**This document includes the Interim Procedure on Maximum Work Time
dated May 28, 2002. (Inserted after PREFACE)**

####### Kennedy Space Center 

####### Safety Practices Handbook

###### 

**Responsible Office:** QA/Director of Safety, Health, and Independent
Assessment

**[PREFACE]{.underline}**

This Handbook establishes consolidated safety requirements that serve as
a framework to define the parameters and boundaries required during
design, operations, and maintenance activities at the Kennedy Space
Center (KSC) and other areas where KSC has jurisdiction. These
requirements represent combined efforts to identify and minimize the
unique hazards associated with daily industrial operations, space
vehicle and payload ground processing, and integrated operations. It is
a living document subject to change. It should be emphasized, however,
that each employee has a responsibility for safety, both his/her own and
that of others who may be impacted by the employee's actions.

All organizations shall meet these safety requirements. It is imperative
that all programs/projects and directorate organizations meet with
safety officials early in the planning stages of operations or tasks.

Close attention to the details specified in this Safety Practices
Handbook is necessary for assurance of the safest possible operations
with maximum efficiency.

SUPERSESSION: This document supersedes KHB 1710.2, Revision D, dated
November 1, 1998.

*/Original Signed By/*

> Shannon D. Bartell
>
> Director of Safety, Health and Independent Assessment

[DISTRIBUTION:]{.underline}

Tech Doc Library

+--------------------------------------------+-------------------------+
| **INTERIM PROCEDURAL LETTER REGARDING      | May 28, 2002            |
| MAXIMUM WORK TIME**                        |                         |
|                                            |                         |
| QA-C                                       |                         |
+--------------------------------------------+-------------------------+

Subject: KHB 1710.2 (Revision E) Interim Policy Letter Regarding Maximum
Work Time

# Purpose

The purpose of this letter is to issue interim policy for KHB 1710.2
(Revision E), KSC Safety Practices Handbook, regarding specific
requirements delineated in Section 3.4, Maximum Work Time (MWT). This
interim policy is issued per the requirements of KDP-KSC-P-2390, Safety
and Mission Assurance (S&MA) Policy Development and Implementation.

# Background

KHB 1710.2 (Revision E) was approved on April 15, 2002. KHB 1710.2,
Section 3.4 discusses MWT requirements, with Sections 3.4c, 3.4d, and
3.4e addressing "Critical Position Definition", "MWT Provisions", and
"Exceeding MWT Limits for Persons in Critical Positions", respectively.
The **[current KHB 1710.2 requirements]{.underline}** associated with
the MWT provision for "7 consecutive days without at least 1 full day
off" are documented in Section 3.4e(4), and are stated as follows:

***"Persons in critical positions shall not work in excess of 7
consecutive days without at least 1 full day off. Preapproval from the
immediate supervisor (or higher) shall be required for deviating from
this limit. The supervisor can approve a deviation for 1 additional day
past 7; program/project or organizational Director approval of an
additional deviation is required to extend the employee to work up to a
total of 12 consecutive days. At the end of the extension period, the
employee must be given a minimum of 2-days off. Under no circumstances
shall employees be required to work more than 12 consecutive days."***

Since the publication of KHB 1710.2 (Revision E), issues have been
raised about the aforementioned MWT provision. These issues, which arise
based on KSC operational and processing scenarios, prevent full
compliance with KHB 1710.2 (Revision E), Section 3.4e(4) requirements.
As currently worded, this MWT provision cannot be waived, and the 12
consecutive days represents a "hard stop" that cannot be exceeded except
in the event of a Program Declared Emergency (PDE) or a Centerwide
Declared Emergency (CDE) \[documented in KHB 1710.2 (Revision E),
Section 3.4f\].

As a result of discussions prior to and during the May 8, 2002, KSC
Safety and Health Council meeting, as well as follow-on discussions with
involved NASA and contractor organizations, the existing MWT provision
requirements for "7 consecutive days without at least 1 full day off"
will be changed (see below) to accommodate (based on preapproval of the
contractor and NASA program/project or organizational Director) waivers
to the 14 (formerly 12) consecutive day limit. Employees in critical
positions shall not exceed 18 consecutive days unless there is a PDE/CDE
in effect. Other well-understood operational/processing scenarios will
be specifically exempted from the consecutive day limit deviation
requirements because the work profile is such that exceeding the limits
is a reasonably expected condition, and the nature of the work is such
that the limits can be exceeded without causing excessive employee
fatigue.

One additional area of the KHB 1710.2 (Revision E), Section 3.4 MWT
requirements that required clarification involved Section 3.4c, Critical
Position Definition. The **[current KHB 1710.2
requirements]{.underline}** associated with the definition of a critical
position include five examples of applicable types of tasks. The fifth
example of an applicable task is stated as follows:

***"(5) Employees working with other systems that are hazardous by
nature."***

This example has been clarified (see below), since the current wording
implies that individuals working on systems that are hazardous (or in
hazardous procedures), even if they are not performing work as part of a
hazardous sequence within a hazardous procedure, could be considered as
being in a critical position. This interpretation has the potential to
unnecessarily increase the number of persons categorized as being in
critical positions.

**[Interim Policy for KHB 1710.2 (Revision E), Section
3.4e(4)]{.underline}**

KHB 1710.2 (Revision E), Section 3.4e(4) **[is changed to read as
follows]{.underline}**:

***"Persons in critical positions shall not work in excess of 7
consecutive days without at least 1 full day off. Preapproval shall be
required to deviate from this limit. Program/project or organizational
directorate (NASA Division Chief; Contractor Director direct report
level \[or higher\]) approval of an additional deviation is required to
extend the employee to work up to a total of 14 consecutive days. This
requires that the requesting program/project or organizational
directorate specify the additional day(s) requested (not to exceed seven
additional days), as well as provide justification detailing how the
additional days requested matches the work profile of the
operational/processing scenario. At the end of the extension period
(i.e., for 8 through 13 consecutive days worked), the employee must be
given a minimum of 1 full day off. It is recognized that certain,
limited operational/processing scenarios prohibit full compliance with
the 14 consecutive day limit. In these situations, the contractor
program/project or organizational Director (with government counterpart
Director \[or designee\] signature) may preapprove an additional
deviation to extend the employee to work up to a total of 18 consecutive
days. For NASA civil servants, the preapproval of an additional
deviation to extend the employee to work up to a total of 18 consecutive
days requires approval of the program/project or organizational Director
(or designee) and the associate Director of S&MA (SH&IA). This requires
that the requesting program/project or organizational directorate
specify the additional day(s) requested (not to exceed four additional
days), as well as provide justification detailing how the additional
days requested matches the work profile of the operational/processing
scenario. At the end of the extension period (i.e., for 14 through 18
consecutive days worked), the employee must be given a minimum of 2 full
days off. Employees shall not work more than 18 consecutive days unless
a PDE or CDE \[PDE and CDE are described in Section 3.4f\] is in effect.
Specific operational/processing scenarios (i.e., Shuttle TAL Support,
Shuttle CONUS Predeployment Landing Support, Shuttle/SCA Ferry
Operations, SRB Retrieval Operations, External Tank Transport Barge
Operations) are exempted from the consecutive day deviation
requirements, since the work profile is such that exceeding the limits
is a reasonably expected condition, and the nature of the work is such
that the limits can be exceeded without causing excessive employee
fatigue."***

**[Interim Policy for KHB 1710.2 (Revision E), Section
3.4c(5)]{.underline}**

KHB 1710.2 (Revision E), Section 3.4c(5) **[is changed to read as
follows:]{.underline}**

***"(5) Employees working hazardous sequences of hazardous
procedures."***

# Applicability

The interim policy documented herein is effective immediately. This
interim policy shall be formally incorporated into the next revision of
KHB 1710.2, KSC Safety Practices Handbook. (NOTE: The next revision of
KHB 1710.2 will be issued as Kennedy NASA Procedures and Guidelines
\[KNPG\] 8715.3.)

Questions regarding this KHB 1710.2 interim policy letter should be
directed to John Branard/QA-C at 867-2268.

/s/

Shannon D. Bartell

Director of Safety, Health & Independent Assessment

cc:

AA/R. Bridges

AA-A/J. Jennings

BA/R. Arbuthnot

CC/B. Anderson

GG/N. Carroll

JP/R. Lugo

OP/J. Hattaway

PH/D. King

PH/M. Leinbach

PH/M. Wetmore

QA/H. Garrido

TA/C. Fairey

TA-C1/T. Williamson (AFGE Union)

UB/J. Talone

VA/S. Francois

VB/M. Benik

XA/J. Morgan

YA/J. Heald

Identical letter to:

Ms. Barbara L. Brown

Manager, Liaison Office

# **NASA/Ames Research Center**

Mail Code: ARC

Kennedy Space Center, FL 32899

Mr. H. Robert Spiess

GSFC Resident Manager

Resident Office/KSC

# **NASA/Goddard Space Flight Center**

Mail Code: GTDRS

Kennedy Space Center, FL 32899

Mr. Anthony J. Ippolito

Station Director -- NASA/GSFC

# **MILA Tracking Station** 

# **NASA/Goddard Space Flight Center**

Mail Code: MILA

Kennedy Space Center, FL 32899

Mr. Jon M. Cowart

Manager

JSC Resident Office/KSC

# **NASA/Johnson Space Center**

Mail Code: MV7

Kennedy Space Center, FL 32899

Mr. Mike Kinnan

Manager

Space Station Launch Site Integration Office/KSC

### **NASA/Johnson Space Center**

Mail Code: OC-KSC

Kennedy Space Center, FL 32899

Colonel James D. Halsell

Manager, Launch Integration

### **Space Shuttle Program/JSC**

Mail Code: MK

Kennedy Space Center, FL 32899

Mr. William W. Clever

MSFC Resident Manager & SRB RO Manager

Resident Office/KSC

### **NASA/Marshall Space Flight Center**

Mail Code: SK

Kennedy Space Center, FL 32899

Ms. Sheryl L. Bergstrom

Manager

# **Jet Propulsion Laboratory**

Mail Code: JPL

Kennedy Space Center, FL 32899

## Mr. Bruce E. Melnick 

# **Vice President-Sr. Site Executive**

# **The Boeing Company**

# **Space Coast Operations**

P.O. Box 21233

## Mail Code: 7210-C001

Kennedy Space Center, FL 32815-0233

Mr. Bruce E. Melnick

Program Manager, Payload Ground Operations Contract

# **The Boeing Company**

P.O. Box 21233

Mail Code: 721S-S205

Kennedy Space Center, FL 32815

## Mr. John W. Elbon III

## Site Director

International Space Station, KSC Ground Operations

# **The Boeing Company**

P.O. Box 21233

Mail Code: 721G-0001

Kennedy Space Center, FL 32899

Mr. William H. Turner

## Senior Manager, Ground Processing

Spacehab Payload Processing Facility (SPPF)

# **The Boeing Company**

P.O. Box 21233

Mail Code: 721S-PPF1

Kennedy Space Center, FL 32815

Mr. Rick Abramson

President and Chief Executive Officer

# **Delaware North Parks Services of Spaceport, Inc.**

Mail Code: DNPS

Kennedy Space Center, FL 32899

Mr. John R. (Dick) Lyon

Program Manager, Engr. Dev. Contract (EDC)

DYNACS Engineering Co., Inc.

P.O. Box 21087

Mail Code: DNX-1

Kennedy Space Center, FL 32815

Mr. Douglas L. Britt

Project Director and Vice President

Life Sciences Support Contract

# **Dynamac Corporation**

Mail Code: DYN-1

Room 3103, O&C Bldg.

Kennedy Space Center, FL 32899

Mr. James Calwells

Project Manager

Lackmann Culinary Services, Inc.

Mail Code: LACK; Bldg. M6-493

Kennedy Space Center, FL 32899

Mr. Robert H. Atkins

Manager - KSC Operations

# **Lockheed Martin Space Systems Company**

Mail Code: MMC-1

Room 1084, O&C Bldg.

Kennedy Space Center, FL 32899

Mr. Brian Duffy

Associate Program Manager, Consolidated Space Operations Contract (CSOC)

### **Lockheed Martin Space Operations**

Mail Code: LM/CSOC

Room 1215, HQ Bldg.

Kennedy Space Center, FL 32899

Mr. Daniel P. (Dan) Houston

KSC/ODIN Program Manager

# **OAO Corporation**

Mail Code: OAO-1

Room 2145, HQ Bldg.

Kennedy Space Center, FL 32899

Mr. Daniel R. Hausman

Site Director - KSC/CCAS

# **Rocketdyne**

Mail Code: ROC-1

Kennedy Space Center, FL 32899

Mr. Michael (Mike) J. Butchko

President

# **Space Gateway Support** 

# **Joint-Base Operations Support Contract (J-BOSC)**

P.O. Box 21237

Mail Code: SGS-6380

Kennedy Space Center, FL 32815-0237

Mr. Theodore L. Shaffner

Manager, KSC Operations/LSS

# **Thiokol Propulsion**

P.O. Box 21005

Mail Code: THIO-LSS

Kennedy Space Center, FL 32899

Mr. William W. (Bill) Pickavance, Jr.

Vice President and Deputy Program Manager, Florida Operations

# **United Space Alliance**

Mail Code: USK-572

Kennedy Space Center, FL 32899

or

8550 Astronaut Blvd.

Cape Canaveral, FL 32920-4304

Mr. P.E. (Ed) Adamek

Vice President, Florida Technical Operations

# **United Space Alliance**

Mail Code: USK-572

Kennedy Space Center, FL 32899

Ms. Marcelite (Marcie) J. Harris

Florida Site Director & Logistics Process Director

# **United Space Alliance**

Mail Code: USK-007

Kennedy Space Center, FL 32899

Mr. Charles W. Murphy

Associate Program Manager

of Integrated Logistics

# **United Space Alliance**

Mail Code: USK-C59

Kennedy Space Center, FL 32899

Mr. Gordon P. Nielsen

Vice President & Associate Program Manager

# **SRB Element**

United Space Alliance

Mail Code: USK-417

Kennedy Space Center, FL 32899

**[TABLE OF CONTENTS]{.underline}**

  ----------------------------- ------------------------ --------------------------------- ------
  Preface                                                                                  i

  Table of Contents                                                                        ii

  List of Illustrations                                                                    vi

  List of Tables                                                                           vi

  List of Mandatory Documents                                                              vii

  List of Reference Documents                                                              ix

  Acronyms and Abbreviations                                                               xiv

  Glossary                                                                                 xxi

                                                                                           

  **[SECTION 1: General                                                                    
  Requirements]{.underline}**                                                              

                                                                                           

  **[CHAPTER 1:                                                                            
  GENERAL]{.underline}**                                                                   

                                                                                           

  1.0                           Introduction                                               1-1

  1.1                           Purpose                                                    1-1

  1.2                           Applicability and Scope                                    1-1

  1.3                           Authority and                                              1-1
                                Responsibility                                             

  1.4                           Compliance with Federal,                                   1-2
                                Consensus, and NASA                                        
                                Standards                                                  

  1.5                           Change Recommendations                                     1-2

  1.6                           Safety Variance                                            1-2
                                Processing                                                 

  1.7                           Safety Jurisdiction                                        1-8

                                                                                           

  **[CHAPTER 2:                                                                            
  WEATHER]{.underline}**                                                                   

                                                                                           

  2.0                           General                                                    2-1

  2.1                           Adverse Weather                                            2-1
                                Notification                                               

  2.2                           Adverse Weather                                            2-1

                                                                                           

  **[CHAPTER 3:                                                                            
  PERSONNEL]{.underline}**                                                                 

                                                                                           

  3.0                           General                                                    3-1

  3.1                           Personnel Controls                                         3-1

  3.2                           Personnel Access                                           3-2
                                Training                                                   

  3.3                           Refresher Training                                         3-2

  3.4                           Maximum Work Time                                          3-3

                                                                                           

  **[CHAPTER 4: CONTROL                                                                    
  AREAS]{.underline}**                                                                     

                                                                                           

  4.0                           General                                                    4-1

  4.1                           Facility Controls                                          4-1

  4.2                           Control Area Analysis                                      4-1

  4.3                           Manloading Limitations                                     4-2

                                                                                           
  ----------------------------- ------------------------ --------------------------------- ------

  ----------------------------- ----------------------------- -------------- -------------------------------------------------- ------ ------------------------
  **[CHAPTER 5: OPERATIONAL                                                                                                            
  SAFETY]{.underline}**                                                                                                                

                                                                                                                                       

  5.0                           Safety Monitoring of                                                                                   5-1
                                Hazardous Operations                                                                                   

  5.1                           Tools                                                                                                  5-1

  5.2                           Pretask and Pretest Briefings                                                                          5-1

  5.3                           Safety Inspections and                                                                                 5-2
                                Walkdowns                                                                                              

  5.4                           Heat-Producing Devices                                                                                 5-2

  5.5                           Use of Photographic Equipment                                                                          5-3

  5.6                           Use of Electronic Equipment                                                                            5-4

  5.7                           Atmospheric Monitoring                                                                                 5-5
                                Systems                                                                                                

  5.8                           Cryogenics                                                                                             5-6

  5.9                           Hazardous Operations Support                                                                           5-6
                                Requirements                                                                                           

  5.10                          Handling of                                                                                            5-7
                                Flammable/Combustible Liquids                                                                          
                                Near Flight Hardware                                                                                   

  5.11                          Safety Warnings                                                                                        5-7

  5.12                          Elevators                                                                                              5-8

  5.13                          Hazardous Operations                                                                                   5-8
                                Emergency Power                                                                                        

  5.14                          Concurrent Operations                                                                                  5-8

                                                                                                                                       

  **[CHAPTER 6: UNIQUE                                                                                                                 
  HAZARDOUS FACILITIES                                                                                                                 
  REQUIREMENTS]{.underline}**                                                                                                          

                                                                                                                                       

  6.0                           General                                                                                                6-1

  6.1                           Vehicle Assembly Building                                                                              6-1

  6.2                           Rotation, Processing and                                                                               6-2
                                Surge Facility                                                                                         

  6.3                           Operations and Checkout                                                                                6-3
                                Building                                                                                               

                                                                                                                                       

  **[CHAPTER 7: MATERIALS                                                                                                              
  PROCESSING]{.underline}**                                                                                                            

                                                                                                                                       

  7.0                           General                                                                                                7-1

                                                                                                                                       

                                **[SECTION 2: ANNEXES:                                                                                 
                                SPECIAL                                                                                                
                                REQUIREMENTS]{.underline}**                                                                            

                                                                                                                                       

  **[Annex]{.underline}**                                                                                                              **[Page]{.underline}**

                                                                                                                                       

  **A**                         **KSC SUPPLEMENT TO OSHA 29                                                                            
                                CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS                                                                            
                                (CFR), PARTS 1910/1926**                                                                               

                                                                                                                                       

                                1.0                                          Personal Protective Requirements                          A-1

                                1.1                                          Fall Protection/Work on Elevated Structures               A-1

                                1.2                                          Machine Shop Safety                                       A-1

                                1.3                                          Self-Contained Atmospheric Protective Ensemble            A-1
                                                                             Requirements                                              

                                2.0                                          Emergency Evacuation Requirements                         A-4

                                3.0                                          Lockout/Tagout Program                                    A-4

                                4.0                                          Danger Tags                                               A-4

                                5.0                                          Battery Handling                                          A-5

                                                                                                                                       

                                                                                                                                       

                                                                                                                                       

  **B**                                                       **KSC                                                                    
                                                              SUPPLEMENT TO                                                            
                                                              NPG 8715.3,                                                              
                                                              NASA SAFETY                                                              
                                                              MANUAL**                                                                 

                                                                                                                                       

                                                              1.0            Technical Operating Procedures                     B-1    

                                                              2.0            Mishaps and Close Calls                            B-9    

                                                              2.1            Definition of Mishaps and Close Calls              B-9    

                                                              2.2            Classifying Mishaps and Close Calls                B-10   

                                                              2.3            Reporting Mishaps and Close Calls                  B-13   

                                                              2.4            Investigation                                      B-15   

                                                              2.5            Mishap Reports                                     B-16   

                                                              2.6            Corrective Action                                  B-17   

                                                              2.7            Lessons Learned                                    B-17   

                                                              2.8            Metrics and Trend Analysis                         B-17   

                                                              2.9            Mishaps Involving Payload Customers, Resident      B-18   
                                                                             Office Personnel, and Official Visitors                   

                                                              3.0            Safety Program                                     B-18   

                                                                                                                                       

  **C**                                                       **RESERVED**                                                             

                                                                                                                                       

  **D**                                                       **KSC                                                                    
                                                              SUPPLEMENT TO                                                            
                                                              NFPA 70,                                                                 
                                                              NATIONAL                                                                 
                                                              ELECTRIC                                                                 
                                                              CODE**                                                                   

                                                                                                                                       

                                                              1.0            Grounding and Bonding                              D-1    

                                                              2.0            Three-Phase Power Connections                      D-3    

                                                                                                                                       

  **E**                                                       **KSC                                                                    
                                                              SUPPLEMENT TO                                                            
                                                              NPD 8710.5,                                                              
                                                              NASA SAFETY                                                              
                                                              POLICY FOR                                                               
                                                              PRESSURE                                                                 
                                                              VESSELS AND                                                              
                                                              PRESSURIZED                                                              
                                                              SYSTEMS**                                                                

                                                                                                                                       

                                                              1.0            Preface                                            E-1    

                                                              2.0            Definitions                                        E-1    

                                                              3.0            Policy                                             E-1    

                                                              4.0            Applicability and Scope                            E-2    

                                                              5.0            Responsibilities                                   E-2    

                                                              6.0            General Pressure Vessel and Pressure Systems       E-4    

                                                              7.0            Documentation Requirements                         E-6    

                                                              8.0            Testing Requirements                               E-7    

                                                              9.0            Inservice Inspection and Test Plan                 E-10   

                                                              10.0           Inspection Requirements                            E-11   

                                                              11.0           Nondestructive Examination                         E-13   

                                                              12.0           Marking/Identification Requirements                E-13   

                                                              13.0           Engineering Analysis                               E-15   

                                                              14.0           Repairs, Alterations, or Modifications             E-15   

                                                              15.0           Inactive and Unsafe Vessels and Systems            E-16   

                                                              16.0           Certifications/Recertification Definitions and     E-17   
                                                                             Requirements                                              

                                                              17.0           Pressure Vessels/Systems Database                  E-19   

                                                                                                                                       

                                                                             Appendix A to Annex E                              EA-1   

                                                                             Appendix B to Annex E                              EB-1   
  ----------------------------- ----------------------------- -------------- -------------------------------------------------- ------ ------------------------

  ------- ------------------ -------------------------------------------------- -------
  **F**   **KSC SUPPLEMENT                                                      
          TO NSS 1740.12,                                                       
          NASA SAFETY                                                           
          STANDARD FOR                                                          
          EXPLOSIVES,                                                           
          PROPELLANTS, AND                                                      
          PYROTECHNICS**                                                        

                                                                                

          1.0                Humidity Requirements                              F-1

          2.0                Explosives Requirements                            F-2

          3.0                Propellant Requirements                            F-9

                                                                                

                             Appendix A to Annex F                              FA-1

                                                                                

  **G**   **KSC SUPPLEMENT                                                      
          TO                                                                    
          NASA-STD-8719.9,                                                      
          NASA SAFETY                                                           
          STANDARD FOR                                                          
          LIFTING DEVICES                                                       
          AND EQUIPMENT**                                                       

                                                                                

          1.0                Hoisting and Handling                              G-1

          2.0                Suspended Load Operation Analysis/Approval         G-3

                                                                                

                             Appendix A to Annex G                              GA-1

                             Appendix B to Annex G                              GB-1

                                                                                

                                                                                

  **H**   **SYSTEM SAFETY                                                       
          AND RELIABILITY                                                       
          ENGINEERING                                                           
          REQUIREMENTS**                                                        

                                                                                

          1.0                General                                            H-1

          2.0                Hazard Analysis/Risk Identification Process        H-1

          3.0                Reliability and Maintainability Engineering        H-2

          4.0                NASA-Managed Development Projects                  H-3

                                                                                

  **I**   **RESERVED**                                                          

                                                                                

  **J**   **RESERVED**                                                          

                                                                                

  **K**   **SPACE SHUTTLE                                                       
          LAUNCH AND LANDING                                                    
          OPERATIONS**                                                          

                                                                                

          1.0                Flight Hardware Access After Power Reactant Supply K-1
                             and Distribution Servicing                         

          2.0                Scrub Operations                                   K-2

          3.0                Turnaround Operations                              K-4

          4.0                Postlaunch Operations                              K-7

          5.0                Orbiter Nominal Landing                            K-7
  ------- ------------------ -------------------------------------------------- -------

**[LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS]{.underline}**

  --------------------------------- -------------------------------------------------- ------------------------
  **[Illustrations]{.underline}**   **[Title]{.underline}**                            **[Page]{.underline}**

                                                                                       

  E-1                               Type E, A, U, Y, and F Hose Containment Grips      E-21

  E-2                               Type T Hose Containment Grip                       E-22

  E-3                               Inservice Inspection Requirements                  E-23

  E-4                               Recertificatioin Procedure for Inservice Equipment E-24

  E-5                               System Data Requirements                           E-25

  E-6                               Vessel Data Requirements                           E-26

                                                                                       
  --------------------------------- -------------------------------------------------- ------------------------

**[LIST OF TABLES]{.underline}**

  ------------------------- -------------------------------------------------- ------------------------
  **[Table]{.underline}**   **[Title]{.underline}**                            **[Page]{.underline}**

                                                                               

  1-1                       Safety Variance Coordination/Approval Process      1-7

  3-1                       Maximum Work Time (MWT) Applicability Table        3-4

  A-1                       Protective Clothing and Ensembles                  A-3

  B-1                       Close Call Determination Matrix                    B-11

  K-1                       Orbiter Post Landing GH~2~ Requirements            K-10
  ------------------------- -------------------------------------------------- ------------------------

**[LIST OF MANDATORY DOCUMENTS]{.underline}**

The latest issue of the following documents shall be used.

  ----------------------- ---------------------------------------------------
  **[OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY  
  AND HEALTH              
  ADMINISTRATION          
  (OSHA)]{.underline}**   

                          

  Executive Order 12196,  
  Occupational Safety and 
  Health Program for      
  Federal Employees       

                          

  Title 29 CFR, Part      
  1960, Basic Program     
  Elements for Federal    
  Employees Occupational  
  Safety and Health       
  Program                 

                          

  Title 29 CFR, Parts     
  1910 to 1990,           
  Occupational Safety and 
  Health Administration   

                          

  Title 40 CFR,           
  Protection of the       
  Environment,            
  Environmental           
  Protection Agency       

                          

  Title 49 CFR, Parts 171 
  to 178, Transportation, 
  Department of           
  Transportation          

                          

  **[NATIONAL AERONAUTICS 
  AND SPACE               
  ADMINISTRATION          
  (NASA)]{.underline}**   

                          

  NPD 8621.1              NASA Mishap Reporting and Investigating Policy

                          

  NPD 8700.1              NASA Policy for Safety and Mission Success

                          

  NPD 8710.1              Emergency Preparedness Program

                          

  NPD 8710.2              NASA Safety and Health Program Policy

                          

  NPD 8710.5              NASA Safety Policy for Pressure Vessels and
                          Pressurized Systems

                          

  NPD 8720.1              NASA Reliability and Maintainability Program Policy

                          

  NPG 1700.6              Guide for Inservice Inspection of Ground-Based
                          Pressure Vessels and Systems

                          

  NPG 8621.1              NASA Procedures and Guidelines for Mishap
                          Reporting, Investigating, and Recordkeeping

                          

  NPG 8715.1              NASA Safety and Health Handbook Occupational Safety
                          and Health Programs

                          

  NPG 8715.2              NASA Emergency Preparedness Plan Procedures and
                          Guidelines

                          

  NPG 8715.3              NASA Safety Manual
  ----------------------- ---------------------------------------------------

  ------------------- ---------------------------------------------------
                      

  NPG 1700.6          Guide for Inservice Inspection of Ground-Based
                      Pressure Vessels and Systems

                      

  NASA-STD-8719.7     Facility System Safety Guidebook

                      

  NASA-STD-8719.9     NASA Safety Standard for Lifting Devices and
                      Equipment

                      

  NASA-STD-8719.11    Safety Standard for Fire Protection

                      

  NASA-STD-8719.13    NASA Software Safety Standard

                      

  NASA-STD-8729.1     Planning, Developing and Managing an Effective
                      Reliability and Maintainability Program

                      

  NSS 1740.12         Safety Standard for Explosives, Propellants, and
                      Pyrotechnics

                      

  KHB 5310.1          Reliability, Maintainability, and Quality Assurance
                      Handbook

                      

  KMI 1710.18         KSC Safety Assurance Policy

                      

  KCA 1308            Joint Operating Procedure Between 45^th^ Space Wing
                      and the John F. Kennedy Space Center for Safety

                      
  ------------------- ---------------------------------------------------

**[LIST OF REFERENCE DOCUMENTS]{.underline}**

The following documents contain information that support the
requirements contained in this Handbook. Consult with the document's
Office of Primary Responsibility (OPR) for applicability.

  ------------------------------- ---------------------------------------
  **[UNITED STATES AIR FORCE      
  (USAF)]{.underline}**           

                                  

  AFMAN 91-201                    Explosives Safety Standard

                                  

  AFSC DH 1-4                     Electromagnetic Compatibility

                                  

  EWR 127-1                       Eastern and Western Range 127-1, Range
                                  Safety Requirements
  ------------------------------- ---------------------------------------

  ------------------------------- ---------------------- ------------------------------------ --
  **[DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE                                                                    
  (DOD)]{.underline}**                                                                        

                                                                                              

  DODM 4145-26                    DOD Contractors'                                            
                                  Safety Manual for                                           
                                  Explosives                                                  

                                                                                              

  DOD 6055.9-STD                  DOD Ammunition and                                          
                                  Explosives Safety                                           
                                  Standards                                                   

                                                                                              

  Functional Plan 3610            Space Shuttle Support                                       
                                  Contingency Functional                                      
                                  Plan 3610-xx (Current                                       
                                  Year Date)                                                  

                                                                                              

  **[JOHNSON SPACE CENTER                                                                     
  (JSC)]{.underline}**                                                                        

                                                                                              

  JSC 08934                       Shuttle Operational                                         
                                  Data Book, Volume I,                                        
                                  Shuttle Systems                                             
                                  Performance and                                             
                                  Constraints Data                                            

                                                                                              

  JSC SW-E-0002                   Ground Support                                              
                                  Equipment General                                           
                                  Design Requirements                                         

                                                                                              

  K-Band Workshop, JSC, May 1984  NSI RF Sensitivity                                          
                                  Evaluation at                                               
                                  Microwave Frequency                                         

                                                                                              

  NSTS 07700, Vol. VIII           NSTS Operations                                             

                                                                                              

  NSTS 08934                      Orbiter Crash and                                           
                                  Rescue Information                                          

                                                                                              

  NSTS 22206                      Requirements for                                            
                                  Preparation and                                             
                                  Approval of Failure                                         
                                  Modes and Effects                                           
                                  Analysis and Critical                                       
                                  Items List                                                  

                                                                                              

  NSTS 22254                      Methodology for                                             
                                  Conduct of Space                                            
                                  Shuttle Program Hazard                                      
                                  Analyses                                                    

                                                                                              

                                                                                              

  SSP 30234                       Failure Modes and                                           
                                  Effects Analysis and                                        
                                  Critical Items List                                         
                                  Requirements for the                                        
                                  Space Station Freedom                                       
                                  Program                                                     

                                                                                              

  SSP 30309                       Safety Analysis and                                         
                                  Risk Assessment                                             
                                  Requirements, Space                                         
                                  Station Freedom                                             
                                  Program                                                     

                                                                                              

  SSP 30423                       Space Station Approved                                      
                                  Electrical,                                                 
                                  Electronic, and                                             
                                  Electromechanical                                           
                                  Parts Lists                                                 

                                                                                              

  **[KENNEDY SPACE                                                                            
  CENTER(KSC)]{.underline}**                                                                  

                                                                                              

  GP-14-2                         Facility Utilization                                        
                                  Charts                                                      

                                                                                              

  GP-435, Vol. 1                  Engineering Drawing                                         
                                  Practices, Ground                                           
                                  Support Equipment                                           

                                                                                              

  GP-864                          Electrical Cables                                           
                                  Handbook (KAPL-3)                                           

                                                                                              

  GSOP 5400                       Ground Safety                                               
                                  Operating Procedures                                        

                                                                                              

  JHB 2000                        KSC Comprehensive                                           
                                  Emergency Management                                        
                                  Plan                                                        

                                                                                              

  K-SF-0003.7                     Ground Safety Plan                                          
                                  Off-Site Facility                                           
                                  (Vandenberg Air Force                                       
                                  Base, CA)                                                   

                                                                                              

  KHB 1610.1                      KSC Security Handbook                                       

                                                                                              

  KHB 1820.3                      KSC Hearing                                                 
                                  Conservation Program                                        

                                                                                              

  KHB 1820.4                      KSC Respiratory                                             
                                  Protection Program                                          

                                                                                              

  KHB 1840.1                      Industrial Hygiene                                          
                                  Handbook                                                    

                                                                                              

  KHB 1860.1                      KSC Ionizing Radiation                                      
                                  Protection Program                                          

                                                                                              

  KHB 1860.2                      KSC Nonionizing                                             
                                  Radiation Protection                                        
                                  Program                                                     

                                                                                              

  KHB 1870.1                      KSC Sanitation and                                          
                                  Pollution Control                                           
                                  Handbook                                                    

                                                                                              

  KHB 4000.1                      Supply Support System                                       
                                  Manual                                                      

                                                                                              

  KHB 6000.1                      Transportation Support                                      
                                  System Handbook                                             

                                                                                              

  KHB 8800.7                      Hazardous Waste                                             
                                  Management                                                  

                                                                                              

  KMI 8800.8                      KSC Environmental                                           
                                  Management                                                  

                                                                                              

  KNPG 8072.1                     KSC Materials and                                           
                                  Processes Control                                           
                                  Procedures and                                              
                                  Guidelines                                                  

                                                                                              

  KSC-DE-512-SM                   Guide for Design                                            
                                  Engineering of Ground                                       
                                  Support Equipment and                                       
                                  Facilities for Use at                                       
                                  Kennedy Space Center                                        

                                                                                              

  KSC-DF-502                      SRM/VAB Inadvertent                                         
                                  Ignition Effects Study                                      

                                                                                              

  KSC-DF-3669                     Vehicle Assembly                                            
                                  Building Housing                                            
                                  Abatement Plan                                              

                                                                                              

  KSC Drawing 80K04331            Safety Standard for                                         
                                  Compresses Gas                                              
                                  Cylinders                                                   

                                                                                              

  KSC Drawing 81K04331            Specification for                                           
                                  Marking of Propellant                                       
                                  Portable Containers                                         

                                                                                              

  KSC Drawing 81K00643            Specification for                                           
                                  Marking of Mobile GSE                                       

                                                                                              

  KSC-PLN-1904                    Trailer/Equipment Tie                                       
                                  Down Plan                                                   

                                                                                              

  KSC-STD-E-0002                  Hazard Proofing of                                          
                                  Electrically Energized                                      
                                  Equipment                                                   

                                                                                              

  KSC-STD-E-0011                  Electrical Power                                            
                                  Receptacles                                                 

                                                                                              

  KSC-STD-E-0012                  Bonding and Grounding                                       

                                                                                              

  KSC-STD-E-0013                  Facility Lightning                                          
                                  Protection Design                                           

                                                                                              

  KSC-STD-E-0015                  Marking of Ground                                           
                                  Support Equipment                                           

                                                                                              

  KSC-STD-SF-0004                 Ground Piping Systems                                       
                                  Color Coding and                                            
                                  Identification, Safety                                      
                                  Standard for                                                

                                                                                              

  KSC-STD-Z-0005                  Pneumatic Ground                                            
                                  Support Equipment,                                          
                                  Design of                                                   

                                                                                              

  KSC-STD-Z-0006                  Hypergolic Propellants                                      
                                  Ground Support                                              
                                  Equipment, Design of                                        

                                                                                              

  KSC-STD-Z-0007                  Hydrocarbon Fuel                                            
                                  Ground Support                                              
                                  Equipment, Design of                                        

                                                                                              

  KSC-STD-Z-0008                  Ground Life Support                                         
                                  Systems and Equipment,                                      
                                  Design of                                                   

                                                                                              

  KSC-STD-Z-0009                  Cryogenic Ground                                            
                                  Support Equipment,                                          
                                  Design of                                                   

                                                                                              

  KSC-STD-Z-0010                  Environmental Control                                       
                                  Systems, Coolant                                            
                                  Servicing Systems, and                                      
                                  Ground Support                                              
                                  Equipment, Design of                                        

                                                                                              

  K-STSM-09.3.1                   STS Operations Plan,                                        
                                  Flight and Ground Crew                                      
                                  Rescue                                                      

                                                                                              

  KVM-PL-1.2                      KSC Emergency Medical                                       
                                  Service Plan                                                

                                                                                              

  KVT-PL-0014                     KSC Off-Site                                                
                                  Operations Plan                                             

                                                                                              

  KVT-PL-0021                     NSTS Salvage Plan                                           

                                                                                              

  OMI S0018                       Adverse                                                     
                                  Weather/Lightning                                           
                                  Monitoring (LC-39)                                          

                                                                                              

  S00000-2                        Technical Operating                                         
                                  Procedures Guidelines                                       

                                                                                              

  **[UNITED STATES                                                                            
  MILITARY]{.underline}**                                                                     

                                                                                              

  MIL-H-25579                     Hose Assembly,                                              
                                  Tetrafluoroethylene,                                        
                                  High Temperature,                                           
                                  Medium Pressure, Class                                      
                                  1                                                           

                                                                                              

  MIL-R-9673                      Radiation Limits,                                           
                                  Notice 2, 6 July 1976                                       

                                                                                              

  MIL-STD-461                     Requirements for the                                        
                                  Control of                                                  
                                  Electromagnetic                                             
                                  Interference Emissions                                      
                                  and Susceptibility                                          

                                                                                              

  MIL-STD-462                     Measurement of                                              
                                  Electromagnetic                                             
                                  Interference                                                
                                  Characteristics                                             

                                                                                              

  MIL-STD-1512                    Electroexplosive                                            
                                  Subsystems                                                  
                                  Electrically Initiated                                      
                                  Design Requirements                                         
                                  and Test Methods                                            

                                                                                              

  MIL-STD-1472                    Human Engineering                                           
                                  Design Criteria for                                         
                                  Military Systems,                                           
                                  Equipment and                                               
                                  Facilities                                                  

                                                                                              

  MIL-STD-1522                    Standard General                                            
                                  Requirements for Safe                                       
                                  Design and Operation                                        
                                  of Pressurized Missile                                      
                                  and Space Systems                                           

                                                                                              

  **[NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND                                                                 
  SPACE ADMINISTRATION                                                                        
  (NASA)]{.underline}**                                                                       

                                                                                              

  NASA-STD-6001                   Flammability, Odor,                                         
                                  Off-gassing and                                             
                                  Compatibility                                               
                                  Requirements and Test                                       
                                  Procedures for                                              
                                  Materials in                                                
                                  Environments that                                           
                                  Support Combustion                                          

                                                                                              

                                                                                              

  **[OTHER SOURCES]{.underline}**                                                             

                                                                                              

  ACGIH                           Threshold Limit Value                                       
                                  and Biological                                              
                                  Exposure Indices                                            

                                                                                              

  ANSI A10.3                      Power Actuated                                              
                                  Fastening Systems,                                          
                                  Safety Requirements                                         
                                  for                                                         

                                                                                              

  ANSI A17.1                      Safety Code for                                             
                                  Elevators and                                               
                                  Escalators                                                  

                                                                                              

  ANSI A136.1                     American National                                           
                                  Standard for the Safe                                       
                                  Use of Lasers                                               

                                                                                              

  ANSI Z135.1                     Safety Color Code                                           

                                                                                              

  ANSI/ASME B31.3                 Process Piping                                              

                                                                                              

  ANSI/ASME B40.1                 Gauges -- Pressure                                          
                                  Indicating Dial Type                                        
                                  -- Elastic Element                                          

                                                                                              

  ANSI/ASME PTC 25                Pressure Relief                                             
                                  Devices                                                     

                                                                                              

  ASME BPVC                       ASME Boiler and                                             
                                  Pressure Vessel Code,                                       
                                  Section VIII,                                               
                                  Divisions 1 and 2                                           

                                                                                              

  ASME/NB-23                      National Board                                              
                                  Inspection Code                                             

                                                                                              

  IEEE C95.1                      Safety Levels with                                          
                                  Respect to Human                                            
                                  Exposure to Radio                                           
                                  Frequency of                                                
                                  Electromagnetic Fields                                      

                                                                                              

  FIRL Report, F-B2303-9          RF Evaluation of the                                        
                                  Single Bridgewire                                           
                                  Apollo Standard                                             
                                  Initiator                                                   

                                                                                              

  National Fire Codes             National Fire                                               
                                  Protection Association                                      

                                                                                              

  Technical Manual No.            Operators and                                               
  11-6230-220-12                  Organizational                                              
                                  Maintenance                                                 

                                                                                              

  USAEHA Radiation Protection     AN/TVS-3 Searchlight                                        
  Special Study No. 42-035-69     (20 kW) Evaluation                                          

                                                                                              
  ------------------------------- ---------------------- ------------------------------------ --

**[ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS]{.underline}**

  ---------- ------------------------------------------------------------
  AC         Alternating Current

  ACGIH      American Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists

  AFGE       American Federation of Government Employees

  AFMAN      Air Force Manual

  AFMC       Air Force Material Command

  AHJ        Authority Having Jurisdiction

  ANSI       American National Standards Institute

  AP         Ammonium Perchlorate

  APS        Aft Propulsion System

  APU        Auxiliary Power Unit

  ARCS       Aft Reaction Control System

  ARF        Assembly and Refurbishment Facility

  ASME       American Society of Mechanical Engineers

             

  BDA        Blast Danger Area

  BEU        Breathing Escape Unit

  BSM        Booster Separation Motor

             

  c/o        Check-Out

  Cat.       Category

  CAP        Corrective Action Plan

  CCAFS      Cape Canaveral Air Force Station

  CCB        Change Control Board

  CCF        Converter Compressor Facility

  CD         Center Director

  CDE        Center Declared Emergency

  CDDT       Countdown Demonstration Test

  CDF        Confined Detonating Fuse

  CFR        Code of Federal Regulations

  CIL        Critical Items List

  COPV       Composite Overwrapped Pressure Vessel

  CPS        Chemical Protection Suit

  CT         Crawler Transporter

             

  DBP        Design Burst Pressure

  DC         Direct Current

  DCR        Document Change Recommendation

  DMES       Dimethylethoxsilane

  DO         Duty Officer

  DOD        Department of Defense

  DOT        Department of Transportation

  DRA        Document Release Authorization

             

  ECS        Environmental Control System

  EDO        Extended Duration Orbiter

  EED        Electroexplosive Device

  ELSA       Emergency Life Support Apparatus

  ELV        Expendable Launch Vehicle

  EM         Electro-Mechanical

  EMU        Extravehicular Mobility Unit

  EOM        End of Mission

  EPD        Emergency Procedures Document

  ERP        Emergency Response Plan

  ESP        Engine Service Platform

  ET         External Tank

  ETA        Explosive Transfer Assembly

  ETE        Explosives Test Equipment

  ETVAS      External Tank Vent Arm System

  EWR        Eastern Western Range

             

  FDS        Fluid Distribution System

  FIV        Fuel Isolation Valve

  FJAF       Field Joint Assembly Fixture

  FM         Factory Mutual

  FM         Frequency Modulation

  FMEA       Failure Modes and Effects Analysis

  FOS        Factor of Safety

  FRCS       Forward Reactant Control System

  FRF        Flight Readiness Firing

  FRSI       Felt Reusable Surface Insulation

  FSM        Fuel Supply Module

  FSS        Fixed Service Structure

  FTA        Fault Tree Analysis

             

  GHe        Gaseous Helium

  GH~2~      Gaseous Hydrogen

  GO~2~      Gaseous Oxygen

  GOAL       Ground Operations Aerospace Language

  GOX        Gaseous Oxygen

  Gr/Ep      Graphite Epoxy

  GSE        Ground Support Equipment

  GUCP       Ground Umbilical Carrier Plate

             

  H~2~       Hydrogen

  HB         High Bay

  HDP        Hold Down Post

  HGDS       Hazardous Gas Detection System

  HMF        Hypergol Maintenance Facility

  HP         High Pressure

  HPU        Hydraulic Power Unit

  HPWF       High Pressure Wash Facility

  HVDS       Hypergol Vapor Detection System

  HVES       Hypergolic Vent Exhaust System

             

  IA         Independent Assessment

  ID         Identification

  IRIS       Incident Reporting and Investigation System

  ISI        Inservice Inspection

  ISS        International Space Station

  IT         Intertank

             

  JSC        Johnson Space Center (NASA, Houston, Texas)

  JBOSC      Joint Base Operations Support Contract

             

  KCA        Kennedy Customer Agreement

  KHB        KSC Handbook

  KMI        KSC Management Instruction

  KNPG       Kennedy NASA Procedure and Guideline

  KPD        KSC Program Directive

  KSC        Kennedy Space Center (NASA, KSC, Florida)

  kV         Kilovolt

  kW         Kilowatt

             

  lb/in^2^   Pound per square inch

  LC         Launch Complex

  LD         Launch Director

  LDA        Launch Danger Area

  LDEM       Lifting Devices and Equipment Manager

  LEL        Lower Explosive Limit

  LH         Left Hand

  LH~2~      Liquid Hydrogen

  LLIS       Lessons Learned Information System

  LOMS       Left OMS

  LO~2~      Liquid Oxygen

  OX         Liquid Oxygen

  LP         Liquefied Propane

  LSC        Linear Shape Charge

             

  M&P        Materials and Processes

  MAWP       Maximum Allowable Working Pressure

  MDD        Mate/Demate Device

  MDOP       Maximum Design Operating Pressure

  MEC        Master Events Controller

  MEOP       Maximum Expected Operating Pressure

  MIB        Mishap Investigation Board

  MIL        Military

  MLG        Main Landing Gear

  MLP        Mobile Launch Platform

  MMH        Monomethylhydrazine

  MOP        Maximum Operating Pressure

  MOU        Memorandum of Understanding

  MPa        MegaPascal

  MR         Material Review

  MRB        Material Review Board

  MSD        Musculoskeletal Disorder

  MTB        Materials Testing Branch

  mV         Millivolt

  MVAK       Module Vertical Access Kit

  MWT        Maximum Work Time

             

  N~2~H~4~   Hydrazine

  N~2~O~4~   Nitrogen Tetroxide

  N/A        Not Applicable

  NASA       National Aeronautics and Space Administration

  NCC        NASA Convoy Commander

  NDE        Nondestructive Evaluation

  NDI        Nondestructive Inspection

  NEC        National Electrical Code

  NEPO       NASA Emergency Preparedness Officer

  NFC        National Fire Code

  NFPA       National Fire Protection Association

  NIOSH      National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health

  NPD        NASA Policy Directive

  NPG        NASA Procedures and Guidelines

  NS         Nonstock

  NSI        NASA Standard Initiator

  NSS        NASA Safety Standard

  NSTS       National Space Transportation System

  NTD        NASA Test Director

             

  O~2~       Oxygen

  O&C        Operations and Checkout

  O&M        Operations and Maintenance

  O&SHA      Operating and Support Hazard Analysis

  OAA        Orbiter Access Arm

  ODS        Orbiter Docking System

  ODMS       Oxygen Deficiency Monitoring System

  OHF        Occupational Health Facility

  OIC        Orbiter Integration Clerk

  OIS        Operational Intercommunications System

  OMBUU      Orbiter Midbody Umbilical Unit

  OMD        Operations and Maintenance Documentation

  OME        Orbiter Main Engine

  OMI        Operations and Maintenance Instructions

  OMRSD      Operational Maintenance Requirements and Specifications
             Document

  OMS        Orbiter Maneuvering Subsystem

  OPF        Orbiter Processing Facility

  OPR        Office of Primary Responsibility

  OSF        Ordnance Storage Facility

  OSH        Occupational Safety and Health

  OSHA       Occupational Safety and Health Administration

  OTC        Orbiter Test Conductor

  OTV        Operational Television

             

  PA         Public Affairs

  PAWS       Paging and Area Warning System

  PCR        Payload Changeout Room

  PDE        Program Declared Emergency

  PEL        Permissible Exposure Level

  PGOC       Payloads Ground Operations Contract

  PHA        Preliminary Hazard Analysis

  PHE        Propellant Handlers Ensemble

  PIC        Pyro Initiator Controller

  PLB        Payload Bay

  PM         Preventive Maintenance

  PNL        Panel

  ppm        Parts per million

  PRA        Probabilistic Risk Assessment

  PRSD       Power Reactant Supply and Distribution

  psid       Pounds Per Square Inch Differential

  psig       Pounds Per Square Inch Gage

  PSM        Pressure Systems Manager

  PTCR       Pad Terminal Connection Room

  PV         Pressure Vessel

  PV/S       Pressure Vessel/Systems

  PVT        Pressure Volume Temperature

             

  QD         Quick Disconnect

             

  R&M        Reliability and Maintainability

  RBDA       Reliability Block Diagram Analysis

  RCM        Reliability Centered Maintenance

  RCS        Reaction Control System

  RF         Radio Frequency

  RH         Relative Humidity

  RMS        Root-Mean-Square

  ROMS       Right OMS

  RPSF       Rotation, Processing, and Surge Facility

  RRB        Risk Review Board

  RSS        Rotating Service Structure

  RTG        Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generator

  RTLS       Return to Launch Site

             

  S&A        Safe and Arm

  S&MA       Safety and Mission Assurance

  S/N        Serial Number

  SAR        Supplied Air Respirator

  SCA        Shuttle Carrier Aircraft

  SCAPE      Self Contained Atmospheric Protective Ensemble

  SCBA       Self Contained Breathing Apparatus

  SCC        Safety Control Center

  SCFM       Standard Cubic Feet per Minute

  SCO        Space Craft Operator

  SFOC       Space Flight Operations Contract

  SFP        Single Failure Point

  SHA        System Hazard Analysis

  SH&IA      Safety, Health and Independent Assessment

  SLF        Shuttle Landing Facility

  SLOAA      Suspended Load Operation Analysis/Approval

  SPF        Spray Paint Facility

  SQ&MA      Safety, Quality, and Mission Assurance

  SRB        Solid Rocket Booster

  SRE        Safety and Reliability Engineering

  SRM        Solid Rocket Motor

  SRM&QA     Safety, Reliability, Maintainability, and Quality Assurance

  SRSS       Shuttle Range Safety System

  SSA        Software Safety Analysis

  SSHA       Subsystem Hazard Analysis

  SSME       Space Shuttle Main Engine

  SSP        Space Shuttle Program

  SSR        Safety Statistics Record

  SSV        Space Shuttle Vehicle

  STD        Standard

  STS        Space Transportation System

  SW         Switch

  SW         Space Wing

             

  TAL        Transatlantic Abort Landing

  TC         Test Conductor

  TCDT       Terminal Count-Down Test

  TD         Test Director

  TLV-TWA    Threshold Limit Value-Time Weighted Average

  TOP        Technical Operating Procedure

  TSM        Tail Service Mast

  TTL        Task Team Leader

  TVC        Toxic Vapor Check

             

  UHF        Ultra High Frequency

  UL         Underwriters Laboratories

  USAF       United States Air Force

  UT         Ultrasonic

  UTPA       Universal Throat Plug Assembly

  UT-THK     Ultrasonic Testing-Thickness

             

  VAB        Vehicle Assembly Building

  VAFB       Vandenberg Air Force Base

  VE         Visual External

  VHF        Very High Frequency

  VPF        Vertical Processing Facility
  ---------- ------------------------------------------------------------

**[GLOSSARY]{.underline}**

+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| *    | Unique Definitions for Discipline Specific Areas are          |
| *NOT | annotated:                                                    |
| E:** |                                                               |
|      | (COPV) -- Composite Overwrapped Pressure Vessel               |
|      |                                                               |
|      | (PV) -- Pressure Vessel                                       |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
|      |                                                               |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
|      |                                                               |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| **   | **[1% H2]{.underline}:** A measure of hydrogen by volume in   |
| 1.** | air.                                                          |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
|      |                                                               |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| **   | **[Alteration]{.underline}:** (PV) Change that affects the    |
| 2.** | pressure containing capability of a pressure vessel.          |
|      | Nonphysical changes such as an increase in the maximum        |
|      | allowable working or design pressure (internal or external)   |
|      | or design temperature of a pressure vessel shall be           |
|      | considered an alteration. A reduction in minimum temperature  |
|      | such that additional mechanical tests are required shall also |
|      | be considered an alteration. See ANSI/NB-23, Chapter 1,       |
|      | Glossary of Terms.                                            |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
|      |                                                               |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| **   | **[Applicable Codes, Standards, Guides]{.underline}:** Any    |
| 3.** | national consensus code, standard or guide, or any NASA KSC   |
|      | accepted design code, standard or guide for the design        |
|      | verification of pressure vessels, systems or their            |
|      | components.                                                   |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
|      |                                                               |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| **   | **[Authorized Personnel]{.underline}:** The maximum number of |
| 4.** | personnel permitted within a control area at any one time.    |
|      | Presence of all personnel is not mandatory. Mandatory         |
|      | personnel participation is normally controlled by call to     |
|      | stations and/or steps/sequences within the body of the        |
|      | procedure.                                                    |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
|      |                                                               |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| **   | **[Blast Danger Area (BDA)]{.underline}:** For the Space      |
| 5.** | Shuttle vehicle with a full load of propellants this area is  |
|      | within a 4485-foot radius centered on the space vehicle       |
|      | including the pad.                                            |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
|      |                                                               |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| **   | **[Breathing Escape Unit (BEU)]{.underline}:** Used only for  |
| 6.** | escape from a hazardous environment.                          |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
|      |                                                               |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| **   | **[Buddy System]{.underline}:** The buddy system requires two |
| 7.** | people be designated to be concerned with each other\'s       |
|      | safety in a hazardous situation. The system does not demand   |
|      | shoulder-to-shoulder contact, but rather visual contact and a |
|      | proximity that allows each buddy to help the other in an      |
|      | emergency.                                                    |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
|      |                                                               |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| **   | **[Cat. I SCAPE]{.underline}:** PHE with backpack. Operating  |
| 8.** | time from air on to air off is 120 minutes.                   |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
|      |                                                               |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| **   | **[Cat. IV SCAPE]{.underline}:** Same as Category I with      |
| 9.** | hose-line breathing in lieu of the backpack.                  |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
|      |                                                               |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| **1  | **[Cat. VI SCAPE]{.underline}:** 'Chemturion' CPS - "blue     |
| 0.** | suit" with hose-line breathing.                               |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
|      |                                                               |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| **1  | **[Caution]{.underline}:** A notation before an operational   |
| 1.** | step, etc., which, if not adhered to or observed, could       |
|      | result in damage to equipment.                                |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
|      |                                                               |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| **1  | **[Certification]{.underline}:** (PV) Documentation           |
| 2.** | qualifying a vessel or system to operate in its particular    |
|      | service.                                                      |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
|      |                                                               |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| **1  | **[Class A PPE]{.underline}:** Personal protective equipment  |
| 3.** | category that is the minimum PPE required for hypergolic      |
|      | operations that have a potential for liquid flow release and  |
|      | heavy vapor concentrations. Refer to Annex A, Table A-1.      |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
|      |                                                               |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| **1  | **[Class B PPE]{.underline}:** Personal protective equipment  |
| 4.** | category that is the minimum PPE required for hypergolic      |
|      | operations that have very low or no potential for liquid      |
|      | flow, and a low potential for liquid residuals, and a         |
|      | potential for vapor release. Refer to Annex A, Table A-1.     |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
|      |                                                               |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| **1  | **[Class C PPE]{.underline}:** Personal protective equipment  |
| 5.** | category that is the minimum PPE required for hypergolic      |
|      | operations that have no potential for liquid flow (hypergolic |
|      | fluids), and a low potential for limited vapor release, and   |
|      | an expectation that the Threshold Limit Valve/time Weighted   |
|      | Average (TLV-TWA) will or has been attained through the       |
|      | monitoring of the breathing zone, and there is a two-valve    |
|      | isolation (with independent controls) from liquid sources.    |
|      | Refer to Annex A, Table A-1.                                  |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
|      |                                                               |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| **1  | **[Cleared Area]{.underline}:** An area where a hazardous     |
| 6.** | condition exists or a hazardous operation is in progress;     |
|      | personnel are prohibited from entering.                       |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
|      |                                                               |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| **1  | **[Close Call]{.underline}:** An undesired and unexpected     |
| 7.** | event resulting in no personal injury or illness, or personal |
|      | injury or illness requiring only first aid, and/or minor      |
|      | damage (less than \$1000), but with potential for causing a   |
|      | mishap or negative mission impact.                            |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
|      |                                                               |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| **1  | **[Compatibility]{.underline}:** (COPV) The ability of two    |
| 8.** | materials or substances to come into contact without altering |
|      | their structure or causing a reaction in terms of             |
|      | permeability, flammability, ignition/combustion,              |
|      | functional/material degradation, contamination, toxicity,     |
|      | pressure/ temperature, shock, oxidation, and corrosion.       |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
|      |                                                               |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| **1  | **[Control Area]{.underline}:** A designated, limited-access  |
| 9.** | area where a hazardous condition exists or a hazardous        |
|      | operation is in progress; nonessential personnel are          |
|      | prohibited from entering.                                     |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
|      |                                                               |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| **2  | **[Control Point]{.underline}:** The area or place where the  |
| 0.** | task leader and any other support groups direct and monitor   |
|      | the operation.                                                |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
|      |                                                               |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| **2  | **[Controlled Switching]{.underline}:** No flight             |
| 1.** | vehicle/element or GSE commands issued, no switches or        |
|      | circuit breakers operated on the flight elements or GSE       |
|      | electrically connected to the flight elements, except those   |
|      | commands and switch/ circuit breaker operations directed by   |
|      | the TD (and sub-tasks) requiring controlled switching.        |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
|      |                                                               |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| **2  | **[Credible]{.underline}:** A condition that can occur and is |
| 2.** | reasonably likely to occur. Failures of structure, pressure   |
|      | vessels, and pressurized lines and fittings are not           |
|      | considered credible failure modes if those elements comply    |
|      | with the applicable requirements.                             |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
|      |                                                               |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| **2  | > **[Critical Position]{.underline}:** A critical position is |
| 3.** | > one in which the worker's job performance can directly      |
|      | > impact ground safety, flight safety or mission success.     |
|      | > This includes but is not limited to:                        |
|      |                                                               |
|      | a.  Workers dealing directly with flight hardware, software,  |
|      |     or ground support equipment, or                           |
|      |                                                               |
|      | b.  Employees having authority to make decisions on flight    |
|      |     hardware or software processing, or                       |
|      |                                                               |
|      | c.  Workers involved in launch or landing activities, or      |
|      |                                                               |
|      | d.  Personnel who work in ground systems that have a          |
|      |     functional or physical interface with flight systems, or  |
|      |                                                               |
|      | e.  Employees working with other systems that are hazardous   |
|      |     by nature.                                                |
|      |                                                               |
|      | In the types of positions delineated above, there is not more |
|      | than one level of check and balance regarding the employee's  |
|      | decisions or actions.                                         |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
|      |                                                               |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| **2  | **[Critical Lift]{.underline}:** A lift where loss of control |
| 4.** | could result in loss of life, loss or damage to flight        |
|      | hardware or a lift involving special, high dollar items, such |
|      | as spacecraft, one-of-a-kind articles or major facility       |
|      | components, etc., where loss would have serious programmatic  |
|      | impact.                                                       |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
|      |                                                               |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| **2  | **[De-Rating]{.underline}:** (PV) The lowering of the maximum |
| 5.** | allowable working pressure or narrowing of the allowable      |
|      | operating temperature range of a pressure vessel or system.   |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
|      |                                                               |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| **2  | **[Design Burst Pressure]{.underline}:** (PV) The theoretical |
| 6.** | pressure at which a vessel or other pressurized component     |
|      | would burst, based on calculations using accepted formulas    |
|      | and material properties. Vessels and systems to be placed in  |
|      | service are never subjected to a burst pressure test.         |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
|      |                                                               |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| **2  | **[Design Pressure]{.underline}:** (PV) The pressure used in  |
| 7.** | the design of a vessel or system for the purpose of           |
|      | determining minimum permissible thickness or physical         |
|      | characteristics of the different parts. When applicable (for  |
|      | liquids), static head shall be added to the design pressure   |
|      | to determine the thickness of any specific part of a vessel.  |
|      | (Reference Appendix 3, Paragraph 3-2, ASME Code, Section      |
|      | VIII, Division 1, and Paragraph 301.2, ASME B31.3).           |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
|      |                                                               |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| **2  | **[Design Temperature]{.underline}:** (PV) The metal          |
| 8.** | temperature used in the design of a vessel or system for      |
|      | determining the minimum required thickness of the components, |
|      | and for selecting the maximum allowable stress for the        |
|      | materials used in the vessel or system.                       |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
|      |                                                               |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| **2  | **[Deviation (1)]{.underline}:** A documented variance that   |
| 9.** | authorizes departure from a particular S&MA requirement,      |
|      | where the intent of the requirement is being met through      |
|      | alternate means that provide an equivalent level of safety    |
|      | with no additional risk.                                      |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
|      |                                                               |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| **3  | **[Deviation (2)]{.underline}:** Documented and approved      |
| 0.** | permission that authorizes the addition, deletion, or         |
|      | modification of steps or sequences in a Category I or         |
|      | Category II TOP. KSC Form 4-30A is used for this purpose.     |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
|      |                                                               |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| **3  | **[Electroexplosive Device (EED)]{.underline}:** EED          |
| 1.** | Categories -- EEDs are categorized based on the effects of    |
|      | inadvertent initiation. EED categories are as follows:        |
|      |                                                               |
|      | a.  Category A: EEDs which, by the expenditure of their own   |
|      |     energy, or because they initiate a chain of events, may   |
|      |     cause injury of death to people or damage to property.    |
|      |                                                               |
|      | b.  Category B: EEDs, which, in themselves, or by initiating  |
|      |     a chain of events, will not injure people or damage       |
|      |     property.                                                 |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
|      |                                                               |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| **3  | **[Emergency Instructions]{.underline}:** Written             |
| 2.** | instructions, contained within a TOP that provide for safing  |
|      | hardware and for implementing emergency actions required to   |
|      | evacuate or safeguard personnel, and prevent or limit the     |
|      | extent of damage should an emergency arise.                   |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
|      |                                                               |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| **3  | **[Emergency Life Support Apparatus (ELSA)]{.underline}:**    |
| 3.** | Used only for escape from a hazardous environment.            |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
|      |                                                               |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| **3  | **[Emergency Procedures Document (EPD)]{.underline}:** A      |
| 4.** | document produced for work areas to provide the processing    |
|      | teams with procedures to be followed if an emergency occurs   |
|      | at any time in that facility.                                 |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
|      |                                                               |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| **3  | **[End Item]{.underline}:** A final combination of end        |
| 5.** | products, components, parts or materials that is ready for    |
|      | its intended use.                                             |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
|      |                                                               |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| **3  | **[Essential Personnel]{.underline}:** The number of          |
| 6.** | personnel required within the control area to perform a       |
|      | particular operation.                                         |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
|      |                                                               |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| **3  | **[Explosive Test Equipment]{.underline}:** Electrical        |
| 7.** | circuit test equipment used for testing explosives items,     |
|      | pyrotechnic devices, or circuits connected to those items     |
|      | before or after installation.                                 |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
|      |                                                               |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| **3  | **[Explosives]{.underline}:** Any chemical compound or        |
| 8.** | mechanical mixture that, when subjected to heat, impact,      |
|      | friction, detonation, or other suitable initiation, undergoes |
|      | a very rapid chemical change with the evolution of large      |
|      | volumes of highly heated gases that exert pressures in the    |
|      | surrounding medium. The term applies to materials that either |
|      | detonate or deflagrate.                                       |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
|      |                                                               |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| **3  | **[Factor of Safety (FOS)]{.underline}:** (COPV) Ratio of     |
| 9.** | design burst pressure to maximum ground processing pressure.  |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
|      |                                                               |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| **4  | **[First Aid]{.underline}:** First aid involves initial       |
| 0.** | treatment and subsequent observation of work-related minor    |
|      | scratches, cuts, burns, splinters, etc., which do not: (1)    |
|      | Ordinarily require professional medical care even though the  |
|      | treatment may be provided by a physician or registered        |
|      | professional personnel; and (2) Involve loss of               |
|      | consciousness, a lost workday, restriction of work or motion, |
|      | transfer to another job; or (3) Result in payments by the     |
|      | Office of Workers Compensation Program. The following         |
|      | procedures are considered first-aid treatment.                |
|      |                                                               |
|      | a.  Application of antiseptics during first visit to medical  |
|      |     personnel.                                                |
|      |                                                               |
|      | b.  Treatment of first-degree burn(s).                        |
|      |                                                               |
|      | c.  Application of bandage(s) during any visit to medical     |
|      |     personnel.                                                |
|      |                                                               |
|      | d.  Use of elastic bandage(s) during first visit to medical   |
|      |     personnel.                                                |
|      |                                                               |
|      | e.  Removal of foreign bodies not embedded in eye if only     |
|      |     irrigation is required.                                   |
|      |                                                               |
|      | f.  Removal of foreign bodies from wound if procedure is not  |
|      |     complicated and is, for example, by tweezers or other     |
|      |     simple technique.                                         |
|      |                                                               |
|      | g.  Use of nonprescription medications and administration of  |
|      |     single dose of prescription medication on first visit for |
|      |     minor injury or discomfort.                               |
|      |                                                               |
|      | h.  Soaking therapy on initial visit to medical personnel or  |
|      |     removal of bandages by soaking.                           |
|      |                                                               |
|      | i.  Application of hot or cold compress(es) during first      |
|      |     visit to medical personnel.                               |
|      |                                                               |
|      | j.  Application of ointments to abrasions to prevent drying   |
|      |     or cracking.                                              |
|      |                                                               |
|      | k.  Use of whirlpool bath therapy during first visit to       |
|      |     medical personnel.                                        |
|      |                                                               |
|      | l.  Negative X-ray diagnosis.                                 |
|      |                                                               |
|      | m.  Observation of injury/illness during visit to medical     |
|      |     personnel.                                                |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
|      |                                                               |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| **4  | **[Flexhose]{.underline}:** There are two basic types of      |
| 1.** | flexhoses -- those constructed entirely of metal, herein      |
|      | described by the term "metal hose", and those constructed of  |
|      | elastomeric material or a combination of elastomeric material |
|      | and metal, herein described by the term "nonmetallic hose".   |
|      |                                                               |
|      | a.  Metal Hose: A metal hose consisting of a flexible metal   |
|      |     pressure carrier tube surrounded by an outer layer of     |
|      |     wire braid (some low pressure metal hoses do not utilize  |
|      |     an outer layer of wire braid). The flexible metal         |
|      |     pressure carrier tube and the wire braid are attached to  |
|      |     the hose end fittings by welding, silver-soldering, or    |
|      |     brazing (some metal hoses used for cryogenic applications |
|      |     utilize an inner and outer flexible metal tube with a     |
|      |     vacuum in the space between the inner and outer flexible  |
|      |     tubes).                                                   |
|      |                                                               |
|      | b.  Nonmetallic Hose: A nonmetallic hose consists of a        |
|      |     polytetrafluoroethylene or other flexible elastomeric     |
|      |     material pressure carrier tube reinforced by fabric or    |
|      |     wire braid with metal end fittings attached by mechanical |
|      |     means such as swaging or crimping.                        |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
|      |                                                               |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| **4  | **[Flight Hardware Processing Facilities]{.underline}:**      |
| 2.** | Buildings and areas, to include their respective perimeter    |
|      | fence, where flight hardware is processed.                    |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
|      |                                                               |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| **4  | **[Flight Termination System]{.underline}:** A radio          |
| 3.** | commanded airborne system whose purpose is to detonate        |
|      | explosives installed on the flight vehicle to end the         |
|      | vehicle's flight.                                             |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
|      |                                                               |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| **4  | **[Fracture Control]{.underline}:** Fracture control is a set |
| 4.** | of policies and procedures involving the application of       |
|      | analysis and design methodology, manufacturing technology,    |
|      | and operating procedures to prevent structural failure due to |
|      | the initiation of and/or propagation of flaws or crack-like   |
|      | defects during fabrication, testing, and service life.        |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
|      |                                                               |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| **4  | **[Fracture Mechanics]{.underline}:** An engineering concept  |
| 5.** | used to predict flaw growth and fracture behavior in          |
|      | materials and structures containing cracks or crack-like      |
|      | flaws.                                                        |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
|      |                                                               |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| **4  | **[Ground Support Equipment (GSE)]{.underline}:**             |
| 6.** | Ground-based equipment used to store, transport, handle,      |
|      | test, checkout, service, and control aircraft, launch         |
|      | vehicles, spacecraft, or payloads.                            |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
|      |                                                               |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| **4  | **[Hazardous Fluids]{.underline}:** (PV) Gases or liquids of  |
| 7.** | such a nature that a given quantity of the gas or liquid's    |
|      | vapor, when mixed or unmixed with air, is hazardous to        |
|      | personnel or equipment due to flammability, toxicity, or      |
|      | extremes of temperature. The following fluids are considered  |
|      | to be hazardous; additional fluids may be designated to be    |
|      | hazardous at the discretion of the KSC PSM.                   |
|      |                                                               |
|      | a.  Alcohol                                                   |
|      |                                                               |
|      | b.  Ammonia                                                   |
|      |                                                               |
|      | c.  Gaseous Hydrogen                                          |
|      |                                                               |
|      | d.  Liquefied Petroleum Gases (Propane, Butane, as defined in |
|      |     NFPA 58)                                                  |
|      |                                                               |
|      | e.  Liquid Air                                                |
|      |                                                               |
|      | f.  Liquid Hydrogen                                           |
|      |                                                               |
|      | g.  Liquid Nitrogen                                           |
|      |                                                               |
|      | h.  Liquid Oxygen                                             |
|      |                                                               |
|      | i.  Trichloroethylene                                         |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
|      |                                                               |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| **4  | **[Hazardous Material]{.underline}:** Any solid, liquid, or   |
| 8.** | gaseous material which meets the hazard reporting             |
|      | requirements of 29CFR 1910.1200. This includes commodities    |
|      | that, under foreseeable conditions, are toxic, carcinogenic,  |
|      | cryogenic, explosive, flammable, pyrophoric, water-reactive,  |
|      | corrosive, an oxidizer, a compressed gas, a combustible       |
|      | liquid, or are chemically unstable.                           |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
|      |                                                               |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| **4  | **[Hazardous Operation (Hazardous Tasks)]{.underline}:** Any  |
| 9.** | operation involving materials or equipment that has a high    |
|      | potential to result in loss of life, serious injury to        |
|      | personnel, or damage to systems, equipment or facilities.     |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
|      |                                                               |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
|      |                                                               |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| **5  | **[Hazardous Steps Affected/Added]{.underline}:** All changes |
| 0.** | and deviations which:                                         |
|      |                                                               |
|      | a.  Change or modify hazardous steps.                         |
|      |                                                               |
|      | b.  Initiate/add hazardous steps to existing                  |
|      |     hazardous/nonhazardous TOPs.                              |
|      |                                                               |
|      | c.  Intensify/extend hazardous steps to existing hazardous    |
|      |     TOPs (e.g., extend duration/time of hazardous operation,  |
|      |     extend hazardous control area, and add number of          |
|      |     personnel in control area).                               |
|      |                                                               |
|      | d.  Change the existing safety requirements.                  |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
|      |                                                               |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| **5  | **[Hazardproof]{.underline}:** Prevention of an explosive     |
| 1.** | atmosphere penetrating electrical fixtures where sparking or  |
|      | arcing could occur.                                           |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
|      |                                                               |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| **5  | **[Higher Level Requirements]{.underline}:** Requirements     |
| 2.** | contained in documents issued by authorities having           |
|      | jurisdiction over KSC operations.                             |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
|      |                                                               |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| **5  | **[Hydrostatic Test]{.underline}:** (PV) The test of a        |
| 3.** | pressure vessel or system during which the vessel or system   |
|      | is filled with a liquid (usually water) and pressurized to a  |
|      | designated level in a manner prescribed in the applicable     |
|      | code. (Reference Paragraph UG-99, ASME Code, Section VIII,    |
|      | Division 1 or Article T-3, ASME Code, Section VIII, Division  |
|      | 2.)                                                           |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
|      |                                                               |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| **5  | **[Impact Limit Line]{.underline}:** A line defining a limit  |
| 4.** | beyond which a missile/spacecraft or specified portions       |
|      | thereof will not be allowed to impact.                        |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
|      |                                                               |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| **5  | **[Inactive Vessels/Systems:]{.underline}** (PV) These are    |
| 5.** | vessels/ systems which are not in service because of changes  |
|      | in program requirements and have no current planned usage but |
|      | have not been determined to be unsafe.                        |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
|      |                                                               |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| **5  | **[Incident]{.underline}:** A mishap consisting of personal   |
| 6.** | injury requiring medical treatment greater than first aid but |
|      | without any lost time and/or property damage or mission       |
|      | failure resulting in loss equal to or greater than \$1000,    |
|      | but less than \$25,000. Permanent occupational hearing loss   |
|      | in excess of 25 decibels in either ear is classified as an    |
|      | incident.                                                     |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
|      |                                                               |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| **5  | **[Industrial Operation]{.underline}:** A task, usually       |
| 7.** | performed in one location, and consisting of one or more work |
|      | elements in which the person(s) performing the task has had   |
|      | training (certificate, license, etc.) to meet the technical   |
|      | requirements for processes, procedures, practices and methods |
|      | that have been adopted as standard (e.g., machinist,          |
|      | electrician, plumber, fork lift operator, chemical handler.)  |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
|      |                                                               |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| **5  | **[Inservice Inspection (ISI)]{.underline}:** (PV) A periodic |
| 8.** | inspection of a vessel or system while in service. If         |
|      | required, the vessel or system will be inoperative during the |
|      | inspection.                                                   |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
|      |                                                               |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| **5  | **[Inservice Inspection (ISI) Plan]{.underline}:** (PV) The   |
| 9.** | plan is a list of inspections and tests and the frequency to  |
|      | be performed on the PV/S.                                     |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
|      |                                                               |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| **6  | **[Integrated Procedure]{.underline}:** A procedure requiring |
| 0.** | the concurrence/approval of more than one contractor or KSC   |
|      | Primary Directorate Government organization, or other         |
|      | independent separate organizations involving test of          |
|      | interfacing systems, components, or elements.                 |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
|      |                                                               |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| **6  | **[Interim Change]{.underline}:** Change made to an existing  |
| 1.** | and approved TOP when there is insufficient time available to |
|      | prepare a formal change (e.g., change pages). OMI deviations  |
|      | are one form of an interim change.                            |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
|      |                                                               |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| **6  | **[Job Cards]{.underline}:** A Category I TOP designed for    |
| 2.** | computer release through work control.                        |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
|      |                                                               |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| **6  | **[Leak Before Burst (LBB)]{.underline}:** (COPV) A failure   |
| 3.** | mode such that any initial flaw in the Gr/Ep COPV liner will  |
|      | grow through the liner to cause leakage without burst of the  |
|      | overwrap.                                                     |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
|      |                                                               |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| **6  | **[Lethal Fluids]{.underline}:** (PV) Poisonous gases or      |
| 4.** | liquids of such a nature that a very small amount of the gas  |
|      | or liquid mixed, or unmixed with air, is dangerous to life    |
|      | when inhaled. See ASME Code, Section VIII, Division 1,        |
|      | Paragraphs UW-2 and UCI-2, Division 2, Paragraph AG 301.1,    |
|      | and ASME B31.1, Appendix M. The following specification-grade |
|      | fluids are to be considered lethal; additional fluids may be  |
|      | designated to be lethal at the discretion of the KSC PSM.     |
|      |                                                               |
|      | a.  Aerozene 50                                               |
|      |                                                               |
|      | b.  Hydrazine                                                 |
|      |                                                               |
|      | c.  Monomethyl Hydrazine                                      |
|      |                                                               |
|      | d.  Nitrogen Tetroxide                                        |
|      |                                                               |
|      | e.  Unsymmetrical Dimethyl Hydrazine                          |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
|      |                                                               |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| **6  | **[Lifting Devices and Equipment Manager                      |
| 5.** | (LDEM)]{.underline}:** The individual, designated by the KSC  |
|      | Center Director, who is responsible for the overall           |
|      | management of the KSC Lifting Devices and Equipment Program.  |
|      | The LDEM resides in the Shuttle Safety and Mission Assurance  |
|      | Division.                                                     |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
|      |                                                               |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| **6  | **[Local Control Area]{.underline}:** A controlled access     |
| 6.** | area (usually less than a 50-foot radius of the hazardous     |
|      | task) in which control is manageable on location by the       |
|      | operation and maintenance contractor and safety personnel     |
|      | using visual/voice contact to ensure personnel safety.        |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
|      |                                                               |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| **6  | **[Major Control Area]{.underline}:** A controlled access     |
| 7.** | area (usually greater than a 50-foot radius of the hazardous  |
|      | task) in which access management requires additional positive |
|      | controls to ensure the safety of personnel.                   |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
|      |                                                               |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| **6  | **[Maximum Allowable Stress Value]{.underline}:** (PV) The    |
| 8.** | maximum unit stress permissible for any specified material    |
|      | that may be used in the design formulas.                      |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
|      |                                                               |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| **6  | **[Maximum Allowable Working Pressure (MAWP)]{.underline}:**  |
| 9.** | (PV) The maximum gage pressure permissible at the top of a    |
|      | completed vessel in its operating position for a designated   |
|      | temperature. This pressure is based on calculations for every |
|      | element of the vessel using nominal thickness exclusive of    |
|      | allowances for corrosion and thickness required for loading   |
|      | other than pressure. It is the same as the design pressure    |
|      | for all cases where separate calculations are not made to     |
|      | determine MAWP. The MAWP is the basis for the pressure        |
|      | setting of the pressure relieving devices protecting the      |
|      | vessel.                                                       |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
|      |                                                               |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| **7  | **[Maximum Operating Pressure (MOP)]{.underline}:** (PV) The  |
| 0.** | highest pressure at which a vessel or system component        |
|      | normally operates. This pressure is based on operating        |
|      | requirements and may not exceed the MAWP or design pressure.  |
|      | MOP is synonymous with MEOP (Maximum Expected Operating       |
|      | Pressure) or maximum working pressure.                        |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
|      |                                                               |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| **7  | **[Maximum Work Time Deviation]{.underline}:** An authorized  |
| 1.** | exceedance of the MWT provisions that is documented and       |
|      | approved prior to the exceedance.                             |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
|      |                                                               |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| **7  | **[Maximum Work Time Violation]{.underline}:** Exceedance of  |
| 2.** | MWT limits without preapproval.                               |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
|      |                                                               |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| **7  | **[Medical Treatment]{.underline}:** The following procedures |
| 3.** | are considered medical treatment. Any NASA work-related       |
|      | injury/illness for which the following type of treatment was  |
|      | provided or should have been provided is considered to be a   |
|      | NASA mishap:                                                  |
|      |                                                               |
|      | a.  Treatment of infection.                                   |
|      |                                                               |
|      | b.  Application of antiseptics during second or subsequent    |
|      |     visits to medical personnel.                              |
|      |                                                               |
|      | c.  Treatment of second or third degree burn(s).              |
|      |                                                               |
|      | d.  Application of sutures (stitches).                        |
|      |                                                               |
|      | e.  Application of butterfly adhesive dressing(s) or sterile  |
|      |     strip(s) in lieu of sutures.                              |
|      |                                                               |
|      | f.  Removal of foreign bodies embedded in the eye.            |
|      |                                                               |
|      | g.  Removal of foreign bodies from wound if procedure is      |
|      |     complicated because of depth of impediment, size, or      |
|      |     location.                                                 |
|      |                                                               |
|      | h.  Use of prescription medications (except a single dose     |
|      |     administered on first visit for minor injury or           |
|      |     discomfort).                                              |
|      |                                                               |
|      | i.  Use of hot or cold soaking therapy during second or       |
|      |     subsequent visit to medical personnel.                    |
|      |                                                               |
|      | j.  Application of hot or cold compress(es) during second or  |
|      |     subsequent visit to medical personnel.                    |
|      |                                                               |
|      | k.  Cutting away dead skin (surgical debridement).            |
|      |                                                               |
|      | l.  Application of heat therapy during second or subsequent   |
|      |     visits to medical personnel.                              |
|      |                                                               |
|      | m.  Use of whirlpool bath therapy during second or subsequent |
|      |     visit to medical personnel.                               |
|      |                                                               |
|      | n.  Positive X-ray diagnosis (fractures, broken bones, etc.). |
|      |                                                               |
|      | o.  Admission to a hospital or equivalent medical facility    |
|      |     for treatment (not merely observation).                   |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
|      |                                                               |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| **7  | **[Mishap]{.underline}:** An undesired and unexpected event   |
| 4.** | that results in injury requiring more than first aid,         |
|      | occupational illness to personnel, and/or damage to property. |
|      | Mishaps also include injuries or occupational illnesses       |
|      | resulting from repetitive stresses or exposures over a        |
|      | prolonged period of time. For purposes of investigation and   |
|      | reporting, mishaps are categorized as follows: Type A         |
|      | Mishaps, Type B Mishaps, Type C Mishaps, and Incidents.       |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
|      |                                                               |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| **7  | **[National Consensus Standard]{.underline}:** (PV) Any       |
| 5.** | standard, or modification thereof: (1) adopted or promulgated |
|      | by a nationally recognized standards-producing organization   |
|      | using procedures that demonstrate to the Secretary of Labor   |
|      | for Occupational Safety and Health that those persons         |
|      | interested in or affected by the standard have reached        |
|      | substantial agreement on its adoption; (2) formulated so that |
|      | an opportunity existed for diverse views to be considered;    |
|      | and (3) designated by the Secretary or the Assistant          |
|      | Secretary, after consultation with other appropriate Federal  |
|      | agencies. (NOTE: A standard, as defined, requires appropriate |
|      | conditions or activities to provide a safe and healthful      |
|      | employment environment.)                                      |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
|      |                                                               |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| **7  | **[Non-Safety-Related Discrepancy]{.underline}:** (PV) Any    |
| 6.** | discrepancy that does not increase the potential for injury   |
|      | or death to personnel or damage to hardware. The following    |
|      | are considered non-safety-related discrepancies (others may   |
|      | be added at the discretion of the KSC PSM):                   |
|      |                                                               |
|      | a.  Panels/systems not properly identified.                   |
|      |                                                               |
|      | b.  Stainless steel piping or tubing not coated for corrosion |
|      |     protection.                                               |
|      |                                                               |
|      | c.  Missing or illegible identification tags on components    |
|      |     (except for relief devices, pressure gages, and flex      |
|      |     hoses).                                                   |
|      |                                                               |
|      | d.  Discrepancies between documentation and hardware.         |
|      |                                                               |
|      | e.  Minor corrosion of vessels, piping, components, or        |
|      |     supports.                                                 |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
|      |                                                               |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| **7  | **[Open Grain]{.underline}:** Exposed solid propellant.       |
| 7.** |                                                               |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
|      |                                                               |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| **7  | **[Operating or Working Temperature]{.underline}:** (PV) The  |
| 8.** | metal temperature that will be maintained in the part of the  |
|      | vessel or system under consideration during normal operation. |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
|      |                                                               |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| **7  | **[Operating Pressure]{.underline}:** (PV) The gage pressure  |
| 9.** | at which a vessel (top of the vessel) or system normally      |
|      | operates. For a vessel, it shall not exceed MAWP, and for a   |
|      | system, it may not exceed the design pressure, except for     |
|      | occasional variations in design pressure.                     |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
|      |                                                               |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| **8  | **[Operations Planning Sheets]{.underline}:** A form used for |
| 0.** | repetitive TOPs, which is released for documentation and      |
|      | control of a single performance of a TOP.                     |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
|      |                                                               |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| **8  | **[Phase 1 Lightning Watch]{.underline}:** Conditions in the  |
| 1.** | atmosphere, developing or observed, that is expected to       |
|      | produce, or is producing, lightning which will arrive at      |
|      | specified areas within 30 minutes.                            |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
|      |                                                               |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| **8  | **[Phase 2 Lightning Warning]{.underline}:** Lightning        |
| 2.** | observed or thunder heard within 5 nautical miles, or         |
|      | forecaster determines the threat of lightning is immediate.   |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
|      |                                                               |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| **8  | **[Photographic Equipment]{.underline}:** Cameras, still and  |
| 3.** | video, and electronic and/or enclosed flash assemblies.       |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
|      |                                                               |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| **8  | **[Physical Agent]{.underline}:** Any environmental factor,   |
| 4.** | such as noise, temperature extremes, vibrations, etc., which  |
|      | may cause harm or injury to personnel.                        |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
|      |                                                               |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| **8  | **[Placard Procedure]{.underline}:** A simple procedure       |
| 5.** | written or printed on a plaque attached to a facility or GSE  |
|      | end item that provides instructions for                       |
|      | activating/deactivating that item.                            |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
|      |                                                               |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| **8  | **[Pneumatic Test]{.underline}:** (PV) A test of a pressure   |
| 6.** | vessel or system in which a gas is introduced and pressurized |
|      | to a designated level in a manner prescribed in the           |
|      | applicable code. (Reference Paragraph UG-100, ASME Code,      |
|      | Section VIII, Division 1, or Article T-4, ASME Code, Section  |
|      | VIII, Division 2, and Paragraph 345.5, ASME B31.1.)           |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
|      |                                                               |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| **8  | **[Pressure Cycle]{.underline}:** (PV) The initiation and     |
| 7.** | establishment of new pressure levels followed by a return to  |
|      | the conditions that prevailed at the beginning of the cycle.  |
|      | Two types of pressure cycles are considered:                  |
|      |                                                               |
|      | a.  Full pressure (startup or shutdown) cycle: any pressure   |
|      |     cycle which has atmospheric pressure as one of its        |
|      |     extremes and normal operating conditions (not exceeding   |
|      |     vessel MAWP/design pressure) as its other extreme.        |
|      |                                                               |
|      | b.  Partial pressure (normal operating) cycle: any pressure   |
|      |     cycle within the full pressure cycle, which is required   |
|      |     for the vessel or system to perform its intended purpose. |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
|      |                                                               |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| **8  | **[Pressure System]{.underline}:** (PV) An assembly of        |
| 8.** | components under pressure, including vessels, piping, valves, |
|      | relief devices, pumps, expansion joints, gages, etc. This     |
|      | includes systems containing hazardous or lethal fluids at any |
|      | pressure above 0 MPa (gage) (0 lb/in^2^ (gage)) and systems   |
|      | containing nonhazardous or nonlethal fluids above 0.1 MPa     |
|      | (gage) (15 lb/in^2^ (gage)), unless otherwise specifically    |
|      | excluded.                                                     |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
|      |                                                               |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| **8  | **[Pressure Systems Manager (PSM)]{.underline}:** (PV) The    |
| 9.** | individual designated by the KSC Center Director who is       |
|      | responsible for the overall management of the KSC Pressure    |
|      | Vessel/Systems (PV/S) Certification Program. The KSC PSM      |
|      | resides in the Institutional Safety and Quality Branch of the |
|      | Spaceport Services Directorate.                               |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
|      |                                                               |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| **9  | **[Pressure Test]{.underline}:** See Hydrostatic Test and     |
| 0.** | Pneumatic Test.                                               |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
|      |                                                               |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| **9  | **[Pressure Vessel]{.underline}:** (PV) Any vessel used for   |
| 1.** | the storage or handling of gas or liquid under positive       |
|      | pressure. Included in this definition are components of       |
|      | systems (e.g., heat exchanger shells and drying towers, and   |
|      | other shell structures) for which the rules of the ASME Code, |
|      | Section VIII, would apply. Vessels containing hazardous or    |
|      | lethal fluids at any pressure above 0 MPa (gage) (0 lb/in^2^  |
|      | (gage)), and vessels containing nonhazardous or nonlethal     |
|      | fluids above 0.1 MPa (gage) (15 lb/in^2^ (gage)) are included |
|      | unless otherwise specifically excluded.                       |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
|      |                                                               |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| **9  | **[Pretask Briefing]{.underline}:** A briefing held           |
| 2.** | immediately prior to the start of (a) hazardous sequence(s),  |
|      | which details the hazard(s) and objective(s) associated with  |
|      | that particular sequence.                                     |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
|      |                                                               |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| **9  | **[Pretest Briefing]{.underline}:** A briefing held prior to  |
| 3.** | the start of a hazardous operation with a major control area, |
|      | which details the hazard(s) and objective(s) of the operation |
|      | and confirms that all operational and support elements are    |
|      | ready.                                                        |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
|      |                                                               |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| **9  | **[Processing Mishap/Close Call]{.underline}:** A mishap or   |
| 4.** | close call, which occurs during the act of ground processing  |
|      | of flight hardware.                                           |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
|      |                                                               |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| **9  | **[Program/Project or Directorate                             |
| 5.** | Organization]{.underline}:** The Government/contractor        |
|      | organization having direct responsibility for performing a    |
|      | task associated with: assembly/ disassembly; checkout,        |
|      | maintenance; servicing; repair; and operation of ground       |
|      | support equipment or flight hardware/systems.                 |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
|      |                                                               |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| **9  | **[Proof Tests to Establish Maximum Allowable Working         |
| 6.** | Pressure]{.underline}:** (PV) Pressure test which establishes |
|      | the maximum allowable working pressure of a vessel, system,   |
|      | or component thereof, may be used: (1) When the strength      |
|      | cannot be computed with a satisfactory assurance of accuracy; |
|      | (2) When the thickness cannot be determined by means of the   |
|      | design rules of the applicable code or standard; or (3) When  |
|      | the critical flaw size to cause failure at the certified      |
|      | pressure cannot be identified by other nondestructive test    |
|      | methods. This test is to be performed in a manner equivalent  |
|      | to one of the methods specified in Paragraph UG-101 of the    |
|      | ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section VIII, Division  |
|      | 1, latest edition. Proof tests may be performed only upon     |
|      | approval of the KSC PSM.                                      |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
|      |                                                               |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| **9  | **[PV/S Representative]{.underline}:** (PV) The individual(s) |
| 7.** | assigned to represent an organization in all matters relating |
|      | to PV/S and shall be identified to the PSM.                   |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
|      |                                                               |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| **9  | **[Radio Frequency (RF) Silence]{.underline}:** When all RF   |
| 8.** | transmitters/emitters on the SSV, payloads, associated flight |
|      | equipment, or GSE within the applicable facility, including   |
|      | LC-39 A/B, are in the power-off position.                     |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
|      |                                                               |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| **9  | **[Rated Load]{.underline}:** The static weight the basic     |
| 9.** | equipment can safely support or lift.                         |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
|      |                                                               |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| **10 | **[Real-Time Decision/Action]{.underline}:** A real-time      |
| 0.** | decision or action is one that affects personnel safety or    |
|      | NASA operational mission accomplishment by causing:           |
|      |                                                               |
|      | a.  The potential to deviate from a normal or standard        |
|      |     practice.                                                 |
|      |                                                               |
|      | b.  A minimum amount of time or no time to functionally       |
|      |     verify the adequacy of the real-time decision or action   |
|      |     and its effect to be performed.                           |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
|      |                                                               |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| **10 | **[Recall System]{.underline}:** (PV) A system which tracks   |
| 1.** | selected components subject to periodic calibration,          |
|      | inspection, or test. Components included in recall systems    |
|      | are relief valves, pressure gages, and flex hoses.            |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
|      |                                                               |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| **10 | **[Recertification]{.underline}:** (PV) The procedure         |
| 2.** | (appropriate tests, inspections, examinations, analyses, and  |
|      | documentation), which qualifies a previously certified vessel |
|      | or system to continue or be returned to operation at a        |
|      | designated pressure.                                          |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
|      |                                                               |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| **10 | **[Recertification Interval]{.underline}:** (PV) The time     |
| 3.** | between recertifications when a certified status is           |
|      | maintained through documented periodic examinations and       |
|      | inspections to determine acceptable vessel or system          |
|      | condition. This time period must me determined when the ISI   |
|      | plan is developed, and the length of this period will depend  |
|      | on the results of the initial and subsequent inspections,     |
|      | tests, and engineering analyses.                              |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
|      |                                                               |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| **10 | **[Reissue]{.underline}:** A revised edition of an existing   |
| 4.** | approved TOP that contains updated material, or has a         |
|      | different effectivity, to which the OMI or change applies.    |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
|      |                                                               |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| **10 | **[Repair]{.underline}:** (PV) The work necessary to restore  |
| 5.** | a pressure vessel or system to a safe and satisfactory        |
|      | operating condition, provided there is no deviation from the  |
|      | original design.                                              |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
|      |                                                               |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| **10 | **[Rerated Vessel or System]{.underline}:** (PV) (1) A vessel |
| 6.** | or system judged to be unsafe, unsuitable, or unnecessary for |
|      | continued operation at its original design pressure and/or    |
|      | temperature limits. (2) A vessel or system recertified to     |
|      | operate at a lesser or greater pressure and/or temperature    |
|      | limit relative to its original designs.                       |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
|      |                                                               |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| **10 | **[Revision]{.underline}:** A modification of information     |
| 7.** | contained in an approved existing TOP.                        |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
|      |                                                               |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| **10 | **[Safety Concurrence]{.underline}:** The consent required    |
| 8.** | from the safety organization, having operational              |
|      | jurisdiction, prior to start of procedures containing         |
|      | hazardous operations, prior to hazardous steps or sequences,  |
|      | prior to the alteration of hazardous steps/sequences, and     |
|      | prior to opening the control area for controlled work at the  |
|      | conclusion of hazardous activities.                           |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
|      |                                                               |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| **10 | **[Safety Coverage]{.underline}:** The presence of a Safety   |
| 9.** | professional, or designee, during operations as determined by |
|      | an assessment as follows:                                     |
|      |                                                               |
|      | a.  Full-time Coverage: The safety professional will be       |
|      |     onsite to provide a go-to-proceed with the operation,     |
|      |     monitor operations and controls to ensure compliance with |
|      |     safe performance and provide technical safety assistance  |
|      |     as needed during the entire operation.                    |
|      |                                                               |
|      | b.  Part-time Coverage: The safety professional shall be      |
|      |     onsite to provide a go-to-proceed with the operation,     |
|      |     periodically and at the end to reopen the area.           |
|      |                                                               |
|      | c.  Optional Coverage: The safety professional is not         |
|      |     required for onsite coverage.                             |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
|      |                                                               |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| **11 | **[Safety Critical]{.underline}:** Any condition, event,      |
| 0.** | operation, process, equipment, or system that could cause or  |
|      | lead to severe injury, major damage, or mission failure if    |
|      | performed or built improperly, or allowed to remain           |
|      | uncorrected.                                                  |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
|      |                                                               |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| **11 | **[Safety Factor]{.underline}:** The ratio of a load that     |
| 1.** | predicts a failure to a rated load.                           |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
|      |                                                               |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| **11 | **[Safety Professional]{.underline}:** Person meeting the     |
| 2.** | Office of Personnel Management standards for such occupations |
|      | defined in 29CFR 1960.2(s) (Definitions) for Government       |
|      | operations or equally qualified military, agency or           |
|      | nongovernment for contractor operations. NASA KSC Safety      |
|      | shall be responsible for determination of equally qualified   |
|      | personnel. Safety Specialists, Representatives, and           |
|      | Inspectors shall have competence to recognize Safety and/or   |
|      | health hazards in the workplace.                              |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
|      |                                                               |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| **11 | **[Safety-Related Hardware Discrepancy]{.underline}:** (PV)   |
| 3.** | Any hardware discrepancy that could increase the potential    |
|      | for injury or death to personnel or damage to hardware. The   |
|      | following are considered safety-related discrepancies:        |
|      |                                                               |
|      | a.  Primary relief device set above the certified MAWP or     |
|      |     design pressure.                                          |
|      |                                                               |
|      | b.  Relief device with insufficient flow capacity.            |
|      |                                                               |
|      | c.  Relief device past due for calibration.                   |
|      |                                                               |
|      | d.  Relief device with missing or illegible identification    |
|      |     tag.                                                      |
|      |                                                               |
|      | e.  Pressure gage out of calibration or past due.             |
|      |                                                               |
|      | f.  Obvious physical damage (e.g., crushed or kinked          |
|      |     flexhose, dented or nicked piping/tubing/vessels, or      |
|      |     heavy corrosion of vessels/piping).                       |
|      |                                                               |
|      | g.  Not labeling the vessel's MAWP/service fluid.             |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
|      |                                                               |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| **11 | **[Safety-Relief Device Set Pressure]{.underline}:** (PV) The |
| 4.** | pressure at which a pressure relief device is set to operate. |
|      | Set to operate means the set pressure of a relief valve or    |
|      | spring-loaded nonreclosing device, the bursting pressure of a |
|      | rupture disk device or the breaking pressure of a breaking    |
|      | pin device. (Reference Paragraphs UG-125 and UG-134, ASME     |
|      | Code, Section VIII, Division 1, and Part AR, ASME Code,       |
|      | Section VIII, Division 2.)                                    |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
|      |                                                               |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| **11 | **[Safety or Safety Representative]{.underline}:** The term   |
| 5.** | Safety is used without context to contractor or NASA          |
|      | personnel. When the phrase "NASA Safety" is used, it shall be |
|      | construed to mean a Government Safety representative only.    |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
|      |                                                               |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| **11 | **[Shall]{.underline}:** A mandatory S&MA requirement.        |
| 6.** | Noncompliance with a "shall" statement requires approval of a |
|      | variance.                                                     |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
|      |                                                               |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| **11 | **[Should]{.underline}:** An S&MA rule/requirement that is    |
| 7.** | recommendation (guidance). The advisability of a "should"     |
|      | statement depends on the specific facts in a given situation. |
|      | Implementation of a "should" statement is at the discretion   |
|      | of the responsible KSC program/project or directorate         |
|      | organization.                                                 |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
|      |                                                               |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| **11 | **[Software]{.underline}:** Computer programs developed to    |
| 8.** | operate, control, service, or check out flight (including     |
|      | payload systems/subsystems) and/or ground support systems/    |
|      | equipment hardware.                                           |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
|      |                                                               |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| **11 | **[Splash (KSC Vapor Suit)]{.underline}:** Two-piece garment  |
| 9.** | consisting of a hooded pullover blouse and trousers with      |
|      | boots and lightweight, long gauntlet gloves.                  |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
|      |                                                               |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| **12 | **[Sub-task TOP]{.underline}:** A procedure used to perform   |
| 0.** | work when called up by another TOP (usually an integrated     |
|      | TOP).                                                         |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
|      |                                                               |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| **12 | **[Sub-task-only TOP]{.underline}:** A procedure preplanned   |
| 1.** | to be performed only as a subtask to a controlling procedure  |
|      | and may contain limited Safety controls.                      |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
|      |                                                               |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| **12 | **[System Certification Pressure]{.underline}:** (PV) The     |
| 2.** | maximum pressure that has been applied to a system; however,  |
|      | no system element can have its MAWP exceeded when the         |
|      | certification pressure has been applied.                      |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
|      |                                                               |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| **12 | **[System Safety]{.underline}:** Application of engineering   |
| 3.** | and management principles, criteria, and techniques to        |
|      | optimize risks within the constraints of operational          |
|      | effectiveness, time, and cost throughout all phases of the    |
|      | system life cycle.                                            |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
|      |                                                               |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| **12 | **[Task Leader]{.underline}:** A person who has been trained  |
| 4.** | and certified/stand boarded by his organization for a         |
|      | particular task.                                              |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
|      |                                                               |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| **12 | **[Technical Operating Procedure (TOP)]{.underline}:** A      |
| 5.** | written communication that identifies and directs work to be  |
|      | performed and provides the detailed instructions necessary to |
|      | accomplish a task.                                            |
|      |                                                               |
|      | a.  Category I TOP: Provides detailed procedures for the      |
|      |     operation, maintenance, and verification of ground        |
|      |     support systems and equipment. Instructions for assembly  |
|      |     and disassembly, checkout, servicing, verification,       |
|      |     handling, and transportation of the space vehicle and     |
|      |     components including payload systems, subsystems, and     |
|      |     experiments during prelaunch, launch, and postlaunch      |
|      |     operations are also provided.                             |
|      |                                                               |
|      | b.  Category II TOP: Provides engineering instructions,       |
|      |     authorizes work, establishes work control methods, in     |
|      |     order to accommodate special tests or authorize temporary |
|      |     installations, removals, or replacements. Category II     |
|      |     procedures shall not be used to change or replace         |
|      |     Category I procedures.                                    |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
|      |                                                               |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| **12 | **[Threshold Limit Value-Time Weighted Average                |
| 6.** | (TLV-TWA)]{.underline}:** The time weighted average           |
|      | concentration for a normal 8 hour workday and a 40 hour       |
|      | workweek, to which workers may be repeatedly exposed, day     |
|      | after day, without adverse effect.                            |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
|      |                                                               |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| **12 | **[Trained Inspector]{.underline}:** (COPV) A person trained  |
| 7.** | specifically in the detection of visual damage of COPVs and   |
|      | familiarized with the NDE methods and results that could be   |
|      | used to aid in the interpretation of visual damage. JSC White |
|      | Sands Test Facility typically conducts this training.         |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
|      |                                                               |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| **12 | **[Type A Mishap]{.underline}:** A mishap causing death,      |
| 8.** | hospitalization (within a 30 day period from the mishap) of   |
|      | three or more persons for other than observation, damage to   |
|      | equipment or property and/or mission failure resulting in     |
|      | loss equal to greater than \$1 million. Mishaps resulting in  |
|      | damage to aircraft, space hardware, or GSE that meet these    |
|      | criteria are included, as are test failures in which the      |
|      | damage was unexpected or unplanned.                           |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
|      |                                                               |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| **12 | **[Type B Mishap]{.underline}:** A mishap resulting in        |
| 9.** | permanent disability to one or more persons, in-patient       |
|      | hospitalization of 2 or less personnel, damage to equipment   |
|      | or property and/or mission failure resulting in loss equal to |
|      | or greater than \$250,000, but less than \$1 million. Mishaps |
|      | resulting in damage to aircraft, space hardware, or GSE that  |
|      | meet these criteria are included, as are test failures in     |
|      | which the damage was unexpected or unplanned.                 |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
|      |                                                               |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| **13 | **[Type C Mishap]{.underline}:** A mishap resulting in damage |
| 0.** | to equipment or property, or mission failure resulting in     |
|      | loss equal to or greater than \$25,000, but less than         |
|      | \$250,000, and/or causing occupational injury or illness that |
|      | results in a case involving day(s) away from work. Mishaps    |
|      | resulting in damage to aircraft, space hardware, or GSE that  |
|      | meet these criteria are included, as are test failures in     |
|      | which the damage was unexpected or unplanned.                 |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
|      |                                                               |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| **13 | **[Unsafe Vessels or Systems:]{.underline}** (PV) These are   |
| 1.** | vessels or systems, which have been determined to be unsafe   |
|      | for service.                                                  |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
|      |                                                               |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| **13 | **[Vacuum System]{.underline}:** (PV) An assembly of          |
| 2.** | components under vacuum (internal pressure less than that of  |
|      | the surrounding atmosphere) including vessels, piping,        |
|      | valves, relief devices, pumps, expansion joints, and gages.   |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
|      |                                                               |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| **13 | **[Vacuum Vessel]{.underline}:** (PV) A vessel in which the   |
| 3.** | internal pressure has been reduced to a level less than that  |
|      | of the surrounding atmosphere.                                |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
|      |                                                               |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| **13 | **[Variance]{.underline}:** Documented and approved           |
| 4.** | permission to perform some act or operation contrary to       |
|      | established requirements. The two types of variances are      |
|      | Deviations and Waivers.                                       |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
|      |                                                               |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| **13 | **[Visible damage]{.underline}:** (COPV) Anomalies that are   |
| 5.** | visible to the naked eye under not less than 15-foot candles  |
|      | at a distance no greater than 24 inches and no less than a 30 |
|      | degree angle. Lighting up to 50-foot candles may be used for  |
|      | the detection or study of small anomalies.                    |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
|      |                                                               |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| **13 | **[Waiver]{.underline}:** A documented variance that          |
| 6.** | authorizes departure from a specific S&MA requirement, where  |
|      | an increased level of risk has been documented and accepted.  |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
|      |                                                               |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| **13 | **[Warning]{.underline}:** A notation which if not adhered to |
| 7.** | or observed could result in loss of life, personal injury, or |
|      | exposure.                                                     |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
|      |                                                               |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| **13 | **[Workday]{.underline}:** Any day a person reports to work,  |
| 8.** | regardless of the amount of time spent on the job. The        |
|      | workday begins when a person reports to work and ends when he |
|      | or she leaves.                                                |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
|      |                                                               |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+
| **13 | **[Workweek]{.underline}:** Any 7 day period beginning on     |
| 9.** | Sunday and ending on Saturday, or other 7 day period, as      |
|      | specified and documented by an organization for accounting    |
|      | purposes.                                                     |
+------+---------------------------------------------------------------+

68. 

**[Section 1: GENERAL REQUIREMENTS]{.underline}**

CHAPTER 1: GENERAL

**1.0 [INTRODUCTION]{.underline}**

> It is the goal of NASA and KSC to provide safe and reliable systems to
> avoid loss of life or injury to personnel and to avoid loss or damage
> to program hardware and KSC facilities. To achieve this goal, KSC
> shall strive to provide and maintain safe reliable Ground Support
> Equipment (GSE) and facility systems and to perform operations in a
> manner that minimizes risk.
>
> The Safety, Health and Independent Assessment (SH&IA) Directorate is
> the organization which ensures that all KSC Safety activities are
> planned, implemented, managed, and coordinated with all other KSC
> program/project and directorate organizations for an effective and
> integrated safety effort.

**1.1 [PURPOSE]{.underline}**

> The purpose of this handbook is to specify and establish safety
> policies and requirements essential during design, operation, and
> maintenance activities at KSC and other areas where KSC has
> jurisdiction.

**1.2 [APPLICABILITY AND SCOPE]{.underline}**

> The provisions of this handbook apply to all organizational elements
> at KSC, to their associated contractors and subcontractors, to service
> providers to the extent of their contracts, and to other Government
> agencies and their contractors operating at KSC. These provisions are
> also applicable at offsite facility areas where KSC has operational
> responsibility. In joint-use facilities (e.g., a facility used both by
> NASA and the Air Force), when there is a difference in safety
> requirements, the more stringent requirement shall apply.

**1.3 [AUTHORITY AND RESPONSIBILITY]{.underline}**

a.  Final authority and responsibility for implementing the NASA Safety
    Program at KSC rests with the Center Director. KSC program/project
    and directorate organizations have responsibilities for developing
    Safety, Reliability, Maintainability and Quality Assurance (SRM&QA)
    programs at the Center. The Center Director has delegated the
    responsibility for assessing and ensuring compliance with SRM&QA
    programs at the Center to the Associate Director of Safety and
    Mission Assurance (S&MA \[SH&IA\]). These responsibilities, and
    those assigned to other Center organizational elements, are set
    forth in detail in KSC Management Instruction (KMI) 1710.18, KSC
    Safety Assurance Policy.

b.  The interpretation of the requirements in this handbook is the
    responsibility of the appropriate program/project and directorate
    S&MA organizations. The Associate Director for S&MA (SH&IA) shall
    resolve conflicts arising from these interpretations.

**1.4 [COMPLIANCE WITH FEDERAL, CONSENSUS, AND NASA
STANDARDS]{.underline}**

a.  Federal Agencies are mandated to provide a safe workplace for their
    employees in accordance with the Occupational Safety and Health Act,
    1970, per Executive Order 12196, "Occupational Safety and Health
    Programs for Federal Employees," dated February 26, 1980, and with
    29 CFR 1960 "Basic Program Elements for Federal Employee
    Occupational Safety and Health Programs and Related Matters."

b.  Applicable Industry Standards shall be used to the extent practical
    to meet NASA and Occupational Safety and Health Administration
    (OSHA) design and operational needs.

c.  Unique NASA operations, materials, facilities, equipment,
    procedures, and practices have or may require the establishment of
    NASA safety standards. Compliance with NASA safety standards shall
    be used to the greatest extent practical to meet NASA's design and
    operational needs.

d.  A listing of mandatory and reference documents is provided in the
    table of contents of this handbook.

**1.5 [CHANGE RECOMMENDATIONS]{.underline}**

> Recommended changes to this Handbook shall be in accordance with the
> KSC Directives Process, KDP-KSC-P-1058. Changes shall be submitted on
> KSC Form 4-348, "Document Change Recommendation" (DCR), to the
> Associate Director of S&MA (SH&IA). The form shall identify the exact
> language of the proposed change and the rationale for the change. The
> initiator shall also coordinate the proposed change(s) through the
> affected organizations and obtain concurring signatures.

**1.6** **[SAFETY VARIANCE PROCESSING]{.underline}**

a\. Overview

> The primary objective of the safety variance approval policy is to
> define the roles and requirements of Center management and KSC
> program/project and directorate S&MA personnel in such a way that KSC
> will maintain control over: 1) Agency S&MA policy and requirements
> that it administers, and 2) Center S&MA policy and requirements that
> it sets. Whenever it is deemed necessary to vary from established
> safety requirements in order to accomplish a task, risk management
> techniques shall be used and documented so that informed decisions can
> be made regarding the approval or disapproval of the variance.

b\. Applicability

> The safety variance approval requirements documented herein implement
> the requirements of NASA Procedures and Guidelines (NPG) 8715.3, NASA
> Safety Manual, and apply whenever requirements of Center S&MA
> handbooks (e.g., KHB 1710.2, KHB 5310.1), higher-level Agency
> requirements (e.g., NASA Policy Directives \[NPDs\], NASA Procedures
> and Guidelines \[NPGs\], or NASA Safety Standards \[NSSs\]), or
> Federal regulations cannot be met.
>
> Proposed safety variances shall not be granted for convenience of
> operation or requesting organization political gain, but may be
> granted after an assessment of the risk associated with the proposed
> variance is made, so that an informed decision regarding its
> acceptability may be made.

c\. Definitions

> The following definitions apply to the safety variance approval
> policy:
>
> **[Variance]{.underline}:** Documented and approved permission to
> perform some act or operation contrary to established requirements.
> The two types of variances are Deviations or Waivers (see below).
>
> **[Deviation]{.underline}:** A documented variance that authorizes
> departure from a particular S&MA requirement where the intent of the
> requirement is being met through alternate means that provide an
> equivalent level of safety with no additional risk.
>
> **[Waiver]{.underline}:** A documented variance that authorizes
> departure from a specific S&MA requirement where an increased level of
> risk has been documented and accepted.

### d. Safety Variance Generation

# When a Center S&MA handbook or higher-level, Agency or Federal requirement cannot be met, the requesting organization (contractor or NASA) shall initiate a safety variance request. When the unmet requirement resides in both a Center S&MA document and a higher-level document, the safety variance will be generated against the requirement in the higher-level document. Safety variance generation involves: 1) Acquiring a KSC safety variance number, and 2) Utilizing KSC Form 6-38NS to document the variance data elements. Safety variance number assignments are made from the KSC Safety Variance and Noncompliance Database. Access to this database can be arranged through the KSC Institutional Safety and Quality Branch. Electronic copies of KSC Form 6-38NS may be requested from KSC Electronic Forms at http://kscforms/ or from the KSC Institutional Safety and Quality Branch at http://kscsafety.ksc.nasa.gov/isqpage.htm. Hardcopies may be obtained from the KSC Institutional Safety and Quality Branch.

e\. Safety Variance Risk Assessments

All safety variance requests shall be accompanied by documentation
(provided by the requesting organization), including an explanation of
why the requirement(s) cannot be met, a risk assessment, an assessment
of the additional risks associated with the safety variance condition,
the effective period of the safety variance, and comments from any
effected employees or their representatives.

> Safety variance risk assessments shall address the following
> questions:

1.  What is the specific requirement(s), which cannot be met (including
    document and section reference)?

2.  What is the rationale for not meeting the requirement(s), what other
    options were considered, and what was the rationale used to
    disposition/discard these options?

3.  Have any design features or procedural controls been eliminated or
    compromised which would affect the safe operation of the
    system/operation?

4.  What additional measures have been taken to ensure a safe operation
    in lieu of the requirement?

5.  How has the number of people exposed to the potential hazard been
    minimized?

6.  How has the amount of hardware exposed to the potential hazard been
    minimized?

7.  What controls are in place to minimize the risk to personnel,
    facilities, or flight hardware?

8.  What are the risks associated with failure to meet the
    requirement(s)?

9.  What is the likelihood of occurrence of a mishap with the identified
    controls in-place, and what are the consequences should the controls
    fail or a mishap occur?

# Safety variances to higher-level documents (e.g., Agency or Federal) may require additional, Government-provided risk assessments prior to submittal for final risk acceptance.

f\. Safety Variance Coordination/Approval Process

> The Safety Variance Coordination/Approval Process is documented in
> Table 1-1. Safety variances shall be approved prior to execution of
> operations. Coordination and approvals (i.e., final risk acceptance)
> for safety variances is based on the level of the requirement document
> being considered. Final risk acceptance shall be made by the
> appropriate NASA/KSC program/project or organizational Director(s),
> the KSC Center Director, or their preapproved (in writing) designee
> (not to be the S&MA organization). In the case of a safety variance
> affecting more than one NASA/KSC program/project or organization, all
> involved program/project or organizational Directors shall provide
> final risk acceptance (concurrence via signature).
>
> The appropriate program/project S&MA organization or directorate, in
> conjunction with the requesting organization, shall coordinate the
> review and final risk acceptance for all safety variances. This
> includes reviewing the accompanying risk assessment and providing a
> recommended disposition for the safety variance. When the review of
> the associated risk assessment results in a disapproval recommendation
> (i.e., nonconcurrence with the variance request), the reviewer shall
> provide detailed rationale for the disapproval recommendation.
>
> Proposed safety variances (and their associated risk assessments)
> involving Cranes/Lifting Devices; Explosives, Pyrotechnics, and
> Propellants; Pressure Vessels (fixed and mobile); and
> Lightning/Grounding shall be routed for review and recommendation to
> the appropriate safety program manager. Safety program managers at KSC
> include the KSC Lifting Devices and Equipment Manager (Shuttle Safety
> and Mission Assurance Division); the KSC Explosives Safety Manager
> (Institutional Safety and Quality Branch); the KSC Pressure Systems
> Manager (Institutional Safety and Quality Branch); and the KSC
> Lightning Safety Assessment Committee Chairman (Shuttle Safety and
> Mission Assurance Division). If these types of variances involve NASA
> employees from an operational or risk exposure perspective, the
> American Federation of Government Employees (AFGE) Union will be
> notified as part of the safety variance coordination and approval
> process.
>
> The approval duration for safety variances shall be based on the
> operational event and circumstances involved, not to exceed one year.
> At the end of this time period, the variance expires. In situations
> where it is desired to renew the variance for an additional time
> period, the safety variance must be reassessed to ensure an extension
> is warranted. Requests of this nature shall be accompanied by detailed
> rationale describing why the specific unmet requirement(s) should
> remain intact. Renewal of safety variances (i.e., extensions beyond
> the initial approved duration) shall have the concurrence of the
> Associate Director for S&MA (SH&IA).

g\. Real-Time Operational Considerations

> In the case of off-shift/real-time safety variances, it is the
> responsibility of the requesting organization (contractor or NASA) to
> obtain, as a minimum, a safety variance number, required risk
> assessments, review and final risk acceptance (may be verbal) from the
> appropriate NASA/KSC program/project or organizational Director. The
> requester shall complete the safety variance process outlined herein
> by the end of the their next full shift.
>
> During terminal launch countdown, safety variances may be approved on
> a recorded net. This approval will include a discussion of the risk
> assessment. Completion of the approved safety variance request (i.e.,
> Form 6-38NS) will follow within 24 hours or by the close of business
> on the next regular business day.

h\. Safety Variance Recordkeeping

> After safety variance processing has been completed (final risk
> disposition obtained), the appropriate NASA/KSC project/program or
> directorate S&MA organization shall ensure that all safety variance
> Form 6-38NS data (and accompanying risk assessment) is entered into
> the KSC Safety Variance and Noncompliance Database. Each NASA/KSC
> program/project or directorate organization shall maintain a file of
> approved safety variances. Copies of approved safety variances will be
> provided to the Associate Director for S&MA (SH&IA).

+---------+---------+---------+---------+---------+---------+---------+
| **DOC   | **INITI | *       | **KSC   | *       | **      | **FINAL |
| UMENT** | ATING** | *RISK** | S&MA    | *SHIA** | HQ/QS** | RISK**  |
|         |         |         | ROLE**  |         |         |         |
|         | **      | **ASSES |         | *       | *       | **ACCEP |
|         | ORGANIZ | SMENT** | **(RE   | *ROLE** | *ROLE** | TANCE** |
|         | ATION** |         | VIEW)** |         |         |         |
|         |         | **(AS   |         | **(RE   | **(RE   | **(APP  |
|         | **(GENE | SESS)** |         | VIEW)** | VIEW)** | ROVE)** |
|         | RATE)** |         |         |         |         |         |
+---------+---------+---------+---------+---------+---------+---------+
| Con     | Con     | Ini     | Surve   | P       | N/A     | Con     |
| tractor | tractor | tiating | illance | eriodic |         | tractor |
|         |         |         | of      | Audit   |         |         |
| (NOTE   |         | Organ   | Co      |         |         | Man     |
| 1)      |         | ization | mpleted | of      |         | agement |
|         |         |         |         | Surve   |         |         |
|         |         |         | Va      | illance |         |         |
|         |         |         | riances |         |         |         |
|         |         |         |         | Act     |         |         |
|         |         |         |         | ivities |         |         |
+---------+---------+---------+---------+---------+---------+---------+
| KHBs,   | Con     | Ini     | Review  | Review  | N/A     | N       |
| KNPGs   | tractor | tiating | and     | A       |         | ASA/KSC |
|         |         |         |         | pproved |         |         |
|         | or NASA | Organ   | Re      | Va      |         | P       |
|         |         | ization | commend | riances |         | rogram/ |
|         |         |         |         | Postop  |         | Project |
|         |         |         | A       | eration |         | or      |
|         |         |         | pproval |         |         | Organ   |
|         |         |         | or      | (IA     |         | ization |
|         |         |         |         | Fu      |         |         |
|         |         |         | Disa    | nction) |         | Dire    |
|         |         |         | pproval |         |         | ctor(s) |
|         |         |         |         | (NOTE   |         |         |
|         |         |         | (NOTE   | 5)      |         | (NOTES  |
|         |         |         | 4)      |         |         | 7 and   |
|         |         |         |         |         |         | 8)      |
+---------+---------+---------+---------+---------+---------+---------+
| NPDs,   | Con     | Ini     | Review  | Review  | Review  | KSC CD  |
| NPGs,   | tractor | tiating | and     | and     | A       |         |
| NSSs    |         | Organ   |         | Re      | pproved | (NOTE   |
|         | Or NASA | ization | Re      | commend | Va      | 8)      |
|         |         |         | commend |         | riances |         |
|         |         | (NOTE   |         | A       | Postop  |         |
|         |         | 3)      | A       | pproval | eration |         |
|         |         |         | pproval | or      |         |         |
|         |         |         | or      |         | (NOTE   |         |
|         |         |         |         | Disa    | 6)      |         |
|         |         |         | Disa    | pproval |         |         |
|         |         |         | pproval |         |         |         |
|         |         |         |         | (NOTE   |         |         |
|         |         |         | (NOTE   | 5)      |         |         |
|         |         |         | 4)      |         |         |         |
+---------+---------+---------+---------+---------+---------+---------+
| Federal | Con     | Ini     | Review  | Review  | Review  | Issuing |
|         | tractor | tiating | and     | and     | and     | Federal |
|         |         | Organ   | Re      | Re      |         | Agency  |
|         | or NASA | ization | commend | commend | Re      |         |
|         |         |         |         |         | commend | (NOTE   |
|         |         | (NOTE   | A       | A       |         | 9)      |
|         |         | 3)      | pproval | pproval | A       |         |
|         |         |         | or      | or      | pproval |         |
|         |         |         |         |         | or      |         |
|         |         |         | Disa    | Disa    |         |         |
|         |         |         | pproval | pproval | Disa    |         |
|         |         |         |         |         | pproval |         |
|         |         |         | (NOTE   | (NOTE   |         |         |
|         |         |         | 4)      | 5)      |         |         |
+---------+---------+---------+---------+---------+---------+---------+

**[NOTES]{.underline}:**

1.  When the unmet requirement resides both in a Center S&MA document
    and a higher-level document, the safety variance will be generated
    against the requirement in the higher-level document. For variances
    that list unmet requirements in multiple documents (e.g., Contractor
    and Center/Agency), final Government risk acceptance only applies to
    the Center/Agency requirements.

2.  When the review of the risk assessment accompanying the proposed
    safety variance results in a disapproval recommendation (i.e., a
    nonconcurrence with the variance request), the reviewer shall
    provide detailed rationale for the disapproval recommendation.

3.  May require additional, Government-provided risk assessments prior
    to submittal for final risk acceptance.

4.  Proposed Safety Variances (and their risk assessments) involving
    Cranes/Lifting Devices, Explosives, Pyrotechnics, and Propellants,
    Pressure Vessels (fixed or mobile), or Lightning/Grounding shall be
    routed for review and recommendation to the appropriate safety
    program manager. Safety program managers at KSC include the KSC
    Lifting Devices and Equipment Manager, and the KSC Explosives Safety
    Manager, the KSC Pressure Systems Manager, and the KSC Lightning
    Assessment Committee Chairman.

5.  Safety variances requesting approval for longer than one year in
    duration shall have the concurrence of the KSC Associate Director of
    S&MA.

6.  NPG 8715.3, Chapter 1.

7.  For safety variances affecting multiple programs, all involved
    program/project or organizational Directors shall provide final risk
    acceptance.

8.  The final risk acceptance may be delegated (in writing, on file) to
    designated individual(s).

9.  The Issuing Federal Agency has an approval role only. Risk
    acceptance resides with the initiating agent (i.e., the KSC CD).

**1.7 [Safety JURISDICTION]{.underline}**

a.  Safety personnel shall have the right to stop work, move/ evacuate
    occupants, or require additional safeguards should conditions
    warrant such action.

b.  Safety personnel shall have the right to enter any facility and to
    monitor any operation(s).

CHAPTER 2: WEATHER

**2.0 [GENERAL]{.underline}**

> a\. Real-time warnings shall be issued for the purpose of protecting
> personnel and property from the hazards associated with adverse
> weather.
>
> b\. Advisories shall be provided to personnel conducting hazardous
> operations with sufficient lead-time to secure the operation before
> the forecasted weather system arrives.
>
> c\. Detailed weather requirements are identified in Operations and
> Maintenance Instructions (OMI) S0018 "Adverse Environment and
> Lightning Monitoring at LC-39."

**2.1 [ADVERSE WEATHER NOTIFICATION]{.underline}**

> a\. The Shuttle Flight Operations Contractor (SFOC) shall notify the
> Joint Base Operations Support Contractor (JBOSC) and the Payload
> Ground Operations Contractor (PGOC) of adverse weather conditions
> affecting KSC operating areas.
>
> b\. The SFOC shall make an all-area page, preceded by a special tone,
> announcing the adverse weather affecting KSC operating areas and shall
> repeat this page every 30 minutes until the advisory is terminated.
>
> c\. Adverse weather shall be announced on all KSC radio nets by the
> respective Duty Officer (DO)/Monitor and repeated every 30 minutes
> until the advisory is terminated.
>
> d\. Termination of adverse conditions shall be announced in a similar
> manner.

**2.2 [ADVERSE WEATHER]{.underline}**

> a\. Lightning
>
> \(1\) Lightning activity detected at or near KSC shall be defined as a
> two-phase process:
>
> \(a\) Phase 1 lightning notification shall be the "Lightning
> Advisory."
>
> \(b\) Phase 2 lightning notification shall be the "Lightning Warning."
>
> \(2\) To avoid damage or injury from lightning strikes:
>
> \(a\) Personnel working outside a lightning protected area shall be
> notified of Phase 2.
>
> \(b\) Personnel working inside a facility shall not be exposed to
> wiring that may conduct electricity from a lightning strike.
>
> \(c\) All facility doors shall be closed when a Phase 2 notification
> is made.
>
> \(d\) Flight hardware shall be protected from lightning strikes.
>
> \(3\) The program/project or directorate organization shall establish
> lightning strike protection controls based upon a safety engineering
> assessment of the following criteria:
>
> \(a\) Personnel exposure outside a lightning protected facility or
> area.
>
> \(b\) Flight hardware exposure, area exposed.
>
> \(c\) Move of flight hardware, hazardous chemicals, and explosives
> outside a lightning protected facility or area.
>
> \(d\) Protection of personnel performing hazardous operations inside
> or outside a lightning protected facility or area.
>
> b\. Wind
>
> The program/project or directorate organization shall establish wind
> restrictions based upon a safety engineering assessment of the
> following criteria:
>
> \(1\) Personnel exposure.
>
> \(2\) Sail areas.
>
> \(3\) Mass.

(4) Wind speed.

CHAPTER 3: PERSONNEL

**3.0 [GENERAL]{.underline}**

> The number and functions of personnel required to perform a hazardous
> operation shall be defined in the applicable Technical Operating
> Procedure (TOP).

**3.1 [PERSONNEL CONTROLS]{.underline}**

> Personnel controls shall be implemented as follows:
>
> a\. Access shall be limited for hazardous areas and/or operations.
>
> b\. Safety control areas shall be clearly marked to indicate the
> control boundary. Personnel shall not enter a safety-controlled area
> unless authorized to do so by the controlling authority. Personnel
> shall not remove or alter posted safety signs or ropes. Only the
> organization installing the safety sign or rope shall be authorized to
> remove or alter it.
>
> c\. Personnel shall not enter an area that is posted with a radiation
> warning sign or barrier unless specifically authorized to do so by the
> radiographer responsible for the area.
>
> d\. All hazardous operations shall require the buddy system as defined
> in the Glossary.
>
> e\. Personnel working in or visiting processing areas and support
> testing facilities shall adhere to the following clothing
> requirements:
>
> \(1\) On structures and areas with grate flooring/ exposed cables,
> shoes shall cover the entire foot, be low- and wide-heeled, and have
> soles heavy enough to provide adequate protection.
>
> \(2\) In areas/facilities where hazardous liquids or fuels are
> handled/processed, canvas or cloth sneakers, porous shoes, "tank
> tops," mesh shirts and/or shorts shall be prohibited.
>
> f\. While hazardous operations are on-going or hazardous conditions
> are present, persons incapable, without the assistance and/or
> resistance of others, of ascending and/or descending ladders or stairs
> within both the direct and/or alternate evacuation routes from the
> hazardous facility shall not be permitted access requiring such ascent
> or descent. An individual may not be permitted access to work in any
> facility conducting hazardous operations if the individual is not
> capable of performing the essential functions of a position in
> question, either with or without reasonable accommodation, without
> endangering the health and safety of that individual or others.

**3.2 [PERSONNEL ACCESS TRAINING]{.underline}**

> Personnel requiring access to operations areas shall complete required
> area access training or be escorted by trained personnel. The
> operational area training course requirement listing is available from
> computers having connection to the internal KSC Intranet or from hard
> copies available from the NASA/KSC SH&IA Process Tools and Techniques
> Division (<http://kscsafety.ksc.nasa.gov/dratepage.htm>). Select
> "Safety, Health, and Independent Assessment" to view the access areas
> and the required training. The Protective Services Office shall not
> issue permanent access badges until certification of training has been
> completed. Supervisors shall ensure that employees are familiar with
> designated facilities where they work or routinely visit. KSC Form
> 13-195, "PM50, KSC Training and Certification Records System
> Attendance Roster," shall be completed by both trainer and trainee and
> then forwarded to the appropriate authorized training organization for
> input to the "PM50, KSC Training and Certification Record System."

**3.3 [REFRESHER TRAINING]{.underline}**

> Employees working on an assigned basis in and around the areas for
> which access has been granted shall not be required to attend
> formalized classroom or videotaped area access safety training for
> maintaining currency. The supervisor shall ensure that emergency
> procedures are covered during periodic safety meetings.
>
> Employees not working on an assigned basis in and around the areas for
> which access has been granted shall comply with the 3-year refresher
> training requirements. However, Emergency Life Support Apparatus
> (ELSA) training is required each year.
>
> Supervisors shall update the employee record by completing and signing
> the KSC Form 13-195, "PM50, KSC Training and Certification Record
> System Attendance Roster". The appropriate course number and date
> shall be recorded on the roster and forwarded to the appropriate
> authorized training organization for input to the PM50.

**3.4 [MAXIMUM WORK TIME]{.underline}**

> a\. General
>
> The KSC Maximum Work Time (MWT) requirements are in place to ensure
> that people do not work excessive hours. Work for prolonged hours or
> for extended periods without adequate time off can contribute to
> fatigue, which can lead to an unsafe act or condition. Long work hours
> can negatively impact a person's life away from work, as well as
> compromise safety and mission success at KSC. Therefore it is
> necessary to mitigate the risks associated with excessive work by
> imposing work hour limits.
>
> Civil Service and Contractor supervisors are responsible for ensuring
> employee knowledge and enforcement of KSC MWT requirements.
> Supervisors are also encouraged to ensure that workers are educated on
> the causes and effects of fatigue. All on-duty periods for employees
> shall be recorded and counted towards their total work time hours. For
> situations involving unpaid duty time (e.g., NASA travel to required
> duty stations), supervisors are responsible for ensuring persons in
> critical positions receive adequate rest periods prior to performing
> critical tasks.
>
> NASA supervisors shall ensure that all work performed by individuals
> in their organizations beyond normal duty hours, is processed in
> accordance with KSC Handbook (KHB) 9620.4, "KSC Approval and Control
> of Overtime, Compensatory Time and Holiday Work Handbook." Contractor
> organizations shall abide by the applicable documents addressing such
> compensation issues for them.

b.  Applicability

> The KSC MWT limits apply to persons in critical and noncritical
> positions as described in Table 3-1. Visiting employees (i.e., NASA
> and contractor) from other NASA Centers shall adhere to their Center's
> MWT policies and requirements. Host KSC organizations shall
> familiarize other visitors (e.g., Launch Service Providers, Payload
> Customers, International Partners, Academia) with the KSC MWT
> requirements herein to the maximum extent possible. Visitors shall not
> work in excess of 16 consecutive hours. No MWT records are required
> for visitors.

+----------------------------+-------------------------------+--------+
| **To Whom MWT Applies**    | **1) When MWT Applies**       | *      |
|                            |                               | *Where |
|                            | **2) Which MWT Provisions     | MWT    |
|                            | Apply**                       | App    |
|                            |                               | lies** |
|                            | **3) Approval Reporting and   |        |
|                            | Recording Requirements for    |        |
|                            | Deviations and Violations**   |        |
+----------------------------+-------------------------------+--------+
| KSC Civil Service          | 1\) Always                    | Any    |
| Employees and KSC          |                               | duty   |
| Contractors **Working in   | 2\) All MWT provisions        | s      |
| Positions Designated as    |                               | tation |
| Critical**                 | 3\) Yes (per this document)   |        |
+----------------------------+-------------------------------+--------+
| KSC Civil Service          | 1\) Always                    | Any    |
| Employees and KSC          |                               | duty   |
| Contractors **Working in   | 2\) All MWT provisions (see   | s      |
| Noncritical Positions**    | Section 3.4d)                 | tation |
|                            |                               |        |
|                            | 3\) No                        |        |
+----------------------------+-------------------------------+--------+

**TABLE 3-1**

**MAXIMUM WORK TIME (MWT) APPLICABILITY TABLE**

a.  Critical Position Definition

> A critical position is one in which the worker's job performance can
> directly impact ground safety, flight safety or mission success. In
> the types of positions delineated herein, there is not more than one
> level of check and balance regarding the employee's decisions or
> actions. This includes but is not limited to:

(1) Workers dealing directly with flight hardware, software, or ground
    support equipment, or

(2) Employees having authority to make decisions on flight hardware or
    software processing, or

(3) Workers involved in launch or landing activities, or

(4) Personnel who work in ground systems that have a functional or
    physical interface with flight systems, or

(5) Employees working with other systems that are hazardous by nature.

> (NOTE: The phrase "not more than 1 level of check and balance" is
> clarified as follows for the types of positions delineated above. A
> technician performing and directly checking a task alone is considered
> to be a "0 level of check and balance". Examples of "1 level of check
> and balance" includes, but is not limited to: Technicians performing
> tasks that are directly checked by a quality control specialist;
> technicians performing tasks that are directly checked by an engineer;
> technicians performing tasks that are directly checked by a
> supervisor; and engineers performing tasks that are directly checked
> by a supervisor. \[For these instances, both the individual performing
> the task and the individual directly checking the task are incumbents
> of a critical position.\])

Examples of positions that can be designated as critical include, but
are not limited to: NASA Test Directors, Systems Engineers, and Quality
Assurance personnel. KSC Civil Service and KSC Contractor employees
whose duties require that they be in a critical position only
occasionally are considered to be in a critical position for the entire
fiscal year.

d.  Maximum Work Time Provisions

Supervisors are responsible for monitoring and maintaining accurate
records of employees work hours, and forecasting their work schedules to
assure MWT requirements conformance.

> Employees shall not work in excess of:

(1) 12 consecutive hours (16-hours in an emergency situation),

(2) 60 hours during a workweek (7-day period),

(3) 7 consecutive days without at least 1 full day off,

(4) 240 hours during a 4-week period, or

(5) 2500 hours during a rolling 12-month period.

> e\. Exceeding MWT Limits for Persons in Critical Positions
>
> It is the responsibility of the program/project or organizational
> Director to ensure that persons in critical positions adhere to the
> MWT provisions herein. It is recognized that there are situations when
> the MWT limits must be exceeded. However, when possible, these
> situations shall be preapproved in the form of a deviation.
>
> For persons in critical positions, the program/project or
> organizational directorate will document MWT deviations, including the
> date, rationale, required approvals, and mode (verbal or written) of
> approval. Verbal and electronic approvals are permitted if a written
> one is not possible. All such approvals shall be documented within
> 24-hours of the event or by close of business the next regular work
> day. Deviations shall be maintained by the approving organization, and
> shall be available for review. Program/project or directorate
> organizations shall report deviations from these MWT requirements to
> their organizational Director on an ongoing basis.
>
> Events that result in the maximum work time requirements being
> exceeded without preapproval are classified as MWT violations.
> Program/project or directorate organizations shall immediately report
> MWT violations by persons in critical positions to their
> organizational Director.
>
> MWT requirements for persons in critical positions are:

(1) Persons in critical positions shall not work in excess of 12
    consecutive hours, except when no other alternatives are available,
    and only with an approved deviation from the employee's immediate
    supervisor or higher. The deviation authorizes the employee to work
    up to an additional 4-hours, for a total of 16 consecutive hours.
    Only during a Centerwide Declared Emergency (CDE) or Program
    Declared Emergency (PDE) \[PDE and CDE are described in Section
    3.4f\] can 16-hours be exceeded. Under those circumstances, the
    immediate supervisor and organizational Director or designee must
    approve the deviation for additional hours before the employee is to
    work them.

(2) Under no circumstances shall employees be required to work so that
    they do not have a minimum of 8-hours off duty between shifts.

(3) Persons in critical positions shall not work in excess of 60 hours
    during a workweek (7-day period). Preapproval from the immediate
    supervisor (or higher) shall be required for deviating from this
    limit. For example, if an employee has an approved deviation to work
    more than 60 hours, the deviation is good only for the day on which
    60 hours within a 7-day period is exceeded. Another deviation will
    be required for each additional day that the employee needs to work
    during the 7-day period.

(4) Persons in critical positions shall not work in excess of 7
    consecutive days without at least 1 full day off. Preapproval from
    the immediate supervisor (or higher) shall be required for deviating
    from this limit. The supervisor can approve a deviation for 1
    additional day past 7; program/project or organizational Director
    approval of an additional deviation is required to extend the
    employee to work up to a total of 12 consecutive days. At the end of
    the extension period, the employee must be given a minimum of 2-days
    off. Under no circumstances shall employees be required to work more
    than 12 consecutive days.

(5) Persons in critical positions shall not work in excess of 240 hours
    during any 4 consecutive work weeks (e.g., Sunday through Saturday).
    A deviation from this limit requires preapproval from the immediate
    supervisor (or higher).

(6) Persons in critical positions shall not exceed 2,500 hours during a
    rolling 12-month period. Approval from the immediate supervisor,
    program/project or organizational Director or designee, and the
    Associate Director of S&MA (SH&IA) or a designee shall be required
    for deviations from this limit.

f\. Planning For Deviation Surges Among Critical Positions

> A process called a Program Declared Emergency (PDE) provides
> program/project or organizational Directors a planning tool to account
> for a large number of deviations in advance of an event or
> circumstance. A PDE may be issued by a program/project or
> organizational Director or a designee during a phase of their planning
> when they determine that the task ahead exceeds their available
> resources for addressing the task within the MWT requirements. The
> normal MWT approval and recording process is required for deviations
> during such a period. After declaring the PDE, the program/project or
> organizational Director must provide the rationale to the Associate
> Director of S&MA (SH&IA).
>
> MWT limits may also be exceeded when a Centerwide Declared Emergency
> (CDE) is issued. A CDE goes into effect by the authority of the Center
> Director or designee, in the event of an emergency or a threat to the
> Center (e.g., natural disaster or terrorism).
>
> g\. Record Keeping for Critical Positions

The approving program/project or organizational directorate shall
maintain work time data. Individual program/project or directorate
organizations may utilize MWT deviation/violation documentation
approached (e.g., forms, logs, summary lists) as deemed appropriate for
their organization. With the exception of the 2500-hour MWT limit, the
fiscal year (Oct. 1 -- Sept. 30) and the fiscal day, which changes at
midnight, shall be used for data evaluation and maintenance of records.
Approving organizations shall ensure that work time data is available
for review.

> Program/project or organizational Directors are responsible for
> assuring the development and maintenance of a list that identifies and
> documents critical jobs and individuals assigned to critical
> positions. Updates must be accomplished when changes occur. A copy of
> this listing shall be provided to the Safety, Health and Independent
> Assessment Directorate at the beginning of each fiscal year (no later
> than Oct. 15^th^).
>
> Program/project or organizational Directors are responsible for
> assuring records preparation, retention and periodic review of the
> monthly MWT deviations. Records are to be retained for a minimum
> 3-year period. Program/project or organizational Directors are
> responsible for preventing deviations from becoming the norm, and
> shall analyze MWT data for trends to prevent system abuse.
> Organizations shall implement corrective actions, which may result in
> actions such as schedule changes, staffing adjustments and employee
> counseling.
>
> Program/project or directorate organizations Directors shall submit a
> monthly maximum work time report no later than the 15^th^ day of the
> following month, to the Safety, Health and Independent Assessment
> Directorate. In addition to the preceding requirement, KSC Contractors
> shall also send work time data to their corresponding NASA contract
> oversight organization by the 15^th^ day of the following month. The
> reports from NASA and contractors shall include all work time
> deviations in each of the categories (e.g., 12-hours worked in one
> day), the number of maximum work time violations that have occurred in
> each category, and action(s) being taken to minimize the number of
> deviations. In the event that an employee has multiple deviations at
> the same time (e.g., in order for employee to perform the required
> work, he must exceed 12-hours for one day and that will result in more
> than 60-hours work in a 7-day period), then the employee requires two
> separate deviations to perform the work, and each deviation must be
> documented in the report.

CHAPTER 4: CONTROL AREAS

**4.0 [GENERAL]{.underline}**

> a\. A control area shall be established by the program/project or
> directorate organization for each hazardous operation.
>
> b\. Manloading shall be determined and implemented for each hazardous
> control area.

c.  Impact limit lines shall be as established by the 45^th^ Space Wing
    at Cape Canaveral Air Force Station (CCAFS).

d.  Tours of facilities or buildings are prohibited during hazardous
    operations.

e.  Control areas for radiation hazards are addressed in KHB 1860.1,
    "KSC Ionizing Radiation Protection Program," KHB 1860.2, "KSC
    Nonionizing Radiation Protection Program," and as specified in the
    user organization's Radiation Use Authorization.

**4.1 [FACILITY CONTROLS]{.underline}**

> a\. Controls shall be established for use of, and entry into,
> controlled access facilities by equipment utilizing internal
> combustion engines.
>
> b\. Access to building roofs, elevated structures, and motor vehicle
> roofs shall be limited to personnel performing authorized work or as
> designated for the performance of launch and landing requirements.
> Where building rooftops or elevated structures are designated for
> personnel traffic, controls and safeguards shall be established for
> personnel protection.

**4.2 [CONTROL AREA ANALYSIS]{.underline}**

A safety engineering assessment shall be performed by the
program/project or directorate organization to establish a control area
for a new operation or to change an existing control area. The
assessment shall identify the reason for the change, the impact if the
proposed change is not approved, and address, as a minimum, the areas
listed below. The format of the assessment is at the discretion of the
user organization, provided all areas are adequately addressed. The
assessment shall be disseminated to the appropriate organizations,
including affected contractors.

a.  Operation Description

Describe the task to be performed.

b.  Operation Location

State the location of the operation. Describe how the immediate
environment and atmospheric conditions affect the operation. Also state
the possible impacts on the location and surrounding environment in the
event of an accident during the operation.

c.  Hazard Potential

    Identify all credible hazards associated with this operation,
    including the worst case scenario.

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c.  Proximity of People

    Describe how the operation, or an accident during the operation,
    will affect personnel who were not involved in the operation and
    were outside of the control area.

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c.  Proximity of Other Hardware

    Describe how the operation, or an accident during the operation,
    will affect hardware that was not involved in the operation.

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c.  System Design

Describe elements of the system design that could have an impact on the
safety or accident potential of the operation.

**4.3 [MANLOADING LIMITATIONS]{.underline}**

> Hazardous manloading controls for KSC locations shall reduce the
> exposure to the minimum number of people, the smallest quantity of
> hazard, and the minimum period of time.
>
> A safety engineering assessment shall be performed by the
> program/project or directorate organization to establish new
> manloading requirements or to change existing manloading requirements.
> The assessment shall identify the reason for the change, the impact if
> the proposed change is not approved, and address, as a minimum, the
> areas listed below. The format of the assessment is at the discretion
> of the user organization, provided all areas are adequately addressed.
> The assessment shall be disseminated to the appropriate organizations,
> including affected contractors.

a.  Working Environment/Air Quality

> Adequate air quality exists to support the proposed manloading level
> based on area volume, delivered flow rate, and air exchange rates.

b.  Ergonomics

> Adequate workspace is available to safely perform work at the proposed
> manloading level.

c.  Area/Compartment Structural Capabilities

> Structural capabilities of the area/compartment are adequate to
> support the proposed manloading level.

d.  Rescue Capabilities

> Adequate rescue capability of the area/compartment for the proposed
> manloading level.

e.  Means of Egress/Egress Capabilities

> Adequate means of egress of the area/compartment for the proposed
> manloading level.
>
> Any changes shall include an additional safety engineering assessment
> as part of the rationale.

**[CHAPTER 5: OPERATIONAL SAFETY]{.underline}**

**5.0 [SAFETY MONITORING OF HAZARDOUS OPERATIONS]{.underline}**

> The program/project or directorate organization shall perform a safety
> engineering assessment for all hazardous operations to ensure
> compliance with established safety and health requirements and
> standards. The assessment shall identify, as a minimum, the areas
> listed below. The format of the assessment is at the discretion of the
> user organization, provided all areas are adequately addressed. The
> assessment shall be disseminated to the appropriate organizations,
> including affected contractors.
>
> a\. The appropriate control.
>
> b\. The acceptable level of safety coverage (full-time, part-time, or
> optional) during the operation based on the likelihood that, in the
> event of an emergency, the effect will:
>
> \(1\) Extend outside the specified control area.
>
> \(2\) Cause personnel injury/exposure.
>
> \(3\) Result in major equipment/facility damage.

**5.1 [TOOLS]{.underline}**

> All tools and equipment shall be tethered when in processing
> facilities above and around flight hardware or when in working
> environments where there is the potential for personnel injury or
> equipment damage. Tools used in flight hardware processing facilities
> shall be traceable to their storage location.

**5.2 [PRETASK AND PRETEST BRIEFINGS]{.underline}**

> Pretask and pretest briefings shall be performed as follows:
>
> a\. Pretask Briefings
>
> \(1\) A pretask briefing shall be performed prior to all hazardous
> sequences within a TOP when two or more personnel are involved.
>
> \(2\) If shift change occurs prior to the completion of the hazardous
> sequence, then the appropriate briefings shall be repeated for the
> relieving employees.
>
> \(3\) The following items shall be addressed in pretask briefings:
> specific hazards to which personnel will be exposed; safety protective
> equipment; emergency alarms; evacuation routes; emergency
> instructions; Emergency Procedures Documents (EPDs); and the specific
> revision of TOPs to be used.
>
> b\. Pretest Briefings
>
> A pretest briefing is required for integrated TOPs that require a
> major control area. The pretest briefing shall be held within 72 hours
> (96 hours in the event of a Centerwide 3-day weekend) prior to the
> start of the operational or control sequences of a TOP.

**5.3 [SAFETY INSPECTIONS AND WALKDOWNS]{.underline}**

> The program/project or directorate organization shall perform safety
> inspections and walkdowns and correct discrepancies for their assigned
> work area(s). All discrepancies, which have been documented in
> accordance with Annex B, shall be corrected prior to the start of the
> affected steps. Required inspections and walkdowns shall be conducted
> as follows:
>
> a\. Readiness Inspections
>
> A readiness inspection shall be accomplished and documented for
> areas/facilities/systems that have undergone construction or
> modification work which changes configuration or hazards involved in
> the process.
>
> b\. Preoperational Inspections
>
> A preoperational inspection shall be accomplished and documented
> within 24 hours prior to the start of all operations having a major
> control area.
>
> c\. Operations Inspections
>
> An operations inspection shall be accomplished and documented
> immediately prior to the start of any hazardous operation.

**5.4 [Heat-Producing Devices]{.underline}**

> a\. Nonflame, Heat-Producing Devices
>
> \(1\) A Welding and Burning Permit (KSC Form 2-13) shall be obtained
> from the applicable organization when heat-producing devices are used
> within 10 feet of flammable/combustible/ explosive materials.
>
> \(2\) When heat-producing devices are used in areas protected by a
> Halon extinguisher system, the system shall be placed in the manual
> mode prior to start of the operation.
>
> b\. Arc/Flame-Producing Devices
>
> A Welding and Burning Permit (KSC Form 2-13) shall be obtained from
> the applicable office if a flame-producing device is required to be
> used within:
>
> \(1\) Areas containing hazardous materials.
>
> \(2\) The perimeter of hazardous processing facilities.
>
> \(3\) A control area.

1.  Spark-Producing Devices and Smoking

> Spark-producing devices and smoking shall be prohibited within the
> following areas:

(1) Orbiter Processing Facility (OPF) perimeter fenced area;

(2) 100 feet of propellant storage containers;

(3) 25 feet of propellant transfer lines;

(4) 25 feet of explosives;

(5) 50 feet of Crawler Transporter (CT) operations;

(6) 100 feet of CT operations with stacked or partially stacked
    segments;

(7) 100 feet radius from centerline during all major flight hardware
    moves.

**5.5 [USE OF PHOTOGRAPHIC EQUIPMENT]{.underline}**

> a\. A safety engineering assessment shall be performed by the
> program/project or directorate organization prior to the use of all
> photographic equipment used within 10 feet of open grain, explosive
> materials, Category A Electro-Explosive Devices (EEDs) \[Faraday cap
> removed/firing circuit exposed\], open containers of
> flammable/combustible fluids, or when used in confined spaces where a
> hazardous atmosphere may be present. The assessment shall evaluate the
> potential for the equipment to produce an arc or spark and the ability
> for components to remain securely installed within or on the camera or
> in remotely located equipment. The format of the assessment is at the
> discretion of the user organization, provided all areas are adequately
> addressed.

3.  In addition, the following requirements shall be in effect:

> \(1\) The camera and all attached parts shall be tethered to the
> photographer.
>
> \(2\) All camera parts shall be self-contained and unable to fall into
> flight hardware.
>
> \(3\) Single-use, heat-producing flashbulbs, flashcubes, or sunguns
> shall not be permitted.
>
> \(4\) In hazardous atmospheres, remote-operated, hazardproofed
> photographic equipment shall be utilized.
>
> \(5\) Lighting for remote cameras shall be either Underwriters
> Laboratories, Inc. (UL), Factory Mutual (FM), or Bureau of Mines
> approved, or shall be hazardproofed, specified for the hazard, and
> enclosed or shielded.

4.  Cameras and electronic flash assemblies to be used inside a Solid
    Rocket Motor (SRM) bore shall be specified for that particular use
    and shall include the above requirements.

**5.6 [Use of Electronic Equipment]{.underline}**

> a\. All Radio Frequency (RF) transmitting devices shall be assessed
> and approved by the controlling safety organization prior to use in
> "controlled access areas".
>
> b\. The use of headphones or earphones with personal, portable
> electronic devices shall be prohibited in controlled access areas
> where hazardous operations are conducted.

c.  Electronic equipment shall meet the National Electric Code (NEC) for
    hazardous locations when used in controlled access areas during
    hazardous operations where combustible dusts, flammable vapors, or
    flammable liquids have the potential of release.

d.  Cellular phones, answer back pagers, and two-way radios shall not be
    used within 25-foot of operations involving explosives,
    pyrotechnics, or propellants.

**5.7 [ATMOSPHERIC MONITORING SYSTEMS]{.underline}**

> a\. Oxygen Deficiency Monitoring System (ODMS)
>
> \(1\) If an ODMS indicates a low oxygen condition, the applicable
> room, area, or compartment shall be cleared and controlled. If an ODMS
> malfunctions, the affected area shall be cleared. Work may resume in
> the affected area provided a portable oxygen detector is used and
> confirms an acceptable oxygen level.

(2) If the inert gas lines of the Mobile Launch Platform (MLP) are to
    remain pressurized during transfer, the ODMS shall remain
    operational in the local mode.

> b\. Portable Oxygen Analyzers
>
> \(1\) Prior to the installation of a portable oxygen analyzer, the
> following shall be determined:
>
> \(a\) The unit is operational and the battery is charged per
> manufacturer's specifications.
>
> \(b\) The audible alarm can be heard above the noise in all areas of
> the compartment in which it is to be used or shall be placed in such a
> location that all occupants will hear it.

2.  The unit shall be checked once per 8-hour shift and a log shall be
    maintained documenting the time, location, and the name of the
    person performing the check.

3.  The unit(s) shall be checked and a normal oxygen (O~2~) atmosphere
    shall be verified at the beginning of each shift prior to any work
    in the controlled area when the area has been left unoccupied on the
    prior shift.

> c\. Hazardous Gas Detection System (HGDS)
>
> \(1\) At least one HGDS shall be operational prior to any remote
> Hydrogen (H~2~) operation. A HGDS monitor shall keep the team advised
> of H~2~ readings.
>
> \(2\) Lower Explosive Limit (LEL) detectors shall be utilized for all
> local H~2~ operations.
>
> \(3\) If H~2~ readings exceed 10,000 parts per million (ppm) the Task
> Team Leader (TTL) shall evaluate the magnitude of the leak and
> determine the actions to take to protect personnel and equipment.
>
> \(4\) Loss of HGDS during Power Reactant Supply and Distribution
> (PRSD) tank pressurization, and before stabilization, shall require
> depressurization immediately. Loss of HGDS after tank stabilization
> shall not require depressurization if no leaks are present.

**5.8 [CRYOGENICS]{.underline}**

> a\. The Orbiter Maneuvering Subsystem/Forward Reaction Control System
> (OMS/FRCS), wings/mid-body/payload bay, and aft compartments shall be
> inerted to less than 1 percent O~2~ prior to PRSD tank servicing and
> External Tank (ET) loading.
>
> b\. Cryogenic fluid systems shall be depressurized and made safe
> before attempting any type of maintenance.
>
> c\. During handling of cryogenics, emergency showers shall be
> available for immediate use. However, water under high pressure of
> water that feels warm to the touch should not be used for cryogenic
> exposure first aid.
>
> d\. The oxygen content in Liquid Hydrogen (LH~2~) transfer lines shall
> be verified less than 1 percent (inert) prior to start of LH~2~ flow.

**5.9 [HAZARDOUS OPERATIONS SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS]{.underline}**

> a\. Communications and Television Support
>
> \(1\) All hazardous operations shall require primary and backup
> communications between the operation's control point and the
> operation.
>
> \(2\) Recorded voice communication and Operational Television (OTV)
> coverage shall be required during the performance of all hazardous
> operations having a major control area.
>
> b\. Safety Radio Net
>
> \(1\) Emergency forces supporting hazardous operations shall be
> required to maintain continuous monitoring on Safety Net 105 or Net
> 205. Verification of operational status shall be accomplished a
> minimum of once per day.
>
> \(2\) The Safety Net shall be used during transit and when
> Self-Contained Atmospheric Protective Ensemble (SCAPE) personnel are
> off Operational Intercommunications System (OIS).
>
> \(3\) Telephones or other means of radio communications shall be
> available for summoning assistance in emergencies in areas where
> hazardous operations are conducted.

b.  Loss of support and equipment during any phase of the operation
    shall be reported immediately to the appropriate program/project or
    directorate S&MA organization for assessment of necessary actions.

**5.10 [Handling of Flammable/Combustible Liquids near flight
hardware]{.underline}**

a.  Containers used for liquids, flammable/combustible or not, shall be
    labeled to specify the contents.

b.  All flammable/combustible liquids brought into, or within 3 feet of,
    the Orbiter, ET, Solid Rocket Booster (SRB) or International Space
    Station (ISS)/payload hardware shall be in nonshatterable containers
    equipped with leak-proof closures that can be positively secured in
    the closed position. The container material shall be compatible with
    the contents.

c.  Individual containers of flammable liquids allowed within 50 feet of
    flight hardware shall not exceed 1 pint.

d.  Plastic squeeze bottles that produce a mist shall not be used to
    dispense flammable liquids with a flash point below 100 degrees
    Fahrenheit (^o^F).

**5.11 [SAFETY WARNINGS]{.underline}**

> Flashing safety warning lights, warning signs, and public address
> systems shall be installed at the control point, in appropriate work
> areas or facilities where hazardous operations exist as a part of
> routine work.
>
> a\. Warning Lights
>
> Warning light designations at KSC shall be:
>
> \(1\) Flashing red. A danger period exists and personnel shall be
> cleared from the control area immediately.
>
> \(2\) Flashing amber. A hazard period exists and entry to the control
> area shall be limited to essential personnel.
>
> b\. Warning Signs
>
> Warning signs will be used in conjunction with and adjacent to warning
> lights as follows:
>
> \(1\) Warning signs adjacent to red lights shall read as follows:
>
> **EMERGENCY SITUATION EXISTS**
>
> **CLEAR AREA IMMEDIATELY**
>
> \(2\) Warning signs adjacent to amber lights shall read as follows:
>
> **ENTRY ON CONTROLLED BASIS**
>
> **HAZARDOUS MATERIALS/OPERATIONS PRESENT**
>
> **ESSENTIAL PERSONNEL ONLY**
>
> c\. Paging and Area Warning System (PAWS)
>
> An announcement, preceded by a high-pitched warbling sound (where
> available), shall be made when an emergency condition necessitates
> clearing the area immediately of all personnel.

**5.12 [ELEVATORS]{.underline}**

> a\. All maintenance of elevators and any work performed in the
> elevator shaft shall require the affected elevator to be locked out.
>
> b\. Protective screens must be installed between the elevator shaft
> being worked on and adjacent operational elevator shafts at all levels
> where work shall be performed.
>
> c\. Adjacent elevators shall be locked out during protective screen
> installation and removal.

**5.13 [HAZARDOUS OPERATIONS EMERGENCY POWER]{.underline}**

> Adequate emergency power shall be required for all hazardous
> operations that utilize electrical power for safing or securing.

**5.14 [CONCURRENT OPERATIONS]{.underline}**

> Concurrent hazardous operations involving major control areas within
> the same facility shall require:
>
> a\. Utilization of a TOP, providing a single control point, for one or
> more similar operations.
>
> b\. For concurrent hazardous operations involving significant loss
> potential or high energy, the following shall be met:
>
> \(1\) The operations can be safely and quickly terminated.

(2) Personnel performing the operations are provided a route of rapid
    exit in the event of an emergency.

(3) Emergency vehicles have ready access to an emergency without
    proceeding through another operational cleared/controlled area.

**[CHAPTER 6: UNIQUE HAZARDOUS FACILITIES REQUIREMENTS]{.underline}**

**6.0 [GENERAL]{.underline}**

> The Vehicle Assembly Building (VAB) and Rotation, Processing and Surge
> Facility (RPSF) are designated as explosives handling facilities.
> Explosives operations shall limit the exposure to a minimum number of
> persons, for a minimum time, to the minimum amount of explosive
> material consistent with safe and efficient operations.

**6.1 [VEHICLE ASSEMBLY BUILDING]{.underline}**

> a\. Dual Operations
>
> \(1\) Additional crane operations involving the other 175/250/325 ton
> cranes shall not be permitted during Orbiter breakover or when lifting
> an Orbiter, SRM segment, or SRB forward assembly to/from the transfer
> aisle and high bay. External tank entry, fire protection outages, and
> Operations and Maintenance (O&M) activities requiring personnel above
> the ET checkout cells or on the VAB roof shall not be scheduled during
> the above crane operations.
>
> \(2\) Major hardware moves and other operations requiring opening the
> VAB doors shall be evaluated for impact on other operations within the
> building. Refer to paragraph 6.1d.
>
> \(3\) VAB crane operations involving nonhazardous/noncritical
> equipment and O&M activities shall be permitted outside the control
> area during ET lifts or when supporting the Orbiter or SRM if the
> crane is static and the Orbiter or SRM is within 5 feet of the
> transfer aisle floor.
>
> b\. Housing
>
> Personnel housing shall be in accordance with the VAB Housing
> Abatement Plan, KSC-DF-3669.
>
> c\. High Bay Roof Access
>
> Stair tower egress doors shall be configured to permit access from the
> interior to the roof. Only west side perimeter roof doors shall remain
> unlocked. East side perimeter doors shall require a key to access off
> the roof.
>
> d\. Aft Booster and Segment Lift
>
> Aft booster and segment lifts shall be permitted from the transfer
> aisle to within 3 feet of the holddown posts and clevis, respectively,
> between the hours of 4:30 p.m. to 6:30 a.m., Monday through Friday.
> Exceptions must have the concurrence of the KSC Launch Director, KSC
> Shuttle S&MA Division Chief and the SFOC Safety, Quality, and Mission
> Assurance (SQ&MA) Director.
>
> e\. Door Configuration
>
> The VAB doors shall be configured based on operational needs,
> personnel safety and egress, effects of high winds, lightning, solar
> radiation, large sail areas, multiple operations, and RF controls. VAB
> door configurations shall be based on KSC-DF-502, SRM/VAB Inadvertent
> Ignition Effects Study, dated September 1981.

**6.2 [ROTATION, PROCESSING, AND SURGE FACILITY]{.underline}**

> a\. Dual Operations
>
> \(1\) Concurrent Operations
>
> The following shall not be done concurrently in the Rotation Building:
>
> \(a\) Grain inspection (when man is in bore).
>
> \(b\) Segment lift or rotation to vertical. (Not applicable if crane
> is secured and segments suspended within 5 feet of floor.)
>
> \(c\) The following operations shall not be performed with (a) or (b)
> above. Unless the following operations violate another operation's
> control area or require unrelated work above open grain, no
> restrictions shall be imposed on performing the following operations
> concurrently with each other.

1.  NASA Standard Initiator (NSI) resistance measurements.

> 2\. Insta-Foam operations when personnel are on breathing air or
> inside enclosure.
>
> 3\. Nozzle preparation and mating operations require personnel inside
> the environmental enclosures. This also includes personnel inside the
> nozzle after mate.
>
> 4\. Air Load Debond Test.
>
> \(2\) Personnel shall not be allowed above the build-up stands' upper
> levels, including roof during (1)(a) or (1)(b) above.
>
> b\. Housing
>
> \(1\) The RPSF manloading level shall not exceed 80 personnel.
>
> \(2\) Personnel housing shall be limited to the Support Building.
>
> \(3\) Additional buildings, trailers, or workshops shall not be
> permitted within the facility perimeter fence.
>
> c\. Special Requirements
>
> \(1\) Exterior doors in the Rotation Building shall be closed whenever
> a Faraday cap/shorting plug on an NSI or electrical cable attached to
> an NSI is removed.
>
> \(2\) Locomotives shall not enter the Rotation Building. The
> locomotive shall use a spacer car when moving railcars in or out of
> the building at all times.
>
> \(3\) The SRM Shuttle Wagon/SRM Transporter may enter the Rotation
> Building without an Internal Combustion permit to move railcars or
> segments, providing there is no open grain. The SRM Shuttle Wagon
> shall require a spacer car only when open grain exists in the
> building.
>
> \(4\) Work within the Surge Buildings shall be limited to periodic
> segment inspection and Ammonium Perchlorate (AP) cleanup when
> performed on each segment sequentially.
>
> \(5\) No more than three segments shall have open grain at any one
> time in the Rotation Building. Only one segment may be exposed at a
> time in the Surge Buildings.
>
> \(6\) Segments shall not be left unattended when open grain conditions
> exist.
>
> \(7\) No more than six segments shall be in the Rotation Building at a
> time (for a total of 22 segments located inside facility perimeter
> fence).

**6.3 [OPERATIONS AND CHECKOUT (O&C) BUILDING]{.underline}**

> No payloads containing liquid fuels or solid propellant shall be
> permitted inside the O&C Building.

CHAPTER 7: MATERIALS PROCESSING

**7.0 [GENERAL]{.underline}**

Materials to be used in KSC facilities in support of programs (e.g.,
Space Shuttle, International Space Station, Expendable Launch Vehicles),
as well as KSC institutional activities (e.g., Research and Development
\[R&D\] projects, propellant farms, laboratories, testbeds) shall be
selected, tested, assessed, and approved per the requirements of Kennedy
NASA Procedures and Guidelines (KNPG) 8072.1, KSC Materials and
Processes (M&P) Control Procedures and Guidelines. KNPG 8072.1, which
establishes the minimum requirements for M&P selection and control in
the design, fabrication, and processing/operation of aerospace GSE and
flight hardware in associated KSC facilities, implements the applicable
requirements of Agency M&P documentation (i.e., NASA-STD-6001).

NASA/KSC program and institutional organizations shall ensure associated
contractor processes and procedures are implemented for safe materials
selection, approval, and usage.

**[Section 2: ANNEXES: Special Requirements]{.underline}**

**ANNEX A**

**KSC SUPPLEMENT TO OSHA 29 CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS (CFR),**

**PARTS 1910/1926**

**1.0 [PERSONAL PROTECTIVE REQUIREMENTS]{.underline}**

> a\. Splash (KSC vapor suit): The suit shall not be used for protection
> against hypergolic propellants.
>
> b\. Emergency Life Support Apparatus (ELSA)/Breathing Escape Unit
> (BEU): All breathing escape unit containers shall be "safety green"
> and white striped with 4-inch black lettering, on a white background
> with a "safety green" border, stating "Breathing Escape Units." The
> green and white stripes shall be 2 inches in width.
>
> c\. Contact lenses: Personnel attired in Self-Contained Atmospheric
> Protective Ensemble (SCAPE), toxic vapor suits, or full-face
> respirators shall not wear contact lenses.
>
> d\. Eyeglasses worn in SCAPE, toxic vapor suits, or full-face
> respirators, shall be secured.

e.  Minimum requirements for garments used at KSC during hazardous
    operations in noncleanroom environments:

**1.1 [FALL PROTECTION/WORK ON ELEVATED STRUCTURES]{.underline}**

> A double action or safety snap lanyard and a full body harness (ANSI
> Class III) shall be required for all identified fall hazards.

**1.2 [MACHINE SHOP SAFETY]{.underline}**

> a\. An eyewash basin shall be located within 6 feet of degreasing
> tanks.
>
> b\. Gloves, identification badges, rings, and other jewelry shall not
> be worn when operating rotating machinery. Long hair shall be kept in
> place.

**1.3 [SCAPE REQUIREMENTS]{.underline}**

> a\. When using Cat. I SCAPE, personnel shall observe a 60-minute rest
> period between consecutive SCAPE operations. Time in Cat. IV suits
> shall not exceed 4 consecutive hours. The use of Cat. VI suits is
> limited only to those operations requiring entry into a
> confined/limited access space not achievable by a Propellant Handlers
> Ensemble (PHE).
>
> b\. Showering of SCAPE Personnel and Equipment.
>
> \(1\) All personnel shall shower immediately when exposed to Nitrogen
> Tetroxide (N~2~O~4~) liquid, and within 10 to 15 minutes when exposed
> to N~2~O~4~ vapors. Personnel may return to the workstation after
> showering.
>
> \(2\) All personnel directly involved in a fuel task shall shower
> thoroughly before proceeding from a fuel task to an oxidizer task or
> vice versa if toxic vapor parameters are exceeded. In case of actual
> or suspected hypergolic liquid contamination of the suit, personnel
> shall shower as required and shall change suits prior to switching
> tasks.
>
> \(3\) All personnel wearing a Cat. VI suit exposed to hypergolic
> liquid fuel or oxidizer or vapors heavy enough to envelop the suit
> shall shower for 5 minutes within 5 minutes of exposure.

(4) Prior to leaving the work area for normal SCAPE operations, SCAPE
    personnel with:

```{=html}
<!-- -->
```
(a) No or low hypergolic vapor residual exposure, shall shower for a
    minimum of 1 minute.

(b) Heavy hypergolic vapor or hypergolic liquid contamination, shall
    shower with all exposed tools and equipment a minimum of 5 minutes.

> \(5\) Tools and equipment exposed as below shall be cleaned
> separately.

(a) Items exposed to hypergolic vapors only, shall be thoroughly washed
    by field flushing or water immersion and released for normal use.

(b) Items exposed to hypergolic liquids shall be field flushed, double
    bagged, and identified as "Hypergolic Contaminated."

> c\. Elevator Support for SCAPE Operations at Launch Complex (LC) 39
> A/B

(1) For operations below the Rotating Service Structure (RSS) 120-foot
    level and Fixed Service Structure (FSS) 115-foot level, two of the
    three elevators shall be operational prior to starting SCAPE
    operations.

```{=html}
<!-- -->
```
2.  For operations at the RSS 120-foot level and above the FSS 95-foot
    level, both FSS elevators shall be operational prior to starting
    SCAPE operations. Once SCAPE operations have begun, at least one
    elevator shall remain operational throughout the operation.

3.  For operations in the Payload Changeout Room (PCR), the PCR elevator
    shall be operational prior to start of SCAPE operations.

> d\. SCAPE Support

(1) During periods of non-SCAPE operations, contingency SCAPE support
    shall be provided within 4 hours of notification.

(2) During all SCAPE operations, adequate personnel shall be immediately
    available, onsite, to safe the system in the event of an emergency.

<table>
<colgroup>
<col style="width: 9%" />
<col style="width: 10%" />
<col style="width: 9%" />
<col style="width: 12%" />
<col style="width: 10%" />
<col style="width: 5%" />
<col style="width: 5%" />
<col style="width: 5%" />
<col style="width: 12%" />
<col style="width: 6%" />
<col style="width: 6%" />
<col style="width: 6%" />
</colgroup>
<tbody>
<tr class="odd">
<td colspan="5">Protective Clothing and Ensembles</td>
<td colspan="4">Approved for use with:</td>
<td colspan="3">Hypergolic Ops</td>
</tr>
<tr class="even">
<td colspan="3">Protective Garment Used</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td colspan="4">(A = approved for use)</td>
<td colspan="3">Category</td>
</tr>
<tr class="odd">
<td>Name</td>
<td>Category</td>
<td>Type</td>
<td><p>Type</p>
<p>Air</p></td>
<td><p>Type</p>
<p>Gloves</p></td>
<td>N<sub>2</sub>O<sub>4</sub></td>
<td>MMH</td>
<td>N<sub>2</sub>H<sub>4</sub></td>
<td>Contaminated Scrubber Liquor/ Rinsates</td>
<td>Class A</td>
<td>Class B</td>
<td>Class C</td>
</tr>
<tr class="even">
<td>SCAPE</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>PHE</td>
<td>Back-pack</td>
<td>50 Mil/ 32 Mil</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr class="odd">
<td>SCAPE</td>
<td>IV</td>
<td>PHE</td>
<td>Hose-line</td>
<td>50 Mil/ 32 Mil</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr class="even">
<td>SCAPE</td>
<td>VI</td>
<td>CPS</td>
<td>Hose-line</td>
<td>32 Mil</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>YES</td>
<td>NO</td>
</tr>
<tr class="odd">
<td>Splash/ Apron</td>
<td>Other</td>
<td><strong>*</strong></td>
<td><strong>**</strong></td>
<td>See <strong>Note</strong> Below</td>
<td colspan="3">NO</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>NO</td>
<td>A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**\*** - Selection based on level of hazard potential associated with
task (clarify in TOP).

**\*\*** - Full-face, Supplied Air Respirator (SAR) when inhalation
hazard present. When no inhalation hazard is present, use chemical
splash goggles and/or face shield.

  -----------------------------------------------------------------------
  **NOTE**: Type Gloves Approved

  Long Gauntlet gloves

  Pioneer rubber Pylox V20 gloves

  North butyl gloves
  -----------------------------------------------------------------------

####### TABLE A-1

####### PROTECTIVE CLOTHING AND ENSEMBLES

**2.0 [EMERGENCY EVACUATION REQUIREMENTS]{.underline}**

> a\. Emergency evacuations shall be announced over the public address
> system. The announcer shall define the location and nature of the
> emergency specifying evacuation exits, alternate routes, and fallback
> area/location. The announcer shall also be responsible for activating
> area (flashing red) warning lights and/or the evacuation/fire alarm
> system, as appropriate.
>
> b\. A person shall be appointed to notify all personnel in areas of
> high noise level or those not within hearing range of public address
> speakers.
>
> c\. Upon completion of an emergency evacuation in designated areas, a
> head count shall be conducted in the designated marshaling area and
> then the Test Director (TD) shall be notified of any unaccounted
> persons.
>
> d\. The Pad Slidewire System shall be operational at all times except
> during scheduled outages.
>
> e\. At least one ELSA shall be provided at the workstation for every
> person in the Orbiter forward and aft compartments. When a hazardous
> payload is installed in the Orbiter, ELSAs shall be provided for each
> person working in the mid-body anytime the payload bay doors are
> closed. ELSAs shall not be required when the payload bay doors are
> open, regardless of payload, or when closed with no hazardous payload,
> provided the ODMS is installed and operational.
>
> f\. Emergency evacuation exercises shall be conducted annually for all
> facilities conducting hazardous operations. Exercises shall be
> conducted for each shift where 10 or more employees commonly work.

**3.0 [LOCKOUT/TAGOUT PROGRAM]{.underline}**

> a\. Locks used shall be keyed padlocks.
>
> c\. All KSC personnel shall use KSC Form 20-195 for tagout.
>
> d\. Locks and tags issued for use shall be traceable from the using
> employee back to the issuing employer.
>
> e\. The issuing employer shall maintain an accountability log of all
> issued and returned devices.

**4.0 [DANGER TAGS]{.underline}**

> a\. The KSC Danger Tag, KSC Form 20-165, shall be used to identify
> defective or nonconforming equipment that presents a threat of death
> or serious injury to personnel or destruction of flight hardware or
> equipment.
>
> b\. Each organization issuing Danger Tags shall maintain
> accountability through the use of a log for all issued and returned
> tags.
>
> c\. Each organization using Danger Tags shall conduct an annual audit
> of the Danger Tag program.

**5.0 [BATTERY HANDLING]{.underline}**

> a\. Equipment used for handling and servicing lead acid and
> potassium-hydroxide electrolyte batteries shall be kept separated from
> each other and shall be properly labeled.
>
> b\. Adequate ventilation and exhaust shall be provided to prevent acid
> vapors from entering nickel cadmium or silver zinc battery areas.
>
> c\. Charging benches and tables shall be coated with
> acid/electrolyte-impervious coatings and shall be equipped with
> splash/drip trays to prevent drips/ leaks from running onto the floor.
>
> d\. Individual/liquid-filled battery charging/ conditioning shall be
> accomplished in battery shops. Battery charging equipment shall be
> continuously monitored by personnel when operating. Battery-operated
> vehicles and equipment shall be recharged only with recharging
> equipment designed for that purpose.

**ANNEX B**

KSC SUPPLEMENT TO NPG 8715.3, NASA SAFETY MANUAL

**1.0 [TECHNICAL OPERATING PROCEDURES (TOPs)]{.underline}**

> a\. General
>
> \(1\) TOPs shall be utilized to provide an organized and systematic
> approach to identify and control hazards. TOPs shall be:
>
> \(a\) Required when equipment operations, planned or unplanned, are
> hazardous or constitute a potential launch, test, vehicle, or payload
> processing constraint.
>
> \(b\) Required when an operation is detailed or complicated and there
> is reasonable doubt that it can be performed correctly without written
> handbooks.
>
> \(c\) Reviewed for KSC and offsite areas to ensure that hazardous
> operations are properly classified and the appropriate safety
> precautions have been specified.
>
> \(2\) All TOPs shall be prepared in clear, precise language that can
> be readily understood by personnel involved in the operation. TOPs
> shall be formatted and processed to contain the requirements specified
> herein. Space Shuttle Program/International Space Station (SSP/ISS)
> payload organizations shall comply with the requirements of KSC
> Handbook (KHB) 1700.7. Laboratory operations shall comply with 29 Code
> of Federal Regulations (CFR) 1910.1450 in lieu of the requirements of
> this Annex.
>
> b\. TOPs shall contain:
>
> \(1\) A brief description of the task, operation, or procedure.
>
> \(2\) Identification of the operating location and/or
> departing/arriving areas.
>
> \(3\) Specific hazards that personnel will be exposed to during the
> operation.
>
> \(4\) Identification of all conditions that cause the TOP to be
> classified as hazardous.
>
> \(5\) A step verifying that the TOP is current and complete.
>
> \(6\) Operational Maintenance Requirements and Specifications Document
> (OMRSD), Hazard Analyses, and/or Payload Hazard Reports that specify
> procedural controls for specific hazardous conditions. The procedural
> controls shall be uniquely identified within the TOP.
>
> \(7\) Safety precautions (CAUTION/WARNING Notes), for any activities
> where specific guidelines must be observed or actions taken to prevent
> or limit hazards. The safety precautions shall immediately, or as
> closely as possible, precede the step that directs the activity. A
> note specifying completion of the hazardous activity shall immediately
> follow the last step.
>
> \(8\) A step providing for public address announcements, or other
> positive means, to be made to alert personnel of the dangers and
> information associated with the hazardous operation.
>
> \(9\) Identification of organizational elements and facilities
> required supporting the operation.
>
> \(10\) Identification of tools, equipment, and clothing required for
> the safe performance of the operation or as required by emergency
> procedures associated with the operation. This information shall be
> contained/specified within the WARNING Note immediately preceding the
> first step/sequences or group of steps within a sequence that is
> hazardous.
>
> \(11\) A list of references that are specifically called out within
> the TOP required supporting the operation. The list shall contain the
> document identifying number, revisions, and title, with the originator
> listed in parenthesis after the title. Where the latest issue of the
> document or drawing is to be used rather than a specific revision,
> latest issue will be entered in the revision column.
>
> \(12\) Unique safety rules and requirements addressed to a specific
> step, groups of steps, or sequences, in the operational sequence of
> the TOP, that are required for the safe conduct of a hazardous
> operation.
>
> \(13\) Identification of those job categories requiring certification
> for the performance of the TOP task.
>
> \(14\) A list identifying the manloading requirements. The list shall
> immediately precede the first step/sequence or group of steps within a
> sequence that is hazardous. The list shall identify the individuals by
> call sign/ functional title, number of personnel, approximate
> location, function, and the organization or contractor employing the
> individual.
>
> \(15\) A procedural step placed immediately preceding the first
> step/sequence of the hazardous steps, to identify/specify each control
> area for hazardous operations. The instructions shall include
> placement of signs, barriers, warning lights, and directions for all
> nonessential personnel to clear the specified control area, allowing
> sufficient time for them to do so before the start of a hazardous
> step/sequence.
>
> \(16\) A procedural step for those hazardous operations requiring
> Safety concurrence prior to starting the step/sequences (or subtask
> TOPs containing hazardous operations) and prior to opening the area
> for controlled work at the conclusion of hazardous activities.
>
> \(17\) A procedural step verifying that a preroute survey has been
> accomplished before transporting Ground Support Equipment (GSE) and
> flight hardware where length, height, or width may cause interference
> problems/hazards.
>
> \(18\) A procedural step verifying that a preoperational inspection
> for operations having a major control area, and/or an operational
> safety inspection for all hazardous operations has been performed. Any
> discrepancies that constrain or have the potential to impact the
> operation shall be documented, prior to the commencement of any
> hazardous steps.
>
> \(19\) A procedural step with task leader verification that personnel
> participating in a hazardous operation are certified, equipped,
> briefed, and ready to proceed.
>
> \(20\) Procedural steps verifying that pretest and pretask briefings
> have been held.
>
> \(21\) TOPs shall have emergency instructions when operations directed
> in the TOP activate system/equipment capable of causing personnel
> injury or equipment damage if not expeditiously shutdown, safed, or
> secured should a malfunction occur. When a TOP is in progress, the
> emergency instruction in the TOP shall take precedence over the
> Emergency Procedures Document (EPD). Emergency instructions shall:
>
> \(a\) Contain specific contingency actions necessary to cope with
> emergency conditions.
>
> \(b\) Address hazards unique to the operation and shall provide for
> rapid shutdown to protect personnel and equipment.
>
> \(c\) Contain all the steps required to accomplish the shutdown and
> shall not refer to another document.
>
> \(d\) Be located in an appendix or at the rear of the TOP using
> goldenrod color pages, distinctive border, or cut corners, and be
> available to the test team at all times.
>
> \(22\) The following data when involving the pressurization of vessels
> within GSE or facilities:
>
> \(a\) Maximum Allowable Working Pressure (MAWP).
>
> \(b\) Relief valve set pressure (if installed).
>
> \(c\) Burst disc pressure/temperature rating (if installed).
>
> \(d\) A WARNING, for initial (first-time) pressurization, stating the
> MAWP immediately before the step that calls for pressurization. (For
> subsequent pressurizations this may be in the form of a statement.)
>
> **NOTE**: A sketch or diagram which shows the configuration of the
> system to be pressurized and which includes maximum allowable working
> pressures, relief valve set pressures, and burst disc
> pressure/temperature ratings may be used to meet the requirements
> listed in (a), (b), and (c).
>
> \(23\) Air handler configuration for hypergolic operations in the
> Orbiter Processing Facility (OPF).
>
> \(24\) A step verifying the safed and armed circuits are safed and the
> Pyro Initiator Controller (PIC) capacitors are discharged prior to the
> disconnection of live explosives.
>
> c\. Subtask Safety Controls
>
> Integrated/controlling TOPs shall manage the specific safety controls
> contained in subtask TOPs/documents.
>
> d\. Job Cards
>
> Safety requirements for Job Cards shall be identical to safety
> requirements for Category I TOPs.
>
> e\. Operations Planning Sheets
>
> Safety requirements for Operations Planning Sheets shall be contained
> in the applicable TOP. Contractor and, if required, Government Safety
> representatives shall approve Operations Planning Sheets prepared for
> hazardous steps of hazardous TOPs prior to implementation of the TOP.
>
> f\. Placard Procedures
>
> \(1\) Placards shall be attached to equipment or positioned near
> equipment to provide assembly or operating instructions.
>
> \(2\) The use of placards shall be limited to repetitive simple tasks.
>
> \(3\) Placards shall be used only for GSE and facility items. They
> shall not be used for electrical or mechanical equipment when
> interfacing with flight hardware, unless authorized by a TOP.
>
> \(4\) Placards shall define any prerequisites, contacts, or
> preoperations that must be performed or made prior to implementation.
>
> \(5\) Placards shall not be used for hazardous operations.
>
> \(6\) Installation of placards shall be authorized using a TOP
> initiated by the organization using the placard and an exact copy of
> the placard shall be attached to the authorizing TOP.
>
> g\. Emergency Procedure Document (EPD)
>
> An EPD shall be produced for work areas where hazardous operations are
> performed in order to provide the processing team with procedures to
> be followed if an emergency occurs at anytime in the facility. The EPD
> shall supplement the emergency instructions specified in 1.0b(21)
> above. See KHB 1040.1 for specific details.
>
> h\. Hazard Classification of TOPs
>
> All TOPs shall be classified as hazardous or nonhazardous. Each
> operation shall be evaluated for the task and location. Categories I
> and II TOPs shall be classified by the originating organization as
> hazardous if the activity controls or involves, but not limited to
> operations that:
>
> \(1\) Require personnel to be present in an enclosed or dangerous area
> (tanks, manholes), including closed spacecraft and closed Propellant
> Handlers Ensemble (PHE) suits, in which the environment deviates from
> a normal atmosphere.
>
> \(2\) Involve the handling, receipt, storage, transportation,
> installation, removal, checkout, or closeout of explosives including
> solid propellants. For any operation or checkout of an explosive
> system, following explosive item installation/connection and prior to
> power on/off simulated or direct explosive system checks or tests, the
> condition or status of the explosives (connected, safed, or
> disconnected) must be stated and verification required within the TOP.
>
> \(3\) Involve moving GSE or flight hardware where length, height,
> width, or weight may cause interference or problems/hazards.
>
> \(4\) Involve crane-hoisting operations. The procedure for crane
> hoisting shall be classified hazardous unless the cognizant
> program/project or directorate S&MA organization determines that the
> size or weight of the equipment to be hoisted is such that it would
> not be considered a hazardous operation.
>
> \(5\) Involve forklift operations for loading, unloading, and
> transporting of hardware or materials where assessment by the
> cognizant program/project or directorate S&MA organization confirms
> potential hazards.
>
> \(6\) Involve the use of ionizing or nonionizing radiation sources
> that have hazard controls specified in the approved Radiation Use
> Authorization for that source as issued by the KSC Radiation
> Protection Program.
>
> \(7\) Involves the handling or transfer of propellants, hazardous
> gases, flammable materials or other materials hazards that require
> implementation of special safety control measures such as use of
> respirators, special ventilation systems, and lockout/tagout
> procedures identified by the program/project or directorate S&MA
> organization.
>
> \(8\) Involve an electrical hazard that may cause injury or death.
>
> \(9\) Involve the pressurization of systems or components and include
> at least one of the following cases:
>
> \(a\) Flight system pressure vessels controlled by fracture mechanics
> with:

1.  Any pressurization that exceeds any previously recorded
    pressurization in the pressure vessel operational time/ cycle log.

2.  Any pressurization above the MAWP.

3.  Any pressurization above 25 percent of the MAWP when the vessel
    contains hazardous fluids.

> \(b\) Flight system pressure vessels not controlled by fracture
> mechanics with:

1.  Any pressurization above 25 percent of MAWP that exceeds any
    previously recorded pressurization in the pressure vessel
    operational time/ cycle record log.

2.  Any pressurization above MAWP.

3.  Any pressurization above 25 percent of MAWP when the vessel contains
    hazardous fluids.

> \(10\) Involve the pressurization of ground-based pressure
> vessels/systems and include at least one of the following cases:
>
> \(a\) Any pressurization above the MAWP/Design Pressure.
>
> \(b\) First time pressurization to rated pressure of any new
> vessel/system or the modified portion of an existing vessel/system.
> This excludes pressurization after removal or replacement of a
> component with a like item that has been pressure tested prior to
> installation. This also excludes pressurization of flex hoses up to
> rated operating pressure, provided hose restraints required by Annex E
> of this Handbook are in place.
>
> \(c\) In-place calibration at more than 80 percent of full scale for
> pressure gauges with scale range over 200 pounds per square inch gauge
> (psig) unless the gauge has a solid front case with pressure relief
> back.
>
> \(11\) Involve procedures that manually control pressurization of
> systems where MAWP/Design Pressure can be reached. The TOP shall
> contain a CAUTION/WARNING note stating the maximum allowable pressure.
>
> \(12\) Call up hazardous sequences of subtask TOPs. The controlling
> TOP shall be classified as hazardous.
>
> \(13\) Involve activities not previously identified in Sections 1.h(1)
> through 1.h(12) that could endanger personnel and/or damage hardware.
>
> i\. TOP Covers
>
> \(1\) TOPs shall be identified as either hazardous or nonhazardous on
> their covers.
>
> \(2\) EPDs shall be distinctively marked.
>
> j\. TOP Changes and Revisions
>
> TOP changes/revisions shall be processed as follows:
>
> \(1\) A written approved deviation is required for changes/deviations
> to any section of a hazardous TOP, including out-of-sequence testing.
>
> \(2\) Interim changes to existing Category I and II TOPs shall be in
> accordance with the following:
>
> \(a\) Insufficient time exists to make a formal change to a previously
> released TOP.
>
> \(b\) An approved deviation authorizing an interim change is obtained.
>
> \(c\) Each change shall be identified (select applicable term) as
> follows:
>
> **THIS CHANGE DOES\_\_\_\_\_DOES NOT\_\_\_\_\_ AFFECT OR ADD HAZARDOUS
> STEPS TO THIS DOCUMENT**
>
> \(d\) Interim changes that add to, or affect, hazardous sequences or
> steps, require Safety review and approval.
>
> \(e\) Redline changes shall only be used to correct clerical errors or
> make pen and ink changes.
>
> \(3\) All approved deviations or other documentation authorizing
> permanent changes to a TOP during its use shall be incorporated as
> part of the next printed change or revision.
>
> \(4\) A deviation shall not be required for preplanned sequences that
> can be performed out of order.

(5) All TOPs/changes/deviations involving the flight termination system
    shall be forwarded to the Associate Director of S&MA (SH&IA) for
    coordination with the appropriate USAF organization.

(6) TOPs/changes/deviations involving hazardous operations at Vandenberg
    Air Force Base (VAFB), or involving hazardous operations for NASA
    Expendable Launch Vehicles (ELVs) at the Cape Canaveral Air Force
    Station (CCAFS), shall be forwarded to the ELV Safety and Flight
    Assurance Office. TOPs/changes/deviations involving hazardous
    operations for NASA payloads (KSC or CCAFS) shall be forwarded to
    the ISS/Payload Processing S&MA Division.

> k\. Processing of TOPs
>
> All organizations operating in areas under KSC jurisdiction shall
> ensure all TOPs they originate are developed, classified (hazardous or
> nonhazardous), and processed as follows:
>
> \(1\) Category I TOPs
>
> \(a\) Prior to use, ensure the appropriate Safety and Health
> professional(s) reviews and verifies (by signature) compliance with
> the requirements of this Handbook.
>
> \(b\) Ensure approved new Category I hazardous TOPs are approved by
> the appropriate Safety and Health professional(s) at least 10 days
> prior to scheduled use.
>
> \(c\) Ensure Category I changes or revisions are approved by the
> appropriate Safety and Health professional(s) at least 3 days prior to
> scheduled use for page changes, and at least 7 days prior to scheduled
> use for document revisions.
>
> \(2\) Category II TOPs
>
> \(a\) A Category II TOP may be used for one-time-only hazardous
> operations and for repetitive nonhazardous operations when work is of
> limited scope and does not economically justify preparation of a
> Category I TOP.
>
> \(b\) Prior to use, ensure the appropriate Safety and Health
> professional(s) reviews and verifies (by signature) compliance with
> the requirements of this Handbook.
>
> \(c\) The procedure shall be submitted to the appropriate Safety and
> Health professional(s) for review and approval at least 2 days before
> the procedure is performed, except in the case of real-time TOPs.
>
> l\. Unique symbols shall be used on all bar charts, integration, and
> element schedules to differentiate between operations having a major
> control area, a local control area, and no control area. A legend
> shall be provided on each page.

**2.0 [MISHAPS AND CLOSE CALLS]{.underline}**

a.  General Requirements

> All undesired and unexpected events shall be reported to the
> responsible supervisor and the organizational (NASA or contractor)
> safety office. Those undesired and unexpected events classified as
> NASA mishaps or close calls, in accordance with Section 2.2, shall be
> investigated to determine the root cause(s), to develop and implement
> corrective actions in order to prevent recurrence, and to document and
> share lessons learned. Events not classified as a mishap or close call
> may be formally investigated when deemed appropriate by the
> organizational safety office or responsible management. All mishaps
> and close calls shall be electronically entered into the NASA Incident
> Reporting Information System (IRIS) database. The requirements stated
> herein implement NASA Policy Directive (NPD) 8621.1, NASA Mishap
> Reporting and Investigating Policy and NASA Procedures and Guidelines
> (NPG) 8621.1, NASA Procedures and Guidelines for Mishap Reporting,
> Investigating and Recordkeeping. The KSC mishap and close call
> processes are documented in KDP-KSC-P-1473, Mishap Reporting and
> Investigation and KDP-KSC-P-1474, Mishap Investigation Board.

**2.1 [DEFINITION OF MISHAPS AND CLOSE CALLS]{.underline}**

a.  Mishaps

> A mishap is an undesired and unexpected event that results in injury
> requiring more than first aid, occupational illness to personnel,
> and/or damage to property. Mishaps also include injuries or
> occupational illnesses resulting from repetitive stresses or exposures
> over a prolonged period of time. For purposes of investigation and
> reporting, mishaps are categorized as follows:

1.  [Type A Mishap:]{.underline} A mishap causing death, hospitalization
    (within a 30 day period from the same mishap) of three or more
    persons for other than observation, damage to equipment or property
    and/or mission failure resulting in loss equal to or greater than
    \$1 million. Mishaps resulting in damage to aircraft, space
    hardware, or ground support equipment that meet these criteria are
    included, as are test failures in which the damage was unexpected or
    unplanned.

2.  [Type B Mishap:]{.underline} A mishap resulting in permanent
    disability to one or more persons, inpatient hospitalization of two
    or less personnel, damage to equipment or property and/or mission
    failure resulting in loss equal to or greater than \$250,000, but
    less than \$1 million. Mishaps resulting in damage to aircraft,
    space hardware, or ground support equipment that meet these criteria
    are included, as are test failures in which the damage was
    unexpected or unplanned.

3.  [Type C Mishap:]{.underline} A mishap resulting in damage to
    equipment or property, or mission failure resulting in loss equal to
    or greater than \$25,000, but less than \$250,000, and/or causing
    occupational injury or illness that results in a case involving
    day(s) away from work. Mishaps resulting in damage to aircraft,
    space hardware, or ground support equipment that meet these criteria
    are included, as are test failures in which the damage was
    unexpected or unplanned.

4.  [Incident:]{.underline} A mishap consisting of personal injury
    requiring medical treatment greater than first aid but without any
    lost time (see definitions of medical treatment and first aid in the
    Glossary) and/or property damage or mission failure resulting in
    loss equal to or greater than \$1,000, but less than \$25,000.
    Permanent occupational hearing loss in excess of 25 decibels in
    either ear is classified as an incident.

    b.  Close Calls

> A close call is an undesired and unexpected event resulting in no
> personal injury or illness or personal injury or illness requiring
> only first aid, and/or minor damage (less than \$1,000), but with
> potential for causing a mishap or negative mission impact.

2.  **[CLASSIFYING MISHAPS AND CLOSE CALLS]{.underline}**

    a.  Undesired and Unexpected Events

        All undesired and unexpected events that result in injury or
        occupational illness and/or property damage, or that have the
        potential to cause these impacts, shall be reported to the
        responsible supervisor and the organizational safety office. For
        purposes of initial classification of mishaps and close calls,
        it is recognized that immediately following an undesired and
        unexpected event, it may be difficult to accurately assess the
        severity of the event. Therefore, a worst-case estimate of
        injury/illness and/or damage shall be made and update as needed.

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    b.  Mishaps

        Mishaps are classified as Type A, B, C, or Incidents in
        accordance with the definitions in Section 2.1a.

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c.  Close Calls

> For those undesired and unexpected events not meeting the definition
> of a mishap, an assessment of the worst case potential mishap severity
> and probability of occurrence shall be performed. The mere existence
> of a hazard does not constitute a close call. In order to meet the
> definition of a close call, there must be an undesired and unexpected
> event associated with the hazard with potential for causing a mishap
> or negative mission impact, even though neither occurred. For example,
> a sidewalk that is buckled and uneven is classified as a hazard by its
> mere existence. If someone were to trip or fall, and escape injury or
> only require first aid, the event is classified as a close call, given
> that it meets the criteria defined herein. Table B-1 shall be used to
> determine whether the event is a reportable close call. Events falling
> in the shaded areas of the table are not close calls and shall not be
> entered into the NASA IRIS database. If any program/project or
> directorate organization is not sure of how to classify an undesired
> and unexpected event, contact the Spaceport Services Institutional
> Safety and Quality Branch or the Safety, Health and Independent
> Assessment (SH&IA) Directorate for assistance.

+--------------+-------------+-------------+------------+-----------+
|              | # **POTENT  |             |            |           |
|              | IAL MISHAP  |             |            |           |
|              | SEVERITY**  |             |            |           |
+--------------+-------------+-------------+------------+-----------+
| # **P        | **TYPE A**  | **TYPE B**  | **TYPE C** | **I       |
| ROBABILITY** |             |             |            | NCIDENT** |
+--------------+-------------+-------------+------------+-----------+
| Likely to    | Close Call  | Close Call  | Close Call | Close     |
| occur        |             |             |            | Call      |
| immediately  |             |             |            |           |
+--------------+-------------+-------------+------------+-----------+
| Probable to  | Close Call  | Close Call  | Close Call | Close     |
| occur in     |             |             |            | Call      |
| time         |             |             |            |           |
+--------------+-------------+-------------+------------+-----------+
| May occur    | Close Call  | Close Call  | Close Call |           |
|              |             |             |            |           |
| in time      |             |             |            |           |
+--------------+-------------+-------------+------------+-----------+
| Unlikely to  | Close Call  |             |            |           |
| occur in     |             |             |            |           |
| time         |             |             |            |           |
+--------------+-------------+-------------+------------+-----------+
| Improbable   |             |             |            |           |
| to occur     |             |             |            |           |
+--------------+-------------+-------------+------------+-----------+

**TABLE B-1**

**CLOSE CALL DETERMINATION MATRIX**

d.  Exposure to Hazardous Substance

> Personnel exposure, or suspected exposure, to a hazardous substance
> exceeding allowable limits (quantity level or exposure time) shall be
> reported immediately to the Occupational Health Facility (OHF) or, if
> not located at KSC, to a licensed medical physician. All exposures
> shall go through the OHF or licensed medical physician (if not located
> at KSC) for medical evaluation and treatment. Confirmed exposures
> exceeding allowable limits shall be reported and documented as a
> mishap or close call.

e.  Musculoskeletal Disorders (MSD)

> Lost time cases due to a MSD or repeated trauma injury or illness
> shall be classified as a mishap. For these cases, the date of
> diagnosis by a licensed physician or the first official lost time day,
> whichever occurs first, is the date that shall be entered into the
> NASA IRIS database.

##### Occupational Illness

> For cases of occupational illness due to long term exposure to
> hazards, such as abestosis, silicosis or hearing loss, the date of
> diagnosis by a licensed physician or the first official lost time day,
> whichever occurs first, is the date that shall be entered into the
> NASA IRIS database.

g.  Injuries Incurred As A Result Of A Recreational Activity

> Recreational activitiy injuries shall be classified as NASA mishaps if
> the employee is on duty and is required to participate for job
> certification, training or by labor agreement. Each program/project or
> directorate organization sponsoring such recreational activity shall
> determine which activities employees can perform. Recreational
> activities shall be designed to minimize the potential for personal
> injury. Injuries resulting from off-duty use of KSC exercise
> facilities are not classified as NASA mishaps. On-duty, nonsponsored
> recreational activities are prohibited.

h.  Natural Phenomenon Mishaps

> Damage resulting from natural phenomena or acts of nature (e.g.,
> flooding, hurricanes, tornados, lightning strikes, wild fires),
> without human intervention, shall be classified as a NASA mishap by
> the organization owning/controlling the damaged or lost property. An
> assessment of all damages incurred shall be performed and cost of
> repairs and/or replacement shall be tracked and entered into the NASA
> IRIS database. Natural phenomenon damage resulting from or made worse
> by failure of personnel to follow established procedures or standard
> practices, such as damage caused by animals as a result of personnel
> failing to properly secure and protect facilities and equipment, is
> not considered damage from natural phenomena, but is still classified
> as a NASA mishap or close call.

i.  High Visibility Mishaps and Close Calls

> Mishaps or close calls that may draw media attention, cause
> embarassment to NASA, or other events deemed important by NASA
> management are considered "high visibility" mishaps or close calls and
> may warrant a full NASA mishap investigation board.

j.  Mishaps and Close Calls Involving Property Damage

> Reported damage shall include the direct cost of replacement of
> damaged equipment and parts, plus labor, as well as the cost of
> cleanup and environmental investigation activity and restoration of
> property as required by environmental regulations. The reportable cost
> also includes replacement of any lost commodity (i.e., compressed
> gasses, coolants, propellants). In cases where replacement parts are
> available from salvaged or excess equipment at little or no cost to
> NASA, the actual costs of replacement parts may be used plus labor.
> The cost of the safety mishap investigation is not included.

k.  Processing Mishaps or Close Calls

> A processing mishap or close call is a mishap or close call that
> occurs during the act of ground processing of flight hardware. If a
> processing mishap or close call occurs, it shall be entered into the
> NASA IRIS database as a mishap (Type A, B, C, or Incident) or a close
> call, and additionally shall be annotated as a processsing mishap or
> close call.

**2.3 [REPORTING MISHAPS AND CLOSE CALLS]{.underline}**

a.  General Requirements (Civil Service and Contractor)

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(1) Initial Reporting

    Initial reporting requirements of mishaps and close calls are based
    on the preliminary, worst-case assessment of actual or potential
    severity and visibility as described herein.

(2) NASA IRIS Database

> All undesired and unexpected events that are classified as mishaps or
> close calls shall be entered into the NASA IRIS database. When
> entering a close call into the NASA IRIS database, the worst case
> potential mishap severity (Type A, B, C or Incident) shall also be
> entered. Conversly, undesired and unexpected events that are not
> classified as close calls according to Table B-1 (shaded areas) shall
> not be be entered into the NASA IRIS database.

b.  Type A, Type B, or Other Highly Visible Mishaps and Close Calls
    (Civil Service and Contractor)

> In order to facilitate the timely investigation and other notification
> requirements of NPG 8621.1, the responsible Civil Service or
> Contractor program/project or directorate organization shall
> immediately (within 1 hour) notify the appropriate program/project or
> directorate S&MA organization, the Associate Director of S&MA (SH&IA),
> and the American Federation of Government Employees (AFGE) Union
> President of Vice-President, by telephone or in person. Initial
> notification shall include the time, the location, a description of
> the event, the organization(s) involved in the event, and a
> preliminary worst case estimate of the injuries/illness and/or cost
> estimate of the damage resulting from the event. For these events, a
> formal Mishap Investigation Board (MIB) \[Contractor and/or Civil
> Service\] shall be formed per Section 2.4.

c.  Type C Mishaps, Incidents, and Close Calls

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1.  Contractor

    The responsible contractor organization shall, within four hours of
    the event (or by 6:45 AM the next workday for mishaps occurring
    during shifts other than first shift), submit an initial report
    (e-mail or fax) to the appropriate program/project or directorate
    S&MA organization, the Spaceport Services Institutional Safety and
    Quality Branch, and the Associate Director of S&MA (SH&IA). The
    initial report shall contain a description, the time, the location,
    and the organizations involved in the event, a preliminary worst
    case estimate of the injuries and/or cost estimate of the damage
    resulting from the event. Within 15 working days, the responsible
    contractor organization shall enter the mishap report (see Section
    2.5) into the NASA IRIS database.

2.  Civil Service

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a.  Civil Service Mishaps Involving Injury or Illness

    For mishaps involving serious injury or illness involving direct
    emergency transport to off-site medical facilities, the emergency
    responders shall provide the OHF initial medical information
    documented on a KSC Form 6-2. For nonlife threatening injury or
    illness, the employee shall report to the OHF. The OHF shall record
    the medical evaluation on a KSC Form 6-2, and forward a copy to the
    Spaceport Services Institutional Safety and Quality Branch and to
    the employee's supervisor (yellow copy). Upon receipt, the
    employee's supervisor shall fill out Section III of the KSC Form 6-2
    and forward it to the Spaceport Services Institutional Safety and
    Quality Branch within 72 hours of the mishap. The Spaceport Services
    Institutional Safety and Quality Branch shall enter the information
    into the NASA IRIS database.

b.  Civil Service Mishaps or Close Calls Involving Property Damage

> For mishaps or close calls involving damaged property (which may also
> involve injury or illness), the NASA Form 1627A (Initial Safety
> Incident Report) shall be completed by the responsible Civil Service
> organization and forwarded to the appropriate program/project or
> directorate S&MA organization and the Spaceport Services Institutional
> Safety and Quality Branch within 4 hours of the mishap or close call
> (or by 7:30 AM the next workday for mishaps occurring during shifts
> other than first shift). The Spaceport Services Institutional Safety
> and Quality Branch is responsible for entering the data into the NASA
> IRIS database.

d.  Reporting Days Away From Work (Civil Service and Contractor)

> Days away from work shall be entered into the NASA IRIS database by
> the responsible contractor organization (for contractor days away from
> work) or the Spaceport Services Institutional Safety and Quality
> Branch (for Civil Service days away from work). Days away from work
> shall be counted for the calendar days away from work for 180 days
> duration. Reporting of days away from work beyond 180 total days away
> due to a single injury or illness is not required. A day away from
> work is defined as a full work day, and results from a nonfatal
> traumatic injury, or a nonfatal nontraumatic illness, that causes one
> or more days away from work beyond the day or shift on which it
> occurred. Only days away from work directed or approved by a licensed
> physician shall be recorded as days away. In calculating total days
> away from work, the total number of calender days off prescribed by
> the physician shall be counted, even if the employee would not
> normally work on some of those days (e.g., weekends, holidays or
> scheduled days off). For injuries or illnesses that become long-term
> or permanent disability cases, the mishap report status shall be
> updated in the NASA IRIS database by the responsible contractor
> organization or the Spaceport Services Institutional Safety and
> Quality Branch to reflect the new mishap classification.

e.  Other NASA Centers Performing Work at KSC

> For work performed at KSC that is exclusively under the control of
> another or other NASA Center(s) (i.e., without the participation of
> KSC employees or contractors), initial and follow-up mishap/close call
> reporting will include notification of the host KSC program/project or
> directorate S&MA organization, as well as any additional KSC reporting
> delineated herein. This requirement is in addition to their own NASA
> Center mishap/close call reporting and follow-on investigation,
> corrective action, and lessons learned requirements.

**2.4 [INVESTIGATION]{.underline}**

a.  Mishap Investigation Boards (MIBs)

    1.  NASA MIBs

> NASA Mishap Investigation Boards shall be formed for all Type A or B
> mishaps. Mishap Boards may also be formed for other mishaps or close
> calls as deemed necessary by the Center Director or program/project or
> organizational Director. Mishap Board investigations shall be
> accomplished in accordance with the requirements of NPG 8621.1 and
> KDP-KSC-P-1474, Mishap Investigation Board.

2.  Contractor MIBs

> For NASA mishaps resulting from NASA contractor operations, the NASA
> Board Appointing Official, with the concurrence of the Associate
> Director of S&MA (SH&IA), may delay the formation of a separate NASA
> Mishap Investigation Board (or activity) pending the review and
> acceptance of the contractor report. In this case, a letter signed by
> the NASA Board Appointing Official shall be sent to the contractor
> notifying them of NASA's intent to delay formation of a separate NASA
> Mishap Investigation Board. NASA slao retains the option of providing
> a Government representative on Contractor-managed MIBs.

b.  Nonboard Mishap and Close Call Investigations

> All mishaps and close calls shall be investigated to identify the root
> cause(s) and other contributing cause(s). Within 15 working days of
> the mishap or close call, the results of the investigation shall be
> documented in the NASA IRIS database (reference KDP-KSC-P-1473, Mishap
> Reporting and Investigation).

1.  Civil Service Nonboard Mishap and Close Call Investigations

> For mishaps or close calls with damage to property exclusively under
> the control of NASA Civil Service personnel, the NASA program/project
> or directorate S&MA organization shall conduct the investigation. When
> injury or illness to civil service personnel is involved, the
> Spaceport Services Institutional Safety and Quality Branch, in
> conjunction with the NASA program/project or directorate S&MA
> organization, shall conduct the investigation. The result of property
> damage investigations shall be documented using NASA Form 1627, Mishap
> Report, and submitted to the Spaceport Services Institutional Safety
> and Quality Branch for entry into the NASA IRIS database. Civil
> Service injury and illness investigation results shall be documented
> in Section III of KSC Form 6-2 and submitted to the Spaceport Services
> Institutional Safety and Quality Branch for entry into the NASA IRIS
> database. The program/project or directorate S&MA organization shall
> maintain involvement and oversight in the investigation and analysis,
> and provide consultation on an as needed basis.

2.  Contractor Nonboard Mishap and Close Call Investigations

> Contractor organizations are responsible for investigating their own
> nonboard mishaps and entering the results of the investigation
> directly into the NASA IRIS database. Both the appropriate
> program/project or directorate S&MA organization and the Spaceport
> Services Institutional Safety and Quality Branch shall maintain
> insight into the investigation of contractor mishaps and may choose to
> audit the investigation results and the effectiveness of the
> identified corrective action.

**2.5** **[MISHAP REPORTS]{.underline}**

a.  Mishap Investigation Board (MIB) Reports

    The mishap investigation report shall contain a description of the
    structured analytical techniques used to identify causal factors,
    detailed documentation of mishap data, discussion of root cause(s),
    and significant observations, findings and recommendations. The
    report shall also include a proposed Corrective Action Plan (CAP) to
    be used as a framework for further development and implementation.
    Witness statements shall be kept separate from the main portion of
    the report so that they can be easily separated and withheld from
    release and distribution of the report. NPG 8621.1 contains detailed
    information on report requirements and format. The MIB Chair shall
    ensure that the NASA IRIS database is updated with the report and
    proposed corrective action plan within 60 days, unless otherwise
    established.

    Once the report is completed and approved, the MIB Chair shall
    distribute the final report in accordance with NPG 8621.1 and
    KDP-KSC-P-1474. The SH&IA Directorate is the official repository for
    all MIB reports and associated documentation. Witness statements and
    medical records shall be sealed and retained by the SH&IA
    Directorate in a locked file, and are not part of the distributed
    MIB report.

    Contractor reports shall undergo a formal review by NASA, and, once
    accepted, a formal letter of acceptance from the NASA Board
    Appointing Official will be provided to the Contractor.

b.  Nonboard Mishap Investigation Board Reports

> A mishap report documenting investigation results including
> identification of root cause(s), significant observations, findings,
> and recommendations shall be entered into the NASA IRIS database
> within 15 days of the event.

**2.6 [CORRECTIVE ACTION]{.underline}**

> Corrective action(s) shall be determined and implemented in order to
> prevent recurrence of similar events. Within 45 working days of the
> mishap or close call (or approval of the report in the case of mishap
> board investigations), the responsible program/project or directorate
> organization shall develop the CAP (or further develop the proposed
> CAP in the case of MIBs) and enter it into the NASA IRIS database. The
> CAP shall provide corrective action(s) for the root cause(s)
> identified, and for all other contributing factors to the mishap or
> close call. The CAP shall provide a description of the corrective
> action(s), and identify (to the lowest level possible) the
> organization(s) responsible for implementation and the organization(s)
> responsible for ensuring completion the action item(s). In the case
> where there are no corrective actions that could reasonably be taken,
> a statement stating this shall be entered into the NASA IRIS database.
> The program/project or directorate S&MA organization is responsible
> for monitoring corrective actions activities for mishaps and close
> calls, and to determine if they are carried out according to plan.

**2.7 [LESSONS LEARNED]{.underline}**

> All mishaps and close calls shall be evaluated for any lessons
> learned. When the evaluation results in lessons learned, then the
> lessons learned shall be submitted to the NASA Lessons Learned
> Information System (LLIS) in order to share this information and
> prevent recurrence. The LLIS is available to all NASA and NASA
> contractor personnel at [http://llis.nasa.gov]{.underline}. Assistance
> in the use of this system can be obtained from the SH&IA Directorate.

**2.8 [METRICS AND TREND ANALYSIS]{.underline}**

a.  Safety Statistics Record (SSR)

> A Safety Statistics Record, KSC Form 6-22, shall be completed monthly
> by all KSC contractor organizations and submitted to the NASA Safety,
> Health and Independent Assessment Directorate for use in developing
> Center-wide safety metrics. If adjustments, corrections or additions
> to a previous fiscal year's statistical data occur, an updated
> year-end SSR for the affected fiscal year shall be submitted.

b.  Trend Analysis

> All KSC program/project or directorate organizations shall perform
> regular analysis of safety-related mishap and metric data in order to
> identify trends requiring corrective or preventive actions.

**2.9 [MISHAPS INVOLVING PAYLOAD CUSTOMERS, RESIDENT OFFICE PERSONNEL,
AND OFFICIAL VISITORS]{.underline}**

For mishaps exclusively affecting non-KSC Civil Service or Contractor
personnel or property (i.e., personnel who are conducting official
business on KSC but who are not NASA/KSC Civil Servants or Contractors),
KSC will provide initial response, medical services and control of the
mishap scene. In this case, the investigation and reporting process will
be determined by the appropriate Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) or
Customer Agreement, or the organization's Center or corporate safety
office. These mishaps will not be counted as NASA/KSC mishaps unless
otherwise stated by a formal agreement. The appropriate NASA/KSC
program/project or directorate S&MA organization shall be provided
insight into the investigation and be provided courtesy copies of the
final mishap report.

**3.0 [SAfety Program]{.underline}**

> a\. Safety Enforcement
>
> Each contractor's safety program shall contain provisions for
> compliance with and enforcement of safety requirements. A means of
> auditing and enforcing these requirements shall be developed and
> maintained.
>
> b\. Safety Program Documentation
>
> \(1\) Facility Inspection Summary
>
> Program/project or directorate organizations having facility oversight
> shall identify potential hazards at least annually. The operating
> organizations shall keep the following information:
>
> \(a\) Facility name and building number
>
> \(b\) Date inspected
>
> \(c\) Hazards identified from the inspection
>
> \(d\) Status of hazards - Open/Closed
>
> \(2\) Safety Statistics
>
> All program/project or directorate organizations shall submit a SSR
> (KSC Form 6-22) per the provisions of Section 2.8 of this Annex.

###### **ANNEX C**

###### **RESERVED**

#### 

**ANNEX D**

KSC SUPPLEMENT TO NFPA 70, NATIONAL ELECTRIC CODE

**1.0 [GROUNDING AND BONDING]{.underline}**

> All sources of static electricity discharges shall be grounded when
> such discharge would create an unsafe situation. Tank cars, storage
> tanks, connecting pipes, hose lines, and nozzles shall be bonded
> together prior to the loading or unloading of flammable materials.
> Where propellants are stored or handled, facilities shall be provided
> for personnel to dissipate static charges from their person.
>
> a\. Personnel Grounding
>
> Personnel grounding devices (e.g., legstats, wristats, conductive
> footware) shall be worn by all personnel handling Category A
> electro-explosive devices (EED) when the Faraday caps are removed, or
> installing Category B items on/in units that will be Category A when
> the installation is complete, or when working within five (5) feet of
> exposed solid grain. When using legstats, personnel must stand on a
> conductive surface and use legstats in pairs to ensure one foot
> remains in contact with the ground at all times. Personnel required to
> wear these devices shall ensure resistance checks are performed using
> a conductive shoe tester prior to operations. The resistance measured
> from facility ground to the wearer must be between 10,000 ohms and 1
> megohm. Reverification of grounding will be necessary if personnel
> remove their conductive shoes, legstats, wristats, or leave the
> immediate area where the operation is taking place. The grounding
> devices shall be removed upon leaving the ordnance operation area.
> Personnel will exercise caution to avoid all electrical sources when
> wearing personal grounding devices.
>
> b\. Grounding of Flight Hardware
>
> \(1\) The Orbiter shall be electrically grounded at all times.
>
> \(2\) After moving an External Tank (ET) between the Turn Basin and
> the Vehicle Assembly Building (VAB), the ET transporter static ground
> strap shall be connected to VAB ground.
>
> \(3\) The forward assembly/aft skirt shall be connected to facility
> ground except when transporting. Forward assembly/aft skirt to pallet
> to transporter ground shall be maintained during moves.
>
> \(4\) A payload or canister containing explosives or hazardous fluids
> shall be grounded to facility ground upon arrival at the
> facility/handling mechanism.
>
> c\. Grounding of Tools, Equipment, and Materials
>
> \(1\) Pneumatic (air motor) tools used on hardware containing EEDs,
> within 10 feet of open grain, or in petroleum/oil/lubricant areas
> shall be fitted with a conductive air supply hose or be connected to
> facility ground. Conductive air supply hoses shall be included in a
> scheduled preventive maintenance program that shall test and verify
> continuity.
>
> \(2\) The Solid Rocket Motor (SRM) transporter shall be grounded to
> facility ground at all times when moving in or out from under a
> segment. When moving a loaded segment, the transporter shall be
> grounded prior to entering (or until after exiting) a building. The
> transporter shall not enter a building at the Rotation, Processing,
> and Surge Facility (RPSF) without being grounded. Segment to pallet to
> transporter ground shall be maintained during moves.
>
> \(3\) All material in contact with open grain shall be grounded.
>
> \(4\) For horizontal SRM segment grain inspection the first pad shall
> be grounded prior to installation. Subsequent pads shall be butted/
> overlapped to ensure electrical continuity of pads.
>
> \(5\) Conductive plastic sheeting (velostat) shall be placed on
> railcar surface at entrance to the bore. Sheeting shall be grounded to
> common ground with railcar prior to installation.
>
> d\. Grounding During Hoisting of Flight Hardware
>
> \(1\) When explosives and/or flammable fluids are involved, electrical
> grounding shall be required as follows:
>
> \(a\) Ground crane hook to facility ground (same potential as the
> load) before connecting to the load.
>
> \(b\) Use bonding strap from load to hook when satisfactory contact
> (continuity) is not obtained.
>
> \(c\) The ground may be disconnected after the load is lifted clear of
> its supporting structure, but shall be reconnected to facility ground
> as soon as possible while the load is still suspended.
>
> \(d\) The final ground attachment/detachment shall be at least 10 feet
> away from any open grain/explosives.
>
> \(e\) Voltage checks on the crane hooks shall be performed prior to
> lifting flight hardware containing explosives. The voltage shall not
> exceed 100-mV direct current (dc) and 100-mV alternating current (ac)
> Root-Mean-Square (RMS) measured across a 1-ohm resistor. The voltage
> checks shall be performed while operating the crane; all crane motions
> shall be checked. Crane hook voltage checks shall not be required for
> lifting of other hazardous commodities providing the crane hook and
> load are properly grounded.
>
> \(2\) All grounding devices shall be checked to ensure proper
> resistance prior to payload canister lift.

**2.0 [THREE-PHASE POWER CONNECTIONS]{.underline}**

> a\. Three-phase power sequencing shall be verified in each KSC
> facility prior to connection, including after facility modification or
> outages.

b.  The phasing of the power source shall be verified prior to each
    closure of the payload canister transporter shore power contactor
    switch. The phasing of the payload canister transporter systems and
    subsystems shall be verified upon first use or component
    replacement.

**ANNEX E**

######## **KSC SUPPLEMENT TO NPD 8710.5, NASA SAFETY POLICY FOR**

**PRESSURE VESSELS AND PRESSURIZED SYSTEMS**

**1.0 [PREFACE]{.underline}**

> This Annex is issued to assign responsibilities and provide
> instructions for the design; certification, recertification, inservice
> inspection, and documentation required for ground-based pressure
> vessels and pressurized systems. The provisions of this Annex apply to
> all KSC organizational elements and to their associated contractors
> and subcontractors. This Annex defines organizational
> responsibilities, defines items excluded from certification
> requirements, contains specific criteria for inspection, analysis,
> documentation, testing, nondestructive examinations, marking and
> labeling of pressure vessels and pressurized systems, and provides
> reporting data input requirements.
>
> Authority for this annex is NASA Policy Directive (NPD) 8710.5, Safety
> Program for Pressure Vessels and Pressurized Systems.

**2.0 [DEFINITIONS]{.underline}**

> Pressure Vessel/Systems (PV/S)-related definitions are included (and
> annotated) in the Glossary.

**3.0 [POLICY]{.underline}**

> It is KSC policy that all ground-based Pressure Vessels and
> Pressurized Systems (PV/S) which are not excluded per Appendix A of
> this Annex, shall be certified/recertified in accordance with ASME,
> Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section VIII, Divisions 1 and 2, ASME
> Code for Pressure Piping, B31.3, and National Board Inspection Code,
> ANSI/NB-23. Additionally, all pressure vessels and pressurized systems
> shall comply with KSC design standards KSC-STD-Z-0005 through
> KSC-STD-Z-0009. All High PV/S shall be safe to operate and be subject
> to Inservice Inspection (ISI) and periodic recertification to maintain
> personnel and equipment safety. The following criteria applies:

a.  All new PV/S shall be designed, fabricated, installed, operated,
    maintained, certified, and recertified in accordance with applicable
    codes, standards, and guides. For existing PV/S which does not
    conform to these codes, standards, and guides. Supplemental
    analyses, tests, and examinations shall be performed to ensure that
    the safety of personnel, equipment, and facilities is not
    compromised.

b.  Periodic inspection and maintenance activities shall be specified
    and documented throughout the usage history of the PV/S. Inspection
    procedures shall be developed on the basis of established codes and
    standards or as the result of engineering evaluation.

c.  Vessels and systems on standby/contingency, either with or without
    pressure, should be treated as if they are in continuous service,
    and the certification of such PV/S shall be maintained to conform to
    expected service conditions.

d.  New pressure vessels or systems shall be certified in accordance
    with the requirements in this Annex.

**4.0 [APPLICABILITY AND SCOPE]{.underline}**

This Annex applies to all KSC program/project or directorate
organizational elements, KSC contractors/subcontractors, and to all
other personnel who design, own, or operate pressure vessel or
pressurized system at KSC, or on property managed by KSC.

**5.0 [RESPONSIBILITIES]{.underline}**

a.  Heads of Primary Organizations

> Heads of program/project or directorate organizations having Design,
> Operation and Maintenance (O&M), or sustaining engineering
> responsibility, are responsible for ensuring that:

(1) Design and modification of pressurized systems for use at KSC, or
    where KSC has design, O&M, or sustaining engineering responsibility
    are in accordance with current codes, standards, and guidelines.

(2) Necessary documentation to support the certification program is
    received for all new pressure vessels, pressurized systems, and all
    systems being modified, and that such documentation is transmitted
    to cognizant O&M organizations and to the KSC Pressure Systems
    Manager (PSM) via Document Release Authorization (DRA).

(3) Field surveys are performed to verify PV/S are properly categorized
    and included or excluded in the PV/S certification program, as
    appropriate.

(4) An inventory database is updated and maintained for pressure vessels
    and systems.

(5) A data management system is established for maintaining files
    containing the documentation required to certify each vessel or
    system.

(6) All PV/S are marked or labeled for traceability in the certification
    program.

(7) Review of existing documentation is performed to determine
    suitability to support certification, and missing documentation is
    obtained or developed.

(8) A 20--year ISI plan is developed and implemented.

(9) A certification report describing all of the steps involved, along
    with the rationale for certifying pressure vessels and systems for
    continued service is provided.

(10) Training requirements for personnel working on pressure vessels and
     systems are established.

(11) An individual is assigned to represent the program/project or
     directorate organization in all matters relating to the PV/S
     certification program and is identified to the PSM per a letter
     assigning the individual to the Pressure Vessels/Systems Committee.

> NOTE: The above responsibilities do not apply to the Director of
> International Space Station/Payload Processing for payload-associated
> Ground Support Equipment (GSE) supplied by other NASA centers and
> government agencies. This equipment is covered by KSC Handbook (KHB)
> 1700.7 or Eastern Western Range (EWR) 127-1.

b.  KSC Pressure Systems Manager (PSM)

> The PSM is responsible for:

(1) Assuring that necessary documentation to support the certification
    program is maintained on all systems owned or operated by KSC or its
    contractors.

(2) Reviewing and approving PV/S certification criteria for special
    cases not covered in this Annex: reviewing certification
    implementation schedules, defining required documentation, analysis,
    inspection, testing, nondestructive examination, and reporting
    requirements for pressure vessels and pressurized systems.

(3) Evaluating exclusion criteria and approving exclusions other than
    those listed in this Annex.

(4) Reviewing disposition (i.e., derate, rerate, repair, scrap) of all
    pressure vessels or systems that do not meet inspection or testing
    requirements.

(5) Reviewing, as necessary, hazardous and nonhazardous inspection and
    test procedures utilized by the certification program, to assure
    adequacy of safety considerations.

(6) Reviewing and approving supplemental analysis, tests, procedures,
    and examinations, as necessary.

(7) Evaluating proposed waivers, deviations, and variances involving
    PV/S, covered by the certification program.

(8) Maintaining a baseline inventory/status of all PV/S for which KSC
    has design or operational responsibility.

(9) Reviewing, evaluating, and have readily available all PV/S
    certification reports.

**6.0** **[GENERAL PRESSURE VESSEL AND PRESSURE SYSTEMS
(PV/S)]{.underline}**

> a\. Ground-based PV/S listed in Appendix A of this Annex shall be
> exempt from the requirements of this Annex.
>
> b\. Existing PV/S not conforming to this handbook shall have
> supplemental analyses, tests, and examinations performed to meet the
> intent of ASME.
>
> c\. A vessel or system that has been de-rated shall be re-rated to the
> original or new operational parameters only after appropriate testing,
> examination, repair, alteration, modification, documentation, and
> engineering analysis.
>
> d\. Inactive vessels or systems being placed in service shall be
> recertified when any of the following conditions exist:
>
> \(1\) The vessel or system is to be used at a higher or lower
> temperature, or at a higher pressure, than specified in the original
> design.
>
> \(2\) The vessel or system shows visible indication of deterioration
> from corrosion or improper handling.
>
> \(3\) The vessel or system has not been certified per the requirements
> of this Annex.
>
> \(4\) There is a change in service conditions that would require that
> a new inspection interval be developed.
>
> \(5\) The vessel or system has been altered, repaired, modified, or
> reconfigured to the extent that any previous certification is
> invalidated.
>
> e\. Vessels and systems on standby/contingency, either with or without
> pressure, shall be treated as if they are in continuous service and
> the certification of such PV/S shall be maintained to conform to
> expect service conditions.
>
> f\. Initial certification shall be given only after all known
> safety-related discrepancies have been corrected.
>
> g\. Program/project or directorate organizations that process
> spacecraft, missiles or launch vehicle systems with one or more
> Graphite/Epoxy (Gr/Ep) Composite Overwrapped Pressure Vessels (COPVs)
> shall be required to submit data that demonstrates the requirements in
> Appendix B have been met.
>
> h\. When systems of different pressure ratings are connected, a relief
> device shall protect each section of the system. In those cases where
> the maximum regulator inlet pressure exceeds the design pressure of
> the section downstream of the regulator, the relief device shall be
> set no higher than the design pressure and be sized to prevent the
> pressure from rising more than 10 percent above the design pressure.
>
> i\. Systems requiring a pressure regulator and/or a pressure relief
> device or both shall not be operated unless such components are in
> place and properly set.
>
> j\. Pressure systems shall always be depressurized before
> disconnection, repairs, or replacements are attempted.
>
> k\. When a pressure system is opened for maintenance or other purposes
> and a segment is capped, an engineering analysis shall be performed to
> determine whether pressure relief capability needs to be added to the
> capped segment. If a previous assessment of the system has been
> performed, a new engineering assessment shall be required only if the
> configuration has changed. Relief capacity shall be added or other
> measures taken, to prevent over pressurization.
>
> l\. Only portable, Department of Transportation (DOT) certified
> bottles/vessels shall be transported under pressure.
>
> m\. PV/S shall be exposed only to those fluids that have been
> demonstrated to be compatible with the vessel or system materials.
>
> n\. Metallic and nonmetallic flex hoses shall be assembled, connected
> and disconnected in accordance with the manufacturer's specifications
> and recommendations. Rated working pressure for all flex hose
> assemblies shall not exceed 25 percent of the manufacturer's specified
> minimum burst pressure.
>
> o\. Flex hose Restraint Requirements
>
> \(1\) Nonmetallic Hoses
>
> Hoses over 0.6 meters (2 feet) in length, pressurized to 1.03 MPa
> (gage) \[150 lb/in^2^ (gage)\] or higher, shall be restrained at each
> end by an approved stainless restraint device (Figure E-1). A hose
> containment grip (Figure E-2) shall be installed across each
> intermediate union or splice on hoses over 1.2 meters (4 feet) in
> length. Adequacy of the structure to which hose end restraints are
> attached shall be determined by engineering.
>
> Restraint requirements are not required for:

(a) Hoses in systems where rapid pressure depletion will prevent

> whipping.
>
> \(b\) Hoses contained by surrounding structure that can provide
> protection to personnel and hardware.
>
> \(c\) Hoses outward from the end of swing arms, tail service masts,
> etc., to flight vehicle interfaces.
>
> \(2\) Metallic Hoses
>
> Hose restraint, other than that which is provided by the fluid system
> piping to which the hose is connected, shall not be required if the
> manufacturing, testing, and inspection requirements of this Annex are
> adhered to.

**7.0** **[DOCUMENTATION REQUIREMENTS]{.underline}**

> The Contractor program/project or directorate organization shall
> prepare and maintain certification files for each vessel or system
> under its jurisdiction. The following documentation shall be required
> and shall either be retained in the permanent PV/S certification file
> or be identified and retrievable from appropriate engineering
> documentation centers:
>
> a\. Pressure Vessels
>
> \(1\) Manufacturer's drawings: The drawings shall be either certified
> shop fabrication drawings or as-built drawings. The drawings shall
> contain the following:
>
> \(a\) Manufacturer's name and address.
>
> \(b\) Date of manufacture (see vessel nameplate).
>
> \(c\) Dimensions and details of construction.
>
> \(d\) Design and operating conditions, including service fluid,
> operating temperature, and MAWP.
>
> \(e\) Material thickness (head, shell, etc.).
>
> \(f\) Material corrosion allowance.
>
> \(g\) Identification of materials, including types of alloys, tensile
> properties, and impact properties.
>
> \(h\) Efficiency of weld joints.
>
> \(i\) Nondestructive Examination (NDE) performed.
>
> \(j\) Types of pressure tests performed.
>
> \(2\) Design calculations - Design calculations for pressure vessels
> shall include MAWP, temperature, wind, vibration, and any other
> applicable loading.
>
> \(3\) Manufacturer's data report(s) - (ASME Forms U-1, U-1A, U-2,
> U-2A, U-3, U-4, A-1, A-2, A-3 as applicable.)
>
> \(4\) Inspection, examination, and test records.
>
> \(5\) Facsimile of nameplate stamping.
>
> b\. Pressure Systems
>
> \(1\) End-to-end system drawings, including schematics, which show (as
> a minimum) system operating pressures, safety device set pressures,
> and line sizes and wall thickness of piping or tubing. Part numbers
> traceable to the manufacturer shall identify all pressurized
> components. For existing systems where components cannot be positively
> identifiable, such components shall only remain in service, provided a
> review of fabrication and installation drawings, maintenance records,
> manufacturer's data, etc., verifies proper components are installed.
>
> \(2\) KSC component specification drawing, component maintenance
> drawing, or equivalent, or vendor data for each unique pressurized
> component in the system suitable for verifying pressure rating,
> materials of construction, flow parameters, operating characteristics,
> and relief device capacity to maintain system pressure within ASME
> Code allowable limits.
>
> \(3\) Approved operating or preventive maintenance procedures that
> describe requirements for periodic system maintenance and testing,
> relief device and pressure gage setting and calibration criteria, and
> flex hose inspection and test criteria.
>
> c\. Repaired, Altered, or Modified Systems and/or Vessels
>
> \(1\) Alterations or repairs to vessels and system modifications shall
> be thoroughly documented in the appropriate system certification file.
>
> \(2\) Vessel alteration or repair documentation shall include
> calculations, drawings, specifications, NDE reports, and other
> pertinent documentation, as applicable.
>
> \(3\) Any vessel or system that is altered, repaired or modified shall
> be recertified. A revised certification report shall be issued that
> describes the alterations, repairs, or modifications.

**8.0** **[TESTING REQUIREMENTS]{.underline}**

> a\. General
>
> \(1\) All new, repaired, or modified systems or portions thereof,
> shall be pressure and leak tested prior to activation. Testing of
> pressure systems shall be in accordance with applicable system and
> equipment technical manuals.
>
> \(2\) Leaks shall not be repaired when a system is under pressure or
> the test fluid has not been drained.
>
> \(3\) A test record for each pressure vessel shall include the
> manufacturer's data (e.g., design specification, applicable code for
> design, test/inspection criteria, operating instructions, location of
> any dimensional check points, and installation information).
>
> b\. Nonflight Pressure Vessel
>
> New pressure vessels shall be pressure tested by the manufacturer in
> accordance with the applicable code. For ASME Code vessels, this test
> shall be one time only. All repairs, alterations and retest of ASME
> Code vessels shall be in accordance with American National Standards
> Institute (ANSI)/NB-23. Vessels designed per 49 Code of Federal
> Regulations (CFR) shall retest in accordance with 49 CFR requirements.
> Where 49 CFR regulations do not specify retest, a retest procedure
> shall be developed.
>
> c\. Flight Vehicle Vessels and Systems
>
> Pressure vessels and systems that have been pressurized to operating
> pressure as complete systems prior to delivery to KSC shall not
> require further testing as part of the receiving inspection/
> acceptance activity. Documented evidence of such previous tests shall
> accompany the vessel/system. Retest shall be performed only as
> specified in approved Technical Operating Procedure (TOP).
>
> \(1\) Flight Vehicle Fracture Mechanics Controlled Vessels and Systems
>
> \(a\) Space Shuttle Program/International Space Station (SSP/ISS)
> Pressure vessels that are controlled by Fracture Mechanics Plans shall
> be tested/pressurized to levels specified in the appropriate Fracture
> Mechanics Plan and JSC 08934, "Shuttle Operational Data Book," Volume
> I, "Shuttle Systems Performance and Constraints Data."

(b) Pressure vessels and systems shall be processed through turnaround
    flow at temperature adjusted operating pressures, only if the
    operating pressures are sufficiently below the threshold pressures
    to avoid subcritical flaw growth, as allowed by the applicable
    Fracture Mechanics Plan. The MAWP shall be specified in the
    applicable operating procedure.

(c) Fracture Mechanics controlled vessels/ systems shall be pressurized
    to operating pressures, using specified liquids/gases, without
    remote controls, only if the vessels/systems have been previously
    pressurized to operating pressure levels.

> 1\. A logbook shall be maintained on each Fracture Mechanics
> controlled pressure vessel/system processed at KSC. The log shall
> identify how many times the vessel/system has been pressurized, the
> pressure levels, liquids/gases used, duration of the pressure cycles,
> and any other pertinent data. The log shall also identify the total
> number of cycles for which the vessel/system was designed.
>
> 2\. A logbook shall be maintained for each PV/S processed at KSC. The
> log shall identify how many times the vessel/system has been
> pressurized, the pressurization levels, fluids used, duration of the
> pressure cycles, and any other pertinent data. The log shall also
> identify the design criteria used in fabricating the vessel/system.
>
> \(2\) Flight Vehicle Vessels Not Controlled By Fracture Mechanics

(a) PV/S shall not be pressurized above 50 percent of design burst
    pressure, adjusted for temperature.

> \(b\) PV/S shall be processed through turnaround flow at pressure
> levels not to exceed 50 percent of design burst pressure, adjusted for
> temperature, if warranted by operational considerations.
>
> \(c\) PV/S that have not been tested as a system prior to delivery to
> KSC shall require personnel evacuation and remote controls for the
> initial (first-time) pressurization and for any subsequent
> pressurization that will exceed the highest level of pressure reached
> during previous testing as a system.
>
> \(d\) PV/S shall be pressurized using fluids specified in JSC 08934,
> "Shuttle Operational Data Book," Volume I, "Shuttle Systems
> Performance and Constraints Data." Pressurization levels specified
> herein shall not exceed those specified in JSC 08934, Volume I.
>
> \(3\) For flight vehicle systems utilizing both fracture mechanics
> controlled and nonfracture mechanics controlled pressure vessels,
> pressurization at KSC shall be performed at pressure levels that do
> not exceed that allowed for the weakest link in the system. The lowest
> design pressure in the system shall be used as the basis for the
> pressure to be applied.
>
> \(4\) Any pressurization of systems or components above 25 percent of
> design burst will require a minimum 200-foot control area when the
> system or component contains hazardous fluids.
>
> d\. Flex hoses (Nonmetallic and Metallic)
>
> \(1\) Hydrostatic Test
>
> \(a\) Each hose assembly shall be hydrostatically tested to between 1½
> times to 2 times the design rated working pressure at the time of
> manufacture/ fabrication.
>
> \(b\) Hydrostatic retest of flex hoses is not required unless they are
> modified or repaired. Flex hoses shall be retested to verify the
> integrity of the modification or repair.
>
> \(2\) Leak Test
>
> \(a\) Permanently installed hoses used with toxic/lethal fluids,
> regardless of operating pressure, shall have the end fittings and
> intermediate splices leak tested, as a minimum, annually. The leak
> test shall be performed at the maximum system operating pressure using
> an inert gas.
>
> \(b\) Temporary use hoses used with toxic/lethal fluids, regardless of
> operating pressure, shall have the end fittings and intermediate
> splices leak tested, as a minimum, annually, at the design rated
> operating pressure of the hose using an inert gas.

**9.0** **[INSERVICE INSPECTION (ISI) AND TEST PLAN]{.underline}**

> a\. General
>
> \(1\) The operating organization shall develop a 20-year ISI and test
> plan in accordance with NASA Procedures and Guidelines (NPG) 1700.6,
> Guide for In-Service Inspection of Ground-Based Pressure Vessels and
> Systems.
>
> \(2\) The ISI plan shall be developed based on the evaluation of the
> documentation, field inspection results, NDE results, and the
> engineering evaluation.
>
> \(3\) When a 20-year ISI plan has been prepared by a previous
> operating organization, the current operating organization shall be
> responsible for implementing and updating the ISI plan.
>
> b\. Plan Reporting and Documentation
>
> \(1\) The ISI plan shall be presented in either a tabular or matrix
> format in the certification report. A sample ISI Form is shown in
> Figure E-3.
>
> \(2\) The ISI plan shall provide development rationale in the
> certification report.
>
> c\. Plan Implementation and Tracking
>
> \(1\) It shall be permissible to conduct the ISI in conjunction with
> routine system maintenance, where appropriate.
>
> \(2\) A tracking system shall be established to ensure that all
> required inspections and tests are completed on schedule.

**10.0** **[INSPECTION REQUIREMENTS]{.underline}**

> a\. The following shall be required for the inspection of KSC Pressure
> Vessels:
>
> \(1\) Proper setting and flow capacity of relief device(s) associated
> with the vessel shall be verified.
>
> \(2\) Vessels designed for permanent installation shall be reinspected
> anytime they are moved to a different location.
>
> \(3\) Perform visual examination of vessels on a case-by-case basis,
> at an interval developed from NPG 1700.6A criteria. For vessels at
> space vehicle launch pads or other locations that are subject to
> severe environmental conditions, including exposure to solid rocket
> exhaust products, shock, and vibration from the launch environment,
> the external visual examination interval shall not exceed two years.
> For other vessels not exposed to such extreme conditions, the external
> visual examination interval may be extended to no more than 5 years.
> The examination interval for hydraulic accumulators shall not exceed 5
> years. Vessels manufactured in accordance with 49 CFR regulations
> shall be inspected as defined in 49 CFR, or in accordance with an
> approved inspection plan in the event 49 CFR does not specify periodic
> visual inspection. The inspection interval for 49 CFR vessels shall
> not exceed 1 year.
>
> \(4\) Perform verification of head and shell wall thickness
> periodically, on a case-by-case basis, considering the service fluid,
> operational environment, and projected service life. In no case shall
> the verification interval exceed 20 years.
>
> NOTE: Cryogenic (jacketed) vessels and other insulated storage vessels
> are exempt from the visual examination requirements, provided the
> pressure retaining boundary is protected from corrosion and leakage is
> not indicated.
>
> b\. Pressure Systems
>
> \(1\) Perform visual examination of all components on a case-by-case
> basis, at an interval developed from NPG 1700.6A criteria, but in no
> case shall the interval exceed 5 years.
>
> \(2\) Perform periodic verification of pipe and tube wall thickness,
> on a case-by-case basis, considering the service fluid, operating
> environment, and projected service life. In no case shall the
> verification interval exceed 20 years.

(3) Maintain verification that relief valves, pressure gages, and flex
    hoses are in a periodic inspection or recall program. Frequency of
    inspection or recall is to be based on design and safety standards,
    codes, and severity of service.

> \(4\) Verify system operating pressures, relief device settings, line
> sizes, and wall thickness, and component pressure ratings are in
> accordance with approved documentation.
>
> \(5\) Verify that all components and piping and tubing are properly
> identified. Also verify from vendor drawings or data sheets that all
> components have been hydrostatically or pneumatically tested.
>
> c\. All system and vessel examination intervals specified above are
> the maximum allowed. When service and environmental conditions, age,
> and additional concerns arise during analysis and evaluation, a more
> frequent examination interval may be established. This could result in
> a shorter recertification interval than would be developed for a
> similar PV/S with no identified concerns.
>
> d\. All changes in service fluids, operating pressure or temperature,
> all repair records, and conditions found during inspections shall be
> included. The inspection record must show as a minimum, MAWP, the last
> date of inspection, and hydrostatic/pneumatic test pressure, and test
> date(s).
>
> e\. Flex hoses
>
> \(1\) Permanently Installed Hoses
>
> \(a\) All permanently installed flex hoses that operate at 1.03 MPa
> (gage) \[150 lb/in^2^ (gage)\] or higher pressure shall be visually
> inspected over their entire length annually, as a minimum, for damaged
> fittings, broken braid, kinks, flattened areas, or other evidence of
> degradation.

(b) All permanently installed flex hoses used with toxic/lethal fluids,
    regardless of operating pressure, shall be externally, visually
    inspected over their entire length annually, as a minimum, for
    damaged fittings, broken braid, kinks, flattened areas, or other
    evidence of degradation.

> \(c\) All nonmetallic hoses used for N~2~H~4~, MMH or N~2~O~4~ service
> shall be internally, visually inspected for any indication of the hose
> liner blistering, after one-year cumulative exposure to any of these
> fluids.
>
> \(2\) Temporary-Use Hoses
>
> \(a\) All temporary-use flex hoses used with toxic/lethal fluids,
> regardless of operating pressure, shall be inspected over their entire
> length prior to use.
>
> \(b\) All other temporary-use flex hoses that operate at 1.03 MPa
> (gage) \[150 lb/in^2^ (gage)\] or higher pressure shall be externally,
> visually inspected over their entire length prior to use.
>
> \(c\) All nonmetallic hoses used for N~2~H~4~, MMH, or N~2~O~4~
> service shall be internally, visually inspected for any indication of
> hose liner blistering after one-year cumulative exposure to any of
> these fluids.

**11.0** **[NONDESTRUCTIVE EXAMINATION (NDE)]{.underline}**

> An NDE shall be performed to supplement the inspection of both
> pressure vessels and systems.
>
> a\. Although the total NDE required for each system and vessel shall
> be determined by analysis, the following are required for each PV/S:

(1) Visual examination of each vessel for evidence of damage, flaws,
    cracks, unacceptable welds, corrosion, excessive heat, etc.,

> \(2\) Visual examination of the system piping, supports, and
> components for evidence of damage, flaws, cracks, unacceptable welds,
> corrosion, excessive heat, etc.,
>
> NOTE: If questionable areas are found during the Visual Examination,
> further examination by NDE techniques shall be performed using
> techniques that do not compromise vessel or system integrity.
>
> \(3\) Ultrasonic Testing-Thickness (UT-THK) of the vessel to verify
> that current head and wall thickness meets or exceeds the design
> thickness.
>
> b\. In pressure systems containing identical vessels, an NDE of a
> sample of the vessels most likely to experience a service-induced
> problem shall be allowed.

**12.0** **[MARKING/IDENTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS]{.underline}**

> Marking and labeling requirements shall conform to the applicable
> design specifications, codes, standards, and fabrication and
> installation drawings. ASME Code terminology shall continue to be used
> until metric units are incorporated into the ASME Code.
>
> a\. Components
>
> Pressure vessels, valves, and other components shall have nameplates
> providing the MAWP, temperature range, capacity, materials, contained
> media, item number, and other identifications. Vessels and components
> shall be identified by unique identifiers (find numbers) traceable to
> the mechanical schematic drawing (refer to GP-435, Volume 1,
> paragraphs 2.5.2 and 6.6.1). All components included in periodic
> recall shall be labeled to indicate next due date.
>
> b\. Portable and Mobile Pressure Systems
>
> KSC owned portable and mobile pressure vessels and systems shall be
> marked in accordance with KSC Drawing 81K04331, "Specification for
> Marking of Propellant Portable Containers," or in accordance with KSC
> Drawing 81K00643, "Specification for Marking of Mobile GSE." Other
> portable and mobile pressure systems shall be marked in accordance
> with 49 CFR requirements for hazardous materials.
>
> c\. Relief Valves
>
> Each relief valve shall be labeled to include the following: Set
> pressure in psig, date (month/year) valve was set or calibrated, and
> next due date. The pressure shown shall be the nominal pressure,
> exclusive of any tolerance, specified by appropriate engineering
> directive.
>
> d\. Flex hoses
>
> All flex hose assemblies in use shall have corrosion-resistant metal
> tag(s) attached that bears the following information as a minimum:
>
> \(1\) Date(s) (month and year) of hydrostatic and inspection/leak
> tests, including due date for the next inspection/leak test.
>
> \(2\) Manufacturer's name and part number and/or KSC part number.
>
> \(3\) Rated working pressure.
>
> \(4\) S/N, if applicable.
>
> \(5\) Service fluid. (This marking shall be legible at all times the
> hose is in use.)
>
> NOTE: Commercial off-the-shelf equipment which contains flex hoses,
> and is approved by Underwriter\'s Laboratory (UL), National Institute
> for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH), or other safety certifying
> organizations, shall be exempt from these requirements.
>
> e\. Nonflight Pressure Vessels
>
> The MAWP and the name of the service fluid shall be shown in a
> conspicuous location on all nonflight pressure vessels except as
> covered in Section 7.0 of this Annex and herein. Where multiple
> vessels are grouped together to store the same fluid at the same
> pressure, only the most conspicuous vessel in the group shall be
> labeled. The marking shall be legible at a distance of 16 meters (50
> feet).
>
> f\. In addition, each certified pressure vessel shall have a
> brass/stainless steel tag permanently affixed or stenciled as near as
> possible to the original manufacturer's nameplate, bearing the
> following information as a minimum: "KSC PV/S CERTIFICATION PROGRAM,
> CERTIFIED MAWP xxxx psig," and "EFFECTIVE DATE (month and year)."

**13.0** **[ENGINEERING ANALYSIS]{.underline}**

> The program/project or directorate organization shall perform an
> engineering analysis to determine the disposition of the system or
> vessel(s). Possible choices for disposition include:
>
> a\. Certifying the system or vessel(s) for continued operation.
>
> b\. Certifying the system or vessel(s) for continued operation with
> specific restrictions imposed.
>
> c\. Re-rating or de-rating the system or vessel(s) for operation at a
> new pressure or temperature.
>
> d\. Replacing components or portions of the system, after which it may
> be certified for continued operation.
>
> e\. Removing the system or vessel(s) from service.

**13.0** **[REPAIRS, ALTERATIONS, OR MODIFICATIONS]{.underline}**

> a\. System Modifications or Repairs
>
> \(1\) All modifications, alterations, or repairs to certified systems
> shall
>
> Comply with the National Board of Inspection, NB-23 and KSC
>
> Design Standards, KSC-STD-Z-0005 through KSC-STD-Z-009.
>
> \(2\) The program/project or directorate organization's designated
> PV/S Program representative shall review all system modifications,
> before work is initiated.
>
> \(3\) System files and reports shall be updated to reflect
> modifications, alterations, and repairs.
>
> b\. Vessel Repairs or Alterations
>
> \(1\) All alterations or repairs shall conform to the ASME Boiler and
> Pressure Vessel Code or other applicable code(s). An R-stamp shall be
> required for ASME Code-stamped vessels, and R-stamp equivalent
> documentation shall be required for noncoded vessels.
>
> \(2\) The program/project or directorate organization's designated
> PV/S Program representative shall review all vessel alterations or
> repairs before work is initiated.
>
> c\. Nondestructive Examination (NDE)
>
> \(1\) Modified systems shall be examined in accordance with the
> requirements of ASME B31.3, to verify the integrity of the
> modification. This examination shall include a pressure test per ASME
> B31.3. Only the modified part of the system shall require examination.
>
> \(2\) Altered pressure vessels shall be pressure tested per the
> requirements of ANSI/NB-23. Repaired pressure vessels
> [may]{.underline} require a pressure test per ANSI/NB-23. See
> ANSI/NB-23, for pressure test criteria.
>
> \(3\) NDE for altered or repaired vessels shall be performed in
> accordance with ANSI/NB-23.
>
> \(4\) Alterations or repairs to vessels in lethal fluid service shall
> require all new butt welds to be radiographed in accordance with the
> requirements of ASME Code, Section VIII, Division 1, Paragraph UW-2
> (a).

**15.0** **[INACTIVE AND UNSAFE VESSELS AND SYSTEMS]{.underline}**

> a\. Inactive Vessels/Systems
>
> \(1\) For each inactive vessel/system, the following information shall
> be submitted to the PSM within 90 days after removal from service:

(a) Facility location (number and name) obtained from

> KSC-GP-14-2.
>
> \(b\) Service fluid.
>
> \(c\) Pressure Vessel/System drawing Identification (ID) number.
>
> \(d\) Manufacturer's name and date of manufacture.
>
> \(e\) Vessel's Serial Numbers (S/N).
>
> \(f\) MAWP or design pressure.
>
> \(g\) Facility O&M organization.
>
> \(h\) Vessel capacity.
>
> \(i\) Code stamping.
>
> \(j\) Certification date.
>
> \(k\) Certification report number.
>
> \(l\) Associated system baseline number.
>
> \(m\) Normal operating pressure, temperature, and pressure cycle.
>
> \(2\) A copy of this information shall be maintained in the respective
> vessel or system documentation file.
>
> \(3\) Inactive vessels and systems shall be stenciled or otherwise
> labeled
>
> "**INACTIVE-CERTIFY BEFORE REUSE.**"
>
> b\. Unsafe Vessels or Systems
>
> \(1\) When a vessel/system is determined to be unsafe for further use,
> it shall be deactivated and prepared for disposal, in accordance with
> KSC Handbook (KHB 4000.1).
>
> \(2\) Each unsafe vessel/system shall be physically disabled and shall
> be stenciled:
>
> "**NOT USABLE - FOR DISPOSAL ONLY.**"
>
> \(3\) A report shall be submitted to the PSM describing the disposal
> procedure. The procedure should address:
>
> \(a\) Disposal method (scrapping, transfer to Government surplus, or
> abandon in place).
>
> \(b\) Method for flushing the vessel or system of any toxic or
> hazardous substance.
>
> \(c\) Guidelines for handling hazardous or toxic residuals.
>
> \(d\) Vessel manufacturer's nameplate data, system baseline number,
> drawing number, or other identifying nomenclature.

**16.0** **[CERTIFICATION/RECERTIFICATION DEFINITIONS AND
REQUIREMENTS]{.underline}**

a.  Certification:

> \(1\) Certification is the documented status that qualifies a vessel
> or system to operate in the service for which it is intended.
>
> \(2\) The Certification Report is a collection of official
> documentation developed through nondestructive tests, inspections,
> analysis, and examinations that qualifies a pressurized vessel or
> system to operate at its design pressure. The certification report
> shall be required for each system or vessel and shall describe the
> steps involved in the certification along with rationale for
> certification. This report shall be revised as necessary to maintain
> an up to date record of certification activities.
>
> \(3\) Copies of all certification reports shall be provided to the PSM
> for review and retention. Each certification report (including
> revisions) shall be approved by the organization PV/S Certification
> Program representative and shall be issued through appropriate DRA.
>
> \(4\) The following information, as a minimum, shall be required in
> the certification report:
>
> \(a\) System Description: Identification of the major components and a
> brief description of the operation and configuration of the system.
> Photographs and drawings may be used as required. System endpoints or
> boundaries shall be clearly defined.
>
> \(b\) Documentation Summary: Description of the documentation
> available, identifying nomenclature, its location, accuracy, and
> identification of significant discrepancies.
>
> \(c\) Design Verification Results: Description of the system and
> vessel design verification effort, identifying applicable codes and
> standards, input data, and significant findings.
>
> \(d\) Engineering Work Packages: Description of documentation issued
> for inspection and tests and description of any repairs and
> modifications required for PV/S certification.
>
> \(e\) Inspection and Test Results: Summary of the tests and
> nondestructive examinations performed, including visual inspections.
> Unacceptable results should be described in detail.
>
> \(f\) Engineering Analysis: Summary of all significant engineering
> analysis Performed, including results of calculations, analysis of
> inspection results, and special engineering analysis performed.
>
> \(g\) Certification Summary: Complete summary of the
>
> Pressure Vessels/Systems certification effort and final disposition of
> the system and components.
>
> \(h\) ISI Requirements: The 20-year ISI plan, including inspections
> and tests to be performed, and the frequency, for the system and
> individual components. ISI guidelines are established in NPG 1700.6A.
> A discussion of the purpose and extent of inspections identified shall
> also be provided.
>
> \(i\) Certification Certificate: Certificate, which indicates that
> system and vessel(s) comply with this Annex, except for non-safety-
> related discrepancies identified in the certification report. PV/S
> shall not be considered certified until all safety related hardware
> discrepancies are corrected.

b.  Recertification:

```{=html}
<!-- -->
```
(1) Recertification is the procedure by which previously certified
    vessels or systems are recertified for use at a designated pressure
    through appropriate tests, inspections, examinations, and
    documentation. Reference NPG 1700.6A for full details concerning the
    recertification process for in service pressure vessels and systems.

(2) Figure E--4 describes the logical recertification procedure for ISI
    equipment.

(3) Recertification Tests, Inspections and Examinations or
    Nondestructive Evaluation (NDE) will consist of, but not limited to
    the following:

```{=html}
<!-- -->
```
(a) Visual External (VE) examination of vessel(s) and system
    component(s) surfaces for subsequent documentation and correction of
    the following general conditions:

```{=html}
<!-- -->
```
1.  Corrosion

2.  Cracking

3.  Bulges or Blisters

4.  Leakage

5.  Excessive Vibration

6.  Abnormal Noise

7.  Overheating

8.  Vacuum Jacket Line Frost

9.  Loose Fasteners, Supports, or Misc. Parts

> VE requirement may be modified or waived if vessel/system component
> Preventive Maintenance (PM) is current and there are no long-standing
> open discrepant conditions from previous PM VE examinations.

(b) Ultrasonic (UT) measurements of vessel head, wall or

> End-bells for material thickness determination and subsequent
> engineering evaluation. UT requirements may be modified or waived in
> the case of multiple vessel clusters of banks where a random sample
> percentage of the vessels in a given group will be selected for UT
> measurement and subsequent evaluation.

**17.0 [PRESSURE VESSELS/SYSTEMS DATABASE]{.underline}**

> a\. General
>
> The KSC Pressure Systems Manager shall maintain an inventory and
> certification status database of all PV/S at KSC.
>
> b\. Data Requirements
>
> \(1\) Each program/project or directorate organization having
> responsibility for one or more pressure systems or vessels that are
> covered by this Annex shall provide the information, as shown in
> Figures E-4, and E-5, and E-6 to the PSM. Other formats may be
> acceptable provided all information in the figures is provided.
>
> \(2\) Each program/project or directorate organization shall submit
> updated data, at least quarterly.
>
> \(3\) Any changes shall be easily identifiable.

(4) This data may also be provided electronically.

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  height="6.717361111111111in"}

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<table>
<colgroup>
<col style="width: 4%" />
<col style="width: 0%" />
<col style="width: 8%" />
<col style="width: 1%" />
<col style="width: 10%" />
<col style="width: 11%" />
<col style="width: 9%" />
<col style="width: 0%" />
<col style="width: 0%" />
<col style="width: 7%" />
<col style="width: 2%" />
<col style="width: 1%" />
<col style="width: 10%" />
<col style="width: 10%" />
<col style="width: 10%" />
<col style="width: 1%" />
<col style="width: 8%" />
</colgroup>
<tbody>
<tr class="odd">
<td colspan="17"><p><strong>(SAMPLE)</strong></p>
<p><strong>INSERVICE INSPECTION (ISI) DATA SHEET</strong></p>
<p>System _____________________________________ Baseline No.
___________</p>
<p>Certification Report No. ___________________ Release Date
___/___/___</p></td>
</tr>
<tr class="even">
<td colspan="5"></td>
<td colspan="10"><p>ISI Requirements</p>
<p>Test Method Required at Time Intervals (Years)</p></td>
<td colspan="2"></td>
</tr>
<tr class="odd">
<td colspan="2"></td>
<td colspan="3"></td>
<td>Initial</td>
<td colspan="3">1</td>
<td colspan="3">2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>20</td>
<td colspan="2"></td>
</tr>
<tr class="even">
<td colspan="2"></td>
<td colspan="3">Vessels</td>
<td></td>
<td colspan="3"></td>
<td colspan="3"></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td colspan="2"></td>
</tr>
<tr class="odd">
<td colspan="2"></td>
<td colspan="3">Vessel Supports</td>
<td></td>
<td colspan="3"></td>
<td colspan="3"></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td colspan="2"></td>
</tr>
<tr class="even">
<td colspan="2"></td>
<td colspan="3">Piping System &amp; Components</td>
<td></td>
<td colspan="3"></td>
<td colspan="3"></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td colspan="2"></td>
</tr>
<tr class="odd">
<td colspan="2"></td>
<td colspan="3">Piping Supports</td>
<td></td>
<td colspan="3"></td>
<td colspan="3"></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td colspan="2"></td>
</tr>
<tr class="even">
<td colspan="2"></td>
<td colspan="3">Relief Valves</td>
<td></td>
<td colspan="3"></td>
<td colspan="3"></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td colspan="2"></td>
</tr>
<tr class="odd">
<td colspan="2"></td>
<td colspan="3">Pressure Gages</td>
<td></td>
<td colspan="3"></td>
<td colspan="3"></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td colspan="2"></td>
</tr>
<tr class="even">
<td colspan="2"></td>
<td colspan="3">Flexible Hoses</td>
<td></td>
<td colspan="3"></td>
<td colspan="3"></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td colspan="2"></td>
</tr>
<tr class="odd">
<td colspan="17">INSPECTION AND TEST METHODS</td>
</tr>
<tr class="even">
<td></td>
<td colspan="2">AET</td>
<td colspan="5">- Acoustic Emission Test</td>
<td colspan="2">C</td>
<td colspan="6">- Calibration</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr class="odd">
<td></td>
<td colspan="2">UT-THK</td>
<td colspan="5">- Ultrasonic Thickness Meas.</td>
<td colspan="2">PT</td>
<td colspan="6">- Liquid Dye Penetrant Exam.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr class="even">
<td></td>
<td colspan="2">VE</td>
<td colspan="5">- External Visual Exam.</td>
<td colspan="2">MT</td>
<td colspan="6">- Magnetic Particle Exam.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr class="odd">
<td></td>
<td colspan="2">VI</td>
<td colspan="5">- Internal Visual Exam.</td>
<td colspan="2">RS</td>
<td colspan="6">- Recall System</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr class="even">
<td></td>
<td colspan="2">UT-VOL</td>
<td colspan="5">- Ultrasonic Volumetric Test</td>
<td colspan="2">RT</td>
<td colspan="6">- Radiography</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr class="odd">
<td></td>
<td colspan="2">HPT</td>
<td colspan="5">- Hydrostatic Pressure Test</td>
<td colspan="2">R</td>
<td colspan="6">- Recertification Required.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr class="even">
<td></td>
<td colspan="2">PPT</td>
<td colspan="5">- Pneumatic Pressure Test</td>
<td colspan="2"></td>
<td colspan="6"></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr class="odd">
<td></td>
<td colspan="3"></td>
<td colspan="3"></td>
<td colspan="4"></td>
<td colspan="5"></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr class="even">
<td colspan="17"><p id="figure-e-3" class="heading"><strong>Figure
E-3</strong></p>
<p><strong>InService Inspection Requirements</strong></p></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

![](media/image5.wmf)

**(SAMPLE)**

**System Data Sheet**

Cert. Report No. \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ Rev.\_\_\_ Rev.
Date \_\_\_/\_\_\_/\_\_\_ Needs Rev? (Y/N) \_\_\_

System Description
\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

Location
\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

No. of Identical Systems in this Cert. \_\_\_\_\_ Facility Number(s)
\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

Baseline No. (B/L) \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ Station Set (SS) No.
\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

PMN (s) \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ ,
\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ ,
\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_,

\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ ,
\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ ,
\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

Orig. Cert. Report Date \_\_\_/\_\_\_/\_\_\_ System Status -
Active/Inactive (A/I) \_\_\_\_\_

System Certified Date \_\_\_/\_\_\_/\_\_\_ Certifying Organization
\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

Cert. Expiration Date \_\_\_/\_\_\_/\_\_\_ O & M Organization
\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

Service Fluid (s) \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ ISI Requirements
Defined? (Y/N) \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

System Design Pressure \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_(MPa or lb/in2 gage)

SMS Drawing Number(s) \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ ,
\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_,
\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_,

\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ ,
\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_,
\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

Number of Vessels in System \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ Number of Relief Devices
in System \_\_\_\_\_\_\_

Number of Gages in System \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ Number of Flex. Hoses
in System \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

Last Walkdown No. \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ Last Walkdown Date
\_\_\_/\_\_\_/\_\_\_

COMMENTS:
\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_
\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

**Figure E-5**

**System Data Requirements**

**(SAMPLE)**

**Vessel Data Sheet**

System Cert. Report No. \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_
Date \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

Vessel Find No. \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ PMN
\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

(or other unique designator)

Vessel Description
\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

KSC Instl. Dwg. No. \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ Mfgr.
Name \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

Mfgr. Dwg. No. \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_
Mfgr. S/N \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

ASME Code Stamp - Yes/No (Y/N) \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ Code
Section/Division \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

Year Built \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ Vessel Fluid Media
\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

Vessel Status-Active/Inactive/Scrapped/Excessed (A/I/S/X) \_\_\_\_\_

Vessel Water Volume \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_(m3 or ft3)

Certified Vessel MAWP \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_(MPa or lb/in2 gage)
at \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_(oC or oF)

Original MAWP \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_(MPa or lb/in2
gage) at \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_(oC or oF)

Min. Design Metal Temp. \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ (oC or oF) at
\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_(MPa or lb/in2 gage)

COMMENTS:

\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_

**Figure E-6**

######## **Vessel Data Requirements**

**APPENDIX A TO ANNEX E**

**ITEMS EXCLUDED FROM CERTIFICATION**

**1.0 [GENERAL]{.underline}**

> The items listed below shall be excluded from certification under this
> handbook. Their Inservice Inspections (ISIs) are covered by national
> consensus standards, other standards or guides, or they do not present
> sufficient hazard to require other than normal routine maintenance
> because of their low potential for failure, low risk, or low stored
> energy:
>
> a\. Fire Extinguishers: Covered by 29 CFR Part 1910, Subpart L:
>
> \(1\) Portable.
>
> \(2\) Standpipe and hose systems.
>
> \(3\) Automatic sprinkler systems.
>
> \(4\) Fixed dry chemical extinguishing systems.
>
> \(5\) Carbon dioxide extinguishing systems.
>
> \(6\) Halogenated extinguishing agent systems.
>
> b\. Heating Boilers: ASME Code, Section VI.
>
> c\. Power Boilers: ASME Code, Section VII.
>
> d\. Nuclear Reactor Coolant Systems: ASME Code, Sections III and XI.
>
> e\. Self-contained Air Breathing Equipment or other Breathing
> Apparatus: Covered by 29 CFR Section 1910.134.
>
> f\. Compressed Gas Cylinders: Covered by: 49 CFR Section 173.34 and 49
> CFR Part 178.
>
> g\. Mobile Equipment for Gases and Liquids: Covered by: 49 CFR Chapter
> 1, Subchapter C.
>
> h\. Heating, Ventilation, Air Conditioning, and Refrigeration Systems:
> Covered by Manufacturer's standard installation, operation, and
> maintenance instructions.
>
> i\. Pressure Gages: Covered by ANSI/ASME B40.1 (for pressure systems
> operating at 1.03 MPa (gage) \[150 lb/in^2^ (gage)\] or less. Water
> system pressure gages are exempt when operated at 1.7 MPa (gage) \[250
> lb/in^2^ (gage)\] or less.
>
> j\. Instrumentation: Pressure transducers, pressure switches, pressure
> transmitters, etc., for pressure systems operating at 1.03 MPa (gage)
> \[150 lb/in^2^ (gage)\] or less. Water system instrumentation is
> exempt when operating at 1.7 MPa (gage) \[250 lb/in^2^ (gage)\] or
> less.
>
> k\. Flex hoses used for calibration, test, checkout, or other
> short-term (not to exceed 6 months) purposes.
>
> l\. Payload-Associated GSE: Covered by Annex E, Section 5.0. This GSE,
> which is used to process or service payloads, is provided by
> organizations other than KSC and does not become a permanent part of
> any KSC ground system.
>
> m\. Portable regulation panels, control panels, or other GSE, which
> are not, a part of any configured system and are used for short term
> (not to exceed 6 months) applications. All pressure gages and relief
> valves in such equipment shall be included in a recall system.
>
> n\. The certification program does not apply to pressure vessels or
> pressurized systems of a temporary nature used to support construction
> or system modification activities.

**2.0 [OTHER PRESSURE VESSELS AND SYSTEMS]{.underline}**

> Some PV/S fall into a utility category and present a minimum potential
> hazard. Such vessels and systems may be excluded based on a review of
> potential hazards. Guidelines for such exclusions shall be as follows:
>
> a\. Exclusion limits for nonhazardous gas systems:
>
> \(1\) Unfired pressure vessels with appropriate overpressure relief
> protection set no higher than 1.03 MPa (gage) \[150 lb/in^2^ (gage)\],
> provided the water volume is less than 0.85m^3^ (30ft^3^).
>
> \(2\) Piping and components with appropriate overpressure relief
> protection set no higher than 1.03 MPa (gage) \[150 lb/in^2^ (gage)\].
>
> b\. Exclusion limits for nonhazardous or nonlethal liquid systems
> other than water:
>
> \(1\) Vessels and storage tanks of any size provided they are vented
> to atmosphere or are maintained at atmospheric pressure at all time.
>
> \(2\) Piping and components with appropriate overpressure relief
> protection set no higher than 1.03 MPa (gage) \[150 lb/in^2^ (gage)\].
>
> c\. Exclusion limits for water systems:
>
> \(1\) Systems used for storage and distribution of potable water.
>
> \(2\) Piping and components, including hydro pneumatic tanks of any
> size, with appropriate overpressure relief protection set no higher
> than 1.7 MPa (gage) \[250 lb/in^2^ (gage)\].
>
> \(3\) Exclusion limits for vacuum systems:
>
> These exclusion limits are based on performance of normal preventive
> and corrective maintenance:
>
> \(a\) Vacuum vessels of less than 2.83 m^3^ (100 ft^3^) volume.
>
> \(b\) Piping, expansion joints, and valves (except relief devices).
>
> \(4\) Exclusion limits for hydraulic systems:
>
> \(a\) Most hydraulic systems designed in accordance with national
> consensus standards are excluded from this program.
>
> \(b\) Hydraulic systems that support launch vehicle functions, fixed
> and mobile launch tower operations, or hydraulic systems that support
> the transportation of launch vehicles or their payloads, or other
> hydraulic systems used for processing flight hardware, are not
> excluded and must be certified in accordance with the requirements of
> this Annex.
>
> \(5\) Exclusion limits for natural gas and Liquefied Propane (LP):
>
> \(a\) Public utility-owned natural gas supply and distribution
> systems.
>
> \(b\) LP gas storage and distribution systems utilizing 49 CFR storage
> vessels and used for utility/domestic applications. ASME Code stamped
> vessels shall not be exempt.

**APPENDIX B TO ANNEX E**

**SAFETY REQUIREMENTS FOR DESIGN, TEST, AND GROUND PROCESSING OF FLIGHT
Graphite/Epoxy (GR/EP) Composite Over wrapped Pressure Vessels (COPVs)
AT THE KENNEDY SPACE CENTER (KSC), CAPE CANAVERAL AIR FORCE STATION
(CCAFS), AND THE VANDENBERG AIR FORCE BASE (VAFB)**

(This Appendix is an agreement between NASA/KSC and the Air Force dated
November 23, 1993)

Spacecraft, Missile, or launch vehicle systems containing Gr/Ep COPVs to
be processed through KSC, CCAFS or VAFB facilities shall, as a minimum,
meet the requirements of this Appendix.

**1.0 [DESIGN REQUIREMENTS]{.underline}**

> a\. The Gr/Ep COPVs shall be in compliance with MIL-STD-1522A.
>
> b\. Gr/Ep COPVs with a liner other than metal may only be designed by
> the ASME Code Section 10. Gr/Ep COPVs qualified to DOT or ASME
> standards are exempt from these requirements.

**2.0 [TEST REQUIREMENTS]{.underline}**

> a\. Those Gr/Ep COPVs with metal liners shall demonstrate their
> failure mode (LBB/Brittle Fracture) by test or similarity.
>
> \(1\) The test vessel demonstration shall include the overwrap and a
> preflawed liner (flaw size to be determined by fracture mechanics
> analysis liner material). Cyclic testing (for demonstration of failure
> mode) shall be performed such that failure occurs as close to MEOP as
> possible. Fluid for cyclic testing may be gas or liquid.

2.  Gr/Ep COPVs with metal liners evaluated by similarity (e.g.,
    comparison with a vessel that has already been tested and documented
    having similar fiber, epoxy, matrix design, and geometry) may not
    require a demonstration test provided it is approved by the
    appropriate approval authority.

> b\. Prior to the first pressurization of the Gr/Ep COPV at KSC, CCAFS,
> or VAFB, an inspection of the vessel overwrap for visible damage shall
> be performed by a trained inspector. If this inspection is not
> possible at the launch base (i.e., not accessible) then it shall be
> conducted the last time the vessel is accessible for inspection.
>
> c\. After arrival at the prelaunch processing location, but prior to
> any propellant loading or pressurization Gr/Ep COPVs shall be pressure
> tested to 1.1 times ground maximum operating pressure. The minimum
> time for holding this pressure shall be 10 minutes. Gr/Ep COPVs shall
> be remotely pressurized or a blast shield shall be used to protect
> personnel.
>
> d\. Nondestructive Inspection (NDI) techniques for Gr/Ep overwrap are,
> at this time, not well defined or understood. There appears to be no
> quantifiable enhancement of personnel safety by requiring NDI in
> addition to remote or blast shield protected pressurization
> procedures. However, NDI of Gr/Ep overwrap is recommended to better
> understand mission assurance and resource protection risks.

**3.0 [GROUND PROCESSING REQUIREMENTS]{.underline}**

> a\. If Gr/Ep COPVs are to be pressurized at the KSC, CCAFS, or VAFB to
> pressures greater than one third of the Gr/Ep COPVs design burst
> pressure the pressurization shall be performed remotely or a blast
> shield shall be used to protect personnel. If the vessel is to remain
> pressurized, personnel access will not be permitted for at least 10
> minutes after pressurization is completed.
>
> b\. Personnel limits for each operation on or near the Gr/Ep
> COPV/Spacecraft shall be established to minimize personnel exposure to
> the pressurized tank.
>
> c\. The transport of pressurized COPVs shall be along routes that
> minimize exposure to personnel and facilities with escort during
> designated time periods.
>
> d\. During manufacture, handling, transportation, assembly, and
> integration of Gr/Ep COPVs into the user's system(s), Gr/Ep COPVs
> shall be protected from impact damage.
>
> e\. Except for the pressure test required by Section 2.0 of this
> Appendix, pressure testing of systems with Gr/Ep COPVs shall not
> exceed the manufacturers' MEOP pressure limit without the
> manufacturers' and appropriate approval authority agreement.
>
> f\. Users shall develop Emergency Response Plans (ERPs) that include
> contingency Safing and backout plans for Gr/Ep COPVs that will
> consider leaks, impacts, and exposure to incompatible chemical agents.
> If implemented, a real-time assessment shall be accomplished and
> contingency operations taken as required. The appropriate approval
> authority as specified in Section 7.0 of this Appendix shall approve
> the ERP.

**4.0 [COMPATIBILITY REQUIREMENTS]{.underline}**

> a\. Gr/Ep COPVs that contain hypergolic propellants shall comply with
> the following compatibility and ground processing requirements when
> personnel are at risk.
>
> \(1\) Single liner Gr/Ep COPVs that contain propellants at flight
> pressure shall meet the following requirements:
>
> \(a\) Testing data shall be provided showing that the Gr/Ep overwrap
> is compatible with the propellant in terms of strength degradation,
> flammability and ignition/ combustion.
>
> \(b\) Hazardous vapor detectors shall be used during loading. In
> addition, the atmosphere in the tank vicinity shall be checked, at a
> minimum, every eight hours thereafter. More frequent checks may be
> required if the compatibility test results so indicate.
>
> \(2\) Single liner Gr/Ep COPVs that contain propellants at blanket
> pressure shall meet the following requirements:
>
> \(a\) Testing data shall be provided showing that the Gr/Ep overwrap
> is compatible with the propellant in terms of flammability, and
> ignition/combustion.
>
> \(b\) Hazardous Vapor Detectors shall be used during loading. In
> addition, the atmosphere in the tank vicinity shall be checked, at a
> minimum, every eight hours thereafter. More frequent checks may be
> required if the compatibility test results so indicate.
>
> \(3\) Double liner Gr/Ep COPVs (that have been demonstrated to be
> single fault tolerant) which contain propellants pressurized up to
> flight pressure will only require the use of hazardous vapor
> detectors. Hazardous vapor detectors shall be used during loading, in
> addition, the atmosphere in the tank vicinity shall be checked, at a
> minimum, every 8 hours thereafter.
>
> b\. Gr/Ep COPVs that contain inert pressurants in close proximity to
> propellant tanks(s) shall comply with the following compatibility and
> ground processing requirements when personnel are at risk.
>
> Testing data shall be provided showing the Gr/Ep overwrap is
> compatible with the propellant in terms of strength degradation,
> flammability, and ignition/combustion. If this data is not available
> the following actions must be accomplished.
>
> \(1\) Verify that the Gr/Ep COPV is not in a credible "drip zone" for
> propellant liquids during ground processing.
>
> \(2\) If the Gr/Ep COPV is in a credible "drip zone," it shall be
> protected with protective coating and/or covers and/or splash shields
> to guard against contact with potentially incompatible liquids.
>
> \(3\) Verify that hazardous vapor detectors will be used to monitor
> the propellant tanks.

**5.0 [DATA REQUIREMENTS]{.underline}**

> a\. The data required verifying compliance of Gr/Ep COPVs with the
> requirements imposed by this Appendix can be submitted to the
> appropriate approval authority with the specific program's safety data
> submittal. However, it is recommended that the data be submitted as
> soon as available in order to resolve potential problems during the
> conceptual phase rather than the design/build phase.
>
> b\. The following data shall be submitted:
>
> \(1\) Ground processing plans and procedures for the launch sites
> including all operations and activities directly involving and
> incidental to the Gr/Ep COPV.
>
> \(2\) A risk assessment of the Gr/Ep COPV during ground processing.
>
> \(3\) Description and analysis of the protection system(s) used to
> prevent impact damage.
>
> \(4\) Description of the protective coating/covers or splash shields
> used to guard against contact with incompatible propellants (if used).
>
> \(5\) Summary of design, analysis, and test data that validates the
> design burst pressure, failure mode (LBB or Brittle Fracture) and
> overwrap compatibility with propellants.
>
> \(6\) History of Pressure cycles along with the design limitations
> (rate, magnitude, and duration).
>
> \(7\) Data to verify design limits have not been exceeded for
> specified storage and transport environmental conditions.
>
> \(8\) Test and inspection results. (Acceptance and proof tests)
>
> \(9\) Reports/inspections that identified abnormal conditions such as
> impacts, chemical exposure excessive environmental loads vibration
> acceleration, temperature, etc.
>
> \(10\) The Emergency Response Plan (Section 2.0 of this Appendix)
>
> c\. The Gr/Ep COPV manufacturer shall maintain inspection data per
> MIL-STD 1522A, Section 4.6.3. This data shall be kept on file at the
> Fabricator's place of business or at a safe depository acceptable to
> the Approval Authority and available to the Approval Authority for at
> least 5 years. When fabrication of vessels over an indefinite period
> of time are involved, the Fabricator's Design Report on each specific
> design shall be kept on file for at least 5 years after use of such
> vessels has ceased.
>
> d\. A record shall be kept on the pedigree of each Gr/Ep COPV. The
> record shall contain, as a minimum, the data identified herein. This
> record shall be kept and updated as required by the Gr/Ep COPV owner.

**6.0 [EXEMPTIONS/DEVIATIONS]{.underline}**

> Exemptions to these requirements may be granted only after submission
> of data and rationale that is acceptable to the appropriate approval
> authority. As a minimum, the data submitted shall clearly identify the
> safety issues regarding personnel, environment, facilities, flight
> hardware, schedule, and cost impacts.
>
> Approval of deviations shall be by the appropriate approval authority
> as specified in Section 7.0 of this Appendix.

**7.0 [APPROVAL AUTHORITY]{.underline}**

> Approval of design, test, and ground processing of a spacecraft,
> missile, or launch vehicle systems containing Gr/Ep COPVs shall be
> given as follows:
>
> a\. For Space Shuttle payloads, ELV payloads, and NASA launch vehicle
> systems at KSC, the Associate Director of S&MA (SH&IA).
>
> b\. For missiles, launch vehicles, and ELV payloads at CCAFS, the
> Chief of Safety, USAF, 45^th^ SW.
>
> c\. For missiles, launch vehicles, and ELV payloads at VAFB, the Chief
> of Safety, USAF, 30^th^ SW.

**8.0 [APPROACHES FOR NONDESTRUCTIVE INVESTIGATION (NDI) OF GR/EP COPV
OVERWRAP]{.underline}**

a\. MIL-STD-1522A paragraph 4.6.1 states: "An Inspection Master Plan
shall be established prior to start of fabrication. The plan shall
specify appropriate inspection points and inspection techniques for use
throughout the program, beginning with material procurement and
continuing through fabrication, assembly, acceptance proof test,
operation, and refurbishment, as appropriate. In establishing inspection
point and inspection techniques, consideration shall be given to the
material characteristics, fabrication process, design concept,
structural configuration and accessibility for inspection." The interim
Gr/Ep COPV recommends an inspection prior to qualification testing. This
NDI will establish a baseline inspection for each Gr/Ep COPV design that
will be used as a comparison with future NDI. This NDI will become a
part of the "Inspection Master Plan."

> b\. The most appropriate NDI techniques for detecting commonly
> encountered flaw types should be used for all pressure vessels (see
> MIL-STD-1522A, paragraph 4.6.2). The interim Gr/Ep COPV recommends the
> performance of NDI using shearography, thermography or other
> techniques found to be capable of detecting impact damage and
> manufacturing type defects (such as indentation, cracks, porosity, air
> bubbles, exposed fibers, lack of resin, excess resin, broken or
> separated fibers, thin areas, wrinkling, uniformity of seal surface,
> and delamination).
>
> c\. NDI of the overwrap before and after acceptance testing may
> establish vessel pedigree and reduce the number of rejectable vessels
> when compared with the prequalification NDI results. This comparison
> will allow a qualitative evaluation of the integrity of the vessel.
> NDI results may be of assistance in determining if the Gr/Ep COPV
> under review is "out of family" with other vessels of the same design.
> MIL-STD 1522A (paragraph 4.6.2) states: "The flaw detection capability
> of each selected NDI technique shall be based on past experience on
> similar hardware. Where this experience is not available or is not
> sufficiently extensive to provide reliable results, the capability,
> under production or operational inspection conditions, shall be
> determined experimentally and demonstrated by tests approved by the
> procuring agency on representative material product form, thickness,
> and design configuration." The flaw may be characterized in terms of
> indication depth, surface area, or other applicable dimensions. It
> should be demonstrated by test that the vessel will safely withstand
> the expected service conditions with the kinds of indications and/or
> defects that are present/found. The demonstration test should consist
> of subjecting one or more prototype vessels to destructive tests.
>
> d\. Inspection data in the form of flaw histories should be maintained
> throughout the life of the pressure vessel (see MIL-STD-1522A,
> paragraph 4.6.3). It is expected that the data will also include:
>
> \(1\) Design specification.
>
> \(2\) Design drawings.
>
> \(3\) Design calculations.
>
> \(4\) Material manufacturers specification sheets for resin, fiber
> reinforcement, promoters, catalyst, and other components used in
> laminate construction.
>
> \(5\) Properly certified documentation for parts of the vessel
> fabricated by other Fabricators.
>
> \(6\) The Procedure Specification, giving the fabrication procedures
> used to fabricate both the prototype vessel(s) and all production
> vessels.
>
> \(7\) Qualification Test Report.
>
> \(8\) Quality Control Test Report.
>
> \(9\) Production Test Report.
>
> This data should be periodically reviewed and assessed to evaluate
> trends and anomalies associated with the inspection procedures,
> equipment and personnel, material characteristics, fabrication
> processes, design concept, and structural configuration. The result of
> this assessment can form the basis of any required corrective action.
>
> e\. In the case of suspect vessels, a Material Review Board (MRB) can
> be created to evaluate the NDI results and disposition. The MRB should
> consist of the procuring agency, the Gr/Ep COPV manufacturer and the
> appropriate launch or test range approval authority. The MRB should
> utilize NDI comparison, past experience, additional NDI, and other
> qualitative and quantitative methods, as they become available to
> determine the acceptability of a suspect vessel. Data collected from
> the MRB process should be recorded per the requirements of Section 5.0
> of this Appendix for future reference. Vessels determined to be unfit
> for continued use shall be rejected. The rejected vessels may be
> returned to the vessel user for scrap or testing (at the user's
> discretion) to determine the burst strength of the vessel for future
> reference and further definition of the database.
>
> f\. A visual inspection prior to installation in the spacecraft of
> launch vehicle at the time of last complete unobstructed access will
> screen for impact damage. This visual inspection may take place at the
> launch site or at the spacecraft/launch vehicle manufacturing facility
> depending on the access availability of the vessel. All visible impact
> damage indication should be reported to MRB for disposition.

ANNEX F

KSC SUPPLEMENT TO NSS 1740.12, NASA SAFETY STANDARD

**FOR EXPLOSIVES, PROPELLANTS, AND PYROTECHNICS**

**1.0 [HUMIDITY REQUIREMENTS]{.underline}**

> Relative Humidity (RH) in the operational area shall be determined and
> recorded prior to the start and every 4 hours during operations
> involving open grain, open flammable/ combustible fluid systems, and
> Category A Electroexplosive Devices (EEDs) \[when the Faraday cap is
> removed or firing circuits to EEDs are exposed\].
>
> a\. At or below 50 percent RH:
>
> \(1\) Bonding, grounding, nonconductive materials, and personnel
> grounding devices (refer to Annex D) shall be verified at less than
> 350 volts potential.
>
> \(2\) Electrostatic scanning, not to exceed 1-hour intervals, shall be
> performed during the operation and at any time additional personnel,
> equipment, or hardware are introduced into the immediate area, the RH
> goes lower, or the handling of nonconductive materials is required.

b.  At or below 30 percent RH:

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1.  Operations involving open grain (except Solid Rocket Booster \[SRB\]
    segments), open flammable/combustible fluid systems, and Category A
    EEDs (with Faraday caps removed or firing circuits exposed) shall
    not be permitted.

2.  All operations where Orbiter Docking System (ODS) pyro devices are
    electrically disconnected, or exposed for testing shall not be
    permitted.

3.  Testing (e.g., resistance checks) of firing circuits connected to
    pyro devices shall not be permitted.

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c.  SRB segment processing between 30 percent and 10 percent RH shall
    use the following requirements:

> \(1\) Electrostatic scanning shall be accomplished at 10-minute
> intervals if the propellant is exposed and 30-minute intervals if the
> propellant is covered.
>
> \(2\) Operations shall not continue on segments with propellant
> exposed if a potential of 350 volts or greater is measured on the
> segment case, propellant, or equipment and personnel who are within 5
> feet of open grain.
>
> \(3\) When the segment has the end rings with shipping covers
> installed, the following shall apply:
>
> \(a\) Operations shall stop when electrostatic scan readings are
> measured above one kV. Processing shall not continue until the
> electrostatic scan indicates less than 1 kV.
>
> \(b\) When electrostatic scan readings on the case (propellant
> covered) are measured above 4 kV, Safety shall be notified and all
> personnel shall be evacuated at least 500 feet (radius) from the
> processing area. Reentry into the operations area shall only be by
> personnel designated to perform electrostatic scans.
>
> \(4\) SRB Segment processing shall not be permitted below 10 percent
> RH.

**2.0 [EXPLOSIVES REQUIREMENTS]{.underline}**

> a\. General Requirements
>
> The following general requirements shall be applicable to all
> activities involving explosives:
>
> \(1\) EEDs shall be classified as Category A or Category B.
>
> \(2\) Restrictions for Category B EEDs shall be developed and
> incorporated into appropriate Technical Operating Procedures (TOPs).
>
> \(3\) All explosive materials used at KSC shall be delivered, stored,
> installed, inspected, and tested only in approved areas/facilities.
>
> \(4\) Explosives shall be under the control of the explosive storage
> area supervisor until delivery to the requesting organization.
>
> \(5\) All electrical connectors on equipment entering the Solid Rocket
> Motor (SRM) bore shall be sealed and potted.
>
> \(6\) Only Factory Mutual (FM)-, Underwriters Laboratory (UL)-, or
> Bureau of Mines-approved, explosion-proof flashlights/lanterns shall
> be permitted in explosives controlled areas.
>
> b\. Explosives Test Equipment (ETE)

1.  The appropriate program/project or directorate S&MA organization
    shall approve ETE. The submitting organization shall provide the
    following data:

    a.  Model number

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b.  Mechanical/electrical engineering drawings and specifications

c.  System safety analysis

> \(2\) A valid calibration seal shall be maintained on all approved
> ETE.
>
> \(3\) ETE approved by the 30^th^ or 45^th^ Space Wing (SW) for use in
> a joint Air Force/NASA jurisdiction facility does not require a
> separate NASA approval.
>
> \(4\) Appendix A to this Annex contains the list of currently approved
> ETE.
>
> c\. Transportation and Handling
>
> \(1\) Safety chains or other types of especially designed breakaway
> control safety features shall be required between towing vehicle and
> trailer(s) when pintle or lunette fasteners are used.
>
> \(2\) Explosives delivered to the operation site shall be only that
> required for the task.
>
> \(3\) Explosives shall remain in the shipping/ transportation
> containers until needed.
>
> \(4\) Explosives delivery to a staged area for all explosives
> operations, including SRM segments, shall be scheduled as late as
> possible prior to the start of the operation.
>
> \(a\) If the explosives operation is delayed prior to the scheduled
> start time, the explosives delivery shall be cancelled and rescheduled
> accordingly.
>
> \(b\) If the explosives operation is delayed after explosive delivery
> and is expected to be delayed more than one shift, the explosives
> shall be returned to the storage area.

(5) The minimum number of personnel shall accompany explosives being
    transported on elevators.

> d\. Operations
>
> \(1\) EED devices shall not be electrically connected to systems until
> power on/power off stray voltage tests are performed.
>
> \(2\) The Space Shuttle Vehicle (SSV) \[i.e., the Orbiter, External
> Tank (ET), SRB, Payload with in the Orbiter) as an integrated vehicle
> or single element and Pyro Initiator Controller (PIC) Ground Support
> Equipment (GSE) shall be powered down during electrical
> connection/disconnection of explosive/pyrotechnic devices, except as
> allowed in (7), (8), and (9) below.
>
> \(3\) Controlled switching and Radio Frequency (RF) silence shall be
> in effect during electrical connection/ disconnection or during the
> removal of Faraday cap/shorting plug of explosive/pyrotechnic devices.
>
> \(4\) Facility doors and openings shall be closed during electrical
> connection/disconnection of pyrotechnic devices, except where required
> for Vehicle Assembly Building (VAB) chimney effect.
>
> \(5\) Safety concurrence shall be required prior to payload power-up
> testing after payload Category A final explosives connection.
>
> \(6\) RF Transmissions
>
> \(a\) Cellular phones, answer back pagers (RF), and portable,
> hand-held, KSC-controlled radio transceivers operating in the Very
> High Frequency (VHF) and Ultra High Frequency (UHF) ranges shall not
> transmit within 25 feet of flight hardware or launch accessory
> equipment containing EEDs, which include NASA Standard Initiators
> (NSIs), when the shorting/Faraday caps are removed either from the
> explosives or firing line(s) connected to explosives. Faraday caps
> shall remain on EEDs at all times unless RF silence has been
> established. Shorting plugs shall not be acceptable unless provided
> with a shielding cap that is designed to provide RF protection.
>
> \(b\) Mobile, KSC-controlled radio transceivers shall not transmit
> within 50 feet of flight hardware or launch accessory equipment
> containing EEDs, which include NSIs, when the shorting/Faraday caps
> are removed and/or firing circuits are not connected.
>
> \(c\) Unapproved radio transceivers, Citizen Band, and amateur radios
> shall not transmit within 600 feet of flight hardware or launch
> accessory equipment containing EEDs, which include NSIs, when the
> shorting/Faraday caps are removed either from the explosives or firing
> line(s) connected to explosives.
>
> \(7\) Safe and Arm (S&A) Devices
>
> \(a\) Pin Removal
>
> Two firing inhibits shall remain when removing an S&A safing pin.
>
> \(b\) Rotation

1.  Rotation of the Shuttle Range Safety System (SRSS) S&As during
    ground test and processing shall be performed with the Explosive
    Transfer Assembly (ETA) or Confined Detonating Fuse (CDF)
    disconnected from the S&A or at the point of terminus. All rotation
    testing of S&As shall be completed before the firing circuits are
    electrically connected, except as required after ordnance
    connection. Rotation testing of SRSS S&As, with only the initiators
    electrically connected, shall be performed with a 10-foot clear
    minimum.

2.  If a condition exists whereby the firing circuits must be connected
    during the rotation test, a safety assessment shall be provided to
    show that inadvertent ignition of the detonators shall not occur.

3.  For rotations that require the ETA connected (one-time postordnance
    connection), all personnel shall clear the appropriate Blast Danger
    Area (BDA), and a remote rotation shall be completed. Safety shall
    be notified prior to rotation of all S&As. SRB ignition S&As shall
    not be rotated in the VAB.

4.  S&A rotation during Phase 1 or 2 lightning warnings shall be
    prohibited.

> \(c\) Installation/Removal
>
> Upon S&A removal, the igniter well shall be covered with an
> appropriate hard cover.
>
> Faraday caps shall remain on EEDs when installing or removing the S&A.
>
> \(8\) Orbiter Hatch T-Handle Explosives
>
> \(a\) The pyrotechnics activation T-handle enclosure lock shall be
> available at each landing and Transatlantic Abort Landing (TAL) site
> and shall be installed as soon as possible after a Forward Assessment
> Team inspection.
>
> \(b\) The lock shall not be removed during processing until the T-6
> hour BDA clear for the start of ET tanking.
>
> \(c\) Removal of the T-handle enclosure lock shall only be per an
> approved TOP. A pyrotechnic engineer shall control the T-handle
> enclosure whenever it is unlocked unless the lock is removed and
> transported to an approved explosive storage facility. The TOP shall
> provide a line item "OK To Proceed" real-time signature by the
> pyrotechnic engineer and Safety immediately prior to lock removal.
>
> \(d\) Whenever the T-handle enclosure is unlocked, safety pip pins
> shall remain installed in the hatch and cabin vent T-handles.
>
> \(9\) SSV Explosives Installation, Connection, Verification and
> Safeguards

a.  SSV hypergolic servicing normally will be accomplished prior to SSV
    explosives operations (Operations and Maintenance Instruction
    \[OMI\] S5009, Part I), thus avoiding the need for SRB power up
    after ordnance operations. Exceptions for SRB power up will be:
    ordnance (Part II), instrument reads, and launch countdown (OMI
    S0007).

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a.  For those payloads that are installed in the Orbiter prior to
    rollout and do not require payload bay access at the Pad, SSV
    hypergolic servicing will be performed prior to SSV explosives
    operations (OMI S5009, Part I). For SSV flows where payloads are
    installed in the Orbiter at the Pad, and perform explosives
    operations in parallel with SSV ordnance operations, SSV hypergolic
    servicing may be scheduled following OMI S5009, Part I.

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c.  The following SSV explosives operations and safeguard requirements
    shall be followed upon completion of OMI S5009, Part I, through
    launch:

    1.  During OMI S5009 Part I, all vehicle and GSE explosives items,
        except the Range Safety initiators, Range Safety CDF, and the
        SRM Ignition S&A control cables, shall be connected.

        a.  Prior to any explosives connection, functional tests shall
            be performed on critical Master Events Controller (MEC) PIC
            circuits.

        b.  After completion of the functional tests, the MEC Critical
            Commands shall be disabled and the SSV and GSE PIC racks
            shall be powered down.

        c.  In parallel with the subsequent pad clear, the active
            version of TCS sequence VFC81 shall be replaced with a dummy
            version (Rev. 0) in the C10 console and any hot spare
            console that is loaded with C10 software. Console dumps
            shall be performed to verify that VFC81 Rev. 0 is loaded in
            both consoles.

        d.  Power-off stray voltage checks will be performed prior to
            installing/connecting the explosives

        e.  After completion of explosives connection, the SSV and GSE
            PIC racks will be powered up for PIC resistance tests.

        f.  After PIC resistance tests, the SRBs shall be remotely
            powered down. The MECs shall be powered down after Space
            Craft Operator (SCO) ingress.

            2.  After the SRBs are powered down, the following
                safeguards shall be in effect:

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a.  VFC81 Rev. 0 shall remain loaded at C10 and the hot spare(s).

b.  MEC Critical Commands shall remain disabled.

c.  Ground Operation Aerospace Language (GOAL) programs capable of
    firing PICs, except SRSS PICs, shall not be activated.

d.  SRB power shall be applied for instrumentation reads only, except in
    OMI S0024, Prelaunch Propellant Loading; OMI S5009, Part II; and OMI
    S0007 Launch Countdown. Any other exceptions shall be approved by
    the Space Flight Operations Contractor (SFOC) and the KSC Shuttle
    S&MA organization.

    3.  OMI S5009, Part II, shall be performed in the following
        sequence:

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a.  SSV powered up for the Range Safety Open Loop Test, flight code
    insertion and the Closed Loop Test.

b.  SRBs, ET, Orbiter, and MEC power removed, power off stray voltage
    checks performed, and the SRSS NSIs, SRSS CDF, and SRM Ignition S&A
    control cables connected.

c.  SRM Ignition S&A safing pins removed.

d.  After completion of explosives Part II (S&A hookup), the forward
    skirts and ET/Intertank (IT) doors will be controlled with safety
    signs until flight doors are installed.

e.  The BDA shall be cleared and the Orbiter/SRB/GSE PIC resistance
    tests shall be performed, al all S&As (SRM ignition and SRSS) will
    be rotated to the armed position, then back to the safe position.

f.  The SRBs will be powered down (remotely), the SCO will ingress, and
    the MECs will be powered down.

g.  The S&As will be physically inspected to verify that they are in the
    safe position, then final SRB forward skirts and ET inner tank area
    closeouts will continue.

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4.  After SRB final power down in OMI S5009 Part II, the following
    safeguard restrictions shall be in effect in addition to those in
    effect for Part I:

    a.  GOAL programs capable of arming or firing SRSS PICs, or arming
        SRSS or SRM Ignition S&A devices, shall not be activated.

    b.  SRSS vehicle power shall remain off.

        5.  If OMI S5009, Part III is performed (i.e., all explosives
            connected during one operation), the same restrictions for
            Parts I and II shall apply, and OMI S0024 (i.e., SRM power
            up) shall be performed before OMI S5009, Part III is
            authorized to start.

        6.  During SSV explosives operations, the following clearing
            requirements shall be in effect:

            a.  During explosives installation/connection, nonessential
                personnel shall be cleared to the Pad fence.

            b.  After explosives connection, and prior to the first MEC
                power up, all personnel, except the SCO, shall be
                cleared to the Pad fence.

            c.  After explosives connection, and prior to the first SRB
                power up, all personnel shall be cleared from the BDA.

            d.  All personnel shall be cleared from the BDA for the PIC
                resistance tests.

        7.  During processing in the Orbiter Processing Facility (OPF)
            or at the Dryden Flight Research Facility (DFRF), Orbiter
            power down is not required for pyro interrupt box
            installation. Orbiter power down is required for
            disconnection of live drag chute explosives.

            a.  For disconnections of live explosives, a hazardous
                control area shall be established, RF silence and
                controlled switching shall be in effect, and the OMI
                shall ensure that PIC circuits are safed by verifying
                PIC capacitors are discharged.

            b.  A Problem Report (PR) shall be written and the Orbiter
                powered down prior to disconnection of all live
                explosives encountered, which was expected to be spent
                (Nose Landing Gear Strut Thruster and Separation Pyros).

            c.  Orbiter power down or controlled switching is not
                required when connections/disconnections are made to
                pyrotechnic circuits that are shorted or isolated from
                the Orbiter electrical system.

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(10) SSV Ordnance Rollback Configuration

> If there is a rollback to the VAB after OMI S5009 has been performed,
> the minimum ordnance configuration shall be as follows:

a.  No vehicle power in the VAB. Ordnance disconnect is not required (ET
    Vent Arm System \[ETVAS\] ordnance disconnect required because of
    physical ET separation from launch pad). GSE PICs, ground PIC rack
    circuit breakers open and tagged out. VFC81 Rev. 0 shall remain
    loaded.

b.  Orbiter power only in the VAB. Ordnance disconnect not required
    (ETVAS ordnance disconnect required because of physical ET
    separation from launch pad). MEC 1 and 2 switches open and tagged
    out. GSE PICs, ground PIC rack circuit breakers open and tagged out.
    VFC81 Rev. 0 shall remain loaded.

c.  Orbiter and SRB power in the VAB. Orbiter and SRB ordnance
    disconnect required in accordance with OMI S5009. GSE ordnance
    disconnect not required (ETVAS ordnance disconnect required because
    of physical ET separation from launch pad). GSE PICs, ground PIC
    rack circuit breakers open and tagged out. VFC81 Rev. 0 shall remain
    loaded.

d.  Ordnance system work required in the VAB. Orbiter, SRB, and GSE
    ordnance will be disconnected in accordance with OMI S5009.

**3.0 [PROPELLANT REQUIREMENTS]{.underline}**

> a\. General Hypergolic Propellant Systems Operations
>
> \(1\) Propellant transfers shall be performed only in Safety-approved
> areas.
>
> \(2\) Prior to starting, Hypergolic Vent Exhaust System (HVES) shall
> be operational.
>
> \(3\) Toxic propellant systems shall be drained and flushed or purged
> to nonhazardous concentration levels prior to opening unless personnel
> are properly protected.
>
> \(4\) Prior to replacement or storage of components or system repair,
> hypergolic or toxic system components shall be flushed and purged of
> all residual propellants and appropriately capped or bagged and
> labeled prior to movement.
>
> \(5\) Toxic and/or flammable vapor monitoring shall be required during
> break-in to any propellant system that has been contaminated by
> propellants and during the handling of contaminated parts. Toxic vapor
> monitoring shall also be required at the conclusion of any hazardous
> operation prior to opening of the control area to unprotected
> personnel.
>
> \(6\) Component parts and tools which have been in contact with the
> oxidizers/fuels shall be decontaminated or considered contaminated and
> as such shall be handled and transported with the same level of safety
> precautions applied to the oxidizers/ fuels.
>
> \(7\) Hypergol Deservicing (OPF-1/2)
>
> In the event of a hypergol propellant release during times personnel
> are authorized in one bay while performing Orbiter hypergol deservice
> in the other, the following procedure shall be followed, as
> appropriate:
>
> \(a\) In the event of a liquid spill, leak or heavy vapor release, the
> air conditioning system shall be shut down immediately.
>
> \(b\) In event of a vapor release or leak in the OPF scrubber or
> outside GSE system, and the OPF is downwind, the air conditioning
> system shall be shut down immediately.
>
> b\. H~2~/O~2~ Operations
>
> \(1\) Personnel exposed to higher than normal concentrations of oxygen
> or hydrogen gases shall not come into proximity of ignition sources
> until they have been in a normal atmosphere at least 30 minutes.
>
> \(2\) Systems previously serviced with gaseous or liquid hydrogen
> shall be purged until the hydrogen content of the purged gases is less
> than 1 percent. Hydrogen systems shall be purged until the oxygen
> content of the purged gases is less than 1 percent (inert) before any
> hydrogen is allowed into the system.
>
> \(3\) Replenishment of the LH~2~/LO~2~ storage tanks or local
> hazardous operations in the storage facilities shall be performed in
> series.
>
> c\. Auxiliary Power Unit (APU)/Hydraulic Power Unit (HPU)
> Exhaust/Drain Plugs Removal
>
> APU/HPU plug removal shall be as late as possible prior to clearing
> the control area for test/launch. Toxic Vapor Checks (TVCs) shall be
> performed during removal. No other checks shall be required prior to
> test/launch if a zero reading is obtained at the time of plug removal.
>
> \(1\) TVCs of the SRB APU exhaust and drain ports shall be performed
> upon test completion or launch scrub. Plugs shall be installed prior
> to opening the control area. When the Rotating Service Structure (RSS)
> is retracted for test, TVCs and Orbiter exhaust plug installation
> shall be performed upon completion of the first rotation of the RSS to
> the Orbiter mate position following the tests.
>
> \(2\) The Orbiter APU exhaust ducts shall be vented outside the
> Payload Changeout Room (PCR) when the PCR doors are open and plugs are
> removed. TVCs of the APU exhaust ports shall not be required when the
> plugs are installed and PCR doors are closed. The Orbiter/SRB APUs
> shall have TVCs performed daily when the Orbiter/SRB Fuel Supply
> Modules (FSMs)/APU systems are fueled with N~2~H~4~ and the exhaust
> plug is removed.
>
> d\. Hypergolic Propellant Scrubber Operations
>
> \(1\) Scrubber system configuration shall be verified before the
> power-up of the fuel and oxidizer scrubbers in storage facilities,
> except in emergency conditions. Restrictions shall be implemented in
> accordance with Chapter 4 of this Handbook. All scrubber liquor shall
> be sampled.
>
> \(2\) OPF Hyper Scrubbers
>
> \(a\) Each scrubber shall be limited to 400 Standard Cubic Feet per
> Minute (SCFM) flow.

b.  The scrubber shall be running when two aspirators are used
    simultaneously.

> \(c\) TVCs shall be documented for each backyard entry.
>
> e\. Hypergol equipment/parts, including the associated clean gas
> equipment, shall be dedicated to fuel or oxidizer media systems.
>
> Exception #1: Tube/Pipe parts and fittings remain as general use (non
> dedicated) subject to the following conditions:

(1) The propellant contact surface(s) is to have a material comprised
    solely of type 304/316 SST, or Type 304L/316L SST (if welded), or
    engineering approval equal.

(2) Verification of precision cleaning in accordance with Level 300A
    (minimum), Test Method 1 of KSC-C-123.

> Exception #2: Parts/equipment previously dedicated/"part-marked"
> ("Fuel Use Only" or "Oxidizer Use Only") for use with one media may be
> re-identified and used with other hypergol media subject to the
> following conditions:

(1) Verification of Section 3.0e(1) and 3.0e(2) above.

(2) All soft goods (including lining) shall be replaced with new soft
    goods comprised of a material compatible with the media, as
    specified in MIL-Type-J-Fluid Service 79K11948, for which it is
    intended for use.

(3) Remarking shall be controlled through the GSE Material Review (MR)
    process.

> f\. Flowing/Venting of Inert/Toxic Gases/Vapors
>
> \(1\) TVCs shall be performed following the flow or venting of toxic
> fluids or gases.
>
> \(2\) Oxygen level checks shall be performed prior to entry into the
> Orbiter access white room, all Orbiter compartments, and any other
> areas if inert gases have been activated or released.
>
> \(3\) Warning signs shall be posted on or in close proximity to all
> engines being actively purged with an inert gas. Signs need not be
> attached to the engine but shall be readily visible and worded to
> alert personnel of the hazard.
>
> g\. Orbiter Processing with Hypergolics Onboard** **
>
> \(1\) Introduction
>
> These requirements delineate specific information, actions, and
> controls that relate to processing an Orbiter containing Orbital
> Maneuvering Subsystem/Reaction Control System (OMS/RCS) propellants.
> These requirements complement current Emergency Procedures Documents
> (EPDs), which provide emergency actions for routine and major test
> operations at their respective sites.
>
> The Orbiter is processed through a normal turnaround with residual
> hypergolic propellants in the OMS and RCS tanks. In addition,
> propellants are retained in the RCS manifolds, the OMS feedlines, and
> the OMS pod crossfeed system.
>
> \(2\) System Configuration Ground Rules Matrix

1.  Dual Isolation: All OMS/RCS systems shall maintain dual valve
    isolation between tank bulk fluids and ambient air from OPF safing
    until Pad propellant servicing for launch, except when hardware
    failures, including component removal and replacement, dictate an
    alternate configuration or when circumstances are such that single
    valve isolation better protects the system from possible thruster
    valve leakage.

2.  RCS Thruster Thermal Conditioning: The RCS primary thrusters must be
    thermally conditioned to prevent thruster valve leakage of
    propellant.

> \(c\) Safety Considerations/Requirements for Arming the Driver
> Switches (VAB)
>
> 1\. Arming of drivers or removal of switch guards is not allowed.
>
> \(d\) Safety Considerations/Requirements for Arming the Driver
> Switches (OPF/Pad)

1.  OPF Bay clear or Pad clear above surface, except for two SCOs (in
    the crew compartment) with emergency breathing devices available.

2.  In the event of a thruster activation, emergency exhaust fans will
    be turned on. The SCO will immediately set all driver switches to
    OFF. SCOs will remain at their station inside the crew module until
    directed to evacuate by the Orbiter Test Conductor. (The crew
    compartment is purged, which should prevent vapor concentrations
    from intruding.) In the event vapors are detected in the crew
    compartment, emergency breathing apparatus should be donned and
    evacuation expedited.

3.  The driver guards shall be installed and locked prior to resuming
    scheduled work.

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e.  RCS Trickle Current Testing: During trickle current testing, a short
    12-15 volt driver output pulse of approximately six milliseconds can
    occur when a driver is turned on with driver power OFF. While there
    is adequate margin to preclude any primary thruster valve motion,
    analysis has shown that a negative margin could exist in the
    worst-case conditions for vernier testing. Procedures are required
    to preclude personnel exposure if negative margin causes momentary
    valve motion.

> \(3\) System Monitoring Tasks
>
> Work areas containing hypergolic propellants shall be monitored
> periodically for leaks.
>
> h\. SRM Processing Requirements
>
> \(1\) General
>
> \(a\) Personnel shall not enter the SRM bore when the SRM is in the
> vertical position.
>
> \(b\) Conductive bore inspection pads shall be installed in the bore
> for personnel access when the SRM is in the horizontal position.

c.  Loose propellant and Ammonium Perchlorate (AP) shall be removed from
    nonpropellant surfaces. Any loose propellant on propellant surfaces
    shall be removed. AP shall be removed from the propellant surface
    where the inspection pads are to be installed. AP removal shall be
    accomplished using clean cotton cloths wetted with distilled or
    deionized water and gently pressing onto the surface and lifting
    free. Do not rub. Remove excess water.

> \(d\) Loose propellant, solid propellant cuttings, and AP (including
> contaminated cloths) shall be placed in velostat plastic bags, inside
> a closed, grounded, metal container, for pickup and delivery to the
> Ordnance Storage Facility (OSF) and subsequent disposal. The
> designated staging area for the waste is the northwest corner of the
> Rotation Building and the waste shall be removed within one shift (8
> hours).
>
> \(e\) Conductive plastic sheeting (velostat) shall be placed on
> railcar surfaces at bore entrances to prevent contamination of
> propellant. Sheeting shall be grounded to a common ground with the
> segment/railcar prior to installation.
>
> \(f\) Open end(s) of segment shall be covered with velostat sheeting
> securely anchored to prevent wind damage during outside moves.
>
> \(g\) Personnel entering the bore shall wear conductive bags over
> socks. No shoes shall be worn in the bore.
>
> \(2\) End Ring Covers
>
> End ring covers shall be reinstalled at the completion of all
> inspections. Forward covers shall be installed prior to break-over
> operations.
>
> \(3\) Cutting and/or Trimming
>
> \(a\) Railcars and rolling stock shall be moved from the railroad
> tracks located between the Rotation, Processing, and Surge Facility
> (RPSF) main gate and Kennedy Parkway North.
>
> \(b\) The segment shall remain secured to the railcar, railcar brakes
> set, and segment connected to facility ground. The forward segment
> shall be orientated with the forward dome end-facing west during grain
> trimming.
>
> \(c\) Doors on the West end of the Rotation Building shall remain
> closed during the trimming of propellant.
>
> \(d\) Public Affairs (PA) tour buses shall be rerouted during the
> operation.
>
> \(e\) Only tools and equipment designated for cutting/trimming of
> grain shall be used.
>
> \(f\) Upon completion of grain trimming, the segment end shall be
> securely covered and the segment moved into the Rotation Building.
>
> i\. RPSF Operations
>
> The H77-0412 Impact Covers (Protective Pies) shall be installed as
> soon as the two point lifting beam is removed from the aft and center
> segments following breakover. Modified, small diameter, covers may be
> used during inspection and/or repair of vertical segment when access
> is limited to the clevis area.
>
> j\. Open Grain Inspection of Booster Separation Motors (BSMs)/Rocket
> Motors at the OSF
>
> Orientation of BSMs for inspections shall be toward the exterior
> (south) wall to minimize property and equipment damage and/or personal
> injury.
>
> k\. SRB Igniter
>
> The igniter shall not remain at the operational site but shall be
> installed or taken to the OSF.
>
> l\. SRM Segment Transfers
>
> \(1\) A segment shall not remain parked outside the VAB/RPSF any
> longer than required to perform electrostatic scan unless a written
> discrepancy condition exists.
>
> \(2\) Two segments may be permitted in the VAB transfer aisle only
> during SRM stacking operations and with Safety concurrence, providing
> that:
>
> \(a\) Segments are spaced a minimum of 240 feet apart.
>
> \(b\) Neither segment is a forward segment.
>
> \(c\) Any segment attached to a crane must be soft mated or hard down
> on pallet.
>
> \(3\) The segmented storage (impact) cover shall be in place under the
> weather cover on the forward end of the segment prior to leaving the
> building.
>
> \(4\) After moving a segment between buildings, an electrostatic scan
> of the pallet shall be required only when humidity levels drop below
> 30 percent.

5.  Operations shall be stopped for electrostatic readings greater than
    1 kV.

> m\. SRB Hoist and Stack on Mobile Launch Platform (MLP)
>
> The SRM impact covers shall be in place on the forward end of the
> segment when in the VAB. The only exception is when the segment is in
> the high bay during scheduled operations, with the following
> precautions:

a.  The covers may be removed provided the entire high bay, in which the
    work is being performed, is cleared except for personnel man-loaded
    by OMI performing the tasks.

b.  Personnel shall not work above the open grain area or do unrelated
    work within 10 feet of the open grain operation.

> n\. Handling and Transfer of Hydrazine (N~2~H~4~)/Monomethyl Hydrazine
> (MMH)/Nitrogen Tetroxide (N~2~O~4~)
>
> \(1\) Hydrazine/MMH/nitrogen tetroxide vessels, contaminated tools and
> GSE, and Propellant Handlers Ensemble (PHE)-suited personnel shall
> ingress/egress test cells by an exterior door (not through inhabited
> areas).
>
> \(2\) Fuel and oxidizer vessels shall not be transported together or
> placed within 25 feet of each other.
>
> \(3\) Storage of fuels or oxidizers shall not be permitted in test
> cells or on hypergolic service pads. Placement may precede the start
> of operations, as directed by the TOP. Only Department of
> Transportation (DOT) compliant containers specifically marked for
> anhydrous hydrazine, methyl hydrazine, or nitrogen tetroxide shall be
> used to collect hypergol fuel or oxidizer (including wastes).
>
> \(4\) A limit of four solid waste containers (two in use, two awaiting
> sample results), and eight liquid waste containers (four in use, four
> awaiting sample results) shall be allowed to be staged at the
> hypergolic sump sites. Containers that exceed this limit shall be
> removed within 3 working days from completion of the operation that
> generated this waste.
>
> \(5\) Containers shall not be filled to more than one-half capacity
> and shall be marked accordingly.

6.  These requirements shall also apply to tanker operations.

####### APPENDIX A TO ANNEX F

**LIST OF KSC APPROVED EXPLOSIVES TEST EQUIPMENT**

  ----------------------------------------------- -------------------- --------
  **Manufacturer**                                **Model**            

                                                                       

  Alinco                                          101-5A1              **\***

                                                  101-5BFG             **\***

                                                  101-5BPGG            **\***

                                                  101-5CFG             **\***

                                                                       

  ETI (Dupont) Blasters Multimeter                101                  

                                                  101A                 

                                                                       

  Fluke                                           11                   

                                                  87                   

                                                  8012A                

                                                  8600A                

                                                                       

  Hewlett Packard                                 3457A                

                                                  3466A                

                                                  4328A                

                                                                       

  Hypertronics Megaohmeter                        HM6B                 

                                                                       

  Keithley                                        580                  

                                                  8600A                

                                                                       

  Space Electronics Igniter Circuit Tester        101-5AF              **\***

                                                  101-5AL              **\***

                                                  101-5HJ              **\***

                                                  101-5HJ/HJR          **\***

                                                  101-5HP              **\***

                                                  101-5RZ-3            **\***

                                                                       

  Stray Voltage Checker                           C721127-2            

                                                                       

  Valhalla Digital Igniter Tester                 4314A                **\***

                                                  4313AB               **\***

                                                  4314AN               **\***

                                                  4314B                **\***

                                                  4314KB               **\***
  ----------------------------------------------- -------------------- --------

\* These meters are approved for NSI Bridgewire Measurements only.

######## **ANNEX G**

KSC SUPPLEMENT TO NASA-STD-8719.9, NASA SAFETY STANDARD FOR LIFTING
DEVICES AND EQUIPMENT

**1.0 [HOISTING AND HANDLING]{.underline}**

The Lifting Devices and Equipment Manager (LDEM) shall be the single
point of contact for the KSC lifting program.

a.  Safety and reliability analyses shall be performed on cranes, hoists
    and hydra-sets for critical lifts to identify single failure points
    and hazards.

b\. Lifting/Suspension of Loads

> \(1\) Loads shall not be lifted, suspended, or transported over flight
> hardware or one-of-a-kind Ground Support Equipment (GSE), whose loss
> would have serious programmatic impact, unless the lift is essential
> to perform a Technical Operating Procedure (TOP) controlled task.
> Lifting the External Tank (ET) over the Orbiter sling is permitted.
>
> \(2\) Space Shuttle flight hardware lifting, stacking or mating
> operations in progress during launch countdown shall be static or
> soft-mated by L-1 hour. Static conditions for Solid Rocket Motor (SRM)
> segments shall either be within 5 feet of the transfer aisle floor, or
> if not soft-mated, the segments shall not engage the clevis or Field
> Joint Assembly Fixture (FJAF). The forward assembly shall remain
> static above and shall not engage the forward segment. Static
> condition for the Orbiter and ET, if not soft-mated, shall be in the
> transfer aisle.
>
> c\. Load Tests
>
> \(1\) Lifting equipment load tests shall not be performed above flight
> hardware or critical GSE or when failure of the lifting equipment
> could damage flight hardware or critical GSE.
>
> \(2\) When the Solid Rocket Boosters (SRBs) are stacked or partially
> stacked, winch load tests shall only be performed with the following
> restrictions:
>
> \(a\) Orbiter Engine Service Platform (ESP): Shall not be performed
> when the Orbiter is mated to the ET.

(b) SRB ESP: Shall be performed if the SRB ESP is in position and
    supported by the cobra heads.

> \(3\) The following requirements shall be followed when a crane is
> used to load test other lifting equipment:
>
> \(a\) Crane hook and load line(s) shall only be loaded vertically.
>
> \(b\) A certification of the initial proof load test or the current
> periodic load test shall be supplied with the lifting equipment prior
> to performing the load test.
>
> \(c\) The responsible systems engineer's signature shall be required
> on all TOPs requiring the use of cranes to perform load tests.
>
> \(d\) Items to be tested by an overhead crane shall be freely
> suspended from the crane hook with the height of the test not to
> exceed 6 inches above the floor/working surface.
>
> \(e\) Items to be tested by a mobile crane shall be suspended from the
> crane hook and the height of the test shall not exceed 6 inches, or
> the lowest reasonable height based on dimension and test article
> configuration.
>
> \(f\) No overhead crane shall be used to load test items attached to
> an immovable object.
>
> \(g\) When a mobile crane is used to load test items attached to an
> immovable object, the boom angle shall be minimized as much as safely
> possible to prevent the boom from contacting the boom stops when load
> testing.
>
> \(h\) For lattice boom mobile cranes, the boom shall be adequately
> restrained to prevent damage to the crane due to sudden unloading
> should the test article fail.
>
> \(i\) A load-sensing device shall be installed in the lifting
> assembly.
>
> \(4\) Appendix A to this annex contains the KSC list of nonload test
> slings.
>
> \(5\) Appendix B to this annex contains the KSC list of cranes used
> for load testing.
>
> c\. Transit of Cranes
>
> \(1\) Prior to any crane move, the route of travel shall be planned
> and checked to ensure that adequate clearances exist along the
> selected route and that the route is adequate for the loads being
> transported.
>
> \(2\) Booms/jibs shall be lowered to angles specified by the
> manufacturer prior to start of move.

(3) All cranes shall maintain at least 2 feet of clearance from walls,
    overhead trestles, columns, and other structures.

> d\. Grounding During Hoisting of Flight Hardware
>
> \(1\) Electrical grounding shall be required, when explosives and/or
> flammable fluids are involved, per the requirements of Annex D of this
> Handbook.

**2.0 [SUSPENDED LOAD OPERATION ANALYSIS/APPROVAL (SLOAA)]{.underline}**

a.  General

> This procedure implements the "National Aeronautics and Space
> Administration Alternate Safety Standard for Suspended Load
> Operations" at KSC. This standard has been approved by the
> Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) as an alternate
> to 29 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 1910.179(n)(3)(vi), 29CFR
> 1910.180(h)(3)(vi), and 29CFR 1910.180(h)(4)(ii).

b.  Analysis/Approval Report

> A report, NASA SLOAA, shall be generated by the operating organization
> for any suspended load operation involving employee exposure. Employee
> exposure means having any part of the body beneath the load such that
> if the crane and/or hoist system (including rigging) were to fail and
> the load were to drop, the employee could be injured or killed if he
> or she were in the envelope of the falling load. An accepted,
> permanent residual risk is where the suspended load operation with
> employee exposure cannot be procedurally eliminated nor corrected by
> engineering means. SLOAA reports are posted at the following web site:
> <http://www-ph.ksc.nasa.gov/sma/SuspendedLoad.htm>.
>
> \(1\) The Lifting Devices and Equipment Manager shall assign a
> tracking number and review the SLOAA report.
>
> \(a\) Those crane and hoist systems [without]{.underline} Single
> Failure Points (SFPs), whose failure would result in dropping the
> load, require NASA S&MA approval.
>
> \(b\) Those crane and hoist systems [with]{.underline} SFPs, whose
> failure would result in dropping the load, require NASA Headquarters'
> (Code Q) review and concurrence.
>
> \(2\) The operating organization shall compile a package for each
> suspended load operation to include the SLOAA, the appropriate Systems
> Assurance Analysis, the applicable working document, and any other
> supporting data. A cover sheet (KSC Form OT-4129) shall be used for
> all KSC approval signatures except for the signature of the
> responsible program/project or directorate S&MA Division Chief, who
> shall sign the last page of the SLOAA.
>
> \(3\) For an emergency or unplanned event where immediate or real-time
> actions are needed, a NASA Suspended Load Operation Interim
> Analysis/Approval (KSC Form OT-4130) shall be prepared at the time of
> the emergency with signature by the responsible program/project or
> directorate S&MA Division Chief and the user organization's (i.e.,
> contractor) Safety Director appointed representatives. The onsite NASA
> and operating organization system engineers shall also sign KSC Form
> OT-4130.

**APPENDIX A TO ANNEX G**

**KSC LIST OF NONLOAD TEST SLINGS**

**1.0 [GENERAL]{.underline}**

> Program/project or directorate organizations having design,
> procurement, operations and maintenance of lifting equipment slings
> are responsible for submitting requests for changes to the LDEM, with
> rationale, to the list of nonload test slings. The LDEM will
> approve/disapprove changes to the list. Requests for additions to the
> list shall state why the periodic load test will not be performed and
> should include the following:
>
> a\. Design standard(s).
>
> b\. Design safety factor(s).
>
> c\. Rated load versus actual load.
>
> d\. Test history.
>
> e\. Operations history.
>
> f\. Planned future use.
>
> g\. Material/construction properties.
>
> h\. Storage provisions.
>
> i\. Maintenance performed.
>
> j\. Other information that is acceptance rationale to not perform the
> periodic load test.
>
> Approved changes to the KSC List of Nonload Test Slings are posted at
> the following website:
> http://www-ph.ksc.nasa.gov/sma/approved_changes_to_ksc_list_of\_.htm.

  -------------------------------------------------------------------------------
  **[IDENTIFICATION]{.underline}**   **[NOMENCLATURE]{.underline}**
  ---------------------------------- --------------------------------------------
                                     

  **ORBITER**                        

                                     

  ARMS-Pad A                         Rigging

  ARMS-Pad B                         Rigging

  HMF                                Rigging

  Midbody-OPF-1                      Rigging

  Midbody-OPF-2                      Rigging

  Midbody-OPF-3                      Rigging

  Payloads-Pad B                     Rigging

  A70-0671-04                        OME Nozzle Extension Covers
  -------------------------------------------------------------------------------

+-------------------------+--------------------------------------------+
| **ORBITER (Continued)** |                                            |
+-------------------------+--------------------------------------------+
|                         |                                            |
+-------------------------+--------------------------------------------+
| A70-0873                | 800-Ton Demag Crane Hook Adapter           |
+-------------------------+--------------------------------------------+
| G070-542549-001         | Bolt Assembly (Radiator Sling)             |
+-------------------------+--------------------------------------------+
| G070-542549-002         | Bolt Assembly (Radiator Sling)             |
+-------------------------+--------------------------------------------+
| G073-200042-001         | Suspension Module Frame Assembly (MVAK)    |
+-------------------------+--------------------------------------------+
| G073-200072-001         | Frame Assembly (MVAK)                      |
+-------------------------+--------------------------------------------+
| G073-200086-001         | Strut Assembly (MVAK)                      |
+-------------------------+--------------------------------------------+
| G073-200086-002         | Strut Assembly (MVAK)                      |
+-------------------------+--------------------------------------------+
| G076-540036-001         | Orbiter Docking System Adapter             |
+-------------------------+--------------------------------------------+
| H70-0511-4              | OMS/RCS (Lifting Beam) Sling Set           |
+-------------------------+--------------------------------------------+
| H70-0529-2              | PLBD Latch Joint Handling/Adapter Set      |
+-------------------------+--------------------------------------------+
| H70-0561                | CM Equipment Installation Set              |
+-------------------------+--------------------------------------------+
| H70-0565                | Multi-Purpose Installer                    |
+-------------------------+--------------------------------------------+
| H70-0588-02-002,        | Aft Fuselage Equipment, less the following |
|                         | (to be load tested before use):            |
| H70-0588-04-004         | G070-550401, G070-550412, G070-550415,     |
|                         | G070-550416, G070-550418, G070-550419,     |
|                         | G070-550421, G070-550422, G070-550600,     |
|                         | G070-550721                                |
+-------------------------+--------------------------------------------+
| H70-0597-2              | Orbiter Mating Sling Set                   |
+-------------------------+--------------------------------------------+
| H70-0598-00-002         | FRCS Handling Sling                        |
|                         |                                            |
| H70-0598-00-003         | FRCS Handling Sling                        |
+-------------------------+--------------------------------------------+
| H70-0651                | Radiator Deployment Fixture Assembly       |
+-------------------------+--------------------------------------------+
| H70-0661                | FRCS Installation/Removal Fixture          |
+-------------------------+--------------------------------------------+
| H70-0668                | Rendezvous Sensor Antenna Sling            |
+-------------------------+--------------------------------------------+
| H70-0679                | OMS/RCS Pod Lifting Fixture                |
+-------------------------+--------------------------------------------+
| H70-0700                | Aft Fuselage Faring Sling                  |
+-------------------------+--------------------------------------------+
| H70-0703-01-001,        | Handling Adapters, less the G070-430588    |
|                         | (to be load tested before use)             |
| H70-0703-02-011         |                                            |
+-------------------------+--------------------------------------------+
| H70-0713                | OMS/RCS Pod Cradle Set                     |
+-------------------------+--------------------------------------------+
| H70-0728                | PLBD Hinge Line Handling Adapter           |
+-------------------------+--------------------------------------------+
| H70-0743                | Orbiter Ferry Sling                        |
+-------------------------+--------------------------------------------+
| H70-0760-01-001         | Aft Fuselage Equipment, less the following |
|                         | (to be load tested before use):            |
| H70-0760-02-002         | G070-550721, G070-550723, G070-550734,     |
|                         | G070-550801, G070-550813, G070-550836,     |
|                         | G070-551014                                |
+-------------------------+--------------------------------------------+
| H70-0768                | Orbiter Forward Handling Adapter           |
+-------------------------+--------------------------------------------+
| H70-0790                | Aft Spreader Bar Adapter Sling             |
+-------------------------+--------------------------------------------+
| H70-0846                | APS Pod Handling Trolley                   |
+-------------------------+--------------------------------------------+
| H70-0855                | Dome Heat Shield Light Weight Lifting      |
|                         | Fixture                                    |
+-------------------------+--------------------------------------------+
| H70-0860                | Mid-Body LRU Adapter Set (Including Piece  |
|                         | Parts)                                     |
+-------------------------+--------------------------------------------+
| H70-0889                | Lightweight Payload Bay Door Strongback    |
+-------------------------+--------------------------------------------+
| H70-0894                | EDO Lifting Sling (Excluding Turnbuckle,   |
|                         | Shackle, and Masterlink assembly)          |
+-------------------------+--------------------------------------------+
| H70-0952                | Trajectory Control Sensor Sling Assembly   |
+-------------------------+--------------------------------------------+
| H70-1400 (51155 F207)   | Auxiliary Spreader Beam (RMS)              |
+-------------------------+--------------------------------------------+
| H70-1401 (51155 F208)   | Strongback (RMS)                           |
+-------------------------+--------------------------------------------+
| H70-1412 (51155 F271)   | Joint Exchange Support Sling (RMS)         |
+-------------------------+--------------------------------------------+
| H70-1504-01             | EMHS Handling Cart Lifting Sling           |
+-------------------------+--------------------------------------------+
| H70-1509-04             | PCES GSE Handle Assembly                   |
+-------------------------+--------------------------------------------+
| H70-1509-05             | PCES GSE End Handle Assembly               |
+-------------------------+--------------------------------------------+
| **ORBITER (Continued)** |                                            |
+-------------------------+--------------------------------------------+
|                         |                                            |
+-------------------------+--------------------------------------------+
| H70-8411                | VAB 250/175-Ton Lifting Link Load Cells    |
+-------------------------+--------------------------------------------+
| H72-0590                | Orbiter/ET Forward Mating Fixture          |
+-------------------------+--------------------------------------------+
| H72-1006                | Aft Ball/Fwd Attachment Removal Equipment  |
+-------------------------+--------------------------------------------+
| H72-1243                | PPU Sling (Including Wire Rope Drop        |
|                         | Legs/Shackles)                             |
+-------------------------+--------------------------------------------+
| H72-1245                | VAB 175/250 Ton Crane Load Indicator Link  |
+-------------------------+--------------------------------------------+
| H72-1270                | Counterbalance Lifting Beam                |
+-------------------------+--------------------------------------------+
| LO70-000046-002/-003    | APS Pod Vertical Rotation Adapter          |
+-------------------------+--------------------------------------------+
| LO70-000274-119         | Tunnel Hatch Adapter Track Assembly        |
+-------------------------+--------------------------------------------+
| M70-0007-00-001         | OMS Pod Vertical Rotation Sling Set        |
+-------------------------+--------------------------------------------+
| M70-0007-00-002         | OMS Pod Vertical Rotation Sling Set        |
+-------------------------+--------------------------------------------+
| M70-0008-00-001         | OMS Pod Horizontal Handling Sling Set      |
+-------------------------+--------------------------------------------+
| M70-0008-00-002         | OMS Pod Horizontal Handling Set            |
+-------------------------+--------------------------------------------+
| M70-0028-00 (SN 001,    | Engine Mounted Heat Shield Handling        |
| 002), L070-000151,      | Fixture                                    |
| 79V26573                |                                            |
+-------------------------+--------------------------------------------+
| MD111-0003-2231         | Bolt Assembly (Radiator Sling)             |
+-------------------------+--------------------------------------------+
| P53931, P53932          | Fuel Cell Power Plant Shipping Container   |
|                         | Adapting Frame                             |
+-------------------------+--------------------------------------------+
| 79K24143-8              | Compact Support Fitting Lift Adapter       |
+-------------------------+--------------------------------------------+
| 10MM-3.5                | Orbiter Docking Mechanism Pressure Dome    |
|                         | Eyebolts                                   |
+-------------------------+--------------------------------------------+
| SFOC HE                 | Heavy Equipment General Purpose Rigging    |
|                         | (including shackles, wire rope slings,     |
|                         | nylon slings, linear fiber slings, metal   |
|                         | hooks and structural hook adapters)        |
+-------------------------+--------------------------------------------+
| TSM-LB-1, -2            | TSM Lifting Beam                           |
+-------------------------+--------------------------------------------+
|                         |                                            |
+-------------------------+--------------------------------------------+
| **EXTERNAL TANK**       |                                            |
+-------------------------+--------------------------------------------+
|                         |                                            |
+-------------------------+--------------------------------------------+
| H78-3008                | ET Forward Hoisting Adapter Set            |
+-------------------------+--------------------------------------------+
| H78-3040                | ET Aft Hoisting Adapter Set -- L/W         |
|                         | Configuration (Including Shackles)         |
+-------------------------+--------------------------------------------+
| H78-5008                | ET Aft Lifting Brackets (Including         |
|                         | Shackles)                                  |
+-------------------------+--------------------------------------------+
|                         |                                            |
+-------------------------+--------------------------------------------+
| **SRM/SRB**             |                                            |
+-------------------------+--------------------------------------------+
|                         |                                            |
+-------------------------+--------------------------------------------+
| H77-0159                | Forward Skirt Lifting Lug Kit              |
+-------------------------+--------------------------------------------+
| H77-0181                | Forward Skirt Lifting Lug Kit              |
+-------------------------+--------------------------------------------+
| H77-0206                | Aft Skirt Lug Kit                          |
+-------------------------+--------------------------------------------+
| H77-0325                | Lifting Bracket Kit                        |
+-------------------------+--------------------------------------------+
| H77-0381                | Handling Ring Lifting Bracket              |
+-------------------------+--------------------------------------------+
| H77-0430                | Exit Cone Fragment Handling Fixture        |
+-------------------------+--------------------------------------------+
| H77-1201                | Empty SRB Hoisting Sling Beam (Less Nylon  |
|                         | Slings)                                    |
+-------------------------+--------------------------------------------+
| H77-1211                | Forward Attach Lug Kit                     |
+-------------------------+--------------------------------------------+
| 8U76228                 | Nozzle Removal Fixture Assembly            |
+-------------------------+--------------------------------------------+
| 8U72669                 | Beam Sling Assembly (Less Cable Drops)     |
+-------------------------+--------------------------------------------+
| SRBE-ARF                | Crosby Group Lifting Equipment (including  |
|                         | pear links, shackles and eyebolts)         |
+-------------------------+--------------------------------------------+
|                         |                                            |
+-------------------------+--------------------------------------------+

  ------------------------- ---------------------------------------------
  **PAYLOADS MECHANICAL     
  GSE**                     

                            

  AB-800                    Pump Module Spreader Beam

  G-206-3-1/4 Ton           Cruciform Plug D-Rings

  GH5-00547                 Cargo Element Lifting Assembly (All Load
                            Tested Items on Drawings 82K03175 and
                            82K03181)

  GH5-00717                 Cargo Element Extension Kit Hoist Rings

  G1-30231                  Orthogrid Handling Fixture Assembly

  G1-30244-1                Spacelab Orthogrid Installation Fixture

  G1-30244-3                Spacelab Orthogrid Installation Fixture

  G4-31655                  MPE Cradle Assembly

  G4-31662-1                MPE Handling Fixture

  G4-31662-3                MPE Handling Fixture

  G4-32007                  MPESS Shipping Cradle Lifting Sling

  G4-32016                  MPE Handling P/L INTEG Assembly & Ship Cradle

  G4-60013                  MPESS Lifting Sling, I Beam Only

  G4-60014                  MPESS Cradle Assembly

  G4-60015                  MPESS Handling Fixture

  G5-60141-1                Cruciform Trunnion Attachment Beam (Astro I)

  G5-60141-2                Cruciform Trunnion Attachment Beam (Astro I)

  G5-60144-1                IRS Shipping Container

  G5-60148-1                Cruciform Trunnion Extension

  G5-60151-3                Hoist Spreader Beam Assembly (Astro I)

  G5-60151-5                Hoist Spreader Beam Assembly (Astro I)

  G5-60152-1                Cruciform Trunnion Plug Assembly (with
                            through bolt P/N G5-60143-1)

  G5-60177-3                IRS Hoist Spreader Beam Assembly

  G5-60741-1                Cruciform Handling Sling Link

  HF-2                      WUPPE Handling Fixture

  SK683-46500               International Standard Payload Rack Lifting
                            Fixture Assembly

  SKCL-040193               Multipurpose Lift Fixture

  SKDK-82792-2              Configuration Trunnion Lift Bracket

  SKMH-026, SKMH-027        Transport Trailer Antenna Lift Member

  SR-8286-1                 Hoist Beam

  TD-1F80519-1SF2-1         Support, Install -- SASA

  TD-1F80519-1SF2-7         Spreader Bar, Support, Install -- SASA

  TD-1F80519-1SF2-11        Bracket, Clamp -- SASA Sling Assembly

  T580664-MTE-501           S/A Dolly Sling Assembly

  T580679-MTE-501           PV Array Sling Assembly

  T580680-MTE-501           PV Array Wing Strongback

  T-5850032                 Battery ORU H-Frame

  T-5850070                 Battery Charge/Discharge Unit H-Frame

  T-5850070                 DC Switch Unit H-Frame

  T-5850070                 Pump Flow and Control Subassembly H-Frame

  T-5850071                 DC to DC Converter Unit H-Frame

  T-5850135                 ORU Box & Fin Protection Fixture H-Frame

  T-5850136                 DC to DC Converter Unit & Fin Protection
                            Fixture H-Frame

  T-8310013                 Platform ORU H-Frame
  ------------------------- ---------------------------------------------

  ------------------------- ---------------------------------------------
  **PAYLOADS MECHANICAL GSE 
  (Continued)**             

                            

  00E076001-2005            FSM Support Structure

  1D21080                   Handling Device Assembly

  1D21090-1                 STT Forward Extension Lift Beam

  1D24149                   Payload Insertion Device

  1F04103-1                 PMA Cradle Assembly

  1F44841-1                 PMA Main Spreader

  1F44842-1                 PMA Secondary Spreader

  1F51678                   KU Antenna Lift Sling

  1F55222-1                 PMA Counter Weight (31-35 pins)

  1F74616-1                 PMA Lift Ring Assembly

  1F74620-1                 PMA Lift Fitting

  1F74621-1                 PMA Lift Fitting

  1F74622-1                 PMA Lift Fitting

  1F74623-1                 PMA Lift Fitting

  1F74632-1                 PMA Saddle Assembly

  1F74641-1                 PMA-3 Brackets

  1F74643                   PMA Rotation Frame

  1F74677-1                 PMA Adapter Ring (octagonal ring)

  1F74677-1                 PMA Frame Assembly

  15M20284                  Aft Flight Deck Sim Beam

  15M20507-1                IPS Alignment Stands

  15M20510                  IPS Rotation Frame

  15M20520                  IPS Sling Kit Spreader Beam

  79K19139-1                Support & Hoist Assembly, Fluid Panel

  79K19144-14               Interface Control Panel Hoist Spreader Beam

  79K19144-2                Interface Control Panel Support Assembly

  79K19155-1                Hoist Spreader Beam Assembly (ESGE)

  79K20826                  Spreader Frame Assembly (ESA Strongback)

  79K23032-2                Lifting Saddle for ESA Strongback (612.110)

  79K23032-3                Lifting Saddle for ESA Strongback (612.110)

  79K24304                  PHF Forward Lifting Yoke

  79K25261                  Integrated Partial PL Lift Assembly

  79K25503                  CXFORM Rotation Sling, Spreader Beam

  79K27404                  Igloo Rotation Device

  79K27424                  PTC & MTC Hoist Beam Low Crane HT

  79K27432                  IPPLA to PAL Hoist Fitting

  79K27440-1                Hoist Adapter for Igloo Trolley

  79K27452                  IPS Hoist Cap

  79K27461-1                LT WT Double Rack Handling Frame

  79K27461-133              LT WT Double Rack Handling Frame

  79K27461-134              LT WT Single Rack Handling Frame

  79K27461-2                LT WT Single Rack Handling Frame

  79K33197                  CRF Hoist Beam Assembly

  80K01300-8 thru           Contingency Igloo Cover and LRU Removal
  80K0300-12                Device

  82K00077-1                MUC Cover Lifting Beam Assembly

  82K00880                  Hoist Beam Modification Access Bridge O&C
                            Bldg.

  82K03083-2                SPRD Hoisting Sling Assembly
  ------------------------- ---------------------------------------------

+-------------------------+-------------------------------------------+---+
| **PAYLOADS MECHANICAL   |                                           |   |
| GSE (Continued)**       |                                           |   |
+-------------------------+-------------------------------------------+---+
|                         |                                           |   |
+-------------------------+-------------------------------------------+---+
| 82K04516-1              | Contingency Access Beam Hoist Ring        |   |
+-------------------------+-------------------------------------------+---+
| 82K06034-1              | Rotation Handling Fixture                 |   |
+-------------------------+-------------------------------------------+---+
| 82K06034-4              | Breakover Beam                            |   |
+-------------------------+-------------------------------------------+---+
| 82K06034-6              | RHF Yoke                                  |   |
+-------------------------+-------------------------------------------+---+
| 82K06034-6 (40B1)       | RHF Spreader Beam                         |   |
+-------------------------+-------------------------------------------+---+
| 82K06034-6 (G-2130)     | RHF 25 Ton Shackle                        |   |
+-------------------------+-------------------------------------------+---+
| 82K06034-15             | RHF Adapter Beam                          |   |
+-------------------------+-------------------------------------------+---+
| 82K06034-16             | RHF Adapter Beam                          |   |
+-------------------------+-------------------------------------------+---+
| 82K06034-8              | Single Lift Spreader Beam                 |   |
+-------------------------+-------------------------------------------+---+
| 82K06034-42L1           | FWD Rotation Beam Link                    |   |
+-------------------------+-------------------------------------------+---+
| 82K06744-2              | S -- Band Antenna Support Assembly        |   |
|                         | Lifting Sling                             |   |
+-------------------------+-------------------------------------------+---+
| 82K06744-4              | S -- Band Antenna Strut Assembly          |   |
+-------------------------+-------------------------------------------+---+
| 82K06757-1              | UHF Antenna Lifting Sling Assy            |   |
+-------------------------+-------------------------------------------+---+
| 612.001.00.000.03       | Module Handling Cage Integration Trolley  |   |
+-------------------------+-------------------------------------------+---+
| 612.006.01.01.000.03    | VSK Hoisting Traverse Beam                |   |
+-------------------------+-------------------------------------------+---+
| 612.006.02.01.000.03    | VSK Stabilizing Strut                     |   |
+-------------------------+-------------------------------------------+---+
| 612.006.03              | VSK Tilting Beam                          |   |
+-------------------------+-------------------------------------------+---+
| 612.006.04 (I 3)        | VSK Crosshead for Hoist Slings            |   |
+-------------------------+-------------------------------------------+---+
| 612.006.04 (I 2)        | VSK Crosshead for Hoist Slings            |   |
+-------------------------+-------------------------------------------+---+
| 612.006.06.01.501.03    | VSK Hoisting Lug                          |   |
+-------------------------+-------------------------------------------+---+
| 612.006.06.01.502.03    | VSK Hoisting Lug                          |   |
+-------------------------+-------------------------------------------+---+
| 612.006.06.01.503.03    | VSK Hoisting Lug                          |   |
+-------------------------+-------------------------------------------+---+
| 612.006.06.01.504.03    | VSK Hoisting Lug                          |   |
+-------------------------+-------------------------------------------+---+
| 612.007                 | End Cone Stand                            |   |
+-------------------------+-------------------------------------------+---+
| 612.013.01.01.000.03    | PAL Segment Sup Integration Trolley       |   |
+-------------------------+-------------------------------------------+---+
| 612.015.01.00.000.08    | Hoist Frame With Cover Support            |   |
+-------------------------+-------------------------------------------+---+
| 612.015.02.00.000.08    | Igloo Handling Kit Support Stand          |   |
+-------------------------+-------------------------------------------+---+
| 612.015.03.00.000.08    | Igloo Handling Kit Tilt Frame             |   |
+-------------------------+-------------------------------------------+---+
| 612.015.04.00.000.08    | Igloo Handling Kit Sup Str                |   |
+-------------------------+-------------------------------------------+---+
| 612.015.05.00.000.08    | Igloo Handling Kit Pump Pck Lower Sup     |   |
+-------------------------+-------------------------------------------+---+
| 612.015.05.03.000.08    | Pump Package Str (Upper)                  |   |
+-------------------------+-------------------------------------------+---+
| 612.015.06.00.000.08    | Igloo Handling Kit Pump Pck Upper Sup     |   |
+-------------------------+-------------------------------------------+---+
| 612.015.07.00.000.08    | Igloo Handling Kit Off Line Sup Frame     |   |
+-------------------------+-------------------------------------------+---+
| 612.015.11.00.000.08    | Hoisting Device FOP                       |   |
+-------------------------+-------------------------------------------+---+
| 612.045                 | Sub-Floor Install/Removal Kit             |   |
+-------------------------+-------------------------------------------+---+
| 612.049.02.13.000.03    | R&F Support Braces Kit (Upper)            |   |
+-------------------------+-------------------------------------------+---+
| 612.049.02.15.000.03    | R&F Support Braces Kit (Lower)            |   |
+-------------------------+-------------------------------------------+---+
| 612.050.01.00.000.03    | Double Rack Handling Structure            |   |
|                         |                                           |   |
| (9003555-1)             |                                           |   |
+-------------------------+-------------------------------------------+---+
| 612.050.02.01.000.03    | Double Rack Adj Mechanism                 |   |
+-------------------------+-------------------------------------------+---+
| 612.050.02.01.066.03    | Double Rack Tie Bar                       |   |
+-------------------------+-------------------------------------------+---+
| 612.050.04.00.000.03    | Control Center Rack Hdl Structure         |   |
|                         |                                           |   |
| (9005361-1)             |                                           |   |
+-------------------------+-------------------------------------------+---+
| 612.050.06.02.000.03    | Double Rack Structure Tilting Frame       |   |
+-------------------------+-------------------------------------------+---+
| 612.050.06.04.000.03    | Hoist Traverse, Rack H&T Kit              |   |
+-------------------------+-------------------------------------------+---+
| 612.050.07.00.000.03    | Double Rack Handling Structure            |   |
|                         |                                           |   |
| (9005211-1LI)           |                                           |   |
+-------------------------+-------------------------------------------+---+

+-------------------------+--------------------------------------------+
| **PAYLOADS MECHANICAL   |                                            |
| GSE (Continued)**       |                                            |
+-------------------------+--------------------------------------------+
|                         |                                            |
+-------------------------+--------------------------------------------+
| 612.056                 | Handling Ring Kit                          |
+-------------------------+--------------------------------------------+
| 612.058                 | Module End Cone Platform                   |
+-------------------------+--------------------------------------------+
| 612.059.52.07           | Pallet Cover Hoist Beam                    |
+-------------------------+--------------------------------------------+
| 612.065.01.00.000.03    | Single Rack Handling Structure             |
|                         |                                            |
| (9003554-1)             |                                            |
+-------------------------+--------------------------------------------+
| 612.065.02.01.000.03    | Single Rack Adjusting Mechanism            |
+-------------------------+--------------------------------------------+
| 612.065.02.01.066.03    | Single Rack Tie Bar                        |
+-------------------------+--------------------------------------------+
| 612.065.05.02.000.03    | Single Rack Structure Tilting Frame        |
+-------------------------+--------------------------------------------+
| 612.065.05.04.000.03    | Hoisting Traverse, Rack H&T Kit            |
+-------------------------+--------------------------------------------+
| 612.065.06.00.000.03    | Single Rack Handling Structure             |
|                         |                                            |
| (9005210-1LI)           |                                            |
+-------------------------+--------------------------------------------+
| 612.110                 | Horizontal Sling Kit                       |
+-------------------------+--------------------------------------------+
| 612.111                 | Handling Adapter Kit, End Cone             |
+-------------------------+--------------------------------------------+
| 612.113                 | Trunnion Handling Fitting                  |
+-------------------------+--------------------------------------------+
| 612.119                 | Attenuation Frame                          |
+-------------------------+--------------------------------------------+
| 612.126.01.01.000.03    | Horizontal Access Kit Ring                 |
+-------------------------+--------------------------------------------+
| 612.126.01.11.000.03    | Hoisting Device RAAB Handle                |
+-------------------------+--------------------------------------------+
| 612.131.01.03.000.03    | Hoist Lug                                  |
+-------------------------+--------------------------------------------+
| 884.421000.00.0         | Lifting Device for UGS                     |
+-------------------------+--------------------------------------------+
| 884.432000.00.0         | PAR Hook                                   |
+-------------------------+--------------------------------------------+
| 884.482000.00.0         | Payload Simulation Plate                   |
+-------------------------+--------------------------------------------+
| 2042-822-200.00C        | HVE Hoisting Slings (excluding 3 ea. web   |
|                         | straps, 3 ea. shackles and 3 ea.           |
|                         | turnbuckles)                               |
+-------------------------+--------------------------------------------+
| 2042-822-400.00C        | Adapter, Plate Hoisting Sling (excluding 4 |
|                         | ea. web straps, 4 ea. shackles and 4 ea.   |
|                         | turnbuckles)                               |
+-------------------------+--------------------------------------------+
| 1066846                 | Hoisting Adapter                           |
+-------------------------+--------------------------------------------+
| 1068941                 | Igloo Hoisting Strut                       |
+-------------------------+--------------------------------------------+
| 1217515                 | Spacelab Rack and Floor Trans. Structure   |
+-------------------------+--------------------------------------------+
| 9004474-1               | Igloo Hoisting Device                      |
+-------------------------+--------------------------------------------+
| 9004475-1               | Igloo Hoisting Device                      |
+-------------------------+--------------------------------------------+
| 9005512                 | Igloo Tilt Frame                           |
+-------------------------+--------------------------------------------+
| 9007770-1               | SCU Lifting Device                         |
+-------------------------+--------------------------------------------+
| 9070400                 | LRU Handling Adapter                       |
+-------------------------+--------------------------------------------+
| 9070401                 | OPF (ORU) Lift Beam                        |
+-------------------------+--------------------------------------------+
| 9007723-1               | MPESS Saddle Lifting Bracket               |
+-------------------------+--------------------------------------------+
| 10-5-24, S/N 54478-2    | Fork Lift Beam Hook                        |
+-------------------------+--------------------------------------------+
| 105-6LB                 | Battery Lifting Beam                       |
+-------------------------+--------------------------------------------+
| 105-FA-6                | Fork Attachment                            |
+-------------------------+--------------------------------------------+
|                         |                                            |
+-------------------------+--------------------------------------------+
| **PAYLOADS              |                                            |
| MULTI-MISSION SUPPORT   |                                            |
| EQUIPMENT**             |                                            |
+-------------------------+--------------------------------------------+
|                         |                                            |
+-------------------------+--------------------------------------------+
| A70-0806                | Orbiter Payload Canister-All Lifting       |
|                         | Hardware                                   |
+-------------------------+--------------------------------------------+
| 79K09857-20             | Pad Hanger Link Assembly                   |
+-------------------------+--------------------------------------------+
| 79K09857-23             | PCR Canister Stow Cable                    |
+-------------------------+--------------------------------------------+
| H70-0802                | Payload Strongback Fixture                 |
+-------------------------+--------------------------------------------+
| H70-0534                | Payload Ground Handling Mechanism          |
+-------------------------+--------------------------------------------+
| 79K08502-2              | Main Rod Assembly (Payload Strongback      |
|                         | Fixture)                                   |
+-------------------------+--------------------------------------------+

  -------------------------- --------------------------------------------
  **PAYLOADS MULTI-MISSION   
  SUPPORT EQUIPMENT**        

                             

  79K08502-3                 Brace Rod Assembly (Payload Strongback
                             Fixture)

  H70-1329                   Payload Handling Fixture

  79K24304                   Lifting Yoke & Shackle (Payload Handling
                             Fixture)

  H70-1360                   Single Pallet Rotation Device

  79K28304                   Single Pallet Rotation Device Stand

  H72-1228                   Canister P. L Fittings & Support Rails

  P70-0870                   Single Point Lifting Frame Assembly

  S70-1309                   External Power Supply - Pallet Lift Frame

  B1/3/B-646                 Telescoping Beam
  -------------------------- --------------------------------------------

**APPENDIX B TO ANNEX G**

**KSC LIST OF CRANES USED FOR LOAD TESTING (NOTE 1)**

**1.0 [GENERAL]{.underline}**

> Primary organizations having design, procurement, operations and
> maintenance of lifting equipment are responsible for submitting
> requests for changes to the Lifting Equipment Devices Manager (LDEM),
> with rationale to the list of cranes used for load testing. The LDEM
> will approve/disapprove changes to the list. Requests for changes to
> the list shall state what load testing will be performed and should
> include the following:
>
> a\. Design standard(s).
>
> b\. Design safety factor(s).
>
> c\. Test history.
>
> d\. Operations history.
>
> e\. Maintenance history.
>
> f\. Other information that is acceptance rationale to perform the load
> testing.

  -----------------------------------------------------------------------
  **[CRANE DESCRIPTION]{.underline}**  **[ALLOWED LOAD TEST % (NOTE
                                       2)]{.underline}**
  ------------------------------------ ----------------------------------
                                       

  **SPACE FLIGHT OPERATIONS CONTRACT** 

                                       

  VAB 325-Ton Bridge Cranes            50

  VAB 250-Ton Bridge Cranes            50

  VAB 175-Ton Bridge Crane             50

  VAB Cell 1 10-Ton Bridge Crane       50 (NOTE 3)

  RPSF 200-Ton Bridge Cranes           50

  OPF 30-Ton Bridge Cranes             50

  K6-1996 3-Ton Monorail Crane         100

  K6-1996 1 ½-Ton Monorail Crane       100

  Linkbelt 250-Ton Mobile Crane        75

  Manitowoc 140-Ton Mobile Crane       75

  P&H 65-Ton Mobile Crane              75

  Linkbelt 40-Ton Mobile Crane         75

  Drott 30-Ton Mobile Crane            75

  Broderson 8 ½-Ton Mobile Crane       75

  P&H 300-Ton Mobile Crane             75

  Tadano 130-Ton Mobile Crane          75

  ARF 1 Ton Gantry Hoist               50

                                       

  **PAYLOAD GROUND OPERATIONS          
  CONTRACT**                           

                                       

  O&C 27 ½-Ton Bridge Cranes           50

  O&C 4-Ton Monorail Crane             50

                                       

  **PAYLOAD GROUND OPERATIONS CONTRACT 
  (Continued)**                        

                                       

  O&C 2-Ton Bridge Crane               50

  O&C 1-Ton Jib Cranes                 50

  VPF 10-Ton Bridge Crane              50

  PHSF 50-Ton Bridge Cranes            50

  SAEF-2 20-Ton Bridge Crane           50

  CRF 100-Ton Bridge Crane             50

  MPPF 20-Ton Bridge Crane             50

                                       

                                       

  **JOINT BASE OPERATIONS SUPPORT      
  CONTRACT**                           

                                       

  P&H 90-Ton Mobile Crane              75

  Manitowoc 140-Ton Mobile Crane       75

  P&H 65-Ton Mobile Crane              75

  Linkbelt 22-Ton Mobile Crane         75

  Proof Test Fixture 10-Ton Bridge     100
  Crane                                

                                       

                                       

  **ENGINEERING DEVELOPMENT CONTRACT** 

                                       

  P&H 50-Ton Mobile Crane              75

  M7-505 10-Ton Bridge Cranes          50

  Lifttech 5-Ton Job Crane             50
  -----------------------------------------------------------------------

**[NOTES:]{.underline}**

1.  Load test requirements in Annex G, Section 1.0c(3) shall be adhered
    to.

2.  Allowed load tests % is calculated based on the crane's rated
    capacity.

3.  It is acceptable to perform SSME rotating sling 1G functional
    testing only at greater than 50% of crane capacity.

**ANNEX H**

**SYSTEM SAFETY AND RELIABILITY ENGINEERING REQUIREMENTS**

**1.0 [GENERAL]{.underline}**

> The system safety and reliability engineering requirements delineated
> herein are intended for systems and operations directly supporting the
> performance of KSC's mission. Formal, documented system safety and
> reliability analyses are required for equipment (i.e., facility
> systems, Ground Support Equipment \[GSE\]) that supports the KSC
> institutional infrastructure and is directly involved in flight
> hardware processing.
>
> Ground systems used at KSC, for which KSC does not have sustaining
> engineering responsibility, shall meet the applicable system safety
> and reliability analysis requirements of the NASA Center or Program
> having sustaining engineering responsibility. KSC shall have the right
> to review all engineering documentation to assure that risks to KSC
> personnel and property from such equipment are adequately controlled.
>
> Program/project or directorate organizations (and their associated
> contractors) shall develop documented processes for accomplishing
> these system safety and reliability engineering requirements on
> systems and operations for which they have contractual responsibility.
> All documentation and data shall be available for review by NASA.
>
> Program/project or directorate organizations shall ensure their
> contractors develop and maintain a list of all systems and equipment
> for which they have contractual system safety and reliability
> engineering responsibility. This list shall include the type and level
> of system safety and reliability analysis performed or required to be
> performed.

Systems and equipment designed for use in the Space Shuttle, Space
Station, or Expendable Launch Vehicle (ELV) Programs shall meet the
system safety and reliability engineering requirements of those
programs. It is anticipated that other future programs that are
implemented at KSC will also have specific ground system safety and
reliability engineering requirements that shall be imposed on
NASA/KSC-managed development projects.

**2.0 [HAZARD ANALYSIS/RISK IDENTIFICATION PROCESS]{.underline}**

The hazard analysis/assessment process is a principal factor in the
understanding and management of technical risk. This process serves
several purposes, including assessing compliance of safety requirements;
providing feedback throughout the system design and development process
to support the optimization of the inherent safety of designs;

> a\. Program/project or directorate organizations (and their associated
> contractors) are responsible for the performance of vigorous,
> proactive system safety engineering hazard analyses throughout the
> program/project lifecycle (i.e., design, test, operations). The
> analyses performed shall identify and document hazards to:

1.  Assess compliance of safety requirements.

2.  Identify and document system safety and mission success risks early
    in the program/project and update the status of these risks
    throughout the program/project.

3.  Provide feedback throughout the system design and development
    process to support the optimization of the inherent safety of
    designs.

4.  Analyze ground processing operations, beginning in the system design
    phase, to identify and mitigate any operational hazards, integration
    hazards and human factor issues.

5.  Analyze and prioritize hazards (risks) for probability (Likelihood
    of Occurrence and impact (Severity).

6.  Assure that valid and verifiable hazard controls are established,
    implemented, and tracked.

7.  Provide for management acceptance of risks.

> b\. There are several system safety analyses that can be used to
> identify hazards. There encompass various degrees of specialization,
> and represent both qualitative and quantitative methods. Example
> system safety analyses that can be utilized include:
>
> \(1\) Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA)
>
> \(2\) Subsystem/System Hazard Analysis (SSHA/SHA)
>
> \(3\) Operating and Support Hazard Analysis (O&SHA)
>
> \(4\) Software Safety Analysis (SSA)
>
> \(5\) Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA)
>
> \(6\) Fault Tree Analysis (FTA)
>
> \(7\) Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA)
>
> \(8\) Lessons Learned

**3.0 [RELIABILITY AND MAINTAINABILITY (R&M) ENGINEERING]{.underline}**

> Program/project or directorate organizations (and their associated
> contractors) shall integrate R&M engineering functions into the
> overall design, sustaining engineering, and logistics support
> requirements. For system development efforts, the contractor shall
> develop system R&M requirements appropriate to the mission profile and
> shall assess designs to assure the requirements are met. R&M
> assessments shall be provided to support maintenance planning,
> logistics support analysis, and ongoing Reliability Centered
> Maintenance (RCM) efforts including trending of equipment reliability
> and effectiveness of the maintenance program.

a.  Program/project or directorate organizations (and their associated
    contractors) shall develop a documented approach to reliability and
    maintainability engineering, which addresses, as a minimum, the
    following three support functions:

> \(1\) The safety risk management process.
>
> \(2\) The capability for as-scheduled mission success.
>
> \(3\) Cost-effective ground systems maintenance and support.
>
> b\. Program/project or directorate organizations (and their associated
> contractors) shall develop and implement reliability analysis
> processes that shall verify the fail-safe design requirement for GSE
> and facility systems developed and used at KSC. Noncompliance's with
> the fail-safe requirement shall be identified, documented, and
> processed for management risk visibility/acceptance in accordance with
> applicable programmatic requirements.
>
> c\. There are several reliability and maintainability analyses that
> can be used to support fail-safe verification and other R&M
> objectives. Example reliability and maintainability analyses that can
> be utilized include:
>
> \(1\) Criticality Assessment
>
> \(2\) Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA)

\(3\) Reliability Block Diagram Analysis (RBDA)

**4.0 [NASA-MANAGED DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS]{.underline}**

> NASA/KSC Project Managers, or Lead Designers with assigned project
> responsibility, are responsible for ensuring the safety and
> reliability of their developed systems and equipment. This
> responsibility begins with identification of safety and reliability
> requirements during the project planning phase and ensuring safety and
> reliability engineering tasks are included in the project schedule,
> funded, and executed.
>
> NASA/KSC developed systems and equipment shall be designed to minimize
> hazards and shall incorporate the fail-safe design philosophy. System
> safety and reliability analyses shall be selected which provide
> verification of the safety and reliability design requirements, as
> well as ensure identification and mitigation of risks (i.e., hazards
> and critical items) present in the design and the intended
> operation(s) of the systems and equipment. These analyses shall be
> performed concurrently with the design process, with the safety and
> reliability design requirements provided at the project design kickoff
> meeting. Draft copies of analyses should be included in design review
> packages (i.e., 30/60/90%) distributed for review. As a minimum,
> analysis results shall be provided to the design team in sequence with
> equipment/system design process to allow for design correction of any
> deficiencies identified by the analyses. Residual risks (hazards and
> critical items) not eliminated through the design process shall be
> formally documented and presented to management for risk disposition.

**ANNEX I**

**RESERVED**

**ANNEX J**

######## **RESERVED**

**ANNEX K**

**LAUNCH AND LANDING OPERATIONS**

**1.0 [FLIGHT HARDWARE ACCESS AFTER PRSD SERVICING]{.underline}**

> a\. Payload experiments/equipment shall be planned for installation to
> minimize late stowage requirements during launch countdown.
>
> b\. Experiments/equipment requiring late installation/ early removal
> at the middeck level may be performed after prelaunch Power Reactant
> Supply and Distribution (PRSD) servicing and prior to External Tank
> (ET) Liquid Hydrogen (LH~2~) boiloff or postlanding PRSD deservicing
> upon completion of Orbiter/pad safing operations.
>
> c\. Habitable Payload Module Access
>
> \(1\) Science experiments requiring late access to minimize science
> degradation may be serviced after PRSD cryo load and prior to ET cryo
> load. Allowable access shall be only via the Orbiter crew compartment.
>
> \(2\) Access to a habitable module via the airlock during postlanding
> Orbiter Processing Facility (OPF) processing may be allowed EXCEPT
> during the following:
>
> \(a\) Orbiter jacking and leveling.
>
> \(b\) At the start of PRSD controlled venting, when a 25-foot clear is
> imposed, and during cryo tank offload.
>
> \(c\) When the Orbiter is powered-down, prior to the establishment of
> PRSD-controlled venting.
>
> \(d\) When the control area imposed by other priority hazardous
> operations would preclude access to the habitable payload module.
>
> \(3\) Initial runway postlanding access via the airlock may be granted
> after the Safety Assessment Team and the NASA Convoy Commander (NCC)
> have given a total safety downgrade of the Orbiter, providing:
>
> \(a\) The Orbiter is powered up, or
>
> \(b\) Controlled venting via the S70-1214 and the S70-1215, T-0 Cryo
> Vent Package has been established.

**2.0 [SCRUB OPERATIONS]{.underline}**

> a\. During launch scrub securing, the Safety Control Center (SCC)
> shall verify the following in sequence:
>
> \(1\) For scrubs with no personnel on pad:
>
> \(a\) Hazardous Gas Detection System (HGDS) and LH~2~ fire sensors
> indicate safe.
>
> \(b\) LH~2~ in/to stable replenish or Terminal Count Safing.
>
> \(c\) Safe to start Liquid Oxygen (LO~2~) drain.
>
> \(d\) LO~2~ in stable drain.
>
> \(e\) Safe to start LH~2~ drain.
>
> \(2\) For scrubs with personnel on pad:
>
> \(a\) HGDS and LH~2~ fire sensors indicate safe.
>
> \(b\) LH~2~ in stable replenish.
>
> \(c\) LO~2~ in stable replenish.
>
> \(d\) All explosive devices are safed.
>
> \(e\) Flight crew egress has begun.
>
> \(f\) Flight crew is clear of the Blast Danger Area (BDA).
>
> \(g\) Closeout crew has secured the cabin and white room and cleared
> the BDA.
>
> \(h\) Safe to start ET LO~2~ drain.
>
> \(i\) ET LO~2~ in stable drain.
>
> \(j\) Safe to start ET LH~2~ drain.
>
> \(k\) Safing/securing teams may proceed to BDA.
>
> \(l\) ET LH~2~/LO~2~ de-tanking is completed, LH~2~/LO~2~ tank engine
> cutoff sensor is indicating dry, and LH~2~ leak and fire sensors
> indicate safe.
>
> \(3\) For scrubs with only Flight Crew on pad:
>
> \(a\) HGDS and LH~2~ fire sensors indicate safe.
>
> \(b\) All explosive devices are safed.
>
> \(c\) LH~2~ in/to stable replenish or Terminal Count Safing.
>
> \(d\) LO~2~ in stable drain.
>
> \(e\) Closeout crew is proceeding to the white room.
>
> \(f\) White Room O~2~ atmosphere is acceptable.
>
> \(g\) Flight crew egress has begun.
>
> \(h\) Flight and closeout crews are clear of the BDA.
>
> \(i\) Safe to start ET LH~2~ drain.
>
> \(j\) Securing teams may proceed to BDA.
>
> \(k\) ET LH~2~/LO~2~ drainage is completed, LH~2~/LO~2~ tank engine
> cutoff sensor indicates dry, and LH~2~ leak and fire sensors indicate
> safe.
>
> \(4\) Prior to reentry of safing teams:

a.  Ground Pyro Initiator Controller (PIC) racks are powered off.

b.  BDA roadblocks are maintained.

c.  Gaseous Nitrogen (GN~2~)/air changeover is completed (HGDS switches
    from prime to backup).

d.  Solid Rocket Boosters (SRBs) are powered off.

e.  SRB aft skirt purge is terminated.

f.  Mobile Launch Platform (MLP) Oxygen Deficiency Monitoring System
    (ODMS) indicates safe.

g.  Orbiter HGDS (backup system) is active.

h.  LH~2~/LO~2~ purges are initiated.

i.  HGDS (backup system) is monitored during boiloff to less than
    1percent H~2.~

j.  LH~2~/LO~2~ drain back is complete and LH~2~/LO~2~ storage areas are
    isolated from transfer lines.

k.  LO~2~/LH~2~ storage facilities are isolated.

> b\. During launch scrub securing, the Post Launch Convoy shall proceed
> to the pad gate and perform the following tasks in sequence:
>
> \(1\) Enter the pad after notification by the SCC.
>
> \(2\) LH~2~/LO~2~ storage area inspection and atmosphere H~2~ sampling
> checks.
>
> \(3\) Start the MLP skid inspection and atmosphere H~2~ sampling
> checks.
>
> \(4\) Establish local control area of 150-foot radius of LO~2~ and
> 200-foot radius of LH~2~ storage tanks.
>
> \(5\) Start Pad Terminal Connection Room (PTCR)/Environmental Control
> System (ECS) depressurization, O~2~ checks and GN~2~ valves lockout.
>
> \(6\) Verify less than 1 percent H~2~ in ET vent line (Fixed Service
> Structure \[FSS\] 203-foot level), facility vent line (FSS 155-foot
> level), MLP side one H~2~ transfer line, and LH~2~ Storage Facility
> vaporizer (less than 4 percent in vaporizer only for 24-hour scrub).
> (If a longer scrub is determined, the vaporizer shall be
> purged/verified less than 1 percent H~2~.)
>
> \(7\) Close E road at pad apron and at Perimeter Road if Gaseous
> Oxygen (GOX) is present in the LO~2~ dump basin.
>
> \(8\) Start MLP O~2~ checks and depressurization. (Entry to the MLP is
> prohibited, except for Safety inspection team, until acceptable
> atmosphere sampling (toxic O~2~) checks are performed.)
>
> \(9\) Sound suppression water valve closed and locks installed.
>
> \(10\) Advise SCC when BDA roadblocks may be released.

**3.0 [TURNAROUND OPERATIONS]{.underline}**

> Following launch scrub securing, the following requirements shall be
> adhered to for turnaround operations:
>
> a\. Entry into the pad (slope and above) shall only be for turnaround
> safing and securing operations.
>
> b\. HGDS and backup system shall remain powered up and monitored until
> ET H~2~ is less than 1 percent.

c.  Following PRSD tank service through scrub/turnaround, except for the
    white room and crew cabin, the Orbiter mid/aft/fuselage and LH~2~
    Tail Service Mast (TSM) will remain closed until the PRSD tanks are
    deserviced and Ground Support Equipment (GSE) inerted. Entry into
    the aft shall only be performed after concurrence of the KSC Launch
    Director, KSC Shuttle S&MA Division Chief, and the Space Flight
    Operations Contractor (SFOC) Safety, Quality, and Mission Assurance
    (SQ&MA) Director. Any off-nominal conditions that exist with the
    vehicle or Pad systems will be evaluated and identified either as a
    constraint or no constraint to aft entry in the scrub turnaround
    meeting. The following requirements shall be met prior to and during
    aft entry:

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1.  GN~2~ purge to the Orbiter has been secured and the manual valves
    are chained and locked in the ECS room.

2.  LO~2~ and/or LH~2~ TSM ordnance shall be mechanically safed prior to
    lowering the triple flip platforms for aft access.

3.  PRSD mid-body valve shall be closed and not actively venting H~2~
    through the T-0. Should it become necessary to vent through the T-0,
    all personal shall evacuate the aft.

4.  Safety shall verify acceptable O~2~ prior to entry and monitor O~2~
    and H~2~ levels during the operation.

5.  Personnel shall be attired in safety-approved, flame-retardant
    coveralls and will be briefed on the hazards of the operation.

6.  Only the minimum number of personnel essential to the completion of
    the task shall be allowed entry into the aft.

7.  Only the minimum amount of platforms necessary to safely accomplish
    the task and allow egress through the 50-1 and/or 50-2 doors shall
    be installed.

8.  The TSM final ordnance and closeout for launch or scrub turnaround
    safing for Operations and Maintenance Instructions (OMIs) S0007 and
    V3517, may be performed after PRSD tank service. Scheduled
    monitoring of ET LO~2~ and LH~2~ vacuum-jacketed lines in the TSMs
    with the concurrence of the NASA Test Director (NTD) may be
    performed until TSM closeout for launch. Acceptable O~2~ levels are
    verified prior to entry and O~2~ and H~2~ levels are monitored
    during this operation. The PRSD tanks are vented through the TSMs.

> d\. The following facilities/GSE shall remain closed for duration of
> ET LH~2~ boiloff:
>
> \(1\) LH~2~/LO~2~ TSMs.
>
> \(2\) H~2~ disconnect tower.
>
> \(3\) H~2~ flare stack area.
>
> \(4\) 50 feet of LH~2~ cross-country vent line.
>
> \(5\) North and ECS bridges.
>
> \(6\) LO~2~ dump basin.
>
> \(7\) GO~2~/GH~2~ facility.
>
> \(8\) MLP zero-level between sound suppression pipes and SRB flame
> hole.
>
> \(9\) Within 10 feet of GH~2~ panel on FSS 75-foot level.
>
> \(10\) Within 50 feet of GO~2~ and GH~2~ facility cross-country lines.
>
> \(11\) For turnarounds involving Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME)
> firings, access to LH~2~ Tail Service Mast TSM may occur to connect
> SSME drying purge with Safety concurrence.
>
> f\. The rotation of the Rotating Service Structure (RSS) in a scrub
> turnaround is normally performed after the completion of ET H~2~
> boiloff and inert to less than 1.0% H~2~. The rotation of the RSS
> prior to completion of ET H~2~ boiloff and inert to less than 1.0%
> H~2~, requires the concurrence of the KSC Launch Director, KSC Shuttle
> S&MA Division Chief, and the SFOC SQ&MA Director. Any off-nominal
> conditions that exist with the vehicle of Pad systems will be
> evaluated and identified either as a constraint or no constraint to
> RSS rotation in the scrub turnaround meeting. For additional
> information, see KSC Hazard Report LL-0112, "Early Rotation of the
> Rotating Service Structure Prior to External Tank boiloff and Inert to
> Less Than One Percent GH~2~."
>
> The following requirements shall be met prior to the start of RSS
> rotation preoperations tasks:

1.  Ground PIC racks shall be powered ***OFF***.

2.  BDA roadblocks shall be maintained, as applicable.

3.  The GN~2~/air changeover shall be completed (HGDS shall switch from
    prime to backup).

4.  SRBs shall be powered ***OFF***.

5.  SRB aft skirt purge shall be terminated.

6.  The MLP O~2~ ODMS shall indicate ***SAFE***.

7.  The Orbiter HGDS (backup system) shall be active.

8.  The LH~2~/LO~2~ purges shall be initiated.

9.  Pad safing/securing teams shall have completed initial pad safing.

10. H~2~ boiloff shall be stable and initial 30-minute purge shall be
    complete.

11. H~2~ fire and leak detectors shall be active and monitored.

12. There shall be no H~2~/O~2~ leaks from the Orbiter, ET or GSE
    systems. Leaks in the storage facilities shall be evaluated to
    ensure no impact or safety concern to the RSS rotation operation.

> g\. SRB/SSME engine service platforms shall not be installed until
> boiloff is complete.
>
> h\. PRSD servicing shall be prohibited until completion of ET H~2~
> boiloff to less than 1 percent H~2~.

**4.0 [POSTLAUNCH OPERATIONS]{.underline}**

> Following launch, the Postlaunch Convoy shall:
>
> a\. Proceed to the BDA upon direction from the Test Director (TD)/SCC.
>
> b\. Hold at the BDA until a safe condition is verified at the pad
> gate.
>
> c\. Enter the Pad upon concurrence from the TD and after the SCC has
> verified that:
>
> \(1\) The PIC resistance tests are complete and the system is powered
> down.
>
> \(2\) The Safety Operational Television (OTV) scan is complete with no
> anomalies.
>
> \(3\) The fire/leak detector status is complete with no anomalies.
>
> \(4\) The LO~2~ and LH~2~ system purges are initiated.
>
> \(5\) MLP GN~2~-to-air changeover is complete.

**5.0 [ORBITER NOMINAL LANDING]{.underline}**

> a\. The entire landing facility area shall be under
> security-controlled access prior to Orbiter approach. The controlled
> access area is defined as a 5500-foot radius established from the
> runway centerline down the entire length of the runway. This control
> area shall be established 3 hours prior to landing until the Orbiter
> lands and it is verified there are no major hazardous materials
> spills.
>
> b\. All essential personnel required to be within the 5500-foot radius
> shall:
>
> \(1\) Have satisfactorily completed emergency escape training for the
> facility.
>
> \(2\) Have egress capability and communications available to someone
> who can direct evacuation.
>
> c\. KSC Guest Viewing Restrictions
>
> \(1\) Viewing shall be at the Shuttle Landing Facility (SLF) Midfield
> Press viewing site. Visitors shall not be permitted at the viewing
> site during abort landings. The total combined number of guest and
> press buses shall be limited to 24 at the viewing site. Buses used to
> transport visitors shall be parked in a manner to provide for
> evacuation as quickly as possible and visitors shall be separated from
> convoy and emergency crews/ equipment by fencing.

2.  The KSC Center Director or his/her designee shall approve runway
    access for KSC Senior Management during Orbiter postlanding
    processing. The Launch Director (LD) or his/her designee shall
    accompany Senior Management and remain in communication with the
    NCC. The NCC shall give the LD an OK to proceed to the runway after
    the following operational requirements are met:

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(a) Landing + 45 minutes

(b) Crew Transport Vehicle moved away from Orbiter

(c) Successful completion of upper level assessment.

> d\. The condition of the Orbiter and wind direction shall determine
> the safety control area, position of the vehicles after Orbiter
> landing, and the Safety Assessment Team attire. The following shall be
> the minimum acceptable control areas until the Safety Assessment Team
> finishes the safety assessment of the Orbiter and the surrounding
> area:
>
> \(1\) A 1250-foot radius of the Orbiter after wheel stop shall be
> established and maintained as the safety control area. All vehicles
> and personnel shall remain at the 1250-foot radius until ingress of
> required safing vehicles and personnel is allowed.
>
> \(2\) A 200-foot upwind and a 700-foot downwind, control area shall be
> established for hypergolic release/leak potentials until safety
> assessments are accomplished.
>
> e\. The Safety Assessment Team shall perform the following in
> sequence, upon direction from the operating organization:
>
> \(1\) Approach the Orbiter in the Self Contained Atmospheric
> Protective Ensemble (SCAPE) vehicle, wearing Self-Contained Breathing
> Apparatus (SCBA):
>
> \(a\) Upwind Landing: Proceed to a point 200 feet from the nose of the
> Orbiter, deploy the Assessment Team, and return to the rear of the
> mini-convoy. The Safety Assessment Team shall take continuous vapor
> readings and proceed to approximately 50 feet from the Orbiter and
> hold until advised by the operating organization.
>
> \(b\) Downwind Landing (or winds less than 3 knots): Proceed to a
> point 700 feet from the Orbiter as directed by the operating
> organization. Deploy the Safety Assessment Team and return to the rear
> of the mini-convoy. The Safety Assessment Team shall take continuous
> vapor readings and proceed to 50 feet from the Orbiter and hold until
> advised by the operating organization.
>
> \(2\) Start the assessment, proceed towards the Orbiter taking
> continuous readings.
>
> \(a\) If readings are acceptable, proceed with the forward and aft
> assessments as outlined in the applicable TOP.
>
> \(b\) If the initial readings exceed Orbiter postlanding GH~2~
> requirements (per Table K-1) then fallback and proceed to personnel
> evacuations as outlined in Section 5.0j.
>
> \(c\) While performing the forward and aft assessments, checks shall
> be made for gas or fluid leaks, fire, hot wheels/brakes, and tire
> damage, staying outside the danger areas outlined in Section 5.0j.
>
> \(d\) Any anomalies found during any part of the safety assessment
> shall be immediately reported to the operating organization.
>
> \(3\) After the forward assessment is completed and acceptable, the
> vehicles required for safing and crew egress may move into position to
> perform their assigned tasks at the direction of NCC, Safety, and the
> operating organization. Any critical entry requirement, beyond the
> required vehicles, shall require approval by NCC, NASA Safety, and the
> operating organization.
>
> \(4\) After the aft ground-level safety assessment downgrade is given,
> then the remaining safing vehicles may move within 50 feet aft of the
> Orbiter. Umbilical access vehicles shall not be positioned at the
> Orbiter until after Auxiliary Power Unite (APU) shutdown.
>
> \(5\) Upon connection of T-0 panels and HGDS Quick Disconnects (QDs),
> Safety shall monitor for GH~2~ content in the aft, payload, and
> mid-fuselage ports.
>
> \(6\) After the forward and aft ground level assessment is complete
> and acceptable, essential payload and/or flight crew systems personnel
> and vehicles may move into position as approved by NCC, Safety, and
> the operating organization.
>
> \(7\) Upon acceptable reading of payload bay HGDS hydrogen sampling
> and following the Payload Bay 10-minute purge, support vehicles may
> move into the control area with approval from NCC and Safety.
>
> \(8\) If mission-returned cargo contains hydrazine, monitor vent doors
> numbers 8 and 9 after purge has been initiated.
>
> \(9\) Continue to monitor toxic vapor sensing instruments and general
> area of Orbiter during postlanding inspection and tow operation.
>
> \(10\) Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) downgrade shall take place
> only after toxic and explosive atmospheric checks are within
> acceptable limits

(11) A 25-foot radial control area shall be maintained around the T-0
     S70-1214/1215 prior to initiating controlled PRSD venting.

+----------+--------------+-------------+--------------+--------------+
| **H~2~   | **VENT DOOR  | **INITIAL   | **FIRST 10   | **AFTER 10   |
| C        | #3 READING   | HAZ GAS     | MINUTE       | MINUTE       |
| ONCEN-TR | (NOTE 6)**   | READING     | MONITOR**    | MONITOR**    |
| ATIONS** |              | (NOTE 5)**  |              |              |
+----------+--------------+-------------+--------------+--------------+
| Over 1%  | • Reposition | • Power     | • Power down | • Power down |
|          | vent doors   | down        | Orbiter      | Orbiter      |
| (NOTE 2) |              | Orbiter     |              |              |
|          | • Power down |             | • Evacuate   | • Evacuate   |
|          | Orbiter      | • Evacuate  | Flight Crew  | Flight Crew  |
|          |              | Flight Crew |              |              |
|          | • Evacuate   |             | • Evacuate   | • Evacuate   |
|          | Flight Crew  | • Evacuate  | all          | all          |
|          |              | all         | personnel    | personnel    |
|          | • Evacuate   | personnel   |              |              |
|          | all          |             | • Maintain   | • Maintain   |
|          | personnel    | • Try to    | purge        | purge        |
|          |              | initiate    |              |              |
|          | • Assess     | purge       | • Take       | • Take       |
|          | quantities   |             | another Haz  | another Haz  |
|          | and leakage  | • Take      | Gas reading  | Gas reading  |
|          | for          | another Haz |              |              |
|          | reassessment | Gas reading |              |              |
|          |              |             |              |              |
|          | • Try to     |             |              |              |
|          | initiate     |             |              |              |
|          | purge        |             |              |              |
|          |              |             |              |              |
|          | • Monitor    |             |              |              |
|          | Vent Door #3 |             |              |              |
|          | until        |             |              |              |
|          | repositioned |             |              |              |
+----------+--------------+-------------+--------------+--------------+
| Trace 1% |              |             | • Essential  | • Essential  |
| (NOTE 2) |              |             | ops (NOTE 4) | ops (NOTE 4) |
|          |              |             |              |              |
|          |              |             | • Maintain   | • Maintain   |
|          |              |             | Orbiter      | Orbiter      |
|          |              |             | power        | power        |
|          |              |             |              |              |
|          |              |             | • Maintain   | • Maintain   |
|          |              |             | purge        | purge        |
|          |              |             |              |              |
|          |              |             | • Continuous | • Continuous |
|          |              |             | monitor      | monitor      |
|          |              |             | (NOTE 1)     | (NOTE 1)     |
+----------+--------------+-------------+--------------+--------------+
| 0%       | Controlled   | Controlled  | Controlled   | Controlled   |
|          | ops (NOTE 3) | ops (NOTE   | ops (NOTE 3) | ops (NOTE 3) |
|          |              | 3)          |              |              |
+----------+--------------+-------------+--------------+--------------+

**TABLE K-1**

**ORBITER POSTLANDING GH2 REQUIREMENTS**

**[Table K-1 Notes:]{.underline}**

\(1\) Spikes are expected; you should expect a downward trend within
five minutes of initiating purge (should be below one percent H~2~
within 15 minutes of initiating purge).

2.  Meter Readings: (All readings above baseline zero percent Lower
    Explosive Level (LEL) shall be reported.)

> \(a\) Trace: A meter reading of at least 10 percent LEL for 30
> seconds.
>
> \(b\) Over 1 percent: A meter reading of at least 25 percent LEL for
> 30 seconds.

\(3\) Controlled Operations: Definition as currently stated in landing
OMI.

\(4\) Essential Operations: To maintain purge, cooling, Orbiter power,
and flight crew egress only.

\(5\) Initiate purge after initial Haz Gas reading or within 30 minutes
of upper aft downgrade, whichever occurs first. Without Haz Gas
readings, initiate purge and monitor vent door No. 9. If reading is less
than trace after five minutes, open upper aft left and right for
controlled operations per landing OMI. Monitor vent door No. 9 until Haz
Gas reading is available.

\(6\) If vent door No. 3 reading is 1 percent or less, it is acceptable
to use the white room vehicle to evacuate the flight crew, provided
ground level hydrogen at hatch area is also 1 percent or less.

f.  When Orbiter power-down is required after the safety assessment, the
    S70-1214/1215 PRSD vent panels shall be installed.

> g\. Personnel shall remain clear of Main Landing Gear (MLG) for a
> minimum of 45 minutes after landing. The restricted area shall be
> bounded by 20-foot radius circles around MLG struts and 60-foot
> radius, 45-degree sectors whose apexes shall be at center of wheels.
> The centerline shall be projected from wheel axles. Strobe lights
> shall be placed 60 feet from the Orbiter MLG (both sides). Strobes
> shall be activated after ground level downgrade is completed and
> acceptable and shall be turned off 45 minutes after wheel stop.
>
> h\. Personnel shall remain clear of restricted area around the Orbiter
> side hatch until the Convoy Commander receives confirmation of hatch
> safe. Restricted area is a 15-foot by 100-foot corridor projected out
> from the side hatch.
>
> i\. Mission-returned cargo containing hydrazine and/or nitrogen
> tetroxide shall be checked at Orbiter left and right hand vent doors
> No. 3 for toxic and explosive vapor readings. If acceptable readings
> are exceeded, SCAPE is required to continue safing operations.
> Acceptable readings are 0 to 1 ppm for fuel and 0 to 20 ppm for
> oxidizer. If hydrazine readings exceed 180 ppm, the following shall be
> implemented:
>
> \(1\) Crew performs an expedited power-down.
>
> \(2\) Mode V aided egress.
>
> \(3\) Evacuate all personnel to 1250 feet of the Orbiter.
>
> \(4\) Upon the direction of NCC and Safety, attempt to establish
> purge.

j.  If the drag chute fails to deploy during rollout, personnel and
    vehicles shall stay clear of drag chute deployment area (10 degrees
    left to 47 degrees right of Orbiter centerline and 100 feet aft)
    until pyrotechnic circuits are verified safed. Confirm circuit
    breaker in crew compartment is verified open.

> k\. Personnel Clears for Postlanding Operations
>
> \(1\) In coordination with the operating organization and the Convoy
> Commander, all personnel, including flight crew, shall be cleared to a
> minimum of 1250 feet from the Orbiter area when explosive/flammability
> readings are above the maximum allowable concentrations.
>
> \(2\) All personnel shall be cleared 200 feet upwind and 700 feet
> downwind of the Orbiter when hypergolic Threshold Limit Value (TLV)
> readings are above the allowable limits (unless personnel attired in
> SCAPE).

3.  After clearing all personnel, the operating organization shall wait
    a minimum of 10 minutes and activate the fan machine (if not already
    activated) before directing the assessment team to approach the
    Orbiter (upwind) for additional assessments. If this assessment also
    exceeds the TLV limits, but less than explosive level limits, then
    further operations shall be conducted in SCAPE.