% were
apartment or condominiums, while the rest were single-family homes.
Within a week of the event, over 14,500 housing units were deemed
uninhabitable, and that number only climbed as more inspections were
made. This damage was also recorded over a wide geographic base, with
buildings receiving 'red tags' or 'yellow tags' as far away as the Santa
Clarita Valley to the north, south-central Los Angeles to the south,
Azusa to the east, and eastern Ventura County to the west.

Low-rise multistory wood-frame apartments that had a first floor
'soft-storey' garage suffered the greatest number of collapses and other
structural damages. The soft-storey lacked the necessary lateral support
to maintain their integrity during the intense side to side shaking that
occurred during the quake. In many of these structures, the second floor
collapsed completely onto the first, crushing cars and whatever else
happened to be stored there. In addition to these structures, hundreds
of apartment buildings with strong first floors were severely damaged.
In the Sherman Oaks neighborhood, virtually all of the buildings were
made uninhabitable by the quake (and had the quake been stronger, there
surely would have been great loss of life through what would have been
widespread collapse of these same structures).

Houses that were not on solid foundations (unbolted houses) and older
houses with antiquated '**cripple-stud** foundations' suffered heavily
from the violent shaking. Even many of the '**slab-on-grade**'
foundations, which should have been protected from the shaking, suffered
severe damages because they were not correctly anchored to those
foundations. Chimneys of all types suffered cracking and collapse, and
many masonry block (cinder block) walls collapsed or were damaged beyond
repair. Wood homes, most significantly those that were two-storeys in
height, became very elastic during the shaking, which resulted in heavy
damages to both the structure and the contents of the home. Most of the
homes that suffered the heaviest damages were not up to current building
code standards of the time, which would have prevented such structural
movement.

Mobile homes, which tend to perform terribly in many different kinds of
natural disasters, fared no better in this earthquake. The most common
source of damage was caused by these homes falling off of their
temporary foundations. In Santa Clarita, which is about fifteen and a
half miles from the earthquake's epicenter, just under half of the 3,000
mobile homes within the county fell free of their foundations. Many
(almost 150) of these homes were destroyed in fires when electrical and
gas lines broke free during their fall from the foundation. It is well
known that this risk to mobile homes associated with earthquakes could
easily be mitigated through conversion of foundations to be permanent in
nature, or installing bracing to the temporary foundations. (Los Angeles
FD, 1994)

The Northridge Earthquake struck what was, at the time, a region of the
country where some of the most comprehensive earthquake mitigation and
preparedness measures had been taken. Like the 1993 World Trade Center
bombing had taught planners there how to more adequately evacuate the
buildings during a disaster -- a lesson that saved many lives on
September 11, 2001, the 1971 earthquake in San Fernando highlighted
deficiencies in construction standards that were subsequently addressed.
Therefore, in a high percentage of the structures affected by the 1971
event, earthquake resiliency was a prime consideration during
construction (RMS, 2004). The 1994 earthquake also occurred early in the
morning when the freeways were experiencing little traffic, and when
public buildings were largely unoccupied. As a result of these two
factors, the event was not nearly as damaging as it could have been. As
a comparison, the Kobe, Japan earthquake, which struck exactly one year
later with exactly the same magnitude, resulted in thousands of deaths
as opposed to the dozens in California. California's advancements in
earthquake building code enforcement was credited heavily with the
disparities in damages between the two events, and between Northridge
and many other historical earthquakes of the same magnitude and shaken
experienced elsewhere in the world.

Yet, despite the consolatory recognition of how much worse things could
have been, the fact remained that tens of thousands of structures would
need repair or replacement. Most notably, in the case of residential
housing, this meant that thousands of families would be in dire and
immediate need of a home.

[]{.mark}

### Recovery Efforts of the Federal Government

Assistance to Californians for the housing infrastructure came through
several government programs. The largest of these sources include:

-   Small Business Administration (SBA) homeowner loans

-   SBA personal property loans

-   SBA business loans

-   Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) individual and family
    grants (IFGs)

-   FEMA minimum home repair (MHR) grants; and

-   HUD programs, including grants, loans, and Section 8 vouchers.

Research into the housing reconstruction following the disaster
established that the total cost of rebuilding the affected housing
sector amounted to between \$12 and \$13 billion. This figure, in
addition to the Federal sources listed above, includes private
insurance. It does not, however, include loans taken from private
institutions (private bank loans) or reliance on personal savings,
which, if known, would raise the final figure significantly (Comiero,
1996). As stated, the bulk of this total figure was covered by private
insurance settlements -- the exact amount lies somewhere between \$8 and
\$10 billion (an amount that actually exceeded the premiums collected by
the insurance companies for such an event in that area).

[]{.mark}

Despite the heavy payouts by private insurance companies, approximately
60% of the residential units that were damaged by the Northridge
Earthquake were not adequately covered through the purchase of
earthquake insurance. For these people, many of which did not have the
personal finances to cover the damage to or loss of their homes, Federal
assistance was their only hope.

The Small Business Administration (SBA) provided the greatest amount of
assistance to these homeowners and renters (as well as businesses),
primarily through the granting of three distinct financial aid programs.
Together, the SBA programs represented approximately 64% of all federal
assistance provided for housing reconstruction in the aftermath of the
earthquake. There is no clear distinction between the homeowner loans
and the business loans because of the fact that multifamily homes were
considered businesses under the SBA program, thus validating the
qualifications of such homeowners for the business loans. The loans were
designed to provide up to a limited amount, according to the intended
purpose of the loan, as illustrated below:

-   SBA Business Loan -- up to \$1.5 million

-   SBA Homeowner Loan -- up to \$200,000

-   SBA Personal Property Loan -- up to \$40,000

The SBA received a total of 260,000 applications for these three loan
types, of which they approved 121,000 and subsequently disbursed \$3.3
billion. Of this amount, the following amounts were given to each of the
three loan types:

-   SBA Business Loan - \$957 million (29%)

-   SBA Homeowner Loan - \$2.2 billion (66.6%)

-   SBA Personal Property Loan - \$145 million (4.4%)

The second largest source of relief and recovery funding for homeowners
and renters came from the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).
FEMA offered two separate programs, both of which were aimed at
assisting in the short term, immediate rehabilitation. Their grants had
relatively simple eligibility requirements, and therefore almost anyone
with a legitimate claim was given funding. FEMA, in an effort to ensure
a fair application process, went as far as to have their publications
translated into several languages spoken by people in the affected
areas, and did their best to ensure that translators would be available
at the application interviews whenever possible.

The first of these FEMA programs, the Minimum Home Repair (MHR) Grant
program, was created to cover the cost of repairing significant home
repairs of relatively minor damages. The grants ranged in size from
several hundred dollars up to a maximum of \$10,000, but the average
grant size was \$2,900. Using a 'fast-track assistance system', FEMA was
able to disburse checks of up to \$2,350 without first having to perform
detailed inspections as long as the applicant resided within identified
zones of strong shaking or within a certain distance from the
earthquake's epicenter. Over 280,000 people applied for the MHR program,
resulting in the granting by FEMA of over \$787 million in funds.

The other grant program offered by FEMA was their Individual and Family
Grant (IFG) program, which has since been restructured into the
Individuals and Households (IHP) Program under the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS). Under this program, applicants were eligible
for up to \$12,200 for the replacement and repair of real estate and
personal property. In the Northridge Earthquake recovery period, over
660,000 people applied for the IFG program, resulting in FEMA's granting
of \$256 million.

The Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) maintained several
loan and grant programs that were made available to both homeowners and
renters affected by the disaster. For those who were found ineligible
for the SBA loans, the HUD programs were often a viable alternative. At
first, HUD provided \$200 million in emergency Section 8 Vouchers (see
Sidebar 5.2.2) for renters in damaged low income properties who could
not afford to cover their rent. Another \$300 million was provided under
the HUD Home Investment Partnership Program (HOME) and the Community
Development Block Grant (CDBG) program, disbursed by local governments
through their departments of housing at the discretion of the local
jurisdiction. These funds were primarily used for rehabilitation of poor
residential neighborhoods that suffered heavily from the earthquake. HUD
grants and loans in the Los Angeles area averaged \$51,000 in size, and
were awarded primarily to low-income renters and to multifamily building
owners.

Many renters and homeowners found relief, though not necessarily
recovery, through the provision of FEMA funding by way of the Temporary
Housing Assistance Program. Under this program, if an applicant's
insurance does not cover the cost of temporary housing, as renters they
could be granted the cost of two months' rent, and as homeowners the
cost of three months' rent. Through the program, FEMA approved over
119,000 applications for a total government expenditure of over \$380
million. The rules of this program as they applied to the victims of the
Northridge Earthquake were such that applicants were not able to apply
them to home repairs or to repair or replace damaged personal property,
and therefore the grant technically was not considered a traditional
reconstruction program.

Of all the Federal reconstruction programs, the money disbursed was
divided as follows:

-   SBA Homeowner Loans -- 43%

```{=html}
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```
-   SBA Personal Property Loans -- 3%

-   SBA Business Loans -- 18%

-   FEMA Individual and Family Grants (IFGs) -- 4%

-   FEMA Minimum Home Repair (MHR) Grants -- 16%

-   HUD programs, including grants, loans, and Section 8 vouchers -- 16%

As would be expected considering the damage incurred upon the structures
in the San Fernando Valley, the greatest amount of Federal recovery
assistance, 59%, was given to single-family homeowners. Sixteen percent
went to the tenants and owners of multifamily structures, though it has
been shown that damages to these structures went largely unreported due
to the inadequate experience of inspectors brought in from out of state,
and because many owners or management companies did not adequately
address the maintenance needs of the building (Loukaitou-Sideris, 2004).

### 

### Conclusion

Like all recovery operations, there were occasional hardships, setbacks,
disagreements, and failures. But overall, the recovery of the housing
market in the areas affected by the Northridge Earthquake was seen as a
resounding success. Though a good portion of the recovery, which was
followed by a reversal in a downward trend in the housing market, is
credited with a national rise in the housing markets nationwide, the
speed and scope of the recovery would surely have been much less
impressive without the Federal aid provided. It is well recognized that
the Federal programs do not aim to restore houses back to their
pre-disaster condition, but nor do they claim to do so -- the amounts of
the grants and loans make this point clear. Homeowners and communities
alike are expected to participate in multiple mechanisms and programs
that increase disaster resilience, including observance of building
codes, retrofitting of weak structures, insurance coverage, among
others. These programs were designed to get victims back on their feet,
and for many hundreds of thousands of applicants, that is exactly what
they did.

**[References:]{.underline}**

Comerio, Mary C., John D. Landis, and Catherine J. Firpo, with Juan
Pablo Monzon. 1996. "Residential Earthquake Recovery: Improving
California\'s Post-Disaster Rebuilding Policies and Programs."
California Policy Seminar Brief Series. September.

Corporation for Supportive Housing. N/D. "Department of Housing and
Urban Development Housing Choice Voucher Program."
<http://www.csh.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=Page.viewPage&pageID=3144>

Los Angeles Fire Department. 1994. "The January 17, 1994 Northridge
Earthquake." EQE Summary Report.
<http://www.lafire.com/famous_fires/940117_NorthridgeEarthquake/quake/01_EQE_exsummary.htm>

Los Angeles Fire Department 2. 1994. "Northridge Earthquake: January 17,
1994." <http://www.lafd.org/eq.htm>

Loukaitou-Sideris, Anastasia and Nabil M. Kamel. 2004. Residential
Recovery from the Northridge Earthquake: An Evaluation of Federal
Assistance Programs. California Policy Research Center. University of
California.

Risk Management Solutions (RMS). 2004. "Northridge Earthquake 10-Year
Retrospective." May 13.
<http://www.rms.com/publications/northridgeeq_retro.pdf>

Science. 1994. "The Magnitude 6.7 Northridge, California, Earthquake of
17 January 1994." Scientists of the U.S. Geological Survey and the
Southern California Earthquake Center. Vol.266, No. 5184. October 21.
Pp. 389-397.

**Image 5.2.1: Intensity Distribution for the Northridge Earthquake**

![](media/image8.wmf){width="6.498611111111111in"
height="5.824305555555555in"}

Source: US Geological Survey

**Image 5.2.2: Distribution of Federal Assistance Funds and
Appropriations in the Northridge Earthquake**

![](media/image9.wmf){width="6.501388888888889in"
height="5.184722222222222in"}

Source: Loukaitou-Sideris, 2004.

**Sidebar 5.2.1: Los Angeles Fire Department Operations Following the
Northridge Earthquake**

> On January 17, 1994, a magnitude 6.8 earthquake occurred at 0431 hours
> in Los Angeles. The earthquake\'s epicenter was in Northridge
> according to the Caltech Seismological Laboratory. Although the
> surface wave magnitude of this earthquake was initially estimated to
> be 6.6, it was later upgraded to 6.8 by the National Earthquake
> Information Center.
>
> The following is a listing of significant events relative to this
> earthquake, and actions taken by the Los Angeles City Fire Department
> to mitigate its impact upon residents of the City of Los Angeles.
> Where possible, events are listed in chronological order.
>
> Immediately following the earthquake, the L.A.F.D. initiated the
> Earthquake Emergency Operational Mode. The Los Angeles County Fire
> Department, Los Angeles Police Department, Area \~A\~ Fire Departments
> (Beverly Hills, Culver City and Santa Monica), the Medical Alert
> Center and the California Highway Patrol were notified as to our
> operational status. Degraded dispatching was instituted citywide.
>
> At 0435 hours, the Emergency Operations Center was activated.
>
> As a result of the earthquake, one radio repeater site was rendered
> inoperative. This, however, did not adversely affect radio
> communications.
>
> One of two 420 kilowatt back-up generators at the Information Services
> Division did not function properly when electricity was lost following
> the earthquake. Under an excessive load, the second of the two back-up
> generators overheated and then it too failed to operate.
>
> The FCCS I computer system at O.C.D. relies on the system at I.S.D. to
> be operational. Therefore, when the computer system at I.S.D. lost
> power, the computer system at O.C.D. also went down and \"manual
> mode\" dispatching was instituted. This failure occurred at 0505 hours
> and manual mode dispatching continued until the Department of Water
> and Power restored the electricity approximately six hours later.
>
> Fire department communications were not interrupted nor adversely
> impacted with the failure of the computer system.
>
> Following the initial assessment by fire companies conducting their
> district drive-thru inspections, Division 3 was identified as the area
> most severely impacted by the earthquake. Fire companies reported
> numerous loom-ups, and severe structural damage to many buildings,
> both residential and commercial. At 0545 hours, Department Command was
> established at O.C.D. and Mayor Riordan declared a state of emergency.
>
> By 0645 hours, as many as 50 structure fires were reported in addition
> to numerous ruptures in water and natural gas mains. Power outages
> were reported city wide.
>
> The Santa Monica Fire Department requested mutual aid, however, this
> request could not be honored due to the critical state of events
> within the city of Los Angeles. Two of the six strike teams requested
> from Region I were subsequently directed to Santa Monica to provide
> necessary assistance.
>
> Severe damage to several freeways was reported. Many freeways
> collapsed entirely or were damaged enough to require closure.
> Landslides hindered the movement of some fire companies in hilly areas
> as they performed their drive-thru inspections.
>
> Sporadic looting was reported by fire companies. However, it did not
> appear to be a widespread problem during daylight hours.
>
> By 0700 hours, there were over 100 active incidents being handled by
> field resources.
>
> The following is a summary of Command Decisions that were made during
> the initial hours following the earthquake.
>
> 1\. The entire off-going shift (\"C\" shift) was held over to provide
> additional staffing.
>
> 2\. Disaster Preparedness Section Staff were recalled to staff the
> Urban Search and Rescue vehicle.
>
> 3\. The Region I Coordinator (L.A. County Fire) was contacted and six
> strike teams and one USAR team were requested to respond to Valley
> Command, which was being established at fire station 88.
>
> 4\. L.A.F.D. Command Staff was recalled to O.C.D.
>
> 5\. Fire station 88 was established as the staging area for fire
> department resources.
>
> 6\. L.A.F.D. inspectors were recalled to formulate damage assessment
> teams.
>
> 7\. Dispatchers were sent to Coldwater to establish a back-up dispatch
> site.
>
> 8\. Twenty-six fire companies were deployed into the valley to augment
> existing division 3 resources.
>
> 9\. Two additional USAR teams were immediately dispatched to F.S. 88
> at the request of Region I.
>
> By 0945 hours, all fires in the valley were controlled and there were
> no active major structure fires in progress.
>
> Due to severe damage following the earthquake, six valley hospitals
> closed. The hospitals that closed were as follows: Holy Cross,
> Oliveview, Northridge, Granada Hills, Kaiser Panorama City and West
> Hills.
>
> Red Cross Shelters were established within the first twenty-four hours
> at the following locations: Sylmar High School, Reseda High School,
> San Fernando Recreation- Center, Canyon High School, Van Nuys Church
> of Christ, Glendale Armory, Hollywood High School, and Granada Hills
> High School.
>
> Power began to be restored in several areas of the valley in the late
> evening and early morning. As power came back on, numerous reports of
> electrical shorts and live power lines were received.
>
> By the end of the day, there were 18 confirmed deaths and 250 reported
> injuries, however, the exact number of casualties could not be
> ascertained.
>
> There were a total of 466 fires reported on January 17. Routinely
> there are between 30 and 40 fires reported on a daily basis in the
> city of Los Angeles.
>
> Within the first 24 hours of the earthquake the L.A.F.D. responded to
> more than 2,200 incidents, which nearly approximates 2 1/2 times the
> daily average.

#### Significant Incidents 

> One of the most significant incidents in terms of life loss occurred
> at a 3-story, 120 unit apartment complex located at 9565 Reseda
> Boulevard. Task Forces 70 and 73 were first to arrive on the scene and
> reported the collapse of a 3-story apartment building. The first floor
> was crushed in the collapse, reduced to a crawl space of two to three
> feet. Many of those that perished were buried under collapsed walls
> and the ceiling.
>
> Ultimately involved in the rescue operation were seven L.A. City Fire
> companies, an L.A. City Fire USAR team, and USAR teams from L.A.
> County, Riverside County, Orange County and the State Office of
> Emergency Services.
>
> Several residents self-evacuated prior to and shortly after the
> arrival of fire companies. Twenty-five to thirty residents were
> assisted out of the structure by firefighters. Eight were evacuated by
> firefighters and USAR teams and then were transported to area
> hospitals in conditions ranging from serious to critical.
>
> To further assist with locating trapped victims, L.A.P.D. search dogs
> were brought in. Unfortunately, all that remained trapped had
> perished.
>
> Sixteen fatalities in all resulted from the collapse of this building.
>
> Another significant incident occurred at the Northridge Fashion Mall.
> A street sweeper that was working on the first floor of a 3-story
> parking structure was trapped in his pick-up truck when the entire
> parking structure collapsed.
>
> An L.A. City Fire USAR team was at the scene but was redirected to the
> incident occurring on Reseda Boulevard due to the number of lives
> involved. Light Force 89, Engine 1, Heavy Utility 56 and a Gas Company
> Crew continued the rescue effort. As the incident progressed an L.A.
> County USAR team was directed to the location to assist.
>
> Firefighters assisted by the Gas Company crew utilized the \'Jaws of
> Life\', hydraulic jacks, sledge hammers, saws, and the Gas Company\'s
> jack hammer to reach the man who was pinned and in critical condition.
>
> Aqueous Film Forming Foam had to be flowed down under the crushed
> pick-up truck, to prevent the ignition of leaking fuel.
>
> It took firefighters six to seven hours to successfully extricate the
> man. He was transported to the U.C.L.A. Medical Center in critical
> condition by Air Ambulance. His condition has since been upgraded to
> serious.
>
> A significant loss of property resulted from structure fires that
> occurred in three separate mobile home parks. These three fires
> simultaneously broke out immediately following the earthquake. The
> cause of these fires appears to have been the rupture of natural gas
> valves and/or mains.
>
> Twenty to thirty mobile homes were lost at the mobile home park
> located at Cobalt and Rinaldi. Twenty-three mobile homes were lost at
> the park located near the intersection of Olden and Ralston.
> Sixty-seven mobile homes were lost at the park located at Glen Oaks
> and Foothill.
>
> Arriving firefighters encountered fire hydrants with little or no
> pressure. To combat the fires, relay operations and water shuttles
> were implemented.
>
> Firefighters evacuated all residents and no serious injuries were
> reported.
>
> Also significant were the ruptures of a large natural gas main and a
> water main at the intersection of Balboa and Rinaldi. These ruptures
> occurred immediately following the earthquake.
>
> Subsequent to the rupture, the natural gas main ignited, and five
> single family homes were consumed in the ensuing fire.
>
> Area residents were evacuated by arriving firefighters and no serious
> injuries were reported.
>
> At approximately 0520 hours, Engine 97 responded to an incident at
> 3999 Sunswept Drive in the Studio City area. Upon arriving on scene,
> Engine 97 reported the complete collapse of a three and four story
> single family dwelling which was located on a hillside.
>
> Two of the four residents of the home had successfully extricated
> themselves from the structure prior to the arrival of firefighters.
> One resident was killed in the collapse and the fourth resident was
> trapped and in need of extrication. Due to the precarious position of
> the collapsed structure on the hillside and the continued after
> shocks, firefighters initially were unable to successfully rescue the
> still entrapped resident.
>
> By 0900 hours, firefighters from Engines 78 and 97, along with several
> L.A.P.D. . Officers, had successfully effected the extraction of the
> trapped resident. The woman had only sustained minor injuries in the
> collapse of the home.

#### January 18, 1994 

> At 0815 hours, the Casualty Information Center reported 2,004 injuries
> treated and released at area hospitals, 506 hospitalized and 33
> deaths.
>
> At 1200 hours on January 18, the DWP estimated that approximately
> 95,000 people were still without power and between 50,000 and 100,000
> were without water.
>
> The National Guard arrived in Los Angeles and handled looter
> prevention and fixed post security missions in support of Police
> Department operations. By 0300 hours on the 18th, 480 Guardsmen and
> 120 Los Angeles County Sheriff\'s Deputies had deployed in Los
> Angeles.
>
> Twenty-nine water tankers were strategically deployed throughout the
> valley for the purpose of supplying water to fire companies for
> potential fires. The combined water capacity of these tankers was
> 78,000 gallons.
>
> Individual tankers were assigned to respond with specified department
> resources on all incidents. In addition, two Tanker Strike Teams
> consisting of one Battalion Chief, three tankers (water capacities per
> tanker range from 1,400 to S,000 gallons), and two engine companies
> were deployed to fire stations 106 and 90.
>
> A Tanker Strike Team was dispatched to incidents any time there was an
> indication that there might be an actual fire. These tankers have
> multiple 2 1/2\" outlets.
>
> Five fire department pick-up trucks loaded with 2,000 feet of 3 1/2\"
> hose were deployed to fire station 88 along with a cache of hose. They
> could be obtained through O.C.D. if a long distance relay became
> necessary.
>
> The Community Service Unit of the L.A.F.D. prepared a Press Release
> detailing post earthquake safety tips. The Press Release detailed
> safety tips involving the use of unvented heating and cooking devices,
> natural gas leaks, usage of flashlights as opposed to candles, and
> chimney precautions.

#### January 19, 1994 

> At 0650 hours, the Casualty Information Center reported that as of
> 2400 hours,3,762 people had been treated and released at area
> hospitals, 526 people were admitted, and 40 people had been confirmed
> dead.
>
> At 1530 hours, the Department of Water and Power reported that the
> water system in the valley had approximately 3,000 leaks as a result
> of the earthquake. It was further reported that it would take between
> two and three months to repair all of these leaks.
>
> At 1700 hours, twelve L.A.F.D. \~200 series\" engines were assigned to
> assist the DWP with water main pumping operations.
>
> Damage Assessment Command organized thirty-six c assessment teams,
> each consisting of Fire Prevention Bureau Inspectors. The thirty-six
> teams corresponded with the thirty-six first-in districts in Division
> 3. Each team was assigned a respective first-in district.
>
> The objective of these assessment teams was to determine the total
> number of buildings damaged, total number of dwelling units affected
> and to estimate the total number of residents displaced by the
> earthquake.
>
> The initial assessments were completed on January 19, 1994. Following
> these initial assessments, teams will conduct a more thorough
> inspection throughout the city. These inspections are anticipated to
> take several weeks to complete.
>
> The L.A.F.D. provided the Goodyear Center with ten post earthquake
> safety messages in English and Spanish. These messages were displayed
> on the Goodyear Blimp throughout the evenings of the l9th and the
> 20th.

Source: Los Angeles Fire Department 2, 1994.

**Sidebar 5.2.2: Explanation of the Section 8 Voucher (HUD) Program**

> Established in 1974, the Section 8 Program is the single largest
> source of rental assistance in the country.  The program is designed
> to bridge the gap between the cost of operating and maintaining
> housing units and what low-income individuals and families can afford
> to pay in rent.   The Section 8 Program is administered at the local
> level by Local Housing Agencies (LHAs), also known as Housing
> Authorities, who receive Section 8 funding through an Annual
> Contributions Contract.  Subsidies are available as Vouchers or
> Project-based, and you should be aware that PHAs are increasingly
> willing to convert tenant-based to project-based assistance (which is
> easier to underwrite for supportive housing).  In 1998, a Federal law
> combined the Section 8 certificates and vouchers programs into one
> program, which is now called the "Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher
> Program."  In addition, HUD offers Welfare-to-Work rental vouchers. 
> In order to qualify, the families must also meet special
> welfare-to-work criteria established in the law.
>
> In 2001, the HUD/VA Appropriations Bill established new regulations
> governing the conversion of tenant-based vouchers into project-based
> Section 8 assistance.  This new legislation gives Housing Authorities
> the authority to use up to 20% of their tenant-based vouchers for
> project-based assistance.  However, the new regulations grant Housing
> Authorities greater flexibility in how the project-based assistance is
> used than in the previous project-basing regulations, and represent a
> promising potential source of funding for supportive housing.

Source: Corporation for Supportive Housing, N/D.

## **Case Study 5.3: September 11^th^ Philanthropic Recovery Efforts** 

# Introduction

# 

On September 11, the United States suffered its greatest civilian mass
casualty event since the Texas City Explosions/Fires of 1947 (581
deaths, 3,500 injuries). In addition to the fatalities and the physical
property that was damaged or destroyed, millions of personal lives were
deeply impacted. Hundreds of thousands of people suffered mental health
problems that needed to be addressed. As many as 100,000 jobs were lost
in New York City alone, and businesses suffered interruptions of weeks,
months, and even years. Many victims' families lost their primary source
of income. It was painfully obvious from the moment the attacks began
the recovery to this disaster would be extraordinary.

As expected, the Federal, State, local, and non-profit organizations
performed their pre-determined roles in both the response and recovery
to the disasters. For the vast majority of these players, their actions
were commendable, and resulted in a much faster than expected recovery
from the attacks. What was truly unexpected, however, was the outpouring
of support from regular citizens of the United States and abroad who
took a personal role in the recovery from the September 11^th^ events.

In the weeks and months following the September 11^th^ terrorist attacks
in New York City, Arlington, VA, and Shanksville, PA, both the federal
government and philanthropic entities (including corporations,
foundations, and individuals) granted more financial assistance than has
been provided in any previous disaster. Some Federal aid programs
distributed more money in response to this disaster than they had given
in all previous disasters combined (Seessel, 2003). Through the various
charity outlets, American businesses, foundations, and private citizens
gave over \$2.8 billion to help the victims of the attacks to recover.
This case will examine the ways in which charitable donations, through
profiling both the September 11 Fund and the Liberty Fund, helped the
nation to recover.

# The Event

At 8:45 AM on Tuesday, September 11^th^ 2001, American Airlines Flight
11, having been hijacked by a group of terrorists after taking off from
Boston, crashed into the north tower of the World Trade Center (WTC)
Complex in New York City (NYC).  Initially, this event appeared to be
isolated. Eighteen minutes later, as the media was televising video of
the blazing tower around the world, a second commercial airliner came
into view and disappeared with an enormous explosion into the South
Tower of the WTC. This plane, United Airlines Flight 175 (also from
Boston), confirmed that the U.S. was under attack by an unidentified
terrorist group.

 

Immediately after the North Tower was hit, the NYC Fire and Police
Departments dispatched personnel to secure the scene and begin rescue
operations. Within five minutes of the second event, the Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA) ordered all NYC airspace \'sterilized\',
(freed from air traffic). Seven minutes later, all NYC airports were
closed, and nine minutes after that (9:26 AM), all U.S. civil flights
were prevented from taking off. Over 4000 planes were aloft in U.S.
airspace, with several hundred en route from overseas, and all were
ordered grounded or re-routed to Canada. This action did not stop
American Airlines flight 77, hijacked shortly after departing Washington
Dulles Airport, from reaching its crash-destination of the Pentagon at
9:43 AM. A fourth commercial aircraft was known to be missing, and the
White House was evacuated at 9:45 AM. At 10:10 AM, United Airlines
Flight 93 from Newark, N.J. crashed in Somerset County, Pennsylvania,
about 80 miles southeast of Pittsburgh. At approximately the same time,
a structural collapse occurred at the Pentagon building in the area of
airplane impact. Just after 10:00 AM, the South Tower of the WTC complex
collapsed completely, raising the estimated dead and injured
exponentially. In response to this tightly grouped series of events,
Secret Service agents were positioned in Lafayette Park (across the
street from the White House), the United Nations complex was evacuated
in NYC, and many Federal departments and agencies were evacuated in
Washington, DC. By 10:30 AM, the U.S. Office of Personnel Management
(OPM) had begun the emergency evacuation of all DC federal buildings.

 

At 10:28 AM, the North Tower of the World Trade Center complex
collapsed, adding to the scale of casualties. At this point, New York
(NY) Governor Pataki closed all government offices in NY, and NYC mayor
Giuliani ordered the evacuation of the area of Manhattan south of Canal
Street. It was reported that several airports around the country were
evacuating, and rumors of car bombs (at the U.S. State Department and
other locations) and additional hijacked planes were making their way
into the news.

 

At noon, it was still not clear that the attack was over. Washington, DC
closed its city government buildings, and the General Services
Administration (GSA) closed its buildings and courthouses throughout 5
states in the Capitol region. Washington D.C. Mayor Anthony Williams
declared a state of emergency for the city of Washington at 1:22 PM.
Soon after, the FAA announced that there would be no commercial air
traffic until at least noon of September 12^th^.

By mid afternoon, rescue crews from around the country began arriving at
the three sites to assist local police and fire departments and nearby
mutual aid resources that had immediately responded. Mayor Giuliani
announced in a press conference at 2:49 PM, that subway and bus services
were restored in NYC. At this time, estimates of the number of injured
or killed ranged from several hundred to tens of thousands, though no
official was willing to give specific numbers. Collectively, the attacks
resulted in the deaths of almost 3,000 people. At the WTC there were
2772 deaths, including the passengers and crew on the two airplanes (of
this number, 50 were police officers and 319 were firefighters.) At the
Pentagon, the terrorist attack claimed 184 victims. In Shanksville, PA,
there were 45 deaths, all passengers or crew on United Airlines Flight
93.

 

As the evening approached (5:20 PM), Building #7 in the WTC complex,
which had been burning for much of the day, also collapsed. It housed NY
City's multi-million dollar, recently completed, state-of-the-art
Emergency Operations Center (EOC). In addition, other buildings in the
area of the towers were on fire, and the collapsed debris continued to
burn. Mayor Giuliani appeared at an evening press conference and urged
New Yorkers to remain at home on September 12^th^ if they could, though
Defense Secretary Rumsfeld held a news conference with a different
message: he stated that Pentagon employees should expect to report to
work.

In the aftermath of the September 11th attacks, the U.S. experienced its
first large-scale integration of emergency management, emergency medical
response, law enforcement, and military resources using the Terrorism
Annex to the FRP. In NYC, initial efforts on the part of locally based
regional offices of Federal agencies to deal with emergency response
were hampered by the destruction of the city's EOC, and loss of use of
federal facilities in lower Manhattan (including the planned Disaster
Field Office). The city's EOC capabilities had to be regenerated
virtually from scratch. The Federal Center in NYC was not physically
damaged, but telecommunications were knocked out, which meant that FEMA
Region II, Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) II, and other Federal
agencies had to use alternate operational locations. Additionally, the
grounding of commercial aircraft restricted the deployment of emergency
response personnel across the country.

 

At the time of the attacks, many senior Federal and State emergency
managers were in Big Sky, Montana at a national emergency management
conference, and some specialized response personnel were on deployment
for potential hurricane response. To move the management and responder
resources and supplies, traditional air transport had to be re-thought
and new arrangements implemented. A rapid mobilization plan occurred for
Federal resources despite these obstacles, and skilled upper and
mid-level managers successfully executed the Federal mobilization.
Mobilized Federal resources for the three 9-11 incident sites included
search and rescue teams, Disaster Mortuary Teams, Disaster Medical
Assistance Teams and other medical response teams, EPA HAZMAT teams,
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) debris removal teams, and American
Red Cross mass care resources. The Catastrophic Disaster Response Group,
the interagency group of senior managers established by the FRP to
resolve major interagency conflicts during a federal disaster response,
was never needed and did not convene. Thousands of federal employees
were involved in the response to the attacks. Fire and EMS services,
Urban Search and Rescue (US&R) teams, structural safety experts, and
debris specialists were engaged in the largest search and rescue and
debris removal missions in United States history.

# Summary of Federal Government Response and Recovery Expenses

To place the charitable component of the response and recovery into the
overall context of the disaster response, it is necessary to provide a
brief overview of the Federal Government response and recovery expenses.

The cost to the Federal Government for the response and recovery of the
World trade center was formally estimated to be \$20 billion, though
other informal measures are more difficult to assess and likely raise
this figure significantly. FEMA provided 42% of the Federal share, with
\$8.8 billion in aid. HUD gave the second largest share, \$2.48 billion,
or 17% of the total share, while DOT ranked third at \$2.37 billion
(11.5%). All other Federal agencies contributed a total of \$820
million, which amounted to 4% of the total Federal share. Also included
in the Federal figures of aid are the tax benefits associated with the
New York City Liberty Zone -- an area of the city where new tax
incentives have resulted in over \$5 billion in indirect economic aid to
the city and its residents. The exact amount of aid resulting from this
program will never be known, and as such, the exact figure of Federal
aid will remain an estimate. For a more detailed breakdown of costs and
programs, see sidebar 5.3.1.

Since September 11^th^, the costs associated with securing the nation
from future acts of terrorism have eclipsed this \$20 billion figure,
through the creation of the Department of Homeland Security, the costs
of airport security, police and fire department overtime, special events
security, equipment and training grants, technology grants, port
security -- the list is extensive. The cost of all of these measures
combined, across the four years since the terrorist attacks, amounts to
several hundred billion dollars, and will likely continue to rise for
many years to come.

# Philanthropy in the Aftermath of the September 11^th^ Attacks

Charities have historically played a role in the nation's response to
disasters. Some charities, such as the American Red Cross or the
Salvation Army, are equipped to arrive at a disaster scene and provide
mass care, including food, shelter, and clothing, and in some
circumstances, emergency financial assistance to affected persons. If
the disaster is notably large, typically measured as a factor of the
extent and nature of devastation to a community and charities' typical
services and capacities, some charities provide longer-term assistance
(such as job training or mental health counseling). Finally, new
charities may form after the disaster specifically to address the needs
of survivors or specific population groups.

FEMA is the lead federal agency for responding to disasters and may link
with charitable organizations to provide assistance. According to FEMA
regulations, in the event of a presidentially declared disaster or
emergency, such as September 11, FEMA is required to coordinate relief
and assistance activities of federal, state, and local governments; the
American Red Cross; the Salvation Army; and the Mennonite Disaster
Service; as well as other voluntary relief organizations that agree to
operate under FEMA's direction. Although charities are expected to be
among the first agencies to provide assistance to those affected, in the
event of some natural disasters, FEMA may anticipate need and be the
first to respond. FEMA can provide a range of assistance to individual
disaster survivors. In natural disasters, such as hurricanes or floods,
the bulk of FEMA's individual assistance program money tends to be given
to individuals whose residences have been damaged. However, following
the September 11the events, FEMA was presented with different
circumstances than what was normally encountered - few people had damage
to their homes, but many needed unemployment assistance and help paying
their mortgage or rent. (GAO 2, 2002)

In the wake of September 11^th^, foundations, corporations and relief
funds financed a range of activities addressing direct and indirect
consequences of the disaster. Many of these organizations defined
"victims" more broadly than had typically done in the past, such that
those who suffered economic and social dislocation as well as the
families of those who died or were severely injured were included. The
General Accounting Office (GAO), having carefully examined the role of
charitable organizations contribution to the response and recovery from
the disaster, concluded in their report "September 11: More Effective
Collaboration Could Enhance Charitable Organizations**"** that
"charitable aid made a major contribution in the nation's response to
the September 11 attacks, despite very difficult circumstances"
(Seessel, 2003).

The Foundation Center, the self-described "nation's leading authority on
philanthropy," has identified 1,339 foundations, corporations, and other
institutional donors that made gifts in response to the September 11^th^
terrorist attacks. These donors gave over \$1.1 billion in more than
4,500 gifts for relief and recovery efforts and for issues related to
the attacks (bioterrorism and civil rights, for example). Giving by
institutional donors represented 39 percent of an estimated \$2.8
billion in total private 9/11-related giving. 301 donors contributed in
excess of \$1 million each for relief and recovery. The average amount
of giving per donor was \$100,000, and foundations and corporations in
the New York 'tri-state' area (New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut)
provided 52 percent of all giving. Individual donors, on the other hand,
provided 61 percent of all philanthropic giving, primarily through
donations to either existing organizations or through funds that were
created in response to the attacks. Private donations amounted to over
\$1.7 billion. To see a visual breakdown of the philanthropic giving
after the September 11^th^ attacks, see Figure 5.3.5.

Two Hundred and seventy-eight funds were created in the aftermath of the
attacks to aid victims, their families, and communities affected by the
disaster. These funds received support from institutional donors
totaling \$773 million. The September 11th Fund of the United Way of New
York City/New York Community Trust received \$163 million, surpassing
all other organizations; the American Red Cross Liberty Disaster Relief
Fund received \$150 million. 1,538 direct-service providers, groups
directly affected by the attacks, and organizations addressing September
11^th^-related issues received \$235 million. Among direct-service
organizations, arts and culture groups affected by the attacks received
\$56 million; local human service agencies providing aid to affected
persons and communities garnered nearly \$55 million. Recipient
organizations and funds were located in 44 states and 12 countries
(Foundation Center, 2004).

The American Red Cross Liberty Disaster Relief Fund, which raised funds
for victims and their families and also provided direct services, ranked
first in overall funds collected. It was also first in terms of the
amount of funds collected from individual citizens, but second in terms
of institutional donor contributions (\$150.2 million provided by
foundations and corporations, or 14 percent of all institutional giving,
and \$925 million from individuals.) The Liberty Fund captured roughly
36 percent of the estimated \$2.8 billion in private funding following
the September 11^th^ attacks.

The September 11th Fund was the second largest 9/11 relief fund ranked
by amount received (\$162.5 million from institutional donors, or 15
percent of all institutional giving, and \$383 million from
individuals), but largest in terms of the funds collected from
institutional charity. The Fund's broad purposes include providing
direct assistance to victims and their families and services to affected
communities. Excluding donations raised for the Fund in a national
telethon, foundations and corporations provided 41 percent of the Fund's
reported \$410 million in private support. (Including the telethon
pledges, the Fund received \$534 million.)

Other top 9/11 relief fund recipients of institutional donors' gifts
included the Twin Towers Fund (\$205 million), the International
Association of Fire Fighters (IAFF) Fund (\$161 million) and the New
York Police and Fire Widows' and Children's Benefit Fund (\$117
million), each established to aid the families of New York City police,
firefighters, and rescue workers who were victims of the attacks; and
the Citizens' Scholarship Foundation (\$113 million), a national-level
fund that provides post-secondary educational assistance to dependents
of those killed or injured in the attacks.

Relief funds created by more than 60 corporations to aid victims
(especially employees) and their families and to support relief and
recovery efforts together received \$173.2 million. Eight corporate
funds received at least \$10 million in support. The largest relief fund
recipient by far was the Citigroup Relief Fund, which received \$15.1
million from the Citigroup Foundation to provide post-secondary
scholarships to the children of victims (The Foundation Center, 2004.)

Though significant, the funds collected amounted to approximately 1
percent of the charitable contributions given by American citizens,
foundations, and corporations. For a more detailed analysis of general
philanthropic giving in the United States, see Sidebar 5.3.2.

### The Red Cross "Liberty Fund"

### 

In the days following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the
Liberty Fund was created as a separate, segregated account (from other
Red Cross funds) to provide assistance to individuals and families most
affected by the disaster. Through the philanthropic donations of
millions of individuals both within the United States and from around
the world, as well as foundations and corporations, the Liberty Fund
received \$1.07 billion. By the end of 2005, the Liberty Fund succeeded
in providing \$858 million in financial, material, physical, and
emotional relief to the victims of the attacks and their families, and
has created detailed plans by which it will distribute the remainder of
collected funds. Through the granting of these funds, thousands of
families have received financial assistance that enabled them to pay
rent, school expenses, and buy food and health care items. Thousands of
others have received or will receive critical mental health and other
health care services to facilitate their recovery from the September
11^th^ events.

In August of 2002, the Red Cross began its transition to the second
phase of a plan to distribute the Liberty Fund -- titled the September
11^th^ Recovery Program (SRP). At this time, though efforts to provide
financial assistance to those directly affected by the September 11,
2001 terrorist attacks continued, the Fund's focus shifted to ensure
that those with longer-term needs, such as mental health and health
care, were receiving the help they require. In developing the
longer-term program, Red Cross officials consulted with victims directly
affected by the tragedy, other service agencies, and Red Cross staff in
Oklahoma City who continue to provide services to people impacted by the
April 1995 Murrah Building bombing. The updated program consisted of
core services (see below) delivery, including the distribution of
remaining direct client financial assistance and longer-term services
such as support for families, mental health and health, and grants for
community-based agencies who provide services to those most directly
affected by the disaster.

The following core services are part of Liberty Fund and its SRP's
mission to provide assistance to those most seriously affected by the
September 11 tragedies.

**Core Services of the Liberty Fund**

-   **Emergency Financial Assistance**; A core mission of the Red Cross
    is to provide rapid assistance to individuals and families affected
    by disasters in order to enable them to resume their daily
    activities. The Liberty Fund was designed to ensure timely
    distribution of funds to families of those who were killed in the
    September 11 attacks, those who were seriously injured, and others
    directly affected by the attacks. To distribute these funds, the Red
    Cross maintained their stated belief that "disaster victims are in
    the best position to evaluate their own immediate and longer-term
    needs and to choose from the resources provided to meet them." Six
    hundred sixty-seven (\$667) million had been distributed or
    committed to those directly affected by the attacks as of December
    31, 2004. Emergency Financial Assistance falls under three general
    categories: Families of the Deceased or Missing, or Persons
    Seriously Injured in the Attacks; Displaced Residents, Economically
    Affected Individuals, and Disaster Responders; and Longer-Term
    Services -- the September 11^th^ Recovery Program (SRP).

    -   **Families of the Deceased or Missing, Persons Seriously Injured
        in the Attacks**; As of December 31, 2004, the Liberty Fund
        distributed or committed a total of \$385 million in direct
        financial assistance to the families of the deceased or missing
        and to persons seriously injured in the attacks through the
        following programs:

1.  **Family Gift Program -** The Family Gift Program was developed to
    provide families of the deceased and persons seriously injured in
    the attacks with basic living expenses not met by other sources. The
    vast majority of families and individuals in this category received
    a full year of assistance under the program. Overall, this program
    assisted 3,561 beneficiaries and disbursed over \$209 million.
    Additionally, \$4 million was spent providing travel and
    accommodations memorializing the first anniversary of the attacks in
    2002.

2.  **Supplemental Gift Program -** The Supplemental Gift is a financial
    grant issued to the estates of decedents and to those individuals
    who were seriously injured on September 11th. The Plan anticipated
    that each estate or individual would receive \$45,000. Due to
    additional Liberty Fund donations received since the program's
    creation, the amount of the Supplemental Gift was increased to
    \$55,000. As of December 31, 2004, \$160 million had been disbursed
    or committed to this program. Thus far, Supplemental Gifts have been
    disbursed to 2,889 estates and seriously injured individuals; an
    additional 23 have been accrued for payment.

3.  **Special Circumstances Gift -** Initially under the Plan, \$15
    million in financial assistance was allocated for dependent extended
    or nontraditional families of the deceased who would not benefit
    from the Supplemental Gift Program. These individuals were not
    beneficiaries of the estate of someone who died in the attacks, or
    were seriously injured persons who received other Red Cross gifts
    but continue to have compelling longer-term financial needs. The
    provision of such financial assistance for these individuals and
    families was determined on a case-by-case basis, taking into account
    a variety of factors, such as the individual's unmet financial
    needs, the level of dependence on the deceased, and the nature of
    the special circumstance. As of December 31, 2004, 1,052
    applications were reviewed and 565 individuals, including 69
    international clients, received a Special Circumstances Gift for a
    total of nearly \$12 million.

    -   **Displaced Residents, Economically Affected Individuals, and
        Disaster Responders;** As a result of the terrorist attacks of
        September 11^th^, roughly 50,000 households were displaced from
        their home or job for some time. To help meet the needs of such
        individuals and other financially impacted individuals, the
        Liberty Fund originally allocated \$290 million in assistance to
        displaced residents and economically affected individuals. Most
        of this assistance was provided in 2002. To date, more than
        \$282 million has been provided to those individuals and
        families who worked below Canal Street and lost their jobs due
        to the attacks, or who lived south of Canal Street in Manhattan
        on September 11^th^ and were displaced, had their home damaged,
        or had access to their home disrupted as a result of the
        attacks. Funds allocated under this program helped cover costs
        associated with relocation, rent or mortgage payments, hotel
        stays, crisis counseling, cleaning, and storage. As the volume
        of requests from affected residents has dropped significantly
        for this specific form of assistance, this program was
        discontinued on June 30, 2004.

    -   **Longer-Term Services -- September 11 Recovery Program (SRP);**
        The Red Cross continues to offer economic assistance,
        counseling, health care services, and other assistance to
        clients. As outlined below, families of the deceased, seriously
        injured and their families, residents, and rescue workers and
        their families are eligible for a range of longer-term services.
        SRP works with a variety of organizations to assure that
        comprehensive information on Red Cross benefits and services is
        disseminated to targeted populations.

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1.  **Additional Assistance Program -** In the Fall of 2002, concerns
    were raised about a number of individuals who did not fall within
    the original framework of the Liberty Fund, but who were nonetheless
    victims of the attacks and deserving of financial and other
    assistance (*e.g.*, health and mental health services) through the
    SRP. The Additional Assistance Program was created to ensure that
    these needs could be met for clients in the following categories:

    a.  People with Disabling Health Injuries or Conditions. This
        category includes individuals such as rescue and recovery
        workers, who do not qualify for financial assistance under the
        Family Gift and Supplemental Gift Programs. Under these
        programs, individuals must have been hospitalized for 24 hours
        within the week following the September 11 attacks. An example
        of a person outside this program criterion would be an
        individual who was injured on September 11, 2001, treated at a
        hospital and released the same day, but subsequently disabled as
        a result of the September 11 disaster and unable to work for
        more than 90 consecutive days.

    b.  People with Disabling Mental Health Conditions. Similar to
        people with physical disabilities, this programmatic category
        allows the Red Cross to provide limited financial benefits on a
        case-by-case basis to individuals who, while they have been
        diagnosed as having a disabling mental-health condition stemming
        from the September 11 disaster, would not otherwise qualify for
        Liberty Fund financial assistance.

    c.  Surviving Family Members. This category allows for the provision
        of additional financial assistance to financially dependent
        family members of persons who died on September 11 and continue
        to have compelling financial needs.

    d.  Rescue and Recovery Workers. This category allows for the
        provision of limited financial benefits to people who were
        officially deployed to restricted work sites, including **Ground
        Zero**, Fresh Kills landfill, the Pentagon, and Shanksville, PA,
        and were physically injured or are suffering from a disabling
        mental health condition.

> Under the Additional Assistance program, an individual is eligible to
> receive up to six months of financial assistance to meet demonstrated
> unmet, essential housing and living expenses. Assistance for other
> necessary expenses could also be provided based on a case-by- case
> assessment under this program. As of December 31, 2004, 493
> individuals with "dire unmet essential living expenses" were awarded
> an average of \$9,195 from the SRP, which in total has distributed
> more than \$4.5 million in Additional Assistance to eligible
> individuals. One noteworthy component of this program regards the
> application of modern technology to ease disbursement. In October
> 2004, SRP began using "Client Assistance Cards", which work exactly
> like debit cards, to distribute funds to victims.

**Family Support Services.** This component of the SRP involves
non-monetary assistance to the victims of the attack. Family Support
Specialists (the trained caseworkers assigned to each of the individuals
and families receiving Liberty Funds) create individualized service
plans in partnership with those affected to support each individual's
and family's return to more normal living. They provide ongoing
individual as well as group support and assistance, along with
assessment, counseling, crisis intervention, advocacy, and information
and referral services. As of December 31, 2004, Family Support Services
had completed its work with 98 percent of 5,962 domestic individuals and
families affected by the September 11 attacks, and continues to provide
ongoing support to 112 individuals and families. A "Case Audit Unit"
works with Family Support Services to ensure that clients have
appropriately received Red Cross funds, and as of December 31, 2004, the
Case Audit Unit and the Office of the General Counsel have resolved work
with 1,225 or 82 percent of 1,492 cases under legal review and continue
to work with the remaining 267 cases.\
\
Delivery of this service to overseas victims was transitioned from the
International Family Assistance Program (IFAP), which existed under the
initial programmatic functions of the Liberty Fund, to the SRP.
International victims receiving casework services include family members
of the deceased, injured individuals, overseas dependents, and residents
who have since relocated overseas. As of December 31, 2004, SRP was
working with 31 national Red Cross and Red Crescent societies to meet
the needs of 161 active clients.

2.  **Mental Health Services***.* The Red Cross provides financial
    assistance for longer-term mental health treatment to people who
    were directly impacted by the September 11 attacks through the "9/11
    Mental Health and Substance Abuse Program." The programs goal is to
    make financially affordable any required treatment for conditions
    such as anxiety, depression, post-traumatic stress disorder, or
    substance abuse, to victims who could not otherwise afford them.
    Through the SRP, the Red Cross provides financial assistance for the
    following services:

    a.  individual, couple, group, and family counseling;

    b.  psychological testing or evaluations for children;

    c.  **psychotropic** medication;

    d.  psychiatric hospitalization; and

    e.  inpatient and outpatient substance abuse treatment.

> To date, the program, which is accessible to people regardless of
> their address, immigration, or insurance status, has provided
> assistance with treatment costs to more than 5,387 people residing in
> 37 states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and nine foreign
> countries.\
> \
> The 9/11 Mental Health and Substance Abuse Program was jointly created
> by the Red Cross (Liberty Fund) and the September 11th Fund soon after
> September 11^th^, 2001. In October 2004, the Red Cross and The
> September 11^th^ Fund began public communication that the Red Cross
> will assume full sponsorship of the Program, which became effective
> January 1, 2005. Through this transfer, the Red Cross now supports the
> continued provision of financial assistance to individuals who
> previously received treatment-related assistance from The September
> 11^th^ Fund.

3.  **Health Care Services*. ***The Red Cross provides clinical case
    management to individuals who were physically injured in the
    September 11^th^ attacks or the ensuing recovery efforts, as well as
    financial assistance for health treatment costs not covered by
    insurance or other programs. The program has provided financial
    assistance with such expenses as home health care, surgical
    expenses, and durable medical equipment. The Red Cross also pays the
    out-of-pocket cost of 24 months of health insurance for surviving
    immediate family members and people who became physically disabled
    due to their September 11^th^ injuries through the Health Insurance
    Subsidy Program (HISP). As of December 31, 2004, more than 1,220
    individuals are receiving coverage of their health insurance costs
    to date. To date, more than 4,500 individuals have received
    assistance through Health Care Services; an estimated 150 injured
    clients are expected to continue to require and receive longer-term
    assistance.

4.  **Client Assistance Center.** The Client Assistance Center (CAC) is
    the main entry point or call center for SRP services, with a mission
    of connecting people affected by September 11 to the services most
    appropriate for their needs. Callers, or those contacting SRP via
    mail or email, are screened for eligibility for Red Cross services
    and benefits. Those who may be eligible for services then receive a
    thorough needs assessment. Those who are not eligible are given
    information on other available resources as appropriate. The CAC
    also addresses complaints and inquiries from clients and their
    advocates. The CAC phone number is 1-877-746-4987.

5.  **September 11 Recovery Grants.** The Recovery Grants Program is an
    ongoing grants program that addresses various issues related to
    September 11^th^ victims. Each quarter, organizations are encouraged
    to submit applications or proposals on various topics for funding
    consideration. For illustrative purposes, the following application
    and proposal requests, issued during the final quarter of 2004, are
    provided below:

    a.  *Youth Recovery & Resilience* -- A Request for Applications
        (RFA) was widely disseminated to umbrella organizations,
        non-profits, and government offices involved in services for
        children and youth throughout the United States. Over 100
        organizations submitted applications, and 64 were invited to
        submit full proposals. The RFA encourages non-profit
        organizations to apply for grant funds to support programs and
        services that:

        i.  Reach children impacted by the September 11 terrorist
            attacks where they live, play, and learn.

        ii. Enhance children's capacity to manage stress and to develop
            and/or maintain effective coping skills, self-reflection, or
            interpersonal skills.

        iii. Help caring adults better understand the needs of children
             exposed to trauma and better support their emotional health
             and growth.

        iv. Develop or maintain collaborations or partnerships among
            community organizations, mental health service providers,
            and specialized centers capable of providing professional
            support for the detection and treatment of young people
            affected by traumatic experiences.

    b.  *Health Impacts* -- A Request for Proposals (RFP) was issued to
        seven health screening and monitoring programs to solicit their
        proposals for services addressing the needs of individuals
        intensively exposed to the World Trade Center building collapse
        and/or the recovery site and who are both experiencing health
        problems and are at significant risk for negative long-term
        health impacts. Funded services could include:

        i.  Patient advocacy services to address psychosocial and
            entitlement issues.

        ii. Medical care specifically targeted to the needs of people
            injured in occupational settings and/or whose injuries
            impede their ability to work who are otherwise unable to pay
            for treatment.

        iii. Diagnostic consultations needed to make accurate diagnoses.

        iv. The addition of screening slots in existing programs to
            monitor the health needs of people significantly exposed to
            the site.

> In December of 2004, the Red Cross awarded approximately \$20 million
> in Recovery Grant funding to 67 non-profit organizations providing
> mental health and wellness services, as well as community-based
> services to people impacted by the 9/11 attacks.

6.  **Client Support Network.** As of June 30, 2004, the Case Management
    Grant Program, which made funds available to other agencies
    providing case management to clients most severely impacted by
    September 11, officially ended. The Case Management Grant Program
    provided 13 awards, totaling approximately \$2.9 million, to serve
    more than 1,400 clients. Building on the work done by the Case
    Management Grant Program, the Client Support Network began operation
    on July 1, 2004. The Client Support Network funds other agencies
    that provide case management to Red Cross-eligible individuals on a
    fee-for-service basis. By working with various agencies throughout
    the United States, the Client Support Network ensures that clients
    have access to services provided locally in their own communities,
    and also allows clients the freedom to choose their own service
    provider (as well as the freedom to switch providers if they wish).
    As of December 31, 2004, the program was serving 713 clients through
    35 agencies.

7.  **Client Activities.** SRP hosts ongoing group activities for
    clients called "Family Days." Family Days feature informational and
    wellness activities, combined with a support component led by
    trained facilitators. As of the end of 2004, approximately 2,150
    clients had attended a total of 234 Family Day events. SRP also
    supports external agencies that provide activities offering clients
    opportunities to develop local supportive networks to aid in their
    recovery. These activities can range from mentoring events, to
    support groups, to family retreats. To date, SRP has approved 129
    external client activities which have served more than 3,460
    clients.

8.  **External Partnerships.** SRP works in collaboration with a wide
    array of external partners including government agencies, advocacy
    organizations, family support, and other constituency groups to meet
    the identified, ongoing, and emerging needs of clients. Examples are
    described below:

    a.  Recently, SRP established service and referral connections with
        two New Jersey-based programs. The first, a newly-funded program
        operated by the University of Medicine and Dentistry of New
        Jersey called "It's-4-U-NJ," provides free crisis counseling for
        all New Jersey residents affected by the September 11 attacks.
        SRP met with the management staff of It's-4-U-NJ to secure a
        referral relationship between the new program and the 9/11
        Mental Health and Substance Abuse Program. SRP reached out to
        the second program, the New Jersey Unmet Needs Roundtable, to
        ensure SRP participation in their meetings and facilitate
        cross-referral of individuals whose financial or service needs
        can be met by SRP.

    b.  SRP staff connected the Friendship Ambassador Foundation, which
        has the mission of promoting peace through cultural exchange,
        with organizations serving victims of the September 11 attacks
        in California and Massachusetts. This connection helped the
        Friendship Ambassador Foundation convene events for surviving
        family members in Boston and Los Angeles.

    c.  To inform SRP planning for Recovery Grants funding towards
        community recovery needs in Lower Manhattan, SRP worked with
        downtown Manhattan service providers addressing the needs of
        residents impacted by the September 11 attacks. SRP met with 12
        organizations that continue to address the September
        11^th^-related needs of downtown residents. During this meeting,
        participants discussed current needs, service trends, and the
        organizations' assessment of existing community-based services.
        SRP has additionally met with organizations serving the downtown
        community at large, managers of buildings impacted in the
        attacks, and Community Board members.

9.  **Outreach and Service Coordination*. ***SRP continues to reach out
    to both affected individuals and external organizations to provide
    information on the services and benefits available to those directly
    impacted by the September 11 attacks. Examples of outreach efforts
    that occurred in late 2004 include:

    a.  An informational mailing to more than 850 individuals who were
        physically injured in the attacks to encourage enrollment in the
        9/11 Mental Health and Substance Abuse Program and the Health
        Insurance Subsidy Program.

    b.  Community-based presentations on the Health Insurance Subsidy
        Program to ensure that eligible individuals applied for the
        program before the December 31, 2004 application deadline.

    c.  Stories about the 9/11 Mental Health and Substance Abuse Program
        in five newsletters sent to rescue-and-recovery-worker employers
        and/or unions, as well as multiple presentations at unions and
        non-profit organizations to promote the program to eligible
        individuals.

    d.  A presentation at the FBI field offices to describe the
        assistance available to September 11 terrorist attack
        responders. SRP provided multiple brochures and posters to the
        FBI offices that deployed agents and staff to the Pentagon, the
        World Trade Center, and Shanksville, PA.

    e.  Ongoing media advertisements promoting the 9/11 Mental Health
        and Substance Abuse Program. SRP ran advertisements in *AM New
        York*, a free newspaper with a daily circulation of 270,000
        readers in the New York metropolitan area, as well as newspapers
        in the greater New York area, Maryland and Virginia. In
        addition, twenty-six external organizations provided a direct
        link on their Web sites to information about these services,
        substantially increasing public awareness of services available.
        (American Red Cross, 2004)

### 

### The September 11 Fund 

The September 11th Fund (the Fund) was established the day of the
terrorist attacks by The New York Community Trust and United Way of New
York City to meet both the immediate and longer-term needs of victims,
families and communities. A second, directly-associated fund was created
September 21^st^ from proceeds of a telethon, *America: A Tribute to
Heroes*, which was broadcast on the major US television networks. Lorie
Slutsky, president *The New York Community Trust*, and the United Way's
CEO, Ralph Dickerson, made contact soon after the events transpired to
create the joint fund. They defined a deliberately broad mandate for The
September 11th Fund: to help meet the immediate and longer-term needs of
victims, families and communities affected by the attacks. In order to
avoid the creation of an entirely new organization, the Trust and United
Way Boards delegated authority over the Fund to an independent board and
staff. With their combined experience in large-scale philanthropy, they
had the ability to make educated and effective grant decisions quickly.

From September 2001 through December 1, 2004 the Fund received more than
\$534 million in contributions and interest income and awarded 559
grants totaling almost \$528 million. Of the total amount granted, more
than \$260 million provided financial assistance and almost \$191
million provided services to individuals and families, more than \$66
million provided services to help businesses and communities rebuild and
almost \$10 million helped with rescue and recovery efforts. Remaining
funds are earmarked for the completion of promised services, community
revitalization and other projects.

Grants from the Fund enabled cash assistance, counseling and other
services to the families of those who were killed, the injured and those
displaced from their homes or jobs. The Fund also provided grants to
affected small businesses and community organizations. It did this by
making grants to nonprofit organizations and agencies with the expertise
to meet a wide range of needs quickly. The Fund supported organizations
and agencies that provide cash assistance, legal counseling, grief
therapy, job training and placement, and other services for victims,
families, and others directly affected. It also made grants to assist
nonprofits and small businesses as they help communities rebuild.

The Fund made its first emergency grant within 13 days of the attacks.
Cash assistance, grief therapy, legal counseling, job assistance, and
other services were immediately made available. Rebuilding funds were
granted to non-profits and small businesses in affected communities. The
Fund made grants to cover the cost of food, equipment and supplies and
reimbursed dozens of non-profits that incurred expenses in the rescue
and recovery effort.

While these immediate needs were being met through the emergency
response program, the Fund planned its Ongoing Recovery Program, which
was a framework designed to meet the longer-term needs of the victims,
families and communities directly affected by the attacks. Ongoing
assistance was coordinated with government and other charities to obtain
necessary resources and help those who might otherwise \"fall through
the cracks\". The September 11th Fund, for example, chose to provide
assistance to more than one family of a victim (from a first marriage,
for example), and to elderly parents who were not technically
dependents, but who were receiving help with rent or mortgage payments.

The Fund created two programs providing cash assistance to victims of
the tragedy: the "emergency" program and the "cash assistance" program.
Both provided immediate financial support to surviving family members
and financial dependents of those killed, the severely injured, and
dislocated workers and residents in lower Manhattan. The programs
provided \"bridge\" support until other known, larger sources of
financial assistance would become available. Up to \$20,000 was
available per family or for each direct financial dependent of someone
who died; up to \$20,000 per person for those injured; up to \$10,000
per person for residents; and up to \$4,000 per person for dislocated
workers.

# "Tribute to Heroes"

Only 10 days after the attacks, on September 21st, in collaboration with
other non-profits and other organizations, "America: A Tribute to
Heroes," a national telethon, was broadcast simultaneously on ABC, CBS,
FOX and NBC, 30 broadcast and cable networks, the internet and AOL,
8,000 radio stations, and the Armed Forces Radio and Television
Networks. Many artists performed and more did their part by answering
phones and taking pledges. Private citizens contributed a total of \$129
million as result of this effort. This money was provided to the
stewardship of the Fund to be included in addition to its regular
donation structure. Ultimately, the telethon alone provided almost half
of the money distributed by The September 11th Fund in direct cash
assistance to victims.

In December of 2004, the September 11^th^ Fund ended its operations
(though ongoing programs remained in service.) The total funds received
were \$534,216,000. Of this amount, \$399 million was collected under
the regular operations of the fund, \$129 million was collected as
result of the telethon, and almost \$6 million was received through
investment income. The Fund awarded \$527 million through the provision
of 559 grants to nonprofits and other service organizations. A full
breakdown of funds by program is provided as Figure 5.3.10.

**September 11^th^ Fund Programs**

-   **Cash Assistance Program\
    \
    **Through the Fund\'s cash assistance programs, nearly 100,000
    people received financial relief. A breakdown is provided below:

    -   Most of the 3,800 families of the deceased and people who were
        seriously injured received about \$20,000

    -   Most of the 35,000 displaced workers received about \$4,000

    -   Most of the 6,000 displaced residents received about \$4,000

Cash assistance programs were designed to take into account grants and
other funding provided by government agencies and other charities, in
some cases to provide help until other funds arrived and in other cases
to help those who otherwise would not receive assistance. The Fund
worked through Safe Horizon, a victim services organization, local
United Ways, JPMorgan Chase and The New York Community Trust to deliver
help. The Fund continues to provide cash assistance through its existing
programs for those who are eligible and have not yet come forward for
help.

-   **Emergency Cash Program -** Eleven days after the terrorist
    attacks, Safe Horizon began writing checks on the spot at Pier 94,
    in anticipation of the Fund's approved grant. Through this program,
    more than 45,000 individuals received checks supporting more than
    100,000 people. In total, \$261 million was provided by the
    Emergency Cash Program.

-   **Helping People Get Help -** Though hundreds of funds were created
    and thousands of charities offered assistance, it wasn't easy
    getting access to the billions of dollars in charitable and
    government aid that was available. In addition, coordination was
    essential to avoid duplication and ensure that victims received help
    as quickly as possible. In answer to these problems the Fund spent
    millions to coordinate assistance, and help people learn what was
    available to weave together a safety net for themselves and their
    families. To do this, a nationwide outreach effort was mounted that
    included a 24-hour toll free hotline, a web-based assistance guide,
    multiple websites, publicity, advertising and public service
    announcements. Daily information sessions were conducted in English,
    Spanish and Chinese throughout the five boroughs of New York City.
    Hundreds of personal service coordinators helped families, displaced
    workers and residents one-on-one. In addition, the Fund supported
    the 9/11 United Services Group (USG) an organization created to
    maintain a database of victims and coordinate the efforts of 40
    charities. USG ensured that agencies talked to each other so people
    in need would not fall through the cracks. Through this program,
    more than 100,000 individuals were assisted. Grants totaling \$37.5
    million were provided for these purposes by the Fund. The following
    are notable facts about the program:

    -   Hotline staff responded to more than 200,000 calls; during peak
        periods, volume reached 400 calls per day.

    -   19,966 people used caseworkers to access benefits and services.

    -   17,688 people attended 1,207 Information sessions.

    -   Ads were placed in 70 papers in 17 languages. More than 1
        million ethnic New Yorkers became aware of charitable programs
        in their native tongue including Spanish, Chinese, Greek,
        Korean, Russian, Bangla, Hindi, Urdu and Arabic---among other
        languages.

    -   The Advertising Council distributed important emergency messages
        including 12 TV Public Service Announcements (PSAs), and one
        radio PSA worth \$89.8 million in advertising time and space.

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-   **Legal Advice -** Many direct and indirect victims found themselves
    suddenly in need of legal assistance as result of the September
    11^th^ disaster. Whether settling an estate, procuring death
    certificates, getting access to public and private benefits,
    managing child custody issues, applying to the Federal Victim
    Compensation Fund, or avoiding eviction, legal expertise was
    essential. September 11th Fund grants provided free legal advice and
    assistance for victims of the attacks, at the Family Assistance
    Centers and at locations throughout New York and New Jersey. More
    than 20,000 victims received free legal support, and 1,745 cases
    were brought to the Federal Victim Compensation Fund thanks to
    September 11th Fund supported lawyers. Through this program, more
    than 20,780 individuals were assisted. Grants totaling \$11.8
    million were provided for these purposes by the Fund. The following
    are notable facts about the program:

    -   Victims' families received an estimated \$2.1 billion from the
        Federal Victim Compensation Fund with help from Trial Lawyers
        Care (TLC), a national organization created after 9/11 and
        supported by the September 11th Fund. TLC helped more than 3,600
        families from 35 states and 11 countries.

    -   The September 11th Fund supported a special project of TLC to
        help 17 catastrophically injured clients get the special kinds
        of expert advice and assistance they needed to win appropriate
        awards.

    -   The Association of the Bar of the City of New York counseled
        nearly 7,500 people.

    -   New York Lawyers for the Public Interest gave pro bono legal
        support to two unions---SEIU Local 32BJ (24 members killed) and
        HERE Local 100 (44 members killed). Some of these families were
        undocumented and needed help in their applications to the
        Federal Victim Compensation Fund.

    -   The NY Immigration Coalition provided more than 2,500 immigrant
        and refugee victims with free legal assistance.

-   **Anti-bias Efforts** - After September 11th, many ethnic
    communities throughout the country found themselves at increased
    risk of hatred and bias. To counter this, The September 11th Fund
    supported Community Through Unity, a nationwide grant program of The
    National Conference for Community and Justice (NCCJ). Grants were
    awarded to 12 non-profit organizations to create or enhance efforts
    in their communities to address bias, prejudice and discrimination
    experienced by South Asian, Muslim and Arab communities due to the
    September 11th attacks. The Fund is also providing support to NCCJ
    to convene a conference of grantees to share best practices, learn
    from each other's experiences and develop coordinated strategies for
    the future. Grantees are conducting programs that provide a variety
    of services and activities. Grants totaling \$1.4 million were
    provided for these purposes by the Fund.

-   **Employment Assistance Program** - The Fund responded to the issue
    of post-disaster unemployment by helping people find new jobs and
    improve their skills through a comprehensive employment program.
    More than 11,000 displaced workers enrolled in what became the
    largest program of its kind in the US. Individuals chose an
    employment and training provider based on their primary language,
    work experience, skills needed and convenience. A job search and
    training allowance helped those who met income requirements take
    advantage of the program when Federal unemployment and other forms
    of support ran out. Simultaneously, the City was experiencing a
    severe economic decline, which further impacted the availability of
    jobs. Ultimately, 2.2 million hours of occupational training and
    over one million hours of English-as-a-Second-Language classes were
    provided by 13 organizations funded throughout New York and New
    Jersey. In total, 11,394 people were assisted through the provision
    of \$78 million in grants (of which \$36 million was income
    support).

-   **Rebuilding Communities** - The Fund provided loans, grants,
    technical and marketing assistance to small businesses and
    non-profits in lower Manhattan and at Ronald Reagan Airport in
    Washington, D.C. by making grants to established agencies with a
    track record of working with small businesses and overseeing loan
    portfolios. The objective was to help these businesses and
    organizations survive despite the serious economic harm suffered in
    their areas. For many, government resources were not enough, or
    their businesses did not qualify for government assistance for lack
    of documentation or size. Small businesses and non-profits eligible
    for Fund support included those physically damaged and/or subjected
    to prolonged loss of pedestrian and vehicular traffic due to
    government restrictions. Over 1000 nonprofits and businesses
    benefited from this program, which was made possible through \$54
    million in grants. Notable facts about the program include:

    -   Civic Capital Corporation made loans to 88 small businesses and
        34 individual seat holders of the New York Board of Trade

    -   SEEDCO assisted 1,029 small businesses through the Lower
        Manhattan Small Business and Workforce Retention Project.

    -   Renaissance Economic Development Corporation made loans to 73
        small businesses in Chinatown ranging from garment factories and
        restaurants to nail salons and laundromats.

    -   A grant to Millennium High School helped complete construction
        to become the first new public high school to be opened downtown
        since September 11, 2001 providing a missing element that will
        encourage families with teen-aged children to stay in the
        neighborhood.

    -   A partnership with the Lower Manhattan Development Corporation
        launched a comprehensive tourism marketing and promotion
        campaign for Chinatown to bring more media attention, visitors
        and revenue to the area.

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-   **9**/**11 Mental Health and Substance Abuse Program --**
    Recognizing that that emotional trauma would be widespread after
    9/11, and that the need for professional support was a priority, the
    9/11 Mental Health and Substance Abuse Program was designed. The
    Fund and the American Red Cross worked together to create a mental
    health program that would allow people to seek help whenever and
    wherever they felt most comfortable, and would then provide
    reimbursement for out-of-pocket costs. The program is administered
    by the Mental Health Association of New York City, and provides
    treatment by a licensed provider at minimal cost to the individual
    wherever he/she lives. It is the primary payment source for those
    who have no insurance or other resources, and covers related
    out-of-pocket expenses for those who have existing insurance. The
    program covers up to \$3,000 per covered individual and is
    retroactive to September 11, 2001. Services include individual,
    group, couples and family counseling, psychotropic medications,
    alcohol or substance abuse detoxification, counseling, or outpatient
    rehabilitation, inpatient hospitalization and some inpatient
    substance abuse treatment. In total, almost 10,000 people took
    advantage of the program. The Fund contributed \$12.1 million to
    this program.

**Mental Health Training** - Recognizing that the number of mental
health practitioners in the New York, Long Island, and New Jersey
regions would be unprepared for the influx of new clients, the Fund
supported a training program that brought the most recent information
about diagnosing and treating Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) to
thousands of professionals. The training initiative was designed to
improve the knowledge and skill level of the metropolitan NYC area
mental health and human services community with respect to trauma,
related mental health conditions, and the most effective supports and
treatments available, and consisted of a variety of courses addressing
the needs of diverse audiences ranging from introductory material to
advanced and specialized trauma treatment methods. Training and support
was also provided for clergy to help them assess PTSD in themselves and
others. Over 6,500 providers were given training at a cost of \$4
million.

-   **Health Care Services** - Many people either lost health care
    insurance due to recent unemployment resulting from the terrorist
    attacks. Many of these people were not eligible for government
    assistance and were left without adequate health care. To address
    this need, free health care for twelve to eighteen months was
    provided for people who lost their jobs or income and could not
    afford to buy private health insurance and were not eligible for
    public health insurance programs. The program offered choice about
    whether to receive benefits from a neighborhood clinic or through a
    network of doctors, and supplemented Consolidated Omnibus Budget
    Reconciliation Act (COBRA) insurance payments for those who were
    able to maintain this type of insurance when their job ended. It
    supplemented health insurance payments for those who reside in
    states where the Fund could not establish group rates. Through this
    program, 15,000 people were assisted through \$32.2 million in
    funding.

-   **Health Care Screenings and Treatment** - First responders, day
    laborers and volunteers who were part of the rescue or recovery
    effort in Lower Manhattan were exposed to potentially hazardous
    environmental conditions, as were residents and workers who fled the
    area. The Fund made grants to monitor conditions and support efforts
    to secure appropriate clean-up and other governmental supports. It
    also provided funds to assure that rescue and recovery workers had
    access to screening and treatment for resultant respiratory
    disorders. Through this program, over 7,000 people were assisted
    through \$3.8 million in grants.

-   **Helping Children and Youth** - An estimated 25,000 students,
    pre-school through high school, experienced the terrorist attacks
    firsthand or were traumatized by the subsequent evacuation or
    relocation from their schools. The Fund supported art therapy and
    child support groups as well as family retreats, after-school
    programs, professional development for teachers and other activities
    intended to relieve stress and improve academic performance.
    Thousands of students participated from 17 elementary/middle schools
    in lower Manhattan, seven high schools and three parochial schools.
    Grants supported case managers, training for counselors in trauma,
    crisis management and intervention, cultural training for counselors
    working in the Chinatown community, training for teachers in
    identifying mental health problems and extra help for students in
    need of remediation or preparing for college. This program served
    over 10,000 students, through \$10.9 million in grants.

### Conclusion

The philanthropic component of disaster management and recovery has long
been established, but is in no way perfect. The most notable lesson
learned about charitable giving in the aftermath of disasters to have
emerged as result of the September 11^th^ attacks is that greater
coordination would have helped significantly to ease the efforts of the
charitable organizations involved, and for the distribution of collected
funds to victims of the disaster. The GAO found that, despite some early
efforts, little coordination of charitable aid occurred early on,
although a more integrated approach emerged as time progressed. Even
with these efforts, they found that victims felt that locating and
applying for grant funding was a confusing process, and they did not
always know about funds for which they were eligible (GAO2, 2002).

Some months after the disaster, oversight agencies and large funders
worked to establish a more coordinated approach. Efforts include:

-   New York State Attorney General had encouraged charities to work
    together to ease access to aid, including use of a common
    application form and database.

-   The 9/11 United Services Group (<http://www.sept11help.org/>), a
    consortium of 13 charities formed in December 2001 to foster a more
    coordinated approach to aid delivery, has in place a database that a
    few member charities are using. Both the 9/11 United Services Group
    and the Survivors' Fund in Virginia have trained service
    coordinators to help survivors identify and access a broad range of
    services.

-   FEMA has taken steps to expand its geographic service area for FEMA
    aid and has convened unmet needs committees in New Jersey and in New
    York City.

-   United Way of the National Capital Area has held information-sharing
    meetings for Washington and Virginia service providers (GAO 2,
    2002).

However, in both financial terms and in terms of the number of people
served, it is undeniable that charitable organizations and individual
donations played a significant role in the recovery from the September
11^th^ attacks. It is clear that, due to the high-profile nature of
these events, there was a greater amount given by all philanthropic
sources, but the same could be said for Federal, State, and local
resources dedicated. It is likely that these events will, and have
already, significantly raised the profile of charitable organizations
within the disaster management community, and it would only be of
benefit for their role to be considered seriously by planners in the
future.

**[References:]{.underline}**

American Red Cross. 2004. "Liberty Disaster Relief Fund Quarterly
Report, December 31, 2004." Liberty Oversight Commission.

Foundation Center, The. 2004. "Giving in the Aftermath of September 11."
December. Excerpted from *September 11: The Philanthropic Response,*
published by the Foundation Center.
[www.fdncenter.org/research/911/](http://www.fdncenter.org/research/911/)

General Accounting Office (GAO). 2002. "September 11: Interim Report on
the Response of Charities." September. GAO-02-1037.

General Accounting Office 2. 2002. "September 11: More Effective
Collaboration Could Enhance Charitable Organizations' Contributions in
Disasters." December. GAO-03-259.

General Accounting Office. 2003. "September 11: Overview of Federal
Assistance to the New York City Area." October. GAO-04-72.

Harrald, John R., Barbera, J., Renda-Tanali, I.R., Coppola, D, and Shaw,
G.L. 2002. "Observing and Documenting the Interorganizational Response
to the September 11 attack on the Pentagon." *Proceedings, 9th Annual
Conference of TIEMS.* Waterloo, Canada. Pp. 32-4,
\<http://www.seas.gwu.edu/\~icdm/nsf_9_11.htm\>

Kiplinger\'s Personal Finance. 2004. "Charities: How America Gives."
Vol. 58, No. 10. Pg. 32. October.

Seessel, Tom. 2003. "Responding to the 9/11 Terrorist Attacks: Lessons
from Relief and Recovery in New York." A Report Prepared for the Ford
Foundation. The John S. Watson Institute for Public Policy. Trenton.

September 11^th^ Fund. 2004. "The September 11^th^ Fund: Final Report."
The United Way of New York City and the New York Community Trust.
<http://www.september11fund.org/index.php>

[WWW.Wikipedia.Com](http://WWW.Wikipedia.Com/). N/D. Internet-based
Encyclopedia.

**Figure 5.3.1: Costliest Disasters for FEMA, HUD, and DOT**

![](media/image10.wmf){width="6.873611111111111in"
height="4.389583333333333in"}

Source: GAO, 2003

**Figure 5.3.2: Federal Compensation for Disaster Related Costs and
Losses (as of 07/2003)**

![](media/image11.wmf){width="6.497916666666667in"
height="1.1527777777777777in"}

Source: GAO, 2003

**Figure 5.3.3: Federal Infrastructure Restoration and Improvement (as
of 07/2003)**

![](media/image12.wmf){width="6.497916666666667in"
height="1.1701388888888888in"}

Source: GAO, 2003

**Figure 5.3.4: Federal Economic Revitalization Efforts (as of
07/2003)**

![](media/image13.wmf){width="6.497916666666667in"
height="1.8590277777777777in"}

Source: GAO, 2003

**Figure 5.3.5: Philanthropic Giving after the September 11^th^ Attacks
(as of 12/2004)**

![](media/image14.wmf){width="3.795138888888889in"
height="2.4604166666666667in"}

Source: The Foundation Center

**Figure 5.3.6: September 11 Fund for 35 Charities**

![](media/image15.wmf){width="6.492361111111111in"
height="8.407638888888888in"}

Source: GAO 2, 2002

# Figure 5.3.7: American Red Cross Liberty Disaster Relief Fund Distribution Plan

![](media/image16.wmf){width="9.504166666666666in" height="4.65625in"}

Source: American Red Cross, 2004.

**Figure 5.3.8: Liberty Fund Expenditures**

![](media/image17.wmf){width="6.375694444444444in"
height="3.247916666666667in"}

Source: American Red Cross, 2004**.**

**Figure 5.3.9: September 11^th^ Fund Expenditures\
**

+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+
|   ----------------------                                              |
| ------------------------------------------- ------------------------- |
| ----------------------------- --------------------------------------- |
|   **Grants by Category as of                                          |
|                                                                       |
|   12/1/04**![](media/image18.png){width="1.04166666666                |
| 66666e-2in"                                                           |
|   height="4.1666666666666664e-2in"}                                   |
|                                                                       |
|                                                                       |
|   ![](media/image19.png){width="1.3645833333333333in"                 |
|               **Victims & Families - 85%**                            |
|   height="1.3645833333333333in"}                                      |
|                                                                       |
|                                                                       |
|                                                                       |
|                                                       ![](media/image |
| 18.png){width="0.10416666666666667in"    Cash Assistance - 49% (\$261 |
|                                                                       |
|     height="1.0416666666666666e-2in"}\                     million)   |
|                                                                       |
|               ![](media/image20.png){width="0.17708333333333334in"    |
|                                                                       |
|               height="0.17708333333333334in"}                         |
|                                                                       |
|                                                                       |
|                                               ![](media/image21.png){ |
| width="0.17708333333333334in"    Other Services - 36% (\$191 million) |
|                                                                       |
|               height="0.17708333333333334in"}                         |
|                                                                       |
|                                                                       |
|               **Community Organizations - 13%  **                     |
|                                                                       |
|                                                                       |
|                                                        ![](media/imag |
| e18.png){width="0.10416666666666667in"    Grants/Loans (\$66 million) |
|                                                                       |
|               height="1.0416666666666666e-2in"}\                      |
|                                                                       |
|               ![](media/image22.png){width="0.17708333333333334in"    |
|                                                                       |
|               height="0.17708333333333334in"}                         |
|                                                                       |
|                                                                       |
|               **Rescue/Recovery - 2%**                                |
|                                                                       |
|                                                                       |
|                                                  ![](media/image23.pn |
| g){width="0.17708333333333334in"    Cash Reimbursement (\$10 million) |
|                                                                       |
|               height="0.17708333333333334in"}                         |
|                                                                       |
|   Total Spent to Date: \$528 Million                                  |
|                                                                       |
|   ----------------------                                              |
| ------------------------------------------- ------------------------- |
| ----------------------------- --------------------------------------- |
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+

Source:
[www.september11fund.org/aboutus.php](http://www.september11fund.org/aboutus.php)

**Figure 5.3.10: Expenditures of the September 11 Fund by Program**

> **Cash and Services to Individuals & Families**
>
> Cash assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
> \$260,865,502 82
>
> Employment assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
> \$85,980,022 56
>
> Helping people get help. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
> .\$37,518,986 140
>
> Health care. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
> .\$36,072,109 31
>
> Mental health & counseling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .\$19,454,571
> 53
>
> Legal & financial advice. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
> .\$11,801,405 37
>
> Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
> \$451,692,595 399
>
> Helping Communities
>
> Rebuilding. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
> \$54,064,968 75
>
> Children & youth. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
> ..\$10,926,882 22
>
> Anti-bias efforts. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
> ...\$1,424,340 8
>
> Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
> . \$66,416,190 105
>
> Rescue & Recovery
>
> Rescue & recovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
> \$9,810,711 55

Source: [www.september11fund.org](http://www.september11fund.org/)

**Sidebar 5.3.1: Federal Disaster Assistance Committed to New York City
Following the September 11^th^ Terrorist Attacks**

**Initial Response to the Attacks** - \$2.55 Billion

-   FEMA - \$2.2 Billion

-   DOT - \$100 Million

-   HUD - \$250 Million

Numerous assistance programs are included in this grouping, such as
search and rescue operations, debris removal operations, emergency
transportation measures, and emergency utility service repair. FEMA
provided the bulk of the federal funds for initial response
efforts---\$2.20 billion---While DOT and HUD provided the bulk of the
remaining funds.

Highlights

-   Search and Rescue - \$22 Million (largest in U.S. History)

-   Debris Removal - \$1.7 Billion (\$1 Billion of which will be used to
    establish an insurance company to cover the city and any contractors
    from potential claims that may arise)

-   Emergency Transportation Measures - \$299 Million

-   Other Response Assistance (Health Monitoring, EPA Cleanup, Etc.) -
    \$285 Million

-   Emergency and Temporary Utility Service - \$250 Million (to be
    disbursed)

**Compensation for Losses** - \$4.81 Billion

-   FEMA - \$3.84 Billion

-   HUD - \$960 Million

This funding, provided by FEMA and HUD, compensated state and local
organizations, individuals, and businesses for disaster-related costs,
such as mortgage and rental assistance to individuals and grants to
businesses to cover economic losses.

Highlights

-   NYPD and NYFD benefits, wages, and other reimbursement - \$643
    Million

-   Other public assistance to NYC, New York State, and other
    organizations - \$847 Million

-   Non-traditional Assistance - \$1 Billion

-   FEMA Hazard Mitigation Grant Program - \$377 Million

-   Mortgage and Rental Assistance Program - \$200 Million

-   Crisis Counseling - \$99 Million

-   Individual and Family Grant Program - \$110 Million

-   Other FEMA Assistance - \$34 Million

-   HUD Residential Grant Program - \$106 Million

-   HUD Business Assistance Program - \$510 Million

**Infrastructure Restoration** - \$5.57 Billion

-   FEMA - \$2.75 Billion

-   DOT - \$2.24 Billion

-   HUD - \$580 Million

The majority of this funding is a combination of FEMA and DOT funds to
rebuild and enhance the lower Manhattan transportation system, including
the construction or repair of roads, subways, ferries, and railroads.
HUD is funding efforts to improve utility infrastructure.

Highlights

-   Projects planned to restore and enhance the lower Manhattan
    transportation system - \$4.55 Billion

-   Permanent Utility Infrastructure Repairs and Improvements - \$750
    Million

-   Short Term Capitol Projects - \$68 Million

**Economic Revitalization** - \$5.54 Billion

-   HUD - \$520 Million

-   Liberty Zone - \$5.03 Billion

Efforts to revitalize the economy in lower Manhattan include the Liberty
Zone tax benefit plan (a Congressionally-created tax benefit plan in
lower Manhattan) - an estimated benefit of \$5.03 billion - and \$515
million in HUD funding for business attraction and retention programs.
Once the city, state, and HUD finalize plans for the remaining \$1.16
billion, these funds will most likely be directed to infrastructure
restoration and improvements and/or economic revitalization.

Highlights

-   Liberty Zone Tax Benefits -- Approximately \$5 Billion, but expected
    to grow

-   HUD Business Assistance Programs and Planning for Rebuilding and
    Permanent Memorial - \$515 Million

Assistance by Agency to New York City:

-   FEMA - \$8.8 Billion -- 42.9%

-   Liberty Zone Tax Benefits - \$5.03 Billion -- 24.5%

-   HUD - \$3.48 Billion -- 17%

-   DOT - \$2.37 Billion -- 11.5%

-   Other Agencies - \$820 Million -- 4%

Source: U.S. General Accounting Office Report GAO-03-1174T

**Sidebar 5.3.2: Philanthropy in the United States.**

> \$179.4 Billion Amount that individuals gave to churches and charities
> in 2003, up 0.2% from 2002 after inflation.
>
> \$831 Million Amount disbursed by the Liberty Fund**,** created by the
> Red Cross after 9/11, to victims and their families.
>
> 75% Percentage of total charitable contributions from individuals.
>
> 9 out of 10 Number of households that give to charity.
>
> \$1,620 Average annual amount that contributing households give to
> charities, which represents about 3% of their income.
>
> \$1,800 VS. \$1,310 Amount contributed to charity by households that
> itemize deductions versus households that take the standard deduction.

Sources: American Red Cross, The Chronicle of Philanthropy, Giving USA,
Independent Sector

# Additional Sources of Information on the 1993 Midwest Floods

CDC Investigation of Diseases After the Flood -
<http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/00031822.htm>

Effects of the Floods on Wetlands -
<http://water.usgs.gov/nwsum/WSP2425/flood.html>

FEMA NFIP in the 1993 Floods - <http://www.fema.gov/nfip/voices.shtm>

NASA Flood Images - <http://rsd.gsfc.nasa.gov/rsd/images/Flood_cp.html>

NOAA Abatement and Control Document -
[www.nwrfc.noaa.gov/floods/papers/oh_2/great.htm](http://www.nwrfc.noaa.gov/floods/papers/oh_2/great.htm)

USGS "Stream Gauging and Storm Forecasting" -
<http://water.usgs.gov/wid/FS_209-95/mason-weiger.html>

American Red Cross "Looking Back" -
<http://www.redcross.org/news/ds/floods/030806midwest93.html>

# Additional Sources of Information on the Northridge Earthquake

Berkeley Northridge Earthquake Resources -
<http://nisee.berkeley.edu/northridge/northridge.html>

Images of the Quake -
<http://images.google.com/images?q=northridge+earthquake&hl=en&lr=&safe=off&sa=N&tab=ii&oi=imagest>

FEMA for Kids: Northridge - <http://www.fema.gov/kids/north5.htm>

Southern California Earthquake Center Northridge Earthquake Page -
<http://www.data.scec.org/chrono_index/northreq.html>

USGS Response to the Northridge Earthquake -
<http://pubs.usgs.gov/of/1996/ofr-96-0263/>

# 

# Additional Sources of Information on September 11^th^ Attacks

9/11 Commission Report - <http://www.9-11commission.gov/>

American Red Cross Recovery Grants - <http://www.recoverygrants.org/>

FEMA September 11^th^ News Archives -
<http://www.fema.gov/news/newsrelease.fema?id=5152>

September 11 Digital Archive - <http://www.911digitalarchive.org/>

September 11 Fund Homepage - <http://www.september11fund.org/index.php>

# September 11 News Archive - [**http://www.september11news.com/**](http://www.september11news.com/) 

# Glossary of Terms

# Blind Thrust Fault - A thrust fault that does not rupture all the way up to the surface so there is no evidence of it on the ground. It is \"buried\" under the uppermost layers of rock in the crust.

# Commodity Credit Corporation - A federally owned and operated corporation within the US Department of Agriculture created to stabilize, support and protect agricultural prices and farm income through loans, purchases, payments, and other operations.

Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) **- A** federal entitlement
program administered by HUD\'s Community Planning and Development Office
that seeks to improve communities by providing decent housing, a
suitable living environment, and expanding economic opportunities -
principally for persons with low and moderate incomes.

Cripple-Stud **-** a stud shorter than the full height of the wall it is
anchoring.

Economic Development Administration (EDA) **-** an agency within the US
Department of Commerce that provides grants to economically-distressed
communities to generate new employment, help retain existing jobs and
stimulate industrial and commercial growth.

# Farm Service Agency - A division of the USDA that oversees the administration of all federal farm programs.

Ground acceleration **-** A measure of earthquake intensity. Unlike the
Richter magnitude scale, it is not a measure of the total size of the
earthquake, but rather how hard the earth shakes in a given location.

Ground Zero **--** the former World Trade Center site, so named because
it was the direct target of two of the hijacked airlines on September
11^th^, and the site where a majority of the damages and fatalities
sustained that day occurred.

# HUD 'HOME' Investment Partnerships Program - Consists of a block-grant of federal housing funds that goes to States and local jurisdictions. This program is designed to expand the supply of safe, decent, sanitary, and affordable housing, with an emphasis on providing rental housing for very low-income and low-income Americans. Its second focus is to mobilize and strengthen state and local governments\' abilities to design and implement strategies for achieving adequate supplies of affordable housing. Third, this program promotes the development of partnerships among state and local governments, the federal government, private industry, and non-profit organizations.

Job Training Partnership Act **-** enacted to establish programs to
prepare youth and unskilled adults for entry into the labor force and to
provide job training to economically disadvantaged and other individuals
facing serious barriers to employment.

Levee - A man-made embankment that controls or confines water.

# Psychotropic - Affects the mind, emotions, or behavior.

Slab-on-grade - A slab-on-grade home has no basement or basement floor
slab; the slab in constructed directly on the ground

# Acronyms

BIA -- Bureau of Indian Affairs

CAC - Client Assistance Center (Liberty Fund)

CDBG -- Community Development Block Grant

COBRA - Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (Insurance)

DHS -- Department of Homeland Security

DOI -- Department of the Interior

DOT -- Department of Agriculture

EDA -- Economic Development Administration

EMS -- Emergency Medical Services

EOC -- Emergency Operations Center

EPA -- Environmental Protection Agency

FAA -- Federal Aviation Administration

FBI -- Federal Bureau of Investigation

FEMA -- Federal Emergency Management Agency

FRP -- Federal Response Plan

GAO -- General Accounting Office

GSA -- General Services Administration

HAZMAT -- Hazardous Materials

HHS -- Department of Health and Human Services

HISP - Health Insurance Subsidy Program (Liberty Fund)

HMGP -- Hazard Mitigation Grant Program

HUD -- Department of Housing and Urban Development

IAFF -- International Association of Fire Fighters

IFAP -- International Family Assistance Program (Red Cross)

IFG -- FEMA Individual and Family Grant Program

MHR -- FEMA Minimum Home Repair Grant Program

NCCJ - National Conference for Community and Justice

NOAA -- National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration

NPS -- National Park Service

NYC -- New York City

OPM -- Office of Personnel Management

PSA -- Public Service Announcement

PTSD - Post Traumatic Stress Disorder

RFA -- Request for Applications

RFP -- Request for Proposals

SBA -- Small Business Administration

SEMA -- (Missouri) State Emergency Management Agency

SRP -- September 11^th^ Recovery Program (of the Liberty Fund)

TLC -- Trial Lawyers Care

US&R -- Urban Search and Rescue

USACE -- U.S. Army Corps of Engineers

USDA -- United States Department of Agriculture

USG -- United Services Group

USGS -- United States Geological Survey

WTC -- World Trade Center

**Discussion Questions**

**General**

1.  Compare the various Federal recovery programs. Are they effective?
    Should they be changed? If so, how would you change them, and how
    would the changes be funded?

2.  Is it realistic to expect State and local organizations to be able
    to contribute to the cost of recovery, or should the Federal
    Government assume 100% of the cost. Explain your answer.

3.  Why is coordination of recovery efforts so important? What kinds of
    things could go wrong in the absence of strong coordination
    mechanisms?

4.  What are the benefits to having a 'customer service' oriented
    approach to recovery from the standpoint of the Federal Government?
    What are the benefits of this approach from the standpoint of the
    victims?

5.  How is it beneficial to join mitigation and recovery in the
    post-disaster phase? Give some examples of situations where this has
    been effective, or examples that you propose for future disasters
    that could be effective in your opinion. Explain your answers.

**1993 Midwest Floods**

1.  Are levees an effective flood control measure? Why or why not?

2.  Should the Federal government be responsible for damages to
    structures that received funds in previous floods? Why or why not?

3.  If the Federal Government reimburses farmers for the losses of their
    crops in floods, should owners of businesses in other sectors expect
    the same recovery measures for their losses? Why or why not?

4.  Explain how the Federal Buyout programs help to alleviate long term
    flood losses. Are the benefits of these floods realized if a future
    flood does not affect the old property? Why or why not?

5.  What are some of the greatest challenges faced by communities in the
    recovery period of a flood disaster?

##### Northridge Earthquake

1.  Did the Federal government do enough to help Californian's recover
    from the Northridge Earthquake? Why or why not?

2.  In what ways does earthquake recovery differ from the recovery from
    other disasters? Give examples from the cases provided or from
    personal experience or knowledge.

3.  Is it appropriate to give loans instead of grants to victims of
    earthquakes? Why or why not?

4.  How long is an appropriate time to expect victims of earthquakes to
    expect to wait before government funding is provided for the
    rebuilding of their home?

5.  How could mitigation measures be applied to federal funding for
    recovery after a disaster like the Northridge earthquake. Could the
    same be done after other types of natural or technological
    disasters? If not, what could be done?

**September 11^th^ Attacks**

1.  Why was the concept of 'victim' expanded for the September 11^th^
    disaster? How was it different than other disasters? Is it possible
    to place a definitive limit on who is defined as a victim, and if
    so, what would that limit be?

2.  How was the recovery from the September 11^th^ disaster different
    from most other natural and technological disasters? How did this
    change the way recovery was conducted?

3.  The primary difference between the two profiled funds was the way in
    which they conducted business; under the Liberty Fund, the American
    Red Cross performed most of the tasks internally, and under the
    September 11^th^ Fund, the money was granted to third parties who
    performed the recovery actions themselves. What are the advantages
    and disadvantages to each?

4.  How will we know when the recovery from the September 11^th^ attacks
    is complete?

5.  Should we expect that philanthropic participation in future
    disasters will be proportionally the same as after the September
    11^th^ attacks, or will it be less? More? Explain your answer.

##### Suggested Out Of Class Exercises

1.  Research on FEMA's website any active disaster declarations. Find
    out what recovery measures are being provided to victims of the
    disaster.

2.  Contact your local office of emergency management, and research what
    kinds of recovery plans are in place in the event of a disaster.
    Report your findings to the class.

3.  Compare the premium costs of insuring a \$200,000 home in your area
    from either earthquake, hurricane, or flood damage for a period of
    20 years, and compare it to the costs associated with damages from
    the same disaster to the home, its contents, and any temporary
    relocation costs. Is such coverage worth the expense?

4.  Contact a local Red Cross chapter, and discuss with them the process
    by which you can become certified in one or more recovery skills
    (such as mental health counseling). Take the course, and volunteer
    your services with the chapter.

5.  If your community has experienced a large-scale disaster that
    required Federal assistance, interview a victim about the recovery
    process. Do they have any major complaints or praise? For what? Is
    there anything they would have liked to have had access to but which
    did not exist at the time of recovery? Was their life ever returned
    to normal? If so, how much of a part of the recovery did Federal
    government aid contribute?