Number range CHAPTERUNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

JOHN GILL SMITH, )

)

Plaintiff, )

) No. 03-6494

and )

)

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )

)

Plaintiff-Intervenor, )

)

v\. )

)

THE CITY OF PHILADELPHIA, )

)

Defendant. )

\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ )

[UNITED STATES' REPLY TO DEFENDANT'S OPPOSITION TO UNITED]{.underline}

[STATES' MOTION TO COMPEL DISCOVERY, AND UNITED STATES']{.underline}

[OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER]{.underline}

I. [Preliminary Statement]{.underline}

After attempting to resolve this discovery dispute without Court
intervention, the United States filed a motion to compel the production
of certain patient care reports generated by Philadelphia Fire
Department ("PFD") paramedics Joni Kuonen and/or Katherine Ceschan for
the period 2000 through 2002. Defendant filed a brief in opposition in
the form of a motion for protective order. Defendant did not dispute
that the patient care reports are relevant to the litigation.[^1]
Rather, Defendant argued that because of the way the reports were
electronically stored, production of responsive documents was impossible
and a manual search for paper documents would be unduly burdensome.
Because Defendant's argument was premised on unsupported factual
assertions that had not previously been raised with the United States,
the United States sought, and the Court granted, a stay to conduct a
Rule 30(b)(6) deposition, previously noticed, regarding the storage and
retrieval of patient care reports.[^2]

Pursuant to the Court's Order, Defendant produced Captain Richard
Marshall Bossert, head of Continuous Quality Improvement for the PFD
Emergency Medical Services division ("EMS"). Captain Bossert's testimony
flatly contradicted the factual assertions underlying Defendant's undue
burden argument, and demonstrated that responsive computer records
generated during the period at issue were identifiable and retrievable
through a database search.

Given the absence of any evidentiary basis for Defendant's argument that
production of the requested records would be unduly burdensome, the
United States respectfully requests that the Court deny Defendant's
motion for protective order and direct Defendant to produce the
electronically generated patient care reports responsive to the United
States' request.[^3]

II\. [Argument]{.underline}

A party wishing to obtain an order of protection over discovery material
must demonstrate that "good cause" exists for the order of protection.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c); [see also]{.underline} [Fort Washington
Resources, Inc. v. Tannen]{.underline}, 153 F.R.D. 78, 79 (E.D. Pa.
1994) ("\[T\]he party seeking the protective order bears the burden of
showing good cause.") (citing [Cipollone v. Liggett Group,
Inc.]{.underline}, 785 F.2d 1108, 1121 (3d Cir.1986); [Trans Pacific
Ins. Co. v. Trans-Pacific Ins. Co.]{.underline}, 136 F.R.D. 385, 391
(E.D.Pa.1991)).

Discovery in the form of document production will always impose some
burden on the party from whom the discovery is sought, thus "good cause"
requires a showing of, and Rule 26(c) protects only against, *undue
burden*. [See, e.g.]{.underline}, [Roesburg v. Johns-Manville
Corp.]{.underline}, 85 F.R.D. 292, 297 (D.C. Pa. 1980) (the fact that
discovery will require the objecting party to expend considerable time,
effort and expense is not alone sufficient to disallow the discovery
unless the requests are "egregiously burdensome or oppressive"). Whether
discovery imposes an undue burden depends on such factors as relevance,
the need of the party for the documents, the breadth of the document
request, the time period covered by the request, the particularity with
which documents are described, and the burden imposed.[^4] [Wyoming v.
U.S. Dep't of Agriculture]{.underline}, 208 F.R.D. 449, 453 (D.D.C.
2002). "Broad allegations of harm, unsubstantiated by specific examples
or articulated reasoning, do not support a good cause showing."
[Pansy]{.underline}, 23 F.3d at 786 (citing [Cipollone]{.underline}, 785
F.2d at 1121).

In this case, Defendant's broad allegations of harm, unsubstantiated,
and largely refuted, by Defendant's designated agent, will not support
the good cause showing required under Rule 26(c), and, accordingly,
Defendant's opposition and motion for protective order must fail.

A.  [Additional responsive reports were electronically generated and are
    identifiable]{.underline}

Defendant alleges, generally, that computer-related issues render an
electronic search, and subsequent production, of additional responsive
records impossible. Defendant asserts that patient care reports from
2000 were not stored on a computer file; that reports prior to late
2001, while possibly electronically generated, could only be searched by
date or dispatch number; and that no reports between 2000 and 2002 could
be searched by the "prior history" field. Defendant's Opp. at ¶¶ 12-15.

These factual assertions were flatly refuted by Defendant's designated
agent. As set out below, Captain Bossert's testimony clearly
establishes: (1) that Ms. Kuonen's and Ms. Ceschan's EMS unit, Medic 2,
was electronically reporting EMS runs prior to late 2001, and (2) that
in any electronically generated patient care report, *all* database
fields are "queryable," or searchable, for terms included on the
pre-programmed drop-down boxes for each database field.

The United States first sought information regarding when and how the
PFD paramedics -- and Ms. Ceschan and Kuonen, particularly -- generated
patient care reports during the relevant time period. Captain Bossert
explained that the United States' document request covered a period of
transition for the PFD, in that during the years 2000 through 2002, the
PFD EMS was converting to a computerized system. [See]{.underline}
Bossert Depo. at p. 36.[^5] Medic units were converted to electronic
reporting at different times during this period, and, while some began
electronic reporting as early as 2000, others continued to generate
paper reports which were then scanned into the computer.
[Id.]{.underline}

Captain Bossert could not testify as to the exact date when Medic 2
converted to electronic reporting although he admitted that this
information is available in his office. Bossert Depo. at pp. 96-97.
However, based on a review of Plaintiff John Gill Smith's patient care
report, dated February 20, 2001, and marked as Exhibit 2, Captain
Bossert testified that Medic 2 was electronic as of, *at least*,
February 20, 2001:

Page 82:

> 18 Q. Now, can you tell from
>
> 19 looking at this \[Exhibit 2\], was Medic 2
>
> 20 electronic at this point?
>
> 21 A. This would be, yes, on this
>
> 22 report.
>
> 23 Q. And the date of this
>
> 24 incident was February 20th, 2001.

Therefore, patient care reports were electronically generated by Ms.
Kuonen and/or Ms. Ceschan from at least that point forward, and may date
back to 2000:

Page 93

> 7 MS. EINSTEIN: And it\'s
>
> 8 your assumption that if they were
>
> 9 electronic in February of 2001, they
>
> 10 were electronic from February 2001
>
> 11 forward?
>
> 12 THE WITNESS: Minus the
>
> 13 exceptions when the computer system
>
> 14 is down.
>
> 15 MS. EINSTEIN: Correct.
>
> 16 THE WITNESS: Okay.[^6]

[See also]{.underline} [Bossert]{.underline} Depo. at p. 97, lines 9 -
14 ("Q. And everything that you just discussed with Miss Einstein, those
assertions hold true if they were electronic in 2000 as well, correct?
A. Correct.").

Captain Bossert also testified, contrary to Defendant's assertions, that
where a patient care report was electronically generated, it could be
queried for, and records identified by, *any* field in the report:

Page 102

> 11 Q. Your understanding is that
>
> 12 any field in a database should be
>
> 13 queryable \--
>
> 14 A. Right.
>
> 15 Q. \-- if the information is in
>
> 16 that field?
>
> 17 A. Correct.

Captain Bossert explained that any terms available from the drop-down
boxes, or "pick-list" within a database field would be searchable and
records including that term would be identifiable. [See]{.underline}
Bossert Depo., at pp. 103, 115-16. Although the PFD used a number of
different database software programs during this period, Captain Bossert
testified that he would be able to determine, "with some reliability,"
which software database program or programs were in use by Medic 2
throughout the period at issue, and, then, determine which terms were
available from the pick-list. [See]{.underline} [id.]{.underline} at
116-17. Significantly, Captain Bossert testified that records wherein
the "probable cause" field included "chest pain" would be identifiable
since the search term specified in the United States' request -- "chest
pain" -- would be phrased consistently regardless of the software.

Page 28 (Witness)

> 9 But that\'s not a problem,
>
> 10 because we have a complaint that says
>
> 11 \"Chief complaint is chest pains,\" and
>
> 12 I can query that, for a particular
>
> 13 medic unit, for a particular time.

And, with respect to the HIV-related reports, when presented with
Exhibit 2, Plaintiff Smith's report from February 2001, and an
additional report from 2002, Captain Bossert confirmed that although the
two reports were generated using different software, both included
AIDS/HIV among the pick-lists for the prior history field and thus
reports during that time frame and generated with those programs would
be searchable by that field and that term. [See]{.underline} Bossert
Depo. at pp. 100-102, 118-19.[^7]

In sum, contrary to Defendant's allegations, the evidence demonstrates
that additional reports responsive to the United States' document
production requests are electronically searchable, identifiable and
producible.

B.  [The HIV/AIDS-related patient care reports]{.underline}

As demonstrated above, some or all of the requested HIV-related records
are electronically identifiable and retrievable. [See also]{.underline}
Bossert Depo. at p. 109, lines 9-12 ("\[Q.\] Logistically, you could
have performed that search, however? \[A.\] Logistically, yes. . . .").

Captain Bossert admitted, however, that, although contacted about the
document request, he *never* searched the PFD electronic records for the
HIV-related reports, and was unaware of whether anyone else did:

Page 107

> 3 Q. Did you do a search for the
>
> 4 requests involving Joni Kuonen and
>
> 5 Katie Ceschan, plus HIV/AIDS, prior
>
> 6 history?
>
> 7 A. No.

\* \* \*

Page 119

21 Q. So you don\'t know what ACS[^8]

> 22 did with respect to this document
>
> 23 request?
>
> 24 A. This particular one, no.

Captain Bossert offered two explanations for why he did not do the
requested search, neither of which justifies, or is relevant to, the
failure to *produce* the requested documents. Captain Bossert explained
that he did not do the requested search because, in his opinion, the
patient care records identified and obtained from such a search would
not be "reliable," the "most probable" reason being that not all
patients with the HIV virus identify themselves as such to paramedics.
[See]{.underline} Bossert Depo., at p. 110. He was also concerned that
variances in the software programs from 2000 to 2002 might result in
less than complete identification of records falling within the
requested parameters because the pick-list might not have included
HIV/AIDS

(a concern proven to be less important given his concession that
HIV/AIDS was, indeed, on the pick-list in February, 2001, and in 2002,
and likely during the intervening time period). [See]{.underline}
[id.]{.underline} at 108. Captain Bossert shared his opinions with his
superiors in the PFD and was then told not to do the search:

Page 109

5 Q. And so you were told not to

6 do the search?

7 A. From my recollection, yes.

Defendant's motion for a protective order, on undue burden grounds, must
fail where Defendant has not presented evidence that it took even the
minimal steps that would have demonstrated that the relevant documents
were searchable and would have indicated the number of documents
responsive to the request.[^9] [Cf.]{.underline} [Fort Washington
Resources]{.underline}, 153 F.R.D. at 79 ("The burden is not met by 'the
recitation of expense and burdensomeness \[which are\] merely
conclusory' statements.") (citing [Panola Land Buyers Ass\'n v.
Shuman]{.underline}, 762 F.2d 1550, 1559 (11th Cir.1985)).

C.  [The "chest pain" patient care reports]{.underline}

With respect to the United States' request for patient care reports
involving Joni Kuonen or Katie Ceschan where the nature of the 911 call,
as documented in the "probable cause" field, includes "chest pain,"
Defendant produced 126 responsive reports from the "latter part" of 2001
through 2002, covering approximately 13 to 15 months of the three-year
period at issue. The United States seeks production of responsive
reports for the period from January 1, 2000 up to the latter part of
2001.

In view of Captain Bossert's admission, discussed above, that responsive
reports were identifiable at least by February 20, 2001, but had not
been produced, the United States asked Captain Bossert whether he had
searched for responsive reports for January, 2001 forward. Captain
Bossert could not recall:

Page 92

> 4 MS. EINSTEIN: Well, let me
>
> 5 ask you specifically.
>
> 6 Did you query for the time
>
> 7 period January 2001 forward?
>
> 8 THE WITNESS: I queried for
>
> 9 whatever I could query for. And
>
> 10 whoever asked for it was told that.
>
> 11 And outside that\...
>
> 12 MS. EINSTEIN: Well, I
>
> 13 asked if you queried for the period
>
> 14 January 2001 forward. Do you recall?
>
> 15 THE WITNESS: I don\'t
>
> 16 know. No, I don\'t recall exactly.
>
> 17 MS. EINSTEIN: Okay.
>
> 18 THE WITNESS: I couldn\'t
>
> 19 tell you.

Nonetheless, Captain Bossert admitted that *if* a search had been done
for the period 2000 forward, all electronically generated reports would
be identified in the search. Since he had already conceded that Ms.
Kuonen and Ms. Ceschan were "electronic" as of February 20, 2001, this
meant that as of at least February 20, 2001, and going forward, all of
the reports generated by Ms. Kuonen and Ms. Ceschan were electronically
generated and retrievable under the criteria specified by the United
States:

Page 92

> 20 MS. EINSTEIN: And if you
>
> 21 had queried January 2001 forward, the
>
> 22 report in Exhibit 2 would have shown
>
> 23 up?[^10]
>
> 24 THE WITNESS: As far as I

Page 93

> 1 can tell, yes.
>
> 2 MS. EINSTEIN: And any
>
> 3 other report that was electronic
>
> 4 would have shown up?
>
> 5 THE WITNESS: That\'s
>
> 6 correct.

Given the established existence of electronically generated reports
prior to "latter 2001," Captain Bossert had no explanation for
Defendant's failure to produce the electronically generated records from
that period:

Page 93

> 17 MS. EINSTEIN: And so do
>
> 18 you have any explanation why in
>
> 19 producing the reports the City did
>
> 20 not produce reports for any time
>
> 21 prior to what they have characterized
>
> 22 as late 2001?
>
> 23 THE WITNESS: The only

24. explanation I could give you would

Page 94

> 1 be, those reports aren\'t
>
> 2 electronically done and they\'re on
>
> 3 paperwork and they\'re archived. That
>
> 4 would be the only \-- I \--
>
> 5 MS. EINSTEIN: No. But
>
> 6 these particular reports, for Joni
>
> 7 Kuonen and Katherine Ceschan for
>
> 8 chest pains \--
>
> 9 THE WITNESS: Okay.
>
> 10 MS. EINSTEIN: \-- which
>
> 11 we\'ve already agreed were
>
> 12 electronically generated.
>
> 13 THE WITNESS: Right.
>
> 14 MS. EINSTEIN: So do you
>
> 15 have any explanation for why those
>
> 16 reports were not produced for prior
>
> 17 to late 2001?
>
> 18 THE WITNESS: Off the top
>
> 19 of my head, I \-- all I remember is
>
> 20 give me the number of calls under
>
> 21 these parameters, tell us what we
>
> 22 have, blah, blah, blah. From that
>
> 23 point on, it went back and forth
>
> 24 multiple times through the \--

Page 95

> 1 MS. EINSTEIN: I just asked
>
> 2 you a yes or no question.
>
> 3 Maybe you should read it
>
> 4 back.
>
> 5 THE WITNESS: Okay. No.

In sum, given that Captain Bossert's testimony demonstrates that
responsive chest pain reports are electronically identifiable and
retrievable as of at least February, 2001, thereby refuting the factual
basis for Defendant's undue burden argument, Defendant's motion must
fail.

D.  [Production of the reports is not unduly burdensome]{.underline}

Defendant alleged that the only reasonable means to locate the
responsive reports would be to conduct a manual search of storage boxes,
at an approximate cost of \$164,160. Defendant's Opp. at ¶¶ 20-24. Now
that Defendant's designated agent has testified that the documents can
be identified and produced through a computer document search,
Defendant's assertions of burdensomeness are moot. Given that it takes
approximately five minutes to produce each report, Defendant's Opp. ¶
17, and that the number of responsive documents is, likely, around
120,[^11] Defendant cannot show that production would be burdensome.

First, it bears repeating that the United States' request is relevant
and narrowly tailored to the facts in this case. Moreover, the reports
at issue already reflect a compromise reached by the parties to limit
the initial request, which covered the time period 2000 to the present,
to a three year period from 2000 through 2002, precisely because
Defendant's counsel expressed concerns about the time it would take to
produce the reports. Indeed, at five to ten minutes per report (giving
Defendant every benefit of the doubt) Defendant could produce 120
reports in ten to twenty hours. The United States was unable to find any
reported cases in which a court held that the expenditure of ten to
twenty hours to produce relevant documents was unduly burdensome. [See,
e.g.]{.underline}, [Fort Washington Resources]{.underline}, 153 F.R.D.
at 79 (Defendant failed to meet burden of showing good cause; assertion
that producing documents would take too much time and expense was
unsupported by the necessary particularized facts and details regarding
the amount of time or expense and why such amounts are unduly
burdensome); [Klausen v. Sidney Printing & Pub. Co.]{.underline}, 271 F.
Supp. 783 (D.Kan.1967) (mere fact that interrogatories are lengthy or
that defendant will be put to some trouble and expense in preparing
requested answers is not alone sufficient to warrant protective order
relieving defendant from burden of answering).[^12]

III\. [Conclusion]{.underline}

For the foregoing reasons, and based upon the entire record herein, the
United States' motion to compel should be granted and Defendant's motion
for a protective order should be denied.

Respectfully submitted this \_\_\_\_ day of July, 2005.

ALBERTO R. GONZALES

Attorney General of the United States

PATRICK L. MEEHAN BRADLEY J. SCHLOZMAN

United States Attorney Acting Assistant Attorney General

Eastern District of Pennsylvania Civil Rights Division

NANCY GRIFFIN JOHN L. WODATCH, Chief

Assistant United States Attorney PHILIP L. BREEN, Special Legal Counsel

Eastern District of Pennsylvania ALLISON J. NICHOL, Deputy Chief

615 Chestnut Street, Suite 1250 Disability Rights Section

Philadelphia, PA 19106 Civil Rights Division

Telephone: (215) 861-8200

> [/s/ Kathleen P. Wolfe]{.underline}

LAURA F. EINSTEIN

KATHLEEN P. WOLFE

Trial Attorneys

Disability Rights Section

Civil Rights Division

U.S. Department of Justice - NYA

950 Pennsylvania Avenue NW

Washington, D.C. 20530

Telephone: (202) 307-0663

**[CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE]{.underline}**

I hereby certify that on July \_\_\_, 2005, I electronically filed with
the Clerk of the Court, using the Electronic Case Management System, the
United States' . . . .

I further certify that copies of this filing were mailed via First-Class
Mail on July \_\_, 2005, to the following non-ECF participants:

Ronda Goldfein

AIDS Law Project of Pennsylvania

1211 Chestnut Street, Suite 600

Philadelphia, PA 19107

By:

Kathleen P. Wolfe

Trial Attorney

Disability Rights Section

Civil Rights Division

U.S. Department of Justice - NYA

950 Pennsylvania Avenue NW

Washington, D.C. 20530

Telephone: (202) 307-0663

[^1]: ^?^ The United States' document request, limited to the three year
    period from January 1, 2000 through 2002, is narrowly tailored to
    reflect and discover relevant information regarding the particular
    paramedics involved in this action during the period reasonably
    preceding and following the incident at issue, which occurred on
    February 20, 2001.

[^2]: ^?^ Initially, the United States requested a designated agent who
    could testify about "the means by which the City of Philadelphia
    collects and maintains data relating to dispatches by paramedics and
    EMT's, and the means by which such data can be retrieved." For the
    purposes of this motion to compel, the request was narrowed to
    reflect the maintenance and retrieval of reports generated from 2000
    through 2002. In addition, we informed counsel for Defendant that
    "the deposition will cover the unsupported representations regarding
    the burden and cost of production raised in your opposition to the
    United States' Motion to Compel."

[^3]: ^?^ In view of Captain Bossert's testimony that additional reports
    responsive to the United States' request can be generated through an
    electronic search, the United States will not seek reports that are
    available only in paper form, thus rendering moot Defendant's
    argument that the cost of a manual search would be unduly
    burdensome.

[^4]: ^?^ Defendant cited only time and expense concerns in its undue
    burden argument, and cannot at this late stage argue that other
    factors justify protection of the documents. [See also]{.underline}
    Footnote 1, [supra]{.underline} (discussing limited scope of
    document request) and United States' Mem. in Support of Motion to
    Compel, at pp. 4-5 (discussing relevance of requested documents).

[^5]: ^?^ Copies of all referenced pages from Captain Bossert's 30(b)(6)
    deposition are attached.

[^6]: ^?^ [See also]{.underline} Bossert Depo., at p. 95-96 (reiterating
    that electronically generated reports from early 2001 on should be
    retrievable and confirming that ACS, a computer consulting firm
    retained by the City and the PFD, could generate and produce a list
    of the responsive records).

[^7]: ^?^ In Exhibit 2, the paramedics had documented HIV in the prior
    history field, thereby establishing that HIV/AIDS was in the
    pick-list, and reports using that software could have been queried
    for "prior history" of HIV/AIDS. [See]{.underline} Bossert Depo. at
    pp. 103-104. Captain Bossert further confirmed that the software
    used by Medic 2 at some point in 2002 also could be queried for a
    prior history of HIV/AIDS. Bossert Depo. at pp. 118-19. Since it is
    unlikely that the PFD *removed* HIV/AIDS from the pick-list after
    February, 2001, and re-inserted it in 2002, it is reasonable to
    assume that a "prior history" of HIV/AIDS is searchable for the
    entire period from February 20, 2001 forward, and possibly earlier.

[^8]: ^?^ ACS is a computer and record storage firm that the City
    contracts with for record maintenance. Defendant's Opp. at ¶ 11.
    Captain Bossert described ACS as "the caretaker\[\] of the
    databases" for the PFD. Bossert Depo. at p. 46, lines 19-22.

[^9]: ^?^ Some of the factual assertions in Defendant's brief concerned
    actions allegedly taken or statements made by representatives of
    ACS, a computer consulting company retained by the City and the PFD.
    Although Captain Bossert understood that he was being deposed as
    Defendant's Rule 30(b)(6) designated agent, he was unprepared to
    answer any questions regarding what actions, if any, ACS took in
    attempting to satisfy the United States' document request. He
    admitted he did not call or speak with ACS prior to the deposition
    and had no knowledge of the actions undertaken by ACS on the City's
    behalf with respect to the document requests. [See]{.underline}
    Bossert depo. at 113-14; 119. [See, e.g.]{.underline}, [Black Horse
    Lane Assoc., L.P. v. Dow Chem. Corp.]{.underline}, 228 F.3d 275, 304
    (3d Cir. 2000) ("\[W\]e believe that the purpose behind Rule
    30(b)(6) undoubtedly is frustrated in the situation in which a
    corporate party produces a witness who is unable and/or unwilling to
    provide the necessary factual information on the entity's behalf.");
    [Hooker v. Norfolk Southern Ry. Co.]{.underline}, 204 F.R.D. 124,
    126 (S.D.Ind. 2001) (explaining that Rule 30(b)(6) "imposes a duty
    upon the named business entity to prepare its selected deponent to
    adequately testify *not only on matters known by the deponent, but
    also on subjects that the entity should reasonably know*") (emphasis
    added).

[^10]: ^?^ Exhibit 2 refers to the patient care report for Plaintiff
    Smith, dated February 20, 2001.

[^11]: ^?^ The 126 chest pain reports already produced represent
    approximately 13 to 15 months -- from the latter part of 2001
    through 2002. Given Captain Bossert's testimony that the date that
    Medic 2 converted to electronic reporting could be readily
    determined from PFD records, as could the particular database(s) in
    use by Medic 2 during that period, it follows that accurate querying
    of the database(s) in use during the period from January 1, 2000 up
    and until the latter part of 2001 would generate approximately the
    same number, or less, of "chest pain" reports. And, although Captain
    Bossert never attempted the electronic query that would have
    indicated the precise number, it goes without question that there
    would be significantly fewer responsive reports documenting a prior
    history of HIV/AIDS.

[^12]: ^?^ Defendant relies on [Lickteig v. Landauer]{.underline}, 1992
    WL 333994 (E.D. Pa. 1992) as support for its assertion that
    production requiring 6000 man hours is unduly burdensome. Def. Mem.
    at 11-12. In [Landauer]{.underline}, the court granted a protective
    order for a document request that required the review of 1,108
    complaints requiring an estimated 554 hours. [Landauer]{.underline}
    is inapposite to the actual facts in this case -- retrieval of
    approximately 120 reports, requiring 10-20 hours. Moreover, even in
    [Landauer]{.underline}, the Court ordered the City of Philadelphia
    to produce documents more closely tailored to the facts of that case
    for a five year period. [Id.]{.underline}