**[Before the\
National Telecommunications and Information Administration U.S.
Department of Commerce\
Washington, DC 20230]{.smallcaps}**

+-----------------------------------+---+--------------------------------+
| In the Matter of                  | ) | Docket No. 040127027-4027-01   |
|                                   |   |                                |
| United States Spectrum Management | ) |                                |
| Policy for the 21^st^ Century     |   |                                |
|                                   | ) |                                |
|                                   |   |                                |
|                                   | ) |                                |
+-----------------------------------+---+--------------------------------+

COMMENTS OF LOCKHEED MARTIN corporation

> **[Lockheed Martin Corporation]{.smallcaps}**
>
> Jennifer A. Warren
>
> Senior Director
>
> Trade & Regulatory Affairs
>
> 1725 Jefferson Davis Highway
>
> Crystal Square 2, Suite 403
>
> Arlington, VA 22202
>
> \(703\) 413-5790

March 18, 2004

TABLE OF CONTENTS

[I. INTRODUCTION and Background 1](#__RefHeading___Toc67402097)

[II. THE GOVERNMENT CAN TAKE meaningful STEPS TO Facilitate A MODERNIZED
AND IMPROVED U.S. SPECTRUM MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
3](#__RefHeading___Toc67402098)

[A. Spectrum Management Organization 3](#__RefHeading___Toc67402099)

[B. Spectrum Planning 6](#__RefHeading___Toc67402100)

[C. Exclusive Government Frequency Allocations and Interoperability
7](#__RefHeading___Toc67402101)

[D. U.S. Tables of Frequency Allocations 8](#__RefHeading___Toc67402102)

[E. Frequency Coordination 9](#__RefHeading___Toc67402103)

[III. The united states must continue to serve an active role in
international spectrum policy fora 9](#__RefHeading___Toc67402104)

[IV. the government must take into account public benefits in any
consideration of "efficient use of spectrum"
12](#__RefHeading___Toc67402105)

[V. a rational spectrum management process must recognize the rights and
reasonable expectations of existing users
16](#__RefHeading___Toc67402106)

[VI. Conclusion 17](#__RefHeading___Toc67402107)

**[Before the\
National Telecommunications and Information Administration U.S.
Department of Commerce\
Washington, DC 20230]{.smallcaps}**

+-----------------------------------+---+--------------------------------+
| In the Matter of                  | ) | Docket No. 040127027-4027-01   |
|                                   |   |                                |
| United States Spectrum Management | ) |                                |
| Policy for the 21^st^ Century     |   |                                |
|                                   | ) |                                |
|                                   |   |                                |
|                                   | ) |                                |
+-----------------------------------+---+--------------------------------+

COMMENTS OF LOCKHEED MARTIN corporation

Lockheed Martin Corporation ("Lockheed Martin") hereby responds to the
National Telecommunications and Information Administration's ("NTIA")
Notice of Inquiry ("*NOI*") regarding U.S. spectrum management policy
for the 21^st^ Century.[^1]

I.  []{#__RefHeading___Toc67402097 .anchor}INTRODUCTION and Background

On May 29, 2003, President George W. Bush issued an Executive Memorandum
announcing the Administration's commitment to develop and implement a
comprehensive U.S. spectrum management policy for the 21^st^ Century.
[^2] The President directed the Secretary of Commerce to develop
recommendations, and Lockheed Martin commends the Department of
Commerce, and NTIA in particular, for working to fulfill the President's
commitment to a modernized U.S. Spectrum Policy. This *NOI* is an
important step in this process. The *NOI* brings to the fore a wide
range of issues that affect all users and beneficiaries of
spectrum-based technologies -- whether Federal or non-Federal, civilian
or military, commercial or non-commercial, terrestrial or satellite,
domestic or international.

Lockheed Martin is participating in this proceeding as a global
enterprise principally engaged in the research, design, development,
manufacture and integration of advanced-technology systems, products and
services for both commercial and government customers worldwide. The
corporation has extensive experience in working with NTIA and Government
agencies on spectrum matters related to civilian and military Government
systems. Lockheed Martin has also worked extensively with NTIA and the
Interdepartment Radio Advisory Committee ("IRAC") process to obtain
authorizations for devices and systems that require U.S. Government
coordination. In addition, Lockheed Martin holds approximately 400
licenses and authorizations issued by the Federal Communications
Commission ("FCC"), including: (1) experimental licenses to support
research and development of advanced technology products and services;
(2) industrial private land mobile authorizations that enable Lockheed
Martin to self-provide critical internal communications on a secure,
reliable basis in support of manufacturing plants and other facilities;
(3) numerous earth station authorizations to perform telemetry, testing
and communications functions and in-orbit transfers, and to provide
satellite communications services to both civil and military customers
worldwide; and (4) a space station authorization for the MARISAT
satellite system. Lockheed Martin also has pending before the FCC a
satellite application to provide a commercial space-based
radionavigation service in support of the Federal Aviation
Administration's Wide Area Augmentation System ("WAAS") Geostationary
Command and Control Segment ("GCCS").

Access to spectrum, including globally coordinated spectrum, whether it
be in the UHF, VHF, C-band, X-band, Ku-band, S-band, L-band, Ka-band or
higher, is an integral and necessary pre-requisite to many of Lockheed
Martin's products, systems and services -- whether they are intended for
Government or non-Government uses.

II. []{#__RefHeading___Toc67402098 .anchor}THE GOVERNMENT CAN TAKE
    meaningful STEPS TO Facilitate A MODERNIZED AND IMPROVED U.S.
    SPECTRUM MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

    A.  []{#__RefHeading___Toc67402099 .anchor}Spectrum Management
        Organization

The *NOI* notes the bifurcated spectrum management system currently in
place in the United States and seeks comment on whether the nation would
be better served by a centralized organization responsible for both
Government and non-Government spectrum matters.[^3] Lockheed Martin does
not propose any structural recommendations with respect to the U.S.
Government's organization of spectrum management activities. To the
extent NTIA is examining alternative spectrum management approaches,
however, one model to consider is a bifurcated structure in which a
single agency would be responsible for U.S. spectrum allocation --
accounting for both Government and non-Government spectrum needs -- and
a separate organization(s) would be responsible for spectrum assignment
duties. A unified allocation process can readily account for the needs
and opportunities of both Federal and non-Federal users, while a
bifurcated organizational structure based upon spectrum management
function -- rather than spectrum user -- could be a more efficient and
rational approach, as described below.

In its purest form, the allocation process sets spectrum priorities and
identifies categories of services within specific spectrum bands. Today,
however, the licensing process -- a distinct downstream component of
spectrum management -- can affect spectrum allocation decisions.
Licensing schemes, auction revenues, and distributional effects hold the
potential to impact allocation decisions. Given the critical importance
of spectrum-based services to the nation's economic and security
interests, the Government could establish an agency in the Executive
Office of the President solely responsible for U.S. spectrum allocation
decisions, leaving spectrum assignment duties in the hands of the FCC
and NTIA.

Putting aside such far-reaching modifications, Lockheed Martin urges
NTIA to recommend adoption of more specific and immediate ways to
improve the U.S. Government's existing approach to spectrum management.
In particular, Lockheed Martin suggests that NTIA -- through its role as
the leader of the IRAC -- place additional emphasis on managing the
interplay between Government and non-Government spectrum interests.
Lockheed Martin identifies below two specific examples -- one each from
the commercial and Government user perspective. First, NTIA, working
with the FCC, should strive to make the IRAC-FCC license coordination
processes as transparent as possible. In addition, NTIA should ensure
that the Office of Spectrum Management and the IRAC have the clear
jurisdiction to protect users in exclusive Government spectrum from
harmful out-of-band-emissions.

With regard to the commercial example, Lockheed Martin notes that
approximately 63 percent of the spectrum from 0 to 3 GHz is subject to a
shared Government/non-Government allocation, which NTIA and the FCC
jointly oversee.[^4] If a commercial entity seeks authority to use
shared Government/Non-Government spectrum, the FCC forwards the
application to the IRAC for review. If the IRAC review process
identifies interference concerns, IRAC may send questions back to the
FCC -- but notice of this correspondence is not a matter of public
record and the commercial applicant has no way of tracking the status of
its application, let alone the underlying concerns expressed in the IRAC
process. At times, it is difficult to determine where an application is
between the FCC and NTIA, through no fault of either agency's staff --
simply the process is not designed to afford transparency to many even
within the respective agencies. NTIA, in conjunction with the FCC,
should seek ways to enhance the IRAC-FCC coordination process to provide
transparency to the applicants and to improve efficiencies in the
licensing/coordination process. For example, the IRAC and the FCC could
agree to enable applicants to track via the FCC website where an
application is, whether questions have been sent to the FCC by the IRAC,
whether those questions remain open and pending, and whether they have
been communicated to the applicant or responded to. This will allow the
applicant to shoulder some of the burden for addressing technical/policy
issues that may arise in using shared spectrum. NTIA is currently
establishing a web-based mechanism to facilitate the coordination of
Federal and non-Federal operations in the 70, 80, 90 GHz bands; as
experience is gained, this approach could be extended to more intensely
utilized spectrum bands.[^5]

Separately, the Administration should clarify the appropriate structure
for regulatory review of out-of-band-emissions that have the potential
to affect Government systems operating in exclusive Government spectrum.
Today, questions remain regarding which Governmental entity has
jurisdiction to assess whether and to what extent a commercial
applicant's out-of-band emissions would be harmful to users of exclusive
Government spectrum. Given the mission critical nature of many uses that
operate in exclusive Government spectrum, Lockheed Martin believes that
the national interest is best served by ensuring that the Office of
Spectrum Management and the IRAC have the absolute jurisdiction over
determinations of potential interference from out-of-band interference
into exclusive Federal government use spectrum.

B.  []{#__RefHeading___Toc67402100 .anchor}Spectrum Planning

The *NOI* seeks comment on the nature and scope of U.S. spectrum
planning activities.[^6] As a threshold matter, U.S. Government spectrum
planning must: (i) account for and be responsive to the changing needs
of Federal users; and (ii) keep pace with the innovation and dynamic
change occurring in spectrum-based technologies. Simply put, effective
spectrum planning must go far beyond the allocation planning function.
It must seek out developments in new technology and understand their
implications; it must consider users' new and ongoing spectrum needs;
and ideally, it must lay the foundation for further innovation.

To accomplish these goals, Lockheed Martin urges NTIA to expand ways for
Federal users to participate in the planning process. They are on the
front lines of operations and offer an unrivaled resource for assessing
the spectrum needs of the future devices, systems and platforms that the
U.S. Government will deploy. Further, they have the complicated and
lengthy, but critical, mission responsibility of meshing those needs
into the Federal procurement processes.

To spur new means to address Federal user needs, Lockheed Martin
proposes that the Government identify specific "spectrum test beds" that
would allow Federal users to experiment with innovative new
spectrum-based technologies. This approach would foster research and
development dedicated to serving the needs of Government with innovative
solutions.

C.  []{#__RefHeading___Toc67402101 .anchor}Exclusive Government
    Frequency Allocations and Interoperability

The *NOI* seeks comment on the merits of retaining exclusive allocations
for Government and non-Government uses.[^7] Lockheed Martin firmly
supports the existing allocation arrangement, especially in connection
with exclusive Government spectrum. As network-centric warfare
capabilities and information superiority have emerged as key to U.S.
successes, it goes without saying that spectrum-dependent technology is
an element of our national defense and homeland security. The mission
critical nature of many Federal spectrum-dependent operations demands
that the U.S. Government have exclusive control in those frequency bands
to guarantee effective access for such systems and services.

Lockheed Martin nevertheless believes the Government should continue its
willingness to support sharing possibilities *where appropriate*. Public
safety interoperability, for example, is a prime example of where
sharing opportunities could prove especially useful. The FCC recently
gave its approval to a unique partnership among Federal, state, and
local governments in Alaska to create a statewide public safety VHF
trunking system using both Government and non-Government spectrum.[^8]
The system will provide for enhanced interoperability and improved
public safety responsiveness by all participating agencies. The
Government should continue to support this type of voluntary partnering
and should consider whether other spectrum bands, including the 700 MHz
public safety band, constitute appropriate frequencies for similar
Government/non-Government partnerships.

The Government should consider additional ways to support agencies
interested in pursuing such *voluntary* partnerships to improve
interoperable communications, thus enhancing spectrum use. Federal
agencies, for example, that manage particular channels and/or
frequencies for their own intermittent, but necessary, uses may wish to
consider the potential of leasing arrangements that would expand
spectrum use opportunities while ensuring that the agency retains access
to the spectrum on a preemptible basis.

D.  []{#__RefHeading___Toc67402102 .anchor}U.S. Tables of Frequency
    Allocations

The *NOI* observes that NTIA and the FCC publish versions of the U.S.
Table of Frequency Allocations that "differ in several ways."[^9] The
conflicting tables create unnecessary hardships for manufacturers and
commercial users seeking to develop systems in accord with U.S. spectrum
allocations. While the *NOI* asks whether the Government should
"replac\[e\] the existing tables with a single national policy
document,"[^10] Lockheed Martin respectfully submits that a more
practical and effective solution would be to produce a harmonized
allocation table, not a new policy document.

E.  []{#__RefHeading___Toc67402103 .anchor}Frequency Coordination

The *NOI* also seeks comment on whether the FCC's frequency coordination
management tool should be expanded to other bands and services.[^11]
Private bodies such as frequency coordinators have proven enormously
useful in facilitating the FCC's administrative process under a mounting
workload. The Government, for example, should consider fostering
frequency coordinators where new operators enter a band and are
responsible for sharing spectrum or relocating hundreds or thousands of
licensed entities. Lockheed Martin, however, is reluctant to suggest
that frequency coordinators would be effective in the
satellite-to-satellite coordination context. Given the relatively small
number of satellite players and the history of successful intersystem
coordination in the industry, the imposition of a frequency coordinator
is unwarranted and would add an unnecessary layer to the coordination
process.

III. []{#__RefHeading___Toc67402104 .anchor}The united states must
     continue to serve an active role in international spectrum policy
     fora

The *NOI* notes the Department of State's role as lead U.S. negotiator
in bilateral and multilateral discussions regarding numerous
communications policy issues including spectrum allocations. It seeks
comment on improving the U.S. national process from preparation through
implementation.[^12]

By way of background, in recent years a strong and stable U.S. presence
in the international spectrum arena has become increasingly important as
regional bodies from across the world have demonstrated greater interest
in spectrum matters. The Government must be vigilant in ensuring that
the interests of the U.S. Government, U.S. industry, U.S. consumers, and
U.S. competitors are served -- and not adversely affected -- in the
international spectrum fora.

The Department of State's Office of International Communication and
Information Policy ("CIP") serves a critical function in U.S.
negotiations on spectrum issues, providing continuity of relationships
with foreign governments in bilateral, regional and multilateral arenas.
Department of State leadership in these intergovernmental discussions
also ensures consistency with U.S. foreign policy in the management of
those governmental relationships. Finally, the Department of State's
CIP, through its own technical and policy staff, plays an essential
arbiter role that no Government agency with parochial spectrum
interests, including NTIA and the FCC, could.

In addition, as a general matter domestic U.S. spectrum management and
related policy decisions cannot be made in a vacuum; rather, such
decisions need to take into account the international table of frequency
allocations in order to maintain existing and obtain, where possible,
new harmonized international spectrum allocations. Moreover, the U.S.
Government needs to take into account the need for some consistency in
its own approach to specific spectrum bands, and avoid the missteps of
the past -- obtaining a global spectrum allocation at an ITU World
Radiocommunication Conference ("WRC") for one service, and then
returning home and reallocating a portion that same spectrum
domestically for another service -- before even the next WRC. While
offering a range of benefits for all spectrum-based service providers
and manufacturers, international spectrum harmonization is far more than
a benefit to the satellite industry. It is critical to the overall
viability of the international and global satellite industry, as well as
to its unique strengths of providing universal global access to
connectivity on a distance insensitive basis.

Lockheed Martin also wishes to emphasize the importance of timely
domestic implementation of WRC spectrum allocation decisions. As
recognized by this Administration and the FCC, timely implementation is
of critical importance to all of the affected interests -- manufacturers
and service providers, Government and commercial users alike. The
satellite industry may be particularly affected by this because of the
intersection between international treaty obligations to which U.S.
satellite companies (and Government operators) are subject (*i.e*., to
make an ITU filing to reserve a place in the "priority queue") and the
FCC's new space station licensing rules which prohibit the acceptance of
a space station application (and the associated ITU filing) until there
is a domestic allocation in place. Regulatory delays in even initiating
relevant domestic implementation proceedings represent significant
opportunity costs for the U.S. satellite industry vis-à-vis competitors
who may file first at the ITU, and delay the opportunity for rollout of
new advanced services and technology to consumers. In addition, timely
implementation of allocation decisions of primary interest to the
Government is also significant. Both Federal agencies and industry spend
significant human and financial resources to obtain particular results
at the WRC; ensuring timely implementation of those results is only
appropriate.

Lockheed Martin commends both NTIA and the FCC for the timely WRC-03
follow-up implementation plan -- an important change from the
significant delay (*i.e*., years) that has historically occurred between
prior WRCs' adoption of international spectrum allocations and
Government implementation of same. Lockheed Martin suggests that the
Government adopt a policy to ensure that last year's timely
implementation plan becomes the guidance for the future if not the
standard. Specifically, the Government should establish that proceedings
to implement WRC spectrum allocation decisions are initiated within four
months of the close of each WRC and are concluded generally within a
year.

IV. []{#__RefHeading___Toc67402105 .anchor}the government must take into
    account public benefits in any consideration of "efficient use of
    spectrum"

The *NOI* solicits comment on the appropriate definition of efficient
use of spectrum and seeks to identify incentives for more efficient and
beneficial use of spectrum.[^13] The *NOI* identifies three ways to
measure efficiency in spectrum use -- technical efficiency (*e.g.,*
bandwidth, frequency reuse, geographic coverage), economic efficiency
(*e.g.,* revenue, profit, added value) and functional efficiency
(*e.g.,* reliability, quality, ease of use).[^14] Lockheed Martin
respectfully submits that Government spectrum use cannot easily be
translated into traditional metrics for spectrum use.

Spectrum-dependant Government operations are vital to many of our
national interests -- serving national security, safeguarding property
and life, furthering crime prevention, and supporting national and
international transportation (by land, sea, air, and space), to name a
few. Supporting these national interests result in "public benefits";
these benefits are not quantifiable as consumer benefits, such as
willingness to pay, or technical efficiency, such as a
bits-per-hertz-per-second value.

Instead, the Government must consider the *effectiveness* of Government
operations -- taking into account the purpose they serve and the
necessary reliability. For example, the Government uses radar systems
for national security purposes -- to detect, for example, incoming
missiles and ensure countermeasures. These operations are, by their
nature, passive and under traditional metrics might not be deemed
"efficient." They, nonetheless, serve critical U.S. national security
interests. While it is appropriate to confirm periodically the
justification for Government spectrum use, the benefits derived are
often qualitative in nature and do not lend themselves to quantitative
metrics.

The *NOI* also seeks comment on the imposition of spectrum fees "to
reflect the opportunity cost of the spectrum resource."[^15] Government
should, of course, endeavor to use technology that is technically
efficient -- and Lockheed Martin is working with Government agencies to
do just that. But Lockheed Martin does not believe that spectrum fees
would create appropriate incentives for more beneficial Government
spectrum use. Spectrum fees would only result in a circular budgetary
approach -- with agencies seeking Government appropriations to then
submit to the Treasury -- and would only serve to constrain
spectrum-dependant Government operations *with no real correlation to
purpose or worthiness of spectrum-based operations*. Further, in
response to the *NOI's* questions regarding OMB efforts to value
Government spectrum, Lockheed Martin is concerned that such actions will
serve to restrict Government systems absent any assessment of the public
benefits derived from the these operations.

In addition, Lockheed Martin notes for this proceeding a very key
congressional mandate that should be recognized for its meaningful
contribution to the health and success of the U.S. satellite industry.
In March 2000, Congress adopted the Open-Market Reorganization for the
Betterment of International Telecommunications Act of 2000 (the "ORBIT
Act") and exempted satellite spectrum for international and global
satellite systems from the FCC\'s auction authority for specific, sound
public policy reasons which are even more valid today.[^16]

The legislative history of this provision makes clear that Congress was
concerned that if the FCC auctioned international spectrum and
associated orbit slots, it would "open\[\] the door and
allow\[\]countries around the globe to conduct such auctions" resulting
in "a dramatic, negative impact upon the development of global
competition in the industry."[^17] The FCC also concurred with this
assessment, concluding that auctioning spectrum for satellite services
"opens the possibility of a hold up by some later country that is the
vital final piece, \[which\] sets auction terms that are unfair and
capricious and thus lead\[\] to distortions in the marketplace."[^18]
The fact remains that the domestic and international financial and
business repercussions and uncertainties associated with global and
international satellite spectrum auctions could undermine the leadership
of the United States in the satellite field. Moreover, the current
approach has enabled the development and deployment of an overall
successful, state of the art satellite industry. Lockheed Martin
believes that subjecting such enterprises to the uncertainties of an
auction dynamic -- whether sequential or global -- could seriously
jeopardize continued commercial research and development in the higher
spectrum bands, as well as curtail current plans for investment in and
expansion of such satellite systems.

For many of the same public policy reasons, the Administration should be
cautious about the ramifications of any agency proposal to impose on
international or global satellite systems any spectrum usage fees that
are not attributable to direct administrative costs.[^19] As a spectrum
management tool, spectrum fees pose significant risks without any
obvious countervailing public policy benefits.

V.  []{#__RefHeading___Toc67402106 .anchor}a rational spectrum
    management process must recognize the rights and reasonable
    expectations of existing users

The President's Executive Memorandum directed the Secretary of Commerce
to identify recommendations regarding, *inter alia,* greater
predictability in the spectrum management process as it relates to
existing users.[^20] Lockheed Martin urges NTIA to offer firm
recommendations in the areas of interference protection and existing
users' authorized rights.

As innovation in spectrum-based technologies continues to expand and
demand for spectrum-based services continues to grow, the Government
naturally is looking at ways to introduce new services or users in
currently authorized spectrum. The Government, however, must maintain
constant vigilance to ensure that the availability and reliability of
existing licensed services will not be diminished due to increases in
the noise floor and the diversion of limited resources to interference
mitigation.

For example, the FCC has initiated a proceeding to consider the
"interference temperature" concept, a proposal that would permit
unlicensed operations below a certain interference level in spectrum
previously awarded on an exclusive use basis. Rather than ensuring
authorized users' rights to make the highest and best use of the
spectrum, sharing concepts like the interference temperature proposal
threaten to degrade the performance of currently deployed systems and
may in fact make future systems more costly, or inhibit the deployment
of advances in technologies by incumbent services in those bands subject
to an interference temperature.

Lockheed Martin urges NTIA to adopt a policy that new entrants seeking
to share spectrum with existing providers authorized on an exclusive use
or primary basis bear the burden of demonstrating that their operations
would not cause harmful interference. To that end, the Government should
consider a program of private interference labs to assist with
state-of-the-art modeling and simulation capabilities to test the impact
of proposed operations on existing providers. These private labs, like
the FCC's private equipment certification bodies, would be required to
operate in accordance with standards established by the Government.

VI. []{#__RefHeading___Toc67402107 .anchor}Conclusion

Lockheed Martin again applauds NTIA and the other Federal agencies for
their efforts to modernize and improve the U.S. Spectrum Management
Policy for the 21^st^ Century. Lockheed Martin urges NTIA to adopt as
recommendations the proposals identified herein.

> Respectfully submitted,
>
> **[Lockheed Martin Corporation]{.smallcaps}**
>
> By: [   /s/ Jennifer A. Warren                    ]{.underline}
>
> Jennifer A. Warren
>
> Senior Director
>
> Trade & Regulatory Affairs
>
> 1725 Jefferson Davis Highway
>
> Crystal Square 2, Suite 403
>
> Arlington, VA 22202
>
> \(703\) 413-5790

March 18, 2004

[^1]: *See United States Spectrum Management Policy for the 21^st^
    Century*, Notice of Inquiry*,* Docket No. 040127027-4027-01, 69 Fed.
    Reg. 4925 (Feb. 2, 2004).

[^2]: *See Spectrum Policy for the 21^st^ Century,* Memorandum for the
    Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, 69 Fed. Reg. 1568 (Jan.
    9, 2004) ("Executive Memorandum").

[^3]: *See NOI,* 69 Fed. Reg. at 4924.

[^4]: *See* NTIA, *Myths vs. Reality,* available at
    http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/myths.html.

[^5]: NTIA initiated this program consistent with an agreement made as
    part of a recent FCC proceeding. *See Allocations and Service Rules
    for the 71-76 GHz, 81-86 GHz and 92-95 GHz Bands, Report and Order,*
    WT Docket No. 02-146 (rel. Nov. 4, 2003). The program is intended to
    allow non-Government users to use a website to determine whether
    they have any potential conflict with Government users. The website
    will keep non-Government applicants apprised of the status of their
    applications, including whether the application has been submitted
    to the IRAC, whether the IRAC has completed its review, and the
    result. *See \<*http://ntiacsd.ntia.doc.gov/webcoord/status.cfm\>.

[^6]: *See NOI,* 69 Fed. Reg. at 4925.

[^7]: *See id*. at 4924.

[^8]: *See* State of Alaska, *Memorandum Opinion and Order,* DA 03-2612
    (rel. Aug. 7, 2003).

[^9]: *NOI*, 69 Fed. Reg. at 4924.

[^10]: *Id.*

[^11]: *Id.* at 4924-25.

[^12]: *Id.* at 4925.

[^13]: *Id.*

[^14]: *Id.*

[^15]: *Id.*

[^16]: Section 647 of the ORBIT Act provides, "Notwithstanding any other
    provision of law, the Commission shall not have the authority to
    assign by competitive bidding orbital location or spectrum used for
    the provision of international or global satellite communications
    services." ORBIT Act, § 647, 114 Stat. at 57 (*codified at* 47
    U.S.C. § 765(f)).

[^17]: *See* Hearings on Satellites and the Telecommunications Act
    Before the Senate Commerce, Science and Transportation Subcomm. on
    Communications, 105^th^ Cong. (Jul. 30, 1997) (Statement of Chairman
    Conrad Burns), *referenced in* S. 376 Report, S. Rep. No. 106-100
    (Jun. 30, 1999).

[^18]: *Id*. (Statement of Peter Cowhey, Chief, FCC International
    Bureau).

[^19]: Even fees for administrative costs carry some real global risks
    for the U.S. satellite industry; to wit, the ITU is already seeking
    ways to impose higher and higher fees on commercial and Federal
    satellite systems. Due to its worldwide leadership and success, the
    U.S. satellite industry would bear the disproportionate burden of
    ITU cost recovery fees, potentially impacting plans for further
    investment and development. Lockheed Martin urges the Administration
    to take the necessary steps to ensure that the U.S. satellite
    industry is not forced to subsidize other ITU activities at the
    upcoming ITU Council meeting in June 2004.

[^20]: *See* Executive Memorandum, Sec. 2(b).