Session No. 3

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**Course Title: Homeland Security and Emergency Management**

**Session Title: Mitigation and Prevention**

**Prepared by: William C. Nicholson, Esq.**

**Assistant Professor**

**Department of Criminal Justice**

**North Carolina Central University**

**Time: 3 hours**

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**Objectives:** At the conclusion of this session, the students should
be able to:

1.  Discuss the Role of Public Information and Education in general
    terms.

2.  Talk about the nature and uses of Litigation Mitigation.

3.  Discuss steps that can be taken to perform Financial Mitigation.

4.  Talk about the benefits of expanded police powers, particularly
    those contained in the USA PATRIOT Act

5.  Discuss Mitigation/Prevention Cases

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1.  Aviation Security

2.  Maritime Security

3.  Nuclear Security (International)

4.  Bioterrorism initiatives

5.  Personal/Community Measures

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**Scope**

> This session discusses the steps that can be undertaken to prevent
> terrorist events and to reduce the effect of those that cannot be
> prevented.

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**Readings:**

1.  **Required readings for students:**

> Multihazard Mitigation Council, *NATURAL HAZARD MITIGATION SAVES: An
> Independent Study to Determine the Future Savings from Mitigation
> Activities,Volume 1- Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendations,*
> National Institute of Building Sciences (2005).
>
> William L. Waugh, Jr., "The 'All-Hazards' Approach Must be Continued"
> *Journal of Emergency Management* Vol. 1, No. 4, 11 (Fall 2003).
>
> "Terrorism Time Line: Major Focusing Events and U.S . Outcomes (1993 -
> 2003)" Claire B. Rubin, M.A., William R. Cumming, J.D., & Irmak
> Renda-Tanali, D.Sc., found on line at
> http://www.disaster-timeline.com/TTLJune1204Irmak_smaller.pdf

2.  **Readings for instructors:**

Ann Strack Angelheart, Ph.D., "Natural Disasters and Weapons of Mass
Destruction: Policy Issues and Implications" Chapter14 in William C.
Nicholson, Editor *Homeland Security Law and Policy*, Charles C. Thomas
Publisher, Ltd., Springfield, IL. (2005)

> Multihazard Mitigation Council, *NATURAL HAZARD MITIGATION SAVES: An
> Independent Study to Determine the Future Savings from Mitigation
> Activities,Volume2 -- Study Documentation,* National Institute of
> Building Sciences (2005).
>
> William C. Nicholson, "FEMA's Changing Priorities Since September 11,
> 2001" Chapter 3 in William C. Nicholson, Editor *Homeland Security Law
> and Policy*, Charles C. Thomas Publisher, Ltd., Springfield, IL.
> (2005)
>
> Rutherford H. Platt, *Disasters and Democracy,* Island Press (1999).

3.  **Background readings for instructors (optional):**

> William C. Nicholson, "Litigation Mitigation: Proactive Risk
> Management in the Wake of the West Warwick Club Fire" *Journal of
> Emergency Management*, Volume 1, No. 2, (Summer, 2003).
>
> William L. Waugh, Jr., "Informing Policy and Administration: A
> Comparative Perspective on Terrorism," *International Journal of
> Public Administration* 12 (1989): 477-99.

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**Remarks**

> This session is designed to provide an understanding of the nature of
> mitigation and prevention in the context of homeland security.
> Mitigation consists of actions that remove or diminish the likelihood
> of a disaster. It also incorporates steps that will lessen a
> disaster's effects. Preparedness includes planning, training, and
> exercising, activities that help to save lives and decrease damage by
> preparing people to respond properly when an emergency is imminent or
> hits. One important aspect of these efforts is Public Information and
> Education, which helps to enlist the general populace as partners in
> this effort as well as letting them know what to avoid during actual
> events. A recent development is Litigation Mitigation, which involves
> pro-active partnering between attorneys and emergency managers in all
> phases of emergency management. Financial Mitigation provides a backup
> source of funds to assist in recovery in the event that traditional
> forms of mitigation do not succeed in fully avoiding a catastrophic
> event. In the area of terrorism mitigation (commonly referred to as
> "prevention"), expanded police powers, particularly those contained in
> the USA PATRIOT Act can offer significant benefits. Finally, a
> discussion of particular Mitigation/Prevention Cases in the following
> areas will help to illustrate the nature of this subject matter:

1.  Aviation Security;

2.  Maritime Security;

3.  Nuclear Security (International);

4.  Bioterrorism initiatives; and

5.  Personal/Community Measures, such as the Community Emergency
    Response Teams (CERT) and related web sites.

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**Objective 3.1**

**Discuss the Role of Public Information and Education in general
terms.**

> Public information and education play a **vital role in mitigation and
> preparedness**.
>
> As the visible face of emergency management, the Public Information
> Officer (PIO) must be in the habit on a regular (perhaps weekly) basis
> of **meeting with press representatives** to inform them of the nature
> of emergency management. Such recurring opportunities for "face time"
> with the press will permit the **development of trusting
> relationships**, which are vital during an actual emergency or
> disaster. The practice also will permit enlightening the press
> regarding the nature of local risks and what steps may be taken to
> lessen their effect by both individuals and businesses, thusly
> enlisting them as partners in educating the public. This is a chance
> to inform the fourth estate of what actions by emergency management
> may be likely in the response to an event. When the response moves
> according to a plan with which the press is familiar, they will
> appreciate that the situation is under control, even if activity
> appears to be chaotic. The result of such an understanding is that the
> press will tend to treat the event in a calm manner, rather than
> embracing an inflammatory approach to coverage. **When the press does
> not overreact, the public will likewise remain unruffled**.
>
> Another important function of the PIO is to perform **direct
> educational outreach to the public**. In this context, he should
> **regularly create and distribute educational materials**. These may
> contain **varying subject matter**, including, for example:

-   the nature of emergency management;

-   general risks and how to prepare for them;

-   hazards specific to the area such as a nuclear power plant or
    riverine flooding and immediate steps to take in the event of
    warning;

-   how to create a home evacuation plan;

-   instructions on the contents of a home preparedness survival kit;
    and

-   a list of the proper equipment to carry in the trunk of one's
    vehicle in order to be prepared for emergencies while away from the
    home.

> Another important part of public outreach is aggressively scheduling
> **educational guest appearances** at venues where large numbers of the
> populace regularly get together, such as schools and churches. School
> appearances in particular have been shown to be effective. Studies
> show that when children gain knowledge of mitigation steps, they bring
> the information home, and frequently serve as the catalyst for
> implementing the actions that they have learned about.
>
> Some groups need to be singled out for particular educational
> attention. Those who are **at risk from particular hazards must
> receive specific information**. An example would be those living in
> **close proximity to a nuclear plant**, who need to understand the
> nature of warning alarms and appropriate response actions in order to
> take prompt action to avoid immediate danger. **Those with special
> needs**, such as physical and mental challenges, as well as their
> caregivers, are another segment of the public whose safety can be
> significantly enhanced through learning in advance about the best way
> to react to different types of risk.
>
> **Preparedness is an excellent opportunity for educational and media
> outreach**. The **emergency management cycle of mitigation,
> preparedness, response, and recovery** can be explained through
> talking about the central role that the planning process plays in
> emergency management. When training takes place, the PIO can talk
> about the importance of upgrading individual capabilities to deal with
> plan responsibilities, relating this process to putting in place and
> understanding the use of family emergency plans. An excellent
> opportunity to use the media to inform the public of how response will
> happen and what they can do to help occurs when the plan is exercised
> and during after action debriefings.
>
> **During an actual event**, the PIO has as his **main function
> disseminating accurate, timely, and useful information to the
> public**. He must also give out **instructions** right through the
> emergency period. The first focus must be on the people at risk in the
> community. It is important to understand, however, that the **wider
> public will have an interest** and be desirous of helping or seeking
> information. They may call to offer help, or just want to send in
> donations of cash or in-kind merchandise. Individuals may inundate
> phone lines to find out about loved ones or to express their desire
> for federal action. Sound, well-timed information may assist in
> preventing a jurisdiction\'s communications network, transportation
> infrastructure, and staff from being overwhelmed.
>
> During an event, the PIO must understand that there will be different
> sources competing for the media's attention. Further, the media will
> be looking for different "angles" on the story. To this end, they will
> seek out the representatives of various officials to get their take on
> the event. To avoid confusion and ensure a consistent approach to
> public information, it is strongly suggested that a Joint
> **Information Center (JIC) be created to serve as the clearinghouse
> for press information**. This will also allow the various PIOs to set
> up a schedule for themselves to ensure that the spokesperson does not
> become exhausted and ineffective during an event that lasts for
> several days or longer.
>
> Sometimes the pressure for news coverage overshadows a PIO\'s ability
> to perform his essential purpose: providing timely, accurate, and
> useful information and instructions to local inhabitants. This is
> **when media relations grow to be a real test for the PIO**. When
> national media and \"local\" media representatives from outside the
> immediate area come together demanding the latest developments on a
> continual basis, the value of **scheduling and organizing public
> appearances** becomes paramount.

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**Questions to ask students:**

1.  What is the most important function of the Public Information
    Officer? Explain your choice.

> If all agree on one function, divide the students into groups, each of
> which must defend the importance of one or the other of the PIO's
> functions.

2.  What other educational activities can you think of for the PIO in
    addition to those mentioned in the text?

> Here it is important to emphasize that the PIO is to a large extent
> seen as the mouthpiece, and that the press will wish to speak with the
> people with real authority, such as the emergency management director
> or the Mayor. One of the PIO's main functions is to run interference
> for these officials so that they have time to perform their leadership
> tasks. Again, it is important to set a schedule for briefings to avoid
> overtaxing leaders.

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**Objective 3.2**

**Talk about the nature and uses of Litigation Mitigation.**

> Self-evidently, one essential aspect of emergency and disaster
> management is that it deals with **abnormal circumstances that may
> include deaths, personal injuries, and property damage**. In our
> litigious society, **legal action is often the reflex movement** of
> those who suffer such losses.
>
> The reality is that **we can never be 100% prepared** for all
> potential hazards. In the aftermath of an event, **second-guessing**
> by pundits often reveals alleged faults in emergency preparedness.
> Media attention on apparent failings resulting in losses predictably
> gives rise to plaintiffs' attorneys looking into the topic as a
> **prospective basis for legal claims**.
>
> The **aftermath of Hurricane Katrina** illustrates the reality of this
> assertion. A web site seeks individuals who lost loved ones, were
> injured, or had property damaged by Hurricane Katrina to submit data
> that would let them to connect with a **class action lawsuit**, some
> defendants of which might be state and local units of government.
> Alleged shortcomings in **FEMA's planning for its post-Katrina
> sheltering program** have resulted in a federal case.
>
> The intensified possibility of lawsuits means that far-sighted state
> and local governments must **carefully look at their mitigation and
> preparedness efforts to determine their legal sufficiency**.
>
> For example, a wildfire threatens a town, and limited resources mean
> that one of two residential areas may be preserved through use of
> available firefighting equipment. One neighborhood has many poor
> residents and very low property values. The other region is an
> affluent enclave with fewer residents but exceedingly elevated
> property values. Even if every resident can be securely evacuated,
> **the decision maker still must make a difficult selection from
> distasteful options**. Whether the choice is to conserve the higher
> property values or the greater quantity of homes, many people will be
> disappointed that their district was not saved. In this situation, as
> with the aftermath of numerous emergency management judgments, the
> group that lost its homes may have the foundation for a lawsuit.
>
> **Taking positive action to avoid bad choices** like the one
> delineated above constitutes the professional test for local
> government chiefs and the emergency managers who work for them. Not
> surprisingly, it is impossible to avoid every instance where the
> available options are unattractive. It is a reality of life that ugly
> choices may be fertile ground for lawsuits. Nevertheless, **involving
> legal counsel in all phases of emergency management can result in
> significant enhancement of legal options**. This approach is known as
> **"litigation mitigation."**
>
> Litigation mitigation has three **goals:**

1.  **decreased exposure to legal claims;**

2.  **enhanced life safety; and**

3.  **improved property protection.**

> Of course, law schools train attorneys to regard the first of these
> three objectives as their main interest. For the emergency manager,
> every one of them is essential. In point of fact, **lessening legal
> exposure leads directly to elevated life safety and property
> protection**.
>
> For the average non-lawyer, the assortment of laws that control local
> government's behavior is likely to be incomprehensible. **All too
> often, emergency managers close their eyes to legal issues**. They may
> enthusiastically announce that they are "too busy saving lives and
> protecting property to bother with all that legal mumbo-jumbo." Coming
> from professionals who whole-heartedly embrace the concept of **"all
> hazards" emergency management**, this attitude appears **aberrant and
> out of character**. Regrettably, resources generally do not exist that
> could help address the shortcoming in emergency managers' legal
> knowledge. Liability issues have, in fact, been referred to as **"the
> great unplanned-for hazard faced by emergency management."**
>
> **Practical challenges cause obstacles** for state and local units of
> government that wish to **put Litigation Mitigation into place.**
>
> The first objection raised by offices that are constantly tasked with
> new unfunded mandates and chronically understaffed is **financial**.
> Attorneys, even those working at reduced government rates, are far
> costlier than the typical emergency management employee. On the other
> hand, the potential costs of a lawsuit for violation of legal
> standards for emergency management may be in the millions of dollars.
> **The economic argument is in fact a classic example of objections
> that have been raised over the years to all forms of mitigation**.
> Those who favor it say that they cannot specifically enumerate the
> savings from a flood that never occurred, for example. Stating the
> amount saved from a lawsuit that does not get filed is an even more
> problematic task.
>
> Listing the **types of costs saved due to the filing of fewer
> lawsuits** provides some understanding of just how significant those
> amounts may be. In a lawsuit that the unit of government **WINS**, the
> costs include:

-   attorneys fees during a lawsuit;

-   court costs;

-   discovery expenses, including depositions, gathering documents and
    things, and attorney support staff costs;

-   time spent by emergency management employees in dealing with the
    lawsuit; and

-   expert witness fees -- these include hiring, briefing, paying for
    reports and revisions to reports, and testimony at trial. Expert
    witnesses are essential in a trial revolving around emergency
    management standards and technical issues such as proper building
    standards. It should be noted that the best expert witnesses - and
    who wants less than the best with millions of dollars at stake --
    are **MUCH** more expensive than attorneys.

> In the unhappy event of **LOSING** a lawsuit, units of government may
> find themselves exposed to judgments costing millions as well paying
> the other party's attorneys fees and even punitive damages, depending
> on the laws of the state involved. **The result, particularly for
> rural jurisdictions, may be its own catastrophe, requiring raising
> taxes to pay for negative results in court.** Such an outcome would
> most probably result in jobs being lost as well.
>
> **Another practical obstacle** to litigation mitigation is the **way
> in which many local units of government employ attorneys**. At the
> local level, the **city or county attorney** is often given the job as
> a **political favor** by the party that runs the unit of government.
> Frequently the test for the job revolves around political purity --
> and campaign chest generosity- rather than **legal expertise or even
> competence**. A lack of expertise often may be addressed through
> **Continuing Legal Education** (CLE) courses. Unfortunately, as with
> emergency managers, there are vanishingly **few CLE opportunities
> available that treat emergency management law as their subject
> matter**. Even when CLE opportunities arise, they are often located
> far from the locality employing the attorney. Attending them,
> therefore, requires both the **CLE fees and travel expenses**. Most
> local governments have **funds for neither**. This practical objection
> to mitigating the lack of emergency management legal expertise again
> runs up against the general argument in favor of mitigation generally
> -- **pay now or pay later, but rest assured that if you must pay
> later, the cost will be MUCH greater**.
>
> Attorneys involved in all phases of emergency management will be able
> to take some or all of the following **proactive steps**:

-   **advise on relevant legal benchmarks** such as state and local
    emergency management law, the Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000, and
    NIMS standards;

-   assist in writing or updating the **local emergency management
    ordinance** to reflect current legal standards;

-   help negotiate and draft **mutual aid agreements**;

-   **evaluate the multiple plans required under NIMS** to gauge their
    compliance with law;

-   **suggest wording changes** in documents that will provide greater
    lawsuit protection; and

-   perhaps most important, **be up to speed on the complexities of
    emergency management law** that affect a particular jurisdiction so
    that, in the aftermath of an emergency or disaster, advice given to
    local leaders will be legally correct and reflect knowledge of local
    plans and practices. This is vital, since **leaders typically keep
    their lawyers close by their sides during emergency responses**.

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**Questions to ask students:**

1.  What is your opinion of the value of Litigation Mitigation?

> Some students may be skeptical of the possibility of lowering the
> number of lawsuits. Make the point that, while all cannot be avoided,
> every suit not filed saves a great amount of money. Refer students to
> the list of costs enumerated above. Remind then that there is a reason
> the concept is referred to as Litigation MITIGATION -- it is not a
> complete solution, but a lessening of the effects of an acknowledged
> hazard affecting every jurisdiction.

2.  What are the obstacles in your jurisdiction to full implementation
    of Litigation Mitigation? Discuss steps you might take to support
    Litigation Mitigation.

> As with all types of mitigation, some will oppose it as costing money
> that might not need to be spent. Arguments in its favor are those
> common to all mitigation steps.

3.  What other contexts can you name where Litigation Mitigation might
    be of assistance?

> This question asks students to think "outside the box." Possible
> answers in the private sector include reviewing contracts, assessing
> compliance with building and fire codes, and in personnel matters.
> Traditional emergency response groups in particular can benefit in
> many of the same ways outlined above that can help emergency
> management. Other parts of government can also benefit from proactive
> legal evaluation of their daily practices and procedures.
>
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**Objective 3.3**

**Discuss steps that can be taken to perform Financial Mitigation.**

> **Financial Mitigation** is a way of **backing up the physical steps**
> that are the heart of mitigation efforts. A variety of risk management
> techniques fall under the financial mitigation rubric. They include
> **insurance, insurance pools, self-insurance, disaster savings
> accounts, and other measures that facilitate recovery** if physical
> mitigation will not cover all losses. Their purpose is to **insulate
> at-risk entities from the results of low-probability, high-consequence
> occurrences**.
>
> For example, physical mitigation steps in erecting a building include
> use of fire resistant materials as well as installation of smoke
> detectors and a fire alarm system. In the event that these precautions
> prove ineffective, however, a fire insurance policy will provide an
> additional layer of protection to allow full recovery after a fire.
>
> Individual people and business enterprises can obtain insurance to
> guard themselves against natural disasters' economic effects. The
> major purpose of insurance is to provide protection from uncommon but
> financially devastating events. In the aftermath of major disasters,
> however, even large insurance companies may find themselves unable to
> pay off their policy holders\' claims. The result can be bankruptcy
> for the insurer and lack of coverage for the insured.
>
> Essentially, when one purchases insurance, one is betting that an
> unlikely event like a major earthquake, tornado, or hurricane will
> occur, damaging or destroying the insured property. The insurance
> company in some ways operates similarly to a gambling organization
> such as a horse racing track. The bettors place wagers at odds
> calculated by the organization to provide it with a comfortable margin
> of return under the most likely circumstances -- that the favorite
> horse will win the event. When this happens, all is well from an
> economic viewpoint -- the track makes money and those who bet on the
> "long shots" lose their money. Occasionally, however, a long shot does
> win. When that happens, the track may lose some money, but it always
> winds in the long run. That is because the odds change - the gambler
> will win less -- if more people bet on the long shot. In the insurance
> industry, in contrast, the bets are larger and the payoffs also
> potentially are much higher. Further, if a long shot does come in --
> like a Hurricane Andrew or Katrina causing billions in losses -- **the
> insurance company may well find itself unable to cover its bets --
> faced with underfunded liabilities, resulting in bankruptcy**.
>
> Reducing the effect of underfunded liability and its consequences is
> the responsibility of three groups -- federal regulators, state
> regulators, and the insurance industry itself. Federal and state
> governments oversee the property-and-casualty insurance business.
> State insurance regulators supervise insurers operating under state
> charters. They also help superintend terms and conditions of insurance
> contracts and licensing of companies, agents, brokers, and adjusters.
> They also seek to ensure public faith in the insurance industry by
> overseeing its activity.
>
> Some experts argue that the high cost of disaster insurance and the
> possibility of a carrier going bankrupt in the aftermath of a
> significant event make disaster insurance a bad investment. They
> reason that high deductibles, limited coverage, and large premiums
> simply are not worth the cost. In fact, the **vast majority of
> homeowners choose to "go bare" on at least some aspects of disaster
> insurance**. Those struggling with the decision must evaluate **three
> factors: their location, their financial situation, and their comfort
> with risk**.
>
> Sources for the more common types of individual disaster coverage
> include:\
> \
> **Earthquake coverage** in most states can be purchased from one's
> homeowners insurance company. In California, most policies are sold by
> the state-run insurance pool, the California Earthquake Authority
> (CEA), although some private companies also sell earthquake coverage.\
> \
> **Flood insurance** is normally provided by the National Flood
> Insurance Program, which is run by the federal government. A few
> private companies also write policies through a special agreement with
> the feds. In states likely to have floods the mortgage lender may
> compel homeowners to purchase the coverage.\
> \
> **Hurricane and other windstorm insurance** varies from state to
> state, and sometimes by individual county within a state. Some states,
> including Alabama, Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina,
> South Carolina and Texas, offer windstorm coverage pools for people
> who are unable to get coverage from private companies. In some coastal
> counties in Georgia and New York, residents can get wind and hail
> coverage through FAIR (Fair Access to Insurance Requirement) plans,
> which are high-risk pools run by insurance companies. Individual
> insurance agents or state insurance departments are the best source
> for additional details.
>
> Following a major disaster, the **Federal Emergency Management Agency
> (FEMA) makes available grants for emergency repairs and temporary
> housing. The Small Business Administration (SBA) offers low-interest
> rebuilding loans**. One important thins to remember when considering
> whether to purchase **insurance is that having it may limit one's
> ability to get government assistance**. Typically, grants are set
> aside for the uninsured, and loans are restricted to amounts not
> covered by insurance. For example, after the Northridge earthquake
> that struck Southern California in 1994, SBA made many loans covering
> just the deductibles.
>
> **Several reasons exist for procuring disaster insurance despite the
> arguments against it.**
>
> **The government might not intervene.** The **president must declare a
> major disaster before FEMA and SBA can get involved to provide help**.
> Limited damage usually means no declaration, even if specific small
> areas suffer catastrophic losses. The vast majority of floods, for
> example, are not declared major disasters.\
> \
> **Federal assistance might be insufficient.** FEMA grants may be
> limited, and SBA loans for home repairs have a \$200,000 cap. (One
> thing to bear in mind in this regard is that repair costs grow
> significantly following a disaster, since all available contractors
> will be working overtime.)\
> \
> **One may be adding considerably to one's debt burden.** SBA loans are
> precisely that \-- loans. The borrower must pay the money back. The
> total of the mortgage and SBA loan, could result in a homeowner owing
> more than the property's value.
>
> In addition to financial mitigation, **traditional physical mitigation
> needs to be considered.** Both new and old buildings can be made much
> stronger using both new construction and refitting measures. Indeed,
> **many earthquake experts choose to invest in additional physical
> mitigation steps instead of paying expensive insurance premiums**.
> Traditional mitigation steps may in fact be the **best form of
> self-insurance available**.\
> \
> The Institute for Business and Home Safety's "Fortified For Safer
> Living\" program specifies building practices that assist homes in
> better withstanding various kinds of disaster. The institute estimates
> these safer-building techniques add about 10% to a new house's
> construction cost. That expense may result in much lower damage in the
> event that a disaster strikes.
>
> Many people who are located in disaster prone areas address the risk
> by investing in **disaster savings accounts**. These are vehicle that
> allow individuals to set aside funds for future recovery needs.
> **Experts recommend having enough money set aside to cover 3-6 months
> of expenses in the aftermath of a disaster.**
>
> One proposal would go further and allow such accounts to work in the
> same way as Health Savings Accounts. A **Catastrophe Tax-Free Savings
> Account** could be created to cover current and future
> catastrophe-related expenses. The earnings from the funds deposited
> would be tax-free, and unused balances would roll over from
> year-to-year. Most homeowners could contribute and hold up to twice
> the amount of the individual's insurance deductible (up to \$15,000).
> In the event of a disaster, the money could be withdrawn to cover
> qualified disaster expenses including deductibles, uninsured losses,
> flood damage and structural upgrades for future storms on a tax-free
> basis. At retirement, the funds could be withdrawn from the account
> without penalty.
>
> **Another alternative** for homeowners and businesspeople without
> significant equity in their property is to **default on loans and
> leave the lender holding the keys to a pile of rubble**. After the
> Northridge earthquake, many homeowners selected that option. As often
> occurs following a disaster, the number of foreclosures increased
> significantly in the area following the 1994 earthquake. However,
> thousands of homes are not the only things damaged after defaults -
> credit reports also suffer.\
> \
> **Those with significant equity**, whose home or business represents a
> large percentage of their net worth, may be **well advised to spend
> the money** for extra insurance coverage despite the cost.

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**Questions to ask students:**

1.  What is your opinion of the value of financial mitigation?

> Some students may bring up the fact that those least able to afford
> steps like financial mitigation are often those who need it most. This
> is a good opportunity to discuss how disasters affect people
> differently based on their economic status, with the most at-risk
> areas being the least expensive and, hence, the places where the poor
> will live.
>
> 2\. Which kind of financial mitigation do you think is most
> worthwhile, and why?
>
> Suggest that a mixture of mitigation types may make the most sense.
> Emphasize the need to begin the process with physical mitigation
> steps.
>
> 3\. What other suggestions can you make for additional financial
> mitigation measures?
>
> This question asks students to think "outside the box." Possible
> answers include making insurance deductibles tax deductible, enacting
> the Catastrophe Tax-Free Savings Account legislation referred to in
> the text, changing daily financial procedures to include putting loose
> change in a "disaster rainy day" shoebox, and others the students may
> propose.
>
> **\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_**

**Objective 3.6**

**Talk about the benefits of expanded police powers, particularly those
contained in the USA PATRIOT Act.**

> The **terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 galvanized the United
> States at all levels of government -- federal, state, and local**.
> Elected officials took actions that reflected the desire of the
> populace to take **concrete, immediate steps to capture and prosecute
> any people who might have assisted the terrorists' attacks**. New
> enactments revolved around increasing the investigative and
> enforcement authorities of law enforcement.
>
> Those who had for years been urging **expansion of police powers** to
> deal with a variety of lawless activity suddenly found themselves with
> **support from virtually all quarters**.
>
> The most far-reaching changes occurred on the federal level. Congress
> reacted quickly to the September 11, 2001 attacks, enacting the
> **Uniting and Strengthening America By Providing Appropriate Tools
> Required To Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act (USA Patriot Act)**
> of 2001 (Pub.L 107-56) on October 26, 2001. Much of the Act originated
> in the Department of Justice's "wish list" which had been created
> prior to September 11, 2001. **Some segments relate to the war on
> terrorism in a tangential manner, if at all**.
>
> The USA PATRIOT Act **permits investigators to employ the means that
> were previously accessible only for investigations of organized crime
> and drug trafficking**. It lets law enforcement make use of
> surveillance against more crimes of terror. The Act allows federal
> agents to pursue clever terrorists trained to elude detection. It
> assists law enforcement in conducting investigations without
> forewarning terrorists.
>
> The USA PATRIOT Act **smoothes the progress of information
> distribution and collaboration** between government agencies to
> enhance their ability to \"connect the dots.\" The USA PATRIOT Act
> modernized the law to deal with new technologies and new threats. The
> Act allows law enforcement to get a search warrant wherever
> terrorist-related activity occurred. It permits victims of computer
> hacking to ask for law enforcement aid in monitoring the
> \"trespassers\" on their computers.
>
> The USA PATRIOT Act **enhanced the punishments for those who carry out
> terrorist crimes**. It proscribes harboring terrorists. It increased
> the maximum penalties for different crimes liable to be committed by
> terrorists. The Act enhanced several conspiracy penalties. The law
> punishes terrorist attacks on mass transit systems as well as
> bioterrorists. It does away with the statutes of limitations for
> certain terrorism crimes and extends them for other terrorist crimes.
>
> The Act **largely revolves around increased law enforcement powers**.
>
> • Section 203 **integrates domestic law enforcement and foreign
> intelligence collection**, which previously worked on separate tracks.
> Historically, very different legal regimes were associated with
> domestic law enforcement and foreign intelligence collection. The
> events of September 11, which involved a number of people who had
> lived in our country for some time, clarified the need for increased
> cooperation between domestic law enforcement and foreign intelligence
> collection. Section 203 facilitates this cooperation by **allowing
> \"foreign intelligence information\" gathered in criminal
> investigations by domestic law enforcement to be shared with the
> intelligence community**. Section 203 also amended the Federal Rules
> of Criminal Procedure to **allow disclosures of \"matters occurring
> before the grand jury\" when the matters \"involve foreign
> intelligence or counterintelligence\"** to \"any Federal law
> enforcement, intelligence, protective, immigration, national defense,
> or national security official in order to assist the official
> receiving that information in the performance of his official
> duties.\" In this manner, section 203 enables the **intelligence
> community access to critical information that might otherwise be
> unavailable**.
>
> • Section 206 modernizes the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act's
> (FISA) approach to **wiretaps**. FISA ease domestic intelligence
> gathering related to foreign powers by permitting the collection of
> such information with lesser legal restrictions than required for
> domestic law enforcement. **Section 206 of the Patriot Act updates
> FISA wiretap authority**. In the era of cell phones, pay phones,
> e-mail, instant messaging, and BlackBerry wireless e-mail devices
> FISA's previous requirement for separate orders for each device was a
> considerable barrier to scrutinizing an individual's communications.
> Section 206 permits a **single wiretap to legally \"roam\" from device
> to device, tapping the person instead of the phone**. Before passage
> of the USA PATRIOT Act, the laws regarding both wiretaps and pen
> register/trap and trace devices authorized carrying out a court order
> only within the geographic jurisdiction of the issuing court. The Act
> (Sections 216 and 219) **enlarges the jurisdictional authority of a
> court to authorize the putting in place of a surveillance apparatus
> anywhere in the United States**.
>
> • Section 225 gives **immunity from suit in to people who cooperate
> with the government on FISA (Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of
> 1978) wiretaps**. Although there theoretically can be no immunity for
> **violations of an individual's Constitutionally protected rights**,
> the Supreme Court has indicated that, **in times of national
> emergency, such rights lose their primacy when national survival is at
> stake**.
>
> • Section 213 **eliminates the previous obligation that law
> enforcement provide a person subject to a search warrant with
> simultaneous notice** of the search **with a showing that notice would
> create an \"adverse result.\"** It **expands the authority** of the
> government in **both terrorism and non-terror investigations** to
> conduct so-called **"sneak and peek" or "black bag" secret searches,
> which do not require notification of the subject of the search**.
> Again, **judicial oversight for these activities is minimal at best**.
> These searches raise the possibility of a person reporting a break-in
> to local police who expend their limited resources on investigating
> what is actually a legal search by a federal agency. From a law
> enforcement perspective, such secret searches allow **gathering
> support for an ongoing investigation without tipping the authorities'
> hand to the subject of an investigation**. The target might, upon
> early notice of official interest, destroy evidence or otherwise make
> prosecution more difficult. This provision is an effort to enhance the
> government's ability to investigate suspected terrorists by granting
> law enforcement greater flexibility in operating covertly.
>
> • Section 215 gives the **FBI the power to request an order
> \"requiring the production of any tangible things** (including books,
> records, papers, documents, and other items)\" **relevant to an
> investigation of international terrorism or clandestine intelligence
> activities**. The scope of the authority applies to any records
> applicable to the individual. This amendment, which **overrides state
> library confidentiality laws**, allows the FBI to force production of
> business records, medical records, educational records and library
> records without a showing of \"probable cause\" (the existence of
> particular facts to corroborate the belief that a crime has been
> committed or that the items wanted are evidence of a crime). Instead,
> the government only needs to claim that the records may be related to
> an ongoing investigation concerning terrorism or intelligence
> activities.
>
> • Section 216 of the Patriot Act substantially changes the law with
> respect to **law enforcement right to use information about computer
> use including Web surfing**. Using an analogy from the previous rotary
> dialed telephone system, the Act extends provisions written to
> authorize putting in place pen registers and trap and trace devices,
> which record outgoing and incoming phone numbers, to permit
> installation of devices to record all computer routing, addressing,
> and signaling information. A mere certification that the information
> likely to be obtained is relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation
> allows the government to obtain this information. This permits the
> **government can learn a tremendous amount of information about a
> person of interest including shopping preferences, materials read, as
> well as identities of friends and associates** through the use of
> so-called **transactional records**. It **minimizes the power of the
> courts to prevent law enforcement authorities from illegally abusing
> telephone and Internet surveillance** in **both anti-terrorism
> investigations *and* ordinary criminal investigations of American
> citizens**. Civil liberties groups are particularly worried about the
> loss of court oversight of these potential invasions of privacy rights
> nominally guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment to the United States
> Constitution. From a law enforcement perspective, however, this is an
> **incredibly powerful tool in detecting crime (terrorist and other
> varieties) before it occurs**. The loss of court oversight has the
> effect of encouraging more aggressive law enforcement investigations.
>
> • Section 217 allows law enforcement, with the permission of the owner
> of a computer, to monitor a trespasser's action without obtaining an
> order for a wiretap. This provision **constrains the ability of
> hackers to use computers without being detected**.
>
> • The USA PATRIOT Act's Title III, the **International Money
> Laundering Abatement and Anti-Terrorism Financing Act of 2001**,
> creates significant impediments to persons wishing to conceal their
> support of terrorist organizations. It **requires financial
> institutions to file Suspicious Activity Reports** with the Financial
> Crimes Enforcement Network. The threshold for reporting such events is
> low, and the **result is reportedly that major sources of support for
> terrorism have dried up**.
>
> • **Section 411 redefines terrorism**, affecting the admissibility of
> persons seeking legal resident alien or citizenship status. Asking for
> funds for terrorist activity is a new **barrier to temporary or
> permanent immigration**. A **widened definition of "terrorist
> organization"** and association with them triggers immigration bans.
> New investigation and tracking systems are authorized by implication
> to enforce these limits. See also the **Enhanced Border Security and
> Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002** (Pub.L 107-173) signed May 14, 2002.
> Section 412 of the USA PATRIOT Act concerns **mandatory detention of
> suspected terrorists** and has been the subject of many articles in
> the press. It permits the Attorney General to **incarcerate or detain
> non-citizens based on mere suspicion, and to deny re-admission to the
> United States of non-citizens (including legal, long-term permanent
> residents) for engaging in speech protected by the First Amendment**.
> This is a pro-active form of preventing the possible mental
> contamination of potential terrorists by outside agitators.
>
> • Section 802 contains a **broad definition of "domestic terrorism."**
> The new definition is so vague that the government could designate
> lawful advocacy groups -- such as Operation Rescue or Greenpeace -- as
> terrorists and subject them to invasive surveillance, wiretapping, and
> harassment and then **criminally penalize them for what had been
> constitutionally protected political advocacy**.
>
> • Section 817 expands the **prohibitions on possession or use of
> certain biologic agents**. See also the Public Health Security and
> Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 2002 (Pub.L. 107-188)
> enacted on June 12, 2002. Section 1013 of the U.S.A. Patriot Act lists
> extensive Senate findings on bioterrorism issues. Congressional
> findings indicate that **the entire public health system must be
> reconstructed to effectively deal with bioterrorism**.
>
> • Section 1005 of the USA PATRIOT Act, the **First Responder
> Assistance Act,** **authorizes "Terrorism Prevention Grants."** These
> **grants fund equipment, technical assistance, materials, and
> training**. This is the largest federal first responder grant program
> ever created. FEMA provides similar funds through the Emergency
> Management Performance Grants (EMPGs), and through the United States
> Fire Administration to the fire community (FIRE Grants). The
> FEMA-funded programs are much smaller. For the medical community, HHS
> may rival these organizations in total outlays for First Responders.
>
> • Section 1014 is the **Grant Program for State and Local Domestic
> Preparedness** authorizes a **grant to each state to prepare for and
> respond to terrorist acts involving weapons of mass destruction
> (WMD's) and biological, nuclear, radiological, chemical, and explosive
> devices**.
>
> • Section 1012 **tightens up security for obtaining** **HAZMAT
> transportation licenses**, requiring a risk determination. This is
> left to the discretion of the Executive Branch.
>
> • Section 1016 involves **Critical Infrastructure Protection**. **The
> Defense Threat Reduction Agency** (successor to the former Defense
> Nuclear Agency) is funded for some functions now being transferred to
> the new Department of Homeland Security.
>
> • The USA PATRIOT Act, in Sections 224 and 303, contains mandatory
> review or **sunset provisions**. By December 31, 2005, a few portions
> of the statute were set to expire, although they were renewed in 2005.
> Foreign Intelligence Investigations begun prior to that date will be
> allowed to continue.
>
> The US PATRIOT Act's true meaning awaits final judicial construction,
> which may take years.
>
> **State and local governments have also put new laws in place to
> enable the legal system to more aggressively pursue and prosecute
> terrorism**. These often include approaches **similar to portions of
> the USA PATRIOT Act**. Contents of their statutory enactments often
> include:

-   broadened definitions of terrorism;

-   enhanced penalties for terrorist acts;

-   changes in government structure analogous to creation of the federal
    Department of Homeland Security; and

-   increased preparedness requirements, such as mandatory bioterrorism
    plans for hospitals.

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**Questions to ask students:**

1.  Which part of the USA PATRIOT Act do you view as most important for
    law enforcement in its pursuit of terrorists? Defend your answer.

> This is a good opportunity to lay out the different changes put in
> place by the Act. Follow up with discussion of how the Act has changed
> daily life on the street for police and prosecutors.

2.  What is your opinion of the "sneak and peak" search provision in the
    USA PATRIOT Act?

> Opinion: It facilitates catching terrorists. It has potential for
> abuse against people expressing lawful alternate political views.
>
> Students either do or do not believe that limits on their civil
> liberties are justified in pursuit of the higher goal of apprehending
> terrorists and preventing attacks. They may not see any direct linkage
> between the Act and their own lives.

3.  What benefits do the "roving wiretap" provisions of the Act have for
    law enforcement?

> Following the person rather than the device means that if bad guys buy
> a bunch of cell phones and throw them away after one call they will
> not frustrate law enforcement investigation of a terrorist conspiracy.

4.  How would the USA PATRIOT Act help prevent another potential
    terrorist conspiracy like the 9-11 attacks?

> Better investigation tools assist in earlier detection -- sneak and
> peak search, computer use monitoring, and roving wiretap. These also
> facilitate prosecution's gathering of evidence. Enhanced penalties
> mean putting terrorists away for a long time even after preliminary
> steps alone. Enhanced penalties also may make potential terrorist
> think twice about becoming involved, encourage cooperation with
> government. On the other hand, religious zealots often could care less
> about penalties for doing what they see as the correct thing.

**\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_**

**Objective 3.6**

**Discuss Mitigation/Prevention Cases**

1.  **Aviation Security**

2.  **Maritime Security**

3.  **Nuclear Security (International)**

4.  **Bioterrorism Initiatives**

5.  **Personal/Community Measures**

> **1. Aviation Security**
>
> **Facts**
>
> Aviation is both at risk and critical to our nation. The September 11,
> 2001 attacks used commercial airliners to destroy the World Trade
> Center Towers and heavily damage the Pentagon. Another plane destined
> for Washington, D.C. went down in Pennsylvania after valiant
> passengers and crew attempted to re-take control. These were well
> thought out, violent assaults not much more complex than a simple
> mugging on the street. The attacks also demonstrated that aircraft are
> possible weaponry with the capacity to cause immense consequential
> destruction. None can doubt that fully fueled transport type aircraft
> potentially threaten any target, even the most sizable edifice. The
> aviation industry is also a vital ingredient in the American economy,
> with a total economic estimated to exceed \$900 billion annually. That
> is about nine percent of the gross national product, with over eleven
> million associated jobs. The aviation industry shut down following the
> 9-11 attacks endangered our whole economy.
>
> Aviation's crucial role and susceptibility to attack has meant it is a
> primary target of terrorists. For this reason, aviation security is
> vital, and increased security after the terrorist attacks was
> imperative.
>
> Increased security steps have included:

-   many more armed air marshals traveling undercover on aircraft;

-   beefed up cockpit doors;

> \- changes in the standard operating procedures when a terrorist tries
> to take an aircraft from compliance to resistance;

-   greatly enhanced baggage screening both by people and by more
    sophisticated equipment including "sniffers" able to detect minor
    amounts of explosive residue;

-   strict matching of passengers with baggage; and

-   federalization of airport screeners under the Transportation
    Security Administration.

> **Issues**
>
> Many of the security steps have been criticized as ineffective and
> overpriced.
>
> Air marshals allegedly must follow procedures and comply with a dress
> code that identifies them to potential terrorists.
>
> Baggage screeners continue to be criticized for failing to detect many
> weapons when they are tested by federal watchdogs.
>
> Screening equipment costing over \$ 7 billion purchased in the
> immediate aftermath of the attacks apparently was not designed for the
> tasks assigned to it. It did not perform as advertised and frequently
> broke down. Reportedly, it all must be junked and replaced with new
> machinery.
>
> Federalizing baggage screeners was criticized as extremely expensive
> and ineffective. The new screeners were said to be no better than
> their underpaid predecessors. Further, in the rush to hire new
> screeners, criminal background checks were frequently not performed
> with the result that unreliable people were placed in these positions
> of trust. Numerous reports of thefts by federal screeners from
> customer bags ensued. Some screening positions have since been
> privatized.
>
> Indirect costs measured in terms of inconvenience to passengers and
> loss of business to the airlines is very problematical to gauge. There
> is no doubt, however, that the cost is high, especially for frequent
> flyers.

2.  **Maritime Security**

> **Facts**
>
> The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is responsible for making
> sure that the maritime transportation system, the waterways that carry
> the vessels, and the ports that are their destinations are securely
> protected. This important work is mostly performed by the
> Transportation Security Administration and U.S. Coast Guard
>
> **Early Ship Identification**:  Every cargo or passenger ship wishing
> to enter an American port must provide 4 days in advance detailed
> information regarding their crew, cargo and ship.  Compliance with
> safety, pollution and immigration regulations is ensured through
> inspections.  To protect our citizens and maritime commerce,
> authorities closely monitor all passenger vessels including both
> cruise ships and ferries.  The International Ship and Port Facility
> Security Code (ISPS), put in place in 2004, assists greatly in this
> process.
>
> **Port Security Planning:** DHS also works with other federal, state,
> local and industry groups with the goal of creating comprehensive
> maritime homeland security contingency plans and threat responsiveness
> in all 361 major U.S. ports.   \$105 million dollars in federal grant
> money is targeted at port security.
>
> **Navigating our Waters**:  All types of vessels must be able to
> safely navigate through our waterways for our national economy to
> fully function. For this reason, the U.S. Coast Guard maintains the
> buoys, beacons, lighthouses, sound signals, and radar-reflecting
> devices that mark navigable channels and hazards.
>
> **Cargo Security**:   In the wake of the 9-11 attacks, efforts have
> been underway to screen more cargo coming into the U.S. Operation Safe
> Commerce is a test bed project between TSA, DOT, Customs, USCG, DoD,
> INS, OHS, State, Justice and Commerce whose goal is to identify and
> fund business driven initiatives to enhance security for the movement
> of cargo throughout the entire supply chain. New technologies such as
> electronic seals for cargo containers show much promise.
>
> **Issues:**
>
> The maritime commerce of the United States is massive in both the
> number of vessels involved and the amount of cargo handled.
> Historically, oversight of the contents of containerized shipping in
> particular has been difficult due mostly to the huge numbers of
> containers and the small number of personnel to inspect them. Further,
> the protective steps taken are still in progress. A very small
> percentage of cargo containers is actually inspected.
>
> Facilities for x-raying cargo containers are very limited and
> extremely overworked. Capabilities for detecting radiation from
> containers are also limited.
>
> Cargo containers typically are targeted for inspection at their
> destination port. A container bound for St. Louis. For example, would
> travel many miles through the heartland of America up the Mississippi
> River before inspection.
>
> There are a limited number of ports that covered by the vessel
> identification system. Some question whether the International Ship
> and Port Facility Security Code system will be effective as many
> vessels were not compliant when it went into effect.
>
> The scope and quality of port security assessments are uncertain.
> There is a need to upgrade these judgments and to monitor them on a
> ongoing basis.
>
> The Coast Guard does not plan to individually approve security plans
> for foreign vessels.
>
> There is potential duplication of maritime intelligence efforts, a
> situation reflecting the unsettled and fragmented nature of our
> intelligence apparatus on the federal level.
>
> The Port Security Grant Program is funded poorly compared to the size
> of the challenge. Reportedly, the quality of the end products varies
> significantly.
>
> **3. Nuclear Security (International)**
>
> **Facts:**
>
> The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) regulates the use of
> nuclear materials around the world. Yet nations attempt to join the
> limited group around the world that possess nuclear weapons, and lower
> grade materials that could be used in a dirty bomb are widely
> available.
>
> After the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, public anxiety about
> radioactive sources' security has grown in many nations. Worldwide,
> there are many radioactive sources. They are widely used around the
> world for a broad variety of medical, industrial, agricultural and
> research purposes.
>
> Some sources hold comparatively sizeable quantity of radioactive
> material that could potentially be utilized in construction of a
> terrorist weapon. Radioactive material might be employed as part of a
> radiological dispersal device (RDD), commonly referred to as a "dirty
> bomb." Indeed, if the substance is easily scattered, it could be
> spread without the need for an explosive by simply breaking open the
> seal and releasing it into the environment. Large areas of an urban
> environment could thusly be contaminated with small but measurable
> amounts of radioactive material. Dispersion of the radioactive
> contamination would likely lessen any potential health effects, but
> fear and social disorder would be likely to take place after such an
> event.
>
> The fact that terrorists could endeavor to employ radioactive
> materials emphasizes the importance of ensuring that the security of
> radioactive sources is sufficient. Unfortunately, many radioactive
> sources are not kept under tight security measures. Only prevention of
> accidental access or petty theft has been the focus. For many years,
> in fact, security has been so lax that many sources have been
> misplaced, forgotten, or lost.
>
> Government authorities in various nations control the majority of
> radioactive sources. Much of this material, however, has never been
> subject to regulatory control. Much material, termed "orphan sources,"
> has been abandoned, lost, misplaced, stolen or otherwise removed
> without authorization. Orphan sources are widely available and totally
> uncontrolled. In an attempt to address this issue, the International
> Atomic Energy Agency agreed with the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy
> and the United States Department of Energy to work together to secure
> and manage radioactive sources in the territory of the former USSR.
>
> As recent events in North Korea and Iran make all too clear, nuclear
> proliferation continues despite international attempts at control.
> These states are the subject of United Nations resolutions aimed at
> stopping their nuclear activities. Such actions include creating
> precursors or actual atomic weapons. Their response is all too often
> to thumb their noses at the U.N. while continuing to pursue weapons of
> mass destruction.
>
> The methods for creating atomic weapons are repeatedly said to be
> available over the internet.
>
> Further, the collapse of the former Soviet Union reportedly has put
> many nuclear devices into the underground stream of commerce.
> So-called "suitcase bombs" are relatively easily transported and could
> be used as terrorist devices.
>
> **Issues:**
>
> Given all the nuclear materials available, the problem becomes
> three-fold: control, detection, and prevention.
>
> As indicated above, controls are virtually non-existent on materials
> below weapons grade. Orphan radioactive sources are located throughout
> the world.
>
> As yet, the world community appears to be unable to put any teeth into
> nuclear non-proliferation, controlling the spread of nuclear weapons.
> Iran and North Korea are the two members of President Bush's "Axis of
> Evil" that demonstrably possess or may soon possess nuclear weapons of
> mass destruction. Against these demonstrated dangers, however,
> ineffectual diplomatic efforts are all we seem able to mount. We have
> taken no action against the Pakistani scientist who spread to Iran and
> North Korea the technical expertise necessary to put their nuclear
> weapons programs on the fast track.
>
> In a rare success, Libya agreed to halt its nuclear program, but some
> of the sophisticated enrichment equipment it ordered on the black
> market apparently went missing, raising the possibility of other, as
> yet unknown, potential players on the nuclear stage.
>
> We have increased our ability to detect nuclear materials. In the wake
> of 9-11, many jurisdictions purchased detection devices with homeland
> security grant funds. Unfortunately, funding was not tied to training
> to use the devices and ongoing competence. Therefore, at this time,
> many jurisdictions have sophisticated radiation detection tools
> sitting in closets that no one knows how to use.
>
> Prevention, in the sense of halting criminal terrorist groups before
> they might utilize nuclear materials continues to be problematic. Our
> intelligence agencies have great difficulty in penetrating terror
> groups. Potential intelligence recruits with the appropriate
> backgrounds to be able to penetrate such cells and potentially be the
> source of prevention information are often unable to pass security
> checks due to the fact that they have such a background.
>
> **4. Bioterrorism Initiatives**
>
> **Facts:**
>
> A bioterrorism attack is the purposeful discharge of viruses,
> bacteria, or other germs (agents) used to bring about illness or death
> in people, animals, or plants. These agents are characteristically
> found in nature. Laboratories during the cold war also created
> augmented strains of agents, increasing their power to cause disease,
> making them resistant to current medicines, or to boosting their
> ability to be spread into the environment.
>
> Terrorists may find biological agents to be an attractive means for
> attacking targets. Bioweapons are often very difficult to detect and
> the delays that may occur between infection and the onset of symptoms
> means that they are extremely difficult to contain.
>
> Some bioterrorism agents are infectious through touch or respiration
> and can be spread from person to person. Other agents, such as
> anthrax, can not.
>
> Health care facilities have been required to prepare plans for
> bioterrorism. Many have established decontamination facilities and
> "hot" rooms for infected people.
>
> In order to detect a bioterrorism attack as soon as possible, health
> care facilities are alert for clusters of similar symptoms presenting
> at emergency rooms. State and federal authorities track symptoms in
> order to promptly identify suspect groups of potentially infected
> patients. This approach's goal is to spot the geographic extent of
> infections as well as facilitating treatment.
>
> The 2002 Defense Authorization bill featured funding for important
> bioterrroism initiatives, including:

-   \$865 million to bolster the ability of the American state and local
    public health system to prevent and respond to bioterrorism,
    including increasing training for public health and medical
    officials, ensuring that there are round-the-clock disease
    investigators in every state, and improving surveillance and
    information sharing capacity at all levels of government;

-   Up to \$10 million to create and maintain a comprehensive inventory
    of all biohazardous pathogens in the nation;

-   \$85 million for expanded research on vaccines and antiviral agents;

-   \$512 billion to produce enough additional small pox vaccine for
    every American by no later than the end of next year;

-   \$593 million to boost the pharmaceutical stockpile and to expand
    research and development;

-   \$135 million to help hospitals increase their surge capacity;

-   \$141 million to improve security of labs that handle anthrax and
    other deadly pathogens and to improve the National Institute of
    Health's lab capacity;

-   \$100 million to upgrade CDC\'s lab and research capacity;

-   \$494 million to improve food safety inspections through the FDA and
    USDA; including

-   \$64 million to improve the National Animal Disease Center;

-   \$74.5 million for other federal response efforts including trauma
    response and expanded federal emergency response teams.

> **Issues:**
>
> The as-yet unsolved anthrax attacks of late 2001 point up the
> difficulties inherent in dealing with bioterrorism. The illness was
> spread through the medium of letters which were so loaded with agent
> that when they went through postal equipment they contaminated postal
> facilities and killed postal workers. The attacks caused significant
> disruption, including the closing of major Washington, D.C.
> installations including the Supreme Court and Senate Office Buildings.
>
> The lag time between infection and visible symptoms is a critical
> challenge posed by bioterrorism. A terrorist may place a dispersion
> device and exit the scene, unidentified and free to repeat the attack
> at a later date in a far away location. Further, given the extremely
> mobile nature of modern society, people infected at a public gathering
> like a concert or sporting event may spread far and wide before
> becoming symptomatic, rendering traditional isolation and quarantine
> steps futile.
>
> The appearance of an apparent round of influenza may in fact be a
> bioterror attack presenting with flu-like symptoms. In the absence of
> more serious symptoms, proper steps to avoid further spreading the
> infection may not take place until the illness has had time to spread
> widely.
>
> A glance at the 2002 initiatives funded for bioterrorism illustrates
> the fact that much is being spent for research. This often indicates
> that current knowledge is insufficient to cope with the problem at
> hand.

5.  **Personal/Community Measures**

> **Facts:**
>
> The massive destruction caused by Hurricane Katrina and survivor
> stories from the attacks on the World Trade Center make it clear that
> government and the traditional first responder community cannot do it
> all when faced with a massive catastrophe. As a result, personal,
> family, and community preparedness is being heavily emphasized by
> government, the private sector, and non-governmental organizations
> (NGOs).
>
> Illustrations and link information for various websites devoted to
> personal and community preparedness follow.
>
> **American Red Cross: Get Prepared**
>
> http://www.redcross.org/services/prepare/0,1082,0_239\_,00.html
>
> Contains guides for preparedness at home, school, work, and in the
> community.
>
> **Are You Ready?**
>
> http://www.fema.gov/areyouready/preface.shtm
>
> FEMA guide for personal and community preparedness steps.
>
> **Citizen Corps**
>
> http://www.citizencorps.gov/
>
> Uniting communities for hometown security.
>
> **District of Columbia Citizen Services: Emergency Preparedness**
>
> http://www.dc.gov/citizen/preparedness/index.shtm
>
> Contains helpful links, including a Family Preparedness Guide.
>
> **Emergency Preparedness**
>
> http://www.coj.net/Departments/Fire+and+Rescue/Emergency+Preparedness/default.htm
>
> City of Jacksonville FL emergency preparedness page. Contains tips for
> homeowners and businesses.
>
> **Emergency Preparedness BSA**
>
> http://www.scouting.org/pubs/emergency/index.html
>
> DHS partnering with the Boy Scouts of America to increase community
> preparedness.
>
> **Family Disaster Plan**
>
> http://www.disastercenter.com/guide/family.htm
>
> Good discussion of how to create a family disaster plan.
>
> **Family Disaster Preparedness**
>
> http://www.floridadisaster.org/bpr/family%20preparedness/index.htm
>
> Florida Division of Emergency Management site with helpful links for
> family preparedness, particularly for hurricanes.
>
> **FEMA Plan Ahead**
>
> http://www.fema.gov/plan/index.shtm
>
> Contains numerous links for protection of family and property.
>
> **FEMA for Homeowners and Renters (or Property Owners)**
> http://www.fema.gov/plan/prevent/howto/index.shtm
>
> Find \"How to\" guides and instructions for identifying if your home,
> business, or property are at risk from certain types of hazards and
> what steps you can take to minimize damages in the event of a
> disaster.
>
> **FEMA for Parents and Teachers**
>
> http://www.fema.gov/kids/teacher.htm
>
> **FEMA for Individuals with Special Needs**
>
> http://www.fema.gov/plan/prepare/specialplans.shtm
>
> **FEMA Caring for Animals**
>
> **Information for Pet Owners**\
> Guidelines on how to prepare a plan to care for pets before, during
> and after a disaster.
>
> http://www.fema.gov/plan/prepare/animals.shtm
>
> **[Information for Livestock
> Owners](http://www.fema.gov/plan/prepare/livestock.shtm)\
> **Guidelines on how to prepare a plan to care for large animals
> before, during and after a disaster.
>
> http://www.fema.gov/plan/prepare/livestock.shtm
>
> **[Wildlife in
> Disasters](http://www.fema.gov/rebuild/recover/wildlife.shtm)\
> **Guidelines on how to approach wildlife after a disaster.
>
> http://www.fema.gov/rebuild/recover/wildlife.shtm
>
> **New York State Department of Health: Emergency Preparedness**
>
> http://www.health.state.ny.us/environmental/emergency/index.htm
>
> Helpful site includes specific information on biological, chemical,
> and radiological exposure.
>
> **NYC.Gov Emergency Services**
>
> http://www.nyc.gov/portal/index.jsp?epi_menuItemID=57b177fa5e53f4f6a62fa24601c789a0&epi_menuID=a4aaa6d5d9e894f6a62fa24601c789a0&epi_baseMenuID=27579af732d48f86a62fa24601c789a0
>
> Contains links to programs, including multilingual Ready New York
> program.
>
> **PrepareNow.org**
>
> http://www.preparenow.org/
>
> Useful links for planning for people with special needs.
>
> **Ready.Gov**
>
> http://www.ready.gov/
>
> Prepare, plan, stay informed for personal, family, business, and
> community safety.

**\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_**

> **References:**
>
> "Bioterrorism" Centers for Disease Control found on line at:
> http://www.bt.cdc.gov/bioterrorism/
>
> Alan Boyd, "Turmoil Over Anti-Terrorism Standard for Ports" *Asia
> Times* (June 26, 2004).

Frank J. Costello, Esq., "Post 9-11 Challenges for Aviation Security"
Chapter 13 in William C. Nicholson, Editor *Homeland Security Law and
Policy*, Charles C. Thomas Publisher, Ltd., Springfield, IL. (2005).

> Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) USA PATRIOT Act resources
> found on line at http://www.epic.org/privacy/terrorism/usapatriot/
>
> *Feeney Introduces Catastrophe Savings Accounts* (March 1 2006) found
> on line at
> http://www.house.gov/list/press/fl24_feeney/csa030106pr.html
>
> FEMA Mitigation Division found on line at
> http://www.fema.gov/about/divisions/mitigation/mitigation.shtm
>
> FEMA, *SLG 101: Guide for All-Hazard Emergency Operations Planning,
> Attachment D: Emergency Public Information Planning (1996)* found on
> line at http://www.fema.gov/pdf/plan/5-ch-d.pdf
>
> "Insatiable Appetite: The Government's Demand for New and Unnecessary
> Powers after September 11^th"^ *An ACLU Report* found on line at
> http://www.aclu.org/safefree/resources/17042pub20021015.html
>
> Institute for Business and Home Safety, *Fortified for Safer Living*
> found on line at
> http://www.ibhs.org/property_protection/default.asp?id=8
>
> Insurance Disaster Response Organization found on line at
> http://www.idro.com.au/about/default.asp
>
> "Nuclear Security" International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) found on
> line at http://www-ns.iaea.org/security/
>
> Spencer Hsu, " 'Obfuscation' By FEMA Hurt Katrina Victims" *Washington
> Post* page A27 (June 22, 2006).
>
> "My Class Action Lawsuit" Found on line at:
> http://www.classactionamerica.com/affiliates/gm/myclassactionlawsuit.asp?lngCaseID=4482
>
> William C. Nicholson, "The Legal Response to Terrorism: The USA
> PATRIOT Act of 2001 and Civil Rights," *Widener University School of
> Law Alumni Magazine*, Vol. 9 No. 1, pp. 10-13 (Winter 2001).
>
> Kristin S. Nolan, "The USA Patriot Act, Money Laundering, and
> Suspicious Activity Reports from Financial Institutions" Chapter 11 in
> William C. Nicholson, Editor *Homeland Security Law and Policy*,
> Charles C. Thomas Publisher, Ltd., Springfield, IL. (2005).
>
> John Podesta, "USA PATRIOT Act: The Good, the Bad, and the Sunset"
> *Human Rights Magazine,* (Winter 2002).
>
> "Preserving Life and Liberty" U.S. Department of Justice website on
> benefits of USA PATRIOT Act found on line at
> http://www.lifeandliberty.gov/
>
> Sigma Report, *Natural Catastrophes and Man-Made Disasters in 2004,*
> Swiss Re No. 1/2005 (2005).
>
> Sigma Report, *Insurance in Emerging Markets: Focus on Liability
> Developments,* Swiss Re No. 5/2005 (2005).
>
> Sigma Report, *Natural Catastrophes and Man-Made Disasters 2005: High
> Earthquake Casualties, New Dimension in Windstorm Losses,* Swiss Re
> No. 2/2006 (2006).
>
> "Travel and Transportation" *Department of Homeland Security* found on
> line at http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?theme=21
>
> Uniting and Strengthening America By Providing Appropriate Tools
> Required To Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act (USA Patriot Act) of
> 2001 (Pub.L 107-56) on October 26, 2001 text found on line at
> http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=107_cong_public_laws&docid=f:publ056.107.pdf
>
> U.S. Coast Guard, "Maritime Strategy for Homeland Security" (December
> 2002) found on line at
> http://www.uscg.mil/news/reportsandbudget/Maritime_strategy/USCG_Maritme_Strategy.pdf
>
> Joby Warrick, "Libyan Nuclear Devices Missing" *The Washington Post*
> (May 29, 2004).
>
> Liz Pulliam Weston, "Do You Really Need Disaster Insurance?" *MSN
> Money*, Found on line at
> http://moneycentral.msn.com/content/Insurance/Insureyourhome/P59648.asp
>
> Jaquetta White, "Wait Times for Adjusters Can Drag On" *New Orleans
> Times-Picayune* (September 30, 2005).
>
> Margaret Wrightson, "Maritime Security: Progress Made in Implementing
> Maritime Transportation Security Act, but Concerns Remain" United
> States General Accounting Office (September 9, 2003) found on line at
> http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d031155t.pdf#search=\'maritime%20security%20progress\'