**COMMUNITY CAPABILITY BUILDING FOR**

**POST 9-11 TERRORISM PREPAREDNESS:**

**Implications for Professional Education**

**William L. Waugh, Jr.**

**Department of Public Administration and Urban Studies**

**Andrew Young School of Policy Studies**

# Georgia State University

**Atlanta, GA 30303**

The events of September 11^th^, 2001, have changed the profession of
emergency management in many respects. Not least of the changes is the
breadth of hazards that emergency managers are being asked to address.
Concerns about more traditional hazards, e.g., earthquakes, hurricanes,
and floods, are being supplanted by concerns about bio-terrorism,
agri-terrorism, suicide attacks, and other manifestations of terrorist
violence. The potential for terrorists to cause hazardous materials
incidents, structural failures, rail and ship disasters, and a host of
other rather common disasters is also being recognized. There has been a
major shift in policy to address the new threats, to build the
capabilities of communities to mitigate, prepare for, respond to, and,
to a lesser extent, recover from terrorist-spawned disasters. None of
these changes are news. However, it is not too early to begin thinking
about policy priorities when "terrorism amnesia" sets in. Just as
policymakers, the public, and many emergency managers have forgotten or
simply moved beyond disasters like Hurricanes Hugo and Andrew, the Loma
Prieta and Northridge earthquakes, and other catastrophic disasters of
the relatively recent past, we will forget the lessons of September
11^th^ or simply move on to other concerns. A magnitude 8 earthquake in
a heavily populated area of the West Coast or a Force 5 hurricane
striking Miami, New Orleans, or another major coastal city will
certainly cause a rethinking of priorities. "Hurricane amnesia" is a
familiar phenomenon and, despite the horrific nature of the events of
September 11, 2001, there is no reason to think that the threat of
terrorism will remain the focus of public and official attention when
other needs demand action and the World Trade Center memories fade.

To the extent that professional education is driven by policy priorities
and, by extension, funding priorities\-\--or, perhaps more directly, by
career opportunities\-\--the events on September 11^th^ and since have
encouraged professional emergency managers, prospective emergency
managers, emergency responders, and others to develop their own
capabilities to deal with international and domestic terrorism. Training
and education programs focusing on counter-terrorism in particular and
emergency management in general are proliferating as a result. Weapons
of mass destruction (WMD) specialists are being added to staffs as
programs expand. However, integrating the capabilities developed to deal
with the threat of terrorism with those developed to deal with more
familiar natural and technological hazards and disasters will be a real
challenge. Applying the "all hazards" model to the risk posed by
terrorists will be a challenge, but likely necessary to assure that
current capacity building has utility in the future. For communities to
build and maintain terrorism preparedness, they have to have more than
abstract threats on which to focus their efforts. Fortunately,
exercising their capabilities dealing with hazardous materials
accidents, structural failures, epidemics, and other natural and
technological disasters will assure that they are better prepared to
deal with terrorism should it occur in their communities.

First, it must be noted that there are serious concerns that (1) the
terrorism programs will supplant those developed to deal with natural
and technological hazards and that (2) emergency management offices and
agencies will fill with terrorism "experts" with very limited
perspectives on the more certain threats that face American communities
and little understanding of the networks of disaster agencies that can
fulfill important roles. In short, community, as well as regional or
state and federal, capabilities to deal with terrorism may be expanding
at the expense of capabilities to deal with more familiar threats.
Despite the billions of dollars being appropriated for anti- and
counter-terrorism programs, human and financial resources are also being
diverted to support the new programs. Notwithstanding the events of
September 11^th^, the threats of earthquakes in California and the
Pacific Northwest, hurricanes in Florida and elsewhere along the Gulf
and East coasts, floods in dozens of states, and pandemics anywhere in
the U.S. are more immediate and certain than a catastrophic incidence of
terrorism. As offices fill with experts hired to deal with "weapons of
mass destruction" there may be fewer and fewer with expertise relevant
to the more certain disasters. Moreover, the terrorism experts may also
be limited in terms of their own perspectives on the terrorism threat.
Certainly, those experts drawn from national security agencies may be
unfamiliar with first responder issues, those drawn from the military
may be unfamiliar with intergovernmental and inter-sector issues, and
those drawn from industrial security offices may be unfamiliar with the
responsibilities of public officials to the public in a democratic
society. Academic experts may lack an understanding of the more
practical administrative and operational issues. There are also
so-called "experts" with less credible qualifications. The point is that
expertise tends to be very specialized and the task environment requires
a broad perspective.

Second, it must also be noted that the equipment purchased or otherwise
acquired by federal, state, and local agencies, as well as their private
and nonprofit sector partners, may well have a short shelf-life.
Computing equipment, for example, may be outdated in three to five years
and incompatible with new software products. Training, too, may provide
a short-lived capability. Retirements, transfers, and time itself erode
capabilities. Maintaining technological capabilities and training
requires continuous or, at least, frequent infusions of funds. Without
additional funding, the training provided by the federal government to
city emergency responders under the Defense Against Weapons of Mass
Destruction Act (or Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Act) will not be maintained, in
other words. Without stable funding, capability maintenance will be
difficult and uneven. Without a continuing credible threat of terrorist
violence, funding will not be stable\-\--funding will be diverted to
other needs.

What will endure when the current crisis fades? It is most likely that
changes in first responder response protocols will endure because
training programs will perpetuate those changes. It is also likely that
improvements in basic, everyday equipment will endure because agencies
will build those improvements into the specifications provided to
vendors. Mechanisms for coordination and communication will endure to
the extent that training programs reinforce them. And, the people hired
today will likely remain for years (or as long as funding levels
permit). Therefore, it is necessary to examine the qualifications that
new hires bring to the agency and to develop education and training
programs to assure that those qualifications (skills, knowledge, and
abilities) will fit changing needs. Human capital building will require
strategic thinking.

# Professional Education

There is frequently too little differentiation between professional
education and technical training and that problem may be exacerbated by
the proliferation of counter-terrorism programs. Many professional
degree programs offer more training than education. Programs focused on
the "tools" of emergency management or the technical competencies of
emergency responders generally do not offer skills in analysis and
adaptation that are required at the management and executive levels
where plans and policies are adapted to circumstances. As the saying
goes, "when all one has is a hammer, everything looks like a nail."
Problems are redefined to fit the available tools, rather than addressed
more directly and appropriately. Emergency operations become variations
on standard emergency response, rather than pragmatic, flexible
responses to situations. A more "educated" approach is needed,
particularly when events test the limits of current capabilities.
Indeed, the range of disasters that may be perpetrated by terrorists
will require extraordinary adaptability.

To examine how professional education should address the needs of
emergency managers engaged in counter-terrorism programs, as well as
programs designed to address the threats of natural and technological
hazards, the role of the emergency manager should be the focus.
Emergency managers typically become directly involved in managing
hazards and disasters when it is necessary to coordinate
intergovernmental, multi-organizational, and/or inter-sector resources.
Until that time, emergency responders require little assistance. The
structure of incident command facilitates the coordination of
organizational efforts and a unified command structure can be
implemented when the number of organizations exceeds ICS capacities. A
broader approach may be necessary when events get very large, however.
Emergency managers may also become involved in mitigating hazards when a
broader focus would be helpful in order to bring together public,
private, and/or nonprofit organizations and individuals.

Professional education in emergency management has to bridge the gap
between emergency response and public administration. That is, it has to
assure that emergency managers can understand and facilitate emergency
response by fire departments, police departments, emergency medical
services, and public health agencies. Professional education should also
provide a broad understanding of the social, political, legal, and
cultural context within which emergency managers and emergency
responders function. And, lastly, professional education should also be
designed to assure that emergency managers can effectively lead and
manage the programs for which they are responsible. To accomplish all
three tasks, emergency managers have to be literate when it comes to the
response disciplines (so they can be helpful without interfering),
sensitive to the boundaries within which agencies have to operate, and
proficient at those tasks necessary to assure organizational success.
Effective management, including budgeting and financial management,
policy implementation, program analysis and evaluation, and human
resource management, is essential. Strong interpersonal skills are also
essential. How does professional education provide the necessary skills,
knowledge, and abilities for emergency managers, particularly after
September 11^th^?

## Leadership development

There are two major models of professional development in the U.S.
Although a few American communities may still rely on ascriptive means
of choosing leaders, most rely on either a specialist model or a
generalist model for developing or choosing leaders and administrators.
In brief terms, the specialist model, which is perhaps most common in
the U.S., trains entry level employees to be technical specialists, such
as clerical, information technology, and human resource workers. A good
example is the U.S. Army where personnel typically are trained in a
specific branch or military occupation specialty and tend to stay within
that specialty throughout their careers. When Army officers reach a
level at which a broader perspective is needed, they are sent to the
Command and General Staff College and/or to one of the war colleges.
When they reach the rank of brigadier general, they take off their
branch (i.e., specialist) insignia and become, if one can forgive the
pun, generalists. By contrast, the U.S. Navy has historically followed a
more generalist model in which officers are assigned a variety of duties
aboard ship with the expectation that they will have learned a great
deal about the ship and its operation by the time they are chosen to
captain a vessel. Notwithstanding the modern career tracks in aviation
and other occupational specialties, the U.S. Navy model was borrowed
from the British Navy and, in large measure, the model still is used.
Both models typically include supervisory and management training when
personnel reach those levels because those skills may not be acquired on
the job. Some corporations use the specialist model of leadership
development with the accountants and lawyers, rather than production or
service delivery (i.e., line) executives, competing for leadership
positions. Other organizations give preference to other specializations
and expect that executives will have developed a broader perspective by
the time that they reach positions of leadership.

In large measure, police departments, fire departments, and emergency
medical services, and public health departments follow the specialist
pattern. Management or generalist training is sought once an individual
reaches a supervisory or executive level, but professional development
tends to focus on passing through the appropriate gateway experiences,
e.g., from patrol officer to supervisor to shift commander. There may be
some expectation that personnel will have "broadening" experiences, but
professional career tracks typically flow within technical specialties.

How does this translate into emergency management professional
development? For many, the designation of "emergency manager" may be
part of a career track in the fire services. The position may represent
a stepping stone to fire chief, a "broadening experience" in one's
professional development, or even a "blind alley" or "dead end" when it
is not valued by the department. Much the same may be true of the police
services. Just as military officers can find drug interdiction or other
special assignments a diversion, rather than a boon to their promotion
prospects, fire and police officers may find a stint as emergency
manager as a loss of progress toward leadership positions. In
professions in which there is a clearly defined age limit, such as 55
years old, the leaders are those who passed through the ranks quickly
without missing a critical milestone. Extraneous experience is not
valued. What is valued is knowing more about one's own discipline. A
perennial problem is that many professions, including law enforcement
and firefighting and emergency medical services, do not offer a breadth
of experience unless one is in a very large department and can move from
one office or unit to another. Too many people have one year of
experience twenty times over. That is, they are no longer learning
because their responsibilities are so routine that they can be learned
in more or less a year, thus they are simply performing the same job
over and over.

## Training versus education

The professions related to emergency management have very different
professional development models. Some rely upon extensive and intensive
training, some rely primarily upon practical experience with little
formal education or training, and increasing numbers are developing
professional degree programs. Firefighting, for example, is a very
technical discipline. It is not simply "putting the white on the red"
(putting water on fires). The equipment and organizational structure
require considerable training. There are educational programs all the
way to the doctoral level, but most fire departments focus on technical
training. By contrast, the emergency manager generally does not have to
know which foam works best on aircraft fires or how to deal with hazmat
incidents, rather the emergency manager needs to know where extra foam
or equipment can be obtained (or the funding can be secured) so that he
or she can help the fire chief when it is needed. Being literate in
terms of understanding how the fire services deal with fires and
hazardous materials incidents is more important than technical knowledge
because there are technical specialists who can provide that knowledge.
It can be helpful for the emergency manager to anticipate needs, but the
fire chief knows what is needed and can ask for it.

What about emergency managers in small communities where they may be
volunteers or only part-time? They may be local fire or police chiefs or
one of their subordinates. It is unlikely that they will have a
professional staff and it is unlikely that they will have sophisticated
equipment. Fortunately, it may also be unlikely that they will face a
wide range of hazards, but a train derailment or airliner crash or
terrorist incidence can certainly provide unanticipated challenges. In
short, the communities most reliant upon technically trained specialists
may have need for broader perspectives and expertise. To some extent,
city and county administrators who understand the emergency management
function and can facilitate operations may satisfy the need for a broad
perspective and expertise. But, the more realistic option may be broader
training for the fire and police officers that are serving as emergency
managers.

**September 11^th^ and Emergency Management Professional Education**

What has changed since September 11^th^? Again, much has changed in
terms of the programmatic emphases. The federal budget outlay for
counter-terrorism has more than tripled and is projected to expand even
more in FY03. Federal monies are funding equipment, training exercises,
and a plethora of programs designed to increase local and regional
(state) capacities to deal with terrorist threats (rather than simply to
expand federal capabilities). Most of the capacity-building effort has
been in terms of training programs, rather than broader educational
programs dealing with the hazard posed by terrorism and how to manage
it. There are many unresolved technical issues, such as public warning
systems and risk communication, and many unresolved implementation
issues, such as how to train local responders to deal with potential
terrorism-related hazards, particularly bio- and chemical hazards, and
how to maintain capacity over time.

What does an emergency manager need to know about terrorism and how to
deal with it? Is it necessary to understand the phenomenon of terrorism
and the many forms it may take -- or can emergency managers simply to
wait for federal law enforcement officials to declare an incident
"terrorism" and let response plans be activated? Emergency managers may
not know a great deal about the geophysics of earthquakes or the
meteorological aspects of hurricanes. Does that limit their
effectiveness? These are cases in which being technically literate can
enhance effectiveness, but literacy is enough. One does not have to be a
seismologist or meteorologist to understand natural hazards and the
threat they pose to people and property. Nor does one have to be a
terrorism expert in the broad sense. However, knowing that domestic
terrorist organizations have specific capabilities and specific target
preferences can facilitate mitigate and preparedness efforts.
Understanding that efforts to secure buildings or restrain individuals
can run afoul of law, violating civil rights and liberties, can reduce
conflicts with the public (and keep officials out of court).

To be sure, many fire and emergency medical services personnel are being
educated about the response protocols of police and public health
personnel in order to reduce conflicts. Many law enforcement personnel
are also being educated about the response protocols of fire and
emergency medical personnel so that they will not interfere with search
and rescue operations and lifesaving efforts. Preserving life has to be
a priority, but the preservation of evidence is also important. All,
too, have to be aware of public health threats that might result in
casualties among first responders. And, all should understand the
information needs of other responders and of the public if operations
are to be effective. All, too, should understand that consequence
management, i.e., dealing with the effects of terrorist violence, should
begin before an incidence occurs and continue throughout the crisis
management phase rather than after the crisis managers do their jobs. In
short, some breadth of perspective, thinking beyond individual
discipline, is necessary and emergency managers should be able to
facilitate, as well as coordinate, those accommodations. Professional
education should encourage such literacy.

Professional education should also assure that responders and emergency
managers and other officials understand how to function in a democracy.
The relationship between the public and government agencies is much
different than it was ten or twenty years ago. The public increasingly
expects to be involved in policymaking and even some operational
decisionmaking. Gone are the days when responders arrived on the scene,
pushed spectators and the media aside, and refused to discuss what was
happening. It is not just the media that wants information now. Refusing
to provide information because it might precipitate panic is not
justified -- panic is more likely to result from rumors and
misinformation and when people do not understand how to protect
themselves. Communities are remarkably resilient in the face of disaster
when they are informed and know what to do. Public information and
education are more effective responses to dire circumstances.

What about the terrorism specialists themselves? A good place to start
is to be wary of those who offer themselves as terrorism experts. There
are security experts (usually with a focus on industrial security or
military security), bio-terrorism experts (either with a focus on
national security bio-weapon concerns or on more traditional public
health, including agri-terrorism, threats), nuclear terrorism experts
(usually with a focus on nuclear nonproliferation and/or the security of
old Soviet nuclear weapons stockpiles), chemical terrorism experts
(usually with a focus on chemical weapon concerns relative to "rogue
states" or the old Soviet weapons industry or the employment of former
Soviet scientists by "rogue states"), law enforcement terrorism experts
(usually with a focus on special operations or more general police
training, including applying Israeli approaches to the threat of
terrorism in the U.S.), and so on. There are also academic experts,
retired colonels and generals, and a gaggle of consultants offering
training, analyses, and other terrorism-related products. Many, if not
most, of the experts do not have broad enough perspectives to understand
fully the nature of the hazard or the boundaries within which
counter-terrorism programs must operate in a democratic, open society.
The point here is simply that expertise takes many forms and
professional education necessarily should provide a broad perspective on
the hazard posed by terrorism and some appreciation of the orientations
that responders, experts, officials, and others have toward the hazard.
To avoid the "hammer and nail" problem, other tools need to be
available. Better yet, professional education should provide a large
toolbox to assure that there is ample flexibility in dealing with
terrorist-sponsored disasters.

## Conclusions

We can now get back to the models of professional development and how
professional education should contribute. What has been suggested is
that emergency managers come from a wide variety of professional fields
and they bring their own organizational predispositions and policy
preferences to their emergency management offices. Those who have come
from very narrow technical fields, such as one of the emergency response
disciplines, or in one of the specialized terrorism-related
organizations may need to broaden their experience to include the
perspectives and the imperatives of other agencies. Those who have
professional experience in fields unrelated to emergency management may
need to acquire basic knowledge concerning the field and become literate
in terms of the roles of emergency responders. Those with little or no
experience dealing with civilian authorities need to develop an
understanding of intergovernmental relations and administrative law and
a sensitivity to the cultural differences among civilian and military
organizations. When Type A military personnel meet Type B civilian
personnel, personality and cultural conflicts are to be expected.
Similarly, those emergency managers who came from the nonprofit sector,
including the American Red Cross, may need assistance understanding the
organizational cultures and decision making styles of military and law
enforcement agencies in order to interact effectively -- and vice versa.
Large agencies with staffs of planners, communications specialists, and
personnel responsible for functions like mitigation and weapons of mass
destruction have a clear advantage in terms of the available knowledge
base. Most agencies, however, do not have a broad knowledge base unless
they invest heavily in training and professional education.

There are lessons that can be drawn from other professional fields. MBA
programs are increasingly requiring coursework on the social and
political environment of business. Businesses do not act in vacuums and
it is necessary to understand how they interact with government and with
the public at large. Undergraduate accounting programs have been moving
from four-year to five-year programs to assure that students get a
broader education. Some universities are not permitting students to
enroll in business classes until they have completed a liberal arts core
curriculum\-\--until they understand the context of business. The
accrediting body for social work has been discouraging the development
of undergraduate programs in the field, preferring instead that students
get an undergraduate degree in something else and then enroll in a
graduate-level professional program. Similarly, there are few
undergraduate programs in public administration because the expectation
is that student should acquire a broader education before choosing
professional study in the field. Criminal justice programs seem to be
making a clear distinction between undergraduate-level law
enforcement/criminal justice and graduate-level criminology. The
connection between heavily technical associate degree programs and
four-year degree programs is getting more tenuous, as well.

The Certified Emergency Manager program and other certification programs
are raising the bar in terms of the educational foundations of the
field. There is an effort to define the "common body of knowledge" that
should be shared among professional emergency managers. Knowledge and
experience that is restricted to one or a few locales, hazards, and
functions does not demonstrate the breadth that would be expected of a
professional emergency manager. If emergency management follows the
pattern of other professions, in addition to having a clearly
identifiable common body of knowledge there will be increasing
educational requirements. An undergraduate degree requirement is the
first step. A graduate degree requirement will follow as prerequisite to
promotion to supervisory and executive levels. While it would be
ill-advised to pick one professional development model given the variety
of backgrounds that emergency managers bring to the field and to be too
specific in terms of the professional education necessary to enter the
field, there should be some attention to the development of management
competencies and a broadening of professional perspectives as emergency
managers move up their respective career ladders. There should also be
some flexibility to assure that expectations fit the needs of those in
public, nonprofit, and private organizations, as well as the changing
demands of the profession.

Educational programs also should include issues of ethics and democratic
governance. Part of the reason for MBA and MPA programs including
coursework on the social and political context of business and
government is that the relationship between public, private, and
nonprofit organizations and the public is changing. It is more and more
difficult for organizations to ignore the public's interest in knowing
what is going on and even participating in decision making. Public
participation has a profound impact on decision making processes and,
while it can be time-consuming and can cause conflicts, it can result in
better decisions. Public participation can encourage consensus-building,
expand the range of solutions considered, and encourage support for
policies and programs. It can also create serious problems if not
handled well. To the extent that public organizations are expected to be
open to public participation, skills in interacting with the public are
essential. To the extent that private and nonprofit organizations are
increasingly involved in public programs or, at least, programs that
affect the public, those skills are also necessary. Tolerance of
agencies that fail to involve the public in their decision processes is
shrinking. Even national security and law enforcement agencies are
finding it more difficult to ignore the public's need to know and desire
to know, as well as its right to know, what is going on and what they
are doing about it. This is not the same world that it was fifty or even
ten years ago. Thus, the social and political context of emergency
management is all the more important.

To the extent that Homeland Security programs are encouraging capacity
building at the local level, communities are expanding their
capabilities to deal with terrorism. They may also be diverting
resources from other programs and building capabilities that have
limited applicability to more traditional hazards. Assuring that
communities maintain and expand their capabilities to deal with
disasters of all types will require investments in human resource
development, as well as the adoption of multi-hazard response protocols
and the purchase of dual use equipment. Technical skills are important,
but education to broaden perspectives will be critical.