**Before the**

**Federal Communications Commission**

**Washington, D.C. 20554**

In the Matter of )

) CC Docket No. 79-252

Motion of AT&T to be Declared )

Non-Dominant for International Service )

**ORDER ON RECONSIDERATION**

Adopted: September 30, 1998 Released: October 5, 1998

By the Commission:

In this decision, we deny petitions seeking reconsideration of our Order
declaring AT&T non-dominant in the market for international message
telephone services (IMTS).[^1] We reaffirm our conclusion that AT&T no
longer possesses sufficient market power to merit dominant carrier
regulation in the IMTS market. We conclude that relieving AT&T of the
regulatory burdens associated with dominant carrier regulation will
serve the public interest by promoting competition in international
telecommunications services.

**BACKGROUND**

In the *Competitive Carrier* proceeding, the Commission defined a
dominant carrier as one that \"possesses market power\" and noted that
control of bottleneck facilities was \"*prima facia* evidence of market
power requiring detailed regulatory scrutiny.\"[^2] The Commission also
concluded that, if a common carrier was determined to be
\"non‑dominant,\" the regulatory requirements of Title II of the
Communications Act, as amended,[^3] would be \"streamlined.\"
Specifically, tariffs filed by non‑dominant carriers would be presumed
lawful and would be subject to reduced notice periods.[^4]

The Commission first applied its dominant/non‑dominant carrier
regulatory classification to U.S. international carriers in 1985 and
concluded that (1) AT&T was dominant in the provision of IMTS and (2)
all other IMTS providers *(e.g.*, Sprint and MCI), except the
non‑contiguous domestic carriers, were not dominant.[^5] The Commission
determined that, for international service, demand and supply elasticity
revealed two major product markets, IMTS and non‑IMTS, and that every
destination country constituted a separate geographic market.[^6] The
Commission also concluded that no carrier ‑‑ including AT&T ‑‑ was
dominant in the provision of non‑IMTS service for any geographic
market.[^7] In addition, the Commission found all foreign-owned carriers
to be dominant for all service to all countries.[^8]

The Commission modified the rules in 1992 so as to regulate U.S.
international carriers, both U.S.- and foreign-owned, as dominant on
routes where an affiliated foreign carrier has the ability to
discriminate in favor of its U.S. affiliate through control of
bottleneck services or facilities in the destination market.[^9] The
Commission reaffirmed this policy in the *Foreign Carrier Entry Order*
and, most recently, in the *Foreign Participation Order.*[^10] The
Commission also concluded that dominant carrier regulation should apply
to U.S. carriers in their provision of international basic service on
particular routes where a co‑marketing or other arrangement, including
an alliance, with a foreign carrier with market power presents a
substantial risk of anticompetitive effects in the U.S. international
services market.[^11]

In October 1995, the Commission found that, although AT&T retained the
ability to control prices for some *de minimis* domestic, interstate,
interexchange services, AT&T did not have the ability unilaterally to
control prices in the overall domestic, interstate, interexchange
market. The Commission found that continuing such regulation harmed
market performance by stifling innovation and imposing compliance costs
on AT&T.[^12] The Commission deferred AT&T\'s request to be reclassified
as non-dominant in its provision of international service, including
IMTS.[^13]

On November 8, 1995, AT&T filed an *ex parte* letter seeking to be
declared non-dominant for international markets on the grounds that
evidence in the record established that it lacked market power under our
standards for determining dominance. The Commission sought public
comment and twelve parties opposed AT&T\'s motion.[^14]

In its Order granting AT&T\'s petition to be declared non-dominant in
international services, the Commission undertook a four-part analysis to
determine if AT&T had market power for the provision of IMTS within any
geographic market \-- that is, between the United States and any
international point. The Commission analyzed: (1) market share; (2) the
demand elasticity of AT&T\'s customers; (3) the supply elasticity of the
market; and (4) AT&T\'s cost structure, size, and resources. The
Commission also examined why U.S. international calling prices were
higher than U.S. domestic long distance calling prices. The Commission
used AT&T\'s market position on a worldwide basis as a surrogate for a
route-by-route analysis, with two exceptions: (1) it scrutinized
individually AT&T\'s market position on particular routes that had not
supported facilities-based entry by competing U.S. carriers; and (2) it
applied a route-specific approach to analyze the competitive impact of
AT&T\'s affiliations and alliances with foreign carriers on particular
U.S. international routes. With the exception of these routes, the
Commission concluded that analyzing AT&T\'s market power on a worldwide
basis was an acceptable surrogate for a route by route analysis of each
of more than 200 international locations.[^15]

The Commission found that AT&T\'s market share for the provision of IMTS
had declined from 98.5 percent in 1985 to 72.7 percent in 1991 to 59
percent in 1994.[^16] In comparison, AT&T\'s share of domestic
interexchange traffic declined from 90 percent in 1985 to 55.2 percent
in 1994. The Commission found that, although AT&T\'s share of IMTS
traffic was a few percentage points higher than its share of domestic
traffic, AT&T had lost market share faster in the international than in
the domestic market. The Commission concluded that there was no reason
based on market share to regulate AT&T differently in the international
than in the domestic market.[^17] The Commission also found that AT&T\'s
market share had similarly declined in the 76 countries for which it had
a greater than 90 percent market share and the 18 countries where it had
a 100 percent market share in 1991. In these countries, AT&T\'s average
market share (weighted by revenues) fell from 95 percent in 1991 to 74
percent by 1994. The Commission noted that the trend suggested that
these declines would continue. With respect to these countries, where
AT&T\'s market share was significantly greater than the average, the
Commission concluded that the high market shares were not an obstacle to
declaring AT&T non-dominant in the absence of barriers to entry that
would prevent AT&T\'s competitors from continuing to gain market
share.[^18]

With respect to demand elasticity,[^19] the Commission found substantial
evidence that AT&T\'s customers are highly price sensitive and that the
evidence supports our conclusion that AT&T alone could not raise and
sustain prices above a competitive level for international services. For
instance, the Commission found those consumers who make over \$15 per
month in international calls switch carriers over 25 percent more often
than average, and that even the remainder of international consumers
(those averaging under \$15 per month) switch carriers at a higher rate
than customers that make no international calls. The Commission found
that an increasing percentage of AT&T\'s international \"dial 1+\"
service customers were selecting discount plans rather than paying
AT&T\'s basic rates. In 1989, the percentage of AT&T\'s international
\"dial 1+\" service traffic on discount plans was zero. By 1994, this
percentage had increased to 60 percent. By comparison, calls made under
AT&T\'s True Promotions plans accounted for only 53 percent of Domestic
basket 1 traffic in 1994. The Commission stated that these data indicate
that IMTS customers are responsive to market signals, including price,
and are consistent with the conclusion that AT&T\'s own price elasticity
is high, and that customers are likely to switch carriers to take
advantage of price promotions.[^20]

To measure supply elasticity,[^21] the Commission looked at the ability
of U.S. carriers to (1) obtain operating agreements in other countries
and (2) obtain submarine cable capacity in a timely fashion. The record
in this case showed that multiple U.S. carriers have operating
agreements to all but the smallest IMTS markets that account for less
than one‑tenth of one percent (0.1 percent) of international revenue.
The Commission concluded that new U.S. facilities‑based suppliers may
obtain operating agreements and enter the market much more easily than a
decade ago.[^22] The Commission also noted that while AT&T owned 85
percent of the U.S. end of TAT-6 and 7 in 1985, its ownership share of
submarine cables had declined to 43 percent in 1996. In 1995, AT&T\'s
ownership share of the total submarine cable capacity worldwide amounted
to 21.6 percent. In addition, AT&T did not have a lead role in several
cables: PTAT, CANUS-1/CANTAT-3, and the North Pacific Cable
Network.[^23] Though commenters raised several concerns regarding access
to international facilities, the Commission stated that those issues
\"were the subject of contractual arrangements with regard to specific
submarine cable facilities\" and encouraged carriers to raise their
concerns in the context of Commission oversight of Construction and
Maintenance Agreements (C&MA\'s) for future cable facilities. The
Commission concluded that there is a sufficiently elastic supply to
mitigate any potential exercise of unilateral market power by AT&T.[^24]

The Commission also concluded that AT&T\'s cost structure, size and
superior resources are not alone persuasive evidence of market power.
The Commission noted, for instance, that AT&T faces large, well‑financed
competitors that involve multi‑billion dollar investments from the
predominant carriers in three of the four largest European Union
countries, with MCI and Sprint having total toll service revenues of
\$11.7 billion and \$6.8 billion, respectively, compared to AT&T\'s
\$36.9 billion.[^25] Although several parties alleged anticompetitive
harm from AT&T\'s global alliances, the Commission concluded that these
allegations were unsupported. However, the Commission also noted that
anticompetitive harm would result if one of AT&T\'s partners used its
bottleneck control to discriminate against rivals or consistently
benefit the alliance. The Commission re-emphasized that our rules did
not permit AT&T to enter into exclusive arrangements or receive special
concessions, and invited carriers to bring to our notice any patterns of
discrimination in access to foreign bottleneck facilities that favor the
AT&T alliance.[^26]

Finally, the Commission concluded that IMTS prices were high due to
imperfections in the U.S. international market, particularly the high
accounting rates that increase the profits of foreign monopolists. The
Commission also recognized that while AT&T does not have the unilateral
ability to set prices, AT&T still has sufficient market share to have
some effect on overall market performance. Accordingly, the Commission
welcomed AT&T\'s voluntary pricing commitments as a means of spurring
competition.[^27]

**DISCUSSION**

Petitioners raise three substantive arguments on reconsideration: (1)
AT&T continues to have market power in the U.S IMTS market and should be
regulated as a dominant carrier;[^28] (2) because AT&T\'s global
alliance partners have market power in their home markets, AT&T should
be regulated as dominant on those routes where its foreign partner has
the ability to discriminate against other U.S. carriers;[^29] and (3)
the Commission should deny AT&T non-dominant status because AT&T is
using its bottleneck control over cable landing stations to discriminate
against other U.S. carriers.[^30] We address each of these arguments
below.

In addition to the issues addressed below, one petitioner, ABS-CBN,
urges the Commission to require AT&T to assist ABS-CBN in acquiring
capacity on a minimum of two cable systems, Trans Pacific Cable-5
(TPC-5) and the Asia Pacific Cable Network (APCN), in which AT&T holds
an ownership interest.[^31] We conclude that, with respect to TPC-5,
ABS-CBN\'s petition is moot because ABS-CBN has acquired the capacity it
sought.[^32] Further, we note that APCN has no landing points in the
United States. Because we have no jurisdiction with respect to cables,
such as APCN, that do not land on any U.S. point, we deny ABS-CBN\'s
petition relating to APCN.[^33]

A. [AT&T\'s Individual Market Power]{.underline}

MFS urges us to reverse our finding that AT&T lacks individual market
power in the U.S. international services market, because (1) AT&T
continues to have the ability to control prices for IMTS and (2) AT&T
still has control over bottleneck facilities. MFS states that the
Commission erred in \"downplaying\" AT&T\'s role in setting IMTS prices
by concluding that structural problems with the international accounting
rate system, rather than AT&T, were responsible for causing IMTS rates
to be higher than rates for domestic telecommunications services. MFS
argues that AT&T\'s \"size and market share\" give it the unique ability
to manipulate the accounting rate systems and keep rates high. MFS also
argues that AT&T has an unfair competitive advantage over its
competitors because its control of bottleneck facilities gives it the
ability to obtain operating agreements that only a handful of other
carriers can obtain.[^34]

We are not persuaded by these arguments. In the 1996 *AT&T International
Non-Dominance Order,* the Commission concluded that AT&T lacks market
power in the U.S. IMTS market because, *inter alia,* (1) AT&T\'s overall
market share of U.S. international calls declined from 98.5 percent in
1985 to 59 percent in 1994; (2) IMTS customers were highly responsive to
price signals and likely to switch carriers if prices were raised; (3)
supply capacity was sufficiently elastic to constrain AT&T\'s market
behavior; and (4) because AT&T faced several large, well-financed
competitors, including MCI and Sprint, its structure, size and resources
were not alone sufficient to exercise market power.[^35]

MFS does not present any evidence to contradict the Commission\'s
finding that AT&T lacks unilateral market power, other than simply to
restate an excerpt from the 1996 *AT&T International Non-Dominance
Order* indicating that AT&T may have the ability to \"have some effect\"
on IMTS pricing.[^36] We note that the test for \"market power\" is the
power to control prices, rather than just to have some effect on
prices.[^37] We also note, moreover, that the Commission specifically
found that \"AT&T does not have the unilateral ability to set prices and
should not be regulated as dominant.\"[^38] Thus, we conclude that
MFS\'s argument that AT&T has the ability unilaterally to raise prices
is unsupported by the record.

We also find that MFS\' argument that AT&T has market power because it
controls bottleneck facilities is similarly without merit. MFS argues
that AT&T\'s \"control over bottleneck facilities\" gives it the ability
to obtain operating agreements with more foreign correspondents, and on
more favorable terms, than other carriers.[^39] Here, too, MFS does not
provide any evidence to support its claim but simply refers to
statements in the *AT&T International Non-Dominance Order* to the effect
that \"a large number of carriers\" have been unable to get operating
agreements.[^40] Although the Commission did state its concern that some
carriers had been unable to obtain operating agreements, the Commission
also concluded that \"multiple U.S. carriers have operating agreements
to all but the smallest IMTS markets that account for less than
one-tenth of one percent (0.1 percent) of international revenue\" and
that \"new U.S. facilities-based suppliers may obtain operating
agreements and enter the market much more easily than a decade
ago.\"[^41] Further, we expect that, as members of the World Trade
Organization (WTO) implement their market access commitments for the
provision of international services under the Agreement on Basic
Telecommunications concluded last year, AT&T\'s competitors will be able
to obtain operating agreements from new entrants as well as incumbent
carriers in WTO countries.[^42] We also reaffirm the Commission\'s
finding that alternative routing arrangements are increasingly available
to U.S. carriers.[^43] Since the 1996 *AT&T International Non-Dominance
Order* and conclusion of the WTO agreement we have, in fact, increased
the number of countries through which we permit U.S. carriers to hub
their IMTS traffic.[^44] We expect that, with the accelerated trend
towards competition in foreign markets, and the resulting downward
pressure on accounting rates, we will continue to see additional
countries emerge as hubs for U.S. traffic. For these reasons, we
reaffirm our finding that AT&T does not control bottleneck facilities
that give it market power in the U.S. IMTS market.

Recent developments reinforce our conclusion that AT&T lacks market
power in the U.S. international services market. AT&T\'s overall market
share has fallen further to 49.3 percent in 1996.[^45] We also note that
submarine cable capacity has increased significantly, with the result
that AT&T has even less of an ability than previously to control prices
by restricting supply.[^46] In short, we see no basis for reversing the
conclusion the Commission reached in 1996 that AT&T lacks market power
in the IMTS market.

B. [AT&T\'s Global Alliances]{.underline}

MFS, Sprint, and WorldCom urge the Commission to regulate AT&T as
dominant on routes where its global alliance partner has market
power.[^47] Sprint also urges the Commission to regulate AT&T as
dominant in its provision of IMTS to France and Germany.[^48] We do not
further address Sprint\'s argument with respect to France and Germany
because it is now moot.[^49] We also reject MFS\'s claim that in this
proceeding the Commission used the standard of \"individual market
power\" rather than \"market power\" as a new test to determine if AT&T
and its global alliances should be regulated as dominant.[^50] The
Commission has previously used the term \"individual market power\"
synonymously with \"unilateral market power\" to distinguish it from
possible oligopolistic behavior, or price coordination, by AT&T, MCI,
and Sprint.[^51] We clarify that \"individual market power\" does not
constitute a new test that the Commission applied to review whether AT&T
should be regulated as dominant on particular routes due to its global
alliances.

We do not agree that we should impose our Part 63 dominant carrier rules
on AT&T on routes where its global alliance partners may have market
power in their home markets.[^52] Sprint suggests that we do so because
AT&T Uniworld Carrier Services (\"Uniworld\"), the joint venture between
Unisource and AT&T, creates incentives for AT&T\'s global alliance
partners to discriminate against AT&T\'s competitors. Sprint, therefore,
urges the Commission to \"revisit its apparent assumption that only
direct equity investments by one carrier in another carrier\" should be
regulated as dominant.[^53] Sprint incorrectly describes our policy in
this regard. As the Commission stated recently in the *Foreign
Participation Order,* our dominant carrier regulations apply to a U.S.
carrier\'s provision of a service on a particular route \"where a
co-marketing agreement or other non-equity arrangement with a foreign
carrier presents a substantial risk of anticompetitive harm in the U.S.
international services market*.*[^54] The Commission also stated that
\"applying dominant classification to *all* non-equity arrangements,
absent a finding of substantial risk of competitive harm, would impose
an unnecessary burden.\"[^55] The Commission noted that non-equity
arrangements generally raised fewer concerns with respect to the
potential for anticompetitive harm than equity arrangements.[^56]

We disagree with Sprint that AT&T\'s foreign partners have the same
incentive to discriminate against AT&T\'s competitors whether they buy
stock in AT&T or form a joint venture with it such as Uniworld.[^57]
Sprint argues that AT&T and its partners have invested substantial sums
in Uniworld and have strong financial incentives to see it succeed and
to favor it over other competitors, such as Sprint\'s Global One venture
with France Telecom and Deutsche Telecom.[^58] We note, however, that
despite initial press reports that AT&T and Unisource would merge all of
their operations in Europe to create a company with 5,000 employees and
over \$1 billion in revenue, AT&T states that such a merger did not in
fact take place.[^59] Instead, the record shows that Uniworld is a
marketing alliance that uses the services provided by licensed carriers
(including the Unisource partners) to design and market intra-European
closed user group voice services (i.e., business networks) for large
multi-national customers throughout Europe.[^60] Although Unisource
partners may have some incentive to favor Uniworld by refusing to
provide AT&T\'s U.S. competitors the underlying carrier services or to
discriminate against them in some way, we believe that AT&T\'s Uniworld
partners have a far greater incentive to serve all carriers on the same
terms. First, the European Union has ordered Unisource and Uniworld to
provide service on a nondiscriminatory basis.[^61] Second, the foreign
carrier will collect the same charges whether it provides the service to
Uniworld or AT&T\'s competitors, and is not likely to refuse to provide
underlying transmission service to a carrier who requests such service.
Hence, we do not find on this record a substantial risk of competitive
harm that requires us to regulate AT&T as dominant because of its global
alliances. We also note that our dominant carrier rules apply to
providers of telecommunications services between the United States and
foreign points but not to traffic that originates and terminates
entirely outside the United States, such as Uniworld\'s intra-European
services.[^62] Thus, even if Sprint were able to show that Unisource
carriers have a financial incentive to discriminate against its Global
One venture in providing transmission services to compete with
Uniworld\'s intra-European service offerings, we do not have
jurisdiction to address that issue and, in any event, the dominant
carrier safeguards that Sprint urges us to impose on AT&T would not
provide an effective remedy.

Several petitioners also cite the potential for discriminatory
accounting rate treatment by AT&T\'s global alliance partners in urging
the Commission to impose dominant carrier regulation on AT&T.[^63] The
Commission concluded in its *Order* that discriminatory accounting rate
treatment was insufficient grounds for regulating AT&T as dominant but
invited carriers to notify it of \"any patterns of discrimination in
access to foreign bottleneck facilities that favor the AT&T
alliance.\"[^64] The petitioners in response allege that AT&T\'s
alliance partners: (1) reduced the accounting rate for AT&T but not for
AT&T\'s competitors; (2) refused to offer AT&T\'s competitors the lower
rate at the same effective date as for AT&T; or (3) refused to activate
circuits until completing accounting rate negotiations.[^65] AT&T,
however, states that it did not seek or accept any special concessions
from a foreign carrier, and, furthermore, urged its global alliance
partners in writing to comply with the Commission\'s policies requiring
nondiscriminatory accounting rate treatment for all U.S. carriers.[^66]
We find that no discrimination actually occurred because AT&T did not
accept the favorable treatment it allegedly was offered. We also find
that there is no evidence that AT&T\'s global alliances partners engaged
in any discriminatory practices after AT&T, in writing, urged them to
comply with the Commission\'s rules requiring nondiscriminatory
accounting rate practices. Thus, we conclude that AT&T\'s global
alliance partners did not use control over bottleneck facilities to
discriminate against AT&T\'s rivals in the markets contested by
Worldpartners and Uniworld.[^67] We also note that petitioners concerns
are addressed by more narrowly tailored remedies, such as our
International Settlements Policy (ISP).[^68] We reiterate that our ISP
requires nondiscriminatory accounting rates, division of tolls and
proportionate return traffic,[^69] and we note that our precedent
specifically prohibits the types of discrimination that petitioners
allege.[^70] With respect to the additional discrimination that WorldCom
alleges may result,[^71] we note that our ISP, our \"No Special
Concessions\" rule, and circuit status and traffic reporting
requirements protect U.S. carriers from potential discrimination in
favor of AT&T with regard to access to facilities by foreign carriers
with market power.[^72] Thus, we conclude that dominant carrier
regulation is not necessary to remedy any preferential treatment on
accounting rates that AT&T may receive from foreign carriers.

We also do not adopt WorldCom\'s suggestion that the Commission require
AT&T to make a binding commitment not to accept a more favorable
accounting rate arrangement from any of its global alliance partners
until all U.S. carriers with operating agreements with that foreign
carrier have been offered the same arrangement.[^73] Such a requirement,
we believe, would most likely result in delaying the introduction of
accounting rate reductions, without enhancing our ability to enforce the
ISP.[^74]

C. [Submarine Cable Stations]{.underline}

Sprint states that, although it agrees with the Commission that there is
a sufficient supply of submarine cable capacity, the *AT&T International
Non-Dominance Order* does not address Sprint\'s concerns that AT&T is
using its bottleneck control over cable landing stations to deny Sprint
(1) access to capacity it owns and (2) the right to obtain cable
restoration when cables fail.[^75] In particular, Sprint points to
AT&T\'s delays in activating circuits that Sprint has requested (e.g.,
on TAT 12/13) and an ongoing dispute relating to restoring Sprint-owned
PTAT\'s service on other cables (TAT-9, TAT-10, and TAT-11) which AT&T
manages. Sprint, therefore, requests the Commission to \"clarify whether
AT&T has any regulatory obligations as a result of its special position
with respect to these facilities.\"[^76]

Though Sprint accurately states that, as a matter of physical necessity,
only one digital access cross-connect switch (DACS) or demultiplexer can
receive the 155 Mbps fiber circuit at the U.S. cable head,[^77] it is
also true that the owners of a submarine cable can choose to land the
cable at any one of several cable landing stations, including stations
not owned or operated by AT&T.[^78] The number of cable stations not
owned by AT&T now includes seven of eight cable stations that have
become operational or for which plans have been finalized since
1996.[^79] Thus, it is not clear that AT&T has a bottleneck at the cable
landing station for purposes of our \"market power\" analysis. In
addition, any of the submarine cable\'s owners (including Sprint) who
are dissatisfied with the cable landing station\'s operations are free
to raise their complaints in accord with the process established by each
submarine cable\'s Construction and Maintenance Agreement (C&MA), the
basic ownership agreement. Submarine cable owners typically resolve
disputes about these issues by a majority vote of 50 percent or greater,
and none of the owners, including AT&T, holds a majority vote.[^80]
Although Sprint may believe it has not been treated fairly, the record
does not show that AT&T has exercised market power to discriminate
against Sprint or any other U.S. carrier in its management of U.S. cable
station facilities. For these reasons, the Commission concluded in its
1996 *Order,* and we affirm now, that disputes over \"contractual
arrangements,\" such as access to and restoration of cable facilities,
do not warrant continued classification of AT&T as dominant for
IMTS.[^81]

In addition, the record shows that AT&T has substantially fulfilled the
voluntary commitments it made in 1996 concerning nondiscriminatory
operation of the cable facilities.[^82] Specifically, with respect to
Sprint\'s circuit activation and restoration claims, AT&T states it (1)
reduced the TAT 12/13 circuit activation intervals (i.e., the period
between receiving a request and activating a circuit) to 7 days for
intra-office and 20 days for inter-office activation and (2) reached
agreement with Sprint concerning restoring a failure on TAT 12/13 by
using PTAT and restoring a failure on PTAT by using TAT 12/13.[^83]
Sprint did not oppose AT&T\'s claim that it fulfilled its voluntary
commitments with respect to activating circuits and providing
restoration. Accordingly, we find that there is no evidence in the
record that AT&T denied Sprint access to cable capacity it owns or did
not provide restoration when cables failed.

**CONCLUSION**

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm our finding that AT&T lacks market
power in the international services market and should be regulated as a
non-dominant carrier.

**ORDERING CLAUSES**

Accordingly, it is HEREBY ORDERED that petitions for reconsideration
filed by MFS, Sprint, MCI, WorldCom, and ABS-CBN are DENIED.

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

Magalie Roman Salas

Secretary

[^1]: ^?^*See* Motion of AT&T Corp. to be Declared Non-Dominant for
    International Services, *Order,* 11 FCC Rcd 17963 (1996) (*AT&T
    International Non-Dominance Order*).

[^2]: ^?^*See* Policy & Rules Concerning Rates for Competitive Common
    Carrier Services and Facilities Authorizations Therefor, CC Docket
    No. 79‑252 (*Competitive Carrier*), *First Report & Order*, 85 FCC
    2d 1 (1980); *Second Report & Order*, 91 FCC 2d 59 (1982); *recon.*
    93 FCC 2d 54 (1983); *Third Report & Order*, 48 Fed. Reg. 46,791
    (1983); *Fourth Report & Order*, 95 FCC 2d 554 (1983*), vacat*ed,
    AT&T v. FCC, 978 F.2d 727 (1992), *cert. denied*, MCI
    Telecommunications Corp. v. AT&T, 113 S.Ct. 3020 (1993); *Fifth
    Report & Order*, 98 FCC 2d 1191 (1984)*; Sixth Report & Ord*er, 99
    FCC 2d 1020 (1985)*, rev\'d*, MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. FCC,
    765 F.2d 1186 (D.C. Cir. 1985).

[^3]: ^?^47 U.S.C. §§ 201 *et seq.*(referred to herein as \"the
    Communications Act\" or \"the Act\").

[^4]: ^?^*Competitive Carrier, First Report and Order*, 85 FCC Rcd at
    57‑58, 92 and 102.

[^5]: ^?^International Competitive Carrier Policies, 102 FCC 2d 812
    (1985) (*International Competitive Carrier*), *recon. denied*, 60 RR
    2d 1435 (1986). As a dominant carrier, AT&T after 1989 was subject
    to price cap regulation (with constraints on pricing flexibility and
    long notice periods for tariff changes) in its provision of
    residential IMTS. These requirements were relaxed for some AT&T
    international services that were competitive (such as commercial
    IMTS). *AT&T International Non-Dominance Order* at ¶ 26-28.

[^6]: ^?^*International Competitive Carrier*, 102 FCC 2d at 828.

[^7]: ^?^*International Competitive Carrier,* 102 FCC 2d at 833-835;
    *see also id*. at 816, n.6 (\"Examples of non‑IMTS services are
    telex, telegram \... private line, high and low speed data, \[and\]
    videoconferencing\").

[^8]: ^?^*International Competitive Carrier*, 102 FCC 2d at 842-843,
    846.

[^9]: ^?^Regulation of International Common Carrier Services, 7 FCC Rcd
    7331, 7334 (1992) (*International Services*). The regulatory
    safeguards imposed on carriers that are regulated as dominant on
    particular routes due to an affiliation or alliance with a foreign
    carrier with market power are set forth in § 63.10(c) and differ
    from the regulatory safeguards imposed on carriers that are dominant
    for reasons other than a foreign carrier affiliation. Section
    63.10(c) requires quarterly reporting of traffic and revenue,
    provisioning and maintenance, and circuit status; limited structural
    separation (separate corporate affiliate; separate books of account;
    no joint ownership of transmission or switching facilities); and
    1-day notice for tariffs. 47 C.F.R. § 63.10(c).

[^10]: ^?^Market Entry and Regulation of Foreign‑affiliated Entities, 11
    FCC Rcd 3873 (1995) (*Foreign Carrier Entry Order*), *recon. granted
    in part, denied in part and deferred in part* in Rules and Policies
    on Foreign Participation in the U.S. Telecommunications Market,
    Market Entry and Regulation of Foreign-Affiliated Entities, 12 FCC
    Rcd 23891 (1997) (*Foreign Participation Order*), *recon. pending*.

[^11]: ^?^*International Services*, 7 FCC Rcd at 7333; *Foreign Carrier
    Entry Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at 3969; *Foreign Participation Order,* 12
    FCC Rcd at 23992. Carriers that are regulated as dominant on
    particular routes due to a co-marketing or other arrangement with a
    foreign carrier with market power are subject to the rules set forth
    in § 63.10(c). *See supra*, n.9.

[^12]: ^?^Motion of AT&T Corp. to be Reclassified as a Non‑Dominant
    Carrier, 11 FCC Rcd 3271 (1995) (*AT&T Reclassification Order*).

[^13]: ^?^*AT&T Reclassification Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at 3357. As
    discussed, *supra* ¶ 3, the Commission determined in the 1985
    *International Competitive Carrier* proceeding that no carrier,
    including AT&T, was dominant in the provision of non-IMTS services.
    In 1987, however, the Commission found AT&T to be dominant in its
    provision of multi-purpose earth station services, a separate
    international product market. *See Id.* at ¶ 22. No party has sought
    reconsideration of our determination in the *AT&T International
    Non-Dominance Order* that AT&T is no longer dominant in its
    provision of multi-purpose earth station services.

[^14]: ^?^*AT&T International Non-Dominance Order* at ¶ 29.

[^15]: ^?^*AT&T International Non-Dominance Order* at ¶¶ 32-36.

[^16]: ^?^*Id.* at ¶ 37.

[^17]: ^?^*Id.* at ¶ 39.

[^18]: ^?^*Id.* at ¶ 40. With respect to four markets in which AT&T was
    the sole facilities-based provider of IMTS, the Commission found
    that AT&T\'s share of U.S.-billed minutes on each of these routes
    constituted 0.002 percent or less of the total billed minutes in
    1994; collectively the minutes on these routes accounted for 0.0025
    percent. The Commission forbore from imposing dominant carrier
    regulation for the provision of IMTS to those countries. *Id.* at ¶¶
    94-97.

[^19]: ^?^Demand elasticity or responsiveness is the propensity of
    AT&T\'s customers to switch carriers or otherwise change the amount
    of services they purchase from AT&T in response to relative changes
    in price and quality. High demand elasticities indicate customers\'
    willingness and ability to switch to or from a carrier in order to
    obtain price reductions and desired features. *Id.* at ¶ 42.

[^20]: ^?^*Id.* at ¶ 46.

[^21]: ^?^The two factors that determine supply elasticities in the
    market are the supply capacity of existing competitors and low entry
    barriers. Supply elasticities tend to be high if existing
    competitors have or can easily acquire significant additional
    capacity in a relatively short time period. Supply elasticities also
    tend to be high even if existing suppliers lack excess capacity if
    new suppliers can enter the market relatively easily and add to
    existing capacity. *Id.* at ¶ 48.

[^22]: ^?^*Id.* at ¶ 51. The Commission further observed that
    alternative means of routing IMTS are increasingly available to U.S.
    carriers. The Commission noted, for instance, that it had recently
    removed U.S. regulatory impediments to the provision of service on
    an indirect, switched transit basis to facilitate the ability of
    U.S. facilities‑based carriers to serve thin routes, or routes for
    which they cannot obtain a direct service agreement. The Commission
    also noted its approval of \"switched hubbing\" IMTS via U.S.
    international private lines between the United States and countries
    it has deemed \"equivalent\" (which at that time were Canada, the
    United Kingdom, and Sweden). *Id.* We more recently revised our
    \"switched hubbing\" and related rules governing \"international
    simple resale\" (ISR) in the *Foreign Participation Order. See
    infra* ¶ 18, n.44.

[^23]: ^?^*AT&T International Non-Dominance Order* at ¶ 51.

[^24]: ^?^*Id.* at ¶¶ 52-62.

[^25]: ^?^*Id.* at ¶ 66.

[^26]: ^?^*Id*. at ¶¶ 71-77. The Commission stated that the pertinent
    questions in monitoring these alliances are: (1) is there any
    evidence that AT&T\'s partners use control over bottleneck
    facilities to discriminate against AT&T\'s rivals in the markets
    contested by AT&T\'s global alliances, and (2) is there any evidence
    that in practice AT&T\'s foreign partners are consistently choosing
    AT&T\'s global alliances as the preferred supplier for these
    services. *Id.* at 74.

[^27]: ^?^AT&T voluntarily committed to maintain its existing rates for
    residential IMTS for a three‑year period ending May 9, 1999, and to
    maintain the rates in effect on April 1, 1996 for customers enrolled
    in AT&T\'s True Country offer (excluding China) for a period ending
    December 31, 1996. After December 31, 1996, AT&T may raise rates for
    True Country; however, AT&T committed that, if the rates for this
    offer increase by more than five percent (excluding China), AT&T
    will have an offer in place with rates for a customer\'s selected
    country (excluding China) discounted 15 percent compared to the same
    basic international long distance price schedule as in the True
    Country offer. AT&T has agreed to make this 15 percent discounted
    offer available until May 9, 1999. *Id.* at ¶¶ 87-88.

[^28]: ^?^MFS Petition at 7-8.

[^29]: ^?^MFS Petition at 3, 4-5, 10-16, 18-21; Sprint Petition at 7-12;
    WorldCom Comments at 2-5.

[^30]: ^?^Sprint Petition at 12-14.

[^31]: ^?^ABS-CBN Petition at 1, 6-9.

[^32]: ^?^ABS-CBN Reply at 2. *See* AT&T Opposition at 16-17.

[^33]: ^?^Although ABS-CBN claims that AT&T made a voluntary commitment
    to \"act as a broker for U.S. carriers that have been unable to
    become owners of international cables,\" ABS-CBN Reply at 4, we note
    that AT&T\'s commitment applies only \"to consortium cable systems
    that land in the U.S\....\" *See AT&T International Non-Dominance
    Order*, Appendix A, at ¶ 3b.

[^34]: ^?^MFS Petition at 7-8.

[^35]: ^?^*Supra* at ¶¶ 7-11.

[^36]: ^?^MFS Petition at 7, *quoting from AT&T International
    Non-Dominance Order* at ¶ 88.

[^37]: ^?^*See* 47 C.F.R. § 61.3(o).

[^38]: ^?^*AT&T International Non-Dominance Order* at ¶ 88.

[^39]: ^?^MFS Petition at 8.

[^40]: ^?^*Id.* at 9, *quoting from AT&T International Non-Dominance
    Order* at ¶ 10.

[^41]: ^?^*AT&T International Non-Dominance Order* at ¶ 50.

[^42]: ^?^*Foreign Participation Order*, 12 FCC Rcd at 23906-23910.

[^43]: ^?^*See AT&T International Non-Dominance Order* at ¶ 35.

[^44]: ^?^*See* In the Matter of AT&T Corp., *et. al,* Applications for
    Authority, Pursuant to Section 214 of the Communications Act of
    1934, as amended, to provide switched services using private lines
    interconnected with the public switched network at one or both ends
    between the United States, on the one hand, and Austria and
    Switzerland on the other, *Order and Authorization*, DA 98-1180
    (Int. Bur., rel. June 29, 1998); In the Matter of AT&T Corp., *et.
    al,* Applications for Authority, Pursuant to Section 214 of the
    Communications Act of 1934, as amended, to provide switched services
    using private lines interconnected with the public switched network
    at one or both ends between the United States, on the one hand, and
    Luxembourg, Norway, Denmark, France, Germany and Belgium on the
    other, *Order and Authorization,* DA 98-816 (Int. Bur., rel. April
    30, 1998); In Re Application of KPN US Inc.*,* Application for
    Authority under Section 214 of the Communications Act of 1934, as
    amended, to Provide Facilities-based Services and to Resell
    Interconnected Private Lines to Provide International Switched
    Service between the United States and the Netherlands, *Order,
    Authorization and Certificate*, DA 98-156 (Int. Bur., rel. January
    30, 1998); In the Matter of Cable & Wireless, Inc., *et. al,*
    Applications for Authority pursuant to Section 214 of the
    Communications Act of 1934, as amended, to resell international
    private line services interconnected to the public switched network
    for the provision of service between the United States and
    Australia, *Memorandum Opinion, Order and Certificate*, DA 97-2554
    (Int. Bur., rel. December 17, 1997); In the Matter of Communications
    Telesystems International*,* Application for Authority pursuant to
    Section 214 of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, to
    operate as an international private line carrier, *Memorandum
    Opinion, Order and Certification*, DA 96-2183 (Int. Bur., rel.
    December 31, 1996) (New Zealand Equivalency). Our rules generally
    permit U.S. carriers to hub their switched traffic on a global basis
    through countries for which we have approved ISR, i.e., the routing
    of U.S.-inbound or outbound switched traffic over private lines.
    Section 63.17(b) of our rules, 47 C.F.R. § 63.17(b), permits U.S.
    carriers to route their inbound and outbound IMTS over private lines
    between the United States and ISR-approved countries and to
    interconnect those private lines with the inbound and outbound
    international switched services and facilities of those hub
    countries. This practice enables U.S.-authorized carriers to route
    their switched traffic between the United States and countries for
    which they may be unable to obtain an operating agreement. Under
    rules adopted in the *Foreign Participation Order,* we will
    authorize ISR between the United States and a WTO member country
    upon a finding either that the country at the foreign end of the
    private line provides equivalent resale opportunities or that
    settlement rates for at least 50 percent of the U.S. billed traffic
    between the United States and that country are at or below the
    benchmark settlement rates adopted for that country in the
    *Benchmarks Order.* In the Matter of International Settlement Rates,
    *Report and Order,* 12 FCC Rcd 19806 (1997), *recon. and appeals
    pending* (*Benchmarks Order*). We will authorize ISR between the
    United States and a non-WTO member country upon a finding that both
    conditions are met. 47 C.F.R. § 63.21 (a).

[^45]: ^?^1996 Section 43.61 International Telecommunications Data
    (January 1998).

[^46]: ^?^*Ex parte* letter to Magalie Roman Salas, Secretary, Federal
    Communications Commission, from James J. R. Talbot, Senior Attorney,
    AT&T, dated June 8, 1998, at 2-3 (*AT&T June 8, 1998 letter*).

[^47]: ^?^MFS Petition at 3, 4-5, 10-16, 18-21; Sprint Petition at 7-12;
    WorldCom Comments at 2-5. AT&T\'s WorldPartners global alliance had
    13 members, as of January 1996. *Ex parte* letter to William F.
    Caton, Acting Secretary, Federal Communications Commission, from R.
    Gerard Salemme, Vice President Government Affairs, AT&T, dated March
    21, 1996, at 2, n.1 (\"AT&T March 21, 1996 letter\"). The members
    are: AT&T, KDD (Japan), Singapore Telecom, AT&T (UK), Telstra
    (Australia), Telecom New Zealand, Hong Kong Telecom, Korea Telecom,
    PLDT (The Philippines), Bezeq (Israel), ITA (Taiwan), Unitel
    (Canada), and Unisource. Unisource at that time consisted of Telia
    (Sweden), Swiss Telecom, KBN (The Netherlands), and Telefonica de
    Espana. Telefonica de Espana has since withdrawn from WorldPartners.

[^48]: ^?^Sprint Petition at 2-7.

[^49]: ^?^ Sprint argued that AT&T had an unfair competitive advantage
    on the U.S.-France and U.S.-Germany routes because the Commission,
    as a condition of permitting France Telecom and Deutsche Telecom to
    acquire an equity interest in Sprint, imposed dominant carrier
    regulations on Sprint that constrained Sprint\'s ability to compete
    with AT&T in France and Germany. *Id.* The Bureau subsequently
    concluded that the French and German markets for telecommunications
    services are open to competition, declared Sprint non-dominant on
    the U.S.-France and U.S.-Germany routes, and removed the conditions
    the Commission had previously imposed. In the Matter of Sprint
    Corporation, Petition for Declaratory Ruling Concerning Section
    310(b)(4) and (d) and the Public Interest Requirements of the
    Communications Act of 1934, as amended, File No. ISP-95-002, and
    Petition for Declaratory Ruling Concerning Section 310(b)(4) and (d)
    of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, File No. ISP-95-002,
    *Declaratory Ruling and Order* (Int. Bur., rel. June 26, 1998).
    Thus, at present, AT&T does not have the unfair competitive
    advantage over Sprint that Sprint alleged it did.

[^50]: ^?^*See* MFS Petition at 3 (\"The Commission loses substantial
    credibility with its counterparts abroad when it changes its test
    from \"market power\" to \"independent market power\" \[*sic*\]
    merely to favor its traditionally dominant carrier.\") and 4, n.7
    (\"The FCC\'s focus on \"individual market power\" appears to
    constitute a new test for market power intended to allow the
    Commission to focus primarily on AT&T as a sole provider of its
    international services, and not on AT&T as a provider of
    international services through its global alliances.\").

[^51]: ^?^*See e.g., AT&T Reclassification Order,* 11 FCC Rcd at 3314.

[^52]: ^?^*See supra ¶ 3*, discussing Section 63.10(c) regulations
    applicable to carriers regulated as dominant on particular routes
    due to an affiliation or alliance with a foreign carrier that has
    market power.

[^53]: ^?^Sprint Petition at 10. *See* MFS Petition at 1314, n.27.

[^54]: ^?^*Foreign Participation Order*, 12 FCC Rcd at 23992.

[^55]: ^?^*Id.*, 12 FCC Rcd at 23992-23993 (emphasis added). *See
    Foreign Participation Order,* 12 FCC Rcd at 23992; *Foreign Carrier
    Entry Order*, 11 FCC Rcd at 3909; *International Services*, 7 FCC
    Rcd at 7333.

[^56]: ^?^*See Foreign Participation Order*, 12 FCC Rcd at 23992*,*
    n.460 (in non-equity arrangements, incentives to discriminate are
    not as great as in an affiliated or fully integrated relationship).
    *See also* Sprint Corporation Petition for Declaratory Ruling
    Concerning Section 310(b) and (d), 11 FCC Rcd 1850 (1996); MCI
    Communications Corporation/British Telecommunications PLC, Joint
    Petition for Declaratory Ruling Concerning Section 310(b) and (d), 9
    FCC Rcd 3960 (1994) (a foreign carrier with equity in a carrier is
    more likely to have an incentive to discriminate in the provision of
    service to a carrier\'s competitor because it would share any
    increased profits earned by the carrier).

[^57]: ^?^*See* Sprint Petition at 10.

[^58]: ^?^*Id.*

[^59]: ^?^*AT&T June 8, 1998 letter* at 1-2.

[^60]: ^?^*See AT&T International Non-Dominance Order* at ¶ 72. *See
    also ex parte* letter to William F. Caton, Acting Secretary, Federal
    Communications Commission, from R. Gerard Salemme, Vice President
    Government Affairs, AT&T, dated March 21, 1996, at 2-5.

[^61]: ^?^*AT&T June 8, 1998 letter* at 1-2.

[^62]: ^?^*See* 47 C.F.R. § 63.10(c).

[^63]: ^?^MCI Petition at 3-8; Sprint Petition at 7-9; MFS Petition at
    13; WorldCom Comments at 3-4.

[^64]: ^?^*AT&T International Non-Dominance Order* at ¶¶ 73-74. *See
    supra* at ¶ 11 and n.26.

[^65]: ^?^*See e.g.,* MCI Petition at 3-4, 5 n.6 (Swisscom reduced
    accounting rate retroactive to September 1995 for AT&T but
    retroactive only to January 1996 for MCI; Telia reduced accounting
    rate from 0.25 to 0.12 SDR for AT&T but proposed higher rate of 0.2
    SDR for all other carriers; PTT Telecom Netherlands stopped
    activating circuits until accounting rate negotiations were
    completed); Sprint Petition at 7-9 (Swisscom reduced accounting rate
    retroactive to September 1995 for AT&T but not for Sprint).

[^66]: ^?^AT&T opposition at 5-6. In letters to its global alliance
    partners, dated June 21, 1996, AT&T stated:

    This letter is to inform you unequivocally and without exception
    \... that AT&T does not seek to obtain or retain any preferential
    accounting rate vis-a-vis its U.S. competitors. \... As required by
    FCC regulation, AT&T\'s settlement manager advised representatives
    of your company of the FCC\'s policy that accounting rate reductions
    are to be made available to all U.S. carriers with whom you
    correspond. AT&T fully supports the FCC policy and urges you to
    respect that policy in your dealings with all U.S. carriers.

    *Id.* at 6.

[^67]: ^?^*See supra* n.26.

[^68]: ^?^Further, as we noted recently, there is a significantly
    reduced threat of discrimination against U.S. carriers in countries
    which are \"ISR-equivalent\" or where settlement rates for at least
    50 percent of the settled U.S.-billed traffic are at or below the
    relevant benchmark rates. In the Matter of 1998 Biennial Regulatory
    Review \-- Reform of the International Settlements Policy and
    Associated Filing Requirements, Regulation of International
    Accounting Rates, *Notice of Proposed Rulemaking,* FCC 98-190 (rel.
    August 6, 1998) at 12. We have proposed to remove the ISP for U.S.
    carriers serving such countries. *Id.* We designate a country as
    ISR-equivalent if it affords U.S. carriers equivalent opportunities
    to resell private lines to provide switched service interconnected
    with the public switched network at one or both ends. *See supra*
    n.44 for a listing of ISR-equivalent countries.

[^69]: ^?^*AT&T International Non-Dominance Order* at ¶ 69.

[^70]: ^?^For instance, the Commission has repeatedly held that
    accounting rate modifications should be nondiscriminatory and have
    the same effective date*.* Regulation of International Accounting
    Rates, 6 FCC Rcd 3552, 3555, 3558, n.36 (1991) *recon. denied* 7 FCC
    Rcd 8049 (1992). *See also* AT&T Corp.*, et al.,* 11 FCC Rcd 13799
    (1996); AT&T Corp*., et al,* 11 FCC Rcd 12107 (1996); In the Matter
    of AT&T Corp., Proposed Extension of Accounting Rate Agreement for
    Switched Voice Service with Argentina, *Order,* ISP-96-W-062, DA
    96-378 (International Bureau, March 18, 1996) at 3.

[^71]: ^?^*See* WorldCom Comments at 4, n.3.

[^72]: ^?^*See* Implementation and Scope of the International
    Settlements Policy for Parallel International Communications Routes,
    2 FCC Rcd 1118 (1987) (ISP applies to U.S. traffic routed on an
    indirect, switched transit basis); Regulatory Treatment of LEC
    Provision of Interexchange Services Originating in the LEC\'s Local
    Exchange Area, *Second Report and Order,* and *Third Report and
    Order,* FCC 97-142 (rel. Apr. 18, 1997) at ¶ 140-141, *Order on
    Reconsideration*, FCC 97-229 (rel. June 27, 1997), *Order,* DA
    98-556 (Com. Car. Bur. rel. Mar. 24, 1998) (ordering partial stay),
    *further recon. pending* (grooming cannot be offered on
    discriminatory basis); 47 C.F.R. § 63.14 (No Special Concessions
    rule); 47 C.F.R. § 43.82 (annual circuit status reports); 47 C.F.R.
    § 43.61 (a) and (b) (annual and quarterly traffic and revenue
    reports). We note that, because AT&T carries more than 1.0 percent
    of U.S. or foreign billed traffic, it is required to file
    international traffic and revenue reports for all U.S. international
    routes on a quarterly basis. 47 C.F.R. § 43.61 (b). Carriers
    regulated as dominant on particular U.S. international routes due to
    an affiliation or alliance with a carrier that has market power on
    the foreign end of the route also must file international traffic
    and revenue reports on a quarterly basis, but only with respect to
    traffic carried on the dominant route. *See* 47 C.F.R. § 63.10 (c).
    Thus, the international traffic and revenue reports filed by AT&T
    are more comprehensive than those filed by carriers regulated as
    dominant under part 63 of our rules. These reports, moreover, are
    more relevant to concerns about favorable treatment in the
    settlements process than any of the other dominant carrier
    safeguards (*i.e*., circuit status reports, provisioning and
    maintenance reports, and structural separation from the foreign
    carrier). *See generally* *Foreign Participation Order*, 12 FCC Rcd
    at 23955-23965, 23999-24022.

[^73]: ^?^*See* WorldCom Comments at 4.

[^74]: ^?^*See* Regulation of International Accounting Rates, 7 FCC Rcd
    8049, 8052 (1992).

[^75]: ^?^Sprint Petition at 12-14.

[^76]: ^?^Sprint Petition at 14.

[^77]: ^?^*Ex parte* letter to William F. Caton, Acting Secretary,
    Federal Communications Commission, from Kent Nakamura, Attorney,
    Sprint, dated March 20, 1996, at 1.

[^78]: ^?^*Ex parte* letter to William F. Caton, Acting Secretary,
    Federal Communications Commission, from R. Gerard Salemme, Vice
    President Government Affairs, AT&T, dated April 8, 1996, at 3-7
    (*AT&T April 8, 1996 letter*); *Ex parte* letter to William F.
    Caton, Acting Secretary, Federal Communications Commission, from
    Kent Nakamura, General Attorney, Sprint, dated April 16, 1996, at
    2-3.

[^79]: ^?^*AT&T June 8, 1998 letter* at 2 (citing cable stations for
    AC-1 in Brookhaven, NJ, which is operated by GCL; for Gemini in
    Greenhill, RI, operated by Gemini; for PC-1 in Elliot Point, WA, and
    Grover Beach, CA, operated by GCL; for Japan-US and Southern Cross
    in Bodega Bay, CA, operated by WorldCom; for Southern Cross in Morro
    Bay, CA, operated by WorldCom. AT&T will operate the Hollywood, FL
    cable station for Columbus III and Americas II.)

[^80]: ^?^*AT&T April 8, 1996 letter* at 4.

[^81]: ^?^*See AT&T International Non-Dominance Order* at *¶¶* 61-62.

[^82]: ^?^*AT&T June 8, 1998 letter* at 3-6.

[^83]: ^?^AT&T states that the initial agreement to use PTAT to restore
    TAT-12 and TAT-12/13 to restore PTAT proved to be impractical
    because existing backhaul facilities between the cable station for
    TAT-12 in Green Hill, RI and the cable station for PTAT in
    Manasquan, NJ were insufficient for this purpose. Thus, mutual
    restoration arrangements were not finalized. Instead, the owners of
    TAT-12/13 made available to PTAT a daily, on-demand restoration on
    TAT-12/13. AT&T notes that PTAT has not used this restoration
    arrangement, or been charged for it, since 1996. *Id.* at 5-6.