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**Communications Infrastructure**

**Security, Access, and Restoration Working Group**

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Final Report

**February 25, 2004**

[Executive Summary 1](#executive-summary)

> [Tampa 2](#tampa)
>
> [Prevention 2](#prevention)
>
> [Restoration 3](#restoration)
>
> [Future Technologies 4](#future-technologies)
>
> [Conclusion 4](#conclusion)

[Prevention Subcommittee 5](#prevention-subcommittee)

[Mission 5](#mission)

[Approach 5](#approach)

[Key Principles 6](#key-principles)

[National Television and Radio Infrastructure
7](#national-television-and-radio-infrastructure)

[Television Networks 8](#television-networks)

[National Radio Broadcasting 12](#national-radio-broadcasting)

[National Satellite Television and Radio Services
15](#national-satellite-television-and-radio-services)

[National Infrastructure Conclusions
18](#national-infrastructure-conclusions)

[Local Radio, Television and Cable Infrastructure
19](#local-radio-television-and-cable-infrastructure)

[Local Radio 21](#local-radio)

[Local Television Broadcasting 25](#local-television-broadcasting)

[Cable Television 30](#cable-television)

[Local Infrastructure Conclusions 34](#local-infrastructure-conclusions)

[Restoration Subcommittee 36](#restoration-subcommittee)

[Introduction 36](#introduction)

[Mission 36](#mission-1)

[Approach 36](#approach-1)

[State of the Industry 37](#state-of-the-industry)

[Local Radio 38](#local-radio-1)

[Local Television 38](#local-television)

[Cable 39](#cable)

[DBS and Digital Satellite Radio 39](#dbs-and-digital-satellite-radio)

[Network Radio and Television 40](#network-radio-and-television)

[Conclusion 40](#conclusion-1)

[Relevant Case Studies 40](#relevant-case-studies)

[Hurricane Andrew (1992) 41](#hurricane-andrew-1992)

[Los Angeles (1993) and San Francisco (1995) Earthquakes
42](#los-angeles-1993-and-san-francisco-1995-earthquakes)

[1993 and 2001 Attacks on the World Trade Center
42](#and-2001-attacks-on-the-world-trade-center)

[Future Technologies/Digital Solutions Subcommittee
45](#future-technologiesdigital-solutions-subcommittee)

> [Mission 45](#mission-2)
>
> [Approach 45](#approach-2)
>
> [Description of Single Frequency Networks
> 49](#description-of-single-frequency-networks)
>
> [Conclusion 50](#conclusion-2)

[Appendix A -- Subcommittee Members
52](#appendix-a-subcommittee-members)

[Appendix B -- Broadcast Restoration Packages
55](#appendix-b-broadcast-restoration-packages)

[APPENDIX C -- Existing Digital Technologies
64](#appendix-c-existing-digital-technologies)

# 

[Figure 1: Alternate site for news and programming
9](#__RefHeading___Toc65409550)

[Figure 2: Disaster recovery plans 19](#__RefHeading___Toc65409551)

[Figure 3: Reciprocity agreements 35](#__RefHeading___Toc65409552)

#  {#section-11 .unnumbered}

# [Executive Summary]{.underline}

In the aftermath of the tragedy of September 11, 2001, the Federal
Communications Commission ("Commission" or "FCC") recognized the
fundamental and essential role that media industries play in providing
and coordinating communications in emergency situations. On March 28,
2002, the Commission announced the formation of a new federal advisory
committee, the Media Security and Reliability Council ("MSRC").

The MSRC was charged with studying, developing and reporting on
communications and coordinated activities designed to ensure the optimal
reliability, robustness and security of the broadcast and multichannel
video programming distribution ("MVPD") industries in emergency
situations.

The MSRC analyzed the current status of media industries and prepared
best practice recommendations. In order to do so, the MSRC was guided by
the following objectives:

-   Prepare a comprehensive national strategy for securing and
    sustaining broadcast and MVPD facilities throughout the United
    States during terrorist attacks, natural disasters and all other
    threats or attacks nationwide.

-   Develop strategies that ensure the operation of broadcast and MVPD
    facilities before, during and after a major national emergency. This
    report will include recommendations for detecting, preparing for,
    preventing, protecting against, responding to and recovering from
    terrorist threats, natural disasters or other attacks upon
    America\'s infrastructure and its people.

-   Provide recommendations to the Commission and media industries that,
    when implemented, will ensure optimal reliability, robustness and
    security of broadcast and MVPD facilities throughout the United
    States.

Organizationally, the MSRC was divided into two working groups: (1)
Communications Infrastructure, Security, Access and Restoration
("CISAR") and (2) Public Communications and Safety ("PC&S"). This report
provides the summaries and best practice recommendations of the CISAR
working group. As such, the CISAR working group's mission is to:

-   Address the risks and vulnerabilities of our nation\'s television,
    radio, multichannel video, microwave, and satellite infrastructure
    during a time of terrorist attack, natural disaster or other
    man-made catastrophe.

-   Assess current practices in the areas of physical prevention and
    physical restoration in an effort to identify what enhancements or
    additions are needed.

-   Focus on industry-specific measures as well as issues that extend
    across different media platforms.

-   Evaluate the redundancy of media infrastructure within each industry
    and among different sectors.

Three subcommittees comprise the CISAR working group: Prevention,
Restoration and Future Technologies. After a two-year process that
included extensive meetings, data collection and analysis, each
subcommittee developed a set of best practice recommendations that were
presented to the MSRC and adopted at committee meetings in May and
November 2003. Many of those best practice recommendations were based on
information from surveys conducted by industry trade groups, including
the National Association of Broadcasters ("NAB"), the National Cable and
Telecommunications Association ("NCTA"), the Satellite Broadcasting and
Communications Association ("SBCA"), and the Association of Public
Television Stations ("APTS"). The survey responses rates were between
20% and 100% and covered most major markets in the country.

## Tampa

During the course of their discussion, the PC&S working group decided to
sponsor a "Model City" Workshop and invited the CISAR working to
participate. With the leadership of the Florida Association of
Broadcasters and strong support from other state industry associations,
media companies and government leaders, the PC&S working group organized
and conducted an Emergency Communications Workshop in Tampa in December
2003. At the Tampa workshop, the CISAR working group presented its best
practice recommendations to members of the Florida broadcasting industry
as well as the State and local emergency management agencies, which
together, provided strong validation of the CISAR's best practices.

## Prevention

The objectives of the Prevention Subcommittee were: to address the risks
and vulnerabilities of media industries during a time of terrorist
attack, natural disaster or other man-made catastrophe; evaluate the
redundancy of media infrastructure; and recommend best practices to
address the vulnerabilities. The subcommittee partitioned its
consideration into national and local levels. This decision was made in
recognition that a substantially different scale of operations and
potential for disruption exists at each level. The partitioning also
aided our consideration of mass media types, since the businesses and
their associated infrastructure are substantially different for
terrestrial television broadcasting, cable television ("CATV"), radio
broadcasting, satellite television ("DBS") and satellite radio.

Because of the relatively small number of media networks and channels
that are national in scope, the subcommittee was able to gather and
assemble relevant information from a combination of first-hand knowledge
and direct contributions from senior-level engineering management at the
various businesses. At the local level, the sheer number of facilities
in the country is substantial -- approximately 1,600 terrestrial TV
broadcasters, 9,500 cable headends and 13,000 radio broadcasters.
Further, it is well understood in the industry that a wide range of
diversity exists in the level of disaster planning and backup facilities
that have been considered prudent and affordable by different businesses
and in different markets. This level of size and diversity clearly
called for a more extensive data gathering effort. The subcommittee, in
conjunction with industry trade associations, developed draft surveys
for television broadcasters, radio broadcasters and cable operators.
Outstanding cooperation was obtained from industry organizations (NAB,
APTS, NCTA and SBCA), which took on the effort of determining an
appropriate sample, distributing the surveys and tabulating the results.

## Restoration

The Restoration Subcommittee was charged with assessing the
communications industry's ability to restore services to the American
people after a natural disaster or terrorist attack. This subcommittee
derived its best practice recommendations, in part, from trade
association survey data. It also examined case studies in order to
evaluate past restoration efforts and determine which practices were
most successful.

The objectives of the Restoration Subcommittee were: to determine the
timelines currently required by media industries to restore services to
the public after a natural disaster or terrorist attack; to recommend
planning processes that can be initiated on a market-by-market basis to
restore service to the public in the most expeditious manner; to
evaluate past restoration efforts to determine which procedures were
most effective and what bottlenecks existed to restoring service; to
identify best practices for restoring service to the public; and, to
make recommendations designed to improve the restoration process.

Working in conjunction with the Prevention Subcommittee, the Restoration
Subcommittee developed surveys for media industries to determine the
current capacity of each communications industry sector to restore
service following a natural disaster or terrorist incident. The results
of the surveys were designed to:

-   Evaluate short-term recovery timelines from a loss of key components
    in the communications delivery system, such as towers, transmitters,
    studio-to-studio transmitter links, studios and cable headends.

-   Determine the long-term manufacturing lead times for replacement of
    key components in communications delivery systems.

-   Prepare case studies on the restoration of service following
    Hurricane Andrew in Florida, major earthquakes in Los Angeles and
    San Francisco, and the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center
    in New York.

## Future Technologies

The mission of the Future Technologies Subcommittee was to identify
particular challenges and opportunities posed by digital technologies to
the reliability of communications infrastructure and to consider new
applications that are enabled by digital technologies that enhance
media\'s role in disseminating security-related information. The
subcommittee made two formal recommendations on how emergency
notification systems can be leveraged, changed or enhanced to take
advantage of digital technologies. The subcommittee agreed that the most
important step was coordination of a digital common alert protocol that
would serve across all digital platforms as a technical standard. This
is a critical element in establishing reliable and universal messaging
in a digital age. The subcommittee also emphasized the urgency of
coordinating this standard to avoid the dissemination of competing or
incompatible systems.

The subcommittee considered digital technologies as they apply to
broadcast, cable and satellite television and broadcast and satellite
radio. The scope was limited to point-to-multi-point communications and
therefore did not address emergency messaging to cell phones, PDAs or
basic email devices. Those devices have not been typically supplied by
cable, broadcast or satellite television and radio. In the course of its
discussion, there was considerable interest expressed in finding ways to
alert the public using these newer devices. The subcommittee suggests
that the responsibility for this future objective be clarified between
the NRIC, the MSRC or some other organization. The subcommittee
solicited and assembled information on existing efforts to pilot or use
digital technologies in emergency messaging. These efforts are
summarized into Appendix C.

## Conclusion

Most members of the media industry have invested time and resources to
ensure that the reliability and continued operation of their systems.
However, as the survey data demonstrated, there are certain initiatives
that can be undertaken to further secure the infrastructure of the media
industry.

In this regard, this report strives to provide media organizations the
opportunity to review the best practice recommendations in this report
and take steps to strengthen their organization's disaster recovery
plans. Second, this report encourages the media industry to engage in
dialogue with local government officials and establish inter and intra-
industry cooperative agreements. Finally, we recommend that media
industry review future technologies as they become accessible. In
following these steps, we believe that the media industry will help
ensure the security and reliability of the media infrastructure.

# 

# [Prevention Subcommittee]{.underline}

## 

## Mission

1.  Address the risks and vulnerabilities of our nation\'s television,
    radio, multi-channel video, microwave, and satellite infrastructure
    during a time of terrorist attack, natural disaster or other manmade
    catastrophe.

2.  Evaluate the redundancy of media infrastructure within each industry
    and among different sectors.

3.  Recommend best practices designed to address vulnerabilities in
    broadcast and MVPD facilities, including how best to address those
    vulnerabilities to prevent disruptions or misuse that would
    otherwise result from terrorist activities, natural disasters, or
    similar types of occurrences.

## Approach

The subcommittee partitioned its consideration into national and local
levels. This decision was made in recognition that a substantially
different scale of operations and potential for disruption exists at
each level. The subcommittee also partitioned its consideration by mass
media type, since the businesses and their associated infrastructure are
substantially different for terrestrial television broadcasting, cable
television (CATV), radio broadcasting, satellite television (DBS) and
satellite radio.

Because of the relatively small number of media networks and channels
that are national in scope, the subcommittee was able to gather and
assemble relevant information from a combination of first-hand knowledge
and direct contributions from senior-level engineering management at the
various businesses. At the local level, the sheer number of facilities
in the country are substantial -- approximately 1,600 terrestrial TV
broadcasters, 9,500 cable headends and 13,000 radio broadcasters.
Further, it is well understood in the industry that a wide range of
diversity exists in the level of disaster planning and backup facilities
that have been considered prudent and affordable by different businesses
and in different markets. This level of size and diversity clearly
called for a more extensive data gathering effort. The subcommittee
developed draft surveys for television broadcasters, radio broadcasters
and cable operators. With the assistance of MSRC leadership, outstanding
cooperation was provided by industry organizations (NAB, APTS, NCTA and
SBCA), which took on the effort of determining an appropriate sample,
distributing the surveys and tabulating the results. All parties
involved in the effort agreed that it was important that the process be
designed to maintain the anonymity of the individual respondents.

## 

## Key Principles

Even as the subcommittee initially discussed how to make its efforts
manageable, agreements were reached on certain key principles that
guided subsequent efforts:

1.  The focus of prevention considerations should be on media businesses
    and facilities that have a role in originating or delivering news
    and/or emergency warnings to the public. Thus, the continued
    origination of entertainment-only programming during a time of
    crisis was not considered essential, and possibly not even
    desirable.

2.  The mission of prevention should be principally defined as ensuring
    that at least one mass communications medium remains in service (and
    that the public can find it) under even the most catastrophic
    conditions. Above the considerations of any individual industry or
    business, it is crucial to national security and public safety to
    preserve the ability for government (whether federal, state or
    local) to effectively ensure that news and public safety information
    can be communicated to the public during a time of crisis. *Thus,
    while keeping all stations on air is most desirable, ensuring that
    some stations remain on air to serve the community is an absolute
    necessity.* Thus, the concept of community level planning and
    coordination as a cost-effective means to achieve the required
    redundancy and geographic diversity of equipment and facilities was
    an important consideration.

3.  Important, but lower a priority consideration, was given to planning
    activity to keep each individual media delivery business/system in
    operation**.** While best practices will be identified, this report,
    its analysis and recommendations are not substitutes for the
    detailed disaster and recovery planning of any individual mass media
    business.

*However, it is recognized that redundancies that are planned to provide
adequate protection against equipment failure and even natural disasters
are not necessarily the same as those needed to protect against a
deliberate attack.* Specifically, protection against deliberate attack
requires security measures at media facilities and a combination of both
redundancy and geographic diversity for critical equipment and
facilities.

For example, cable television redundancies have been planned to deal
with natural disasters or outages to an inadvertent loss of connectivity
(such as a backhoe snapping a cable), but not a deliberate attack. Large
cable television operators often have a fiber link between local
broadcasters and the cable headend. An example of a good practice is
that they also continue to maintain an RF connection as a backup.
However, many cable television operators must rely solely on RF, which
may be an issue in rural areas. Another example, in the case of
terrestrial television and radio broadcasting, is that rural areas can
have more towers and less sharing of antennas co-located on a single
tower than more crowded urban and suburban areas. Obviously, co-located
antennas make the loss of a tower more significant. One example of
redundancy and geographic diversity at the community level is that
coverage areas should have two or more towers in order to provide some
overall service robustness to the population. Therefore, in the final
analysis, an attempt has been made to identify situations that lead to
significant vulnerabilities within and across multiple media businesses
and to recommend best practices that would help prevent catastrophic
loss of service at the community level.

# 

## National Television and Radio Infrastructure

This section of the report describes the elements that compose the
country's nationwide communications infrastructure -- television
networks (and associated cable news channels), radio networks and
satellite television and radio service providers. The subcommittee
recognized that disruption or loss of service by any single nationwide
media service provider would have serious business and public interest
impact. There are many practices for achieving high-reliability
operations in their infrastructure that each network and service
provider currently employs. The huge economic incentive to remain in
continuous operation has driven each of these organizations to have
redundancies and backup systems, coupled with extensive emergency
planning and rehearsals.

Disruption or loss of service by all national communications service
providers would be truly catastrophic to American's social fabric.
Fortunately, the collective diversity of the various networks and
service providers makes this an extremely unlikely event. Nevertheless,
it remains prudent to consider how collaborative efforts and contingency
plans among national networks and service providers can further improve
the overall robustness of nationwide mass media communications.

### 

### Television Networks

The four major broadcast television networks (ABC, CBS, Fox and NBC) and
the Public Broadcasting Service (PBS) provide the television programming
and network news that makes up the majority of viewing hours by the
American public. Each commercial network owns TV broadcast stations in
major markets and provide television service to almost all American
households through their own stations, affiliated stations or cable
retransmission of network programming. PBS is the nation's largest
television network with 349 transmitters serving all 50 states, the
Caribbean and Guam and Samoa. Each major broadcast television network is
a large business with its own disaster planning and redundancies.

Television broadcasters are a primary source of national news and
information, regardless of whether households in the community receive
the signal over the air, by cable or through DBS. It is therefore vital
that one or more television broadcasters be capable of continuing
operations under the extremely adverse conditions that could occur in
the event of a disaster.

[]{#__RefHeading___Toc65409550 .anchor}Figure 1: Alternate site for news
and programming

![](media/image2.wmf){width="5.27007874015748in"
height="3.62992125984252in"}

The four major broadcast networks operate dual origination centers with
one typically located in New York and a second center in Los Angeles or
Washington, DC. PBS has three separate uplink sites located in
Alexandria and Springfield Virginia. PBS also has planned and tested a
back-up origination site using the uplink facilities of a PBS member
station located in the Midwest. Typically, network signals are
distributed by redundant microwave radio links and fiber cable to two
satellite earth stations that transmit signals. For example, each CBS
affiliate has two satellite earth stations. Most television networks
have operational redundancies in place that would enable one facility to
instantaneously take over transmission operations from the main
transmission center in the event of an emergency.

**State of the National Television Industry**

Highlights of findings in the state of national television
infrastructure include these following examples:

*Planning*

-   CBS affiliate stations in New York run simulators to train operators
    on emergency recovery procedures such as local access network
    failures, server failures, and videotape failures.

-   Fox Network and Fox News Channel both have plans in place that are
    regularly audited to ensure that they are responsive to current
    conditions. Also Fox regularly tests systems to ensure they work as
    designed.

-   NBC routinely drills and participates in disaster simulation in an
    effort to continually test and refine emergency procedures.

-   PBS has had a formal written Disaster Recovery Plan in place for
    almost seven years. That plan is regularly updated. PBS routinely
    drills and participates in disaster simulation including planning
    and practicing emergency "shelter in place" scenarios.

*Physical Security*

-   All networks and PBS surveyed maintain physical site security
    through a combination of security personnel, card restricted access,
    video surveillance, and other methods to ensure physical security.

*Backup Power*

-   All networks and PBS have backup power generating facilities with
    enough fuel for several days of operations.

*Redundant Communications*

-   All surveyed maintain a network of fiber links to major operations
    centers and uplink facilities.

-   In addition, several networks, including PBS, have satellite phones
    in the event of an outage of regular telephony.

*Redundant Facilities*

-   The Fox Television Network is based in Los Angeles. Fox News
    Channel, which is an independent organization, is based in New York.
    Redundant transmission systems are employed by both entities. Both
    provide origination back up for one another. Both also have limited
    backup facilities at tertiary locations.

-   NBC uplinks its network feeds for all four time zones from a
    mid-town Manhattan location. In the event that the network center
    becomes completely incapacitated, news could be sourced at CNBC
    studios in mid-town Manhattan, delivered to MS-NBC in Secaucus, to
    NJ over redundant fiber and microwave links, and from there
    satellite linked to Burbank, California for nationwide distribution
    to affiliates. News could also be sourced at MS-NBC or in Burbank.

-   As a further layer of redundancy, WNBC in New York maintains a
    microwave link with PBS in Long Island to uplink the network signal
    to Burbank in the event of an emergency.

-   Satellite News Gathering ("SNG") trucks are located at each
    origination center and could also be used for alternate
    distribution.

-   PBS headquarters, located outside Washington, DC in Alexandria,
    Virginia has 3 separate uplink sites and an unstaffed uplink
    facility located in Prince William County, Virginia. In addition, as
    noted above, PBS has made arrangements and practiced uplinking
    capabilities with a PBS member station located in the Midwest.
    Typically, network programming originates at PBS headquarters in
    Alexandria, Virginia, and is distributed to the main PBS uplink
    facility by fiber (primary) and uses microwave as a backup.

**National Television Conclusions**

Industry highlights demonstrate that the major television networks have
extensive plans for emergencies and deep facilities and equipment
redundancies. Based on the Prevention Subcommittee analysis of the state
of the industry, the highest priority areas of concern in the national
television infrastructure are:

1.  Vulnerability assessments, emergency response drills and disaster
    recovery plans should be made with special consideration given to
    switching network origination and control among geographically
    diverse sites.

2.  Networks and cable news channels should have backup carriage
    agreements with non-news channels, with supporting interconnections

3.  Networks and cable news channels should make provision to have their
    audio signals available to national radio networks and satellite
    radio operators.

In addition to reinforcing their own facilities and operations, national
television operators should consider jointly coordinating with one
another and with affiliates to ensure that backup infrastructure is in
place to continue operations in the event of a national emergency. This
may also mean coordinating with affiliates of other networks in addition
to their own affiliates, as well as with cable and satellite systems to
ensure that emergency information can be disseminated to the public
under the worst of conditions.

## 

### National Radio Broadcasting

Radio broadcasting is an integral part of the media industry in that it
provides listeners with important news and information from around the
world as well as entertainment and educational programming. Moreover,
the ubiquity of radio enables people in urban and rural communities to
have immediate access to important news and information in the event of
a national emergency. Like television networks, radio networks have a
high economic incentive to create and maintain a highly reliable
infrastructure.

**State of the National Radio Industry**

Highlights of findings in the state of national radio infrastructure
include:

*Backup Power*

-   All national radio broadcasters surveyed have plans for at least 3
    day of backup power for their facilities

*Redundant Communications*

-   ABC Radio Networks distributes its programming from its main site in
    New York to New Jersey where SES Americom uplinks it. There are 2
    routes from New York to New Jersey with nothing in common except
    start and end points. The New Jersey site has both a UPS and
    generator back-up system.

-   NPR distributes programming through a single-channel-per-carrier
    C-band satellite system known as the Public Radio Satellite System
    (PRSS). In addition to the primary uplink at NPR's Washington
    headquarters, there are approximately fifteen geographically diverse
    regional uplinks, each of which is capable of delivering at least
    two discrete channels of programming to the PRSS. Most of these
    regional uplinks are equipped with ISDN codecs and POTS hybrids,
    allowing programming to be originated for the network from virtually
    any location via the public telecommunications network.

-   Westwood One maintains multiple T-1 lines between its Washington, DC
    and New York facilities for CBS news and Westwood One talk
    programming. Also, there is connectivity between most key government
    buildings and Westwood's Washington Bureau and a T-1 connection
    between their Silver Spring, Maryland location and the Washington
    bureau. Westwood can also "back-haul" audio to and from the
    California offices via satellite.

*Redundant Facilities*

-   ABC Radio Networks originates its programming from several studio
    locations and remote locations throughout the US. News mainly
    originates in New York. ABC Radio Networks has a back-up news
    origination site in Washington, DC. This back up could be activated
    or used within a few minutes by decision makers in New York,
    Washington, DC and Dallas, Texas. At that point, the main news
    origination would be out of DC. Dallas would be available if the
    others were not. In fact, any program origination can be done from
    anywhere as long as a dial-up ISDN link can be established to a
    working uplink

```{=html}
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-   NPR recently commissioned a second major production center in Culver
    City California with staffing and systems capable of originating
    continuous programming for the network. Program production elements
    and completed program materials generated in Washington, DC are
    continuously "pushed" to the production center's networked digital
    audio workstation system through a dedicated DS3 circuit.

```{=html}
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```
-   Programming distributed by Westwood One originates from different
    studio locations around the country. This includes studios in New
    York, Washington, DC, Silver Spring, Maryland, and Culver City and
    Valencia, California. Westwood One provides program distribution for
    the CBS, CNN, FOX, and NBC radio networks.

National Radio Conclusions

As noted above, radio communications plays a unique role in ensuring
that critical news and information is delivered to the public in the
event of a national emergency. Based on the Prevention Subcommittee
analysis of the state of the industry, the highest priority areas of
concern in the national radio infrastructure are:

1.  Vulnerability assessments, emergency response drills and disaster
    recovery plans should be made with special consideration given to
    switching network origination and control among geographically
    diverse sites.

2.  Radio networks should engage in coordinated industry efforts to
    ensure that an appropriate level of diversity is reached with
    respect to satellite utilization; and

3.  Radio networks should consider increasing their redundancy and
    geographic diversity by arranging (bi-directional) interconnections
    with television news providers.

In addition to reinforcing their own facilities and operations, national
radio operators should consider jointly coordinating with one another
and with affiliates to ensure that they have the backup infrastructure
in place to continue operations in the event of a national emergency.
This may also mean coordinating with affiliates of other networks in
addition to their own affiliates and possibly television news networks
to ensure that emergency information can be disseminated to the public
under the worst of conditions.

### National Satellite Television and Radio Services

Approximately 20 million American households receive MVPD services
through direct broadcast satellite (DBS). DBS generally carries the same
nationwide channels as cable, and also provides carriage of local
stations in major metropolitan areas (referred to as local-into-local
service). Currently, DirecTV and EchoStar retransmit local stations in
45 of the top 50 television markets

In addition, another 1.3 million Americans receive satellite radio
service in their cars, homes, boats and recreational vehicles. Satellite
radio carries approximately 100 channels of digital audio with music,
sports, and information. During a time of national crisis, it may also
be the primary means of communicating to its subscribers.

State of the National Satellite Television and Radio Industries

Highlights of findings in the state of national satellite television and
radio services include:

*Planning*

-   Both major satellite broadcasters, DirecTV and Echostar, have
    disaster plans in place and have practiced these plans to ensure
    continued broadcasting through a disaster or other emergency.

*Physical Security*

-   Satellite providers each maintain on site security and video
    surveillance. Also secure access systems are used to protect
    building security.

*Backup Power*

-   Satellite providers maintain adequate backup power to continue
    operations in the event of an electrical outage.

*Redundant Communications*

-   Both satellite MVPD providers maintain geographically diverse
    customer service facilities with backup power and have plans for the
    extended stay of key personnel.

*Redundant Facilities*

-   Both satellite MVPD providers also maintain backup feed and downlink
    facilities capable of delivering at least expanded basic service.
    While most content is originated from a satellite feed, one provider
    has origination capability in the event of a disaster. Providers
    also maintain backup power at operations and downlink facilities
    adequate for operating up to one week. Both providers also have
    multiple up link facilities in geographically diverse locations. In
    addition one of the providers has a reciprocity agreement in place
    to continue service should there be a total satellite failure.

-   XM's Washington, DC studio is supplemented by studios in mid-town
    Manhattan and at the Country Music Hall of Fame in Nashville,
    Tennessee. External feeds for content are received by either a
    satellite downlink with receive dish at the XM Studios or via fiber
    network connection.

-   Control uplink for the XM satellites is located in Allen Park,
    Canada with a fully redundant system in Calgary, Canada. All
    programming content is uplinked from the XM studios in
    Washington, DC. The link from the broadcast center to the uplink is
    via redundant fiber and both facilities are located at the XM
    facility in DC. XM also stores a spare satellite should there be
    problems with its in-orbit assets.

-   Sirius also stores a spare satellite should there be problems with
    one of its three satellites**.**

National Satellite Television and Radio Conclusions

Satellite television and radio service subscribers depend upon their
service providers to deliver critical news and information in the event
of an emergency. MVPD services represent a growing number of television
viewers nationwide, making their infrastructure an important security
concern. While satellite radio only provides information to a small
segment of the population today, it is anticipated that growth in the
industry may make satellite radio listeners a sizable part of the
population. Also, as noted in the radio section, portable and automotive
receivers may be a major source of information in the event of a
widespread power outage. Based on the Prevention Subcommittee analysis
of the state of the industry, the highest priority areas of concern in
the national satellite television and radio infrastructure are:

1.  Satellite MVPD providers should seek to ensure geographically
    diverse redundancy for local-into-local signal feeds to their uplink
    sites;

2.  Satellite radio providers should ensure that they have backup signal
    feeds and diverse redundancy for news sources;

3.  Satellite television and radio service providers should ensure
    geographic diversity and enhanced security for uplink and satellite
    control sites.

In addition to their inherent subscriber audiences, satellite television
and radio services are discussed later in the report as important backup
signal feeds for local television and radio broadcasters and cable
headends. Thus, their security is of potentially greater importance than
their subscriber numbers alone might indicate.

### National Infrastructure Conclusions

A great deal of geographically diverse redundancies already exist at
each major television and radio network and at the satellite television
and radio service providers. However, one notable fact emerges: all of
the national media rely on satellite communications as their primary
(and often only) means of delivering programming to affiliates or
subscribers. While backup communications usually make use of different
satellites than the primary system, and there is substantial diversity
in the satellites and facilities that are employed, the ubiquity of a
single communications modality gives cause to warrant continued scrutiny
and diligence that this infrastructure remains secure. In addition, it
would be prudent for television and radio networks and satellite service
providers to consider non-satellite alternatives for tertiary backup,
even if these communications provide a substantially lower level of
technical quality. The crucial factor in examining such alternatives is
the ability to continue to provide emergency communications and news to
the American public in the event of a disaster, rather than being a
backup for the continuation of normal business.

Finally, in order to achieve the greatest possible strength on a
nationwide basis, inter-industry agreements should also be considered
that would ensure the public's access to news and information in the
event of a disaster. Because radio, television broadcasting and cable
operators typically operate as separate industries, emergency operations
and carriage agreements among them are less common than agreements among
companies in the same industry. It would be prudent to consider putting
such agreements and the supporting interconnection infrastructure in
place.

## 

## Local Radio, Television and Cable Infrastructure

In this section examination of the state of the local radio, television
and cable industries occurs and best practices are described to help
ensure that local media services remain available to the public under
adverse conditions. Because most disasters and emergency situations are
local in scope, maintaining at least some level of local mass media
communications with the public is an essential part of a community's
ability to cope effectively with emergency situations. Best practices
for reducing the vulnerability of the infrastructure that each local
radio broadcaster, television broadcaster and cable operator can
consider implementing are detailed for each type of service in the
following sections of this report. It is important that all media
companies assess and consider their vulnerabilities and make informed
decisions about their infrastructure with these criteria in mind.

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.anchor}![](media/image3.wmf){width="5.2220472440944885in"
height="3.617322834645669in"}Figure 2: Disaster recovery plans

However, it is essential to understand that not all best practices have
equal importance or equal cost implications, and it is important to
resist considering them as mandatory requirements that should be imposed
on local media. The best practices represent an ideal situation that is
unconstrained by financial or facilities realities. In assessing the
applicability of these best practices, the particular capabilities,
community service needs and logistical and financial practicality of
each company's individual situation must be considered and appropriate
decisions made.

More important than any individual company's abilities, it is the
*collective* capability of the community's media assets to provide
continued service in the event of a local disaster that should be
considered. Thus, for example, it may not be necessary for all
television broadcasters in a market to have backup news studios, so long
as some do. Alternatively, if geographic diversity exists among
"competing" broadcaster studios, backup studio capabilities might be
provided by establishing fiber connections to a broadcaster's
transmitter from a "competitor's" studio, as part of an appropriate
emergency operations agreement between them. There are numerous examples
of how cooperative efforts among media companies could meet the best
practice recommendations in a more cost-effective manner than each
company acting independently. However, the planning and implementation
of such approaches can only be achieved by considering the specific
situations of each community and the businesses involved reaching
specific agreements.

When considering community priorities, it must be noted that radio
broadcasters have a special importance, because they may be the
community's last line of defense to communicate with the public under
extremely adverse conditions. The ubiquities of battery-powered and
automotive radio receivers make them the best available way to
communicate with the public under widespread power outage conditions.
Therefore, it is vital that one or more radio broadcasters in a
community be capable of delivering emergency information to the public,
even under extremely adverse conditions**.**

### Local Radio

Radio is the most ubiquitous of all mass media, with receivers located
in virtually every home and automobile in the country. There are
approximately 13,000 radio stations across the U.S., serving their local
communities. Because of the widespread availability of battery-powered
and automotive receivers, radio broadcasters are likely to be the last
line of defense for communicating with the public under the extremely
adverse conditions that could result in the event of a local disaster.
It is therefore vital that one or more radio broadcasters in a community
be capable of delivering emergency information to the public even under
extremely adverse conditions.

State of the Local Radio Industry

Some highlights of the radio industry survey conducted by the NAB are:

-   93% of radio stations have the capability to retransmit EAS sources.

-   77% of radio stations are affiliated with a news network.

    *Planning*

-   15% of radio stations have a written disaster recovery plan.

-   7% of radio stations reported that they rehearsed their plans.

    *Physical Security*

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-   39% of radio stations have secure access at primary studio / news
    facilities; 6% have security personnel and 11% have video
    surveillance.

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-   93% of radio stations have their satellite dishes located on
    premises; 67% of radio stations have secure access at their primary
    satellite facilities, 7% have security personnel and 19% have video
    surveillance.

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-   Most (95%) radio transmitters are located on a small hill or
    mountaintop, while 4% are on buildings; 32% of radio stations have
    secure access at their primary transmitter facilities, 2% have
    security personnel and 2% have video surveillance.

    *Backup Power*

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-   56% of radio stations have backup power at their primary studio.

-   49% of radio stations have backup power at their primary satellite
    link facilities.

-   47% of radio stations have backup power at their primary
    transmission facilities.

    *Redundant Communications*

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-   Studio-to-transmitter links (STLs) are primarily microwave (62%),
    but there are also a large number of fiber links (19%) and
    on-premise equipment (11%); 48% of radio stations have a backup STL.

-   23% of radio operators can activate a backup communications link to
    their transmitter facility within 15 minutes while an additional 31%
    can activate a backup communications link within three hours.

    *Redundant Facilities*

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-   59% of radio stations have backup local news or live programming
    origination capabilities other than their main studio; however, only
    27% have backup power capabilities at their backup studio.

-   18% of radio stations have backup satellite dishes; only 11% have
    uplinks

-   53% of radio stations have backup transmitters, with 13% being
    geographically diverse; but only 19% have backup transmitters can
    operate at full power; 19% of radio stations have backup power at
    their backup transmitter.

-   66% of radio stations report that there is a separate transmitter
    site in their market that is 3 or more miles away from their
    transmitter.

Local Radio Conclusions

NAB survey data shows that many radio stations are operating very lean,
and without the redundant equipment levels of television stations or
cable systems. Based on the Prevention Subcommittee analysis of the
aggregated responses to the NAB radio survey, the highest priority areas
of concern in the radio infrastructure are:

1.  Vulnerability assessments and disaster recover plans should be made.
    Only 15% of all radio stations have a written disaster recovery
    plan. This is an obvious first step for the industry to rectify,
    since vulnerability assessment and disaster recovery planning drive
    other budgetary decisions about facilities, equipment, etc.
    Additionally, to be effective, disaster plans must be rehearsed \--
    only 7% radio stations reported that they rehearsed their plans.

2.  Physical security should be tightened - 39% of radio stations have
    secure access to their studio, 67% at satellite dishes, 72% at
    transmitter.

3.  Especially because of radio's key role in power outage conditions,
    more widespread deployment of backup power is advisable,
    particularly at primary and backup studios and transmitters.

4.  Additional backup for satellite dishes is advisable; lower cost
    backup means such as consumer satellite radio receivers, telecom or
    Internet connections could be considered as alternatives to
    additional satellite dishes and receivers.

5.  The relatively small number of satellite uplinks at local radio
    stations (11%) implies that radio is not well positioned to be a
    source of national news in an emergency. Again, low cost
    alternatives such as telecom and Internet should be considered as a
    potential source for outgoing information.

It is imperative that radio operators jointly coordinate to ensure that
they have the backup infrastructure in place to continue operations in
the event of a local emergency. This may also mean coordinating with
local TV broadcasters and cable systems to ensure that emergency
information can be disseminated to the public under the worst of
conditions.

### Local Television Broadcasting 

Television broadcasters are a primary source of local news and
information, regardless of whether households in the community receive
the signal over the air, by cable or through DBS. Television
broadcasters are often a crucial community resource for local news
origination, as well as for the delivery of television service to
antenna-equipped receivers, including an increasing number of portable
and battery powered devices. It is therefore vital that one or more
television broadcasters be capable of continuing operations under the
extremely adverse conditions that could occur in the event of a local
disaster.

The National Association of Broadcasters ("NAB") and the Association of
Public Television Stations ("APTS") developed the industry survey to
assist in evaluating the reliability and security of local television
stations. The NAB surveyed commercial television stations. A total of
361 commercial television stations responded to the survey representing
a 33% response rate. Twenty percent of the respondents represent markets
1-25. The 33% response rate provides statistically compelling results
for analysis. The APTS surveyed public television stations. A total of
60 public television stations responded to the survey representing over
one-third of all public television licensees. The response rate reflects
a significant portion of the public television community. The results of
the NAB and APTS industry surveys form much of the basis for our
analysis and resulting recommended best practices.

### 

### 

### 

### 

State of the Local Television Broadcasting Industry

Some highlights of the NAB and APTS television survey include:

*Planning*

-   47% of all commercial television stations and 31% of public stations
    have a written disaster recovery plan.

-   17% of commercial television broadcasters and 12% of public stations
    report that they rehearse their plan.

    *Physical Security*

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-   88% of commercial television broadcasters and almost 90% of public
    stations have secure access at their primary studio/news facilities;
    23% of commercial television broadcasters have security personnel
    and 50% of public stations have security personnel; 65% of
    commercial television broadcasters have video surveillance and
    approximately 60% of public stations have video surveillance.

-   93% of commercial television broadcasters and 90% of public stations
    have their primary satellite receive dishes on premises; 65% of
    commercial television broadcasters and approximately 80% of public
    stations have secure access at their primary satellite facilities;
    20% of commercial television stations and approximately 40% of
    public stations have security personnel and 37% of commercial
    television stations and approximately 38% of public stations have
    video surveillance.

-   Most (96%) television transmitters of commercial television
    broadcasters and 66% of public stations are located on a small hill
    or mountaintop with a large tower (74% of towers for commercial
    television broadcasters and 71% of public stations are over
    500feet), while 3% of commercial television broadcasters and 2% of
    public stations are located on buildings; 86% of commercial
    television broadcasters and approximately 80% of public stations
    have secure access at their primary transmitter facilities, 11% of
    commercial television stations and approximately 20% of public
    stations have security personnel and 27% of commercial television
    stations and 20% of public stations have video surveillance.

    *Backup Power*

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-   71% of commercial television broadcasters and 58% of public stations
    have backup power at their primary studio facilities.

-   70% of commercial television broadcasters and 57% of public stations
    have backup power at their primary satellite downlink; 37% of
    commercial stations and 67% of public stations have backup power at
    an uplink (they may not have an uplink).

-   76% of commercial television broadcasters and 60% of public stations
    have backup power at their primary transmitter.

    *Redundant Communications*

-   76% of commercial television broadcasters and 53% of public stations
    have backup signal feeds from primary satellite downlink.

-   44% of commercial television broadcasters have backup signal feed
    from primary satellite uplink.

-   75% of commercial television stations' and approximately 70% of
    public stations' studio-to-transmitter links (STLs) are primarily
    microwave and 14% of commercial television stations and 30% of
    public stations STLs are fiber; 74% of commercial television
    broadcasters and approximately 72% of public stations have a backup
    STL.

    *Redundant Facilities*

-   41% of commercial television broadcasters and 28% of public stations
    have backup local news or live program origination capability at a
    location other than their primary studio; however, at a backup
    studio, only 20% of commercial television stations and 12% of public
    stations had backup power capabilities.

-   Most commercial television broadcasters have remote newsgathering
    capability. 77% of commercial television broadcasters and 17% of
    public stations have an ENG truck and 44% of commercial television
    broadcasters and 10% of public stations have an SNG truck.

-   53% of commercial television broadcasters and approximately 38% of
    public stations have a backup satellite downlink; 14% of commercial
    television stations and approximately 12% of public televisions have
    backup satellite uplink.

-   31% of commercial television broadcasters and 25% of public stations
    have a backup transmitter, but only 12% of commercial television
    stations and approximately 5% of public stations have a
    geographically diverse backup transmitter and only 15% of the
    commercial stations' backups and only 46% of public stations backups
    are full power; only 22% of commercial television broadcasters and
    24% of public stations have backup power at their backup
    transmitter.

-   23% of commercial television broadcasters and 29% of public stations
    plan to use DTV transmitters as a backup.

-   42% of commercial television broadcasters and 45% of public stations
    report that they share a primary transmitter site with other local
    broadcasters; 71% of commercial television broadcasters share the
    site with 3 or fewer other broadcasters.

-   66% of commercial television broadcasters and 75% of public stations
    report that their community has another transmission tower 3 or more
    miles from their own site. We also note that maintaining multiple
    towers in a community requires appropriate policy support at both
    the federal and local levels.

Local Television Broadcasting Conclusions

NAB and APTS survey data shows that many television stations have
invested in redundancy to prevent loss of service from routine equipment
and power failure. As expected, far fewer stations have taken the more
costly and elaborate steps needed to protect against outages due to
natural disasters or deliberate attack.

Based on the Prevention Subcommittee analysis of the aggregated
responses to the NAB and APTS surveys, the highest priority areas of
concern in the local television-broadcasting infrastructure are:

1.  Vulnerability assessments and disaster recovery plans should be
    made. Only 47% of all commercial television stations and 31% of
    public stations have a written disaster recovery plan. This is an
    obvious first step for the industry to rectify, since vulnerability
    assessment and disaster recovery planning drive other budgetary
    decisions about facilities, equipment, etc. Additionally, to be
    effective, disaster plans must be rehearsed \-- only 17% of
    commercial television broadcasters and 12% of public stations report
    that they rehearse their plan;

2.  The presence of stand-alone backup studio facilities (backup studios
    and/or ENG/SNG trucks with appropriate communications to the
    station's transmitter) should be increased where feasible and their
    emergency power capability examined. Television broadcasters should
    strive to be capable of originating news even if their primary
    studio became totally incapacitated and a power outage was
    simultaneously in progress.

The local television broadcasting industry should move forward and
engage in substantive joint planning to protect against outages due to
natural disasters or deliberate attack. However, there are several
stations in each local market that could provide much of the essential
diversity of facilities at relatively modest cost, if joint planning to
help prevent and recover from loss of service were put into effect. In
fact, NAB survey results indicate that 13% of commercial television
broadcasters have a reciprocity agreement of some kind with other local
broadcasters, indicating that such agreements are indeed possible.

### Cable Television

The US cable television industry serves approximately 73 million basic
cable customers. The Nation's cable network is comprised of about 9,339
cable systems, with approximately 9,899 headend facilities. Many of the
systems are owned by Multiple System Operators (MSOs), with the ten
major MSOs providing service to about 60 million households. Cable
carries national and local cable news channels, which are an important
source of news and information for the public. The carriage of broadcast
television programming is generally provided by carrying the local
affiliate's signal. The local affiliate also provides an important
source of local news coverage. In addition to these services, there are
many channels of nationwide cable programming that serve a wide
diversity of interests for entertainment and information. The cable
industry is also a leading provider of Internet access service in the
US, providing high-speed cable modem service to approximately 15 million
customers. Also, approximately 2.5 million customers receive local
telephone service from cable television operators**.**

The National Cable and Telecommunications Association ("NCTA") developed
an industry questionnaire to assist in evaluating the reliability and
security of cable systems. NCTA administered, collected and aggregated
the results of the questionnaire in May 2003. In total, 22
questionnaires were distributed, and 17 responses received. The
responses represent approximately 83% of total US basic cable customers.
The aggregated results to cable industry questionnaire help form the
basis for our analysis and recommended best practices.

State of the Cable Television Industry

Highlights of the NCTA survey results are:

*Planning*

-   70% of all cable operators surveyed and 100% of the top10 MSOs
    reported that they had a written disaster recovery plan.

-   59% of all cable operators, and 67% of the top10 MSOs reported that
    they had rehearsed their disaster recovery plan.

-   12% of all cable operators, and 23% of the top10 MSOs reported that
    they had a reciprocity agreement with other local cable operators.

    *Physical Security*

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-   100% of cable headends have some level of secure access; 13% of all
    operators and 25% of the top10 MSOs have security personnel and 32%
    of all operators and 63% of the top10 MSOs have video surveillance.

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-   Approximately 35% of the cable plant is underground; 33% within the
    top 10 MSOs.

-   84% of customers among all operators, and 83% among the top 10 MSOs,
    are served by systems with physical security at customer support
    facilities.

    *Backup Power*

-   73% of customers among all operators, and 72% among the top 10 MSOs,
    are served by systems with standby power supplies.

-   98% of customers among all cable operators, and 96% among the top 10
    MSOs, are served by a primary headend facility with backup power;
    75% have an average standby time in excess of 72 hours.

-   87% of customers among all cable operators, and 86% among the top 10
    MSOs, are served by a hub facility with backup power; 74% have an
    average standby time in excess of 72 hours.

-   64% of customers among all operators, and 62% among the top 10 MSOs,
    are served by systems with backup power at customer support
    facilities.

    *Redundant Communications*

-   Most cable operators receive local broadcast signals with an antenna
    (76% of systems) or a fiber connection (24% of systems); 33% of
    cable systems among the cable operators surveyed, and 52% of systems
    among the top 10 MSOs have an over-the-air backup feed for
    broadcasters' signals.

-   54% of customers among all cable operators, and 53% among the top 10
    MSOs, are served by systems that have backup satellite receive
    capabilities.

-   63% of customers among all cable operators, and 62% among the top 10
    MSOs, are served by systems that have redundant signal routes from
    headend to hubs.

-   5% of customers among all cable operators, and 5% among the top 10
    MSOs, are served by systems that have redundant signal routes from
    hubs to neighborhood nodes.

-   88% of the customers of all cable operators are served by a headend
    with Internet connections.

    *Redundant Facilities*

-   35% of customers among all cable operators, and 35% among the top 10
    MSOs are served by systems that have backup headend or hub
    facilities capable of delivering at least expanded basic service at
    a separate location other than the primary headend.

-   33% of customers among all cable operators, and 32% among the top 10
    MSOs are served by systems that have a remote news vehicle.

Cable Television Conclusions

NCTA survey data shows that many cable operators have taken good steps
to prevent outages due to equipment and power failure as they have
modernized their plant. The survey results indicate that much of the
nation's cable network is in fact quite modern, since 64% of the cable
plant among all operators, and 85% among the top 10 is capable of 750
MHz or greater bandwidth. Based on the Prevention Subcommittee analysis
of the aggregated responses to the NCTA survey, the primary areas of
concern in the cable infrastructure are:

1.  Vulnerability assessments and disaster recovery plans should be made
    by smaller cable operators as well as the larger ones. Additionally,
    to be effective, disaster plans must be rehearsed \-- 71% of cable
    operators report that they rehearse their plan.

2.  Geographically diverse backup capabilities should be expanded for
    cable headends that serve large numbers of customers. The potential
    for the destruction of a cable headend facility to cause loss of
    cable services for a large number of customers in a local franchise
    area is significant. Approaches to reduce these risks might be made
    more cost-effective if solutions were considered that provided a
    higher degree of protection for a limited number of key news and
    information channels that would be critical to the community in a
    time of crisis.

3.  Where economically feasible, cable operators should continue to
    appropriately "harden" their plant, particularly in areas prone to
    severe weather or natural disasters.

In many markets there may only be one cable operator. As such, it is
imperative that cable operators and broadcasters jointly coordinate to
ensure the redundancy of the interconnections among local broadcasters
(often a key source of local news and information) and cable systems.

### Local Infrastructure Conclusions

The brute-force approach of providing geographically diverse
redundancies at each radio station, television station and cable system
is an obvious approach, but one that is likely to be both financially
and operationally impractical. Certainly, all media companies should
have vulnerability assessments and a disaster recovery plan that is
periodically rehearsed. Hopefully, as industry awareness of MSRC Best
Practices grows, additional investments will be made in providing
redundancies that are appropriate in each respective business. These
steps alone will make a significant improvement in the robustness of US
media infrastructure.

It is worth restating the critical importance placed on the *collective*
capabilities of media companies to continue providing service to their
communities. In both examples and best practice recommendations, it has
been pointed out that inter-company agreements among media companies of
each type (i.e, radio, TV broadcasters and cable operators) have the
potential to reduce vulnerabilities in an affordable and practical way.
Strengthening each type of media in a community will make great strides
in reducing vulnerabilities and in ensuring continued mass media service
to the community during times of emergency.

[]{#__RefHeading___Toc65409552
.anchor}![](media/image4.wmf){width="5.27007874015748in"
height="3.6291338582677164in"}Figure 3: Reciprocity agreements

In order to achieve the greatest possible strength on a community-wide
basis, inter-industry agreements should also be considered. Because
radio, television broadcasting and cable operators typically consider
themselves as different industries, emergency operations agreements
among them are less common than agreements among companies in the same
industry.

But consider, for example, a situation in which a television news crew
can capture an evacuation warning from civil authorities, but few
citizens in the affected area can receive television because of a power
outage. In such a case, a simple audio interconnection among television
and radio stations could ensure that the warning would be sent out on
radio stations, thus reaching a potentially large number of citizens
with battery powered or automotive radios.

We expect that cooperative agreements among radio stations, television
broadcasters and cable operators will increase as they find that joint
efforts are a cost-effective way to achieve the robustness required to
ensure that they can serve their communities in times of crisis. Also,
in partnership with local emergency management officials, local media
should jointly examine the diversity and recovery capabilities of key
suppliers, whose own continued ability to provide materials and services
may become a critical path item for the media's ability to continue
operations.

In conclusion, the subcommittee believes that significant advances in
the robustness of the local media infrastructure in the US can be
achieved with relatively modest investment, based upon cooperative
planning and joint efforts of all local media.

# 

# [Restoration Subcommittee]{.underline}

## Introduction

The Restoration Subcommittee was charged with assessing the
communications industry's ability to restore broadcast radio and
television service, as well as multichannel video program distribution
such as cable and direct broadcast satellite (DBS), to the American
people after a natural disaster or terrorist attack. The report examines
case studies in order to evaluate past restoration efforts and determine
which practices were most successful.

## Mission

The mission of the Restoration Subcommittee was to:

1.  Determine the timelines currently required by broadcast radio,
    television, cable and DBS to restore service to the public after a
    natural disaster of terrorist attack.

2.  Recommend planning processes that can be initiated on a
    market-by-market basis to restore service to the public in the most
    expeditious manner.

3.  Evaluate past restoration efforts to determine which procedures were
    most effective and what the bottlenecks were to restoring service.

4.  Identify best practices for restoring service to the public.

5.  Make recommendations designed to improve the restoration process.

## Approach

Working in close consultation with the Prevention Subcommittee, the
Restoration Subcommittee helped develop surveys for the radio,
television, cable and DBS industries to determine the current
capabilities of each communications industry to restore service
following a natural disaster or terrorist incident. The results from
these surveys were designed to:

1.  Evaluate short-term recovery timelines from a loss of key components
    in the communications delivery system, such as towers, transmitters,
    studio-to-transmitter (STL) links, studios, and cable headends.

2.  Determine the long-term manufacturing lead times for replacement of
    key components in the communications delivery system, including
    towers, transmitters, STLs, studios, and cable headends.

3.  Prepare case studies on the restoration of service following
    Hurricane Andrew in Florida, major earthquakes in Los Angeles and
    San Francisco, and the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center
    in New York.

The Restoration Subcommittee wishes to acknowledge the contributions of
leading industry trade groups, notably the National Association of
Broadcasters (NAB), the Association of Public Television Stations
(APTS), the National Cable and Telecommunications Association (NCTA),
and the Satellite Broadcasting and Communications Association (SBCA).

## State of the Industry 

In the event of a natural or man-made disaster, the quickest restoration
process is for a broadcaster to have redundant facilities and emergency
backup power. In the event the primary facility is affected, having a
geographically diverse transmission facility is the only way to ensure a
short-term restoration in the range of minutes to hours.

These emergency facilities are viewed as ways to prevent disruption of
service to the public. This report will define restoration as the
longer-term processes necessary to resume broadcasting in the event the
primary studio and transmission facilities suffer a *catastrophic*
failure. Many emergency plans have focused on how the stations should
respond to natural and man-made disasters around them. The plans do not
focus on how the stations will respond if their studios or transmitters
are destroyed or rendered inoperable due to other circumstances such as
biological attacks.

This section will focus on long-term restoration processes that could
take weeks, months or, as we will see in the case studies, even years to
complete. The best practice recommendations will look at ways to reduce
these restoration timelines and steps that stations can take to prepare
for such catastrophic failures.

This emphasis on long-term restoration processes is not meant to
suggest, however, that devising and implementing procedures for
short-term restoration of over-the-air broadcasting and other media
services are any less urgent. Indeed a number of the recommendations
offered by the Restoration Subcommittee are specifically designed to
ensure the timely resumption of service in the immediate aftermath of a
natural or man-made disaster. One such recommendation involves the need
to establish market-by-market restoration committees consisting of FCC
licensees and other electronic media, notwithstanding the fact that
intense marketplace competition makes this an especially challenging
goal. Another recommendation notes that intra-industry dialogue and
planning are also vitally important. Failing to have a cooperative
framework, if not a contingency plan, in place prior to an emergency
will make restoration of service that much more difficult.

Because they are typically more numerous and their facilities more
geographically diverse, radio stations may be particularly well
positioned to provide critically needed information during major
emergencies, assuming that they have cooperated and engaged in joint
planning at the local level.

In sum, the subcommittee found that America's broadcast, cable and DBS
sectors have made measurable strides in the area of emergency planning,
but that much remains to be done if they are to respond effectively in a
worst-case situation.

### Local Radio

An industry survey of the nation's radio stations found, for example,
that fewer than one in five have a "geographically diverse" backup
transmitter and that nearly one-half of those polled lack backup
capability altogether. In terms of activating the backup transmitter,
nearly one-half expressed confidence that they could restore a signal
within one hour, while a clear majority said that they could have a
signal on the air within 24 hours, of an emergency.

Among radio stations surveyed, less than one-fifth have written disaster
recovery plans, although virtually all of those who do manage to
identify key personnel and provide them with extended-stay support. Of
those with disaster recovery plans, only a small minority has struck
reciprocity agreements with other local broadcasters. And only one in
eight radio stations with disaster recovery plans have updated them
since September 11, 2001.

### 

### Local Television

Fewer than 50 percent of local television stations have a geographically
diverse backup transmitter and antenna, according to another
industry-sponsored study made available to the subcommittee. On a
positive note, three of four stations have backup power at their primary
transmission site and over half said they could operate on backup power
for more than 48 hours. One-half of those responding indicated they
could activate a backup link to their primary transmission facility
within 15 minutes, nearly two-thirds within one hour, and three-fourths
inside three hours. The survey results show that a significant number of
TV stations share their transmitter/antenna facilities with other local
stations. While there are benefits in sharing facilities, we recognize
the importance of diversifying these transmitter/antenna facilities.

Industry survey data suggest that a bare majority of local television
stations have prepared written disaster plans, but nearly an equal
number have not. Of those with disaster recovery plans, the vast
majority identifies essential personnel and provides extended-stay
support. Not unlike their radio counterparts, fewer than one in seven
have entered into reciprocity agreements with other local broadcasters.
Approximately one of every three TV stations polled reported that they
have updated their contingency planning since 9/11.

In terms of the viability of digital television (DTV) during
emergencies, the vast majority of local stations have co-located their
DTV and analog transmission/antenna facilities and only a scant number
have backup for transmitting digital TV. Nearly one-third, however, have
agreements with cable systems to distribute their digital signal. And
the uniquely flexible digital TV technology allows a local station to
offer multiple channels of standard-definition television (SDTV) during
an emergency or even to downconvert its digital service to NTSC
(analog).

### 

### Cable

Standby power supplies, according to industry-sponsored research, serve
nearly three of every four cable providers. While for all practical
purposes every cable company carries broadcast programming,
three-fourths rely on an over-the-air feed for their broadcast signals.

Seven of every ten cable providers have a written disaster recovery
plan, detailing how they would continue to operate if portions of their
systems were to be rendered inoperable; that figure rises to 100 percent
when the question is put to the ten largest Multiple System Operators
(MSOs). The vast majority of those responding said that these plans
identify key personnel in the event of an emergency.

According to industry-sponsored research, relatively few cable providers
have forged reciprocity agreements with other local cable operators.
Only one in eight generally -- and one in five among the largest MSOs --
currently has reciprocity plans in place. This is understandable
considering that in most markets there is only one cable operator.

### DBS and Digital Satellite Radio

America's DBS providers have made considerable progress in the area of
disaster recovery planning, according to the survey data. Written
emergency plans -- identifying key personnel and providing them with
extended-stay support -- have been prepared and implemented. Not unlike
their broadcast and cable counterparts, however, DBS companies need to
update these contingency plans in the aftermath of 9/11 and strike
reciprocity agreements with their competitors.

At satellite downlink and customer service facilities, the DBS industry
appears to have achieved a high degree of physical security. With backup
power at primary satellite downlinks and backup downlink facilities, DBS
providers indicated that they could activate backup downlink satellite
communications in 15 minutes to one hour.

Like the DBS companies, the digital satellite radio industry has written
disaster recovery plans but needs to improve in the areas of rehearsing
for emergencies and establishing reciprocity arrangements. Digital
satellite radio providers have physical security at their primary
downlinks, but have an uneven record in terms of backup power at those
facilities.

### Network Radio and Television

Surveys of the industry indicate that most commercial networks have
multiple geographically diverse origination centers that have emergency
power and multiple communications transmission paths including C and Ku
Band uplinks and downlinks, inner city microwave facilities, fiber
optics and satellite telephones. They appear well prepared to restore
service and news coverage in the event of a catastrophic failure of
their primary facility.

Some networks have established a third level of protection by agreeing
to reciprocity agreements with other networks. CBS, for example, has
geographically diverse, redundant origination centers in New York and
Los Angeles. They also have redundant uplink sites in both cities. The
uplink sites contain redundant paths to the origination center as well
as emergency power. Further redundancy is achieved by routing the signal
to two satellites and to two receiving dishes at each affiliate. In the
event of catastrophic failure at both the main and backup origination
centers, CBS has established reciprocity agreements with the ABC
television network to provide technical facilities, including inventory
of commercial libraries.

Having written agreements established prior to the event are crucial to
rapid restoration of service in the event of catastrophic failure. These
agreements were invoked recently during the complete failure of Galaxy
4, which contained multiple transponders utilized by the broadcast and
cable industries.

### 

## Conclusion

### 

Industry surveys suggest that both the major networks and DBS providers
have redundant, geographically diverse origination centers and satellite
distribution facilities. In addition, many of the local television
stations in major markets have redundant transmitters and emergency
power, which will enable them to restore service in as little as 15
minutes or less.

In the event of catastrophic failure of the tower or studio, however,
stations are far less well prepared. As a result, if a station has
exhausted its backup facilities, which are usually co-located at the
main tower/studio complex, they will be confronted with much longer
restoration times, quite possibly on the order of months or even years.

# 

## Relevant Case Studies

While the Restoration Subcommittee enjoyed full access to the broadcast,
cable and DBS survey data, its best practice recommendations are based
to a significant degree on the personal experiences of industry
executives in real-world emergencies, including hurricanes and
earthquakes as well as terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center.
Because they are central to the subcommittee's findings and
recommendations, these case studies are presented in the body of this
report rather than as an appendix.

### Hurricane Andrew (1992) 

In 1992, Hurricane Andrew devastated much of the broadcast
infrastructure in the Homestead and South Miami (Fla.) area. Many
stations lost their transmission towers and had no geographically
diverse transmission site.

CBS station WCIX-TV, Channel 6, lost its 2,000-foot tower when the eye
of the hurricane passed over the Homestead transmission facility. The
Channel 6 studio and newsgathering operation remained operational with
emergency backup power, even though the studio and office complex
suffered substantial wind damage. Even though the main transmitter was
off the air, the station had pre-established microwave and fiber links
to cable headends and low-power repeater sites. Many of the station
personnel were left homeless due to the storm and were camped out in the
studio as their only possible alternative. In order to recover from this
natural disaster, the network stepped in with three distinct teams. The
first team was charged with installing a temporary transmitter and
antenna at an alternate location. The second was charged with staffing
the newsgathering and production operation. The third team consisted of
roofers, carpenters, and electricians charged with repairing the homes
of station personnel.

The transmitter restoration team's challenge was to locate the Channel 6
transmitter antenna and alternate tower site. A new transmitter would
have taken over 60 days to manufacture, which was an unacceptable lead
time. As a result, a 30-year-old tube transmitter was pressed into
service. A used Channel 6 antenna was located at an antenna
manufacturer, and space on a 900-foot tower 30 miles to the north of the
original site was located. Within five days, WCIX/Channel 6 was back on
the air at reduced power.

The next stage in the restoration process was to rebuild the 2,000-foot
tower and transmission plant at its original Homestead location. The
lead-time for fabricating the tower and guy lines was 12 months.
However, the longest lead-time was securing local building and zoning
approval to erect an identical tower at the same location. Because the
tower was down for more than 30 days, the FAA removed the tower from its
database, which necessitated re-applying to the FAA and conducting an
inquiry into whether the tower represented a hazard to air navigation.
Without this determination, the local building and zoning authority
would not consider processing the construction permit. As a result, the
permitting process took over 18 months and the tower erection process
took an additional 12 months -- a total of 30 months to erect an
identical tower at the exact location of the original tower.

Had the eye of Hurricane Andrew passed 20 miles to the north, it is
highly likely that every television station in the greater Miami area
would have lost its transmission capability, since the transmission
towers are clustered in adjacent antenna farms.

The restoration of service to the Miami area could have been improved by
better federal government interagency coordination between the FAA and
the FCC, and through federal preemption authority to re-erect the tower
in the same location and elevation in accordance with EIA 222 Tower
Construction Codes.

### Los Angeles (1993) and San Francisco (1995) Earthquakes

In both of these earthquakes, broadcast operations were disrupted due to
loss of electrical power from downed lines and loss of
studio-to-transmitter links (STL). The STL losses resulted in microwave
dishes being misaligned after the tremors and/or fiber optics being
severed. Additionally, an overloaded cellular telephone network further
hindered communications between station personnel involved in restoring
service.

In order to facilitate communications from stations' technical
personnel, alternate communications systems were utilized including
amateur radio repeaters and equipment, 450 MHz business radio, and
satellite telephones. Temporary microwave links were established between
the studio and transmitter using electronic newsgathering vehicles. In
locations where studio buildings were damaged, satellite newsgathering
vehicles and electronic newsgathering vehicles were used as makeshift
control rooms in alternate buildings. Backup generating facilities at
the studio and transmitter were essential components to remaining on the
air for many days due to the massive power grid disruption. Mobile
generators were in strong demand and were allocated in many cases to
hospitals and other medical facilities, leaving the broadcasters to fend
for themselves if they did not have existing backup facilities.

### 1993 and 2001 Attacks on the World Trade Center

In two separate incidents, the greater New York area was adversely
affected when terrorists attacked the World Trade Center. This resulted
in both television and radio stations being knocked off the air for
extended periods of time.

In February 1993 a truck bomb was exploded in the lower levels of the
World Trade Center. The blast disrupted the main electrical distribution
system and numerous water supply lines. The water flooded the emergency
generators, thereby eliminating all emergency power to the World Trade
Center. The only commercial news broadcaster with a full-power redundant
facility at the Empire State Building was WCBS-TV. Within ten seconds of
the disruption of service at the World Trade Center, WCBS switched to
its alternate site at the Empire State Building. The other broadcasters
were off the air for over 48 hours until electrical power was restored
at the World Trade Center.

In September 2001 two commercial airliners piloted by terrorists
destroyed both buildings of the World Trade Center, resulting in the
permanent loss of two radio and nine television transmission facilities.
WCBS-TV again was the only commercial news station in town with
redundant emergency backup facilities. Not only were broadcasters
affected by this loss, but also a major fiber optics hub was demolished
when Building 7 of the World Trade Center collapsed after the attack.
This in turn affected data circuits, video circuits linking television
stations to cable companies, direct broadcast centers and related
services.

The major obstacle in restoring television and radio service in the
number-one market in the United States has been the lack of local
building and zoning permission to erect a temporary tower for the
broadcasters. More than two years after the attack, many of the
television stations are operating at 20 percent power or less and have
no emergency backup power in the event of a massive blackout. The only
station with enough emergency backup power to operate analog and digital
facilities is WCBS-TV.

The schedule for restoration of the broadcast transmission facility in
New York City remains uncertain. The most optimistic projection for
restoration is 2009. Had the broadcasters been allowed to erect a
temporary tower on Governor's Island -- which was federal land at the
time of the attack -- service could have been restored in 18 months.

# [Future Technologies/Digital Solutions Subcommittee]{.underline}

## 

## Mission

-   Identify particular challenges and opportunities posed by digital
    technologies to the reliability of communications infrastructure

-   Consider new applications that are enabled by digital technologies
    that enhance media's role in disseminating security-related
    information

-   Supplement the work of the overall MSRC to plan for optimal
    reliability, robustness and security of broadcast and MVPD
    facilities using new technologies

-   Recommend how emergency notification systems can be leveraged,
    changed, or enhanced to take advantage of digital technologies.

## Approach

The subcommittee approached our work by initially reviewing the
forecasts for the rollout of digital media technologies and identifying
the technologies of focus. Our work primarily considered digital
technologies as they apply to broadcast, cable and satellite television,
and radio. Our scope was therefore limited to point-to-multipoint
communications. We have not addressed emergency messaging to cellphones,
PDAs or basic email devices because those are not devices that cable,
broadcast or satellite has traditionally supplied. In the course of our
discussion, there was a considerable amount of interest expressed in
finding ways to alert the public using these newer devices, and we
suggest that the responsibility for that be clarified between the NRIC,
the MSRC or some other organization.

The subcommittee solicited and assembled information on existing efforts
to pilot or use digital technologies in emergency messaging. These
include models that are based on revisions to the existing Emergency
Alert System (EAS) and models that are based on entirely new technology
or new approaches. We include a summary of these efforts in Appendix A,
with the intention to communicate the range of activities that could
inform the EAS revision process. We also closely monitored the work of
the Public Communications and Safety Working Group so that issues
related to digital technologies could be coordinated across the MSRC
effort. This included incorporating comments and input from the PCS
workshop in Tampa.

Through discussion of these inputs and idea generation around other
potential applications that could be developed to enhance emergency
messaging, the subcommittee composed two recommendations to the full
MSRC.

[MCAP Description]{.underline}:

-   Protocol to deliver emergency messages via digital radio and
    television networks

-   Protocol that flows over all methods of digital transport and can be
    received by all digital receivers

-   Protocol that is optimized for point-to-multi-point networks and
    devices only

![](media/image5.wmf){width="5.910416666666666in" height="3.4in"}

-   

[MCAP Rationale:]{.underline}

-   There must be a single, ubiquitous standard for alert messaging over
    radio and television. The importance of one standard, that is
    developed and accepted before a multitude of incompatible systems
    arise on their own, cannot be overstated.

-   The nation's current Emergency Alert Service (EAS) must evolve to
    embrace the digital medium. A common protocol can be a critical
    element of a transition.

-   Digital technology offers many enhancements over existing systems in
    terms of speed, robustness and flexibility. Government and media
    should take full advantage of these enhancements to communicate
    emergency and safety information. Digital data, expressed as audio,
    video or text, can play a critical role in successful management of
    emergency situations.

-   Digital networks and digital devices are adopted at different rates
    by consumers, schools, government and response organizations. A
    universal digital protocol that is simple, comprehensive, and
    flexible, will accommodate the variability in when and how digital
    media is implemented.

[MCAP Key Attributes:]{.underline}

-   **Addressability:** national, regional and local

-   **Scaleability:** support variable and dynamically changing bit
    rates

-   **Interoperability:** easily transported within existing digital
    media systems

-   **Prioritizing:** automatic based on alert level

[Other Issues:]{.underline}

-   Once the MCAP is defined, industry organizations and companies will
    have an important role in progressing to implementation, by
    developing standards and specifications for carriage of MCAP on
    various media.

-   The importance of coordinating the development of MCAP before other
    standards are developed is highlighted by the existence two efforts
    that are already underway in this area. First, the Partnership for
    Public Warning has issued a standard called OASIS, which is
    referenced (without identification) in Appendix C (\"Draft Common
    Alert Protocol). Second, in January 2004 the Consumer Electronics
    Association adopted a performance standard for public alert received
    over the NOAA Weather Radio Network known informally as the all-
    hazard receiver standard. According to CEA\'s public statement \"the
    standard expands the functionality of the receivers by increasing
    the options available to consumers about when and how they are
    notified of these alerts.\" Our committee acknowledges these efforts
    as being within the framework of an MCAP and we cite them as
    potential catalysts for development and adoption of a single
    standard as soon as possible.

Examples of how existing standards could be applied:

-   Content written to ACAP middleware standard

    -   The ACAP standard, developed by the ATSC in conjunction with
        CableLabs will provide a common consumer platform for enhanced
        and interactive content. This will support display and
        processing of supplemental information. Emergency content based
        on MCAP would be compatible with the ACAP standard. Applications
        could be developed to allow easy consumer access to MCAP data.
        (Example: lists of local available shelters is accessible while
        video of local disaster is distributed on primary signal)

```{=html}
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-   Multiple video and audio channels

    -   Create a program paradigm that identifies a specific uniform
        virtual channel within a broadcast transport stream that a
        viewer would be directed to switch to in the event of an
        emergency. Initial notification to the viewer would be made via
        a crawl or aural announcement on the primary program channel
        directing them to switch to the alternate virtual channel.
        (Example: Channel 5.5, where the ".5" is an agreed upon
        emergency channel designation)

    -   In later years as receive devices adopt targeting capabilities,
        such as directed channel change, and device activation based on
        emergency alert transmission, this tuning would become
        automatic.

-   Closed captioning

    -   The existing analog captioning standard supports two closed
        captioning channels and 2 text channels. This capability is
        implemented in current receivers and could be used to deliver
        specific text based information to homes augmenting what is
        delivered by the primary program channel. This enhanced
        information would be of particular value to the hearing
        impaired.

## 

In addition to these examples of applying the existing tool set, we cite
the example below of Single Frequency Networks (SFN) to illustrate the
potential for new technology to enhance our emergency alert
infrastructure. It will be important to monitor the evolution of
technology across all MVPD platforms and identify enhancements to the
base infrastructures that will improve the reliability, redundancy and
robustness of any MVPD service. Implementation of single frequency
broadcast networks across the country would provide both redundancy and
local origination capabilities that do not exist in our broadcast
infrastructure today. Rather than a single point of failure as
experienced in New York on 9/11, failure of any single portion of the
network could be localized to a small area rather than affecting the
entire market.

## Description of Single Frequency Networks 

Distributed transmissions systems also know as single frequency networks
(SFN), may be able to play a role in providing improved reliability of
digital television signal delivery through redundant, low power,
transmitters in the event of a disaster that disables the main TV
transmitter site.

An SFN comprised of several low power DTV transmitters with overlapping
signal coverage can be used to augment or even replace the traditional
high power transmitter site, which can be a single point of failure
causing a complete loss of TV service area.

An SFN is more flexible in terms of coverage area than a single high
power transmitter with a high antenna. They are more interference
resistant and also cause less interference. They are inherently much
more fault tolerant. They have the potential of offering lower
installation cost, and more potential transmitter sites, allowing for
easy coverage extension.

Problems in a traditional system such as, transmitter failure, antenna
failure, primary AC power failure etc., may result in a complete loss of
coverage. In an SFN system, the loss of a single transmitter will result
in minimal loss of coverage, if there is overlap in the coverage between
adjacent transmitter sites. If there is no overlap, the loss of a
transmitter site results in only a partial loss of coverage area. It is
possible and even desirable, to implement an SFN network using lower
antenna heights. This makes it possible to use existing structures as
transmitter sites such as buildings, water towers, and cellular towers.

## 

![](media/image6.png){width="2.7291666666666665in"
height="2.4854166666666666in"}The diagram above provides an example of a
dense SFN surrounding the central higher power transmission site.

TV receiver equalizers are the key to successful implementation of a
Single Frequency Network. SFN networks utilize several transmitters
simultaneously transmitting the same modulation information on the same
frequency. A receiver might get its signal from more than one
transmitter resulting in multipath interference also known as
\"ghosting\". The receiver must work in such an intentional multipath
environment to successfully recover the DTV signal. The ATSC DTV
transmission system uses equalization techniques that work in severe
multipath environments. Use of equalizers in DTV receivers can eliminate
the multipath limitations of analog systems. The limitations in SFN
reception are directly related to receiver equalizer performance. Not
all equalizers perform the same and some receivers are better suited for
an SFN environment than others. DTV receiver equalizer performance
specifications will need to include the capability required to receive
signals in an SFN environment. The ATSC is in the process of developing
a Recommended Practice that will address issues related to SFN design.

# 

## Conclusion

Digital platforms throughout the MVPD universe are in their infancy. As
we reviewed the variety of technologies currently in place we noted a
number of proprietary implementations. Fortunately, we feel that this is
just a transitional issue that was a result of developmental timing of
each of the systems we analyzed. The good news is that cable, satellite
and broadcast are now working together to insure that technical
standards are in place that will support interoperability for both
programming and emergency alerts in a seamless manner throughout the
country.

As we look out into the future, there are many uncertainties about the
timing and particular levels of adoption of digital technologies. One
certainty however, is that the devices and consumer uses of digital
media will be significantly more varied than in the past. For example,
throughout the second half of the last century it was assured that
broadcast radio and television would reach almost every home because
there was uniformity in receivers. Looking out into the future, there is
no assurance that the reach of broadcast will be as universal because
homes may not have a digital tuner and antenna, which are necessary to
receive digital television over the air. (One data point to note on this
topic is that under 15% of the digital televisions sold to date are
equipped with an over-the air tuner). Similarly, many radios today are
not sold with an AM band, and consumers are listening to music via
digital download or other non-broadcast devices. The overall message
here is that with so many options in a digital age about how to receive
media, no one form can be relied on in the way broadcast as been relied
on in the past. Our committee recommends that examination of consumer
adoption of digital devices be an integral part of the next phase of the
MSRC effort.

The committee urges the government to coordinate development of MCAP. It
is essential that the industry utilize **one protocol** that can flow
over digital radio and television systems. We applaud the pioneering
efforts to use digital media for alert messaging described in Appendix
C. However, we are concerned that without government leadership in
coordinating development of standards as the first step, the country
will implement an array of multiple non-compatible alert systems or will
not develop any at all.

# Appendix A -- Subcommittee Members

# 

**[Prevention Subcommittee]{.underline}**

[Subcommittee Chairman & Broadcast Television Subgroup
Chair]{.underline}

Glenn Reitmeier

NBC

[Cable Television Subgroup Chair]{.underline}

Peter Brubaker

Susquehanna Communications

[Radio Subgroup Chair]{.underline}

Jack Goodman

National Association of Broadcasters

[Subcommittee Members]{.underline}

Mark Erstling

Association of Public Television Stations

Paul Gemme

Time-Warner Cable

Wayne Hall

Comcast

Tania Hanna

Harris Corp.

John Matthews

Radio-One

Charlie Morgan

National Radio Systems Committee

Larry Nelson

Nelson Multimedia

Maureen O\'Connell

Fox/NewsCorp

Mark Richer

ATSC

Andy Scott

National Cable and Telecommunications Association

Jeff Tate

Susquehanna

Lonna Thomson

Association of Public Television Stations

Bud Warner

SES-Americom

Kelly Williams

National Association of Broadcasters

**[Restoration Subcommittee]{.underline}**

[Subcommittee Chairman]{.underline}

Bob Seidel

[Subcommittee Members]{.underline}

Jay Adrick

Harris Broadcast Communications

Sterling Davis

Cox Enterprises

David Donovan

MSTV

Al Kenyon

Clear Channel

Gary Kline

Cumulus Media

Bob Lawson

Verestar

Bob Morgan

American Tower

Robert Plummer

DirecTV

Andy Scott

NCTA

Gwen Wood

PBS

**[Future Technologies Subcommittee]{.underline}**

[Subcommittee Chairman]{.underline}

Ira Goldstone

Tribune Company

[Subcommittee Member]{.underline}

Lisa Wiersma

Tribune Company

# Appendix B -- Broadcast Restoration Packages

(Please note that all prices are approximations)

# 

# 

AM Broadcast

**1 KW. Flyaway System \$55,500**

Includes:

1KW. Solid State Transmitter

Audio Processing Equipment

Monitoring Equipment

Dummy Load and Switch

250' Transmission Line with Connectors

Antenna Tuning Unit

Quick Erect Frequency Agile Antenna

Shipping Cases

Tools

**5 KW. Flyaway System \$122,500**

> Includes:

5 KW. Solid State Transmitter

Audio Processing Equipment

Monitoring Equipment

Dummy Load and Switch

250' Transmission Line with Connectors

Antenna Tuning Unit

Quick Erect Frequency Agile Antenna

Shipping Cases

Tools

**50 KW. Containerized System \$420,000**

> Includes:

50 KW. Solid State Transmitter

Audio Processing Equipment

Monitoring Equipment

Dummy Load and Switch

250' Transmission Line with Connectors

Dehydrator System

Antenna Tuning Unit

Quick Erect Frequency Agile Antenna

> ISO Shelter with air conditioning, ventilation ducts, power
> distribution, signal panels and equipment mounting racks

Tools

**[FM Broadcast]{.underline}**

**1 KW. Flyaway System \$48,500**

> Includes:

1 KW. Solid State Transmitter

Audio Processing Equipment

Monitoring Equipment

Dummy Load and Switch

250' Transmission Line with Connectors

Quick Erect Frequency Agile Antenna

Shipping Cases

Tools

**10 KW. Containerized System \$205,500**

> Includes:

10 KW. Solid State Transmitter

Audio Processing Equipment

Monitoring Equipment

Dummy Load and Switch

500' Transmission Line with Connectors

Dehydrator System

Quick Erect Frequency Agile Antenna

> ISO Shelter with air conditioning, ventilation ducts, power
> distribution, signal panels and equipment mounting racks

Tools

**[VHF Analog -- Low Band]{.underline}**

**5 KW. Containerized System \$364,000**

> Includes:

5 KW. Solid State Transmitter

Video Processing Equipment

Audio Processing Equipment

Monitoring Equipment

Dummy Load and Switch

1000' Transmission Line with Connectors Dehydrator System

> Side Mounted Emergency Antenna
>
> ISO Shelter with air conditioning, ventilation ducts, power
> distribution, power regulator, signal panels and equipment mounting
> racks

Tools

**[VHF Analog -- High Band]{.underline}**

**10 KW Containerized System \$422,000**

> Includes:

10 KW. Solid State Transmitter

Video Processing Equipment

Audio Processing Equipment

Monitoring Equipment

Dummy Load and Switch

1000' Transmission Line with Connectors

Dehydrator System

Side Mounted Emergency Antenna

> ISO Shelter with air conditioning, ventilation ducts, power
> distribution, power regulator, signal panels and equipment mounting
> racks
>
> Tools

**[UHF Analog]{.underline}**

**30 KW Containerized System** \$1,108,000

> Includes:

30 KW. Atlas Solid State Transmitter

Video Processing Equipment

Audio Processing Equipment

Monitoring Equipment

Dummy Load and Switch

1000' Transmission Line with Connectors

Emergency Antenna

ISO Shelter with air conditioning, water to air heat exchanger, power
distribution, power regulator, signal panels and equipment mounting
racks

Tools

**[UHF DTV]{.underline}**

**7.25 KW. Containerized System \$934,000**

> Includes:

7.25 KW. Solid State Transmitter

4 Channels of Video Processing Equipment

4 Channels of Audio Processing Equipment

4 Channel ATSC Encoder

PSIP System

Monitoring Equipment

Digital Mask Filter

Dummy Load and Switch

1000' Transmission Line with Connectors

Emergency Antenna

> ISO Shelter with air conditioning, ventilation ducts, power
> distribution, power regulator, signal panels and equipment mounting
> racks

Tools

**[Mobile Power Generation Systems]{.underline}**

Each system includes generator set, weather enclosure, muffler, trailer,
day tank, metering package, circuit breaker, battery and other
applicable options

**20 KW \$16,000**

**30 KW \$19,000**

**50 KW \$28,000**

**100 KW \$52,000**

**200 KW \$126,000**

**[Tower Systems]{.underline}**

Medium Duty Tower \$65,500

Medium duty tower package capable of being configured into several AM
one-quarter wavelength antenna arrays at any Medium Wavelength (MW)
frequency or supporting FM emergency antenna systems.

Includes:

75 Ten foot quick erectable tower sections (Rohn 55 or similar)

Antenna base plates

Antenna top sections 4

Base Insulator sections 20

Guy brackets

Guy anchors

Guy insulators

5000 Guy Cable

Turnbuckles

Guy Lugs

Gin Pole fixtures with hoisting line

> 10,000' Copper ground wire
>
> Assorted hardware for guy and ground wire systems

Heavy Duty Tower System \$750,000

500' Heavy duty tower system capable of supporting up to three emergency
television or FM antennas, transmission lines and STL antennas.

Includes:

Tower sections

Tower base section

Tower top section

Guy brackets

Guy anchor materials

Guy cables

Lighting equipment

Antenna mounting brackets

Grounding cables and hardware

Tower base materials

Climbing ladder

Safety equipment

[Summary of Restoration Packages by Location]{.underline}

######## Eastern United States Restoration Package

+---------+------------------------------------------------------------+
| ###     | #####                                                      |
| ### [Qt |                                                            |
| y]{.und |                                                            |
| erline} |                                                            |
+---------+------------------------------------------------------------+
| ######  | #####                                                      |
+---------+------------------------------------------------------------+
| ######  | ##### [RADIO]{.underline}                                  |
+---------+------------------------------------------------------------+
| #       | ##### 1Kw AM Flyaway System                                |
| ##### 2 |                                                            |
+---------+------------------------------------------------------------+
| #       | ##### 5 Kw AM Flyaway System                               |
| ##### 2 |                                                            |
+---------+------------------------------------------------------------+
| #       | ##### 50 Kw AM Containerized System                        |
| ##### 1 |                                                            |
+---------+------------------------------------------------------------+
| #       | ##### 1 Kw FM Flyaway System                               |
| ##### 2 |                                                            |
+---------+------------------------------------------------------------+
| #       | ##### 10 Kw FM Containerized System                        |
| ##### 1 |                                                            |
+---------+------------------------------------------------------------+
| ######  | #####                                                      |
+---------+------------------------------------------------------------+
| ######  | ##### [TELEVISION]{.underline}                             |
+---------+------------------------------------------------------------+
| #       | ##### VHF Analog Low Band System                           |
| ##### 1 |                                                            |
+---------+------------------------------------------------------------+
| #       | ##### VHF Analog High Band System                          |
| ##### 1 |                                                            |
+---------+------------------------------------------------------------+
| #       | ##### UHF DTV System                                       |
| ##### 1 |                                                            |
+---------+------------------------------------------------------------+
| ######  | #####                                                      |
+---------+------------------------------------------------------------+
| ######  | ##### [GENERATOR SYSTEMS]{.underline}                      |
+---------+------------------------------------------------------------+
| #       | ##### 20 Kw System                                         |
| ##### 4 |                                                            |
+---------+------------------------------------------------------------+
| #       | ##### 30 Kw System                                         |
| ##### 1 |                                                            |
+---------+------------------------------------------------------------+
| #       | ##### 100 Kw Systems                                       |
| ##### 3 |                                                            |
+---------+------------------------------------------------------------+
| #       | ##### 200 Kw Systems                                       |
| ##### 1 |                                                            |
+---------+------------------------------------------------------------+
| ######  | #####                                                      |
+---------+------------------------------------------------------------+
| ######  | ##### [TOWER SYSTEMS]{.underline}                          |
+---------+------------------------------------------------------------+
| #       | ##### Medium Duty Towers                                   |
| ##### 2 |                                                            |
+---------+------------------------------------------------------------+
| #       | ##### Heavy Duty Tower                                     |
| ##### 1 |                                                            |
+---------+------------------------------------------------------------+
| ######  | #####                                                      |
+---------+------------------------------------------------------------+
| ######  | ##### \$4,044,500                                          |
+---------+------------------------------------------------------------+

**[Central United States Restoration Package]{.underline}**

+---------+------------------------------------------------------------+
| ###     | #####                                                      |
| ### [Qt |                                                            |
| y]{.und |                                                            |
| erline} |                                                            |
+---------+------------------------------------------------------------+
| ######  | #####                                                      |
+---------+------------------------------------------------------------+
| ######  | ##### [RADIO]{.underline}                                  |
+---------+------------------------------------------------------------+
| #       | ##### 1Kw AM Flyaway System                                |
| ##### 2 |                                                            |
+---------+------------------------------------------------------------+
| #       | ##### 5 Kw AM Flyaway System                               |
| ##### 2 |                                                            |
+---------+------------------------------------------------------------+
| #       | ##### 50 Kw AM Containerized System                        |
| ##### 1 |                                                            |
+---------+------------------------------------------------------------+
| #       | ##### 1 Kw FM Flyaway System                               |
| ##### 2 |                                                            |
+---------+------------------------------------------------------------+
| #       | ##### 10 Kw FM Containerized System                        |
| ##### 1 |                                                            |
+---------+------------------------------------------------------------+
| ######  | #####                                                      |
+---------+------------------------------------------------------------+
| ######  | ##### [TELEVISION]{.underline}                             |
+---------+------------------------------------------------------------+
| #       | ##### VHF Analog High Band System                          |
| ##### 1 |                                                            |
+---------+------------------------------------------------------------+
| #       | ##### UHF DTV System                                       |
| ##### 1 |                                                            |
+---------+------------------------------------------------------------+
| #       | ##### UHF Analog System                                    |
| ##### 1 |                                                            |
+---------+------------------------------------------------------------+
| ######  | #####                                                      |
+---------+------------------------------------------------------------+
| ######  | ##### [GENERATOR SYSTEMS]{.underline}                      |
+---------+------------------------------------------------------------+
| #       | ##### 20 Kw System                                         |
| ##### 3 |                                                            |
+---------+------------------------------------------------------------+
| #       | ##### 30 Kw System                                         |
| ##### 2 |                                                            |
+---------+------------------------------------------------------------+
| #       | ##### 100 Kw Systems                                       |
| ##### 2 |                                                            |
+---------+------------------------------------------------------------+
| #       | ##### 200 Kw Systems                                       |
| ##### 2 |                                                            |
+---------+------------------------------------------------------------+
| ######  | #####                                                      |
+---------+------------------------------------------------------------+
| ######  | ##### [TOWER SYSTEMS]{.underline}                          |
+---------+------------------------------------------------------------+
| #       | ##### Medium Duty Towers                                   |
| ##### 2 |                                                            |
+---------+------------------------------------------------------------+
| #       | ##### Heavy Duty Tower                                     |
| ##### 2 |                                                            |
+---------+------------------------------------------------------------+
| ######  | #####                                                      |
+---------+------------------------------------------------------------+
| ######  | ##### \$5,561,500                                          |
+---------+------------------------------------------------------------+

**[Western United States Restoration Package]{.underline}**

+---------+------------------------------------------------------------+
| ###     | #####                                                      |
| ### [Qt |                                                            |
| y]{.und |                                                            |
| erline} |                                                            |
+---------+------------------------------------------------------------+
| ######  | #####                                                      |
+---------+------------------------------------------------------------+
| ######  | ##### [RADIO]{.underline}                                  |
+---------+------------------------------------------------------------+
| #       | ##### 1Kw AM Flyaway System                                |
| ##### 2 |                                                            |
+---------+------------------------------------------------------------+
| #       | ##### 5 Kw AM Flyaway System                               |
| ##### 2 |                                                            |
+---------+------------------------------------------------------------+
| #       | ##### 50 Kw AM Containerized System                        |
| ##### 1 |                                                            |
+---------+------------------------------------------------------------+
| #       | ##### 1 Kw FM Flyaway System                               |
| ##### 2 |                                                            |
+---------+------------------------------------------------------------+
| #       | ##### 10 Kw FM Containerized System                        |
| ##### 1 |                                                            |
+---------+------------------------------------------------------------+
| ######  | #####                                                      |
+---------+------------------------------------------------------------+
| ######  | ##### [TELEVISION]{.underline}                             |
+---------+------------------------------------------------------------+
| #       | ##### VHF Analog Low Band System                           |
| ##### 1 |                                                            |
+---------+------------------------------------------------------------+
| #       | ##### VHF Analog High Band System                          |
| ##### 1 |                                                            |
+---------+------------------------------------------------------------+
| #       | ##### UHF DTV System                                       |
| ##### 1 |                                                            |
+---------+------------------------------------------------------------+
| ######  | #####                                                      |
+---------+------------------------------------------------------------+
| ######  | ##### [GENERATOR SYSTEMS]{.underline}                      |
+---------+------------------------------------------------------------+
| #       | ##### 20 Kw System                                         |
| ##### 4 |                                                            |
+---------+------------------------------------------------------------+
| #       | ##### 30 Kw System                                         |
| ##### 1 |                                                            |
+---------+------------------------------------------------------------+
| #       | ##### 100 Kw Systems                                       |
| ##### 3 |                                                            |
+---------+------------------------------------------------------------+
| #       | ##### 200 Kw Systems                                       |
| ##### 1 |                                                            |
+---------+------------------------------------------------------------+
| ######  | #####                                                      |
+---------+------------------------------------------------------------+
| ######  | ##### [TOWER SYSTEMS]{.underline}                          |
+---------+------------------------------------------------------------+
| #       | ##### Medium Duty Towers                                   |
| ##### 2 |                                                            |
+---------+------------------------------------------------------------+
| #       | ##### Heavy Duty Tower                                     |
| ##### 1 |                                                            |
+---------+------------------------------------------------------------+
| ######  | #####                                                      |
+---------+------------------------------------------------------------+
| ######  | ##### \$4,044,500                                          |
+---------+------------------------------------------------------------+

# APPENDIX C -- Existing Digital Technologies

The information below contains summaries of existing or announced
efforts in deploying digital technologies for alerts. Inclusion in this
list does not imply any endorsement or evaluation of the effort.

Use of digital broadcasting spectrum -- datacasting

[Overview of the process:]{.underline}

Through "datacasting" packets of information (data) can be embedded
within a digital television signal and sent to PCs outfitted with a DTV
tuner card.

The data would be encrypted by a public safety agency, then received by
the station and inserted into the digital TV signal.

The station sends the data packet through their digital transmitter to
the intended recipients.

-   The receiving PC is equipped with an inexpensive DTV tuner card
    (costing roughly \$300) and a small antenna placed on the computer
    (costing approximately \$30).

-   The data can consist of text, video, audio, graphs, maps or medical
    information.

-   The system is entirely "addressable" so that public safety agencies
    can direct to whom the data is sent.

-   The datacasting services are delivered simultaneously with the
    station's regular digital broadcast program stream, without
    interfering with that service. Viewers would not experience any
    interruption or degradation of the signal they receive.

### 

The service requires very little of a station's digital capacity.
Transmission of the data over the digital spectrum decreases the
information lag to just seconds, and bypasses the congestion of wireline
and wireless services. Reach is a major advantage as over the air
television could potentially reach 99 percent of American households,
and the addressable nature of the network allows secure information to
relevant agencies and first responders in the field.

The Kentucky Network has been one of the pioneers in this field. Several
key KY state agencies are involved in the initiative, including the KY
State Police, and KY Division of Emergency Management. The system
follows the general outline of the APTS proposal, using datacasting on
the digital spectrum for receipt on specially equipped personal
computers, laptops, or any device with a digital TV module.

Specific datacasting efforts have been developed in Kentucky and New
Jersey. Also, a station in New York City has set out to establish an
urban testbed to develop and analyze end-to-end solutions for effective
dissemination of information to first-responders acting in national
disaster situations. The station is also prepared to use their
transmitter on the Empire State Building and a portion of their spectrum
for experimental purposes. The station will support the project by
providing a portion of their digital spectrum and its Instructional
Television Fixed Service (ITFS) band, operating at approximately 2.5GHz.

The project proposes to develop a system to capture, integrate,
disseminate and display video, other sensor data, and multi-source
national intelligence data related to special operations for urban
environments, perimeter defense, homeland defense, emergency response
systems, emergency broadcast systems, and mobile C2.

A unique feature of the proposed system, enabled through the use of the
ITFS band, is the use of an in-band return path to handle requests for
additional information coming back from emergency responders within the
same broadcast channel. Unlike the DTV channel spectrum (being more of a
pure broadcast channel), ITFS will allow two-way communication.
Depending on the geography and purpose of the message, either the ITFS
or DTV band could be used.

Use of satellite system in AMBER alerts

### 

A state emergency management association has requested local stations in
their state to install new satellite receiver systems for receiving and
activating these various alerts. The system would be triggered by the
state police, who would receive information from local police (for AMBER
alerts) or any other appropriate government agency.

The transmission of an alert on the satellite system would be
supplemental to the existing daisy chain EAS system, which would still
be activated utilizing the current EAS receiver. The current EAS system
has recently introduces a new "CAE" code, to represent a Child Abduction
Emergency.

The request from state emergency management association is based on
their view that a new satellite system would introduce less delay into
the AMBER alert notification, as the signal would be broadcast
simultaneously to all stations, avoiding the delay in the daisy chain
radio method utilized by the current EAS system. The satellite also has
the ability to transmit other information along with the alert, such as
photos and audio.

Emergency Digital Information Service

The Emergency Digital Information Service (EDIS) is an advanced digital
tool used by one state's emergency managers to alert and inform the news
media and the public. EDIS has been in continuous operation since 1990.
In 1999 the statewide EDIS network was upgraded to add image and sound
capabilities and to use an advanced satellite datacast technology for
reliable statewide service.

EDIS is a service of the Governor\'s Office of Emergency Services in
partnership with private, local, state and federal organizations and
agencies. Service to the deaf and hearing-impaired and other populations
with special needs are a particular emphasis of the EDIS program

EDIS is a combination website, newswire and a 24-hour broadcast service.
Authorized agencies release text, pictures and sounds over EDIS using
their own existing information networks. News media and the public
access the latest EDIS information in many ways: over the Internet, via
digital radio broadcasts, on their pagers, by email. EDIS bulletins,
maps, pictures and sounds are specially formatted for the computers and
graphic systems used by the news media.

EDIS is designed to be disaster-resistant. A sophisticated satellite
distribution network constantly updates \"mirror\" EDIS servers in
selected newsrooms and network facilities around the state. EDIS can be
used to trigger Emergency Alert System (EAS) alerts, but it can also be
used to follow through with the detailed information people need after
an initial alarm.

# 

EDIS carries a wide range of emergency and public safety bulletins.
Weather alerts, earthquake data, and tsunami warnings are available over
EDIS, as are urgent alerts and prevention information from state and
local agencies. Simple text bulletins have been at the heart of EDIS
since its inception and are still the most widely received. EDIS can
also deliver maps, graphics and photos as well as sound files.

Every EDIS message comes from an authorized emergency-management or
public-safety organization which is responsible for its content. Any
local, state or federal agency with emergency management
responsibilities can request authorization to use EDIS, as can selected
voluntary and non-governmental organizations.

Draft of Common Alert Protocol

A not-for-profit organization that promotes the development, convergence
and adoption of e-business standards has drafted a common alert protocol
(CAP). The CAP is defined as an open, non-proprietary digital message
format for all types of alerts and notifications. The CAP format is
compatible with emerging techniques, such as Web services, as well as
existing formats including the Specific Area Message Encoding (SAME)
used for NOAA Weather Radio and Emergency Alert System, while offering
certain key enhancements. Key benefits of CAP will include reduction of
costs and operational complexity by eliminating the need for multiple
custom software interfaces to the many warning sources and dissemination
systems involved in all-hazard warning.

Each CAP Alert Message consists of an alert segment (basic information),
which may contain one of more information segments (specific event
data), each of which may contain one or more area segments (geographic
area the information applies to). The primary use of the CAP Alert
Message is to provide a single input to activate all kinds of alerting
and public warning systems. A secondary application of CAP is to
normalize warnings from various sources so they can be aggregates and
compared in tabular or graphic form as an aid to situational awareness
and pattern detection. Although primarily designed as an
interoperability standard for use among warning systems and other
emergency information systems, the CAP Alert Message can be delivered
directly to alert recipients over various networks, including data
broadcasts.

Among the principles which guided the design of the CAP Alert Message
were:

-   **Interoperability** -- Exchange of alerts and notifications among
    all kings of emergency information systems

-   **Completeness** -- Provide for all the elements of an effective
    warning message

-   **Simple implementation** -- Not place undue burdens on technical
    implementers

-   **Simple XML and portable structure** -- Although the primary
    anticipated use of the CAP is as an XML document, the format should
    remain sufficiently abstract to be adaptable to other coding schemes

-   **Multi-use format** -- One message schema supports multiple message
    types **Familiarity** -- The data elements and code values should be
    meaningful to warning originators and non-expert recipients alike

-   **Interdisciplinary and international utility** -- The design should
    allow a broad range of applications in public safety, emergency
    management, and allied applications, and should be applicable
    worldwide.

**Wireless access to alert messages**

Two private are working together to deliver homeland security threat
information to cell phone users via live on-demand wireless audio
streaming and SMS alerts. When alerts break, a brief text message is
automatically sent to the user's handset, enabling them to connect
directly to a detailed live or on-demand audio presentation of the
related information.

There are numerous scenarios in which this combined technology might be
utilized, including:

-   Terrorist activity warnings

-   Homeland Security Advisory System status updates

-   Post-attack communications

-   Public addresses

-   Joint coverage of television and radio broadcasts

-   Emergency resource notification

The partnership offers a number of benefits to both homeland security
agencies and the general population:

-   Reach -- There are currently an estimated 137 million wireless users
    in the U.S., with penetration in most adult demographics exceeding
    60%

-   Flexibility -- The wireless technology platform is scalable and can
    be integrated into any telecommunication infrastructure

-   Customization -- The platform enables user-level content
    customization

-   Security -- The core components of the platform can be centrally
    housed in a single secure facility

-   Adaptability -- The same system can be utilized for additional
    public service applications beyond homeland security communication

Another private company has developed a new device called the Instant
Traffic Reporter. The device, a small unit designed to fit inside the
car, will provide instant traffic reports to users within a local area.
The device is being marketed as the only on-demand source of traffic
reports, where motorists can get instant access to local conditions
versus every 10 minutes or so on local radio. The Instant Traffic
Reporter tunes in to a special radio signal transmitted by a radio
company that updates traffic reports on a constant loop 24 hours a day
and updates them whenever there is a traffic incident. Users simply
press a button on the device to get the latest updates.

In addition to traffic reports, the device will allow emergency
notification via a series of audible and visual alerts. The unit is
addressable, and an emergency incident (severe weather, terrorist alert,
AMBER alerts, etc) can trigger a series of lights and beep tones on the
unit. Users can then hear the latest emergency message.

#