European Perspectives on Security -- Lessons of the Conflicts in the
Balkans, the Middle East and Africa

**Dr. Andrea Ellner**

**Lecturer in International Relations**

**Acting Director, Graduate Institute of Political and International
Studies (GIPIS), University of Reading, UK**

**and Centre for International Security and Defence Studies, UK**

**May 2004**

**The views expressed in this and other papers associated with the NIC
2020 project**

**are those of individual participants. They are posted for discussion
purposes**

**only and do not represent the views of the US Government.**

European Perspectives on Security -- Lessons of the Conflicts in the
Balkans, the Middle East and Africa

**Dr. Andrea Ellner**

**Lecturer in International Relations**

**Acting Director, Graduate Institute of Political and International
Studies (GIPIS), University of Reading, UK**

**and Centre for International Security and Defence Studies, UK**

**May 2004**

**Paper prepared for the Conference on the "Changing Nature of Warfare",
in support of the "Global Trends 2020" Project of the U.S. National
Intelligence Council**

**Framing the Question**

Answering the question which political and strategic lessons the
Europeans learnt from their involvement in conflicts in the Balkans, the
Middle East and in Africa and how these are shaping their expectation of
future developments in their and global security is not a
straightforward task. The operations concerned took place in a variety
of different frameworks, national, under NATO, more recently, the
European Union (EU) or as part of a 'coalition of the willing' and the
United Nations (UN). In each context, both the contributing nations as
well as the umbrella organisation learnt lessons and one could argue
that each case yielded specific lessons that are not always transferable
to other conflicts or operations. In many cases the lessons are still
being learnt, not least because the peace support operations and
reconstruction are still ongoing.

Yet, these are not the only problems in answering the question. Lessons
learnt in past operations are not confined to the operational
engagements themselves. Apart from affecting plans for developing
national capabilities, there was also reflection on the relationship
between allies within or apart from the EU and NATO, at the level of
both regional organisations and on the relationship between individual
member states and the two organisations with the UN. It is, however,
safe to say that perhaps the most important lesson the Europeans learnt
from their operations is, that military intervention is usually followed
by a sustained period of political, economic and social instability
whose resolution demands a highly complex mix of military, diplomatic,
humanitarian and economic approaches and substantial long-term
commitment. This is the case for individual European states as well as
the EU and NATO. Yet, this essay focuses on developments at EU level for
three reasons:

One, the EU has hit a very steep learning curve over the past decade,
which is currently generating a significant dynamic. In December 2003
the Council published the EU's first strategy paper. It can be seen as
an interim consolidation of a process that had begun in the wake of the
EU's critical self-reflection on its performance over the break-up of
Yugoslavia, a response to the lack of consensus within the EU and
transatlantic relations over Iraq and a framework for future approaches
to regional and global security. Two, without significant input from
member states these developments would not have been possible and many
of the lessons learnt from 'national initiatives' are relevant to the
EU's thinking about its future security. Hence, some national lessons
will be examined, but as far as possible through the prism of the EU.
This allows a assessing some general principles of 'European' security
policies with due regard to the potential impact of national experiences
or preferences and the role of the EU and NATO (and the relationship
between them) in the implementation of these principles.

Three, the EU is very much aware of the problems it is and will be
encountering in implementing the security strategy it has only just
devised. However, not only does the nature of the main security
challenges require international co-operation or co-ordination, at a
purely European level no state can attempt to meet them with national
resources alone. It is this realisation of the need to work together -
in the EU, NATO and with the US and other allies - which has provided
the impetus for the quite dynamic developments in the past decade. The
future of EU security co-operation is somewhat uncertain, as enlargement
is very likely to change the internal dynamics of negotiating agreement
on policies but, although this may slow developments down, ultimately
there is a strong rationale for working towards further cohesion - the
EU is contributing to the stability of the continent through increasing
its membership and preparing further enlargement. As the experience in
the Balkans has shown, the latter cannot always only be accomplished
through negotiation, but has involved, and will do so in the foreseeable
future, a strong commitment to providing security and rebuilding
societies that are officially, though not always factually, in a
post-conflict phase. For this reason alone, the EU has a stronger
incentive than ever to create the capacity to perform political and
military tasks, which it did not have to conduct during the Cold War.

**Towards a Common Security Strategy**

The conflicts in the Balkans had a significant impact on the EU. It was
the critical reflection on their performance during the break-up of
Yugoslavia that triggered the St Malo process in 1998, when the UK and
France took the lead in promoting a viable Common Foreign and Security
Policy (CFSP), including the provision of military capabilities, which
had led a rather dormant life since its inception with the Maastricht
Treaty. The serious inner-European and transatlantic rift over the war
on Iraq gave the EU's approach to security another jolt. At the
Thessaloniki European Council in June 2003 the EU's Special
Representative for CFSP, Javier Solana, proposed strategy papers on
security and WMD proliferation respectively.[^1] Both documents were
adopted officially as 'A Secure Europe in a Better World -- European
Security Strategy' and 'Fight Against the Proliferation of Weapons of
Mass Destruction -- EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass
Destruction' in December 2003.[^2] The EU's new security strategy has
three central characteristics, which also form the background to the
Non-Proliferation Strategy as it is essentially an elaboration of one
aspect of the former:

One, the security strategy conceptualises future security challenges as
negative effects of globalisation and is deeply wedded to the concepts
of 'human security' and 'global common goods', which must be protected
or enhanced through a mix of political, economic and, if necessary,
military means (in line with the Petersberg Tasks). The latter are seen
as important, but as a last resort rather than a primary tool in
protecting security now or in future. Two, unsurprisingly since the EU
has itself grown from multilateral co-operation, both strategies
strongly emphasise multilateral co-operation with and within both
international organisations, especially the UN, the WTO or the IAEA, in
conjunction with NATO and individual allies, especially the US, but also
Russia. Significantly, the transatlantic relationship is identified as a
core element of the international system, which is not only in the EU's
"bilateral interest but strengthens the international community as a
whole".[^3] Three, the security strategy defines three concentric rings
of concern: the EU area, its immediate neighbourhood and the wider
world.

It identifies as main challenges for the future: development and
security as its precondition, global environmental and health risks,
competition for natural resources, especially water, and Europe's
dependence on energy imports, which it expects to rise from 50% today to
70% of total energy consumption in 2030, from mainly the Gulf, Russia
and North Africa. Explicitly defined key threats are terrorism (for
which Europe is a target and a base), the proliferation WMD (by both
state and non-state actors) with the possibility of an arms race in the
Middle East, regional conflicts that may escalate or lead to state
failure, state failure (potentially associated with terrorism and
organised crime) and organised crime (especially cross-border
trafficking in drugs, women, weapons and illegal migrants) that may have
links with terrorism. The threat assessment concludes: "Taking these
different elements together -- terrorism committed to maximum violence,
the availability of weapons of mass destruction, organised crime, the
weakening of the state system and the privatisation of force -- we could
be confronted with a very radical threat indeed."[^4]

The policy implications envisaged are broadly to be more active (not
only in pursuing the EU's strategic objectives, but also in conflict
prevention); more capable (in conducting military operations and
eventually a wider spectrum of missions, such as joint disarmament
operations or security sector reform, intelligence sharing and working
with NATO); and more coherent (in bringing together EU assistance and
development programmes or military and civilian assets of member states,
co-ordinate external policies with Justices and Home Affairs). The
strategy paper suggests that the EU should play a more active role in
the Southern Caucasus, which will "in due course also be a neighbouring
region", an implicit acknowledgement that Turkey will become an EU
member. It projects developing further existing ties with the Middle
East, Africa and Asia and strategic partnerships with Japan, China,
Canada and India. The relationship with Russia is seen as a major factor
in the EU's security and prosperity, but the transatlantic relationship
is described as "irreplaceable". The EU should aim to have an "effective
and balanced partnership with the US", because if they are acting
together they "can be a formidable force for good in the world", which
is "an additional reason for the EU to build up further its capabilities
and increase coherence".[^5]

**Filling the Gap between Aspirations and Military Capabilities**

The strategy thus clearly reflects both the EU's own experience in
building security and stability from within the Union and the impact of
its or its member states' experience in conflicts after the Cold War.
There is a strong commitment to building the capacity for military
action, a process that had started before the Anglo-French Agreement at
St Malo, but since then has had a great deal more impetus. There is wide
spread realisation that the EU can only become effective in preventing,
containing or helping to resolve regional conflicts, if it is able to
enforce stability or the norms of good governance to which its is deeply
committed. Under the leadership of the UK, which many officials in
Brussels see as indispensable, in conjunction with France and to a
smaller degree Italy and Germany, the EU and NATO have begun to drive
forward military reform in Europe. The Helsinki Headline Goals (1999),
which are to enable the EU to deploy an autonomous force of 50,000 to
60,000 with their equipment and logistics to a crisis and sustain it for
up to one year, were declared operational at Thessaloniki in 2003,
although they may have been only be two thirds ready.

In May 2004 the Council of Europe approved 'Headline Goal 2010'
(6309/6/04), which incorporates the capabilities of the new member
states. It will be submitted to the Council for official adoption in
June 2004. It sets the parameters for the development of the EU's
military forces by 2010 and defines more clearly the level of rapid
reaction to be achieved. The EU aims to be able to decide on the launch
of an operation within five days of the Crisis Management Concept having
been approved by the Council and for the forces to start implementing
their mission within ten days after the decision to launch. The Council
emphasised that the new Headline Goal force is in keeping with the
Security Strategy and draws on lessons learnt from EU-led operations. It
announced that member states committed themselves to "be able by 2010 to
respond to a crisis with rapid and decisive action applying a fully
coherent approach to the full spectrum of crisis management operations"
covered by the EU Treaty; including: "humanitarian and rescue tasks,
peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management,
including peacemaking" and possibly "joint disarmament operations, the
support for third countries in combating terrorism and security sector
reform."[^6] The commitment is for the EU to "share the responsibility
for global security".[^7] There is an expectation that an initial Battle
or Tactical Group capability for rapid response is available by early
2005 and full capability by 2007.

**Headline Forces, NATO Response Force (NRF) and Procurement Planning**

On paper the forces required for the Headline Goals and the NATO
Response Force (NRF) are highly compatible, because both are expected to
engage in the same types of operations, except that NATO forces are to
be available for collective defence which is not part of the EU's remit,
and the EU forces are intended to be bigger than NRF. It will be
absolutely necessary to further expand co-ordination with NATO as some
of the national units will be double hated and, in view of available
resources, this situation will persist for the foreseeable future.
However, it has been stressed that close co-ordination with NATO is
essential, lest the two organisations are prepared to run the risk of
overstretch.[^8] It is widely recognised that the publics of EU member
states are unlikely to approve of significantly higher defence budgets.
Given this and the fact that there are not only large numbers of
obsolete forces, but also significant duplication in major equipment
items, aims such as avoiding duplication, spending defence budgets more
efficiently through obtaining economies of scale and interoperability
are also recognised as long term goals. In the meantime a suggested aim
is to identify areas of R&D of common interest, such as new
technologies, space and advanced command, control, communications,
intelligence and information systems that are compatible with US
equipment, which are essential. Although essential, only few programmes
exist in these areas.[^9]

The establishment of the European Armaments, Research and Military
Capabilities Agency, whose head Nick Whitney (UK) was appointed earlier
this year, and the commitment of the EU members to "harmonise their
future requirements" by 2010,[^10] are significant steps in the right
direction. One could of course argue that the main topics of the debate
are not new, in fact they were on the transatlantic burden-sharing
agenda throughout most of the Cold War and yielded very little result.
However, there are various reason for some degree of optimism.

One, the defence industrial landscape in Europe has changed over the
past decade with a number of trans-national mergers, although there is
on the one hand still less than desirable efficiency and on the other
hand the risk of losing the advantage of competition to monopolisation.
Two, the pressure on European defence budgets is increasing. In the UK,
for example, concern has arisen over the choices policy makers will have
to face if they continue on the path they have chosen without
contemplating budget rises. There are several highly capital intensive
items in the pipeline and the 2003 Defence White Paper projected even
further integration with the military capability of the US. Timothy
Garden has argued in various contexts that, although it was desirable
for the UK to have a high-end capability, should the defence budget not
increase the UK might have to make a choice between contributing to US
operations, not necessarily in a significant manner, or to EU crisis
prevention or management capabilities.[^11] This suggests that the
problem is much more fundamental than the allocation of material
resources. Should the choice be between being able to co-operate with
the two main allies -- the US and European partners - the question of
how to spend defence funds becomes even more profoundly political. This
is not a question the UK has not faced before, but it has become much
more difficult to answer. Three, there are now wider external pressures
to adapt to the new strategic environment, which arise no longer only
from the US, but also from requests for a European crisis intervention
capability, as was most recently put forward by the President of
Azerbaijan.[^12] The Security Strategy projected a greater engagement in
the Caucasus and the EU may now find itself swiftly called upon to come
through with its commitments. Unless the Union and its members wish to
risk their credibility, they need to continue the very dynamic pace of
translating words into actions.

**Putting Words into Action -- New Operational Experience for the EU**

The EU and member states -- under NATO and with third countries -- have
of course long been involved in the Balkans, providing security,
reconstruction assistance and training, for example new security forces,
in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia-Montenegro, Kosovo as well as FYROM. It
has, however, also begun to take more self-sustained action. With
Operation *Proxima* it took on policing missions in FYROM. Operation
*Artemis* in Democratic Republic of Congo, which the EU implemented
after France had prepared the mission in 2003, did demonstrate -- within
the limits of the operation being of relatively small scale, with a
narrow mandate and of predetermined short duration -- that the EU could
set up the relevant organisational structures and conduct the operation
successfully. The EU maintained a presence in the Democratic Republic of
Congo in support of the stabilisation and reconstruction process. In her
assessment of Operation *Artemis*, Fernanda Feria concluded that
operational weaknesses and institutional constraints were overcome by
political will and it was the latter "that really mattered".[^13]

The EU drew several positive lessons from the operation, which was the
first to be conducted by EU in conjunction with other forces, but
without NATO assets. The arrangement of France acting as the so-called
framework nation was subsequently regarded as a success. Some have even
suggested that this -- at least for operations of similar scale -- would
render or perhaps postpone the need for EU Operational Headquarters,
which had caused some considerable tensions both among EU member states,
with NATO and the US.[^14] -- However, there are doubts that all EU
members would be capable of acting as the framework nation. - Even the
humanitarian aid community, which has often had difficulties working
with armed forces providing security during interventions in intra-state
conflicts, considered the management of civil-military relations to have
been one of the particularly successful aspects of the operation.
Nevertheless, the EU was also reminded of the already well-known
shortcomings in military capabilities, such as strategic transport,
secure and long-distance communication, information technology,
intelligence sharing and interoperability of European forces.[^15]

By the end of 2004 the EU is expected to take over the duties of SFOR,
pending an official decision by the EU at the European Council in
Brussels and NATO at the Istanbul Summit, both in June 2004. Although
the details of the operational arrangements are still being determined,
the expectation is that the EU and NATO will co-ordinate their
activities, including an exchange of expertise NATO personnel acquired
with their presence in Bosnia-Herzegovina and a relatively strong
continued presence of US personnel.[^16] Originally proposed by the UK
and France, this will be the largest and most demanding operation the EU
is undertaking.[^17] Where *Artemis* included 400 troops, EUFOR as it
may be called, is expected to command about the same number as SFOR
(7,000). It will be conducted under the Berlin Plus arrangements, that
is, with NATO assistance.

**Aspects of Member State Input into EU-Level Policy**

There is little doubt that the UK has played a major role in driving
developments forward. Amongst virtually all NATO members, the UK has the
most extensive experience in the type of counter-insurgency,
peace-keeping and enforcement operations that became necessary during
the 1990s, combined with advanced warfighting skills and a much less
complicated and fraught attitude towards the use of force than, say,
Germany. As a result of the experience in the Balkans under UN mandate,
the UK was the first European country to develop a doctrine for
peace-keeping and peace support operations. France, too, was in many
ways better prepared than other European NATO and EU members for post
Cold War operations. It is therefore not surprising that UK and France
were the main drivers of progress in defence matters at EU level.
Germany took first tentative steps towards becoming a player in the
global and regional security business in Somalia, also under the
auspices of the UN. It has since become much more deeply involved than
could have been expected at the end of the Cold War and plans to
contribute 1,500 soldiers to the European successor to SFOR.

However, Germany has also made significant progress in developing new
organisational and conceptual tools for the civil and military elements
of peace-keeping and long-term conflict resolution, although its
aspirations are even higher and directed at developing national
expertise in conflict prevention. This includes enhancing co-ordination
between ministries and other organisations involved in the provision of
the different dimensions of security and the establishment of a Centre
for International Peace Operations (Zentrum für Internationale
Friedenseinsätze) in Berlin, which trains personnel in crisis
prevention, management and negotiation techniques.

Although military reforms are only gradually picking up, are constrained
by budgetary considerations and the armed forces are not substantially
tied into the comprehensive 'conflict management' framework, there is at
last a commitment to implement aspects of the reform proposals of the
1990s. The focus of current and planned reforms is on personnel
structures. On the one hand this is sensible because, although the
German armed forces are numerous, the proportion of personnel that is
adequately prepared for the tasks envisaged by the government is
relatively small. -- Defence Secretary Struck is, however, still
committed to conscription. Should German armed forces be sent to global
conflict regions more frequently, it is likely only a matter of time
until the Bundeswehr becomes a professional army, not least because
there are some arguments that this would be more cost effective.[^18]
The German approach to security policy is highly compatible with the
EU's strategy paper, because it emphasises crisis prevention and
management, but does not preclude military intervention.[^19] An
approach to dealing with crises that is designed for the long-term,
follows the same philosophy as the EU's strategy paper -- and despite
many changes in the past decade, apart from NATO the EU is still central
to Germany's foreign and security policy.

**Of Complex Tasks and Long Hauls**

The EU defined security in terms of human security, not least due to its
and its member states' experience since the 1990s. Although the ability
to use high-level force was in some cases essential -- and the EU
becoming painfully aware of the deficiencies in its own forces was a
major trigger for subsequent action -- the restoration of post-conflict
societies is significantly more complex and requires a much broader mix
of tools and expertise. EU member states, which were or are part of NATO
missions in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo and FYROM, and gradually the EU
as a whole have been preoccupied with the tasks and setbacks of
reconstructing Balkan societies for years and are likely to continue to
do so. It is quite safe to project that the EU - in co-operation with
NATO or independently -- or its members will be involved in enhancing
security at its periphery, especially the Balkans, for at least the next
decade.

A case in point is Kosovo, where EU members are of course present under
the UN and NATO umbrella. Failure in Kosovo could be disastrous for the
entire region. Kosovo Albanians have persecuted Kosovar Serbs since 1999
and in March 2004 the situation escalated, resulting in riots against
Kosovo Serbs and UN personnel, nineteen deaths, 900 injured and Serb,
Askali and Roma homes as well as Serb churches and monasteries destroyed
and 4,500 people displaced.[^20] The displaced people were mainly Kosovo
Serbs living in enclaves in the South, which were effectively ethnically
cleansed during the riots, and resulted in the displaced Serbs moving
into the Serb-dominated northern part of Mitrovica. At the time all
affected or interested neighbours were restrained, but UNMIK and KFOR
are considered to have been exposed as weak and, as the International
Crisis Group warns, "if the underlying causes of the violence are not
dealt with immediately and directly -- through political, developmental
and security measures alike -- Kosovo risks becoming Europe's West
Bank".[^21]

Cross-border ethnic ties, the yet unresolved status of Kosovo, the
continued dependence (for example for health and education) of Kosovo
Serbs on Belgrade, where political developments have also given cause
for concern more recently, could draw Serbia-Montenegro, FYROM and
Albania into a conflict. The result may be either a number of failed
states in the Balkans from which any terrorist organisation can pick in
order to establish a base. Or, a prospect not even marginally more
appealing, the Balkans revert to multiple internal and trans-border
wars. The problem that emerges is that, although Kosovo has received
very significant amounts of development aid from the EU as well as
individual member states, this has not yet transformed a derelict
economic infrastructure into a core of assets for viable economic
development. It has been suggested that the large amounts of aid that
have flown into the province are part of the problem.[^22] The economy
has been able to grow, but on the back of 'assets' that are in the
process of being reduced. These are the international presence as well
as aid from the Balkan Stabilisation Pact. Foreign investment on the
other hand has not yet been attracted, because the security situation,
the administrative infrastructure and the legal status of property are
not yet settled. Given that the Kosovo Albanians, including the elite,
appear to be of the opinion that the situation will be remedied as soon
as independence is achieved, and set their political priorities (and the
willingness to co-operate with Belgrade) accordingly, and
Serbia-Montenegro is also showing reluctance to reform its political
structures and attitudes, a period of very intense diplomacy lies ahead
for UNMIK, KFOR and the EU.

Ultimately, it is projected that the countries of the Balkans will join
the EU, but there is no illusion that this might happen soon. Before
this is feasible, there is a variety to security issues to be addressed.
These are all related to central elements of the Security Strategy. The
establishment of functioning police forces as well as the stimulation of
political will of local authorities and governments to enforce laws and
combat organised crime is seen as essential for the security and
prosperity of the Balkan societies and EU internal security. All Balkan
economies need not only be reconstructed, but also undergo the
transition process from planned to free market economies. Political
structures and processes have to be established in support of not only
democratic governance, but also -- in view of most Balkan countries' own
aspirations -- provide for the implementation of Human Rights and, more
immediately important, the return or, where unavoidable, re-settlement
of refugees or displaced people.

**Kosovo and Iraq -- Difference Scales, Comparable Challenge?**

Are any of these experiences then of relevance to transatlantic
relations? The problems in the Balkans pale into insignificance compared
to the situation in Iraq. However, some of the challenges experienced
during and after NATO's intervention in 1999 suggest lessons for the
current situation in Iraq. The military operations in Kosovo did not
achieve the political objective as fast as intended, a problem often
attributed to the fact that NATO expected Belgrade to comply much sooner
in response to a strategy of gradual escalation and therefore did not
apply massive pressure from the air immediately. In the case of Iraq,
the latter approach was chosen. In both cases major combat operations
were concluded relatively quickly, in 78 and 43 days respectively, but
in both cases the phase following the period of major combat is proving
to be significantly more difficult than anticipated prior to the
intervention. A Stabilisation Plan was in place for Kosovo even before
the fighting ended, but its implementation needs to be adapted to the
evolving situation. It is widely believed in Europe that the absence of
such as plan for Iraq before the war has contributed significantly to
the subsequent difficulties. Adapting an existing plan is generally
easier than developing one in the midst of crisis. Yet, in both cases
major problems arose and still arise not only from the physical
challenges of securing the environment, re-building the infrastructure
and re-establishing political and economic processes, but also from
problems of perception and expectations.

In both cases the problems of perceptions were generated already during
the combat phase, but they have the nasty habit of being reinforced
negatively over time regardless of whether the perception matches
reality or not and they may be crucial for the success or failure of the
post-combat and eventual restoration phase. The importance of images and
perceptions -- and the ability to project them -- as well as the great
importance of managing civil-military co-operation were two major
lessons of the Kosovo operation, debated during a conference at
Sandhurst which assessed the lessons of the wars in the Balkans.[^23]
There was a strong notion that, whilst images and media coverage may not
contribute to winning a war, they can contribute to losing it. At the
same time, British and NATO representatives emphasised that it was of
great importance to tell the truth, as it will come out anyway. Iraq has
a much higher profile in the international media and the potential
ramifications of the situation much wider scope. It is thus possible
that enemy perceptions in the Arab world will not only have operational,
but strategic consequences.

One link between these two cases and the wider thinking about security
in the medium and longer term future is that in both cases the
expectation is that either the peace support operations will be required
for at least a decade, perhaps a generation, though not necessarily
conducted by the forces currently deployed. A further link is that a
failure of either operation may spell long-term insecurity in the
respective region for two reasons. One, in both regions the potential
for a currently contained conflict to spill over into neighbouring
countries is high. Two, in both conflicts the potential of non-state
actors, organised criminals or terrorists, finding or already
establishing a base for their operations is high. Despite the continued
reluctance of some European allies to send troops to Iraq, there is a
strong case for building bridges on both sides and drawing on the
lessons learnt and now being implemented by the Europeans in complex
conflict environments. New initiatives need to be imaginative and should
include partners in the region, where the Europeans might be able to use
their diplomatic leverage. They may have to be prepared long before an
adequate mode of implementation is likely to be found, but the risks to
global, US and European security of a failure to resolve the crisis in
Iraq are too grave to not make a renewed attempt. This would also signal
to the Europeans that they are listened to as partners and not only
heard -- which was one of the major causes of friction in recent
transatlantic relations.

**Outlook and Conclusions**

By way of an outlook, the Europeans are likely to be preoccupied in the
next one or two decades with the following concerns:

Stability in the wider region, including the Middle East, is likely to
rise on the security agenda for various reasons. The terrorist threat
and Iraq war have again reminded the EU of the need to resolve the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Although Russia is a major energy supplier
for the EU, especially gas, the member states are dependent on oil from
the Middle East. In the future Caspian Sea countries are likely to be
major suppliers, which is one reason for the EU's projection of greater
involvement in the Caucasus. Furthermore, Turkish EU membership,
although still contested, has for some time now been debated as
increasingly likely. In that case, the EU will share a border with
countries that are currently not particularly stable or potentially
unfriendly. The EU's efforts at negotiating a trade agreement with Syria
that includes a commitment to non-proliferation of WMD, as well as the
intended 'expansion' of the Euro-Mediterranean dialogue to the wider
Arab world need to be seen in this context. The threat of terrorism to
energy supply lines and transport links through the Mediterranean will
require more than dialogue with transit states. Although this is not
explicitly mentioned in the Security Strategy, it is hardly conceivable
that these questions only concern NATO, but not the EU.[^24]

The EU will continue to be concerned about the proliferation of WMD, but
it is not yet clear how it is going to expand its efforts beyond the
active engagement with international organisations, such as the IAEA,
and diplomatic initiatives with countries such as Iran. It will continue
its co-operation with Russia and other FSU states on securing nuclear
facilities and materials. Its scope is, however, somewhat limited by
internal and external factors. Throughout the 1990s Russia has often
been reluctant to allow the EU or non-nuclear member states access to
potentially sensitive sites. The current constructive relationship
cannot be taken for granted. In the contemporary context the potentially
more important factor are some, although not debilitating, internal
restrictions. For example, some member states, which decided to freeze
the development of nuclear energy at home, are reluctant to support any
activities that might be seen to facilitate the continued existence of
the post-Soviet nuclear industry. Even if a project is intended to
facilitate disarmament, such as the MOX option for the disposal of
excess plutonium, there is resistance to supporting such efforts,
because they ultimately contribute to the new development of nuclear
infrastructure.

There is little doubt that the Europeans are going to be preoccupied
with the security of post-conflict societies, if this is not too
optimistic a term, in their immediate vicinity for the foreseeable
future. Added to the pre-existing incentives for deep engagement and
further development of capabilities for crisis prevention, conflict
management and resolution capabilities as well as support for global
development is now the linkage between terrorism and failed states. The
purpose here is to deny terrorist organisations access to a territorial
base and recruitment pool. Related to concern that the conflicts in the
Balkans may re-emerge is the persistent problem of organised crime. This
problem of course goes beyond the Balkans and has been a major
preoccupation during the accession negotiations with the Central
European states. The EU's borders have moved closer to one of the major
geographical sources of organised criminality. Apart from enhancing
internal security co-operation and law enforcement tools, especially
since 9-11, it will also be necessary to support the new members in the
area of border security.

A potentially quite difficult challenge will be the management of the
transformation to a much larger EU. The new members seek to maintain and
deepen their ties with both the EU and the US, but if forced to choose
have at least in the past opted for an Atlanticist approach to foreign
and security policy. This inclination is linked to high expectations in
NATO as the principal guarantor of their security -- including against
Russia -- and ultimately the US as the guarantor of European security.
The objective of maintaining close transatlantic relations is widely
shared among NATO and EU members, but the "old" EU members, especially
if they are also members of NATO, have developed a tradition of
negotiating the transatlantic relationship. The question for the future
is whether the new EU members will feel sufficiently assertive in
Brussels as well as confident in their relationship with the US to
engage actively in the EU's discourse on security policy and the
negotiations on the transatlantic relationship, which may lead transform
both.

In conclusion, for transatlantic relations the row over the Iraq may in
some ways have been healthy. It forced the EU to reflect on its
capabilities, assets and expertise. It triggered new determination to
seek complementary approaches to highly complex problems of global
security and at the same time reminded the member states, whether they
were with or against the decision, that they needed to enhance their
credibility if they sought to influence events. The Security Strategy
was developed in response to this row and it is at the very least highly
likely that the EU will now take more determined steps to implement it,
because the nature and complexity of future security challenges cannot
be met with national expertise and resources alone. The US and EU have
complementary assets and expertise. They could do worse than learn from
each other and strengthen each others' weaknesses.

[^1]: For an examination of the evolution and a comparison of the
    Thessaloniki and final documents see Sven Biscop, *The European
    Security Strategy -- Implementing a Distinctive Approach to
    Security*, Paper No 82 Royal Defence College, Brussels, March 2004.

[^2]: Council of the European Union, *A Secure Europe in a Better World
    -- European Security Strategy, Brussels, 12 December 2003*, accessed
    at <http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf> on 20 May 2004;
    Council of the European Union, *Fight Against the Proliferation of
    Weapons of Mass Destruction -- EU Strategy against Proliferation of
    Weapons of Mass Destruction*, Brussels, 10 December 2003 accessed at
    <http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/misc/78340.pdf>
    on 20 May 2004.

[^3]: *A Secure Europe in a Better World*, p. 9.

[^4]: *A Secure Europe in a Better World,* p. 5.

[^5]: *A Secure Europe in a Better World,* p. 13.

[^6]: Excerpt from Press Release, 2582^nd^ Council meeting -- External
    Relations, Brussels 17 May 2004 (9210/04 (Presse 149) - Excerpt.

[^7]: L. Kirk, *EU Defence Ministers Admit Global Responsibility*, Forum
    Europe New Detail, 18 May 2004 accessed at
    http://www.newdefenceagenda.org/news_detail.asp?ID=181&block=true on
    20 May 2004.

[^8]: Assembly of the Western European Union, *A European Strategic
    Concept -- Defence Aspects*, Report submitted on behalf of the
    Defence Committee by Mr Gubert, Rapporteur, 1 December 2003, A/1841,
    p. 21.

[^9]: Assembly of the Western European Union, *A European Strategic
    Concept*, p. 22.

[^10]: L. Kirk, *EU Defence Ministers Admit Global Responsibility*

[^11]: Air Marshal Sir Timothy Garden and General Sir David Ramsbotham,
    "About Face -- The British Armed Forces Which Way to Turn?, *RUSI
    Journal* May 2004 and accessed on 21 May 2004 at
    http://www.tgarden.demon.co.uk/writings/articles/2004/040427rusi.html

[^12]: A. Beatty, *EU asked to intervene in crisis in Caucasus*, Forum
    Europe- News Detail, 18 May 2004, accessed at
    <http://www.newdefenceagenda.org/news_detail.asp?ID=180&block=true>
    on 22 May 2004.

[^13]: Fernanda Feria, *Crisis Management in Sub-Saharan Africa -- The
    Role of the European Union* (Paris: EU-ISS, Occasional Paper No 51,
    April 2004), p. 47 - The assessment of Operation Artemis is based on
    this source.

[^14]: Feria, pp. 47 ff.

[^15]: Feria, p. 44

[^16]: Assembly of the Western European Union, The European Union's
    Stabilisation Missions in South-East Europe, Report submitted on
    behalf of the Political Committee by Mr Wilkonson, Rapporteur (UK,
    Federated Group), Document C/1859, 10 May 2004, pp. 14-16.

[^17]: Assembly of the Western European Union, *The EU headline goad and
    the NATO Response Force (NRF) -- Reply to the annual report of the
    Council*, Report submitted on behalf of the Defence Committee by Mr
    Rivolta, Rapporteur, 3 June 2003, A/1825, p. 8.

[^18]: Hans-Dieter Lemke, *Welche Bunderwehr fuer den neuen Auftrage? --
    Die Freiwilligenarmee ist die bessere Loesung* (Which Bundeswehr for
    the New Mission -- A Volunteer Army is the better Solution), SWP
    Study \--S 26, Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, June 2003.

[^19]: For more details see for example Gunilla Fincke and Arzu Hatakoy,
    "Krisenprävention als neues Leitbild deutscher Aussenpolitik:
    Friedenspolitik mit zivilen und militärischen Mitteln?" (Crisis
    Prevention as the New Rationale for German Foreign Policy: Peace
    Policy by Civilian and Military Means?), in Sebastian Hanisch et
    al., *Deutsche Sicherheitspolitik -- Eine Bilanz der Regierung
    Schröder* (German Security Policy -- Taking Stock of the Schröder
    Government) (Nomos, 2004), pp. 59-86.

[^20]: International Crisis Group, *Collapse in Kosovo* (Report No 155,
    Pristina, Belgrade, Brussels, 22 April 2004), p. i.

[^21]: *Collapse in Kosov,* p. i.

[^22]: Marie-Janine Calic, *Kosovo 2004 -- Optionen deutscher und
    europäischer Politik* (Options for Germana and European Policy),
    SWP-Studie S-1 (Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, January
    2004).

[^23]: Stephen Badsey, Paul Latawski (eds.), *Britain, NATO and the
    Lessons of the Balkan Conflicts, 1991-1999* (London, New York: Frank
    Cass, 2004).

[^24]: For a NATO perspective see for example Martin Edmonds and Oldrich
    Cerny (eds.), *Future NATO Security -- Addressing the Challenges of
    Evolving Security and Information Sharing Systems and Architectures*
    (NATO Science Series, Amsterdam: IOS, 2004).