**PUBLIC NOTICE**![](media/image1.png){width="0.7388888888888889in"
height="0.7458333333333333in"}

**FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION**

**445 12th STREET, S.W.**

**WASHINGTON, D.C. 20554**

News Media Information: (202) 418-0500

Fax-On-Demand: (202) 418-2830

Internet: http://www.fcc.gov

ftp.fcc.gov

####### DA 99-1103

June 7, 1999

**FIRST PAGING SERVICE SPECTRUM AUCTION**

##### SCHEDULED FOR DECEMBER 7, 1999

**COMMENT SOUGHT**

**ON RESERVE PRICES OR MINIMUM OPENING BIDS AND**

###### OTHER AUCTION PROCEDURAL ISSUES

**Report No. AUC‑99-26-A (Auction No. 26)**

By this Public Notice, the Wireless Telecommunications Bureau
(\"Bureau\") announces the first in a series of auctions of Paging
service licenses, scheduled to commence on December 7, 1999.[^1] As
discussed in greater detail herein, the Bureau proposes that the first
Paging auction be composed of 2,499 licenses in the 929 and 931 MHz
bands (the "Upper Bands Auction"). These licenses, which are available
in 51 geographic areas known as Major Economic Areas (MEAs), encompass
the United States, the Northern Mariana Islands, Guam, American Samoa,
the United States Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico. In this Public Notice,
we seek comment on this and other procedural issues relating to the
Upper Bands Auction (Auction No. 26). Future public notices will include
further details regarding application filing and payment deadlines,
seminars, and other pertinent information for this auction. We will seek
comment separately on procedural issues relating to the auction of
licenses in the 35-36 MHz, 43-44 MHz, 152-159 MHz, and 454-460 MHz bands
(collectively, the "Lower Bands Auctions").

**I. Auction Sequence and License Groupings for the Paging Service
Auctions**

In the *Reconsideration Order*, the Commission concluded that the upper
bands licenses should be awarded in each of 51 Major Economic Areas
(MEAs), and the lower bands licenses should be awarded in each of 175
Economic Areas (EAs).[^2] There are 12 channels in the 929 MHz band and
37 channels in the 931 MHz band, resulting in a total of 2,499 upper
bands paging licenses. There is a significantly larger number of lower
bands licenses (approaching 14,000); therefore, the Commission proposes
to auction the upper bands licenses first and will seek comment on
procedures and license groupings for the lower bands licenses at a later
time. We seek comment on this proposal.

### 

The following tables contain the proposed Block / Frequency Cross
Reference List for the 929 MHz and 931 MHz bands.

**929 MHz Paging Channels**

  ------------- -------------------- -- ------------- --------------------
  **Block       **Frequency**           **Block       **Frequency**
  (License                              (License      
  Suffix)**                             Suffix)**     

  A             929.0125                G             929.4625

  B             929.1125                H             929.6375

  C             929.2375                I             929.6875

  D             929.3125                J             929.7875

  E             929.3875                K             929.9125

  F             929.4375                L             929.9625
  ------------- -------------------- -- ------------- --------------------

**931 MHz Paging Channels**

  ----------- --------------- -- ----------- --------------- -- ----------- ---------------
  **Block     **Frequency**      **Block     **Frequency**      **Block     **Frequency**
  (License                       (License                       (License    
  Suffix)**                      Suffix)**                      Suffix)**   

  AA          931.0125           AN          931.3375           AZ          931.6375

  AB          931.0375           AO          931.3625           BA          931.6625

  AC          931.0625           AP          931.3875           BB          931.6875

  AD          931.0875           AQ          931.4125           BC          931.7125

  AE          931.1125           AR          931.4375           BD          931.7375

  AF          931.1375           AS          931.4625           BE          931.7625

  AG          931.1625           AT          931.4875           BF          931.7875

  AH          931.1875           AU          931.5125           BG          931.8125

  AI          931.2125           AV          931.5375           BH          931.8375

  AJ          931.2375           AW          931.5625           BI          931.8625

  AK          931.2625           AX          931.5875           BJ          931.9625

  AL          931.2875           AY          931.6125           BK          931.9875

  AM          931.3125                                                      
  ----------- --------------- -- ----------- --------------- -- ----------- ---------------

### II. Reserve Price or Minimum Opening Bid for the Upper Bands Auction (Auction No. 26)

The Balanced Budget Act of 1997 calls upon the Commission to prescribe
methods by which a reasonable reserve price will be required or a
minimum opening bid established when FCC licenses are subject to auction
(*i.e.*, because the Commission has received mutually exclusive
applications for them), unless the Commission determines that a reserve
price or minimum bid is not in the public interest.[^3] Consistent with
this mandate, the Commission has directed the Bureau to seek comment on
the use of a minimum opening bid and/or reserve price prior to the start
of each auction.[^4] The Bureau was directed to seek comment on the
methodology to be employed in establishing each of these mechanisms.
Among other factors the Bureau should consider is the amount of spectrum
being auctioned, levels of incumbency, the availability of technology to
provide service, the size of the geographic service areas, issues of
interference with other spectrum bands, and any other relevant factors
that reasonably could have an impact on valuation of the spectrum being
auctioned. The Commission concluded that the Bureau should have the
discretion to employ either or both of these mechanisms for future
auctions.[^5]

Normally, a reserve price is an absolute minimum price below which an
item will not be sold in a given auction. Reserve prices can be either
published or unpublished. A minimum opening bid, on the other hand, is
the minimum bid price set at the beginning of the auction below which
*no bids* are accepted. It is generally used to accelerate the
competitive bidding process. Also, in a minimum opening bid scenario,
the Bureau generally has the discretion to lower the amount later in the
auction. In the event that a license is not sold in an auction, the
Bureau also may lower the minimum opening bid or reserve price for that
license in subsequent auctions. In anticipation of the first Paging
service auction and in light of the Balanced Budget Act, the Bureau
proposes to establish minimum opening bids for the Upper Bands Auction,
and retain discretion to lower the minimum opening bids. The Bureau
believes that the use of minimum opening bids is an effective auctions
practice which has been used successfully in prior Commission
auctions.[^6] A minimum opening bid, rather than a reserve price, will
help to regulate the pace of the auction. Specifically, the Bureau
proposes the following formula for calculating minimum opening bids on a
license-by-license basis in the Upper Bands Auction (Auction

No. 26):

\$.001 x Pops (the result rounded to the nearest hundred for levels
below \$10,000, and

rounded to the nearest thousand for levels above \$10,000), with a
minimum of

no less than \$2,500 per license.

This formula is intended to apply to all geographic paging licenses in
the 929 and 931 bands, and was determined based upon the considerations
explained above. The specific proposed minimum opening bids for each
license are set forth in Attachment A. Comment is sought on this
proposal. If commenters believe that the formula proposed above for
minimum opening bids will result in substantial numbers of unsold
licenses, or is not a reasonable amount, or should instead operate as a
reserve price, they should explain why this is so, and comment on the
desirability of an alternative approach. Commenters are advised to
support their claims with valuation analyses and suggested reserve
prices or minimum opening bid levels or formulas. In establishing the
formula for minimum opening bids, we particularly seek comment on such
factors as, among other things, the amount of spectrum being auctioned,
levels of incumbency, the availability of technology to provide service,
the size of the geographic service areas, issues of interference with
other spectrum bands and any other relevant factors that could
reasonably have an impact on valuation of the Paging service spectrum.
Alternatively, comment is sought on whether, consistent with the
Balanced Budget Act, the public interest would be served by having no
minimum opening bid or reserve price.

### III. Other Auction Procedural Issues for the Upper Bands Auction (Auction No. 26)

The Balanced Budget Act of 1997 requires the Commission to \"ensure
that, in the scheduling of any competitive bidding . . . an adequate
period is allowed. . . before issuance of bidding rules, to permit
notice and comment on proposed auction procedures. . . .\"[^7]
Consistent with the provisions of the Balanced Budget Act and to ensure
that potential bidders have adequate time to familiarize themselves with
the specific provisions that will govern the day-to-day conduct of an
auction, the Commission directed the Bureau, under its existing
delegated authority,[^8] to seek comment on a variety of
auction-specific issues prior to the start of each auction.[^9] We
therefore seek comment on the following issues relating to the Upper
Bands Auction (Auction No. 26).

**a. Information Available to Bidders During the Course of the Auction**

In the *Second Report and Order*, the Commission concluded that, due to
the large number of licenses to be auctioned, the advantages of limiting
the disclosure of information available to bidders during the course of
the Paging auctions (*e.g.*, revealing only high bids and total number
of bids on each license and withholding bidder identities) may help to
speed the pace of the auctions.[^10] In the *Reconsideration Order*, the
Commission directed the Bureau to seek further comment on this issue.
The Bureau tentatively concludes that it will be unnecessary to withhold
bidder identities if the Paging licenses are auctioned in groups of
approximately 2,500 or fewer licenses, as we have proposed to do with
the Upper Band licenses. We seek comment on this tentative conclusion.
In addition, we propose to disclose all information relating to the
bids, including revealing all bids and withdrawals placed in each round,
the identity of the bidder placing each bid or withdrawal, and the net
and gross amounts of each bid or withdrawal during the Upper Bands
Auction (Auction No. 26). We seek comment on this proposal.

b\. Structure of Bidding Rounds, Activity Requirements, and Criteria for
Determining Reductions in Eligibility

We propose to divide the Upper Bands Auction into three stages: Stage
One, Stage Two and Stage Three, each characterized by increased activity
requirements. The auction will start in Stage One. We propose that the
auction will generally advance to the next stage (*i.e.*, from Stage One
to Stage Two, and from Stage Two to Stage Three) when the auction
activity level, as measured by the percentage of bidding units receiving
new high bids, is below ten percent for three consecutive rounds of
bidding in each Stage. However, we further propose that the Bureau
retain the discretion to change stages unilaterally by announcement
during the auction. In exercising this discretion, the Bureau will
consider a variety of measures of bidder activity including, but not
limited to, the auction activity level, the percentages of licenses (as
measured in bidding units) on which there are new bids, the number of
new bids, and the percentage increase in revenue. We seek comment on
these proposals.

In order to ensure that the auction closes within a reasonable period of
time, an activity rule requires bidders to bid actively on a percentage
of their maximum bidding eligibility during each round of an auction
rather than waiting until the end to participate. A bidder that does not
satisfy the activity rule will either lose bidding eligibility in the
next round or use an activity rule waiver.

For the Uppers Bands Auction (Auction No. 26), we propose that, in each
round of Stage One of the auction, a bidder desiring to maintain its
current eligibility is required to be active on licenses encompassing at
least 80 percent of its current bidding eligibility. Failure to maintain
the requisite activity level will result in a reduction in the bidder\'s
bidding eligibility in the next round of bidding (unless an activity
rule waiver is used). During Stage One, reduced eligibility for the next
round will be calculated by multiplying the current round activity by
five-fourths (5/4). In each round of the second stage of the auction, a
bidder desiring to maintain its current eligibility is required to be
active on at least 90 percent of its current bidding eligibility. During
Stage Two, reduced eligibility for the next round will be calculated by
multiplying the current round activity by ten-ninths (10/9). In each
round of Stage Three, a bidder desiring to maintain its current
eligibility is required to be active on 98 percent of its current
bidding eligibility. In this final stage, reduced eligibility for the
next round will be calculated by multiplying the current round activity
by fifty forty-ninths (50/49). We seek comment on these proposals.

**c. Minimum Accepted Bids**

Once there is a standing high bid on a license, there will be a bid
increment associated with that bid indicating the minimum amount by
which the bid on that license can be raised. For the Upper Bands Auction
(Auction No. 26), we will use a standard exponential smoothing
methodology to calculate minimum bid increments, as we have done in
several other auctions. The Bureau retains the discretion to change the
minimum bid increment if it determines that circumstances so dictate. We
seek comment on this proposal.

The exponential smoothing formula calculates the bid increment for each
license based on a weighted average of the activity received on each
license in all previous rounds. This methodology will tailor the bid
increment for each license based on activity, rather than setting a
global increment for all licenses. For every license that receives a
bid, the bid increment for the next round for that license will be
established using the exponential smoothing formula.

The calculation of the percentage bid increment for each license in a
given round is made at the end of the previous round. The computation is
based on an activity index, which is calculated as the weighted average
of the activity in that round and the activity index from the prior
round. The activity index at the start of the auction (round 0) will be
set at 0. The current activity index is equal to a weighting factor
times the number of new bids received on the license in the most recent
bidding round plus one minus the weighting factor times the activity
index from the prior round. The activity index is then used to calculate
a percentage increment by multiplying a minimum percentage increment by
one plus the activity index with that result being subject to a maximum
percentage increment. The Commission will initially set the weighting
factor at 0.5, the minimum percentage increment at 0.1, and the maximum
percentage increment at 0.2.

### Equations

A~i~ = (C \* B~i~) + ( (1-C) \* A~i-1~)

I~i+1~ = smaller of ( (1 + A~i~) \* N) and M

where,

A~i~ = activity index for the current round (round i)

C = activity weight factor

B~i~ = number of bids in the current round (round i)

A~i-1~ = activity index from previous round (round i-1), A~0~ is 0

I~i+1~ = percentage bid increment for the next round (round i+1)

N = minimum percentage increment or bid increment floor

M = maximum percentage increment or bid increment ceiling

Under the exponential smoothing methodology, once a bid has been
received on a license, the minimum acceptable bid for that license in
the following round will be the new high bid plus the dollar amount
associated with the percentage increment (variable I~i+1~ from above
times the high bid). This result will be rounded to the nearest thousand
if it is over ten thousand or to the nearest hundred if it is under ten
thousand.

#### Examples

License 1

C=0.5, N = 0.1, M = 0.2

[Round 1 (2 new bids, high bid = \$1,000,000)]{.underline}

1\. Calculation of percentage increment for round 2 using exponential
smoothing:

A~1~ = (0.5 \* 2) + (0.5 \* 0) = 1

The smaller of I~2~ = (1 + 1) \* 0.1 = 0.2 or 0.2 (the maximum
percentage increment)

2\. Minimum bid increment for round 2 using the percentage increment
(I~2~ from above)

0.2 \* \$1,000,000 = \$200,000

3\. Minimum acceptable bid for round 2 = 1,200,000

[Round 2 (3 new bids, high bid = 2,000,000)]{.underline}

1\. Calculation of percentage increment for round 3 using exponential
smoothing:

A~2~ = (0.5 \* 3) + (0.5 \* 1) = 2

The smaller of I~3~ = (1 + 2) \* 0.1 = 0.3 or 0.2 (the maximum
percentage increment)

2\. Minimum bid increment for round 3 using the percentage increment
(I~3~ from above)

0.2 \* \$2,000,000 = \$400,000

3\. Minimum acceptable bid for round 3 = 2,400,000

[Round 3 (1 new bid, high bid = 2,400,000)]{.underline}

1\. Calculation of percentage increment for round 4 using exponential
smoothing:

A~3~ = (0.5 \* 1) + (0.5 \* 2) = 1.5

The smaller of I~4~ = (1 + 1.5) \* 0.1 = 0.25 or 0.2 (the maximum
percentage

increment)

2\. Minimum bid increment for round 4 using the percentage increment
(I~4~ from above)

0.2 \* \$2,400,000 = \$480,000

3\. Minimum acceptable bid for round 4 = 2,880,000

**d. Initial Maximum Eligibility for Each Bidder**

The Bureau has delegated authority and discretion to determine an
appropriate upfront payment for each license being auctioned, taking
into account such factors as the population in each geographic license
area, and the value of similar spectrum.[^11] With these guidelines in
mind, we propose to calculate upfront payments for the Upper Bands
Auction on a license-by-license basis, using the following formula:

\$.0008 \* Pops (the result rounded to the nearest hundred for levels
below \$10,000 and

to the nearest thousand for levels above \$10,000) with a minimum of no
less

than \$2,500 per license

This formula is intended to apply to all geographic paging licenses in
the 929 and 931 bands, and was determined based upon the considerations
explained above. The specific upfront payments for each license are set
forth in Attachment A. We seek comment on this proposal.

We further propose that the amount of the upfront payment submitted by a
bidder will determine the initial maximum eligibility (as measured in
bidding units) for each bidder. Upfront payments will not be attributed
to specific licenses, but instead will be translated into bidding units
to define a bidder\'s initial maximum eligibility, which will define
licenses on which bids may be placed. Eligibility cannot be increased
during the auction. It is important that in calculating the upfront
payment amount, an applicant determine the [maximum]{.underline} number
of bidding units it may wish to bid on (and/or hold high bids on) in any
single round, and submit an upfront payment covering that number of
bidding units. We seek comment on this proposal.

**e. Activity Rule Waivers and Reducing Eligibility**

Use of an activity rule waiver preserves the bidder\'s current bidding
eligibility despite the bidder\'s activity in the current round being
below the required minimum level. An activity rule waiver applies to an
entire round of bidding and not to a particular license. Activity
waivers are principally a mechanism for auction participants to avoid
the loss of auction eligibility in the event that exigent circumstances
prevent them from placing a bid in a particular round.

The FCC auction system assumes that bidders with insufficient activity
would prefer to use an activity rule waiver (if available) rather than
lose bidding eligibility. Therefore, the system will automatically apply
a waiver (known as an \"automatic waiver\") at the end of any bidding
period where a bidder\'s activity level is below the minimum required
unless: (1) there are no activity rule waivers available; or (2) the
bidder overrides the automatic application of a waiver by reducing
eligibility thereby meeting the minimum requirements.

A bidder with insufficient activity that wants to reduce its bidding
eligibility rather than use an activity rule waiver must affirmatively
override the automatic waiver mechanism during the bidding period by
using the reduce eligibility function in the software. In this case, the
bidder\'s eligibility is permanently reduced to bring the bidder into
compliance with the activity rules as described above. Once eligibility
has been reduced, a bidder will not be permitted to regain its lost
bidding eligibility.

A bidder may proactively use an activity rule waiver as a means to keep
an auction open without placing a bid. If a bidder submits a proactive
waiver (using the proactive waiver function in the bidding software)
during a bidding period in which no bids are submitted, the auction will
remain open and the bidder\'s eligibility will be preserved. An
automatic waiver invoked in a round in which there are no new valid bids
will not keep the auction open.

We propose that each bidder in the Upper Bands Auction (Auction No. 26)
will be provided with five activity rule waivers that may be used in any
round during the course of an auction as set forth above. We seek
comment on this proposal.

**f. Information Regarding Bid Withdrawal and Bid Removal**

For the Upper Bands Auction (Auction No. 26), we propose the following
bid removal and bid withdrawal procedures. Before the close of a bidding
period, a bidder has the option of removing any bids submitted in that
round. By using the remove bid function in the software, a bidder may
effectively \"unsubmit\" any bid placed within that round. A bidder
removing a bid placed in the same round is not subject to withdrawal
payments.

Once a round closes, a bidder may no longer remove a bid. However, in
any subsequent round, a high bidder may withdraw its standing high bids
from previous rounds using the withdraw bid function. A high bidder that
withdraws its standing high bid from a previous round is subject to the
bid withdrawal payment provisions.[^12] We seek comment on these bid
removal and bid withdrawal procedures.

In the *Part 1 Third Report and Order*, the Commission explained that
allowing bid withdrawals facilitates efficient aggregation of licenses
and the pursuit of efficient backup strategies as information becomes
available during the course of an auction. The Commission noted,
however, that in some instances bidders may seek to withdraw bids for
improper reasons, including to delay the close of an auction for
strategic purposes. The Bureau, therefore, has discretion, in managing
the auction, to limit the number of withdrawals to prevent strategic
delay of the close of the auction or other abuses. The Commission stated
that the Bureau should assertively exercise its discretion, consider
limiting the number of rounds in which bidders may withdraw bids, and
prevent bidders from bidding on a particular market if the Bureau finds
that a bidder is abusing the Commission\'s bid withdrawal
procedures.[^13]

Applying this reasoning, we propose to limit each bidder in the Upper
Bands Auction (Auction No. 26) to withdrawals in no more than two rounds
during the course of each auction. To permit a bidder to withdraw bids
in more than two rounds would likely encourage insincere bidding or the
use of withdrawals for anti-competitive strategic purposes. The two
rounds in which withdrawals are utilized will be at the bidder\'s
discretion; withdrawals otherwise must be in accordance with the
Commission\'s rules. There is no limit on the number of standing high
bids that may be withdrawn in either of the rounds in which withdrawals
are utilized. Withdrawals will remain subject to the bid withdrawal
payment provisions specified in the Commission\'s rules. We seek comment
on this proposal.

**g. Stopping Rule**

In the *Reconsideration Order*, the Commission upheld the hybrid
simultaneous/license-by-license stopping rule that had been adopted for
the paging auctions in the *Second Report and Order*, but retained
discretion for the Bureau to use another stopping rule after seeking
further comment on this issue in the pre-auction process.[^14] The
Bureau concludes that our proposal to conduct a series of auctions may
eliminate the risk of unnecessarily protracted auctions, and likewise,
the need for a hybrid stopping rule.

Therefore, for the Upper Bands Auction (Auction No. 26), the Bureau
proposes to employ a simultaneous stopping approach. The Bureau has
discretion \"to establish stopping rules before or during multiple round
auctions in order to terminate the auction within a reasonable
time.\"[^15] A simultaneous stopping rule means that all licenses remain
open until the first round in which no new acceptable bids, proactive
waivers, or withdrawals are received. After the first such round,
bidding closes simultaneously on all licenses. Thus, unless
circumstances dictate otherwise, bidding would remain open on all
licenses until bidding stops on every license.

We also seek comment on a modified version of the simultaneous stopping
rule. The modified version of the stopping rule would close the auction
for all licenses after the first round in which no bidder submits a
proactive waiver, a withdrawal, or a new bid on any license on which it
is not the standing high bidder. Thus, absent any other bidding
activity, a bidder placing a new bid on a license for which it is the
standing high bidder would not keep the auction open under this modified
stopping rule. The Bureau further seeks comment on whether this modified
stopping rule should be used unilaterally or only in stage three of the
auction.

In addition, we propose that the Bureau retain the discretion to keep an
auction open even if no new acceptable bids or proactive waivers are
submitted and no previous high bids are withdrawn. In this event, the
effect will be the same as if a bidder had submitted a proactive waiver.
The activity rule, therefore, will apply as usual; and a bidder with
insufficient activity will either lose bidding eligibility or use a
remaining activity rule waiver. We seek comment on this proposal.

Finally, we propose that the Bureau reserve the right to declare that
the auction will end after a

specified number of additional rounds (\"special stopping rule\"). If
the Bureau invokes this special stopping rule, it will accept bids in
the final round(s) only for licenses on which the high bid increased in
at least one of the preceding specified number of rounds. The Bureau
proposes to exercise this option only in certain circumstances, such as,
for example, where the auction is proceeding very slowly, there is
minimal overall bidding activity, or it appears likely that the auction
will not close within a reasonable period of time. Before exercising
this option, the Bureau is likely to attempt to increase the pace of the
auction by, for example, moving the auction into the next stage (where
bidders would be required to maintain a higher level of bidding
activity), increasing the number of bidding rounds per day, and/or
increasing the amount of the minimum bid increments for the limited
number of licenses where there is still a high level of bidding
activity. We seek comment on these proposals.

**h. Information Relating to Auction Delay, Suspension or Cancellation**

For the Upper Bands Auction (Auction No. 26), we propose that, by public
notice or by announcement during the auction, the Bureau may delay,
suspend or cancel any auction in the event of natural disaster,
technical obstacle, evidence of an auction security breach, unlawful
bidding activity, administrative or weather necessity, or for any other
reason that affects the fair and competitive conduct of competitive
bidding.[^16] In such cases, the Bureau, in its sole discretion, may
elect to: resume the auction starting from the beginning of the current
round; resume the auction starting from some previous round; or cancel
the auction in its entirety. Network interruption may cause the Bureau
to delay or suspend an auction. We emphasize that exercise of this
authority is solely within the discretion of the Bureau, and its use is
not intended to be a substitute for situations in which bidders may wish
to apply their activity rule waivers. We seek comment on this proposal.

# IV. Conclusion

Comments are due on or before June 30, 1999, and reply comments are due
on or before July 13, 1999. To file formally, parties must submit an
original and four copies to the Office of the Secretary, Federal
Communications Commission, Room TW-B204, 445th 12th Street S.W.,
Washington, D.C. 20554. In addition, parties must submit one copy to Amy
Zoslov, Chief, Auctions and Industry Analysis Division, Wireless
Telecommunications Bureau, Federal Communications Commission, Room
4-A760, 445 12th Street, S.W., Washington, D.C. 20554. Comments and
reply comments will be available for public inspection during regular
business hours in the FCC Public Reference Room, Room CY-A257, 445 12th
Street S.W., Washington, D.C. 20554.

For further information concerning this proceeding, contact Lisa
Hartigan or Anne Napoli, Auctions and Industry Analysis Division,
Wireless Telecommunications Bureau, at (202) 418-0660, or Bob Reagle,
Auctions and Industry Analysis Division, Wireless Telecommunications
Bureau, at (717) 338-2801.

This is a permit-but-disclose proceeding pursuant to 47 C.F.R. § 1.1206.

‑ FCC -

[^1]: ^?^ The Commission recently modified and clarified the Paging
    service and competitive bidding rules. *See* Revision of Part 22 and
    Part 90 of the Commission\'s Rules to Facilitate Future Development
    of Paging Systems, *Memorandum Opinion and Order on Reconsideration
    and Third Report and Order*, FCC 99-98 (rel. May 24, 1999).
    (\"*Reconsideration Order*\").

[^2]: ^?^ *See Reconsideration Order,* FCC 99-98, ¶¶ 16-21.

[^3]: ^?^ Section 3002(a), Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. 105-33,
    111 Stat. 251 (1997) (\"Budget Act\"); 47 U.S.C. § 309(j)(4)(F). The
    Commission\'s authority to establish a reserve price or minimum
    opening bid is set forth in 47 C.F.R. § 1.2104(c) and (d).

[^4]: ^?^ *See* Amendment of Part 1 of the Commission\'s Rules \--
    Competitive Bidding Procedures, Allocation of Spectrum Below 5 GHz
    Transferred from Federal Government Use, 4660-4685 MHz, WT Docket
    No. 97-82, ET Docket No. 94-32, FCC 97-413, *Third Report and Order
    and Second Further Notice of Proposed Rule Making*, 13 FCC Rcd 374,
    454-455, ¶ 141 (1998) (\"*Part 1 Third Report and Order*\").

[^5]: ^?^ *Id*.

[^6]: ^?^ *See* Auction of 800 MHz SMR Upper 10 MHz Band, Minimum
    Opening Bids or Reserve Prices, *Order*, 12 FCC Rcd 16354 (1997);
    Revision of Rules and Policies for the Direct Broadcast Satellite
    Service, *Report and Order*, 11 FCC Rcd 9712, 9787-9788, ¶ 186
    (1995).

[^7]: ^?^ Budget Act, § 3002(a)(1)(B)(iv).

[^8]: ^?^ *See* Amendment of Part 1 of the Commission\'s
    Rules\--Competitive Bidding Proceeding, WT Docket No. 97-82, FCC
    97-60, *Order, Memorandum Opinion and Order, and Notice of Proposed
    Rule Making*, 12 FCC Rcd 5686, 5689 ¶ 16 (1997) (\"*Part 1 Order,
    Memorandum Opinion and Order, and Notice of Proposed Rule
    Making*\"*)* (\"We also clarify that pursuant to Section 0.131 of
    our rules, the Chief, Wireless Telecommunications Bureau, has
    delegated authority to implement all of the Commission\'s rules
    pertaining to auctions procedures.\")

[^9]: ^?^ *Part 1 Third Report and Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 448, ¶ 124. The
    Commission directed the Bureau to seek comment on specific
    mechanisms related to day-to-day auction conduct including, for
    example, the structure of bidding rounds and stages, establishment
    of minimum opening bids or reserve prices, minimum accepted bids,
    initial maximum eligibility for each bidder, activity requirements
    for each stage of the auction, activity rule waivers, criteria for
    determining reductions in eligibility, information regarding bid
    withdrawal and bid removal, stopping rules, and information relating
    to auction delay, suspension or cancellation. *Id.* at 448, ¶ 125.

[^10]: Revision of Part 22 and Part 90 of the Commission\'s Rules to
    Facilitate Future Development of Paging Systems, *Second Report and
    Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking*, 12 FCC Rcd 2732,
    2786, ¶ 106 (1997) (\"*Second Report and Order*\").

[^11]: ^?^ *See Part 1 Order, Memorandum Opinion and Order, and Notice
    of Proposed Rule Making*, 12 FCC Rcd at 5697-98, ¶ 16. *See also*
    Implementation of Section 309(j) of the Communications
    Act---Competitive Bidding, *Second Report and Order*, 9 FCC Rcd.
    2348, 2377, ¶ 169 (1994) ("We believe that using a formula that
    bases the size of the upfront payment on the amount of spectrum and
    population on which a bidder is interested in bidding at any one
    time is a rational way for the Commission to be provided assurance
    that each bidder is a bona fide applicant and that each bid is
    sincere. The size of the upfront payment will thus directly relate
    to the size and capabilities of the licensed facilities, the cost to
    construct a system, the value of the licensed spectrum and the
    potential amounts bidders will bid.")

[^12]: ^?^ *See* 47 C.F.R. §§ 1.2104(g); 1.2109.

[^13]: ^?^ *See Part 1 Third Report and Order*, 13 FCC Rcd at 460, ¶
    150.

[^14]: ^?^ *See* *Reconsideration Order*, FCC 99-98, ¶ 84; *Second
    Report and Order*, 12 FCC Rcd at 2785, ¶ 103. *See also* 47 C.F.R. §
    1.2104(e) (The Bureau has discretion \"to establish stopping rules
    before or during multiple round auctions in order to terminate the
    auction within a reasonable time\").

[^15]: 47 C.F.R. § 1.2104(e).

[^16]: ^?^ *See* 47 C.F.R. § 1.2104(i).